Oliver Williamson: Most Cited Articles 1976-1996

Most Cited Articles 1976 - 1996

Most Cited Articles: 1976 Williamson, Oliver E. 1976. Franchise bidding for natural monopolies--in general and with respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics 7, no. 1: 73-104.

Article Full Text Abstract The orthodox attitude among economists toward regulation is one of "disdain and contempt." The general reputation is not undeserved, but it fails to discriminate among different economic activities and different types of regulation. An effort to distinguish between those circumstances in which regulation, in some form, is immanent from those in which market modes can be made to work relatively well is needed.

Discriminating assessments of regulated industries (extant and proposed) will be facilitated by examining transactions in much greater microanalytic detail than has been characteristic of prior studies of regulation and proposed alternatives thereto.

My examination of franchise bidding for natural monopoly discloses that this mode suffers from much more severe contractual disabilities than have hitherto been acknowledged.

Faced with both technological and market uncertainties, CA TV, circa 1970, does not appear to be among the circumstances for which unassisted franchise bidding can be expected to work well.

Most Cited Articles: 1980 Williamson, Oliver E. 1980. The organization of work a comparative institutional assessment. Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1): 538 Article Full Text

Abstract Sociologists, radical economists and others who claim that hierarchical modes of organization are explained by power rather than efficiency neglect transaction costs in reaching this conclusion. This is understandable since neoclassical economics also neglects transaction cost But it is also regrettable, since the transaction costs that arise when intermediate product is transferred across technologically separable stages of production depends crucially on organizational structure. A microanalytic assessment of alternative modes of organization entails (1) an identification of the relevant transaction cost dimensions for assessing performance, (2) a description of the organizational and operating properties of alternative modes, and (3) a comparative evaluation of alternative modes in terms of their transaction cost attributes. Transaction costs drive organizational outcomes in considerable degree.

Most Cited Articles: 1985 Riordan, Michael H., and Oliver E. Williamson. 1985. Asset specificity and economic organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, no. 4: 365.

Article Full Text Abstract Examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization. Expression of production cost and transaction cost differences as a function of asset specificity; Aggregation of the demands of buyers; Assessment of production cost savings.

Most Cited Articles: 1985 Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. Employee ownership and internal governance. A perspective. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 6 (3): 243-245.

Article Full Text Abstract Author concurs with most of what Raymond Russell has to say in his interesting paper on employee ownership and governance structures. To be sure, he would give greater emphasis to some of the differences that appear both within and between the activity groups that he examines.

Most Cited Articles: 1987 Williamson, Oliver E. 1987. Transaction cost economics. The comparative contracting perspective. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8 (4): 617-625.

Article Full Text Abstract Gregory Dow's assessment of transaction cost economics is both thoughtful and provocative. Although we agree on many matters, these remarks focus on our differences. I begin with a brief sketch of the framework out of which transaction cost economics operates. I then examine the purported bias of transaction cost economics in favor of capital managed as against labor managed firms and my alleged failure to deal with ‘downward opportunism’. Dow's claim that transaction cost economics is given to functionalist excesses is considered next. Concluding remarks follow.

Most Cited Articles: 1988 Williamson, Oliver E. 1988. Technology and transaction cost economics. A reply. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 10 (3): 355-363.

Article Full Text Abstract I argue here, as I have previously, that technology is neither fully determinative of nor irrelevant to economic organization.

Transaction cost economizing occupies a prominent position in any effort to assess the efficacy of alternative forms of economic organization.

Most Cited Articles: 1992 Williamson, Oliver E. 1992. Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation. An unfolding perspective.

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 17 (3): 335-352.

Article Full Text Abstract Author’s reading of the literature on economic organization is that science is at a pre-unified state of development and that several well-focused and internally consistent perspectives are needed. Some perspectives will inform one set of problems; some will inform another set; some will be bankrupt; and the more productive will lead to the variations on a theme.

Most Cited Articles: 1996 Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. Economics and Organization: A primer. California Management Review 38, no. 2: 131-146.

Article Full Text Abstract This article discusses the public policy of modern corporations.

The basic theory of the firms that are usually featured in microeconomics textbook describes the firm in technological terms as a "production function" in which inputs are transformed into outputs according to the laws of technology.

The economics of organization is a huge subject and is usefully examined from several points of view. A technological perspective in which price and output are featured is one instructive approach, but should not exclude all others. The transactions cost economics point of view, works out for an interdisciplinary perspective that emphasizes the importance of organization. Transaction cost economics is always and everywhere an exercise in comparative institutional analysis.

As opposed to the earlier tradition of invoking flawless government regulation as the standard remedy for "market failures," the comparison now becomes one of flawed markets with flawed regulation. When viewed through transaction cost economics, the difference in firms and markets always come at a cost not at incentive.

Most Cited Articles: 1996 Williamson, Oliver E. 1996. Economic organization: The case for Candor.

Academy of Management Review 21, no. 1: 48-57.

Article Full Text Abstract The article reports on transitional cost economics (TCE) and opportunism in business. The author focuses on discussing the economic theory of industrial organization. It is suggested that research related to self-interest and cognitive styles is especially useful when considering aspects of organizational behavior. It is further suggested that TCE and industrial efficiency are connected to one another. The author discusses the strengths and weaknesses present in many professional contracts. Prediction methods are also examined.