Dutch Nationalism in the Europeanised Foreign Policy and the Question of Indonesia by s. van selagan

DUTCH NATIONALISM IN THE EUROPEANISED FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF INDONESIA

GUNARYADI

INDOCASE PRESS ‘S-GRAVENHAGE

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Copyrights © 2009 by Gunaryadi. Published in The Netherlands by INDOCASE Press All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. For information, address: INDOCASE Press, Bakkersstraat 35, 2513 TJ, ‘s-Gravenhage – Nederland, Tel: +31- Tel: +31-152160340, Email: gunaryadi@indocase.nl, Website: http://indocase.nl. Sumber grafis kulit: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Officierskruis_in_de_Orde_van_Oranje_ Nassau_Civiele_Divisie.jpg

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Table of Contents Table of Contents .................................................. iv PART I .............................................................. 1 PROLOGUE ............................................................ 1 PART II ............................................................. 7 CONTEXTUAL CONCEPTS ................................................. 7 PART III ........................................................... 10 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DUTCH NATIONALISM ................................ 10 PART IV ............................................................ 19 NATIONALISM IN DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY ................................ 19 PART V ............................................................. 25 EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY ......................... 25 PART VI ............................................................ 30 THE NETHERLANDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY . 30 1. Vigilant Participation in the European Political Cooperation (1970-1980) ...................................................... 31 2. Paradigm Shift (1980-1988) .................................... 34 3. Defence Issue Remained Contentious (1988-1993) ............... 37 4. Pursuing Credible EU Foreign Policy (Since 1993) ............. 40 5. Impacts of Stronger CFSP Mechanism on Dutch Foreign Policy ... 43 PART VII ........................................................... 45 EUROPEANISED DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF INDONESIA .... 45 PART VIII .......................................................... 51 EPILOGUE: SOME LESSONS ............................................. 51 REFERENCES ......................................................... 54

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PART I PROLOGUE Ever since the aftermath of the 2nd World War through the 1980s, the issues related to nations, nationhood, and nationalism seemed to be less inspiring to the debating tables of commentators and academics in Western Europe, despite it is ironically the birthplace and lieu classique of nationalism. There are at least two identifiable factors that precipitated the void. First, it stemmed from the European trauma of Nazism and Fascism as the causal wickedness of the Great War and genocide (G. Schรถpflin, 2000).1 Those three notions had been usually oscillated in the sphere of identity politics, which in turn generated nationalism, and eventually regarded by some quarters, developed into Nazism or Fascism. In that logic, many interpreted the defeat of those state-nationalist regimes as concomitant with the subjugation of nationalism itself. Second, it was because of the United States that helped the European democracies to overrun the evil ethno-nationalist ideologies favoured for a less fragmented post-war Europe gravely divided by asymmetrical nationalistic lines or uneven nationhood development and maturity. It is after the rise of far-right political movements in Europe and outbreak of ethno-conflict in the Balkans driven by ferocious national-

See: G. Schรถpflin (2000). Nations, Identity, Power. The New Politics of Europe. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., pp. 2-3. Page | 1

ist creed, as well as the impact of globalisation that helped it to recapture our interest. Terminologically the modern usage of nationalism referred particularly to several meanings. A.D. Smith (2001) related it to 5 references.2 First, it is a process of formation, or growth, of nations. Then, it is a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation. Third, it is related to language and symbolism of the nation. Fourth, it is social and political movement on behalf of the nations. Finally, it is a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular. As an ideology, compared to other mainstream ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, some argued it is considered “philosophically poor and incoherence” (B. Anderson, 1991:5).3 While, M. Freeden (1998:750) called it a “thin-centred” ideology as it lacked of wider ideational concepts so that it failed to provide complex argument. Nationalism only becomes of paramount importance ephemerally—in crises of nation building, conquest, external threat, disputed territory, or the internal perceived dominance of hostile ethnic or cultural group.4

See: A.D. Smith (2001). Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History. Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 5-6. Further, see: B. Anderson (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (2nd Ed.). London: Verso. Further, see: E. Kedourie (1960). Nationalism. London: Hutchinson; and M. Freeden (1998). ‘Is nationalism a distinct ideology?’ Political Studies XLVI, pp. 748-765.

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While it has been defined in many ways, a general explanation of nationalism is that it is an ideology that consigns the nation in its centre of interest and strives to promote its welfare. A working definition of nationalism can be formulated as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”5 Nationalism goes beyond national sentiment or national ideology.6 It endeavours to construct nations according to the “authentic” spirit and image of earlier ethnic and religious communities, but it adjusts itself to face the modern challenges of geopolitics, economics, and cultural. In this view, nationalism emerges as a construction of public and publicised culture, which finds its fundamentals on “authenticity”, and a sort of political religion aspiring to advocate the national identity, autonomy, and unity of a sacred union of people in their inherited homeland. Conversely J. Breuilly (1993) introduced a political and instrumental approach to nationalism. Nationalism is, he argued, simply an argument used by the sub-elites to mobilise the masses, manage the divergent interests of social groups, and legitimise their action to retain power in the modern state. To him, nationalism is merely

5 6

Op.cit, p. 9. See: A.D. Smith (2001), p. 133. Page | 3

an instrument for achieving political goals, and as such it can only emerge under modern conditions.7 As an across-the-board concept, nationalism theoretically can be approached from broader perspectives. J. Coakley (1992) managed to stitch the wide-spans between the various approaches into three types, viz. definition of the dependent variable, disciplinary approach, and ideological perspective.8 This present monograph is an endeavour to assess Dutch nationalism using the disciplinary approach offered by J. Coakley. The disciplinary approach employed here is combining political, international relations, and inevitably historical perspectives. It is multidisciplinary and at the same token constructivist. The analysis shall not contest the different theories relevant to the analysis of Dutch nationalism. Instead, it attempts to construct a relatively general view on the subject and will not stick on certain theory but make use the most pertinent theoretical perspectives. It investigates how the Netherlands maintained its national identities and pursued its national interests—based on the principles of nationalism—in the course of Europeanisation of foreign policy. Here, Dutch nationalism is scrutinised in the context of how

Breuilly, J. (1993). Nationalism and the State, (2nd Ed.). Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 2. See: J. Coakley (1992). ‘The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements and Explanations of Nationalism: A Review’, in: Coakley, J. (Ed.) (1992). The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements. The Contemporary West European Experience. London: Sage Publications, pp. 2-3.

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it responded to the process of more Europeanised foreign policy and the roles it played in the development. The analysis goes further to how it managed to preserve its national interests within the processes and how the new reality of Europeanised foreign policy affected the perception and behaviour of Dutch foreign policy toward Indonesia which reflects the struggle for the very survival of the Netherlands as a “national state”. It also tries to trace some lessons of nationalism from this minor national state as it participated in a complex process that involved vis-à-vis giant states in EU, and the management of its foreign policies toward Indonesia. The capacity and advantage of states in the world politics could be viewed from quantitative and qualitative criteria. The quantitative criteria are measurements of absolute capabilities. The qualitative criteria, on the other hand, are the sum total of a state’s material capabilities that must be viewed through the prism of its psychological and relational terms.9 From the perspective of quantitative cum qualitative criteria the Netherlands deserves the status as being minor state, both in global and regional contexts.10 Even when it lost the Nederlands Oost-Indië it did not only entail that a “rampspoed geboren” but also compelled the Dutch to identify itself

Stoesinger, J. (1973). The Might of Nations (4th ed.). London: Random House, p. 9. Tonra, B. (2001). The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 48. Page | 5

that its position in the international politics degraded to the rank of Denmark.11 Two lop-sided prepositions are unwrapped at this point. First of all, the Netherlands was Indonesia’s former master that has “special” relations with its former colony. It went even beyond that material perception, as Indonesia had been also a source of Dutch national prestige. With this “special” interplay, it is presupposed that in its foreign policy toward Indonesia the Netherlands would prefer “exclusively” and bilaterally acting alone as a single sovereign state. Second of all, as a minor state in the international politics particularly when it lost its colony in Southeast Asia after the 2nd World War, the Netherlands inclined to lean on stronger alliance or community in order to attain its national interests, in this case, by means of foreign policy.

Baudet, H. and M. Fennema (1983). Het Nederlands belang bij Indië. Utrecht:

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PART II CONTEXTUAL CONCEPTS At the outset, I seek to deal with nationalism in two frameworks, strictly speaking, first in defining the concept of nation as one of the most fascinating issues in the modern political thinking notably when it is connected to nationalism. Second, it recounts on the nature of nation formation whose review in this monograph is confined only to the modernist and perennialist paradigms. From the first framework, some argued nation as a product of national consciousness, nationalism, and national will and spiritual forces. It is state and nationalism that create a nation, not the other way round.12 Nation is therefore derivative to nationalism that functions as its primary formative factor. However, a nation is a constituent of a social reality of historical origin (M. Hroch, 1985:3).13 In this view, nationalism is largely attached upon and originated from a nation.

Uitgeverij Het Spectrum B.V., p. 10. See: E.J. Hobsbawm (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10. Further, see: M. Hroch (1985). Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page | 7

A nation is not a state and a nation is not an ethnic community. A nation is not a state because the latter constitutes a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from other institution, possessing a legitimate monopoly or coercion and extraction in a given territory; while a nation is felt and lived community whose members share a homeland and a culture.14 With this distinction, the term of “nation-state” which was drawn from and largely influenced by the French Revolution in 1789 seemed not a proper way to define the interplays between state and nation because the state was regarded as dominant and nation merely functioned as a junior partner or just a qualifying adjective. A proper term to portray the “nationstate” is by putting it as “national state” or “state-nations” because the majority of the states are poly-ethnics, not a single nation in a single state or a single state for a single nation which basically resembled the French’s case. A national state is therefore a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity and integration (but not of cultural community). Meanwhile, a nation is not an ethnic community either as they possess different attributes as put forward by A.D. Smith (2001:13) below. Ethnic community • Proper name • Common myths of ancestry, etc.

See: A.D. Smith (2001), p. 12.

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Nation • Proper name • Common myths

• Shared memories

• Shared history

• Cultural differentia(e) • Link with homeland • Some (elite) solidarity

• • • •

Common public culture Occupation of homeland Common rights and duties Single economy

Now I shift to the second question in the debate that is whether the conception of nation in regards to nationalism is a modern or ancient phenomenon. The former concept refers to the “modernist” perspective and the latter attributes to the “perennialist” outlook of nations. To the modernists, nationalism is chronologically and sociologically a relatively modern. Sequentially, the ideology, movement, and symbolism of nationalism are new phenomena. Sociologically it is an innovation or a new discovery not simply an updated version of something distant older.15 On the other hand, the perennialist while accepted the fact the nationalism as an ideology, but argued that many nations existed in every period of history and many of them existed from time immemorial. J.R. Llobera (1994:3) called it as a product of longue durèe, as a result of how a nation was formed dated back to the Middle Ages.16 The perennialist camps can be classified into, first, “continuous perennialism” where particular existing nations have a long, continuous history, from the medieval; and second, “recurrent perennialism” which emphasises

15 16

Op.cit, p. 46. Further, see: J.R. Llobera (1994). The God of Modernity. The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe. Oxford: Berg Publishers. Page | 9

that certain nations are historical, it came and it disappeared, but nation as a category of human association is perennial as it reappears in every period of history.17

PART III BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DUTCH NATIONALISM It is not easy to fathom Dutch nationalism. What we can perceive from it is that it is merely expressed symptomatically and tended to be shallow, for example, whether it is manifested in the pride of the national football team especially when it played against the Germans’, the attachment with the Orange royal family, or in their perception toward the Belgians. A considerably vivid face of Dutch (political) nationalism however can be identified for instance from its unremitting refusal to recognise Indonesia’s independence of 17 August 1945,18 the rise of far-right politicians and agendas mainly since 2002, and the rejection of Dutch people in the consultative referendum in the ratification process of the European Constitution. The response of Dutch nationalism on the Europeanised foreign policy is also part of this later category. To put this within the framework of “continuous perennialism” the Dutch has developed from the ethnic communities that inhab17 18

Op.cit, p. 50. An underlying hurdle, as many saw it, in Dutch-Indonesian relations was removed concomitant with the 60th anniversary of Indonesian independence, 17 August 2005.

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ited the Low Countries since the time of “immemorial”. In such context, I briefly handle with what the Dutch nation history denotes. This framework brings together the process of Dutch nation building and state-formation. The Low Countries were first populated around 12.000 years ago.19 The early inhabitants were reindeer hunters. Some of their artefacts that were found in Texel and SintOdiliënberg of Limburg dated back to the period. Around 4500 BC, the first farming settlements were set up in South-Limburg, which were also established in the northern region about one or two millennia later. Before the occupation of the Low Countries by the Romans in 12 BC—according to Romans sources—the Germans and Celtic tribesmen had inhabited the area. The Germans moved south from Scandinavia around 1400 BC, while the Celts moved northward from the mountainous areas of Alps. When the Romans came, the Batavians that were probably originated from Central Germany had already settled along the Rhine riverbanks around 50 BC. The Batavians had an extraordinary association with the Romans, but it revolted against their master in 69 AC led by Gaius Julius Civilis which were defeated by the Romans in the following year. Civilis was centuries later regarded as the first freedom fighter for the Netherlands. In 260 the Romans abandoned the Low Countries.

Further, see: H. Beliën and M. v. Hoogstraten (1998). De Nederlandse geschiedenis in een notendop. Amsterdam: Prometheus, p. 10. P a g e | 11

Other ethnic groups that inhabited the region were the Germanic Frisians and Franks. The Frisians resided in the north and the Franks dwelled in the south. In 695, the Franks defeated the Frisians and the Christianisation of the region began at full speed. Up to the 15th century, the area successively came under the Carolingian Franks and the Vikings, the Burgundies (1384-1477), and the Habsburgs (1477-1588). The Low Countries at the time consisted of the Seventeen Provinces, a personal union of states in the Low Countries that approximately covered the modern Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, some part of France and Germany. In 1548, Emperor Charles V of the Habsburg granted the Seventeen Provinces a separate entity status, which was neither part of the Habsburg Empire nor France. Although it was not a full independence status, the Low Countries received a significant autonomy. After the abdication of Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and the King of Spain in 1556, the Seventeen Provinces came under the Spanish Habsburg. Then the Provinces waged the Eighty Yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s War (1568-1648) against the Spanish ruler. In 1579 the Provinces declared their independence from the Spanish Habsburg Empire and was recognised by Spain through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. During the war, the renegade regions formed the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (1581-1795). Independent from the Spanish Habsburg, the United Netherlands

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grew as one of the main seafaring and economic powers of the 17th century, which contributed to its Golden Age (1580-1702). Following the French Revolution, the spirit of revolt and the Napoleonic French expansionism reached the Low Countries, and the United Netherlands was changed to the Batavian Republic (1795-1806). It was eventually transformed into the Kingdom of Holland (1806-1810) as part of the 1st French Empire, under the younger brother of Napoleon I of France, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. But the sovereign called himself as King Lodewijk I. He was abdicated by Napoleon I of France on 1 July 1810 who accused him of putting the Dutch interests above those of France, and the Low Countries directly became part of the French Empire. After the crush of Napoleon troops in the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, the Low Countries became the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815-1830). In 1830 the overwhelmingly Catholic Belgians revolted against the mainly Protestant northern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was recognised as an independent state by The Hague in 1839. Officially conceding the Belgiumâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence, a Dutch national state emerged. From this period the state of the Netherlands underwent modernisation up to the eve of the 2nd World War despite it was slow to industrialise compared to its neighbours, largely owed to its distinctive infrastructure of waterways and de-

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pendence on wind power. From 1948 onwards it progressed as one the major welfare states in Europe. While in the framework of â&#x20AC;&#x153;recurrent perennialismâ&#x20AC;? the present-day Dutch nation were descendants of the Germanic and Celtic ethnic groups that revived at every turn of history even though through cooptation, accommodation, adoption and adaptation, a long process20 that occurred whether peacefully or by force. Some of the ancient ethnic groups that inhabited the Low Countries simply perished. Only the Frisian ethnic groups still retain their ancient ancestral name. And some reappeared as new groups that came together to emerge as the modern Dutch nation. From the modernist perspective, however, the Dutch nationalism is chronologically and sociologically novel if the ideology, movement, and symbols of nationalism are to be derived from the 1789â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s French Revolution. If we combine this modernist view with that of the perennialists, any events in Dutch history resembling nationalist movements, as we understood them today should be confined to pre-modern. The pre-modern roots of Dutch national consciousness stemmed from the revolt led by William of Orange (Willem de Zwijger) against Spain in the 16th century. The causes of the revolt were threefold: soaring taxation on the prosperous Dutch to finance the 20

See: S. Bahar and M. Zulfan Tadjoeddin (2004). Masih Ada Harapan: Posisi sebuah Etnik Minoritas dalam Hidup Berbangsa dan Bernegara. Jakarta: Yayasan Sepuluh Agustus, p. 116.

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Habsburg military expeditions, rivalry between the predominantly northern region Calvinist Protestants and the preponderant southern Catholic Counter-Reformation, and bureaucracy centralisation in Brussels. The two former causes were believed to lure the conflict to involve the whole levels of societies both in the north and south. William of Orange succeeded to personify himself as the defender of the “vrijheid” of the “worthy inhabitants who enjoyed freedom in former times” from cruel tyranny (J. Israel, 1995:162). It was not coincident that the renowned heroic song, the Wilhelmus, which glorified the William of Orange and was considered as the world’s oldest anthem, was composed around 1568.21 Albeit the opponents accused it as excessively praising William of Orange as the “Father of the Fatherland”, it was adopted as the Dutch national anthem in 1932.22 The emergence of “specifically Northern consciousness” or Dutch national awareness separate from that of the south can be said only cropped up after the revolt against the Spanish Habsburg. Meanwhile, the modern outlook of European nationalism stemmed from the 1789’s French Revolution that also stimulated the raise of nationalism in Western Europe against the Napoleonic oppression on other countries. The Batavian Republic did not only 21

See: J. Israel (1995). The Dutch Republic. Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 14771806. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 162. See: H. Beliën and M. v. Hoogstraten (1998), p. 50. P a g e | 15

serve as a defensive flank for France against the British Empire but its former system of personal states was also changed to a unitary national state. While in the most part of the United Provinces’ history, the identity and allegiance were usually based on local rural, civic, or provincial sentiments rather than the bond to the Republic as a whole,23 however, under the French it was put on a single national entity and centralised, which brought fundamental impact on the emerging Dutch national state. In their campaign, those who founded the Batavian Republic (1795-1806) called themselves the “Patriots”. To fight their cause they wielded nationalist sentiments against the Orangists. The Orangist leaders who fled to England orchestrated the efforts with other European powers to defeat the French. In this sense both sides used similar sentiments—utilising J. Breuilly’s claim (1993) of nationalism as an instrument—that the sub-elites mobilising the masses, directing the conflicting interests in the societies, and legitimising their action to retain power. Dutch nationalism reheated when the predominantly Catholic south seceded from the north and revolutionised into the Kingdom of Belgium in 1830, the resistance against the Nazi Germans during the 2nd World War, in the effort to regain control of its former Nederlands Oost-Indië after the war, and in the incremental European integration. In this framework, M. Freeden (1998) rightly argued 23

See: J. Israel (1995), p. vi.

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that nationalism only proved to be important momentarily in situations where there were crisis of nation building, conquest, external threat, disputed territory, or the internal frictions. Compared to other Western Europe countries like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the faรงade of nationalism in the Netherlands has been less flamboyant. It has owed to several accounts. First, it happened to be that those major European states had deeper and stronger historical collective identities and territories inherited from the medieval Britannia, Gallia, Germania, Italia and Hispania24, and distinctive course of nationhood and statehood trajectories. Second, the medieval Netherlands consisted of more or less autonomous provinces subjected under foreign sovereigns or rulers. The allegiance and loyalty in this system were given to smaller units of self-governance where larger national identities, sentiments, and myths were less obvious. Third, to the modern-day Netherlands, it owed to the traumatic experience under the Nazis during the 2nd World War, the backlash of nationalist movements when Dutch colonies (Indonesia and Suriname) fought for independence, and its strong international orientation as the Dutch survival had been significantly dependent on international economic relations, and its tolerance and solidarity on others particularly the oppressed. Fourth, although the Dutch societies had been socially constructed by pillarisation (zuilen systeem), migrant 24

See: J.R. Llobera (1994), pp. 22-70. P a g e | 17

ethnic minorities, and the several last decades by the politics of multiculturalism, but the majority of Dutch people are relatively homogenous and facing nearly no territorial secessionist ethnic movement. It is true however that since 2002 there is a tendency of polarisation in the political and policy arena where the right-wing politicians started to use and introduce nationalistic interpretation of political rhetoric. Yet, it is more for alluring the right-wing electorates instead of as a comprehensive and long-term strategy of social and political reform. From the pre-modern period, in the nucleus of Dutch nationalism there swayed two key elements: religion, namely the Dutch Protestantism, and the Orange Royal House. The first functioned as the source of inspiration of nationalism and the latter served as the symbol unifying the nation. Inferring J.R. Llobera (1994:146), religions, particularly the Protestantism had not only performed significant roles in the development of Dutch nationalism in terms of providing legitimation of the Netherlands as a state and promoting nationalistic values but it intertwined with nationalism in the same reservoir of ideas, symbols, and emotions. While the Orange House—though have undergone enormous constitutional scrapping of their political privileges and authorities25, and became simply folkloric—still play important role in The Hague and remained in 25

There have been recently calls to limit the current political function of the Orange monarch as the Head of State. Further, see: W. Dekker and B. van Raaij (22 April 2006). ‘Politieke macht van Oranjes inperken’. de Volkskrant.

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the heart and mind of many Dutch as the symbol of national unity. From a recent survey carried out by the Nederlandse Omroep Stichting about 79% of the Dutch were for the monarchy, and 56% thought that the Queen’s influence was precisely fine.26

PART IV NATIONALISM IN DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY How does nationalism influence a national state’s foreign policy? As a matter of fact, foreign policy is usually the playground for nationalism to signify, as it is the first bastion of a state’s frontline in relations with other states. The basic goal of foreign policy is directed toward self-preservation and prosperity of a national state. Since a national state is legitimated by the principles of nationalism, it is always underlying every decision made in a state’s foreign policy. What matters is that the “nation” is practically represented by the government of the state whose establishment and accountability elected and taken through democratic processes. And the intensity of nationalist policies involved may vary over time dependent to the issues, and the political lenience and background of the decision-making actors. Moreover, the concept of self-preservation and prosperity are the core ingredient of a state survival, which is reciprocally fortified by nationalism.

See: A. Pegtel (5 May 2006). ‘Onaantastbaar Oranje’. HP de Tijd, p. 41. P a g e | 19

The concept of self-preservation differs from state to another. Post-war Dutch foreign policy objectives can be said have been two tracks. Simultaneously they have been directed toward the transatlantic cooperation and the European integration.27 This is highlighted by the Netherlands membership of NATO and its participation into the Western European Union and the European Coal and Steel Community, Eurotom, and the European Economic Community that later metamorphosed into the current European Union. From historical perspective, P.R. Baehr (1978) divided Dutch foreign policy into 3 segments i.e. the golden age, period of decline, and western alliance.28 The first period was the Golden Age (15681648 to 1702-1713). During this period, the Republic of the Seven Provinces in which Holland was the principal and the most prosperous province played a major role in international affairs. It owed to the flourish of international trade and economic activities in cities in the north western of Low Countries. Due to this important position, the competition with Spain and Britain was very tight. The Dutch foreign policy in this period was emphasised on the maintaining of peace in order to ensure the progress of free trade. A 17th century Dutch statesman, Johan de Witt, exactly expressed this

Baehr, P.R. (1996). ‘Mensenrechten en ontwikkelingshulp: Nederland en Indonesië’: in P.P. Everts (Ed.) (1996). Dilemma’s in de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland. Leiden: DSWO Press Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, p. 16. Baehr, P.R. (1978). ‘The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands’ in: Leurdijk, J.H. (1978). The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers B.V., p. 4.

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objective by stating: “The interest of the State demands that there be quiet and peace everywhere and that commerce can be conducted in an unrestricted way.”29 The second phase represented the period of decline. This is the period where the supremacy of the Netherlands particularly in the areas of international trade and leverage began waning. This took place since the end of the Golden Age until the outbreak of the 2nd World War. It was highlighted by the establishment and flourishing of the empires in West and East Indies until the conquest of East Indies by the Japanese in 1942. During this long period, the Dutch foreign policy was projected toward neutrality. The third period was that, after the Great War, it discarded the principle of neutrality from its foreign policy based on the experience of being invaded and occupied by the Nazis. The lesson was that neutrality could not guarantee a country’s independence and sovereignty. The bitter lesson from the war combined with the graving threat of Soviet communists in Central and Eastern Europe; the Netherlands showed its lenience toward the Western allies. These also reflect a historical background that transformed the Netherlands to be one of NATO’s staunchest allies. There have been two external determiners in Dutch foreign policy viz. its position within the security complex and its location in the Cold War overlay. 29

Heldring, J.L. (8 January 1976). ‘De Invloed van Openbare Mening op het P a g e | 21

Security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security complex concerns (defined as being based upon military, political, economic, social and environmental considerations) linked together sufficiently closely so that their national securities could not realistically be seen in isolation.30 This concept also reflected strong inward-looking character influenced by constellations of amity and enmity. The relations were usually constructed over time and to certain degree were based on geographic proximity. Within this local security understanding, for more than two hundred years the Dutch security was formed by patterns of amity and enmity with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This is due to the Netherlands’ strategic geopolitics in Western Europe. Its relation with Germany had been the most complicated one among other neighbours. This probably was caused by different historical background. Before the war, the Germans could be considered to seek discipline; in contrast, the Dutch preferred accommodation. The Germans tended to centralise power, the Dutch decentralised it; one sought imperial expansion, and the other accepted republican contraction.31

30 31

Buitenlandse Beleid’. Internationale Spectator, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 4. Tonra, B. (2001), p. 52. See M.C. Brands (November 1989). ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands: Contrast and Complementarity’, Internationale Spectator, Vol. 23, No. 11.

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Meanwhile, the impact of France upon the Dutch foreign policy can be said very significant. The Dutch nervous attitude toward French neo-imperial aspiration became a constant subject matter in the bilateral relationship. The Netherlands post-war relations with the UK can be regarded as very crucial to the Dutch foreign policy. According to J.J.C Voorhoeve (1979), the importance of the relations with the British was based on two respects.32 First, the Dutch support to the UK inclusion into the European Economic Community would strengthen the Atlanticist elements in Europe and counter balancing the Franco-German alliance. Second, the UK could play very important role to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance as well as balancing France ambivalence toward the U.S. leadership. Differed from the security complex, the security overlay is a situation where one or more states entered the local security complex and are able to suppress or alter that complexâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s natural dynamics. In the context of this analysis, the overlay being scrutinised is that of raised during the Cold War in 1945-1990 where the U.S. and the Soviet-Union appeared the two most important players. Traumatised by the fault of neutrality and the threat of the communism, after the war the Netherlands sought to fortify its relations with the U.S. and transatlantic alliance. Exhausted by the war, the Netherlands also needed economic support from the U.S. This

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made it as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;faithful allyâ&#x20AC;? in the context of Transatlanticism. It thus can be concluded that the U.S. indisputably was the most important external actor in the Dutch foreign policy in the whole period. Beside, it might perceive that its next post-war security guarantor would be the United Nations. The Dutch had been involved since the very initial efforts to establish an international organisation that later became the United Nations. That is why it has been a committed member in supporting the UN actions and missions. One may be quick to conclude that if the Netherlands pursed the two objectives it can plunge itself into antagonistic strife of interests. However, the Dutch government apparently never felt that the transatlantic cooperation should or could interfere with its efforts to help creating further European integration.33 In its effort to guarantee national self-preservation and prosperity, delicate endeavours to balance these two potentially divergent aspirations still dominate the formulation and implementation of the Dutch foreign policy objectives.

See J.J.C. Voorhoeve (1979). Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 68. Baehr, P.R. (1996), p. 17.

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PART V EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY This section lays down several concepts and limitation of the Europeanisation. In his notion of involving more European countries into the Union undertakings, M. Emerson (2004) described Europeanisation as the transformation of national politics in line with modern European values and standards through legal and institutional obligations flowing from the norms and rules of the EU and Council of Europe; objective changes in economic structures and interests of individuals as a result of integration; and subjective changes in beliefs, expectations and identity.34 He emphasised more on the probable inclusion or involvement of more European countries into the Union.

See: M. Emerson (February 2004). â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Deepening the Wider Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, Centre for European Policy Studies, at http://www.ceps.be (Accessed in June 2004). P a g e | 25

According to S.J. Bulmer and C.M. Radaelli (2004) Europeanisation involved the processes of construction; diffusion; and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies.35 In his in his study on Danish and Irish foreign policies, Ben Tonra (2000:229) defined Europeanisation as “(…) a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.”36 Whilst J.V. Fanés (2001) defined the Europeanisation of a foreign policy as the process of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European integration process.37 In studying the phenomena of Europeanisation, some limits might surface since the integration as a source of change cannot be

See: S.J. Bulmer and C.M. Radaelli (2004). ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy? Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No. 1/2004. Tonra, B. (2000). ‘Denmark and Ireland’, in: The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, I. Manners and R. Whitman. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 224-42. See: J.V. Fanés (April 2001). ‘Europeanisation and Foreign Policy’, Working Paper No. 21, London School of Economics, Barcelona: Observatori de Política Exterior Europea.

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viewed in isolation from other (potential) sources of domestic institutional and political change (Hix and Goetz 2000:3).38 J.V. Fanés (2001) outlined the limits in three directions. First, assessing the magnitude and the quality of the changes observed; this is what he called the “relevance of change”. The changes’ relevance assessment would be crucial in the realm of bureaucratic adaptations and institutional adaptation brought about by the process. In this context, the appraisal could be made on how deep and formal the adaptations were, etc. Second, establishing the causal link between European integration and the changes observed; i.e. studying “Europeanisation as a cause”. In this view, the Europeanisation could be regarded as a process where it could arguably be referred as the source of the development. It would be likely to include the discussion on the vital elements of temporality and modes of the Europeanisation; it would cover the question of time and how. Finally, reviewing the observed changes in the light of other domestic and international processes parallel to Europeanisation, what he termed as the “contrasting phenomena” (Goetz, 2000:221-23). 39 Since studying changes in foreign policy where Europeanisation as a single variable could contribute to improve understanding on the foreign policies of member states and—at the same moment—

See: S. Hix and K.H. Goetz (2000). ‘Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems’, West European Politics, 23(4), pp. 1-26. See: K.H. Goetz (2000). ‘European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect?’ West European Politics, 23(4), p. 211-40. P a g e | 27

generally on the European foreign policy, the impacts of Europeanisation vis-à-vis other progressions that might impinge on foreign policy at the same time as the Europeanisation must be examined and distinguished. In one of his later studies, Ben Tonra (2001) investigated the notion of Europeanisation of national foreign policy in the European Union.40 He compared the cases of Danish, Dutch, and Irish foreign policy in the context of ever-closer integration of the Union. It focused on the relationship between national and the Union’s foreign policies. Tonra’s study covered the foreign policies of the three Member States since 1945 until the inception of the EPC in 1970 and replaced by the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and the Treaty of Nice in 2003. His investigation was carried out in order to answer the question whether the development of foreign policy cooperation within the Union has constrained or empowered the foreign policy of the countries in question. Among the conclusions derived from the study are: first, that the relationship between national foreign policies and an evolving common European foreign and security policy is a reciprocal one in which each is simultaneously constrained and empowered by the other. Second, Tonra drew two practical conclusions. Firstly, the capacity of the European foreign policy had considerably grown but it remained lack a required foundation in 40

Tonra, B. (2001).

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terms of democratic consent and accountability. Secondly, the evolution of the European Union foreign policy has led to a point where some Member States, the common European foreign policy has become a foreign policy objective in its own right. It did not involve the shift of loyalties from the interests of the nation state towards new European interests, but rather a reappraisal of national interests in a new European context.41 This conclusion seemed to match the thesis of “filling-in” of policy-making mechanism in the Union instead of the adverse concept of “hollowing-out”. Despite the end aim of the European integration has been political i.e. a peaceful Europe through the common market namely the single market, the process of political integration in Europe seemed to be more difficult than the economic ones. This dues to that the process fairly involved a compromise of the autonomy or to some extent not less than the sovereignty of the Member States in favour of common bodies operating within a legal system that is usually superior to the States themselves. As part of “high-politics”, the field of foreign policy has been very sensitive in such integration, especially to the major Member States due to their robust capabilities in the implementation of their foreign and security policies. That was also a reason why the CFSP has been put in the second rather than the third Pillar.

Tonra, B. (2001), p. vi. P a g e | 29

For certain reasons, nevertheless, minor Member States may prefer more integrated and capable mechanism in the Unionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign policy than the major ones. This is due to their shortcomings in terms of resources to implement its national foreign policy. They are willing to participate in a stronger common mechanism since if a single minor Member State act alone it may be incapable in the implementation of the policy. Yet, the decision to participate has been very uneasy as it may progressively reduce their ability to act independently in order to gain the benefits thereof.

PART VI THE NETHERLANDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF COMMON EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY In this part we will see the Netherlands roles and strategies in the Europeanisation process of national foreign policy. Inspired by nationalism, to foster and defend its national identity and interest as a minor state, we will observe how it ingeniously adapted to new realities and played significant influence in its capacity as a minor state in the development of Europeanised foreign policy.

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1. Vigilant Participation in the European Political Cooperation (1970-1980) Aspirations for a political and defence cooperation in the EU have subsisted since the early years of the European Community. There had been several attempts to materialise such ideals particularly in 1952 and repeated in 1961. Unfortunately, the efforts failed due to differences among member states on the spirit of the proposed collaboration. The Netherlands resisted the proposals fearing that it might both menace the Transatlantic Alliance and chipped away at the European Communities. In 1969, the French President, Georges Pompidou, proposed a summit to push the European integration after almost a decade of impasse. Held in The Hague on 1 December 1969, the summit of the Head of States or Government issued a final communiqué charged the foreign ministers to “…study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the context of enlargement.”42 In 1970, foreign ministers of six member states followed up The Hague’s summit in Luxembourg. The Netherlands put three priorities in the negotiations. First, the country would counter such cooperation if the new mechanism could weaken the transatlantic political role. Second, it requested that the role of EC institutions to be protected. Third, it hoped to establish some elements of democ-

EC Bulletin (1970), No. 1, p. 3. P a g e | 31

ratic oversight in the process.43 The two latter arguments showed that how it attempted to create a device to compensate its minor complex from the early beginning of political cooperation. The Dutch strong concerns on the new procedure might compromise NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s roles contributed in forcing the Luxembourg Report to yield a minimalist intergovernmental structure to help agreement in the area of foreign policy. Following the adoption of the Luxembourg Report, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was set up on 27 October 1970. Another shortcoming of the Luxemburg Report mechanism was that there was no lucid demarcation between economic integration and political cooperation. This rose concerns on the European Commission. To reduce the vagueness of the responsibility, in May 1972 the Netherlands presented a memorandum proposing a number of instruments to connect the EPC with the EC institutions. In the Dutch mind, that linkage was a precondition for further EPC formation.44 The institutionalisation of the EPC was deepened in the Copenhagen summit in 1973. A join Dutch-Belgian proposal was endorsed to increase the frequency of the annual meetings between the EPC ministers and the European Parliamentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Political Committee from two to four. The Netherlands also won support for its proposal that 43 44

See: J.J.C. Voorhoeve (1979), p. 178. Further, see S.J. Nuttal (1992). European Political Cooperation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 72.

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the Political Committee of senior foreign ministry officials would be directed to “draw to the attention of Ministers proposals adopted by the European Parliament on foreign policy questions.”45 In this framework, close dealings would be kept up with the Commission on the matters that influenced the Community activities. In 1974, the European Council was formalised to allow a construction of the EC and EPC decision-making. This important institutional development was partly aimed at boosting coordination between the Community and the EPC. The Netherlands, however, cautiously perceived the formalisation.46 The Dutch refusal was based, firstly, on its resolve to avoid institutionalised summitry and the risk of creating an intergovernmental directoire, and secondly, on the sentiment that the summits might challenge the exclusive constitutional position of the Dutch foreign minister. A report on “European Union” was presented to the European Council in December 1975 to re-examine, in broader term, the Community’s institutions to ensure the progress of the economic and political integration. One of the recommended points in the report was the embedding of defence identity in the eventual advancement of the integration.47 However, the Netherlands was strongly against the idea of including any military capability into

45 46 47

See: J.J.C. Voorhoeve (1979), p. 179. Tonra, B. (2001), p. 145. See: L. Tindemans (1976). ‘European Union’, Report to the European Council, EC Bulletin Supplement, No. 1, pp. 13-15. P a g e | 33

the EC competence and in particular refused the initiative of acquisition of any nuclear capability into the Community.

2. Paradigm Shift (1980-1988) In 1979 and early 1980s, the world saw cycles of international crises. Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and hostage crises, the declaration of martial law in Poland, invasions of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and Lebanon by Israel at the early 1980s significantly strained the EPC device. These external challenges seemed to confirm the limitation of EPC mechanism to provide immediate, coordinated, and decisive responses to any international calamity. It compelled the Member States to increase their readiness to use the Community’s instruments in the enforcement of their foreign policies by fitting in some revisions to the EPC procedures during the London summit in October 1981. The adjustments, firstly, included the streamlining of the ministerial meetings workload by putting only the major important issues with precise recommendations or clearly defined options on agenda. Next, they concurred on the strengthening of the Community’s level of participation in the EPC, and the formal formation of the “Troika” system. The latter showed an organic development inside the EPC to guarantee its substantive and procedural consistency. The London summit also formally introduced political as-

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pects of security48 on the EPC agenda for the first time even if by maintaining its flexible and pragmatic approach partly to prevent hostile response from the Transatlanticists. This position remained on the “Solemn Declaration on European Union” adopted in Stuttgart summit on 19 June 1983 by describing the EPC objective as “…the coordination of positions of the member states on the political and economic aspects of security.”49 Then a committee led by Senator James Dooge was set up to draw up proposal to improve European cooperation both within the Community field and in that of political or any other form of cooperation, which finalised in Dublin summit in June 1985.50 The conclusion of this report was put on voting, and the Netherlands was among the member states that voted in favour for an intergovernmental conference to revise the European treaties.51 During the initial negotiations, it was reluctant to discuss of formalising intergovernmental cooperation within the body of a Community text (A. Pijpers, 1983:174). However, after a series of conference meeting, the foreign ministers drew a final text that eventually became the Single European Act (SEA). The new regulation placed the EPC into the Title III of the

48 49 50

EC Bulletin (1981), No. 3. EC Bulletin (1983), No. 6, p. 25. Fourth Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities, European Parliament Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Report No. 14, Dáil Eireann (20 March 1985), p. 28. EC Bulletin (1985), No. 6. P a g e | 35

agreement although it was not incorporated into the treaties mainly owing to the reluctance of the member states to put the foreign policy into the normal Community decision-making procedures. In this framework, almost all decisions were taken by consensus where each member state could engage independently if it so chose and decided, and no laws were made within the EPC. However, a new aspect generated from the SEA was the decision to establish a permanent EPC secretariat in Brussels. Its important element was to “inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint actions.”52 In response to this development, in July 1986 the Dutch government bespoke a semi-official body, the Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid (Advisory Council on Peace and Security). It reviewed the Dutch policy towards a European dimension in Western security policy.53 The body acknowledged that there had been a “lack of balance in the distribution of authority and responsibility in the Alliance.”54 They recommended that it was ripe to reconsider the policy of 52 53

Ibid. This organ consisted of chief political, military, and academic experts. Further, see Report by the Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid, ‘Western European Security Cooperation: An Atlantic Necessity’, The Hague (1986), pp. 1-5. Op.cit, p. 11.

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strict distinction between security and economic cooperation between NATO and the EC. It advised that the Netherlands should advocate a “Europeanisation” of security policy that—temporarily— any debate on this issue should take place in the Western European Union frameworks.55

3. Defence Issue Remained Contentious (19881993) Throughout 1988-1990, economic and monetary issues were at top of the EC agenda. This led to the increasing concern that the Union’s political objective might alienated. In fact, the post-Cold War challenges in Europe required a stronger EC political identity. An initiative was jointly then taken by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand urging further discussion towards European Political Union, without ruling out the possibility of any Treaty adjustments. This was followed by an instruction to the foreign ministers to prepare report, which they presented during the Dublin summit in June 1990. Referring to the report, the European Council decided to set up two intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). The first conference was charged with preparing treaty-based proposals on European Monetary Union and the second conference was assigned to examine options for establishing European Political Union, as well as four as-

Op.cit, p. 60. P a g e | 37

pects of political union, reassessment of the Communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s international personality and the expectation for a common foreign and security policy. The conference on political union commenced their task on 14 December 1990. In response to the development, the Netherlands underscored its support for incorporating the EPC into the body of the Community. Their logic was that it was necessary to strengthen the coherence and cohesiveness of the entire Community policy. However, it was reserved on the aspirations of including defence instrument into the EC and against the idea of making the Western European Union as an EC defence instrument (A. Pijpers, 1996:253-54). In April 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency put forward a draft to the IGC. It drew a three-pillar edifice that would safeguard the distinctive inter-states decision-making structures of the EPC and gave a supplementary intergovernmental structure relating to judicial cooperation. On 1 July 1991, the Netherlands assumed its presidency and revised the Luxembourg document by proposing a single institutional framework for all decision-making, and by design removing the three-pillar approach. However, the Dutch proposal presented during the Council of Minister on 30 September 1991 was rejected as a basis of negotiation document, and considered it only as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;reference documentâ&#x20AC;?.56 The majority of the member states returned to the Luxembourg paper instead, which led to

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the accord for the Maastricht Treaty. To the Dutch side, it was a “Black Monday” of distasteful episode of negotiation. The Maastricht Treaty did not only breed a new organisation, the European Union, but also introduced an edifice that was based on three pillars: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The CFSP in the second pillar directed the member states towards a reinforced political obligation to the common line and execute a shared foreign and security policy. The new provisions gave greater political obligation of the CFSP despite it was still beyond the judicial review regimes of the European Court of Justice. In term of decision-making, the principle of unanimity was still intact despite decisions on the implementation of joint foreign policy actions under the auspice of CFSP could be made through qualified majority vote (QMV). Considering the opposition from some delegations, it was accepted provided the decision to such vote should be agreed unanimously (P. de Schoutheete, 1992-93:22). The inclusion of defence policy into the new mechanism required a compromise between the Euro-centric and Atlanticist preferences. To solve this, the treaty granted the WEU to elaborate and implement the Union’s decisions and actions that contained defence implications whenever requested by the Union to do so. This concession was believed to have smoothed the treaty ratification by 56

Neihe, E.F.C. (6 November 1991), unpublished speech cited in B. Tonra P a g e | 39

the Dutch Lower House by 137 votes for and 13 against on 12 November 1992.57

4. Pursuing Credible EU Foreign Policy (Since 1993) The operations of the Maastricht Treaty or the TEU had to be evaluated by other IGC meetings.58 It triggered another IGC in 1996 that led to the consideration and preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty. During the negotiations to resolve the Amsterdam Treaty, the Dutch government demonstrated brawny aspirations for credible European foreign, defence, and security policies. The reason behind this ambition was to embed a treaty reference to “the objective of gradual integration of the WEU into the Union.”59 Occupying the presidency in the first-half of 1997, the Netherlands apparently attempted to avoid another “Black Monday”. It therefore prepared a proposal, which at lengths pursued to make general compromise to unite the member states within a single line. In response to the Irish proposal submitted in December 1996, the Netherlands decided to expand it and made some amendments, and smartly left more con-

57 58

(2001), p. 155. Tonra, B. (2001), p. 156. Further, see N. Nugent (2003). The Government and Politics of the European Union, 5th Ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 70. Cited in Tonra. B. (2001), p. 160 (originally from The Irish Times, 12 June 1997).

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troversial issues untouched such as that of in the CFSP considerably for extensive negotiations in later stage of debates avoiding the topics not to “sink before it swim”. Nevertheless, the Dutch did propose significant adjustments especially in the decision-making procedure in the CFSP.60 In this framework, they put forward that the European Council should set up the principles, and general guidelines for the foreign and security policy. Their further suggestion was that the European Council should unanimously agree on “common strategies” regarding subjects where a common set of member states’ interests had been recognised. Within this framework of common strategies the foreign ministers were given sufficient space to issue declarations or political statements through the QMV, or unanimously agree to found “common positions” or “joint action”. The Netherlands reckoned that the greater chance for QMV mechanism in the CFSP decision-making, the more effective, and decisive the decisions would be. The Dutch position for the use of the QMV was, however, not applying to any decision that had defence and military implications. With its adamant position on defence and security policy, the Netherlands ratified the treaty through the parliament in 1998 despite vast criticisms on the fault of the treaty to achieve stronger and expected foreign and security policy.

Tonra, B. (2001), pp. 160-61. P a g e | 41

The Amsterdam Treaty laid down the emphasis on the fundamental objectives of the CFSP. It comprised: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union, to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to promote international co-operation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.61 The Amsterdam Treaty did strengthen the provisions of the TEU in some ways. First, the policy instruments were streamlined and extended. Second, the extension of the QMV provisions by introducing a â&#x20AC;&#x153;constructive abstentionâ&#x20AC;? device, which allowed a member state of not applying a decision that if not obliged the EU. Third, the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU, and creation of within the Council of a CFSP High Representative and a Policy Planning and Early-Warning Unit (N. Nugent, 2003:415-17). The Treaty of Nice that succeeded the Amsterdam Treaty has been effective as for January 2003. It brought about several changes on institutional provisions namely that of national representations in EU institutions prior to the enlargement, changes on QMV weightings in the Council as well as extension of the QMV legal base. Modest extensions were also made on co-decision procedures, 61

Article J.1., para. 1, Title V, J.1, Provision on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, European Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg (1997), pp. 9-10.

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and designed enhanced cooperation procedures easier to materialise. On the policy provisions, it provided marginal extensions of the functioning policy areas mainly in the JHA and social policy spheres. In the field of CFSP, the modification was on the possibility to use the second pillar of the Treaty to implement joint actions and common positions as long as they do not have military and defence implications.62

5. Impacts of Stronger CFSP Mechanism on Dutch Foreign Policy The issue of foreign policy remains in fact a national competence. However, since the EU has been a sui generis blend of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, a common foreign and security policy has appeared as more cohesive and coherent, coordinated and integrated, which makes it a stronger mechanism. The stronger CFSP framework has brought some consequences on the Dutch foreign policy. This can be seen from the foreign policy process and the foreign policy output. With those adjustments and progress, in terms of the foreign policy process, the Netherlandsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;as well other member states within the mechanism of CFSP: (1) enjoyed larger access to information and international actors; (2) underwent administrative

See: N. Nugent (2003), p. 88. P a g e | 43

changes; (3) experienced cultural changes and socialisation. Meanwhile, in terms of foreign policy output, the Netherlands: (1) took account of security policy in its foreign policy agenda; and (2) attempted to optimise its policy impact.63 In the perspective of this latter foreign policy out we will subsequently glimpse of Dutch foreign policy on the question of Indonesia.

Tonra, B. (2001), pp. 257-68.

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PART VII EUROPEANISED DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF INDONESIA This section assesses to what extent the Netherlands has played its role and maximised its influence in the decision-making of the common foreign policy. Even though it would not entirely suffice to employ the three possible characteristics of studying the Europeanisation of foreign policy suggested by J.V. Fanés (2001), the Europeanisation of Dutch foreign policy on Indonesia can be viewed from the three perspectives. Firstly, from the “relevance of changes” perspective which can be largely traced from the bureaucratic and institutional adaptations of foreign policy, two essential indicators here can be in assessing the extent of the Dutch foreign policy’s shift on Indonesia prior and within the EU mechanism, namely the policy objective, and policy means and instruments. In term of policy objective, from 1945 up to the mid 1960s, the central objective of the Dutch foreign policy toward Indonesia after the end of the 2nd World War was to regain control on its former colony. It was not prepared to lose Indonesia considering the economic importance of the former colony that was considered equal to that of Germany for the Netherlands’ post-war reconstruction.64

In 1946, the Dutch Catholic Party leader, Romme, emphasised this Indonesia’s economic importance. P a g e | 45

In the following period up to the present the emphasis of the Dutch foreign policy objective on Indonesia was substantially to recover and sustain economic interests in Indonesia that had been ‘interrupted’ during the Pacific War. This objective was interpreted as strengthening of trade relations, development cooperation, and promotion of human rights. These three interests potentially contained contradiction especially the development cooperation and trade vis-à-vis the promotion of human rights. In practice, the interests for trade and development cooperation were often more prioritised when it came in conflict with the promotion of human rights. Since 1998, while focusing to the reform process that is gradually taking place in Indonesia, the principal objective of Dutch foreign policy on Indonesia is still emphasised on sustaining its economic interests. The fields of cooperation have been mainly in higher education and culture. From policy instruments outlook, during the initial months of Indonesian independence, the Netherlands preferred military measures to diplomacy. It was impossible to the Dutch to talk with “extremists”, the terms they usually attributed to Indonesian freedom fighters. Even though since the very beginning the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ready to negotiate with Indonesian counterparts on equal basis, only after pressures from the British and Americans the Netherlands fixed on to exercise diplomacy.

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In diplomacy, the objective of the Dutch foreign policy was firstly to prevent and block the issue of Indonesia to be brought before the UN. After this effort seemed to fail, the Dutch diplomats repelled the UN Security Councilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s competence in this case. They insisted that Indonesia had been always the Netherlandsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; internal affair. Facing a diplomacy cul-de-sac in the UN, they often finally accepted the UN mediations. Such pattern of diplomacy was repeated in subsequently different cases. In term of military, at the peak of its effort to restore control on Indonesia in the second-half of the 1940s, the Netherlands deployed about 150,000 of its soldiers in the country.65 This constituted almost all of its military capability, or significantly more than it contributed under the NATO command, which was also starting to form in Europe. The capacity of Dutch military personnels and equipments to wage military actions to restore its authority in Indonesia was limited. From the second-half of 1960s up to date the policy means and instruments wielded by the Netherlands during this period were considerably diplomacy combined with economic and trade, and pressures using the development cooperation channels. During this period, the Dutch ruled out the use of military means. This was not only because the Dutch full military commitment to the NATO, but also the necessity to wield this instrument as there was no tension 65

Another source told that there were 90,000 Dutch troops in Indonesia in that period. Further, see: H.P. Jones (1971). Indonesia: The Impossible Dream. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., p. 107. P a g e | 47

related to a nation’s territorial integrity. The difference in term of means and instruments used after the resumption of bilateral relations in 1998 might be in the style of exercising them. In this period, the Netherlands tended to use “indirect” means and instruments to prevent any backlash from Indonesia. It emphasised more on multilateral channels such as the UN Commission for Human Rights, etc., on sensitive issues. It is in this period the Dutch described the relations as “mature” and “smart”. In the context of this latter pattern of diplomacy means and instruments the Netherlands preferred exerting the EU mechanism both the Commission for low-politics and the CFSP for high-politics issues. It is less clear about how the Netherlands exactly had played its roles in the process partly due to the decisions were typically made behind closed door and prepared by the officials of the lower ranks. However, it can be inferred that the Netherlands have played leading roles in some processes. First, the Netherlands not only had “special” ties with its former colony and had experienced many “blunders” during the interaction, but it possessed more extensive and deeper knowledge on Indonesia compared to other Member States. The opinion and position of the Netherlands on Indonesia should have been a kind of reference to other Members to decide their position. This role, for instance, can be seen from the original text of an EU’s declaration the still used a Dutch spelling; instead of writing Jakarta—the capital city of Indonesia—the text was written P a g e | 48

as Djakarta.66 Second, the influence of the Netherlands can be also seen when Indonesia announced to execute Soekarno’s former bodyguards. The Dutch government that then held the Presidency of the European Council of Ministers, and other European countries responded this with démarches.67 Third, many of the Union concerns—if not all—in its foreign policy on Indonesia were the issues such as the human rights, which had traditionally been priority concerns of the Netherlands in the previous periods. From this fact thus, it can be deduced that the Netherlands— having shared more interest than other member sates—has brought this kind of highly sensitive issues to the mechanism of the Union foreign policy on Indonesia. The lofty priority of the EU concerns in certain conflict areas in Indonesia namely in the Moluccas and Western Papua—two high-profile sources of skirmishes between the Netherlands and Indonesia—can be traced to the Dutch influence in CFSP construction. Concerning the second notion of J.V. Fanés of the “Europeanisation as a cause”, the changes of the Dutch foreign policy behaviours toward Indonesia were predominantly caused by the stronger institutionalisation of the EU External Relations and CFSP devices. The EU deepening integration has reshaped the perception of the Dutch foreign policy makers particularly over the 1990s, and combined 66

See: East Timor ‘1902. Council–General Affairs’, CFSP Presidency Statement, Brussels (29 January 1996), Press. 16, No. 4496/96. Baehr, P.R. (1996), p. 126. P a g e | 49

with the waning influence of the old generation and veterans, as from 1992 Indonesia was moved to the periphery of Dutch foreign policy agenda.68 It could arguably be referred as the source of the process. However, the facts showed the Europeanisation of the policy on Indonesia could not be perceived at the initial stage of the European foreign policy infrastructure formation in 1970s and early 1980s. Thirdly, from the ‘contrasting phenomena’ outlook, the changes of the Dutch foreign policy on Indonesia were not solely as the impacts of Europeanisation process. The “diplomacy failures” attributable to the “historical burdens” and “decolonisation trauma”, as well as the end of the bipolarity in which the Netherlands moved to concentrate its foreign policy towards the proximate and surrounding regions—instead of exclusively Europeanised processes—were the probable causes of such policy transformations. A sort of Europeanisation—as explained previously—did occur in this context corresponding to the external factors.

Indonesia regained momentum of significance in Dutch foreign policy after the 11 September 2001 focusing primarily on empowering the elements moderate Muslims in the country to combat terrorism.

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PART VIII EPILOGUE: SOME LESSONS In regard to nationalism, some lessons can be drawn. First, the persistence of Dutch as a nation greatly owed to its success transforming pre-modern revolutionary nationalism to a democratic and pragmatic form. Rather than clinging to the static, shallow, and symbolic nationalism it managed to search the deeper substance of nationalist principles that is to sustain its survival as a national state. Second, the modern nationalism in Dutch foreign policy can only and distinctively be identified in the understanding that it is a national state. Popular mobilisation, national marches and parades, and red-with-blue flag-waving69, vicious nationalistic rhetoric, and other fervent manifestations of nationalism were rarely observable. This implies that the post-war Dutch evident nationalist sentiments only appeared for instance in the decolonisation period, and transiently against the wish of H.J. Princen—a former Dutch soldier defected to Indonesia’s side during the politionele acties—to visit his sicken mother in the Netherlands, and the 60-year recognition delay of Indonesia’s independence of 17 August 1945. But these were

Flag-waving in the Netherlands is usually to show respect and joy instead of an expression of patriotism or having nationalistic ends. P a g e | 51

not nationally widespread and tended to be elitist. Even some elements in Dutch societies held the opposite views of the government on the question of Indonesia. Such sentiment also reappeared when the Dutch majority rejected the consultative referendum on ratification of the new European Constitution. Third, it seemed to the Netherlands that nationalism is not something to pronounce but rather a substance whose principles and objectives to be observed. This pragmatism appeared to be effective on the issues in question. Joining the European political cooperation meant to the Netherlands it would lose some of its authority and independency to go-it-alone in the international politics including to act “exclusively” in its relations with Indonesia. Acceding some of national political power to Brussels proved not to “hollow out” its national authority, but rather for effective and efficient functional purposes that can give considerable weight of influence to its national interests through Europeanised foreign policy including that of toward Indonesia. Fourth, in the name of nationalist principles, the Netherlands designed its foreign policy on Indonesia contradistinctively compared to that of pre-1992. Since then, the “special” relations and historical experiences were no longer substantial to convince the Netherlands to channel its foreign policy in Indonesia through bilateral medium. The Netherlands remained bilaterally channelling the “low-politics” issues such as economic, development and culP a g e | 52

tural cooperation as means of its foreign policy toward Indonesia. On the contrary, for sensitive issues it preferred exercising its influence through available multilateral channels especially the CFSP. The Netherlands seemed to learn from the previous “blunders” of its foreign policy on its former colony. It looked to avert of acting alone dealing with sensitive issues such as human right violence and democratisation in Indonesia.70 The Dutch realised that they bore “historical burden” and Indonesia was eager to exploit this trauma for the advantage of its national and domestic benefits. This diplomacy context put the Netherlands at a rather disadvantage position to counter Indonesia’s diplomacy tactics. Channelling those traditionally embedding elements of Dutch national foreign policy through the EU mechanism could shield it from backlash from Indonesia since that policy was not a Dutch but a European one. This was also to disguise its political motive vis-à-vis Indonesian sensitivity to it. Finally, it loomed that the Netherlands gained more profits in its foreign policy than the price it had paid under the name of this brand of nationalism.

The Hague’s decision to delay releasing the result of post-mortem examination on the late Munir who died on his flight to Amsterdam on 7 September 2004 was presumably to prevent strain in its relations with Indonesia. There was a little skirmish between the Dutch Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the approach to handle the issue. Further, see: Gunaryadi and D. Nataliani (02/12/2004). ‘Disclosing Munir’s Bump-off: An Acid Test to Indonesia-Netherlands Interplays’, Indocase at: P a g e | 53

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