Duriswamy finalss 1415

2013-14 JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient Ancients Alive: The Influence of the Roman Republic on James Madison’s Conception of the Senate and the Resulting Impact on the American Constitution Kevin Duraiswamy, Class of 2014

Ancients Alive: The Influence of the Roman Republic on James Madison’s Conception of the Senate and the Resulting Impact on the American Constitution

Kevin Duraiswamy

2014 John Near Scholar Mentors: Ms. Julie Wheeler and Mr. Scott Paterson April 14, 2014

Duraiswamy 2 That most of the Founding Fathers were well-learned in the classics is an indisputable fact, but whether their classical education influenced their political beliefs and, in turn, the Constitution is the subject of much debate. Though many scholars have argued that classical examples were a critical source of inspiration for the Framers’ political philosophies, there are many others who disagree.1 They explain, instead, that the Framers were more pragmatic in their beliefs, looking mostly to contemporary colonial experiences, English history, and the Enlightenment for guidance rather than the antiquities.2 Any classical references in the writings and speeches of the Founding Fathers, from their perspective, were simply “window dressing”— examples provided to add further legitimacy to beliefs that the Founders had drawn from other sources.3 While from a modern perspective—one that sees the classics confined almost solely to academia—this argument may make sense, it is an ill-suited explanation for the world of the nascent American republic, a world in which the classics were a “foundation stone of learning.”4 For this reason, this paper adopts the former perspective—that the classics were a critical source of the Founders’ political philosophies—and, in doing so, provides a specific instance of this occurrence in James Madison and the influence of the Roman Republic on his conception of the American Senate. Specifically, the paper will argue, first, that from his extensive studies of the Roman Republic, Madison drew many lessons that both consciously and subconsciously shaped his understanding of the proper structure and function of the Senate and, second, that these beliefs, in turn, affected the role of the Senate within the Constitution.

Madison’s Classical Education What enabled the classics to have such a large impact on Madison’s political thought was his immense familiarity with the ancient world. To fully understand the extent of this familiarity, it is necessary to examine the classical roots of his education, and to understand his classical

Duraiswamy 3 education, it is instructive to envision it within the context of standard schooling at the time. In colonial America, as in Europe, the classics were a central component of the schooling of all educated children since they were revered as the finest models of writing, virtue, government, and more. From a young age, students were introduced to the antiquities with “the core of colonial primary education systems [being] the study of Latin and Greek languages and literatures, as well as classical antiquities, even to the exclusion of English language studies.”5 As students grew older, this focus on classics certainly did not abate; colleges incorporated classical learning as a central part of both their academic curricula and extracurricular activities.6 As a result, “[the Founders’] formal education, and consequently their lifelong orientation, were built on the granite foundation of the classics.”7 Madison’s education was certainly no exception.

Like most others, he was introduced to the classics as a young schoolboy, beginning Latin at age twelve.8 Within his first year of studying the language, he had read Cicero, Vergil, and Cornelius Nepos, and, in the following years, while proceeding through a wide selection of other Roman authors, he would have also taken on ancient Greek.9 Though he did study a variety of subjects during these pre-college years, “learn[ing] the ancient languages was Madison’s basic task.”10 All this schooling left him well-prepared when, at eighteen years of age, he set out for Princeton—then the College of New Jersey—where he was expected to have an extensive knowledge of Greek and Latin before he entered.11 There, Madison began a rigorous curriculum that, under the supervision of the college’s president John Witherspoon, was composed of a wide range of subjects but invariably included more studies in the classics.12 By the time he graduated in 1771, his years of studying Greek and Latin as well as his zeal for the subject had shaped him into an exemplary classical scholar. As Professor Ralph Ketcham, a noted biographer of Madison, remarks,

Duraiswamy 4 Madison mastered Latin well enough to correct English translations of Grotius, and he knew enough Greek to read Aristotle and Thucydides and Plutarch in their native tongue. He must have known Cicero and Virgil by heart. Moreover his mind had been saturated with them before he paid much attention to serious works in English.13

This passage reflects two critical aspects of his classical education. First, the centrality of the classics to his studies meant that they formed his initial impression of the world, shaping the way he viewed issues throughout his life, including those concerning government. Second, as an exceptionally adept student of the classics, Madison was well acquainted with ancient authors and history—something that would allow him to use the antiquities to great effect later in his life. Importantly, these characteristics did not fade as he aged since the classics, for him, were a source of perpetual fascination and inspiration. Long after his school days, Madison continued to study Greece and Rome to enrich his understanding of the ancient world and to inform his decisions on contemporary issues.14 By 1787, these studies had left him so learned in the classics that “[o]f the individuals who actually attended the Constitutional Convention,…Madison…was first among equals insofar as his classical knowledge was concerned.”15 He was indeed well prepared to create an American form of government founded on the wisdom of the antiquities.

From a Classical Education to a Political Philosophy Before looking at the final impact of this classical education on Madison’s political thought, it is also important to consider how classical ideas became a part of Madison’s beliefs on government. Understanding these mechanisms of influence will enable a more effective analysis of the manifestations of classicism in his ideology, and, critically, these mechanisms were manifold. As Madison developed his vision of an American government in the lead-up to

Duraiswamy 5 the Constitutional Convention, the classics shaped his thoughts both consciously as a result of Madison’s efforts to heed the lessons of past governments and subconsciously as a result of values imprinted on his mind from his boyhood education.

The former of the two—the conscious impact—stemmed from the timeless principle, shared by the Founders, that history is the key to the future; by studying past governments, Madison and his compatriots believed they could predict what political institutions would and would not work in America.16 Indeed, as Professor David Bederman notes in his book The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, “[t]he Framing generation was more apt to pay homage to Clio [History] than to other Enlightenment deities.”17 From Federalists, such as John Dickinson who remarked that “experience must be our only guide...Reason may mislead us,” to Anti-Federalists like Patrick Henry who declared that “[he knew] of no way of judging the future but by the past,” the Founders almost universally made a conscious effort to observe historical examples during their deliberations on the Constitution.18 The scholar in Madison naturally supported this mindset, extolling history as “the oracle of the truth.”19 As a major corpus of history, the classics, therefore, served as an important guide to Madison;* he “[pursued]…classical knowledge as an adult for the instrumental purpose of informing his judgment about forms of American government.”20 In the political institutions of the ancient civilizations, including the Roman Republic, he could observe principles of good and bad governments, and this resource would be most essential to Madison in perhaps the greatest task of his life—drafting the Constitution. For this reason, he spent the spring and summer of 1786, in anticipation of the Constitutional Convention, poring over volumes of history and *

This guide, however, was not wholly accurate. Ketcham observes that “modern historians have shown that the actualities of ancient history were different from the picture left by the great classical authors” (James Madison: A Biography, 46). As a result, Madison’s understanding of classical history, which was based on these ancient texts, at times deviated from what actually happened. This paper will focus on what Madison believed to have happened rather than the historical reality since the former reflects the aspect of the classics that truly influenced him.

Duraiswamy 6 classical texts, which he used, among other things, to compile his extensive “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.”21 Importantly, these studies were more than a formality; they made a direct appearance in his contributions to the debate on the Constitution. In Federalist 18, for example, Madison used ideas about the ancient Greek confederacies, which he had developed in his Notes, to outline the weaknesses of confederacies and defend the need for the Constitution.22 More significant than the specific lessons in this Federalist Paper is the general principle that it represents: classical historical examples were a formative part of Madison’s political philosophy and, in developing his beliefs, Madison actively sought after them.

Nevertheless, even when Madison was not examining history, the classics still influenced his ideology—subconsciously. Since, as mentioned in the previous section, Madison saturated his mind in classical studies before turning significant attention to other subjects, his mental foundations—the ones he applied to each one of his tasks, including crafting the Constitution— were indelibly molded by the antiquities. Thus, Ketcham argues, To understand Madison’s mind, it is necessary to sense in some way the broad and primordial impact upon it of the Greek and Latin authors. Though, like most of his contemporaries, he did not often “footnote” the ideas he took from his classical studies, it is apparent that again and again he accepted many of them as axiomatic when he considered public problems in Williamsburg, Philadelphia, and Washington. For Madison’s generation, the wisdom of Greece and Rome furnished, so to speak, the folklore, the “morality plays,” and the schoolboy texts on fundamental concepts of human nature and society. (emphasis added)23

In essence, the classical ideals Madison absorbed into his own values as a youth later resurfaced in his political ideology—but not as explicitly classical ideals because he had long since accepted

Duraiswamy 7 them as “axiomatic.” Often, what were ostensibly his own beliefs were, in actuality, classically influenced notions. Given this reality, an approach to the topic of this paper that looks only at Madison’s direct references to the antiquities will miss much. To form of a more complete picture of the influence of the classics on his philosophy, it is necessary to read between the lines, so to speak, looking for implicit parallels between the ideas in Madison’s writings and those in Greek and Roman texts—looking for the subconscious impacts, not just the conscious ones.

At the same time, though Madison revered the ancient civilizations—especially the Roman Republic—he did not seek to make the Constitution a mere imitation of its governments for several reasons. First, as a child of the Enlightenment, Madison, like his colleagues, fundamentally believed in the potential for human progress, and that belief suggested that the best governments of modern times should far surpass the best of ancient times.24 Indeed, “[t]he genius of the founders was that they did not embrace classical practices with starry-eyed enthusiasm…[T]heir background in the classics allowed them to assess failures and learn from triumphs.”25 The fact that the Roman Republic fell meant that it was imperfect and that by adapting Rome’s political institutions to meet their deficiencies, Madison could create a better form of government for the new nation. Second, as Madison himself noted in Federalist 63, “[he was] not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish[ed] the American from other popular governments, as well ancient and modern.”26 Therefore, rather than adopting large parts of Rome’s government—which would be unsuitable given the differences across the time periods— he identified specific principles that could be incorporated into the Constitution, grounded in, as he explained, the “many points of similitude” between America and the antiquities.27

Duraiswamy 8 Third, the Roman Republic was but one of many sources of influence on Madison’s political thought. All the knowledge of the educated world of the eighteenth century went into creating his vision of government—history from the antiquities, Europe, and colonial America, various strands of Enlightenment thought, and much more.28 In this eclectic mix, no one source dominated (except, perhaps, the ideas of Montesquieu), and therefore, each one, including the Roman Republic, contributed only specific pieces to the larger conglomeration of ideas that outlined a radically new government. For these three reasons, it is critical, when searching for Roman influences on Madison’s political thought, to look not just at broad political structures but also at smaller aspects—substructures or specific ideas contained within institutions; these may be the product of specific lessons from the Roman Republic that Madison then weaved into parts of his American government.

The Roman Republic and Madison’s Senate Having thus examined the sources of Madison’s classical knowledge and the means through which that knowledge affected his political ideology, the discussion can now turn to the end result—specifically for this paper, the influences of the Roman Republic on his conception of the Senate. Throughout this section, it is critical to keep in mind that, as discussed earlier, the classics were the foundation of Madison’s education. Without recognizing this reality, one can more easily overlook the classical undertones of Madison’s arguments and, instead, argue that more modern sources were the true foundations of all his political beliefs. If, on the other hand, the primacy of the classics in Madison’s mind is acknowledged, it becomes clear that the antiquities had a pervasive impact on his ideology. Indeed, as Madison built his vision of the Senate, examples from Roman history constantly guided his thoughts both consciously and subconsciously, manifesting themselves in many facets of his Senate—the very idea of need for

Duraiswamy 9 a Senate, its function as a check on the democratic excesses of the House of Representatives, its secondary function as a repository of virtue within the federal government, and the structure of the Senate as a small legislative body.

The Necessity of the Senate The Senate was not, by itself, the complete legislature in Madison’s conception of the government. Like most of his colleagues at the Constitutional Convention, Madison strongly believed in the need for a bicameral legislature for the following reason. Based on his observation of political institutions, especially the colonial governments, he noted that “the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.”29 The legislature, therefore, was the institution most likely to disturb the balance of powers within his Montesquieuan tripartite government. To guard against this danger, Madison believed in adding a second body to the legislature, which would “[double] the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient.”30 Where the Roman Republic influenced the scheme of Madison’s bicameral legislature was in convincing him that one of the two houses should be a senate—in his mind, an “institution that [would] blend stability with liberty,” that is, an upper house, grounded in the consent of the governed but more removed from the people than the lower house.31 As he observed in Federalist 63, It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied...These

Duraiswamy 10 examples [are]…very instructive proofs of the necessity of some [such] institution.32

Thus, the ancient republics—both ones that succeeded and ones that failed—informed Madison of the importance of a senate-like body, convincing him to incorporate a senate into his conception of the American government. Moreover, out of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, the example of Rome would have provided him with the most support for the idea of the senate, not primarily because it was the only ancient senate-like body that had the name “senate”—the senatus Romanus—but because classical texts contained, and Madison had, more information on the government and senate of Rome than on those of Sparta and Carthage.33 In addition to this rather static analysis of the Roman Senate—the fact that its existence strengthened the Republic—the direct relation between changes in its power and changes in the stability of the Republic would have reinforced Madison’s belief in the need for a Senate. As Madison himself noted, at the start of the Roman Republic, the “power of [the] Senate [was] unlimited almost at first.”34 Though the plebeians soon obtained a more equitable distribution of power, a trend then emerged over the next several centuries in which the Senate gradually lost even more power to the masses because of a series of laws and secessions of the plebs.35 By the late second century BC, the Senate had become a much weaker institution than it had formerly been; critically, this shift corresponded with a move from the idealized days of the early Roman Republic, lauded by Livy—with whom Madison was familiar—to a time of far greater instability marked by ambitious men such as Marius and Sulla.36 To Madison, this degradation of the Republic would have given more proof of the need for a strong senate in government. The conclusion of this trend of the weakening Roman Senate would have further supported this belief; as the Senate lost more influence in the first century BC, it gradually conceded power to

Duraiswamy 11 individuals such as Caesar and Octavian, which weakened the foundations of the republican government.37 In the end, these actions saw the fall of the republic as the Senate became subservient to Octavian, Octavian became Augustus, and the republic turned into an empire.38 Though the collapse of the Roman Republic was certainly more complex than the weakening of the Senate, Madison’s logical mind would have found some connection between the two and, therefore, would have believed the inclusion of the Senate in the American government to be an important safeguard of the republic. Nonetheless, demonstrating the need for a Senate was but one of several impacts that the Roman Republic had on Madison’s conception of this institution.

A Check on the Democratic House Its government, as described in the works of the Greek historian Polybius, also suggested a critical function of the Senate within the American political system—a check on the populist passions and impulses of the House of Representatives. Writing The Histories in the second century BC, Polybius had sought to provide “an apologia, an explanation for the emergence of Rome as the leader of the Mediterranean world.”39 To do so, he first documented the expansion and conquests of Rome and, next, identified what he saw as the reason for this great success— Rome’s government.40 In Chapter VI, the most well known section of the work, he delved into a description of how that government functioned and, critically, why it worked so well.41 This text, since it held the secret behind the greatness of the Roman Republic, became one of the most respected and influential sources for the Framers, including Madison.42 Thus, it is instructive to review the theories outlined by Polybius before considering their effect on Madison’s Senate.

At the inception of his explanation, Polybius established that there were three basic forms of government “kingship, aristocracy, and democracy.”43 These terms he defined rather

Duraiswamy 12 narrowly, a kingship being a monarchy “which is voluntarily accepted by the subjects and where they are governed rather by an appeal to their reason than by fear and force,” democracy being rule by a virtuous citizenry, and aristocracy being not a hereditary elite but “a selected body of the justest and wisest men.”44 Given the idealistic nature of these definitions, he qualified his generalization, noting that there were actually three other forms “which are naturally allied to them…monarchy, oligarchy, and mob-rule”—the first three being the pure forms of government and these latter three being their degenerate parallels.45 Each pure form, given enough time, would naturally degenerate to its parallel, and this corrupted form would eventually be overthrown and replaced by another pure form, which then would degenerate, leading to a perpetual cycle of good and bad governments—a process Polybius called anacyclosis.46 What Polybius found so admirable and ingenious in the Roman Republic was its complex structure that avoided this problem; rather than alternating between good and bad governments, it restrained itself from degenerating so that the government would always remain in its pure form.

In Chapter VI, he explained the mechanism by which the Roman government achieved this: The three kinds of government that I spoke of above all shared in the control of the Roman state…For if one fixed one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely monarchical and royal; if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic; and when one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a democracy….[W]hen one part having grown out of proportion to the others aims at supremacy and tends to become too predominant, it is evident that, as for the reasons above given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them with contempt. All in fact

Duraiswamy 13 remains in status quo, on the one hand, because any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked and from the outset each estate stands in dread of being interfered with by the others.47

Known as the “mixed constitution,” this idea was at the heart of Polybius’ explanation of the Roman Republic and became his greatest contribution to later generations, including the Founding Fathers.48 No part of the government would degenerate—become corrupt, tyrannical, or harmful to the public good—since any attempts to accumulate power would be blocked by the other parts. In this theory, the Founders had an explanation for Rome’s greatness, and those, such as Madison, who sought to incorporate the successful pieces of past republics into America’s government would, therefore, turn to Polybius as an importance source of guidance.

Critically, as he developed his own political ideology, Madison was certainly aware of Polybius and this idea of the Roman mixed constitution. Aside from the fact that Polybius was one of the most well known classical authors to the Framers, Ketcham notes that he was one of the sources Madison studied during his months of preparation for the Constitutional Convention.49 Madison himself demonstrates his familiarity with Polybius, citing him in Federalist 63 concerning the Carthaginian senate.50 Though this example does not refer specifically to the Roman mixed constitution, the fact that Madison was at all aware of Polybius’ work means that he would certainly have known of his commentary on the government of the Roman Republic. Indeed, in Federalist 40, Madison explicitly refers to the proposed Constitution as a “mixed Constitution,” which, given his knowledge of Polybius, suggests some degree of familiarity and influence.51 Based on this idea of the mixed constitution and the familiarity of the Founders with Polybius, many studies of the impact of the Roman Republic find a parallel between the tripartite

Duraiswamy 14 government of Rome and the three branches of the American government and conclude their explanations at this point. Though these analyses are not incorrect, they oversimplify the nature of Polybius’ influence. The separation of powers in Madison’s philosophy—and later in the Constitution—did not come directly from Polybius. Instead, Polybius influenced Montesquieu, whose Spirit of the Laws then functioned as a manual for Madison to create a government of three branches.52 While this fact does indicate that Polybius did indirectly shape the concept of the separation of powers, the American system of this separation is more indebted to Montesquieu for the following reason. Polybius advocated creating distinct branches based on their inherent nature—democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical—yet the American government divides power based on function—legislative, judicial, and executive—the precise division that Montesquieu advocates. Indeed, Madison notes that on the idea “that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct[,]…[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu”—not Polybius.53 Thus, the strongest tie between the Roman mixed constitution and Madison’s political philosophy lies not in the overarching separation of powers. In his conception of the purpose of the Senate, a clearer link can be found.

Drawing inspiration from Polybius’ portrayal of Rome, Madison sought to make the Senate the aristocratic element of the national government so that it could check the rash tendencies of what he wanted to be a populist House of Representatives. Since Madison firmly believed in “government by consent,”54 he explained at the Constitutional Convention that he “considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free [Government].”55 What Madison referred to was the direct election of representatives, a principle he wanted the House to operate on, thus, making it closely responsive to the will of the people—the democratic voice in his republican government. The Senate, on the

Duraiswamy 15 other hand, as Madison outlined it in the Virginia Plan, was to be elected by the members of the House.56 In this manner, the Senate was infused with an aristocratic element, more removed from the people and consisting of wiser individuals since they were chosen not by the commoners but by their more educated representatives.

While the fact that Madison’s House and Senate contained democratic and aristocratic elements does not in itself prove that he was influenced by Polybius in constructing the Senate, the way in which Madison explained the function of this body is the key to establishing its connection to the Roman Republic. Enumerating the advantages of the Senate, Madison explained in Federalist 63 that [S]uch an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions…[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?57

The Senate, Madison envisioned, would be the body to provide this check against popular passions. Notably, this language Madison uses here to describe that check is filled with echoes of Polybius. Though the Senate’s main function would be to restrain the House, Madison refers repeatedly to the “people”—the demos—going astray, underlying the democratic nature that the

Duraiswamy 16 Senate would counterbalance. The Senate, on the other hand, he casts as a “temperate and respectable body of citizens”—a phrase that harkens back to Polybius’ description of an aristocracy (mentioned above) as a “body of the justest and wisest men.”58 In this manner, when describing the check that the Senate would place on the House, Madison plays upon the distinctions in the nature of each body—an idea closely-associated with Polybius—rather than their different legislative powers. These close parallels suggest that Madison drew this function of the Senate from Polybius’ description of the opposing aristocratic and democratic elements of the Roman Republic and, thus, sought to make the Senate an aristocratic branch that would restrain the whims of the people.

What Madison feared in the people that he wished the Senate to guard against with its aristocratic nature was their capacity to make rash, shortsighted decisions. As much as Madison was a defender of representative government, he still, like many of the Founders, did not fully trust in the capacity of the commoners to reason properly and to judge political issues well.

Moreover, with recent events, such as Shay’s Rebellion, fresh in his mind, his faith in the people would not have been at its highest. In his view, they could easily be influenced by sensational public events, mass movements inspired by unsubstantial ideas, demagogues playing on the emotions of the people, individuals spreading false information, or any other event that would raise “irregular passions” in their spirits.59 Any of these catalysts would push the people towards hasty decisions that reflected only their most immediate concerns, not their long-term interests— decisions they would later regret.60 From his experience in the Virginia state legislature, Madison had learned that these popular passions often made legislators “subject to intense pressures from their constituents” and that as a result, many representatives “acted on short-sighted calculations of their own interests or those of their constituents.” Given that Madison also believed in the

Duraiswamy 17 necessity of popular representation in government, this reality of the inconstancy of the people put him in a bind. Either the people, along with their passions, could have representation, or the fickleness of the people could be eliminated, along with their voice in government.

Fortunately, Polybius’ Roman mixed constitution provided Madison a solution to this issue: he could have the best of both worlds—popular representation and stability. Following the example of the Roman Republic, he included both a democratic element and an aristocratic element in the Congress and, thereby, allowed the commoners to have a voice in government while preventing their passions from pulling the legislature down the wrong path. With the Senate removed from the people as an indirectly elected body, it was insulated from the their inconstant desires and was able to protect the long-term interests of the republic. Furthermore, the more selective nature of the Senate meant that its members would be of higher wisdom and character than other representatives, making them capable of impartially weighing the interests of the republic and blocking decisions of the House that were the product of popular passions. In this manner, the Roman Republic with its mixed constitution served not just as a general example of good government that Madison wished to adapt but also as a specific remedy to some of the maladies he wished to address in the new American government.

It is important to note that Madison did not mention this view of the aristocratic Senate only in Federalist 63—an occurrence that, if true, would suggest that this idea was not a critical part of Madison’s conception of the Senate. Rather, the same sentiments appear quite often in all the forums through which he expressed his political opinions, including the Constitutional Convention. In one particular Convention debate concerning the Senate, for example, Madison noted in language similar to that in Federalist 63 that

Duraiswamy 18 It [would] next occur to [the] people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, [through] want of information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection [would] naturally suggest that the [Government] be so constituted, as that one of its branches might have an [opportunity] of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests[.]

Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, [would] be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence [against] this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose [against] impetuous councils.61

As seen before, Madison viewed the Senate as “a portion of enlightened citizens”—an echo of Polybius’ “body of the justest and wisest men”—who would protect against the “fickleness and passion” of both the people and the democratic House.62 Interestingly, Madison also introduced a similar but slightly nuanced idea that the Senate would sometimes have better “knowledge of the public interests” than the people, thereby allowing it to work towards the public good when the people and the House were unable to do so. Again, this idea corresponds closely to the Roman Republic where, according to Professor Andrew Lintott, the “people, though by no means deferential in all respects, trusted in the ability of their aristocracy,” that is, the senators.63 When the American people were at their worst, the Senate would be, perhaps, their guardian angels.

After considering the fact that Madison was certainly familiar with Polybius’ work, the parallels between his Senate and the mixed constitution—the existence of democratic and aristocratic bodies in each and the function of the latter as a check on the former—point to the

Duraiswamy 19 clear conclusion that Polybius’ portrayal of the Roman Republic was the source of this aristocratic function of Madison’s Senate. The fact that Polybius names the mixed constitution as the source of Rome’s “greatest perfection” makes it more likely that Madison would have decided to incorporate some of its principles.64 Though he nowhere explicitly cited Polybius as the authority for this idea, this absence does not indicate the absence of Polybius’ influence.

Rather, as mentioned earlier, Madison and his colleagues rarely “footnoted” classical ideas in their writing since they and their audiences already knew the texts quite well.65 Therefore, the significant similarities between Madison’s Senate and Polybius’ mixed constitution—in light of Madison’s extensive familiarity with the classics and Polybius’ work specifically—provide sufficient evidence to infer that the Roman Republic shaped Madison’s understanding of the Senate as an aristocratic check on the popular branch of the legislature.

Critically, reference to the Senate’s function as “aristocratic” does not suggest that Madison wished to see an aristocracy established in America. In fact, like most of his contemporaries, he abhorred the idea of a hereditary aristocracy, especially in government, finding the British House of Lords, for example to be a display of “aristocratic usurpations and tyranny.”66 For Madison to have called the Senate aristocratic would, therefore, have violated his own beliefs about the American government and provided ammunition like no other to the AntiFederalists. Instead, Madison embraced not an actual aristocracy but the ideal behind Polybius’ aristocracy—”a selected body of the justest and wisest men”—the word aristocracy itself meaning, at its Greek root, rule of the “best”.67 Indeed, this idea of justice and wisdom in government, captured in Polybius’ aristocracy, appeared throughout Madison’s work, for example, in Federalist 57, where he opined that “[t]he aim of every political constitution…ought to be…first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to

Duraiswamy 20 pursue, the common good of society.”68 More so than in other parts of the national government, Madison sought to instill these qualities in the Senate, which he hoped would function through “a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good,” in other words, wisdom and justice.69 Commenting on Thomas Jefferson’s draft of a Virginia Constitution, he noted that, among other things, “[a] Senate…ought to supply the defect of knowledge and experience incident to the other branch.”70 Just a small sample of Madison’s writings on this subject, these sources indicate that no matter how much he protested aristocracy, Madison firmly believed in the Polybian ideal of a just and wise governing body and incorporated this principle into the Senate, an analogous institution to the aristocratic Roman Senate and a check on the democratic tendencies of the House.

In addition to this idea of the Senate being the aristocratic element of a mixed legislature, the Roman Republic inspired a second balancing function in Madison’s Senate—representing the interests of the landed against the interests of the landless. Polybius’ portrayal of the Rome was somewhat idealistic, admitting to clash between the three branches of government but portraying that clash as orderly and deliberate. What Madison drew from Polybius was, therefore, also somewhat idealistic, viewing the Senate as an enlightened body “[giving] wisdom and steadiness” to the House.71 Madison, however, also understood the Senate to serve as a second, more realistic check—one that he derived from his own reading of the Roman Republic, a reading that more openly acknowledged its problems. As Madison noted at the Constitutional Convention, All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, and interests, as they happened to consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests…In all cases where a

Duraiswamy 21 majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger...These observations are verified by the Histories of every Country ancient and modern. In Greece and Rome the rich and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the patricians and plebians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.”72

In this observation, Madison quite rightly pointed to the class struggles, glossed over by Polybius, that had dominated much of Rome’s history. From the birth of the republic in 509 BC to its death, the patricians and the plebeians—the quintessential “haves” and “have-nots”—had wrestled over influence in the government and the promotion of their respective interests.73 Marked by multiple secessions of the plebs, clashes between the tribunes and the Senate, and perhaps most notably by the reform attempts of the Gracchi brothers, this conflict demonstrated to Madison that where class divisions existed, each class was at risk of oppression by the other.74 Ever observant of history, he feared a similar situation arising in America. Later at the Constitutional Convention, he remarked that though “we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient [Governments] as well as the modern States of Europe”—that is, no formal class system—“[w]e cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous mass.”75 Over time, he recognized that “[a]n increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.”76 What worried him was that “[t]hese [citizens] may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence,” in other words, the poor would eventually outnumber the rich.77 The potential effects of such a situation could be seen in ancient Rome where, as Madison noted, “[t]he tribunes…who were the representatives of the people, prevailed…in almost every contest

Duraiswamy 22 with the senate for life”—a development that, if replicated in America, would put the landed at significant risk of losing their power and rights to the common people.78 Though by no means did Madison wish to remove the landless from government, he, at the same time, disliked the notion of them having political influence to the exclusion of the wealthy, in part, because of his philosophical belief that a majority should never be able to dominate a minority and, in part, because he and his colleagues were themselves of the upper class.

Fortunately, the Roman Republic provided not only a cautionary tale of the danger of class conflict but also a solution to that problem. Given that its members were predominantly patricians (the upper class) and equestrians (the merchant middle class), the Roman Senate had served as the chief representative of the wealthy and landed;79 by resisting certain efforts of the popular assemblies, it was able to represent patrician interests and prevent the plebeians from gaining full control of the government.80 Already envisioning an American Senate, Madison was able to coopt this function into that political body and, thus, make it a check against popular encroachments on the rights of the upper classes. As he explained to Jefferson regarding the composition of a legislature, The first question arising here is how far property ought to be made a qualification [for voting]…A freehold or equivalent of a certain value may be annexed to the right of vot[in]g for Senators, and the right left more at large in the election of the other House…This middle mode reconciles and secures the two cardinal objects of Government, the rights of persons, and the rights of property.

The former will be sufficiently guarded by one branch, the latter more particularly by the other. Give all power to property; and the indigent [will] be oppressed.

Duraiswamy 23 Give it to the latter and the effect may be transposed. Give a defensive share to each and each will be secure.81

Though Madison’s method of elections for the national Senate was different—election by the House—the members of the House would tend to be of more wealth and of higher class than the common person, making Madison’s Senate, in effect, quite similar to the one he described to Jefferson. This Senate, in turn, was quite similar to the Roman Senate with its members being mostly of the upper classes. Aware of the fact that the Roman Senate gradually lost power to the people, Madison sought to prevent this from occurring in America by making the House and Senate constitutionally “coequal branch[es] of the government” with regards to their power and authority.82 For this reason, the Senate would be able to stand its ground against the House and, thus, represent the interests of the upper classes, guarding against any encroachments by the common people on the rights of the wealthy.

While the Senate would balance the democratic House both by acting as a source of wisdom and by protecting the propertied, the system worked the other way around as well.

Indeed, Polybius noted not only that the aristocratic Roman Senate placed a check on the people but also that the people placed a check on the Senate.83 Likewise, as much as Madison placed faith in the Senate, he also understood its potential threat and, therefore, explained in Federalist 63 “that the federal senate will never be able to transform itself into an independent and aristocratic body” because “the house of representatives with the people on their side will at all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive forms and principles.”84 As the Senate pursued its duty of moderating popular passions, the House would ensure that it still remained faithful to the people, and as the Senate represented the interests of the wealthy, the House would make sure that the interests of the common people were still heard. Therein lay Madison’s

Duraiswamy 24 genius. Throughout the Constitution, he established institutions whose function he understood and respected, but at the same time, he always remained aware of their potential to be corrupted and accounted for that danger—just as Madison placed great faith in the Senate but still placed the House as a check on it.

A Repository of Virtue Within the Government In adapting elements of the Polybian mixed constitution, Madison consciously sought to incorporate lessons from the Roman Republic into his ideology, but as mentioned earlier, other aspects of the classics worked their way into his beliefs subconsciously. Prominent among these examples is his visualization of the Senate as a seat of virtue in the government. To Madison, virtue was critical to the well being of any republic, and this belief ultimately stemmed from his studies of the Roman Republic as a youth. As a statesman decades later, however, when Madison incorporated these ideas into the Senate, that ideal had become so deeply ingrained in his own mentality that he did not openly recognize it as classical—even though, at its root, it was.

The classical texts Madison read in his early years repeatedly stressed the centrality of virtue to the success of the Roman Republic. Ketcham, for example, notes that “[Madison’s] first visions of virtuous government…probably came from Livy’s idealized account of the Roman Republic” and that Plutarch, whose Parallel Lives examined notable ancients including many from the Roman Republic, “may have been Madison’s first preceptor in the virtues necessary for statesmanship.”85 Polybius himself lauded the virtue of ancient Rome as one of its sources of greatness and superiority to other ancient civilizations.86 Given that the classics were some of the first texts Madison studied and that they were presented to him as “an incomparable source of insight into human affairs,” he could not help but adopt these ideals of virtue into the foundation of his political beliefs.87 Indeed, Professor Gilbert Chinard notes that as youths, the Founders

Duraiswamy 25 “eagerly sought in the classics allusions to contemporary events,…found in them principles of public and political morality, and…looked on them as masters and guides.”88 Even if these open praises of virtue were not enough to convince Madison of its necessity, the fall of the republic certainly would have. Its destruction at the hands of men such as Caesar would have taught him that abandonment of civic virtue for issues of self-interest and personal ambition was a “poison…into the body politic.”89 Since Madison sought to draw lessons not just from Rome’s successes but also from its failures, the fact that an adherence to traditional republic virtues would have been a remedy to Rome’s troubles further emphasized the importance of this value.

To put it simply, declarations of the need for virtue abounded in the classical texts Madison read.

Yet as much as they abounded in classical texts, so too did they abound in Madison’s own writings. The lessons concerning virtue that the Roman Republic had taught him as a youth did not fade as Madison grew older. To the contrary, he strengthened these beliefs over time with the result that by the time Madison arrived at the Constitutional Convention, he fiercely held to the notion that virtue was vital to the health of any republic. In Federalist 55, for instance, he noted that “[a]s there is a degree of depravity in mankind…, so there are other qualities…which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence…Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form” (emphasis added).90 One of the fundamental pillars of Madison’s republic was, therefore, these good qualities—that is, virtuous characteristics—which would enable the government to pursue the public good and resist tendencies towards excessive self-interest. For this same reason, he declared in Federalist 57 that one of “[t]he aim[s] of every political constitution…ought to be…to obtain for rulers men who possess…most virtue to pursue the common good of the society.”91 Clearly, Madison

Duraiswamy 26 viewed virtue as a necessity for the American republic—a belief rooted in his classical education—and, thus, wished to ensure its existence in the government.

To this end, aside from the fact that the virtue of the people would ensure the virtue of the government as a whole,92 he made the Senate the primary repository of virtue within the government. Given that Madison could not legislate virtue on the people or the government, he sought to structure at least one branch in such a way that it would make it more virtuous that the rest. This institution—in Madison’s mind, the Senate—could then maintain overall virtue in the government as it could check the anti-republican tendencies of any other branch that decayed and became consumed by self-interest. Madison’s decision to use the Senate as this body had several reasons. For one, the nature of the Senate as an aristocratic institution—in the ideal, Polybian sense—lent itself to this function. In Madison’s view, men of a wiser, elite nature, such as his intended senators, also tended to be more virtuous. Furthermore, while the common people were best suited to choose members of the House who represented their own interests, the more informed members of the House were better suited to choose senators for their virtue. In this way, the existing structure of the Senate would allow it to be the more virtuous body that Madison hoped for. Additionally, the means through which that virtue would be secured— insulation from the people—indicates why Madison could not structure the entire government to be virtuous (though he hoped the people would end up choosing virtuous representatives).

The nature of the Senate as a virtuous body also had historical precedent. In Rome, the censors—the magistrates who decided Senate membership—had the authority to remove senators who were not “of good character.”93 Though it is debatable whether Madison knew about this procedure, given that the body of classical knowledge was smaller during his time than it is today, there is a fair chance he did since in his Additional Memorandums on Ancient and

Duraiswamy 27 Modern Confederacies, he explicitly refers to the position of censor in the Roman Republic.94 Regardless of whether this specific fact was known to Madison, the conclusion still remains that the Senate would have been the best institution to be a repository of virtue.

Evidence from Madison himself indicates that he did indeed view virtue as one of the Senate’s functions. At the Constitutional Convention, for example, he hoped to protect “republican principles….by the establishment of a body in the [Government] sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue.”95 While the notion of wisdom refers to the aristocratic function of the Senate, the idea of virtue indicates his view that senators should be of higher character and should protect basic republican values. Furthermore, the idea of having only one specific body that contains wisdom and virtue suggests that although Madison hoped that each part of the government would possess these qualities, the Senate was the only one whose primary function was to contain them and, thus, the Senate would be the wisest and most virtuous part of the government. This same sense of senatorial virtue and upright character is echoed elsewhere in Madison’s writings, for example, in Federalist 55, where, examining the risk of corruption in the government, he notes that to corrupt the Senate, the President would have to “sub[due] the virtue of the Senate,” in Federalist 62, where he describes senators as “requiring greater extent of…stability of character,” and in Federalist 63, where he describes the Senate as providing “a due sense of national character.”96 Perhaps most strikingly, in one of the debates at the Constitutional Convention, he declared that the Senate should “[be] the impartial umpires and Guardians of justice and general Good.”97 This idea of impartially pursuing justice and the public good fits perfectly into the notion in Madison’s time of civic virtue and duty where virtuous citizens, in participating in government, were expected to leave behind their personal interests and protect the public

Duraiswamy 28 interest. So too does it tie in neatly with concepts of virtue in the Roman Republic. Polybius, for example, praising the great virtue of its citizens, noted that “[s]ome even when in office have put their own sons to death…setting a higher value on the interest of their country than on the ties of nature.”98 The idea behind this action—placing the public good above personal interests—was the same idea that lay behind Madison’s declaration at the Constitutional Convention concerning the Senate, an idea that appears to be classical in its inspiration. As a more select and insulated body, the Senate would, he hoped, act with virtue and protect the “general Good,” especially if the other branches of government failed to do so.

Nevertheless, just as he did with the Senate’s aristocratic function, Madison placed faith in its function as a body of virtue but, at the same time, remained aware of its limitations and guarded against its failures. Even if the Senate should fail in its task as a virtuous institution, he explained at the Virginia ratifying contention, as long as “there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men…[s]o that we do not depend on their virtue…but in the people who are to choose them.”99 While the Senate was one resort against a decay in virtue in the government, the people were another. Moreover, Madison recognized that virtues such as honesty, respect for character, and conscience had often been insufficient guards against the oppression of minorities.100 For this problem, the solution he proposed was his idea of the “extended republic,” in which expanding the size of a republic over a vast area would necessarily bring many competing interests or “factions” into the government, preventing one group from oppressing the other.101 In essence, where virtue was insufficient to prevent self-interest from causing harm, he would pit self-interest against self-interest. Thus, while the virtuous Senate—at its root, inspired by the Roman Republic—was important to Madison’ political ideology, it was but one piece of his vision for the American government.

Duraiswamy 29 The Need for a Small Senate While the Roman influences already discussed concerned the existence of the Senate in Madison’s beliefs and his understanding of its functions, the last Roman legacy to be considered pertains to its structure. The example of institutions within the Roman Republic—specifically the tribunes and the Senate—taught him that the greater the number of members in a political body, the more prone it was to disunity and conflict. Such a situation in the Senate would, in Madison’s view, have to be avoided, for it would prevent it from fulfilling its duties both of placing a check on the House and of providing stability, wisdom, and impartiality. With this in mind, he resolved in his political philosophy that the number of senators should remain small.

At its foundation, this idea was rooted in Madison’s study of ancient Rome—something he pointed out at the Constitutional Convention. In one of the debates, John Dickinson of Delaware urged the delegates to “admit into the Senate a very large number of members” so that it would have the weight to resist the popular powers of the House.102 Rising in response, Madison explained the reasoning behind opposing his position: The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct.

[I differ] from Mr. [Dickinson] who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it [appears] to [me] that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number. The example of the Roman Tribunes [is] applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the popular interests and pretensions at Rome, because

Duraiswamy 30 the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert; were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust.103

The issue Madison saw in increasing the number of tribunes was, thus, this notion of “faction.”

A term that appears throughout his writings—most notably in Federalist 10—faction referred to a group of individuals united by a common interest, for example, their economic status, religious sect, or geographic location.104 In his view, increasing the number of senators would increase the number of divisions among them and, thus, increase the number of factions. Though Madison accepted factions as an inevitable part of any free society and accounted for them in his model of government, he sought to prevent their emergence in the Senate specifically, as had happened with the Roman tribunes, for two reasons.

First, as Madison explained, faction among senators would “communicate to them the vices which they [were] meant to correct.”105 Where faction existed, self-interest and passion ruled—the antithesis of the impartiality, wisdom, and stability that the Senate ought to have and the embodiment of the democratic shortcomings that the aristocratic Senate ought to fight.

Indeed, Madison, commenting on the ills of faction in Federalist 10, deplored the “effects of unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations” and noted that “the public good is often disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties.”106 Unless, therefore, the Senate remained a small institution, its representatives would be sufficient in

Duraiswamy 31 number to break into factions, severely reducing the utility of the Senate in the government, as Madison had envisioned it, and weakening the balance of democratic and enlightened sentiments that he had constructed.

Second, faction in the Senate would weaken its power vis-à-vis the House. As Madison observed, the divisions among the tribunes in Rome made them “prey to their aristocratic adversaries.”107 They were placed at a disadvantage against the Senate, just as the American Senate, if riddled by faction, would be at a disadvantage to the House. While Madison noted that the tribunes prevailed despite their factious spirit, he explained in Federalist 63 that their success was due to “the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side.”108 For the Senate, however, the tables were turned. The Roman tribunes could rely on their popular support to make up for their faction, but the Senate in America, even without faction, was already fighting an uphill battle for it was struggling against the popular branch. This imbalance was a cause of great concern for Madison, who wanted the two branches to be equal, and the emergence of faction in the Senate would only further jeopardize its power.

Since even the smallest degree of faction could “kindle…unfriendly passions, and excite…most violent conflicts,” the Senate would begin to fight against itself rather than fighting the House as a unified front, preventing it from checking the populist excesses of the House. 109 The example of the Roman Senate, though Madison did not explicitly refer to it in this context, would have confirmed this link between the number of representatives and the amount of faction. Over the course of the republic, the number of the senators increased, growing rapidly at its end under Julius Caesar.110 Madison was certainly aware of this trend, noting of the Senate in his “Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies” that it “consisted originally of 100—usually abt. 300—finally by Jul. Caesar 1000.”111 Given Madison’s grasp of

Duraiswamy 32 this time period and these changes in the Senate, he would likely have noted the trends that accompanied the growth in the number of the senators. For one, towards the end of the republic, when the senators were more numerous, they became increasingly divided under factions—the optimates and the populares—the conservatives and the populists.112 The Senate became riddled with conflict and, thus, decayed from the more noble and idealized body of the early republic to one that partook in the strife and civil infirmities of the day. A clear confirmation of the lessons Madison had learned from the tribunes, this example would have reinforced his belief that a large Senate would be unable to act as proper guardians of the public good.

Furthermore, the Senate under Caesar—which Madison notes was diluted to a thousand members—became complicit in the destruction of the republic, supporting his quest for power and conferring upon him the title of dictator for life—in the Roman sense.113 To Madison, it would have appeared that just as the tribunes fell prey to the senators when their numbers increased, so too were the senators subject to the mercy of powerful men such as Caesar once they became a large body. Their large numbers made it easy for opponents to create divisions among them and, thus, establish pockets of support. That Brutus and Cassius had to resort to murder on the Senate floor to save the republic would have only emphasized to Madison the senators’ growing inability to maintain stability and uphold the public good.114 Even worse, the Senate soon after gave up much of its power to Octavian, signaling the end of the republic.115 To prevent the American Senate from decaying in a similar fashion, Madison understood that it would have to remain a small, select body. Only with this established could it remain unified and resist threats to the public good from other branches of government—especially the House.

Notably, Madison did not wish faction to be removed from the House since the purpose of the

Duraiswamy 33 House, as the direct representative of the people, was to encompass all of their diverse interests—that is, to represent faithfully each of the many factions among the populace.116 In sum, Madison’s conception of the Senate was fundamentally shaped by his studies of the Roman Republic. The very existence of this body was inspired by the examples of similar institutions in the ancient civilizations, especially ancient Rome. His understanding of its twofold check on the house—one as an enlightened body of citizens and one as a representative of landed interests—stemmed from Polybius’ portrayal of the Roman government and from his own reading of the class conflict in ancient Rome. The idea of the virtuous Senate had its source in Madison’s central belief in the necessity of virtue, which, in turn, was ultimately rooted in the classical texts he had read as a youth. Even the structure of the Senate as a small legislative body took shape out of the size and power of ancient institutions, especially the Roman tribunes and Senate. While, as with most aspects of Madison’s ideology, many diverse sources certainly contributed to his conception of the Senate—the colonial legislatures, for example—it is nevertheless hard to deny the pervasive influence of the Roman Republic.

The Resulting Impact on the Constitution With the classical roots of Madison’s Senate thus established, the logical step in carrying this analysis to its conclusion is to examine the ultimate impact of these classical examples—that is, the impact they had on the structure of the Senate in the Constitution as a result of Madison’s efforts at the Constitutional Convention. In the previous section, the impacts of the Roman Republic were direct; looking back to examples from ancient times, Madison shaped his political ideologies to account for the events he observed. The classical impacts in this section, however, are mostly indirect; they encompass aspects of the Senate that Madison devised as a means of achieving the classically influenced functions discussed earlier. Incorporated into the

Duraiswamy 34 Constitution as a result of Madison’s efforts—he was, after all, the unofficial “Father of the Constitution”—these aspects of the Senate were its higher minimum age for members, longer terms, and smaller number of members.117 When exploring these concepts, it is important to note that Madison’s efforts at the Convention were not the only reason that these ideas became a part of the Constitution. Though it is true that “Madison, more than any other Founding Father…shaped our constitutional system of government,” each of the Framers was a brilliant thinker in his own right, and some came to support these parts of the Constitution for their own independent reasons.118 The first way in which the structure of the Senate in the Constitution reflected the purpose of the institution as envisioned by Madison was the higher age requirement for senators than for representatives. At heart, the different age requirements would allow the Senate to restrain the House better. He believed that to increase checks in a bicameral legislature, “it must be politic to distinguish [the two bodies] from each other by every circumstance.”119 With differing age requirements, the Senate would be more at odds with the House and would, thus, be able to carry out more effectively its Polybian role of restraining the House’s democratic excesses. More specifically, Madison explained in Federalist 62 that [A qualification] proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist[s] in a more advanced age…The propriety of [this distinction] is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages.120

Duraiswamy 35 With “Greater extent of information” referring to the wisdom senators must possess and “stability of character” referring to the virtue they needed, Madison here displayed that the age requirement advanced the two fundamental functions of the Senate—a check against populist passions and a seat of virtue in the government. Over time, an individual gathered more wisdom and shed the character infirmities of their youth, making them more suitable to be a senator.

Therefore, by limiting membership to those of greater age, the Constitution allowed the Senate to better serve the purposes that Madison had adapted from the Roman Republic.

Madison, though, had less of a hand in establishing this aspect of the Senate in the Constitution than he did in establishing the two other aspects that will be discussed later—its term length and size. When the issue of senatorial age first came up at the Constitutional Convention, the delegates approved the provision that senators be at least thirty years of age without any debate.121 For this reason, Madison was never able to explain his reasoning to the delegates; they made their decision based on their own beliefs rather than his. Nonetheless, he may have indirectly influenced the outcome of this vote, especially considering that he was one of the most influential members of the Convention. By the time the vote took place, Madison had already explained to the delegates his idea of the Senate as an aristocratic body.122 In accepting this function of the Senate—advanced by Madison as well as several other delegates—the Convention would perhaps have seen it as self-evident that the age of senators should be greater than that of representatives for the same reason Madison did and, thus, would have incorporated it into the Constitution. The end result was that the minimum age for senators was set at thirty, as it still is now, which, though it does not seem quite old today, was more significant at the time given both that the average life expectancy was shorter and that the minimum age for the House

Duraiswamy 36 was markedly less—twenty-five years.123 And while the exact extent of their impact is uncertain, Madison’s classical ideas concerning the Senate had some role in creating this requirement.

Where Madison and his classical ideas had a clearer effect was on the Constitution’s established term length for senators. In pressing the need for longer Senate term limits, Madison provided three reasons for this advocacy—all relating to the institution’s ability to function as a Polybian aristocratic branch of the government. The first stemmed from the need for wisdom in the Senate. As discussed earlier, Madison envisioned the Senate to have greater “knowledge of the public interests” so that by solving for the “want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation” in government, it could check the poor decisions of the House and effectively pursue the public good.124,125 While requiring senators to be of greater age would help ensure their greater wisdom, it was an insufficient measure by itself for the reason that Madison noted in Federalist 62: “[i]t is not possible that an assembly of men…continued in appointment for a short time…should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust.”126 The reasoning behind this statement was that without sufficient experience in the government, legislators would not fully understand what was best for the public good. Madison may have had in mind the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation whose delegates were elected annually and whose laws he considered “so many monuments of deficient wisdom.”127 If, on the other hand, senators remained in office for a longer period of time, they would gather the requisite wisdom to act in the public interest and check the rashness of the House. To this end, the system in the Constitution whereby one-third of the senators would be elected every two years rather than all of them every six further secured wisdom in the Senate by assuring that at no point would all of its members be inexperienced.

Duraiswamy 37 A second reason Madison provided was that only by serving for longer periods of time could senators look after the long-term interests of the people. As he noted in Federalist 63, “[t]he objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.”128 The latter—laws that operated slowly over the long-term—would have to be the responsibility, in Madison’s mind, of the enlightened Senate, first, because it was the only body in government with sufficient wisdom and knowledge to decide what would be best for the nation over greater time periods and, second, because he believed the people and their direct representatives to be too short-sighted to consider long-term issues. However, Madison recognized that “[r]esponsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to the objects within the power of the responsible part.”129 Senators appointed annually or biennially, for example, could not be held responsible for issues that would unfold over many years “any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements, which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years.”130 To Madison, therefore, “[t]he proper remedy for this defect” was that the Senate should “[have] sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention.”131 With this in place, it could properly carry out its intended role as a classically inspired enlightened upper house.

Lastly, Madison believed that longer terms would provide the Senate the stability necessary to check the popular passions of the House. Stability was one of the central ideas of Madison’s Senate. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, he explained in Federalist 63 that the ancient senates were “very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty” (emphasis added).132 This stability was critical since the Senate was supposed to

Duraiswamy 38 remedy the “fickleness and passions” of the people and the House; it could not carry out this function if it too changed its course constantly.133 Importantly, Madison noted that “mutability in the public councils…[arose] from a rapid succession of new members.”134 Therefore, the senators, if elected often, would reflect the whims of the common people and augment the inconstancy of the House but, if elected less frequently, would hold a steady course and moderate the House. In Madison’s words, “[a senate] ought…to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.135 This idea of stability was what Madison used at the Constitutional Convention to defend long terms for the Senate. Though many delegates supported his position, it was by no means a clear issue for them; many strongly opposed long terms because of their experiences with Parliament in England.136 During the debate on this issue, Madison attempted both to assuage those concerns and to defend his desire for stability in the Senate by explaining on the Convention floor, [I consider] 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we [wish is] to give to the [Government] that stability which [is] every where called for…[I am] not afraid of giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. [My] fear [is] that the popular branch [will] still be too great an overmatch for it…The Constitution of Maryland [is] the only one that [bears] any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance [has] the Senate of Maryd. created just suspicions of danger from it…In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the [House] of [Delegates] they [have] had with them the suffrages [i.e. support] of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates [are] chosen in the same manner as the other branches,

Duraiswamy 39 of the Legislature, and [hold] their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check whatever [against] the instabilities of the other branches.137

In the end, Madison’s views prevailed. Immediately following this speech, the Convention voted to include seven-year senatorial terms to the Constitution—eight states to one with two states divided.138 Granted, some delegates may have supported this proposition even without Madison’s insistence; Edmund Randolph, for example, presented nearly identical arguments in a speech preceding Madison’s (though Madison may have influenced him before as both were in the Virginia delegation), and others voiced this opinion at later debates in the Convention.139,140 Nonetheless, Madison must have influenced the delegates’ decision to some degree.

Compared to other explanations of this argument, Madison’s was more complete and detailed, which would have made it more persuasive to the Convention. Moreover, his warning that senates with frequent elections failed to rein in popular instabilities had greater significance because it tied into his earlier description at the Convention of the need for the Senate to act as a check on the House. Especially on an issue like this where opinions were divided, such arguments would have had considerable power to alter the outcome of the Convention’s vote.

Interestingly, the fact that Madison used the example of the state senates to inform his decision indicates the indirect, rather than direct, impact of the Roman Republic on this aspect of the Constitution; while the ultimate goal was to achieve a Polybian Senate, the means through which Madison achieved that goal—longer terms for senators—was not classically inspired. While the Convention later changed the term length from seven years to six, it still remained—and does remain today—far greater than the House term length of two years as Madison had intended.

Another aspect of the Senate in the Constitution that bears Madison’s mark is its size— small rather than large. Aside from the classically influenced idea discussed earlier that faction

Duraiswamy 40 would occur in large bodies, there were two reasons for this decision. First, Madison believed that a large legislature would become captive to the opinions of a handful of its most powerful members, preventing it from acting with wisdom and reason. As he explained in Federalist 58, [T]he larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.141

Thus, in a larger assembly, calm and informed discussion could not occur; instead, a few influential orators would dominate the legislature and bend it to their own opinions (he perhaps had in mind Patrick Henry whose passionate speeches often prevailed over reasoned arguments in the Virginia legislature to Madison’s great frustration).142 Since this sort of demagoguery was one of flaws of popular government that Madison lamented, he hoped the Senate, as the enlightened aristocratic body, would restrain this behavior and, therefore, explained in Federalist 62 that “a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous.”143 Madison’s second reason for creating a small Senate was that it would, in furtherance of the Polybian ideal that the aristocratic body should consist of the “justest and wisest men,” lead

Duraiswamy 41 to senators of higher character and greater commitment to the public good. Indeed, Madison noted in Federalist 10 (in a different but analogous situation) that when “each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens…the suffrages of the people being more free…will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.”144 This idea corresponds directly to the Madison’s belief, described earlier, that the Senate should be the seat of virtue in the government and that its members, therefore, should be of higher character and quality. By increasing the selectivity of the senatorial election process through limiting the number of members, he hoped to increase the stature of the members of the Senate. The smaller number of senators would also make them more attentive to national interests, for, as Madison explained in Federalist 58, “in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the interest with which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government.”145 Held more accountable for their actions because of their elevated status, they would better pursue the public good in accordance with their role as the enlightened upper house.

As noted towards the end of the previous section, Madison used these arguments at the Constitutional Convention to speak out in favor of a smaller Senate. To the other delegates, he explained that in Rome, “[t]he more the representatives of the people…were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves…and of course, the less capable of fulfilling their trust.”146 Support for this position, however, was by no means unanimous. Several other delegates argued in favor of a large Senate, including John Dickinson, who, speaking before Madison, “hoped there would be 80 and twice 80 [senators]” because “[i]f their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them.”147 Despite this opposition, Madison’s views prevailed in the end with

Duraiswamy 42 the number of senators set at two per state—twenty-six total at the time. While this decision by the Convention demonstrates the impact of Madison on the size of the Senate, it also suggests the broader influence of his classical conception of the Senate. Twenty-six senators could not reasonably be expected to represent all the diverse interests of each individual group or faction across the thirteen states as the House was supposed to do. Instead, their small number indicates that the Convention intended for them to pool their knowledge in an impartial manner to protect the long-term public good—to be the “Guardians of justice and general Good” Madison had hoped for, modeled on the just and wise aristocratic branch Polybius had described.148 Many delegates, thus, must have shared or adopted Madison’s views.

While Madison thus had a significant impact on the structure of the Senate in the Constitution, influencing its age requirement, term length, and size, it is important to recognize that not all aspects of his vision were incorporated into the actual Senate—notably his method of electing senators. As discussed earlier, the system in the Virginia Plan whereby the House elected senators protected several aspects of Madison’s Senate—its insulation from the people, its representation of landed interests, and its greater virtue. In contrast, however, the Constitution provided for election of the senators by the state legislatures because many delegates wished for “[t]he preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency” in the federal government.149 While this system, as it was distanced from the common people, still protected the aristocratic and virtuous functions of the Senate, Madison strongly opposed it, stating that “[i]f an election by the people, or thro[ugh] any other channel than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt and impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures.”150 Put simply, he saw this as one of the worst methods of electing senators.

Duraiswamy 43 The reason behind this belief is apparent in a similar issue—that of having the state legislatures pay the salaries of senators; here Madison argued that “[senators] would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places…during the pleasure of the State Legislatures… mak[ing] the Senate…the mere Agents and Advocates of State interests and views, instead of being the impartial umpires and Guardians of justice and general Good.”151 Election by the state legislatures would have the same effect, making senators beholden to their respective states rather than the nation as a whole. They would then be unable to pursue the public good as they ought to and, instead, would act in a short-sighted, self-interested manner. For Madison, the infirmities of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation, which represented individual state interests, would have supported this belief. Nonetheless, despite his opposition, the Convention still chose to represent state interests in the Senate and, thus, Madison’s classically influenced vision of an enlightened upper house was never realized in full.* Yet even the insulation from the people provided by election by the state legislatures disappeared over time. The idea of having an elite body in government—one that could be superior in wisdom to the people—has been widely held in America perhaps only at the time of its founding. From that point onwards almost without exception, the nation has moved towards greater and greater democratization of government. Jacksonian democracy was but the first step.

Successive generations have increasingly believed that all parts of government should be directly accountable to the people, that a government that resists the popular will was unjust. Springing forth from this ideological current, the Progressive Movement dealt the deathblow to the *

It is interesting to note that though state representation in the Senate was at odds with Madison’s classical Senate, it too had its own classical precedent. As Bederman notes, “the decision to have two senators perpetually elected from each State was directly modeled on the plan of Greek city-state representation on the Amphictyonic Council” (The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 224). Madison viewed the Greek confederacies as too weak and, thus, rejected this model, but it provides a compelling example of the fact that the use of classical history was not confined to any one side in the debates on the Constitution. The governments of antiquity shaped many different perspectives on how the American government should be structured.

Duraiswamy 44 Madisonian Senate—an institution of the elite—when it passed the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 establishing direct election of senators by the people instead of the state legislatures—an act that fundamentally altered the nature of the Senate. This reality means that upon analyzing Madison’s conception of the Senate and its classical antecedents, it is important—for better or for worse—not to equate that vision of the Senate with the institution that exists today.

Despite the expulsion of Polybius from the American Senate and the expulsion of the classics from the everyday in modern times, it is clear that just as much as the classics used to be a fundamental part of society in early America, so too were Polybius and the Roman Republic a fundamental part of the Senate and the Constitution. In Madison’s writings alone, the repeated invocations of ancient Rome compounded by the extensive implicit similarities to Roman history and classical authors speak of an undeniable classical influence—especially when his extensive education and readings in Latin and Greek are taken into account. That the other delegates tended to agree with him and chose to incorporate much of his classically influenced Senate into the Constitution is not surprising given that many of them shared with Madison “an education that…was almost entirely classical in subject matter and inspiration.”152 From that education, he and his compatriots found many of the principles that guided their construction of the American government. To say that Madison would have been lost without the example of ancient Rome is an overstatement, but to say that he again and again turned to it for guidance seems right on target. It is in this truth that the answer to the debate with which this paper opened—whether the classics influenced the Founders’ politics and the Constitution—can easily be found.

Duraiswamy 45 Notes

1

David J. Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2011), x, digital file.

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1971; Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1990), 19.

5

Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 3.

6

Ibid., 7-9.; Caroline Winterer, "Chapter 1: Antiquity in the New Nation," in A Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 10-13, 26-27.

7

Saul K. Padover, “The World of the Founding Fathers,� Social Research 52, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 197.

8

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 19-20.

9

Ibid., 20.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid., 25-28.

12

Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 7.

13

Ibid., 46.

14

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 27, 1785, Founders Online, National Archives.

15

Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 22.

16

Winterer, A Culture of Classicism, 18-20.

17

Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 277.

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.

Duraiswamy 46

20

Ibid., 22.

21

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 183-84.

22

James Madison, “Federalist 18,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 119-25.

23

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 46.

24

Ibid., 50.

25

Chris Mullin, “Classical Influence on the Founding Fathers: The Founding Fathers and the Classical World,” in American Government (ABC-CLIO).

26

James Madison, “Federalist 63,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 453.

27

Ibid.

28

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 45-50.

29

James Madison, “Federalist 49,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 363.

30

James Madison, “Federalist 62,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 444.

31

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 453.

32

Ibid., 452-53.

33

James Madison, “Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,” 1787, Founders Online, National Archives.

34

Ibid.

35

George M. Pepe, “Lex Hortensia Reforms the Roman Constitution,” in Great Events from History: The Ancient World, Prehistory-476 c.e., ed. W. Chavalas Mark (Salem Press, 2004).

36

Tom Holland, Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic (New York: Random House, 2003).

37

Ibid.

Duraiswamy 47

38

Ibid.

39

William T. Walker, “Polybius,” in Great Lives from History: The Ancient World, Prehistory476 c.e., ed. Christina A. Salowey (Salem Press, 2008).

40

Ibid.

41

Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 59.

42

Ibid., 15.

43

Polybius, The Histories, c. 150 BC.

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.; Bederman, The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution, 61.

47

Polybius, The Histories.

48

Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17-18.

49

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 183.

50

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 457.

51

James Madison, “Federalist 40,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 277.

52

RA Ames and HC Montgomery, “The Influence of Rome on the American Constitution,” The Classical Journal 30, no. 1 (October 1934): 26.

53

James Madison, “Federalist 47,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Schuster and Simon, 2004), 345.

54

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 50.

55

James Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 6, 1787, June 6, 1787, Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

56

James Madison, “Virginia Plan,” 1787, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

57

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 451-52.

Duraiswamy 48

58

Polybius, The Histories.

59

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 451-52.

60

Ibid.

61

James Madison, “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 26, 1787,” June 26, 1787, Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

62

Ibid.

63

Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 86.

64

Polybius, The Histories.

65

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 46.

66

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 453.

67

Polybius, The Histories.

68

James Madison, “Federalist 57,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 409.

69

Madison, “Federalist 63, in The Federalist Papers, 458.

70

James Madison, “Observation's on Jefferson's Draft for a Constitution of Virginia,” 1788, Founders Online, National Archives.

71

James Madison to Caleb Wallace, August 23, 1785, The Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund.

72

Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 6, 1787.

73

Jim Tschen Emmons, “Roman Republic,” in American Government (ABC-CLIO).

74

Ibid.

75

Madison, Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 26, 1787.

76

Ibid.

77

Ibid.

Duraiswamy 49

78

Madison, “Federalist 63, in The Federalist Papers, 457.

79

Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 65-72.

80

Pepe, “Lex Hortensia Reforms the Roman Constitution.”

81

Madison, “Observation's on Jefferson's Draft for a Constitution of Virginia.”

82

Madison, “Federalist 63, in The Federalist Papers, 456.

83

Polybius, The Histories.

84

Madison, “Federalist 63, in The Federalist Papers, 45-58.

85

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 46.

86

Polybius, The Histories.

87

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 46.

88

Gilbert Chinard, “Polybius and the American Constitution,” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (January 1940): 40.

89

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 46.

90

James Madison, “Federalist 55,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 403.

91

Madison, “Federalist 57,” in The Federalist Papers, 409.

92

James Madison, Representation, James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 20, 1788, The Founder's Constitution, University of Chicago Press and the Liberty Fund.

93

Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 71-72.

94

Madison, “Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.”

95

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

96

Madison, “Federalist 55,” in The Federalist Papers, 402; Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 441-42; Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 449.

97

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

98

Polybius, The Histories.

Duraiswamy 50

99

Madison, Representation, James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention.

100

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 6, 1787.”

101

Ibid.

102

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

103

Ibid.

104

James Madison, “Federalist 10,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 61-63.

105

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

106

Madison, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist Papers, 61.

107

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

108

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 457.

109

Madison, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist Papers, 63.

110

Holland, Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic.

111

Madison, “Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.”

112

Holland, Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic.

113

Ibid.

114

Ibid.

115

Ibid.

116

James Madison, “Federalist 56,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 404-06.

117

AE Dick Howard, “James Madison and the Constitution,” The Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 80.

118

Ibid., 91.

119

Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 444.

Duraiswamy 51

120

Ibid., 441-42.

121

James Madison, “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 12, 1787,” June 12, 1787, Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

122

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

123

Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 441.

124

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

125

Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 445.

126

Ibid.

127

Ibid.

128

Madison, “Federalist 63,” in The Federalist Papers, 450-451.

129

Ibid., 450.

130

Ibid., 451.

131

Ibid.

132

Ibid., 453.

133

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

134

Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 446.

135

Ibid., 445.

136

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 12, 1787.”

137

Ibid.

138

Ibid.

139

Ibid.

140

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

Duraiswamy 52

141

James Madison, “Federalist 58,” 1788, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 420-21.

142

Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography, 217.

143

James Madison, “Federalist 62,” in The Federalist Papers, 444-45.

144

Madison, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist Papers, 67.

145

Madison, “Federalist 58,” in The Federalist Papers, 420.

146

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

147

Ibid.

148

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

149

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 7, 1787.”

150

Ibid.

151

Madison, “Notes on the Debates, June 26, 1787.”

152

Ames and Montgomery, “The Influence of Rome on the American Constitution,” 20.

Duraiswamy 53

Bibliography Ames, RA, and HC Montgomery. “The Influence of Rome on the American Constitution.” The Classical Journal 30, no. 1 (October 1934): 19-27. http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/pdfplus/3290141.pdf?acceptTC=true.

In this journal article, Ames and Montgomery—at the time, Professors of History at Wabash College, present an explanation of how the example of ancient Rome shaped the Constitution. They focus especially on Polybius’ mixed constitution and its impact on the separation of powers in America. This source was useful for this paper because of its description of the classical nature of early American education that the authors used to contextualize their argument. Furthermore, it allowed the paper to identify Montesquieu as the intermediary between Polybius and the Framers’ idea of separation of powers.

Bederman, David J. The Classical Foundations of the American Constitution. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Digital file.

This book provides a detailed analysis of the impact of the classics on the Constitution— both on general ideologies in the document and specific sections. In his analysis, Bederman— then, a Professor of Law at Emory University and the author of many works on the impact of foreign legal practices on American jurisprudence—first describes the pervasiveness of the antiquities in the Founders’ education and the specific classical texts they were most familiar with. From there, he proceeds methodically through numerous parts of the Constitution and describes their classical antecedents. This book was most informative for this paper in its discussion of the classical education of the Founders and its explanation of the significance of Polybius. As well, it provided an introduction to the two competing theories on the impact of the classics on the Framers.

Chinard, Gilbert. “Polybius and the American Constitution.” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (January 1940): 38-58. http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/pdfplus/2707009.pdf.

Chinard, a former Professor of French Literature at Princeton University and an expert on early American history, provides in this journal article another analysis of the classical inspirations of the Constitution, focusing mostly on Polybius and the separation of powers. This source, thus, aided the paper’s explanation of Polybius and his significance. In addition, the parts of the article that describe how the Founders openly embraced and followed classical ideas helped this paper explain the mechanisms through which the classics influenced the Founders.

Emmons, Jim Tschen. “Roman Republic.” In American Government. ABC-CLIO. http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Search/Display/1811765?terms=rome.

In this reference article, Emmons, a Ph.D. in History from UC Santa Barbara, provides a brief overview of the history and structure of the Roman Republic. Because of this, it provided useful context for some of the examples from ancient Rome that influenced Madison’s ideology.

Most notably, it highlighted the overarching struggle between the plebeians and patricians in

Duraiswamy 54

ancient Rome, which this paper was able to use to analyze the function of Madison’s Senate as a representative of landed interests.

Holland, Tom. Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic. New York: Random House, 2003.

In this book, Holland—British author and historian of the classical and medieval eras and a graduate of Cambridge University—gives a thorough account of the downfall of the Roman Republic that spans slightly over a century, starting with the efforts of the Gracchi brothers and ending with Augustus’ ascension to power. Thus, this source offered useful background for this paper’s discussions of Madison’s analysis of the decline of the Roman Republic. Furthermore, by suggesting causes of the Republic’s fall that Madison might also have noticed, it highlighted issues that Madison might have sought to account for in his construction of the Senate.

Howard, AE Dick. “James Madison and the Constitution.” The Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 80-91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40256894.

This journal article by Howard, a Professor of Law and Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, who focuses on constitutional law, provides a brief account of Madison’s life with emphasis on his role in crafting the Constitution. In explaining his significance as the father of the Constitution, this source was helpful for this paper as it provided greater support for the paper’s arguments that the sections of the Constitution that seem to correspond to Madison’s Senate were brought about, at least partly, by his efforts.

Ketcham, Ralph. James Madison: A Biography. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1990. First published 1971 by Macmillan.

In this book, Ketcham, a Professor Emeritus of American Studies, Political Science, and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, provides one of the most authoritative biographies of Madison. Drawing from an extensive list of sources, he describes in great detail each part of Madison’s life, providing a complete picture of the father of the Constitution. The section of Ketcham’s work that was invaluable for this paper was the thorough account of Madison’s education from his early days at Donald Robertson’s school to his time at Princeton—an account which naturally outlined the classical curriculum that Madison followed. As a result, the first section of the paper was able to provide background that was specific to Madison’s education rather than just the education of the Framers’ in general. Furthermore, Ketcham clearly emphasizes the significance of the classics to Madison’s mind, providing more support for the paper’s thesis.

Lintott, Andrew. The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Lintott, a Professor of Roman History at the University of Oxford, examines in this book the unwritten constitution of the Roman Republic, analyzing accounts of its political customs and procedures to identify the structure and rules of its government. This account of ancient Rome

Duraiswamy 55

aided the paper’s analysis of Madison’s adaptation of lessons from Rome by providing more context for Madison’s source materials. Furthermore, specific facts were helpful—for example, that censors in Rome had the power to remove senators who were not on good behavior.

Madison, James. “Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.” 1787.

Founders Online. National Archives. http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0183.

As a supplement to Madison’s earlier “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,” this document includes additional details about the many confederacies he had studied as well as notes on the governments of Rome, Sparta, and Carthage—though they were not confederacies.

This source, from Madison’s own pen, allowed the paper to establish with certainty some of what Madison knew of the Roman Republic rather than having to speculate or quote scholars’ speculation. One point that was especially useful was Madison’s statement that displayed his awareness of the increase in the size of the Senate over the course of the Republic.

———. “Federalist 10.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 60-69. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Written by Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay to encourage New York to ratify the Constitution, the Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays carefully describing the benefits of the Constitution and its superiority to the Articles of Confederation. Though all were written under the pseudonym Publius, historians have used Madison and Hamilton’s private records to identify who wrote each of the essays. Madison’s essays provide an invaluable window into his understanding of the Constitution as well as his broader political ideology. They were, thus, fundamental to this paper’s analysis. In Federalist 10 specifically, Madison’s first Federalist, he presents his novel theory of the extended republic. While his explanation aided the paper’s discussion of faction, smaller facets of the argument also elucidated other beliefs of his—for example, that officials elected by a greater number of people would be of higher character.

———. “Federalist 18.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 119-25. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

In this Federalist Paper, Madison explains the flaws of weak national governments by carefully recounting the failures of the ancient Greek confederacies. While this dislike of confederacies was a classical influence, this source was more important for the section section of the paper—examining how Madison used the classics rather than what he used them for—in that it provided firsthand of evidence of the fact that Madison actively studied the antiquities to inform his opinions on the American government ———. “Federalist 40.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 277-86. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Duraiswamy 56

Madison uses this essay to address the argument that the Constitutional Convention had the power only to revise the Articles of Confederation not to draft a new charter of government. The importance of this Federalist for the paper, however, lay not in the overall message of the essay.

Instead, a specific statement Madison makes towards the beginning—referring to the proposed plan as a “mixed Constitution”—helped establish Madison’s familiarity with Polybius and suggested that Polybius had some degree of impact on ideology.

———. “Federalist 47.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 344-52. New York: Schuster and Simon, 2004.

Refuting claims that the Constitution’s three branches of government were too interconnected, Madison, in this essay, explains how the Constitution had actually achieved a proper balance of powers that would restrain the government and secure liberty for the people.

Where this source was most helpful was in cautioning against the reading that Polybius’ main impact was on the separation of powers. The reason is that when Madison explains the separation of powers in this essay, he cites Montesquieu as the authority, never Polybius, and he refers largely to the example of the British government, never the Roman government.

———. “Federalist 49.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 360-65. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

In this essay, Madison provides several responses to a proposal that if two-thirds of two branches of the government wished, they could request a convention from the people to amend the Constitution and redress any violations of it. More important for this paper than the overall message of the argument was a specific point Madison made that revealed one of his beliefs about government. He noted that the legislative branch was the most likely to accumulate power at the expense of the other branches, which helped the paper explain why the legislative branch alone had two sections.

———. “Federalist 55.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 397-403. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

One of several Federalist Papers describing the House of Representatives, this essay focuses on its size, addressing concerns that it had too few members to be a safe “depositary of public interests.” As with some of the other Federalists, this source was helpful for this paper not for its primary argument but for some of the more minor arguments Madison made in it, revealing his political beliefs. For example, he explained that virtue was essential to the function of a republic, which aided the paper’s discussion of the virtuous Senate.

———. “Federalist 56.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 404-08. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

This Federalist Paper responds to worries that the House was too small for congressmen to represent effectively the interests of their constituents. What was informative in this essay’s argument was its explanation of how the House would represent the factions of the people. By

Duraiswamy 57

contrasting this idea with the fact that the Senate was supposed to be free from faction, the paper was able to display how Madison used the House and Senate in conjunction to great effect—in this case, allowing faction to exist in the House but using the Senate to restrain its harmful effects.

———. “Federalist 57.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 409-15. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

In Federalist 57, Madison refutes claims that the members of the House would not be representative of the masses. This source’s most important contribution to the paper lay in Madison’s statement that the primary purpose of a government is to secure officials who are distinguished in their wisdom and virtue. Thus, it aided several analyses in the third section of the paper, supporting the argument that Madison believed in the ideal of wisdom behind Polybius’ aristocracy and the argument that Madison wished for virtue in government.

———. “Federalist 58.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 416-22. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Yet another essay on the House, Federalist 58 contains Madison’s defense against the argument that the number of representatives would not increase in proportion to the increase in the nation’s population. Where this source was useful for the paper was in the fourth section— specifically concerning Madison’s belief that the Senate should be a small body. In this essay Madison explained that legislatures with many members would fall prey to the power of a handful of orators and that when representatives were more in the spotlight, they would be more attentive to the public good. When these ideas were applied to the Senate, they suggested that the Senate would have to be a small body to fulfill its Polybian aristocratic role. This source, thus, helped explain why Madison supported a small Senate.

———. “Federalist 62.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 441-48. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

The first of two essays explaining the structure and function of the Senate, Federalist 62 covers a number of the institution’s aspects, including the qualification requirements for its members, their method of election, the equal representation of states in the Senate, the number of senators, and their term lengths. This source was, thus, quite important for this paper, especially the fourth section. It provided explanations for why Madison structured the Senate in the ways that he did; the paper was then able to take these explanations and connect them to the classical ideas he had adopted.

———. “Federalist 63.” 1788. In The Federalist Papers, edited by Cynthia Brantley Johnson, 449-59. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

In Federalist 63—the second of his two essays on the Senate—Madison, in essence, launches into a detailed praise of the virtues of the proposed Senate. Without a doubt, this source was one of the most important to the paper for not only did it provide an extensive amount of

Duraiswamy 58

information on Madison’s views of the Senate but it also provided a great deal of information on the classical influences on the Senate as Madison spends much of the essay discussing the ancient governments and their senate-like institutions; Madison also explains his idea that the Senate would act as a balancing force on the House, which was essential in this paper’s analysis of the link between Madison’s Senate and Polybius’ mixed constitution. Perhaps more paragraphs of this Federalist are cited in the paper than are not. A few examples of this source’s uses include the idea that the Senate had to have longer terms so that it could look after long term interests (helpful in the fourth section), the observation that no long-lasting ancient republic lacked a senate (important for the third section), the explanation that though America and the antiquities are quite different, there are still some points of similarity (useful for the second section), and an explicit citation of Polybius concerning Carthage (helpful in the third section).

———. James Madison to Caleb Wallace, August 23, 1785. The Online Library of Liberty.

Liberty Fund. http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1934&chap ter=118555&layout=html&Itemid=27.

In this letter to Caleb Wallace of Kentucky, a friend from his days at Princeton, Madison outlines his views on the best form of government; carefully describing carefully each branch of government should be structured. His commentary on the legislature was helpful for this paper as he explains his belief that the Senate was essential for the government and that it should function as a body providing stability to the legislature. This source, thus, supported the paper’s explanation of the connection between Polybius and Madison’s Senate.

———. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 27, 1785. Founders Online. National Archives. http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0146.

Madison wrote this letter to Jefferson, one of his closest friends, while Jefferson was serving as the US ambassador to France. In addition to updated Jefferson on events in America, he also included a list of books he wished Jefferson to bring back from France—among them, several classical texts and commentaries on ancient history. The fact that Madison still sought to learn more about the antiquities almost a decade and a half after graduated from college helped the paper establish in the first section that he continued to admire and study the classics throughout his life, which, in turn, supported the paper’s thesis that the classics were an importance inspiration for some of his political beliefs.

———. Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 6, 1787. June 6, 1787. Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_606.asp.

While other records of the Constitutional Convention exist—an official record and the private records of several delegates, Madison’s notes are by far the most extensive. Having spent much time studying the histories of previous governments, he realized how information a thorough record of the creation of the Constitution would be to future generations, especially concerning “the principles, the reasons, and the anticipations, which prevailed in the formation” of the Constitution. For this paper, Madison’s notes did indeed serve this purpose. They provided

Duraiswamy 59

critical insight into Madison’s views on the best form over government for America.

Furthermore, they allowed the paper to understand better how his beliefs influenced the decisions of the Convention. One of the discussions recorded in these specific notes—the notes from the debates on June 6—concerned the method of electing the House. In this debate, Madison voiced his firm belief in the need for one branch of the legislature to be popular—which helped the paper explain why the other branch had to be aristocratic. He also presented his reading of history that saw divisions based on wealth to be inevitable in society, which was important for the paper’s explanation of how the classics shaped his idea that the Senate should also be a representative of landed interests.

———. “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 7, 1787.” June 7, 1787. Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_607.asp.

These notes of the Convention covered a debate over the size of the Senate and the method of electing senators. In a speech during this debate, Madison presented his argument that the tribunes, when more numerous, fell into faction, which helped the paper explain the classical influences on the Senate’s small size. Furthermore, he strongly urged against the election of senators by the state legislatures. Because that electoral mechanism was eventually incorporated in the Constitution, this source, thus, demonstrated that not all of Madison’s views were adopted by the Convention, which helped the paper qualify the extent of his influence on the Constitution.

———. “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 12, 1787.” June 12, 1787.

Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_612.asp.

In this Convention debate, Madison argued for longer terms in the Senate—seven years to be precise—based on the idea that it would have to be a stable body. By connecting a structural aspect of the Senate to the idea of stability that was classically influenced, this source was important in the fourth section for explaining how the classical ideas Madison had adopted indirectly shaped the Constitution.

———. “Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, June 26, 1787.” June 26, 1787.

Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_626.asp.

On June 26, the Convention spent the whole day discussing various aspects of the Senate, including term lengths for senators and the method of paying them. This source was quite important to the paper because in the course of participating in these discussions, Madison also made many statements that revealed his views on how the Senate should function. Most significantly, he carefully explained his belief that the Senate should act as a check against the improper decisions of the people both by providing stability and wisdom and by representing the interests of the wealthy so that they would not be oppressed by the masses. The paper was able to use these explanations to connect Madison’s Senate to classical antecedents.

Duraiswamy 60

———. “Observation's on Jefferson's Draft for a Constitution of Virginia.” 1788. Founders Online. National Archives. http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-020216.

At the request of John Brown of Kentucky, Madison prepared these comments on a draft for a new constitution for Virginia that Jefferson had created in 1783. In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of Jefferson’s plan, he revealed many of his own beliefs on how a republican government should function. Most useful for this paper was his explanation of the function of the Senate. He described the Senate not only as an upper house providing wisdom and stability but also as a protector of the rights and interests of the wealthy minority, explaining how senatorial election methods could be structured to achieve this function. For this reason, this source was important in the third section for describing the Senate’s second classically influenced balancing function ———. Representation, James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention. June 20, 1788. The Founder's Constitution. University of Chicago Press and the Liberty Fund. http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s36.html.

In this speech from the Virginia’s convention for ratifying the Constitution, Madison explained that a virtuous citizenry was necessary for a republic because they would ensure the election of good representatives and prevent the government from becoming corrupted. This source was useful to the discussion of the virtuous Senate for two reasons. First, it reinforced the importance of virtue—a classical value—to Madison. Second, it demonstrated that Madison did not place all his faith in the Senate, hoping that the people would act as a check on them.

———. “Virginia Plan.” 1787. The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vatexta.asp.

Written mostly by Madison with some input from other members of the Virginia delegation, the Virginia Plan was an initial proposal for a new government brought to the Convention that served as a starting point for the debates. Thus, it provides a useful insight into how Madison wished the new American government to be structured. For this paper specifically, the Virginia Plan was helpful because it indicated that Madison wished senators to be elected by the House, giving further proof that he wished the Senate to be removed from the people and also displaying how he wished to establish that.

Mullin, Chris. “Classical Influence on the Founding Fathers: The Founding Fathers and the Classical World.” In American Government. ABC-CLIO. http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Analyze/Display/1296540?cid=14&webSiteCode=SLN_A MGOV&returnToPage=%2fAnalyze%2fDisplay%2f1296540%3fcid%3d14&terms=rom e&token=8BF847AE22376DCFCE7B8B4DF5E10BFA&casError=False.

This reference article discusses both the significance of the classics to the Founders and some of the ways in which the classics influenced them. It was most useful in the second section since it explained that the Founders did not seek to emulate the Roman Republic but, instead,

Duraiswamy 61

recognized its flaws and sought to fix them. This analysis opened the paper later on to discussion not only of the ways in which Madison incorporated facets of the Roman republic but also sought to account for the problems that led to its downfall.

Padover, Saul K. “The World of the Founding Fathers.” Social Research 52, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 191-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982556.

In this journal article, Padover—then a historian at the New School for Social Research— paints a picture of America at the time of the Founders. As part of this analysis, he describes their education, especially its immense focus on classical studies. Thus, this source was useful in the first section of the paper as it provided a clear background of the classical education in early America within which Madison’s own classical education took place. Discussing the significance of the classics in the education of the time was, in turn, important because it provided the necessary context to make the papers thesis about the significance of the classics appear more plausible.

Pepe, George M. “Lex Hortensia Reforms the Roman Constitution.” In Great Events from History: The Ancient World, Prehistory-476 c.e., edited by W. Chavalas Mark. N.p.: Salem Press, 2004. http://puffin.harker.org:2316/doi/full/10.3331/GEAW_1611249022?prevSearch=roman% 2Bsenate&searchHistoryKey=&queryHash=12d82e05a47af05bc541a325d01db43f.

In this reference article, Pepe—a Professor of Classics at the Washington University in St. Louis—describes the Lex Hortensia, a law in 287 BC that gave plebiscites the power of laws enforceable on all of Rome. As part of this discussion, the article places the law within the context of a larger struggle between the patricians and the plebeians for political power. This context was useful, first, in establishing the plebeians gained more power over the course of the republic—a trend that reinforced the notion that a strong aristocratic branch was necessary—and, second, in demonstrating that the Senate in Rome had represented the interests of the patricians, an aspect of the Roman Senate that Madison adopted.

Polybius. The Histories. c. 150 BC. http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/home.html.

This primary source is Polybius’ account of the growth of the Roman Republic up through the Punic Wars. In Chapter VI, the section that this paper cites, Polybius describes the theory of the three forms of government, the theory of anacyclosis (the cyclic pattern of good and bad governments), and his idea of the mixed constitution existing within the Roman Republic. This source provided the necessary background in the third section of the paper for explaining how Madison modeled much of the Senate on the aristocratic branch of the tripartite government. Furthermore, it allowed the paper to identify specific similarities between Polybius’ theory and Madison’s.

Rakove, Jack N. James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic. Edited by Mark C. Carnes. 3rd ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Duraiswamy 62

In this book, Rakove—a Professor of History and American Studies at Stanford University, one of whose specialties is the theory of James Madison—provides a brief account of the life of Madison and his impact on the American government. It was most useful for this paper in establishing what aspects of previous American legislatures, such as the Continental Congress and that of Virginia, Madison wished to change. By identifying what aspects Madison wished to change, the paper could then examine how he used classical examples to meet those deficiencies.

Walker, William T. “Polybius.” In Great Lives from History: The Ancient World, Prehistory-476 c.e., edited by Christina A. Salowey. 2 vols. N.p.: Salem Press, 2008. http://puffin.harker.org:2316/doi/full/10.3331/GLAW_3611222011?prevSearch=polybius &searchHistoryKey=&queryHash=afa8ba3119e7044e15f5b153a72111d2.

This reference article by Walker, a Professor of History at the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science, provides a brief biography of Polybius ideas, discusses his contributions to historiography, and summarizes the main ideas within Polybius work. It was most useful to this paper in establishing why Polybius discussed Rome’s government in his work—to explain the rapid growth of the Roman Republic—since it provided background before launching into a discussion of Polybius’ theories. Furthermore, the fact that Polybius set the idea of the mixed constitution at the center of the success of Rome’s government and its civilization as a whole helped explain why his ideas were so important to the Founding Fathers.

Winterer, Caroline. "Chapter 1: Antiquity in the New Nation." In The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life 1780-1910, 10-43. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

In Chapter I of her book, Winterer—a Professor of History at Stanford University— discusses the role of the classics in early America in many aspects—from education to society to political theory. The ultimate thesis of this chapter is that the classics were of paramount importance to the people of the seventeen hundreds, who treated the classics with unrivaled respect. This source was, thus, helpful in several respects. It emphasized the significance of the classics in colonial education, which, via the first section, helped suggest why classical ideas may have been such a formative part of Madison’s political theories. Furthermore, it explained how the Founders looked to classical political history as a predictor of future events, reinforcing the idea in the second section of the paper that Madison would certainly have used the classics to help him shape his thoughts on the American government.

The Harker School | 500 Saratoga Ave., San Jose CA 95129 OofC: 4/14 (RM)