Simonian Mitra

2015-16 Mitra FAMILY GRANT Recipient Whispers in Russia: The Influence of the Rumors Surrounding Empress Alexandra Feodorovna on the Russian Revolution and Their Role in the German Effort to Overthrow the Tsarist Regime Natalie Simonian, Class of 2016

WHISPERS IN RUSSIA: THE INFUENCE OF THE RUMORS SURROUNDING EMPRESS ALEXANDRA FEODOROVNA ON THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THEIR ROLE IN THE GERMAN EFFORT TO OVERTHROW THE TSARIST REGIME

Natalie Simonian 2016 Mitra Family Scholar Mentors: Ms. Donna Gilbert, Mrs. Lauri Vaughan April 6, 2016

In a revolutionary crisis it is perceptions and beliefs that really count…All revolutions are based in part on myth.

Orlando Figes

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The various scandals, intrigues, and rumors that surrounded Empress Alexandra Feodorovna in the last years of the Romanov dynasty played a significant role in the disintegration of centuries of tsarist rule, ultimately culminating in the Revolution of 1917. From the salacious stories that circulated regarding her relationship with the notorious Gregory Rasputin, to wild allegations that she was supplying Kaiser Wilhelm II with vital information revealing Russia’s military movements during World War I, Alexandra Feodorovna was widely hated for being an adulteress, a traitor, and a cold, rude Tsaritsa who had little interest in maintaining the longstanding customs of the Russian court. However, while Alexandra may have sowed the seeds for some of this discontent by misunderstanding the importance of her public image, the effect of this public displeasure would not have been nearly so ruinous without the interference of an outside party, namely the German regime. In order to wield a devastating blow to the rampant Russian nationalism that stymied German victory during World War I, the German military surreptitiously organized a media campaign to depose the symbol of this nationalism—the Tsar—by exacerbating the public’s mistrust in the Tsaritsa and thus fanning the flames of the social discontent fueling the Russian Revolution.

The Hemophiliac Heir The birth of the long-awaited heir, initially such a joyous and reassuring event, ultimately caused the degradation of Alexandra’s public image, her entanglement with dubious charlatans, and her wholehearted immersion into her religious faith. Within six weeks of his birth, Alexei began to show symptoms of the dreaded disease hemophilia, which had taken the life of Alexandra’s younger brother Freddy.1 Due to the excessive intermarriage of the European royal families, hemophilia was a common ailment among ruling males; this blood disease is genetically inherited through the mother, a fact that was well known at the time and undoubtedly

Simonian 4 exacerbated Alexandra’s guilt, worry and anxiety over her son’s illness.2 Each time the active and mischievous child attempted to engage in boyish horseplay and pranks, Alexandra would anguish over his safety, for in his condition even the most minor scrape or bruise could threaten his life. She constantly hovered around him, surrounded him with vigilant guards who doubled as his playmates, and sat at his bedside during the agonizing nights of pain that would follow the simplest fall or accident.3 It is imperative to understand the special importance of Alexei to Alexandra not only as a mother, but also as the ostracized German-born empress of Russia. Her primary goal after her marriage was to provide Nicholas with an heir; her four successive daughters, though much loved, did not fulfill her imperial responsibility, and each time she became pregnant, she prayed desperately for a son.4 Thus, Alexei was not just her adored fifth child, but “the crowning of her marriage, the fruit of her hours of prayer, God’s blessing on her, on her husband and on the people of Russia.”5 The realization that the Tsarevich, who should have been Alexandra’s single greatest contribution to Russia, was not the strong and healthy successor she believed the Russian people deserved, compounded with the fact that she was the cause of his weak constitution, shattered her fragile self-confidence and plagued her with a crippling sense of guilt and failure towards her adopted country.6 Monsieur Pierre Gilliard, the palace tutor, explains in his memoirs: “Think of the torture of that mother, an impotent witness of her son’s martyrdom in those hours of anguish—a mother who knew that she herself was the cause of those sufferings, that she had transmitted the terrible disease against which human science was powerless. Now I understood the secret tragedy of her life.”7 Alexandra’s constant anxiety over her son’s health revealed itself in her public appearances; already shy and nervous during society balls and dinners, she withdrew even further and interacted less and less with the crucial upper class that was instrumental in

Simonian 5 maintaining her popularity.8 Alexandra’s preoccupation with Alexei’s devastating illness increasingly removed her from the public sphere and alienated her from her subjects, and she “gave the impression of resenting the public role which her position obliged her to play…She gained a reputation for coldness and hauteur, two very un-Russian vices.”9 Zinaida Gippius, a prominent member of the literary intelligentsia at the time, draws attention to Alexandra’s unpopularity: “No one liked the Tsarina…Her sharp face, beautiful, but ill-tempered and depressed, with thin, tightly pressed lips did not please.”10 In his book, Nicholas and Alexandra, Robert Massie illuminates a curious and grave misunderstanding that explains the seemingly cruel apathy the Russian people exhibited towards her plight: “Russians are a compassionate people, warm in their love of children and deeply perceptive in their understanding of suffering. Why did they not open their hearts to this anguished mother and her stricken child? The answer, incredibly, is that Russia did not know.”11 In an effort to maintain confidence in the strength of the royal family, Nicholas and Alexandra kept the reality of their son’s condition a tightly regulated secret, hiding the truth even from nonessential members of the palace staff.12 Ironically, their attempts at protecting the people’s admiration and respect for the monarchy undercut Alexandra’s popularity with the aristocrats who had no idea that her reticence at society events was not the result of personal aversion but rather, serious personal tragedy.13 Massie further elucidates this point: A revelation of Alexis’s condition would inevitably have put new pressures on the Tsar and the monarchy. But the erection of a wall of secrecy was worse…It undermined the nation’s respect for the Empress and, through her, for the Tsar and the Throne. Because the condition of the Tsarevich was never revealed…[Russians were never] able to form a true picture of Alexandra herself. Unaware of her ordeal, they wrongly ascribed her

Simonian 6 remoteness to distaste for Russia and its people. The years of worry left a look of sadness settled permanently on her face; when she spoke to people, she often appeared preoccupied and deep in gloom‌When she did emerge, she was silent, seemingly cold, haughty and indifferent. Never a popular consort, Alexandra Feodorovna became steadily less popular.14 The implications of her waning personal popularity are more significant when considered in the context of the Russian Revolution. Clueless about the heavy hardships Alexandra faced at home, the Russian people interpreted her aloofness as a personal affront and therefore regarded her with the same animosity. Her shyness had always been an obstacle to her social presence, but amidst festering pockets of revolutionary sentiment in the crucial periods leading up to World War I, her inability to connect with the people and appeal to their sympathy was a serious blow to the stability of the family.15 Her maternal grandmother, Queen Victoria, wrote Alexandra a concerned letter advising her to pay careful attention to her public role: There is no harder craft than our craft of ruling. I have ruled for more than fifty years in my own country, which I have known since childhood, and, nevertheless, every day I think about what I need to do to retain and strengthen the love of my subjects. How much harder is your situation. You find yourself in a foreign country, a country which you do not know at all, where the customs, the way of thinking, and the people themselves are completely alien to you, and nevertheless it is your first duty to win their love and respect.16 Alexandra’s response indicated her fatal misunderstanding of her position and the important role that public appearances played in Russian court life:

Simonian 7 You are mistaken, my dear grandmama; Russia is not England. Here we do not need to earn the love of the people. The Russian people revere their Tsars as divine beings, from whom all charity and fortune derive. As far as St Petersburg society is concerned, that is something which one may wholly disregard. The opinions of those who make up this society and their mocking have no significance whatsoever.17 During a time when most European countries were slowly decentralizing their monarchies, Alexandra overestimated the extent to which the public accepted absolute imperial rule and consequently was unable to properly balance her roles as a devoted mother and wife and an empress facing a changing and threatening political landscape.

As a result of her continued withdrawal from society, the Russian people grew more indifferent towards their Empress, and by extension the entire monarchy, which inflamed the rebellious whisperings and deprived the imperial family with the necessary backers to their reign at the critical moment of the Revolution. Alexandra’s detachment was particularly jarring and isolated her even further from a people who were accustomed to an invested and lively queen following the tenure of Nicholas’s mother, the dearly beloved and gregarious Dowager Empress Marie Feodorovna.18 The personal aspect of the Revolution cannot be ignored in the face of the political circumstances; while Nicholas was primarily responsible for conducting the policy errors that contributed to the downfall of the monarchy, Alexandra’s inability to find common ground with the people intensified the growing discontent smoldering amongst the peasants and intelligentsia and jeopardized any hope of garnering human sympathy for the family. Her failure on this front, which insulted the loyalty and pride of the Russian people, coupled with an already waning regime and a weak emperor, critically endangered the preservation of the monarchy in a dangerous time of political instability and uncertainty.

Simonian 8 Gregory Rasputin and Alexandra’s Religious Faith Beyond damaging Alexandra’s public perception, Alexei’s hemophilia also pulled her further into the depths of religion and superstition and drew her to so-called religious healers who promised that they could harness the will of God to cure her son. She already had deeply ingrained religious beliefs from childhood and in an effort to better connect with her husband and people, she fully immersed herself in the Russian Orthodox Church, which she found to be ideally suited to her beliefs.19 Alexei’s disease only intensified her ardent devotion; after numerous failed attempts by conventional doctors to cure Alexei’s illness or even alleviate his symptoms, Alexandra, trying to control the waves of anxiety and frustration that kept rolling over her, sought answers by throwing herself into the Church. The Russian Orthodox Church is an emotional church with a strong belief in healing power of faith and prayer. As soon as the Empress realized that no doctor could aid her son, she determined to wrest from God the miracle which science denied.20 She found solace in the security and comfort that the Church offered her and fervently prayed at all hours of the day to the only entity that still presented her with some sort of hope for her child’s improvement.21 Unfortunately, even this secluded aspect of her private life put her at odds with the intellectuals who were slowly moving away from intense religion in fin de siècle Russia. In fact, Sergei Bulgakov, a Marxist contemporary of Lenin and Gorky, states that the intelligentsia went so far as to reject God entirely (quoted in Ferro): It is well known that there is no intelligentsia more atheistic than the Russian. Atheism is the common faith into which are baptized all who enter the bosom of the humanistic

Simonian 9 intelligentsia church…In the eyes of our intelligentsia a certain level of education and enlightenment is synonymous with indifference to religion and repudiation of it…22 This extreme polarization amongst the class of people who would be primarily responsible for organizing and executing the Revolution was dangerous for the imperial family amid the Empress’s somewhat outmoded religious fervor. She was already estranged from the public through her limited and halfhearted social appearances, and this additional divide on the sensitive and emotional point of religion further distanced her from the very people who heavily influenced the political climate. Especially since they were oblivious to the mitigating context of Alexei’s illness, the intelligentsia viewed Alexandra’s ardent faith as antiquated and silly, further deepening the rift between the Empress and her subjects.23 Her most fatal and infamous mistake came in the form of a self-professed holy man and healer who preyed on Alexandra’s maternal anguish over Alexei and her piety. She met Gregory Rasputin through a mutual acquaintance a year after Alexei’s birth when all scientific avenues for alleviating the child’s illness were exhausted.24 Regardless of the severity of a hemophilic episode, Alexei always miraculously regained his health after Rasputin prayed over him, which undoubtedly formed the basis for Alexandra’s unwavering faith in his power.25 A particularly horrific episode in 1912 at the Imperial shooting lodge at Spala confirmed Alexandra’s incontestable conviction in Rasputin’s abilities. Alexei had taken a bad fall and a hemorrhage quickly developed in his groin, causing his left leg to draw up towards his torso. The hematoma pressed on his inflamed nerves and his temperature skyrocketed. As Alexandra sat by his bedside, listening to his cries of pain, and Nicholas paced the hallways, powerless to help his son, three palace doctors drafted official bulletins to be released the morning following the Tsarevich’s death. Desperate for a chance to save her son, Alexandra frantically cabled Rasputin, who

Simonian 10 telegraphed that the little boy would not die.26 Nicholas’s sister, Grand Duchess Olga, recounts the apparent miracle that unfolded that night: The poor child lay in pain, dark patches under his eyes and his little body all distorted and the leg terribly swollen. The doctors were just useless…more frightened than any of us…Alicky then sent a message to Rasputin…early in the morning Alicky called to me to go to Alexis’s room. I just could not believe my eyes. The little boy was not just alive, but well. He was sitting up in bed, the fever gone, the eyes clear and bright, not a sign of any swelling in the leg; later I learned from Alicky that Rasputin had not even touched the child but merely stood at the foot of the bed and prayed.27 Modern medicine still cannot explain how Alexei managed to survive that injury; given the limited medical knowledge at the beginning of the twentieth century and Rasputin’s fortuitous timing, it is completely understandable that Alexandra wholeheartedly believed that Rasputin had cured her son through prayer.28 He managed to arrive perfectly on time in several of Alexei’s more minor incidents as well, which cemented her faith in his power.29 Again, it is crucial to reiterate that high society and the public were clueless about Alexei’s illness, so to them, Alexandra’s sudden infatuation with Rasputin seemed utterly irrational and unfounded.

Given Rasputin’s existing reputation as a womanizer who was rumored to exchange prayers and prophecies for sexual intercourse, the reasonable and easy conclusion was that Alexandra was just another one of Rasputin’s dalliances.30 Rumors regarding their alleged relationship circulated, and “Alexandra’s ‘sexual corruption’ became a kind of metaphor for the diseased condition of the tsarist regime.”31 Alexander Krylov-Tosltikovich mentions a mysterious rumor of a clandestine black car that sped across the Nevsky Prospect, whose occupants took potshots and threw empty beer bottles at unsuspecting passersby. People suspected that this disgusting

Simonian 11 behavior could only be attributed to Rasputin, which contributed to his and Alexandra’s social defamation.32 Vasily Gurko, the army’s Chief of Staff discusses why these rumors were so widely believed and the impact they had on the public’s attitude towards the monarchy: “What is said in high society trickles down into the social circles of the two capitals, and subsequently, through the servants and caretakers, passes down to the masses, upon whom such rumours have a revolutionary effect.”33 Political cartoons depicting their illicit relationship were printed in newspapers and disseminated this idea throughout Russia. Pornographic postcards illustrated Rasputin’s “hold” over Alexandra: sexually, politically, and psychologically. (See Fig. 1). The cartoon’s caption

Figure 1. Rasputin’s Hold Over Alexandra, 1916, Houghton Library, Cambridge Mass. plays on the Russian verb derzhit, which means to hold but is also the root of the word samoderzhavie, or autocracy. Coupled with the suggestive image, the caption satirizes Rasputin’s true position of power over Alexandra.34 Since these postcards were circulated widely in St.

Simonian 12 Petersburg, the public was convinced that Alexandra engaged in sexual relations with Rasputin, which was expressly false.35 Because of her unwavering certitude that Rasputin was the mouthpiece of God, she manipulated her husband into incorporating Rasputin’s political recommendations (usually the result of his personal approval and disapproval of certain officials) into his decisions.36 In 1916, when Nicholas was heading the Russian army at the Eastern front, Alexandra took to appointing and dismissing ministers as she (influenced by Rasputin) felt was necessary.37 She writes to Nicholas following her appointment of Alexander Protopopov as the Minister of Agriculture, referring to Rasputin, the main impetus behind this decision, as “our Friend”: Forgive me for what I have done—but I had to—our Friend said it was absolutely necessary…I had to take this step upon myself…[to] save Russia…Forgive me, but I had to take this responsibility upon myself for your sweet sake.38 The situation was not particularly assuaged by the fact that Protopopov was a societal joke, widely ridiculed in St. Petersburg gossip circles and rumored to be a necrophiliac who frequently spoke to an icon on his desk that advised him as to the successful execution of his duties.39 Cartoonists were particularly fond of illustrating Rasputin’s influence over the royal

Figure 2. The Tsar Dancing to Rasputin’s Pipe, 1916, The State Central Museum of Contemporary Russian History, Moscow.

Simonian 13 family in damaging images that often depicted Nicholas as a fool with Rasputin as the dominant manipulating figure. The image from the collection of the State Central Museum of Contemporary Russian History in Moscow shows Rasputin controlling Nicholas with his pipe,

Figure 3. One Head is Good, Three are Better, 1917. and Nicholas is represented as an idiotic fool.40 (See Fig. 2). Another image shows Rasputin sharing the crown with Nicholas and Alexandra41 (See Fig. 3) and yet another depicts a more malevolent version of him pulling Nicholas and Alexandra’s strings, again portraying the two of them as submissive puppets. 42 (See Fig. 4).

Figure 4. The Russian Royal Family at Home, 1916, The State Archives of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

Simonian 14 The Russian people could have endured Alexandra’s social vices, be it her personality or her dubious relations, but her political interference was the last straw. Orlando Figes writes: The unpopularity of the Empress would not have mattered so much had she not taken it upon herself to play an active political role…she pushed [Nicholas] this way and that according to her own ambitions, vanities, fears and jealousies. It was the tsarina and Rasputin who—at least so the public thought—became the real rulers of tsarist Russia during the final catastrophic years.43 Richard Pipes explains the impact of her perceived political meddling: “By her actions, she greatly contributed to widening the breach between the monarchy and society until it became unbridgeable; by 1916, even the staunchest monarchists, including many grand dukes, would turn against her and plot to have her removed.”44 The Tsar’s first cousin once removed, Grand Duke Nicholas, constantly clashed with Alexandra because of the control she had over her husband and her alleged German political leanings and went to considerable lengths to orchestrate her downfall. Marfa Mouchanow argues: Certainly he was the means through which the Empress acquired her strange tastes for all things connected with occultism, and he was also the first person to draw the attention of the public and of the Imperial family to this peculiarity, and insist on the dangers it presented…The Grand Duke Nicholas, who headed the faction having for aim the removal of Alexandra Feodorovna, spared no means to destroy her influence, and to ruin her reputation as a Sovereign and as a woman.45 Since she was controlled by Rasputin, her relationship with the starets destroyed the legitimacy of the imperial family in every way possible. Socially, her and Nicholas’s reputation was marred by allegations that she was sexually involved with Rasputin; politically, she made a

Simonian 15 series of disastrous and ridiculous appointments that not only directly weakened the regime but also undermined respect for the tsar and his power within his own court.46 The public’s response is understandable given that they had no knowledge of the Tsarevich’s precarious health and Rasputin’s critical role in not only alleviating the boy’s pain but also Alexandra’s anguish. In the absence of this information, her devotion to such an obviously inappropriate fraud must have seemed completely irrational and unjustified and worsened her image as a neurotic and unstable hazard to the empire. As Alexander Kerensky said, “Without Rasputin, there could have been no Lenin”; thus, the Rasputin scandal was detrimental to the already threatened monarchy by providing a significant foothold for enemies of the state in their efforts to subvert tsarist rule. 47 ‘Nemka’: The German Woman Alexandra’s inability to find common ground with her people and in politics extended far beyond her unwelcome and misunderstood reliance on Rasputin and her indifference towards social responsibilities. The final affront for the utterly disillusioned Russian people was Alexandra’s German heritage and her alleged conspiracy with her cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II during World War I. Rumors abounded in St. Petersburg accusing Rasputin and Alexandra of being German sympathizers and betraying the Russian cause by supplying critical information to the Germans.48 As the war progressed, The idea of treason in high places gained momentum as rumours spread of the existence of a ‘Black Bloc’ at the court, which was said to be seeking a separate peace with Berlin.

It was widely claimed that the Empress and Rasputin were working for the Germans; that they had a direct line to Berlin; and that the Tsar informed his uncle, the Kaiser Wilhelm, about the movement of his troops. The condemnation of the Romanov court as ‘German’ and ‘corrupt’ ultimately served to justify the Revolution as a patriotic act.49

Simonian 16 The distrust and speculation was not confined to the public; high-ranking officials also expressed concerns regarding Alexandra’s loyalty and patriotism: “‘What can we do?’ asked one Russian general at the front. ‘We have Germans everywhere. The Empress is a German.’ Even Admiral Nilov, the Emperor’s Flag Captain, said, ‘I cannot believe she is a traitoress, but it is evident she is in sympathy with them.’ Alexandra could do nothing; the public believed the rumors.”50 Again, cartoons were essential in disseminating the image of Alexandra as a traitor. A cartoon titled “A Modern Delilah” appeared in a March 1917 article in The Bulletin (Sydney, Australia) and promulgates the widely held suspicion that Alexandra was in possession of some

Figure 5. A Modern Delilah, March 1917, The Bulletin, Sydney. secret communication device that directly connected her to the German monarchy. (See Fig. 5).

The caption proclaims: “(The downfall of the Czar was due to the pro-German actions of his

Simonian 17 Prussian wife, who had installed a secret wireless plant in the Palace to communicate with Berlin.) The Czarina: ‘See, I have sacrificed throne, husband, son, all for my fatherland.”51 The rumors could not be more incorrect; Alexandra was a true patriot, and from her arrival in Russia, she devoted herself to her adopted country with heartfelt sincerity. Even her political machinations stemmed from her desire to steer the country to prosperity; she understood that Nicholas was weak and easily swayed, so she took control of the government in his absence with—what she thought were—Russia’s best interests in mind.52 She said to her lady-in-waiting Baroness Buxhoeveden, “Twenty years I have spent in Russia, half my life, and the fullest, happiest part of it…It is the country of my husband and son. I have lived the life of a happy wife and mother in Russia. All my heart is bound in this country I love.”53 She deeply disliked Kaiser Wilhelm II, especially given his aggression towards her beloved husband during World War I.54 In the aftermath of the Revolution, extensive searches were conducted to uncover evidence that would prove her cooperation with German agents (including the infamous communication device), yet despite great effort, no secret telephone line or incriminating letters were ever found.55 Despite the lack of concrete evidence corroborating her treachery during the war, “The root of the problem was that even if Alexandra and Rasputin did not actually engage in demonstrable treason, in the eyes of many patriotic Russians they could not have worked more effectively for the enemy if they were full-fledged enemy agents.”56 During wartime, especially one that was not progressing favorably and cost so many Russian lives, stories accusing an already hated Empress of treachery had a deadly impact on the crumbling Romanov dynasty. A contemporary of the time speaks to the current mood: “In the salons, cafes, and stores, there was open talk that the ‘German’ was ruining Russia, and it was necessary to imprison her as delusional. And about the emperor, people were saying that he

Simonian 18 should consider the fortunes of Emperor Paul I,”57 who was assassinated by conspirators denouncing his rule.58 Regardless of their accuracy, “the point of these rumours was not their truth or untruth, but their power to mobilize an angry public against the dynasty. In a revolutionary crisis, it is perceptions and beliefs that count rather than realities.”59 Nicholas’s disastrous leadership at the front and Alexandra’s purported duplicitous activities in St. Petersburg decimated the royal image at a precarious political moment and shattered public faith in and respect for the imperial couple. Figes discusses the implications of these rumors in his book Revolutionary Russia: “Without this ‘atmosphere’—created out of gossip, half-truths, facts and fabrications, bits of information from the press which were then distorted into fantasies—it is impossible to understand the ‘revolutionary mood’ or the ways in which the Revolution turned on the interpretation of hearsay and events.”60 Alexandra’s apparent distaste for Russian society, her relationship with Rasputin, and her considerable political involvement all converged on one another in a damning avalanche of public suspicion that ultimately destroyed the Romanov dynasty.

A logical question to pose in hindsight of the success of the rumors on the dissolution of the Russian monarchy is whether or not a third party with a vested interest in the elimination of the regime somehow exploited Alexandra’s various scandals to manipulate popular opinion and catalyze the revolution. Given the context of World War I and Russia’s bitter aggression with Germany, it is reasonable to suggest that Germany had a considerable advantage to gain from the Tsar’s downfall. Pierre Gilliard expands on this theory: The Germans are the only European nationality that very well knew the Russians. They very well understood and recognized the Russians, even more so than the Russians themselves. They knew for a very long time that the tsarist regime, even with all its

Simonian 19 downfalls, was able to extend the Russian resistance. They knew that if the tsarist regime disappeared, Russia would find itself under German governance. And nothing stopped them from achieving that result.61 With this notable motive, the methodology by which the Germans achieved their goal is now called into question. Since intense nationalism was a major aspect of Russian personality and identity, directly attacking the Tsar in the middle of World War I would certainly backfire on the German cause and might even raise support for the Russian monarch.62 Therefore: The Germans employed old tactics to target the monarch through the wife. Of course it is easy to demean a woman, especially if she is a foreigner. Using the fact that the Empress was a German princess, they disseminated the idea that she was betraying Russia. It was a very convenient way to compromise the Tsaritsa in the eyes of the nation. The blame that was thrown in her face became a strong weapon against the Romanov dynasty.63 As demonstrated earlier, the treacherous rumors regarding Alexandra certainly had a significant impact on the development of the Russian Revolution and the outlook of the people on their sovereigns. A resident of Petrograd recalls: “Rumours filled the lives of all inhabitants.

They believed more readily than the newspapers, which were censored. The public was desperate for information, for almost anything, on political subjects, and any rumor about the war or German intrigues was bound to spread like wildfire.”64 Figes and Kolonitskii explain the powerful impact of these rumors on the unfolding events: What gave these stories their revolutionary power and significance was how far they accorded with the ‘general mood’ (and with previous rumours that had shaped that mood).

Once a rumour, however false, became the subject of common belief, it assumed the

Simonian 20 status of political fact, informing the attitudes and actions of the public. All revolutions are based in part on myth.65 Of course, it is difficult to substantiate the extent to which the Germans interfered in the natural progression of rumors, including which ones (if any) they instigated and which ones they helped achieve their full destructive potential. Despite this ambiguity, Krylov-Tolstikovich describes a specific incident in which the Germans clearly capitalized on Alexandra’s indiscretions: “Along the Russian trenches passed vulgar anecdotes about Rasputin and the Tsaritsa and German planes dropped caricatures on which were drawn Wilhelm supported by the people and Nicholas leaning on Rasputin’s phallus. But behind the front, the same thing was happening.”66 In the Russian army, the impact of these rumors was almost instantaneous: the soldiers were convinced that Alexandra was a German traitor, and the “effect on the troops’ morale and discipline was catastrophic…Military authority collapsed as soldiers talked and listened to the arguments of those familiar with socialist ideas…The army was a school of revolution in this sense.”67 The notion that the German army deliberately distributed compromising images of the Tsar amongst the Russian troops in an attempt to prey on their worst fears and erode their respect for their own Emperor not only speaks to the incredible hidden machinations that could have played an influential role in the Russian Revolution, but also to the potency of rumors as a powerful tool to dismantle centuries-old institutions and traditions.

Nicholas grew increasingly irritated with the incredible lies circulating in his court and country and endeavored to root out their source. He summoned his military attaché in Paris, Colonel Pavel Ignatiev, to court and requested that he investigate the cause of the rumors

Simonian 21 accusing Nicholas and Alexandra of constructing a separate peace with Germany.68 Ignatiev recounts in his memoirs, which are quoted in Sergei Fomin’s book, Skorbniy Angel: We received information from the French press which allowed me to conclude that the rumors came from Holland and especially from Switzerland…Further information brought us to two powerful Swiss-German publishing houses, but I had to yet establish who commissioned them to print the slanderous material. That was a very natural question, because high caliber newspapers like that could not simply invent that kind of slander…69 Further investigation allowed one of Ignatiev’s agents to befriend the editor-in-chief of one of the papers, which afforded him the opportunity to secretly listen to a conversation between the editor-in-chief and the German diplomat in Switzerland.70 Ignatiev describes the conversation and his conclusions: The diplomat…expressed numerous reasons to support this rumor and tried to prove the need to convince the foreign public through the press the veracity of these rumors, making it clear that their disclosure was derived from an official source. It was undeniably clear that this official source was Germany…all the rumors of a separate peace, which in October so greatly angered the Emperor and stained the honor of Russia in the eyes of her allies and defamed the Russian Imperial Family, came from the German General Staff or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.71 In his official report to the Emperor, Ignatiev also included instructions from the German diplomat to the editor-in-chief: "We are not interested to know that the Russian Emperor does not want to establish a separate peace. It is important that others believe these rumors, which will

Simonian 22 reduce the position of Russia and its allies at the same time. That is the only thing that we need and what we expect from you.”72 The link between the pernicious gossip and the German military does not stop there.

Later, Nicholas sent Ignatiev a telegram containing similar commands, but this time asking Ignatiev to investigate the origin of the slander against Alexandra. Former Brigadier-General of the French army, Sergei Pavlovich Andolenko, relates a conversation he had with Vladimir Vladimirovich Lyshchinsky-Troekurov, an old officer of the Preobrazhensky regiment who worked with Ignatiev, in an article he wrote for the Vozrojdenie journal in 1968 (quoted in Fomin): “Using the network of Russian agents in Switzerland and in Germany, they [Ignatiev and Lyshchinsky-Troekurov] were able to establish, that all gossips, slandering and discrediting of the Empress were maliciously fabricated and distributed by the General Military Headquarters of Germany.”73 Ignatiev included this information in the afore-mentioned report and left the documents in the care of the History Department of the French Military Ministry for safekeeping; following World War II, Lyshchinsky-Troekurov attempted to request the documents, but was told that the ministry no longer possessed the report.74 It is highly likely that during the German occupation of Paris, the incriminating evidence was discovered and subsequently destroyed.75 The allegation that Germany deliberately disseminated lies amongst the Russian people with a specific military motive attests not only to the influence of the press, but also to the power of rumors. Especially with the public’s existing animosity towards Alexandra and her undeniable heritage, these well-placed accusations played on the people’s uncertainties in a time of heightened nationalist tensions and emphasized their insecurities and mistrust towards the royal family. As Figes argues earlier, public mood and attitude towards the royal family is critical in

Simonian 23 understanding the increasingly revolutionary inclinations of the Russian people during World War I. Alexandra’s understandable yet no less grievous mistakes began with her misinterpretation of the Russian people and her obligations towards them as Empress; in denying the upper class and the public the opportunity to connect and empathize with her, Alexandra lost the emotional support of her people and endangered the stability of the monarchy. Her untimely immersion into the Orthodox religion and her naïve faith in the morally distasteful and publicly hated Rasputin made her vulnerable to an onslaught of damaging rumors that aggravated the already tense relations between the Empress and the public. As Russia entered World War I, the public—who already resented Alexandra—was quick to pounce on her treacherous German heritage which instigated the circulation of incriminating rumors that accused Alexandra of betraying Russia. Clandestinely bolstered by the efforts of the German military, these rumors slowly gathered force and played a significant role in alienating the public and inciting the revolutionary sentiments that ultimately toppled the Romanov dynasty.

Simonian 24 Notes 1

Greg King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last Empress of Russia) (New York, N.Y.: Atlantic International Publications, 1990), 131.

Marc Ferro, Nicholas II: The Last of the Tsars, trans. Brian Pearce (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 52.

2

3

Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic Account of the Fall of the Romanov Dynasty (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2000), 145.

4

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 122.

5

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 144.

6

Ferro, Nicholas II: The Last, 53.

7

Pierre Gilliard, "Duties as Tutor: Aleksey's Illness," in Thirteen Years at Russian Court (1921; repr., Austin, TX: Pallasart, 2011), accessed February 25, 2016, http://www.alexanderpalace.org/gilliard/III.html 8

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 147.

9

Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution (New York, NY: Viking, 1997), 25.

10

Ibid., 25-26

11

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 154.

12

Ibid., 154

13

Ibid., 147

14

Ibid, 155

15

Orlando Figes, Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2014), 25.

16

Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History, 26.

17

Ibid., 26

18

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 11.

Simonian 25

19

Sophie Buxhoeveden, The Life and Tragedy of Alexandra Feodorovna Empress of Russia (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 32.

20

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 146.

21

Ibid., 146.

22

Ferro, Nicholas II: The Last, 41.

23

Ibid., 40

24

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 147.

25

Buxhoeveden, The Life and Tragedy, 141.

26

Ibid., 131-133.

27

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 152.

28

29

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, 177-179.

Ibid., 176.

30

Candace Fleming, The Family Romanov: Murder, Rebellion, and the Fall of Imperial Russia (New York: Random House Children's Book, 2014), 101.

31

Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History, 285.

32

Ibid., 238

33

Figes, Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History, 63.

34

Samoderzhavie, 1916, image, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Mass., accessed March 22, 2016, http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-graphics/nggallery/page/2.

35

Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History, 284.

36

Ibid., 27.

37

Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), 224.

38

Nicholas Alexandrovich Romanov and Alexandra Feodorovna, The Nicky-Sunny Letters: Correspondence of the Tsar and Tsaritsa, 1914-1917 (Hattiesburg, Miss.: Academic International, 1970), 428.

39

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 227.

Simonian 26

40

The Tsar Dancing to Rasputin's Pipe, image, accessed March 23, 2016, http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-graphics/nggallery/page/2.

41

One Head Is Good, Three Are Better, 1917, image, accessed March 22, 2016, http://aeliita123.blogspot.com/2011/08/grigory-rasputin-russia.html.

42

Rossiski Tsarstevshi Dom, 1916, image, The State Archives of the Russian Federation, Moscow, accessed March 22, 2016, http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolutiongraphics/nggallery/page/2.

43

Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History, 26-27.

44

Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 60.

Marfa Mouchanow, My Empress: Twenty-Three Years of Intimate Life with the Empress of All the Russias from Her Marriage to the Day of Her Exile (New York City: John Lane Co., 1928), 126-127.

45

46

Fleming, The Family Romanov: Murder, 149-150.

47

Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra: The Classic, vi.

48

Figes, Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History, 61.

49

Ibid.

50

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 203-204.

51

A Modern Delilah, 1917, image, accessed March 22, 2016, http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-graphics/nggallery/page/2.

52

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 203.

53

Ibid.

54

Ferro, Nicholas II: The Last, 180.

55

King, Empress Alexandra, (the Last, 204.

56

Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 246-247.

Aleksandr Krylov-Tolstikovich, Posledni︠︡ a︠ i︡ a Imperatrit︠︡ sa: Sanni-Aliks-Aleksandra (Moskva: RIPOL klassik, 2006), 237. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

57

Simonian 27

58

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 275.

59

Figes, A People's Tragedy: A History, 284-285.

60

Ibid., 61.

61

Krylov-Tolstikovich, Posledni︠︡ a︠ i︡ a Imperatrit︠︡ sa: Sanni-Aliks-Aleksandra, 236.

62

63

Ibid., 237.

Ibid., 237.

64

Orlando Figes and B. I. Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 1917 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 25.

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid., 238.

Figes, Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History, 64-65.

S. V. Fomin, Skorbnyĭ Angel: T︠︡ sarit︠︡ sa-muchenit︠︡ sa Aleksandra Novai︠︡ a v Pisʹmakh, Dnevnikakh I Vospominanii︠︡ akh (St. Peterburg, Russia: Ob-vo svi︠a︡titeli︠a︡ Vasilii︠a︡ Velikogo, 2006), 562. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

67

68

69

Ibid., 564.

70

Ibid., 564.

71

Ibid., 565.

72

Ibid., 565.

73

Ibid., 566.

74

Ibid., 566.

75

Ibid., 566.

Simonian 28

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Simonian 29

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