Arnav Tandon - 2017 Mitra Scholar

2016-17 Mitra FAMILY GRANT Recipient Cross-Cultural Camaraderie: Tracing the Roots of Cicero’s Philosophy on Friendship to Aristotelian Ideas Arnav Tandon, Class of 2017

Cross-Cultural Camaraderie: Tracing the Roots of Cicero's Philosophy on Friendship to Aristotelian Ideas

Arnav Tandon 2017 Mitra Family Scholar Mentors: Mr. Clifford Hull, Ms. Andrea Milius, Mrs. Meredith Cranston April 12, 2017

Tandon 2 Of all the relationships that constitute a personal and cultural environment, friendship is likely the most quintessential. Human nature necessitates companionship in almost all affairs, but friendship’s abstraction as an intangible concept often renders its examination as the territory of authors and philosophers, although even young children begin to experience friendship as soon as they can walk and talk. Modern philosopher Alexander Nehamas describes a friend as a mirror for the self, allowing for novel self-discovery and self-understanding, one of the many roles friendship plays in daily life.1 Friendship, then, deserves more attention in personal thought. By virtue of its relatability, friendship acts as an elegant vehicle for philosophical inquiry and discourse, a medium through which the esoteric qualities of philosophy become exoteric.

History provides a trove of rewarding philosophical information about friendship.

Friendship today, in the Western tradition, shares the same underpinnings as it did in Ancient Greece and Rome, and a study of the foremost authors, orators, politicians, and philosophers of the Classical Age reveals friendship’s true ubiquity. An analysis of the origins, terms, and reasons for friendship enables a better philosophical understanding of modern social constructs and ultimately activates an appreciation for Classical contributions to the present.

Both Aristotle and Cicero address friendship and its milieu, each with his own unique flavor influenced by the politics, culture, and society of the time. Greek philosophy, marked by the writings of Aristotle and his counterparts, tends to be much more abstract and idealistic than the Roman philosophy espoused by Cicero, and this discrepancy stems from differences between the two regions’ cultures. Since friendship is an inherently moral topic, an examination of the nature of friendship in each society reflects the larger moral fabric underlying the culture.2

1 2

Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 11.

Richard White, "Friendship and Commitment," Journal of Value Inquiry 33, no. 1 (March 1999): 1, accessed August 16, 2016.

Tandon 3 Lorraine Smith Pangle refers to friendship as an enduring association between individuals, and at the foundation of all relationships in both Ancient Greece and Rome lies the guest-host relationship.3 Ancient Greece centered on the idea of xenia, the prescribed relationship between hosts and their guests, while the Latin word hospes, which means both guest and host, expresses the importance of guests and hosts in these two cultures. Guests and hosts held equal status and were of equal importance in the social fabric in both cultures, and each group had to fulfill specific duties towards the other. All friendships build upon these principles, and a consideration of the evolution and development of friendship as provided by Aristotle and Cicero lends vast insight into friendship as a social construct. While Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship formed some of the framework for Cicero’s later writings, Cicero’s personal background, characterized by unique social and cultural practices from Republican Rome, largely guided his philosophical writings on the subject.

Friendship in the Greek Tradition Any philosophical discussion of friendship and its importance and origins must include philia, a quintessential philosophical base for all interpersonal relationships. Due to linguistic shortcomings, English admittedly mistranslates philia as friendship, but such a translation disregards the scope of relationships philia encompasses.4 The Ancient Greeks saw philia in relationships ranging from marital love to that between a creditor and a debtor, and thus, its translation as friendship is completely inadequate. Rarely does a customer in a restaurant consider the manager a friend, yet the existence of philia in this relationship calls for the

3

Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 39.

4

Nehamas, On Friendship, 15.

Tandon 4 expansion of the analytical context of friendship. The concept of friendship in the modern context differs from that of friendship in antiquity, and understanding these differences through an ancient Greek cultural lens is critical to gaining perspective on ancient Greek ideals of friendship.

Ancient Greek literature provides incomparable insight into ancient Greek culture.

Homer’s writings elevate friendship, defining it as an essential element of social virtue.5 Homer’s epics contain indestructible friendships, such as that between Achilles and Patroclus, which exemplify Ancient Greek ideals of friendship. Upon hearing of the death of Patroclus, his closest comrade, Achilles reacts with uncontrollable emotion, first grief, then anger: A dark cloud of grief fell upon Achilles as he listened. He filled both hands with dust from off the ground, and poured it over his head, disfiguring his comely face, and letting the refuse settle over his shirt so fair and new. He flung himself down all huge and hugely at full length, and tore his hair with his hands. […] [Achilles] lay groaning for [Antilochus] feared that [Achilles] might plunge a knife into his own throat. Then Achilles gave a loud cry.6 That Patroclus’ death drives Achilles to the consideration of suicide exemplifies the strength of their friendship, for Achilles describes Patroclus as “my dear comrade […], whom I valued more than all others, and loved as dearly as my own life.”7 Achilles intends to avenge Patroclus’ death at all costs, and when his mother warns him that his own death will follow any vengeful acts, he does not hesitate to proclaim that he deserves death for desertion of his friend.8 Achilles carries 5

Sandra Lynch, Philosophy and Friendship (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 7.

6

Homer, Iliad, trans. Samuel Butler (800 BCE), accessed March 11, 2017.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.

Tandon 5 the memory of his fallen comrade with him throughout the rest of the Trojan War; in fact, prolonged grief of his loss drives Achilles to spiral into insanity. Achilles ignores orders of the gods and transgresses social norms on his quest for vengeance: for example, after slaying Hector, he ties Hector’s body to a chariot and drags his corpse through the sand, refusing Hector’s family’s requests to halt.9 Homer praises and idealizes Achilles’ and Patroclus’ friendship as the perfect form of friendship, but he also shows the importance of balancing one’s grief after the loss of a friend. Achilles does not temper his feelings, and ultimately he suffers due to his actions. Avenging a friend’s loss, cherishing friendly memories, and sacrificing self-interest for the sake of a friend are all Homeric ideals of friendship which codify friendship in Ancient Greek times. In essence, Achilles’ and Patroclus’ relationship embodies philia perfectly, and Homer clearly exhibits the importance and power of philia as the basis for a relationship.

However, equally important to Homer, and thus equally entrenched in Ancient Greek culture, lie Homer’s ideas about pragmatism and reciprocity in friendship. With friendship comes the duty to defend a friend in a time of need or adversity, a tangible metric that adds an element of gravity beyond the emotional underpinnings of the relationship.10 Similarly, ancient Greek philosophical thought also accounts for the converse: that friends ought to act as a last resort for desperate times.11 The mutuality of friendship arises from the inherent trust that characterizes a friend’s willingness to support and assist a companion, and Homer’s Ancient Greeks believed that such reciprocal and complementary behavior was necessary for a stable and admirable friendship.

9

Ibid.

10

Lynch, Philosophy and Friendship, 8.

11

Ibid.

Tandon 6 In addition to reciprocal admiration and affection, much of the moral code of conduct that Homer presents in his epics, including his thoughts on friendship, stems from the Ancient Greek concept of xenia. Xenia is the cultural policy that governed interactions between guests and hosts in Ancient Greece; in a government structure based on sovereign city-states, frequent travel between the individual regions necessitated a set of guidelines for hosts and their guests to follow. Xenia called for cordiality between guests and hosts, setting standards for interaction that correlated directly to a character’s moral virtue. Hosts had to fulfill all the duties towards their guests, and vice versa, in order for both host and guest to gain the favor and approval of the gods.

In Homer’s Odyssey, much of the conflict regarding Penelope’s suitors relates to their complete disregard for the rules of xenia, as the suitors completely despoil Odysseus’ palace while simultaneously attempting to seduce Penelope. Homer clearly abjures such a vast transgression of xenia’s boundaries, and through the suitors, he again evokes the traditional Greek concept of philia. As discussed earlier, philia encompasses a broad set of relationships, but obeying the principles of xenia in a relationship promotes philia through strengthening the bond between the partners. Yet because philia transcends modern boundaries of friendship, xenia is not a precondition for friendship as much as it is an overarching cultural tenet perceived to enrich all relationships.

An examination of the interplay between xenia and philia in context of friendship requires arête, another Ancient Greek philosophical quality. Arête most nearly translates to excellence and virtue, and it clearly impacts philia.12 Logically, a relationship in which the members act virtuously and engage in typically positive behavior will outlast one lacking in these regards; naturally, a philia based on arête tends to excel in length and strength. Thus,

12

Arthur W. H. Adkins, "'Friendship' and 'Self-Sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle," The Classical Quarterly 13, no. 1 (May 1963): 40.

Tandon 7 Homer’s take on friendship establishes baseline necessities for a friendship to succeed, and subsequent developments collaborate to form a purely Greek philosophical canon.

Philia, xenia, and arête represent essential cultural pillars of Ancient Greek society, but the three ultimately are a set of artificial constructs that qualify ethically and morally correct behavior. Because he was the first Greek writer to postulate their existence and define their characteristics, Homer set the foundation for later Greek philosophers to incorporate these cultural precepts in their own writings and ideas. Naturally, individual philosophers employed philia, xenia, and arête in different ways, but these three principles formulated the common springboard for all Ancient Greek philosophy. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their respective writings, addressed these ideals in some capacity, and the ubiquity of xenia, philia, and arête in Ancient Greek culture and philosophy cemented their status as normative policies upon which all Ancient Greek philosophers are built.

As Ancient Greeks fomented these ideas of friendship, individual philosophers started to diverge from Homer’s uniform precedent. Among the many was Plato, who discussed paradoxes and contradictions that arose from the perception of friendship as a simple affinity from one person for another.13 Plato concluded that the feelings that evoke friendship, such as compassion and affection, had to be mutual in order for a friendship to exist. One can feel goodwill towards an inanimate object such as a car or an article of clothing, but that object’s inability to reciprocate such feelings renders the relationship something lesser than friendship. For a relationship to be called friendship, it must occur between two sentient beings, of whom each can definitively verify positive emotional reactions to the other. Plato’s thoughts on these inconsistencies and limitations of friendship reappear in Aristotle’s later works. In Book 8 of his

13

Julia Annas, "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism," Mind 86, no. 344 (October 1977): 533.

Tandon 8 Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the absurdity of a person’s well-wishing for an object such as wine, since there can be no reciprocal feeling between a person and a bottle of wine.14 Both writers’ point that friendship necessitates mutual feelings echoes Ancient Greek philia, and this Platonic contextual background for Aristotelian friendship demonstrates the continuity between Greek philosophers and the inherent similarity of their ideas.

Nevertheless, Ancient Greek philosophy did not rest solely on idealistic elements like philia, xenia, and arête. Of course, the political and social environment of the time affected philosophical ideas, and the Athenian polis demonstrably facilitated a rich cross-exchange of intellectual ideas. The social nature of the government encouraged and supported discussion and public democratic participation, and thus fostered xenia and philia. Through continued social exposure, Athenian citizens built relationships and understood the importance of equality and respect in their relationships. The variety of governmental actions similarly spurred the development of new avenues for philia, as people connected with each other for a multitude of reasons. Such relationships and their proximity to friendship as assigned by the Ancient Greeks differ from the modern realm of friendship, and remaining mindful of this discrepancy and consequently augmenting the analytical sphere enables a clearer comprehension of the Ancient Greek philosophies.15 A paramount point of discussion among many Greek philosophers, the contextual characteristics of Ancient Greek friendship unlock Aristotle’s detailed treatise on the matter.

14

Aristotle. et al., The Nicomachean Ethics, further revised edition. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 203.

15

David K. O'Connor, "Two Ideals of Friendship," History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1990): 109.

Tandon 9 Aristotelian Friendship An investigation of Aristotle’s reasons for forming friendship reveals many of his thoughts on the subject. Specifically, looking at the some of the reasons for forming friendship allows a determination of whether, in friendship, Aristotle prioritized self-interest or genuine care and love for another person, and thus, where in Aristotle’s trifold system the friendship belonged. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes that friends exist for the sharing of wealth and prosperity between each other, crediting the idea that one strength of friendship lies in the prospect of financial and material contribution.16 However, Aristotle nuances this seemingly selfish point of view by accounting for the support, both emotional and physical, that friends ought to provide each other, during not only adversity but also prosperity.17 Though he previously admits that friends enjoy receiving material pleasures from each other, he ensures that true loyalty and encouragement outweigh the potential for tangible benefit. Furthermore, Aristotle discusses the inherent importance of friendship to life itself: that friends make life worth living through engaging in mutually enjoyable activities together.18 Passing time with a friend generally provides more joy and reward than spending time alone, and here, Aristotle postulates that the systematic necessity for companionship that people feel as social creatures automatically enables friendship as a social construct. The natural tendency towards friendship contains yet another benefit that lies in the capacity for mutual improvement.19 Through conversation and interaction, friends appreciate and adopt characteristics they find admirable and

16

Aristotle. et al., The Nicomachean Ethics, further revised edition. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 251.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid., 253.

19

Ibid.

Tandon 10 appreciable in each other, and as a result, each of the friends experiences an individual yet simultaneous awakening.

As shown, these reasons for forming friendships are already disparate enough to call for a division of friendship into more specific categories. It is difficult to imagine someone solely interested in gain wholeheartedly providing unconditional emotional support to a friend, and Aristotle acknowledges this inconsistency as a deleterious factor to his description of friendship as a means towards achieving happiness. To combat this issue, he creates three artificial categories into which a friendship can fall, based on the elements that characterize the friendship and appear most often in its actions: utilitarian friendship, pleasure friendship, and perfect friendship. These different types of friendship address imbalances in any of the aforementioned reasons, such as unique traits from one friend to another and disproportionate amounts of pleasure and joy derived from certain activities. The facile solution to this potential for disharmony limits friendship as workable between only either similar or different people, but Aristotle forgoes such a shortcut and instead leaves that question unanswered. The resulting ambiguity raises debate about how similarities or differences actually affect a friendship, according to Aristotel, which becomes apparent through a discussion of Aristotle’s three types of friendship.

Aristotle’s division of friendship into three branches elegantly bypasses the crossroads that he encounters regarding differences among friends. The first type of friendship that Aristotle identifies is friendship based on utility. By nature, utilitarian friendship is weak and does not endure, since its existence revolves entirely around material gain.20 Because of the subjectivity of personal benefit, a utilitarian friendship remains easily and highly mutable, as people’s desires

20

Ibid., 204.

Tandon 11 and wishes can easily change, rendering the friendship ineffectual. Even the premise of utilitarian friendship itself, namely, a focus on and an appreciation of utility as opposed to humanity, damages the relationship from the outset and dooms it to disunion. Friendship based entirely on utility comes to an end “as soon as the advantage ceases, because they were attracted not by each other but by the prospect of gain,� emphasizing the impermanence of these friendships.21 Allowing material or physical gain to surpass a true, personal connection greatly hinders the ability for a friendship to thrive. Aristotle regards utilitarian friendship as the weakest of the three types, sustainable only in rare circumstances where the utilitarian benefit accompanies a deeper basis for friendship.

Friendship based on pleasure, the second category, has a transient nature similar to that of utilitarian friendship, though slightly less uncertain.22 Aristotle argues pleasure-friendship to be marginally stronger than utilitarian friendship on the grounds that in order for friends to obtain pleasure from spending time together, some subliminal attraction needs to exist. In other words, pleasure can only follow from some rudimentary attraction to the traits and qualities of the other person. Pleasure-friendship, just as utilitarian friendship, hinges on the emotions and feelings of the individual, because people naturally perform actions and engage in circumstances that provide immediate or imminent gratification.23 This penchant for opportunistic action likewise sways the premise of a pleasure-friendship away from a pure appreciation for another person to some combination of that genuine affection with selfish tendencies. Although pleasure-

21

Ibid., 207.

22

Ibid., 205.

23

Ibid.

Tandon 12 friendship does possess some of the characteristics of ideal friendship, its discredit lies in its focus on pleasure instead of virtue.

Aristotle’s third category is perfect, ideal friendship. Aristotle views friendship that stems from goodness and virtue as the consummate form of friendship. Perfect friendship, the highest and most moral form of friendship, exists between authentically good, virtuous people who wish well for each other and appreciate each other’s qualities and personality traits over the utility and pleasure that they may provide.24 Aristotle concedes that perfect friendship often does include aspects of utility and pleasure, but these elements arise secondarily from the true appreciation of the other person instead of acting as the crux of the entire relationship. Ultimately, perfect friendship entails friendship for the sake of the friend’s goodness, not for any palpable entity that the other can provide.

A metric for correctly categorizing friendship aligns with the balance between egoism and altruism in the relationship, with egoism referring primarily to the unabashed pursuit of selfinterest and altruism contrarily to the recognition of a friendly duty to fulfill the needs of others.

Distinguishing between egoism and altruism in a friendship provides crucial information regarding the bond’s nature and strength, and evaluating this paradigm based on a personal moral compass promotes cultivation of friendships that account for individual desires. Contrary to the opinion of some schools of philosophical thought, which espouse friendship as a device solely for self-gain, sincere altruism exists, characterized by genuine appreciation and action for another person.25 Such an honorable trait undoubtedly comprises Aristotle’s perfect friendship, yet his writings fail to elaborate and to codify whether altruistic loyalty extends to the person’s

24

Ibid.

25

Annas, "Plato and Aristotle," 543.

Tandon 13 entire being or just to the person’s personality. Alternatively, does the basis of loyalty and devotion to a friend lie in the person’s physical form, or rather in the person’s identity and charm? The latter seems to hold true, as transplanting one person’s outwardly altruistic tendency to another person in turn should render the recipient good-natured and altruistic. Regardless, Aristotle’s incompleteness here does not impact the necessity of altruism in perfect friendship, since altruism is critical, not merely possible.26 In a sense, the presence or absence of altruism allows a relationship to be defined in terms of the interplay between selfishness and selflessness: no person acts purely selflessly all the time, but certainly some do more than others. A discrepancy between selfish and selfless behavior in a friendship surely affects the friendship, and finding balance between the two is paramount to sustaining a friendship.

Although Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, does not definitively state whether he values altruism higher than egoism as a foundation of friendship, interpretations of his writings portray him as leaning more towards egoism.27 Egoism in the traditional sense refers to selfish behavior, but Aristotle’s writings embody egoism in a slightly different sense: he proposes an appreciation of the person’s qualities and character traits as opposed to the person’s being.28 Thus, Aristotle voids the earlier dilemma regarding a transfer of agreeable attributes, since he believes that those values themselves define the person. Consequently, Aristotelian logic prescribes perfect friendship only to people with mutual admiration for favorable characteristics in the other, different from the belief that a person’s form itself contains aspects that can advance friendship.

Scholars agree that this Aristotelian idea lacks completeness, since a full appreciation of 26

David B. Annis, "The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship," American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 4 (October 1987): 349.

27

Annas, "Plato and Aristotle," 539.

28

Ibid., 549.

Tandon 14 someone’s entire being must include acceptance of external aspects in addition to the internal.29 Aristotle’s friendship is partly egotistic in the sense that it allows incomplete allegiance to a friend. If, therefore, a friend’s devotion to a counterpart can be curtailed, to whom does the remaining loyalty and devotion proceed? Aristotle answers this implicit question by equating friendship to self-love.30 Not only does he limit the perception of friendship by essentially cutting off physical form, an integral part of a personal identity, but he also explicitly explains friendship as a mimicry of self-love. Though self-love conceptually differs from arrogance and direct self-interest, minor inconveniences or thoughts can sway the scale balancing the two and transform genuine self-love into more pronounced egoism, leading the friendship down a destructive path. Furthermore, the perfection of Aristotle’s ideal friendship now becomes dubious. Wholly loving another person is often regarded as one of the most virtuous behaviors humanly possible, but Aristotle does not extend his allegedly perfect friendship to such an extent, perhaps demonstrating impurities and imperfections in his ideal friendship. Only appreciating the person’s inner qualities does not allow for an embrace of the entire person, and this oversight undermines the completeness and strength of the friendship.

An analysis of Aristotelian friendship independently fosters a deeper understanding of his policies and conditions for ideal friendship. Although some of his writings contradict expectation, the vast majority of his writings still apply to friendship in context. For example, friendship centers on mutuality, both in experiences and in affection. One of the most effective avenues for developing friendships is through common activities: friends who spend their leisure

29

Ibid., 550.

30

Aristotle. et al., The Nicomachean, 236-237.

Tandon 15 time together in hobbies both enjoy have motivation to hold the relationship.31 Likewise, friendship necessitates mutual affection: if one does not truly feel love and benevolence for a friend, the friendship will undoubtedly lose strength, so friends must reciprocate these feelings for each other.32 However, Aristotle’s ideal friendship minimizes this mutuality by focusing on the friend’s traits instead of the friend’s entire person. Empathy with and support of a friend requires actual, human sensibility, and by limiting the scope of the relationship to personality traits, the friendship does not root as strongly as it should. Ultimately, an actually perfect friendship transcends Aristotle’s perfect friendship, as the importance of the person’s physical form is not neglected. Similarly, Aristotle limits perfect friendship only to morally good people, which is, in itself, a discriminatory mechanism.33 Because perfectly virtuous people are rare, Aristotle implies that no common person can ever obtain perfect friendship.34 This thought falsely diminishes the role friends and companions play in the lives of most people, since people in adversity tend to have only their friends’ support. All people deserve friends, and the support and assistance that even imperfect friends provide arguably supersedes Aristotle’s limitation of friendship to perfect individuals.

How do Aristotle’s lesser friendships compare to his perfect friendship? By nature, friendship of pleasure and utilitarian friendship contain ulterior motives, but goodwill and positive intentions can still endure. John M. Cooper claims that mutual goodwill exists in all three kinds of friendships, but the question arises, then, as to how the three kinds of friendship

31

Annis, "The Meaning," 350.

32

Ibid., 352.

33

Nehamas, On Friendship, 14.

34

John M. Cooper, "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship," The Review of Metaphysics 30, no. 4 (June 1977): 626.

Tandon 16 truly differ.35 David K. O’Connor answers Cooper’s question by explaining that the main difference between the three types of friendships relates to the level of intimacy among the friends.36 However, another possible answer to Cooper’s question that contradicts O’Connor’s response describes the lesser friendships as inferior based on the prospect of one-sided utilitarian or pleasurable gain. Placing more weight on self-interest than on altruistic behavior epitomizes egoism, but Arthur Adkins disagrees, because even the two inferior Aristotelian friendships contain semblances of altruism on the basis that ultimately, friends perform deeds and actions for the sake of another.37 Although different from complete devotion to another person, or idealistic altruism, the ability to perform actions that gratify another person contains intrinsic unselfishness. Summarily, since friendship is based on sharing and openness with another person, no friendship that evolves from strictly selfish sources can survive.38 At the lowest level, a friendship is a partnership, which automatically implies a willingness to attend to another person’s needs.39 If all three kinds of Aristotelian friendships incorporate unselfish, altruistic conduct, how do utilitarian and pleasure-friendship actually differ from ideal friendship? Aristotle himself lays the foundation of this argument in Nicomachean Ethics. David Annis postulates that the difference lies in a true liking for the other person versus an affinity for the other’s traits.40

35

Ibid., 631.

36

O'Connor, "Two Ideals," 113.

37

Adkins, "'Friendship' and 'Self-Sufficiency,'" 42.

38

Nehamas, On Friendship, 11.

39

O'Connor, "Two Ideals," 113.

40

Annis, "The Meaning," 349.

Tandon 17 Aristotle concludes his discourse on friendship with the notion that a friend ought to hold closer the traits and personality of another person as opposed to the other person’s entire being, but Annis delves deeper into the dissimilarity between the three types of friendship to expose Aristotle’s nuanced omission. Likewise, O’Connor affirms that ideal friendship arises when friends act virtuously with one another, as the presence of virtue in a friendship greatly strengthens the relationship.41 A small fallacy appears in O’Connor’s thoughts, however, because limiting friendship just to actions performed by friends overlooks a critical component of the scope of friendship. Merely spending time with a friend, without any substantial deeds or achievements, can bring immeasurable joy, and friendship’s beauty lies in its ability to permeate all aspects of daily life. Because friends hold each other’s best interest at heart, simply existing in a friendship warrants happiness and amiability.42 Perhaps, ideal friendship is ideal because it naturally includes both pleasure and utility in the pursuit of a greater self-reflection and selfunderstanding: that friends maintain each other’s best interests leads to a higher, more complete level of happiness that would otherwise remain latent through solitude and isolation.

One final argument for the inferiority of utilitarian and pleasure-friendship as compared to perfect friendship incorporates human nature itself. Aristotle, like his predecessors, subscribes to the idea of the polarity of society: people are either philosophically good or are not. The prescription of perfect friendship to only people of the philosophically good category is selfevident, but questions arise at the corresponding conclusion that all people who engage in utilitarian and pleasure-friendships are simply not philosophically good. Aristotle lays the groundwork for this argument in Nicomachean Ethics, when he declares that “obviously only

41

O'Connor, "Two Ideals," 115.

42

Cooper, "Aristotle on the Forms," 646.

Tandon 18 good men can be friends for their own sakes,” meaning that only philosophically good people are capable of feeling a genuine connection to another person.43 Conversely, Aristotle shows the weakness of utilitarian and pleasure-friendships, writing that “bad people take no pleasure in each other unless there is a chance of some benefit.”44 Aristotle seems to discount utilitarian and pleasure-friendship as markers of “bad” people, but soon after, he admits the possibility for pleasure-friendship to hold traces of true goodness. Aristotle admits that the personal definition of a good is subjective, and if friendship is a means to achieve goodness, different kinds of friendship definitely exist. Although pleasure-friendship contains a material quality, pleasure friends are “friends in so far as they are attracted by a kind of goodness, […] because to lovers of pleasure pleasure too is a good.”45 While a relationship motivated by pleasure is by no means perfectly altruistic, Aristotle hesitates to classify pleasure-friendship as the selfish antithesis to perfect friendship because of the potential for a transfer of goodness, and this indecision elevates pleasure-friendship from its inferior standing in certain cases.

Ultimately, Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics is an idealistic inquiry, and the upcoming discussion of Cicero’s more practical and grounded thoughts on friendship builds on Aristotelian tenets while assuming an especially Roman flavor.

Friendship in the Roman Tradition The Roman cultural tradition mirrors that of the Greeks to a large degree, though Roman culture during the Republic centered not on abstract concepts nearly as much as on pragmatic social policies. Similar to the Ancient Greeks, the Romans upheld rules regarding guest-host

43

Aristotle. et al., The Nicomachean, 207.

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid.

Tandon 19 interaction, although the Roman approach was more of an implied set of guidelines than a clearly pronounced and well-defined construct. The significance of the Latin word hospes, which, contextually, can mean either guest or host, evidences the normative equity between the two groups. Although in practice, the two groups often fell into a hierarchy, the underlying interdependence and similarity between guests and hosts was obvious to the Romans.

Just as the Roman hospes echoes Ancient Greek xenia, the Roman amicus perfectly symbolizes Ancient Greek philia. Philia for the Greeks signified the basis of a variety of relationships; likewise, amicus, the Latin word translated into English as friend, far exceeds this modern interpretation.46 Colleagues, associates, political allies, and even patrons and their clients all indicate amicitia, a word, like philia, often translated as friendship but best interpreted more conservatively as a congenial baseline relationship that builds on some kind of exchange. The manifold forms of an amicus that exist reinforce the breadth of relationships that Roman amicitia encompasses. Roman patricians highlighted practical friendships that would aid them in business or politics, and as a result, roles like colleagues, associates, and allies maintained increasing importance. Amicitia also extended to plebeian culture, as the salutatio, or patron-client, system demonstrated. As part of the salutatio, patrons, members of the higher social classes, provided their clients, of lower rank, with services such as food leftover from dinner parties and other small gifts, and in turn, the client would rally political support among the lower classes for the patron, testify for the patron in court, and perform other socio-political favors. The system rose through the ranks, for example, a client of a senator could be a patron of a shop-owner, assembling a chain of dependence throughout Roman society and necessitating amicable relationships between people of different statuses. The salutatio system clearly captures the

46

John Gruber-Miller, "Exploring Relationships: Amicitia and Familia in Cicero's de Amicitia," The Classical World 103, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 89.

Tandon 20 linkage between different social classes in Roman society, specifically, how certain exchanges could benefit both involved parties. The salutatio system demonstrates a practical application of xenia, as maintaining cordiality between patron and client is analogous to the guest-host relationship of xenia. Another Roman cultural principle appears in the saying “do ut des,” which translates to “I give so that you may give.” The phrase contains a play on the Latin verb dare, meaning to give. That both aspects of the agreement are expressed by the same word emphasizes the parity in the exchange: both the giver and receiver are on the same platform and each has an equally important role. These three words capture the cultural essence of Republican Rome: functional pragmatism drove most, if not all, interactions between Romans, thereby separating Roman friendship from Ancient Greek friendship from the outset.

Cicero’s life exhibits this Roman tendency to the letter, and a brief introduction of his life creates context that further explains his writings in De amicitia. Born in 106 BCE, Cicero came from wealth, but his family was not part of the patrician rank.47 Cicero pursued higher education in Rhodes and Athens, as did most affluent Romans, and his education exposed him to the foremost Ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle, among others. His familiarity with Ancient Greek writings and ideas cemented his legacy as the founder of the Roman philosophical tradition, an honor he holds to this day.48 When Aristotle’s texts were lost briefly in the Middle Ages, Cicero’s writings mainly provided the ancient viewpoints on friendship, and Aristotle’s influence on Cicero’s De amicitia is clear.49 While his philosophical model paralleled Aristotle’s, Cicero’s political background and his experience with the practicality of everyday life set him

47

P.H. DeLacy, "Cicero, Marcus Tullius," Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2, no. 2nd (2006): 257.

48

Michael von Albrecht, Cicero's Style: A Synopsis (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 37.

49

Nehamas, On Friendship, 12.

Tandon 21 apart and did not allow him to isolate philosophy from politics.50 Examining Cicero’s thoughts on friendship as presented in De amicitia bolsters the argument that his writings highly resemble those of Aristotle, but he also includes lessons from his experiences as a politician in Republican Rome to compose a more Roman set of philosophical ideas.

Before diving into Ciceronian philosophy, it is important to understand more about his life and how his personal background shaped his writings and actions. As a novus homo, meaning new man, Cicero was the first member of his family to gain a senatorial position, and his status as an outsider, relative to the descendants of long-standing powerful Roman families, often caused doubts regarding his competency and intellect.51 Cicero spent much of his career in court, arguing for and against many important Romans, and through these experiences, he unlocked an inlet into patrician culture and the Roman political dynamic. Cicero’s political insecurities stemming from his unfamiliar position of power in Roman government followed him for his entire career, and these doubts often motivated him to treat his colleagues and friends as a means to validate and augment his credibility and political legitimacy. Thus, much of Cicero’s behavior as a politician opposed the code of conduct he presented in De amicitia, and understanding the reasons for this disparity between his actions and his writings lends insight into Roman culture and his own personal thought processes. The more apparent role of selfinterest in Cicero’s philosophy than in Aristotle’s philosophy results from Cicero’s tendency to prioritize his own personal gain, a direct byproduct of his inferiority complex as a novus homo.

Ciceronian Friendship

50

Yelena Baraz, A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 95.

51

Ibid., 161.

Tandon 22 Cicero’s reasons for forming friendships as presented in De amicitia do not deviate too strongly from Aristotle’s, and looking at these causes for friendship will reveal his own thoughts on its role in Roman society. In De amicitia, Cicero famously asks, “How could you have full enjoyment of prosperity, unless with one whose pleasure in it was equal to your own?”52 Immediately afterwards, he asserts, “Nor would it be easy to bear adversity, unless with the sympathy of one on whom it rested more heavily than on your own soul,” demonstrating the emotional connection between friends.53 Cicero believes that friendship provides not only emotional support in times of adversity, but also incomparable enjoyment of success and positivity. Sharing one’s sentiments, whether positive or negative, with a friend, constitutes an unspeakable trust and strength in the relationship. In this case, the Roman potential for practicality and self-gain is subliminal, as Cicero mentions nothing regarding the motives of a friend for sharing in their companion’s elation and misery. While some Romans surely possessed genuine care for their friends and acted out of affection and empathy, others certainly viewed friendly interactions as a mechanism for achieving ulterior greed and halfheartedly participated in the duties of a friend until an opportune moment for fulfilling selfish motives. Here, Cicero’s silence raises questions about his personal opinions, but as the author, he often receives the benefit of the doubt and escapes aspersions on his character.

Furthermore, Cicero claims that friendship combines all common utilities, enumerating a few: wealth for use, power for respect, honor for reputation, sensual gratification for pleasure, and health for a healthy life.54 That his list consists solely of pleasurable utilities reveals that the

52

Marcus Tullius Cicero, De amicitia, trans. Karl Beier (San Bernardino: hardpress.net, 2016), 21.

53

Ibid., 21.

54

Ibid.

Tandon 23 Romans identified the utilitarian and pragmatic value of friendship as perhaps more important than their equivalent of Aristotle’s perfect friendship. Essentially, Cicero hints that the potential for utilitarian and pleasurable gain from a friendship is more important than the friendship itself.

Unlike Aristotle, Cicero, by not addressing friendship as a philosophical construct and instead discussing only its results and consequences, already undermines the morality of Roman friendship. Here, the extent to which Cicero lauds friendship as a practical, utilitarian measure demonstrates his deviation from Aristotelian thought: Cicero’s praise of friendship’s highest form centers on its utility and fails even to approach Aristotle’s perfect form of friendship.

Cicero later contends that “You cannot put water or fire to more uses than friendship serves,” again emphasizing the predominant Roman focus on concrete, materialistic gain from their friendships.55 Cicero claims that friendship has more utility than even water and fire, showing his rational and realistic approach. While water and fire deliver the ability to live, Cicero argues that friendship supersedes them in its potential for any kind of gain: friends may win the lottery and distribute winnings among their friends, friends may donate used items to their friends, or friends may provide genuine emotional comfort when their friends feel unhappy. The uses and potential benefits from a friendship are innumerable, and Cicero views this trait as friendship’s optimal quality. Cicero’s focus on the utility of friendship does not clarify his intentions as an author and does not expound whether he, personally, believed most friendships to be selfless or selfish.

One last clue to discerning his intentions lies in his limiting of friendship to existing only between similar people.56 People who share many commonalities undoubtedly provide more tangible benefits to each other, as they express interest in similar activities and have similar

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid.

Tandon 24 likings. Approached from the inverse perspective, the paradox becomes clearer: dissimilarity in friendship does not affect potential for emotional, abstract support, but it precludes, or at least greatly hinders, potential for tangible gain. In order for a friend to empathize with another, it is not required that both people share tastes, but in order for a friend to provide the other with palpable assets, they must possess at least some common tendencies. Unlike Aristotle, Cicero values self-interest and self-gain highly as reasons for friendship, and as a result, Ciceronian friendship lacks the purity and idealism of Aristotelian friendship.

Cicero also expresses thoughts on different types of friendship, which arise from a question he himself poses in De amicitia. Cicero inquires whether need or nature births friendship, whether human nature drives people to make friends or whether some hidden, internal need does. Cicero chooses nature to answer his own question, meaning that human nature as a sociable creature motivates friendship.57 This idea is much nobler and more honorable than the previous point regarding friendship’s utility, perhaps indicative of Cicero’s own questions about the motives of his own friendships. Cicero definitely engaged in relationships for his own personal benefit, but he might have also viewed true, spiritual friendships as equally, if not more, important than the former kind.

Naturally leading from his admission that friendship can have different motives, Cicero addresses the Aristotelian trichotomy between ideal and the two inferior friendships: combining this line of thought with the previous one regarding need versus nature, Cicero’s thoughts become apparent.58 A possible discrepancy between ideal friendship and the inferior friendships relates to the source of each type: nature sources ideal friendship, while need sources the inferior

57

Arthur L. Keith, "Cicero's Idea of Friendship," The Sewanee Review 37, no. 1 (January 1929): 52.

58

Cicero, De amicitia, 21.

Tandon 25 friendships. By answering his original question and electing nature over need, Cicero adopts Aristotle’s idealistic voice, essentially characterizing himself as a member only of perfect friendships. As Cicero’s firsthand experience shows, needs changed especially quickly in Roman politics, and as a natural politician, he had much experience manipulating colleagues and the Roman populace. Roman politicians, not excepting Cicero, constantly adapted to social and cultural changes to ensure their continued power, and Cicero’s decision to proclaim his faith in friendship based on nature marks him as silently guilty of harboring friendships based squarely on need.

Since Cicero has acknowledged the possibility of having friendships based on selfinterest and fulfillment of needs, how do the two earlier concepts of egoism and altruism manifest in his writings? Cicero’s thoughts are undoubtedly more self-interested than Aristotle’s, evidenced both from the text and from his personal background. Although “self-interest is not the aim of friendship,” the discrepancy between some of his idealistic views and his actions as a politician and practical philosopher magnifies the role of self-interest in the Roman Republic.59 Roman politics and society functioned mostly with self-interest in mind, as shown by the salutatio system and “do ut des,” and Cicero could not escape the potential for egoism in friendship. He accepts altruistic friendship as well, when he claims that friendship can sprout from human nature and genuine goodness, but he writes as a product of Roman society and expresses the distinct possibility for a friendship based on egoism, too. Ultimately, Rupert Lodge writes that Roman society during this time followed the idea of “each for self, and none for all,” and this phrase captures the intersection of the Roman political and philosophical landscape extremely well.60 Surely a political manifesto, Lodge’s description of Cicero’s society starkly

59

Willy Evenepoel, "Cicero's Laelius and Seneca's Letters on Friendship," L'Antiquité Classique 76 (2007): 178.

Tandon 26 opposes parts of De amicitia, leading to the conclusion that Cicero’s thoughts on friendship consist of both altruistic and egoistic elements.

Contextually, De amicitia must be understood to possess a generic relationship to Roman culture in addition to a specific appeal to late Republic aristocracy.61 Roman culture held vast influence on Cicero and his writings, and separation of De amicitia from its original historical background clouds the reasoning for Cicero’s philosophical choices. As a politician, Cicero had exceptional experience in the public sphere, and he tended to focus his philosophy more on reader appeal than on personal motivations.62 While De amicitia contains primarily Cicero’s voice, parts of the piece assume an external voice, driven by his knowledge of the aristocracy’s thoughts and actions. His political background contributed to this external voice, and Cicero found it impossible to separate completely the philosophical and political aspects of his personality. More often than not, he melded politics with philosophy in a diametrical manner.

Even after his removal from governmental affairs, he still coupled philosophy and politics, following his propensity for engaging in philosophical politics.63 Because he could never fully separate politics and philosophy, Cicero’s writings take on a different tone from Aristotle’s, namely, one more politically charged and socially keyed to Republican Rome.

An inspection of De amicitia as a standalone, as done here, paints a picture of Cicero as a much more politically-influenced author. De amicitia openly possesses elements of Roman politics and political culture, and the interplay between his uniquely Roman focus on politics and his tendency to engage in pure, Aristotelian philosophy yields De amicitia an enigmatic piece.

60

Rupert Lodge, "De Amicitia" [On Friendship], International Journal of Ethics 47, no. 2 (January 1937): 224.

Thomas N. Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's 'de Amicitia,'" Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 23, no. 4 (December 1990): 106.

61

62

Baraz, A Written, 45.

63

Ibid., 76-77.

Tandon 27 Analyzing friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics alongside Cicero’s De amicitia illuminates the extent of Aristotle’s influence on Cicero while also revealing unique Roman elements.

Aristotle’s Influence on Cicero Scholars agree that the Greeks exerted immense influence on the Romans, ranging from language to culture, and Roman authors constantly refer to their Greek predecessors’ and counterparts’ ideas. Before beginning a cross-analysis of Aristotelian and Ciceronian friendship, understanding the continuity from Greece to Rome is an important first step. However, minimizing the Roman tradition as simply derivative of the Greek tradition treats Roman culture unfairly and prematurely precludes a complete appreciation of Rome’s culture. Roman culture, after all, was quite Roman, exhibiting the presence of exclusively Roman elements in addition to Greek credos.64 Discussing similarities, differences, and the causes of each between the two works demonstrates this Roman duality.

When one reads both works, Cicero’s thought trend clearly emulates Aristotle’s. Both authors incorporate key ideas apropos of friendship, such as its nature and strength. Aristotle details perfect friendship and the two inferior brands, and Cicero similarly considers the difference between friendships that stem from nature versus those from need. Naturally, Aristotle’s perfect friendship embodies all his espoused ideals and fulfills all of friendship’s prescriptions, while the two inferior friendships, utilitarian friendship and pleasure-friendship, teeter on a scale based on subjective self-interest. Cicero regards friendship based on nature as more honorable than friendship based on need, since desiring the company of others due to an innate, human attraction transcends companionship formed on the basis of an exchange of

64

Habinek, "Towards a History," 185.

Tandon 28 concrete needs. Each of these friendships carries with it a set of typical actions: Aristotle’s perfect friendship and Cicero’s natural friendship obey virtue and moral goodness, while Aristotle’s lesser friendships and Cicero’s need-based friendship employ selfish favors and gifts that attempt to compensate for the lack of genuine spiritual affinity.

Both Aristotle and Cicero place heavy emphasis on their respective forms of idealistic friendship, with Aristotle’s perfect friendship dominating the Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero’s natural friendship prevailing in De amicitia. Aristotle and Cicero laud friendship as a construct, but each philosopher focuses too deeply on the ideal form.65 In reality, many types of friendship exist, and Cicero himself engaged in quite a few imperfect friendships over his career.

Additionally, their excessively high esteem for perfect friendship clouds the true beauty of friendship.66 Friendship is special because of its ubiquity and accessibility, and revering only some forms of friendship while ignoring the inherent goodness present in all friendship disservices its beauty. Categorizing and arranging friendship hierarchically augments the rift present between idealistic friendship and real, palpable friendship, a conflict which both Aristotle and Cicero are guilty.67 Very few people can act perfectly virtuously in perpetuity, and the supposition that only those few people can achieve and maintain a long-standing, healthy friendship is absurd. Aristotle’s and Cicero’s virtuous man is admittedly rather uncommon, and confining perfect or ideal friendship to these few individuals discredits the universality of friendship, perhaps its foremost quality.

65

Lynch, Philosophy and Friendship, 16.

66

Ibid., 16.

67

Ibid., 16.

Tandon 29 Aristotle and Cicero also share key inconsistencies that relate to friendship. Each author advocates for maturity as a precursor to friendship, but people at any point in their lives deserve friendship as an avenue towards happiness. People of any age possess the capability to establish friendships, and a refusal to recognize the omnipresence of friendship detracts from its sanctity as a virtuous bond. Aristotle and Cicero similarly denounce friendship among immoral or nonvirtuous people, demonstrating innate hypocrisy and discrimination in friendship. People deserve happiness by virtue of their humanity, and friendship consistently joins people who find happiness in similar pursuits. However, many of Cicero’s personal and political actions conflict with De amicitia’s moral code, so Cicero himself often acts as one of the immoral people whose friendships he denounces.

Aristotle’s and Cicero’s philosophies share defining ideas, as a result of Cicero’s early educational exposure to Ancient Greek philosophy and the Romans’ usual appreciation of Greek ideas. However, Cicero does not merely copy Aristotle’s work and rebrand it as his own; instead, he adjoins similar basic tenets with a particularly Roman sensibility. Stylistically, Cicero’s writing differs from Aristotle’s linear discourse. He obviously targets De amicitia to the aristocracy, since its dignified, powerful members would understand his references and political undertones.68 Because the Romans valued dialogue as a literary technique, Cicero manufactures De amicitia on a conversational premise.69 Instead of presenting the philosophy in a dry, technical fashion, Cicero spins it into a narrative and uses the casual discussion between Laelius and his sons-in-law, Fannius and Scaevola, as the setting for his philosophical exploration.

Indeed, the conversational tone allows for a larger practical and political voice in the work, as the

68

Albrecht, Cicero's Style, 129.

69

Ibid., 87.

Tandon 30 philosophy recalls the thoughts and true feelings of Roman aristocrats. Framing the philosophy as a dialogue makes it more accessible and enhances its appeal to the reader, allowing Cicero to publicize his ideas efficiently among his upper class comrades.70 Nevertheless, his overtly political tone and point of view ultimately diminish the accessibility of his piece and constrict the size of his audience.

Cicero’s political background inarguably tainted his philosophical lens, and, unlike Aristotle, Cicero’s main guide for his actions and philosophies was politics.71 Furthermore, his political and personal backgrounds cooperate to make his philosophy more practical. Ciceronian philosophy accounts for everyday affairs and conflicts better than Aristotelian philosophy, and because many of Cicero’s experiences are typical of a member of the Roman aristocracy, discerning the impact that these incidents have on his writings uncovers an additional level of meaning present in De amicitia.72 Individually, Cicero’s business friendships most exemplify the influence of his actions on his intellectual ideas. Cicero and his friends performed officia and beneficia, or reciprocal favors, for each other, representing the businesslike nature of Roman politics.73 During his governorship of Cilicia, south of Asia Minor, Cicero promoted the interests of his own friend and manager T.P. Atticus to the neighboring governors, securing many lucrative deals for Atticus in exchange for favors as small as importing estate-wares from Greece and as large as managing Cicero’s complete asset portfolio for long periods of time.74 This

70

Ibid., 37-38.

71

Keith, "Cicero's Idea," 56.

72

Evenepoel, "Cicero's Laelius," 183.

73

Nicholas K. Rauh, "Cicero's Business Friendships: Economics and Politics in the Late Roman Republic," Aevum 60, no. 1 (January-April 1986): 6.

74

Ibid., 8-9.

Tandon 31 penchant for performing unethical and occasionally illicit favors conflicts directly with Cicero’s idealistic claim that friendship’s aim is not self-interest. Although all favors did not lead to immediate selfish gain, politicians and aristocrats tracked each other’s service and fixed arrangements that would ensure knowledge of debts owed. In this way, patricians with different levels of power often lost their leverage on each other and became equal players in a game of exchanges. True Roman practices contrasted greatly from Aristotelian idealism, further contributing to Cicero’s exclusive philosophical theory. Another element of these professional relationships arose from Cicero’s status as a senator: quid pro quo arrangements were typical of the senatorial class. These exchanges came in the form of business services, loans, support in elections, or even hospitality while traveling, and such services merely cemented and increased the aristocracy’s propensity for selfish actions.75 These activities resembled the “do ut des” construct, facilitating cooperation between officials for mutual benefit.

Cicero used friendship as a means to collect personal benefits, presenting a stark rejection of both his own and Aristotle’s philosophical postulations.76 As a player in the “high-stakes game of power and influence” that was Roman politics, Cicero fully embraced the Roman power hierarchy and its role in social relationships.77 Wealthy aristocrats continually manipulated the plebeians to maintain their affluence, power, and political support, and providing occasional services to the lower classes, through provisions such as the salutatio, ensured that aristocrats preserved their authority.

75

Ibid., 7.

76

Ibid., 11

77

Habinek, "Towards a History," 177.

Tandon 32 The most revealing aspect of Cicero’s daily life relates not to its shaping of his philosophy, but to his own inability to adhere to the morals put forth in De amicitia. Direct contradictions between his daily life and his writings demonstrate the disparity between his philosophy and his existence, reinforcing the idea that his philosophy represents a normative standard that even he himself does not match. Nicholas Rauh alleges that Cicero based the closeness of his personal friends on the magnitude of the favors they performed for him, thus typifying the most clinical definition of an egoistic, selfish friendship.78 Although he posits in De amicitia that friendly esteem and respect follow from age, he noticeably contravenes his own doctrine throughout his personal life.79 Moreover, Rauh characterizes Cicero’s personal friends as “conduits for his multitude of domestic, business, and financial needs,” casting additional doubt on Cicero’s ability to embody his ideal, virtuous friend.80 An interrelation between business and friendship allowed Cicero to advance his own self-interest significantly. While De amicitia stresses the importance of honesty in friendships, Cicero undoubtedly neglected honest, truthful behavior for personal gain from his friendships, rendering him even further in violation of his own principles.81 Similarly, Cicero condemns flattery and warns against its dangers in friendship, but flattery was often the choice tool of politicians for assuring future services from counterparts.82 For example, in a 62 BCE letter to Pompey the Great, Cicero utilizes flattery to its fullest potential by aggrandizing Pompey as “a much greater man than [Scipio] Africanus,”

78

Rauh, "Cicero's Business," 12.

79

Cicero, De amicitia, 31.

80

Rauh, "Cicero's Business," 19.

81

Habinek, "Towards a History," 168.

82

Ibid., 170.

Tandon 33 despite centering De amicitia completely on the same Africanus’ virtue and moral excellence.83 In this way, Cicero’s prioritization of his own self-interest and image to his fellow aristocrats clashes with Aristotle’s spotlight on appreciating genuinely good traits in friendship.

Familiarization with these aspects of Cicero’s personal life informs and contextualizes shortcomings and exceptions in his philosophy. De amicitia prescribes overall honorable action in friendship, but Cicero does account for some departure from the rigid path of honor, such as the occasional underhanded action on behalf of a friend.84 Because of his time as a politician, Cicero certainly did not always carry himself in an exemplary manner, since betrayal and corruption permeated politics in Republican Rome. Cicero internalized the behavior typical of the Roman aristocracy, and his background ultimately caused some divergence from Aristotle’s philosophy in De amicitia.

Ultimately, unique cultural traditions in both Greece and Rome affected the philosophies of both authors. While Aristotle’s writing assumes a much more idealistic and abstract tone, Cicero differentiates his philosophy by conflating traditional, Aristotelian philosophical thought with Republican Rome’s political theory. Cicero subliminally invokes his own personal background, combined with the social, cultural, and political scene in Rome, to weave together an exclusive philosophical canon. Cicero lived in a time and place whose customs demanded a system of practical exchanges, and his philosophy clearly adopts hints of this political actuality.

As one of the main purveyors of Ancient Greek philosophy into Rome, Cicero had the opportunity to set the precedent for future Roman philosophy, and while his study in Greece

83

Marcus Tullius Cicero to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, "Cicero: Letter to Pompey the Great on Their Friendship (62 BCE)," 62 BCE. 84

Keith, "Cicero's Idea," 52.

Tandon 34 influenced him and exposed him to the ideas of his forerunners, he decisively amended their ideas with an imprint of Roman culture to contrive a novel, specifically Roman, philosophy on friendship.

It is important to realize that Aristotle’s categories of friendship exist only for contemplation and reflection on one’s personal friendships, not as an archetypal organization of friendship. The three types of friendship do not serve as categories into which individual friendships are placed, and people do not tally their counts of each type of friendship. Consistent with the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, these categories are idealistic constructs that act as thought-provoking vehicles for self-reflection. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics proposes a utopia of friendship, built on unachievable, far-fetched ideals that champion the everlasting Greek idea of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Aristotle’s trifold system definitely underlies Cicero’s philosophy, yet Cicero, as a token of his Roman heritage, grounds Aristotle’s precedent with real-life pragmatism typical of the Roman political scene. Cicero focuses his praise of friendship on its utility and practicality, in essence, his highest form of friendship reaches only the second tier of Aristotelian friendship. This shortcoming can only be explained by the inherent difference between the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions: the Greek focus on idealism and exploratory knowledge contrasted with the Roman spotlight on the material and functional value of friendship.

As social creatures, people draw themselves to others. Most people do not employ a philosophical calculus when making friends, but understanding the role of friends and actively attempting to reflect on the causes of friendship leads to a higher level of self-understanding.

Pondering the frequency and reasons for each of Aristotle’s three types of friendship reveals one’s internal ranking of utility, pleasure, and genuine emotional attraction, allowing for

Tandon 35 otherwise unachievable introspection and self-improvement. Likewise, ascribing friendships to nature or need promotes a more humble world view, contextualizing the scope of human nature and separating it from the auxiliary desires that cloud its universal uniformity. Despite their philosophical differences, both Aristotle and Cicero relished such self-reflection and strived to attain deeper self-awareness. Aristotle’s three categories of friendship serve to assign qualitative rankings to individual friendships, inciting contemplation on one’s shortcomings and merits as a friend. Similarly, Cicero’s philosophy and the extent to which it is influenced by his personal and political experiences depicts the necessity for balance in friendship and the potential for any relationship, not just friendship, to be affected both positively and negatively by external circumstances. The undeniable thread that connects Ciceronian philosophy to Aristotelian philosophy, however, reinforces the continuity of friendship in the ancient world. Similar trends in ancient philosophy on friendship demonstrates Aristotle’s considerable influence on Cicero, and ultimately, the vast interrelation of the Greco-Roman world.

Tandon 36 Bibliography Adkins, Arthur W. H. "'Friendship' and 'Self-Sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle." The Classical Quarterly 13, no. 1 (May 1963): 30-45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/637932.

Arthur W.H. Adkins was the Edward Olson Professor in Classical Languages and Literatures at the University of Chicago from 1977 to 1996. His research on the Ancient Greeks led to significant progress in the Classics, specifically regarding the Ancient Greek value system. His article discusses Ancient Greek ideals of friendship from a lens focused on the self. He relates ideas present in Homer to Aristotle's ideas, clarifying the interrelation between Aristotle and his predecessors. This article helped provide Greek cultural background on friendship to relate to Aristotle's ideas as a symbol of the role Greek culture played in Aristotle's philosophy.

Albrecht, Michael von. Cicero's Style: A Synopsis. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Michael von Albrecht is a German translator and scholar, specializing in the history of Roman literature. In 2004, he received the Johann-Heinrich-Voss prize for excellent translation of Latin. He writes extensively about specific Roman authors and the historical circumstances that affected their writings, combining historical analysis with appropriate references to Roman culture. His book provides specific background on Cicero's career as a philosopher and author, and his analysis of concrete stylistic elements in Cicero's writings help explain why Cicero wrote as he did and how Ciceronian style fits well with Roman culture.

Annas, Julia. "Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism." Mind 86, no. 344 (October 1977): 532-54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253312.

Julia Annas is a British philosopher who focuses on Ancient Greek ethics, psychology, and epistemology, with current research interests on Platonic ethics. She uses the example of friendship paradoxes in Plato's Lysis to explain further Aristotle's friendship.

She also discusses applications of egoism and altruism in Plato's and Aristotle's works, and posits that Aristotle's thoughts on friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics take a somewhat egoistic point of view based on Aristotle's description of the grounds for friendship. This article discusses self-interest in Aristotle's philosophy, which provides a necessary comparison point for an analysis of the prioritization of self-interest in Aristotelian and Ciceronian philosophies.

Annis, David B. "The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship." American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 4 (October 1987): 349-56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014212.

David B. Annis is a philosopher and author previously affiliated with Ball State University in Indiana. He focuses on epistemology, critical thinking, and research in higher education. He also studies how values and duties tie in to philosophical ideas which then go on to shape actions in relationships like friendship. He writes about the meaning of friendship from the point of view of the values present in friendship and the duties friends have toward each other, specifically discussing the mutual nature of friendship and its values and duties. This article clarifies some of what was expected from a friend during antiquity, and how those expectations generally function in the friendship.

Tandon 37

Aristotle., J. A. K Thomson, Hugh Tredennick, Jonathan Barnes, and Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Further revised edition. ed. London: Penguin Books, 2004.

Aristotle was a famous Greek philosopher and student of Plato. He wrote philosophy on many subjects, and his writings are still widely read today. Aristotle addresses friendship in part of his Nicomachean Ethics, and he elaborates the subject significantly, discussing everything from types of friendships to individual actions within a friendship. The Nicomachean Ethics acts as a primary source to read Aristotle's ideas on friendship and then analyze and compare them to Cicero's.

Baraz, Yelena. A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Yelena Baraz is an Associate Professor of Classics at Princeton University. She focuses on Latin Literature and Language, Roman cultural history, and the history of ideas. She writes about Roman authors and cultural influences of their writings, while providing ample historical context about the development of their ideas. Her book gives background on Cicero and his writings from an analytical standpoint of culture during Republican Rome. She effectively handles the confusing and complex relationship between politics and philosophy during Ciceronian times, and her work explains how the very political flavor to Roman culture obfuscates Cicero's ability to be a pure philosopher.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De amicitia. Translated by Karl Beier. San Bernardino: hardpress.net, 2016.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a famous Roman politician, author, philosopher, orator, lawyer, senator, and consul during the Roman Republic. He spent his life as a member of the Roman aristocracy. He wrote many philosophical works on a range of subjects, from old age to friendship, and his works are still widely read today. His works are famous for the insight they provide into the Roman Republic and its social and cultural happenings.

Cicero's De amicitia is a primary source that describes his thoughts on, and by extension, the Roman aristocratic conception of friendship. Analyzing his philosophy from a social and cultural angle provides additional insight into factors that influenced him and Republican Rome as a whole.

———. Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, "Cicero: Letter to Pompey the Great on Their Friendship (62 BCE)," 62 BCE. http://www.ancienthistory.abcclio.com/Search/Display/1811339.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a famous Roman politician, author, philosopher, orator, lawyer, senator, and consul during the Roman Republic. He spent his life as a member of the Roman aristocracy. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, also known as Pompey the Great, was a famous Roman general. This correspondence between Cicero and Pompey provides insight into Cicero's personal relationships and how he and his close allies communicated with each other. This letter acts as a primary source to measure how well Cicero himself upholds the ideals set forth in De amicitia. The style and content of the letter also provides information about Republican Roman culture and society.

Tandon 38 Cooper, John M. "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship." The Review of Metaphysics 30, no. 4 (June 1977): 619-48. http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/20126987.

John M. Cooper is the Henry Putnam University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He is regarded as an expert on ancient philosophy. He writes about the ideas of many ancient philosophers, ranging from Socrates to Plotinus, and he focuses on knowledge, reason, and goodness. His article discusses Aristotle and his views on the forms and types of friendship in conjunction with the role feelings or morality and goodwill play in each of these friendships. This article provides analysis of some of Aristotle's ideas that parallels some of Cicero's ideas, allowing for effective and clear comparison of the two.

DeLacy, Phillip Howard. "Cicero, Marcus Tullius." Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2, no. 2nd (2006): 257-59. puffin.harker.org/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&sw=w&u=harker &v=2.1&id=GALE%7CCX3446800368&it=r&asid=58803310e5452777978985f65c36c 5c3.

Phillip DeLacy was Professor Emeritus of Classical Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, among other prestigious institutions. He studied primarily Ancient Greek philosophy and medicine, and his writings and research focused on Hippocrates, Plutarch, and Galen. DeLacy was President of the American Philological Association from 1966 to 1967. DeLacy's article addresses historical and cultural context of Cicero's life, focusing on his status as a novus homo and how that affected his status in Rome.

Evenepoel, Willy. "Cicero's Laelius and Seneca's Letters on Friendship." L'AntiquitĂŠ Classique 76 (2007): 177-83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41665644.

Willy Evenepoel is a scholar and writer based affiliated with Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. He writes extensively on Latin literature and history, focusing mainly on philosophical writings by famous Roman authors like Cicero and Seneca. He also writes quite a bit about the religious conflict during the Roman Empire between Christians and Pagans, analyzing the written material of each group to learn more about their particular situations. This article about Cicero's and Seneca's thoughts on friendship addresses the role of self-interest and other aspects of Roman daily life in the philosophical writings, ultimately allowing for analysis of the differing significance of self-interest in friendship in Aristotle versus in Cicero.

Gruber-Miller, John. "Exploring Relationships: Amicitia and Familia in Cicero's de Amicitia."

The Classical World 103, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 88-92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40599907.

John Gruber-Miller is an Associate Professor of Classics at Cornell College in Iowa. In addition to philosophy, he focuses his research on Greek and Roman comedy, Latin poetry, and alternative analytical approaches to Greek and Latin literature. He writes about the wider implications of friendship in Republican Rome, which stretched much wider than the modern connotation of friendship. Roman friends had more responsibilities than a modern friend, and Gruber-Miller details these roles, ranging from colleagues to political allies to clients. This article sets comparable context between the Greek philia and the Roman amicus.

Tandon 39 Habinek, Thomas N. "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's 'de Amicitia.'" Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 23, no. 4 (December 1990): 165-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913647.

Thomas N. Habinek is a Professor of Classics at USC. His interests center on Greek and Roman literature and diversity in a historical context. He writes about the historical context of Greek and Roman literature, such as how Cicero's writings work in the fabric of Roman culture. He also examines specific qualities of friendship and how they fit in with Roman culture. This article mentions specific factors from Cicero's philosophy and how they are influenced by aspects of Roman culture. Additionally, Habinek discusses the role of the power struggle between members of the aristocracy that played a large role in Cicero's philosophy.

Homer. Iliad. Translated by Samuel Butler. 800 BCE. Accessed March 11, 2017. http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/iliad.html.

Homer's Iliad traces the story of the Greek hero Achilles through his many trials, including the Trojan War. Homer's writings provide the first written record of Ancient Greek cultural, philosophical, and literary tradition, and his works remain among the world's most well-respected and widely-read writings. Including examples that demonstrate the strength of the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus introduces friendship in the Ancient Greek tradition and provides context for Aristotelian ideas of friendship.

Keith, Arthur L. "Cicero's Idea of Friendship." The Sewanee Review 37, no. 1 (January 1929): 51-58. http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/27534355.

Arthur L. Keith was a philosopher and Classicist associated with the Sewanee Review published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. His works focused on Latin philology and philosophy, and he wrote extensively about language and meaning in Vergil and in Homer. His writings relate mostly to technical aspects of language and how they influence meaning and ideology in an author's works. This article provides a philosophical summary of some of Cicero's ideas on friendship, which, combined with an analysis of stylistic and cultural elements present in Cicero's work, creates a complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the publishing of De amicitia.

Lodge, Rupert. "De Amicitia" [On Friendship]. International Journal of Ethics 47, no. 2 (January 1937): 224-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2989336.

Rupert Lodge was a famous Anglo-Canadian philosopher, often regarded as the most widely read philosopher in Canada. His research focused on philosophy relating to the mind and education, as well as Platonic and Ancient Greek ethics. He writes generally about Ancient Greek philosophy as well as more specific topics like goodness and morality. This article addresses moral and philosophical implications of Ciceronian and Aristotelian viewpoints on friendship, allowing for external analysis of both schools of thought from a moral, and more specifically self-interested, lens.

Lynch, Sandra. Philosophy and Friendship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.

Philosophy and Friendship by Sandra Lynch compiles ancient Greek views on friendship, such as those present in Homer's works, that characterize friendship as a

Tandon 40 formal relationship with practical value, with those espoused by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and by Cicero in De amicitia. Lynch's skilled analysis and explanation of similarities and differences between the ideas of these two major philosophers, among others, creates a concrete and informed base for further studying the topic of friendship. Lynch examines applications of abstract ideas of friendship in real life scenarios like politics and power dynamics, which existed even from the time of Aristotle and Cicero. Formerly a teacher of philosophy at the University of New South Wales and Macquarie University, Sandra Lynch now spends her time writing and teaching about the development and institution of philosophical skills in classrooms. Her book identifies similarities and differences between Aristotle's and Cicero's views and applies each set of views to specific situations from its respective time period.

Nehamas, Alexander. On Friendship. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Alexander Nehamas is a Professor of Philosophy and Edmund N. Carpenter, II Class of 1943 Professor in the Humanities at Princeton University. He focuses his research on Greek philosophy, aesthetics, Nietzsche, Foucault, and literary theory. He originally wrote on Platonic metaphysics and Socratic philosophy, and he now writes about modern philosophical contexts of long-standing philosophical ideas, like friendship. His book provides modern contextualization for some of Aristotle's and Cicero's ideas about friendship, while also setting up historical background with contemporary and modern examples that illustrate the application of these philosophical ideas.

O'Connor, David K. "Two Ideals of Friendship." History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1990): 109-22. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27743926.

David K. O'Connor is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Concurrent Associate Professor of Classics at the University of Notre Dame. His areas of interest include ancient philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of literature. His current work focuses on Platonism and skepticism in English and American Romantic writings, such as those by Percy Bysshe Shelley and Ralph Waldo Emerson. This article discusses Aristotle's ideals of friendship and how they differ from modern friendship, while arguing against Cooper's assertion about the equality of goodwill in all three kinds of friendship. His article provides analysis of some of Aristotle's specific prescriptions of friendship, which enhance the analysis of Aristotle's work as a whole.

Pangle, Lorraine Smith. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship provides a comprehensive yet detailed overview of Aristotle's views on friendship. Specifically, Pangle explores similarities present between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, setting effective context for the ideas laid forth by Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics. Later on, Pangle examines Cicero's viewpoint in De amicitia as a result of both a unique social situation and a collection of similar influences. Lorraine Smith Pangle is a political philosophy professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Her work clearly and effectively underlines the significance and modern import of famous works on friendship, while always remembering to provide the reader with ample context.

Tandon 41 Rauh, Nicholas K. "Cicero's Business Friendships: Economics and Politics in the Late Roman Republic." Aevum 60, no. 1 (January-April 1986): 3-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20858020.

Nicholas K. Rauh is a Professor of Classics at Purdue University. His research focuses on the Classics, Ancient History, and Ancient Cultures, and he writes extensively on patrician and senatorial business relationships in Rome and the effects that these cultural practices had on the works of famous Roman authors like Cicero. This article discusses Cicero's business friendships from his time as a senator and politician in great detail, allowing for close analysis on what aspects of Roman culture and specifically what events from Cicero's personal life would have shaped his philosophical thoughts in De amicitia.

White, Richard. "Friendship and Commitment." Journal of Value Inquiry 33, no. 1 (March 1999): 79-88. Accessed August 16, 2016. https://puffin.harker.org/login?url=http://puffin.harker.org:2390/docview/203919860?acc ountid=618.

Richard White is a Professor of Philosophy at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska.

His research and teaching centers on philosophy, virtue, philosophy in literature, and multiculturalism. His focus on modern and nineteenth century philosophy and philosophical thoughts allows for analysis from a unique interdisciplinary point of view.

This article discusses the role of commitment and other similar values in friendship, providing a modern context of friendship to which ancient ideas can be compared and trends through time can be identified.

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