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Critical Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice Toran Hansen
This article brings together a variety of ideas from critical theorists and practitioners in order to present a coherent critical approach for the field of conflict resolution. The historical roots of critical theory are briefly presented, along with critical practices that conflict resolution practitioners and theorists have developed. This leads to a discussion of critical strategies that are employed by conflict resolution practitioners who have aligned their practice and values with critical ideology. The potential place of critical theory and practice in the field of conflict resolution is stressed, highlighting new forms of practice and new roles for practitioners. As Alinsky wrote, “Conflict is the essential core of a free and open society” (1971, p. 12).
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ritical theory has a long tradition in the social sciences and has contributed insights to many professional fields. The legal profession has used it to confront social justice concerns both in and out of the courts (Cornell University, n.d.; Ward, 1998). Teaching, in particular in higher education, has emphasized critical pedagogy in an effort to develop analytical thinking skills and promote critical ideas among students in critiquing the treatment of marginalized and oppressed populations (Knupfer, 1995). Social work has used critical theory to confront the social justice concerns faced by the clientele they serve daily (Payne, 2005). In fact, critical social workers such as David Gil (1998) have gone so far as to develop practice principles that guide a would-be critical social worker in community practice (see Exhibit 1). The field of conflict resolution and practitioners interested in addressing social justice concerns can benefit greatly by learning from this body of critical theory and practice wisdom. It is precisely this
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Exhibit 1. Critical Social Work Practice Principles 1. Rejecting the idea of political neutrality and believing in social justice and liberation 2. Choosing values consciously: equality, liberty, cooperation, and community 3. Transcending technical and professional approaches 4. Facilitating critical consciousness through dialogue 5. Advocating human rights 6. Confronting obstacles to needs fulfillment 7. Analyzing oppression in one’s personal life 8. Analyzing future possibilities 9. Spreading critical consciousness and building social movements Source: Gil (1998), pp. 104–108.
important societal concern for social justice and improving the lives of oppressed people that makes this endeavor worthwhile, for those entreated with assisting people in managing their social conflicts.
Historical Roots The origins of critical theory come from the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the mid-1800s. At that time, Marx and Engels developed a critique of the capitalist system by analyzing the social structure from which it emerged (Collins, 1985). This analysis was based on considering how capitalism perpetuated the social classes. Marx and Engels argued that the lower class (the proletariat) was dominated by the upper class (the bourgeoisie) which controlled the societal resources and the means to produce them, concentrating societal wealth through political, ideological, and economic hegemony (see, for example, Collins, 1985). A particularly important means of control used by the bourgeoisie was ideological, with the lower classes accepting the social structure and the rules supporting it and adopting the interests of the elites as their own, though the social structure did not support their interests (Marx and Engels, 1985). This process was later termed “false consciousness.” Overcoming this domination required the lower classes to revolt against their oppressors (Marx and Engels, 1969). Initially termed Marxist, this theoretical framework was later called “radical.” A recent period of great activity for radical activists and theorists was the 1960s and 1970s (Galper, 1976). In this era, the civil rights movement drew CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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heavily on radical theory and practice in attempting to overturn unjust societal institutions and structures (Piven and Cloward, 1979). Constructivists such as Michel Foucault (who did not consider himself a Marxist or radical theorist) and Paulo Freire had a great impact on radical theory. Foucault reconsidered common understandings of social phenomena such as power and grounded them in the details of language, challenging the notions of neutrality and objectivity (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999). To Foucault, social understandings were created by those responsible for naming the social phenomena and norms in a society. In this sense, things were “true” only insofar as they were legitimized through language, which gave societal power to those who created the societal discourse, the societal elites (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999; Foucault, 1994a). Freire’s thought (1997) emerged directly from his work with the poor in Brazil who were facing the day-to-day reality of their oppression. Freire determined that societal change would emerge from a kind of education, one based on dialogue and self-discovery that would assist oppressed groups in understanding the structural obstacles to their hopes for social justice and equality. He called this awareness based on these new understandings “critical consciousness” (Freire, 1997). Educating for critical consciousness gave critical theorists a means for supporting marginalized groups in attaining their societal goals. These constructivist ideas had a profound impact on radical thought, and “critical theory” emerged from this union. Critical theory has thus evolved over time. Different iterations were responses to social conditions and circumstances in various eras, when the public mood vacillated between more conservative and more liberal ideologies (Galper, 1976). In general, critical thought submerged in conservative eras when it was not favored and emerged again in favorable social and academic climates that were typically more liberal and less affluent (Galper, 1976). Theorists and practitioners working on behalf of diverse social movements have over time drawn on critical theory to explain and confront the oppression of various marginalized populations such as African Americans; Native Americans; women; gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) groups; and the physically and mentally challenged (Galper, 1976; Gil, 1998). The current conservative era (from the 1980s to the present), with increasingly consolidated wealth, a greater emphasis on military security, mainstream media that do not tend to question the status quo, and the relative absence of critical social analysis, supports the hypothesis that critical thought tends to submerge in affluent, conservative eras such as CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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the one we are presently living through (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000; Longres, 1982).
Important Concepts Critical theory is relevant for the field of conflict resolution because it offers conflict resolution practitioners and scholars a framework that can guide them in assisting parties to overcome societal and interpersonal oppression and injustice: Oppression refers to a mode of human relations involving domination and exploitation—economic, social, and psychologic—between individuals; between social groups and classes within and beyond societies; and globally, between entire societies. . . . Injustice refers to coercively established and maintained inequalities, discrimination, and dehumanizing, development-inhibiting conditions of living (e.g., slavery serfdom, and exploitative wage labor; unemployment, poverty, starvation, and homelessness; inadequate healthcare and education), imposed by dominant social groups, classes, and peoples upon dominated and exploited groups, classes, and people [Gil, 1998, p. 10].
Societal oppression therefore adversely affects the entire society, oppressors and the oppressed alike, by dehumanizing them and giving certain groups advantages at the expense of others. The oppressed are dehumanized when they are denied opportunities that oppressors take for granted in pursuing their rights and in getting their needs met (Freire, 1997). Oppressors are dehumanized by controlling and violating the rights of the oppressed and becoming dominators, polarizing their communities, and denying their compassion for their fellow human beings (Freire, 1997). Oppressive societies reinforce the exploitation of certain societal members for the benefit and privilege of others, resulting in unequal rights, conditions of living, and distribution of resources (Gil, 1998). These systemic social imbalances call for systemic alterations to the social structure and the taken-for-granted social order to address them, creating greater parity between groups (Galper, 1975). This is the essence of social justice, the principal goal of critical work. The National Association of Social Workers (1999) defines social justice as “pursu[ing] social change, particularly with and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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people. . . . Social change efforts are focused primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression and cultural and ethnic diversity [and] strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources; equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision making for all people.” The ultimate goal of critical theory is thus to transform societal relationships and institutions that are exploitative, creating a more equitable society. Power in social relationships is the central organizing concept around which critical theory is organized. Marx and Engels (1985) originally conceived social power as arising out of historical relationships based on domination. Power is located in the hands of the oppressors and controlled by them in shaping societal ideologies. In the process, their interests become hidden, appearing as though they represent the interests of the entire society including oppressed groups (Marx and Engels, 1969, 1985). This “false consciousness” gives the upper class in a society ideological domination, thereby contributing to the control of the lower classes. The upper class also dominates a society through economic means, systematically concentrating societal wealth (Collins, 1985; Marx and Engels, 1969). In overcoming oppression, the oppressed must awaken their awareness of the repressive dimensions of this oppressive societal ideology and rise up in a revolution to wrest ideological, economic, and political power from the hands of their oppressors (Marx and Engels, 1969, 1985). Overthrowing the oppressors in a social revolution is therefore paramount in Marxist thought and is transformative, altering society and its ideology wholesale rather than incrementally by nibbling away at the dominant societal ideology (Marx and Engels, 1969, 1985). Later iterations of critical theory have since challenged this notion of complete societal revolution as the only means to accomplish critical ends, in favor of incrementalism. Foucault suggested that power as originally conceived by Marx and Engels was too simplistic. Instead of existing within the oppressors, like a thing that was inevitably repressive, Foucault felt that power existed throughout the social network of relationships and had to be exercised in specific social contexts (Foucault, 1994a). To Foucault, power could be used for either productive or repressive ends (Foucault, 1994b). However, the societal members who controlled the creation and maintenance of language controlled the power in relationships by determining how social phenomena were named and discussed (Foucault, 1994b). This process CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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creates what is perceived as the truth in any society. For this reason, Foucault looked at the transformative potential of societal discourses as a means to change society, rather than revolution as advocated by Marxist thought (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999). Such transformation could be attained by disturbing common understandings of social phenomena and relationships, destabilizing societal discourse through analysis and language use rather than by force as envisioned by Marx and Engels (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999; Foucault, 1994b). These constructivist ideas allowed analysts to see more complexity when conceptualizing power, making societal transformation incremental (and less objectionable) while retaining an analysis of ideological societal domination and false consciousness. Critical theory therefore calls for an analysis of power in overcoming societal injustice and oppression. Expressions of power can be either covert or overt, and a practitioner must consider both of these modalities of expression if they wish to overturn its unjust application (Gil, 1998; Piven and Cloward, 1979). However, societal discourse is frequently controlled by elites who can inhibit an official power analysis on a societal level, in order to protect the prevailing social order (Freire, 1997). Freire has suggested that overcoming these obstacles can be achieved through a new kind of education, called “problem-posing education.” Students learn to deconstruct the societal ideology affecting them in their everyday lives, see how it inhibits attainment of their interests, and visualize possible societal changes that could better serve their interests. Problem-posing education ultimately results in “critical consciousness,” which can be emancipatory for oppressed individuals who can then seek to alter their world and the prevailing oppressive societal ideology in accordance with their new understandings. Traditionally, education and societal institutions have objectified people, denying them opportunities for probing into important societal discourse in order to deconstruct it for their benefit as “subjects” capable of questioning and transforming their world (Foucault, 1994a; Freire, 1997). To allow oppressed individuals and populations to become subjects, their voices must come to the fore and be counted. In meeting the needs of the oppressed, more equitable societal alternatives should be conceived by them, as a grassroots approach, rather than being imposed on them from more powerful social groups (Galper, 1975). The common interests of various oppressed groups can be used as a means to galvanize their solidarity of voice, which could then create the leverage needed to generate social CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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change (Freire, 1997). Preventing their voices from entering the societal discourse is a form of violence perpetrated against the oppressed and must be overcome in order to create and maintain a just society (Freire, 1997). When individuals reach critical consciousness, it allows them to become subjects in their world, actively and consciously co-creating it, rather than passive “objects” who accept their social reality (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999; Foucault, 1994a; Freire, 1997). In this way, critical theory calls for praxis, addressing real-world problems and constraints, rather than armchair theorizing. Praxis is the reciprocal, dynamic, and reflexive relationship that practitioners engage in when their theorizing about societal oppression informs their actions taken to challenge that oppression, and vice versa (Marx and Engels, 1985). Praxis also puts the scholar or practitioner in a position of continuous reflection, questioning the theory-action relationship in order to continuously revise his or her approach. A praxis orientation is inherently future-oriented and hopeful, with scholar-practitioners creating new visions for societal relationships in overcoming societal domination, which in turn are an impetus for further societal analysis and action (Freire, 1997; Scanlon and Longres, 2001). There have been many important and valid criticisms of critical theory since the time that Marx and Engels originally conceived it. As was already stated, concepts of power employed by critical theorists have been criticized for being too narrow, focusing on collective rather than individual justice and exclusively considering domination by elites when “powerless” groups can use both violence and social power to further their own ends as well (Payne, 2005; Spencer, 1991). In conflict resolution, this can create a problem when the subjective experiences of clients and their understanding are minimized (ideological concerns) in favor of paternalist practitioner understandings based on society as a whole (materialist concerns; Eide, 1972; Heyworth, 1991; Spencer, 1991). At its worst, critical theory can be used to blame an individual’s social environment and his or her assumed place in it for all of the problems and conflicts, eliminating personal agency and responsibility for ameliorating those concerns (Payne, 2005). Likewise, “the establishment” (societal elites) are thought of by critical theorists in very stereotypical, one-dimensional terms (Kent, 1971; Spencer, 1991), which can create further polarization between parties in conflict. Paying attention to such criticisms can help critical theorists and practitioners recognize the limitations of their analysis. In the field of conflict resolution, these limitations can help guide decisions as to when it would be appropriate to employ a critical analytic framework and when it would not. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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The Place of Critical Theory in Conflict Resolution Theory Critical theory is not altogether new to the field of conflict resolution. In the early 1970s, Rapoport initiated a debate considering the proper place of critical theory and practice in international conflict resolution and peace studies. Kent (1971), Eide (1972), and Stohl and Chamberlain (1972) were among those to respond to this discussion. Rapoport (1970) suggested that conflict resolution could potentially be seen as a tool of “the establishment” in attempting to pacify conflicting parties, potentially undermining the attempts of marginalized populations in attaining social justice. In this vain, Stohl and Chamberlain juxtapose the goal of social justice with that of social stability, questioning whether it is possible for conflict resolution practitioners to pursue both goals simultaneously. Eide went further to say that the quest for neutrality in the profession may in fact mask underlying inequitable power governing the relationships of conflicting parties. This stance suggests that true neutrality is not possible in conflict resolution as the societal elites benefit from such a position, holding power and privilege outside the conflict resolution process itself. Hence conflict resolution processes would be biased toward societal elites rather than “underdogs,” reinforcing the status quo. These arguments embed individual conflicts firmly in the social structures where they have arisen, thus broadening the field of conflict resolution to consider the impact of significant external societal factors (such as power) on any particular conflict, and their potential implications for its management or resolution. In a rebuttal to the premise that conflict resolution was being used as a tool by the establishment, Kent (1971) suggested quite the opposite: that conflict resolution was not a tool of the establishment and conflict scholars have had sufficient autonomy to critically examine conflicts and conflict resolution processes. In fact, their independence is what enabled them to aid parties in discovering the causes of their conflicts and help craft just resolutions. He believed that researchers and practitioners were not so much a part of the establishment but rather were not being thorough and contemporary enough to ensure that their work went outside the bounds of the expectations of the establishment. Today, this debate is still very much alive in considering the potential utility of critical theory and practice in international conflict resolution. Quille (2000), for instance, suggested that critical theory might have an important role to play in informing peacekeeping operations. Quille indicates that creating a sustainable peace involves more than placating or CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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pacifying conflicting parties; any resolution should also ensure the human and economic rights of parties in conflict. This type of peace building differs from traditional peacekeeping operations by empowering and developing local communities. Martin (2005) states that such support for the underdogs ensures that peace building protects minorities and human rights, rather than supporting a conservative, elite-legitimated social order. Traditional notions of peacekeeping may tend to quell hot conflict by military or political means in advance of any thorough consideration of the implications of halting the conflict before the underlying social issues are addressed. Critical theory and practice can also be applied to domestic conflict resolution settings. Certain conflicts, where social justice considerations are present (such as those involving racial, gender-based, and other social justice-related concerns), may call for an approach supporting the party in conflict who is the underdog. Such contexts necessitate attention to the structural causes of and remedies for conflicts, which are considered embedded in the social structure and societal discourse. Conflict resolution is a pluralistic field with a variety of theoretical orientations possible, owing to their specific practice contexts and goals. Critical practice can fill a specific niche in the field of conflict resolution outside of traditional settings where a neutral third-party stance is desirable or essential (as with mediation in the courts, for instance). Bush and Folger (1994) show us that mediation as a form of conflict resolution, for example, is a diverse enterprise in outlining four mediation conceptions: “the satisfaction story,” “the social justice story,” “the transformation story,” and “the oppression story.” The satisfaction story’s primary goal is satisfying the needs of parties in conflict by settling their dispute through problem solving. In the transformation story the primary goals are promoting empathy between the parties (recognition) and empowering them in their decision making (empowerment). The social justice story considers mediation a tool for overcoming societal oppression, while the oppression story suggests that it may actually be used as a tool to promote and perpetuate the status quo of societal domination. Although critical theory aligns with the social justice story, Bush and Folger suggest that the satisfaction story has dominated the field of mediation to the detriment of both the social justice story and the transformation story. Mediation scholarship and practice may therefore be artificially narrowed in the field of conflict resolution, stifling potential opportunities for tension and debate that could broaden and improve it. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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The satisfaction story relies heavily on the mediator taking a neutral stance as a conflict intermediary (Bush and Folger, 1994). Such a neutral, disinterested stance suggests that a mediator can stand apart from his or her social, economic, political, and cultural context (Cotter, Monk, and Winslade, 1998). For the conflict resolution practitioner, however, true neutrality may be more of a myth or “folklore” than an actual attainable goal (Rifken, Millen, and Cobb, 1991). The world in which conflict resolution practitioners live is situated in a specific historical, social, and political context, and they are subject to that context, including many established social patterns and norms that are invisible to them (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999; Foucault, 1994a, 1994b; Freire, 1997; Gil, 1998). A neutral stance, without an analysis of power between the parties in conflict, can obfuscate the power differential that exists between parties in conflict and actually undermine the efforts of oppressed people by tacitly or explicitly supporting the prevailing ideology and social order oppressing them (Eide, 1972; Townley, 1994). Because social actions are not politically neutral, conflict resolution practitioners may erroneously believe that they have conducted themselves in a neutral and impartial manner as mediators. In actuality, they may have unwittingly supported societal norms that oppress the very people they are serving, upholding an oppressive social order. Critical theory does not rely on this neutral position but rather calls for conflict resolution practitioners to explicitly state power imbalances, take a partial position with the underdog, and seek to go beyond conflict settlement, helping parties change oppressive social relationships. Critical theory fits well with various core ideas in conflict resolution theory. Conflict theorists from a variety of disciplines and practicing in different settings have sought to uncover and remedy the underlying causes of conflicts, including oppression. Johan Galtung’s vision of conflict resolution, for instance, corresponds very well to many central ideas in critical theory. Galtung’s notion (1969, 2000) of positive peace entrenches individual conflicts in the societal structure where they have arisen. For a negative peace to exist in a society, that society must be free of physical violence, but for positive peace to exist it must be free of both direct physical violence and structural violence. Structural violence occurs when stable social patterns perpetuating imbalances are embedded in a society, thus harming individuals or social groups and preventing those people from realizing their potentialities. Even though the conflictual behaviors of the parties in conflict represent the parties themselves, their underlying CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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relationship emerges from their social structure (Eide, 1972). In this way, the achievement of peace involves more than the absence of societal violence, instead requiring the presence of social justice. A practitioner should not simply assist parties in conflict to reach a decision, placating them and potentially fostering negative peace, but should instead help them reach a decision that is just, fostering positive peace. Feminist conflict resolution theorists have also drawn heavily from critical theory in their work. Betty Reardon (1990), for instance, recognizes that the concepts of peace and justice are inherently tied to one another; her feminist conflict analysis is not intended to be neutral but rather to challenge deep-rooted gender oppression, bringing about positive peace. Furthermore, she ties militarism to masculine societal domination and contrasts this against traditionally feminine, nurturing practices and social mores. Reardon links the fulfillment of needs with peace, which would ultimately serve to challenge masculine societal domination and notions of security that emphasize military and police protection. Brock-Utne (1990) also seeks to challenge sexist social practices that lead to violence and negative peace. Her analysis challenges societal sexism and the institutions that support it, ultimately leading her to consider ways of redistributing societal resources to women and assisting women in attaining institutional positions of power in society. Both of these feminist scholars seek to challenge the oppressive status quo and bring about societal reform through conflict resolution. There are a variety of other conflict resolution theorists whose ideological orientation and practice align to varying degrees with critical theory and practice. John Burton’s problem-solving workshops (1996) call for participants representing conflicting parties to recognize each other’s basic human needs and creatively discover ways of meeting those needs together. Burton saw his approach as essentially preventative, calling the process “provention,” attempting to address causative factors that gave rise to the conflict to begin with. When these factors are understood, workshop participants can then be given the skills to dialogue with one another, problemsolving means of overcoming these obstacles. Hence conflict settlement is intimately connected to conflicting parties’ understanding the societal structures shaping their behaviors (such as a lack of human and economic rights), while fostering individual and community empowerment by giving them the skills to discuss these imbalances. Critical theory also aligns well with John Paul Lederach’s elicitive training model for peace building. Lederach (1995) suggests that conflict CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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resolution practitioners training individuals and communities to address and overcome conflict must necessarily prioritize the voice of the trainees. Lederach illustrates how this approach to training can help to overcome cultural biases in cross-cultural settings. Equally important, like Freire, Lederach recognizes that emphasizing the voices of the populations one is working with helps the practitioner gain credibility and meet the needs of the people in conflict, while acknowledging that potential resolutions should be grounded in local knowledge and language. The elicitive approach illustrates how ground-up decision making can simultaneously help conflicting parties better meet their immediate needs and realize their long-term structural goals. When oppressed people achieve critical consciousness, they identify their own needs, obstacles, and potential solutions to their problems in light of their new understanding of societal power. When calling for the voices of the oppressed to identify their own concerns and their potential resolutions, grassroots participatory democracy is promoted (O’Brien, 2005).
Implications for Conflict Resolution Practice Applying critical theory to the field of conflict resolution points conflict resolution practitioners in a new and important direction. This does not mean that other forms of conflict resolution practice should not be valued or practiced in our society; conflict resolution is a pluralistic discipline requiring a number of conceptions and methods to address different kinds of conflict. Critical conflict resolution puts practitioners in a new role in order to address and ameliorate societal oppression. Oppression and social injustice are considered multitiered, nested conflicts, simultaneously existing at the individual, community, and societal levels. Critical conflict resolution becomes a means to challenge social injustice and oppression. Social welfare, for instance (nonprofit and government services for poor and marginalized communities), could be considered a means to mediate class, gender, and ethnic conflicts, either masking or managing these conflicts depending on its implementation (Chatterjee, 1996). Conflict resolution practitioners working with social welfare agencies could use a critical lens to manage individual, group, and organizational conflicts within that system, as dialogue facilitators who foster productive communications between individuals or groups with differing levels of power. Critical conflict resolution practice calls for both short-term and longterm strategies to challenge societal oppression. Gil (1998) suggests that CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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even though critical practices emphasize long-term, structural social change in assisting oppressed populations, short-term strategies are called for as well. Short-range strategies are necessary to ameliorate the “symptoms” of oppression and reduce or eliminate oppressive practices targeting specific oppressed individuals or groups in given situations. Long-range strategies, on the other hand, seek to eliminate the root causes of oppression, hoping to create a just society free from oppression. Both short-term and long-term strategies would be enhanced with conflict resolution practitioners who promote and enhance communications between the oppressed and their oppressors as well as facilitate discussions among oppressed individuals to help them determine their needs and their preferred means to meet them. Regardless of whether strategies are short-term or long-term, however, they imply a very different ethical code than is presently emphasized in many conflict resolution circles. The American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Association for Conflict Resolution highlight self-determination, impartiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, competence, confidentiality, quality of the mediation process, responsible solicitation of services, reasonable fees, and advancing mediation practice as their ethical standards in their Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), but critical practice suggests a very different set of ethical principles. Critical ethical principles tend to focus less on the professional role of the practitioner and more on their commitment to social justice, including a concern with the common welfare of humanity, meeting the needs of all in society, consistent critical values in one’s personal and professional lives, advancing critical theory and practice, supporting fellow critical practitioners and holding them to critical ethical standards, valuing the freedom of all people, seeking to uphold democratic and humanistic ideals, and working to change society to match these ethical principles (Galper, 1975). Ethical frameworks for advocates may be more suitable for such an approach and already exist within the fields of social work and the law. Consequently, these other professions furnish ethical frameworks that might offer ethical insights for critical conflict resolution practitioners. Critical practitioners should abide by certain practice guidelines in conducting their work: developing oneself to reflect critical ideals; linking one’s work to broader social movements and political solutions to social problems; and focusing on conflict prevention with long-term, durable, just resolutions. To assist others in overcoming oppression, practitioners need to first reflexively question their own values and experiences with oppression as CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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their practice will undoubtedly reflect their personal theoretical orientation and values (Galper, 1975, 1976). Critical theory also emphasizes egalitarian relationships with one’s clients and colleagues (Galper, 1975, 1980). This means shedding the “expert” role in favor of reciprocal learning and clientdriven practice. Once oppressed individuals have reached critical consciousness by being educated about structural power imbalances, they become empowered to identify manifestations of oppression and determine means for addressing them. Critical practitioners are charged with facilitating critical discussions of societal discourse that draw out personal perspectives of oppression, obstacles to transforming oppressive relationships, and the potential means for overcoming those obstacles from the oppressed themselves (Freire, 1997; Galper, 1980; Galtung, 2000). Hence critical dialogue includes reflection by the oppressed on societal norms, institutions, language, and values, as well as discussions of actions to be taken to alter these phenomena in order to promote social justice (Chambon, Irving, and Epstein, 1999; Freire, 1997; Galtung, 2000). Critical practice also calls for efforts to build local collectivities and organizations that link to larger movements: “Change comes from power and power comes from organization” (Alinsky, 1971, p. 113). The process of community organizing means acquiring and expanding a network of allies (Alinsky, 1971; Galper, 1975, 1980; Gil, 1998). When linked to broader social movements, communities of the oppressed can maximize their “disruptive power” in challenging oppressive societal practices and the social order (Galper, 1975; Piven, 2006, Piven and Cloward, 1979). In changing societal discourse, inevitably critical practice must bring the voice of the oppressed to the political stage. Policies involving health care, unemployment, and other such concerns inevitably affect the oppressed, and their voices must be shared with policymakers in an effort to influence them (Eide, 1972; Gil, 1998). Conflict resolution practitioners can use mediation, negotiation, and facilitation skills to bring oppressed allies together, communicate with potential supporters from larger social movements, and struggle for political changes that could ameliorate their circumstances. Critical practice demands that practitioners go beyond a reactive stance that tends to modify the status quo, seeking instead to address the underlying causes of oppression. As conflict resolution practitioners, Burton (1996) and Galtung (2000) emphasize preventative conflict resolution approaches. The underlying assumption suggested in their work is that meeting people’s basic human needs may prevent a harmful conflict from CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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arising or escalating. Preventative critical conflict resolution entails facilitating productive dialogue to assist oppressed people in receiving the services, skills, and resources they need by advocating with them to ensure that their needs are met so that resolutions are consequently durable (O’Brien, 2005). The question remains, however, as to what the incentive would be for an oppressor to come to the bargaining table with the oppressed and a conflict resolution practitioner who is partial to their plight. There are three potential reasons an oppressor would participate in such a venue. First, the oppressor may be educated as to the injustice experienced by the oppressed party and want to ameliorate it. Freire (1997) terms these oppressors “converts,” who desire to overturn an unjust social order. Second, the oppressor may be compelled to come to the table in being regulated to do so either by a higher authority or by the oppressed themselves, who can use shaming, nonparticipation in the social structure, or other direct action to force the oppressor to act. Martin Luther King Jr. used such nonviolent tactics to dramatize racial injustice in order to “create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to do so” (King, 1992, p. 116). In contrast to Dr. King’s approach, the use of legal authority, such as that coming from Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, compelled schools to face the issue of racially integrating school systems across the United States (King, 1992). The third reason an oppressor may come to the bargaining table with a critical conflict resolution practitioner is that just solutions tend to be more durable, long-term solutions. Resolutions that give the oppressed more power to control their own lives and problems by reducing societal inequities, eliminating structural forms of oppression, and ensuring that the needs of the oppressed party are met are likely to be more sustainable (Galtung, 2000; Martin, 2005; O’Brien, 2005; Quille, 2000).
Critical Conflict Resolution Practice As has been suggested, critical conflict resolution places conflict resolution practitioners in roles and settings that are different from those of traditional conflict resolution practitioners. Rather than third-party neutrals, conflict resolution practitioners might more suitably take on the roles of catalyst, educator, advocate, advisor, systems navigator, or another that would assist oppressed people in challenging oppression by fostering productive dialogue (Kent, 1971; Knupfer, 1995; Stohl and Chamberlain, 1972). There are already many conflict resolution practitioners and scholars who have CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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adopted such atypical roles, as with conflict resolution education for instance, where practitioners educate and advocate rather than mediate. These emerging, diverse roles within the conflict resolution profession may also call for new and innovative settings for novel forms of conflict resolution practice to be nurtured, as in nonprofit organizations such as peace and justice centers that educate community members for critical consciousness, train them in communication skills, and cultivate social justice discourse. Traditional conflict resolution practitioners do not use a critical framework for conflict analysis or practice. However, practitioners in the field of conflict resolution are positioned well professionally to do critical work because they are the only professionals to holistically examine social conflicts and are skilled at various core processes for intervening in conflict: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, community conferencing, negotiated rulemaking, communication and problem-solving training, and efforts to reduce violence in schools (Association for Conflict Resolution, n.d.). These skill areas make conflict resolution practitioners uniquely suited for certain forms of critical practice, intervening in social justice–related conflict. Here we offer several examples of how the core conflict resolution processes of mediation, negotiation, facilitation and training, and conflict resolution education can be conducted in using a critical practice framework. Prior to conducting critical conflict resolution, practitioners must undertake a power analysis of the parties in conflict. In a power analysis, a practitioner “examine[s] how power is distributed in a given situation in terms of, for example, race, gender, education, economics, sexual orientation, or socio-political history. Through power analysis the [practitioner] and client[s] come to a more informed and context-sensitive understanding of beliefs, choices, perceptions, and behaviors. An important component of power analysis is understanding the meaning and effects of privilege” (McWhirter and McWhirter, 2007, p. 423). In such an analysis, the practitioner should conduct a self-analysis to understand the role power might play in interactions with parties in conflict, as well as an analysis of the parties themselves (McWhirter and McWhirter, 2007). In conducting a power analysis, a practitioner considers both societal power imbalances and those stemming from practitioner and party cultures, institutions, organizations, languages, and idiosyncratic belief systems (Roy, 2007). The relevant forms of power to be mapped out are context-dependent and may include other forms of power and privilege such as those that come with age or physical ability, for instance CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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(McWhirter and McWhirter, 2007). The conflict resolution practitioner uses this power analysis over the course of working with the parties to educate them as to how societal power could be affecting their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, enabling them to overcome social justice–related obstacles to dialogue and conflict resolution. Critical Conflict Resolution Mediation
Critical mediation, particularly with therapeutic mediation models, involves drawing attention to power differentials as a result of gender, class, racial, ethnic, or other group membership. In fact, Roy (2007) suggests that all mediations involve “rearranging power” to some extent between parties in conflict. In this sense, it is not possible for a mediator to be neutral; rather, the practitioner should advocate for those who have less power in the mediation according to the social structure: “The job of the mediator is to persuade those with more power to see where their own interests join with their subordinates’ in recasting roles and relationships, as well as teaching leaders the difference between the cooperative use of power and its hierarchical abuse” (Roy, 2007, p. 84). In this mediation model, there is a clear mandate to help facilitate more egalitarian relationships between conflicting parties and support the rights of weaker parties. Narrative mediation also calls attention to societal power differentials between parties in conflict. Winslade and Monk (2001) illustrate examples of mediating disputes between spouses and ex-spouses in which the men in conflict have a sense of patriarchal entitlement. They show how the use of “externalizing language” (separating the people from the problem) can be used to draw attention to such power differences without creating defensiveness or loss of face on the part of the male power abuser. This mediation model places the specific conflict being mediated in the overarching societal discourse around patriarchy and male entitlement. The mediation venue is used to show the parties in conflict how their conflict fits into that discourse and the negative effects the discourse has on their lives and the conflict. That being clarified, they are in a position to change their relationship with the overall discourse and resolve their conflict accordingly. Critical Conflict Resolution Negotiation
Critical negotiation plies many of the same skills of traditional negotiation toward critical ends, while involving a degree of uniqueness. For instance, Kritek (2002) presents several examples of negotiations that she was a part CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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of in health care as a nurse and administrator, which she used as opportunities to challenging existing systems of power for the benefit of marginalized groups. She engaged in negotiations with a state funding agency, social service agencies, university groups, and neighborhood residents to get more community control in a clinic serving the needs of racially diverse community residents. She also engaged in negotiations with her university’s administration to establish mechanisms for women to participate more fully in university governance and to recruit more students of color. Kritek believes that negotiating at “uneven tables” in order to struggle against existing power structures involves unique “ways of being” in order to be successful. Though all negotiators should be authentic, honest, innovative, open to learning, and take responsibility for change, less powerful groups must be particularly innovative, be even clearer on what their limits are, expand discussions to wider and deeper outcome and process visions, and know how and when to leave the bargaining table. Critical negotiators thus work as advocates, laboring for the cause of social justice and against oppressive institutions. This fits within the purview of social workers as well, who have defined social advocacy as “the exclusive and mutual representation of a client(s) or a cause in a forum, attempting to systematically influence decision making in an unjust or unresponsive system(s)” (Schneider and Lester, 2001, p. 65). In fact, as alluded to earlier advocacy is entrenched in the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics (1999), linking social work’s commitment to advocacy with the value base of the profession, which includes striving for social justice, placing clients’ needs in their environmental context, and considering the general welfare of society (Schneider and Lester, 2001). Advocacy can be done case-by-case (advocating for client needs), for a cause (advocating for systemic change to benefit entire social groups), on the legislative level (advocating for political and regulatory change), or as a social service administrator by changing one’s agency to reflect social justice goals (Schneider and Lester, 2001). Conflict resolution practitioner skills in conflict analysis and negotiation are well suited to engaging in various forms of advocacy when working with disadvantaged groups or individuals to reform social institutions or policies. Critical Conflict Resolution Facilitation and Training
Critical facilitation can be done between oppressed groups and their oppressors or within an oppressed group alone. Kelman (2002) has conducted interactive problem-solving workshops between groups with CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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different levels of societal power. In his model of unofficial diplomacy, Kelman links the problem-solving sessions with the larger political negotiation process to bring the individual changes undergone by workshop participants to the larger political stage in order to change the social structure. Critical theory can inform this process as facilitators provide content observations and illuminate blind-spots for participants (potentially educating them as to unaddressed social justice concerns), though their primary role is safeguarding the process itself. Truth and reconciliation commissions are another model for facilitating a forum between societal underdogs and elites to address social injustice. For example, in North Carolina the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission entered the societal discourse around race relations in the United States. They conducted an investigation of a shooting by Ku Klux Klan members on November 3, 1979, examining evidence, conducting interviews, and making recommendations for change as a result of the incident (Brown and others, 2006; Zucker, 2007). Facilitating community discussions and public interviews (in addition to reviewing written evidence) resulted in a community dialogue and a report that gave a new historical account of the incident for the community (Brown and others, 2006; Zucker, 2007). Curle, on the other hand, has conducted seminars for the oppressed alone, designed to raise their awareness of structural inequalities and discuss strategies for nonviolent means to resist that oppression (Avruch, 2002; Curle, 1995). These trainings consist of instruction in skills such as mediation, facilitation, negotiation, general communication, organizing, and nonviolent action, but they also impart the principles of nonviolence, promote empathy, and emphasize compassion for others as a core value (Curle, 1995). The facilitator is not a neutral but an activist who enters the dispute between a community group and the established social structure as a supporter of the group (Avruch, 2002). The Dutch Reform Church, in conjunction with Cape Town University’s Centre for Intergroup Studies, has used this workshop model in South Africa to shift South Africans away from the policy of apartheid (Curle, 1995). Critical Conflict Resolution Education
Conflict resolution education is used to teach students in kindergarten through twelfth grade conflict resolution skills and participatory democracy (Hedeen, 2005). As schools are a microcosm for society, they can also constitute an excellent forum for educating students about social injustice, CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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its expressions, and ways of resisting injustice in one’s personal life (Bettman and Moore, 1994; Townley, 1994). Such is the goal of Freire’s problem-posing education (1997). Raines (2004) and Tidwell (2004) illustrate how poignant conflict resolution education can be in developing or war-torn countries, where the effects of oppression and injustice are acute. Critical conflict resolution education goes beyond traditional conflict resolution education models by helping students see personal manifestations of oppression in their lives, discuss means of resisting them, and consider plans for doing so (Freire, 1997). For instance, instead of discussing racism generally and teaching students to be “colorblind,” an antiracist education teaches students to see their racial privilege or internalized oppression and deliberately act against its overt and covert manifestations in their lives, altering racist social structures within their purview (Derman-Sparks and Phillips, 1997). Critical higher education can be used by conflict resolution programs to bring critical theory and practice to curricula, furnish a venue for students to develop their critical practice skills, link classroom learning to real world praxis via service learning, and provide a rationale for a program’s institutional practice to match its social justice mandate (Bettman and Moore, 1994; Galper, 1980; Gil, 1998; Knupfer, 1995; Scanlon and Longres, 2001; Wells, 2003). Various university conflict resolution programs have included courses addressing oppression as part of their curricula (such as the Women, Trauma, Leadership, and Peacebuilding class at Eastern Mennonite University; n.d.) or support students in taking such classes through affiliated university programs (such as the Race and Civil Rights Law class at the University of Denver; n.d.). The School for International Training has even created a master’s degree program dedicated to educating students in conducting social justice work with conflict resolution skills (the Social Justice in Intercultural Relations program, n.d.). Scholarship in higher education has another role to play in researching the process and outcomes of critical practice, improving practice and demonstrating effectiveness. Critical research can be used to build theory and practice, support political agendas, make the concerns of oppressed groups more visible, communicate societal concerns to a broader audience, and develop the analytic capacity of critical researchers and oppressed people (Galper, 1980; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000; Scanlon and Longres, 2001). Many individual conflict resolution scholars have conducted this kind of research. George Mason University (n.d.) has even sponsored a publication that focuses on social justice scholarship (Social Justice). One conflict resolution CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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program that has explicitly committed itself to social justice work is the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teacher’s College in Columbia University (n.d.). The founder, Morton Deutsch (2006), believes that oppression is a root cause of most serious conflicts and thinks that conflict resolution can be facilitated when oppressed parties in conflict enhance their power and oppressor party power is suppressed. The ICCCR program has a stated mission to embrace social justice work and work against oppression in teaching and scholarship. They further this mission by creating scholarly conferences to discuss oppression and injustice, support student scholarship with social justice awards, and ultimately educate many soon-to-be teachers on principles and techniques that foster critical conflict resolution education in the classroom.
Conclusion Conflict resolution practice and theory emerging from a critical framework point the profession of conflict resolution in a new and important direction: resisting an unjust status quo. Conflict resolution can be enriched with more attention placed on power analyses, power balancing, and the attainment of sustainable resolutions that resist social injustice and oppression. The skills used by conflict resolution practitioners (such as mediation, negotiation, facilitation, training, and education) could be effectively employed to confront societal oppression in alignment with critical theory, as illustrated by the examples in this article. Critical conflict resolution certainly has its limitations, but it can complement other forms of conflict resolution, addressing conflicts with underlying social justice concerns using techniques appropriate to those concerns. As such, critical theory and practice fill a specific niche in the field of conflict resolution. The critical theoretical framework should coexist with other theoretical orientations within the pluralistic profession of conflict resolution, adding to healthy discussion and debate in the field. Critical theory does not limit but broadens the field of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution practitioners and scholars can only benefit from the ideas and practices that it brings. References Alinsky, S. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Random House, 1971. American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and Association for Conflict Resolution. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2005, CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq
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Toran Hansen is a doctoral student of social work at the University of Minnesota. CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY • DOI: 10.1002/crq