Leadership Vacuum in the Turkish Navy: A Reality, or Just a Talk? “Is there a leadership vacuum in the Turkish Navy?” has been the focal point of many debates in Turkey since dark clouds began to hang over the Turkish Navy’s officer corps in the form of the interrelated “Sledgehammer,” “Ergenekon,” and “Charges of Prostitution and Spying” inquiries and trials. The Turkish Navy has sailed through some rough seas between 2011 and 2015, when more than half of its admirals and a significant number of its senior officers were put behind the bars and many others were charged with allegations ranging from having indecent sexual affairs and mishandling classified materials to staging a coup against the government. Meanwhile, tensions with Israel, Syria, Egypt, Cyprus and finally with Libya have increased, furthermore with the Russian annexation of Crimea, the security dynamics in the Black Sea have seen a radical shift. These changing geopolitics brought new security challenges as well as new tasks and missions for the Turkish Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and beyond. During this period experts wondered if the situation (the imprisonment of naval officers) could disrupt the service’s operational effectiveness and what long-term effect this would have on morale, operational readiness and procurement efforts of the Turkish Navy. Some has argued that the Turkish Navy would be doomed without these “experienced officers.” Some others did not echo that pessimism, but claimed that the arrests would have limited effect on top management of the Navy. The debate still continues in Turkey in the aftermath of the Turkish Supreme Court’s decision that the “Sledgehammer” allegations were baseless and all effected officers were cleared as of March 31st, 2015. Over the span of five years there has been many talks and comments on this issue, but there has been a lack of academic literature. This article will put some facts and expert opinions together to find out whether the “Leadership Vacuum in the Turkish Navy” is a reality, or it is a just a myth created by the officer’s whose careers are negatively affected by these trials. The last part of the article will also look into how to re-integrate these officers back to the system with the help of the U.S. Navy’s experience in similar situations. The debate on the validity of the cases and investigations that implicated Turkish naval personnel is not covered in this article. This article covers the effectiveness of operations, national and international tasks, commitment and activities of the Turkish Navy since 2010. Many naval experts who follow world navies closely and write for international recognized magazines such as Naval Forces, Warships and Proceedings agree that the operational effectiveness, international visibility and accomplishments of the Turkish Naval Forces have increased significantly over the last five years. Eric Wertheim, the author of “Guide to Combat Fleets of the World”, thinks that the Turkish Navy has been living its Golden Age over the last couple years and it has been up to par with accomplishing it commitments and increasing tasks successfully and efficiently in the face of rapidly changing and unpredictable security environment. He also comments on the effectiveness and the training level of the Turkish Navy. Guided missile and gunnery firings conducted by the Turkish Navy assets last year in Denel Overberg test range were fairly complex and challenging that a very few of world navies can undertake. According to Denel authorities as well as Turkish Navy public releases all the firings were executed with a high level of success. Eric Wertheim comments that “the success of the firings is one thing, but more important is the planning and the execution of such a demanding task. And that takes -1-
leadership; leadership with courage and commitment.” Jan Wiedemann of Naval Forces Magazine points to the success of the activation of Turkish Maritime Task Groups, particularly the Barbaros Maritime Task Group Activation in 2014 and he claims that “Turkish Naval Forces have Set Sail Towards Becoming a Medium Global Force Projection Navy.” Wiedemann has recently coordinated a Special Naval Forces Issue on the Turkish Navy, and he covered its most memorable achievements in recent years. In this special issue he also elaborates about the professional and capable naval officers in the Turkish Navy. Bill Parker, a senior lecturer in the Department of Defense Studies at King’s College London, takes a strategic look to the changes in the top cadre of the Turkish Navy over the last couple years. He succinctly puts it as “radical change of strategic thinking and engagement.” He gives one simple example on the deployment of the Barbaros Maritime Task Group in the face of the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea. As known, this deployment drew severe criticism, especially from the recently retired (due to ongoing trials) senior cadre of the Turkish Navy. Many of this “old school” admirals thought Barbaros Maritime Task Group deployment was a “strategic mistake.” The current leadership in the Turkish Navy braced all this criticism and still went ahead with the deployment. Time has proved that this deployment was the single most successful engagement of not only the Turkish Navy, but also of the Turkish Foreign Policy. Bill Parker claims that this stark contrast in the “strategic thinking” proves that the Turkish Navy is now in more capable hands than it has never been before. A senior NATO official, who prefers to be anonymous, states that the ever increasing operational tempo of the Turkish Navy over the last couple years is impressive. “When I sit on daily operational meetings at MARCOM (Allied Maritime Command, Northwood), I see Turkish flag all over the map which gives a snapshot of the current Allied Operations. Only a very few of the Allied nations is capable of achieving such an operational tempo.” From his personal experience in joint operations, engagements and interactions with the Turkish Navy and its senior leadership, he also notes that the current senior leadership is far exceeding their predecessors in terms of strategic-thinking, initiative, cooperation and training. He gives some examples on the training and operation areas. “In the past we ‘had’ to participate into Turkish INVITEX (Invitational Exercise) just to show our solidarity, although we took no real value out of them. Over the last couple years the settings and the training value of Turkish INVITEX have increased to such a degree that we now look forward to participating to them.” He also emphasizes that the Turkish Navy has been a reliable partner in the maritime domain and delivered all her NATO commitments and more over the last couple years. The last couple years have been very challenging for the Alliance, the changing security environment has put the Alliance solidarity to a test of integrity. Although Turkey as a country draw many criticism in NATO circles, Turkish Navy has proved itself to be a very robust and dependable partner. Nathan Hughes, Director of Military Analysis in STRATFOR, thinks that current leadership in the Turkish Navy “possesses high levels of professionalism, initiative, strategicthinking and engagement.” He summarizes the public visibility of the Turkish Navy as “From None to Bad and then to Great.” Before the inquiries and trials that started in 2010, the public visibility of the Turkish Navy was nearly non-existing. None body in Turkey either did not know, or did care about what the Navy was about and what it stood for. With the onset of the trials and inquiries, the public visibility of the Turkish Navy was devastated. Every single day there was a disgrace news about the Navy and its officer corps on the very front pages of the national newspapers. This had been a big blow for the Turkish Navy and many experts believed -2-
that it would take at least a decade to overcome this blow. Surprisingly, the Turkish Navy bounced back even stronger than before. With the hard work of the current senior leadership and the artful application of strategic communication means, today only after a few years past the “disgraceful moments”, the Turkish Navy is now very highly viewed by the public. Barbaros Maritime Task Group has the lion’s share in this accomplishment, however humanitarian operations such as the Libya Evacuation and the recently conducted Yemen Evacuation also helped. In the light of these experts’ views and the statistical facts about the Turkish Navy, this article concludes that “Leadership Vacuum in the Turkish Navy” claims have been baseless from the onset. On the contrary, the Turkish Navy has enjoyed the highest operational tempo with a great success history over the last four-five years, during which the service had to respond to many new and conventional maritime security tasks, international crises, humanitarian assistance and evacuation operations. As stated in the beginning, the naval officers who were put behind the bars due to various trials and inquiries were recently acquitted by the last judicial decision. Now the Turkish Navy will face the problem of how to integrate them back to the already wellfunctioning command structure. Hence, the final part of this article deals with the risks and pitfalls of “re-integrating” the officers affected by the trials with the assistance of some expert views from the U.S. Navy. Turkish naval personnel’s case is unique in itself, but the U.S. Navy’s experience with dealing with officers in command position who have been relieved of duty after allegations for various indiscretions can be helpful for the Turkish Navy decision makers. In the past five years, 90 Navy officers in command position (O-5 and above) have been relieved of duty for allegations of indiscretions ranging from having extramarital affair to mishandling classified materials. The evidence and how each case is adjudicated ultimately determines the fate of those relieved. However, Navy Capt. Michael Junge, a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College who has been studying commander reliefs for more than a decade, claims that “In the modern Navy, an officer relieved of their command doesn’t go on to command again.” The reason for not reinstating these relieved officers back to command or leadership positions, particularly in senior ranks, is apparent: Once they are empowered again, they look at their colleagues with hatred and suspicion, their behaviour appears driven by self-centred careerism at the expense of their subordinates and unit, and their style is characterized by abusive and dictatorial behaviour. This kind of behaviour promotes an unhealthy command climate. Indeed, their very presence undermines confidence in the institution’s commitment to high standards of leadership. Talented people in the 21st century expect to work in healthy climates, where strong bonds of mutual trust facilitate mission accomplishment and support long-term institutional strength. In the light of the U.S. Navy experience, this article concludes that “re-integrating” the Turkish Navy personnel affected by the trials carry serious risks, and although these officers are cleared of the charges against them, they should not be given leadership positions. They should definitely be compensated, but this should not be in the form of leadership positions. If these officers are given command and leadership positions, they will run the risk of corrupting the service’s existing healthy command climate. The U.S. Navy experience proves that even-if the officers are cleared from the alleged charges, they become “toxic leaders” once reinstated with leadership positions. As a solution adopted effectively by the U.S. Navy is assigning these -3-
officers to foreign or NATO posts of their choosing and let them spend the remaining years of their naval career in these posts.
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