Awareness Programme on CWC and SCOMET

Awareness Programme on CWC and SCOMET Proliferation concerns and Reputational Risk Ministry of External Affairs June 13, 2017

WHY EXPORT CONTROL? •Foreign Policy/ National Security considerations •Responsible,

committed proliferation efforts

• To sustain

partner

to

International

GDP growth rates (7.5% p.a)

•To be able to adopt and adapt to technology transfers •Contribute to the global value chain

Non-

Items have Dual use = Civilian + military/WMD PROLIFERATION CONCERNS Threat: International transfer of dual-use goods

Goods, software and technology normally used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications, or may contribute to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) What are WMD? : Nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capable of delivery by missile systems and otherwise

States Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention( 1993) & Biological Weapons Convention (1975)

Chemical Weapons . . .cheap and easy to make

UPDATED CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF CHEMICALS DGFT NOTIFICATION NO.5 OF 24TH APRIL 2017

CWC Schedules 1,2 &3 is fully aligned with SCOMET 1A,1B & 1C respectively Australia Group(Chemical precursors and chemical equipment) covered under SCOMET 1A,1B,1C,1D and 3D ‘Catch-all’ controls operationalised to capture non-listed dual-use and military items that may have potential risk of diversion to WMD or military end use-Para 2.72(b) of HBP introduced.

SCOMET Category 1CMost Precursors controlled both by AG and CWC

AG controls all CWC Schedule 3 chemical precursors, except Methyldiethanolamine

NEW SCOMET AG-RELATED CATEGORY 1D SCOMET Entry

Chemical

1D004 1D005 1D006 1D007

Ammonium bifluoride Diethylaminoethanol Diisopropylamine Dimethylamine

1D008

Dimethylamine hydrochloride

1D009 1D014 1D015 1D016 1D017 1D018 1D019 1D020 1D021 1D022

Hydrogen fluoride Phosphorus pentasulphide Potassium bifluoride Potassium cyanide Potassium fluoride Sodium bifluoride Sodium cyanide ( used in Tabun production-CWC Schedule 1) Sodium fluoride(used for Sarin production –CWC Schedule- I) Sodium hexafluorosilicate Sodium sulphide

1D023

Triethanolamine hydrochloride

1D024 1D025

Triisopropyl phosphite Diethylamine

Does not require SCOMET licence for exports to AG countries

SCOMET Category /Chemical

Dual-use

Physiological Effect

1C-Choking Agents Phosgene Chloropicrin

Plastics, Dyes, insecticide, used in WW-I Insecticide, Soil fumigant , tear gas

Fluid builds up in lungs, choking victim

1C-Blood Agents Hydrogen cyanide

Mining, metal finishing, deadly chemical Chemical Synthesis and fumigation

Cyanide destroys ability of blood tissues to utilise oxygen, causing them to ‘starve’ and strangling the heart

1A-Blister Agents Sulfur mustard(mustard gas)

Chemical warfare

Burns skin, mucous membranes and eyes; large number of casualties, low percentage of death

Nitrogen mustard

Medicines

Lewisite

Chemical warfare

Cyanogen chloride

1A- Nerve Agents Tabun ,Sarin, Soman

For chemical warfare

Cyclosarin VX 1C- Trimethyl phosphite

Commercial insecticide and for warfare Warfare Precursor for insecticides and precursor to nerve agents

1C- thionylchloride

Pharmaceuticals ,Pesticides and nerve agent

1B-Thiodiglycol

Printing and precursor used to make sulphur mustard

Causes seizures, loss of body control; paralyses muscles, including heart and diaphragm; lethal doses can cause death in five minutes

VALID CONCERNS .

Date

Chemical Agent

Casualties

21 - 27 Oct 2016

Sulfur (sulfur mine set on fire)

2 killed, 1500 injured

08 March 2016

Blistering agent

1 killed, 600 injured

23 June 2015

Chlorine (truck bomb with filled chlorine tanks)

30 injured

Sept – Oct 2014

Chlorine & Mustard Gas

40 injured

21 August 2013

Sarin Nerve Gas ?

1429 killed including 426 children

Mar – Apr 2013

multiple chemical agents?

at least 44 killed, 76 injured

Mar 1995

Sarin Nerve Gas

12 killed, 5511 injured

June 1994

Sarin Nerve Gas

7 killed, 290 injured

Mar 1988

cyanide, mustard gas, nerve agents

5,000 killed, 8,000 injured

Aug 1983 – July 1988

Chemical Agents

21000 killed & 92000 injured

Source: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html

Reputational risk of export of thionyl chloride SCOMET 1C(CWC Schedule 3 & AG) to CWC SP

AG-What it means for India?

• India was opposed to the AG earlier because we viewed it as a ‘technology denial regime’; • Government policy changed over the years; in 2010 a conscious decision was taken to align our practices with AG (and other export control regimes) with a view to full membership • Informal Arrangement- Decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the Government.

• Reinforces India’s principled non-proliferation policy on the chemical & biological weapons • Promotes international cooperation to fight against CBW activities or terrorism.

• Not intended to impede legitimate chemical or biological trade • Opportunity for Indian industry to participate in technologyembedded global commerce (Access to high-technology not automatic) • Promotes foreign collaborations/JVs/ investments

AG-WHAT IT MEANS TO INDIA?

• Sound non-proliferation credentials -key criteria for grant of licence exceptions by other AG members

• Common control lists facilitate ease of doing business internationally • Greater share in global governance • Information exchange secures trade/lowers violations/ Indian chemical industry will be protected from possible proliferators

BE VIGILANT. GUARD YOUR REPUTATION DO KYC • What are you exporting? ( Is it on the SCOMET list?)

• Where are you exporting? (Is it under sanctions/embargo?)

• Who all will receive your item? (Is it Abnormal route?)

• Who is the ultimate end user? (Is he a trader/freight forwarder/user?)

• For what purpose would your item be used? (Is the purpose known?

Reason to suspect WMD?) • Do you have any other reason to believe that item may be diverted for WMD purposes?

• Inform Government agency • Encourage Internal Compliance Program

OUTREACH TO INDUSTRY

India’s mature and growing capabilities need to align with best international practices Need to develop strong Government-Industry-International partnership (Government and Industry are partners not adversaries) Experience/Feedback –Membership a win-win outcome Let us secure trade through confidence building among international partners

Thank You

Anandi Venkateswaran Under Secretary Ministry of External Affairs usdisa@mea.gov.in