Awareness Programme on CWC and SCOMET Proliferation concerns and Reputational Risk Ministry of External Affairs June 13, 2017
WHY EXPORT CONTROL? •Foreign Policy/ National Security considerations •Responsible,
committed proliferation efforts
• To sustain
partner
to
International
GDP growth rates (7.5% p.a)
•To be able to adopt and adapt to technology transfers •Contribute to the global value chain
Non-
Items have Dual use = Civilian + military/WMD PROLIFERATION CONCERNS Threat: International transfer of dual-use goods
Goods, software and technology normally used for civilian purposes but which may have military applications, or may contribute to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) What are WMD? : Nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capable of delivery by missile systems and otherwise
States Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention( 1993) & Biological Weapons Convention (1975)
Chemical Weapons . . .cheap and easy to make
UPDATED CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF CHEMICALS DGFT NOTIFICATION NO.5 OF 24TH APRIL 2017
CWC Schedules 1,2 &3 is fully aligned with SCOMET 1A,1B & 1C respectively Australia Group(Chemical precursors and chemical equipment) covered under SCOMET 1A,1B,1C,1D and 3D ‘Catch-all’ controls operationalised to capture non-listed dual-use and military items that may have potential risk of diversion to WMD or military end use-Para 2.72(b) of HBP introduced.
SCOMET Category 1CMost Precursors controlled both by AG and CWC
AG controls all CWC Schedule 3 chemical precursors, except Methyldiethanolamine
NEW SCOMET AG-RELATED CATEGORY 1D SCOMET Entry
Chemical
1D004 1D005 1D006 1D007
Ammonium bifluoride Diethylaminoethanol Diisopropylamine Dimethylamine
1D008
Dimethylamine hydrochloride
1D009 1D014 1D015 1D016 1D017 1D018 1D019 1D020 1D021 1D022
Hydrogen fluoride Phosphorus pentasulphide Potassium bifluoride Potassium cyanide Potassium fluoride Sodium bifluoride Sodium cyanide ( used in Tabun production-CWC Schedule 1) Sodium fluoride(used for Sarin production –CWC Schedule- I) Sodium hexafluorosilicate Sodium sulphide
1D023
Triethanolamine hydrochloride
1D024 1D025
Triisopropyl phosphite Diethylamine
Does not require SCOMET licence for exports to AG countries
SCOMET Category /Chemical
Dual-use
Physiological Effect
1C-Choking Agents Phosgene Chloropicrin
Plastics, Dyes, insecticide, used in WW-I Insecticide, Soil fumigant , tear gas
Fluid builds up in lungs, choking victim
1C-Blood Agents Hydrogen cyanide
Mining, metal finishing, deadly chemical Chemical Synthesis and fumigation
Cyanide destroys ability of blood tissues to utilise oxygen, causing them to ‘starve’ and strangling the heart
1A-Blister Agents Sulfur mustard(mustard gas)
Chemical warfare
Burns skin, mucous membranes and eyes; large number of casualties, low percentage of death
Nitrogen mustard
Medicines
Lewisite
Chemical warfare
Cyanogen chloride
1A- Nerve Agents Tabun ,Sarin, Soman
For chemical warfare
Cyclosarin VX 1C- Trimethyl phosphite
Commercial insecticide and for warfare Warfare Precursor for insecticides and precursor to nerve agents
1C- thionylchloride
Pharmaceuticals ,Pesticides and nerve agent
1B-Thiodiglycol
Printing and precursor used to make sulphur mustard
Causes seizures, loss of body control; paralyses muscles, including heart and diaphragm; lethal doses can cause death in five minutes
VALID CONCERNS .
Date
Chemical Agent
Casualties
21 - 27 Oct 2016
Sulfur (sulfur mine set on fire)
2 killed, 1500 injured
08 March 2016
Blistering agent
1 killed, 600 injured
23 June 2015
Chlorine (truck bomb with filled chlorine tanks)
30 injured
Sept – Oct 2014
Chlorine & Mustard Gas
40 injured
21 August 2013
Sarin Nerve Gas ?
1429 killed including 426 children
Mar – Apr 2013
multiple chemical agents?
at least 44 killed, 76 injured
Mar 1995
Sarin Nerve Gas
12 killed, 5511 injured
June 1994
Sarin Nerve Gas
7 killed, 290 injured
Mar 1988
cyanide, mustard gas, nerve agents
5,000 killed, 8,000 injured
Aug 1983 – July 1988
Chemical Agents
21000 killed & 92000 injured
Source: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html
Reputational risk of export of thionyl chloride SCOMET 1C(CWC Schedule 3 & AG) to CWC SP
AG-What it means for India? • India was opposed to the AG earlier because we viewed it as a ‘technology denial regime’; • Government policy changed over the years; in 2010 a conscious decision was taken to align our practices with AG (and other export control regimes) with a view to full membership • Informal Arrangement- Decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the Government. • Reinforces India’s principled non-proliferation policy on the chemical & biological weapons • Promotes international cooperation to fight against CBW activities or terrorism. • Not intended to impede legitimate chemical or biological trade • Opportunity for Indian industry to participate in technologyembedded global commerce (Access to high-technology not automatic) • Promotes foreign collaborations/JVs/ investments
AG-WHAT IT MEANS TO INDIA?
• Sound non-proliferation credentials -key criteria for grant of licence exceptions by other AG members
• Common control lists facilitate ease of doing business internationally • Greater share in global governance • Information exchange secures trade/lowers violations/ Indian chemical industry will be protected from possible proliferators
BE VIGILANT. GUARD YOUR REPUTATION DO KYC • What are you exporting? ( Is it on the SCOMET list?) • Where are you exporting? (Is it under sanctions/embargo?) • Who all will receive your item? (Is it Abnormal route?) • Who is the ultimate end user? (Is he a trader/freight forwarder/user?)
• For what purpose would your item be used? (Is the purpose known? Reason to suspect WMD?) • Do you have any other reason to believe that item may be diverted for WMD purposes? • Inform Government agency • Encourage Internal Compliance Program
OUTREACH TO INDUSTRY
India’s mature and growing capabilities need to align with best international practices Need to develop strong Government-Industry-International partnership (Government and Industry are partners not adversaries) Experience/Feedback –Membership a win-win outcome Let us secure trade through confidence building among international partners
Thank You
Anandi Venkateswaran Under Secretary Ministry of External Affairs usdisa@mea.gov.in