Journal of International Peace Operations Vol. 6 No. 1 (July-August 2010) by Jessica Vogel

Volume 6, Number 1

July-August, 2010

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Kyrgyzstan Descends into Chaos Q&A with Carolyn McAskie Successful Disaster Relief Strategies

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Countdown to 2011 in Sudan

The Publication of IPOA

Contents Volume 6, Number 1 July-August, 2010

JIPO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Feature | Risk Management

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11 13 16

Regulars | President’s Message

Regulars | Government & Legal Affairs

THE PUBLICATION OF IPOA (FORMERLY THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION)

Founded in 2004 as the IPOA Quarterly ISSN 1933-8189 ISBN 978-0-9826386-2-0

Editor-in-Chief ................. J. J. Messner Publisher ........................ Doug Brooks Business Manager ........... Melissa Sabin

Contributing Editor......... Naveed Bandali Asst. Editor..........Caitlin Tyler-Richards

Doug Brooks

Shifting the Blame Are Government Clients Giving Contractors a Bad Name?

Pete Dordal

Choosing Security Wisely Cutting corners may result in longer-term problems Jasbir Dhillon

Have Risk. Will Travel. Managing safety and security while traveling to challenging places Adam Clampitt

Managing Risk … to Your Reputation Preparation is paramount in surviving a recreational crisis

Jonathan Rosen

Compliance in the Age of Corporate Scrutiny Regulatory compliance as a form of risk management

Leader | Kyrgyzstan

Q & A | Carolyn McAskie, OC

Salmanat Berdikeeva

An Island of Unpredictability And so goes the neighborhood as Kyrgyzstan spirals into chaos

Naveed Bandali

Committed to Keeping the Peace An Interview with Carolyn McAskie, OC

Insight | Peace and Stability Operations

Regulars | Columnists

25 27 29

31 33 35

Priscilla Phelps and Charles Billand

Rebuilding After Natural Disasters What works and what does not Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Applying Lessons Learned from Iraq A proposal for a new Office for Contingency Operations Shaida Abdali and Ashraf Haidari

Securing Afghanistan for its Own Sake Time to stop and ask Afghans what they think

Ambassador Herman J. Cohen (Ret.)

Countdown to 2011 Preparing for the worst, but hoping for the best in South Sudan J. J. Messner

No Points for Trying Noble aims do not a successful practical document make Gary Sturgess

Tales of Wells Fargo Public-private competition on the mail routes out West

Regulars | Development

IPOA Membership Directory

Development Resources

Academic and Professional Relevant academic programs, conferences and events

The Association of the Stability Operations Association

A Directory of the Members of IPOA Providing a vast array of services in conflict and post-conflict environments

Copyright © 2010 IPOA. All rights reserved. The IPOA logo and the IPOA lion image are trademarks of IPOA. The Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO) and its logo are trademarks of IPOA. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the opinions of IPOA, its officers, Board of Directors, members or affiliates. IPOA bears no responsibility for the editorial content; the views expressed in the articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the Editor-in-Chief.

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

President’s Message Doug Brooks

A Local Issue The trade-offs involved in using local nationals.

Not quite ready to walk in off the street. Photo: U.S. Army

HAVE long advocated for the use of local personnel and companies in stability operations. There are enormous advantages to the larger mission including economic stimulation, technical capacity building and cost savings. It is also worth highlighting the fact that companies in our Contingency Contracting Industry prefer to use local personnel and subcontractors for practical reasons including, again, cost savings, knowledge of local languages, street smarts and more. In short, working with locals offers international contractors a competitive edge over their rivals. In recent years the U.S. Congress grasped this concept and has made requirements that contingency contractors working U.S. contracts in Afghanistan utilize local Afghan companies as much as possible. Now they are recognizing there are inevitable trade-offs with this course of action. Taxpayers in donor nations benefit from the utilization of locals in contingency operations, and the industry benefits from the expertise of local subcontractors, so what’s not to like? Unfortunately, a number of drawbacks to local services The author is President of IPOA. Contact Doug at dbrooks@ipoaonline.org.

Journal of International Peace Operations

have made the news of late: stories of local contractors providing substandard services, cutting corners, employing shoddy equipment and under-trained personnel, being under the control of powerful warlords, or even paying the enemy to facilitate safe passage for convoys. These stories have focused particularly on local Afghan private security companies (PSCs). Specifically, Afghan PSCs contracted to escort NATO supply and reconstruction convoys are alleged to be undisciplined and under-supervised, using lethal force indiscriminately and even paying the Taliban not to attack. It is claimed the local Afghan PSCs do little if any vetting or training of their personnel, and that they do only the most basic instruction on weapons and training on the limits to the use of force. The realities of working with local companies – often in underdeveloped countries – can be harsh and the problems can be difficult to address. In Afghanistan contract management, reporting and oversight problems are amplified due to widespread illiteracy, an engrained warlord structure and complex political motivations that actively undermine attempts to address the deficiencies. There is the unfortunate assumption that local companies are somewhat less professional and capable than Western

companies, but even still, there can be a very fuzzy line between “good enough” and “unacceptable.” Reports, audits and inspections are onerous and time consuming for international contractors, but they are a normal part of the unique contingency contracting industry. Lawmakers and taxpayers have a right to know their funds are being used appropriately. Since there are so many advantages to having local staff capable of doing these tasks, it is therefore quite normal to see local nationals being trained by international companies on the skills necessary to operate and manage contracts to Western standards. However, for Afghan companies in a virtually computer-less industry, normal oversight and reporting requirements can be completely overwhelming. Sometimes Afghan companies will have Western partners that help with paperwork and reporting, or some will work with nongovernmental organizations that help them improve their business practices to a point where international clients are confident in their abilities. But we need to recognize that local companies are not going to have the same standards and capabilities as foreign companies overnight. X 42 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

The IPOA Annual Summit is the premiere event of the stability operations industry.

Who Does Attend AND Who Should Attend the IPOA Annual Summit?

The Summit is being held in Washington, D.C., home to some of the world’s largest clients in the global stability operations industry and also Headquarters of IPOA.

Logistics Firms Humanitarian Development Firms Security Sector Reform Firms UXO Firms Private Security Firms Product Manufacturers and Suppliers Military Government International Organizations NGOs Academics Media

The 2½ day Annual Summit will include prominent guest speakers, panel discussions on all aspects of the stability operations industry, plenty of networking opportunities, and an exhibition. The venue for the Summit will be the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, in downtown Washington, D.C., just blocks from the White House.

Excellent sponsorship and exhibitor packages are still available. Contact Melissa Sabin at msabin@ipoaworld.org for more information. Register early for special discounts on attendance!

Kyrgyzstan | Leader Saltanat Berdikeeva

An Island of Unpredictability And so goes the neighborhood as Kyrgyzstan spirals into chaos

Ethnic Uzbeks fleeing violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Photo: U.N.

HAMPIONED as an “island of democracy” in 1990s, invoking the country’s embrace of liberal democracy and free market economy, Kyrgyzstan today verges on becoming an island of chaos with a potential to destabilize the region. Indeed, in the wake of two violent government overthrows within a five-year period and further bloody massacres in the country’s south this June, the current interim government’s failure to establish legitimacy and rule of law could have dire consequences. When the 2005 Tulip Revolution replaced the 15year rule of Askar Akaev with Kurmanbek Bakiev, the impoverished country of 5 million looked at the change with immense hope. Bakiev promised to end the long-standing family-run governance, cronyism and corruption, and boost freedom of press and speech; but his actions reinforced the worst qualities of Akaev’s presidency. By any measure, living standards and basic freedoms have rapidly deteriorated since 2005. The Bakiev government’s decision to increase energy and telecommunications prices in early 2010 led to spon-

Saltanat Berdikeeva is a Senior Research Analyst with Energy Policy Research Foundation, Inc. (EPRINC)

Journal of International Peace Operations

taneous angry protests that took a violent climax on April 7 when a bloody riot ended with 87 deaths and over a thousand wounded unarmed civilians. Although the lootings and vandalism following the violence were lesser in scale compared to the aftermath of the 2005 revolution, chaos swept through government and parliament buildings, the commercial sector and a television station. Kyrgyz law enforcement was demoralized and absent the night of the government overthrow. Ordinary citizens and businesses demonstrated that they were (and still are) ready to use force to protect property, particularly when illegal land grabs began in and around the capital, Bishkek. People gathered to form volunteer vigilante groups to provide for public order and protection of private property. Such groups still remain in force, as evidenced by signs displayed in shops around Bishkek. Not a single looter is punished yet, according to local press reports. The post-Bakiev lull was shattered on June 10, when armed militia began attacking ordinary citizens in Osh and Jalal Abad provinces in Kyrgyzstan’s south, reportedly with the intention of stoking an inter-ethnic conflict between the Uz-

beks and Kyrgyz. These events were preceded by inter-ethnic clashes in Jalal-Abad on April 13-14, 2010 and may divide the country into North and South. According to official accounts, the latest violence claimed over 191 lives, but the real numbers could be a lot higher. With over 1,000 injured, this disaster creates a massive refugee and humanitarian crises. The U.N.’s latest estimates show the refugee figures at 400,000, with thousands of Uzbeks fleeing to neighboring Uzbekistan. The violence has appeared distinctly ethnic-based, with attacks and killings aimed primarily at Uzbeks, which constitute about 30 percent of southern Kyrgyzstan. However, many Kyrgyz residents in the conflict zone fled as well, reportedly because the killings were aimed indiscriminately against both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. While relations between the two ethnic groups have been tense for many years due to disagreements over resource distribution and political representation ― particularly after a brief but bloody conflict in 1990 ― the massacres were apparently premeditated and carried out by a third party to deliberately fuel a conflict in order to advance a constitutional referendum scheduled for June 27. Kyrgyz X 08 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Leader | Kyrgyzstan W 07 | An Island of Unpredictability | Saltanat Berdikeeva authorities claim that the Bakiev family, specifically the former president’s son Maksim, is behind the violence: A tapped phone conversation allegedly between Maksim and Janysh details plans to destabilize the country in an effort to regain power. The post-Bakiev environment has been conducive to provocations and instability due to the resultant power vacuum and political wrangling. Since Bakiev’s ousting in April, both the public and politicians have been divided in their views on a new draft of the constitution, which aims to change the existing presidential system to a parliamentary structure after a constitutional referendum. According to the new version of the constitution, the state and the political system would no longer be concentrated in the hands of a president, and mechanisms to balance the power of the deputies of parliament would be strengthened. However, while many believe that the presidential system contributed to the current dangerous political deadlock, many others are concerned that a new system would still carry over long-standing problems such as cronyism, corruption and the rule of a small elite.

A critical issue remains the weakness of the interim government, which is now even more unpopular in the wake of its complete failure to stop the killings in the south and in turn preventing the refugee and humanitarian disaster. Prior to the latest crisis, the legitimacy of the interim government became increasingly questionable with the publication of incriminating tapped phone conversations between key members revealed counter -revolution plans and divisions of government positions. Because of diverging positions and a power struggle among members, there is no clear consolidation or unity within the current power structure. This was evidenced by a statement of Almaz Atambayev, interim Deputy Prime Minister, implicating a first deputy, Azimbek Beknazarov, and acting Finance Minister, Temir Sariev, in the illegal use of public funds; Beknazarov in turn accused Atambayev for selling a top customs position. The fact that the current government includes individuals both from the Akaev and Bakiev teams only exacerbates the potential for instability. Taped phone conversations have exposed many other politicians’ behind-the-scenes involvement in fomenting instability in order to gain power. A

case in point is a leader of the Communist Party, Iskhak Masaliev, who was part of the parliamentary committee on constitutional legislation. Despite telling a Bishkek newspaper of his desire to normalize the situation in Kyrgyzstan and expressing his readiness to do anything for stability, the leak of a recorded phone conversation demonstrated his direct connection in coordinating protests in southern Kyrgyzstan to garner support for his election as a speaker of the parliament, which would ultimately pave a way for Masaliev to act as the country’s president in line with the current constitution. The dynamic and changing political situation, and inconsistent positions of power players leaves the country’s future uncertain. Compounding the country’s problems is widespread and growing criminality. With rising fissures within the interim government and weak morale in law enforcement structures, a sense of lawlessness has arisen, and criminal forces are now vying for spheres of influence. According to a member of the interim government, Emilbek Kaptagaev, the country’s General Directorate of Criminal Investigation has also been closely linked with organized crime and any effort to change the system would be met with firm resistance to protect current positions. There is a great danger that this power vacuum and the lack of the rule of law will embolden criminal elements in the country seeking to take advantage of the situation, with their ultimate aim being to insinuate themselves into the political structure. The country witnessed a similar development after the 2005 Tulip Revolution, which brought to light a close connection between the state and criminal underground. Many in Kyrgyzstan claim that the latest violence in the south was carried out by Kyrgyz criminals and mercenaries. At least one source, Kadir Malikov, director of Bishkek-based research group Religion Law and Politics, argues that the Bakiev family hired volunteers to kill, including some from Afghanistan linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan’s increased political and ethnic drama may also have regional ramifications if it spills over into neighboring countries. Further, there is concern that it could undermine NATO’s military mission in Afghanistan, which relies on the Manas airbase at the outskirts of Bishkek for the transit of military and humanitarian support. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sealed the borders with Kyr-

Looking for security in Kyrgyzstan. Photo: U.N.

Journal of International Peace Operations

X 18 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Risk Management | Feature

Risk Management Preparing for operating in risky environments. And for when things go wrong.

Photo: Stock

PERATIONS in conflict and postconflict environments can be inherently risky. Employees and the organization’s projects and assets can be exposed to all manner of risks, some sinister and others not. But regardless of the nature of the risk, organizations have a clear obligation to properly manage them. In dealing with security risks, much of the attention tends to fall on physical security, i.e., protecting people, places and things. After all, security can often be high profile and thus obvious. But often, some of the most important aspects of security ― physical and otherwise ― are less obvious. The Feature of this Journal focuses on some aspects of risk management that responsible organizations must bear in mind when operating in challenging environments. Physical security is unfortunately a necessity in many environments. But just as important as having that security is ensuring that the security provider is not going cause further problems for their clients through their conduct. Pete Dordal provides an overview of the key factors that clients should consider when seeking a security provider. After all, if a security provider fails in its duties, it can reflect badly on the client just as Journal of International Peace Operations

much as the provider itself. Getting to and from an area of operations is not as simple as hopping on Orbitz.com and booking flights. Jasbir Dhillon argues that it is critical for organizations to ensure that they have a robust policy for their employees that outlines how they may travel safely. Furthermore, organizations should ensure that their employees are properly trained before they travel, well monitored during their journey and that the employer have in place a comprehensive response strategy should anything go wrong. Safety and security however is not just confined to employees and operations. Another key consideration for organizations is at a very macro level: their own longevity. There must always be policies in place to rescue employees and assets when things go wrong - but what about rescuing the image and reputation of the organization itself? Adam Clampitt looks at how organizations can establish a strong reputation for corporate social responsibility, and how this track record can be critical during an internal crisis. Because when that does happen, the manner and tenor of the response can dictate how forgiving the media, public and even authorities will be ― and

ultimately how the organization will survive those challenges. Our Feature on risk management also stretches into our Government & Legal Affairs section, with an in-depth analysis by Jonathan Rosen on legal compliance. With increasing attention from U.S. authorities, it is more important than ever that companies understand their legal obligations and the compliance structures they should have in place. Next issue, the Feature section will focus on Maritime Security.

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Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY, CORRUPTION, AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING THE IPOA LEGAL CONFERENCE

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

RONALD REAGAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ensuring Legal Compliance and Combating Corruption for Professionals in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments In 1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to further U.S. economic policy and protect the integrity of the American business system. Over thirty years later, the U.S. Department of Justice now refers to corruption as a “national security issue” that impacts U.S. efforts in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Other nations, such as the United Kingdom, have recently taken a much harder line on corruption. Criminal prosecutions, of both companies and individuals, are on the rise. What do these developments mean for companies operating in contingency environments? How do you address the challenges of corruption when working in failed or weak states, and how do you stay compliant with applicable laws?

IPOA’s second annual Legal Conference will take place at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center in Washington, D.C., on Thursday, September 16, 2010. The conference will bring together private sector and governmental actors to discuss on compliance issues - and in particular focusing on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) - as it concerns operating in the world’s conflict and post-conflict zones. CLE credit is pending upon receipt of written material.

Join IPOA for a one-day conference that will look at these issues, and discuss the complex intersection of corruption, national security, and contingency contracting. The conference will include panels of experts that will discuss the FCPA and other similar anti-corruption laws, their relevance on contingency operations, and the challenges of compliance. The panels also will discuss past cases and prosecutions that demonstrate the very real nature of these challenges. Key Issues

From 1970s to Now: A Primer on the History and Mechanics of the FCPA A Bribe By Any Other Name: Anti-Corruption Policy and Laws Around the World Briber Beware: The Increasing Focus on FCPA Enforcement

Registration Fees IPOA Members Non-Members

$ 275 $ 325

Early Bird Discount: 15 % All registration fees will be discounted if paid in full no later than July 31, 2010.

Getting It Right: Compliance and Preventing FCPA Violations

For any questions on sponsorship packages or event details, please contact Melissa Sabin by email at MSabin@ipoaonline.org or phone at +1 202 464 0721.

When Things Go Wrong: How to Handle a Potential FCPA Violation

www.IPOAworld.org/fcpa2010 The Association of the Stability Operations Industry

Risk Management | Feature Pete Dordal

Choosing Security Wisely Cutting corners may reduce initial costs, but will usually result in longer-term problems

The choice of security can reflect on the client. Photo: Sr. Airman Jacab Corbin/U.S.A.F.

ISK management when it comes to security is not about the what: it is about the who. Who a security firm employs, and who they task to provide said security. What is important is the individual’s qualifications, his or her experience, the understanding of the client’s mission, the understanding of the environment, and, as always, the company’s best practices, lessons learned and resource allocation. As recent events have vividly demonstrated, failure to carefully select a private security company (PSC) can result in significant problems for clients ― be they government agencies, NGOs or private firms ― seeking to protect people and assets both at home or abroad. Taking the time and making the effort to choose the right PSC is the surest way to minimize or all together avoid such problems. It also helps ensure you are working with a company that will deliver the services you need in the manner you require. . Good contracted security starts with hiring quality personnel and managing them throughout the

Pete Dordal is Managing Director for GardaWorld’s international operations. Contact Pete at pete.dordal@garda-world.com.

Journal of International Peace Operations

contract period. In today’s economy, with tight budgets and an emphasis on cutting costs, there is an undeniable temptation for clients to make their security decisions based on cost alone. However, though cutting corners may reduce initial costs, chances are that such a strategy will result in longer-term problems. If cost does form a very large component of the decision-making process, you must ask yourself: What skills are you willing to tradeoff quality for cost? Good PSCs emphasize quality from the start: meticulous recruiting and vetting, rigorous training and close supervision. The more thorough these programs, the better quality services – and fewer headaches – you can expect in the long-run. Selecting a good PSC for your organization begins at the Request for Proposal (RFP) draft stage. Three essential areas of your RFP ― namely recruiting, training and management ― will enable you to make distinctions between private security providers and ultimately choose the one best suited to your needs. Below is a check list of questions to assist in the process.

Recruiting It is important for clients to understand how their private security provider recruits its staff. After all, these personnel will be entrusted with your organization’s (and maybe even your own) security. Their conduct and actions will also naturally reflect on your organization. Therefore, it is important that the provider recruit its staff well. A private security provider should be able to demonstrate the how it recruits its personnel, how it interviews potential recruits and the specific criteria and qualifications for each staff position. Key questions are:

• How does the company recruit its personnel? • How long has the recruiting team been in place?

• What is the vetting process? Does it include criminal, employment and military background checks?

• What is the PSC’s applicant acceptance to rejection rate?

• Does the PSC maintain detailed employment records for all staff? X 12 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Feature | Risk Management W 11 | Choosing Security Wisely | Pete Dordal Particularly where the hiring of local or thirdcountry nationals is concerned, it is useful to determine if the provider has its own dedicated recruiting offices in those countries, and if not, who their representative agent is. (If a third-party recruitment agency is involved in a provider’s recruitment process, similar due diligence should be performed on them as well.) By that same token, does the provider have dedicated recruiting offices and personnel in the countries where they will provide service? Another consideration that is worth noting is the provider’s staff turnover rate. High turnover rates are a likely symptom of low morale, poor supervision and low pay. It often leads to higher incident levels and thus vulnerability for your organization’s image. The average tenure of supervisory staff that would be assigned to your contract is just as important. Together with issues such as career development opportunities and the competitiveness of staff compensation, these considerations combine to demonstrate the provider’s culture of long-term commitment to its staff and vice-versa. Training Once you have established that a potential private security provider has robust hiring and vetting procedures, it is just as (if not more) imperative that they also have equally good training. Key considerations include:

• whether the training is in-house or outsourced; • the extensiveness of pre-deployment training;

• whether the training includes a focus on ethics and integrity, as well as education on the rules of engagement and use of force;

• what certifications are required and how they are maintained;

• what on-going and remedial training is required; and

• whether the company maintain records of all training provided to each staff member. Not only is it important to ascertain the level and regularity of training, it is just as important to ensure that the training of the PSC’s personnel is well-rounded and comprehensive. It is of course important that security personnel know how to keep you out of danger. It is just as important that they know how to do so legally and ethically, and in a way that keeps your organization’s image secure. Management Even with the best people who undergo the best training, a company still requires effective risk management. In essence, this consideration goes beyond the “who.” It should be established early on the nature of a PSC’s approach to security and risk management, and whether this approach aligns with that of your own organization. This can include considerations such as the company’s security planning process, and how the PSC gathers and utilizes information for that process. Beyond information, the operational side is

another item worth examining. It is important to understand what the PSC’s operational policies and procedures consist of. More specifically, plenty can be determined by simple analysis of the ratio between supervisors and staff ― the smaller the number, the more quality can be monitored. It is also key for you, as a client, to understand how your own management of the contract would work. It is imperative to know what the management reporting process is that will enable you to oversee the performance of the PSC during the contract. For example, on-site PSC managers will provide better quality oversight, with verbal and written updates and ongoing valuable advice. Establish whether the PSC’s internal reporting process (daily, weekly, etc.) enables you to access the specific details you may need for your own oversight. Finally, does the PSC have in place Quality Assurance programs to measure performance on your contract? Additional Criteria Once you are comfortable with the company’s policies, procedures, personnel and management, it is time to look at other factors that might help you decide between providers. From a practical perspective, determine whether the PSC has a well -established, start-up model that can be adapted to your site and operations. Beyond this, it could be useful to determine how extensive the company’s relations with government, business and social organizations are in the country in which operations will occur. Finally, though it may seem elementary, a key element of due diligence is to look at who the company’s other clients are, both past and present, and what services they provide for those clients. Achieving your objectives while keeping your people and assets safe requires experience, expertise and commitment to quality. It is not an area where cutting corners for the lowest cost produces the results you want and need. Beyond the obvious dangers of ineffective security, reputational risks can be considerable as recent headlines painfully document. Choosing your PSC wisely and well helps assure a solid return on your security investment..

Insecurity is a hot issue for organizations operating in conflict and post-conflict environments. Photo: Martine

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Risk Management | Feature Jasbir Dhillon

Have Risk. Will Travel. Managing safety and security while travelling to conflict and post-conflict zones.

An idyllic destination, with views of the ocean and a peacekeeping operation. Photo: Marco Dormino/U.N.

VERY year thousands of employees within humanitarian and missionary organizations travel across the world to countries plagued by war, disease and natural disasters. In many of these often dangerous environments, risk is part of everyday life. Some risk is avoidable and some is not. Regardless, employers have both a humanitarian and a legal duty to protect their employees by reducing and mitigating this risk. Over recent times, we have witnessed a number of high profile events around the world that have impacted the well-being of both leisure and humanitarian travelers. These have included earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, and riots and civil disturbance in Greece, India, Jamaica and Thailand. Sadly though, this year is no different from any other. Over the previous decade we have seen terrorist attacks as far afield as Mumbai, New York, Madrid, Moscow and London, natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and floods in New Orleans, and civil unrest in many more countries. There catastrophes represent only

Jasbir Dhillon is a Marketing Manager at Key Travel. Contact Jasbir at jdhillon@keytravel.com

Journal of International Peace Operations

one facet of the dangers in traveling as they do not even take into account getting there in the first place; as incidents such as the Air France disaster in the Atlantic Ocean or the Afriqyah Airlines crash in Tripoli demonstrate. The threat of civil litigation and obligations under occupational health and safety laws and regulations understandably concentrates the minds of every responsible employer regarding the safety and wellbeing of their staff from a legal and ethical perspective. In the case of work-related travel (and specifically in regards to humanitarian organizations that frequently send staff to less secure locations) this means the importance of ensuring there is a process in place to manage the welfare of employees, from pre-trip risk assessment to taking care which forms of transport and accommodation are taken and when. As a company that specializes in the humanitarian, missionary and academic markets, Key Travel conducted a survey to develop a deeper understanding of the issue of traveler welfare. Customers were asked a number of questions, including the following:

• Have you been abroad when a serious incident happened in the location you were travelling in?

A surprising 26 percent answered yes.

• Are you made aware of the risk levels associated with a destination, or provided with any pre-trip briefing? 42 percent answered no. With these results in mind it is worrying that many organizations do not yet have a systematic process for tracking where employees are going and still provide only general advice for the travelers (to check websites, such as the State Department) in relation to associated levels of risk and travel safety tips for their destinations. Step 1: The Travel Safety Policy Unlike the traditional travel policy, which focuses on preferred suppliers and expense management, the Travel Safety Policy sets out what the company does to protect its travelers and the steps to maintain and demonstrate a Duty of Care. When putting together the policy, the following needs to be considered and answered:

• Which countries are safe to travel to and how to monitor this?

• Which airlines are safe to travel on and which hotels are safe to stay in? X 14 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Feature | Risk Management W 13 | Have Risk. Will Travel. | Jasbir Dhillon

• Who in the organization is allowed to travel and how should they seek authorization?

• What happens if a trip is booked out of policy? • What should the organization do in case of an emergency or incident?

• What should the traveler do in case of an emergency or incident? These are all questions that law enforcement organizations will ask you if they believe you may be in breach of the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is, however, advisable to make your policy as comprehensive as possible. Different organizations require different steps to ensure safety and unfortunately there is no “one size fits all” answer. Step 2: Training Training is essential to ensure all travelers and travel bookers are aware of the policy, the implications of not conducting a thorough risk analysis and failing to adhere to the policy. Travel bookers, for example, need to know to which destinations are safe to travel, the associated threat levels and how to act or respond if one of their travelers is caught up in a dangerous

situation. For their part, travelers should be made aware that they are to “report in” if their plans change at all, so that the organization knows where they are at all times. They also need to know how to behave if they find themselves in a dangerous situation and who they can contact back at their organization when things go wrong. It is often useful to provide employees with a waterproof, plastic card with such details embedded on it and a spare in case the first is lost or damaged. Whilst regular training is essential, short top-up briefings before employees embark on their trip are also beneficial. As with all training, simply performing it is not often enough. Short tests are therefore helpful to ensure that employees have taken the information onboard.

Step 3: Monitoring An effective risk management policy should include a strategy for monitoring events and threat levels pre-trip, whilst the traveler is en-route to the destination and whilst they are there. The

importance of this aspect cannot be overemphasized. Some organizations believe that watching CNN is enough. But the news does not – and cannot – report every global incident, and furthermore, situations change quickly and constantly. Systems such as specialized travel alerts provide much more reliable and up-to-date risk advisories. Key Travel’s risk management system, for example, is comprised of two core functions: the Travel Risk Intelligence System (TRIS) and the Employee Travel Monitoring System (ETMS). The TRIS provides organizations with accurate, up-to-date monitoring and alerts from across the globe and the ETMS is designed for rapid reaction. The ETMS works by picking up employees travel itineraries automatically through our booking system and then monitoring them alongside security and risk information. A threat level indicator (measured from one to five, five being the highest) is then fed to key contacts at the respective organizations, enabling them to decide whether they deem the situation to be an acceptable level of risk and whether it falls within their Travel Safety Policy. Step 4: Response If a situation escalates or a new emergency situation arises whilst the traveler is away, you must know when and how to get them out to protect their safety. This can be a tricky call, as when everyone else is typically fleeing an area, charity workers are going in. Whilst the aforementioned monitoring tools can be useful in this situation, they must be coupled with feedback from eyes and ears on the ground. Just because the general threat level in a country is minimal does not mean that your employees are safe. To stay ahead of the game: if your employees are travelling to a known high risk location it is advisable to plan at least some of your response before they leave. This does not have to be detailed; but answers to questions such as:

• “what are the nearest three airports?” • “what is the quickest, safest form of transport to use?”

• “where are the nearest hospitals?” Planning these responses in advance will significantly increase your employees’ ability to react quickly and efficiently. One type of inconvenience that can befall the business traveler. Photo: NTSB

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Feature | Risk Management Adam Clampitt

Managing Risk … to Your Reputation Preparation is paramount in surviving a reputational crisis

We want answers. Photos: NASA; Stock

N February of this year, a multinational aerospace and defense contracting company paid nearly $500 million to the U.S. Department of Justice and the British Serious Fraud Office to settle a case involving allegations of corruption. Given the sheer size of the penalty – and that of the company that paid it – one would think that the company would soon play the role of poster child in the ongoing debate surrounding proposed reforms of the defense procurement system. But that has not been the case. In fact, the company just won a multimillion contract from the Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, just one of the many pieces of new business they have garnered since the settlement was announced. How did the company emerge unscathed? Not only was its performance for the customer as close to impeccable as exists in this day and age; it aggressively articulated that record to public and private stakeholders that run the gamut from the

Adam Clampitt is a Vice President at Washington D.C.based Levick Strategic Communications and the former Director of Public Affairs Plans and Social Media for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Contact Adam at aclampitt@levick.com.

Journal of International Peace Operations

general public to members of Congress. When taken alongside its well-publicized charitable and educational initiatives, the company had conditioned the marketplace to be forgiving of its missteps. Simply put, the company’s efforts to build a strong brand before a reputational crisis arose elicited a “that’s not the company I know” response when a blemish inevitably occurred. The word “inevitable” is key, because the current reputational landscape is as challenging as it has ever been for defense contractors and the peace operations industries. Budget deficits and goodold-fashioned politics have dovetailed to drive vastly increased government scrutiny. Meanwhile, every unfortunate misstep by a government contractor involved with either large weapons systems or on-the-ground operations has emboldened opponents’ attacks and claims of “war profiteering,” an incendiary charge in today’s environment. The reality that most of these incidents are isolated – or that accusations are often inaccurate or politically motivated – simply does not matter, even in cases where a single bad actor in a company has blatantly ignored stated corporate policy. Time and again, we have seen companies

that lacked the reputational strength of the case study above taken to task on the front page, in the nightly news, online and, eventually, in Congress, the White House and the Pentagon. By the time remediation efforts are underway, the news cycle has moved on and often irreparable damage has been done. In such a perilous setting, the best – and often only – way to protect a company from catastrophic reputational damage is to proactively build a strong corporate reputation that earns the ongoing admiration and respect of customers, key stakeholders and the public at large. Simply put, it is about making enough deposits in the corporate trust bank during periods of relative calm to ensure that withdrawals during crisis do not leave an organization in the red. In a world where the media drives government policy and decision-making, effectively publicizing a strong record of results, an excellent management structure and commitments to safety, ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is what enables a firm to emerge from a crisis with its reputation intact. X 18 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Feature | Risk Management W 16 | Managing Risk … to Your Reputation | Adam Clampitt While there are a wealth of proven reputationbuilding initiatives, there are a number of “must haves.” These are listed below. Firstly, it is important to maintain an appropriate level of communications resources either in-house or via consultants. Develop and implement a sound communications plan with experienced strategists and tacticians. Hiring a strong Director of Communications with proven expertise and knowledge of digital communications is a must. In today’s 24-hour news cycle, controversies begin with online chatter, and even after the mainstream media is finished reporting on an issue, the topic can live on for months or years in the blogosphere or on social media sites. In many cases, it makes sense to augment your staff with an outside firm who understands your issues and your industry to provide strategic counsel and tactical execution when necessary. Second, build a strong Web presence that provides positive information about the company. This includes placing messages on the company website, monitoring third-party sites such as Wikipedia for damaging or misleading content, engaging prominent bloggers who cover the stabilization industry, creating your own blog, or developing a following on social media sites such Facebook and Twitter that can act as brand ambassadors should crisis strike. In addition, Web

properties should be fully-optimized via search engine optimization (SEO) and marketing (SEM) to drive as much traffic to promotional messages as possible. Third, develop a list of journalists, editors and bloggers who cover your industry and engage them through informal meetings and briefings. Contrary to popular opinion, the media can be an embattled company’s best friend if relationships are nurtured before the company needs them. Develop these connections by providing reporters with an ongoing stream of information – either “on the record” or for background purposes only. Tell the story about your company that you want the public to hear and always be as open and transparent as possible. Further, create a press kit that highlights the company’s background and mission. This familiarizes journalists with your company’s history and exposes them to the positive stories a company has to tell. Make sure the press kits are updated once every six months at a minimum and include recent news articles that provide an accurate portrayal of company performance, as well as financial information if the company is publicly traded. Fourth, recruit third-party allies who are experts in the defense field and can speak to the excellent return on investment that an organization provides. Encouraging these thoughtful leaders to

write op-eds or make the cable news rounds – and facilitating these opportunities wherever possible – lends credibility to corporate messages and provides a powerfully supportive voice in times of crisis. Again, cultivate these relationships before you need them – for once a company finds itself in the eye of the storm, it will likely be too late. Finally, ensure that the CSR program is wellpublicized. Charitable contributions, employee volunteering, fundraising events and pro-bono work for non-profits are all elements of a comprehensive CSR campaign and should be liberally articulated. If a company has yet to establish a CSR program, now is the time to create one. Societal contributions are not only the right thing to do; they protect companies when faced with daunting public relations challenges. A significant communications offensive may seem intimidating – and especially so for companies that have not traditionally focused on reputational strength. But remember: While many companies wait until a crisis erupts to speak publicly, it is the organizations that invest in their public perception that build long-term brands and are best able to weather an otherwise crippling crisis. A positive corporate reputation yields invaluable benefits and bulletproofs organizations in the event of a future crisis.

W 08 | An Island of Unpredictability | Saltanat Berdikeeva gyzstan for almost two months after Bakiev’s ouster, thereby severely disrupting bilateral trade and movement of people. Kazakhstan decided to open the country’s border with Kyrgyzstan only after the latter pressured to cut water supplies and food imports upon which Kazakhstan relies. However, more border closures, with ensuing cross-border problems, are not ruled out if Kyrgyzstan continues to stay unstable. The American presence in Kyrgyzstan has also been central to the nation’s politics. The United States heavily invested in the Manas airbase in order to support its mission in Afghanistan. While the interim government assured its contract sanctity with the United States to keep the military airbase in Kyrgyzstan, the lack of certainty about the stability of the divided current government and diverging viewpoints on foreign policy cast doubt on the long-term future of the airbase. The Journal of International Peace Operations

interim government views the U.S. with skepticism, in light of the belief that the country conveniently turned a blind eye to president Bakiev’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies in the interests of continuing to use the airbase. This feeling prompted Washington to give significant focus to its diplomacy with Bishkek in the wake of the events of April 7. There are voices in Kyrgyz political circles arguing that the relations with the United States should be improved and the airbase should stay given the base’s financial benefits to the country. Thus, the United States has a window of opportunity to improve its image in the country by more actively helping to cope with the crisis in the south and supporting the democratic process.

erage had on his ouster, its influence over the country cannot be underestimated. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan’s comparative weakness, along with its economic and political dependence on Russia will likely mean that Russia’s influence will only grow. The latest crises in Osh and Jalal Abad demonstrated Kyrgyzstan’s lack of preparedness to defend itself and its citizens from violence, prompting the interim government to ask for Russia’s military intervention to stop the bloodshed (a request that was denied). Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Russia and its neighbors is expected to grow further as it deals with an enormous humanitarian and refugee crisis, ethnic animosity, economic setback and criminal forces.

Russia, too, is a major external player in Kyrgyzstan’s future. Given Russia’s ability to wield its influence on Kyrgyzstan, as evidenced by the affect its open displeasure and critical media cov-

While external actors may not dictate the outcome of internal dynamics in Kyrgyzstan, they have the ability to usher its direction, as the country finds itself at a crucial crossroads in its survival.

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Government & Legal Affairs Jonathan Rosen

Compliance in the Age of Corporate Scrutiny Regulatory compliance as a form of risk management

The Department of Justice could take a keen interest in your operations. Photos: Stock; Ed Brown

N this hyper-intensive environment of corporate scrutiny, the Department of Justice (DOJ) acts as the pre-eminent federal regulator of corporate culture. DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, also known as the Filip Memorandum, affirmatively establish the government’s interest in using criminal prosecutions to achieve institutional reform in a corporate setting. Anticipating and defending against these structural enforcement actions requires an effective compliance program.

The Filip Memorandum underscores the importance of an effective corporate compliance program, which is commensurate with that company’s resources and business risks. In this post-Enron era of heightened regulatory enforcement designed to target corporate fraud, an effective compliance program deters criminal conduct by its employees and agents, and, thereby, helps avoid an investigation in the first place. Moreover, in light of the increasing criminalization of Jonathan N. Rosen is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, where he specializes in white collar defense and corporate compliance. A former federal prosecutor, he served as the Fraud and Public Corruption Section of the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia. Contact Jonathan at jrosen@shb.com.

Journal of International Peace Operations

business conduct, it can persuade law enforcement that the company did not intend to benefit from the errant behavior of its employees and agents, thereby reducing the likelihood of a corporate prosecution under the Filip Memorandum. Today, the government enjoys extraordinary leverage over companies facing the risk of an enforcement action. The imbalance of power between the government and the company is explained by the following two factors: the Draconian consequences of an indictment; and the elastic notions of corporate criminal liability. As reflected by the case of Arthur Andersen, the issuance of a corporate indictment is a death knell for the corporation. No amount of trial preparation and success can undo the damage wrought by the market in reaction to a corporate indictment. A corporation will rarely risk being indicted by the federal government because the financial risks are simply too extreme. Moreover, a company can be criminally liable for the conduct of a single, low-level employee if the employee acted within the scope of his or her employment, and the employee was in part motivated to benefit the corporation. If a lowlevel employee commits such a crime, the entire

company can be prosecuted. In light of the dire consequences of an indictment and the elastic theory of corporate criminal liability, a company will generally do a great deal to be deemed cooperative with a government investigation once it has begun. As a result, the government’s leverage creates significant opportunities for prosecutorial overreaching. In response to the WorldCom and Enron scandals, the government took several steps, including the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to remediate the perceived breakdown of corporate culture and responsibility. After the president created a Corporate Fraud Task Force to enhance DOJ’s prosecution of corporate entities, DOJ issued a guideline for corporate prosecutions called the Thompson Memorandum. The Thompson Memorandum required prosecutors to consider bringing charges based, in part, on whether or not the corporation “appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agencies.” As a result, prosecutors generally expected a company seeking leniency from the government to, among other things, conduct a rigorous internal investigation; disclose to the government the results of the X 20 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Government & Legal Affairs W 19 | Compliance in the Age of Corporate Scrutiny | Jonathan Rosen internal investigation, including memoranda of witness interviews (e.g., attorney-client privileged material, and attorney notes and mental impressions reduced to writing, e.g., attorney work product) and deny payments of attorneys’ fee to employees under investigation. This practice spawned a “culture of waiver,” which placed corporations in a precarious catch22. A corporation could conduct its own investigation, disclose the results of that otherwise privileged investigation to DOJ, provide the government with a road map for an effective prosecution and also expose itself to the risk of additional litigation without the benefit of any protection from prosecution or derivative thirdparty claims. Alternatively, the corporation could risk being labeled uncooperative, which invariably increased the likelihood of being indicted. This practice also undermined the effectiveness of a corporation's internal compliance program and, thereby exposed that corporation to even greater risk of governmental scrutiny. Disclosing the statements of corporate employees served to “chill” the full and free candor necessary for the company to learn of any wrongdoing in the first place. As a result, waiver actually impeded the corporation's efforts to identify and prevent crime. In 1996, in response to a storm of criticism from the Congress, the Courts and the bar, DOJ revised the Thompson Memorandum. The revised guidelines, called the McNulty Memorandum, implemented a series of rules and procedures purportedly intended to restrain the discretion of the line prosecutor conducting investigations of corporate wrongdoing. If a “legitimate need” existed, prosecutors were instructed to follow specific procedures depending on the “category” of information sought by the prosecutor’s request. Category I materials included factual information such as key documents, witness statements or purely factual interview memoranda. Before requesting a waiver for Category I information, the line prosecutor had to seek approval from the U.S. Attorney, who had, in turn, to consult with the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. DOJ considered a corporation’s response to a request for Category I information in deciding whether to indict. Category II materials included attorney-client communications, legal advice or non-fact attorney work product. Before seeking a waiver for Journal of International Peace Operations

Category II information, the United States Attorney had to obtain written approval from the Deputy Attorney General. These procedures did not apply if the company was relying on an advice of counsel defense or if the legal advice fell within the crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. In contrast to Category I demands, a corporation’s response to a request for Category II information could not be considered in deciding whether to charge the corporation. Moreover, with respect to legal fees, the McNulty Memorandum purported to eliminate the payment or reimbursement of legal fees as a factor that the prosecutor could consider in deciding whether to indict. However, the McNulty Memorandum included an exception where, “in extremely rare cases,” the “totality of circumstances show that [payment of fees] was intended to impede a criminal investigation.” The McNulty Memorandum failed to provide any meaningful protection against the erosion of the privilege and its concomitant harm to internal compliance programs. Under the revised policy, cooperation with the government was continuously linked with a voluntary waiver of the privilege. For example, if Company A waived its privilege with respect to Category II information while Company B did not, it was not likely that Company A and Company B would have been treated the same. As a result, companies facing the specter of an indictment felt circumstantially coerced to waive the same kind of information as before the McNulty Memorandum, even if the line prosecutor did not make an explicit request for it to do so. Moreover, DOJ was silent on what type of evidence could have been used to show intent to obstruct. As a result, the new policy did nothing to eliminate any negative scrutiny associated with the signing of a joint defense agreement, the sharing of critical documents between the company and its employees and a company's continued employment of an employee under government investigation. The changes implemented in the McNulty Memorandum did not satisfy most critics of the Thompson Memorandum. Support grew in Congress to pass the Attorney Client Privilege Act of 2008, prohibiting government agencies from considering a company's privilege waiver as a factor in granting cooperation credit and preventing the

government from considering whether the company (i) indemnified its employees, (ii) entered into a joint defense agreement, or (iii) chose not to discipline or terminate an employee who did not cooperate in the investigation. To head off congressional action, DOJ modified the McNulty Memorandum by issuing a revised version of its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, called the Filip Memorandum. The Filip Memorandum introduces several changes with respect to the waiver of attorneyclient privilege. For example, the Filip Memorandum states that cooperation will not be measured by waiver of privileges, but rather by the extent to which a corporation discloses relevant facts and evidence about misconduct, whether or not privileged. The Filip Memorandum prohibits prosecutors from requesting waivers of “core” attorney-client communications or work product, analogous to Category II material under the McNulty Memorandum. Changes with respect to waiver requests, however, may prove more illusory than real. Given the centrality of counsel in the conduct of an internal investigation, any “fact” uncovered in an investigation is really an attorney’s distillation of various interviews and constitutes attorney work product. Thus, even under the Filip Memorandum, corporations will still have to waive the privilege to receive cooperation credit. Weakened attorneyclient privilege and work product protection discourage employees from consulting with company counsel. As a result, DOJ’s policies and procedures, even under the revised Filip Memorandum, impede the efficacy of internal compliance programs. In other areas, the Filip Memorandum is similarly inadequate. With respect to joint defense agreements, for example, the Filip Memorandum states that Federal Prosecutors will not consider whether a company has entered into a joint defense agreement in evaluating cooperation. However, the Filip Memorandum also states that a prosecutor will consider a corporation’s failure to disclose “relevant facts” based on the assertion of a joint defense agreement. Although inadequate in several respects, the Filip Memorandum continues DOJ's practice of considering the existence and adequacy of a corporation's compliance in its assessment of X 34 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Carolyn McAskie, OC | Q & A Naveed Bandali

Committed to Keeping the Peace An interview with Carolyn McAskie, OC

An impressive line-up. U.N.; Photo: Mark Garten/U.N.; Carolyn McAskie. Photo: Paulo Filgueiras/U.N.

AROLYN McAskie, OC, is currently a Senior Fellow in the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. She previously served as Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding (2006−2008), Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Burundi (2004−2006), as well as Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator at the U.N. Secretariat in New York (1999-2004), and Emergency Relief Coordinator (1999−2001). Ms. McAskie is an Officer of the Order of Canada and a Director of Canadem and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

but fighting still going on in other parts. Modern peacekeeping goes way beyond just patrolling the line of two parties who find a peace agreement. Modern peacekeeping forces now need to be prepared to work with the local authorities to stabilize parts of the country. You could say that most current operations fall into the category of where there is no peace to keep — so it is not unusual at all.

JIPO: How can a peacekeeping operation proceed when

McAskie: I think you have touched on one of the most frustrating elements of the U.N. The U.N. Security Council decides that it is going to mount a mission in a particular country, then the U.N. Secretariat is pretty much left to its own devices to find countries that are willing to provide troops. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal have been most generous, and their troops are disciplined, well-trained and reasonably well-equipped, but maybe do not have the heavy equipment that is fully required. Then the next category of troops is usually from countries that are very poor and do not have the capacity to train and equip troops up

there is no apparent peace to be kept? McAskie: The concept of modern peacekeeping has changed so much that there is very rarely a peace to be kept. There is often a situation in countries where there is a combination of peaceful areas maybe in agreement with the government,

Naveed Bandali is the Senior Analyst of the Information Operations Division at Pax Mondial Limited and a contributing editor of the Journal of International Peace Operations. Contact Naveed at nbandali@peaceops.com.

Journal of International Peace Operations

JIPO: Is it fair to suggest that United Nations peacekeeping operations rarely, if ever, receive the adequate resourcing, support and political will to succeed? If yes, how must strategy and planning take this into account?

to the standard required of a peacekeeping mission. NATO members will not commit their troops and their equipment to U.N. peacekeeping efforts. This is one of the most serious and critical issues for U.N. peacekeeping. They say it is because they prefer the NATO command structure and are used to working with each other, but to my mind, that is a bogus argument. NATO should help the U.N. to further refine its procedures. The advances in U.N. peacekeeping since 1995 are unimaginable; 2000−2005 saw major watersheds in the reorganization and professionalization of U.N. peacekeeping. There are now 124,000 international personnel — soldiers, civilians, police, etc. — involved with U.N. peacekeeping missions. The British and the French have some troops in peacekeeping missions, but very little relative to the total number. Canada, my own country, has 24 soldiers involved — we are sort of 58th in the ranks — yet Canadians tend to criticize U.N. operations for being inefficient or poorly equipped. Sudan I think was a very tragic example where the X 24 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Q & A | Carolyn McAskie, OC W 21 | Keeping the Peace | Naveed Bandali Security Council discussed for months the possibility of mounting a mission. The only troops who came forward were not well-equipped. The Secretariat begged Western countries to at least provide equipment, transportation capability, lift capability and attack helicopters. Very little was given. Some countries did give extra money over and above the basic assessed budget costs that every member state is obliged to pay under U.N. Treaty, but very few countries really stepped up to the plate — and then they criticize the U.N. for not being able to get it together in the Sudan.

JIPO: Is U.N. peacekeeping, then, operationally, materially and politically overstretched?

we were struggling with — both in the mission and in headquarters — was that it was very hard to say who was who, because headquarters and a mission work very closely together. It was very much a team approach, unlike what was happening in 1994 with the tragedy of Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, where he really was cut-off from headquarters. The civilian and military must be brought closer together in terms of the strategic intelligence and the management of the mission. And that is always a problem. It means that you need to have a military team and a senior civilian team that can work together and understand each other’s roles.

weak partners, but most U.N. personnel and Western governments recognize we have a responsibility at this stage to strengthen the African regional organizations to take on more and more of the burden, which they dearly want to do. They are seriously lacking in personnel to do these kinds of jobs — and the minute you get someone who is doing really well, they leave and join the U.N. You cannot stop someone from wanting to move onto something bigger, but it is a vicious circle. We have to accept the fact that this is going to take 20 years of support and training, and help them to develop the mechanisms to manage new capabilities.

JIPO: Many complain that U.N. bureaucracy often McAskie: Of course U.N. peacekeeping is overstretched because the whole concept of what the international community wants the U.N. to do is always going to be greater than the resources provided to do it. The Security Council will have certain definitions of what can be done and will try to do more than it is able to raise resources for. But think of the opposite: what if the U.N. was not overstretched? It would mean that it is sitting on all of its resources. But resources are provided once a decision is made to take a particular action—so you are always playing catchup. It is in the nature of the beast.

JIPO: What lessons may be drawn from your time heading the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Burundi? McAskie: My Mission was designed in 2004 and we are now in 2010, so in fact, a lot of advances have already been made. At that time, one thing

JIPO: In your view, how can African peace and stability operations improve? McAskie: To be fair, a lot of improvements are already underway in new U.N. peacekeeping missions. I do think that you do need Western governments to make a serious commitment to providing resources and equipment. There are some interesting exercises going on of training African peacekeepers and improving African capabilities. Part of the problem is that the African regional organizations, like the peace and stability mechanism of the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States, are very anxious to play a more important part. But they depend on their own governments for support — who do not have the kind of money to create the needed mechanisms. They are struggling and are criticized as being

undermines missions and policies. Did you face those issues as Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)? What can be done to improve this situation? McAskie: I do not agree with the basic premise. There are always tensions between the civilian and military sides — and between humanitarians and peacekeepers — because each of them has a concept of what their goals are and what kinds of jobs they are supposed to do. But these tensions are human tensions and they are worked out on the ground. As far as I am concerned, the more we get into these complex missions, the more we learn how to manage these problems. My experience in OCHA finished in 2004 and a lot has changed. I was very much in favor of humanitarian coordinators becoming senior officials in U.N. peacekeeping missions. I felt that this did not threaten the humanitarian independence or neutrality. The U.N., by its nature, has to be seen as neutral, although since it often gets involved in the actual fighting, it is often seen as taking sides because it is supporting the government. But I do not see anything wrong with supporting the government of the day, unless it is engaged in nefarious practices. Our job is to help the government to stay out of trouble and not make bad decisions. Humanitarians will often be in areas where there are no peacekeepers, or in areas where there are peacekeepers, and they have to find a modus operandi. Now, in areas where you have trouble with the peacekeepers, where the peacekeepers have been accused of misbehavior, then this can

Security Council, listen up. Photo: Devra Berkowitz/U.N.

Journal of International Peace Operations

X 30 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Insight Priscilla Phelps and Charles Billand

Rebuilding After Natural Disasters What works and what does not

Rebuilding Haiti will be an uphill task. Photos: Logan Abassi/U.N.; Sophia Paris/U.N.

N managing post-disaster reconstruction, a complex series of decisions need to be made almost immediately by all those involved. Despite this pressure, one must remember that these decisions will have long-term impacts on those affected by the disaster. Ideally, reconstruction policy would have been defined by government before the disaster, but there are few countries where this is the case. Therefore, defining and deliberating over the reconstruction policy will generally occur in the precious time after the disaster. The Communities Group International (TCGI) was contracted by the World Bank, beginning in 2008, to prepare a handbook on post-disaster housing reconstruction. The World Bank intended the handbook to assist government policy makers and government and donor project managers engaged in large-scale post-disaster reconstruction programs make decisions about how to reconstruct housing and communities after natural disasters.[1] This article describes the key findings

Priscilla Phelps is a Senior Finance Advisor and Charles Billand is an Executive Vice President at TCG International LLC. Contact Priscilla at phelps@tcgillc.com and Charles at billand@tcgillc.com.

Journal of International Peace Operations

and recommendations from the handbook, and proposes what a reconstruction project in one town in Haiti that conforms to the best practices identified in the handbook might look like. International experience — and the case studies in the reconstruction handbook — clearly demonstrate that reconstruction policy defined by government should encompass five key areas: the Institutional Strategy, the Financial Strategy, the Community Participation Approach, the Reconstruction Approach and Risk Management. At the same time, it also shows that local communities can and usually want to be put in charge of many of the operational practicalities of the reconstruction process. This combination of “top-down policy” and “bottom-up operations” has repeatedly been shown to be the most effective and efficient way to manage reconstruction. Put another way, this means that there are tasks related to reconstruction that communities do best — such as assessing local damage, accounting for their members, looking out for the most needy, identifying suitable relocation sites, replanning neighborhood layouts, overseeing and/ or carrying out reconstruction, even managing the

funding at the local level. And there are tasks that government does best — such as defining the reconstruction approach, coordinating with international agencies, establishing minimum and maximum standards for reconstruction and rules for the equitable distribution of assistance, programming and tracking the money and making sure the entire reconstruction enterprise is adequately monitored over time. A critical fact of housing reconstruction is that it is not just about “the house.” For that reason, the reconstruction handbook focuses on housing and community reconstruction. Of course, the community on which it focuses is not a physical entity, like a neighborhood. The community entails the social fabric that holds the neighborhood together; the livelihoods that make it possible for people to maintain their households; the sense of place, heritage, and security and a basic quality of life and level of community services. Planning and carrying out successful reconstruction means that all these aspects of community — as well as the house — must be attended to at more or less the same time. One emerging practice is that of “transitional shelter,” whereby the attention is put on stabilizing the X 26 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Insight W 25 | Rebuilding After Natural Disasters | Priscilla Phelps and Charles Billand community through provision of a minimum shelter solution that allow households to safely return to their neighborhoods, while more permanent reconstruction takes place. Because a community must regain its footing after the trauma of a disaster, the processes of transitional sheltering and reconstruction, properly organized, can play a big part in helping to make social recovery happen. Now where do all the other players, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector fit into the scenario just described? Everyone wants to help. Many even have the funding to do so. NGOs and CSOs with established relationships with communities in the disaster location can easily work with those communities to define what needs to be done. The private sector may also have established relationships within the affected communities that will give them the ability to identify local needs they can support. More complicated is the surge of private and nonprofit altruism that follows a major disaster, particularly those sometimes referred to as “celebrity disasters,” from organizations that may not have roots in the disaster-affected region. The reconstruction handbook identifies some critical success factors related to private sector and NGO/CSO involvement. These are detailed below. Firstly, let markets work. Interventions that distort markets or keep them from reestablishing themselves should be avoided after a disaster. In the case of materials provision, the handbook urges an effort to identify the bottlenecks in the supply market and pinpoint the minimum intervention necessary. Vendors with new technologies they would like to introduce into the construction market face an interesting challenge with this approach. It may be necessary to associate with existing suppliers, manufacturers or construction firms to introduce new products. Secondly, manage competition among agencies involved in reconstruction. Competition can often contribute to undesirable outcomes, as agencies “compete” for “customers” (i.e. homeowners or communities) in the reconstruction assistance marketplace. Good practice is for governments to set some limits on the form and cost of assistance to households, so that resources are equitably distributed, and to monitor results.

Journal of International Peace Operations

Third, support demand-driven reconstruction. Some of the most efficient post-disaster reconstruction projects provided financial resources to households or communities and let them (with technical assistance) make reconstruction plans and oversee implementation. In a country such as Haiti where construction is normally incremental, this may be more difficult, but household satisfaction with reconstruction organized this way — even when it takes longer — is generally much higher. Fourthly, given the ubiquity of risks in reconstruction projects, it is critical to manage these risks. They range from environmental risks in site selection, risks associated with substandard reconstruction, to corruption risks in contracting and financial assistance delivery. Even donated goods and services may create risks that make these offers unattractive. For instance, introduction of unfamiliar construction practices without sufficient training may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. Explicit programs of risk management should be established in reconstruction projects. NGOs, CSOs and private entities that present proposals identifying and mitigating risks (i.e., by providing third-party monitoring or conducting pilot projects before scaling up) may find a warmer reception for their ideas. Finally, make it sustainable. No long-term benefit accrues from post-disaster investments that cannot be maintained. Nor do projects that exacerbate pre-disaster environmental problems have much merit. Therefore, sustainability of several types are key reconstruction considerations. These include environmental sustainability, economic sustainability (will the local government be able to maintain the sewage system once it is installed?) and institutional sustainability (can local communities guarantee that risk mitigation measures such as early warning systems will be sustained?). TCGI is proposing to partner with two neighborhood groups, a local NGO and one or more local microfinance institutions, and with local professionals, to plan and oversee the execution of two projects in Haiti that demonstrate the principles put forth in the reconstruction handbook, including a participatory approach to relocation and community development, starting with transitional shelters and minimal services.

improved over time as additional resources become available. These projects are also intended to train a cadre of build-environment professionals who can replicate and scale up an approach that can contribute to the goal of the Government of Haiti of de-concentrating Port-au-Prince by supporting the growth of sustainable secondary cities. To protect against loss of life, camps must be relocated to safer sites as soon as possible. The proposed transitional communities are intended to move families and their transitional shelter to safer sites, while allowing permanent, healthy, economically viable communities to be planned and developed during the longer reconstruction period. Using a plan designed by the community as the framework, the project will focus on ensuring that the community is capable of advocating for its own interests and raising resources for the plan over time. A team composed of the local community, local organizations, local officials and local and international planners, will coordinate a process of participatory planning, and define replicable financial and development strategies in these demonstration communities. Households will lead the planning and participate in the development of neighborhoods that initially will include basic services such as minimal roads, water, sewerage and power; public facilities such as markets, community gardens, schools and health facilities; and facilities and support restoring livelihoods. With local economic development as a principal goal, residents will receive training in construction and other skills needed to develop the demonstration community and replicate it elsewhere, as well as for jobs and entrepreneurial activities that can contribute to the growth of the local economy. The model is based on community planning methodologies that have been carried out as part of community revitalization projects in cities around the world, but will be adapted to the Haitian context. Disasters are terrible occurrences. Even so there are opportunities, as former U.S. President Bill Clinton has put it, to “build back better.” Endnotes [1] Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing after Disasters, was published in January 2010.

In these projects, both shelter and services will be

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Insight Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Applying Lessons Learned from Iraq A proposal for a new Office for Contingency Operations

Painting a picture of lessons learned from Iraq. Picture: SFC Darrold Peters/U.S. Army

ROM the Balkans to Baghdad, the United States has repeatedly deployed civilian and military assets to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past two decades. But the mixed results of these endeavors reveal that the U.S. government has not yet found a successful approach to effectively managing such interagency assistance operations. Over the past six years, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has published more than 350 reports, documenting every facet of the Iraq reconstruction program. In the course of doing so, SIGIR has developed an extensive catalogue of lessons learned, many of which are applicable to current and future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Foremost among these lessons is that the United States lacks an integrated management office to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, thwarting unity of command and inhibiting unity of effort.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. is the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Contact Stuart at stuart.bowen@sigir.mil.

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To fill this gap, SIGIR has proposed the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. Working closely with the Chief of Mission, the USAID mission director and the military commanders, USOCO’s director would manage all stabilization and reconstruction efforts for the life of the stabilization or reconstruction operation.

1. Restoring security before engaging in Large Scale Reconstruction Establishing security means more than ensuring the absence of violence. The long-term success of any stability and reconstruction operation depends not only on securing the population, but also on developing sustainable rule-of-law institutions such as a corruption-free judiciary, an effective anticorruption office and a capable police force.

Stabilization and reconstruction operations are a distinct “middle” step — both in time and in nature — that occur between the active military intervention and the longer-term development activities that are traditionally the mainstay of USAID. SIGIR has used the term “the fourth D” to describe these efforts (as they are neither defense, development, or diplomacy) but in fact a fourth element that has yet to be clearly defined, and that has elements of the prior three, but is unique and would become the purview of this new entity.

2. Fit Reconstruction Strategies To Match Host-Country Capacities Infrastructure reconstruction programs must consider local conditions, capabilities and contexts. In the early stages of the Iraq planning effort, a decision was made to build state-of-theart capital projects, as opposed to those that would match local operating capacities and support systems. Too often, this strategy led to failure.

USOCO’s operations would be informed by a set of core principles drawn from lessons learned in previous stabilization and reconstruction operations, including:

3. Prioritize “Soft” Programs The Iraq experience teaches that initiatives to develop the capacity of people and governmental systems (“soft” programs) are as important as “bricks-and-mortar” projects. The early years of the reconstruction effort largely ignored the X 28

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Insight W 27 | Applying Lessons Learned from Iraq | Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. lessons of other post-conflict experiences by failing to prioritize the soft programs needed to build and sustain a modern bureaucratic state. Absent of a skilled cadre of professional managers, even the best projects will fall short of expectations. 4. Coordinate U.S. Government Efforts with the Contractor Community SIGIR has published scores of audits detailing the U.S. government’s evolving relationship with government contractors. Oftentimes, these reports identified serious management and oversight gaps. For example, in 2009 SIGIR looked at the coordination and management of private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, finding that U.S. government agencies lacked uniform policies and procedures to manage, oversee and report on PSC operations.[1] Acting on SIGIR’s recommendations, their oversight, coordination and control of PSC activities in Iraq has been strengthened, if ad hoc in nature. The creation of an integrated entity responsible for managing stability or reconstruction operations would provide contractors operating in a contingency environment with a single point of contact, thereby simplifying reporting responsibilities and improving coordination. 5. Engage the International Community from the Outset Effectively coordinating and harmonizing international resources and expertise can further U.S. interests in a stability or reconstruction operation. Therefore, the global community should be included in stability and reconstruction operations planning from the outset. 6. Base Reconstruction Decisions on Accurate, Timely and Complete Information Time and again, course changes in Iraq reconstruction policy wasted considerable resources. The fundamental decisions on what to do, how much to do and where to do it were repeatedly altered during the reconstruction program. For future operations, a comprehensive projectreporting system should, at a minimum, follow standardized output formats and common update cycles and should consider longer-term horizons. 7. Create a Single SRO Funding Source Creating a single decision-making structure responsible for prioritizing the use of consolidated stability and reconstruction operations funds would focus responsibility for project selection

Journal of International Peace Operations

and management in one entity and establish accountability for theater-wide SRO outcomes.

Training and Assistance Program, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.

USOCO The Iraq reconstruction effort began with inadequately resourced management structures that were incapable of effectively executing the unprecedented effort. Staffed primarily by temporary employees serving short tours, the Coalition Provisional Authority operated against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation. It confronted an array of challenges for which it was ill-prepared. Its decisions were too often driven by ever-changing circumstances, while the unstable security environment impeded progress on all fronts. Notwithstanding these painful realities, many aspects of which were perhaps unavoidable, a well -developed stability and reconstruction operations plan with a sufficiently robust interagency management office could have anticipated some of the problems and implemented program adjustments, averting the waste of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. The most salient lesson from Iraq is that the United States did not have a single point of accountability and responsibility for executing what became the two most expansive stability and reconstruction operations (including Afghanistan) in U.S. history. That problem persists to this day. USOCO could solve it. Upon creation by the Congress, USOCO would become the locus for planning, funding, staffing and managing stability and reconstruction operations, replacing the fragmented process that now exists. Importantly, USOCO would provide a single office whose sole mission is ensuring that the United States is prepared for the next contingency operation. It would be operational, and heavily focused in the field. At its heart, the USOCO proposal does not call for creating an entirely new organization. Instead, USOCO would bring together under one roof varied mission elements, now spread amongst the interagency community, including the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, various Department of Defense programs and offices established under Stability Operations guidance, the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative

Key senior leadership positions within USOCO would include:

• A Director and three Deputy Directors, who would be a presidential appointment requiring Senate confirmation;

• Permanent staff, supplementing the full-time staff with detailees from relevant agencies and judicious use of contractors.

• Embedded Field Operatives, where groups of USOCO personnel would be positioned within Combatant Commands to work with the military on stability and reconstruction operation planning and with the U.S. Embassy to coordinate through the Chief of Mission.

• Surge personnel, so that in the event of a declared stability or reconstruction operations, the pre-positioned field cells would be reinforced with deployable elements drawn from permanent USOCO personnel as well as “ready reserve” experts from other federal departments and contractors. Without a modest institution dedicated to this mission, there is no place in the U.S. government where individuals with the necessary skills and abilities to carry out unique civilian-military tasks in a stability or reconstruction operation can thrive, nor is there a location in government where assessments can be made, where best practices can be housed and developed, or where accountability can finally be achieved. Since 2001, the United States has committed more than $100 billion — and more than 6,500 soldiers’ and civilians’ lives — to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. In a time of severe financial constraints, the U.S. government should implement reforms that learn from and apply the lessons of Iraq to reduce waste and improve economy, efficiency and effectiveness. By establishing USOCO, the Congress would take a tangible and enduring step toward institutionalizing what was learned in Iraq and ensuring that the United States is better prepared for the crises of tomorrow. Endnotes [1] SIGIR Audits 09-019 and 09-022.

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Insight Shaida Abdali and Ashraf Haidari

Securing Afghanistan for its Own Sake Time to stop and ask Afghans what they think

Opinions welcome. Photo: Cpl. Justin Schaeffer/U.S. Army

LACING the people of Afghanistan at the center of the ongoing debate on the lingering war against extremism and terrorism is the key to the success of international peace building efforts in the country. Yet, this is rarely done. Afghans, as the main victims of the past thirty years of imposed conflicts on their country, seldom figure into the ongoing discussions of the past, present and future of Afghanistan. In other words, the moral obligation of helping Afghans build a strong state, a secure future, increasingly appears to have become secondary to preserving foreign national security interests in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Afghan people would have built a functioning state and Afghanistan ’s development would have slowly taken off by now had Afghanistan not become a victim of both the Cold War and its aftermath, the culmination of which was the tragedy of September 11, 2001. But Afghanistan decided to side with the West against the Soviets in the last decade of the Cold War. Of all the nations in the West or in the East, and Shaida M. Abdali is Deputy National Security Adviser and Special Assistant to President Hamid Karzai. M. Ashraf Haidari is the Political Counselor of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.

Journal of International Peace Operations

since the end of the Second World War, Afghans made the ultimate sacrifice to help defend and ensure the freedom of then “the Free World” or our NATO nation-partners today. It is dismaying, however, that the sacrifices of the Afghan people are hardly remembered or recognized in some NATO countries. One hardly reads in the American or European newspapers that Afghanistan suffered immense losses in human life and limb (2 million killed; over 2 million injured), destruction of the country and its property ($100 billion a year for two decades), internal and external displacement of the Afghan population (10 million displaced) and the ensuing generational psychological trauma affecting every Afghan today. In return instead, Afghanistan’s post-Cold War reconstruction was completely neglected. The unspeakable atrocities of the 1990s against the Afghan people are well-documented by human rights organizations, and we remember the tragedy of September 11 as a direct consequence of having failed to deliver on the moral obligation of rebuilding post-war Afghanistan and giving Afghans a glimmer of hope for a bright future, for their own sake.

So today, when Afghans hear talk by some NATO countries of limited involvement or withdrawal plans, even when we know that half-measures for the last nine years have failed, many Afghans feel betrayed. They increasingly believe that international involvement has hardly been about them, about their human rights, about their very basic expectations for peace and justice, or about their overwhelming demand for institutionalization of peace and democracy in Afghanistan . As Afghans listen to the official statements of their nation-partners, they may begin believing that international involvement in Afghanistan is more about the national security or geo-strategic interests of the countries involved. These divergent and conflicting interests, Afghans may think, seem to determine what should or could be done or what should not or could not be done to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Hence, Afghans could believe that Afghanistan is once again serving as a proxy battlefield for international posturing and influence at worst or as the main frontline in the war against transnational security threats at best. And even the latter narrative now means different things to different X 30 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Insight W 29 | Securing Afghanistan for its Own Sake | Shaida Abdali and Ashraf Haidari countries in or outside the alliance in Afghanistan. No wonder that, to simplify this crisis of what is really at stake in Afghanistan, metaphors such as poker, chess or worse, buzkashi have become routine to describe and rationalize international intervention in Afghanistan.

stan are just as frequent. Clearly, these mischaracterizations of Afghanistan may be designed to serve certain domestic purposes in some countries, while in others it may be due to mere ignorance of ground realities in the Afghan theater.

Afghans are appalled by some of the bizarre and irrelevant terms used to describe them, their country, their culture and their very way of life. Some outside observers call Afghanistan a “tribal society” and thus primitive and backward, who by extension to not deserve human rights, democratic security and governance, or a place in the community of what they call “civilized nations.” Others call Afghanistan “the graveyard of empires” where peace-building is doomed to failure no matter what. References to Afghanistan as America’s second Vietnam or NATO as the second coming of the Soviet Union in Afghani-

The fact is, however, that Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in the world, which is at once extremely resilient and enterprising. Contrary to the misperception of a “divided tribal society,” Afghans take pride in our ethnic diversity, long history and rich cultural heritage, and have stood united, particularly at the grassroots level, on major national causes, including the stabilization, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Despite all these problems and short-comings, Afghans have not lost hope in their partners and the future of their country. A BBC-ABC-ARD

poll released in January 2010 confirms widespread optimism and unity among Afghans, as 70 percent said they thought Afghanistan was going in the right direction. Ninety percent said they want the country run by the current government, and only 6 percent want to see the Taliban come back. The same survey rated approval of President Karzai at 72 percent, and 60 percent viewed government performance favorably. Indeed, if the state-building enterprise for the security of Afghanistan and global peace is to succeed and sustain on the long run, it has to be Afghan-centered and Afghan-led. In other words, international peace building efforts must, henceforth, be driven by Afghan hands, not the “Afghan face” for without building peace by and for the sake of Afghans, the drama will most likely end in tragedy again, not just for Afghanistan but for its nation-partners as well.

W 24 | Keeping the Peace | Naveed Bandali be a problem. Obviously, humanitarians do not want to be associated with any of these misbehaviors. But the U.N. peacekeeping side now has a very strong framework for dealing with bad behavior, which is reported more routinely and action has been taken more swiftly.

JIPO: How can the private sector better support peacekeeping operations? McAskie: I do not have personal experience working directly with the private sector; however, my personal view is that it should work from a very basic principle that the overall peacekeeping mandate has to be respected and that contractors have to come under the management span of the peacekeeping mission. There should be a very clearly defined role for the private sector and it should recognized that they are contractors — not independent operators. They are contracted by the peacekeeping structure to perform a certain function, and it is no different from the U.N. putting together its own team to do X or Y. If they hire a private sector team to do X or Y, then it has to follow the rules and stay within the spirit and mandate of the mission.

JIPO: Are you concerned about the trend of Western governments decreasing commitments to U.N. peacekeeping, or is it perhaps an opportunity for other governments to develop and provide their capabilities? Journal of International Peace Operations

McAskie: Of course you always do want to create opportunities for other member states to develop their capacity and participate in missions, but to say that Western members ignoring the U.N. is a positive factor in providing such opportunities is mixing apples and oranges. These are two very separate issues. There should be a measured return to U.N. peacekeeping by NATO members. If they want to work within the NATO structure, fine, but they are all members of the U.N.. There are operations where the multi-complex U.N.-type mission is what works, and we need to support it and help make it work better. So why do they not get together and do that, and commit their own troops and capabilities to these efforts? At the same time, there are programs to support African militaries — I know that the U.S., Canada, Germany, and the U.K. are involved — but why not look beyond and support Latin America troops to develop peacekeeping capabilities? There are quite a few Latin American governments that are engaged in peacekeeping. Asian governments are the most active and provide the bulk of the troops — some 30 percent of U.N. peacekeepers come from the Indian subcontinent. So they are already very active and can be a part of a process that can help to train others as well. There are a whole slew of options and one is not dependent on the other. It is not the fact that we should be developing other capabilities

because the Western countries are not helping out. The Western countries should help out and we should also be developing the capacity of others.

JIPO: Do you have any advice for those involved with ongoing peacekeeping missions? McAskie: One of the things is that they have to take to the code of conduct on sexual behavior very seriously. The only way to ensure good behavior from the troops is with a very strong message coming from the top. I never missed an opportunity when talking to the troops in Burundi to remind them that they were members of the noble profession of peacekeeping. They were here to be part of the solution, not of the problem, and that we expected the highest standard of behavior from them. And we also kept the local contingent commander to account. I know from my colleagues on other missions at the time, that women in other codes of conduct or gender units five years ago, were struggling to do this all by themselves — without a great deal of support from the management structure of the mission. A lot of that was changed because the issue has become so public and because there are now so many good things in place to prevent or deal with it. Still, the leadership element is fundamentally important. Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists Ambassador Herman J. Cohen (Ret.)

Countdown to 2011 Preparing for the worst, but hoping for the best in South Sudan

Government of South Sudan President, Salva Kiir Mayardit. Photo: Tim McKulka/U.N.

HE year 2011 will undoubtedly be momentous for the Sudan, Africa’s largest country by area. It will be the sixth and final year of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 (CPA) signed by the central Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The latter is the political movement that engaged in a 30-year insurgency against the central government through its Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM/SPLA represents the 8 million Africans living in the southern third of Sudan. Their insurgency was motivated by central government repression, violence and the imposition on the mostly Christian southerners of Islamic practices in education, language and law. The CPA, which was brokered largely by the Bush Administration, is a complex document, but the main points are as follows:

• A cease-fire in the thirty-year guerilla war; • The establishment of the autonomous region of South Sudan with its own government,

Ambassador Cohen is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and is President of Cohen & Woods International.

Journal of International Peace Operations

operating in parallel with the national government of Sudan (Government of South Sudan – GOSS);

• Establishment of a government of national unity (GNU) under President Bashir, with one northern and one southern Vice President;

• A six-year cooling off period during which the national government would make an effort to demonstrate to the southerners that maintaining one Sudan would be the best solution;

• A referendum in the south in which the people would decide whether they wish to remain part of a unified Sudan or become an independent state;

• A fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue during the transition in view of the fact that the producing oil fields straddle the north-south dividing line. As of mid-2010, most analysts forecast that the 2011 referendum will call for the establishment of a new state in Southern Sudan. The people of Southern Sudan clearly do not feel that the Arab establishment that holds all of the power in Khartoum is willing to give them equal rights and equal access to the nation’s wealth. If that is indeed the case, what are the prospects for a relatively peaceful transition?

An analysis of the CPA indicates that the Arab government of Sudan does not have any interest in a stable transition to independence of the south. The main reason is that as much as 75 percent of Sudan’s oil reserves are located south of the north-side divide. If and when southern independence takes place, Khartoum’s revenues from oil could decrease considerably. In addition to oil revenues, both Khartoum and Cairo do not wish to see an additional independent state straddling the waters of the Nile in view of the river’s importance to both Sudan’s and Egypt’s national economic security. What actions could Khartoum take to protect its interests in the south? They have a number of options. Firstly, they could try to rig the southern referendum so that the requisite 60 percent of the voting age population in the south does not vote for independence. If this happens, the chances are strong that the GOSS will declare its independence unilaterally. Such an action could give rise to major instability and international problems, not to speak of potential armed conflict. X 32 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists W 31 | Countdown to 2011 | Ambassador Herman J. Cohen (Ret.) Second, in the event of a unilateral action by the South, Khartoum would most likely make a military grab for the oil producing regions immediately south of the north-south divide. The major thrust would be to take over the oil-rich sub -region of Abyei, which has a separate statute under the CPA. Abyei is required under the CPA to have its own separate referendum because of its mixed ethnic nature. A unilateral declaration of independence by the south and a land grab by the north would create a major dilemma for the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Thirdly, inside the south, there is still a lot of work to do in developing the institutions that will allow the south to have a viable functioning state. Despite large amounts of foreign aid, the southern regime is still far from ready. In addition, there is growing internal violent ethnic strife, some of it probably being financed and fomented from the

outside. This requires the southern regime to spend a very high percentage of its oil revenue on security, as opposed to education, public health and infrastructure. The absence of social capital among the hundreds of ethnic groups, particularly those engaged in nomadic herding, is palpable and dangerous. This is especially true in view of the large quantity of arms available in the south after thirty years of guerilla war. Fourth, in the event of Khartoum making a military grab for the oil producing areas, it could probably count on protection within the U.N. Security Council from China that would certainly veto any demands that it remove all troops from the disputed areas. If unilateral southern secession is considered “illegitimate,” then all legal bets are off for the entire CPA. The U.N. peacekeeping units already operating in the region would certainly not be given a mandate to use force.

Finally, within the African Union there would probably be chaos because it is a club of sitting heads of state. Normally, the members would support Khartoum as a sitting member against the newly secessionist regime of the south sitting in its capital city of Juba. On the other hand, southern Sudan’s neighbors, Kenya, Uganda and D.R. Congo, would probably clamor for recognition, along with Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and possibly others. It could turn into an Arab vs. African standoff. What would be the options for the United States in the event of the type of worst case scenario described above? As the principal mediator in the negotiation of the CPA, the United States would probably insist on a return to the implementation of the CPA, and would make a major effort in the U.N. Security Council for action to force Khartoum to withdraw forces from southern territory, as well as to persuade the southern regime to rescind its unilateral action. On the other hand, the administration would also come under heavy pressure from internal political opinion, especially from the evangelical and human rights communities, to recognize the independence of southern Sudan. An analogy to the unilateral secession of Kosovo from Serbia is relevant in the case of southern Sudan. The key thrust of U.S. policy would be to do everything possible to prevent a return to all-out war between the north and the south, but it is doubtful that Washington could resist extending recognition to an independent south. The prevention of a return to war will probably be possible. But dealing with unilateral “facts on the ground” on the part of Khartoum will be difficult to handle. One possible compromise solution would be for the south and Khartoum to agree on a continuation of fifty-fifty oil revenue sharing for a fixed period of time after independence in order to allow final border demarcation to take place. Even after border demarcation, the north could earn considerable revenue from transporting southern oil through its pipeline. Such a deal could calm Khartoum’s angst, at least temporarily. In the Sudan during 2011, the international community has to prepare for the worst while working assiduously to help the newly born independent southern state maintain stability as it faces both internal and external challenges.

Ballot counting in South Sudan. Photo: Tim McKulka/U.N.

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Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists J. J. Messner

No Points for Trying Noble aims do not a successful practical document make

In search of assistance. Photo: Evan Schneider/U.N.

T must have been a slow news day. Recently, IPOA and a collection of member companies (guilty by association apparently) along with the U.S. and British governments, were lambasted in the media for “blocking” a proposed U.N. Convention on the Regulation, Surveillance and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies.[1] Of course, the central headline of the article was baseless, and a correction was later issued – to change “blocking” to “voicing concerns” – but not before the article was seized on by bloggers to prove the evils of the industry. It also highlighted an interesting issue that has begun to creep into the debate regarding the stability operations industry from the perspective of the media, government, international organizations and other critics alike. A decade ago, industry critics rightly pointed out that there was a dearth of effective – and international – regulation, and especially enforcement, for private firms supporting international peacekeeping, stability, reconstruc-

The author is Director of IPOA and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations. Contact J. J. at jmessner@peaceops.com.

tion and disaster relief operations. Of course, a significant hurdle in the process of actually finding some kind of resolution was that there were those who conflated private sector operations with mercenarism, and tried to fit the square peg of private firms into the round hole of mercenary conventions. Now that even the most virulent in the “mercenary regulation” camp (such as the U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries) have become more realistic in their views, there seems to be some progress on the horizon. But it seems that when it rains, it pours. Indeed, now there almost seems to be a glut of proposed regulation. There is also a myth held by many that any regulation is automatically good regulation. The tenor of the Bloomberg article was, essentially, that the U.N. has proposed a Convention that is going to save the world; the evil private sector has ganged up with the forces of doom to see that the Convention doesn’t succeed, but fortunately our courageous heroes in New York are fighting the good fight and maybe the righteous will overcome evil. But the article seems not to ask a glaring – and important question – is the Convention, in its current draft form, going to work?

The article quotes the British Foreign Office position as being lukewarm towards the Convention, because “investigations, obtaining evidence and enforcement would all be likely to prove highly complex and difficult.” Doug Brooks, IPOA’s president, was quoted as saying, “If companies need additional licenses, permits, personnel vetting, they will be significantly slowed” and that “in the case of a Haiti earthquake or something requiring immediate response and services, such delays directly cost lives.” These comments seem to be taken as proof that the industry and certain governments are trying to eighty-six the Convention, rather than simply voicing concern over aspects that may require further examination. To be sure, the U.N. Working Group responsible for the draft Convention has faced a challenging and unenviable task. The draft Convention represents an attempt at a workable document. But it is not quite there yet. In some aspects, the Convention appears to breach state sovereignty – for example in its prescription of inherently governmental functions and micro-level regulation of businesses and individuals. In others, it appears to be contradictory and even at cross-purposes X 34

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Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists W 33 | No Points for Trying | J. J. Messner with other arms of the United Nations itself. And in some aspects, one could be forgiven for thinking that the Convention’s aim is to abolish the entire industry of private sector support for stability operations. Would anyone really realistically expect any industry to be in favor of abolishing itself? There is also a danger that the United Nations, through this Convention, might end up handicapping itself. After all, U.N. peacekeeping operations have become increasingly dependent on the private sector, particularly in terms of logistics and support. And given the track record of severe deficiencies in nation-state contributions to U.N. operations (Darfur, anyone?), it would appear that any Convention that unreasonably curtailed private sector operations would be tantamount to the U.N. cutting its nose off to spite its face. Far be it from any country, let alone a trade association or even individual companies, to block a Convention. As we know of many aspects of international law and treaties, there are very few that are universally accepted. The United States

has not even signed the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child – by all means, anyone can write a Convention however they want, but it does not automatically mean that everyone is going to accept it. In reality, the industry has been at the forefront of calls for good regulation. IPOA has supported third party certification in the United States. IPOA has been a central, key player in the Montreux process and particularly in assisting with the drafting of the International Code of Conduct. And IPOA has even supported the U.N. Working Group’s efforts as much as possible, offering comments and guidance from an industry perspective. The industry recognizes that good regulation benefits good companies. What better way of developing business than marginalizing companies that undercut you and meanwhile give the industry as a whole a collective black eye due to poor standards and ethics?

favor of any regulation. As previously mentioned, the industry is not going to favor regulation that effectively puts it out of business. Governments are not going to be in favor of regulations that impinge on their sovereignty. And nor should governments – or even the U.N. for that matter – be in favor of any regulatory framework that undermines the effectiveness of international peacekeeping, stability, reconstruction or disaster relief operations. Just because a document has “Treaty” or “Convention” stamped across it does not therefore mean that it is automatically a sacred, perfect text. While the U.N.’s efforts are to be commended, this is not an instance where anyone simply wins points for trying. Regulation, conceptually, is a good thing – and something that the industry has supported consistently – good regulation is an even better thing. Endnotes

Is the industry in favor of improved regulation? Yes. But that does not mean that the industry – or governments for that matter – are or should be in

[1] Varner, Bill. U.S., U.K., Security Group Question UN Regulations. Bloomberg News. http://www.bloomberg.com/ apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=afXFjxwMEVjI

W 20 | Compliance in the Age of Corporate Scrutiny | Jonathan Rosen corporate criminal liability. As a result, the new rules continue to partially delimit the exercise of a prosecutor's charging discretion to an effective corporate compliance program. The Filip Memorandum, therefore, provides a helpful guide on how a company can possibly forestall a government investigation in the first place. The need for compliance is underscored by the fiduciary nature of the corporation. According to the Filip Memorandum, “[d]irectors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation's shareholders, the corporation’s true owners, and they owe duties of honest dealing to the investing public in connection with the corporation's regulatory filings and public statements. The faithful execution of these duties by corporate leadership serves the same values in promoting public trust and confidence that our criminal prosecutions are designed to serve.” The lynchpin for any compliance program is its effectiveness, which the government will review in light of any company’s resources and business risks. There is no “one size fits all” compliance program. Regardless of context, however, the Filip

Journal of International Peace Operations

Memorandum emphasizes that the compliance program must be more than a “paper program.” For example, the principals of the company must independently and proactively assess the implementation of any compliance program to ensure that is actually effective. Best practices require that consequences ensue for the breach of any compliance program. Based on the Filip Memorandum (and its corresponding reference to the United States Sentencing Guidelines), an effective compliance program should include the following:

• policies to protect against the particular risks created by the company's business;

• designation of a specific individual with direct reporting responsibility to top management to ensure the efficacy of compliance efforts;

• sufficient resources to audit the results of the corporation's compliance efforts to evaluate and modify the current compliance program;

• an employee training program that is interactive, in person and involving local outside experts as is reasonable to avoid “check the box” training;

• a written code of ethics and business conduct which is identified with the company's top management;

• a fraud reporting hotline that is posted and allows employees and others to report criminal conduct without fear of retribution; and

• voluntary disclosure of issues uncovered by the program. The more things change, the more they remain the same. So it is with respect to the DOJ and its enormous leverage over companies who face the specter of a government investigation. Despite revisions in the Filip Memorandum, the government continues to exercise extraordinary power over companies, both big and small, who face the possibility of an investigation. Moreover, the government will impute knowledge of criminal misconduct to senior corporate officers, directors and employees if that company fails to identify the red flags that would have been identified with an effective compliance program. From a corporate and an individual perspective, the only thing costlier than an effective compliance program is not having one at all. Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists Gary Sturgess

Tales of Wells Fargo Public-Private Competition on the Mail Routes Out West

Away to a six-horse town. Photo: University of Oregon

This is the Night Mail crossing the Border, Bringing the cheque and the postal order, Letters for the rich, letters for the poor, The shop at the corner, the girl next door. . . - W.H. Auden

by government. For John Stuart Mill, the postal service ranked alongside coinage and weights and measures as activities that increased the public’s sense of nationhood.

While there was popular resistance to the colonial postal service in North America, once the mail service was in their own hands, the founding fathers never questioned public ownership. In the infancy of the U.S. mail, when post offices were located in the corner of a store, they were already synapses in a national communications network, places where men of importance would come each day to wait for news from abroad and debate its significance.

N 1935, the General Post Office commissioned England’s poet laureate to write a poem celebrating the rail service that carried the overnight mail from London to Glasgow. Set to music by the renowned composer Benjamin Britten and produced as a short film by the great socialist filmmaker John Grierson, Auden’s “Night Mail” quickly became a national icon.

With a clickety-clack rhythm and, as Auden read it, a bland, thoroughly reliable voice, “Night Mail” captured the role that the postal service has played (in most countries around the world) by reinforcing our sense of national community. Not even classical liberals questioned the government’s monopoly of the mail. Adam Smith thought that the post office was perhaps the only mercantile project that had been successfully run

The author is Executive Director of The Serco Institute.

Journal of International Peace Operations

After the Civil War, public space was punctuated by a network of imposing buildings that were placed at the very heart of local communities, symbols of national government that spoke of its permanence and omnipresence. Yet for people living on the Pacific coast of North America in the second half of the nineteenth century, there was another mail service that united them in this way. From 1849 until the end of the nineteenth

century, the post office failed to deliver a universal service in the region, and that space was filled by a private company, Wells, Fargo & Co. One eastern newspaper editor, who travelled to the west in 1864, wrote: “Its offices are in every town, far and near; a billiard saloon, a restaurant and a Wells & Fargo office are the first three elements of a Pacific or Coast mining town; its messengers are on every steamboat, and rail-car and stage, in all these states. It is the ready companion of civilization, the universal friend and agent of the miner, his errand man, his banker, his post office.” [1] Hamstrung by regulations sent out from Washington, postal officials were unable to respond to the fluid environment in the Californian goldfields. The post office expected men to leave their diggings and journey to one of the major towns to collect their mail in person. It was a price few were willing to pay, and more often than not, it was an expressman who delivered the long-awaited news from home. In the 1860s, a Wells Fargo agent named Charles T. Blake journeyed for nine days through deep snow from Walla Walla in Washington Territory, X 36 Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Columnists W 35 | Tales of Wells Fargo | Gary Sturgess carrying a bag of mail to the remote mining camp of Placerville, which his superiors thought might still exist. He described the joyous welcome he received: One of the crowd that followed us in said to our guide “Can you tell us anything about Wells Fargo & Co? We understand that they were going to establish an agency here.” “Yes” says the guide “they are, and that man in spectacles is the agent.” The next instant I heard a shout taken up and repeated through the whole town “Wells Fargo have come.” In less than three minutes I was surrounded by an excited crowd of two or three hundred men, who hardly allowed me time to get my saddle off from my mule before they almost dragged me into a large unfinished building on the Plaza, as they called the square. [2] The result was that Wells Fargo grew into “the heart and habit of the people.” [3] In 1880, the post office launched a frontal assault, calling for legislation to eliminate its rival. Wells Fargo organised a massive lobbying campaign in opposition, telegraphing newspaper editors,

briefing politicians and organising thick petitions. In one month, 140 articles appeared in 109 newspapers and journals across the West, with only four of them supporting a government monopoly. An editorial from a San Francisco newspaper sums up what many of the editors thought: “It will be time enough for the government to interfere when our people complain that they are paying two fees for a single service. They do not so complain, and there is no more popular or convenient institution on this coast than that of the express company of Wells, Fargo & Co.” [4] The company won, but while it was not evident at the time, Wells Fargo’s mail service was already in decline: in 1895, Wells Fargo withdrew its mailboxes from the streets of San Francisco and closed it letter express forever. In large part, this was because the post office had finally delivered a superior service, extending postal delivery to the individual home, farm and business. As the historian, Daniel Boorstin,

expressed it, ‘From every farmer’s doorstep there ran a highway to the world.’[5] Competition had accomplished what politics could not. How did a private company occupy this place at the heart of the public domain and remain there for so long? It was not because it spent more on physical infrastructure – at no time did Wells Fargo have more agencies in California than the post office. Above all else, it was superior service. Henry Wells once described his express business as “carrying parcels and packages as fast as possible, with special care to their safety in transportation and their sure delivery.” Speed was of the essence – it was the express companies’ reason for existence and they competed against one another to get the news through first. But Wells Fargo was also respected for its reliability, its reach into remote communities and its deep sense of obligation to its customers. In San Francisco, local managers went out of their way to court business amongst the Chinese community, arranging for offerings to the god of wealth when new offices were opened. Throughout the 1870s when opposition to Chinese immigration was at its height, the company published four editions of a Chinese business directory. The Chinese responded with their custom – a tradition that is reflected in the writings of a modern Chinese American, Amy Tan. That same sense of ubiquity was evident throughout the West. Wyatt and Morgan Earp were Wells Fargo messengers in Tombstone, and the shotgun Doc Holliday carried to the OK Corral was a Wells Fargo special. As one historian noted, “The name Wells Fargo became synonymous with the West.” [6] In the newspaper campaign of 1880, the company was referred to as “an old friend,” a “trustworthy company” and “a public benefactor.” To the people of the West, Wells Fargo was simply different from other corporations. Endnotes [1] Samuel Bowles, Across the Continent, Springfield, Mass.: Samuel Bowles & Co., 1866. [2] Philip L. Fradkin, Stagecoach: Wells Fargo and the American West, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002 p.26. [3] Bowles, op.cit. [4] ‘Wells, Fargo & Co.’, San Francisco News Letter, 20 March 1880. [5] Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Democratic Experience, New York: Vintage Books, 1974, p.133. [6] Edward Hungerford, Wells Fargo, New York: Bonanza Books, 1949, p.12.

The competition. Photo: Stock

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Professional Development

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

Professional Development

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

IPOA Membership Directory

The IPOA Membership The Association of the Stability Operations Industry IPOA, the Association of the Stability Operations Industry, is proud to have a multisectoral membership that represents the many various aspects of operations performed in conflict, post-conflict, disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. The Membership Directory attempts to provide a visualization of the different roles that our member companies fulfill in contingency operations by using the icons below to classify each companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s activities. Armored Vehicles

Construction

Ground Transportation Logistics

Legal, Accounting and Compliance Services

Risk Management

Aviation Logistics and Maintenance

Consulting Services

Human Development and Capacity Building

Logistics, Freight and Supply

Security

Aviation: Rotary

Demining and UXO Removal

Information Technology

Medical Support Services

Security Sector Reform

Base Support and Logistics

Equipment

Intelligence Services and Analysis

Product Suppliers and Manufacturers

Shelter

Communications and Tracking

Fleet Management, Leasing & Maintenance

Language Services and Interpretation

Recruitment and Human Resources

Training

Abbreviations

Location of company headquarters

AECOM Technology Corporation HQ W PC

Los Angeles, California www.aecom.com Col. Rick Orth (Ret.)

Website

HQ W PC

Safat, Kuwait

www.agilitylogistics.com

Bibiana Popal

Air Charter Service PLC Surrey, United Kingdom www.aircharter.co.uk Tony Bauckham

Ras Al Khaimah, U.A.E. www.agpglass.com Tobias Beutgen

Journal of International Peace Operations

W PC

HQ W PC

Mahe, Seychelles www.aspicltd.com Carlos Nielly

Baker Tilly HQ W PC

Vienna, Virginia www.bakertilly.com Bill Keating

ArmorGroup North America HQ

Number of years as Member of IPOA

Greenville, South Carolina www.ameco.com Paul Camp

American Glass Products HQ

ASPIC

AMECO

IPOA Point-of-Contact/Designated Delegate

Agility

Arlington, Virginia www.armorgroup.com Mike Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Connell

Burton Rands Associates HQ W PC

Washington, D.C. www.burtonrands.com Nicola Lowther

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IPOA Membership Directory Crowell & Moring LLP HQ W PC

Washington, D.C. www.crowell.com David Hammond

W PC

Bethesda, Maryland www.cyrusstrategies.com Robert L. Rubin

W PC

London, United Kingdom www.dlapiper.com Tara Lee

DynCorp International W PC

Falls Church, Virginia www.dyn-intl.com John Gastright

Ecolog International W PC

Dubai, U.A.E. www.ecolog-international.com Florin Hasani

EOD Technology, Inc. W PC

Montreal, Canada www.garda-world.com Andrew Gibson

W PC

Washington, D.C. www.gibsondunn.com Joseph D. West

W PC

Lenoir City, Tennessee www.eodt.com Bill Pearse

W PC

Journal of International Peace Operations

HQ W PC

Tulsa, Oklahoma www.j-3globalservices.com Joe Woolslayer

Houston, Texas www.gorgrp.com Cory Dahmer

Medical Support Solutions HQ W PC

East Wellow, United Kingdom www.medsupportsolutions.com Pieter de Weerdt

Glendale, Arizona www.goldcoasthelicopters.com William Tresky

Harbor Homes LLC

Mitcheldean, United Kingdom www.exlogs.com Jonny Norman

Ras Al Khaimah, U.A.E. www.interarmored.com Sally Stefova

J-3 Global Services

Bangkok, Thailand www.globalfleetsales.net Nicholas Ling

Exploration Logistics

Gold Coast Helicopters HQ

International Armored Group HQ

Global Operational Resources Group HQ

Denver, Colorado www.hollandhart.com Trip Mackintosh

Global Fleet Sales HQ

Limassol, Cyprus www.hartsecurity.com Claire Kee

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP HQ

Holland & Hart LLP

GardaWorld HQ

Dubai, U.A.E. www.fsi-worldwide.com Nicholas Forster

DLA Piper LLP HQ

Cyrus Strategies HQ

HART

FSI Worldwide

MineWolf Systems HQ W PC

Pfaffikon, Switzerland www.minewolf.com Philipp von Michaelis

Mission Essential Personnel

Thomasville, Georgia www.permashelter.com Lucas A. Stewart

HQ W PC

Columbus, Ohio www.missionep.com Chris Taylor

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IPOA Membership Directory MPRI, an L-3 Division HQ W PC

Alexandria, Virginia www.mpri.com Hank Allen

New Century W PC

Arlington, Virginia www.newcentcorp.com Laura Engelbrecht

W PC

Dubai, U.A.E. www.olivegroup.com Ted Timberlake

W PC

Miami, Florida www.ossiinc.com John Wallbridge

Overseas Lease Group W PC

Fort Lauderdale, Florida www.overseasleasegroup.com Tracy Badcock

W PC

Johannesburg, South Africa www.paramountgroup.biz Richard Merrison

W PC

Reed Inc. HQ W PC

Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP

Leesburg, Virginia www.reedinc.com Marius van der Riet

HQ W PC

SOC Inc.

Relyant HQ W PC

Maryville, Tennessee www.gorelyant.com Tiffany Midyett

HQ W PC

W PC

SOS International Ltd.

Alexandria, Virginia www.rutherfoord.com Sara Payne

HQ W PC

W PC

Fort Worth, Texas www.securiforce-ia.com Kenneth Nix

W PC

London, United Kingdom www.paxmondial.com Paul Wood

Journal of International Peace Operations

W PC

HQ W PC

Sliema, Malta www.tangiers-intl.com Christopher Catrambone

Threat Management Group

McLean, Virginia www.securiguardinc.com Peter McVety

HQ W PC

Kuwait City, Kuwait www.tmg-security.com Steven Giles

Security Support Solutions HQ

Tangiers International

Securiguard Inc. HQ

Reston, Virginia www.sosiltd.com Bill Canter

Securiforce International America HQ

Las Vegas, Nevada www.soc-smg.com Bruce Watenpaugh

Rutherfoord HQ

Washington, D.C. www.shb.com David Douglass

Pax Mondial HQ

Seoul, South Korea www.shieldconsulting.co.kr Lucy Park

Paramount Logistics HQ

OSSI, Inc. HQ

Shield International Security

Dubai, U.A.E. www.raints.com Neil E. Cheadle

Olive Group HQ

RA International

Surrey, United Kingdom www.sss3.co.uk Mike Pearson

Triple Canopy HQ W PC

Herndon, Virginia www.triplecanopy.com Mark DeWitt

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010

IPOA Membership Directory Unity Resources Group HQ W PC

Vertical de Aviacion Ltda

Dubai, U.A.E. www.unityresourcesgroup.com Jim LeBlanc

HQ W PC

URS Federal Services HQ W PC

Bogota, Colombia www.verticaldeaviacion.com Fernando Lopez

Worldwide Shelters LLC HQ W PC

Glenwood, Maryland www.worldwideshelters.com Ryan Hudock

Whitney, Bradley & Brown Inc.

Germantown, Maryland www.urscorp.com Robie Robinson

HQ W PC

Note to IPOA Members: Please address all updates and corrections to the Assistant Editor of the Journal of International Peace Operations, at publications@ipoaonline.org.

Reston, Virginia www.wbbinc.com Bob Wells

W 04 | A Local Issue | Doug Brooks As a result, Western contract managers in the field attempting to carry out international policies are confronted with the conflicting directives from above to use more local companies and at the same time to ensure meticulous oversight and reporting. Even more challenging, in many cases there are politically compelling reasons for using a particular local company, requirements that may trump the need for proficient contract compliance, transparency and accountability. In the recent Congressional hearings on the topic, panelists made the point that thirty years ago the Soviet army discovered the hard way that, when moving convoys in Afghanistan, paying off local warlords was far cheaper in blood and treasure than defending themselves with brute force. And others made the observation that in Afghanistan, not paying warlords for protection and safe passage could have the reasonably detrimental effect of turning the warlords and their militias into the enemy. All of which means there is more to choosing local contractors than arithmetic or capability.

Closer government oversight is not necessarily the easy, go-to option either. Some have suggested that American contract management personnel simply need to get “outside of the wire” of their bases, proposing that a U.S. Contract Officer Representative (COR) accompany every truck convoy. However, Westerners are targets themselves, and such a practice would increase the target value of the truck convoys to the Taliban and thus necessitate the need for significantly heavier security for all convoys.

professionalism of their subcontractors.

A better option might be to work with Western contractors who have the prime contract positions and are thus responsible for all their subcontractors’ compliance. Many industry companies operate with a very low profile, enabling them to discreetly do effective oversight and management of their subcontractors. Oversight does not have to be done by Western citizens and certainly does not have to be done by government officials who are themselves a target. Ultimately, it is far easier, safer and more effective for the government agencies to monitor the prime contractor and hold them accountable for the effectiveness and

What is clear is that cutting Afghan companies out of the process is not a wise or realistic option. If local companies can prove they have the professionalism and capabilities to carry out a task and provide necessary transparency, then they are an ideal option for all the right reasons. In far more cases it may make more sense to let proven and accountable international companies handle the management and oversight of subcontracted local firms, an option that reduces the risk and saves money for the governments carrying out the policies.

All contractors, Western or local, are beholden to the needs and requirements of their clients. Clients set standards, quality levels, vetting requirements, performance benchmarks, timetables and reporting requirements. No one expects local companies to always have the necessary capabilities, but clients are right to insist that local companies ultimately develop such expertise.

Contingency contracting is inherently chaotic, and it is absurd to expect these missions to run without a hitch – there will always be some aspect that can and will be criticized with greater or lesser justification. Nevertheless, there is much that can be done to improve the quality and professionalism of the contracting and thus enhance the chances of success for the larger mission and policy. Finding ways to ensure effective use of local personnel and firms in Afghanistan – or in any peacekeeping or stability operation – is vital to ultimate success. The government has started to take a keen interest. Photo: C.W.C.

Journal of International Peace Operations

Volume 6, Number 1 - July-August, 2010