Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice by IPPR

Institute for Public Policy Research

MAINSTREAMING ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

George Dibb, Luke Murphy and Harry Quilter-Pinner June 2022

ABOUT IPPR IPPR, the Institute for Public Policy Research, is the UK’s leading progressive think tank. We are an independent charitable organisation with our main offices in London. IPPR North, IPPR’s dedicated think tank for the North of England, operates out of offices in Manchester and Newcastle, and IPPR Scotland, our dedicated think tank for Scotland, is based in Edinburgh. Our purpose is to conduct and promote research into, and the education of the public in, the economic, social and political sciences, science and technology, the voluntary sector and social enterprise, public services, and industry and commerce. IPPR 14 Buckingham Street London WC2N 6DF T: +44 (0)20 7470 6100 E: info@ippr.org www.ippr.org Registered charity no: 800065 (England and Wales), SC046557 (Scotland) This paper was first published in June 2022. © IPPR 2022 The contents and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors only.

The progressive policy think tank

CONTENTS

Summary...........................................................................................................................5 1. Change commensurate to the challenges we face............................................. 7 IPPR’s view of the world............................................................................................... 7 People and planet: From crisis to justice................................................................8 What is mainstreaming?.............................................................................................10 What are we mainstreaming?................................................................................... 11 2. Shaping a strategy for mainstreaming: Factors and lessons........................13 A strategy for mainstreaming...................................................................................13 Factor one: The context..............................................................................................14 Factor two: The actors.................................................................................................19 Factor three: The leverage points............................................................................ 31 3. Implications for IPPR ..............................................................................................34 A longer term and more targeted approach ...................................................... 34 4. Implications for the wider movement................................................................43 A stronger, more effective movement....................................................................43 References.................................................................................................................... 46 Annex 1: Steering group............................................................................................. 49 Annex 2: interviewees................................................................................................ 50

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

George Dibb is head of the Centre for Economic Justice at IPPR. Luke Murphy is associate director for energy, climate, housing and infrastructure at IPPR. Harry Quilter-Pinner is director of research and engagement at IPPR.

CONTRIBUTORS

We would also like to acknowledge the significant contribution of our colleagues: Joshua Emden Stephen Frost Carsten Jung Emma Killick Becca Massey-Chase Shreya Nanda Henry Parkes

ABOUT THIS PAPER

The purpose of this paper is to present the findings of a scoping project with the objective of understanding what factors define mainstream consensus and how ideas can be shifted into and out of the mainstream.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the generous support of the Laudes Foundation. We would like to thank Carys Roberts and the project steering group (see annex 1) for their support, guidance and advice.

Permission to share This document is published under a creative commons licence: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 UK http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/uk/ For commercial use, please contact info@ippr.org

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

SUMMARY

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Delivering economic and environmental justice is both necessary and possible – with a growing set of bold, evidence-based policies available to leaders. The financial crisis. The rise of populism. The Covid-19 pandemic. The climate and nature emergency. The cost-of-living catastrophe. The last two decades have been a stark reminder that progress is far from inevitable. Yet we know a better future is possible. Our recent work, building on the work of a range of academics, think tanks and new economy activists, sets out a plan of action, evidence-based ideas and policy proposals to deliver a better economy and society. Despite this, progress in turning these ideas into action has been limited. Governments across Europe, including in the UK, have made commitments to tackle the twin crises of environmental deterioration and inequality. However, progress in putting in place and delivering bold policy to meet these challenges has been limited. Collectively, we are failing to meet the demands of this moment in history. Why? In part because of the strength of entrenched interests opposed to these reforms. But it’s also because those in favour of environmental and economic change have too often acted as though simply providing more and better evidence will deliver change. Instead, changemakers must seek to ‘mainstream’ bold economic and environmental policies so they are not just possible but common sense. We need to do more than evidence the need for change and the alternatives available to policy makers. We must win the argument for our vision and policy agenda among both elites and the public. And we need to shift the power dynamics within our society to ensure those who stand to benefit from change have a greater say in how we are governed. We need to make bold action to tackle the twin crises of people and planet not just possible but treated as the common sense option. This is what we call ‘mainstreaming’.

WHAT IS MAINSTREAMING?

Mainstreaming is the process by which ideas or policies move from being seen as politically or socially impossible to common sense. Our full definition is: ‘the process of normalising an idea, policy agenda, or individual policy to achieve the effective delivery of a desired objective’. Mainstreaming is not a linear process: progress can ebb and flow over time. Mainstreaming can occur to both progressive and regressive ideas. Mainstreaming can be driven by external factors (eg events) or more deliberately by actors, movements and institutions. This process can be seen on issues as varied as LGBT+ rights, austerity and net-zero (climate).

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

IPPR’s research helps us understand what the mainstream is and how mainstreaming occurs, including how actors like IPPR can drive it forward. We draw six key lessons for IPPR and the movement. Lesson 1: The mainstream on any one issue cannot be precisely measured but it can be located. Lesson 2: What is in the mainstream can shift and be shifted. Lesson 3: Powerholders (ie politicians, policymakers) hold a disproportionate amount of power over which ideas become mainstream. Lesson 4: Opinion shapers (ie print, broadcast media) play a vital and varied role in shifting the mainstream. Lesson 5: The public matter and can be given a bigger role in mainstreaming. Lesson 6: Changemakers and movements must be prepared for events and crises which can bring about radical shifts in which ideas are considered mainstream.

IMPLICATIONS FOR IPPR

IPPR will put mainstreaming at the heart of its new mission to build on our most impactful work. IPPR will pursue a new mission ‘to build a fairer and more prosperous society by mainstreaming progressive ideas to deliver economic and environmental, social and democratic justice’. Within this mission we believe we have three roles. 1. To mainstream bold progressive ideas and policies so that they are considered politically possible and desirable, defend those that are already mainstream, and shift regressive ideas and policies from the mainstream. 2. To influence powerholders to adopt and implement the most effective and ambitious ideas and policies to deliver deep systems change. 3. To shift power by developing talent to take up roles within power holder and opinion shaper institutions, supporting the movements we are part of, and empowering the public to engage in policymaking. To deliver on this mission – first and foremost on economic and environmental justice – we will seek to make four key shifts. 1. A longer term and more targeted approach: Repetition and long-term deep commitment to change is needed to mainstream. We need to move away from the ‘research-publish-repeat’ think tank model. We will therefore identify a small number of policy areas within the economic and environmental justice agenda to mainstream over the long term. 2. A greater investment in influencing and communications activity: While it has always been core to our model, we must shift IPPR’s activities on economic and environmental justice towards a greater focus on influencing the climate of ideas and the balance of power in society. We will do this by investing in expanding our communications hub and creating a new advocacy hub. 3. Expanding alternative forms of driving change: To shift salience and power we must move beyond just pursuing traditional think tank activities of research and communications. We will pursue models of change such as working with powerholders in places to pioneer alternatives to the status quo on the ground and creating a talent pipeline of future progressive leaders to deliver change. 4. Commit to a movement generous change strategy: IPPR cannot perform all the functions of mainstreaming. We recognise that we will succeed or fail together. To be effective, then, we must partner with other organisations across the UK where we lack capacity or capability or where others have existing strengths.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

1. CHANGE COMMENSURATE TO THE CHALLENGES WE FACE IPPR’S VIEW OF THE WORLD

The financial crisis. The rise of populism. The Covid-19 pandemic. The climate and nature emergency. The cost-of-living catastrophe. The last two decades have been a stark reminder that progress is far from inevitable. The remainder of this century will be dominated by profound societal shifts including that precipitated by environmental breakdown and technological transformation which threaten to deepen and accelerate our age of crisis. All the signs suggest that economic inequality and societal instability are being exacerbated by the failure of government to respond commensurately to the challenges we face – in either scale or direction. Yet we know a better future is possible. By addressing environmental breakdown, reimagining capitalist economies, and rewiring our democratic systems, we can shift our collective future in a progressive direction. FIGURE 1.1: IPPR SEEKS TO LOCK-IN ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE The impact IPPR seeks

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

SOCIAL JUSTICE

DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE

Source: Authors’ analysis

IPPR’s work aims to respond to three profound societal crises, by locking-in three forms of justice – economic and environmental justice, social justice, and democratic justice. We have a vision of the change that is needed to create a better society. But putting this into practice demands more ambitious, deeper and far-reaching action than those in power are currently willing and able to pursue, whether on the political right or left. IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

PEOPLE AND PLANET: FROM CRISIS TO JUSTICE

Nowhere is this clearer than the twin crises of people and planet. Both environmental deterioration and inequality have been accelerating for decades. In recent years there has been a greater commitment by governments in the UK and elsewhere to tackling these problems. Notably, the UK became the first advanced economy to legislate for net zero emissions and more recently the UK government has committed to addressing regional inequalities through its ‘levelling up’ agenda. However, we are failing to meet the demands of this moment in history. Progress on achieving our environmental and economic goals is painfully slow. COP26 was a major post-pandemic moment of global agreement on decarbonisation, but the IPCC are still clear that progress is too slow and insufficient to prevent a climate catastrophe (IPCC 2022). Meanwhile, despite the 'build back better' rhetoric, the pandemic is likely to have exacerbated inequalities rather than leading to new policies to drive improvements (Dibb et al 2021). This lack of progress is not because of an absence of ideas to turn the tide. IPPR’s recent work – including the Commission on Economic Justice (IPPR Commission on Economic Justice 2018)) and Environmental Justice Commission (IPPR Environmental Justice Commission 2021) – has set out a plan of action for a new economy, where people and nature can thrive, with resilient local communities, good jobs and lives, successful low-carbon businesses, and where inequalities are reduced, and opportunities available to all. In doing so this work established a range of evidence-based ideas and policy proposals to deliver this vision of a better economy and society (figure 1.2). This work builds on that of a whole range of academics, think tanks and new economy activists who have all set out ideas and plans for how we can meet this moment of crisis. FIGURE 1.2: CORE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IDEAS ECONOMY AND SOCIETY THAT MEET ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS

MACROECONOMIC POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY

FAIR AND GREEN TAXATION

Alternatives measure of success to GDP such as wellbeing

Increased investment including green stimulus for a high-pressure economy

Shift from viewing taxes as primarily for revenue raising to economy shaping

Use of national missions to direct economy

New fiscal rules that incorporate social investment

Use of legislation to set legal limits on resource usage

Reforms to the monetary policy framework including monetary financing and macro coordination

Shift from taxes on labour to taxes on rents and wealth

INTERVENTION FOR A GREEN INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY

INCREASED WORKER POWER AND COMMUNITY WEALTH

Significant increases in state investment through national investment bank to crowd in private funding

Devolution of power and resources to drive economic rebalancing

More active use of competition policy and state intervention to tackle concentrations of power Training and skills to enable economic transformation

Worker power, corporate governance reform and a living income to rebalance time and money from capital to labour Community wealth and asset building as well as collective ownership of key resources from data to land

Source: Authors’ analysis

Green taxes to reduce emissions and restore nature

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Instead, the lack of progress experienced can be explained by a failure of those in power to adopt the bold ideas, policy agendas and policies commensurate with the challenges we face. Why? In part because of the strength of entrenched interests opposed to these reforms (Laybourn-Langton et al 2021) which manifests politically as ideological opposition to anything that threatens these interests. But it’s also because those in favour of environmental and economic change have too often acted as though simply providing more and better evidence will deliver change. This is what we call the information deficit theory of change (figure 3). We need to learn from where our work has been most impactful and go beyond providing more and better evidence for our ideas and focus on closing what we call the salience and power deficits that stop change happening (figure 1.3). This means doing more to win the argument for our vision among both elites and the public. We must tilt the playing field so that it is more hospitable to our ideas. And it means shifting power dynamics within our society to ensure those who stand to benefit from change have a greater say, and power. FIGURE 1.3: PROGRESSIVES NEED TO CLOSE THE INFORMATION, SALIENCE, AND POWER DEFICITS Schematic of the deficits progressives need to close

Information deficit

Salience deficit

Power deficit

Problem

Solution

People simply lack evidence on the movement’s issue or information on how to solve it.

Produce new evidence that demonstrates scale of the problem and potential solutions.

Problem

Solution

People do not think the issue is important or see it through a different frame.

Well-framed stories and narratives mainstreamed to increase salience and shift the frame.

Problem

Solution

People who seek the movement’s ends are not in positions of power or have limited influence.

Build alternate bases of power, capture existing bases of power and increase influence of movement.

Source: Laybourn-Langton et al (2021)

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

WHAT IS MAINSTREAMING?

We define mainstreaming as:

"the process of normalising an idea, policy agenda, or individual policy to achieve the effective delivery of a desired objective". We understand mainstreaming as a process that can occur in both a regressive and progressive direction. For our purposes, mainstreaming is a means to achieving a lasting consensus that enables beneficial economic, environmental, democratic, or societal impacts for the long term. Mainstreaming is not a linear process; there are advances and set-backs, and progress in mainstreaming can ebb and flow over time according to circumstances and events. There are several ways of understanding mainstreaming, but we conceive of mainstreaming occurring in three stages ‘problematisation, persuasion and power shift and adoption’. • Problematisation: the problem is identified and ‘advertised’ by those actors seeking change. Effective problematisation does not just involve providing evidence of the problem but raising its salience as well, through communications, campaigning, and advocacy. • Persuasion and powershift: changemakers are engaged in persuading the relevant audiences not just of the need to act on the problem but to utilise the solutions that they are advocating for. This may include, for example, changing media discourse on ideas or shifting public opinion through campaigning. But in the medium to long-term, this will also include changing those who are in power and shifting power – both in a progressive direction. • Adoption: at this stage, actors eg government and policymakers are actively adopting the ideas and moving towards implementing them in practice. Here it is a case of getting the means right for successful adoption and implementation eg through policy design and/or successful behaviour change. Mainstreaming also varies in its depth – this can be understood as the degree of systems change. An idea adopted at a shallow level can and does bring about change, but it may not bring about the fundamental change required to deliver the systems change necessary – and crucially the shallower the adoption, the easier the idea maybe to dislodge. Figure 1.4 pulls together these two concepts with an illustration showing the development of the concept of neoliberalism, where the horizontal axis shows the stages from problematisation to adoption and the vertical axis shows the depth or shallowness of change. This figure is illustrative but demonstrates the kinds of shifts needed to mainstream ideas.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FIGURE 1.4: THE MAINSTREAMING OF NEOLIBERALISM Diagram showing the mainstreaming of neoliberalism from ‘problematisation’ to ‘adoption’

1979: Margaret Thatcher elected 1947: Mont Pelerin Society founded

Agenda goes backwards as Attlee government builds collective institutions

Problematisation

Persuasion and power shifts

1970s: A transatlantic network and ideas and networks permeate political parties, academic and government institutions

Degree of collaboration

New Labour elected Brexit – austerity agenda weakens

Financial crash and austerity Shallow

Degree of systems change

Deep

Increasing acceptance across political spectrum

Adoption

Source: Authors’ analysis of concept introduced in Laybourn-Langton and Jacobs (2018) Note: This is illustrative only, in reality the mainstreaming process for neoliberalism was far more complex and had many more points of change overtime

WHAT ARE WE MAINSTREAMING?

Here we distinguish between policies and policy paradigms where the latter are the ideas and frameworks that sit behind policies. These cannot be viewed in isolation; in fact, deep change is extremely difficult if we only focus on policies and not paradigms. A policy paradigm consists of a core idea (eg that the market always delivers better outcomes), with a number of peripheral ideas or policies that surround it (eg that health services should be organised by the market) (figure 1.5). To achieve deep and lasting change we have to shift both the core ideas or paradigms and peripheral policies into the mainstream. To date, we have largely focussed on just the latter. Shifting individual policies can contribute to the incremental shift identified by Lindblom (1959), which may end in not just a shift in peripheral ideas but the core idea or paradigm. However, doing both is essential to be sure of effective and lasting change across our areas of focus. As we show throughout this paper, progressives must be: 1. armed with the core ideas (see figure 1.5) necessary to bring about the paradigm shift that this moment of crises demands and to ensure narrower policy agendas and policies being pursued build towards the broader paradigm shift 2. ready to work together with other actors not just to bring about a shift in peripheral ideas but also paradigms or core ideas that sit at the heart of how our economies and societies are structured 3. prepared for the events and crises that could provide the windows of opportunity to bring about significant progressive change.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FIGURE 1.5 POLICY PARADIGMS CONSIST OF CORE AND PERIPHERAL IDEAS

Everyone adhering to the paradigm holds the core idea, eg austerity paradigm in the 2010s

Peripheral ideas and beliefs on ‘how the world works’

Core idea

Some but not all hold these peripheral ideas, and they can change over time. The core idea can survive by adjusting peripheral

Authors’ analysis of concept introduced in Laybourn-Langton and Jacobs (2018) Note: Laybourn-Langton and Jacobs (2018) define policy paradigms as comprising goals, frameworks, narratives, and policies. Policy paradigms can exert a powerful influence over academic, political, public, and media debates, as well as on policymaking institutions, both national and international.

Modern economic history can be roughly split into different eras in which certain sets of dominant ideas ‘politico-economic paradigms’ have dominated politics and policy (ibid). A policy paradigm is used to determine policy on an ongoing basis. Over time the peripheral ideas can change to adapt to external circumstances (like Hall’s (1993) first order change). Peripheral ideas can shift, changing the paradigm but keeping its core idea alive (second order shifts). A paradigm shift occurs when the core idea gets abandoned and key players move to a new core idea (third order change). In 2022, IPPR has sought to test our emerging ‘mainstreaming’ theory of change, through research into what it would take to ‘mainstream’ ideas for economic and environmental justice. Our research included mapping progress on economic and environmental justice, analysis of the state of public opinion, and case study investigation into past examples of mainstreaming successes (see annex 2). This paper sets out our core findings, and initial lessons we have drawn for IPPR’s own strategy, as well as that of the broader movement we are part of.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

2. SHAPING A STRATEGY FOR MAINSTREAMING: FACTORS AND LESSONS A STRATEGY FOR MAINSTREAMING

Going beyond closing the information deficit to closing the salience and power deficits demands a clear strategy. In this chapter we set out the insights to underpin a mainstreaming strategy based on key lessons from our research. We set out three interacting areas to understand before setting any mainstreaming strategy. 1. The context: understanding where the current ‘mainstream’ on that issue sits and the barriers, levers, and blocks to mainstreaming ideas. 2. The actors: understanding who the enablers and supporters of change are, who is persuadable and who are the blockers of change. 3. The leverage points: understanding and identifying the windows of opportunity and how to prepare for them. We then consider the implications of this strategy in chapter 3 where we identify the tasks, the tools and tactics needed for IPPR to respond. FIGURE 2.1: THE TASKS, TOOLS AND TACTICS FOR MAINSTREAMING ARE DERIVED FROM AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTEXT, LEVERAGE POINTS AND ACTORS The interacting factors that shape strategy for mainstreaming

WHAT

HOW

MAINSTREAMING

CONTEXT

The tasks, tools and tactics

Values, drivers, levers and blocks to mainstreaming

LEVERAGE POINTS Seizing opportunities and windows of opportunity WHEN

ACTORS The enablers and supporters, the persuadable and blockers of change

Understanding the context, actors, and leverage points, and where and how they interact allows changemakers to determine the suitable tasks, tools and tactics for mainstreaming

WHO

Source: Authors’ analysis

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FACTOR ONE: THE CONTEXT Lesson 1: The mainstream on any one issue cannot be precisely measured but it can be located Locating the mainstream Our research suggests that the mainstream on any topic is formed by a complex interaction between powerholders (eg, politicians, civil servants, institutions, business groups), opinion shapers (eg, print and broadcast media, civil society groups and campaigns, prominent individuals) and the public (eg, public at large, core electoral coalitions) (see figure 2.2). Here we seek to understand how these actors interact and contribute to the mainstream, and in the next section (Factor Two) we seek to understand the actors, their roles and power, more deeply. FIGURE 2.2 THE MAINSTREAM IS FORMED BY A COMPLEX INTERACTION BETWEEN POWERHOLDERS, OPINION SHAPERS AND THE PUBLIC

Opinion shapers

Powerholders

The public

Source: Authors’ analysis

The relative power that these actors have to determine what is considered ‘mainstream’ varies issue by issue. For some issues, powerholders and opinion shapers have a disproportionate impact on the mainstream, whereas on others the public will have greater power. Whilst this varies significantly by topic there are some ‘rules of thumb’ which tend to determine the relative influence of these groups, for example how visible the issue is to the public or how much and how clearly it relates to their lived experience (see table 2.1).

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

TABLE 2.1: THE ‘RULES OF THUMB’ FOR THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF KEY ACTORS General public

Tend to be more influential when...

Powerholders

•

Topic is more visible and understandable to the general public

•

Topic is less visible or more complicated to understand

Topic relates to the public’s direct lived experience

•

Topic is more systemic or removed from day-to-day experience

•

Topic linked to deep-rooted social and cultural views on ‘how the world works’

•

Topic is less confronting for deeprooted social and cultural views

•

More people are impacted and it is easier to build cooperation and/or an active movement

•

Fewer people are impacted or groups with shared interests don’t cooperate

Opinion shapers The influence of opinion shapers on the mainstream depends highly on the issue and the actors. For example, the media (tabloid media in particular) can shape public opinion effectively on issues linked to deep-rooted social and cultural views but can also play a role in influencing both powerholder and public opinion on topics that are less visible or more complicated eg, the FT.

Source: Authors’ analysis

We find that there are a set of issues where powerholders and opinion-shapers are more likely to be influential. For example, many economic and environmental issues are likely to be complex, their effects are not immediate, and whilst they impact people’s lives, they do so in ways that are far from peoples’ lived experience. There are exceptions to this overall assessment; for example the general public are far more influential on areas such as taxation of fuel and inheritance tax explicitly because they relate so closely to lived experience. How much a policy issue is perceived to be linked to lived experience can also be shaped and changed. Figure 2.3 shows how we are conceiving of the different relative power of stakeholders for an initial survey of relevant topics where a position closer to a corner indicates a greater relative power for that stakeholder group to define the mainstream.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FIGURE 2.3: EXAMPLE EVALUATION OF THE RELATIVE POWER OF DIFFERENT ACTORS BY ISSUE Hypothetical plot of relative power of powerholders, opinion shapers and the public across different economic and environmental issues Public

Powerholders are more powerful/ influential

Powerholders are less powerful/ influential

1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7

Public

0.6

0.8

0.5 0.8

0.7

0.1

0.9

0.6

0.2

0.5

0.7

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.4

0.1

1.0

0.0

0.5

1.0

0.0

Power holders

0.8

Opinion shapers

0.7 Fuel tax

0.6

0.2

0.2 0.3

Public debt and finances

0.5 0.6 0.8

0.8 0.9

0.9

0.7

0.1

0.6

0.2

0.5

0.7

0.3

0.4

0.3 0.0 Carbon taxes

Alternatives to GDP

1.0

General taxation

0.1

0.4

0.1

Power holders

0.0

0.5

Action on net zero Industrial policy

Inheritance tax

Opinion shapers

Source: Authors’ analysis Note: This is illustrative rather than a fully worked example

It is possible to locate the mainstream position of these stakeholder groups more accurately using a range of methods and data sources. The intention of this broader data-gathering is not to precisely measure the mainstream as this is not possible for such a complex set of issues. Attempting to do so could give a false sense of precision and elide the complexity of the mainstream. But gathering and assessing a range of data and measures can give us more information on which to base a mainstreaming strategy. We propose a range of measurement methods that could be used to help locate where ideas sit in relation to the mainstream (table 2.2). This includes polling these actors – not just the general public but also opinion shapers and powerholders. However, we need to go further than this to get a more nuanced understanding of the mainstream. This is because it is perfectly possible for a policy agenda to benefit from significant support, even from all three groups, but still fail to be adopted. We therefore also propose to use methods such as discourse analysis, focus groups and power-mapping to give a more nuanced picture. 16

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

TABLE 2.2: METHODS FOR LOCATING A POLICY AREA OR ISSUE IN THE MAINSTREAM Group

Data source Public polling Qualitative research (focus groups, interviews)

General public

Deliberative democracy Discourse analysis (eg google search terms, social media analysis) Power mapping Polling of journalists Qualitative research (focus groups, interviews)

Opinion shapers

Discourse analysis eg, newspaper articles and opinion, social media Systematic survey of frames and metaphors used in reporting Power mapping Polling of parliamentarians

Powerholders

Qualitative research (focus groups, interviews) Analysis of government speeches, consultations, party manifestos, Hansard, select committee documents, etc Power mapping

Source: Authors’ analysis

Taking these data points for a range of policies or ideas across an ideological spectrum for different stakeholder groups allows us to form a picture of where the mainstream is located. In figure 2.4 we demonstrate through an illustrative example what this could look like for a range of paradigmatic policy positions on how the state and private sector should interact to determine a zero-carbon energy mix. Degree of support is determined using one of the data-sources listed above (this figure is illustrative and not reflective of actual polling). FIGURE 2.4: THE MAINSTREAM ON A TOPIC CAN BE LOCATED Degree of support for different policy positions on how the state and private sector should interact to determine a zero-carbon energy mix across different stakeholder groups More collectivist

More individualist

Degree of support Public Powerholder Opinion shaper

Public ownership and control

Government coordination

Crowding in private sector

Private sector decides

Position of the mainstream Source: Authors’ analysis

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Key implications for changemakers The key implications for changemakers seeking to mainstream their ideas include the following. • Knowing the context is crucial to understanding how to make change ie, the visibility of an issue, the degree of public impact and the level of vested interests. • By collecting a range of data, an approximation of where the mainstream lies can be developed – a crucial step to developing an effective strategy and understand progress. • Where there are systemic issues that don’t readily speak to immediate experience, there is a need to focus on powerholders and opinion formers in the short term, while supporting strategies to shift power in a progressive direction in the medium to long-term. • Where the issues relate to lived experience and the day to day lives of the public, there is a need to apply a greater focus on the public.

Lesson 2: What’s in the mainstream can shift and be shifted

The ideas that are in the mainstream can and do shift over time. We know this because a whole range of ideas have gone from being considered inappropriate or impossible, to being normalised, adopted, and implemented by those in power. Some examples of this are shown in figure 2.5. From LGBT+ rights to the way we think about national debt and deficits, ideas have shifted in and out of the mainstream. A shift in the mainstream can happen very quickly or slowly – it can take weeks, years, even decades. This can be seen by contrasting shifts such as changes in the mainstream on LGBT+ rights, which occurred over several decades, and changes in the mainstream on austerity, which shifted rapidly between the 2007/8 crisis and 2010. A number of factors determine the pace of change, but the main determinant is the nature of the cause of the shift (investigated in more detail below). FIGURE 2.5: FOUR EXAMPLES WHERE THE MAINSTREAM HAS SHIFTED TO ENABLE MORE PROGRESSIVE POLICY

The minimum wage

LGBT+ rights Over the last 40 years public attitudes to and the elite discourse around LGBT+ people have transformed – and the legal rights of these communities have been greatly expanded, including the right to marry and adopt.

Increasing the minimum wage was once seen as financially unsound and likely to drive unemployment. In the UK, it is now embraced by both the political right and left – and supported by mainstream economic thinkers.

Net zero in the UK

Austerity In 2010 the UK government became an outlier in pursuing austerity measures in response to the 2007 financial crisis. However, in recent years Conservative governments have publicly rejected this policy and the mainstream media have called for greater social investment.

The climate agenda has historically been driven by the political left. But in the UK the centre-right is also increasingly pursuing action on climate, becoming the first country to commit to net zero by 2050.

Source: Laybourn-Langton et al (2021)

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Similarly, shifts in the mainstream are rarely linear. Mainstream shifts can be lasting, particularly if they become embedded in social norms, public opinion, or institutions - or garner strong interest groups to defend them. This can be seen in shifts such as gender rights or sexuality which have been largely maintained in the UK, even as other countries experience setbacks on these agendas. But shifts in the mainstream can also be reversed. This can be seen in the volatility of views on austerity in recent decades. In general, economic issues are more likely to experience a ‘pendulum’ (or thermometer) effect as the economic cycle shifts, than cultural issues which are more likely to be long term (Wlezien, 1995). There are myriad factors that can ‘trigger’ a shift in the mainstream. Some of these are external and either outside of the control of changemakers (or, sometimes, of anyone) or not deliberate in their impact on the mainstream (a by-product of wider human actions). This includes world events such as wars, financial crises, invasions, or natural disasters. Another cause of long-term shifts in mainstream consensus are gradual trends and shifts in social demographics over time (Duffy 2021), for example younger people with more socially liberal views on gender, sexuality and race over time making up a bigger proportion of the population (ibid). In other cases, the trigger for shifts in the mainstream are a result of the deliberate efforts of individuals, institutional actors and movements. This may include activities such as research, campaigning, direct action, building alternatives, and contesting power, to displace ideas and replace them with alternatives. Regardless of whether the trigger for mainstream change was external or deliberately created, events are always continuously interpreted, narrated, and responses are shaped by the three core groups of stakeholders who define the mainstream. It is this process that we seek to shape. For example, the lessons that people take away from the Covid-19 pandemic are determined by the interaction between power-holders, opinion-shapers, and the public. This is reached through a story-telling and interpretation process and is defined by, among other things, the way the causes and effects are framed. Key implications for changemakers The key implications for changemakers seeking to mainstream their ideas include the following. • Changemakers should seek to understand how, and learn lessons from, where ideas have been mainstreamed in the past. • Changemakers should identify core issues, including in relation to economic and environmental justice, and make them a priority for mainstreaming. • Changemakers should seek to defend ideas that are already in the mainstream from ‘backsliding’.

FACTOR TWO: THE ACTORS Lesson 3: Powerholders hold a disproportionate amount of power over which ideas become mainstream

As well as understanding the context of an issue and location of the mainstream, our research shows that changemakers need a deep understanding of the role that different actors play in the process of mainstreaming. Importantly, their power and influence, how they relate to each other, and who to target to mainstream economic and environmental justice. Shifting what is within the mainstream is desirable because it changes the decision-making environment of those in power. What is in the mainstream is an enabler and a constraint. It can enable progressive change and constrain less desirable alternatives. Notably, if there is strong consensus across all three

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

stakeholder groups that an idea sits outside the mainstream it is harder and less likely for it to be adopted by those in power even if they wish to do so.

WHO ARE POWERHOLDERS?

Powerholders are traditionally thought of as politicians: in a UK context meaning members of parliament and the House of Lords at a national level and metro-mayors and local councillors. Within these groups, those politicians who are part of the governing party(s) and in particular those who are given a position of power (eg a secretary of state or ultimately the prime minister) can be considered the most influential powerholders. However, we chose to take a broader definition that includes non-elected powerholders. This is because in the UK significant power is also held by non-elected officials. Sometimes this is explicit. For example, there has been a growing trend within advanced democracies towards creating arms-length bodies with powers delegated to so-called technocrats (eg the creation of an independent Bank of England). In other cases, significant power is also held by senior civil servants or, increasingly special advisors (political appointees) who both advise politicians and sometimes take decisions on their behalf. Despite this, our research is clear: powerholders still act as ‘veto players’ of policies and ideas that get adopted. Put simply, they hold a disproportionate amount of power over whether change happens. Why? Firstly, by the virtue of their position, powerholders have a bigger platform – and more power – to shape the opinion of others, including the public through the media. For example, there is growing evidence base which shows the potential of elite powerholders and opinion-shapers to lead public opinion. O’Grady (forthcoming), finds that shifts in elite discourse (in parliament and the media) in the 1990s pre-dated and led the shift in welfare policy seen in the 2000s. The fact that this consensus on welfare was cross-party was particularly important in driving this effect. Secondly, because powerholders – or at least a sub-set of them that form the executive – ultimately make decisions on government policy they hold a unique position in the mainstreaming process. If mainstreaming is the process by which all possible actions on any one issue are narrowed down into a ‘mainstream menu’ from which one policy is adopted, then powerholders are the ones who make the ultimate decision of which policy to adopt. Moreover, under certain conditions - notably if they are willing and able to use significant political capital (eg have a larger majority) or if the feedback loops between the public and opinion formers are weak (eg weak democratic institutions) - they can resist ideas that are considered by the public or opinion holders to be mainstream or pursue agendas that sit outside of the mainstream. These conditions are in turn influenced by the democratic system (eg how many checks and balances), the information landscape (eg media) and the institutional set up (eg degree of power for technocrats). Our evidence is clear that who holds power and how they exercise it is integral to mainstreaming. Changemakers should care about and seek to influence the views and decisions of powerholders – and have clear strategies for doing so. Changemakers must also be concerned with shaping who holds power, given the ‘veto power’ that they hold on what change happens. On a political level, this

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

means creating the conditions for progressive parties and individuals to win power. This is because this will in turn influence how the power of government is used to shift the mainstream (mechanism 1 below) but also through the decisions they make both from the mainstream, and where they can and want to, outside of it (mechanism 2). But it also means influencing the types of people – their backgrounds, skillsets, and world views – who take up positions in the civil service or take on roles as political advisors within government. Changemakers who seek to deliver economic and environmental justice should particularly seek to shape those in power with significant influence over the economic and environmental policy agendas such as the Bank of England and Treasury. Influencing non-elected officials can often have a longer-term payoff because these individuals often remain in positions of power beyond the lifecycle of a political party and project. FIGURE 2.6: PERSUASION AND POWER SHIFTS ARE ROUTES TO SHIFTING IDEAS INTO THE MAINSTREAM THAT ARE ESSENTIAL IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM The ways in which ideas can be mainstreamed

Short term Institutions/ people/voters change their mind

Medium term People in positions of power to shape mainstream change

Long term Relative power of institutions/ people changes

Performative (extrinsically motivated) Substantive (intrinsically motivated)

Shifts in individual policies Institutional reform

Shift in power of existing actors Creation of new actors

For example, FT calls for more investment or new fiscal rules

For example, a change in government, or Geordie Greig becomes editor of the Daily Mail

Mainstreaming ideas

For example, trade unions lose membership For example, XR created

Source: Authors’ analysis

Key implications for changemakers • See implications under lesson 4 (below)

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Lesson 4: Opinion shapers play a vital and varied role in shifting the mainstream

Opinion shapers are made up of a diverse group including primarily print and broadcast media, business, but also wider civil society actors such as think tanks, NGOs, trade unions, academics, and movement activists. They influence the mainstream through two main channels: an insider and outsider route – although the most effective movements operate successfully across the two. Insiders tend to be more focused on mainstreaming ideas by building strong relationships with powerholders and opinion shapers, and using this access to shape their ideas, opinions, and decisions. By contrast outsiders seek to mainstream by putting external, often noisy, pressure on powerholders from the outside (eg, campaigning and protest), as well as building alternative sources of power. Both groups will play a role in changing the individuals in power by creating the conditions for progressive parties or supporting a diversification of exiting power-holding institutions. Both groups play a vital role. Our research points to the need to understand the breadth and diversity of the ecosystem within which changemakers must operate. It’s important to note, that while some actors are more likely to play some of these roles than others, different actors can play a variation of these roles at different times and on different issues eg, George Osborne acted as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ for austerity but may act as a ‘veto-player’ or ‘gatekeeper’ on others. Insiders • ‘Veto players’, ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘credible institutions’: Veto players are political actors who can decline a choice being made (Tsebelis 2022) – in the UK this would include the prime minister or a party with a majority in parliament at the national level. Gatekeepers are key individuals or institutions that have an outsized impact on decisions taken and the public debate (but not necessarily ‘veto power’). These vary across issues but so does their strength. Examples of gatekeepers amongst powerholders include the Treasury and the Bank of England, and amongst opinion shapers the BBC and the Financial Times. Credible institutions play a significant role in reinforcing or questioning and undermining ideas (Baker 2015). For example, the IMF shifting its position on (some aspects of) austerity in 2011/12, had a significant impact on the debate though it didn’t ultimately shift the paradigm in the UK (ibid). • Policy ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘reformers’: Successful policy entrepreneurs can have an outsized impact on shifting ideas within the mainstream. In or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organisations, their defining characteristic is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return through policy and political change (Kingdon 1984, 2011). Reformers work with powerholders who have direct influence over policy and practice. These could include academics, think tanks, or charities eg, IPPR. • The ‘amplifiers’: These actors tend to amplify the ‘mainstream consensus’ around particular issues but can also act to amplify new ideas being propagated by successful ‘policy entrepreneurs’. The position and power of amplifiers can vary significantly, ranging from long-standing institutions in the media such as the BBC to political parties in opposition to less powerful NGOs who amplify the ideas of policy entrepreneurs in their campaigns. Although these actors may not themselves initiate new ideas, the network position of some amplifiers can give them particular power (Flickenschild and Afonso 2019). • The ‘embedders’: Socialisation is key for embedding existing ideas (Bell 2012) and there are a set of actors that are key to the process of embedding. These actors tend to be slower moving and respond to strong evidence shifts (Cairney 2019) (eg, 22

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

the civil service and the Bank of England (BoE)). The process of embedding can be key to ensuring that an idea is adopted within the mainstream and can involve the creation of new institutions which work to embed thinking eg, the creation of the Climate Change Committee (CCC) which helped to embed Climate Change Act (2008) but has also subsequently acted as an amplifier and even arguably an entrepreneur itself as its report calling for a net zero amendment made a significant contribution to the net zero debate (Averchenkova 2018). Outsiders These groups and individuals are usually concentrated in the campaigning space but can also include outsider think tanks and delivery charities. These groups often help to raise the salience of the issue, shift the frame of an issue, push for new more radical ideas, and create countervailing power to the status quo. All of these groups are needed simultaneously to shift the mainstream - and ideally, they would be connected and coordinated (including with insiders above): • Rebels push for radical change and draw attention to the scale and nature of the problem, such as those taking part in occupations or street protest eg, Extinction Rebellion. • Organisers: build coalitions and organisations to drive change, such as founding the non-profit that supports street protesters or working in a union to bolster turnout eg, trade unions. • Helpers prioritise service delivery to directly combat the problem, often on a local level. This could include delivery charities, community support groups, and public service practitioners eg, Citizens Advice Bureaus or foodbank charities. FIGURE 2.7: THE ROLE THAT POWERHOLDERS AND OPINION SHAPERS PLAY CAN VARY DEPENDING ON THE TIME AND ISSUE The roles of powerholders and opinion shapers

The roles outsider changemakers play in bringing about change

The key roles that ‘powerholders’ play with regard to change Gatekeepers to power Credible institutions

Power holders

Opinion shapers

Rebels Organisers Helpers Reformers These actors are exclusively ‘opinion shapers’ and operate as outsiders

Who are ‘powerholders’ and ‘opinion shapers’? Powerholders

Cabinet and government ministers Metro mayors, local authority leaders Civil servants

Opinion shapers Business Media Trade unions NGOs and think tanks Campaigners and activists Academia Churches and faith groups

Those working against or standing in the way of change Key vested interests These actors are ‘opinion shapers’ and mostly, but not exclusively, businesses

The roles insider changemakers play in bringing about change Policy entrepreneurs Amplifiers Embedders These actors can be ‘powerholders’ or ‘opinion shapers’ and operate as insiders

Source: Authors’ analysis

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

BOX 2.2: BUILDING EFFECTIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND NURTURING NETWORKS

Our research has shown the importance of building a developed ecosystem with strong networks across the movement, of strong professional networks between the movement and powerholders and key opinion shapers eg, within the media, and understanding existing networks within key powerholder and opinion shaper institutions eg, the Treasury and the BBC. • Effective movement ecosystems: Our research suggests that the most effective movements seek to build three key characteristics across the change eco-system (Laybourn-Langton and Quilter-Pinner 2021). Movements that fail to ensure these three characteristics are more likely to struggle in driving change. – Breadth (diversity): The ecosystem has a broad range of different groups and activities, from rebels to reformers. – Depth (capability): The ecosystem’s groups have sufficient resources and ability to undertake these activities effectively including money, talent, and knowledge. – Inter-connection (community): The ecosystem is well connected, whether tangible (such as formal convening organisations) or intangible (eg trust and shared language). •

•

Cultivating the cultivators: Successful movements are rarely organic: they require active cultivation. The most effective movements have active ‘cultivators’. These organisations do the work that is in everyone’s interest but no-one’s individual responsibility. This includes convening and bridging gaps, resourcing, collective care, and shared learning (ibid). Nurturing networks: Professional networks matter. This includes links between thinktanks and academics and people in key institutions eg, the Treasury. For example, our research has found that the connections of the Institute of Fiscal studies (IFS) to academic economists has been a key factor in bestowing them with credibility. The Resolution Foundation to some extent is successfully replicating this, by increasing cooperation with academics and executive level economists at policy institutions like the Bank of England. Moreover, as the example on climate change (above) shows, networking between those outside of government and those in government – particularly SPADs and civil servants – is crucial to creating a supportive ecosystem for mainstreaming ideas. Similarly, networks mattered a lot for the spread of the austerity paradigm eg, Alberto Alesina was a key policy entrepreneur in favour of ‘expansionary austerity’ who had strong professional networks in key academic, financial and policy-making institutions (Helgadottir 2016).

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

BOX 2.3: CASE STUDY: MAINSTREAMING CLIMATE ACTION

The mainstreaming of climate targets which resulted in the groundbreaking 2008 Climate Change Act is a powerful example of well-coordinated effective insider influencing and outsider campaigning to bring about progressive change. Culminating in the creation of the Climate Change Committee (CCC) and legally binding carbon budgets, it was a result of an effective and multilayered approach which sought to influence both inside government and outsider campaigning. In this case, Friends of the Earth (FoE) (albeit drawing on existing calls from the then-prime minister Tony Blair in speeches and recommendations from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP)) were a key ‘policy entrepreneur’. They identified the problem, had a policy ready to be implemented, and used the politics of the moment to develop a ‘competitive consensus’ between the then Labour government and Conservative opposition on the need for legally binding climate targets. The Big Ask Campaign run by FOE but working with multiple partners across the environmental movement took a multi-layered approach, looking to both influence inside of government and getting people to write to MPs, seeking celebrity endorsements for a climate change target and building a broad coalition of many environmental groups to all send the same message. FoE and its partners seized on key windows of opportunity including the Conservative party leadership election in 2005, utilising strong relationships that had been built with influential figures at the time including Oliver Letwin and Greg Barker. Likewise, they leveraged strong relationships with key figures in the Labour government such as David Miliband who saw giving his support for the legislation as a way to bolster credentials for a potential leadership bid. There was also lots of collaboration across the sector and inside and outside of government. The Stern Review, which provided a new perspective on the economic costs of climate change is seen as particularly influential in winning over a key ‘gatekeeper’ in the Treasury. The success of the campaign was not just in persuading powerholders and opinion shapers of the core idea behind the legislation but also the way in which it was designed which has deepened its adoption. For example, many interviewees and literature pointed to the ‘legal metronome’ and institutional power of the CCC, the annual reporting punctuated by more newsworthy 5-yearly carbon budgets, and the legal requirement to respond to it as key for the survival of climate policy despite being scaled back by Cameron and Osborne in the mid-2010s. Thus, climate policy is an example where political changes have changed the extent of the ambition, but the target has remained and in fact been strengthened.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Key implications for changemakers • Who holds power and how they exercise it is integral to mainstreaming. Changemakers should care about and seek to influence the views and decisions of powerholders – and have clear strategies for doing so. • But changemakers must also be concerned with shaping who holds power, given the ‘veto power’ that they hold on what change happens. This could mean creating the conditions for progressive parties and individuals to win power. But it also means influencing the types of people – their backgrounds, skillsets, and world views – who take up positions in the civil service or take on roles as political advisors within government. • In particular, changemakers who seek to deliver economic and environmental justice should particularly seek to shape those in power with significant influence over the economic and environmental policy agendas such as the Bank of England and Treasury. Influencing non-elected officials can often have a longer-term payoff because these individuals often remain in positions of power beyond the lifecycle of a political party and project. • Changemakers must also work to bring about power shifts more broadly, building up alternative bases and institutions of power that are focused on securing economic and environmental justice. • Changemakers should seek to build deep, broad, and interconnected movements that work together to shift the mainstream. This will require an investment in resources to create a shared change infrastructure and strategy. • Changemakers should seek to influence other opinion shapers – particularly those gatekeepers with an outsized influence on powerholders – as part of a mainstreaming strategy. • Changemakers, including think tanks, should seek to identify, cultivate, and utilise trusted and ‘impartial’ spokespeople in order to have more impact. This can often be more impactful than using their own spokespeople and brand.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

BOX 2.4: THE MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

Where people get their information has a big impact on public opinion. For issues that are relatively peripheral to their everyday concerns, people tend to be more swayed by the most recent information that they have been presented on that issue. The media therefore has a key role in transmitting this information to the public. However, it’s not just the content of coverage that’s important; the frequency and prominence of stories give the impression that a given issue is important and worthy of an individual’s attention (Carmichael and Brulle 2016) – not least because this drives salience. Our research shows that media coverage is largely driven by elite cues and largely expresses elite views. Moreover, media coverage can have a big impact on issue salience, not just for the public but also for decision makers. As one interviewee told us, “back-bench Tory MPs care about what’s written in the Times”. They also noted that local media is important to MPs and commands high levels of trust amongst the public. Our research has highlighted several key tactics for how changemakers should respond. • Build strong relationships and networks: Our research has shown the importance of building strong relationships and networks with media organisations and individual journalists. From the spread of the austerity agenda to progress on climate, strong relationships with opinion shapers in the media has helped play a role in shaping the public debate. • Framing and messaging: Repeating the frames and messages that resonate, attuned to people’s core values, builds salience, and salience builds policy support. Messages don’t need to be explicitly about the economy or the environment – for example the economy should be in service of the outcomes that are important to people. They should repeat values-led messages about the changes that are needed and build confidence that these changes are possible. • Trusted spokespeople and local, tangible progress: A deficit in political trust weakens people’s belief that policies can and will make life better for them. Identifying and mobilising trusted messengers on the key issues and building feelings of agency and autonomy can be an effective antidote. Localised messages are particularly powerful. Support can be built by showing what can be done, using relatable stories from people’s everyday experiences and local examples of progress. Localising and contextualising issues makes them more tangible, more do-able. Hearing locally tailored messages is great; having practical experiences is even more powerful. • Salience: There is space in the new economy and environment movement for a drumbeat of communications that are aimed at increasing salience, rather than going into the policy detail or always presenting new findings. • Build agency and autonomy: Building a sense that these challenges are surmountable also encourages the public to hold those in power more accountable.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Lesson 5: The public matter and can be given a bigger role in mainstreaming “No one believes that public opinion always determines public policy; few believe it never does.” Burstein 2003

In a democratic system the public have a role in shaping what ideas are considered mainstream. This partly manifests through the process of democracy itself. The political party that voters elect to govern has a significant impact on both which ideas and policies are considered in the mainstream, and within these which ones are adopted (as per lesson 3). Moreover, certain electoral groups can hold disproportionate influence if they are either in perception or reality more influential in an election eg, swing voters in swing seats. Outside of electoral events there is a second channel through which the public shape what is considered mainstream: through public opinion. And the motivations behind voters’ choices go far beyond their views on policy and the ideological direction of the country (Achen and Bartels 2017). There is now a growing consensus that although public attitudes at the individual level can sometimes be contradictory or variable, public opinion on many issues across whole populations over time are often consistent and are representative of people’s underlying values, beliefs, experiences, and preferences (Page and Shapiro, 1992). This is particularly true of issues which relate to deeply held values or identities and on issues of significant public salience.

BOX 2.5: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

We find that policies associated with economic and environmental justice receive broad public support in the UK. Concern about climate change in the UK is high and found across every demographic. Since 2020, the environment has featured in the top three issues facing the country in 44 per cent of YouGov polls, and in the top four in 88 per cent (IPPR analysis of YouGov 2022). Moreover, 74 per cent of UK citizens think the economy is in a bad shape (Ipsos MORI 2022). At the policy level there is also broad support for green and fairer economy policies. There are high levels of support across a range of green policy solutions, such as home insulation, scrapping fossil fuel subsidies and car-free city centres (Opinium 2021). Most people (59 per cent) think that wealth difference in Britain is unfairly large (59 per cent), versus just 20 per cent who think it is fair and 16 per cent who think it is unfairly small (Morgan and Taylor 2020). In general people are more concerned about reducing inequality (51 per cent) than raising the income of the poorest (34 per cent) (YouGov 2021c). Furthermore, the evidence is clear that there is a strong positive correlation between shifts in public opinion and the policies adopted by government (Page and Shapiro 1983). This correlation is strongest when these shifts are large and sustained (ibid). The causal link between these two factors – policy and public opinion – has been much debated. Two potential explanations have been suggested with very different implications for movements wishing to shift policy. • Shifts in public opinion drive shifts in policy. According to this theory, political parties respond to the democratic will of the people. As the public’s attitudes shift towards issues such as sexuality or climate this will create pressure for policy makers to respond by changing policy. This implies that those wishing to

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

•

mainstream should focus their attention on how to shift public opinion on their cause in order to change policy. Shifts in policy drive shifts in public opinion. According to this theory, it is political parties shifting policy – and elites shifting their opinion and ‘signalling’ to the population via communications - that then results in a shift in public opinion. This would imply that those who wish to mainstream should focus their influencing efforts on shifting the consensus of politicians and other elites and securing policy change, which in turn will follow through to a shift in public opinion.

The evidence on these two theories suggests that both effects exist. Notably, Page and Shapiro (1983) find that in most cases, shifts in public opinion pre-date changes in policy, but that in a minority of cases the opposite effect can be seen. This suggests that there is a role for both, where there is a mutually reinforcing cycle of movement activists attempting to shift public opinion, while insider ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘reformers’ focus on shifting policies1. There is also emerging evidence on the conditions that have to be satisfied in order to increase the likelihood of a shift in public opinion resulting in policy change. Notably, large and sustained shifts in public opinion are likely to result in corresponding policy change. Another factor that is important is the salience of the issue in question. The more salient an issue to the public - the more the public prioritise it - the more likely this their opinion is to be translated into policy change (Burstein 2003, Shapiro 2011). What determines salience? What we prioritise is informed by our personal beliefs, values, and experiences (NatCen Social Research 2021) but also by our information environment (eg media coverage (see box 2.4) and our personal connections). This implies that those wishing to mainstream should not just care about the level of support on an issue but how salient it is. Finally, the nature and the strength of the feedback loop between the public and powerholders is also important in determining the degree to which changes in public opinion feed through to policy change. Autocratic regimes are less responsive than democratic systems and within democratic systems those that either have proportional representation or utilise direct democracy (eg referendums) are more likely to see a strong link between public opinion and policy change (Iverson and Soskice 2006; Golder and Ferland 2018). However, in the absence of direct democracy, there is no ‘golden threshold’ beyond which public opinion automatically tips into a new mainstream consensus or policy change. This is because the mainstream is determined by the intersecting views of the public, powerholders, and opinion shapers and because in a representative democracy, collective opinion is refracted through our political system and representatives who can, to some degree, choose to reflect them, adjust them or ignore them (eg, ‘veto players’). This opens a question about the mechanisms by which public opinion is filtered through to powerholders from the public. One route is via direct polling and focus groups by those who govern. But often the views of the public are taken from externally commissioned surveys and polls (either by academia or interest groups) and are reflected through the media or changemakers (eg, think tanks, campaign organisations). This indirect route by which public opinion is expressed also opens up the possibility that the perception of what public thinks ends up being as important as the ‘true’ state of public opinion. Those individuals and 1

There is also a growing evidence base which shows the potential of elites to lead public opinion. For example, O’Grady (forthcoming), finds that shifts in elite discourse (in parliament and the media) in the 1990s pre-dated the shift in welfare policy seen in the 2000s. Furthermore, the evidence increasingly suggests that in many cases these channels may become mutually reinforcing (eg elites shift their opinion or policy, public opinion shifts in the same direction and this results in a further shift in elite opinion or policy).

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

organisations looking mainstream can have a significant impact in interpreting and communicating public opinion to powerholders. This is a particularly important lesson to take on for those pursuing economic and environmental justice because polling in the UK shows that there is overwhelming support for progressive policies to the status quo, but this does not translate to those ideas becoming mainstream. This is reflective of a series of findings throughout this paper, including recognising that there is a need to shift power so that public opinion is better represented (for example, through deliberative democracy initiatives), that support for individual policies does not necessarily reflect the often contradictory and complex views of the public, or how salient that issue is at that time. FIGURE 2.8: THERE IS SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PROGRESSIVE POLICIES BUT THAT DOES NOT EQUATE TO THEM BECOMING MAINSTREAM Support and opposition to progressive policies? Greater government regulation of how digital companies operate New corporation tax for multinationals that report low UK profits Raising the minimum wage from £7.83 to £8.75 an hour Obliging big companies to have two workers on their boards Bank of England adopting policies to control house prices Minimum wage for zero hours contracts 20% above NMW Establishing a publicly owned investment bank Higher govt borrowing to invest Taxing income from wealth at same rates as work income

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Oppose

Support

Source: Colebrook (2018)

Key implications for changemakers The key implications for changemakers seeking to mainstream their ideas include: • Over the long-term changemakers should aim to achieve as strong a consensus as possible across the three groups of actors. • In the short-term, any mainstreaming strategy has to put significant emphasis on influencing the views of powerholders. In the medium to long-term, shifting who is in those positions of power and who has power in a progressive direction are central to effective and deep mainstreaming.

The Sky Data poll for IPPR asked a representative sample of 1,330 British adults its views on a number of aspects of the economy, and gauged support for some of the policies the Commission recommends.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

•

• •

Changemakers should care about and seek to influence public opinion on economic and environmental justice but progressives should not fall into the trap of thinking there is a ‘golden threshold’ of public opinion. Changemakers should also focus on shifting the salience and the dominant frame on their issues as the level of support. Changemakers should also focus on shifting power, including through elevating the voice of the public. Think tanks can and should do this through greater citizen participation Individuals and organisations looking to mainstream can have a significant impact in interpreting and communicating public opinion to powerholders. Changemakers should seek to shift the media landscape and political mechanisms by which the public will is fed through into representative democracy.

FACTOR THREE: THE LEVERAGE POINTS Lesson 6: Changemakers must be prepared for events and crises which can bring about radical shifts in which ideas are considered mainstream Events and crises are drivers of change – they can radically change the context within which changemakers operate and result in a shift in the views of powerholders, opinion shapers and the public, as well as the relative power dynamics between them. Indeed, there are often long periods of stability interrupted by moments of abrupt, significant change brought about by events (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2009).

High-profile events that the status quo cannot explain or effectively respond to are often the biggest catalysts for change (Laybourn-Langton et al 2021). Crisis periods often involve the breakdown of apparently established, taken for granted economic relationships and policy frameworks, engendering uncertainty as a series of unique phenomena that have not been experienced or encountered before by existing policy makers (Blyth 2002; Jacobs and Laybourn-Langton 2018). In such a context, a range of political actors search for new ideas to help navigate this uncertainty and to explain the set of circumstances they find themselves in. This can create a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs (see above) to affect radical change (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke 2007; Chwieroth 2010). While these events can often come as a surprise, such as the 2007/08 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, the impact that they have on what is considered mainstream is not a random process. They can be shaped by progressives – as well as their opponents – in terms of the perception of their significance, the root causes of the event, and how we should collectively respond. Events are interpreted, narrated, and framed by stakeholders to define a new mainstream position. Our research has identified several ways in which events can cause paradigms to shift. This includes incrementalism through small steps pursued by risk-averse policymakers (Lindblom 1959, 1979); institutionalism where motivated individuals and groups have impact (Mettler 1998; Sheingate 2003); the multiple streams framework where change emerges through a combination of actions by individuals and the operations of formal and informal social processes Kingdon (1984,2011); the advocacy coalition framework where people from a variety of positions who share a specific belief system and coordinate activity over time (Sabatier 1988); and crisis driven change where long periods of stability are interrupted by moments of abrupt, significant change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993,2009). The evidence of how changemakers on different parts of the political spectrum have responded to economic crises over the past 50 years only serves to demonstrate the potential for shaping the narrative, perceived causes, and political and policy responses with the right preparation, infrastructure, and frameworks. For example, neoliberals had been preparing for the economic crisis in the 1970s, the ‘crisis of IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Keynesianism’ and were able to respond with a developed intellectual framework, narrative, and focused resources (see box 2.6).

BOX 2.6: HOW NEOLIBERALS PREPARED FOR AND SHAPED RESPONSES TO THE ECONOMIC CRISES OF THE 1970s AND 2000s

The economic crisis in the 1970s was a ‘crisis of Keynesianism’ (Blyth 2002, Blyth and Seabrooke 2007, Kramer 2018). Neoliberals had been preparing for this for a long time and had developed their own intellectual frameworks in preparation. They also had their resources including a network of think tanks (such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, founded in 1955). Their response to the 1970s economic crisis was not ad-hoc. When the ‘crisis of Keynesianism’ occurred, they were ready with a response and a new narrative that then became the dominant economic paradigm – neoliberalism. Unlike neoliberals, progressives were not ready for the ‘crisis of neoliberalism’ when it occurred in 2007/08. Those on the centre left and left were not prepared for a financial crisis – either in terms of having an intellectual framework, the capacity, or the resources. Gordon Brown thought he had ended boom and bust. Keynesian and heterodox economic ideas were out of fashion. Centre-left and left wing think-tanks were more likely to be within the intellectual orbit of the Labour party, which had adopted key facets of the neoliberal paradigm. It was in the context of a lack of an alternative, or even substantive opposition, that the proponents of austerity in Britain were able to be so successful at exploiting the financial crisis for their own ends. This involved key ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (see below) such as George Osborne who was prepared for the crisis with an intellectual framework and policies to respond to the crisis. They were supported by key powerholder institutions such as the Treasury (HMT) and the Bank of England (BoE) who supported ‘balancing the books’ over other macroeconomic considerations. These powerholders were joined by opinion shapers who actively supported the austerity agenda including academics, businesses, and city economists. Furthermore, media outlets also either actively supported the agenda convinced as they were by the core idea (eg, the Financial Times) or amplified the key arguments and narratives (eg, the BBC and the ‘household budget analogy’). With no major player with credibility opposing the dominant austerity paradigm – the Labour Party accepted that some cuts needed to be made, and the Liberal Democrats signed up to the agenda from within government – the pro-austerity actors had free reign to pursue their agenda. What this shows is that an event or crisis rarely creates change by chance: it depends on how it is collectively interpreted and acted upon and who leads the process by which that process occurs. In the absence of an intellectual framework, the resources and capacity to understand the moment, create a new narrative and intervene in debates, changemakers will struggle to leverage the moment for progressive change. In other recent high-profile examples, progressives have responded to events – or even created events of their own – and used them to mainstream ideas. This can be seen in the spike in interest and reframing of the debate following the murder of George Floyd in the US and the Black Lives Matter protests of summer 2020, in the debate about the environmental crisis after the Extinction Rebellion protests in April 2019 and even in the response by progressives to the pandemic. 32

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

These examples, and other cases of successful mainstreaming throughout this paper, show that there are a range of paths for changemakers to achieve their goal – there are successful policy entrepreneurs who effectively build networks and mainstream their ideas with elites and then there are broader ‘outsider’ movements from rebels to reformers who are also capable of achieving change. Indeed, many effective movements entail a range of theories of change simultaneously pursued, with insider and outsider movements working in tandem together. Key implications for changemakers • Be prepared for new events by: - developing an intellectual framework that has buy-in across as many partners as possible - develop the policies, narratives, and messaging, that accompany the framework. • •

Be ready by building the capacity to react to large systemic crises when they occur. As well as big events, utilise specific moments eg, leadership contests, elections, and big fiscal moments.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR IPPR The work presented in this report has profound implications for IPPR as an organisation and the wider movement. This strategy seeks to build on the cases where IPPR's work has been most impactful – for example the Commission on Economic Justice and the Environmental Justice Commission – and identify the things we need to do more of. However, in some cases, we have focussed too narrowly on highlighting problems and evidencing and developing policies, but not shifting the decision-making environment of those in power who ultimately determine the policies enacted, who is in power and what shifts in power could bring about. We intend to change this. We have adopted a new IPPR organisational mission shifting our priorities towards mainstreaming:

“

To build a fairer and more prosperous society by mainstreaming progressive ideas to deliver economic and environmental, social and democratic justice

”

The research we have carried out, that we report here, will be foundational in helping us to achieve this mission. IPPR’s role is threefold. • To mainstream bold progressive ideas and policies so that they are considered politically possible and desirable, defend those that are already mainstream, and shift regressive ideas and policies from the mainstream. • To influence powerholders to adopt and implement the most effective and ambitious ideas and policies to deliver deep systems change. • To shift power by developing talent to take up roles within power holder and opinion shaper institutions, supporting the movements we are part of, and empowering the public to engage in policymaking. We will apply this new mission across all our work, but first in our major economic and environmental work as we build on the Commission for Economic Justice and the Environmental Justice Commission. This means applying the lessons we have learned on mainstreaming and aligning our activities accordingly. We have identified four institutional shifts which are required for IPPR to adopt this new theory of change and to put these concepts into practice – first in our economic and environmental work and then, as we learn, across the organisation as a whole. This strategy builds on the best and most effective of IPPR’s recent activities. But it also represents a significant organisational change, establishing a new clear strategic purpose, altering the content of our work, reweighting our activities, and adopting a stronger partnership approach.

A LONGER TERM AND MORE TARGETED APPROACH

Mainstreaming requires a long-term commitment to delivering change. Why? First, repetition is at the core to the idea of mainstreaming – by which we mean promoting new economic ideas until they become a new consensus. Second, we 34

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

need to pursue a range of activities over the long term, rather than spreading ourselves too thin and perpetuating the ‘research-publish-repeat’ think tank model, to achieve lasting change. We will therefore identify a small number of policy areas (3–5) to mainstream over the long term. This narrowing of our focus around a few core ideas and a policy agenda will allow us to undertake the deep work required for mainstreaming. TABLE 3.1: CORE IDEAS THAT NEED TO BE MAINSTREAMED

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Economic and social policy that reflects environmental goals by prioritising broader indicators beyond GDP as the preferred measure of success, and ensuring our society and economy operate within sustainable environmental limits. New fiscal rules and a macroeconomic policy framework for increased investment, decarbonisation and nature restoration that enables social investment and enables a society and economy that produce prosperity for all.

Policy is focussed on delivering a fairer and more productive economy – away from one dominated by economic rents accruing to those with assets, ensuring collectively shared wealth and financial returns, and reduced monopoly power.

An active state, willing to step in to steer the economy through industrial policy to drive investment, pioneer frontier technologies, ensure a public return, achieve net zero, and restore nature.

A power shift to people and places and an increase in economic democracy away from capital and towards society. For a shift in political power from elites to the public, in worker power from employers to workers and in economic power from the centre to regions and places. Shifting from taxes on work, labour, and productive business to fair taxes on emissions and environmental extraction, economic rents, and wealth. Tax not just as a tool for revenue raising but to shift to a fairer, zero-carbon, and nature-rich society and economy.

Trade policy as a tool for supporting equitable prosperity, both domestically and globally, addressing the climate and nature crisis, promoting democracy and human rights.

Source: Authors' analysis

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

Selecting from this short-list of ideas will be the first activity of our joint economic and environmental justice programme. Once we have selected the core ideas we want to mainstream, we will apply all the insights and tactics we have investigated through this project. Figure 3.1 sets out a process by which an organisation or collaboration should approach mainstreaming new ideas derived from the lessons summarised in chapter 2. Starting at the top-left with defining the ‘big ideas’ and seeking to locate the current mainstream, to down in the bottom-right implementing and adapting. This takes the lessons and findings and provides a framework we hope others can implement, either as individual organisations or collectively through collaborations, and that will form the underlying structure for IPPR’s work on mainstreaming. FIGURE 3.1: GENERAL PROCESS FOR MAINSTREAMING

Define policy area or ideas to mainstream

Locate the mainstream

Identify which stakeholders are focus

Determine partners and build coalitions

Select relevant strategies, tasks, tactics and activities

Identify movements of leverage and prepare frameworks

Implement

Review progress and adapt

Set short-, medium- and long-term objectives Source: Authors’ analysis

A greater investment in influencing and communications activity

Given what we have a learnt about how ideas shift into the mainstream, what can we say about the activities that IPPR should engage in to be most effective? We have summarised these here as a ‘toolkit’ for mainstreaming and below we set out a series of tactics that we have learnt from looking at past case studies. Figure 3.2 shows the six broad categories of activities that we have determined to be important for IPPR in mainstreaming ideas.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FIGURE 3.2: A TOOLKIT FOR SHIFTING IDEAS INTO THE MAINSTREAM

Convene and coordinate

Seeding talent

We convene powerholders and opinion formers to shape a new consensus

We develop future change makers and support them into roles within power holder and opinion shaper institutions.

Evidence and design We undertake research to evidence the need for change and design policy alternatives

Public deliberation

Communicate and campaign

We put involving the public at the heart of everything we do.

We reframe issues in the mainstream media and work with campaigners to make change

Pioneer and demonstrate

Engage and influence

We demonstrate new policies working and create new organisations to deliver change

We build relationships with powerholders to shape the choices they make

Source: Authors’ analysis

Under each of these categories are many different specific types of activities but by using this grouping, we can assess strengths and weaknesses, focuses and gaps. Table 3.2 sets out a non-exhaustive but expanded list of specific activities that IPPR and movement organisations can undertake. The activities in table 3.2 are labelled to indicate in which circumstances such an activity is more applicable or useful. Label of (PH) indicates that an activity is best used when powerholders have the most sway over what is considered mainstream, (O) for opinion shapers and (GP) for general public.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

TABLE 3.2: EXPANDED BY NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF ACTIVITIES IN EACH OF THE SIX CATEGORIES Convene and Coordinate

Evidence and Design

Pioneer and Demonstrate

Engage and Influence

Communicate and Campaign

Seeding talent

Framing and metaphor developing (PH,O,GP)

Developing next generation of changemakers (PH,O)

Bringing together stakeholders (PH,O)

Policy research and design (PH,O)

Service delivery (PH,GP)

Mapping of core powerholders and opinion shapers (PH,O,GP)

Private roundtables (PH,O)

Fiscal costings (PH)

Partnering with practitioners (PH)

Influencing and advocacy campaigns (PH,O,GP)

Message testing (O,GP)

Elevating persuasive voices (O,GP)

Helping coordinate between insiders and outriders (PH,O,GP)

Synthesising new evidence base (PH,O)

Working in depth with powerholders (inc local leaders) (PH,O,GP)

Strategic relationship building (PH,O)

Coordination and mapping of core gatekeepers (PH,O)

Media and leadership training (PH,O)

Building partnerships with those outside of power (O,GP)

Institutionalising (PH)

Trialling and demonstrating (PH,O,GP)

Public facing campaign of influence (PH,O,GP)

Coordinating picking fights (PH,O,GP)

Building powerful networks (PH,O,GP)

Publishing reactive analysis to repeat messages and increase salience (O, PH, GP)

Generating and elevating local examples (O,GP)

Letter writing/ petitions (PH,O)

Polling and focus groups (PH,O,GP)

Hosting citizen juries (PH,O,GP)

Source: Authors' analysis

While it has always been part of our work, we must shift IPPR’s activities on economic and environmental justice towards a greater focus on influencing the climate of ideas. Research and evidence will remain a vital part of the neweconomy movements activities: it is required to understand the most effective ways of changing society for the better. IPPR, as a research organisation will continue to play a vital role in performing this function. But our research is clear that as a movement we need to rebalance our activity towards influencing activities to shift the climate of ideas and the balance of power in society.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

BOX 3.1: REACTIVE ANALYSIS

Pro-active responsive analysis can be an important way for an organisation like IPPR to engage in mainstreaming activity. An example intervention is a briefing paper (Ending the race to the bottom) on global corporation tax published in June 2021. This received major print and broadcast media attention and was cited by shadow chancellor Rachel Reeves and leader of the Labour party Keir Starmer which in turn helped pressure the government into shifting position. Responsive analysis will often take the form of short, targeted interventions directed at steering and shaping the public discourse, frequently featuring one striking figure that could be cited in news headlines and taken up by others in the movement in their own communications. We will formalise this function within IPPR, forming an ‘analysis hub’ (figure 3.3). This will be able to draw on capacity from across and outside the organisation to quickly respond to emerging topics of discourse with pointed and media-friendly analysis. Responsive analysis is most effective when coupled with influencing around the intervention eg with political parties and institutions and those developing frames and messaging. An important aim of reactive analysis is to shape the narrative around an event. Informing external spokespeople in prominent institutions (eg Confederation of British Industry, Federation of Small Businesses) is also key as they can influence wider audiences because voters outsource their opinion-forming to trusted delegates.

FIGURE 3.3: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AT IPPR

Analysis hub

Ideas hub

Comms hub

Advocacy hub

Source: Author’s analysis

IPPR must contribute to this shift by investing in more capacity and building more capability within IPPR (and the movement) to shift salience and power. This means a reweighting towards and an increase in activity in influencing opinion shapers and powerholders. We will therefore invest more capacity in our communications function. This will be housed in a ‘communications hub’ embedding our media and comms expertise into our mainstreaming work. This hub will lead on: • developing new frames and metaphors for talking about economic and environmental justice • message testing • convening and engaging directly with networks of opinion-shapers • elevating persuasive and local voices. We will also create a new politics and power capacity within IPPR, housed in an ‘advocacy hub’ which will lead on: IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

• • •

coordinating engagement activities across the movement developing and implementing a political engagement strategy influencing and campaigning.

Expanding alternative forms of driving change

IPPR will invest in alternative models of influencing. We have two initial proposals for how we can do this based on our research: firstly, demonstrating alternatives, and secondly, a leadership programme. Demonstrating alternatives: Demonstrating that alternatives to the status quo are possible can be an incredibly powerful means of shifting opinion and influencing decisions. We work with devolved and local governments to put new economy ideas into action including IPPR Scotland’s work with the Scottish government on introducing a Minimum Income Guarantee. We also work directly in partnership with communities across the UK, through citizens’ assemblies, to set out local visions for a fair transition to net zero and the restoration of nature. We are excited to be building on this work to pioneer new models of participative research and action. Leadership programme: IPPR has a track record of recruiting talented staff, developing their skills and reputation, and then deploying them in mainstream political institutions to make change. IPPR alumni can be found in all the major economic and political institutions in the UK including the civil service (nationally and locally), regulators, the main political parties and both print and broadcast media. IPPR is now considering the development of this as a more intentional model for long-term influence in the new-economy space by creating a leadership programme and an alumni network. This could involve partnering with a wellrespected but progressive economics or environmental post-graduate (Masters) programme, recruiting a cohort of promising students each year and putting in place a training programme. We envision this would include new economy and environmental policy design and leadership skills. We would seek to support them to secure positions within key civil service (Treasury, Bank of England), media (Financial Times) and civil-society organisations.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

FIGURE 3.4: IPPR’S ROLE AS A TALENT PIPELINE TO PROGRESSIVE ORGANISATIONS

Policy advocacy NEF Positive money

Academic foundations

Progressive Economy Forum Autonomy

Institute for New Economic Thinking & INET Oxford & Cambridge

Common Wealth Women’s Budget Group

IIPP UCL PERC Goldsmiths Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI)

IPPR Delivery

Campaigning and communication

CORE Rethinking Economics

NEON

CLES

Economic Change Unit

Social Guarantee

Tax Justice UK Oxfam Frameworks Institute Pink arrow = IPPR alumni in leadership role

Source: Authors' analysis

BOX 3.2: IPPR’S ‘OFFER’ TO THE MOVEMENT

IPPR is uniquely positioned to act as a ‘bridge’ between the new economy and environment movement and Westminster insiders. Because of IPPR’s history and its traditional position as a ‘credible centre-left think tank’ and our robust foundation of policy development and evidencing we have an external image that gives us a higher degree of access to the elite than others in the new economy movement. We have a degree of access to politicians, political parties, journalists and news desks from our decades of history that others do not. It’s our ‘offer’ to the movement that we will use that position and occupy that discrete role in the movement. We intend for this mainstreaming theory of change to be a framework that we can work on in collaboration with partners across the environmental and economic justice movement. This theory of change development has been an open process, engaging a steering group from organisations including NEON, ECU, Green Alliance, NEF, P4NE and the Hewlett Foundation. We hope to work in a movement-generous way with partners from across broader movements.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

A more movement-generous organisation

Lastly, an important insight from our work is that to be successful IPPR must work with and within a wide eco-system of actors to deliver change. We have always worked in collaboration with others, but in order to achieve our vision IPPR recognises the need to play a greater role in growing the impact of the new-economy movement as a whole. IPPR cannot perform all the functions of mainstreaming. We recognise that we will succeed or fail together. To be effective, then, we must partner with other organisations across the UK where we lack capacity or capability or where others have existing strengths. We already work closely with organisations such as the Economic Change Unit, TUC, Tax Justice UK, New Economy Organisers Network, Green Alliance, Green New deal Rising and others. We must deepen these relationships and forge new ones including with a wider range of actors and specialisms. We are also seeking to strengthen the links between the UK, US, and European new-economy movements. History tells us that it is partnerships across nations that underpin new economic orders. This strategy is informed by recent IPPR research – undertaken with the Runnymede Trust, the UK’s race equality think tank – on what works in building change movements (Laybourn-Langton et al 2021). We are proposing to work with the movement to crowd in significant new investment to help develop smaller organisations and seed new ones in order to fill strategic gaps in our movement (see box 4.1).

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WIDER MOVEMENT The first and most important implication of our investigation of mainstreaming is that movements are essential. There is no way for one organisation to mainstream an idea by itself. We need a powerful group of aligned actors, working in diverse ways towards a common goal.

A STRONGER, MORE EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT

An exploration of mainstreaming and how it can be put to use by the economic and environmental justice movements has reinforced just how important building an effective eco-system is – as outlined in chapter 2. An ecosystem needs to be broad (or diverse) to drive change across leverage points. Making change requires movements to be made up of a diversity of groups that undertake a variety of functions. They may have different visions and theories of change but this is vital because it allows a movement to simultaneously push for change from different angles and perspectives: to target multiple and different leverage points, using different methods. This amounts to a ‘division of labour’. It’s our assessment that the new economy and environment movement have real strengths in policy research and development and a growing recognition of the need for coordination. However, there are in gaps in our approach eg, not enough focus on winning the argument for our ideas, including in campaigning, trialling, and putting into practice, and where these activities are occurring they can be disconnected from more ‘insider’ strategies. Part of the shift that we want to see and will work to achieve through adopting this new mainstreaming theory of change is to fill these gaps. We will work with others to achieve this division of labour. It is our intention to work as an active partner, building IPPR’s capacity and capability and that of the movement (see chapter 3). Through our research and by reflecting on the way the movement works today we have identified seven key shifts that, if adopted, would enable us to better effect change through mainstreaming.

1. Greater coordination and strategic alignment

Greater coordination and strategic alignment of the movement around theories of change, priority areas, and long-term plans is required. When they work together effectively movements can be enormous drivers of change. The new economy movement is increasingly working towards coordination, primarily through the work of the Economic Change Unit (ECU) and New Economy Organisers Network (NEON), both of which provide important ‘infrastructure’ for inter-organisation coordination. Whilst these efforts have been immensely valuable, as the points below make clear, we still need to progress beyond talking to each other and towards greater strategic alignment and agreement on organisations’ different roles.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

2. A culture shift towards salience and power

The collective failure to achieve change on a scale commensurate to the challenges we face is in part due to prioritising evidencing and developing policies over shifting salience and building power. We need to shift our activity towards increasing salience and power through a joint strategy with a greater focus on campaigning, communications and influencing.

3. Recognition of the diversity of roles

There is a need for a diversity of different organisations, with different visions and different organisational theories of change. In chapter 2 above we identify the different groups of actors needed to achieve change - these will likely take different organisational forms and engage in different tactics, but a movement that encompasses them all can more effectively shift ideas into the mainstream.

4. Understanding and trust

To work together successfully, organisations must have a shared understanding and trust. A movement working to loosely aligned plans with a diversity of actors may involve allies adopting conflicting positions and advocating different policies. This is necessary and normal. For the movement to be successful and effective the organisations should appreciate this diversity and not find it threatening. This requires all the actors in the movement to maintain open communications and build trusting relationships.

5. Building reinforcing alternative bases of power

In the medium- and long-term the economic and environmental justice movements need to develop strong and mutually reinforcing alternative bases of power. These may be citizen movements, trade unions, or protest organisations, for example. This can’t be achieved by one organisation alone and the movement needs to work together to pursue this longer-term aim.

6. Elevating diverse and local trusted voices

Hearing new ideas from someone ‘like me’ or from a similar place or background can be enormously effective. That means when thinking about how to communicate ideas we need to think not just about what we say but who says it. We should work together to identify, train, and elevate alternative persuasive voices for our ideas.

7. Greater reactive and responsive capacity

Organisations must be ready and have resource for responding to events and opportunities as they arise. We need to shape the narrative arc of how events are understood and organise the movement around them, and we need to effectively counter regressive ideas and policies as and when they arise to avoid them becoming entrenched.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

BOX 4.1: NEW PHILANTHROPY INITIATIVE

A key determinant of the breadth, depth and interconnectivity of the new economy and environment ecosystem is the funding available to the movement. Whilst there are a small number of existing new economy funders in the UK, the sector still faces several funding constraints. Primarily the movement needs to increase the quantity and quality of funding being given – as well as a shift in its allocation to fill gaps in the change ecosystem. IPPR is working with other organisations on a collective effort to secure new and better philanthropic funding to grow and develop a more comprehensive and effective new economy movement in the UK. Separate from our mainstreaming work we propose establishing a New Economy Philanthropy Initiative to take forward this initiative. This could have three key objectives. • Bring together a case for support for the movement that lands with our target funders (adapted for different funding pools). • Identify and prospect pools of funding with the potential to invest more in the movement in the UK. • Establish a strategic cultivation process to build relationships with these donors and secure significant funding pledges for the movement.

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

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IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

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IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

ANNEX 1: STEERING GROUP Alfie Stirling Director of research and chief economist, New Economics Foundation (NEF) Ayeisha Thomas-Smith Interim executive director, New Economy Organisers Network Jo Swinson Director, Partners for a New Economy (P4NE) Brian Kettenring Director of the Economy and Society Initiative, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Chris Venables Head of politics, Green Alliance Sarah-Jayne Clifton Executive director, Economic Change Unit (ECU)

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES Lord Adair Turner, former chair of Climate Change Committee

Jessie Nicholls, European Climate Foundation

Adam Corner, consultant

Jo Swinson, director, Partners for a New Economy (P4NE)

Amiera Sawas, Climate Outreach Alfie Stirling, director of research and chief economist, New Economics Foundations (NEF) Ayeisha Thomas-Smith, interim executive director, New Economy Organisers Network

John Myers, London YIMBY Kate Wilson Larry Elliott, economics editor, Guardian Laurenz Gehrke, Politico Berlin

Benet Northcote, Conservative Environment Network

Matthew Honeycombe-Foster, Politico London Influence

Brian Kettenring, director of the Economy and Society Initiative, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

Michael Jacobs, former advisor to Gordon Brown

Bronwen Smith-Thomas, former World Wildlife Fund campaigner

Peter Geoghegan and Laura Basu, OpenDemocracy

Bryony Worthington, ex-Friends of the Earth and Climate Change Committee

Sarah-Jayne Clifton, executive director, Economic Change Unit (ECU)

Carys Roberts, director, IPPR

Simon Wren-Lewis, University of Oxford

Charles Ogilvie, COP 26 director of strategy Chris Venables, head of politics, Green Alliance Dora Meade, New Economy Organisers Network

Molly Walsh, European Climate Foundation

Sofie Jenkinson, New Economics Foundation Steven Akehurst, Global Strategic Communications Network Tony Juniper

Giles Wilkes, former advisor to Vince Cable

Treasury civil servants (anonymous)

Harry Quilter-Pinner, deputy director, IPPR

Will Snell, Fairness Foundation

IPPR | Mainstreaming economic and environmental justice

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