International Relations Review: Fall 2021

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

FEATURING:

by ANFANIOLUWA LAWAL

by SARAH LOPEZ

Review: The Egyptian Coffeehouse

by HANADI AMIN

REDEFINING RESISTANCE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

Letter from the Editors in Chief

Note from the Creative Director

REFLECTIONS ON THE IRR

Foreword by Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Ph.D

Note From Our Founder by Andrew Facini

Interview with Noah Riley with Bridgette Lang, Josh Wright & Barrett Yueh

Editor's Note Conditions for Abortion Reform in Latin America by Maecey Niksch

Hispaniola and Climate Change by Sarah Lopez

Editor's Note Hospitality for a Price by Diana Reno

In the Wake of the “Bulldozer” by Bella Newell

LGBTQ+ Rights in West Africa During COVID by Anfanioluwa Lawal

Refugees, Hydro-Terrorism, and Unstable Governments by Keegan Mitsuoka

Book Review: The Egyptian Coffeehouse by Hanadi Amin

Editor's Note A Temporary Ban On Its Own Citizens by Nick di Paolo Consensus and Clean Air by Sydney Steger

Thailand: An Unforeseen Victim of Myanmar ’ s 2020 by Ashari Bilan-Cooper

Editor's Note

To Build Bridges or Walls? by Jude Hoag Taking Up Merkel’s Mantle by Erica MacDonald

French Positionality on Security by Sydney Pickering

Editor's Note The Fragile State of Kyrgyzstan by Azima Aidarov The Arms Race Five Times Faster Than Sound by Joseph Su

Photography

Senior Editorial Board Contributing Staff

Letter from the Editors in Chief

Dear Reader, We are thrilled to bring you the Fall 2021 issue of the International Relations Review (IRR) Journal. Since 2009, the International Relations Review has contributed to the breadth of international scholarship through a bi-annual publication written and edited by Boston University's undergraduate students. Founded with the intention of promoting dialogue between students, scholars, and policy-makers in an increasingly globalized world, the platform that the IRR creates for emerging scholars is needed now more than ever.

The traditional lenses of understanding international relations have shifted in the decade that separates this issue from the first. From antigovernment demonstrations and far-right nationalism to the implications of climate change and the global pandemic, the past twelve years have illuminated the extent to which technology and social mobilization have redefined resistance for the generations to come.

Despite the unique hardships posed by the global pandemic, the 25th edition preserves the IRR's commitment to illuminating key currents in international affairs that are often neglected by global media. This issue seeks to explore the role of resistance in promoting political reform, thwarting suppression, and accelerating solutions to the world's most pressing crises, whether through the coffeehouses of Egypt or the colonial histories of Latin America.

In celebration of the 25th edition, the International Relations Review team has reworked nearly every facet of the journal to reach

uncharted territory in academia and journalism. In an age of misinformation and unprecedented social mobilization, we hope the IRR remains at the forefront of global debates on international affairs through research-driven and policy-forward analysis.

As always, thank you for supporting the International Relations Review, and enjoy the issue. We look forward to publishing again in Spring 2022.

Until next time,

BRIDGETTE LANG

Boston University College of Arts and Sciences, Kilachand Honors College, and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2023 and Editor in Chief at the International Relations Review , 2021–22

JOSHUA WRIGHT

Boston University College of Arts and Sciences and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2022 and Editor in Chief at the International Relations Review , 2021–22

BARRETT YUEH

Boston University College of Fine Arts and College of Arts & Sciences Class of 2022 and Creative Director of Print at the International Relations Review , 2021–22

Note from the Creative Director

The title Creative Director did not exist for this journal until this year. The idea of having someone so versed in and focused on art, design, and typesetting for an academicstyle journal has, at times, seemed laughable. Ellen Lupton, author of every designer’s favored typography guide Thinking With Type says, typography and design is all about making information make sense visually. As I have spent the last semester organizing the activities of our layout designers and coordinating the production of this journal, I can testify that there is an impressive

range of incredibly high-level, scholarly writing to be consumed in this journal, and it has been no easy task to make it make sense .

In my two and a half years with the International Relations Review , my job has varied substantially in scope and definition. I entered the editorial board as a layout editor as a sophomore in the fall of 2019 and within months accepted an offer to be the next senior layout editor, a position whose duties would range from “supervise the layout team” to “wake up at 5am to meet with the Editor in Chief and review the final proof.”

My long-term affiliation with the IRR in this capacity has allowed me to see the journal flourish in three distinct eras of leadership—Soo Min Cho and Kavya Verma in 2019, Noah Riley in 2020, and now Bridgette and Josh in 2021. Each of these teams has brought with them their own unique perspectives and contributions to the branch and to the journal, and it has been a true joy to bring them to life visually.

It has been an immense honor to work with the entire editorial board to help design and produce the IRR’s 25th issue,

and I of course look forward to completing my work with the IRR in our Spring 2022 issue. I hope to address you all again then.

With love,

REFLECTIONS IRR on the

Foreword

As a graduate student, I took a course called “Teaching Political Science.” My then professor imprinted on me how best to reach others when talking about International Relations—we should “bring the good news.” The term “evangelical,” he went on, is derived from the Greek word euangelion, meaning “gospel” or “good news.” The Greek root word was initially used in the first centuries AD in a secular context to share announcements celebrating military victories. The Boston University International Relations Review , while of course not celebrating military victories, brings the good news. How? It brings together student voices that are eager to understand and solve pressing problems. And there are no shortages of problems. The pandemic and public health emergencies with large, rising authoritarianism, extremism, poverty, racism, and climate change all require multifaceted collective solutions. No one person, government, or institution can solve them. The voices in the

ROSELLA CAPPELLA ZIELINSKI, Ph.D

Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University, Visiting Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, and Non-Resident Fellow at the Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare at Marine Corps University. Most importantly, she is the faculty advisor to the Boston University International Affairs Association.

IRR are at the forefront of bringing attention to issues global in scope and shaping how we understand them. The contributors and staff are not buckling under the daunting nature of these grandiose problems but bravely facing them.

Critical to bringing the good news is the IRR staff. With social media and a 24-hour non-stop news cycle, it often feels like there are too many voices, and breaking through the noise seems impossible. The staff of the IRR makes sure that every contributor feels confident in their piece. Pieces are vetted for academic rigor and promoted online and in hardcopy. The hard work of the staff over the years has paid off. Since 2011, the Library of Congress has retained physical copies of the IRR catalog. Visitors to the Library of Congress can request past IRR issues in the Jefferson and Adams Reading Rooms.

IRR, you inspire us to take the hard step of having a public conversation and proposing solutions to pressing political problems. Indeed, a keystone of democracy. Thank you for bringing the good news for twentyfive issues now. Happy Anniversary!

ANDREW FACINI, CAS '10

Director of Communications at the Institute for Science and Technology and former Publishing Manager at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

A Note From Our Founder

Our community is built upon excellence. Together, let's prove what the best IR department in the nation is capable of,” I wrote in the inaugural issue of the IR Review . Pretty rich, coming from an Editor in Chief cruising into senior year with a 2.7 GPA.

When I was approached in early 2009 by Frank Pobutkiewicz, the then-leader of the Boston University International Affairs Association, about launching an academic journal, I was initially excited to have a new project to work on “outside” of classes.

In 2006, I found the IR program under CAS—the Pardee School was still eight years away—to be both inspiring and overwhelming. Like today, it was BU's largest undergraduate department, and the opportunities were plenty. But I found my mind wandering and the curriculum structure vague. I changed academic “tracks” within the major more than once and struggled to stay focused across the disparate possible paths ahead of me. I ended up turning to student organizations and journalism work for much of those first three years.

So by 2009, starting something new like the International Relations Review was a no-brainer. I brought over fresh editorial skills from The Daily Free Press and was thrilled to connect with the go-getters at the International Affairs Association, all of whom were much more rooted in the IR programming than I had been. We imagined a few issues that could fill (maybe) eight pages and set things on a sustainable course that wouldn't immediately end when we graduated.

The work itself was decidedly makeshift. We put out fliers to ask students to repurpose their term papers for articles. We wrote to study abroad coordinators, asking for reflections. I polled my friends, in case anyone had some decentquality photos left on their digital cameras from their travels. The InDesign program I used to lay it all out was almost certainly pirated. Our office was my dorm, and the payment (if I could scrounge cash) was beer.

But from there, we caught something unexpected—a great vibrant enthusiasm from those first contributors and editors to get those stories out; to share their journeys figuring out the program, and finding themselves in the field for the first time.

Suddenly, the discordant threads in the IR department were speaking up, revealing to me so many newfound passions and possibilities. In a way that's never truly captured by the sanitized advertising from the university itself, those articles displayed that authentic “excellence” that I only—until then—pretended to understand.

By the second issue, it was clear that we had tapped into something compelling. At an institution that exudes a thick, almost commercial veneer, an independent space to share honest reflections of our diverse paths is something I'm incredibly proud to have helped establish. Thinking back to those late-night editorial binges in my South Campus room, I really hoped the IRR would, first, survive in the years after graduation. I would never have believed the IRR would reach 125 pages by its 25th issue. A profound congratulations is owed to the hundreds of students who kept this inspiring and genuinely authentic endeavor rolling year after year.

My only advice is just what I found while putting together that first issue: keep sharing those journeys. In a world as boundless as this, it's too easy to feel disconnected and directionless. But if you're here to learn about people and countries and how everything is connected, all you need to do is look for those stories of growth and learning, and find reflections of yourself in them.

NOAH RILEY, CAS '21

Editor in Chief at the International Relations Review , 2020–21

Blending the Past & Present: An Interview with Noah Riley

In April 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Noah Riley, a rising senior at Boston University, was elected Editor in Chief of the International Relations Review . For three years, Noah wrote for the IRR’s online and print publications and was one of the founding anchors of the investigative YouTube series, REACT News. Now a Boren Scholar, Yenching Scholar, former Pardee School Dean’s Ambassador, and current graduate student at Peking University, Noah sat for an intimate interview with Bridgette, Barrett, and Josh.

Since many of our readers are undergraduate IR students, what advice would you give to younger students thinking about pursuing opportunities in the field and forging a unique path for themselves?

If we're talking specifically about professional opportunities, take the time to apply to as many different fields or sort of different organizations as you can. When I was in school, I imagined I would be really, really interested in working at a think tank, and right now, I'm fortunate to be able to intern at one, but I now know that I would never want to work at a think tank as a junior staffer. By trying out different opportunities, you put stuff on a resume and build your personal skills, but also it's really valuable as a tool for you as you go off into the world and figuring out what you really like and don't like.

I would also say you should take classes outside the field of IR. If you're interested in being a decision-maker, you're not gonna think, “Oh, remember that time John Mearsheimer wrote that one thing and that one book?”

Literally, you'll never ever say that, so finding other classes and other opportunities, outside of IR, to expand the way you think, is really important too.

What advice would you give to our staff writers, especially the younger staff that are publishing their first piece in the Fall 2021 issue and hope to continue with the IRR in the future?

I think people underestimate how important of a skill writing is. The more and more you write, the better you're going to get at it. It's a very different type of writing than you'll experience in class, and probably more important than the type of writing you do for class. The IRR is a great opportunity to do that, and to figure out what the most important things are to you, and taking the time to get really invested in them and write about them. It will give you opportunities both professionally and personally moving into the future.

What future do you see for the IRR? What are you most excited to see accomplished?

One thing that's super exciting right now is it's infinitely more organized than the way I left it. It's so much bigger and more impressive, and I think there's a lot of different moving parts that have come together really nicely in a way. I think that previous renditions of the IRR weren't able to do that. The expansion into

digital space means the IRR has different platforms now for people who might not necessarily be like long-form writers but who still want a chance to talk about their perspective and the issues that are important to them.

What is the greatest lesson you learned from the IRR?

The lesson I learned specifically about the IRR is that it's a really unique platform for undergraduate students to be able to voice their opinion in a professional way. Oftentimes people don't have the time for it, or don't necessarily know the process for outside publication is, so I think it's a really powerful thing for students to be able to get published in a journal like this.

I think personally, the IRR also gave me an opportunity to figure out how best to present people's voices and what people have to say because a lot of people have very interesting ideas. They have really insightful things to say, and then sort of wanted an opportunity to say that. Being Editor in Chief helped me realize how I can help manage those things, how it can help promote those things, and then I guess lead to like future lessons about that.

What knowledge about academia, more broadly, have you carried with you into graduate school or other professional opportunities?

My classes, for the most part, in international relations, gave me a foundation to understand real world problems. I had a mix of classes that were really theory-based and heavy on reading and then through BU, there are a lot of professors of the practice that help you tackle real-world problems, I suppose. It gives you a solid foundation and background and a way to approach problems from different perspectives that I think is different from something more STEMfocused that uses very specific frameworks to approach problems.

In what ways did the IRR help you excel in your senior thesis?

I really figured out how to structure my ideas and put together analysis. The IRR isn't necessarily always about making an argument in the paper, but for the purpose of analysis, it can be really helpful. You know you'll get feedback from your editors or people who are like more senior staff-level people

at the IRR who will say, “Oh, you should fix this,” or, “I don't find this necessarily convincing.” That will improve sort of your ability to analyze and in some ways your arguments. Again, it also just goes back to figuring out how to write about international relations. That can sort of add to your portfolio of things to do with your thesis.

Professionalism is undoubtedly essential for students entering the workforce. Since you’ve had such substantive internship and practical experiences in international affairs, what are your recommendations for maintaining a competent attitude?

There's like a whole host of advice people can give, but I think there are two things that have really helped me.

First: never be afraid to reach out to people, whether it's on LinkedIn or somebody's website contact information. You should understand that there are also people too, who are generally pretty passionate about you know the fields that they work in, and they would be more than happy to chat with you about that field or

that organization. As long as you reach out in an appropriate and respectful way and are sensitive to their time, they’d be more than happy to chat over Zoom or get a cup of coffee or whatever.

Secondly, something that's really helped me is that, say you do take a job or an internship— within the first week or so, reach out to your supervisor about ways to succeed in your internship. Then you'll have an idea of how to succeed in what they're looking for, and the easier it is for you to fulfill those expectations and hopefully exceed them.

I guess the last thing is just getting to know people in a more personal way. When there's a feeling that you want to get to know them for who they are, as a person, then they also are really interested in your work and personal life.

Unfortunately, you were unable to have a launch party or opportunity to speak to your staff last year. Given the chance now, what would you say?

I would say that they've done a great job. I hope they appreciate

the sort of platform and opportunity the IRR offers because I think it is like a really unique space for people to develop their voice.

How is graduate school treating you? What advice do you have?

One: make sure that if you're applying right out of undergrad that this program or this certain topic is something you're definitely interested in, because if it's not, then those years can maybe feel like wasted years when you could be getting professional experience before really defining what your interest is and then going back to grad school. If you're going to do it right out of undergrad, really understand that that's the field you're interested in.

In the same vein, start applying early and really value your relationships with your professors. It's always important to have relationships with professors anyway but it also helps like for practical applications with networking or writing letters recommendation.

And lastly, I've really enjoyed grad school because like I

said, I knew the topic I was really interested in and have been able to really specialize in that. All my courses are geared towards that, and I've really enjoyed it.

And lastly, what do you miss most about BUIAA?

I miss my weekly Zoom appointments with Barrett and Branden! But seriously, I do think that the different branches of BUIAA actually helped me develop a lot as a person, and I think I realized attributes about myself that

I like and maybe want to develop or that I don't necessarily like. The IRR was a great place where I was able to find my voice as a writer, and iin my later years, I figured out how I can be a better leader, managing different personalities and moving parts. Even if the relationships among people aren't necessarily the greatest, there's always ways to work better and towards a goal. I think there are a lot of situations that BUIAA puts you in that really help you grow as a person. Love you all.

AMERICAS

Editor's Note

North and South America, collectively distinguished as the Americas, face a diverse set of challenges, many of which we seek to explore in this section. One of the Caribbean's most pressing concerns is the impact of climate change and the associated infrastructure needed to combat these effects, which Sarah explores in her analysis through a modern and historical context. Uneven development of the region has led to uneven effects in the light of natural disasters.

This section seeks to explore the influence of social movements on the politics and development of Latin America through the lenses of climate, infrastructure, and social reform. While two articles only begin to explain the breadth of historical and political development in the hemisphere, we sought to shed light on two lesser-known matters in contemporary Latin American affairs.

MARLA HILLER, CAS '22

Senior Editor, Americas

AMERICAS

Conditions for Abortion Reform in Latin America

How Argentine women's movements legalized abortion on demand

by MAECEY NIKSCH

“This article intends to provide arguments about the success of legal reform in Argentina in comparison with what is called a moderate legal reform in Chile. The importance of the topic speaks for itself in a region with the most restrictive laws in the word and higher rates of induced abortion and adolescent pregnancy.”

BEATRIZ GALLI

Senior Latin America Policy Advisor for Ipas and member of the Bioethics Commission of the Lawyers Bar Association in Rio de Janeiro

The prevalence of the Catholic Church in Latin American governance has long prohibited the abortion debate from entering political discussions. Abortion restriction is persistent in Latin America because it is politically divisive; those in power avoid moving against the anti-abortion status quo, as the resulting antagonization of religious actors would threaten their political viability. 1 However, in the twenty-first-century, abortion reform has developed across Latin America in varying degrees of moderation, as is seen in the cases of Chile and Argentina. In 2017, Chile revised its abortion regulations to make exceptions in cases of saving maternal lives, as well as in cases of rape and fetal malformation. 2 More recently in December of 2020, Argentina completely legalized abortion on demand for the first fourteen weeks of gestation. 3 Feminist social movements have been the most critical actors in the advancement of abortion reform policies, but the asymmetrical adoption

of abortion reform across Latin America reveals a dependency on collaboration between women’s movements and the incumbent government, as well as the countries’ respective political environments, to adopt such reforms.

The ability of women’s movements to form productive connections with state institutions depends on the country’s institutional rules for the participation of women in government. These rules, such as gender quotas, facilitate the success of legislative bills for abortion reform and place female politicians in positions of power where they can act as state allies. Gender quotas in particular give women a fixed share of seats in legislative bodies by implementing a limit for the number of representatives that can be of a single sex. However, collaboration between women’s movements and the government tends to steer women’s movements away from promoting radical change because they are expected to act in the interest of the state and its anti-abortion status quo. In Chile, the women’s movement MILES ( Miles por la Interrupción Legal del Embarazo ) attempted to collaborate with the Bachelet government, but the Bachelet administration proposed its own bill

despite the similarity in their demands. In instances where state collaboration has proven to yield less radical reform, feminist movements, especially Ni Una Menos in Argentina, have strengthened and mobilized so that policymakers can no longer ignore their demands for total abortion decriminalization, resulting in a more radical liberalization of abortion than when collaboration occurs. While the adoption of gender quotas has increased the number of women represented in legislatures, these quotas have not guaranteed the implementation of abortion reform, nor have they been effective at instituting reform without the presence of women’s rights activism. In Chile, institutions such as formal rules, along with informal practices and norms, have dictated the extent of women’s presence in all political arenas. Chile’s binomial majoritarian electoral system, which was created during the Pinochet dictatorship in order to decrease the number of political parties competing and overrepresenting the political right, continued to dictate national elections in the post-Pinochet period of democratic consolidation. 4 During her second term in 2015, Chilean President Bachelet replaced this electoral system law with a more proportional electoral system by increasing the size of both chambers of Congress. 5 Additionally, Bachelet’s new law

included a gender quota, stating that “parties cannot have lists where more than 60 percent of the candidates are from a single sex,” effectively instating a 40 percent quota for women. 6 Gender quota laws, though, do not seem to have advanced political discussion about abortion reform in any way. This quota was only implemented under Bachelet’s second administration in 2015, and the abortion reform effectively passed two years later in 2017. This is not enough time to indicate that a redistribution of the proportion of women in the legislature caused the proposal of the abortion reform bill, though it did make it more likely to pass. It was President Bachelet’s second administration that also put forward the bill to end the total abortion ban that Pinochet had put in place in 1989. 7

The case of Argentina also demonstrates how an increase in the number of women in government does not guarantee support for women’s rights movements and their agendas, especially regarding abortion reform. Since the 1990s, the institution of gender quotas in Argentina has largely increased legislative representation for women’s movements at both the national and subnational levels in the locations where they have been implemented, allowing women to be brought into the political conversation. The world’s first gender quota law was signed in Argentina by President Carlos Menem in 1991, which dramatically increased the proportion of women legislators in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and Argentine provincial legislatures over the following decades. 8 By 2015, 37 percent of the seats in the National Chamber of Deputies, 40% of seats in the National Senate, and an average of about 25 percent of seats across all provincial legislatures were held by women. 9 However, quota adoption alone did not emanate either immediate or uniform increases in women’s numeric representation in all legislatures due to significant variation in legislative election cycles, the use of placement mandates, and variation in district sizes. 10 In a federal system such as that of Argentina, the decentralization of policymaking from the central government to the provincial level—especially regarding jurisdiction over health, education, and social policies—makes women’s appointment to subnational cabinet ministries

integral to understanding women’s influence over abortion reform and other reproductive rights policies. 11 Nonetheless, women are still marginalized from political party leadership posts in Argentina, and those women who have made it to executive positions—such as Isabel Perón and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner—have done so through informal institutions and under-the-table processes, both having been selected as successors to their husbands. 12 Furthermore, not all women who achieve prominent representative positions in Argentina have ushered in abortion reform. For instance, President Fernández de Kirchner was widely seen as uncommitted to promoting progressive women’s rights, as she strongly opposed abortion and took a conservative stance on reproductive rights. 13 Though gender quota laws did provide women with more representation in legislatures, they ultimately did not advance the abortion debate in Argentina, nor did having a woman in the presidential position. Rather, Argentine women’s movements were the critical actors who finally pushed for the adoption of reform. Abortion reform has occurred either when women’s movements attempted to collaborate with state institutions to push their demands, as in Chile, or when feminist movements have strengthened and mobilized for their demands, as in Argentina. The former method has resulted in a more moderate abortion reform, whereas the latter has driven more liberal abortion decriminalization. Even with a female executive, such as Bachelet who was critical to the introduction of the abortion reform bill, Chilean abortion reform remained moderate, largely because the Bachelet administration crafted the bill without the direct input of women’s movements in order to dampen more ambitious demands from women’s movements. 14 Bachelet’s second administration introduced its own abortion bill in lieu of the one proposed by MILES to Congress in 2014, despite its similarly moderate demands to legalize abortion in instances of threat to maternal life, fetal malformation, and rape. 15 The Bachelet administration conducted negotiations within the electoral coalition, which limited interaction with the existing campaigns and feminist organizations, 16 especially due to the Socialist

Party’s lack of roots in civil society and its strong Catholic influence. 17 Women’s movements alone were not capable of introducing abortion reform to the legislature, due to women’s movements’ exclusion from representation in political parties. Additionally, women’s movements were notably weakened and discouraged by the institutional legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship, which emphasized political parties and prevented social movements from organizing specific campaigns for policy reforms. 18 Therefore, the Chilean abortion reform bill ended up being more moderate, making it more likely to pass in Congress; the bill would only legalize abortion under the circumstances of a threat to the woman’s life, rape, and fetal malformations incompatible with life outside the womb. 19 Furthermore, President Bachelet played a key role in defining abortion policy through a law that allows Chilean executives to introduce bills and force a debate on them by declaring them as “urgencies.” 20 If it were not for President Bachelet’s pursuit of abortion reform via the wide legislative powers of Chilean presidents, the abortion reform bill would not have passed Congress, although institutional barriers undermined a complete collaboration with women’s movements and the Bachelet administration distanced itself from MILES’s initial proposal.

For Argentina, the predominant force pushing for abortion reform has been women’s movements, such as Ni Una Menos, which have notably demanded abortion reform through street activism, a method which has proven more effective government collaboration in mobilizing for complete abortion legalization.

When abortion reform finally rose to the forefront of the Argentine political discussion in 2018, it was under the conservative right-wing PRO president, Mauricio Macri, which shocked many because previous center-left governments, including the administrations of female executives, had not touched on the abortion debate. 21 While this political timing is perplexing, the surfacing of the abortion debate in political discussion can be explained by the strengthening of feminist movements in Argentina during this period. The implementation of abortion reform in Argentina was a consequence of strengthening feminist mobilization, which brought the abortion issue to the forefront of the political agenda and made it impossible for policymakers to ignore. 22 The Ni Una Menos movement emerged on the political scene in 2015—organizing a massive march of over 200,000 women in Buenos Aires in front of the Argentina National Congress—initially to make visible the country’s femicide issue, but it evolved to create a platform for the mobilization of Argentina’s abortion debate by allying itself with other women’s groups and forming a natural social movement base for abortion decriminalization. 23 Ni Una Menos was such a powerful abortion rights movement in Argentina because its activists framed abortion as a social justice issue, emphasizing the deaths of women due to clandestine abortions and arguing that women would undergo abortions regardless of the law, though in unsafe conditions. 24 Framing abortion as a social justice issue broadened public support for abortion decriminalization, as it illuminated the relationship between abortion rights and other injustices suffered by poor women in particular, including domestic violence and wage inequality. 25 As a result, the discussion of abortion decriminalization became more politically accessible, and in 2018, President Macri opened the abortion debate in a legislative session for the first time. 26 However, attitudes toward abortion only began to change substantially after 2018 as feminist social movements increased street protests while the legalization and decriminalization bill was debated in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. 27 As state institutions failed to meet their demands, Argentine feminist movements became stronger, increasing political unrest and further

mobilizing women’s movements in the streets. With the prevalence of their street protests, the abortion rights movement started to garner a bloc of support in the political arena, even gaining the recognition of former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who changed her position from being against abortion decriminalization to being in favor of it and acknowledged the importance of the massive mobilizations that took place in Argentina. 28 Thus, Argentina exemplifies the significance of feminist mobilization in pushing abortion reform onto the political agenda in the instance when collaboration with state institutions fails to enact any change, or to enact change that is radical enough to champion women’s reproductive rights to the greatest extent.

Women’s movements have been the most critical actor in lobbying for full abortion decriminalization, with or without the state’s support, though feminist movements’ attempts to collaborate with state institutions has resulted in more moderate abortion decriminalization. The ability of women’s movements to form productive connections with state institutions has largely depended on the country’s institutional rules for the participation of women in government to facilitate the success of legislative bills for abortion reform and place female politicians in positions of power where they can act as state allies. The failure of a state to collaborate completely with women’s movements may even serve to strengthen and mobilize these movements further, as demonstrated in Argentina. Understanding how women’s movements have successfully demanded full abortion legalization in Argentina may inform women’s movements in other countries, in the Americas and beyond, on how to effectively advance women’s reproductive rights.

References

1 Cora Fernández Anderson, Fighting for Abortion Rights in Latin America: Social Movements, State Allies and Institutions (Routledge, 2020), 41.

2 Susan Franceschet, “Informal Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Chile (1990-2015)” in Gender and Representation in Latin America , ed. Leslie A. SchwindtBayer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

3 Mariela Daby and Mason W. Moseley, “Feminist Mobilization and the Abortion Debate In Latin America: Lessons from Argentina” in Politics & Gender (2021), 1-35.

4 Francescet, 8.

5 Ibid, 9.

6 Ibid.

7 Anderson, 97.

8 Tiffany D. Barnes and Mark P. Jones, “Women’s Representation in Argentine National and Subnational Governments” in Gender and Representation in Latin America , ed. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 2.

9 Ibid, 8.

10 Ibid, 13.

11 Ibid, 10.

12 Ibid, 12; Gervasoni, Carlos. “Argentina’s Declining Party System: Fragmentation, Denationalization, Factionalization, Personalization, and Increasing Fluidity” in Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse , ed. Scott Mainwaring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 258.

13 Barnes & Jones, 18-19; Gudiño Bessone, Pablo. "Los Debates Por La Legalización Del Aborto En Argentina. Notas Sobre La Relación Entre La Iglesia Católica Y Los Distintos Gobiernos Presidenciales En Democracia (1983-2018)," Apuntes (Lima) 47, no. 87 (2020): 94-96.

14 Anderson, 120.

15 Ibid, 97.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid, 98.; Valenzuela, J. Samuel, Somma, Nicolás, and Scully, Timothy R.“Resilience and Change: The Party System in Redemocratized Chile'' in Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse , ed. Scott Mainwaring (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 150.

18 Anderson, 104.

19 Ibid.

20 Anderson, 101.

21 Daby & Moseley, 2.

22 Ibid, 3; Gudiño Bessone, 99-100.

23 Daby & Moseley, 8.

24 Ibid, 13.

25 Ibid, 14.

26 Ibid, 16; Gudiño Bessone, 99.

27 Daby & Moseley, 20; Gudiño Bessone, 99.

28 Daby & Moseley, 28; Gudiño Bessone, 101.

Hispaniola and Climate Change

by SARAH LOPEZ

The week of August 16, 2021, Haiti was hit with a 7.2-magnitude earthquake that caused an estimated death toll of nearly 1500 people. 1 The country was already reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic, the political crisis following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, and the 2010 earthquake, which continues to challenge the country. The Dominican Republic, the neighboring country on the island of Hispaniola, has not suffered to the same extent as Haiti. The countries were established at similar moments in time with similar histories, yet Haiti is constantly devastated by tropical storms, hurricanes, and earthquakes—disasters that also hit the Dominican Republic. In comparison to Haiti, the Dominican Republic has been more adept at recovering from natural disasters. As climate change worsens, islands like Hispaniola will continue to suffer from extreme climate catastrophes. If Haiti is unable to recover from an earthquake that occurred over a decade ago, it will likely fare far worse in the future as natural disasters ensue with increased frequency. Examining the root causes of Haiti’s severe vulnerability will allow for a better understanding of how Haiti can work to prevent such destruction in the wake of natural disasters more effectively. While both countries on Hispaniola have similar

backgrounds, the lasting effects of colonialism on Haiti, the lack of efficient implementation of environmental policies, and the tense politics on the island and within the country affect Haiti’s ability to recover and support its population after the many natural disasters the country has endured in the last two decades.

Hispaniola’s history is fraught with slave revolts, violence, and many government overthrows. The 1791 Haitian Revolution, which lasted thirteen years, toppled the French colonial elites, abolished slavery, and became a beacon of Black independence for the many enslaved Africans in the Western Hemisphere. 2 The Dominican Republic remained a Spanish colony until 1822 while Haiti occupied the capital city, Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic was under Haitian rule until February of 1844, when Dominican militants and guerilla men chased Haitians out of Santo Domingo and declared itself independent from both Spain and Haiti. After their respective declarations of independence, both the Dominican Republic and Haiti were occupied by the United States in the early 20th century, but the U.S. military occupations had varying effects for both nations.

The U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and of the Dominican Republic from

How Haiti's complex and tragic history creates an increasingly vulnerable nation

1916 to 1934 overlapped, and the U.S. controlled both countries’ economies at the same time. As opposed to the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic which saw rapid development, the U.S. occupation of Haiti was characterized by accelerated urbanization without modernization. Haitians were migrating to Port-au-Prince and other large cities in Haiti, as the U.S. centralized power in the capital and opportunities for labor became concentrated in the larger cities. However, due to the racism Haiti faced from the large powers in the international sphere that deeply affected its standing, Haiti was unable to access the technology that many countries developing in this era utilized to keep pace with modernization. On the other two-thirds of the island, the Dominican Republic was experiencing industrialization and rapid economic growth because it did have access to the American technology that worked to remodel many developing economies. The Dominican Republic appealed to American interests and aligned with the capitalist United States during the Red Scare. After the American occupation of the island, both nations underwent dictatorships—again with varying consequences. The dictatorship of Francois Duvalier in Haiti resulted in an inefficient bureaucratic system and an even more cemented distrust in the central government from the Haitian population. 3 The Trujillato , the reign of Rafael Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic, while incredibly violent and authoritarian, continued the trend of economic growth and increased public education and literacy rates. The Haitian dictator Duvalier did not as there were rarely any opportunities for foreign corporations to buy and develop land in Haiti—the Dominican Republic, however, did provide land for foreign corporations, which helped the Dominican economy grow, though often at the expense of the local businesses. Despite having been the first nation in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery through a successful slave revolt, Haiti is, and has been since the 1990s, at the mercy of foreign aid and intervention. The racism that faced the Black Republic after its independence severely impacted its first fifty years as a new nation in the global sphere which also affected its development in the 20th century. 4 The white and predominantly

slaveholding countries at the time, such as the United States and France, refused to grant Haiti its sovereignty, limiting the country’s main form of income—agricultural exports. With plantation slavery, Haiti was a primary exporter of sugar and coffee, and without recognition of sovereignty, global markets were largely unavailable to the nation. In 1824, the French recognized Haitian independence with the condition that Haiti would need to pay 150 million francs—the equivalent of $21 billion—within five years as reparations for France’s loss of profit since it would no longer be able to exploit Haiti and use slave labor. 5 In the first century of its existence as an independent state, Haiti’s revenue from its limited agricultural exports went to paying off the debt instead of investing in infrastructure and public goods like education, healthcare, and job security. The debt to France was paid off in 1947. 6

The other persisting structures of plantation slavery and colonialism are present in the statebuilding of Haiti like the hierarchical divisions based on race—where mulatto , or mixed-race, people formed the elite class and the freed blacks were often working-class and below the elites. 7 Cities were reserved largely for the mercantile, mulatto elite while many freed blacks were pushed to rural areas and then forced to work on agricultural land owned by mulattos , similar to the share-cropping system in the southern United States. 8 The reliance on agricultural exports, developed under colonialism and maintained after Haitian independence, influenced Haitian statebuilding in that most cities and locations with jobs were developed along the coast instead of spread across the nation’s territory. The Haitian coast is along a fault line, so while geography does play a role in Haiti’s vulnerability to climate catastrophes, the disasters are more devastating because the majority of the population and labor live along the fault line where most large and destructive earthquakes occur.

Geography also plays a role in the permeation of guerilla tactics in Haitian society. The mountainous regions of the island were useful during the initial slave revolts that garnered Haiti’s independence. Guerilla tactics continued to be used throughout the nineteenth century as the

Haitian population often violently protested the government that was only interested in protecting elite interests. 9 Guerilla tactics developed an extreme distrust of the Haitian government amongst Haitians, and the distrust of government has cemented itself as a social norm of Haiti now. The structures rooted in the colonial years of Haiti were further exacerbated by U.S. occupation in the early twentieth century and Haitian political elites catering to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). U.S. occupation of Haiti centralized political power and economic power in Port-auPrince, where many mercantile elites lived. 10 This centralization of power in one city of Haiti led to the neglect of other provinces. The country’s inability to access technology that would modernize the nation because of racism from the U.S. and France, who would not acknowledge Haiti, led the country to be underfunded. Haiti was also still working to pay off its debt to France at this point. The already weakly connected country began to crumble at this centralization of power due to the neglect of the other provinces. As power was centralized in the capital, black Haitians migrated from rural areas to the capital to find work, and many mixed-race elites fled to rural areas. This migration caused the population to concentrate in urban areas, so when a natural disaster hits these urban centers, like the earthquake in 2010 that hit the capital, the disaster decimated much of the population.

The American presence in the early twentieth century was then replaced by NGOs in the middle of the century to provide financial aid to the Haitian population. The Haitian American Voluntary Association estimates that in 1984, about 200 to 300 NGOs were working in Haiti. In 2010, that number was estimated to be 10,000. 11 These NGOs are often viewed as an extension of state power, especially in a government as weak as Haiti’s, because these NGOs work in areas considered to be government responsibilities, such as healthcare, water distribution, and natural disaster recovery. NGOs also tend to operate out of foreign interest as they receive funding from former colonial powers like the U.S. and the U.K., and this conflict of interest—working in Haiti but also keeping funding—is not beneficial to the Haitian

population long-term. 12 These organizations are unsuccessful in providing long-term and concrete aid to Haiti, as shown by their long duration in Haiti—the first recorded NGO arriving in 1954 after a hurricane. 13 The continued inefficiency of the government to provide its population with recovery and prevention from natural disasters led the Haitian political elite to pander to the NGOs as they had the resources to, in the short term, provide relief for the Haitian population. 14 In contemporary times, Haiti’s political elite depends on NGOs instead of working to restructure its inefficient systems.

The difference in climate vulnerability between the two nations on Hispaniola largely relates to state development as climate adaptation is “limited by institutional rigidity, governance inefficiencies, or pathway dependence,” meaning the development of efficient bureaucratic systems is largely what determines a nation’s vulnerability to natural disasters. 15 Efficient government structures can implement environmental policies effectively and educate the population on prevention and aid, which decreases the state’s vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change. Due to the Dominican Republic’s dependence on ecotourism as well as its colonial history based in land-holding and ranching, instead of crop plantations like in Haiti, the concept of land protection and conservation has deeper roots in Dominican politics. 16 The implementation of reforestation in the Dominican Republic is one of the earliest forest conservation laws in the Western Hemisphere, and the robust forest protection policies were further enforced through the authoritarian government of the dictator, Trujillo. 17 The culture of forest protection, as well as the implementation of public school enrollment—both figures cemented through an authoritarian and violent regime—point to an efficient government in terms of natural disaster aid and education around climate. 18 The racist colonial structures that prioritized the mulatto elite add to Haiti’s climate vulnerability as elites often owned the land previously used by the French colonials for slave labor, which needed to be cleared to continue with agricultural exportation of sugar and coffee—an economic system created under French colonization. 19 Currently, just 1.25 percent of the

Haitian territory is covered by forests. 20 In Haiti, deforestation remains necessary to clear land for agricultural exports and for the charcoal that is the country’s primary form of fuel. 21

The Dominican Republic in the last century and recent years has also inhibited Haiti’s development. The tension between the two countries on the island is fueled by racism and anti-Blackness, which was exacerbated by the Trujillo dictatorship’s aim to appeal to inherently racist eurocentric ideals. In recent years, the Dominican Republic has revoked the citizenships of hundreds of Dominicans because they could not trace Dominican ancestry from 1929. Many Dominicans who have Haitian grandparents or great-grandparents are now being deported to Haiti in droves, further destabilizing the country and putting more economic strain on the nation. The Dominican Republic’s actions indirectly affect Haiti’s vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change by putting more strain on an already crumbling government.

In addition to infrastructure issues and tension on Hispaniola, Haiti also experiences extreme political instability, which has worsened in the last five years when President Moïse came to power in 2017 after a contested election. 22 New presidential elections were expected in March 2021, but the politician demanded his term end in 2022 as it took a year for him to officially take

office—a demand that reminded Haitians of the Duvalier dictatorship. 23 Moïse dissolved Parliament and consolidated all his power by dismissing the country’s elected mayors. 24 He was assassinated on July 7, 2021, throwing the nation into even more political instability in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Grace and an earthquake earlier that week. The interim Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, plans to hold elections swiftly, but much of the population fears that elections will not be held amid the violence that currently grips the capital city. 25

As Haiti attempts to recover from the recent events, the continuation of a dangerous pattern can be seen. There is a repetition of what occurred in the twentieth century—American policy and intervention creating harmful repercussions as U.S. policymakers continue to operate in their national interest and not help the Haitian population in the long term. In July 2021, following the assassination of Moïse, the U.S. announced its intention to send a “Special Envoy” to Haiti to aid “Haitian and international partners [in facilitating] long-term peace and stability and support efforts to hold free and fair presidential and legislative elections” as well as “work with partners to coordinate assistance efforts in several areas, including humanitarian, security, and investigative assistance.” 26 Like NGOs did after Duvalier’s dictatorship, the Special Envoy is meant to assist in many areas considered the Haitian government’s responsibility and yet, there are no concrete actions in this announcement of the Special Envoy. Haiti is already shrouded in uncertainty, and American intervention only adds to the uncertainty. In the same month, the United States deported over 7,000 Haitian migrants. 27 The strain that these now 7,000 people will put on Haiti is an extremely harmful move on the side of the United States, who is aware of the political instability and violence that is rampant in Haiti currently. 28 This policy move was condemned by many, including the head of the Special Envoy team who resigned in protest of the U.S.’s immigration move amongst other reasons, leaving the fate of Haiti in more uncertainty. 29 The recent disasters and the mishandling of American aid in response to the current political upheaval in Haiti demonstrate how ineffective foreign intervention can be in a country with such a complex history.

The historical complexities of Haiti inhibited its development as a state. The nation suffered through persisting racist structures and inefficient bureaucracy, which was worsened by a century-long debt to a colonizer and destroyed Haiti economically. It is vulnerable to climate disasters because of deforestation, which is a product of the colonial plantation system as land needs to be cleared of trees to make room for Haiti's agricultural exports. Policy change and cooperation is difficult because the population does not trust the government, another by-product of colonialism. A by-product of U.S. occupation, Haiti’s weakly connected institutions create vulnerability and force Haitians to consolidate in urban centers. As a result, natural disasters become devastating because the death toll is higher when there are more people concentrated in one area. Keeping in mind the complexities of Haiti’s struggles, future analysis should focus on the intricacies of state failure that originates in the very beginnings of Haiti’s existence as well as how to protect the population from climate catastrophe while working around a failed state. The assassination of Moïse provides the opportunity for an overhaul of the government, which can then work long-term to recover from the myriad of natural disasters that have and will continue to plague the nation.

References

1 “Haiti earthquake: Tropical Storm Grace hampers rescue,” BBC, 17 August 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-latin-america-58222888#:~:text=Tens%20of%20 thousands%20of%20people,unknown%20number%20 are%20still%20missing.

2 Mark Schuller, “Haiti’s 200-year Menage-a-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society,” Caribbean Studies 35, No. 1 (2007).

3 Francois Pierre-Louis, “Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti,” Journal of Black Studies 42, no. 2 (2011).

4 Hans Tippenhauer, “Freedom is not enough: Haiti’s sustainability in peril,” Local Environment 15, No. 5, (2010).

5 Robert Fatton Jr, “Haiti in the Aftermath of the Earthquake: The Politics of Catastrophe,” Journal of Black Studies 42, No. 2 (2011).

6 Mark Schuller, “Haiti’s Unnatural Disaster,” Humanitarian Aftershocks in Haiti (Rutgers University Press, 2016).

7 Ibid.

8 Schuller, “Haiti’s Unnatural Disaster.”

9 Tippenhauer, “Freedom is not enough.”

10 Schuller, “Haiti’s Unnatural Disaster.”

11 Pierre-Louis, “Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti.”

12 Schuller, “Haiti’s 200-year Ménage-à-Trois."

13 Pierre-Louis, “Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti.”

14 Ibid.

15 Mimi Sheller, Yolanda M. Leon, “Uneven socioecologies of Hispaniola: Asymmetric capabilities for climate adaptation in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” Geoforum 73 (2016).

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ewout Frankema and Aline Mase, “An Island Drifting Apart: Why Haiti is Mired in Poverty while the Dominican Republic Forges Ahead,” Journal of International Development 26 (2014).

19 Ibid.

20 Tippenhauer, “Freedom is not enough.”

21 Ibid.

22 Laurel Wamsley, “Even Before Jovenel Moïse's Assassination, Haiti Was In Crisis,” NPR, July 7, 2021.

23 Ibid.

24 Maryam Gamar, “What the assassination of Haiti’s president means for US foreign policy,” Vox, July 10, 2021.

25 Anthony Esposito and Daniel Wallis, “Haiti since the assassination of President Moise,” Reuters, 14 August 2021.

26 Ned Price, “Announcement of Daniel Foote as Special Envoy for Haiti” (Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, 2021).

27 Diana Beth Solomon, “Migrants' hopes dashed by surprise deportation to Haiti from U.S. border,” Reuters, 8 October 2021.

28 Ibid.

29 Yamiche Alcindor, “U.S. special envoy to Haiti resigns, citing ‘inhumane’ deportation of Haitians,” PBS, 23 September 2021.

AFRICA

Editor's Note

Though Africa is often inaccurately considered a homogenous region, the following articles explore diverse topics spanning from international human rights to meaningful political shifts in the region. Contributors examined the harmful anti-LGBTQ+ laws and homophobic tendencies that plague West Africa, Uganda's open-door refugee policy, and the implications of Tanzania's political transition after Magufuli's shocking death. Together, these pieces expose the continued diffusion of progressiveness throughout African politics. From discriminatory policies and progressive refugee laws to democratic state-building in East Africa, we hope to demonstrate the diversity and development of the African political sphere from unique angles.

LÉA NAMOUNI, CAS '23

Furthermore, the Middle East section examines the cultural, environmental, and economic factors that form modern Middle Eastern politics and society. Through deconstructing The Egyptian Coffee House , Hanadi explores coffee houses' cultural and political implications in Egypt. Keegan draws from the literature on hydro-terrorism and resource politics in the Middle East to address the imminent consequences of the climate crisis in Syria and Iraq. With a book review and a call to action, the Middle East section utilizes academic frameworks to discern the basis of substantial political conflicts in the region.

Senior Editor, Africa & Middle East

Hospitality for a Price Uganda's "Open Door" Policy Toward Refugees

by DIANA RENO

In the eyes of international media, political scientists, and the United Nations, Uganda has the most progressive refugee policy in the world. In the 1960s, Uganda created a refugee settlement program with lofty economic and social integration goals, leading them to welcome thousands from Poland, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Sudan. 1 Today, estimates put Uganda’s current refugee population at over one million. 2 Refugees are accepted in Uganda, but they are also free to move around the country, obtain jobs, open businesses, and access social services, including schools and healthcare. 3 Most refugees are given modest homes and small plots of land to farm. 4 This generous allotment allows refugee families to acquire food and generate income by trading their surplus crops with Ugandan merchants. The development of self-reliant refugee settlements aims to create communities of settled families that are not dependent on Uganda’s resources and aid for survival.

In 2021, Uganda made international headlines for agreeing to take in 2,000 Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan’s government. The United States asked Uganda to be a stopover for the refugees, promising financial support for three months—September through December 2021—until the United States and Canada processed incoming visas. The United States Embassy in Kampala publicized their gratitude, posting to Twitter that “the Government

of Uganda and the Ugandan people have a long tradition of welcoming refugees and other communities in need.” 5

Amidst this sea of praise, some scholars argue that the situation in Uganda is anything but ideal. Ugandan citizens are remarkably poor, and resources are stretched thin between citizens and refugee settlements. Moreover, President Yoweri Museveni allegedly operates one of the most corrupt governments in the modern state system. His regime holds close and complicated political ties to the United States, making their refugee-hosting collaboration significant. There has been speculation that the Ugandan government’s kindness towards refugees may be a publicity tool to draw attention away from Museveni’s

allegedly brutal suppression of political opposition during the last election season. 6 In light of this information, one has to make a difficult decision: should Uganda still be considered a progressive role model for humanitarian refugee policy? Perhaps more importantly, can Uganda maintain its high level of refugee support without first addressing the dark political undertones that make it possible? Uganda’s self-reliant refugee policy will lose its viability if its proponents do not resolve the administrative, historical, and foreign policy factors corrupting the program.

Uganda’s refugee settlement program could not have lasted as many decades or hosted as many migrants without the overwhelming support of the Ugandan people. Many native Ugandans feel solidarity with displaced refugees, due to their own experiences with mass displacement. Warlord Joseph Kony’s insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the early 2000s terrorized citizens, abducted children to become soldiers, and mutilated and murdered untold numbers of Ugandan and Sudanese people. Around 1.8 million individuals were internally displaced, profoundly impacting how Ugandans perceive refugees to this day. 7 Empathy for incoming migrants has allowed for the development of mutually beneficial trade relationships and a collective willingness to share Uganda’s few resources. Many Ugandans take great pride in these amicable relationships and their nation’s openness to refugees. 8 Economic

integration also plays a crucial role in the success of Uganda’s refugee communities. Refugees are often able to trade with Ugandan merchants, who prefer their lower-priced agricultural products. Many long-term refugees start small businesses that employ both Ugandans and other refugees. This economic interdependence encourages Ugandan citizens to be supportive of their nation’s inclusive refugee policy. Recently, however, popular perception of refugees has shifted. Despite moderate economic growth, Uganda remains plagued by poverty, especially in and around refugee host communities. These communities live in extremely poor conditions with limited access to fresh water, food rations, and other necessities. Due to the overextension of resources, the national government recently reclaimed plots of land from some permanently settled refugees, leaving many incapable of feeding their families or generating income. 9 In certain cases, the food scarcity reached such a dire level that some refugees were forced to return to the countries they fled. In the northern region especially, conflict over water access and food caused tensions among citizens and refugees. 10 Unpredictable patterns of flooding and droughts have wrought havoc on the agricultural sector, leading disgruntled Ugandans to now work for refugees in exchange for some of their government-provided food rations. In July 2017, a group of Ugandans blocked water trucks

from reaching a refugee settlement in protest of the disproportionate allocation of resources to refugees. 11 If the Ugandan government does not publicly recognize the unmet needs of their citizen population, the Ugandan people will continue getting hungrier and more discontent. Regardless of whether they direct that anger at the politicians or the refugee settlements, the government will eventually be forced to take notice.

As an additional point of contention, the influx of Afghan refugees has awoken concerns of conflict spill-over into Uganda. Conflict spillovers occur when refugee warriors and armed exiles continue military activities within host countries. 12 The last thing Ugandans want is the newly empowered Taliban turning their attention to the nation sheltering Afghanistan’s expatriates. Fear of terrorist attacks like the bombings of Kampala in 2010 has dampened enthusiasm around the incoming 2,000 Afghan refugees. 13 Failing to acknowledge the Ugandan people’s concerns around new refugee communities causes internal distrust of the refugee settlement system. This loss of public support detracts from the efficacy of the refugee program as a whole.

The current administrative failures plaguing Uganda’s refugee settlement program are strongly interconnected with the nation’s fluctuant history of refugee support. Throughout these changes, Uganda’s ruling body has consistently used refugees to gain power, legitimacy, and international funding. In 1971, Idi Amin, the “Butcher of Uganda,” staged a military coup to become the president. His reign was marked by extreme violence, expulsion of the Asian business community, and collapse of the national economy. 14 Amin used refugee populations to grow his power and influence by recruiting soldiers from countries like Sudan, Rwanda, and the Congo. These countries continue to experience substantial refugee movement into Uganda today. Amin created, and later modernized, several refugee settlements that are still in use. He also oversaw Uganda joining the 1951 Refugee Convention and created the Determination of Refugee Status Committee. Despite his reputation for violence within Uganda, Idi Amin was praised for his commitment to the human rights of refugees at

every level of authority extending up to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 15

In the wake of Idi Amin’s rule, Uganda struggled to maintain the crumbling refugee settlements that the UNHCR created but could not sustain. 16 Milton Obote, deposed as acting president of Uganda in 1971, became president again in 1980. Obote appealed to the International Conference on Refugees in Africa for more funding, but concerns about the mistreatment of Rwandan refugees hindered his efforts. 17 Uganda experienced Rwandese immigration by the thousands in the decades leading up to the Obote II period, forcing the government to build more refugee settlements and hire additional administrative and technical staff. 18 The strain on government resources resulted in a significantly reduced quality of life for Rwandese in Uganda. Additionally, the 1980 election made clear that the Rwandese voter base posed a significant threat to Obote’s party, thus Obote’s Minister of International Affairs introduced “The Alien Registration and Control Bill,” which stripped naturalized citizens of their access to the benefits of Ugandan citizenship, including the right to vote. 19 The bill implicitly gave Ugandan citizens permission to abuse and seize land from settled Rwandese “aliens.” Even as Uganda continued to support refugees in developed settlements, Rwandese refugees under Milton Obote were forced to run for their lives.

In 1986, Yoweri Museveni seized the presidency, ruling Uganda ever since. This abrupt regime change seemed like a promising opportunity to improve the quality of life for refugees in Uganda because Museveni showed commitment to refugee support programs as a national development issue. 20 His novel approach to refugee settlement laid the groundwork for the United Nations’ development and adoption of the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The Declaration outlines a “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework,” which pledges the UN’s commitment to supporting countries that host a large number of refugees. 21 Similar to the former presidents, Museveni tried to use the large-scale influx of refugees to garner financial support from the international community. In June 2017, Museveni collaborated with UN Secretary-General

Antonio Guterres to co-host the Refugee Solidarity Summit in Kampala. Based on the overwhelming international support for the New York Declaration and the increase in refugees seeking shelter in Uganda, Museveni seemed to be in an advantageous position to ask for more pecuniary support in the international community. This led him to set a goal to raise $2 billion for maintaining refugee settlements in Uganda. By the conclusion of fundraising, Uganda only received $358 million. 22 Despite all of the praise Uganda received in the wake of the New York Declaration, simply continuing to host and support refugees would not win Museveni the international funding he had hoped to receive. This encounter changed the way Museveni approached refugee policy, and Museveni would go on to alter his policies with the apparent intention of gaining more money and power. In pursuing his goals, Museveni often uses Uganda’s long-term commitment to refugee support as leverage in the sphere of foreign policy. Take, for instance, the relationship between Uganda and the United States. The two nations maintain a close relationship, despite the United States sanctioning Uganda in April of 2021 for “undermining the democratic process” in their most recent election. Museveni faced serious allegations by his political opposition, Bobi Wine, of kidnapping, torturing, and killing Wine’s supporters. The United States acknowledged that violence was committed against members of the democratic political opposition and members of the press, along with significant election tampering. 23 However, these sanctions did little more than appease the American public’s

desire to defend democracy. Ugandan-American relations were quickly repaired with the United States financially supporting the 2,000 Afghan refugees that Uganda is temporarily hosting. Both the United States and Uganda have valid reasons to stay in each others’ good graces. Museveni provides the United States with regional enforcement to further U.S. interests in East Africa. Museveni readily sends troops on behalf of the United States to regions such as Somalia, South Sudan, Congo, and Burundi in order to influence regional conflicts. The United States is also following a popular trend among wealthy nations of outsourcing refugee management to client African countries in order to avoid xenophobic backlash. This system works well for the United States, as it has someone to clean up its messes in Africa and the Middle East while keeping its voter base content. 24 Though Uganda expends significant resources in providing these services to the United States, the relationship remains beneficial by giving Museveni access to international funds and influence. Instead of focusing on his party’s human rights abuse allegations, the international press praises Uganda for its progressive refugee settlements. Moreover, Museveni reframes his image as the protector of displaced Afghans. Considering how quickly the United States lost interest in sanctioning Uganda, Museveni effectively has permission to continue dismantling Uganda’s democracy so long as he continues doing favors for the United States. As a useful ally of the United States, Uganda increases its political and diplomatic standing in the international system.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, taking in refugees for the United States is financially beneficial to Uganda. The United States ensures that Uganda has continuous access to large IMF loans, which play a critical role in supporting Museveni’s regime. The United States offered to financially support the 2,000 Afghan refugees as well, which resulted in the refugees being sheltered in five-star hotels. Considering the significant lack of resources for the settled refugees and Ugandan citizens, this program seems absurd. However, considering Museveni’s apparent interest in maintaining a strong relationship with the United States, this exorbitant display of dedication serves his purpose. 25 The Ugandan national government is not committed to promoting the well-being of all refugees within its borders, causing an imbalance in the refugee support program that makes it unstable long-term.

Change under Uganda’s current autocratic regime would likely be slow-moving and face substantial resistance. However, if Uganda opened itself to resolve the current political and developmental issues within its refugee settlement program, the nation would benefit. One possible solution would be to create a refugee settlement system independent of the national government. Future research should examine which aspects of the broken current system could function outside of direct government control. Moreover, researchers should analyze the contrast between different phases in the history of refugees in Uganda, such as periods of more or less funding and popular support, to demonstrate how a theoretical nonpartisan organization may meet the needs of both Uganda’s refugee and citizen populations. The separation of refugee management and government may not be a politically viable solution for Uganda, but it would promote the humanitarian objectives that the international community admires in Uganda’s self-reliance refugee system. Uganda could be the model for treating refugees with basic human decency. As it exists now, Uganda’s refugee policy is too encumbered with administrative, historical, and foreign policy deficiencies to remain viable.

References

1 Ahimbisibwe Frank, “Uganda and the Refugee Problem: Challenges and Opportunities,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 13, no. 5 (2019): 63.

2 Sulaiman Momodu, “Uganda Stands out in Refugee Hospitality,” African Renewal (2018-19).

3 The World Bank, “Uganda’s Progressive Approach to Refugee Management,” The World Bank (2016).

4 Ulrike Krause, “Limitations of Development-Oriented Assistance in Uganda,” Forced Migration Review (2016): 52.

5 Isaac Mugabi, “Arrival of Afghan Refugees in Uganda Raises Security Concerns,” DW: Made for minds (2021).

6 Ibid.

7 Christopher E. Bailey, “The Quest for Justice: Joseph Kony & the Lord’s Resistance Army,” Fordham International Law Journal 40, no. 2 (2017): 247.

8 Tessa Coggio, “Can Uganda’s Breakthrough RefugeeHosting Model Be Sustained?” The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute (2018).

9 Melanie Gouby, “What Uganda’s Struggling Policy Means for Future of Refugee Response,” The New Humanitarian (2017).

10 Coggio, “Can Uganda’s Breakthrough Refugee-Hosting Model Be Sustained?”

11 Gouby, “What Uganda’s Struggling Policy Means for Future of Refugee Response.”

12 Frank, “Uganda and the Refugee Problem: Challenges and Opportunities,” 66.

13 Mugabi, “Arrival of Afghan Refugees in Uganda Raises Security Concerns.”

14 Christopher Riches and Jan Palmowski, “Amin, Idi,” in A Dictionary of Contemporary World History (5 Ed.).

15 Alexander Betts, “The Political History of Uganda’s Refugee Policies,” Refugee History

16 Byaruga Emansueto Foster, “The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda,” Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (1989): 150.

17 Betts, “The Political History of Uganda’s Refugee Policies.”

18 Emansueto Foster, “The Rwandese Refugees in Uganda.”

19 Ibid.

20 Betts, “The Political History of Uganda’s Refugee Policies.”

21 UN Refugee Agency, “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (2018).

22 Coggio, “Can Uganda’s Breakthrough Refugee-Hosting Model Be Sustained?”

23 Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Imposing Visa Restrictions on Ugandans for Undermining the Democratic Process,” U. S. Department of State (2021).

24 Nyasha Bhobo and Kudakwashe Magezi, “As Afghan Refugees Grow Increasingly Desperate, Museveni’s Uganda Sees Lucrative Gains,” The New Arab (2021).

25 Ibid.

AFRICA

In the Wake of the “Bulldozer”

What the aftermath of the Magafuli regime says about the future of Tanzania

by BELLA NEWELL DANIEL PAGET

Lecturer in Politics, Department of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Aberdeen, and Author of “Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide” in the Journal of Democracy (2021) and “Again, making Tanzania great: Magufuli’s restorationist developmental nationalism” in Democratization (2020)

“I appreciate the effort made to grapple with the contestable and open question of President Hassan’s presidency, in the context of Magufuli’s presidency and the longer legacy of CCM rule. In my judgement, this essay captures a variety of issues at stake in contemporary Tanzanian politics.”

When John Magufuli took office as the President of Tanzania in 2015, he promised to make change. Early on, his policies attempted to curb government spending, crack down on corruption, and modernize the country. He was applauded by Tanzanian and international onlookers alike for these actions, and reporters dubbed him the “Bulldozer” for his brazen razing of unnecessary frivolities. 1 He was exactly the type of man Tanzania needed to continue their projected and much discussed upward trajectory. But by March of 2021, when he unexpectedly died in office, the headlines read differently. Instead of bringing political change to

Tanzania, Magufuli had led the country down an increasingly undemocratic path.

His replacement, Samia Suluhu Hassan, became the first female President. To many, she is a welcome replacement, a strong matriarch sent to usher in a new democratic age. To others, she is simply a less embedded, less brash version of Magufuli. In the months since his death, her regime has been equally lauded and criticized domestically and internationally, with many still unsure what to make of her. However, in examining the downfall of Magufuli and the rise of Hassan, one can better understand how her presidency should be evaluated, as well as the impact that her regime may have on both the current and future Tanzanian political sphere. Situated in the center of East Africa, Tanzania has long held geostrategic and political importance in the region. It is one of the largest countries in Africa, with an emerging middle income economy, relatively stable civil history, and tradition of involvement in regional affairs. There are regular elections and opposition parties are legally allowed, but they are often suppressed and have never ascended to the office of the presidency. One party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has dominated politics since the founding of the country and was historically widely-loved, due to its association with founder Julius Nyerere. The first President of an independent Tanzania, Nyerere was a well known advocate for inclusivity, unity, and various political freedoms. However, he also framed multi-party politics as contrarian and divisive, thus ingraining one party rule into the fabric of Tanzanian politics.2

In recent years, the CCM has lost some level of public support. Although Magufuli was elected by a large majority, this majority was considerably smaller than many of his predecessors. The perceived weakening of the CCM, even if it is only relative, is often used to explain why Magufuli massively increased autocratic practices during his time in office. The most notable of these actions was his widespread crackdown on opposition parties (specifically Chadema, the second largest party in the country). 3 Under Magufuli, opposition party leaders were regularly arrested, detained, and tortured. One representative, Tundu Lissu, was almost assassinated. Throughout the media, there were numerous accusations of state sponsored killings. 4 In the years Magufuli was in office, there were also ongoing media bans, as well as degradation of the general political climate in Tanzania. While no reporters were killed, several were jailed or went missing following shallow arrests, which caused a decrease in reputable reporting on the opposition parties. Additionally, Magufuli’s government closed numerous media sources without reason—three websites and a newspaper in 2019 alone and fifteen total since he came to power. 5 This situation became so bad that in 2020, after an election marred by accusations of manipulation, intimidation, violence, and fraud, only forty-three of the 393 seats in Parliament were occupied by parties other than the CCM (compared to 133 in 2015). 6 Most recently, his inflammatory speeches preaching Covid-19 denial and refusal to put preventative measures

in place lead to a massive outbreak in Tanzania. These actions and others caused his reputation to shift from that of a no-nonsense, corruption fighting “bulldozer” to the President “waging war on democracy.” 7

Prior to becoming President, Hassan had already made history as the first Tanzanian female Vice President. However, her career actually started with activism, not politics. She began in her native Zanzibar, an island archipelago that has a high degree of autonomy from the mainland, where she worked for the Association of NonGovernmental Organizations in Zanzibar. 8 At the time, she focused primarily on ensuring Zanzibaris had access to basic

provisions and social services, such as food, water, and healthcare. 9 In 2000, she won a special seat in the Zanzibar House of Representatives, and in 2010, the countrywide National Assembly. 10 Her nomination to the Vice Presidency in 2015 was a major attempt by Magufuli and the CCM to appeal to a broad base of support, and followed the institutionalized pattern of leadership in Tanzania; a Christian President typically selects a Muslim Vice President, or vice versa. The appointment resolidified this traditional compromise and added a gendered component to it, which appeared to signal the CCM was ready to take a more aggressive stance on women in government.

While Magufuli’s leadership seemed to increase division, Hassan spent her time as Vice President trying to increase reconciliation. She expanded the role of the VP past its mostly ceremonial limits in order to do the work that Magufuli often refused to do, such as meeting with world leaders or opposition party representatives. 11 When Tundu Lissu was in the hospital recovering from his assasination attempt, she was the one sent to visit him and symbolically bridge the gap between Chadema and the CCM. 12 In the media, she was framed as Magufuli’s foil, calm and levelheaded in a crisis, thoughtful and considerate. But with Magufuli’s actions consistently making negative headlines, she often became a side note in the saga of his downfall. Now as the president, she is in the spotlight.

So far, Hassan’s new government has pursued an inconsistent approach towards Magufuli’s legacy. In many ways, the government has torn apart his policies, making strong strides to distance themselves from his authoritarian measures. Hassan’s Covid-19 stance is perhaps the most shocking example of this adjustment. Magufuli made headlines internationally for his virulent denial of Covid-19, refusal to close off the country to outside visitors, and condemnation of vaccines. Almost immediately after coming to power, Hassan led a series of initiatives to aggressively clamp down on the spread of Covid, including appointing a taskforce to create new legislation and beginning a massive vaccination drive. 13 She has also attempted to make some peace with the opposition by appointing their representatives to roles within her administration. When pressed by senior CCM officials, she told her party it was “necessary to build unity.” 14 She has seemingly also loosened restrictions, or at least the enforcement of them, on the media, with many Tanzanians claiming freedom of the press has increased greatly in the months since Magufuli’s death. 15 She mass pardoned over 5,000 prisoners, which further solidified the shift from Magufuli’s perceived tough on crime image. 16 In terms of internal politics, she has expressed her desire to expand access to social services while also moving towards increased financial independence. 17 Additionally, she is once again welcoming conversations with important regional allies, which is a marked shift from Magufuli’s isolationist stance. The East African Community, which Tanzania is a founding member of, had been severely weakened under Magufuli’s regime, with him only visiting other EAC member states five times in five years. 18 In three months, Hassan visited three. 19 Her economic policy has similarly shifted. Along with visiting regional partners, she has also aggressively pursued international investors, and in preparation, has requested the Investment Bureau take on sweeping reforms. 20 More domestically, she has taken a heavy handed approach in economic restructuring, leading the Bank of Tanzania in their interest rate decrease and meeting regularly with members from the Tanzanian Private Sector Foundation. 21 In terms

of her perceived pursuit of greater women’s rights, she has welcomed more women into positions of power in the government, such as Dr. Stergomena Tax (the first female Minister for Defense and National Service), Dr. Ashatu Kijaji (the Minister for Communications and Information Technology), and six other female cabinet ministers. 22 While this is a stance which many expected she would take, it has been welcomed by Tanzanians nonetheless. Her appointments are also emblematic of a departure from Magufuli’s regime, albeit in a different way. When making her ambassadorial appointments, many of Hassan’s candidates have been holdovers not from the Magufuli regime, but from his predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete’s. 23 There is a substantial divide within the CCM between Magufuli and Kikwete loyalists, and although Magufuli supporters have more concrete power, Hassan has shown that she is welcome to include Kikwete supporters, and even the former President himself, in her policy discussions. 24 However, the most important appointments, most notably her Vice President, have largely been from the Magufuli camp.

Although there have been many changes, there have also been meaningful similarities. Early on in her Presidency, Hassan was especially quick to highlight the ways in which she was similar to Magufuli. It’s understandable why she would attempt to craft this comparison. While he was a widely divisive figure in Tanzanian politics, Magufuli did maintain a decent sized following, even throughout his descent into greater authoritarianism. This domestic backing was not only propped up by his harsh anti-corruption policies and economic progress, but also by the historical support many Tanzanians have for the CCM. Her instinct to draw parallels between her and Magufuli may have just been to garner greater support in the party. Still, many argue she has yet to begin reversing some of his more repressive doctrines. Many laws regarding the opposition or the media have yet to be overturned, and there were several notable arrests of opposition party leaders this fall. Additionally, Hassan has failed to initiate the writing of the new constitution and when asked about it, has shifted the focus to other issue topics. 25 Negotiations over constitutional reform began

in 2010 under former President Jakaya Kikwete but completely ceased under Magufuli. 26 The proposed reforms, which have been championed by opposition parties like Chadema, would limit the powers of the President and better institutionalize human rights and the rule of law into Tanzanian governance. In refusing to engage with the calls for reform, she is falling in line with one of Magufuli’s most undemocratic stances. Furthermore, many believe that her strides towards gender equality in government have not been aggressive enough. Although she increased the number of women in government positions, so did Magufuli. 27 Under him, 17.4 percent of Cabinet seats were held by women; under Hassan, that number has only increased to 21.7 percent. 28 All of these points make many wonder if her regime will truly mark a departure from Magufuli’s, or if it will eventually settle into the same patterns.

There is evidence that Tanzanians believe the new administration is doing more for the government than the previous. Afrobarometer studies published after Hassan took power show that over 75 percent of Tanzanians believe that the government is headed in the right direction, compared to 62 percent in 2017. 29 Both of these numbers show a massive improvement from 2014, when that same statistic was only 25 percent of the population. 30 This dichotomy highlights a major conflict in Tanzanian politics—while Magufuli was condemned internationally and by opposition supporters, his actions, especially at the beginning of his rule, were widely supported by the people. To many, he marked a major change in Tanzanian politics. In many ways, Hassan is now being framed similarly, except instead of being praised for her anti-corruption tactics, she's being portrayed as the leader of a new (post-Magufuli) era. Magufuli used his initial popularity as a tool to leverage more political power for his personal goals, and Hassan is now in a similar position. She has a strong potential to make change in Tanzania, but there are still several contrasting lenses from which to view her rule.

On one hand, she could continue to retract some of Magufuli’s more controversial and oppressive policies, paving the way for greater political competition and openness within the

country. She has brought forth significant changes so far, many of which seem to return Tanzania to its pre-Magufuli politics. As a woman, she is uniquely primed to usher in major changes to women’s rights, both within the CCM and the greater Tanzanian population. Her more rational persona will undoubtedly make her much easier to work with internationally, and she has previously demonstrated the capacity to appeal to (or at least cordially approach) opposition parties. If Hassan is able to restabilize Tanzania’s international relations and restore some semblance of their global credibility, it is likely she will be able to direct the country down a constructive path. Especially within East Africa, Tanzania has a strong potential to be a model for other countries, and many of Hassan’s changes suggest she could be heading in that direction. In the past, she has made progress (or at least attempted to) to bridge the gap between the CCM and Chadema, but her rhetoric about reconciliation has been confused since entering office, which is evidenced by both her failure to begin the new constitution writing process and her Magufuli-esque arrests of opposition leaders.31 If she is able to be the leader to step forward and usher in greater opposition participation and freedoms, she may very well be able to bring forth a new era of multi-party politics. In a case like Tanzania’s, it is almost impossible for such changes to take place without prodigy and support from the government in power. Alternatively, she could fall back into Magufuli’s patterns. The CCM has an incredible grip over the Tanzanian political sphere, and Hassan will ultimately need their support to remain in power. Magufuli’s autocratic changes limited the rights of many Tanzanians, but they also kept the executive branch strong and the CCM dominant. If Hassan sees the need to maintain these elements of his legacy, she may have to slip into some of the same practices he did. If Hassan proves to be a hardline party loyalist, there is strong evidence that she will do very little to challenge the inherent structures of patriarchal power. While she may be able to make smaller reforms, she will be inherently beholden to her party’s politics. Given how ingrained the CCM is in the Tanzanian government, this will likely be exacerbated even further. If the party is to decrease in popularity

during the course of her regime, it is much more likely that she will lose power. 32 Additionally, while Magufuli was a longtime party loyalist, Hassan has only been in the CCM since 2010. 33 Because of this gap, she has fewer embedded loyalties in the party and much more to prove to CCM elders. Dr. Aikande Kwayu, a social scientist in Tanzania, argues that this may force her to appeal to their more traditional policies, even if it comes at the cost of greater modernization or change. 34 Alternatively, the CCM may use her new regime as a tool to signal “rhetorical change” within the party, without actually making any concrete concessions. 35 Dan Paget, a lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, argues this type of relationship with the CCM may cause her to turn out even more authoritarian than Magufuli. 36 This summarizes another major conflict in Hassan’s presidency which undercuts many of these arguments; that of rhetoric vs. real change. Although Hassan has expressed support for numerous causes (women’s rights, opposition support, renewal of the media) over the course of her rule, she has brought about only surface level reforms in these areas. 37 In other areas, such as the writing of the constitution, she has made no real changes at all. Kwayu also supports this interpretation of Hassan’s actions, which severely contrasts the idealized vision of Hassan as a harbinger of democratic reforms in Tanzania. Gender also plays a major role in understanding Hassan’s relationship with the CCM. While there are a relatively stable number of women in politics in Tanzania, this is not independent of political strategizing and maneuvering. Within the Tanzanian legislature, there are a number of special seats (in 2016, 30% of them) reserved for women as a part of a quota system. 38 This system was designed primarily by the CCM, and because they have the formal legitimacy to select women to run for these special seats, they are able to help more women be elected than any other opposition party. In this way, women are better able to obtain positions of power, but their very presence in those seats upholds the dominant party system. Ultimately, this creates a system where women in government are inherently indebted to parties which, in the case of the CCM, use them as political pawns. 39 Hassan herself is an example of this; she was not

Magufuli’s original choice for the Vice Presidency and was, in fact, only put up by the CCM after two female candidates, Asha-Rose Migiro and Amina Ali, finished closely behind him in the primaries. 40 Understanding this dynamic adds yet another level to Hassan’s relationship with the party, and again, could explain her need to remain close with them. Hassan is a unique case; the group of female presidents in East Africa is small. While not necessarily rare, there have only been a handful of female presidents across the entire continent, and many of them have only served interim terms. When looking for examples of female leadership in post-autocratic regimes, there is really only one example to follow. Joyce Banda, the former president of Malawi, was the country’s first female President, coming after leader, Bingu wa Mutharika, who many perceived as authoritarian. Banda was a welcome surprise to many, as she quickly embraced the international community, advocated for shockingly liberal reforms to maternal healthcare and LGBTQ+ rights, and drastically increased the number of women in government. But despite these seemingly positive reforms, she was unable to survive accusations of corruption. Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa, a lecturer at the University of Malawi, argues that although similar accusations had plagued her predecessors, her status as a woman led her to be hypercriticized by her opposition for details that were routinely overlooked by her male predecessors. 41 If Hassan is aware of this pattern, it may explain why, despite her attempts at reform, she refuses to sway far from the CCM’s platform. In a state like Tanzania, with one party firmly embedded in the fabric of the country, staying close to them may ultimately save her from the fickle whims of the people, especially if they are inherently biased towards her from the beginning. The last interpretation engages the least with Hassan directly and instead focuses on the history of the Tanzanian political system. The idea that Tanzania was becoming increasingly democratic prior to the Magufuli years is often touted to emphasize how much the country shifted under him, but while Magufuli did increase autocratic measures, the country was by no means a perfect model of democracy prior to his regime taking over. In 2010, a Polity report concluded that “despite the

introduction of multiparty competition in Tanzania in 1992, the CCM retains its hegemonic hold over the institutions of governance [in Tanzania].” 42 While it didn’t find evidence of widespread electoral violence or intimidation, it did find that the CCM was only “willing to tolerate the existence of a multiparty political system” and that “it continues to actively bias the playing field against its political challengers.” 43 Similar evidence can be seen in a 2011 study, which found that the 2005 election, initially deemed “clean, free, and fair” actually had a wide number of hidden irregularities. 44 When viewing Hassan’s regime through this lens, it is much harder to anticipate her making any major changes, as the system she works within has been inherently flawed from the beginning.

When he was first brought into office in 2015, many Tanzanians believed Magufuli would bring about much needed changes to the country. It is only with time and hindsight now that we are able to see how his legacy impacted Tanzania. While Hassan holds much potential to make change, time will be able to tell what her actual legacy is. When asked recently about her leadership style compared to Magufulis, she simply said, “As we go forward, the government [will be] based on strong action and not noise.”45 Ultimately her commitment to strong action above rhetoric may, in the long run, set her apart from Magufuli as a welcome reformer. However, greater research and more time is still needed to understand how Hassan’s regime will be shaped by Magufuli’s legacy, Tanzania’s history, and her own identity.

References

1 Hamza Mohamed, “Bah Humbug in Tanzania as President Cancels Xmas Cards,” Poverty and Development News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, November 27, 2015).

2 Jaimie Bleck and Nicolas Van de Walle, Electoral Politics in Africa since 1990 Continuity in Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

3 Kizito Makoye, “Tanzania Arrests Opposition Leader Ahead of Protest,” Anadolu Ajansı (Anadolu Agency, November 2, 2020).

4 Dan Paget, “Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide,” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 2 (2021): pp. 61-76, https://doi. org/10.1353/jod.2021.0019.

5 Reporters Without Borders, “Tanzania: ‘Bulldozing’ the Media: Reporters without Borders,” RSF (Reporters Without Borders, 2020).

6 Nicodemus Minde, “Remembering Not to Forget: Tanzania's 2020 General Elections: Democracy in Africa,” Democracy in Africa | A Resource for the Study of Democracy in Africa (Democracy in Africa, October 28, 2021).

7 Dan Paget, “Magufuli Has Been President for Two Years: How He's Changing Tanzania,” The Conversation (The Conversation, November 7, 2017).

8 Alvar Mwakyusa, “Samia Suluhu Hassan: A Tough Journey from Activism to Politics,” The National Newspaper: Daily News (Tanzania Standard Newspapers Ltd., September 17, 2014).

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Rasna Warah, “After a Year of Denial, Tanzania Responds to COVID-19 under New Female Leadership,” ONE (ONE, July 1, 2021).

14 Chrispin Mwakideu, “Tanzania: President Samia Suluhu Hassan's 100 Days in Office: DW: 26.06.2021,” DW.COM (Duetsche Welle , June 26, 2021).

15 Ibid.

16 The Citizen Reporter, “President Samia Suluhu Hassan Pardons 5001 Prisoners,” The Citizen (The Citizen, April 27, 2021).

17 APO Reporter, “Samia Stresses Self-Reliance,” Africanews (Africanews, September 4, 2021).

18 Nebert Rugadya, “Is President Suluhu the New Hope for EAC Integration?,” Uganda Radionetwork (Uganda Radionetwork, May 22, 2021).

19 Ibid.

20 Abduel Elinaza, “Tanzania: Samia Pace Woos Investors, Improves Business,” allAfrica.com (Tanzania Daily News, June 28, 2021).

21 Ibid.

22 Louis Kalumbia and Salome Gregory, “More Women Now Hold Powerful Cabinet Posts in Tanzania,” The Citizen (The Citizen, September 14, 2021).

23 William Linder, “Tanzanian President's Reform Agenda Faces Growing Resistance,” 14 North Strategies (14 North Strategies, July 27, 2021).

24 “Magufuli's Death Offers Limited Reform Opening,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (Oxford Analytica, March 23, 2021).

25 Louis Kalumbia and Alex Nelson, “Economy My Priority, Says President Samia,” The Citizen (The Citizen, June 29, 2021).

26 Nicodemus Minde, “Tanzania's Hassan Faces Her First Political Test: Constitutional Reform,” The Conversation (The Conversation, October 18, 2021).

27 Fergus Kell and Sammy Awami, “Tanzania Sees Only Glimpses of Change by New President,” Chatham House

– International Affairs Think Tank (Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 6, 2021).

28 Ibid.

29 “Afrobarometer,” Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer, July 14, 2021).

30 Ibid.

31 Oryem Nyeko, “Tanzanian Opposition Leader, Supporters Arrested,” Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, July 22, 2021).

32 Diana Z. O'Brien, “Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 4 (October 2015): pp. 1022-1039, https://doi.org/10.1111/ ajps.12173.

33 Nic Cheeseman, Hilary Matfess, and Alitalali Amani, “Tanzania: The Roots of Repression,” J ournal of Democracy 32, no. 2 (2021): pp. 77-89, https://doi.org/10.1353/ jod.2021.0020.

34 Aikande C Kwayu, “The End of the Honeymoon in Tanzania: CCM Reverts to Type: Democracy in Africa,” Democracy in Africa | A Resource for the Study of Democracy in Africa (Democracy in Africa, August 4, 2021).

35 Dan Paget, “Tanzania: The Authoritarian Landslide,” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 2 (2021): pp. 61-76, https:// doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0019.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “Gender Equality Reforms on an Uneven Playing Field: Candidate Selection and Quota Implementation in Electoral Authoritarian Tanzania,” Government and Opposition 51, no. 3 (2016): pp. 464-486, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.10

39 Makulilo, Alexander Boniface. “‘Whose affirmative action is affirmative?’ lessons from Tanzania,” CEU Political Science Journal 4, no. 4 (2009): 607+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed October 22, 2021).

40 Omar Mohammed, “Tanzania's Ruling Party Nominates John Magufuli as Presidential Candidate,” Quartz (Quartz, July 12, 2015).

41 Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa, “The ‘Joyce Banda Effect’: Public Opinion and Voting Behaviour in Malawi,” in Women in Politics in Malawi (Zomba, Malawi: University of Malawi, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, 2016).

42 Polity, “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Tanzania,” 2010. 43 Ibid.

44 Alexander Boniface Makulilo, “‘Watching the Watcher’: an Evaluation of Local Election Observers in Tanzania,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 2 (2011): pp. 241262, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x11000036.

45 Josephine Christopher, “‘Don't Mistake Calmness for Weakness,’ Samia Tells Her Appointees,” The Citizen (The Citizen, September 13, 2021)

LGBTQ+ Rights in West Africa During COVID

A microcosm of Africa's LGBTQ+ history during crisis

by ANFANIOLUWA LAWAL

In the region of West Africa, nine of its seventeen countries have specifically outlawed LGBTQ+ activities. During the international crisis of COVID-19, the region’s LGBTQ+ community underwent a series of struggles, as multiple West African countries launched renewed campaigns against homosexual and transgender people during the first year of the pandemic. In the months following January 2020, West Africa has become a clear microcosm of the horrendous conditions experienced by the continent’s LGBTQ+ community during the crisis. Compared to the rest of Africa, West Africa’s scorn for homosexuality is not dissimilar from the rest of Africa’s attitude. With an extended analysis of West African countries’ specific activities during COVID-19, and the historical background surrounding various crises throughout Africa, clear patterns of strife can be found in the marginalized African LGBTQ+ community. Observations of the West African countries Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte D’Ivoire can reveal key patterns and models on which many African countries base their LGBTQ+ relations. When considering West Africa’s LGBTQ+ community, attention can first be directed towards Nigeria. Its nominal GDP dominates Sub-Saharan

Africa, making it one of Africa’s foremost economic powerhouses. 1 Additionally, Nigeria stands as one of the most culturally prominent countries in West Africa, containing more than 250 ethnic groups with distinct practices. 2 Despite this range of accepted cultures, the government almost universally criminalizes the LGBTQ+ community. Nigerian laws aimed to disrupt the LGBTQ+ community have become cultural institutions since the early 90s, with the maximum jail sentence of anyone who engages in same-sex acts set at fourteen years. 3 Even supporting someone who’s part of the LGBTQ+ community can carry a punishment of up to ten years in jail. 4 AntiLGBTQ+ institutions have only worsened since the turn of the twenty-first century, steadily taking root in Nigerian culture. Though legal institutions give constant anxiety to the Nigerian LGBTQ+ community, very few Nigerian citizens have been sentenced to jail for homosexual acts, despite increased awareness of the LGBTQ+ community over the years. Even if someone is arrested for activities deemed vulgar, it is often too difficult for a court to find empirical proof of these activities. So, if Nigerian laws haven’t been enforced, what keeps the LGBTQ+ community in hiding? In truth,

the country relies on its individual communities to independently silence the LGBTQ+ community. If local law enforcement suspects an individual, they may simply expose them to people in their local community instead of arresting them. In place of legal practices being used to punish LGBTQ+ civilians, citizens take matters into their own hands by verbally and physically attacking LGBTQ+ individuals, considering them pariahs in their own communities and driving them out. Additionally, Nigerian newspapers will print the names of suspected homosexuals in hopes that a community may run out offenders. In 2014, a newspaper published in northern Nigeria revealed the names of homosexual men who had planned to form an LGBTQ+ association in their region of Bauchi State. Using the released information, religious leaders publicly denounced these men to Bauchi State citizens, and police forces used the released names to locate and arrest any co-conspirators not mentioned in the paper. Finally, while being transported to court for trial, a crowd of Bauchi State citizens surrounded the courthouse and began throwing rocks at the building, in an attempt to sway the courts to sentence the men to death. The stoning grew so vicious that police officers had to fire their weapons in the air to disperse the crowd, and the trial date was postponed to dissuade further civilian retaliation. 5 Through the printing of one local newspaper, the exposed men became pariahs

not only in their local communities, but the entirety of Bauchi State. News about a closeted homosexual community member abroad in less sexually restrictive countries can even circulate back to Nigerian communities and illicit violent action from domestic community members. 6 Because of the community imposed isolation, Nigerian courts rarely have to act on their laws, as the people will act for them.

With Nigerian citizens willing to judge and punish LGBTQ+ individuals without governmental oversight, it becomes apparent why the lack of enforcement of laws is a nonissue in Nigeria, and it becomes clearer why the LGBTQ+ community had no chance to rest during the pandemic. A 2021 American Psychological Association study led by Nigerian social scientists found that Nigeria’s lockdown forced LGBTQ+ individuals into unwelcoming communities without the reprieve of gatherings of like-minded peoples, exacerbating mental strain in the community in the long run. 7 For example, Nigerian safe houses for LGBTQ+ youths were entirely filled in the early months of the pandemic, with availability offered only to people who were exiled from their communities. 8 Feelings of isolation during COVID-19 were theorized to worsen the mental health of the LGBTQ+ community considerably, more than straight or cisgender Nigerians. Due to these feelings of community isolation, LGBTQ+

Nigerians have been identified as uniquely at-risk during the pandemic. 9

Nigeria’s support of vigilantism and isolationism put upon the LGBTQ+ community is not an issue unique to the country. In September 2017, the Egyptian government dealt with a movement involving youth raising rainbow flags at public events. Homosexuality is not specifically illegal according to Egyptian laws, but people have been convicted for homosexual acts and LGBTQ+ support under the effect of breaking laws of public decency. Despite a tacit understanding of Egypt’s laws on homosexuality, multiple people waved rainbow flags at a concert. The day after the concert, Egyptian media independently identified the people waving flags and broadcasted their names over official news sources, leading to 84 individuals being arrested and imprisoned in horrifying conditions. Those who weren’t arrested were harassed both online and in their own communities. A few individuals who waved the rainbow flag had more extensive information revealed about them by the media, including lesbian activist and writer Sarah Hegazi. With her personal information revealed and the nation’s eye focused on her, she was arrested and detained for three months. During this time, she was tortured and sexually assaulted with the full authorization of Egyptian authorities. After being released on bail and fleeing to Canada, Hegazi committed suicide on June 10, 2020, after suffering from PTSD from her detainment. 10 The general mental health of LGBTQ+ youth in Egypt almost universally declined after the Rainbow Flags incident, with depression and paranoia becoming more prevalent in the Egyptian LGBTQ+ community. 11 Unlike Nigeria, Egypt formally sentenced many of the Egyptians who waved the flag. But similarly to Nigeria, the Egyptian community mobilized, without prompting from the official government,

to identify anyone who waved the rainbow flag and punish them.

In these two examples of the weaponization of fear, the African governments did not have to do all the work identifying and punishing individuals viewed as dangerous to social health. Instead, private citizens voluntarily identified, harassed, and suppressed LGBTQ+ individuals. Media played a pivotal role, as the increasing interconnectedness of the world allowed for easy access to individual identities. But, Egypt and Nigeria are far from the only African countries to rely on the power of community to identify and squash civil liberties for the LGBTQ+ community. Even countries with no laws explicitly banning homosexuality can have local customs that allow a community to have the final say on the life of homosexual or transgender people. What can be done to not only protect the LGBTQ+ community in these situations but let the community thrive? Part of the answer lies in actual protections assigned by the government, including making all discrimination illegal and providing government-sponsored centers where the community can gather in safety. The most difficult part of this societal upheaval would be the education of civilians in these countries. In both Egypt and Nigeria, over 90 percent of the population believes that homosexuality has no place in society. 12 At this point, concerted efforts would

need to be made at every level of society to rapidly place protections on at-risk LGBTQ+ people. West Africa’s role as a small-scale demonstration of the LGBTQ+ community during the crisis continues with Ghana’s aggressive campaign to introduce anti-LGBTQ+ legislation during the summer of 2021. Ghana, much like Nigeria, holds considerable influence over the Western region of Africa and stands as the only West African country in the “medium quality of human development” section of the UN’s Human Development Index. 13 Despite its international standing, Ghana has consistently criminalized the LGBTQ+ community. Though homosexual acts can carry a legal penalty of up to three years in prison, almost no one has been convicted in the twentyfirst century. However, Ghana stands firmly on its anti-LGBTQ+ policies when asked to loosen or repeal its laws. After a group of LGBTQ+ activists organized at a Ghanaian hotel and the government was unable to prosecute them for advocating for the LGBTQ+ community, Ghana immediately set out to correct the gap in its laws by creating the “ Promotion of Proper Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill” in July of 2021. 14 This bill, if enacted into law, would punish activities or identities deemed “incompatible with the sociocultural values of any ethnic group in Ghana” and would not only outlaw promoting LGBTQ+ communities but would also criminalize intersex

people and doctors who attempted to conduct gender reassignment surgeries. 15

Ghana’s recent draft bill is an untimely move for the LGBTQ+ community, especially as rapid mobilization from within Ghana to combat the bill seems impossible during the pandemic. Although this bill has no official connection to COVID-19, its supporters have reached for connections from the pandemic to fight against the LGBTQ+ community. Speaker of the Ghanian Parliament Alban Babgin defended the Family Values Bill by explicitly invoking the image of the LGBTQ+ community as its own pandemic, saying, “I can tell you that [the LGBTQ+ community] is more than COVID-19, and I am happy that our beloved country, Ghana, is together in this.... Ghanaians have spoken with one voice, and we don’t want to do anything that has to do with LGBTQ+ activities.” 16

Much like how Nigeria’s state of fear was similar to LGBTQ+ experiences across Africa, quotes like Speaker Babgin’s are not new. Homosexuals have been analogized with pestilence and death for centuries. Instead of being a natural part of life, homosexuality is portrayed as a virus that can affect social health if not properly confronted. In a more harrowing interpretation of African crises, sickness can be seen as a divine reaction to the impurity of homosexuality. One of Africa’s more recent health crises, the 2013 to 2016 West Africa Ebola crisis, involved a

number of legitimate religious and political leaders accusing homosexuals of incurring ebola on all of West Africa through sexual immorality. Infamously, Liberian organizations released official statements calling ebola a heavenly reprisal on Liberia’s depravity, with the Liberian Council of Churches releasing an official statement saying, “Liberians have to pray and seek God's forgiveness over the corruption and immoral acts (such as homosexualism, etc.) that continue to penetrate our society.” 17 Statements like these directly lead to serious harassment of the LGBTQ+ community, including property being destroyed and people being exiled from their communities. 18

Viewing homosexuality as a disease has been an effective tactic against the LGBTQ+ community for decades, and the repercussions on the community with this type of metaphor cannot be understated. A whole community viewed as a disease will be treated as a disease; this includes identifying the community, destroying the community, and then creating contingencies so that the community can never take roots in the proverbial soil of a country again. The clearest way of directly combatting this is to make sure that government bodies and officials represent the LGBTQ+ community in a safe and accurate way, through public announcements and proper education on the history of LGBTQ+ people around the world.

Contrasting Ghana or Nigeria, Côte D’Ivoire has no explicit law against same-sex acts. The country has never had a regulation or statute directly focused on preventing or punishing the LGBTQ+ community since its independence. While Ivorian same-sex couples remain unable to adopt children or donate blood, Côte D’Ivoire stands as one of the only countries in West Africa, and in Africa as a whole, that doesn’t threaten legal repercussions towards same-sex relations.

Although Côte D’Ivoire’s lack of specific antiLGBTQ+ legislation is a relative improvement over surrounding West African countries, the LGBTQ+ community still didn’t escape the various impacts of COVID-19.

HIV and AIDS have disproportionately affected the LGBTQ+ community worldwide, and Côte D’Ivoire is no different. Côte D’Ivoire is

estimated to have the highest prevalence of HIV in the West African region, and a 2019 estimate of the population of HIV-affected Ivorians placed gay men as having an HIV prevalence almost six times higher than the total Ivorian male prevalence. 19 In response to this epidemic, HIV/ AIDS testing has rapidly progressed in Côte D’Ivoire, with antiretroviral therapy programs, or ARTs, receiving increased funding from the Ivorian government over the past few years. But as ARTs and other prevention programs continue to spread across Côte D’Ivoire and West Africa, system shocks like COVID-19 often distract a country’s focus from other serious health concerns, leaving some citizens without a support system or any source of assistance.

COVID-19’s effect on HIV/AIDS testing in Côte D’Ivoire was nearly immediate. Ivorian COVID restrictions were strongly enforced by March of 2020, and in a study of the pandemic’s consequences on 1,059 ART facilities spread across eleven Sub-Saharan African countries, testing experienced a 3.3 percent decline when comparing the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter of 2020. Furthermore, the amount of people receiving treatment for HIV at these facilities fell by 9.8 percent in these periods. 20 Of the ART facilities measured across the 11 countries, Cote D’Ivoire contained the second-highest number of them, with the country maintaining 14 percent of the measured facilities. 21 It is apparent that the early months of quarantine dissuaded Ivorian citizens from pursuing treatment for HIV/AIDS, causing a much heavier impact on the LGBTQ+ community compared to the general Cote D’Ivoire population. The more immediate concern of COVID-19 drew focus away from the concern of the HIV epidemic, causing those who may have needed treatment for HIV and AIDS to stay inside their homes and not attempt to travel to HIV/AIDS prevention sites. Furthermore, Cote D’Ivoire’s HIV/AIDS testing suffered funding setbacks due to its focus on financing COVID-19 countermeasures. 22 This resulted in the already at-risk Ivorian LGBTQ+ population to suffer from a disease that they had fought against for decades, while COVID ravaged communities worldwide. The draining effect of outside factors during a crisis on testing isn’t just limited to Côte D’Ivoire

or West Africa. Around the African continent, crises of various scales demand attention from both the government and civilians, leaving critical testing for HIV prevention underfunded or underutilized. From this lack of testing, the at-risk LGBTQ+ community suffers. A prominent example of this suffering exists in South Africa, the country with the highest number of HIV-affected people in the world. 23 The HIV/AIDS epidemic began to take hold in South Africa in the early 1990s and began to spiral as the South African government first denied, then struggled to find effective solutions to combat HIV/AIDS. Today, 7.8 million South Africans are reported living with HIV, while men who have sex with men are reported as having a 5 percent higher HIV prevalence than the general population of men. 24 In response, South Africa has amassed the largest ART program in the world, equipped with varied and diverse tools to stop the spread of HIV. 25 The efforts of the South African government seem to have an effect on HIV and AIDS testing. Since 2000, the amount of HIV tests taken by adults has risen by fourteen million, and HIV prevalence in those adult testers has fallen by almost 15 percent. 26 However, this progress has been inconsistent since 2000. Culture shocks in South Africa have rocked HIV testing across the country, with income inequality influencing how much HIV is tested. Measured by the Gini coefficient, used by the World Bank to measure income inequality, South Africa currently has the highest rate of income inequality in the world, creating an enduring crisis that has created barriers in South Africa for decades. 27 With such wide socioeconomic differences, a number of variables factor into HIV testing and prevention. A 2021 study measured how the South African income inequality crisis creates gaps in how low-income citizens acquire testing and remain knowledgeable on HIV compared to high-income citizens. With race, age, and gender factored in, low-income citizens generally scored lower in HIV testing and correct HIV knowledge. 28 Compounding this, LGBT+ South Africans face higher rates of unemployment and poverty than straight, cisgendered South Africans, placing them in a category that makes receiving HIV treatment difficult. 29 Income inequality not only deprived funding for measures against HIV contraction but

left many unable to reach HIV prevention sites. The sustained crisis of socioeconomic disparity then affects the general health of the LGBTQ+ community. Both Côte D’Ivoire and South Africa find themselves unable to properly support the LGBTQ+ community when in a countrywide crisis. COVID-19 and vast income inequality are two dissimilar versions of crises, but it is worth noting that the effect they can have on the LGBTQ+ community is very similar. Both deprive LGBTQ+ citizens of confronting a serious epidemic through resource drainage and impracticability of access, rendering the already at-risk population vulnerable. The answer on how to properly ensure the LGBTQ+ community is consistently receiving healthcare is a difficult question to answer, considering the wide variety of problems that can affect a country at any given time. A good step would be to ensure that LGBTQ+ health resources, including ART testing and general HIV prevention, secure proper funding in a crisis. A firm, unmoving budget for LGBTQ+ health, that couldn’t have funds diverted during economic troubles, could go a long way to ensure that the LGBTQ+ community doesn’t suffer more than any other citizen in their respective country.

Policy changes in some of the most homophobic places in the world may seem impossible to attempt when facing the sheer depth and history of anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda, but the LGBTQ+ community has always found a way to grow when faced with a crisis, even during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nigeria’s LGBTQ+ community may be forced to stay inside, but studies have found that the resilient nature of the Nigerian community will allow techniques to be developed to counter mental health problems in the LGBTQ+ community there. 30 Ghanaian LGBTQ+ activists haven’t stopped fighting against the Ghanaian government’s anti-LGBTQ+ “Family Values” bill, with some political analysts theorizing that the Ghanian president won’t keep pursuing the bill because there’s no true political benefit. 31 In Côte D’Ivoire, the decrease of Ivorians going to ART facilities quickly returned to normal levels after July 2020, and by the end of the year, civilians going to ART facilities had actually risen when compared to 2019. 32 These specific West African

responses to distress, and the responses from the LGBTQ+ community worldwide, paint a picture of adaptability and strength that frames the community not as victims but as tenacious people that continue to fight against an unjust system. The lessons learned from a region where a community is almost entirely marginalized also shouldn’t be ignored by regions where that marginalized community is more widely accepted. Tensions and biases run deep, and it can take decades for a society to truly unlearn them. By taking a look at West Africa’s tendencies and trends, even countries with comparatively good relationships with the LGBTQ+ community can improve and make society a safer place for those that need it.

References

1 “GDP (Current US$) - Sub-Saharan Africa,” The World Bank - Data. The World Bank, n.d.

2 World Book, “Nigeria,” World Book , July 9, 2018.

3 “Nigeria,” Human Dignity Trust, Human Dignity Trust, n.d.

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Nigeria: Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013,” Refworld (December 17, 2013).

5 Will Ross, “Nigerian Gay People Being Hunted Down,” BBC News (BBC, February 6, 2014).

6 The Legend of the Underground , 2021.

7 Olakunle Ayokunmi Oginni, Kehinde Okanlawon, and Adedotun Ogunbajo, “A Commentary on COVID-19 and the LGBTQ+Community in Nigeria: Risks and Resilience,” Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity 8, no. 2 (2021): 261–63, https://doi.org/10.1037/sgd0000476.

8 CJ Nelson, “How Nigeria’s COVID-19 Lockdown Affected Queer Folks,” StackPath, May 20, 2020.

9 Oginni, Okanlawon, and Ogunbajo, “A Commentary on COVID-19 and the LGBTQ+Community in Nigeria.”

10 Ahmad Qais Munhazim, “Suicide of Egyptian Activist Sarah Hegazi Exposes the 'Freedom and Violence' of LGBTQ Muslims in Exile,” The Conversation , July 10, 2020.

11 Ben Gittleson, “Fear and Paranoia Grip Egypt’s LGBTQ+Community: ‘I Want to Be Forgotten,’” ABC News (ABC News Network, November 15, 2017).

12 Jacob Poushter and Nicholas Kent, “Views of Homosexuality around the World,” Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, October 27, 2020.

13 “Human Development Reports,” Human Development Reports, 2020.

14 “Ghana Court Drops Case against 21 LGBT+ Activists,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, August 5, 2021).

15 “Draft Bill on ‘Proper Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family

Values Bill 2021’ - an Analysis by UN Independent Human Rights Experts in Ghana,” United Nations, August 12, 2021.

16 Muri Assunção, “Ghana Political Leader Says LGBTQ ‘Pandemic’ Is Worse than Covid-19 and It ‘Must Be Fought by All of Us,’” nydailynews.com (New York Daily News, July 2, 2021).

17 Misha Hussain and Maria Caspani, “Gay Community under Attack in Liberia over Ebola Outbreak,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, October 23, 2014).

18 Ibid.

19 “Côte D'Ivoire,” UNAIDS, July 22, 2021; Abhirup Datta, Wenyi Lin, et al., “Bayesian Estimation of MSM Population Size in Côte d’Ivoire,” Statistics and Public Policy 6, no. 1 (2019): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/233044 3x.2018.1546634.

20 Roger Pebody, “‘Resilient’ HIV Programmes in African Countries Have Maintained Viral Suppression during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” aidsmap.com, March 17, 2021.

21 Tiffany G. Harris, “Resilience of HIV activities during COVID-19 pandemic at health facilities in Africa,” in CROI March 6-10 2021, 62, Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections, 2021.

22 “The Impact of the COVID-19 Response on the Supply Chain, Availability and Cost of Generic Antiretroviral Medicines for HIV in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” UNAIDS, June 22, 2020.

23 “The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic,” KFF, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, March 2, 2021.

24 “South Africa,” UNAIDS, July 12, 2021.

25 “HIV and AIDS in South Africa,” Avert, April 15, 2020.

26 Leigh F. Johnson, Craig van Rensburg, Caroline Govathson, and Gesine Meyer-Rath. “Optimal HIV Testing Strategies for South Africa: A Model-Based Evaluation of Population-Level Impact and Cost-Effectiveness,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (September 2, 2019), https://doi. org/10.1038/s41598-019-49109-w.

27 “Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” The World BankData, The World Bank, n.d.

28 Sean Jooste, Musawenkosi Mabaso, Myra Taylor, Alicia North, Yolande Shean, and Leickness Chisamu Simbayi, “Socio-Economic Differences in the Uptake of HIV Testing and Associated Factors in South Africa,” BMC Public Health 21, no. 1 (August 26, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889021-11583-1.

29 S.N. Nyeck and Debra Sheperd, “The Economic Cost of LGBT Stigma and Discrimination in South Africa,” Williams Institute (Williams Institute, December 1, 2019).

30 Oginni, Okanlawon, and Ogunbajo, “A Commentary on COVID-19 and the LGBTQ+ Community in Nigeria.”

31 Agence France-Presse, “Ghana's President in Tight Spot over Anti-LGBT Law,” VOA, September 2, 2021.

32 Harris, “Resilience of HIV activities during COVID-19 pandemic at health facilities in Africa.”

MIDDLE EAST

Refugees, Hydro-Terrorism, and Unstable Governments Syria and Iraq's climate crisis

by KEEGAN MITSUOKA

Climate change is one of the most pressing and consequential issues of this generation. The arid Middle East has been particularly susceptible to dangerous temperature spikes and droughts, patterns that will only worsen if no action is taken to slow global warming. Scientists predict a 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit increase in the region by the end of the twenty-first century. The Arab Center of Washington D.C. states, “the Middle East is the most water-stressed region in the world: in fact, 70 percent of the world’s most water-stressed countries are in MENA.” 1 The agricultural sector is severely threatened as water becomes more and more scarce. Water scarcity also threatens human life through crop failures and limited access to potable water. Although violent wars and political conflict drive the Middle Eastern refugee crisis, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees predicts that climate change will be a primary cause of future emigration. 2 Syria and Iraq are two specific states experiencing the debilitating effects of climate change, and many experts contend that warming temperatures exacerbate the countries' internal unrest and political instability and create international conflicts.

From 2006 to 2011, a severe drought in Syria disrupted the livelihoods of countless rural civilians, forcing them to abandon their livestock, crops, and homes to seek refuge in Syrian cities with additional access to resources. This sudden flood of migrants into urban areas “ quickly overburdened aging infrastructure and sanitation,” thus inhibiting their long-term capacity to support individuals. 3 Drought cycles in Syria are becoming more frequent, occurring every eight years as opposed to fifty-five. These extreme weather

patterns have catastrophic effects on Syria’s internal stability. 4 A recent theory describes the Syrian Civil War as a “climate war,” citing that migration to cities exacerbated the “internal socio-economic stresses which underpinned the country’s…ultimate descent into war.” 5

With Syria’s cities as a tinderbox, a single spark could set the country aflame. The Arab Spring, which swept the Middle East in 2010 and 2011, provided that spark. In March 2011, prodemocracy demonstrations erupted—protesting corruption, high unemployment, and President Bashar al-Assad’s repressive regime. Assad’s government suppressed protestors with deadly force, intensifying the conflict and plummeting Syria into war. What began as a two-sided conflict rapidly escalated, drawing foreign powers and empowering rebel groups. Extremist groups also started articulating new agendas, further concerning the international community. The dramatic consequences of the civil war have necessitated a theoretical understanding of its causes. In particular, the “climate war” theory has drawn substantial scholarly debate. Like numerous scholars, Cummings believes a “combination of substandard living conditions, food shortages, and lack of water…made the Syrian uprising a virtual inevitability.” 6 Others, including Eklund and Thompson, argue that the drought does not coincide with the political conflict—they simply happened to occur at the same time. 7 Despite the debates about the accuracy of the “climate war” theory, climate change undoubtedly contributes to Syria’s social tensions and political insecurity.

The drought directly led to massive refugee flows. Professor Amery of the Colorado School of Mines asserted that it was not the 2011 Civil War that forced Syrians to migrate to Lebanon; instead, it was the drought that caused initial movement. This drought caused farmers working in agriculture to relocate from Syria’s Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo, Al Haksa, and Dayr Az Zawr provinces to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, which has a more moderate Mediterranean climate. With an estimated 1.5 million Syrians living in Lebanon, a state facing massive economic and political troubles, Syrian refugees have faced backlash from Lebanese citizens. The arrival of Syrians “[threatens] the

country’s confessional governance and stability.” 8 Lebanon’s confessional government system is based on a delicate balance of power between ethnic and religious groups, a proportion which the arrival of millions of Syrians may disrupt. Lebanon's political system remains stagnant and unresponsive, with corruption stoking massive economic crises, so Lebanon cannot willingly accommodate additional migrants. The situation in Lebanon will further deteriorate if Syrians continue needing new homes away from lands drained of water.

Since the early 2010s, radical groups have weaponized water access against Syrians facing water insecurity and extreme heat conditions. The Euphrates River, which flows through Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran and is essential for irrigation, agricultural productivity, electricity, and drinking water, has recently fallen victim to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also known as ISIL, ISIS, and IS). Scholars call this insurgent tactic of depriving populations of water needed for survival “hydroterrorism,” while Warner and Zeitoun term a general strategy of dominating water resources “hydro-hegemony.” Hydro-hegemony is “hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment.” 9 Countries and groups may exploit power asymmetries through treaties, military force, or infrastructure construction. ISIS’s quest for hydro-hegemony began in 2013 with the capture of Syria’s Tabqa Dam, which provides drinking water and electricity to five million people, including those in Aleppo, the country’s most populated city. 10 ISIS has used its hydro-hegemony to enable acts of hydro-terrorism. Once ISIS controls a dam along the rivers, they contaminate water, retain water behind dams to dry certain areas, or release water behind dams to cause flooding—all in an attempt to gain power and political legitimacy. 11 The extremist group also aims to harm who they call “infidels,” opponents of their mission, by cutting their water supply.

In a National Geographic documentary series, Parched , scholars look at the security implications of ISIS using water as a weapon against civilians. A woman interviewed in the episode stated that ISIS wouldn’t let individuals

near the Euphrates. Those who attempted to obtain water from the river would be shot, and if one were unlucky enough to be detained by ISIS instead, they would be beheaded. 12 The group has also charged people for water, using that income to build their military and recruit vulnerable farmers whose livelihoods have been cut off by the drought. 13 In this way, environmental stressors enable ISIS to exert control over the population in Syria. A similar water crisis is occurring in Iraq. The water level of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the most important sources of water in Iraq, have decreased 30 percent in the past three decades, with scientists pointing to a potential 50 percent reduction by 2030. 14 The drop in available water affects the Mosul and Haditha dams’ ability to create hydroelectricity. Officials also fear the collapsing of food systems as farming lands dry, which would exacerbate Iraq’s existing problems. Since 2014, millions of Iraqis have become internally displaced or sought refuge in neighboring countries as a result of both economic and environmental issues and sectarian violence. As a result, domestic tensions have risen considerably over water supplies as armed groups eye dams and reservoirs. In 2015, ISIS “closed the gates of a dam in the Iraqi city of Ramadi that they seized...posing a humanitarian and security threat.” 15 Closing the Ramadi dam gates enabled ISIS to lower the Euphrates’ water level, allowing them to exploit the river to achieve military goals and move more easily from one place to another. Using water as a weapon, the Islamic State can destroy downstream areas, even without direct military control. ISIS has also given water to neglected populations in an effort to gain their support. Supplying these individuals with much-needed water and electricity “increased the legitimacy and credibility of the militia as a state-like entity.” 16 The pattern of ISIS's hydro-hegemony in Iraq is similar to that in Syria. The same environmental stressors that strengthen ISIS in Syria have contributed to its power in Iraq. However, the weaponization of water for political or military gain is not a strategy unique to ISIS. Leaders and governments in the Middle East have carried out water wars dating back centuries. In 539 B.C., Cyrus the Great of Persia used water from the Euphrates to flood surrounding cities, allowing his

troops to cross the river and conquer Babylon. 17 In 1967, Israel seized the Golan Heights area during the Six Days War with one intention being to secure Israel’s water supply, one-third of which originates in the Golan. 18 However, the water shortages of the modern Middle East only increase the risks of interstate conflict over water.

In the last few decades, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have become embroiled in a contentious dispute over the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, which begin in Turkey and flow downward to Syria and Iraq. Negotiations between Syria, Iraq, and Turkey regarding water access started in the 1960s and ended in 1987 with an agreement that Turkey would “[release] from its dams a minimum of 500 cubic meters of water per second.” 19 Though, concerns about Turkey’s control over the water supply remain, as Turkey’s geographic position allows the state to dominate the water supply as a hydro-hegemon and control how much water flows into countries downstream.

Like Syria and Iraq, Turkey is facing low rainfall and increasing temperatures. The Turkish government has therefore sought to maximize its water intake from the Tigris and Euphrates through massive infrastructure projects. The largest is a series of dams across the Euphrates and Tigris known as the Great Anatolian Project (GAP), which Turkey began pursuing in the 1990s. One article titled “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria” states that GAP’s goals are “to harness the power of rivers to provide hydroelectricity for Turkey, to significantly expand the agricultural land under cultivation, and to increase the productivity and prosperity of the southeastern Anatolian region.” 20 However, by diverting water from the rivers, they are depriving those further south of much-needed water. In 2018, Turkey completed the Ilisu Dam, which has the ability to reduce water flow down the Tigris by 50 percent, further straining tensions between the states. To date, twelve out of twenty-two dams and fifteen out of nineteen hydroelectric plants have been completed under the GAP project. 21 As Turkey continues to construct these dams and plants, Turco-Syrian and Turco-Iraqi disputes may intensify, especially as global warming’s effects take hold of the region.

Scientists around the world predict that the Middle East will become almost uninhabitable before the end of the century if nothing is done to stop and prevent further anthropogenic-created climate change. For example, Cummings states that “temperature spikes in [the Middle East and North Africa] could reach the heat index equivalent of 165 degrees Fahrenheit, and the average duration of warm spells could increase from 16 days to 80–120 days out of the year.” 22 These extreme temperatures could lead to lower production and quality of crops and depleted water for livestock, in turn causing reduced incomes and food shortages or starvation. Thus, climate change poses an existential threat to regional economies and populations. The fragile governments in Syria and Iraq have limited capacity to implement climate change policies, but both states have taken some measures to combat the crisis. In 2017, Syria signed and ratified the Paris Climate Accords and vowed to seek foreign aid to help meet their commitments. 23 In 2020, Iraq and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) launched the National Adaptation Plan to fight against climate change by “strengthening institutional, technical and financial capacities to ensure that medium- to long-term adaptation needs are integrated into national development planning.” 24 Along with internal progress, international aid and assistance are crucial for slowing global warming. Since the United States is one of the most powerful and influential countries,

it can help improve the Middle Eastern climate crisis in numerous ways: providing aid through the Paris Climate Agreement, opening more communication lines with Middle Eastern states, utilizing American technical expertise, and funding environmental programs to educate individuals. 25 Middle East states can also enforce local initiatives to help individuals cope with the changing climate. Although the Middle East faces security threats and fragile governments, implementing small yet impactful policies that utilize cleaner energies and promote more efficient water usage can improve citizens’ lives and prevent future conflict. Dutch chemist and professor Johannes Lelieveld suggests taking advantage of the region’s abundant solar energy to generate hydrogen used to produce electricity. Sunlight can also be utilized to desalinate seawater, making it potable. He added, “investments in non-polluting and futureoriented technologies and agriculture, together with education will make societies more resilient.” 26 Additionally, less oil use within Middle Eastern states would help the environment, though this may prove difficult given that economies in Saudi Arabia and many Gulf States depend on this natural resource. Cross border agreements between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria would help ensure access to water. Unfortunately, many Middle Eastern governments are experiencing internal turmoil, placing climate change policies on the back burner. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the climate crisis

in the Middle East, but ignoring the changing environment will not make the problem disappear and further exacerbate existing challenges. The climate crisis in the Middle East has jeopardized the health and livelihoods of millions, worsening the region's existing conflicts and divides. In Syria and Iraq in particular, water shortages fuel civil war, interstate conflict, and terrorism. The security implications of climate change make the need for concerted international and regional action to reduce emissions and bolster societies’ resilience in the face of extreme weather events. Turmoil throughout the Middle East will only worsen and spread as dry-spells and heatwaves intensify. UN Secretary-General António Guterres offers a sobering reminder: “Climate change is moving faster than we are, but we don’t give up because we know that climate action is the only path.” 27

References

1 Nabil Sharaf, “Climate Change in the Arab World: An Existential Threat in an Unstable Region,” Arab Center Washington DC, March 2, 2021.

2 “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” United Nations, September 13, 2018.

3 Bradley Cummings, “‘Refugees’ of the 21st Century: Climate Change and an Uninhabitable Middle East/North Africa,” University of Denver Water Law Review at the Sturm College of Law, March 11, 2020.

4 Hussein A. Amery, “Climate, Not Conflict, Drove Many Syrian Refugees to Lebanon,” The Conversation , September 3, 2020.

5 “On Blaming Climate Change for the Syrian Civil War,” MERIP, September 29, 2020.

6 Bradley Cummings, “‘Refugees’ of the 21st Century: Climate Change and an Uninhabitable Middle East/North Africa.”

7 Lina Eklund and Darcy Thompson, “Is Syria really a 'climate war'? we examined the links between drought, migration and conflict,” The Conversation , April 28, 2021.

8 Omer Karasapan and Sajjad Shah, “Why Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Are a Crisis within a Crisis,” Brookings, April 15, 2021.

9 Jeroen Warner and Mark Zeitoun, “Hydro-Hegemony- a Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary Water Conflicts,” IWA Publishing, September 2006.

10 Fred Pearce, “Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, a Battle for Control of Water,” Yale E360, August 25, 2014.

11 “The Role of Water in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars,” Clingendael , March 5, 2020.

12 National Geographic, “Global Water Wars,” Youtube Video, 47:20, July 21, 2021.

13 “How Climate Change Is Fueling Extremism | CNN,” March 10, 2019.

14 Tobias Von Lossow, “More than infrastructures: Policy Brief water challenges in Iraq,” Clingendael , July 2018.

15 “ISIS Closes Ramadi Dam Gates, Cutting off Water to pro-Government Towns,” The Guardian News and Media, June 3, 2015.

16 “The Role of Water in the Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars.” 17 Ibid.

18 “The Golan Heights: Why it matters,” Middle East Eye, 2019.

19 “Drought in Iraq and Syria Could Totally Collapse Food System for Millions, Aid Groups Warn,” September 10, 2021.

20 Mark Dohrmann and Robert Hatem, “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria,” Middle East Journal 68, no. 4 (2014): 567–83, http://www. jstor.org/stable/43698183.

21 von Lossow, “More than infrastructures: Policy Brief water challenges in Iraq.”

22 Bradley Cummings, “‘Refugees’ of the 21st Century: Climate Change and an Uninhabitable Middle East/ North Africa.”

23 “Paris Climate Accord: Syria to Sign up, Isolating US,” BBC News, November 7, 2017.

24 “ISIS Closes Ramadi Dam Gates, Cutting off Water to pro-Government Towns,” The Guardian News and Media, June 3, 2015.

25 Peter Schwartzstein, “Bringing the Natural World into America’s Middle East Policy: Averting a Crisis Foretold,” The Century Foundation, December 14, 2020

26 “Climate change, water woes, and conflict concerns in the Middle East: A toxic mix,” Earth Day, September 8, 2020.

27 “Secretary-General's remarks at United Nations Day Concert [as delivered],” United Nations, October 24, 2018 .

MIDDLE EAST

Book Review: The Egyptian Coffeehouse Culture, Politics, and Urban Space

by HANADI AMIN

“A place for socialization and entertainment, the coffeehouse has long been associated with popular communal gatherings in both urban and rural Egypt...It is a microcosm of the larger Egyptian society with its history of multiculturalism and great diversity.”

DALIA MOSTAFA

Lecturer in Arabic and Comparative Literature in the Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies Department, the University of Manchester and Author of The Egyptian Coffeehouse: Culture, Politics and Urban Space (2020)

“This is an insightful and illuminating review of the book, and very enjoyable to read. The review covers the key ideas of the book and also expands on its main premises by integrating significant and relevant political concepts by other scholars. I quite liked how the author approaches her close reading of the book critically and raises important points about the ways in which the research can be developed in future work, particularly to show how the cafe's space across Egypt, not only in the major cities of Cairo and Alexandria, has played a crucial role in the social and political life of Egyptians.”

In The Egyptian Coffeehouse: Culture, Politics and Urban Space , authors Dalia Mostafa and Amina Elbendary conduct a provocative and multidisciplinary investigation into the “cultural centrality and sociopolitical importance” of the coffeehouse in Egypt (called the ahwa in Egyptian vernacular Arabic). Mostafa and Elbendary attempt to address what they call the “academic gap” in formal research into the subject. To this end, they employ the scholarship of numerous renowned thinkers and sociologists, including Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and Asef Bayat—to name only a few. The result is a compelling critique of a facet of Egyptian society portrayed via a masterful blend of both narrative and analytical discourse accessible to a broad audience. This article provides a review of The Egyptian Coffeehouse , in addition to a brief interrogation of its findings in light of contemporary political science theory.

The Egyptian Coffeehouse is composed of eight chapters; each examines the subject from various economic, political, artistic, historical, and psychosocial perspectives. Although the authors frequently revisit and expand upon concepts introduced early in the text (most notably, Lefebvre’s theories on “social space” as well as a number of key events in Egyptian history), a reader would not feel lost approaching The Egyptian Coffeehouse through an isolated chapter as, for instance, part of an assigned reading for a sociology or art history course. Technical and Arabic vernacular terms are clearly defined, and the text’s ample historical context is succinct and informative. However, what contributes most notably to The Egyptian Coffeehouse ’s appeal is the way Mostafa and Elbendary deftly interweave historical narrative and descriptive imagery with theoretical analysis that might otherwise feel dry

and monotonous. For instance, Chapter Three, Locating the ahwa in the work of Egyptian writers , examines Ahmed Mourad’s novel 1919 , which dramatizes multiple narratives of revolutionary activity in Egypt set against the backdrop of the real Matatya Café. From the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 to the ‘1952 Free Officers Coup,’ Mostafa and Elbendary argue that Matatya Café has become personified in the Egyptian literary canon as both a “political space” and “revolutionary” character that adapts and contributes to generations of political resistance among the Egyptian masses. This segment precedes Chapter Four, The case of Naguib Mahfouz: Storyteller of the Egyptian coffeehouse , which likewise proves an insightful read, recommended for any student of Egyptian literature and culture.

While addressing a vast range of relevant sub-topics, from Egypt’s cinematic and musical history; to the gender dynamics of the ahwa ; and the January 2011 Revolution’s impact on Egyptian civilian life, The Egyptian Coffeehouse does not claim to offer an allencompassing analysis. Indeed, Mostafa and Elbandary frequently encourage their readers to inquire beyond its scope, most earnestly in Chapter Two, Betwixt and between: The arrival of coffeeshops in Cairo as an urban phenomenon:

Popular epics soared in their popularity during this period and they were often performed at coffeeshops… did the existence of coffeeshops encourage the crystallization of these narrative traditions? Or were coffeeshops needed to accommodate these new arts?...These are some of the questions which still need further study and investigation by popular culture scholars.

Moreover, the authors warn against the temptation to assume a Eurocentric perspective by comparing the Egyptian cafe and its accompanying socioeconomic context with their French counterparts. That said, The Egyptian Coffeehouse can be critiqued for its tendency to hyper-centralize the Cairene experience, particularly in its penultimate segment, Chapter Seven, Pictures, voices and narratives of coffeehouses . Here, six residents of Cairo recount their personal experiences in the ahwa environment. Perhaps an approach of broader geographical scope—one that compares individual accounts of Egyptian coffee culture across the country’s vast socioeconomic, environmental, and political landscapes—would reveal noteworthy results.

Nonetheless, The Egyptian Coffeehouse ’s insight into the unique role of the ahwa in Egypt’s revolutionary history is incredibly revealing of the nature and organization of Egyptian civil society, particularly once examined through the lens of various contemporary political science theories. In Mobilizing Islam , for instance, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham investigates numerous obstacles to formal political participation within Egypt’s restrictive political climate. Ultimately, Wickham illustrates how limited opportunities for institutionalized democratic participation in Egypt result in the stratified distribution of the country’s civic political activity into three distinct categories. The center, defined as the state’s parliamentary structure where “legal political parties compete for

power,” precedes the “major occupational or professional interest groups” of the semiperiphery (e.g., labor unions), which itself extends toward the “periphery,” in which “all other potential arenas for collective action” operate (such as local community centers, schools, and private households).

Wickham’s theories mirror Quintan Wiktorowicz’s analysis of Middle Eastern “defensive democratization” and domestic order. In his article Civil Society as Social Control—State Power in Jordan , Wiktorowicz investigates the Hashemite Kingdom’s methods of manipulating Jordanian civil society into an “instrument of state social control” as opposed to a “mechanism of collective empowerment.” In an attempt to avert the threat of popular insurgency to the political system, and often in response to international pressures to democratize, the regime encourages the establishment of formal civil society organizations. Yet, under “defensive democratization,” restrictive surveillance apparatuses and rigid state regulations prevent genuine reform. To Wiktorowicz, this pseudoliberalization reflects a "growing trend away from overt repression” toward more subtle methods of social control in the broader Middle East.

Wiktorowicz maintains that his findings in Jordan are “almost identical” to their Egyptian counterparts, especially

with regard to the Egyptian legal context. For instance, under Law 32 of 1964— eventually replaced with the similarly restrictive Law 84 of 2002—all Egypt’s non-governmental and “semiperipheral” organizations, including private and civic associations, are subject to administration by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). Analogous to the provisions of Law 60 of 1953 in Jordan, for an organization to exist in accordance with Egyptian law, the MSA must first and foremost approve its registration. Henceforth, the government body is permitted to withhold a group’s license, as well as inspect and intervene in its activities, finances, and electoral processes for unspecified reasons. According to Wiktorowicz, such restrictions within the formal political arena incite unorthodox political participation “detached from— and opposed to—the country’s formal political institutions” of the “center” and “semiperiphery.”

The Egyptian Coffeehouse thus encourages its readers to consider: has the ahwa become a “peripheral” institution in which revolutionary activity offers Egyptian civil society an opportunity for political participation beyond the oppressive “center” and restrictive “semiperiphery”? Considering such a complex question, this article’s investigation is limited to the parallels between The Egyptian Coffeehouse ’s

numerous interviews in Chapter Seven and the sociopolitical theory outlined above. A predominant theme among many of the conversations Dalia Mostafa hosted for The Egyptian Coffeehouse between 2018 and 2019 is the spirit of collectivism and solidarity prevalent among the ahwa’s visitors, particularly during moments of revolutionary upheaval in Egypt. For instance, “Marwa” (all interviewees are cited under pseudonyms) recalls frequenting her local café with other activists during the Egyptian Movement for Change (or “Kefaya''), a grassroots coalition founded in 2004 to protest Hosni Mubarak’s presidency and regime: “The cafés,” she maintains, “were places which welcomed us.” Similarly, “Tarek” recounts his involvement in the Egyptian political sphere from an ahwa on Hussein Higazi Street:

During the long sit-in of the Property Tax workers which took place in 2009...we used to go to the ahwa there every evening. The protestors would gather there to write their demands and statements, discuss the impact of their sitin on a daily basis and make decisions on what to do next.

Furthermore, Tarek recognizes this particular café’s remarkable durability, as it would entertain more revolutionary gatherings in the future: “in other words, the café as a social and political space played a primary role in the organization” of various protests. Yet, these narratives, although powerful, do not address why coffeehouses in Egypt have adopted this function. To this end, “Michael’s” testimony provides great insight: before Egyptian cafés offered refuge to progressive civic movements, they embodied a “space for critical thinking” and debate over “religious and untouched, or taboo issues” outside the mainstream. Customers of diverse economic, social, and political backgrounds are drawn to the cafe’s low prices, particularly compared to those of restaurants popular among Egypt's upper classes. Beyond social gatherings, visitors sit “close to one another” at the ahwa during work meetings, concerts, literary seminars, theatrical performances, and more. Reflecting upon this sense

of intimacy and closeness, Marwa also points to the ahwa enviroment’s fascinating ability to cultivate social and political groups where they did not already exist:

You would go to the ahwa to have a break and then you find yourself sitting among a big group of people...and new relations would be formed; friendships and personal relations would be built; or you begin to organize activities with new people...I believe that the cafés also link different groups to one another...

The formal, rigid requirements for non-governmental associations in Egypt’s “semiperipheral” sphere are hardly conducive to this sort of spontaneous fraternization. Moreover, according to Michael, the ahwa ’s platform for the exchange of free thought and collective engagement explains why “downtown cafés were always targeted” by police and informants—a tension which only heightened during and after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Licensed or otherwise, downtown cafés fueled revolutionary fervor in the Arab Spring’s Egyptian domain by sheltering huge gatherings of people “from all age, class and gender groups”—even evolving into “temporary clinics” for the beaten, gassed, and shot—and, in turn, have become increasingly targeted by law enforcement.

Thus, the ahwa has undoubtedly emerged along the “periphery” of Egyptian civic society as a space for popular mobilization. In the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, The Egyptian Coffeehouse’s interviewees speak on the “deteriorated” conditions of the beloved ahwa and broader Egyptian civil society. As Mostafa and Elbendary reveal, "citizens feel that they are under surveillance in this seemingly free public sphere.”

Under increased government monitoring and regulation, Wiktorowitz reveals, apolitical spaces may evolve into sites of contestation between the regime and the populace. State control is simultaneously “subverted” and “reinforced” in the ahwa : while the regime attempts to exert its authority through a restrictive legal

code and its accompanying enforcement mechanisms, ordinary Egyptians repeatedly undermine state legitimacy by attending coffeehouses to engage in critical, unrestrained discourse on politics, culture, the arts, and more. This very tension, the authors argue, makes the ahwa so conducive to revolutionary activity as “public defiance” offers a “shared language” from which collective mobilization may emerge. With time, we will see what the future brings for the ahwa in Egypt as its role both informs, and is informed by, the Egyptian political climate.

Ultimately, Dalia Mostafa and Amina Elbendary’s The Egyptian Coffeehouse: Culture, Politics and Urban Space offers a valuable and engrossing exploration of historical and contemporary Egyptian culture. I highly recommend this work to any reader interested in literature, anthropology, and the broader Arab/Middle Eastern world.

Works Cited

Mostafa, Dalia Said, and Amina Elbendary. The Egyptian Coffeehouse: Culture, Politics and Urban Space . London: I.B. Tauris, 2021.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt . New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan.” Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (October 2000): 43–61. https:// doi.org/10.2307/422423.

ASIA

Editor's Note

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of Asian foreign relations has grown; with this, smaller states in Asia have started receiving increased media attention, such as coverage of the Myanmar coup in Southeast Asia and the Afghanistan crisis in Central Asia. As such, my goal as Senior Editor of Asia was to elevate the relationships between the smaller states of Asia, bringing their issues to the forefront. Additionally, writers evaluated the relationships between these states during the COVID-19 pandemic.

It was an honor to have worked with individuals who shared this goal; the Asia team has brought focus to various ongoing issues pertinent to the region and analyzed the potential to significantly alter Asian relationships on a global scale in the coming decades. We believe the following articles are vital in understanding the region and its systems, especially those who aspire to pursue a career in Asia's politics and foreign affairs.

Senior Editor, Asia

SALLONI SUNDERAJ, CAS '24

A Temporary Ban On Its Own Citizens Australia's unprecedented citizenship challenge

by NICK DI PAOLO

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia has been recognized for its distinctive approach in handling and mitigating the effects of the virus on its citizens. Canberra has adopted various measures to limit the spread of the virus. With a population of nearly twenty-six million people, 1 Down Under has been quite successful in ensuring few positive COVID-19 cases and maintaining a low death rate, especially in comparison to other developed countries. By the same token, Australians have been subjected to numerous rounds of intense lockdowns in order to potentially suppress the spread of the virus. The lockdowns have elicited a diverse range of emotions and reactions

throughout the country, and the divide in the country concerning the extent to which a government should intervene to limit the spread of the virus remains controversial. While some Australians support the measures of the Morrison government in the name of safety and mitigation, other Australians have contrasted this opinion by stating that “Fortress Australia” 2 has encroached upon their rights and liberties. Within this spectacle of finding an appropriate balance between safety and freedom, the Morrison government made an unprecedented decision concerning the rights and privileges associated with citizenship that warrants further analysis and review.

Following the mutation of the COVID-19 virus that eventually materialized into the Delta variant, India experienced a massive surge in COVID-19 cases in spring 2021, prompting Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison to intervene by imposing a new travel ban on April 27, 2021. However, the travel ban that the Morrison administration intended to impose on India had an eyebrow-raising characteristic that previous travel bans of his administration did not possess. In response to the influx of COVID-19 cases spreading throughout India, the Morrison administration announced that Australian citizens in India were not permitted to travel back home to Australia. This travel restriction levied hefty penalties for those who did not follow the mandate. An Australian could face up to five years in prison and a fine of US $46,300 under Australia’s Biosecurity Act if he or she attempted repatriation. 3 The Morrison government attempted to use the travel ban as a way to alleviate some of the burdens placed on the Australian quarantine and healthcare systems. 4 Nonetheless, one must put such an extraordinary announcement into context. India was facing monumental increases in COVID-19 transmission at this time due to the more deadly and contagious characteristics of the Delta variant. Already operating with an underfunded healthcare system, India suffered from dangerously low supplies of oxygen and became inundated with around-theclock crematoriums. There were unimaginable amounts of deaths experienced in a short period of time. In other words, Australian nationals were not allowed to leave, even when the newly discovered Delta variant engulfed and suffocated various parts of India. India already had capacity shortcomings and medical equipment issues for its own citizens, but now, thousands of Australians would have to navigate through these shortages and deficiencies to seek treatment. BBC News estimated that “9,000 Australians” 5 were stranded in India when the travel ban was announced, and, amongst these Australians, there were 600 classified as “vulnerable.” 6 Since a government is often designed to serve and protect its citizens, it can be argued that the Australian government had moral and constitutional obligations to protect its citizens when they needed help and protection the most.

Other developed countries opted for a different strategy to repatriate its citizens located in India, marking once again Australia’s distinctive approach in responding to the pandemic. On April 30th, 2021, an American presidential memo pinpointed India as the source of “over one-third of the new global cases.” 7 Rather than outright prohibiting repatriation, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany solely suspended the entry of non-citizens from India into their respective countries. 8 The Australian government’s ban on its own citizens in India, who sought to return to their homes, altered how citizenship is perceived globally and rattled the establishment of legislators and human rights activists.

The rights and privileges affixed to citizenship wield tremendous power, and various international decrees, agreements, and conferences have consistently acknowledged and protected these unalienable rights. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has established and validated thirty articles of human rights that apply to all people around the world. Article Thirteen of the UDHR boldly proclaims, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” 9 Although the UDHR is not a legally binding treaty, the declaration has garnered an ample amount of support from the international community, including Australia, which was one of the eight original drafters of the UDHR. 10 It should be noted that there is a dissenting perspective concerning the enforcement of international declarations, like the UDHR, during a time of crisis. When a crisis arises that threatens national security, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it has been argued that exceptions must be permitted in order to protect the collective security and health of the country. Australia was not alone in restricting its own citizens from being repatriated, as New Zealand also took a similar approach in temporarily banning its own citizens following the deadly developments in India. Nevertheless, The New York Times reported that it might be the “first time that Australia has made it a criminal offense for its own citizens and permanent residents to enter the country.” 11 The ability for a citizen to be repatriated has been honored and maintained for decades, as it

is considered a norm in international relations. The Morrison government, known for instituting some of the strictest border restrictions following the outbreak of the pandemic, angered some human rights activists and local community leaders of the Indian-Australian community, one of the fastest-growing communities in Australia. For instance, the largest group of new Australians citizens in 2019 to 2020 was composed of Indian immigrants. 12 Morrison’s travel ban was perceived as an overly harsh response to the COVID-19 situation, and some alleged that it unfairly targeted the Indian diaspora. As the relationship between the two former British colonies continues to grow and becomes more intertwined, it is important to understand the citizenship process and its relationship to the Indian-Australian community. The Indian Constitution currently does not allow for its citizens to possess more than one citizenship, which prompts many Indian immigrants to renounce their Indian citizenship in favor of acquiring an Australian passport. Some Indian immigrants seek Australian residency options instead. In the case of COVID-19, however, owning an Australian passport did not make a difference for those stranded in India. For example, Emily McBurnie, an Australian stuck in India as a result of the travel ban, told The New York Times that she “thought our passports would look after us,” 13 as she and her partner contracted COVID-19 while in India and might have required medical attention. In addition, McBurnie and her partner recalled the sight of makeshift crematoriums throughout the city of Delhi and “the smell of burning bodies every morning,” 14 apocalyptically representing the dire situation in India. The Australian Human Rights Commission evoked a similar sentiment that McBurnie expressed concerning citizenship and repatriation. The commission labeled the travel ban as a “serious human rights concern” and called upon the federal government to ensure that its temporary ban on its own citizens seeking repatriation is not discriminatory and only focused on the greater good of public health and safety. 15 Other Australians of Indian descent have pointed out potential areas of hypocrisy. No temporary travel bans were instituted for Australians traveling home to Australia from China, the United States,

or the United Kingdom, even when these countries were experiencing their respective waves of COVID-19 cases in 2020.

Citizens and legal residents of Australia have mostly sustained the ramifications and political fallout of the travel ban, yet the bilateral relationship between Australia and India currently remains healthy. The Australian-Indian relationship has tremendous influence in the Asia-Pacific Region. Australia has turned to India to form a stronger alliance in international affairs in recent years, especially since Australia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China has become increasingly frosty. This tension originated when Australia requested an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, which was the first COVID-19 epicenter. Since India has had strained relations with the People’s Republic of China following years of wars and land disputes, Australia and India have gravitated towards each other to seek alternatives to dependency on China for goods and services. For instance, both countries have pursued joint defense agreements, like the Australia-India Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement, and are on track to secure new trade and maritime defense agreements in 2022. 16 Australian-Indian relations were further solidified when both countries signed the Quad agreement alongside the United States and Japan. In reference to the April 2021 travel ban, Indian diplomats were not directly involved in the efforts to repatriate Australian citizens (some of whom used to be Indian citizens). Indian officials were more focused on handling the response efforts for its citizens while the virus rapidly spread throughout the country. It is possible that turmoil could arise over any future travel bans, however. India remains “Australia’s seventh largest trading partner and sixth-largest export market in 2020,” 17 as international education abroad remains a crucial component of the Australian-Indian bilateral relationship. Professor Raghbendra Jha, Executive Director of the Australia South Asia Research Center at the Australian National University, has also emphasized the importance of Australia and India’s strong Track II diplomacy, which is centered on strong levels of people-topeople interactions, 18 throughout the pandemic.

While various tariffs and trade restrictions are exchanged in a tit-for-tat manner between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, the Australian-Indian relationship remains crucial for Australia to sustain for the time being and must be considered and examined in the event of any future travel bans transpiring.

The Morrison government’s temporary travel ban against its own citizens was lifted on May 15, 2021, and repatriation flights were able to commence after the restriction period elapsed. Australian citizens, in a desperate attempt to leave India during the outbreak of COVID-19 cases, filed emergency legal challenges against the Australian government for its decision to implement the temporary travel ban. Constitutional rights, and their relationship to citizenship, were a major focus point in the cases. Despite the trapped Australians’ attempts to be granted repatriation through legal action, an Australian judge ruled that the “government had not overstepped its biosecurity powers in banning Australians from returning home temporarily.”19 In the judge’s ruling, the court recognized the influential legislative impact of Australia’s Biosecurity Act of 2015, which was labeled as a “legislative bulldozer”20 and intended to give the government, specifically the health minister, more emergency powers and privileges in order to ensure the greater health and well-being of Australia. In particular, Section 477 of the Biosecurity Act grants the health minister the ability to institute “determinations” that are deemed necessary to control the spread of COVID-19; constitutional experts have labeled the section as a “Henry VIII clause” for its ability to override laws at the federal and state levels.21 Since the expiration of the travel ban, reports concerning Australian citizens being barred from returning to Australia are no longer under judicial review and do not receive the same amount of attention in the press they once received. The immediate impacts of the temporary ban are no longer experienced, yet the long-term ramifications of this travel ban remain relevant. Australia’s unprecedented challenge to citizenship has the potential to ignite a larger conversation about citizenship during crises. It remains to be seen which rights historically associated with citizenship can become negotiable in the future for the sake of biosecurity.

References

1 Amy Gunia, “After Australia Banned Its Citizens in India from Coming Home, Many Ask: Who is Really Australian?” TIME Magazine , May 19, 2021.

2 Ibid.

3 Mike Cherney, “Some Countries Threaten Citizens With Jail if They Return from India,” The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2021.

4 Damien Cave and Livia Albeck-Ripka, “Australia Tells Its Citizens in India Amid Covid Crisis: Don’t Come Home,” The New York Times, May 3, 2021.

5 “COVID: Australians could face jail or fines if they return from India,” BBC News, May 1, 2021.

6 Ibid.

7 “A Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional Persons Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting Coronavirus Diseases 2019,” The White House, April 30, 2021

8 Cave and Albeck-Ripka, “Australia Tells Its Citizens in India Amid Covid Crisis: Don’t Come Home.”

9 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” The United Nations, Article 13.

10 “Australia and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Australian Human Rights Commission.

11 Cave and Albeck-Ripka, “Australia Tells its Citizens in India Amid Covid Crisis: Don’t Come Home.”

12 Sangeetha Pillai, “Is Australia’s India travel ban legal? A citizenship law expert explains,” The Conversation, May 4, 2021.

13 Cave and Albeck-Ripka, “Australia Tells its Citizens in India Amid Covid Crisis: Don’t Come Home.”

14 Sheri Mimis, “Stranded Aussie’s hell on earth amid India’s COVID-19 outbreak,” 9News’s A Current Affair , April 2021.

15 “Statement on Travel Ban and Sanctions on Australians Travelling from India,” Australian Human Rights Commission, May, 2021

16 Archana Chaudhary and Ragini Saxena, “India, Australia Deepen Defense, Trade Ties Amid China Tensions,” Bloomberg , September 11, 2021

17 “India Country Brief,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

18 Jha Raghbendra, “Reinvigorating the Australia-India Relationship During the Pandemic,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, May 7, 2021.

19 “Australian Court Upholds India Travel Ban,” The Hindustan Times, May 11, 2021.

20 Michaela Whitbourn, “Federal Court deals blow to India travel ban challenge,” The Sydney Morning Herald , May 10, 2021.

21 “Is Australia’s Ban on Citizens Returning from India Legal?” Scroll.in, May 5, 2021

Consensus and Clean Air

Indonesian haze policy within the ASEAN context

by SYDNEY STEGER PAK ALFAJRI

Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Riau (Riau Islamic University), Indonesia, former Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Abdurrab, and Author of “Hydrosocial rupture: causes and consequences for transboundary governance” in Ecology and Society (2021)

“This article has a strong contribution to the study of international affairs particularly on environmental issues. This is still a very relevant topic, as the land and forest fires keep burning tens of thousands of hectares of land and forest in Indonesia’s eight most fire-prone provinces.”

Transportation, manufacturing, household appliances, and industrial agriculture all share a common trait: being contributors to haze pollution, also known as air pollution, in Indonesia. The primary culprit in the case of Indonesia’s haze pollution problem is industrial agriculture in the form of palm oil and pulpwood production. Haze season produces one of the most unique facets of Indonesia’s haze pollution issue. Haze season is an annual phenomenon in Indonesia that has historically spiraled out of control, especially when Indonesia’s industrial palm oil production utilizes illegal slashand-burn farming techniques, setting peatlands ablaze. 1 Recent extreme examples of haze pollution in the form of haze seasons in Indonesia have garnered much international attention, such as the haze crisis of 2015. Massive fires raised measures of pollution to values over 2000 in some areas of Indonesia, well over the Air Quality Index’s healthy level of 100 and even the hazardous range of 301 to 500. 2 The dangerous air quality present is an issue beyond Indonesia’s borders, spreading into neighboring states such as Singapore and Malaysia, even spreading into the region as a whole. 3 The effects of haze go far beyond gray skies. Haze season and greater haze pollution in Indonesia have proven to be an extensive issue, affecting public health, corporate

regulation, and international relations. Though a long-standing issue, especially within Southeast Asia, recent domestic and international movements have put the Indonesian government’s actions under continued international scrutiny. To understand the heightened attention given to haze pollution in Indonesia compared to other environmental issues, it is essential to articulate the intense impact of haze pollution on the health and lifestyle of the general population. Studies have shown that almost all residents of Indonesia are affected by the increasingly consistent episodes of severe haze pollution. 4 The health implications of exposure to haze pollution appear in both short-term effects—such as worsening symptoms for those suffering chronic health issues including asthma and chronic pulmonary lung disease—and long-term effects—such as chronic respiratory

issues including cardiovascular issues and reduced lung development in younger individuals. 5 These health effects can be tracked to individual, extreme haze pollution incidents, such as the 2015 Haze Crisis which lead to 500,000 cases of respiratory issues alone in Indonesia. 6 Overall, residents of Indonesia lose an average of 1.2 years of their lifespan as a result of haze pollution, some even losing up to four years in certain areas. 7 Haze pollution can also become so immediately severe that some schools and businesses are forced to close until the air quality returns to a safer level. 8 Due to their severity and spread, the effects of haze pollution are felt by the general population of Indonesia more than almost any other environmental issue.

With effects this severe and the causes of said pollution mostly removed from the activity of everyday people, people in Indonesia have begun mobilizing efforts to address this issue by calling on their government to mitigate haze pollution. In a lawsuit filed in 2019, citizens of Jakarta attempted to hold Indonesia’s government accountable by suing the government for negligence in preventing haze pollution and its effects, naming Indonesian President Joko Widodo and other senior officials as defendants. This lawsuit also contained an unprecedented argument, suing for the violation of their human right to clean air.9 This case

had the potential to be a landmark in international environmental protections with government acknowledgement that negligence to stop such pollution is a human rights violation— a status with significant legal meaning. Although a district court ultimately recognized the negligence of the government in protecting its citizens, it failed to uphold the plaintiff's case in regards to identifying it as a human rights issue. Regardless, this case sparks many questions for the future of haze pollution in Indonesia, especially given the vocal calls from its citizens and neighbor states to make significant changes due to the apparent insufficiency of the steps Indonesia has taken.10 Furthermore, this lawsuit spotlighted the issue of Indonesian haze policy on the international stage.

The Indonesian government has long struggled to fix its pollution crisis, as they have faced difficulties addressing highly publicized concerns, such as those brought forward in the lawsuit. The state’s environmental policy grapples with a multitude of competing forces, including maintenance of international agreements, industry pressure to continue allowing harmful practices, and the aforementioned domestic public pressure of accountability to maintain healthy air quality levels. Additionally, haze pollution policy requires more substance than basic environmental regulation. It must also include industrial standards, disaster

management, and agricultural policy. 11 Finally, haze pollution legislation must be properly implemented and enforced across all levels - local to transnational. Also, since industrial agriculture is a major part of the Indonesian economy, the Indonesian government must choose between prioritizing economic or environmental policies, and finding middle ground. The palm oil industry and pulpwood industry comprise a large and unique part of the Indonesian economy, with the country being the world’s largest producer of palm oil by far, and being a top ten producer of pulpwood since 2010. 12 Between 2003 and 2013, demand for palm oil doubled globally, and the Indonesian economy grew to match this demand. 13 The pulpwood industry has seen similar levels of growth, with an expected increase in demand of 70 percent between 2010 and 2030. 14 As this demand grew, the Indonesian economy has shifted to foster this growth, increasing industrial agriculture's share of the labor market and overall economy. While the conditions for this work are ripe with labor rights violations, this industry nonetheless provides important and potentially growing employment opportunities. 15 Any reductions in these industries as a result of further

regulation would mean a decrease in some of the country’s largest exports, a major labor market, and overall a sector used by the Indonesian government as a tool for development. Additionally, small producers comprise up to 40 percent of palm oil production, making them key stakeholders in the question of palm oil production outside of major corporations.16 The scale of this sector makes it impossible to ignore the effects haze pollution policy might have on these industries. The growth and success of industrial agriculture has proved to be a major factor in slowing substantial action on haze policy across time. Domestic policies regarding haze pollution did see movement towards more sustainable and anti-pollution practices over the last twenty or so years, despite the continued growth of these unsustainable industries. 17 This was in spite of a lack of interaction by Indonesia with international institutions. Following a particular few years of severe haze pollution from 1997 to 1998, Indonesia enacted a regulation on forest and land fires, Government Regulation No. 4/2001. This law was extensive, including a broad ban on the use of fire to clear land for any purpose, with exceptions for small-scale agriculture; it also included mechanisms

for reporting violations. However, this law was broad, weakly enforced, and neglected the specific issue of corporations using fires in peatland areas. Additionally, with a lack of enforcement and incentives for corporations or smallscale farmers alike to switch techniques, this law could not alone handle the issue of peatland slash-and-burn techniques causing fires and haze pollution. Another policy in Indonesia poised to address the haze pollution included the Presidential Instruction No. 16/2011: a forest firerelated disaster risk management policy that improved coordination at different levels of government and made some improvements. 18 One of the most important pre-2015 steps in domestic haze pollution policy came in the form of the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification scheme. The ISPO,

or No.19/Permentan /OT.140/3/2011 regulation came in 2011 under the Minister of Agriculture, and acts as a mandatory certification for major palm oil producers to follow certain environmental guidelines. 19 Unfortunately the ISPO certification system also suffered from a lack of ability to properly implement these regulations. Across the board, these policies were and still are insufficient in addressing industry standards because of a lack of proper implementation or oversight. Despite efforts to work around various domestic economic concerns to make progress on combating haze pollution, the issue continued receiving attention while the major haze crisis continued. For example, in 2013, there was another significant haze crisis deriving from Indonesian transboundary haze in Southeast Asia, despite these ongoing policy initiatives. 20 With these flawed policies in place, international pressures began to rise in the early 2010s. Although environmental domestic policy was changing, it was clear that it was not enough, especially for neighboring states heavily affected by Indonesian haze pollution.

It became clear that Indonesia could no longer ignore the calls from neighboring states to adjust its policies, especially as the health impacts of such extreme haze pollution events became more clearas these events continued

to occur with relative frequency. One major international intervention came in the form of the Indonesia Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) Initiative. Supported by the United Nations Development Programme, this project sought to bring together the various stakeholders in palm oil to encourage more sustainable agricultural practices, with this specific project focused on deforestation rather than haze pollution. This was specifically partnered with the ISPO. 21 Though the ISPO made substantial changes, the biggest change in Indonesia's haze policy came with its official adoption of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement, otherwise known as the THPA, in 2015. Indonesia was the last ASEAN member state to signon. Before, the state had long refused to sign, feeling that it would unfairly impact one of its largest industries, and overly benefited more industrialized ASEAN member states. This was a major source of conflict amongst ASEAN states, as Indonesia was and is the region’s chief source of haze pollution. 22 However, after over a decade of diplomatic conflict and strong international pressures relating to Indonesian Haze Policy, the state decided to sign on. 23 The Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement, originally drafted in 2002, was regarded at its implementation as a revolutionary document for dealing

with environmental policy. The THPA called upon states to recognize that they must follow a “no-harm” approach. More importantly, it also declares that haze pollution is by nature a transboundary issue and states must take into account the effect on other states in their domestic haze pollution policy. 24 The THPA also requires that signatory states go beyond recognition, as it also calls upon concrete monitoring, prevention, and assistance regarding peatland fires. These various provisions, if followed exactly, would have required significant changes to Indonesian domestic policy. 25 However, it is debatable if these changes have taken shape since Indonesian signed on in 2014. Following the ratification of this agreement, there were some changes to Indonesian domestic policy, including changes to the type of gasoline used in transportation and the establishment of a Peatland Restoration Agency, both well-regarded actions by states looking to see Indonesia tackle its haze crisis. 26 Additionally, major revisions have been made to the ISPO since the signing of the THPA, including in 2015 and recently in 2020, strengthening the specific government agencies implementing the regulations, and including small-scale producers in the need to gain mandatory certification. 27 However, given that major haze crises have continued to occur frequently and as recently as the 2019

haze crisis, it begs the question of what will truly push Indonesia into taking firm action to stop this activity and what tactics will be successful in doing so. 28 The prospects of regional or multilateral international pressure remain at the forefront, but it seems there are many barriers to the policy effectiveness through international or regional policy. Additionally, this has left Indonesia in an in-between state diplomatically, as their intention to sign the THPA in order reduce diplomatic tensions within ASEAN has not been realized.

In the international sphere, Indonesia’s signing of the THPA represented its willingness to address the concerns of its neighboring states, such as Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore has long called on Indonesia to rectify the haze pollution issue, as haze pollution, particularly during haze season, travels annually out of Indonesia and into Singapore. Singapore has been dedicated to addressing this issue on the international stage and has gone as far as to mention this issue at the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.29 Despite this criticism and the more widespread international pressure it brought, Indonesia had avoided action at the international level. With Indonesia signing onto the THPA, it has given Singapore a new platform to call out the state for its shortcomings in haze pollution mitigation policy. Singapore has put multilateral accountability mechanisms from the THPA into use, using one such procedure to call upon Indonesian firms to move towards prevention of further peatland fires.30 However, despite available mechanisms for holding overseas firms accountable, the THPA defaults to the ASEAN standard of cooperation and sovereignty as priorities, and therefore provides no mechanism for disputes between ASEAN member states regarding violations of the THPA.31 As such, Singapore has been unable to move beyond these calls, with the THPA as a tool being more symbolic of a failure on Indonesia’s end to uphold the intent of the document.32 Thus, even though domestic policy shifted following Indonesia’s ratification of the THPA, its continued failure to manage the haze pollution crisis more broadly suggests that this issue cannot be easily addressed within the ASEAN system. Additionally, the relationship between Singapore and the Indonesian industrial agriculture sector is far more complicated than it may seem

through the lens of ASEAN multilateral relations. As much as Indonesia has its own domestic economic reasons for protecting large palm oil producers, Singapore also has had a longstanding reliance on Indonesian industrial palm oil production in particular. Alongside Malaysia, Singapore provides major foreign investment in Indonesian palm oil production through several large banking institutions, and the ongoing expansion of the Indonesian palm oil industry would not have been possible without such foreign investment. 33 Additionally, some large Singaporean firms have been found to be using harmful or even illegal palm oil agricultural practices in Indonesia, the very kind that has historically contributed to haze pollution. 34 Singapore itself has recently taken action to lessen its relationship with palm oil agriculture, looking to be the world’s first nation with fully-sustainable palm oil usage. 35 However, the state still sees Indonesia as being culpable, including financially, for fixing the vast majority of the transboundary haze pollution issue. This issue then becomes one of more developed states, such as Singapore, pining responsibility over transboundary pollution, which they themselves have benefitted from on a more newly industrialized state such as Indonesia. 36 Regardless of where the burden will ultimately be placed, this conflict makes bilateral approaches to solving the crisis seem ineffective.

The question then becomes what must be done moving forward if cooperation-based multilateral treaties are not sufficient in addressing the issue, and are, in fact, creating divisions in regional organizations, such as ASEAN, and widening divides in the Indonesia-Singapore bilateral relationship. Lawsuits, such as the one brought against President Joko Midodo and his government, have proven to be an effective method in earning specific protections but not in overhauling haze pollution policy as a whole. 37 Domestic policy has continued to shift towards sustainable practices, but regardless of continued improvements and policy implementation, such as the expanded ISPO certification system, policy in this realm still has the possibility of being shifted to benefit palm oil producers. Additionally, it has proven to be wholly insufficient given recent

haze crises. Internationally, countries such as Singapore will likely continue to make public calls for changes, but with the nature of ASEAN’s consensus and sovereignty-focused negotiations, it seems like a formal platform for resolving these disputes will not be available any time soon. Even worse, such a platform might only worsen the rising tensions between more developed ASEAN states and developing ASEAN states, as the proposed financial burden and general accountability of clean palm oil production is placed on the latter. But, it is clear that some resolution to how to solve the issue of transboundary haze in Southeast Asia will be critical in the near future. Citizens in Indonesia, and in nearby states such as Malaysia and Singapore, will continue to suffer as long as haze pollution is not significantly reduced, shortening lifespans and interrupting the flow of everyday life. Indonesia, caught between domestic and foreign stakeholders and economic concerns, must grapple with these forces as environmental policy and action continues to take space as one of the most important issues of the modern international sphere.

References

1 “Indonesia haze: Why do forests keep burning?” BBC, BBC, 16 September 2019.

2 Ibid.

3 Daniel Heilmann, “After Indonesia’s Ratification: The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and Its Effectiveness as a Regional Environmental Governance Tool,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34, no.3 (December 2015): 97.

4 Michael Greenstone and Qing Fan, “Indonesia’s Worsening Air Quality and its Impact on Life Expectancy,” Air Quality Life Index, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, March 2019.

5 “Impact of Haze on health,” HealthHub, Ministry of Health Singapore, 22 November 2019.

6 Michael Taylor, “As fires burn, can Indonesia avoid repeat of 2015 haze crisis?” Reuters , Reuters, 5 August 2019.

7 Greenstone and Fan, “Indonesia’s Worsening Air Quality and its Impact on Life Expectancy.”

8 “Indonesia fires forces schools and airport to close in Sumatra,” Al Jazeera , Al Jazeera, 13 September 2019.

9 Aisyah Llewellyn, “Jakarta Residents Await Landmark Ruling on Right to Clean Air,” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, June 9, 2021.

10 Kate Lamb and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, “Indonesia court finds president negligent in air pollution lawsuit,” Reuters , Reuters, September 16, 2021.

11 Laely Nurhidayah, "Legislation, Regulations, and Policies

in Indonesia Relevant to Addressing Land/Forest Fires and Transboundary Haze Pollution: A Critical Evaluation," Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 16 (2013), 218

12 “Indonesia” Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2021; K. Obidzinski and A. Dermawan, “Pulp industry and environment in Indonesia: is there sustainable future?” Regional Environmental Change 12, 961–966 (2012), https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10113-012-0353-y.

13 Varsha Vijay, Stuart L Pimm, et al., “The Impacts of Oil Palm on Recent Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss,” PloS One 11, no. 7 (2016): E0159668.

14 Obidzinski and Dermawan, “Pulp industry and environment in Indonesia: is there sustainable future?”

15 Hans Nicholas John, “Report finds litany of labor abuses on RSPO-certified oil palm plantations,” Mongabay, 17 December 2020.

16 “Sustainable Palm Oil (SPO) Initiative,” Indonesia, United Nations Development Programme

17 Vijay, Pimm, et al., “The Impacts of Oil Palm on Recent Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss.”

18 Nurhidayah, 225.

19 Edi Purwanto, “New ISPO: a New Hope to Strengthen Oil-Palm Governance?”

Info brief - October, 2020, Tropenbos Indonesia, Bogor.

20 Alan Taylor, “Singapore Haze,” The Atlantic , 20 June 2013.

21 “Sustainable Palm Oil (SPO) Initiative.”

22 N. Nazeer and F. Furuoka, “Overview of ASEAN environment, transboundary haze pollution agreement and public health,” International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 13 (1): 73–94, http://dx.doi.org/10.21315/ijaps2017.13.1.4.

23 Heilmann, 97.

24 Ibid, 104.

25 Ibid, 105.

26 Greenstone and Fan, “Indonesia’s Worsening Air Quality and its Impact on Life Expectancy.”

27 Purwanto, “New ISPO: a New Hope to Strengthen OilPalm Governance?”

28 Michael Taylor, “As fires burn, can Indonesia avoid a repeat of 2015 haze crisis?”

29 Heilmann, 115.

30 “Singapore, Indonesia jostle over anti-haze measures.”

31 Heilmann, 108.

32 “Singapore, Indonesia jostle over anti-haze measures.”

33 P. Pacheco, S. Gnych, et al., “The palm oil global value chain: Implications for economic growth and social and environmental sustainability,” Working Paper 220, Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR., 2017, DOI: 10.17528/cifor/006405 5.

34 Hans Nicholas Jong, “Indonesia’s top palm oil deforesters are the usual shady suspects: Report,” Mongabay, 11 February 2021.

35 Michael Taylor, “Singapore set to become world's first sustainable palm oil nation,” Reuters, December 6, 2019.

36 Nazeer and Furuoka, “Overview of ASEAN environment, transboundary haze pollution agreement and public health.”

37 Lamb and Beo Da Costa, “Indonesia court finds president negligent in air pollution lawsuit.”

ASIA

T

by ASHARI BILAN-COOPER

Eight months later, the military has continued to crack down on anti-junta protests with little effective intervention from other states. In June 2021, the United Nations formally

he February 1, 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which saw the detainment of Myanmar politician Aung San Suu Kyi and 4,500 other officials by military senior general Min Aung Hlaing, has created social and political unrest domestically, regionally, and internationally. General Hlaing has established total military rule, justifying the coup by declaring Suu Kyi's election a fraud, even though the election was internationally interpreted as fair. The coup was violent in nature, resulting in more than 1,000 civilian deaths. 1condemned the coup as they feared the possibility of a future civil war emerging. However, some Asian countries, particularly those geographically closer to Myanmar with higher stakes, have expressed little disagreement about its current political situation.

One key state actor to observe is Thailand. Its reaction is particularly significant, as it shares a border and therefore has substantial geopolitical, economic, and personal ties to Myanmar. How Thailand reacts to the extraordinary and potentially still volatile situation in Myanmar could determine the trajectory of future foreign relations between the two countries for decades to come. Thailand and Myanmar's political instability

share similarities. Both states have experienced regular shifts in political power from military rule to novice attempts at democracy. Myanmar's military (the Tatmadaw) has long dominated its domestic political scene since Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948. For the next fourteen years, Myanmar experienced a power struggle between democratic and military rule, with the army eventually gaining governmental control in 1962. The military Junta finally dissolved in 2011, and a democratic party, the NLD, represented by Suu Kyi, emerged as the leading political force. However, the Tatmadaw still essentially held veto power as they occupied 25 percent of parliamentary seats. It is evident that the embedded historical significance of the military prevailed, and a democratic party, even recognized as a legitimate political power, could not change that. This power imbalance became even more apparent in 2018 with the UN-classified genocide of the Rohingya population in Myanmar. The military's grasp on politics in Myanmar is undoubtedly strong, and the February events cemented this.

Thailand's history follows a similar vein. The constant ebb and flow between democracy and military coups with the addition of the 'lese majeste’ law’s implementation into the Criminal

Code meant it was equally challenging for Thailand to break free from military power and historical governance structures. 2 In 2014, General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the army chief, secured control and has maintained a semi-authoritarian rule since his election as Prime Minister, limiting discussions on democracy, government criticism, and heightened censorship. 3

Evidently, Thailand and Myanmar's similar political regimes and histories may suggest reasons for their intimate relations. Sharing similar political ideologies, Thailand and Myanmar leaders have established a close relationship over the years, both economically and socially. Former Thai Prime Minister and military officer Prem Tinsulanonda even informally adopted current Myanmar military leader Hlaing, forming a “godson-godfather” relationship and mentorship. 4 Undoubtedly, these close relationships have a bearing on their respective government policies, grounded on a sense of loyalty to one another. In 2014, when the Thai military regained control under Prayuth, Hlaing was the first to show his support and offer congratulations. 5 Thailand reciprocated in 2018 when, during the height of the Rohingya crisis, they presented Hlaing with Royal Honour of the Knight Grand Cross (first-class) at a ceremony in Bangkok. 6

After gaining control in February, Hlaing sought out Thailand's support in a letter addressed to Prayuth, indicating the perceived value of this relationship. 7 Understanding the nature of the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar makes it easier to comprehend Thailand's current cautious stance when asked to comment on Myanmar's politics. The repercussions of Myanmar’s recent actions go beyond their borders and have lasting effects on the region as a whole. This is especially true in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that benefits Thailand significantly through the free flow of goods, services, investment, and labor. State relations are extremely malleable as the region finds itself more divided ideologically and politically.

As emphasized by an Amnesty International spokesperson at the ASEAN emergency summit in April 2021, “ This is not an internal matter for Myanmar but a major human rights and humanitarian crisis which is impacting the entire region and beyond.” 8 This summit came after the UN General Assembly resolution requesting an end to violence, the state of emergency, and a return to democracy, amongst other things. Sharing this international view, Indonesia made it explicitly clear that they perceived the Myanmar coup as “ unacceptable” and advocated for restoring democracy in the state. 9 ASEAN drafted a five-point consensus that included aims to end the violence in Myanmar and initiate conversations between ASEAN states. 10 Unexpectedly, the Myanmar Ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, voiced his support for the resolution and international assistance in protecting Myanmar by stating, “ the military is still operating in its own twisted reality, ignoring the international community's calls.” 11 Kyaw Moe Tun was fired shortly after this public display of disapproval, illustrating the restrictive and powerful nature of the new military regime. 12 Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam shared this perspective and voiced their agreement. 13 However, the meeting, unfortunately, resulted in ASEAN members becoming more divided than united in their response. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand abstained from the resolution, highlighting that perhaps some neighboring states

have more risk from public displays of opposition, Thailand being one of them. 14 By abstaining from the resolution, Thailand has adhered to ASEAN's non-interference law; yet this decision has international and regional implications for the state’s future. Their lack of explicit support or condemnation of Myanmar's actions could indicate an internal conflict emerging as they decide whether to risk their established relationship with Myanmar or their status on the international stage. Given the nature of the modern, interconnected economy, Thailand’s development depends heavily on global politics, investment, and inter-state relations in Asia and the broader Western world. The U.S. is Thailand's primary export market, and seeing as they are an export-dependent country, this relationship is significant and cannot be jeopardized. 15 With the U.S. publicly condemning the violence of Hlaing's ruling of Myanmar, one must consider how Thailand's silence may affect U.S.-Thai relations. COVID-19 has considerably strained Thailand's economy, dropping by 6.1 percent in 2020, especially with the reduced tourism and global economic crisis. 16 This puts, at least in the short term, more pressure on Thailand to solidify economic relations, particularly with the U.S., as they cannot afford to strain their economy further. Undoubtedly, Thailand cannot afford to jeopardize its economic relationship with the U.S., however, their loyalty to Myanmar is equally important. The undeniable significance of geopolitics is explicitly evident in the 2,416 km border that Thailand and Myanmar share. 17 It ensures more accessible trade relations between the states, with cross-border trade totaling $9

billion in 2019. 18 Furthermore, Thailand relies on 1.6 million migrant workers from Myanmar to assist in their domestic development. 19 These two states are considered developing economies in Asia, and this relationship is vital because of its mutually beneficial nature. Borders are also associated with more than just economic ties—migration from Myanmar to Thailand has been ongoing for years. However, there has been a considerable influx of refugees fleeing Myanmar, seeking asylum in Thailand since February. Thailand is not part of the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, making those who seek asylum in their borders vulnerable to deportation, detention, arrests, and trafficking. 20 As of September 2021, Thailand hosts 91,479 refugees from Myanmar; however, with the current influx due to the February coup, the Thai National Security Council has denied them access with military blockages. 21 This lack of assistance implies a sense of camaraderie between the Thai government and the new military government in Myanmar, indicating that diplomatic relations between the two states are important enough to risk Thailand's credibility in international relations as they are actively defying customary international laws on granting asylum. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that Prayuth and Hlaing are communicating behind closed doors through back channels. 22 The content of these communications has not been disclosed. Still, the mere act implies that their close relationship has not been hindered in light of recent events. It also suggests that Thailand's indirect communications with Myanmar are a way to continue appearing neutral to the international community. This way, they can appease their other state relations, such as the U.S., while advancing their political agenda. It is increasingly evident that Myanmar-Thai ties are mutually beneficial from economic dependency to political support due to the distinct similarities in their regime; therefore, it is understandable that Thailand is acting in this cautious manner.

The future implications of Thailand's response, however, can be hypothesized. Firstly, one must consider what Thailand gains

from international recognition and whether condemning Myanmar benefits their future relations. As mentioned previously, Thai-U.S. relations clearly benefit Thailand’s economy; however, with the recent shift to a more authoritarian Thai regime, it appears that U.S. interests no longer align as strongly as they once did. With the military having secured control over politics, Thailand is unstable, both politically and economically. With inequality rising, direct investment falling, and legitimacy slipping away, Thailand is becoming increasingly unattractive to the U.S. as an ally. 23 The August 2021 South-East Asia visit by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris illustrates this distinct change in the U.S.-Thai relations; Harris limited her trip to two nations— Singapore and Vietnam—both long-standing strategic partners with predominantly stable diplomatic relations. However, it is likely that VP Harris did not visit Thailand as its military regime has limited their attractiveness as a nation when compared to economic powerhouses in Asia, like Singapore. Therefore, one could go as far as to argue that the U.S.’s decision to avoid Thailand was a way of highlighting its disapproval of Prayuth’s regime. Nonetheless, it is evident that their relationship is deteriorating and in turn, perhaps Thailand is more focused on building relations and expanding their influence in Asia, particularly with China.

China is a critical facet of conversations regarding the importance of the U.S. in Asia, and how Thailand and Myanmar may be seeking a stronger relationship with this emerging hegemon. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes Myanmar and appears to hold even more significance in light of the recent coup. Hlaing and Chinese President Xi Jinping have established meaningful diplomatic ties, with China historically providing support to Myanmar’s military. 24 Myanmar connects China to oil and gas fields, a key component to furthering their economy. 25 This trade relation rests on maintaining good terms with China and vice versa, especially as the Myanmar military has various holdings in companies involved in energy, construction, and finance, all of which now look to depend on China and their BRI

plans. 26 Myanmar cannot afford to jeopardize this relationship.

Equally, Thailand has solidified Chinese relations. For example, their plan to construct a Thailand-China high-speed railway linking the two states. 27 As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the railway will promote economic development and upgrade Thailand's infrastructure enormously. Thailand may be re-assessing its diplomatic commitments and perhaps focusing more inward in Asia to form stronger ties; their growing relationship with China, and its economic benefits, could be another factor influencing their outwardly neutral public opinion on Myanmar. The growing social influence of China in Thailand, evident in the establishment of multiple Confucius Institutes, more than those present in all ASEAN states combined, as well as the wide distribution of Chinese media outlets in Thailand, is also a sign of Chinese culture penetrating Thailand and their close relationship. 28 With China emerging as Thailand’s second largest trading partner, as well as a recent pledge to enhance parliamentary and diplomatic cooperation, it is evident that the relationship is becoming more important on various fronts; economically, socially, and politically. 29 China clearly appears to be a key

figure, influencing the future of both Myanmar and Thailand, therefore perhaps this new common friend will spark even more camaraderie between the two military states.

Ultimately, Thailand has to decide whether it risks these valuable Asian relationships to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. In this case, perhaps the coup acted as a catalyst in further shifting international power dynamics by weakening Thailand’s dependency on the U.S. and instead strengthening Chinese influence. Perhaps, Thailand is looking to receive protection from China as it appears to now prioritize regional relationships. Given the U.S.’s agenda that prioritizes managing China’s growth and influence, Thailand may be more hesitant to support the U.S. and preserve its relationship. Evidently, the intentions of Thailand and the U.S. with China do not align.

China and the U.S. have found themselves competing in recent years for global dominance. With numerous contentious issues, tension has been building- examples range from disputes over Taiwan and its sovereignty, to U.S. public dissaproval of the Uyghur genocide. 30 Given the U.S. intentions with China, a relationship with Thailand appears less capable of supporting U.S. plans, weakening their initially strategically beneficial relationship.

Therefore, perhaps Thailand's involvement on the global stage is of less relevance to the U.S. as there do not appear to be any genuine attempts at reviving this 'dying' relationship.

However, Thailand’s response to Myanmar is still highly relevant in the context of Asia, and if they want to continue to progress, they should consider the importance of other Asian states’ reactions too. It is undoubtedly clear that China has a bearing influence on Thailand and exploring their perspective on Myanmar is important. China responded to the Myanmar coup with mixed messages, stating that “both the National League for Democracy and the Tatmadaw maintain friendly relations with China,” yet they “support the mediation efforts by ASEAN and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar.”31 This unclear response is similar to Thailand’s withdrawn attitude, suggesting both states share a similar stance, especially in regards to cooperating with Myanmar’s military leaders. Other Asian states, however, expressed otherwise, further complicating Thailand’s future diplomatic relations. Indonesia is one of the more outspoken ASEAN members on the crisis in Myanmar as they have publicly condemned their actions on multiple occasions. With Thailand abstaining from the ASEAN resolution and their limited response to the situation in general, one can only predict this will impact Thai-Indonesian relations. Being the two largest economies in ASEAN, they could work together to foster mutually beneficial development and growth. 32 Having officially initiated diplomatic ties in 1950, the two states have enjoyed a largely friendly relationship. 33 For example, Indonesia supported Thailand during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and in 1999, Thailand sent troops to assist Indonesia when East Timor was seeking independence. 34 In 2020, they became leading trade partners for one another, and their bilateral trade was over $16 billion. 35 Both states have similar rising economies in Asia, and, although allies, could be seen as competitors. Furthermore, like Indonesia, Singapore openly condemned Myanmar's actions and is one of Thailand's most important foreign investors. 36 Their bilateral ties are crucial for Thailand's economic success. Ultimately, expressing similar concerns to the states mentioned above and continuing to

appear friendly will be a factor in maintaining these regional economic ties, given the increased importance of state opinion in international relations. One can only predict whether Thailand decides to prioritize China, the U.S., or smaller regional states depending on its political and economic agenda. What is not up for debate is the significance of the Myanmar coup in influencing this decision.

Clearly, Thailand is in a difficult position. It has long-established relations, economically, politically, and socially, with the current military leaders of Myanmar. Both countries are governed by military regimes and have an unspoken sense of loyalty toward one another. Yet, Thailand’s status as an emerging economy places greater significance on its role in regional and global economic structures to allow trade and investment benefits. It is unlikely that Thailand will be quick to sever ties with Myanmar given their long-standing relationship; however, as explored above, the significance of their international and regional connections is equally important to consider. The 2021 Myanmar coup has altered Thailand’s role in international relations in more ways than one; from a shift in diplomatic priorities, evident in the weakening Thai-U.S. relations and strengthening Thai-China relations, as well as its emphasis on preserving long-standing state relations with Myanmar, the current political climate suggests that Thailand can no longer remain quiet and must decide which relationships can best advance its domestic interests.

References

1 Lindsay Maizland, “ Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations.

2 Panu Wongcha-um and Kay Johnson, “ Timeline: Thailand's Coups, Kings and Protests,” U.S.

3 Ibid.

4 Bangkok Post Public Company Limited, “ Myanmar Dignitaries Honour Gen Prem.”

5 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “ How Generals Plot Together, in Myanmar and Thailand,” The New York Times - Breaking News, US News, World News and Videos.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Sullivan, Becky. "Southeast Asian Leaders Call For Immediate End To Violence In Myanmar." NPR.org. Last modified April 24, 2021.

9 Ibid.

10 Oren Samet, “ There is No ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar,” The Diplomat

11 Margaret Besheer, “ At UN, States Condemn Myanmar's Junta,” VOA.

12 Becky Sullivan, “ Myanmar Ambassador Fired After Extraordinary Rebuke Of The Military Before The U.N.” NPR.org.

13 Samet, "There is No ASEAN Consensus on Myanmar."

14 Ibid.

15 International Trade Administration, “ Thailand - Market Overview,” International Trade Administration | Trade.gov.

16 Ruji Auethavornpipat, “ Thailand’s Weak Reaction to the Myanmar Coup,” East Asia Forum.

17 The World Factbook, “ Burma,” Central Intelligence Agency - CIA.

18 Kay Johnson and Panarat Thepgumpanat, “ Analysis: Myanmar's Neighbour Thailand Unlikely to Toughen Stance on Coup,” U.S.

19 Ibid.

20 Auethavornpipat, “ Thailand’s Weak Reaction to the Myanmar Coup”

21 Ibid; UNHCR, “ Thailand Fact Sheet,” UNHCR Thailand.

22 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “ Thai PM and Myanmar Junta Chief Stay Engaged Via Back Channels,” Nikkei Asia.

23 Abuza, Zachary, “ America Should Be Realistic About Its Alliance with Thailand,” War on the Rocks.

24 Chris Devonshire-Ellise, “ Belt And Road Projects In Myanmar Likely To Progress In Light Of Military Coup,” Silk Road Briefing.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Global Times, “ China, Thailand Sign Agreement on

High-speed Rail Line, Set to Open in 2026,” Global Times.

28 “ Of Questionable Connectivity: China’s BRI and Thai Civil Society,” Council on Foreign Relations.

29 “ China, Thailand to Enhance Parliamentary Cooperation.”

30 United States Institute of Peace, “ What’s Next for U.S.China Relations Amid Rising Tensions Over Taiwan,” United States Institute of Peace; Council on Foreign Relations, “ Timeline: U.S. Relations With China 1949–2021,” Council on Foreign Relations.

31 “ Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar H.E.Mr. Chen Hai Gives Interview to Myanmar Media on the Current Situation in Myanmar.”

32 Statista, “ ASEAN Countries GDP 2021,” Statista.

33 Songphol Sukchan, “ New Normal of Indonesia-Thailand Relations,” The Jakarta Post

34 Ibid.

35 Royal Thai Embassy, “Thailand and Indonesia: The Journey of Relations from Close Historical Ties to Strategic Partnership in the New Normal Era,” Royal Thai Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia.

36 Lee U-Wen, “ Singapore-Thailand economic ties to be strengthened,” The Business Times .

EUROPE

Editor's Note

Home to several economic and democratic world leaders, the European Union is often considered a paragon of multinationalism for other regions around the world. In recent years, however, far-right political parties and populist movements have taken center stage in Europe. With many EU member states struggling to situate themselves in an ever-changing political, economic, and social environment, prospects for European unity are slipping.

As Senior Editor of Europe, I chose to highlight the ongoing lack of cohesiveness in EU member states and the struggle of European integration. Through discussing anti-immigration in the Nordic model, France's EU security stance, and a history-changing German election, we dive deeper into the historical and contemporary dynamics of Europe and identify some of the most prominent issues in Europe's growing basket of political conflict.

Senior Editor, Europe

FIONA CAPTAN, CAS '23

To Build Bridges or Walls?

The hurdle of immigration for the Scandinavian welfare system

by JUDE HOAG

Twenty-first century problems will change fundamental characteristics of states' economic and political systems. One iteration of this change is currently playing out in Scandinavia. Norway, Sweden, and Finland's Nordic system of economics is the model for successful social welfare states. The combination of a highlyskilled economy and a generous social safety net has been beneficial to the populations of these countries. However, the logistical strain caused by a system reliant on the taxes of an aging workforce and the recent increase in immigration has called into question the feasibility of this system's future. In reaction to these potential logistical problems, the three states created different policies aimed at reforming immigration, increasing social programs, or promoting community organizations of other cultures. If the Scandinavian states want to balance the issues of an aging population and immigration, they will need to integrate job training and programs working with immigrant communities to help individuals transition to their host country.

In the face of twentieth century inequalities and economic inefficiencies, Scandinavian countries invested in a social welfare system providing universal benefits for their citizens from childhood until old age to increase equality and economic efficiency. 1 Farmers seeking agricultural

subsidies made deals with the labor party, an alliance formed from trade unions, to create a complete welfare system in exchange for policies adding the subsidies. Because the farmers and laborers in these parties created a “ red-green coalition” of middle-class workers, the compromise of the welfare state united the middle-class, which expected and protected these privileges. 2 While Norway, Sweden, and Finland’s systems originated through political labor movements, this economic system separated citizens’ status from their financial situation. However, moving toward the ideal of economic equality came at the cost of a heavy social service burden on the state. 3 Despite this burden, all three states achieved high economic growth and low unemployment after World War II. In the 1990s, a significant increase in unemployment led to a political push toward welfare reform, but the basic structure persists today. 4

These states require the taxes of an expansive labor force to fund the welfare system, but these countries' aging populations strain the system by decreasing the labor force and draining social services. All three countries have an increased life expectancy and a declining birth rate, meaning that more retired people rely on the social expenditure associated with old age, and fewer

people can replenish that workforce. 5 Since the turn of the millennium, when demographic shifts made clear that labor shortages would hit this region by 2050, Scandinavian countries, especially Finland, pushed for programs that increase workforce participation for older citizens and disincentivize retirement. 6 One of the factors combatting the diminishing workforce is immigration. The influx of immigrants has slightly restrained the rate at which the average age in the region has increased in previous years, making immigration vital to a sustainable workforce. 7 Supplementation to the workforce by an inflow of immigrants may make up for the growing proportion of retirees leaving. Yet the issue of immigration, more so than the aging population, has brought challenges, particularly the employability of the immigrants in their host country. Immigration from outside the European Union (EU) has increased in these countries, and the employment level of nonEU immigrants is considerably lower than that of the native population. 8 The difference in the average education level of native and foreign-born individuals poses a barrier to entry into these countries’ highly skilled economies, resulting in different levels of employment. 9 The gap between the average literacy of these two groups is equivalent to three and a half years of schooling. 10 Therefore, immigrants have a more difficult time finding employment with the competition of a highly-educated native population. While this is a generalization, the data suggests that average literacy of immigrants compared to these countries’ native populations directly leads to different employment access.

This difference in employment rates is exacerbated by the proportion of the population change in these countries coming from immigration. The population increase of Scandinavia in the last few decades is greatly due to immigration, accounting for two-thirds of the population change between 1990 and 2017. 11 Immigration, therefore, is a significant factor in the populations of these countries. A substantial amount of these immigrants come as refugees from areas in crisis. Many refugee crises, particularly the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 that created immigration flows of 19,000 people on average

per year since, pose an ongoing challenge for these states to maintain high employment rates and ensure that migrants can find the necessary resources to find work in the host country. 12 Some representatives in these states, however, see this as a reason to enforce stricter border control. Due to a rapid influx of immigration in November 2015, Sweden enacted a major policy reversal toward Syrian refugees, closing its southern border with Denmark. This followed much debate between the increasingly strained logistics of the welfare state during the crisis and the demand for upholding human rights. 13 Closing the border was just one instance of a recent trend of rising right-wing populism in Scandinavia. The Populist Radical Right (PRR), a family of right-wing parties across the three countries, has gained increasing success on a platform advocating anti-immigration rhetoric in the past few decades. 14 The PRR and other anti-immigration advocates influenced Scandinavia in recent years, advocating for an end to the 2015 immigration and pushing limiting policies such as selective immigration.

As a result of PRR influence, recent policies have followed a system of selective immigration, allowing only for immigration of ‘highly-skilled’ individuals who can easily integrate into complex fields of employment. In 2010, Norway began implementing immigration policies differentiating immigrants by skill level, whereas Sweden removed differentiating immigrant workers by skill level after 2008. 15 Fewer workers will be allowed into the state by the method of differentiating by skill, but the employment rate of these workers would, theoretically, be much higher. This approach restricts immigration to individuals bringing assets to the economy and placing minimal burden on the welfare state. However, seeing how Sweden's employment rate did not suffer since their reversal and relied on foreign-born workers for its labor force increase, it is difficult to see why this restraint on employment would be beneficial. 16

The rise of the PRR's anti-immigration influence in policy seems to have successfully limited the effect on the reception of immigrants even in Sweden, recognized as having the most liberal immigration policy. The Swedish government must work with its municipalities

to agree on how many immigrants each will receive, raising PRR influence in localities to national importance. Analyzing the effect on local governments, therefore, demonstrates the aggregate national effect. Between the elections of 2006 and 2010, municipalities that saw a rise of anti-immigration party power in their assemblies correlated with a decreasing acceptance of immigrants by those localities. 17 Anti-immigration party influence has effectively decreased the number of immigrants that Scandinavian communities are willing to host. The anti-immigration push from these countries may have successfully limited the number of immigrants allowed into the state. However, this approach is one-dimensional. It ignores the potential for immigrantion to be a solution for the aging population of Scandinavia. Stricter laws limiting immigration itself may be beneficial for states in short-term crises, such as in 2015, but it will not be enough to combat the welfare states' coming problems.

These three states have also adopted a different approach to the issue of immigration by implementing training programs to increase the immigrants' skills needed by their economy. Many workplace programs now aim at increasing language acquisition skills, industry training, and internships to effectively fill the skill gaps of the labor market. 18 These policies aim to mutually benefit the recipients

and employers by providing individuals with marketable skills. Despite attempting to include more immigrants in the workforce, these policies have faced criticism for integrating individuals at the expense of their culture and heritage. For instance, the emphasis on learning the state language and culture for immigrants has been described more as forging a national identity than helping the individual, especially in the case of the Roma, whose culture was historically labeled as foreign and incompatible. 19

In Sweden, employment levels for immigrant groups increased after a policy incentivizing work programs. 20 This effect on employment, however, is dependent on gender, with only women with low levels of education showing gains whereas men of any education level saw gains, possibly because educated, immigrant women would not elect to participate in these work programs. 21 Further, the employment gap was especially noticeable for immigrants coming from Iran, Iraq, and Africa due partly to the cultural difference between these areas and Scandinavia compared to immigrants from Eastern Europe. 22

However, the continued success of job training programs will be dampened by the states' pessimism of their effectiveness. Sweden maintains its optimism that immigration paired with skill training will help societal development. Still, Finland and Norway have more pessimistic

approaches, noting in their government reports and political statements that the benefit of immigration depends solely on successful integration. 23 All three of these states are above the mean score in the EU migration integration policy index, indicating that their policies are liberal in helping to integrate new migrants into the workforce and society, but the differences between each system are very distinct. 24 These distinct attitudes are reflected in the policy each state creates, and it is vital that these states do not allow their pessimism to limit policy that makes immigration more beneficial.

If the three countries want to increase the workforce in their highly-skilled economies, they will need a policy for immigrant job training. Improving the employable skills of immigrants is mutually beneficial for the individual and the state. For the individual, the problem with this policy is focusing on the skills, literacy, and cultural habits that may weaken their connection to their own culture. The difficulty of this approach for the state is a waning optimism without evidence of overwhelming success. This pessimism must be weathered.

To better the chances of success for immigrants to find employment and social cohesion while also keeping their cultural identity, Sweden has supported thousands of immigrant communities to work directly with the state by acting as a liaison for the members of the community and the state. These organizations formed channels to provide individuals with easier access to the welfare state and decreased barriers such as language differences, literacy, trust, and discrimination at the individual level. 25 Importantly, the community approach avoids crowding out traditional community organizations with the welfare state by making an individual's first point of contact their community rather than directly with the host country. An argument against integration policy was that if the individuals' first contact was with the state, they might not be as engaged in their cultural communities. The community would therefore be crowded out. The current aim of encouraging more community engagement was inspired by a short history of multicultural policy in Scandinavian countries. In the 1970s, following a debate on whether

immigrants should be required to integrate, Norway, Sweden, and Finland implemented policies recognizing multiple cultural community organizations and allowing for individuals to keep their native language alone, but many debates in the following decades about the national character of these states resulted in this approach holding less favor in Norway and Finland, and Sweden being the state seen as most amenable to diversity. 26 Efforts to make multiculturalism a part of immigration policy in these states have not always been effective. The community channels have helped individuals adjust to the state, but inequalities still exist. Further, a host country lacking hospitable policies toward immigrants may be dangerous for those communities. In 2013, the EU cited the lack of resources, the level of inequality, and the isolation of communities as the reason for disastrous riots against immigrant groups in Stockholm. 27 Resentment against immigrants from Muslim-majority countries is an important factor. A debate on whether these countries should do more to accommodate these communities and dissuade resentment remains. The Swedish model of job training programs for the individual and communication with cultural groups is a hopeful policy for immigration. Compared to Norway’s increasing prevention of immigration, Sweden's emphasis has moved to building the skills of immigrants and allowing their communities to have autonomy and serve a purpose to their members. A policy like this creates a structure that will help fill the workforce's skill gap in the future. Further, the individual's social cohesion will be more likely with a policy that respects their respective cultural communities. The issue of immigration in the welfare state system will be ever-growing in the foreseeable future due to the rise of refugees from climate, economic and geopolitical crises. Experiments with different immigration policies have led to varying levels of immigration and the successful inclusion of individuals in the state. The PRR and anti-immigration advocates have pushed for stricter border and immigration laws. However, this approach alone will not mitigate the coming issue of a workforce too old on average to pay for its pension system. Selective immigration

may increase immigrant employment rates, but it is highly exclusive. Job training programs are a solution for lower-skilled immigrants to find work in these complex economies, but these programs often focus on cohesion in the state, ignoring the immigrant’s culture. In Sweden, the approach to supporting immigrant community organizations has helped the individuals of those communities better interact with the welfare state. A real solution, especially in a democratic system, will likely require a mix of approaches with an emphasis on including the greatest number of immigrants to an aging workforce while respecting the communities they come from. It remains to be seen how these states will adapt their social welfare systems to changing demographics and a changing world because the problems they now face will only grow in the future.

References

1 Gosta Epsing-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): 28.

2 Ibid, 29.

3 Ibid, 28.

4 Ying Li, “Analysis of Welfare State Reform in Sweden,” European Consortium on Political Research (2018): 1-2.

5 “Nordic Welfare States, challenged by ageing and immigration: Comparable indicators,” NOSOSCO, E. G. (2018): 25-32.

6 H Piekkola, “Nordic policies on active ageing in the labour market and some European comparisons,” International Social Science Journal , 58, (2006): 545557, https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.1111/j.14682451.2008.00654.x.

7 Tommy Bengtsson and Kirk Scott, “Population Ageing and the Future of the Welfare State: The Example of Sweden,” Population and Development Review 37 (2011): 158–170.

8 “Nordic Welfare States, challenged by ageing and immigration: Comparable indicators.”

9 Rune Halvorsen, Bjørn Hvinden, and Mi Ah Schoyen, “ The Nordic Welfare Model in the Twenty-First Century: The Bumble-Bee Still Flies!” Social Policy and Society

15 , no. 1 (2016): 57-73, doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy. bu.edu/10.1017/S1474746415000135.

10 “Nordic Welfare States, challenged by ageing and immigration: Comparable indicators.”

11 Tim Heleniak, “State of the Nordic Region 2018 Immigration Edition,” Nordic Council of Ministers, (2018): 16-20.

12 Ibid.

13 Vanessa Barker, “Nordic Nationalism and Penal Order : Walling the Welfare State,” (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017): 1-2.

14 A.-C. Jungar and A.R. Jupskås, “Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family,” Scandinavian Political Studies 37, (2014): 215-238, https://doi-org.ezproxy.bu.edu/10.1111/1467-9477.12024.

15 Kolbe and Kayran, “The limits of skill-selective immigration policies,” Journal of European Social Policy, 29 (2019): 20.

16 Torbjörn Israelsson, Marwin Nilsson, et al., “Generation Shift in the Swedish Labor Market,” (Organisation for Cooperation and Development, Paris, France, 2017), 8.

17 Niklas Bolin, Gustav Liden, and John Nyhlen, “Do Anti-Immigration Parties Matter? The Case of The Sweden Democrats and Local Refugee Policy,” Nordic Political Science Association (2014): 333-334.

18 Anders Buch, Sara Kristine Gløjmar Berthou, and Thomas Bredgaard, “ Refugees and Immigrants in the Nordic 1,” Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 8, (2018): 1-5.

19 Peter A Kraus, Peter Kivisto, Andrea S. Dauber-Griffin, “The Challenge of Minority Integration: Politics and Policies in Nordic nations,” (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter Open, 2015), 129-131.

20 Haodong Qi, Nahikari Irastorza, Henrik Emilsson, Pieter Bevelander, “Does integration policy integrate? The employment effect of Sweden’s 2010 reform of the introduction program,” Institute of Labor Economics (2019): 20.

21 Ibid, 11.

22 Per Lundborg, “Refugees’ Employment Integration in Sweden: Cultural Distance and Labor Market Performance,” Review of International Economics 5, (2013): 227-229.

23 Joachim Vogt Isaksen, “Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Official Government Reports,” Nordic Journal on Migration Research 10 (2020): 117-118; Kraus, Kivisto, Dauber-Griffin, “The Challenge of Minority Integration: Politics and Policies in Nordic nations.”

24 “Nordic Welfare States, challenged by ageing and immigration: Comparable indicators.”

25 Olle Frodin, et al, "Integration, cultural preservation and transnationalism through state supported immigrant organizations: a study of Sweden's national ethnic associations," Comparative Migration Studies 9, no 1 (2021): 3-4.

26 S. Søholt, “Becoming multiethnic: integration and settlement policies,” University of Helsinki Press, (2010): 275; Antti Kuovo and Carita Lockmer. “Imagine All the Neighbours: Perceived Neighbourhood Ethnicity, Interethnic Friendship Ties and Perceived Ethnic Threat in Four Nordic Countries.” Urban Studies 50, no 16 (2013): 3305–3322.

27 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Multiculturalism in Sweden: Riots spark debates about identity and policy,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 15, 1 (2014): 98, 101.

French Positionality on Security

À travers le temps

by SYDNEY PICKERING

The inimitability of the French identity has long been characterized by pride, independence, fraternity, and distinctly rich culture. Contrary to popular belief, these features not only shape the general population, they also form the French approach to policy, namely related to defense and security. Take, for instance, French pride, which many see as a prime motivator for French icon Charles de Gaulle’s nuclear program. France has also been a leader in asserting European independence and non-reliance on other nations for security, such as the United States. French emphasis on fraternity sets them apart from other nations, as they have strived for regional unity with their European brethren—especially in their role in the European Union. Most of all, it is this distinct French culture that differentiates the nation from others, making integration and cooperation an especially daunting task.

As evidenced throughout history, France has always played a central role to security and defense policy in Europe and, more specifically, the European Union (EU). Because the twentieth century was marked by wars and perpetual regional conflict throughout Europe, the notion of a common defense policy for the continent can be dated as far back as 1948, when the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux

(Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Brussels. 1 Although this collective defense agreement was more so the basis for the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its genesis indicates France’s early commitment to joint security efforts. 2

From the humble origins of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the present-day European Union, France has sustained these efforts. The French role as ringleader of EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is evidenced further through the 1998 Franco-British Summit at St. Malo. 3 This historical moment established the foundations and strategic aspirations of today’s CSDP, which offers a cooperative framework for peacekeeping and strengthening international security. 4 With time, Europe has recognized France as the driving national power behind CSDP and other collective security efforts. Yet in the past three decades, French positionality has been anything but consistent, as opinions on France’s role in defense and security have fluctuated among national leaders and in public opinion. 5 In modern times, French President Emmanuel Macron struggles to reconcile France’s recently turbulent past to determine their role in security for the future.

CSDP is unique when weighed against other policy areas of the European

Union. Early political theorists, such as John Locke, repeatedly defined the government’s responsibility to protect its constituents’ life, liberty, and property, conceptually prioritizing national security over economic well being. Whereas free trade and monetary policy are important to the economic success of a country, issues of security are directly related to the sensitivity of national sovereignty. Successful CSDP is only realized when EU member states are integrated with one another. In this sense, coordination, cooperation, and integration are especially fundamental. Moreover, compared to other policy areas of the EU, such as the four free movements of goods, capital, services, and people or the Rule of Law as dictated by the European Court of Justice, many have considered CSDP to be widely unsuccessful. In a piece titled “Flattering to Deceive: the Common Security and Defense Policy,” scholar Anand Menon asserts that among many flaws in CSDP, the policy undermines the EU’s ability to wield soft power, missions are too often limited in scope, and some, if not all, actions have been political cosmetology.6 Menon refers to the concept of political cosmetology to highlight how EU member states have been wielding CSDP simply for surface level operations or looks, rather than utilizing its potential to successfully address multidimensional security and defense complications. Despite EU foreign policy being punctuated by a pattern of crisis-and-response, theorists Peterson and Helwig critique that in the domain of CSDP, the EU will likely fall short more often than it will meet expectations.7 In sum, CSDP is not free from critique: it is a point of hot contention, yet an ever changing and complex international security environment may initiate the possibility for improvement and integration in the future.

The future of CSDP is likely to be characterized by a supranational organization; thus, understanding historical context and distinct national identities will offer insights for how CSDP may progress without violating traditional norms of sovereignty established by the Westphalian nation-state. Focusing on the history and identity of France in relation to CSDP in the EU will inevitably constitute a comparison to NATO, as well as relations with other states.

A thorough exploration of France's history in security and the shaping of French strategic culture will reveal two main takeaways. Firstly, France and the EU are at a crossroads, in which recent strategic environments have prompted the pursuit of nondependence on the United States for security and defense. Secondly, a historical recount will indicate that no matter the direction that CSDP goes in, integration will remain remarkably trying so long as culture, identity, and national sovereignty maintain a central role.

As previously stated, France’s past points to a number of moments in which the country catalyzed European defense and security integration. Delving deeper into these landmark cases will not only explain France’s positionality on CSDP today, but it will also help to explain CSDP for the future.

The logical starting point is the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War. For western Europe and the former Allied forces, two of the main concerns were the threats posed by an overly powerful Germany—even if it was partitioned into the Soviet Union’s East and West Germany—and an expanding Soviet Union. 8 France had sustained a deeply resentful relationship with Germany for a significant amount of time, especially through the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and World War II. Therefore, its greater concern lay with German militarism; as a response, French Premier and former Defense Minister René Pleven proposed the “Pleven Plan” or the “European Defense Community” in 1950. 9 The proposal entailed the creation of a European Army or a Defense Community under the authority of all of its member states (France, West Germany, Italy, the Benelux). 10 The logic follows that Germany could not use the army against any of the member states, namely Western European states, and more broadly, that civil wars throughout Europe would be near impossible. Despite including a proposed budget, institutional organization, and plans for an army, the Pleven Plan met much resistance. What is most ironic is the amount of opposition that the Pleven Plan met from its home country France, especially in comparison to other Western countries. When presented to the French National Assembly in 1954, its deputies refused to ratify the Treaty, automatically terminating the plan. 11 For some, the need for a common army diminished alongside the waning conflict, a direct reference to the 1953 death of Stalin and the 1953 end of the Korean War. 12 Ardent supporters of Charles de Gaulle saw the European Defense Community as a means to undermine national sovereignty and military independence in France. The popularity of communism in France also sparked conspiracies that the Pleven Plan was backed by the United States to undermine this

movement. 13 Members of the French Parliament were also concerned that the exclusion of the United Kingdom would harm their bilateral alliance that had persisted through the conflict of the first half of the twentieth century. 14 The French proposal and French denial of the European Defense Community is a prime example of how European integration for defense has remained a longstanding goal, but time and time again national interests and sovereignty hinder progress.

Only a few years later, in 1959, General Charles de Gaulle was elected to the French Presidency where he established a legacy marked distinctly by French security and defense. Characterized by outwardly power displays and dedication to national strategic interests, de Gaulle’s actions and motivations are debated decades later. While some theorists contend that de Gaulle merely engaged in “posturing” and impassioned rhetoric to enhance French prestige, others argue that he truly had a grand vision for the reshaping of Europe in the international world order.

Charles de Gaulle’s timeless visualization for France and Europe is often referred to by two key

terms, a “European Europe” 15 that existed “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” 16 His desire was for the two hegemons, the United States and the Soviet Union, to lessen their presence in their respective spheres of Europe and, instead, for the European people to create what American President Eisenhower alluded to as “the third great power complex in the world.” 17 Moreover, he envisioned that in this new order, France would play a key role in leading the European bloc militarily and politically.

In order to embody this vision, de Gaulle continually critiqued Europe’s dependence on the United States for security, especially due to France’s possession of nuclear weapons. Paris’ open disagreement with Washington’s purpose and structure of the Atlantic “interdependence” was the first of a longstanding debate on Europe’s strategic autonomy. However, these fears of relying on America for security were not unfounded. When NATO was founded in 1949, Russia lacked the capability to deploy nuclear weapons to the continental United States. But with the rapid vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by both hegemons, it was clear that the vulnerability of the United States was a gaping hole in the American guarantee. 18 Would America be willing to sacrifice New York City for Paris?

By the late 1950s, President de Gaulle continued his pre-existing plans for a French nuclear weapons and energy program, named the Commission Energie Atomique (CEA). 19 The idea of a French nuclear force appealed to de Gaulle and to his realist perception of the international world order for a few reasons. For one, de Gaulle strongly believed in the effectiveness of a nuclear deterrent. Having suffered immense losses through invasions of France in World War I and II and German occupation in the latter, de Gaulle was determined to protect his nation: “For to attack France would be equivalent, for whomever it might be, to undergoing frightful destruction itself.” 20 His affinity for the realist lens led him to the assumption that states could never definitively trust one another; yet he believed resolutely that the possession of a nuclear bomb would have lasting and profound effects on how statesmen would utilize military force. 21 In sum, de Gaulle’s perception of the world and international

relations largely shaped France’s sharp turn away from American dependence and towards security non-dependence through the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Even as de Gaulle’s rhetoric beautifully illustrated an ever-stronger European bloc, it was clear that, with French nuclear weapons in play, progress towards this vision was not operational. Despite the successful creation of a French nuclear arsenal, Europe chose the United States as its nuclear umbrella. Moreover, while trying to balance non-dependence on the United States, France was also preoccupied with the potential of a West German nuclear capability. De Gaulle understood that replacing NATO with a purely European defense system would require a nuclear capable West Germany to deter the USSR. Fears of West Germany proliferating were so profound for the French that France opposed the NATO nuclear planning organization of greater allied approval mainly because it gave too much power to West Germany; de Gaulle believed that Germans should not have any input in the decision to deploy or use nuclear weapons. 22 Yet again, French security policy oscillated between fears of depending on the American nuclear safety net, another power agglomeration by Germany, and a desire for integrated European security policy as envisioned by de Gaulle. It is evident that the ins and outs of security policy and national sovereignty are not just sensitive but also complex and multidimensional, existing as a pattern through history.

European integration deepened with each decade. Through the 1980s, the European Economic Community transformed into the European Community, a true common market, which encouraged the free movement of goods, capital, and labor. Especially momentous were creations of the euro (and thus, the Eurozone) and the Schengen Zone. Finally, in 1991 came the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the EU. Germany was reunified, institutions were strengthened, and the political discourse turned to the birth of the three pillars of the EU: European Communities, Police and Judicial Cooperation, and Common Foreign and Security Policy. 23 These moments of deep integration gave hope for a resurgence of CSDP, but EU leaders only believed

it possible if CSDP became a policy instrument matured through an EU agency. 24

On December 4, 1998 in St. Malo, France, the foundation for the EU’s CSDP was drafted at the Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense. Here, France and Britain’s leaders met to develop a modern, common defense policy and establish three spheres of ambition. 25 The main political objective is to allow the EU to define its own strategic interests without the directives of the United States. At the level of capacity, CSDP aims to generate civilian and military instruments to pursue the aforementioned strategy; this goal directly challenges the European free-riding system that exists in NATO. And lastly, on an operational level, EU CSDP aims to acquire the confidence, experience, and ability to conduct significant overseas operations. 26 Recommitment to European defense autonomy lit a match in EU member states, and, of course, France was at the center of its resurgence.

Unfortunately, opinions and trust in the progress of EU CSDP is in frequent fluctuation— the French included. President Jacques Chirac signed the St. Malo declaration alongside Prime Minister Tony Blair. 27 By the time Nicolas Sarkozy was elected to the presidency, French public opinion on CSDP was waning, yet his attempts to reinvigorate French passion for CSDP by re-joining NATO could not reverse their apathy. 28 President Hollande, who was elected to the presidency from 2012 to 2017, further steered France away from

EU CSDP by legitimizing budget reductions on the basis of strategic autonomy 29. Presidential leadership and public opinion have not always aligned with each other in France; especially regarding defense and security policy, French positionality is continually in flux, ever influenced by de Gaulle’s ambitious vision and the difficulties of integration.

Despite the most recent decades of CSDP positionality fluctuation and the retreat from St. Malo’s objectives, EU CSDP and the potential for a Common Army remain a hotly contested debate. Current French President Emmanuel Macron, like his predecessors, is in the process of creating his own French posture. France’s recent lack of consistency in defense positionality means that the international community remains divided on what the French role is in CSDP presently and for the future. Though, many contend that Macron is following a Gaullist path—one that has been triggered by shifting American interests and drastic changes in EU dynamics.

When the United States’ Trump Administration took office in 2016, American foreign policy returned to isolationism. With Trump’s frequent yet unpredictable Twitter rants critiquing transatlantic relations, both Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated discussions about a common European army. 30 International constituencies had hoped that President Joe Biden’s 2020 election to office would signal a return to international norms, namely the ones most often associated with President Barack

Obama, and renew transatlantic relations between the United States and Europe. Despite a majority approval of Biden’s election, in a pan-European poll of eleven countries, 32 percent of all respondents indicated that the American electorate can not be trusted after Trump’s 2016 victory. 31 This study is one of many that evidence a growing disapproval of the United States’ political system among European populations. France has been left questioning if America, and more specifically its democracy, can be trusted and if American defense can be relied upon, as they had in the past. While the heat of the conversation around a European common army took place in 2018, the impacts are lasting: European integration continues to take precedence over Euro-American relations. In response to Macron, Merkel stated, “The times when we could rely on others are over…Europeans [must] take our destiny into our own hands if we want to survive as a Union.” 32 Merkel’s words are a reflection of Macron’s sentiments: De Gaulle’s vision of an independent, regional Europe is on the return. Issues in transatlantic relations certainly did not end with the US presidential transition from Trump to Biden. One of the most significant recent developments occurred in September 2021 when Australia hastily opted out of a $66 billion defensive submarine contract with France, instead establishing a new Australian defense acquisition of nuclear power submarines from the United States and United Kingdom. 33 Further complicating international relationships, Australia announced the founding of a trilateral security partnership with the two aforementioned actors, cleverly dubbed AUKUS. 34 Experts see this budding alliance in the Indo-Pacific region as a strategic move by the Americans to counteract the growing power and influence of China, which has the largest naval force on the planet. 35 The new contract appears to be a straightforward challenge to Sino-American security relationships, yet it has been created, underhandedly, at the expense of France.

Having been in the works since 2016, the cancelled Future Submarine contract between France and Australia has led to significant French retaliation. Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister and the nation’s top diplomat, explicitly described the situation as a “crisis of trust” between

two longtime allies. 36 For the first time in history, France recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Australia—a decision that marks an unprecedented breakdown in modern French and American relations. A number of analysts have attributed France’s drastic measures to the economic loss of the cancelled deal, which is predicted to affect thousands of laborers in their domestic defense industry. 37 The implications extend well beyond economic damage. The ‘crisis of trust’ alluded to by Le Drian resonates across borders; the cancellation of the submarine deal and founding of AUKUS has prompted the EU’s executive branch, the European Commission, to analyze the situation holistically, determining the cause and impact of the Australian submarine agreement. 38 While the EU has been evaluating the events with gravity, France’s allies are on different pages: the United States, Australia, and Britain contend that the crisis and diplomatic recall will not hinder long-term relationships with France. 39 For Macron, this breach of trust interferes with, and even impedes, his long-term foreign policy and security goals. The French President has consistently referred to his goal of achieving strategic autonomy in the EU, and the Future Submarine contract would have aided France and the rest of Europe in asserting security-related independence and influence. The event and discourse surrounding it will remain politically dangerous for Macron, who seeks reelection in 2022. As evident here, shifting American interests heavily influence French defense positionality and point to Macron’s policy parallels to de Gaulle regarding the need for European security non-dependence.

Evidently, shifting American interests and its influence on French defense positionality is not the only issue that Macron has had to deal with. Turning attention and analysis away from transatlantic relations highlights how the dynamics of the EU and the broader continent have been changing drastically. With Brexit fundamentally altering EU dynamics, France has been left as the only nuclear power in the EU. Looking to the future, France has been given the opportunity to emerge as a military leader in either a European common army or plainly EU CSDP. Debate remains over whether France’s nuclear shield is large

enough to cover all of Europe given that France has historically been very conservative in opening up their nuclear domain for cooperation. 40

Brexit is one moving piece in a larger movement of Euroscepticism growing across the continent. Euroscepticism is a political ideology established by deep opposition and criticism to the European Union’s institutions and policies. 41 While France’s leadership remain fierce proponents of deeper EU integration, this is not to say the associated far-right groups, such as the Front Nationale, have not gained traction. Beginning in the early 1990s, French public opinion has seen an increase in discontent or disapproval towards the European project. According to a 2020 working paper published by the Institute for International Political Economy Berlin, cultural aspects such as national identity and national security are crucial sources of Euroscepticism, which is being frontlined by the Front National, France’s far-right party. Euroscepticism, put plainly, is one of the greatest challenges facing the EU right now; it also largely contributes to the complex security issues that threaten the likelihood of Macron's reelection. Historically, notions of Gaullist ambition and German pragmatism have worked in tandem to propel the EU and its CSDP forward, but the two leaders’ strategic partnership is rarely realized. 42 Throughout the 20th and 21st century, a structural pattern has emerged explaining why the Franco-German security and foreign policy partnership is so often met with obstacles. France seeks to “preserve autonomy” by being selective in partners, while Germany holds multilateral relations at the core of its foreign policy, often seeking the participation of as many actors as possible. 43 Despite major differences in approaches to CSDP, there is an ever-present opportunity for France to continue partnering with Germany and progress European defense cooperation. Recent progress in the CSDP domain include PESCO (the Permanent Structure Cooperation) and the EI2 (European Intervention Initiative). 44 While France and Germany have had disputes over both of these initiatives, discourse or even disagreements do not rule out the possibility that these two nations will lead EU CSDP hand in hand. Another major factor in the EU’s uncertain future is the election of a new

German Chancellor, as Angela Merkel steps down from her position of fifteen years. 45 It not only leaves more questions than answers for the future of EU security, but it also jeopardizes France’s role in EU security as Macron must rebuild and revitalize Franco-German relations. The many moving parts in European domestic and international affairs compound a thorny equation. What appears is an opening, an opportunity for France to jump towards the European integration it has long dreamed of.

Macron’s speech on defense and deterrence strategy held in February of 2020 is the most in line with the historical context of French security policy, especially as posed by de Gaulle. In his address to the École Militaire of Paris, Macron clarifies his strategic vision for Europe. He calls on Europe to step up as an autonomous actor in the defense and security realms. 46 With a reaffirmation to the transatlantic relationship, he also makes explicit references to the “dismantling of international norms,” which “Europeans…cannot ignore.” 47 Macron alludes to the longstanding idea of progressing France’s national nuclear deterrence system to be a European deterrent — a role that de Gaulle had imagined more than sixty years ago. The February 2020 speech will be archived as Macron’s stance on French national security, EU CSDP, and his strategic vision for the future. It is one that is shaped most fervidly by the French identity, a national history that is vibrant with the colors of security leadership, and the “European Europe” foreseen by French leader Charles de Gaulle.

It is more than clear that the EU is at a crossroads. The question is less of where CSDP will go and more of how it will get there; who will lead the twenty-six member states towards coordination, cooperation, and integration?

Integration is the key to unlocking successful CSDP. However, distinct national postures, cultures, and histories make the process more difficult in practice than on paper. While de Gaulle’s vision of a non-dependent European security might not be the immediate next step, Macron’s leadership is certainly a step in that direction.

References

1 Jolyon Howorth, “The CSDP in Transition: Towards ‘Strategic Autonomy?’” in Governance and Politics in the Post-Crisis European Union , 2020.

2 “Brussels Treaty,” November 29, 2016.

3 Howorth, “The CSDP in Transition: Towards ‘Strategic Autonomy?’”

4 “Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),” Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, 2021.

5 Kaija Schilde, The Political Economy of European Security , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, doi:10.1017/9781108182492.

6 Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür, eds., Key controversies in European integration , Macmillan International Higher Education, 2016.

7 Dermot Hodson and John Peterson, eds., The institutions of the European Union , Oxford University Press, 2017.

8 David Ramiro Troitino, European integration: Building Europe (European political, economic, and security issues) , Nova Science Publishers Incorporated, 2013.

9 René Pleven, “Statement by René Pleven on the Establishment of a European Army (24 October 1950),” CVCE.EU by UNI.LU, October 24, 1950.

10 Arnold Kanter, “ The European Defense Community in the French National Assembly: A Roll Call Analysis,” Comparative politics 2, no. 2 (1970): 203-228.

11 “The Failure of the European Defence Community (EDC),” The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) - From the Messina Conference to the Rome Treaties (EEC and EAEC) - CVCE Website, CVCE EU.

12 “The Refusal to Ratify the EDC Treaty,” The refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty - The organisation of post-war defence in Europe (1948–1954) - CVCE Website, CVCE EU.

13 Ibid.

14 Troitino, European integration .

15 Paul Halsall, “Modern History Sourcebook: Charles De Gaulle, President of France: Europe and Its Role In World Affairs, July 23, 1964,” Internet History Sourcebooks , July 1998.

16 Éric Anceau, “De Gaulle and Europe,” Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe , June 22, 2020.

17 Marc Trachtenberg, A constructed peace: the making of the European settlement , 1945-1963., Vol. 79., Princeton University Press, 1999.

18 Ronald Steel, “Europe, De Gaulle & the Deterrent,” Commentary Magazine , December 1962.

19 “French Nuclear Program,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, February 14, 2017.

20 Władysław Wszebór Kulski, De Gaulle and the world: the foreign policy of the fifth French Republic , Syracuse University Press, 1966.

21 Philip H. Gordon, “ Charles de Gaulle and the nuclear revolution,” Security Studies 5, no. 1 (1995): 118-148.

22 Marc Trachtenberg, “ The de Gaulle Problem,” J ournal of

Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (2012): 81-92.

23 “The Pillar Structure of the EU,” Resources for The pillar structure of the EU - The European Union - CVCE Website, CVCE EU.

24 Howorth, “The CSDP in Transition: Towards ‘Strategic Autonomy?’”

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Peter Ricketts, “ The EU and Defence,” The RUSI Journal , 162:3 (2017), 30-38.

28 Lisa Watanabe, “ Keeping France in the CSDP,” CSS Policy Perspectives 3, no. 3 (2015).

29 Ibid.

30 Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke, “ France and Germany: spearheading a European security and defence union,” Policy Paper 202 (2017): 19.

31 Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, “The Crisis of American Power: How Europeans See Biden's America,” ECFR, January 19, 2021.

32 Maïa de La Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for EU Army to Complement NATO,” POLITICO , POLITICO, November 14, 2018.

33 Dustin Jones, “Why a Submarine Deal Has France at Odds with the U.S., U.K. and Australia,” NPR, NPR, September 20, 2021.

34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Edith M. Lederer and Jennifer Peltz, “‘Crisis of Trust’: France Bristles at US Submarine Deal,” AP NEWS, Associated Press, September 21, 2021.

39 Ibid.

40 Thibaud Harrois, “ Franco-British Defence and Security Cooperation after Brexit: An Exception in Europe,” Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique 25, no. XXV-4 (2020).

41 M. Ray, “ Euroskepticism,” Encyclopedia Britannica , June 24, 2016.

42 Ronja Kempen, Wolfram Locher, et al., “France's Foreign and Security Policy under President Macron: the Consequences for Franco-German Cooperation,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Berlin, May 2021.

43 Judy Dempsey, “Germany's Vote Should Set the Pace for Europe,” Carnegie Europe, September 14, 2021.

44 Koutouzi Dimitra, “POLICY PAPER: Europe's Defence: between EI2 and PESCO,” Vocal Europe , February 22, 2020.

45 E. Macron, “ Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy,” Paris, École de Guerre, 7th of February.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

Taking Up Merkel's Mantle

What a change in chancellorship really means for Germany

by ERICA MACDONALD

ERIC LANGENBACHER

Teaching Professor of Government at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow and Director of the Society, Culture, & Politics Program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, and Editor of “Twilight of the Merkel Era: Power and Politics in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag Election” (2019)

The conclusion of a sixteen-year-long position at the helm of the fourth largest global economy is no small shift in international politics. The queen (metaphorically, of course) has left the chessboard. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel leaves behind an era of relative stability, modest growth, and shocking approval ratings— ignoring precedent with her departure. Merkel is the first Chancellor of post-World War II Germany to step down, rather than run for re-election. And why, when she was widely beloved? The answer, put simply, is practicality. Merkel embodies many of the attributes that make a good politician—rational, logical, reliable—attributes we rarely see nowadays, especially when compared to many of her male counterparts. 1 These traits deterred Merkel from any showy grab of power, or more aptly, too long cling to it. She did not force a political dynasty where it was not warranted , even if some Germans and global citizens may have wanted it. Merkel’s career was defined by a balance between progressive policies and an overall attempt

“This is an important topic for any student or observer of international affairs, given the importance of Germany in the world system and the long and successful tenure of Chancellor Angela Merkel.”

to avoid “revolutionary shifts,” an approach that garnered great respect in the European Union (and larger international community). It was this reputation that earned her, and therefore Germany, the title of the “EU’s unifier.” 2 Maintaining this reputation is crucial and a hefty challenge for her successor. Even though Merkel plans to retire quietly, nothing is guaranteed. This transition of power, if unsteady, will ripple through the country and the continent. Many things are set to change in title, in position, and in rhetoric. The government’s composition will shift from one party to another, and the new one in power may pursue different goals—consequently, Germany’s reputation as consistent, itself, may change. The media will certainly see talk of ushering in a new age of policy. Nevertheless, the political agenda may shift greatly in theory, but in practice, not as much may change as voters think.

The German election, conducted on September 26, 2021, positioned Merkel’s opposing political party, the Social Democratic Party

(SPD) in power, via Chancellor-elect Olaf Scholz. Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), was voted into 196 seats of the Bundestag, as opposed to the SPD’s winning share of 206. Suffice to say, it was a close election. During Merkel’s administration, the CDU and SPD worked as a two-party Coalition, aptly named the Grand Coalition (consisting of the two dominant political parties). With the SPD’s election, that previously cooperative formation has dissolved, shaking the CDU from its place at Germany’s helm; its former partner steps up.

The CDU has been in power 52 of the 72 years that the Federal Republic of Germany has existed. 3 Its historic defeat itself speaks volumes about the shifting political climate. Many scholars attribute the supposed dynamic shift to a demographic shift—meaning the new generation is stepping up to the polls and seeking change. After all, the parties that appeal to the youth, particularly the under-30s (which, as of 2017, constituted roughly 15% of the electorate), had historic showings themselves this election. The Greens cinched a solid 14.8% of the vote, less than party leaders projected but still higher than ever before. 4 In the decades prior, the CDU’s popularity has been rooted in its appeal to the center, and even though it didn’t win the 2021 electoral majority, the

German political center, where the majority of the electorate falls, still calls the shots. The hand-off between the CDU and the SPD does not really constitute a swing from one opposite political ideology to the other—both parties are essentially centrist on the German political scale. Though Merkel and the CDU are viewed as slightly further right, many of Merkel’s policies defied what Americans would traditionally view as conservative. One prominent example is her immigration policy, which was largely welcoming, a far cry from the nationalism typically associated with conservatism. 5 In fact, Merkel famously deviated from the party line on three key issues. First, her abolishment of military conscription was largely unprecedented and a drastic shift from the previous fifty years of German compulsory military service. Second, Merkel’s radical phasing out of nuclear energy was certainly a move towards the center (n.b. this phase-out is projected to be completed by 2022). 6 The third of Merkel’s policies that were surprisingly progressive took the form of an unprecedented voting procedure. Although Merkel herself didn’t outwardly support the position, she did open a conscience vote in the Bundestag on legalizing same-sex marriage in 2017. 7 Stereotypically an issue the right opposes, Merkel differentiated herself from more conservative legacies within her party by allowing this vote. Similarly, the SPD supports a few policies that aren’t traditionally aligned with their party (i.e. more conservative-leaning policies), and German citizens can expect them to occasionally align with precedents Merkel set. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a transition of power from one party to the other would result in any extremes; luckily, there are a few key issues on which they wholeheartedly agree, such as their support of the European Union. This is good news

for the EU, as Germany is undoubtedly one of the strongest countries, if not the strongest, and “Gexit” would have disastrous consequences. The European Union requires the size, stability, and overall affluence of Germany’s economy. Given the predominant desire across parties to remain within and bolster the EU, the threat of Germany leaving is practically nonexistent.

That’s not to say that the shift will change nothing. In some ways, the CDU and the SPD conform to traditional center right-leaning and left-leaning views, respectively. On the topic of the economy and fiscal policy, the CDU tends to favor lower taxes and oppose government regulation of business; the SPD favors “a government that actively seeks to redistribute wealth.” 8 Even with their differences, Olaf Scholz may not choose to lean heavily into his party politics, should he become Chancellor. After all, he campaigned on Merkel’s coattails, as Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister. To win over the “center” voting demographic, the SPD and Scholz appealed to the working class, boosting promises of “modest policy proposals that focused on issues like building more

affordable housing, preserving the pension system, and enacting a 12-euro minimum wage.” 9 None of this statement spells drastic change. As a federal democracy, the displacement of the CDU is relative and temporary within a system that relies on party cooperation and representation. Though it is no longer the dominant party in the Bundestag, it will still play a role in Parliament.

German elections involve a vote for a representative, elected directly into a parliamentary seat, and a vote for a political party, which determines the percentage of the party in Parliament. The party with the most seats opens negotiations on the formation of the Coalition, which elects the Chancellor and leads the government. The Coalition in recent years has been two-party: the CDU and the SPD. Now, there is more uncertainty. There are plenty of possible iterations on the horizon, many of which include alliances with smaller but certainly not fringe political parties, like the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The largest shift in power would be a coalition of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP, which would leave out the CDU completely. This is often referred to as the “traffic light” coalition, given the colors of each party: the Greens (green, obviously), FDP (yellow), and the SPD (red). 10 While Olaf Scholz will be working to form a beneficial coalition that would bolster his position and strengthen his bid for the Chancellorship, the CDU will be rigorously fighting for their spot in the political hierarchy. One thing is for certain—this is not the political structure of the Germany we have known for the last two decades. Coalition negotiations can take months to form, and although nothing is certain, a few possibilities are favored. Namely, the aforementioned “traffic light” coalition is appearing more and more likely, as the parties have entered

into preliminary discussion. A coalition of this composition would be the first in Germany’s history. 11 However, these parties are in ideological gridlock on many points: “The FDP is against the SPD and Greens' plan to raise taxes on the wealthiest to deal with the pandemic and the resulting national debt. At first glance, the liberals appear also at odds with their climate policy, which envisions a stronger government hand. The FDP wants market-driven solutions to the climate crisis.” 12 Could these parties reconcile their stances enough to have a productive coalition? Even party officials express skepticism. A three-part coalition is tenuous simply by virtue of its structure—none of the proposed parties have been in a three-part coalition before and there hasn’t even been a threepart coalition since the 1950s. 13

Whatever the new government may be, what’s on the agenda? Keep an eye on the three C’s: covid recovery, climate change, and the China challenge. The questions surrounding these policies broadly apply to the European Union, but it is Germany that directs the response. Germany sets the precedent, and its choices in the following

months will determine the EU’s relative successes and failures in dealing with these issues. For example, the 2020 Covid Recovery Plan proposed by the EU will be subject to opposition, depending upon the parties that take power in the German government. Some of the policies from the plan may be extended or blocked. In one instance, the Recovery Plan allowed for “member states to loosen the Stability and Growth Pact rules and to allow massive public investments,” a policy France hopes to implement in the long term. 14 France’s objective, however, may be met with backlash if the FDP or the CDU are in power.

Climate change, too, is subject to debate. The varying stances on how to deal with climate change spells uncertainty for national, European, and international policy. The spectrum is wide, but most agree on attempting coal phase-out and climate neutrality. How they may work towards those goals, however, is very different. Solutions range from solar panels to emissions trading. 15 The most aggressive approach originates within the Green Party, a likely power player in the new coalition— their involvement will mean a lot of support for the

Paris Agreement and encouragement of even more progressive policies in the EU. Last but most certainly not least is the China challenge. Certain German political parties, namely the Greens, could push Germany (and the EU by proxy) to address human rights violations in China, which would negatively impact the current trade relationship. This would not displease German voters; they tend to be in favor of criticising China and slowly eroding economic alliances and agreements. This, too, may placate France, whose politicians and public also seem to be seeking a separation from Chinese entanglements. Generally speaking, German-Chinese relations these past few years have been tense. A whopping 47% of Germans regard China as “rival or outright adversary that is in conflict with Europe.” This election shows that voters have been pushing for change, and they just might get it regarding the three C’s.

A historic election in Germany has moderates vying for the reins. The younger generation of voters boosted more progressives into place, but the dust has yet to settle. Minority parties are getting more and more seats at the political table—their prominence is only set to increase as the government reforms itself. Will they squeeze their way into power? Ongoing coalition negotiations have the German public and international community watchful as the dynamics shift and the country undoubtedly enters a new political era. The hallmarks of said era are uncertain. How much will change, even if the players do? If Germany is ruled by those slightly left of center, what does that actually look like after Merkel? A political titan herself, Merkel has left much to question with her departure, but those in line to fill her shoes seem poised to maintain and perhaps improve upon her legacy. As Germany undergoes its first real political reshaping in nearly two decades, the world waits with uncapped pens and an increasingly progressive agenda.

References

1 Ivana Kottasová, “Angela Merkel Endured as Others Came and Went. Now World's Crisis Manager Steps Down,” CNN, Cable News Network, September 27, 2021.

2 Piotr Buras, Jana Puglierin, “Beyond Merkelism: What Europeans Expect of Post-Election Germany,” ECFR, September 14, 2021.

3 Jefferson Chase and Rina Goldenberg, “The CDU: Germany's Major Postwar Party Seeking to Redefine Itself: DW: 26.09.2021,” DW.COM., Deutsche Welle , September 26, 2021.

4 “German Elections 2021,” The Economist , The Economist Newspaper.

5 Chase and Goldenberg, “German Election: What Do the Terms ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ Mean, If Both CDU and SPD Are in the Center?”

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Jen Kirby, “Germany's (Sort of) Change Elections,” Vox , Vox, September 27, 2021.

10 Marcel Fürstenau, “German Government: What Are the Chances for a 'Traffic Light' Coalition?: DW: 07.10.2021,” DW.COM. Deutsche Welle , July 10, 2021.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Katrin Bennhold, “Germany's Coalition Dating Game Starts to Get Serious,” The New York Times , The New York Times, October 7, 2021.

14 Martin Quencez, Michal Baranowski, et al., “The Merkel Legacy and the Post-Merkel Challenges,” GMFUS, September 21, 2021.

15 Jens Thurau, “German Election and Climate Change: What Are the Parties' Pledges: DW: 23.09.2021,” DW.COM. Deutsche Welle , September 23, 2021.

RUSSIA & FORMER SOVIET UNION

Editor's Note

It is my distinct honor to introduce the IRR's contribution to research on the international relations of Russia and the former Soviet Union. We cover a vast array of historical and contemporary issues that influence modern politics, including the foundation of the strategic and critical development of U.S.-Russia engagement.

JACQUELINE MOSHKOVICH, CAS '22

Azima highlights the fragile state of Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet state struggling to break free from Russia's authoritative grip. Joseph challenges the extent of U.S. military prowess by analyzing the rapid advancement of Russian technology. Together, these two pieces expose new layers of the Russian effort to attain hegemony in the post-Cold War international system.

Senior Editor, Russia & Former Soviet Union

The Fragile State of Kyrgyzstan

today

by AZIMA AIDAROV

Where is Kyrgyztan’s democracy heading? Thirty years after independence from the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan is still facing government corruption, division amongst ethnical groups, a weak economy, and Russia’s prominent influence from within.

On August 31, 2021 Kyrgyzstan celebrated its thirtieth annual Independence Day, which honors the independence it acquired after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan is a small, mountainous country in Central Asia that is situated between the great powers of Russia and China. Its path to independence has not been easy—since 1991, it has undergone severe economic difficulties, numerous ethnic conflicts, and three revolutions in which incumbent presidents were expelled from office. There has only been one peaceful transition of power across six presidencies, making it the only country in Central Asia to undergo regular regime changes. 1

Under the leadership of the first postSoviet president, Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan seemed to be heading in the direction of a democracy with financial assistance from the U.S., the European Union, Japan, and various international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Akayev was able to attract foreign investment and

carry out some economic reforms; for example, Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries among the former Soviet Union republics to implement its own national currency, the som , in 1993. 2 An emerging democracy, people began calling Kyrgyzstan the “Switzerland of Central Asia” and an “island of democracy” in comparison to neighboring Central Asian authoritarian regimes. 3 Yet throughout all its years of independence, Kyrgyzstan has been unable to reach independent economic prosperity and create a strong democratic governmental system. Akayev set a poor precedent in his attempt to overextend his time in office by passing Constitutional reforms that would’ve allowed him to stay in power for a third term, claiming that his first term “didn’t count.” 4 This, along with corruption within his family and findings by the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe that the parliamentary elections were fraudulent, led to the first Kyrgyz revolution, known as the Tulip Revolution of 2005. 5 Afterwards, Akayev was ousted from power and fled to Moscow, where

Once Central Asia's most promising democracy, and where it stands

Putin offered him exile. 6 Kyrgyz citizens truly believed that the Tulip Revolution would be the turning point which would signify the start of less corruption, increased governmental transparency, and, subsequently, a better standard of living. They hoped that it would sow the seeds of real democratization in Kyrgyzstan — if this had happened, Kyrgyzstan would be an exemplar for other Central Asian states and the effects of it may have reverberated across the region. Unfortunately, each president that came into power after Akayev followed his precedent of corruption. Under the rule of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the president who took office after the Tulip Revolution, the quality of life for the average Kyrgyz citizen worsened and the prevalence of corruption continued to grow, as members of his family took on senior government positions. 7 Interim President Roza Otunbayeva stated that the funds misappropriated by Bakiyev’s family reached “an estimated $2 billion,” which exceeded the country’s annual budget. 8 The second Kyrgyz revolution, the Melon Revolution, occurred in 2010 and resulted in the ousting of Bakiyev in the capital city, Bishkek.

These revolutions proved that the Kyrgyz people are capable of ousting people from power, albeit through violence, when they see that their government is not fulfilling its purpose and bettering their livelihoods. Notably, more people from the “younger generation of political leaders” came out and demanded change from those in the older generation who were consolidating power. 9 However, the revolutions have not led to substantive changes because they simply led to a power vacuum waiting to be filled by yet another corrupt leader. When discussing the Melon Revolution, Ariel Cohen, a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, stated, “instead of change, this revolution produced stagnation, incentivized corruption, and severely weakened the legitimacy of the state.” 10 Subsequent leaders failed to carry out democratic reforms and put an end to governmental corruption that revolved around family ties. The revolutions inspired a lot of hope among the public, but these hopes were never fulfilled because of a lack of fundamental changes to the political system.

The underlying cause of the corruption in Kyrgyzstan is that its political system is not based

on competing political ideas and ideologies; rather, it is based on tribal ties that date back to centuries ago when Kyrgyzstan was divided into different clans and tribes. These ties play a large role in determining which regional group rises to power and how it will maximize its profit off of the presidency in a limited amount of time. Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, noted that, “Kyrgyzstan may officially have political parties, but in reality, each party is a facade for a particular group formed around influential leaders and united by regional and family ties…These groups can roughly be divided into those representing the north and those representing the south.” 11 This rivalry between the north and south exacerbates political rivalries as groups of elites from each side try to wrest power from the other. Putting this into historical context, the Kyrgyz people were once made up of forty nomadic tribes, meaning the basis of the identity of a Kyrgyz individual lay in the context of their clan—their survival depended on their connections which increased the degree of loyalty and commitment they felt to each other. This way of thinking made its way into contemporary politics and is evident in the constant divisions between clans that threaten to disintegrate the country’s unity. 12 For example, a president from the south will primarily appoint those who are from the same clan or region to high-level governmental

positions to ensure that they will be loyal to him and share the same views. The fear of disloyalty prevents leaders from creating a more diverse government that would resemble the ideological variety that is typically seen in democracies. When the most important factor in determining whether someone gets a governmental position is what clan they come from rather than how qualified they are, problems can arise in terms of the legitimacy of political decision making. Thus, with the rise of globalization and the need to cooperate with other countries, it is increasingly important for Kyrgyzstan to be united, rather than rely on antiquated divisions that inhibit effective governance. 13

However, it can be posited that the most significant cause of Kyrgyzstan’s struggle to democratize is Russia’s tight grip on its political processes, economy, and culture. Russia and Kyrgyzstan have strong historic ties that date back to 1876 when Kyrgyzstan officially became part of the Russian Empire. These ties only strengthened throughout the seventy years that Russia and Kyrgyzstan were part of the Soviet Union and didn’t end during its breakup in 1991. Russia continues to exert a great amount of influence over Kyrgyzstan economically and militarily to this day.

Given that Kyrgyzstan’s weak economy offers few domestic jobs, many people are forced to become labor migrants and move to other countries. 14 According to the World Bank, around thirty percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP comes from remittances of Kyrgyz citizens (typically young people) who migrate to Russia in search of better opportunities. 15 The data shows that “In 2018, Kyrgyz migrants sent home about $2.7 billion in remittances.” 16 This dependency poses risks because it means that any economic downfall that occurs in Russia will adversely affect Kyrgyzstan’s economy. This can be seen when unexpected crises arise, such as the COVID-19 pandemic during which Kyrgyzstan went through an economic crisis as a result of a substantial decrease in remittances from labor migrants. 17 Kyrgyz labor migrants typically have lowpaying jobs, “mostly in construction and service industries,” in which they get paid less than

their Russian counterparts. They also face high rates of deportations because of complications with obtaining a worker’s permit and visa, as laws concerning labor migrants in Russia have become more restrictive. This puts a strain on the abilities of Kyrgyz migrants to work because there is a great risk that they will be stopped by the police and sent home. 18 In addition, migrant workers face human rights abuses, sexual assault, and extreme racism. Gulnara Durbasheva, a human rights activist in Kyrgyzstan, stated that “discriminatory rhetoric against migrants remains rampant in Russia.” 19 This rhetoric oftentimes evolves into more violent xenophobic attacks not just by Russian citizens but law enforcement officials as well purely because they don’t “look Slavic.” 20 These attacks sometimes even result in deaths, perpetrated by those who “commit hate crimes against foreigners,” with labor migrants being one of their favorite targets. They are unified by the infamous political slogan, “Russia for Russians.” 21 Women in particular are most susceptible to violence, specifically sexual exploitation and “are subjected to forced prostituiton, forced child care, and domestic

servant work,” according to a U.S. Department of State Trafficking report. 22

Another aspect of Russia’s influence over Kyrgyzstan lies in the way that it shapes public opinion through media, especially through Russian state-run news outlets that amplify antiWest sentiments. Regular consumption of Russian media works to strengthen the connection Kyrgyz people feel with Russia and causes them to view the U.S. and the West as the enemy, rather than a partner. In a public opinion poll conducted by Dr. Rasa Alisauskiene on behalf of the International Republican Institute, an American nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that works to advance freedom and democracy worldwide, sixty-eight percent of respondents, permanent residents of Kyrgyzstan aged eighteen or older, shared that they have a positive view of mass media in Kyrgyzstan. 23 Additionally, ninety-five percent of respondents assessed relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia as “good.” 24

The popularity of Russian media not only impacts public opinion, it also impacts policies that get implemented. Edil Baisalov, who was the chief of staff to the former interim leader Roza

Otunbayeva, stated that “the consequence of such viewing habits…can be seen in the national parliament, where lawmakers are considering bills almost identical in substance to those discussed in the Russian state Duma.” 25 Russia’s authoritarian political system consists of fraudulent elections, a stagnant economy, and consolidation of power amongst Putin and his cronies. It is also actively engaged in suppressing political dissidents and freedom of the press; its global freedom score is 20/100 as of 2021, meaning it is considered “not free,” according to Freedom House. 26 For Kyrgyzstan to be mimicking its style of governance, after thirty years of supposed independence, is concerning because it holds itself back from charting its own course—meaning that the cycle of fruitless revolutions will likely continue. It is imperative for its development that Kyrgyzstan separates itself from the Russian model and implements freedom of expression among media outlets.

A big part of why Russia is able to continue to wield significant influence in the region is also because most of Kyrgyzstan’s media outlets are broadcast in the Russian language. 27 Russian media, both print and electronic, makes up seventy percent of mass media, according to a local Kyrgyz news source. 28 Russian is already an official language in Kyrgyzstan and has been since 1997. Bishkek, for example, is considered “highly Russified,” with Russian being the main language spoken there. 29 Paul Goble, a longtime specialist on Eurasia, 30 stated that “Russian enjoys a higher official status and greater respect in Kyrgyzstan than in any other Central Asian country,” and that it has “been a source of irritation for many ethnic Kyrgyz, who are offended that the language of a foreign country and former occupier retains a de facto higher status than their own.” 31 Russian will most likely continue to be the dominant language in the foreseeable future, seeing as it is beneficial for those in the workforce or for those aiming to obtain higher education. Many Kyrgyz students hope to go to Russia for higher education because education in Russia is considered better than it is domestically. 32 Furthermore, while Kyrgyz is

viewed as the “traditional” language, knowledge of the Russian language is considered more “elite” and tied to one’s social status or level of education because those in urban areas are more likely to speak Russian while those in rural areas are more likely to speak Kyrgyz.

Although Kyrgyzstan has been officially known as “independent” for the past thirty years, this is essentially just a formality since Russia retains a strong hold over what the country can and cannot do. Given Russia’s undemocratic nature, it’s unbeneficial for the Kremlin to have post-Soviet republics in its sphere of influence undergo a process of democratization. Democratizing would mean that these post-Soviet states would be more independent in making political and economic decisions, thus revealing the flaws in Russia’s illiberal political governance. As a result, Russia continually intervenes in the political affairs of weaker countries that attempt to break free from its grasp or make independent decisions. Yet Kyrgyzstan has a lot of potential to flourish on its own, which can be actualized if it pursues the right policy decisions. The nature of Kyrgyzstan is some of the most beautiful in the world—the Tian Shan mountain range runs through the region33 and it is home to the tenth largest lake in the world, IssykKul.34 If better infrastructure were to be implemented, ecotourism could play a bigger role in boosting its economy than it currently does by attracting many tourists from all over the world. Furthermore, if more young people begin learning English instead of Russian and get involved in the IT sector, which “is one of the fastest growing industries in the Kyrgyz Republic,” there will likely be immediate economic benefits.35 Kyrgyzstan should consider getting more involved in the global digital economy given the fact that more young people find opportunities through participating in international projects that are based on IT, outsourcing being one of them. There are some young activists who already have plans to create the first IT Hub in Kyrgyzstan and currently have a project implemented in Chicago, IL, in which over 300 people are being trained in programming.36

Despite all the turbulence and missed opportunities within the last thirty years, there is still hope that Kyrgyzstan could be independent from Russia and collaborate more with Western

countries as a result of implementation of political and economic reforms. Its location between the great autocratic powers of Russia and China undoubtedly makes it difficult as each will continue to try to play a bigger role in the region. However, its civil society may prove to be strong enough to withstand these challenges and push for the progress they hope to see. The youth of Kyrgyzstan could create a turnaround for the country by advocating for free and fair elections, an independent judiciary and more economic freedom. When looking at the big picture, thirty years of development for any country is not a great amount of time—for Western countries, it took hundreds of years to get to where they are today. Thus, this is just the beginning of Kyrgyzstan’s journey. The path ahead is by no means simple, but considering that the country is small and the civil society is robust, positive changes are not just possible but necessary.

References

1 Current Time, “How the 2005 Tulip Revolution Changed Kyrgyzstan,” en.currenttime.tv, 25 Mar. 2020

2 “Kyrgyzstan Som Spot.” Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg.

3 “Kyrgyzstan: Why Human Rights Have Been Declining over the Last 20 Years and What Happened to the 'Switzerland' of Central Asia?” The Foreign Policy Centre, February 28, 2021.

4 Charles Carlson, “Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Referendum Culminates Five Months of Heated Debate,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty; Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Referendum Culminates Five Months Of Heated Debate , April 9, 2008.

5 Jim Nichol, CRS Report for Congress Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications , 2005.

6 Martha Brill Olcott, “Kyrgyzstan's ‘Tulip Revolution.’” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 28, 2005.

7 Current Time, “How the 2005 Tulip Revolution Changed Kyrgyzstan.”

8 Alexander Lukin, “The Dilapidation of Authoritarianism,” Russia in Global Affairs , 7 July 2010.

9 Eurasia Center, “Kyrgyzstan Gripped by Political Chaos Again: What Comes Next?” Atlantic Council , 8 Oct. 2020

10 Ibid.

11 Alexander Gabuev, “The Scramble for Power in Kyrgyzstan,” The Moscow Times , 8 Oct. 2020.

12 Жылдыз Урманбетова, “Код кыргызов,” Kgcode. akipress.org, 26 June 2021.

13 Ibid.

14 Sam Bhutia, “Russian Remittances to Central Asia Rise

Again | Eurasianet,” eurasianet.org, 23 May 2019.

15 World Bank, “Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) - Kyrgyz Republic | Data,” Data.worldbank.org.

16 Kanat Altynbayev, “Economic Risks Spur Concern over Kyrgyz Remittances from Russia,” Caravanserai , 3 May 2019.

17 Eurasia Center, “Kyrgyzstan Gripped by Political Chaos Again: What Comes Next?”

18 “Hope and Fear: Kyrgyz Migrants in Russia,” The New Humanitarian , 24 Apr. 2015.

19 Altynbayev, “Economic Risks Spur Concern over Kyrgyz Remittances from Russia.”

20 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Labor Migrants Face Abuse, Xenophobia,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 22 Oct. 2007.

21 Erica Marat, Labor Migration in Central Asia: Implications of the Global Economic Crisis , May 2009.

22 Bir Duino, Kyrgyzstan, Women and Children from Kyrgyzstan Affected by Migration an Exacerbated Vulnerability with the Participation of ADC “Memorial,” Sept. 2016.

23 Marinez, Christopher, Wallis Stanfield, and Ruaksana Haque. “What Happens When a Democracy Emerges?” IRI, November 9, 2021.

24 International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, 2019.

25 Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Russian ’Information Wars’ Heating up | Eurasianet,” Eurasianet.org, 16 Apr. 2014

26 Freedom House, “Russia: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report,” Freedom House.

27 Erica Marat, “RUSSIAN MASS MEDIA SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION in KYRGYZSTAN.” Jamestown , 7 Dec. 2006

28 Институт Медия Полиси, “В Кыргызстане русскоязычные печатные и электронные СМИ занимают до 70 процентов местного медиарынка,” Институт Медиа Полиси, 5 Mar. 2009.

29 Oishimaya Sen Nag, “Languages Spoken in Kyrgyzstan,” WorldAtlas , WorldAtlas, April 25, 2017.

30 The Jamestown Foundation, “Paul Goble,” Jamestown .

31 Paul Goble, “Russian Language Losing Its Position in Kyrgyzstan—and Moscow May Be as Well—Jamestown.” Jamestown , 2019.

32 Emma Sabzalieva, “Kyrgyz Students in Russia,” Emma Sabzalieva, 14 Feb. 2020

33 Travel Land, “Nature, Mountains, Environment, Outdoors Kyrgyzstan,” Travel Land .

34 Almut Weis, “Lake Issyk-Kul – Kyrgyzstan,” Global Nature Fund - Lake Issyk-Kul (Kyrgyzstan).

35 International Trade Administration, “Kyrgyz RepublicInformation and Communication Technology (ICT),” trade. gov, 5 Oct. 2021.

36 Kyrgyz National News Agency Kabar, “First IT HUB in Central Asia to Be Opened in Kyrgyzstan.” Информационное Агентство Кабар, 20 Feb. 2020

The Arms Race Five Times Faster Than Sound

by JOSEPH SU

The slowest Russian hypersonic missile can carry 700 pounds of conventional explosives or a nuclear warhead from Boston to D.C. in less than five minutes. While Russia is actively testing, fielding, and even deploying these missiles, the United States is desperately racing to catch up, with little success. These developments have contributed to the erosion of American hard power in Eurasia, allowing Russia to adjust its foreign policy through increased military action.

All evidence points to the fact that the United States has fallen behind Russia in all development and deployment stages of hypersonic weapons. Russia is already fielding these weapons in a limited yet visible way. Furthermore, the Kremlin is drastically ahead of the U.S. in almost all aspects of weapon testing. While Russian missiles are being deployed across hotly contested regions on the international stage, the U.S. is still struggling to get its missile programs off the ground, figuratively and literally. This apparent advantage in weapons technology is something that Russia has not held since the Soviet Union. Now, Russia can strike faster, from longer distances, and penetrate the existing U.S. missile defense network. The United States, as of now, has no comparable and operational counterpart to these weapons or a way to protect its most valuable assets against them.

The most critical aspect in understanding this development is the two military postures that the U.S. and Russia have adopted and how they

have evolved. Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has maintained and upheld its dominance through a vast network of alliances, projection of its military might through 800 overseas bases, eleven supercarriers that patrol the world's oceans, and the widespread deployment of troops to all regions of the globe. 1 Costing upwards of $10 billion, these supercarriers are protected by a strike group with additional billion-dollar warships while carrying 100 million dollar planes. To say that these carriers are targets would be a vast understatement. On the other hand, Russia has postured itself for defensive war and has been content as a regional superpower, exerting its will through proxies and other means. Russia has maintained a defensive posture and is more focused on amassing a sizable force to exert its power to its neighbors and denying NATO access into Russia’s sphere of influence. Despite its defensive posture, Russia has no credible ability to challenge NATO or the U.S. on the seas, in the air, or on a unified ground offensive, and would be much more successful in utilizing asymmetrical warfare. The development of these missiles has given Russia the ability to challenge the U.S. on the high seas and strike key strategic assets with near certainty. While these developments alone should not change Russian doctrine or strategy, they present clear and brazen challenges for western alliances, make U.S. policymakers and military leaders rethink their use of military assets, and add additional weight to the international scales.

Russia has successfully tested three hypersonic weapons and, as recently as August 2021, announced another hypersonic weapon project will be completed soon. 2 These new weapons are being developed to replace current systems and fill gaps within existing strike capabilities. Currently, Russia has developed one cruise missile, the 3M22 Tsirkon, one air-launched ballistic missile, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, a reentry glide vehicle meant to carry nuclear warheads, the Avangard, and a newer, lesser-known missile known as the Kh-95. 3 The most alarming part of this is that it gives Russia an unparalleled and clear advantage over other nations in their ability to strike critical strategic assets faster and farther away with thermonuclear warheads.

The 3M22 Tsirkon is an air and shiplaunched anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile. Prototypes were initially launched in 2012 and 2013. While the details are difficult to discern given the secretive nature of this technology, current news and U.S intelligence sources believe that the Tsirkon has a range of 250 to 600 miles, can reach up to mach eight, and can carry a 600 to 900-pound warhead including a nuclear payload. 4 State testing is expected to conclude at the end of this year, paving the way for serial production and adoption into service.

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is an air-launched, anti-ship and land-attack, ballistic missile. The missile entered a trial period beginning in 2017. While the extent of its proliferation amongst Russian forces is unknown, as recently as June of this year, MiG-31’s were deployed with Kinzhal missiles to the Mediterranean as the British HMS Queen Elizabeth was in the area. 5 Additionally, in December of 2020, the Northern Fleet’s aviation wing was equipped with Kinzhal missiles as part of Russia’s arctic restoration and military buildup. 6 Finally, the Kinzhal is capable of carrying a 1058 lb payload, including a nuclear option. 7

The Avangard is a boost-glide warhead launched from traditional Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems (ICBM). Given this, the missile has an almost unlimited range and can strike almost anywhere. Additionally, the most important part, its payload weight, has also yet to be proven. While the Commander-In-Chief of Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakev, has claimed it can carry 800 kilotons to two megatons, 8 yet the only information available to substantiate this claim is a Russian media report. While some point to past procurement and development programs as signals of things to come, these developments present a clear threat if the Russian forces continue to invest in these programs as they have.

On the other side of the globe, the United States is pouring billions of dollars into developing their own weapons of similar capability. In 2021, $2.1 billion was invested into the various projects across the services and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In 2022, the most recent budget proposal sits at $2.218 billion. 9 The U.S is taking a different approach to develop these weapons, as each military branch is developing their own programs, alongside the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), with a common glide vehicle and booster rocket save the Air Force which is developing its own aerial propulsion system. In June 2018, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that the Navy would develop a common glide vehicle for all the services to use. The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) and the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon will use the common glide vehicle across the services and the Navy’s booster system. 10 In May 2021, the first stage test of the booster system was successful, and in late August, the second stage was also successfully tested, marking massive milestones in the program’s development. 11 According to the most recent government documents, the Navy hopes to test CPS on surface ships in 2025 and its Virginia class submarines in 2028. 12 The Army hopes to test the LRHW in 2022 and field prototypes in 2023. Given this timeframe, Russia now fields hypersonic weapons while the U.S. will be unable to do so for another few years.

The Air Force and DARPA are working together to develop a secondary boost-glide vehicle aside from the Navy’s CPS program. Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) is primarily being developed as an air-launched Air Force program. However, there are plans to work around the Navy’s vertical launch systems and work towards a ground-launched system. The Air Force is independently developing an airlaunched hypersonic weapon with TBG, which will be capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 with a range of around 1,000 miles. The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) has still yet to complete a successful flight test and has failed twice in April and July of this year.13 The Air Force and DARPA continue to develop other programs. However, much of their nature is highly secretive and sealed in classified documents.

As one can see, the U.S has no technological equivalent with most of its missile arsenal from the 20th century onward. Moreover, no current missile defenses have been proven to be able to successfully defend against a hypersonic weapon. For example, the U.S Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), designed to protect the entire U.S., has a comforting success rate of just 55 percent. 14 While this number is bumped up to 80 percent when all missile defense systems are included, the increase is only due to much shorter-range strategies, which cannot protect the entire nation. All current missile defense systems across the globe have no calculable chance of being able to consistently and verifiably counter these types of weapons. The former Undersecretary of Defense (R&D), Michael Griffin, has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest. 15 Due to these technological advancements, the United States’ main way of projecting its military power, namely through its aircraft carriers, is now at a heightened risk. Additionally, the U.S bases overseas are also now in increased danger as they now stand near unprotected from Russian aggression. While the U.S has significantly more airpower, sufficient strike, and retaliatory power, its missiles are easy for the Russian military to intercept. While these developments will not likely prompt a Russian strike, Russia’s advantage should be lurking in the minds of American military leaders.

The U.S is now presented with a clear warning that its military supremacy is eroding, and Russia is now in a position of increased influence, as its ability to project power grows. While Russia hasn’t deviated from its long-held position and strategy, this could very well be the first step towards an increased Russian presence across the globe. Tsirkon and Kinzhal missiles have now been spotted in key geostrategic locations, and their deployments will only continue to grow as time marches onwards. This technology is still new by military timelines, and it will take time to see how it impacts Russian positions. While it does not populate the front page, there is growing contention in the arctic as Russia amasses its forces to protect its northern borders and open up new oceanic pathways. Additionally, more forces are being deployed to the Western Military District as Russia ups its presence in key areas. This year has seen an increased number of Russian planes entering the U.S Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone as Russian planes head north and test the U.S response. 16 Russia is also holding major military exercises with its quadrennial Zapad exercise, and much to the U.S’s dismay, exercises alongside Chinese ground and naval forces. With the United States’ two greatest rivals increasing cooperation and Russian technology rapidly advancing, the U.S has something to keep its eye on.

Hypersonic missiles alone won’t win a war, change Russia’s posture, or upend the balance of global power, but they do reflect an alarming trend for U.S leaders and the western world. The United States is rapidly losing its technological and military dominance. With shaken allies amongst an ever-tense world, the seeds of change have been planted. For the longest time, the United States has maintained the global order through its overwhelming force. But as rivals continue to catch up, it continues to have to meet greater and greater challenges, failing to do so.

References

1 David Vine, “Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 17762021,” Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776-2021 | AU Digital Research Archive, American University, June 4, 2021.

2 “Russia Developing New KH-95 Long-Range Hypersonic Missile,” TASS.

3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress , by Kelley M Sayler, R45811, 2021.

4 Ibid.

5 David Axe, “Russia's Hypersonic Ship-Killers Head to the Med as British Carrier Sails Nearby,” Forbes, Forbes Magazine , June 28, 2021.

6 X. оружие, A. Лавров, and P. Крецул, 2021, Холодный «Кинжал»: Северный флот получит стратегическое оружие. [online] Известия.

7 Masao Dahlgren and Shaan Shaikh, “Kinzhal,” Missile Threat , July 31, 2021.

8 Андрей Коц, “Шахты ‘Авангарда’. Почему Гиперзвуковые Блоки Решили Ставить На Урале.” РИА Новости. РИА Новости 154.796internet-group@rian.ru7 495 645-6601ФГУП МИА “Россия сегодня,” December 18, 2018.

9 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. 10 Ibid.

11 “Lockheed Martin Successfully Tests Navy's Hypersonic Strike System,” Media - Lockheed Martin; Xavier Vavasseur, “U.S. Navy Tests Second Stage Hypersonic Rocket Motor,” Naval News , August 27, 2021.

12 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.

13 Garrett Reim, “US Air Force's ARRW Hypersonic BoostGlide Missile Fails Second Launch Test,” Flight Global , Flight Global, August 2, 2021.

14 “GMD: Frequently Asked Questions,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, April 6, 2021.

15 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.

16 Rachel Cohen, “Spike in Russian Aircraft Intercepts Straining Air Force Crews in Alaska, Three-Star Says,” Air Force Times , Air Force Times, April 29, 2021.

REDEFINING RESISTANCE PHOTOGRAPHY

Cover Image: Jan Canty; Reflections on the IRR: Brittany Chang; Americas: Baiden Wright; The Conditions for Abortion Reform in Latin America: Source: Wikimedia Commons, Beatrice Murch, Ana Clara Nicola, Ana Clara Nicola, Thayne Tuason; Hispaniola and Climate Change: Debby Hudson; Africa: Claire Martin; Hospitality for a Price: Antoine Pluss, Jeff Ackley, Roman Nguyen; In the Wake of the “Bulldozer”: Colin Newman, Source: Kigali Today; LGBTQ+ Rights in West Africa During COVID: Emmanuel Ikwuegbu, Source: IFE; Middle East: Ruofei Shang; Refugees, HydroTerrorism, and Unstable Governments: Levi Meir Clancy, Levi Meir Clancy; The Egyptian Coffeehouse : Heather Shevlin, Alex Azabache, Qalam Eka Maulana,

Rawan Yasser, Julia Barbosa; Asia: Ng Shi Qing Elizabeth Natalie; A Temporary Ban On Its Own Citizens: Tyler Duston; Consensus and Clean Air: Tom Fisk, Natalie Ng, Alfin Auzikri; Thailand: An Unforeseen Victim of Myanmar’s 2020: Source: Pixabay, Kosygin Leishangthem, Ganta Srinivas, Source: Pixabay; Europe: Diana Reno; To Build Bridges or Walls?: Rebeccas Giovanetti; French Positionality on Security: Lina Kivaka, Ava Rheeve, Margarida Louro, Ava Rheeve, Yiwen Wong; Taking Up Merkel’s Mantle: Niki Nagy; Russia & Former Soviet Union: Stephen Conrad; The Fragile State of Kyrgyzstan: Irene Strong, Irene Strong; The Arms Race Five Times Faster Than Sound: Tim Mossholder, Tima Miroshnichenko; Maps: An Pham

FALL 2021

SENIOR EDITORIAL BOARD

BRIDGETTE LANG

Editor in Chief Class of 2023

International Relations

JOSH WRIGHT

Editor in Chief Class of 2022

International Relations

ITZEL SANTANA

Chief of Staff Class of 2023 Economics & International Relations

SAM McGUIRE

Director of Public Relations & Events Class of 2024

International Relations & Spanish

SYDNEY PICKERING

Director of Marketing & Media Class of 2022

International Relations & Political Science

MALIKA MADAN Business Director Class of 2023 International Relations

BARRETT YUEH

Creative Director, Print Class of 2022 Flute Performance & Political Science

TING WEI LI Creative Director, Online Class of 2022 History & Political Science

LILA REDLER Director, In Relation To Class of 2024 Psychology JENNY KORNREICH Director, IRR Online Class of 2023 Journalism

FIONA CAPTAN

Senior Editor, Europe Class of 2023 International Relations

MARLA HILLER

Senior Editor, Americas Class of 2022 International Relations & Journalism

JACQUELINE MOSHKOVICH

Senior Editor, Russia & Former Soviet Union Class of 2022 International Relations & Russian

LÉA NAMOUNI

Senior Editor, Africa & Middle East Class of 2023 International Relations

SALLONI SUNDERAJ

Senior Editor, Asia Class of 2024 International Relations

REDEFINING RESISTANCE CONTRIBUTING STAFF

SENIOR EDITORIAL BOARD WRITERS

BRIGETTE LANG & JOSH WRIGHT

Editors in Chief

BARRETT YUEH

Creative Director, Print

LÉA NAMOUNI

Senior Editor, Africa & Middle East

SALLONI SUNDERAJ Senior Editor, Asia

MARLA HILLER Senior Editor, Americas

FIONA CAPTAN Senior Editor, Europe

JACQUELINE MOSHKOVICH

Senior Editor, Russia & Former Soviet Union

AMERICAS

Sarah Lopez Maecey Niksch

AFRICA

Anfanioluwa Lawal Bella Newell Diana Reno

MIDDLE EAST Hanadi Amin Keegan Mitsuoka

ASIA

Ashari Bilan-Cooper Nick di Paolo Sydney Steger EUROPE

Jude Hoag Erica MacDonald Sydney Pickering

RUSSIA & FORMER SOVIET UNION

Azima Aidarov Joseph Su

EDITORS LAYOUT

AMERICAS

Max Ferradino Julie Lee Baiden Wright

AFRICA

Lenny Adonteng Libby Egan Wish Pandey

MIDDLE EAST

Gideon Gordon

ASIA

James Rhee Ashley Soebroto EUROPE

Andrea Gomez-Watson Mano Harada Jessica Swanson

RUSSIA & FORMER SOVIET UNION Madison Romo Katya Tsvirko

DATA & GIS SPECIALIST An Pham

AMERICAS

Paige Croney Lucas Zhang AFRICA Sean Young

MIDDLE EAST Ava Rheeve Ruofei Shang ASIA

Natalie Ng Angela Song EUROPE Melina Nguyen Smaran Ramidi RUSSIA & FORMER SOVIET UNION Simona Simeonova

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

The IRR is set in Minion 3, an expanded and updated version of the serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and released by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissanceera type for extended reading, and named for the traditional nomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between nonpareil and brevier at 7pt.

The IRR also sets titles in Brandon Grotesque and our logotype in Baskerville.