International Relations Review: Fall 2020

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

SHAPED

BY CRISIS INSIDE: VENEZUELA’S BLOOD GOLD page 9

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM page 13

ASSAD’S ALAWITES page 26

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW ISSUE 23 FALL 2020

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR THE AMERICAS

3

VENEZUELA’S BLOOD GOLD

5

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AS EXPANSIONISM

8

State failure and human rights abuses by Pamela Troconis

Chinese strategy in Latin America by Caroline Koehl

AFRICA

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM And the future of the Nile River by Mazin Sayed

ASIA

COVID–19 AND THE UIGHUR CRISIS How the pandemic further exacerbated political and economic exploitation by Nada Shalash

13

17

MIDDLE EAST ISRAEL-BAHRAIN-UAE RELATIONS

21

ASSAD’S ALAWITES

26

THE LOOMING WATER CRISIS IN IRAQ

29

LEBANON’S EXPLOITATIVE KAFALA SYSTEM

32

And the implications for Palestinian statehood by Janney Collens

Unyielding allegiance challenged by nearly a decade of war

by Jannah Kalai

by Stella Dzialas

A form of modern-day slavery by Tima Dasouki

EUROPE O BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU?

35

AND THEN THERE WERE NONE

40

The paradox of Ukraine’s far-right by Madison Sargeant Implications of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany

by Lilly Bayly

GLOBAL FASHION TO DIE FOR?

43

ENDNOTES

47

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

53

Human rights violations in the garment industry during the COVID-19 pandemic by Madison Romo

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Dear Reader, I am thrilled to bring you the Fall 2020 issue of the International Relations Review (IRR) Journal. Since 2009, the IRR Journal has been produced on a bi-yearly basis by Boston University’s undergraduate student body, the culmination of a semester-long effort of idea generation, topical analysis, drafting, and editing and layout, before finally bringing the issue to print.

In a semester defined by challenges, stability could be found among IRR contributors, who identified global issues lacking in media coverage and produced pieces shedding light on the events and trends shaping the world around us.

Together, we are all living through the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, the severity of the hardships facing many populations is not at all lost on our editorial staff heavily attuned to international affairs. That said, I would like to voice great appreciation for the resilience exhibited by the student contributors to the IRR over the course of the past year. Life for students has proved no easy task, with the upheaval of daily activities, disruption of coursework, and transition to online learning exacerbating the already existing stress related to health, family, and feelings of creeping isolation. Despite the uncertainties brought about by the pandemic, the work the editorial board was able to achieve this semester was remarkable.

3 FALL 2020

In Shaped By Crisis, the editorial staff sought to identify topics in need of greater coverage, under-the-microscope examination, and nuanced analysis for the readership of the IRR. Many of these issues, be them related to strategic security, resource disputes, or human rights, have been amplified by the profound impacts of COVID-19.

On a global scale, COVID has accelerated already existing social, political, economic, and public health trends and exposed deeply rooted vulnerabilities in international relationships and institutions.

However, it has also provided the opportunity for nations and other actors to evolve and pivot in innovative directions to address domestic and transnational problems.

In this issue of the journal, the International Relations Review team wrote on matters that are timeless in nature—pursuant with themes relevant to the world of today but set to shape the world of tomorrow.

Articles dive deep into geopolitical water crises, the rise of far-right nationalism, and the exploitative labor practices of regimes and global industry.

As always, thank you for supporting the International Relations Review, a publication of the Boston University undergraduate student body. Enjoy the issue.

Sincerely,

Noah Riley Editor In Chief Boston University International Relations Review

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 4

VENEZUELA’S BLOOD GOLD

by Pamela Troconis

S

STATE FAILURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE ORINOCO ILLEGAL MINING INDUSTRY

imultaneously brimming with valuable natural resources and increasingly dire human rights violations, Venezuela seems to embody the paradox of the plenty: a contradiction that emerges when resource-rich countries produce mediocre economic growth and weak governmental institutions despite the abundance of profitable commodities at the government’s disposal.

The ample oil reserves on which Venezuela rests have provided the authoritarian ChavezMaduro regime a stable influx of funds ever since Chavez assumed power in 2000. As the Venezuelan economy gradually collapsed, the regime increasingly depended on fossil fuels to preserve its power amid an increasingly chaotic domestic environment. Despite the escalating gravity of the Venezuelan humanitarian and economic crisis, the Chavez-Maduro government remains in power in large part because of the unrestricted access to this valuable fuel, presenting a perfect example of what is known as the resource curse.

From Angola to Iran, valuable resources have consistently supplied authoritarian governments the necessary funds to retain their power despite domestic crises. Yet this capacity for power preservation through the exploitation of natural resources is not exclusive to state actors.

Armed groups have also tapped into these materials as a way to fund their endeavors, particularly in places where the central state can no longer project authority. These non-state actors gain command of the extraction in the regions where these resources are found and become the de-facto authority, thus establishing their own forms of governance on the local communities.

One of the most notorious uses of these conflict minerals is the control of gold resources 5 FALL 2020

in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by multiple armed groups. Following the 1997 overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, the DRC’s central government lost effective control over much of its resource-rich territory, leaving power-vacuums in pockets throughout the country, particularly in the eastern borderland with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.1 The power-vacuums left in these regions decimated by both recurring political and ethnic conflict ushered in the emergence of non-state actors who have secured control over the region’s vast natural resources. In the background of a failing central government, these non-state actors came to the forefront to establish illegal monopolies of violence and in many instances became the de-facto authority within the region.2 By exploiting the production process of mineral resources such as coltan, cassiterite, wolframite, and gold, armed groups in the eastern DRC have found consistent sources of income to finance their illicit activities and obtain control of the territory.

In the absence of

state effective authority, these armed groups have employed brutal regimes of violence against local populations and perpetrated an array of human rights abuses, including mass rape, harrasement, and recruitment of child soldiers.3

6,133 miles away, another deteriorating government is similarly capitulating its jurisdiction in parts of its resource-rich territory to armed criminal groups. In the midst of ravaging rates of hyperinflation, nation-wide food and medical shortages, crumbling infrastructure, and a mounting refugee crisis, the Venezuelan government under Nicolas Maduro is exponentially losing its legitimacy within the nation. And while—in contrast to the DCR—Venezuela’s resource-based richesse is mostly associated with its petroleum reserves, the South American country’s plethora of mineral wealth extends further; including natural resources such as natural gas, iron ore, bauxite, and, notably, gold.4

These gold deposits, clustered around the Arco Minero (which spans the states of Amazonas, Bolivar, and Delta Amacuro), are now under the de-facto administration of several criminal groups, who, like the armed groups in the DRC, utilize the revenues from this industry to fund a stream of illegal activities.

The gold is first illegally mined in the Arco Minero, then smuggled to Colombia, Guyana, Brazil, and other neighboring countries, and is finally laundered and sold to customers worldwide.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), this Venezuelan “blood gold” is sold to customers in the Middle East, the United States, Africa, and Asia.5 Yet in the absence of central government control, these gold deposits have become the battleground for different non-state actors over the control of such valuable resources.

Conflicts between Colombian paramilitary groups and conflicting criminal organizations (known as “sindicatos”) run rampant in the region, with recurring human rights abuses being reported as a consequence of such sustained clashes.6

Despite the frequent conflict in the region as a cause of the blood gold, government officials

VENEZUELA’S BLOOD GOLD under the Maduro regime remain acquiescent to the non-state control of the gold mining business.7 Amid an increasingly hostile international community,8 the Maduro regime is becoming exponentially isolated from global markets and is thus running out of sources to finance its regime.

This, coupled with an economy on the brink of collapse, has pushed the Maduro regime to cling to other natural resources within the country as a means of survival. Yet the continued cooperation between state-owned companies and violent nonstate actors in the Arco Minero (in which gold extracted from illegal mines is sourced by state enterprises and later exported to other countries such as Turkey and the UAE)9 accounts for only a small percentage of the government revenue obtained from the illegal gold mining business.

The most salient reason for continued government consent of these illegal endeavours stems from the many forms of rent extracted by government officials in the region. By still maintaining control over the oil supply in the region, military officers are able to charge consistent tolls in exchange for turning a blind eye to such illegal activities. These activities are compounded by the existence of numerous checkpoints, in which government officials accept bribes from the various actors in the regions. This established system of bribery collects funds that reach the highest echelons of the Maduro regime, providing a lifeline for a state most others treat as a pariah.10

Thus in part due to the state’s implicit consent, the illegal regime established by the various non-state actors in the Arco Minero have perpetuated an abundance of atrocities against the local population. Local testimonies assert that workers in such mines (many of which are minors)11 are exposed to inhumane labor conditions and draconian punishments. These include hand mutilations by gang members, kidnapping, and rape.12 In addition, clashes between criminal groups over the control of the gold deposits have heavily affected local populations; there have been numerous reports of massacres in the Arco Minero, accompanied with recent reports of mass grave sightings in the state of Bolivar.

When one incorporates the types of laborers employed in the Arco Minero, these abuses become INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 6

THE AMERICAS even more poignant. Living through the worst humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere today, many impoverished Venezuelans migrate to the southern border of the country in search of labor, withstanding extremely dangerous labor conditions given the limited options for work elsewhere. Furthermore, as the Arco Minero encompasses various clusters of indigenous groups, criminal factions have forced many of these communities to work in these mines, further marginalizing those who have already been disproportionately affected by the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis through forced labor.13

In addition to the already grave reality, the negative impacts of blood gold in the Arco Minero transcend further. There has been an alarming spike in malaria cases in the region, mainly a result of the standing water used in the gold mines and the highly unsanitary work conditions. In 2019, the WHO reported 323,392 malaria cases in two Venezuelan states (Bolivar and Amazonas) between January and October, with a respective 25% and 21% of deaths resulting from malaria. Estimates conclude that Venezuela is experiencing an 85% shortage of basic medical supplies, meaning that increases in diseases such as malaria place an increasing strain in an already collapsing medical system.14

photo by Brian McHale 7 FALL 2020

The international community’s animosity towards the Maduro regime is certainly exerting exponential burdens on the dictatorship—be it though economic sanctions by the EU and the US, clear condemnations by the UNHCR, or international support of Juan Guaido’s claim to presidency. But without significant legislation against the Venezuelan illegal gold market, the atrocities committed will only continue to be perpetrated, especially since the presence of nonstate actors distances the Maduro regime from these abuses-even if only superficially.

Revisiting the case of conflict minerals in the DRC, the United States and its allies passed extensive legislation that significantly hampered the sale of minerals deriving from these areas, notably hindering the incentives for these criminal groups to continue their regimes of terror. Following this exampleand acknowledging the significance of this illegal industry for the survival of the Maduro dictatorship-the international community must place regulations on the sale of Venezuelan gold, as it is only when this supply is severed that the atrocities in the Arco Minero, and in Venezuela as a whole, will stop.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AS EXPANSIONISM CHINESE STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA

by Caroline Koehl

photo by Michael Yang

T

THE AMERICAS he expansionist interests of the modern-day People’s Republic of China are not new, yet expansionist activities have greatly increased in recent years. Many of these efforts have taken place in the region surrounding China, but Chinese expansion efforts are increasingly global, with Latin America serving as a newer target for directed Chinese influence. While Latin America is a region familiar with foreign influence pervading their regional politics, China represents a new player with a different approach from other powers who have exerted authority in the region in the past.

China has a number of motivations for expanding its influence in Latin America, and investment in infrastructure development is a central tool employed to achieve its gains. The introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative into Latin America represents a clear commitment to this strategy.

However, the long-term efficacy and viability of this approach are unclear, as its vulnerabilities have been further exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

China’s motives for expanding its influence in Latin America are multifaceted, and in some cases, unclear. Geopolitics is a driving force. By building its influence in Latin America, a region in which it is a relative newcomer, China is creating the potential to build a network of global allies.

One example of China’s maneuvering in Latin America is seen in its efforts to dismantle alliances with Taiwan, specifically in Central America and the Caribbean, where some of Taiwan’s strongest allies remain.1 Moreover, building inroads in Latin America has helped China gain access to strategic geographic locations, specifically ports, through lease agreements. These acquisitions aid China both geopolitically and economically.

While some of China’s intentions in Latin America are ambiguous, its desire for greater economic integration in the region is clear; for the PRC, Latin America presents a previously unpenetrated market. For China to sustain its impressive economic growth, it is important to take advantage of all global markets. Similarly, the building of China’s influence in Latin America will help it gain a stronger foothold for trade.

By building both diplomatic ties and economic linkages across the region, China is constructing the foundation for what it hopes to be an 9 FALL 2020

economically fruitful relationship. As of 2017, China was the Latin American region’s secondlargest trading partner trailing only the United States, albeit by a wide margin.2 Whether or not China wishes to expand its influence in Latin America to directly challenge the influence of the United States, Chinese economic expansion increasingly competes with the singular economic influence the US holds in the region.

CHINESE ECONOMIC EXPANSION INCREASINGLY COMPETES WITH THE SINGULAR ECONOMIC INFLUENCE THE US HOLDS IN THE REGION.

China’s strategies to increase its influence in the region consist of a diverse set of economic and political tactics. China has deployed its preferred expansion strategies to win international influence in the region. One example is investment in infrastructure development, a strategy which global powers—particularly China—have used to gain regional influence, especially in developing countries. In fact, infrastructure development has been the cornerstone of Chinese strategy in Latin America, providing for the majority of both Chinese investment and development finance in the region in 2019.3 Much of this investment comes directly from the Chinese state, sometimes through state-owned enterprises. It also comes from Chinese companies deciding to finance projects in the region, likely with approval or encouragement from the state.

Infrastructure development finance and investment have been used for a wide variety of projects, especially in the development of transportation networks and electrical grids across the region. In 2019, China’s policy banks loaned $600 million to the Dominican Republic for upgrades to their electrical grid and $236 million to Argentina to fund the purchase of cars for the country’s Roca railway system.4 These types of investments are a continuation of China’s development work both throughout the world and within Latin America and, while they have slowed

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AS EXPANSIONISM in recent years, China seems to be committed to BRI can be described as a vehicle to promote this strategy. economic integration and, as many argue, build

Interactions between private enterprises global influence. The project began as a measure and between private and state-owned enterprises to increase connectivity between China and their have emerged as potential pathways for continued Asian and European neighbors to the west but has infrastructure development in the region, such since expanded to Latin America. BRI has been as the agreement between the state-owned converted from a regional strategy to a global one, enterprise China Railway Group Limited and the partially unifying China’s use of infrastructure Chilean private developer Sigdo Koppers for the development in foreign countries across the globe development of future projects.5 These interactions under one cohesive plan. may be emerging because private companies in

BRI’s extension into Latin America fits Latin America find state-owned or private Chinese naturally with China’s pre-existing strategy in enterprises to be more credible, or it may simply the region. Since 2017, nineteen countries in the be because their goals align more in the present greater Latin American and Carribbean region day than they did previously. More recently, China have signed Belt and Road agreements with China, has sought to increase its influence by expanding including Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, greenfield investment projects in Latin America, and Venezuela.7 China has clearly advanced BRI in 6 especially in the infrastructure sector. These the region, but some notable regional powers, such greenfield investments allow Chinese companies to as Argentina and Brazil, remain absent from BRI begin operations abroad in Latin America, allowing agreements with China. them to control their production and image in Latin Belt and Road agreements generally function America from their headquarters in China. The as bilateral Memorandums of Understanding growth of greenfield investments and activity in (MoU) between China and a given partner the private sector illustrates China’s willingness and nation. In MoUs, the partner country agrees to ability to adapt strategically in order to maintain policy cooperation, as well as the promise of the growth of its regional influence through the collaboration on potential future projects. Signing medium of infrastructure development assistance. an MoU also lends legitimacy to the Initiative.

The discussion of China’s global infrastructure Cooperation outlined in the MoUs can vary widely, development planning is incomplete without from collaborative efforts on the development of considering one of their overarching programs: infrastructure projects to the elimination of trade The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Promoted barriers between China and the signatory country. since 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative is a global Though MoUs are not legally binding, they do scale development program in which China invests function as a starting point for increased Chinese significantly in international development projects. influence through the promotion of partnerships.

Thus far, however, China has not made significant progress beyond the initial MoUs with Latin THE BELT AND ROAD American countries, lacking in the development INITIATIVE IS A GLOBAL of BRI-specific infrastructure projects. To this point, the Initiative presents a more formalized SCALE DEVELOPMENT for China to continue its infrastructure PROGRAM IN WHICH CHINA opportunity development efforts in Latin America, adjacent INVESTS SIGNIFICANTLY to the continuation of existing projects. The long term implications of BRI in Latin America are IN INTERNATIONAL not entirely clear, but the sudden impacts of the DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. COVID-19 pandemic have clouded China’s future strategy in the region.

COVID-19 has produced a number of world-changing impacts, two of which are photo by Zachary Thomas INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 10

photo by Isabelle Celedon

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AS EXPANSIONISM especially relevant to evaluating future Chinese debt crisis. strategy in Latin America: the global economic

China’s strategy of investing in infrastructure slowdown and new barriers to international development as a tool to gain influence and build movement. It is clear that declining Chinese economic ties with countries has been a mainstay investment and a general paring down of Belt and of Chinese foreign policy in Latin America. The Road Initiative projects around the world predate introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative in the 8 the pandemic; some of China’s largest borrowers region represents an increased commitment to this in Latin America have begun moving away from blueprint. However, the efficacy of this approach taking Chinese lines of credit. Overall Chinese may be in jeopardy. While investing and lending investment has actually declined in the region, for these types of projects always carry risk, the although infrastructure-related lending remains COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed the 9 important for both sides of the relationship. vulnerabilities of this strategy for both China, as

At this stage, it is impossible to estimate the it faces diminishing returns and even losses on full extent of COVID-19’s impact on China’s strategy projects it has sponsored, and for Latin American in Latin America, however, it will likely continue to countries, as they face debt issues. Such financial slow new Chinese spending in the region. This would troubles may jeopardize future Chinese aims in the not only call into question the fate of existing projects region. but also public perception of China in the region, CHINA IS NOW AN which has already suffered since the outset of the pandemic.10 As a result of COVID-related economic ESTABLISHED PRESENCE turmoil, China may see diminishing returns on IN THE REGION, BUT THE infrastructure investments as countries in the QUESTION STILL REMAINS: region, hit by an economic recession, will see limited growth. The scope of economic loss, while currently WHAT IS IN STORE FOR unknown, will play a large part in determining how THE FUTURE OF THEIR intensely China pursues infrastructure development RELATIONSHIPS IN LATIN projects and the Belt and Road Initiative as legitimate prospects for furthering its interests in Latin America AMERICA? moving forward.

Another possible impact of a COVID19-induced recession is the potential for Latin American nations to default on infrastructure development-related debts owed to China. Some critics of the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese infrastructure development efforts in the region have pointed out that some Latin American countries are taking on unsustainable amounts of debt related to China-linked projects. Such practices may very well set up a debt trap scenario for Latin American countries.11 These concerns are further intensified by the opacity of China’s lending terms, with little to no available public information on Chinese lending programs.12 Given the unforeseen economic turmoil spurned by COVID-19, it is not outside the realm of possibility that Latin American countries involved with Chinese infrastructure development lending could face troubles with debt, or, in an extreme case, a INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 12

THE

GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM AND THE FUTURE OF THE NILE RIVER

by Mazin Sayed

photo by Mazin Sayed

D

eep within the lush Ethiopian wilderness on the outskirts of a sparsely populated section of the Blue Nile River stands what is slated to become the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa. Behold, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a record-breaking 1,780 meter-long structure that will be capable of generating 6.45 gigawatts of power upon completion—enough electricity to power all of Ethiopia and some areas in its neighboring countries.1 The dam, which began construction in April 2011 and costs an estimated $4.7 billion, speaks to the ambitiousness of the Ethiopian national project spearheaded by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The strategic and economic value of the GERD, once fully realized, will be incredibly significant.

Perhaps even more significantly, the GERD has the potential to alter the regional dynamics of East African relations towards the Nile River. For 13 FALL 2020

clarification purposes, the term “riparian state” refers to any of the ten countries that the Nile River flows through. “Downstream” nations refers to Egypt and Sudan while “upstream” nations include Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.2 As of July 2020, Ethiopia has begun filling the massive reservoir of the GERD. It is the latest development in a decades-long dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over management of the Blue Nile River and its water output. Ethiopia will have the ability to shift the Nile River’s resources to better support its country and use the dam as a multifaceted tool of regional bargaining. Much to the disconcertment of Egypt, which has historically laid claim to the majority of the Nile River’s output, the dam is feared to substantially reduce water levels not only in Egypt but also in Sudan. The GERD will soon break

Egypt and Sudan’s historical monopoly over the Nile River’s allocations. If no agreement is made to equitably share its resources among the riparian states, East Africa will experience an unprecedented shift in the Nile River’s water output and risk direct conflict, both of which jeopardize the livelihoods of this region. The riparian states should abandon hostilities and utilize the Nile Basin Initiative framework to settle the dispute over the allocation and management of the Nile River’s resources.

ORIGINS OF THE NILE’S “NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHTS”

In order to understand the dispute over the management of the Nile River between the riparian states we have to briefly examine the history of Nile River governance. In doing so, one would find that colonial-era agreements devised by the British Empire overwhelmingly favored Egypt and Sudan over Ethiopia. This does not come as a surprise— both of these domains served as important strategic strongholds at a time when European colonial powers were vying for access to resources on the continent. Additionally, the British realized the potential for the Nile River to generate enormous agricultural and industrial output through access to the Suez Canal. In 1929, newly-independent Egypt and the British East African colonies negotiated the first of the Nile Waters Agreements.3 It gave Egypt the right to allocate 48 billion cubic meters of water for its own purposes and 4 billion to Sudan out of a total yield of 84 billion cubic meters.4

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM Egypt was granted the right to veto any upstream Nile River projects that could interrupt its flows, further adding to the disproportionate allocation that the agreement provided. The first Nile Waters Agreement set the precedent for what Egypt would later refer to as its “natural and historical rights” to the waters of the Nile River. Because of this, Ethiopia has never undertaken a Nile River project as formidable as the GERD.

The second Nile Waters Agreement was signed in 1959 by Egypt and Sudan.5 This agreement increased the allocation of the Nile River’s flows between the countries to 55.5 billion cubic meters and 18.5 billion cubic meters, respectively.6 Any surplus water yield would be shared between the two countries equally. It was not long until Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya would see the negative effects of these agreements.

Almost immediately, the water levels upstream stagnated and fell, exacerbating droughts in a region where rainfall is scant throughout the year.7 In fact, the lack of sufficient rainfall triggered a widespread drought and significantly decreased agricultural yields in the 1980s. Ethiopia suffered from a catastrophic famine that took the lives of approximately one million people. Had Ethiopia been able to effectively utilize its Nile River resources, the drought could have been mitigated dramatically.

Today, Egypt is particularly wary about any changes to the output of the Nile. With a population of nearly 100 million people and steadily growing,

photo by Rebecca Moot

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 14

AFRICA the country depends on its allocated water as a minimum. Nearly every major industry in Egypt, from agriculture to manufacturing, uses the Nile River to generate important hydropower. The vast majority of Egyptians live along the Nile River’s basins and tributaries as a result of outgrowth from earlier civilizations. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is justified in claiming that for Egypt, “The Nile is a matter of life or death.”8 The impact of water shortages would be significantly more devastating for Egypt than it would for any other riparian country, due to its sheer population size and near-complete dependence on the river to sustain its most basic needs.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND CONFLICT

Climate change will continue to take its toll on the riparian states as worsening environmental conditions jeopardize the very agricultural and societal foundations of riverside communities in East Africa. Rising temperatures lead to difficult harvests, and this is compounded by the fact that Nile waters are shrinking. Due to the lack of evaporation-capturing technology, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia lose 10 billion cubic meters of water annually to evaporation. Without sufficient water, farming downstream is not sustainable in the long-term.9 Ethiopia should take into account the regional agricultural implications when deciding how best to control the Blue Nile water flow.

Although Egypt has taken measures to establish non-hydrological energy sources, most riparian states do not have the financial means to invest in them. Sudan, for example, is in the midst of an economic crisis and efforts to repair its own dams facing pressure and erosion from the GERD remain on hold indefinitely.

If a fair and equitable agreement between the riparian states is not reached, hostilities in East Africa will continue to foment. In 2013, Egyptian officials were overheard plotting to sabotage the construction of the GERD through a covert bombing operation. The circumstances resulting from such threats are more than dire and should discourage Ethiopia from foregoing talks.

Ethiopia ultimately has the decision to ignore or embrace discussions regarding the GERD. For the 15 FALL 2020

photo by Nikta Khani past few months, it has opted to leave talks on the backburner, while Egypt has panicked over the implications of reduced water output. Time and time again historians, politicians, and scientists alike have warned of militarized conflict over the Nile River’s resources. To avoid such a predicament, Ethiopia needs to confidently reassure Egypt and Sudan that it will adjust the reservoir filling period so that it doesn’t harm either country’s water supply during the dry season. Furthermore, a mechanism needs to be put in place in which Ethiopia releases enough water from the dam to cope with droughts that occur downstream. In regards to upstream riparian states, Egypt should relinquish its monopoly on Nile River resources by allowing those countries to independently pursue their own operations along the Nile to best accommodate their own needs.

ALLIANCES HANDICAPPING THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE

The Nile Basin Initiative, a partnership of the riparian states that was created in 1999 as a forum to discuss issues relating to the Nile River, has provided ample dialogue space to voice every Nile state’s concerns. It meets two or three times a year however the last major decision was reached in 2015 and gave the GERD a green light for further construction. Differences in vision have led to the creation of mini-alliances within the initiative that have extended internationally. Specifically, there is a divide between the downstream duo of Egypt and Sudan, who seek to retain much of the Nile River’s resources, and the upstream states including Ethiopia who reject the historical allocation agreements. The riparian states need to meet at the roundtable again for more extensive

deliberations. Moreover, water diplomacy should be coordinated by a neutral third party. This party should ideally have an experienced background in water management to best recommend provisions that are fair for all the riparian states. Progress has been made through Egypt’s recent recognition that its “natural and historical rights’’ to the Nile River are anachronistic and leave upstream countries impoverished. Ethiopia’s control of the GERD gives it the upper hand in defusing tensions but it does not seem to be taking the route of appeasement towards Egypt. Up until the developments of this past summer, Ethiopia had tacitly promised to not begin filling the dam’s reservoir until an agreement was reached. Eager to start generating power within a year, Ethiopia began filling the reservoir in June 2020 without notifying Egypt and Sudan, causing much alarm. The United States subsequently suspended aid to Ethiopia in September 2020 for breaking a tacit promise and failing to reach an agreement over the GERD.

WHERE TALKS SHOULD RESUME

Discussions should give particular attention to the timeline of the GERD reservoir’s filling and the rate at which it is filled. This process directly restricts the Blue Nile’s flow to the north into Sudan and Egypt—and it has already led to water shortages.

While Sudan has received enough rainfall this rainy season to counteract the marginally reduced water flow, prospects for Egypt remain bleak. Despite the massive share of water Egypt receives, access is severely limited during the dry season that spans from February to September. By 2025 it is estimated that Egypt will lose 500 cubic meters of water, not factoring in water loss from the GERD.

Second, a resource-sharing agreement should provide a framework for each country to enjoy an amount of the Nile River’s flow sufficient to fulfill its needs. This would mean that allocation of water flow to the upstream states will have to be deducted from Egypt’s 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan’s 18.5 billion cubic meters.

This is perhaps the most contentious point to be considered. However, other factors could mitigate the impact of reduced water to Egypt and Sudan, such as increased rainfall in some upstream states.

To this effect, Egypt and Sudan need to invest

THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM in sustainable irrigation practices and perhaps plant seeds with shorter life spans for the sake of harvest efficiency. Additionally, these nations need to implement enhanced waste management systems along the Nile River to clean up pollution and industrial runoff and spillover. While these measures do not necessarily provide more water, they do improve access and quality to the water itself.

The GERD is a major infrastructural achievement in East Africa with the potential to improve the lives of millions of people. It is expected to generate enough electricity to power all of Ethiopia and major regions of its neighboring countries, including energy-deprived Sudan.

Furthermore, it could alleviate pervasive flooding along the Nile and, contrastingly, help mitigate droughts. However, growing distrustful relations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan threaten to destabilize any resource sharing agreement that could very well prove beneficial to all parties involved. The Nile Basin Initiative provides a framework for the riparian states to discuss and set forth measures to ensure that all countries have equitable access to the Nile River. Ethiopia urgently needs to negotiate the GERD reservoir filling with Egypt and Sudan while taking into account the seasonal changes of the Nile River and its impact downstream. Following negotiations, Egypt should agree to let upstream countries pursue independent projects to develop the Nile River with consensus approval of the NBI. Diplomacy is the key to coming up with a solution to the management of the Nile River and the riparian states have no reason to forego talks. Finally, the ancient dream of “governing” the Nile River is being realized. This is a historic opportunity to address and alleviate major regional issues in East Africa, including but not limited to poverty, famine, and climate change.

In order to avoid a regional conflict over the GERD, Ethiopia and the rest of the riparian states are best served cooperating through the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 16

COVID-19

& THE UIGHUR CRISIS

How the pandemic further exacerbated political and economic exploitation

by Nada Shalash

I

t is currently estimated that between 1 and 3 million Uighurs are being detained in what the Chinese government calls “re-education” camps in the country’s northeast region of Xinjiang. Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim indigenous Turkic ethnic group, regard themselves as culturally and ethnically similar to many Central Asian nations, and there are currently around 11 million Uighurs living in northwest China. Uighurs are sometimes referred to as “the other Tibet” due to the theoretical status of northwest China as an autonomous region.

Uighurs in the concentration camps are exposed to many forms of physical and psychological torture, including mass forced sterilization of Uighur women, sexual abuse, forced labor, waterboarding, and intense surveillance through using cameras and microphones to monitor people’s every move in a manner that is very similar to prison-like conditions.

In addition to these torture methods, the Chinese agenda has also included the destruction of many Uighur cultural sites and indoctrination at the camps which encourages Uighurs to criticize or renounce their faith and declare allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party.2 Although Uighurs have their 17 FALL 2020

own language, those taken to the concentration camps are forced to learn Mandarin and abandon many of their cultural and religious practices. According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, most Uighurs in the camps have never been charged with a crime and did not receive legal representation.3,4 Some of the excuses used to place Uighurs into the camps include growing a beard, wearing a hijab—a veil worn by many Muslim women—talking to people in other countries, going to religious gatherings, sharing digital files with Islamic teachings, and not serving alochol at restaurants, which all point to China’s agenda of cracking down on religious practices in general, and Muslim practices in specific, because they are considered by the government to be a threat to the state.5 Even those who are not taken to the camps are persecuted for their beliefs and lifestyle. Women whose husbands are sent to the camps are forced to share beds6 with Han Chinese men who are sent by the government to spy on households and report back on any “suspicious activity,” which refers to any sign of religious symbols or Muslim practices.

Uighurs are banned from fasting during the month of Ramadan, and those in the camps are also forced to consume pork and

photo by Michelle Nie

COVID-19 AND THE UIGHUR CRISIS alcohol, which are forbidden in the UN Convention for the Islam.7 Uighurs are also forbidden Punishment and Prevention of from going to mosques. Children the Crime of Genocide in 1948, are systemically separated which specifically includes from their parents and sent to suppression of birth in the boarding schools which aim definition of genocide.11 The to isolate children from their Chinese government denies such 8 Muslim communities. Those claims and continues to defend in the Uighur diaspora living in the existence of the, explain other countries often face the that Uighurs live “peacefully” difficult choice between visiting alongside other ethnic groups, the region to see family members and claim that they are treated and risk being detained in the equally under the law. The camps or remaining separated government also repeatedly from loved ones and not being refers to the internment camps able to contact them (or choosing as “re-education camps” which not to, for the safety of their provide “vocational training”, and loved ones). continues to build new detention

Amid criticism aimed centers to this day.12,13 at the camps, the Chinese

Although the crisis has government initially denied been given more attention in their existence, then pivoted recent years due to the work of to justifying the camps as a activists and leaked documents necessary response and safety which have resulted in some measure to protect against media attention, the history separatist violence in Xinjiang of the tension between the and the threat of violent majority Han-Chinese state and extremism. For example, in a the Uighur minority stretches 2017 speech by the Chinese further back. Uighurs briefly Communist Youth League declared independence in the Xinjiang Branch, it was explained early 20th century, but the that the camps are meant to serve region was brought under the as an educational program that complete control of communist teaches laws and regulations “to China in 1949. In fact, the term eradicate from the mind thoughts “Xinjiang,” which translates to about religious extremism and “new territory” or “new frontier,” violent terrorism, and to cure is rejected by many Uighurs ideological diseases.”9 By most who support the East Turkestan international standards, Chinese independence movement and persecution of the Uighur consider China’s control over its minority is considered ethnic northwest region a suppressive cleansing, and in fact meets the occupation which curtails 10 UN definition of genocide. many of the Uighurs’ political, This is because policies which cultural, religious, and economic suppress birthrates and reduce activities.14 China intensified population growth, such as its crackdown on Uighurs after forced sterilization, meet one protests demanding economic of the five criteria set forth by rights in the 1990s, and again in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 18

ASIA the years leading up to the 2008 Olympics. Police arrested 82 Uighurs and accused them of plotting an attack on the Olympics, but Uighurs claimed that they were being discriminated against and were participating in peaceful activism to demand greater political and economic autonomy from Beijing.

After President Xi Jinping issued a directive in 2017 stating that “religions in China must be Chinese in orientation” and “adapt themselves to socialist society,” there was another round of increased repression and crackdowns against the Uighurs’ religious practices.

The COVID-19 pandemic has posed further challenges for Uighur populations. Uighurs were faced with an immediate heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 due to East Turkestan’s location just north of Wuhan, the first coronavirus epicenter. Given conditions at the camps with Uighurs forced into small living quarters, social distancing is not possible. The media blackout in the region makes it difficult to know the true numbers of COVID cases, and many critics suspect that these numbers are much higher than the official government figures.15 When asked about the impact of the virus on Uighur detainees, a government spokesperson claimed that there is no risk of contracting the virus because most people in the camp have “graduated” and been released.

There is no evidence to support these claims and Uighurs in the diaspora have taken to social media to voice their concerns.16 Uighurs across the globe have demanded the World Health Organization send a delegation to the region to investigate and monitor the spread of the disease.17 Moreover, the global challenges posed by COVID-19 have provided the Chinese government a distraction to divert attention from these internment camps at the expense of the Uighurs.18

The pandemic has also exacerbated the suppression of Uighurs’ economic rights and access to job opportunities. Before the pandemic, the Chinese government invested heavily in industrial and energy projects in northwest China and encouraged Han Chinese workers to move to the region. Many Uighurs complained that Han Chinese were taking their jobs. However, during the pandemic, many Uighurs have been subjected to forced labor. Throughout China, many of the 19 FALL 2020

jobs lost as a result of lockdowns were forced upon Uighurs in camps to ensure the continuity of several industries and projects. Yet the safety measures imposed on the rest of the country were deemed not applicable to enforce for Uighurs. For instance, China has been exploiting Uighur labor to produce face masks, enforcing abusive labor quotas and strict working conditions to accelerate production for domestic use and international export. The state media’s defense of this labor transfer program as a means for “poverty reduction” twists the realities of forced labor in an effort to garner support and justify the policies of the Chinese government.19

Given the severity of human rights abuses against the Uighurs, especially as a result of the pandemic, the question remains: why are many countries still so silent on this issue? Although the crisis has received increased media attention, the general attitude of the international community towards the persecution of Uighurs has been that of neglect and indifference, with little action taken by other nations despite harsh criticism from the UN Human Rights Council.20 The driving force behind the failure to hold the Chinese government accountable is the desire to maintain a world order that prioritizes the protection of economic and political interests. Many national governments do not want to jeopardize diplomatic and financial relations with China.

While China stands to benefit most significantly from human rights abuses against Uighurs, other countries, too, are reaping the economic benefits. East Turkestan is a major logistical hub for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); BRI is of huge importance to China’s global projection of political and economic power.21 For other countries, several other factors to the lack of political will to take action against the Chinese government. Silence from the European Union is a means of protecting economic relations with China while avoiding any obstacles to diplomatic relations—the same could be said about private industry in the US.22 China’s northwest region is a major supplier of cheap labor which many multinational corporations profit from. The cotton used in clothing manufactured by several major brands comes from Uighur forced labor, which has allowed many American

companies to maintain their profits even in the face of a worldwide economic slowdown.23 As more companies continue to outsource labor in an increasingly globalized world, consideration of workers’ rights and human rights violations could have serious implications for the future of manufacturing.

In addition to the implicit protection of economic interests, there are many obvious parallels between China’s concentration camps and the US foreign policy agenda of combating “religious extremism” in other countries. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, China launched its own “war on terror”, claiming that supporters of the separatist movement of East Turkestan were a part of a network of terrorists with connections to parts of the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.24 Capitalizing on the post-9/11 increase in US interventionism in the Middle East, China positioned its Uighur crackdown in an apparent alignment with US foreign policy priorities. In addition, under the Trump administration, the Uighur crisis has been used as a bargaining chip.

COVID-19 AND THE UIGHUR CRISIS Compared to long-standing US policy on China, the Trump administration has taken a significantly more protectionist and unilateralist approach, creating an environment in which the Uighur crisis is leveraged for trade negotiations.25 Sanctions against China related to the internment camps were held up out of fear that they would hinder trade agreements, displaying an intersection of foreign policy priorities and economic interests.26

In general, the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated the oppression and severity of human rights abuses against Uighur Muslims in northwest China. The silence from the international community is largely driven by economic interests as many stand to benefit from manufacturing carried out by forced Uighur labor. Further, nations have prioritized diplomatic ties over calling out human rights abuses and holding the Chinese government accountable. So long as these priorities remain and there is no international call to action or political will to address the issue, Uighur Muslims will continue to suffer the consequences of that negligence.

photo by Michelle Nie INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 20

photo by Carolyn Hoffman

ISRAELBAHRAINUAE RELATIONS & THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

by Janney Collens

21 FALL 2020

I

t is no secret that Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have been quietly cooperating for many years, particularly on security matters. However, these historically behind-the-scenes relationships have recently become very public. In August, the UAE and Israel signed the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement establishing full diplomatic relations between the two countries. In September, Bahrain and Israel followed suit. What prompted this sudden move to normalize relations between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel? Why now?

The timing of these agreements should be looked at in light of several relatively recent phenomena: the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Middle East region under the Trump administration; an increase in Iranian troublemaking since the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal; a generational shift in Saudi Arabia to the leadership of Mohammed Bin Salman; and the proposed Trump peace plan for Israel and Palestine. Even though the Arab Peace Initiative has, for nearly twenty years, conditioned normalization with Israel on the resolution of the Palestinian conflict, the combination of these developments is driving a rethinking of alliances right now. The initial Palestinian reaction to the normalization agreements has been to harshly criticize the Gulf Arab states. However, this criticism fails to recognize that we are at an inflection point in Middle East alliances due to a shifting balance of power. Instead, the Palestinian leadership, and everyone else interested in a two-state solution, must understand the shifting landscape and attempt to capitalize on these changes for the benefit of the Palestinian people and their national aspirations.

The Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy strategy has had destabilizing effects on the balance of power in the Middle East. Since the beginning of his presidency, Mr. Trump has made it clear that U.S. allies in the Middle East can no longer rely on U.S. protection.

In October of 2019, in reference to the Middle East, President Trump stated:

We’re getting out.

Let someone else fight over this long blood-stained sand.

The job of our military is not to police the world.

In fact, U.S. troop withdrawal under the Trump administration has been very consistent with this

ISRAEL-BAHRAIN-U.A.E. RELATIONS statement. First, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew its troops from northern Syria, leaving reliable allies, the Kurds, to fend for themselves. Then, despite the possibility of an ISIS resurgence as a result of American troop withdrawal, the Trump administration announced an artificial timeline on the drawdown of troops in Iraq. Finally, in the greater region, the Trump administration has withdrawn troops from an unstable Afghanistan, recently stating that the entirety of U.S. troops will be out of the country by this coming Christmas.

The departure of U.S. troops from the Middle East has left a power vacuum, and is a gift to other actors such as Russia, Iran, and the Taliban. Furthermore, the U.S. exit from the Iran nuclear deal reflects a diplomatic withdrawal from the region as well, and leaves the U.S. with less diplomatic leverage in addressing the region’s greatest security threat.

Overall, the U.S.’s disentanglement from the region has signaled to our Middle Eastern allies that once certain American protection is no longer reliable, and that states must pursue strategies that will ensure their own future security.

At the same time that the U.S. has been withdrawing troops, Iranian military aggression has been increasing across the region. The SunniShia conflict has been around for centuries. Iran, through its proxies, has been instigating conflict around the Middle East for decades. This includes supporting Shia militias in Iraq, providing both military and economic support to rogue dictator Bashar-Al Assad in Syria, and funneling weapons to both Hezbollah and Hamas as a threat to Israel. Yet, since the U.S. exited the nuclear deal and reimposed economic sanctions in 2018, Iran has increased its aggressiveness by attacking oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. And this was followed

by Iran’s most brazen attacks directly on Saudi Arabia, originating from Yemen and the Iranianbacked Houthi fighters. In September 2019, Iran attacked Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facility with missiles and drones, causing immense damage and temporarily rendering 5% of the world’s oil supply undependable. And in June 2020, Iran fired missiles directly at the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Most telling, neither the U.S. nor Saudi Arabia ever responded to these attacks with serious force. Since the Persian Gulf War, it has been the precedent that the U.S. would ensure the stable flow of oil from the Middle East. The dozens of American military bases in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 22

photo by Nikta Khani

the region have acted as a deterrent to any bad actor wanting to disrupt the flow of oil. However, the Trump administration’s reluctance toward any direct military engagement has left adversaries of Iran feeling exposed and insecure. Iran’s unrelenting troublemaking in the region, as well as its pursuit of nuclear weapons, has essentially forced the traditional enemies of Iran to seek additional security alliances.

A third development that is driving the normalization push has been the leadership change in Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia itself is not part of the normalization agreements with Israel, it is highly likely that the UAE and Bahrain moved forward with the consent and coordination of the Saudi government. In fact, in the Arab media, one of the strongest voices on these agreements has been Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia. The role of Saudi Arabia, whether formal or informal, is critical to the normalization process, and the principal change in Saudi Arabia over the past few years has been the generational shift in leadership to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).

MBS has outwardly recognized Israel’s right to exist. And, although sympathetic to Palestinian national aspirations, MBS also seems less willing than the previous generation to let the Palestinian national cause dictate Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy.

This younger generation of Arab leaders, including MBS and the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed, have grown in an era where Iran, not Israel, has become a bigger political enemy and a real threat to their national security. With a retrenching U.S. and an aggressive Iran, this new generation of Gulf Arab leaders sees a stable Israel, a nuclear power with the Middle East’s most powerful military, as an attractive strategic ally. Through a lens of realism, normalization between the Gulf states and Israel is critical to their future security and prosperity.

Political events in Israel also help explain why normalization with the Gulf states is happening now. In January 2020, the Trump administration unveiled its long awaited IsraeliPalestinian peace plan. Prime Minister Netanyahu, in the midst of a heated election process, seized on the part of the plan that was most favorable to Israel, and began talking about unilateral annexation of large portions of the West Bank.

Although many observers felt that unilateral annexation would be both harmful to Israel’s

ISRAEL-BAHRAIN-U.A.E. RELATIONS security and damaging to its international relations, Mr. Netanyahu was able to use the potential annexation as a credible threat. The annexation plan gave Israel something to bargain with, and opened space for dialogue between Israel and the UAE regarding normalization. As a condition of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, Israel agreed to temporarily suspend its West Bank annexation plans.

The normalization agreements between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel have important implications for the Palestinians and prospects for achieving a Palestinian state. Palestinian leaders were caught off guard by the developments between the Gulf states and Israel, and are frustrated that their strategy of internationalizing the conflict and relying on other Arab countries to do their bidding has failed. While the Gulf states may believe that the Israelis are unjust in their treatment of Palestinians, they have made it clear, through their actions, that protecting their own security is more important. The trends that are driving normalization between the Arab states and Israel—U.S. retrenchment, Iranian aggression, and generational changes in leadership—will continue.

The challenge for Palestinian leaders is to recognize the shifting balance of power in the Middle East, and navigate the new path for the benefit of their people.

First, Palestinians must choose who to strategically align with in this shifting landscape.

In speaking with Al Arabiya television, Prince Bandar recently said, “The Palestinian cause is a just cause but its advocates are failures…There is something that successive Palestinian leadership historically share in common: they always bet on the losing side, and that comes at a price.” The choice that the Palestinians face is to align with either Iran, or Turkey, or a more western-facing bloc, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the U.S. It seems obvious which of these groups has the economic, military, and political resources that can be brought to bear for the benefit of the Palestinians. In addition, by aligning with the Arab states in this group, Palestinians could work from the inside to see that further normalization with Israel should be tied to progress on the two-state solution.

Second, re-engagement with the Israelis is important. Israeli security will benefit immensely INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 24

MIDDLE EAST from normalization with the Gulf states, and it is in the interest of the Israeli government to keep this momentum going. This gives the Palestinians leverage. The Palestinians could push for confidence building actions from the Israelis. And in return, the Palestinians could resume formal security cooperation.

Third, leadership matters. For seventy years, Palestinian leaders have pursued strategies that have not resulted in statehood for their people.

With the prospect of Palestinian elections in early 2021, it is unclear if any of the current leaders recognize the changing regional landscape and can articulate a new strategy. Just as the generational shift allowed MBS to look at Saudi foreign policies with a fresh set of eyes, perhaps new Palestinian voices will emerge that take a new approach toward resolving the conflict with Israel. Furthermore, politics in the United States are in flux with an upcoming presidential election. Perhaps Joe Biden will win, and seek to restore the U.S. presence in global affairs. Alternatively, Donald Trump could win reelection and seek to establish a foreign policy legacy in his second term. Therefore, regardless of who wins, the strong possibility exists that the U.S. will seek to re-engage with the Palestinians after our election. Moreover, in Israel, it is possible that Benjamin Netanyahu’s legal troubles could see him removed as Prime Minister. The Palestinians should be ready to capitalize on any of these outcomes and possible leadership changes.

While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are not the largest countries in the international arena, the normalization agreements with Israel reflect the significant strategic changes in the Middle East. This realignment of Arab states toward normal relations with Israel is likely to continue, but it does not mean that Arab states have given up on Palestinian statehood. They are not mutually exclusive. It is possible for the Palestinians to advance the two-state solution as the regional landscape changes because, with change, comes opportunity. Israeli diplomat Abba Eban famously once said the Arabs “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Hopefully this time he will be proven incorrect.

photo by Yasmin Younis 25 FALL 2020

ASSAD’S ALAWITES UNYIELDING ALLEGIANCE CHALLENGED

BY NEARLY A DECADE OF WAR

by Jannah Kalai

photo by Cameron Barkan

S

MIDDLE EAST yrian President Bashar al-Assad has maintained his tight grip on Damascus.

Despite extremist groups—both local militant Islamists and foreign—economic sanctions, and an internationalized civil war, the Assad regime has weathered nearly a decade of civil unrest.

The tenacity of his regime is due to its reactive and transformative character, as well as two distinct lines of assistance. Regionally, Assad finds ideational and material support from Iran and Russia. Domestically, Assad leverages patronage and co-opted civil society networks assisted by the strong entrepreneurial class and religiously-allied security service elite.

Military, police, and intelligence loyalty is heavily intertwined with Syrian Alawite community history. Alawites, a minority Shia Islam-linked sect, constitute approximately 12 percent of the population.1 As former President Hafez al-Assad consolidated control of the Ba’ath Party through the 1960s, Alawites received increasingly preferential treatment. Despite Syria’s Sunni majority, the Assad family constructed a 40-year dynasty partly on the foundation of Alawites as the security and political establishment. Assad, as his father before him, draws great strength from his Alawite identity.

Alawites continue to hold elevated political status disproportionate to their numbers.2 Alawite loyalty to the Assad regime has remained largely resolute, but nine years of civil war has muddied Alawite support and made fractures in the community increasingly salient.

HISTORY OF SYRIA’S ALAWITE COMMUNITY AND POWER ASCENSION UNDER PRESIDENT HAFEZ AL-ASSAD The Alawite faith is highly secretive, and the community has faced systemic oppression.

Religious discrimination, egalitarian social structure, and rural condition drove their ideological inclination toward Arab nationalism, secularism, and socialism.3 During the French Mandate in Syria, the French found great use of ethnoreligious minorities - to include the Alawites -in quelling the threat of Arab nationalism, a sentiment headed primarily by the Sunni Muslim community.4 Deliberate French agitation of sectarianism made political integration after Syrian independence particularly difficult.5

French military training and its allure of socio-economic gain provided the foundation for 27 FALL 2020

Alawite military tradition. In post-independence Syria, military coups and sectarian disorganization culminated in a 1970 coup, led by then General Hafez al-Assad, that solidified Alawite political control in Syria for decades. Today, the Syrian Alawite community is concentrated in the northwest regions of Latakia and Tartus, but significant Alawite pockets in Damascus, Homs, and Hama remain.6

The Alawite community’s largely unyielding loyalty following the death of Hafez al-Assad is heavily intertwined with Bashar al-Assad’s intensifying authoritarianism in his first term.

Following the death of his father in 2000, Assad was quickly challenged by a secular liberal professional class demanding an end to emergency law, and the establishment of a multiparty system, and competitive elections.7 In the wake of his father’s death and the intense political debate of the so-called “Damascus Spring,” Assad relied on the following strategies: generating nationalist legitimacy by deflecting opposition demands, co-opting an allied technocrat-business class, appeasing the urban middle class through political decompression,8 and developing a relationship with Islamist milieu.9 However, political adaptation did not occur parallel to social change, and domestic vulnerabilities were neglected.

Sparked in Tunisia in late 2010, prodemocracy sentiment and demonstrations swept across the Middle East and North Africa region in the “Arab Spring,” eventually finding footing in Syria. Protests swelled against a backdrop of systemic socio-economic and political issues including corruption, inflation, and unemployment.

Syria’s subsequent descent from insurgency to sectarian civil war has fragmented civil society and nullified hope of post-conflict democratization.

AUTHORITARIAN SURVIVAL & SECTARIAN LEVERAGING When authoritarian powers are subject to internal or external threats of force or civil unrest, three distinct themes of response emerge. First, authoritarian upgrading and consensus-building.

The face of the regime and cultivated personality is secondary to consensus-building among elites.

This is essential to authoritarian continuity, especially in cases of hereditary succession.10 Raymond Hinnebusch, Director of the Center for Syrian Studies at the University of St. Andrews

argues further that Assad’s authoritarianism was topical, that weakened civic institutions and the benefits of hereditary succession could not address shortcomings in the lack of social change.11 The second theme of response: a pivot to existing domestic networks of support and regional alliances. The Syrian state bourgeoisie, Russia, and Iran are significant contributors to regime cohesion and success. Third, an increasingly strategic and often violent repressive toolkit. Syria has limited strategic options in the face of unrest, and material constraint drives identity change.12

In this context, it is worth analyzing why the Alawites have directly tied themselves to the perseverance of the Assad regime. Regime survival in the case of Syria is not simply a question of elite political allegiance, but a larger question on the greater community’s dependence on Assad.

Framing Alawite support for the Assad regime as a consequence of a sectarian civil war, pitting the Alawite government against Sunni opposition, lacks the necessary analytical granularities. First, this is a largely topical approach and fails to penetrate Syrian domestic discourse. Sectarian designations were rejected in the early civil unrest of 2011,13 and although Alawite support for Assad remains largely stable, nearly a decade of conflict has revealed deep fractures in an isolated and attacked population.

Second, Alawite support for the Assad regime is not only driven by loyalty to a religiously-linked head of state but worry of what his removal may mean for the community after regime decapitation. Syrian Alawites feared the eradication of the Ba’ath Party, the complete demobilization of existing security services, and deep bureaucratic purges.14 FRACTURES IN ALAWITE SUPPORT FOR ASSAD Assad is not only instinctively aware of the value brought by his most loyal base but also of how sharply the balance of power would shift if Alawite support collapsed.15 As such, Assad has made an active and deliberate effort to wrestle the sectarian narrative and frame the war as holding broad and deep implications for global power. In a June 2012 address to Syrian Parliament on the Houla massacre, Assad stated, “We are not facing a political problem because if we were this party would put forth a political program. What we are facing is (an attempt) to sow sectarian strife and the tool of this is terrorism,” He continued, “The issue

ASSAD’S ALAWITES is terrorism. We are facing a real war waged from the outside.”16

Syrian Alawites are not a monolith. They are divided into urban and rural, coastal and interior, and further separated by tribal loyalties and class divisions.17 The Alawite community of 1970 is not the community of 2011, nor of 2020. The civil war has torn the fabric of society and no ethnoreligious group, including the Alawites, has remained unaltered or unscathed. Loyalty to Assad has come at a high cost as support for the regime has created human targets. The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria has reported that extremist non-state actors–to include the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—targeted Shia, Alawite, Christians, and other religious minorities as well as other Sunnis with killings, kidnappings, and arrests.18 ISIS continues to attack religious minority groups, using their media to incite violence against Shia populations.19

Sectarian strife is far too simple an explanation for the Alawite community’s relationship with the Assad regime. March 2021 will mark ten years since protests erupted in Daraa over the detention of students arrested for graffitiing anti-regime messages on the walls of their school.

Only a few days after protests began, security services opened fire, killing four.20 As protests and demonstrations spread, the Assad regime’s response grew increasingly violent. Since the onset of the conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports nearly 5.6 million people have fled Syria.21 In March 2018, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated at least 511,000 people had been killed in the war since March 2011, although the exact statistic is extremely difficult to substantiate.22 In this context, it is no longer adequate to ask what may push the Alawite community to turn against Assad, but rather what exists to maintain their allegiance.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 28

THE LOOMING WATER CRISIS IN IRAQ

by Stella Dzialas

M

ore than 6000 years ago, the Tigris and Euphrates river system gave rise to Sumer, widely considered to be the first civilization on Earth. Today, the two rivers and their tributaries still serve as an essential life source for the region, with millions of people across several countries relying on them for their livelihoods. However, a rising water crisis in Iraq threatens to destabilize the region and deprive many citizens of basic necessities like potable drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene.

For years, a water shortage crisis in Iraq has escalated steadily. Droughts over the course of the past few decades, most notably in 2008 and 2016, have led to huge declines in water storage and crop yield. More gradual changes in climate, such as decreasing precipitation and rising temperatures, have exacerbated these issues. Water shortages have already displaced thousands of people throughout the country. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the river system to the people of Iraq, as it accounts for approximately 98 percent of the country’s surface water supply.

The Tigris and the Euphrates begin in Turkey, flowing through Syria and Iraq before emptying into the Persian Gulf. Many of the Tigris’s tributaries also start in Iran. This leaves Iraq in a vulnerable position because it is the farthest downstream and thus at the mercy of surrounding countries. Throughout history, these countries have taken advantage of their position to build dams and other irrigation projects, leaving Iraq with a heavily polluted and weakened water stream.

This widespread water pollution comes from dumping garbage into the rivers, which is a common form of waste management across the region. Thus, the further downstream, the dirtier the water. In Iraq’s southern provinces, pollution has led to a public health hazard. The province of Basra has not had consistent access to safe drinking water for the past 30 years, a crisis which peaked in 2018, when 118,000 people were hospitalized due to contaminated water.

Apart from becoming increasingly polluted, the rivers in Iraq are drying up at an alarming rate; both the Tigris and Euphrates have seen a 30 percent decrease in the water flow since the 1980s.

The Iraqi government expects a further decline of

THE LOOMING WATER CRISIS IN IRAQ up to 50 percent by the year 2030.1 This bodes for extreme shortages in the near future, especially when taking into account a rapidly growing population—Iraq has one of the highest population growth rates in the Middle East (after only Oman and Bahrain) and comes in at 18th worldwide, per the United Nations Population Division. Decreased water flow also has other consequences beyond water shortages. As a result of weakening currents and less water volume, southern provinces have seen sea water from the gulf push up into the rivers, causing heavy damage to farmlands as they become salinated and no longer arable.

These issues are all symptoms of a much larger problem. Decades of war and imperfect leadership have led Iraq into a period of political instability and civil unrest. Due to this, water and agriculture infrastructure are ineffective and in desperate need of reform. However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has pushed Iraq’s economy to the brink of collapse, current infrastructure projects have been suspended indefinitely. Further exacerbating the economic crisis is Iraq’s tanking oil revenues, which is normally a key driver of Iraq’s economy.2

Recently, Iran has further jeopardized important water sources in parts of Iraq. The Sirwan and Lower Zab are key tributaries of the Tigris River that feed into Iraq’s water reservoirs.

Starting in Iran, the two rivers enter Iraq in the northern Kurdistan region of the country, serving as the area’s crucial water sources. For the third consecutive year, Iran has cut off waters from these rivers into Iraq, most heavily impacting Kurdish farmers. Iranian dams and water diversion projects have caused the flow of these rivers to dramatically decrease, threatening the livelihood of millions.3 Iran’s existing projects include 16 dams on the Sirwan river, with plans for 109 more dams extending through 2021. Additionally, August 2020 saw the start of operations for the 47 kilometer long Nawsud water tunnel, which diverts water from the Sirwan to Iranian cities. This project could result in the loss of up to 100 percent of drinking water for some Iraqi provinces, according to Kawa Ali, Halabja province deputy governor. The impacts of this project on daily life are potentially devastating, harming agriculture, fishing industries, tourism, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 30

MIDDLE EAST power generation, and more. According to the director of the Darbandikhan dam, Rahman Khani, the Nawsud water tunnel will have the capacity to completely redirect the Sirwan river during drought seasons. The Water Minister of Baghdad, Mehdi al-Hamdani, asserts that Turkey and Iran reduced water flow to Iraq by half with their recent projects.

The Sirwan and the Lower Zab rivers are also crucial water sources for two of Iraq’s major dams in the region, the Darbandikhan and Dukan respectively, both of which have seen a drastic decrease in water flow as a result of Iran’s actions. The Little Zab river, the sole water source feeding into Dukan reservoir, has been completely obstructed, impacting the nearly 100,000 people who depend on the reservoir. According to the Water Ministry in Baghdad, flows from these reservoirs have dropped from 45 cubic meters per second to only seven cubic meters per second—a decrease of 84 percent. In some parts, the flow has been almost completely interrupted, and is at only a scant two cubic meters per second.4

Both the Kurdistan semi-autonomous region and the Iraqi government have called on Iran to stop blocking the water flow of the two major tributaries, but this has been unsuccessful so far. Being the furthest nation downstream, Iraq has little political or economic leverage over Iran.

The same holds true for negotiations with Turkey, a nation which has historically used water flow as political leverage and has imposed many projects blocking water to Iraq. As part of the ongoing Southeast Anatolian Project (also known as GAP), Turkey has a number of ongoing projects on both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Future plans include 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants, and large irrigation networks across the river basin. After being on hold for two years, Iraq’s negotiations with Turkey resumed in May 2020. However, Ankara has maintained a firm stance of “absolute sovereignty” over the rivers, making clear its intentions to continue exerting full control over the rivers without consideration for the nations downstream.

In September 2020, Iraq formed a special delegation to negotiate with Turkey and Iran in regard to water sources, in hopes of resolving some of these disputes. Previously, neither Turkey nor Iran has been willing to grant water shares to Syria 31 FALL 2020

or Iraq, but Iraq hopes to exert some pressure on the nations upstream by levying sanctions.

Nations and states have always fought over scarce resources. Freshwater is among the most vital of these resources to sustain life. In Iraq, the accelerating water crisis is coming to a head, with potentially disastrous results for its almost 40 million citizens. With Turkey and Iran exploiting their advantageous positions upstream, water flow into Iraq has steadily diminished over recent decades, and as a result, Iraq has experienced water shortages and substantive damage to local economies. Two key tributaries in eastern Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region have been cut almost completely, leaving citizens with little water flow. Should these trends continue, Iraq could face a potential mass displacement of its people, as well as other devastating consequences for local biodiversity.

Iraq’s water crisis will only worsen with time.

Increasing populations worldwide and the adverse effects of climate change will increase demand for water. According to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, Iraq’s population of around 40 million requires around 71 billion cubic meters of water per year. By the time Turkey and Iran are set to complete their planned water projects in 2035, Iraq is projected to receive only 51 billion cubic meters of water annually,5 only about 70% of what its people require, without even accounting for population growth and other variables.

Without drastic changes soon, both in domestic water management and the external decision making of Turkey and Iran, Iraq could be headed toward disaster. With increasing water needs and dramatically decreasing water resources, a possible catastrophe is looming on the horizon.

The Iraqi people are left without a safe or reliable water source as once again tensions mount in the Middle East.

LEBANON’S EXPLOITATIVE KAFALA SYSTEM

by Tima Dasouki photo by Raina Kadavil

O

ut of the 300,000 people negatively impacted by the Beirut bombings, 25,000 of them were vulnerable migrant workers confined to the shackles of the Kafala system. The Kafala system is a sponsorship system developed in the 1950s to connect migrant workers from West Asia with employers in the Middle East. It is mainly found in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and in Lebanon and Jordan. The terms of the Kafala system dictate that the migrant worker is “bound” to their sponsor or “kafeel.” Migrant workers cannot leave, nor switch or enter employment without approval from the agency they are sponsored by.

The Kafala system has been likened to a form of modern slavery due to the gross amount of power it authorizes to employers over their contracted migrant workers.

During economic booms, the system was developed to bring in large amounts of temporary labor and to rotate migrant workers back out of the country during less prosperous economic periods. Despite the convenience of this rotating labor scheme, it places migrant workers in lifethreatening situations because their sponsors can abandon them in the face of disaster without facing legal accountability. Correspondingly, as a result of the August 4th bombing, injured and homeless workers from the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Kenya became abandoned without their belongings, including money to afford a ticket back home. The Kafala system results in workers not being granted citizenship in the country they

a modern day form of slavery are working in, no matter how long they reside there. In addition, the Lebanese government has no coherent regulations or policies on residence and employment for migrant workers to combat exploitative practices. Lebanese employers therefore unfairly benefit from cheap labor without facing regulations or policies that would restrict their behavior. In the face of economic gain, migrant workers’ rights are neither protected nor prioritized.

Authorities possess such a stronghold over migrant workers because they can restrict the workers’ mobility. More specifically, once the worker is in the country, they are not allowed to switch employers or leave until their contract ends.

Employers exercise their power by holding onto travel documents like passports to forcefully ensure the workers’ stay in the country. If migrant workers do attempt to leave for any reason, even a life-threatening emergency, they are charged with a criminal offense. Many migrant workers face instances of verbal, physical, sexual and psychological abuse in the workplace. This has proved especially problematic in cases where migrant workers are subject to mistreatment by their employers and cannot switch or leave their job until the contract is terminated, breeding harmful and life-threatening work environments.

Specifically, in Lebanon and GCC countries, migrant workers face verbal abuse because of a “national prejudice” that considers them second class citizens. If they are to report their abusive situations in their workplace, they often face abusive responses and are threatened with deportation. They are especially vulnerable to these

MIDDLE EAST dangerous situations when forcefully confined to their employers’ homes. Since the power balance between the sponsor and the worker is so skewed, workers are forced to submit to poor working conditions, acknowledging that they must endure these conditions to support their families back home. This system puts workers in especially vulnerable positions where their livelihoods and residency are tied to the agency that sponsors them.

As a result, migrant workers focus on survival while navigating the Kafala system instead of reforming it.

The Kafala system is purposefully controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, as opposed to the Ministry of Labor, in Lebanon. Since the Kafala system functions under the Minister of the Interior and not the Minister of Labor’s jurisdiction, migrant workers are denied domestic labor law protections This strategic placement also denies migrant workers the right to complain against any labor rights’ violations in the workplace, despite their abundance in such an unchecked system. In fact, migrant workers under the Kafala system are not protected by minimum wage requirements and are often locked in their employers’ homes to ensure they do not leave during holidays. Moreover, agencies are permitted to alter the contract’s terms, often lowering wages to impermissible rates or delivering worse working conditions than initially promised. Employers can even force workers to say they received all their wages, in cases where they haven’t in exchange for their travel documents.

With no enforcement mechanism to ensure that employers are abiding by the terms of the contract, agencies can go unpunished while they do not pay workers on time, provide safe accommodations, or cover the cost of tickets to return home. In some cases, workers are completely abandoned by their agencies and left without any travel documents, their only hope of repatriation left on the doorstep of their consulate. Cases recently documented by Amnesty International note migrant workers were completely abandoned by their sponsors during times of economic crisis without any pay and belongings such as their passports. More specifically, as a result of the August 4th Beirut bombings, migrants suffered trauma, lost all their belongings including phones to contact their families, and could not contact the 33 FALL 2020

consulate or NGOS for help. After a migrants work years with their assigned families, raising children and taking care of elders, sponsors simply let go of migrant workers during times of crisis without a salary or ticket home.

Under the Kafala system, if a worker’s contract with their individual sponsor is terminated for any reason, they would be sent back home immediately. An alternative proposition to this framework would be to implement an employmentbased residency system instead of an employerbased residency system where workers’ residencies are not under their sponsor’s jurisdiction. That would enable workers to have the mobility to change their job, resign, or pursue legal action in the case of abuse while keeping their residency status. This framework would be overseen by the Ministry of Labor as the central authority, which would force the guest worker system to abide by state labor regulations as opposed to having no oversight or accountability.

This system would not only benefit migrant workers, but it would also benefit the state, protecting it from facing loan defections during economic crises. For example, if an economic crisis were to occur, migrant workers would have to leave the country upon losing their jobs. This subjects banks to possibilities of loan defection when many belongings are abandoned during these crises.

Within the Ministry of Labor, it would be vital to have legal frameworks that investigate cases that are exploiting or violating labor regulations, and to prosecute them accordingly. Implementing a policy of this nature would mean conducting regular check ins with migrant workers to address their concerns by investigating the cases when necessary. Migrant workers should have access to affordable legal resources that they can use in court when employer violations take place. When the grievances against their employers are taken to court, especially in cases of abuse, migrant workers should maintain the ability to stay in the host country without threat of being sent back if their contract is terminated.

Working conditions should also be reformed by improving the employer and employee relationship. The kafala system has been likened to a form of modern slavery because of its forceful nature, forbidding workers from leaving the home

LEBANON’S EXPLOITATIVE KAFALA SYSTEM they work in for holidays or vacations, if they so choose. This leads to human rights violations as employers prevent workers from leaving by locking their homes and threatening them for fear that they will escape. To decrease the likelihood of these situations, the new framework would have to dilute the employer’s financial and legal responsibility over the migrant worker. That way, the employer would not face financial or legal consequences if the migrant worker were to run away. The employer would also not have to pay for the plane ticket home if the worker decides to resign or terminate

their contract. This kind of reform would create more balance in the employeremployee relationship and would not leave as much room for exploitation.

Reform or abolishing the Kafala system is necessary but the profit that Kafala sponsors enjoy stands in the way of those prospects. Powerful business lobbyists also have a hand in pushing against reform in hosting countries. Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have all showed initiative to reform the system and with enough pressure from the international community, Lebanon may follow suit.

photo by Yasmin Younis INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 34

O

BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU?

The paradox of Ukraine’s far-right by Madison Sargeant

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ver the last seven years, the Russo-Ukrainian War has damaged lives, families, and entire cities. While one can quantify the number of lives lost, the number of people missing and displaced, and the amount of property damaged, the stress caused on Ukrainian society and identity is much less quantifiable. Nationalist movements that emerged in the early weeks of the Revolution of Dignity (known internationally as Euromaidan), and right-wing militias that formed in response to the annexation of Crimea gave cause for worry that the country would soon be overrun by ultranationalists and neoNazis. Though this did not come into fruition, the

photo by Anastasia Kukunova

annexation of Crimea and subsequent Russia-backed separatist conflict in the Donbas has cultivated a stronger sense of nationalism in many Ukrainians.

In addition, certain far-right groups, such as the Azov Battalion and Right Sector, are gaining popularity throughout the country.

However, whatever the ultra-nationalist groups have gained in

social capital, they have yet to obtain in political capital. The post-Euromaidan government’s contiguous policy of integration, rather than ostracization, of far-right groups in society, has contributed to an increased presence of the farright in the public eye, but also has prevented the amassing of national electoral power by these groups. Kyiv’s handling of ultranationalist, farright groups has prevented them from gaining the political and military power necessary to threaten the Ukrainian government’s control of the state.

Unable to amass electoral power, these groups contribute to Ukraine’s public sphere through “uncivil society”. The resulting situation for the far-right remains a paradox: while far-right groups have been tolerated and nationalism embraced, the Ukrainian people have not allowed these groups political representation.

Prior to the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the far-right ideological space was “essentially monopolized”1 by the Svoboda party under former member of parliament Oleh Tiahnybok. The violent response from President Viktor Yanukovych’s government during the first two months of Euromaidan inadvertently prompted Right Sector, then a newly founded far-right group, to attack state security forces.2 Furthermore, Russia’s reactive annexation of Crimea following the Revolution and subsequent backing of separatists in eastern Ukraine resulted in a proliferation of nationalistic paramilitaries and politically-orientated groups that rose to the occasion that Ukraine’s military—in “decrepit condition”3—couldn’t. Groups such as the Azov Battalion, Aidar, the Donbas Battalion, and Dnepr 1 organized quickly and absorbed smaller groups of volunteers.4 Some analysts pointed out that the cooperation between these groups and Kyiv should be “watched carefully”,5 as alliances such as these can result in lasting social and political problems for a state. The post-Euromaidan government provided the volunteer groups with an ultimatum—either join the official Ukrainian military or be removed from the front lines.6 Those interested in joining the national guard were subject to “background checks, observations during training, and [were required to] accept Ukrainian citizenship”.7 Of this subset, individuals unable to pass screening were able to work for the state in

O BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? other capacities, such as with the civilian volunteer corps, which assisted police, cleared snow, and worked on a public radio.8 Many did integrate, but others split to pursue careers with NGOs and political groups.9 A minority refused to assimilate and were arrested. Kyiv’s efforts were relatively successful, as the paramilitaries withdrew from the frontlines, although former members would continue to seek political and social influence by forming or flocking to various far-right social organizations, such as Right Sector and the Azov Movement, which remain active today.

The post-Euromaidan government provided the volunteer groups with an ultimatum— either join the official Ukrainian military or be removed from the front lines.

The international community fretted over the possibility of radical nationalists rising to power following the breakout of conflict in the east, but the far-right did not collect the political support necessary in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections to confirm these fears.

In May 2014, pro-European candidate Petro Poroshenko won the presidency with 56% of the vote.10 Svoboda’s Oleh Tyahnybok won 1.3% of the vote, while the Right Sector’s candidate Dmytro Yarosh won .9% of the vote.11 Parliamentary elections in the fall produced similarly promising results: the majority of seats were won by proEuropean candidates. The Radical Party and Svoboda both only managed to capture 6% of the vote, hardly making it over the 5% threshold for representation.12 Even with many Ukrainians in the separatist territories not voting because of separatist sympathies, intimidation, or lack of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 36

EUROPE polling stations, the far-right nationalists were not given a political advantage.13 The majority of Ukrainians saw unity and moderation as their path forward, not a hard turn to the right in response to the breach in their territorial sovereignty.

The swift integration of far-right, nationalist paramilitary groups, at least as a temporary accommodation, was a positive development for a state contesting their much larger and powerful adversary, Russia. The actions of Kyiv prevented these armed groups from turning on the government and starting a two-front war. This is an underappreciated aspect of the Ukrainian crisis—one of the primary characteristics of a state is its monopoly on violence. Without this, it becomes much more difficult for a government to govern and the likelihood of being disposed of increases significantly—the weakness of Tsarist Russia during World War I illustrates what could have befallen Ukraine. As Russian backedseparatists waged war in the east and with Crimea lost, it was of the utmost importance that these ultranationalist groups remained on Kyiv’s side, providing manpower that Ukraine didn’t have at the time. However, now the situation is much more precarious despite a truly impressive military and political transformation by the Ukrainians. The Russo-Ukrainian War has evolved into a frozen conflict and while President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is determined to find a peaceful solution, it is unlikely any party will be satisfied with the outcome, least of all the far-right.14 The toll of the conflict has been heavy but can get worse as it stretches on—further disillusionment with Kyiv and resentment of Russia and other foreign actors will only solidify the beliefs of the members of these far-right groups, and potentially increase their membership. While intolerance for a peace deal with Russia increases, so does a public tolerance of radical nationalist organizations.15

The public allowance of these groups does provoke valid concerns about the role of the farright in Ukrainian civic society. Many of the farright groups in Ukraine fall into political scientist Petr Kopecky’s definition of “uncivil society”16: they possess ideologies that are either “implicitly or explicitly antidemocratic”17 and are active in the public sphere, but do not hold political or 37 FALL 2020

economic influence. Rather, these groups influence public dialogue through demonstrations. Some demonstrations, such as Kyiv’s March of Defenders first held in 2019, are activities that Ukrainians of all political orientations are welcome to and do attend.18 Sports clubs, training camps,19 and other activities hosted by far-right groups have attracted the Ukrainian youth, with some even forming their own groups such as the Sober and Angry Youth.

Aside from demonstrations, the far-right still regularly utilizes intimidation and harassment to make their presence known. For example, in February 2019, a group of men verbally disrupted a lecture given by Anna Hrytsenko, a researcher on far-right movements, at the Izolyatsia arts center’s Armed and Dangerous exhibition.20

As opposed to demonstrations and harassment, other activities have been physically violent, indicating the extremity of some groups.

A surge in violence by the far-right occurred in the spring of 2018 when six attacks on Roma settlements were carried out.21 On 20 April, members of C14 violently chased Roma people in Lysa Hora park, Kyiv; burning their dwellings and belongings.

As Ukraine and other Eastern European societies struggle with anti-Roma prejudice, the public response to this event was overall positive; an investigation by law enforcement yielded no official suspects, despite leaders of C14 speaking openly about the event on talk shows.22 This had the effect of encouraging other groups to act in a similar manner; on 23 June, there was a pogrom on a Roma settlement on the outskirts of Lviv carried out by the Sober and Angry Youth group. Masked men killed a 24-year old man and critically injured four other people, including a 10-year old boy.23 This time, the attack was so brutal that public outrage prompted a quick response from the police.

Law enforcement arrested those involved but characterized the event as a “Russian provocation”,24 purposefully administering blame incorrectly. That being said, violent attacks subsequently fell off, seemingly due to the fact that the consequences of being accused of Russian affiliation was much worse than any benefit violence could provide.

Despite the decrease in these violent attacks after the 23 June pogrom, the far-right remained in the public eye often without much pushback. Violence

O BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? past a certain threshold of savagery was seen as

In 2014, the post-Euromaidan government unacceptable, but ultranationalism and to some decided reigning in and incorporating far-right extent, xenophobia, was not. nationalists into the military and civilian services and allowing them discourse space was the best means to prevent a two-front war: one against Russia and separatists in the Donbas, and one at home against the far-right. This policy, albeit curious and not without flaws, allowed the government to hold Ukrainian society together with the common goal of defending the homeland against foreign aggression. Far-right violence is nowhere near the level it was in 2018, but intimidation and counter demonstrations remain favorable methods of the far-right in order to influence their communities. The country has experienced a surge in nationalism since the Revolution of Dignity; however, this is common ground for Ukrainians across the political spectrum,

Concerns over far-right fueled violence including Russian-speakers that ultimately want to would return in early 2019 when far-right nationalists move past the war in the east and enjoy the benefits generated chaos around the presidential election. of territorial sovereignty like any other European On 16 March, ten suspected far-right affiliated country. The past two rounds of presidential and individuals were arrested in Poltava for trying parliamentary elections indicate that while the far25 to “provoke a conflict” with law enforcement right is highly visible in Ukrainian society, it does at President Poroshenko’s campaign event. On not dominate the political landscape.

27 March, three nationalists were arrested again

The path forward for the far-right in 26 for attempting to “derail a campaign appearance” Ukraine is unclear—there is strong support for by the president. During this time, the G-7 wrote joining the EU and NATO from the general public to Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, claiming which contradicts the priorities of many of the intimidation from far-right groups, such as the far-right groups active in Ukraine, and even those National Corps political party and National that are not interested in joining the Western fold Militia civil organization, would influence voter don’t necessarily subscribe to far-right nationalism. behavior and damage the Ukrainian government’s One thing is clear: the longer the Russo-Ukrainian reputation.29 Avakov himself has enjoyed a War burdens the Ukrainian people, the more close relationship with Ukraine’s far-right for tired Ukrainian society will become, providing over a decade, a connection that can be seen as opportunities for far-right nationalists to be enabling or taming. Again, against observers’ bets, glorified, fill holes left by the government in Kyiv, Ukrainians were not deterred. The country would and influence society in a way that could have long28 overwhelmingly elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a lasting and negative consequences for Ukrainian Jewish moderate-nationalist, as their next president. civic society.

The collective far-right’s preferred candidate, Ruslan Koshulynskyi, went home with 1.62% of the vote. Svoboda, National Corps, and Right Sector coordinated in the 2019 Parliamentary elections in hopes of capturing at least a few seats, but failed miserably in this endeavor as well, receiving only 2.25% of the vote.30 The far-right’s electoral power has only decreased since 2014 based on these trends.

Violence past a certain threshold of savagery was seen as unacceptable, but ultranationalism, and to some extent, xenophobia, was not.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 38

photo by Maryna Markowicz

AND THEN THERE WERE IMPLICATIONS OF A U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY

NONE

by Lilly Bayly

S

ince the end of the Second World War, the United States and Germany have shared a unique bond, and the two countries have remained close allies and trading partners. Set in motion by the revival of West Germany’s economy through the help of the United States Marshall Plan in 1948,1 their bond was strengthened by the joining of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955.2 However, tensions in the German-American relationship have steadily increased since the beginning of the Trump administration.

President Trump’s decision this past summer to move troops stationed in Germany elsewhere, thereby reducing the American presence in the country, has further strained relations.3 Although the number of American troops stationed in Germany has steadily decreased for years, the way in which President Trump has gone about carrying on this trend is unorthodox, as it is out of step with major allies and German wishes.4

Historically, the United States has a strong military presence in Germany, with the Air Force, Army, and Marines stationed around the country.5 American bases, which employ 12,000 German civilians, have helped to establish personal relationships and local economic ties, and the largest American overseas base, US Army Bavaria Garrison, is located in the German town of Grafenwöhr.6 The surprising decision has implications for the

German-American relationship, the broader transAtlantic relationship, NATO, and the respective roles that each country plays on the world stage.

The decision to withdraw American troops from Germany was first publicized on June 5, 2020, following a directive from President Trump to the Pentagon.7 At the time, the German defense ministry had not been formally notified of any proposed changes to American troop numbers.8 The American Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, formally announced the decision and corresponding preliminary planning on July 29, 2020.9 Secretary Esper indicated that the five principles guiding the Department of Defense (DoD) planning were to “enhance deterrence of Russia, strengthen NATO, reassure allies, improve U.S. strategic flexibility and European Command (EUCOM) operational flexibility, and take care of our Service members and their families in the process.”10

President Trump initially suggested a reduction of 9,500 troops, but this number was increased to 11,900 when the decision was formally announced, in part due to previous uncertainty about the actual number of American forces in Germany.11 This move would reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Germany from approximately 36,000 to 24,000.12 Roughly 5,400 Army and Air Force troops are projected to be redeployed to other parts of Europe, and 6,400 are expected to return to the United States to be redeployed elsewhere.13 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 40

EUROPE

The first two principles of the DoD’s planning are to enhance Russian deterrence and strengthen NATO. The American presence in Germany is not only important for each country individually, but also for the global geopolitical environment.

Germany has an important strategic position, located in Central Europe and close to Russia, with solid infrastructure and communication lines.14 Troops stationed in Germany act not only as a military presence in Europe, but Germany also serves as a staging area for deployment to other locations around the world.

In August, the United States signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Poland,15 and is pivoting to a greater presence there through Operation Atlantic Resolve.16 The decision has been presented as a way to continue to build and expand the United States’ relationship with other European and NATO countries. Pivoting may be strategic, but when done it should be in coordination with allies and within the established framework of NATO. Poland is one of the few NATO member countries that has reached the 2% of GDP spending goal on its domestic military.17 However, if Russian deterrence is truly the priority, this agreement should have come much earlier in the Trump administration, and be part of a consistent strategic effort.

President Trump’s rationale for the initial order was that “Germany is delinquent, they haven’t

41 FALL 2020

paid their fees. They haven’t paid their NATO fees and they are way off and they have been off for years.”18 Trump explicitly framed the decision regarding the removal of American troops from Germany as a way to punish Germany for not currently fulfilling its NATO spending obligations.

However, Germany has pledged to reach the NATO guideline of spending 2% of national GDP on its military by 2024, and it is up to date on payments to the collective budget of NATO.19 According to the outlined plans, the troops that are to stay within Europe will be moved to Italy and Belgium.20 Like Germany, neither country has reached the 2% spending guideline.21

Secretary Esper announced that EUCOM and Special Operations Command will be moved from their current position in Stuttgart, Germany to Mons in Belgium, constituting a major reordering of the United States’ presence in Europe.22 NATO’s European headquarters are also in Mons, so this move could lead to a closer working relationship between the United States and NATO.23 However, this move carries the bureaucratic issues of relocation with it, making an adjustment and relearning process likely. It will not do much to enhance deterrence in a systematic way, because changing the structure of American forces will cause logistical problems and delays, which may form weaknesses that could be exploited. Nonetheless, President Trump’s actions may push other NATO members to fulfill their obligations ahead of schedule. Rather than appealing to the longstanding tradition and value of the alliance to do so, this decision may put pressure on NATO countries to increase their spending because of the threat that the United States will actually pull out of the country.

The third principle in the DoD strategy is to reassure allies. The withdrawal of American forces from Germany sends a message to the rest of the world about where American priorities lie.

Countries may conclude that America no longer values partnerships as highly as before. If an ally no longer appears to be reliable, countries will look elsewhere for partnerships.

Germany is no different in this regard. If it feels that it can no longer rely on the United States as an ally, it will likely seek

to build ties elsewhere. The negligent American attitude towards longstanding allies has been a pattern throughout the Trump administration, and Germany is no longer as deferential to American wishes as it might have once been. For example, Germany has vocally supported the building of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is set to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany and other European countries.24 The pipeline is 94% complete, but the United States has been opposed to it from its inception, and has threatened to impose sanctions on companies from participating countries.25 Beyond constraining Russia’s geopolitical power, the United States may be hoping to encourage the export of American natural gas to Europe. However, souring the military relationship with Germany does not appear conducive to this goal.

Beyond serving as a military alliance partner, Germany is an important ally to the United States in other ways too. As the largest economy in Europe, Germany serves as a crucial trading partner to the United States, and is influential in decisions made by the European Union.26 Germany complements the global U.S. military presence through greater development assistance spending as a percentage of GNI.27 A declining relationship on security issues may impact their bilateral relationship across the board.

The fourth principle in the planning is to improve U.S. strategic flexibility and EUCOM operational flexibility. In addition to the geopolitical cost of withdrawing and moving troops, there is also the physical cost of reestablishing facilities in new locations, estimated to be in the billions of dollars.28 Due to the longstanding presence of the American military in Germany, there are many well-established bases and training facilities that have just recently received upgrades. They serve as a central part of America’s overseas presence, and many members of the military spend time being stationed or trained at one. For example, Ramstein Air Force base in the west of Germany currently hosts 50,000 U.S. personnel.29 It serves as NATO’s base for units and training, and is the headquarters for the United States Air Force in Europe.30 To many, moving elements of these facilities is a blatant waste of taxpayer money, which could be used more efficiently elsewhere. This is in line with the growing unease about America’s rising defense budget.

There are further dimensions to President Trump’s decision. The United States is in the midst of a

AND THEN THERE WERE NONE contentious election, whose outcome will determine how, and even if, this plan is implemented. The reelection of President Trump would certainly lead to the administration seeing through its plan of withdrawing troops from Germany, and reorganizing the American presence in Europe. As a leader who prides himself on shows of strength, going back on his word would undermine President Trump’s claim to be “putting America first.”

Another possibility in a second term of a Trump administration would be a decision to withdraw the United States from NATO entirely. He has threatened to do this numerous times throughout his first term, but has thus far always been dissuaded.31

There is also the possibility that President Trump loses the election to Joe Biden. In this case, the new administration would have the ability to halt the plans, given that the repositioning is projected to take “months to plan and years to execute.”32 Biden has often emphasized the value that he places on personal relationships with the leaders of other countries, and the traditional alliances that the United States has relied on. It is likely that he would work to repair America’s relationship with Germany, and strengthen NATO through their cooperation. An aide to Biden has said that “We would review all of the decisions that President Trump has taken, including that one,” in reference to Biden’s intended approach to the withdrawal plans.33

President Trump’s decision to withdraw American forces from Germany, a long-standing ally, seems no more in line with long term strategic goals now than it did when it was announced in June. What may have been intended as a retaliatory move in a declining personal relationship between the President and the German Chancellor has far reaching national security and geopolitical implications. It has damaged the trans-Atlantic relationship, and thereby the United States is endangering its own national security, wasting money, and alienating an important ally. It remains to be seen what effect the American presidential election will have on the execution of this plan.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 42

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

FASHION TO DIE FOR?

Human rights violations in the garmet industry during the COVID-19 pandemic by Madison Romo

S

ince the start of the Covid-19 crisis, businesses and workers around the world have struggled to make ends meet, facing unprecedented challenges. Essential supplies have at times been scarce, and new regulations and laws have emerged in all aspects of life. With many countries in lockdown during the summer of 2020 and over a million pandemic-related deaths worldwide, there has been little room in the public consciousness or the media for “non-essentials” like fashion.

However, the fashion industry is vital to millions of people around the world, and its importance has been highlighted during this pandemic. From couture designers to factory workers, the global fashion industry is massive— worth 2.5 trillion dollars and employing between 60 and 75 million people worldwide.1 According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1.8 million people are employed in the fashion industry in the United States alone.2 Despite the sheer magnitude of this industry, its workers’ rights and voice have been made small.

Pre-pandemic, this lucrative industry created some of the world’s worst working conditions. Sweatshops, despite multiple reform efforts, remain active around the world.

Bangladesh, in particular, is a hub for garment manufacturing and major human rights violations within the garment industry. According to data from the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Worker Federation, garment workers in Bangladesh received only six cents per hour for their work in 2005.3 The average monthly wage photo by Zayda Romero

43 FALL 2020

is lowest in Bangladesh at about 8,000 taka or 95 dollars per month;4 this is an extremely low wage, even compared to workers in other developing countries.5 The 2010 Bangladeshi minimum wage remains below what is deemed in the industry as a “starvation wage,” failing to meet the level of pay required for the purchase of basic human necessities.

Low wages are far from the only tribulation that garment workers face. Abuse, sexual harassment, and dangerous working conditions also put workers, especially female workers, in peril.

This treatment is particularly poignant considering three-fourths of the fashion production labor force is female. Undoubtedly, this fact has contributed to the dismissal of garment workers’ calls for reform and relegated them to a low political priority for policymakers around the world. Especially in countries where women are disenfranchised and unable to obtain an education, corporate and political interests actively exploit these inequalities and stunt meaningful change. Since 1990, thousands of people, primarily teenage girls, have died from dangerous factory conditions leading to fires or building collapse. In 2013, the Rana Plaza Disaster in Savar, Bangladesh killed 1,100 workers and injured thousands more.6 The aftermath of such a catastrophe has led to little change. One garment worker explained that when she entered the garment factory at age 12, she did not know that it was illegal for her boss to touch her inappropriately, slap her, or force her to work sixteen hours days without appropriate compensation. She simply knew that she needed “to keep her job to feed

her young brother and sister.”7 Garment workers depend on their jobs to survive, and they are unable to risk unemployment for the sake of fighting for better treatment. Their inability to advocate for themselves and companies’ unwillingness to enact change has created a system that perpetuates injustice and human suffering, consequences made only more severe by the COVID-19 pandemic.

A major consequence of COVID-19 has been a rise in unemployment among already impoverished garment workers. According to some estimates, half of the 4.1 million garment workers in Bangladesh have been laid off since the start of the pandemic.8 An even greater problem has been retail giants’ treatment of their remaining employees. Major brands have scrambled to implement profitable contingencies in the face of COVID-19, in response to the closure of retail stores and a broad decrease in business as a result of social distancing protocols and stay-at-home mandates.

Employers have minimized their losses by abdicating their financial burden to manufacturers altogether. This strategy has placed the greatest financial burden on those at the bottom of the retail supply chain—the garment workers themselves.

Brands like Topshop, Primark, and Urban Outfitters have canceled orders from suppliers and have refused to pay for goods that had already been produced for their brands.9 Retail giants like Kohl’s and the Arcadia group have exploited legal loopholes, evoking force majeure clauses in their contracts with manufacturers without meeting the requisite legal criteria for doing so. Canceling orders that have already been received and often produced10 has enabled these companies to navigate the COVID crisis largely unscathed. Upon further review, analysts found that many retail contracts were written asymmetrically to favor the brands over suppliers and violated international business standards put forth by the United Nations and other institutions.11 Manufacturers panicked and implored brands to reconsider, but 72% of buyers even refused to cover the supplier’s cost for raw materials for orders that were canceled after the supplier had already purchased the necessary inputs.12 Brands can exploit contracts and legal loopholes because they understand manufacturers

FASHION TO DIE FOR? have no recourse. Few manufacturers have the means to pursue legal action, but if they do, they will likely lose desperately needed business.13

Consequently, factory owners, lacking cash due to the refusal of companies to adhere to their contracts, have failed to pay their workers and forced them to work on the promise of future pay or at greatly reduced wages. Additionally, COVID-19 has been exploited to pursue unionbusting and a crackdown on workers’ limited workplace rights. Some critics suggest that factories with unions were deliberately among the first to close during the pandemic.14 The BHRRC estimates that the unethical decisions of major retailers have impacted 60 million people in 2020, only adding to the already major plight of the average garment worker.15 Workers in the global south have not only had to worry about surviving the pandemic, but also about surviving without a wage. One worker tragically stated, “If we stay home, we may save ourselves from the virus. But who will save us from starvation?”16 In response to the ongoing human rights abuses, garment workers across several countries at the focal point of international clothing production have taken to the streets in protest. In Bangladesh, one worker carried a sign reading, “I don’t want to die for fashion.”17 At every level of the supply chain, there is a power imbalance, between brands and suppliers and suppliers and workers.18 Brands have wielded their power over suppliers by refusing to pay for their products, leaving the manufacturer to deal with the crisis. Accordingly, suppliers have treated workers as disposable and fired those who protest poor working conditions.19 At every level, the international fashion industry prioritizes profits over people, amid a global crisis.

While COVID-19 has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis that exists within the fashion and garment making industry, it is not solely to blame. COVID has simply underscored the industry’s exploitive race to the bottom for higher clothing production at lower costs.20 The problems within the industry have been laid bare, but the solutions are less obvious. In years past, numerous companies have made public proclamations of their company’s changing values and desire to implement more ethical practices. H&M famously INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 44

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

photo by Natalie Carroll announced in 2013 that it would execute a plan to pay its garment workers “a living wage” by the end of 2018.21 Unfortunately, H&M’s announcement, like hopeful statements from other major retailers, turned out to be an empty promise. By 2017, H&M had switched to a “less ambitious course,” failed to implement changes by its self-imposed deadlines, and remained opaque about what concrete steps were being taken to improve the company’s systems and workers’ conditions.22 Critics also noted that the company’s public updates were vague and primarily served to project the image of an ethical company, rather than fundamentally changing the company’s practices.

Any solution to these problems will likely require a long, multi-faceted, and industry-wide effort. For a brand seeking to improve its company ethics and working conditions, one of its first steps at the company level should be to create an effective plan to regularly measure and audit working environments.23 These policies should carry both concrete incentives for improvement and consequences for failing to meet basic standards.

Without enforcement mechanisms, companies will not be motivated to effect change.24 45 FALL 2020

The first stages of a comprehensive plan to improve working conditions should focus on building safety and higher wages. Physically unsafe working conditions are common and preventing catastrophe, such as the Rana Plaza Disaster, is critical.25 Next, companies need to ensure that workers in their supply chain are being paid at least the minimum wage. Although the issue of low wage floors remains, some workers are not even compensated at their country’s minimum wage.

This reform would provide the foundation for further raises.

Companies also need to take legal responsibility for their workers.26 Many companies avoid close involvement in changing working conditions because they seek to avoid signing legally-binding documents. Such paperwork has the potential to give workers more rights and a formal path for redress in the event of wrongdoing,27 a measure ultimately essential for guaranteeing improved workers’ rights. Finally, companies should advocate directly for their workers. One reality made clear by the pandemic is the incredible authority that companies possess. In many countries that account for clothing manufacturing,

FASHION TO DIE FOR? large retail companies hold enormous sway over Jordan, reports of sexual harassment declined by suppliers, factory chains, and even governments.

18%, and lines with female supervisors, who had Companies can leverage their power to motivate been trained by Better Work’s Supervisory Skills policymakers to create laws and mechanisms that program, increased productivity by 22%.32 Better protect workers, raise wages, and pressure factory Work’s progress has proven that intervention from owners to create humane conditions within their international organizations is a promising strategy. businesses rather than simply taking advantage of

Lastly, consumers can also drive change. power imbalances. Concurrently, companies need While the onus for reform should not be placed to act ethically towards suppliers and pay a fair upon the individual consumer, consumers do hold price for their products. power in their behavior, and people should be

Government policy may play a critical role aware of the practices they are supporting through in bringing change, but it will be a complicated their purchases.33 Fortunately, consumers are process. In the past few years, some governments becoming more mindful of their decision-making in garment-making hubs have passed new over the past few decades. In a Morgan Stanley minimum wage laws.28 While this is a step in the 2016 study, approximately 62 percent of surveyed right direction, these new laws are only minor consumers listed “good ethics” among their key improvements to previous legislation that often shopping decision criteria, compared to only 53 29 fails to account for inflation. Additionally, the percent in 2010.34 This pattern demonstrates that laws that do exist to protect workers from abuse consumers are increasingly concerned with what and harassment are largely ineffective due to a exactly their purchases support. Consumers can lack of enforcement mechanisms. Kalpona Akter, exert significant influence in pressuring companies an activist for garment workers’ rights, was and governments to enact reforms and pass new fired from her factory job and later repeatedly legislation. Additionally, some consumers are imprisoned for her role in organizing unions, using social media to spread awareness about protests, and exposing government corruption. contemporary sweatshops and exploitation that During her speech at the Business of Fashion exists in the garment industry. In response to VOICES 2018 Summit, Akter explained that the cancellations by major retailers during the 30% of Bangladeshi Parliament members own COVID-19 pandemic, a transnational social media 30 or invest in garment factories. For this reason, movement called #PayUp has emerged, and the she says that the government has an interest in attention garnered by the movement has compelled ignoring workers’ demands for better conditions multiple retail giants to pay for their canceled 31 and actively suppressing workers’ unions. orders.35 One Instagram account, Labour Behind Therefore, action from international agencies and the Label, highlights issues, worker protests, and intergovernmental organizations will likely be reforms within the industry, and encourages needed to crack down on government corruption followers to sign petitions, donate to garment and bring about lasting, substantial change. “Better worker relief funds, and spread awareness about Work”, a United Nations-backed program designed worker labor issues. Business of Fashion, a firm by the International Labour Organization (ILO) that provides fashion industry reports and analysis, to improve garment factory conditions, has been has over 1.8 million followers on Instagram, who implemented in several countries with promising interact with company reform campaigns, fashion results. The ILO has attributed substantial decreases industry protests, and other fashion-related news. in “coercive labor practices” and “harassment and These are just two of many platforms that work to verbal abuse” to the program, which monitors raise awareness about human rights violations in and tracks factory conditions. One surprising factories around the world and implore consumers effect of the program was a significant increase to consider if the season’s latest fashion trends are in female leadership within factories, a likely really worth the cost. product of Better Work’s supervisory skills training program geared toward women in the industry. In INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 46

ENDNOTES

photo by Han Beul Kee

Fashion to Die For? 1. Joint Economic Committee based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data, The Economic Impact of the Fashion Industry, last modified Feb. 22 2019. Accessed on October 19, 2020.

2. Joint Economic Committee based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data, Fashion Industry Create High-Value Jobs Across the US, last modified Feb. 18 2016. Accessed on October 18, 2020.

3. Muhammad, Anu. Wealth and Deprivation: Ready-made Garments Industry in Bangladesh. Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 34 (2011): 23-27. Accessed October 20, 2020.

4. Muhammad, Anu. Wealth and Deprivation: Ready-made Garments Industry in Bangladesh, 24.

5. Ibid.

6. International Labour Organization, The Rana Plaza Accident and Its Aftermath, Last modified (n.d.).

Accessed on October 11, 2020.

7. Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

8. Rebecca Wright, Salman Saeed, Bangladeshi garment workers face ruin as global brands ditch clothing contracts amid coronavirus pandemic, last modified April 22, 2020. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

9. Bloomer, Phil. Millions of garment workers face destitution as fashion brands cancel orders, Reuters. Last modified April 24, 2020. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

10. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, ILAW, “Farce majeure: How global apparel brands are using the COVID-19 pandemic to stiff suppliers and abandon workers”, Workers Rights Consortium, last modified September 2020, Accessed October 20, 2020.

11. Cline, Elizabeth. “Fashion’s $16 Billion Debt to Garment Workers Should Spark Reform Not Sympathy,” Forbes, Last Modified October 15, 2020, Accessed on October 20, 2020.

12. Anner, Mark. Abandoned? The Impact of Covid-19 on Workers and Business at the Bottom of Global Garment Supply Chains. Penn State Center for Global Workers’ Rights. Last modified March 27, 2020. Accessed on October 10, 2020.

13. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, ILAW, “Farce majeure: How global apparel brands are using the COVID-19 pandemic to stiff suppliers and abandon workers”, Workers Rights Consortium, last modified September 2020, Accessed October 20, 2020.

14. Harriet Grant, Joshua Carroll. Covid Led to ‘Brutal Crackdown’ on garment workers’ rights says report, The Guardian, Last modified August 7, 2020, Accessed on October 9, 2020.

15. Bloomer, Phil. Millions of garment workers face destitution as fashion brands cancel orders, Reuters, Last modified April 24, 2020, Accessed on October 9, 2020.

16. Jasmin, Malik Chua. “Protesting Bangladesh Garment Workers: ‘Who Will Save Us from Starvation?’.” Sourcing Journal (Online) (Apr 16, 2020).

17. Reuters Events, Photograph of Garment Worker Protest

ENDNOTES

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

from article “Four years after Rana Plaza, garment workers are still dying in unsafe factories,” 20 Oct. 2017, Accessed 20 Oct. 2020.

Cline, Elizabeth. “Fashion’s $16 Billion Debt to Garment Workers Should Spark Reform Not Sympathy,” Forbes, Last Modified October 15, 2020, Accessed on October 20, 2020.

Siddiqi, Dina M., “What the Pandemic Reveals: Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh and Garment Supply Chains,” Georgetown University, Last Modified September 3, 2020, Accessed on October 16, 2020.

Josephine Moulds, Child Labour in the Fashion Supply Chain, UNICEF and The Guardian, Last modified (n.d.).

Accessed on October 19, 2020.

Chua, Jasmin. Why is it so hard for clothing manufacturers to Pay a Living Wage?, Vox, Last modified February 27, 2018. Accessed on October 13, 2020.

Ibid.

Searcy, Cory. “5 Steps to Building Better Working Conditions in Global Supply Chains,” Sustainable Brands (FairTrade America), Last modified 2017. Accessed on October 20, 2020.

International Labour Organization, “Wages and Working Hours in the Textiles, Clothing, Leather, and Footwear Industries,” International Labour Office, Last modified 2014, Accessed on October 8, 2020.

“5 Steps to Building Better Working Conditions in Global Supply Chains.”

Cline, Elizabeth. “Fashion’s $16 Billion Debt to Garment Workers Should Spark Reform Not Sympathy,” Forbes, Last Modified October 15, 2020, Accessed on October 20, 2020.

Arengo, Elena, Future of Fashion: Worker-Led Strategies for Corporate Accountability in the Global Apparel Industry, International Labor Rights Forum, 5, Last modified February 2019, Accessed on October 21, 2020.

Reuters Staff. “Bangladesh Raises Wages for Garment Workers,” Reuters, Last modified September 13, 2018, Accessed October 10, 2020.

Chua, Jasmin. Why is it so hard for clothing manufacturers to Pay a Living Wage?, Vox, Last modified February 27, 2018. Accessed on October 13, 2020.

Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

Business of Fashion VOICES SUMMIT. Improving the Life of Bangladeshi Garment Workers. Youtube, speech by

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 48

ENDNOTES

Kalpona Akter, Last modified April 24, 2019. Accessed on October 9, 2020.

35. Siddiqi, Dina M., “What the Pandemic Reveals: Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh and Garment Supply Chains,” Georgetown University, Last Modified September 3, 2020, Accessed on October 16, 2020.

Venezuela’s Blood Gold 1. Reed, Jan A. Conflict Minerals: International Response and SEC Disclosure Rule. New York: Nova publishers, 2013.

2. Sierra, Raúl Sánchez De La. “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo.”

Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 1 (2020): 32–74. https://doi.org/10.1086/703989.

3. Between 1998 and 2007, as many as an estimated 5.4 million people may have died in Congo from direct and indirect war-related causes, including malnutrition and disease, with the highest casualty rates concentrated in eastern DRC. See Reed, Jan A. Conflict Minerals: International Response and SEC Disclosure Rule. New York: Nova publishers, 2013.

4. “Venezuela,” OPEC (Organization of the Oil Exporting Countries, 2020).

5. Rendon, Moises. “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions.”

Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions | Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 23, 2020.

6. “Venezuela: Violent Abuses in Illegal Gold Mines.”

Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2020.

7. Moises Rendon and Linnea Sandin, “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions,” Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions | Center for Strategic and International Studies (Center for Strategic Studies, April 16, 2020).

8. In which it has been the European Union, the United States, Mexico, Switzerland and Panama have issued an extensive length of sanctions on Venezuelan officials, in addition to constant condemnation from NGOs and the United Nations Human Rights. See “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/41/18) (Advance Unedited Version) - Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ),” July 5, 2019, and Moises Rendon, “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?,” Center for Strategic Studies (CSIS, October 19, 2020).

9. Moises Rendon and Linnea Sandin, “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions,” Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions | Center for Strategic and International Studies (Center for Strategic Studies, April 16, 2020).

10. Moises Rendon and Linnea Sandin, “Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions,” Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in the Amazonas and Orinoco Regions | Center for Strategic and International Studies (Center for Strategic Studies, April 16, 2020).

49 FALL 2020

11. Filipetti, Carrie. Illicit Mining: Threats to U.S. National Security and International Human Rights: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, December 5, 2019. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020.

12. In a report presented to Congress, a woman retells how she saw another woman accused of stealing a pair of pants having her hands cut off with a machete by a gang member. See Filipetti, Carrie. Illicit Mining: Threats to U.S. National Security and International Human Rights.

13. “Venezuela: Violent Abuses in Illegal Gold Mines.”

Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2020.

14. Rhodes, William R. “Venezuela’s Healthcare Crisis Needs Emergency Attention.” Financial Times. Financial Times, February 8, 2019.

Infrastructure Development as Expansionism 1. Carrie Kahn, “China Lures Taiwan’s Latin American Allies,” NPR, October 13, 2018.

2. “Latin America & Caribbean Trade,” World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank, accessed October 9, 2020.

3. Rebecca Ray and Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa, “China-Latin American Economic Bulletin, 2020 Edition,” Boston University Global Development Policy Center, accessed October 9, 2020.

4. Ray and Batista Barbosa, “China-Latin American” 5. Pepe Zhang, “Belt and Road in Latin America: A regional game changer?” Atlantic Council, October 8, 2019.

6. Ray and Batista Barbosa, “China-Latin American” 7. Andrés Bermúdez Liévano, “China’s Belt and Road advances in Latin America’s Andean Region,” Diálogo Chino, June 18, 2019.

8. Cissy Zhou, “China slimming down Belt and Road Initiative as new project value plunges in last 18 months, report shows,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2019.

9. Ray and Batista Barbosa, “China-Latin American” 10. Igor Patrick, “Latin America Used To Be Positive Toward China. COVID-19 Might Change That.” The Diplomat, April 10, 2020.

11. Raquel Carvalho, “China in Latin America: partner or predator?” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2019.

12. Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “China’s overseas lending and the looming developing country debt crisis” CEPR Policy Portal, Vox EU, May 4, 2020.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 1. “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, BenishangulGumuz.” Water Technology.

2. Hurst, Harold Edwin, and Magdi M. El-Kammash. “Nile River.” Encyclopædia Britannica. November 07, 2019.

3. Mahemud Tekuya JSD/Ph.D Candidate. “Colonial-era Treaties Are to Blame for the Unresolved Dispute over Ethiopia’s Dam.” The Conversation. March 25, 2020.

4. Kimenyi, Mwangi S., and John Mukum Mbaku. “The Limits of the New “Nile Agreement”.” Brookings. July 29,

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Tekuya, The Conversation Tekuya, The Conversation Carlson, Andrew. “Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia’s History-Changing Dam.” MIT. September 29, 2013.

Asiedu, Michael. Report. Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), 2018.

Ibid, Brookings, “The Limits of the New Nile Agreement.”

Kimenyi, Mwangi S., and John Mukum Mbaku. “The Limits of the New “Nile Agreement”.” Brookings. July 29, 2016.

Ibrahim, Nadeen. “This Is the Water Crisis That Egypt Is Facing.” World Economic Forum. November 7, 2019.

Tekuya, The Conversation.

Israel-Bahrain-U.A.E. Relations 1. Al Jazeera, “Donald Trump Vows to Get out of ‘BloodStained’ Middle East,” Syria | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, October 24, 2019).

2. Barnes, Julian E., and Eric Schmitt. “Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Northern Syria,” October 13, 2019. Stavridis, James. “Trump’s Iraq Troop Withdrawal Is Good for Iran, Russia, Syria.” Bloomberg. com. Bloomberg, September 9, 2020.

3. III, Leo Shane. “Trump: US Will Be out of Afghanistan by Christmas.” Military Times. Military Times, October 8, 2020. Sadjadpour, Karim. “Iran’s Unwavering Support to Assad’s Syria.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 16, 2017.

4. Hubbard, Ben. “Iran’s Allies Feel the Pain of American Sanctions.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 28, 2019.

5. Landler, Mark, Julian E Barnes, and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Puts Iran on Notice and Weighs Response to Attack on Oil Tankers.” The New York Times. The New York Times, June 14, 2019.

6. Daniel L. Byman, “Trump’s Reckless Middle East Policy Has Brought the US to the Brink of War,” Brookings (Brookings, January 6, 2020).

7. Al Jazeera. “Yemen’s Houthis Fire Missiles, Drones towards Saudi Arabia.” Saudi Arabia | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, June 23, 2020.

8. Marcus, Jonathan. “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Bitter Rivals.” BBC News. BBC, September 16, 2019.

9. Halbfinger, David M. “Netanyahu Drops Troubled Annexation Plan for Diplomatic Gain.” The New York Times. The New York Times, August 13, 2020.

10. Toameh, Khaled Abu. “The Final Nail in Palestinian-Arab Relations?” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, October 8, 2020.

11. Halbfinger, David M. “Netanyahu Corruption Trial Begins, Taking Israel Into Uncharted Territory.” The New York Times. The New York Times, May 24, 2020.

Assad’s Alawites 1. State, “Religious Freedom,” 3.

2. State, “Religious Freedom,” 11.

3. Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear, 10.

4. Fildis, “Roots,” 148.

5.

6.

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22.

ENDNOTES

Khaddour, “Assad’s Officer Ghetto,” 9.

Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear, 6.

Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Upgrading,” 103.

The sudden collapse of an authoritarian regime may trigger a period of decompression wherein opportunity for representation and policy grow in a previously closed system, often producing disorientation.

Islamists were traditionally the strongest concentration of opposition to the Ba’ath Party; Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Upgrading,” 104.

Stacher, “Hereditary Succession,” 199.

Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Upgrading,” 97.

Darwich, “Ideational and Material Forces,” 146.

Harling, “Syrian Revolution,” 8.

Goldsmith, “Alawites for Assad.”

Dagher, “Families Who Sacrificed.”

Karouny, “Houla.”

Goldsmith, Cycle of Fear, 6.

State, “Religious Freedom,” 13.

State, “Religious Freedom,” 13.

Associated Press, “Syria Since March 2011.”

UNHCR. Specia, “Syria’s Death Toll”.

The Looming Water Crisis in Iraq 1. von Lossow, Tobias. “More than Infrastructures: Water Challenges in Iraq.” Den Haag: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, July 2018.

2. “Iraq Economic Monitor: From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery.” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2018.

3. von Lossow, “More than Infrastructures: Water Challenges in Iraq.”

4. Indhar, Haydar. “As Neighbours Build Dams, Iraqis Watch Twin Rivers Dry Up.” Macau Business, August 27, 2020.

5. Indhar, “As Neighbours Build Dams, Iraqis Watch Twin Rivers Dry Up.” Lebanon’s Exploitative Kafala System 1. Barkawi, B. (2020, August 20). ‘Bad to worse’: Beirut blast final blow for Lebanon’s trapped migrants. Retrieved October 22, 2020.

2. Hamill, K., 2020. Policy Paper On Reforming The “Sponsorship System” For Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards An Alternative Governance Scheme In Lebanon. [online] Kafa.org.lb.

3. Ilo.org. 2020. [online] [Accessed 11 October 2020].

4. MAKOOI, B. (2020, August 26). Beirut blasts leave migrant workers overlooked in life and death. Retrieved October 22, 2020.

5. Lori, Noora. Offshore Citizens: Permanent Temporary Status in the Gulf. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. doi:10.1017/9781108632560.

6. Ilo.org. 2020. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

7. Hamill, K., 2020. Policy Paper On Reforming The “Sponsorship System” For Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards An Alternative Governance Scheme In Lebanon. [online] Kafa.org.lb. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

8. Ilo.org. 2020. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

9. Amnesty.org. 2020. Lebanon: Revised Contract Must Lead

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ENDNOTES

To End Of Kafala System. [online] 10. Hamill, K., 2020. Policy Paper On Reforming The “Sponsorship System” For Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards An Alternative Governance Scheme In Lebanon. [online] Kafa.org.lb. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

11. Lori, Noora. Offshore Citizens: Permanent Temporary Status in the Gulf. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. doi:10.1017/9781108632560.

12. Hamill, K., 2020. Policy Paper On Reforming The “Sponsorship System” For Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards An Alternative Governance Scheme In Lebanon. [online] Kafa.org.lb. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

13. Ibid 14. Ilo.org. 2020. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

15. Hamill, K., 2020. Policy Paper On Reforming The “Sponsorship System” For Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards An Alternative Governance Scheme In Lebanon. [online] Kafa.org.lb. [Accessed 11 October 2020].

16. Ibid 17. Ibid COVID-19 and the Uighur Crisis 1. “China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang | Council on ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

2. “Up to one million detained in China’s mass “reeducation” drive.” Accessed October 28, 2020.

3. “The Uighurs and the Chinese state: A long ....” Accessed October 14, 2020.

4. “Independent UN rights experts raise alarm over ... - UN News.” Accessed October 18, 2020.

5. “Here are the flimsy excuses China uses to throw Uighur ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

6. “China’s Uighurs told to share beds, meals with party members.” Accessed October 28, 2020.

7. “China bans Muslims from fasting Ramadan in Xinjiang | China ....” Accessed October 28, 2020.

8. “China denies Muslim separation campaign in Xinjiang BBC ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

9. “China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims ....” Accessed October 14, 2020.

10. “The United States Should Formally Recognize Genocide in ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

11. “China Suppression Of Uighur Minorities Meets U.N. Definition ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

12. “China Uighurs: All you need to know on Muslim ‘crackdown ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

13. “China is building vast new detention centers for Muslims in ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

14. “The Uighurs and the Chinese state: A long ....” Accessed October 14, 2020.

15. “Student Opinion: The Uighur Crisis and COVID-19 UMN CLA.” Accessed October 19, 2020.

16. “China Says There’s No Risk of a COVID-19 Outbreak in ....” Accessed October 19, 2020.

17. “Exiled Uighurs fear spread of coronavirus in ... - Al Jazeera.” Accessed October 19, 2020.

18. “The Impact of COVID-19 on Uighur Muslims: An Ignored Crisis ....” Accessed October 19, 2020.

19. “China Is Using Uighur Labor to Produce Face Masks The ....” Accessed October 19, 2020.

51 FALL 2020

20. “China’s brutal crackdown on the Uighur Muslim minority ... - Vox.” Accessed October 18, 2020.

21. “Xinjiang becomes logistics hub of Belt and Road Chinadaily ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

22. “Europe said ‘never again.’ Why is it silent on Uighur genocide ....” Accessed October 18, 2020.

23. “Major brands try to determine if cotton in their ... - NBC News.” Accessed October 19, 2020.

24. “China’s “War on Terror”: September 11 and Uighur ... jstor.” Accessed October 28, 2020.

25. “Assessing US-China relations 2 years into the Trump presidency.” Accessed October 29, 2020. “US sanctions over Xinjiang’s Uygur internment camps are ....” Accessed October 29, 2020.

O Brother, Where Art Thou?

1. “The Far Right and the 2019 Parliamentary Election.”

Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine. Accessed September 30, 2020.

2. Oleg Shynkarenko. “Can Ukraine Control Its Far Right Ultranationalists?” The Daily Beast. The Daily Beast Company, March 1, 2014.

3. Josh Cohen. “Commentary: Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi Problem.”

Reuters. Thomson Reuters, March 19, 2018.

4. Vera Mironova and Ekaterina Sergatskova. “How Ukraine Reined In Its Militias.” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2017.

5. Sabra Ayres. “Driven by Far-Right Ideology, Azov Battalion Mans Ukraine’s Front Line.” Al Jazeera America, July 24, 2014.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Josh Cohen. “Commentary: Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi Problem.”

10. Shaun Walker, and Alec Luhn. “Petro Poroshenko Wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls,” May 25, 2014.

11. Corinne Deloy. “Presidential Election in Ukraine.”

Fondation Robert Schuman, May 25, 2014.

12. Steven Pifer. “Ukraine’s Parliamentary Election: What Happened? What’s Next?” Brookings. Brookings, October 27, 2014.

13. Shaun Walker, and Alec Luhn. “Petro Poroshenko Wins Ukraine Presidency, According to Exit Polls.”

14. Roth, Andrew. “Thousands March in Kyiv to Oppose East Ukraine Peace Plan.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 14, 2019.

15. Andreas Umland. Publication. Ukraine’s Far Right Today: Continuing Electoral Impotence and Growing Uncivil Society. Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2020. 6.

16. Kopecky, Petr. “Uncivil Society Revisited.” ECPR General Conference 2019. Lecture presented at the ECPR General Conference 2019, 2020.

17. Umland, Andreas. “THE FAR RIGHT IN PREAND POST-EUROMAIDAN UKRAINE: FROM ULTRANATIONALIST PARTY POLITICS TO ETHNOCENTRIC UNCIVIL SOCIETY.” Demokratizatsiya. 259.

18. Foccusser. “Massive March of Defenders Held in Kyiv (Photo).” Ukraine Today .org, August 24, 2020.

19. Fred Weir. “Militaristic and Anti-Democratic, Ukraine’s Far-Right Bides Its Time,” April 15, 2019.

20. Richard Unwin. “Ukrainian Nationalists Target Lecture at Kiev Arts Centre as Far-Right Activity Rises.” The Art Newspaper. The Art Newspaper, April 23, 2019.

21. Attacks on Roma and Public ‘Acceptance’ of Far Right Violence.” Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine. Accessed October 6, 2020.

22. Ibid.

23. “Ukraine: Fatal Attack on Roma Settlement,” October 17, 2020.

24. “Attacks on Roma and Public ‘Acceptance’ of Far Right Violence.” Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine.

25. “10 Arrested in Nationalist Protest against Ukraine’s Leader.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, March 16, 2019.

26. “Nationalists Scuffle with Police in Ukraine, 3 Arrested.”

AP NEWS. Associated Press, March 27, 2019.

27. Taras Kuzio. “Who Gains from Using the Far-Right in Ukraine’s Elections?” Atlantic Council.

28. “Ukraine Election: Comedian Zelensky Wins Presidency

by Landslide.” BBC News. BBC, April 22, 2019.

29. Oleh Hlyniailiuk. “Who Are Ukrainian Nationalists, and How Do They Differ?” UkraineWorld. UkraineWorld, June 24, 2019.

30. “The Far Right and the 2019 Parliamentary Election.”

Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine.

And Then There Were None 1. “What Is NATO?” NATO. Accessed September 29, 2020.

2. “Marshall Plan.” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed September 29, 2020.

3. Gordon, Michael R., and Gordon Lubold. “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops From Germany.” The Wall Street Journal. June 05, 2020. Accessed September 29, 2020.

4. Knight, Ben. “US Military in Germany: What You Need to Know: DW: 16.06.2020.”

5. “US Military Bases in Germany: 21 Bases.” Military Bases.

March 07, 2018. Accessed October 09, 2020.

6. Knight, Ben. “US Military in Germany: What You Need to Know: DW: 16.06.2020.” DW.COM. June 16, 2020.

Accessed October 08, 2020.

7. Gordon, and Lubold, “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops From Germany.”

8. Gordon, and Lubold, “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops From Germany.”

9. Esper, Mark. “U.S. European Command Force Posture Policy Press Conference: Secretary Esper’s Opening St.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. July 29, 2020.

Accessed October 09, 2020.

10. Esper, Mark. “U.S. European Command Force Posture Policy Press Conference: Secretary Esper’s Opening St.” 11. Browne, Ryan, and Zachary Cohen. “US to Withdraw Nearly 12,000 Troops from Germany in Move That Will Cost Billions and Take Years.” CNN. July 29, 2020.

Accessed September 29, 2020.

12. Browne and Cohen. “US to Withdraw Nearly 12,000 Troops from Germany in Move That Will Cost Billions and Take Years.”

13. Ibid.

ENDNOTES

14. DW News, “Will the US pull its troops out of Germany?”

YouTube video, 6:43, June 9th, 2020.

15. Masters, Jonathan, and William Merrow. “How is the U.S. Military Pivoting in Europe?” Council on Foreign Relations. September 23, 2020. Accessed September 30, 2020.

16. Office of the Spokesperson. “U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. August 15, 2020. Accessed October 09, 2020.

17. NATO. Public Diplomacy Division. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019).” News release, November 29, 2019. NATO. Accessed October 9, 2020.

18. Guardian News, “’Germany is delinquent’: Trump defends US withdrawal of 12,000 troops,” YouTube video, 0:57.

July 29, 2020.

19. Masters, Jonathan, and William Merrow. “How is the U.S. Military Pivoting in Europe?”

20. Browne and Cohen. “US to Withdraw Nearly 12,000 Troops from Germany in Move That Will Cost Billions and Take Years.”

21. NATO. Public Diplomacy Division. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019).”

22. Masters, Jonathan, and William Merrow. “How is the U.S. Military Pivoting in Europe?”

23. Ibid.

24. Reed, Stanley, and Lara Jakes. “A Russian Gas Pipeline Increases Tension Between the U.S. and Europe.” The New York Times. July 24, 2020. Accessed October 09, 2020.

25. Ibid.

26. Silver, Caleb. “The Top 20 Economies in the World.”

Investopedia. September 18, 2020. Accessed October 08, 2020.

27. OECD. “Development Finance Data.” OECD. April 2020.

Accessed October 21, 2020.

28. Gordon, and Lubold, “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops From Germany.”

29. “US Military Bases in Germany: 21 Bases.”

30. Ibid.

31. Barnes, Julian E., and Helene Cooper. “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia.” The New York Times. January 15, 2019.

Accessed October 09, 2020.

32. Browne and Cohen. “US to Withdraw Nearly 12,000 Troops from Germany in Move That Will Cost Billions and Take Years.”

33. Ax, Joseph, and Trevor Hunnicutt. “Exclusive: Biden to Review Trump Decision to Cut Troops in Germany If Elected.” Reuters. July 09, 2020. Accessed October 09, 2020.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 52

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

photo by Michelle Nie

EDITORIAL BOARD FALL 2020

EDITOR IN CHIEF Noah Riley SENIOR EDITOR Yoni Tobin SENIOR LAYOUT EDITOR Barrett Yueh STAFF WRITERS Jesse Lamba Michelle Ramiz Natalie Cressey Jennifer Kornreich Madison Romo Caroline Koehl Nada Shalash Jacob Szczepanski Tima Dasouki Lilly Bayly Madison Seargent Francesca Padilla Soumya Nimmu Stella Dzialas Jannah Kalai Maz Sayed Pamela Troconis Frank Serpe Nika Vachani Sydney Pickering Gideon Gordon Janney Collens

EDITORS Chloe Rudnicki Elaine Hovsepian Samantha Dorning Clementine Lee Libby Egan Jacqueline Moshkovich Josh Wright Catherine Kreider Maecey Niksch Elle Nicoletti Sam McGuire Anika Brahmbhatt Emma Shapiro Michelle Kaplun Aashna Gupta Lea Namouni Ana Lucia Perla Alice Yeung Michelle Nie

A NOTE ON THE TYPE The IRR is set in Minion Pro, a serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and released in 1990

by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissanceera type for extended reading, and named for the traditional nomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between nonpareil and brevier at 7pt.

The IRR also uses Source Code Pro, Avenir, Lato, Roboto, Chapaza, Baskerville, and Chronicle Display.

LAYOUT EDITORS Bridgette Lang Angela Song Ting Li Rannd Muhanna REACT NEWS Elisabeth Garfield Bonita Chang Megana Vonguru Mugdha Gurram Branden Alberts Alejandra Alfaro-Carcoba Xinying Tao MARKETING Olivia Rollins Alexis Rosales Hernandez COVER PHOTO Anushka Pinto

COLOPHON Composed in Adobe InDesign and using Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, and Adobe InCopy by the IRR Editorial Board at Boston University in Boston, Massachusetts. Printed and bound by The Fenway Group in Boston, Massachusetts.

November 2020.

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