AFRICA Spotlight on Sahel: An Evaluation of the EU’s Involvement in the Sahel Region of Africa

by Lucy Stevens

edited by Lenny Adonteng and Anfani Lawal

At the edge of the Sahara Desert, a physical barrier dividing the distinct geographies and identities of the deserts of the Middle Eastern linked North Africa from the more tropical fertile lands of the sub-Saharan continent, lies the Sahel region. Sitting at the crossroads of these contrasting cultural influences, the Sahel is a semi-arid geographical belt just below the Sahara Desert spanning east to west across the continent that includes the countries Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. 1 In Arabic, the very name of this region means “shore” or “coast,” furthering the idea that the Sahel holds a significant geopolitical position at the edge of the Sahara. 2 This geographical, political, and economic role is best displayed in the Sahel’s responsibility as an important stop on the historical transSaharan trade route, an “extensive trade network” that spanned the Sahara Desert and connected sub-Saharan Africa to the important trade routes accessed via the countries bordering the Mediterranean coast. 3 Not only did these networks allow for the transportation of goods across far reaching areas of Africa, they also facilitated interaction amongst different individuals, cultures, and languages, helping to establish connections amongst the population of Africa more broadly. Despite this rich history and culture, the arrival of colonial powers and European trading companies in the nineteenth century disrupted these established connections, with drastic impacts on the region’s stability and prosperity. The European powers not only enacted unsustainable policies of extraction but also contributed to disparate economic development, as they inconsistently built up the infrastructure of areas of the Sahel that best served their interests. 4 Unfortunately, the legacy of this colonial period did not disappear with the independence movements of the 1960s with prosperity continuing to escape the countries of the Sahel. Over the last decade in particular, the Sahel has experienced a period of intense instability and volatility stemming from both physical and social threats that seems far from resolution. Already susceptible to extreme weather given its desert location, ongoing drought has left the Sahel’s food infrastructure weak.

Climate scientists with the National Academy of Sciences have forecasted that as the effects of climate change progress over the coming years, the Sahelian countries will experience further dramatic environmental changes. 5 Principally, the predicted changes to precipitation levels and increased average temperatures will leave the already fragile agroecosystem of the region, as well as the food security and living conditions of locals, threatened. 6 This, in combination with projections estimating that the region’s population will more than double by 2050, point to an environmental crisis on the horizon for the countries in the Sahel, as the physical environment will soon be unable to support its future population. 7

The social situation across the Sahel similarly does not bear much hope. Social scientists have described a “perfect storm” in the region where “expanding extremist networks and the multiplication of criminal gangs in a deteriorating socio-economic environment” have resulted in almost a decade of closely linked instability across the nations of the Sahel. 8 The epicenter of what the United Nations (UN) has termed ‘The Sahel Conflict’ lies in Mali, where the social fallout from the insurgency that the country experienced in 2012 continues to be felt domestically and within its neighboring countries of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania.

The 2012 uprising began when a separatist movement amongst the Tuareg minority, a nomadic ethnic community that had historically been alienated from mainstream Malian politics, was able to successfully establish control over an area in the country’s north as their demands for selfdetermination grew. 9 This movement was initially supported by Islamist militant groups. However, ideological disagreements saw the extremist groups shifting their focus to more radical attempts at gaining territory and influence in the region. 10

The strategy of Islamists in the Sahel took on a similar nature to the methods of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and their attempts to declare a recognised anti-Western Islamic state. These militant groups have wreaked havoc throughout the Sahel, taking advantage of weak political institutions and informal social infrastructures to undermine governmental control through “repeatedly target[ing] communities and national institutions [with] coordinated attacks”. 11 Some of the major Jihadist organisations present on the ground have included Al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM), its affiliate Jama'at Nasr alIslam wal Muslimin (JMNI), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Niger concentrated Boko Haram. Inter-fighting and contradictory aims amongst these groups have added yet another layer to the chaos they bring, heightening the overall volatility of the situation and making it an extremely violent and unsafe region for the civilian population. This instability continues to characterize the political landscape of the Sahel today, with solutions to the regional crisis appearing more and more distant as the conflict drags on. In May 2021, Mali experienced a military coup against the transitional civilian government that had taken over the year earlier, marking the fifth coup the nation has experienced since independence in 1960 and clearly highlighting the weakness of the political structures in the region. 12 This extremely precarious combination of weak infrastructure, undercut by terror and criminal organisations have, and continue to, render it almost impossible for concentrated efforts towards political progress in the Sahel to achieve any kind of success to date.

One of the most detrimental outcomes of this regional conflict has been the displacement of civilians and the subsequent refugee crisis that has emerged. The lack of structured governance across the Sahel has left “livelihood insecurity” abundant, with increasing weather extremity due to climate change making resources and the chances for economic growth limited. 13 In addition, the lack of trust in weak governmental institutions means that citizens and criminal organizations commonly resort to violence to solve disputes. 14 These factors, in combination with the targeted attacks against civilians by extremist groups, have left many seeking a more prosperous life elsewhere in other areas of the African continent, or, towards the Mediterranean and the routes to Europe it provides. 15 As of August 2022, the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that approximately three million individuals have been internally displaced within the Sahel, representing a portion of the five million total population that the UNHCR classifies as being at risk of displacement as a result of this crisis. 16 The extent of this crisis has classified it as one of the worst forced migration events facing our world at the moment, indicating that the situation in the Sahel is far more significant than just a regional African conflict.

International Involvement

The breadth of this ongoing political emergency has led to the involvement of a variety of external actors. International assistance has been present on the ground in the Sahel since 2011, with varying aims of strengthening political institutions, establishing robust infrastructure to address environmental issues, and anti-terrorist missions attempting to prevent the spread of influence of extremist groups in the region. 17 These task forces originate from varied sources with different goals, and as such, coordination across them has been relatively difficult. Internationally, the UN has led the charge with a peacekeeping mission titled the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MUNISMA), which, as of October 2022, deploys approximately 17,000 personnel to the Sahel. 18 France, with its colonial ties to Mali, has played another large role in the international community with Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorist mission that saw approximately 4,000 troops deployed. 19 In a recent development, President Macron announced in February 2021 that France would be withdrawing their troops from Mali given a communication and cooperation breakdown between Paris and Bamako. 20 It remains unclear what the effect of this withdrawal will be, but as this decision is carried out and French troops continue to be removed from the conflict, the outcomes will begin to reveal themselves. More locally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have utilised strategic policies to promote stability in the region. These actions have been supported by the efforts of G5 Sahel, an organisation involving the leaders of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, and the G5 Sahel Force, a counterterrorism security force created by the organisation in 2017 to fight militant groups across the region. 21

It would be impossible to discuss external actors in the Sahel without acknowledging the significant role that the EU has played in the trajectory of the conflict. The attentiveness of the EU to the Sahel crisis can be traced to the fact that the region theoretically constitutes a part of the EU’s southern geopolitical border. Therefore, Europe has direct personal interest in restoring stability to the countries of the Sahel, promoting regional peace, and in turn, minimizing the migration of refugees north towards the European continent. 22 Social scientists have concluded that European involvement in the Sahel has been largely “driven by those issues that the Union sees as most relevant for itself: crime, terrorism and migration.” 23 Looking closer at the EU’s policy in this region provides interesting insight into an intersection of two pillars of Europe’s foreign policy, both in their normative responsibility to encourage peace in their political ‘neighbourhood’, as well as their desire to maintain strong border security and minimise external forces intruding on domestic European peace. Evaluating the strategic policies of the EU in the Sahel illuminates how these actions have been able to change the landscape of the current crisis, and delivers informed guidance into potential solutions that may exist for the future role of the EU in the Sahel region.

Overview of EU Policy in the Sahel

The EU involvement in the Sahel began in September 2011 when the European Union published their Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (SSDS), outlining the pillars of their aims in the region. The EU’s strategy focused on building robust “development processes” and the “promotion of good governance” as a way to tackle the region’s poverty and allow “conditions for economic opportunity and human development”. 24 However, a key conclusion outlined in the document was that this could only be achieved in a sustainable way if the weak security infrastructure of the Sahelian countries was similarly strengthened. This led to the EU adopting a “comprehensive approach,” addressing the Sahel conflict in terms of both state development and security strengthening. 25 Further, actions were undertaken by the EU following this document’s formulation. This included the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), a military training mission established in 2013 where EU forces were deployed to provide “military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities”. 26 The EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP) laid out similar goals when it was created in 2014. EUCAP aimed to assist “internal security forces in reasserting the State authority” through “improving operational efficacy, re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains, [and] reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities”. 27 These programs continue to hold significance in regard to EU foreign policy as they are repeatedly extended well past their original time frames. Most recently, in 2021, the EUCAP mission and its associated budget was extended until 2023, just under a decade from its predicted end date of 2014. 28 In April 2021, the Council of the EU also released a revised strategic policy titled the ‘EU’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel’. This updated plan of action echoed many of the goals laid out in the SSDS, concluding that the Union’s continued efforts “reflect Europe's commitment to peace, security, stabilisation and the protection of civilians in the Sahel”. 29 While similar to earlier releases, this latest strategic document provides the most current version of the EU stance on the Sahel and similarly indicates that this crisis remains a relevant topic for the Union’s position in the international community. With each of these missions, weighty goals for a peaceful solution to the Sahel conflict are outlined. However, it is important to consider the underlying EU interests built into these strategies and evaluate whether or not these grand aims are actually met.

Evaluation of EU Policy in the Sahel

The recent decade has dramatically put to test the EU’s immigration policies and willingness to accept refugees. For European policymakers, the rise of terrorist groups and violence across the Sahel from 2011 pointed to another source of displaced individuals that could potentially seek refuge in Europe or allow for the further spread of terrorism that could internally affect the European continent. 30 Despite these clear motivations for the EU to address the displacement that has accompanied the Sahel crisis, the new Integrated Strategy release refers only twice to the issue of migration. The strategic document concludes that “poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows” and that moving forward, the EU and its domestic partners in Africa must “continue to promote fruitful cooperation in the area of migration, based on the constructive partnerships established in recent years”. 31 Neither of these statements directly address the dramatic impact the migration patterns caused by conflict in the Sahel could have on the EU. However, the emphasis and effort placed into building the security capabilities of the countries in this region can be interpreted as an implicit effort by the EU to address the imagined threat of refugees. The foundations of the Union’s two main missions in the Sahel, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP), have both been structured largely towards building the capacity of state security as a method for achieving peace rather than alternative, more civilian focused strategies. In reference to the EUCAP mission, an interview conducted through the Netherlands Institute of International Relations with an unnamed EU member nation diplomat concluded that although “migration [would] not be the main issue in this cooperation, it is the main motivation for the EU”, indicating the true incentive for these security focused task forces. 32 Researchers at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs define this as an example of the EU’s “principled pragmatism” whereby the Union is able to use the normative European values of promoting democracy and peace, but in a way that allows them to promote their own interests overseas. 33

While these self-interested aims behind the EU’s actions in the Sahel are not negative in themselves, given that they represent a state-like organization acting to ensure its own interests abroad, the lack of concrete outcomes from the EU involvement indicates that this strategy may be coming at the expense of actual resolutions in the Sahel. Italian security experts Luca Raineri and Alessandro Rossi state that the EU’s focusing of funds towards strengthening border security and preventing illegal migratory flows have at times “come at the cost of ongoing and planned development activities” and similarly have “decreased the flexibility and the availability of aid funding for development cooperation”. 34 This sentiment is echoed by Erol Yayboke, Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ Project for Fragility, who argues that “hard security approaches and greater barriers to migration may stop people from migrating the way they used to, but they also push them into more dangerous irregular routes”. 35 This highlights the potential that the EU’s focus on security in the Sahel has for further endangering civilians rather than helping them to find more stability.

In tracing the outcomes of immigration away from crisis areas in Africa, previous research has concluded that overseas migration may actually be a way to promote domestic development given that the wealth accrued by these individuals can “contribute significantly to the sustenance of communities at home” through personal networks. 36 This challenges the EU’s policy of clamping down on and strengthening firm borders in the Sahel as a way to build lasting stability in the region given that more flexible approaches seem to be more effective for local civilians. If the EU was really interested in promoting peace for the Sahel perhaps they would be more open to these alternative strategies. Echoing a similar sentiment, researchers have concluded that the European “imposed criminalisation of migration” has impacted local dynamics forcing previous movement throughout the region underground, increasing the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation by criminal and terrorist networks. 37 A press release published on June 30, 2020 by the European Council stated that helping to ensure a “prosperous, peaceful and resilient Africa is an essential EU foreign policy objective”. 38 As such, the EU needs to reshape their strategy in the Sahel to reflect this aim. This does not mean that they must throw out all self-interest. But if they are to achieve these kinds of goals, they must recognise how their current methods may have effectively protected their own interests, while simultaneously continuing to fail to create meaningful change in the Sahel.

References

1 Musilli, Pietro, and Patrick Smith, “The Lawless Roads: An Overview of Turbulence Across the Sahel,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, June 10, 2013, 1.

2 Lang, Matt, Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, Routes of Crosscultural Exchange, New York: Cavendish Square, 2018, 5.

3 Ibid, 5.

4 Ibid, 80.

5 Defrance, Dimitri et al., “Consequences of Rapid Ice Sheet Melting on the Sahelian Population Vulnerability,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS 114, no. 25 (2017): 6533.

6 Defrance et al., “Consequences of Rapid Ice Sheet Melting on the Sahelian Population Vulnerability,” 6535.

7 Graves, Alisha et al., “Avert Catastrophe Now in Africa's Sahel.” Nature (London) 575, no. 7782 (2019): 282.

8 Wilén, Nina, “A Logic of Its Own: The External Presence in the Sahel,” ARI Publication, no. 132 (2020).

9 “Instability in Mali,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2022.

10 Ibid.

11 “Integration for Impact: Interpol and the G5 Sahel,” Interpol, May 2020.

12 “Instability in Mali,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2022.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid

15 Adeyemi S Badewa, and Mulugeta F Dinbabo, “Irregular Migration and Regional Security Complex in the Sahel-Lake Chad Corridor: A Human Security Discourse,” Ìrìnkèrindò, no. 12 (2021): 4.

16 United Nations, “Situation Sahel: Coordination Platform for

Forced Displacements in Sahel,” United Nations Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, September 30, 2022.

17 Bymolt, Roger, and Karlijn Muiderman, “Strategies and Initiatives for Security and Development in the Sahel,” Common Fund for Commodities, 2016, 4.

18 United Nations Peacekeeping, “MINUSMA Fact Sheet,” United Nations, Accessed October 30, 2022.

19 Doxsee, Catrina, Jared Thompson, and Marielle Harris, “The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 2, 2022.

20 Ibid.

21 “Integration for Impact: Interpol and the G5 Sahel,” Interpol, May 2020.

22 Aboulghit, Abdelkarim, “Evaluating U.S. and EU Trans Sahel Policies,” Master’s Thesis, United States Army War College (2013): 7.

23 Iso-Markku, Tuomas, and Teemu Tammikko, “The EU’s Role and Policies in the Sahel: the Need for Reassessment,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 290 (July 28, 2020): 5.

24 Council of the European Union, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, Brussels (July 23, 2011), 2.

25 Ibid, 2.

26 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/34/ CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), Brussels (December 9, 2013): 3.

27 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Luxembourg (April 15, 2014): 2.

28 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 of 7 January 2021 Amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Brussels (January 7, 2021): 1.

29 Council of the European Union, The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, Brussels (April 16, 2021): 6.

30 D'Amato, Silvia, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,” International Studies Review 23, no. 4 (2021): 1520.

31 Council of the European Union, The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, 3 & 15.

32 Van der Lijn, Jaïr, “For the Long Run: A Mapping of Migration-related Activities in the Wider Sahel Region,” Clingendael Institute Report, January 2017, 6.

33 Iso-Markku and Tammikko, “The EU’s Role and Policies in the Sahel: the Need for Reassessment,” 5.

34 Raineri, Luca, and Alessandro Rossi, “The SecurityMigration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 1, 2017, 9.

35 Yayboke, Erol, and Rakan Aboneaaj, “Peril in the Desert: Irregular Migration through the Sahel,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2020.

36 Raineri and Rossi, “The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, 7.

37 D'Amato, Silvia, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,” 1527.

38 Council of the European Union. “On the Path to a Deeper and Stronger Partnership, Living Up to the European and African Aspirations: Council Adopts Conclusions on Africa.” Council of the EU Press Release, June 30, 2020.

Maps by: An Pham