Shadows in Ukraine How War Could Strengthen

the Illicit Arms Trade

by Amy Graham edited by Emma Shapiro

As Russia ignited war in Ukraine, the world first sent outpours of solidarity; and then the world sent guns. While Putin’s campaign may have been foreseeable by world leaders, they were swift to emphasize how critical the war would be. Any collateral of this war dominates the media, ranging across the spheres of European energy security or nuclear war; the world is unwilling to let the war slip into its periphery. NATO and EU countries have remained firm that an outcome that gives rise to Russian hegemony is an outcome that threatens democracy and sovereignty worldwide. For many world leaders and decision-making bodies, military assistance to Ukraine was not a question of should we but of how much. The allied decision—both by individual nations and through affirmations by international organizations— to send weapons to Ukrainians was not as controversial as it was unprecedented. But while the consensus remains relatively clear—that Ukraine needs international help—the massive flow of arms poses an overlooked question: where might they all end up?

Recently overlooked is Ukraine’s reputation as a hub for arms trafficking and organized crime. Vladimir Putin has already cemented his position as Europe’s deadliest antagonist, but he is not the only adversary in Ukraine; the other threats simply remain out of the frame of current dialogue. Terrorists, insurgents, and other violent nonstate actors have kept the demand for weapons high, and the world’s arms support for Ukraine is increasing that supply fortuitously; but no good deed goes unpunished. If the war in Ukraine follows the pattern of recent post-conflict states, it may be poised to proliferate the market for illicit weapons regionally and worldwide.

Military Aid on Good Faith

Approximating the aid sent to Ukraine is not an exact science, and the sum dollar figure varies among sources. Additionally, countries continue to pledge new aid as the war continues, meaning that estimations change constantly. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, based in Germany, is one of the many organizations that is attempting to calculate the total and has assembled a ‘Ukraine Support Tracker’ that quantifies and categorizes international aid to Ukraine. 1 The United States remains the biggest benefactor, and as of October 11, has committed roughly $52 billion in humanitarian, financial, and military aid to Ukraine, $28 billion of the $52 billion being military aid. The runner-up, denoted as ‘EU Institutions’ by the Kiel Institute, falls about $35 billion behind the U.S., at just above $16 billion. Dissimilarly to the U.S., EU contributions consist mostly of financial aid, and only $2.5 billion of their $16 billion total is in the form of military aid. At least 28 countries have sent weapons to Ukraine, 25 of them being NATO countries. 2 For many of these nations, the most important task is maintaining Ukraine’s ability to compete with the quantity, caliber, and technology of the Russian military.

A threat more dire than exacting dollar amounts, though, is the ambiguity surrounding the transfer process in its entirety. Analysts and officials have sounded alarms about the real possibility that the weapons sent to Ukraine will fall into rogue hands. Interpol chief Jurgen Stock sees this as a certainty, having stated in June that “once the guns fall silent, the illegal weapons will come.” 3 Just under five months later, the U.S. Department of State finally addressed the concern, and on October 27, 2022, published the “US Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe.” 4 Although not the first time the US has had concerns about arms transfer to Ukraine—in the 2018 government spending bill, Congress went as far as to include an arms embargo specific to Ukraine’s far-right Azov Battalion 5—it is the most substantial. The proposal includes a three-pronged approach to mitigate the risk of arms trafficking, consisting mainly of assisting Ukrainians to account for weapons, strengthening border security, and aiding security forces in deterring, detecting, and stopping trafficking. The proposal, however, does little to reassure those assessing the risk of trafficking potential.

Among the vaguely actionable proposals includes the promise of end-use verifications, a promise made previously by a Department of State spokesperson who stated that the 2022 military aid includes signed agreements that “do not allow the retransfer of equipment to third parties without prior U.S. government authorization.” 6 This describes end-user certificates, which are included in all international arms transfers. The Department of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) is responsible for overseeing these agreements but falls short of actually stopping end-use transfers from taking place, because violations are not often followed by any sort of action. In April 2022, the U.S. violated a similar agreement when it approved a shipment of helicopters to Ukraine that were originally purchased from Russia, which included the same provision in the terms of the sale. 7 EU countries have similar provisions in place, but they face the same issues with consequences for violations: it was only in 2021 that the EU committed to—in the future—developing uniform standards for enduse monitoring with the objective of curbing arms trafficking. 8

A further shortcoming of the plan is its sole emphasis on “sensitive and advanced conventional weapons,” specifically man-portable air defense systems (such as shoulder-launched missiles, like Javelins) and anti-tank/all-purpose tactical guided missiles. 9 The plan does not, however, place any emphasis on small arms (traditionally understood as more conventional ‘guns’) which are the most easily trafficked weapons. Further assurances include the loosely defined promise to strengthen border security, which was undertaken by the EU in July when it launched a ‘support hub for internal security and border management’ in Moldova with the aim of curbing trafficking, and continuing to “scrutinize requests to transfer defense articles… to screen for parties that may pose an unacceptable risk of diversion.” 10 Still, recent U.S. efforts to enforce these initiatives have been largely unsuccessful as masses of arms have fallen into the wrong hands. Following the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, billions of dollars worth of weapons were left behind and subsequently used by the Taliban against Afghan forces. 11 The U.S. encountered the same issue in Iraq when it lost roughly 360,000 U.S.-provided small arms despite having thousands of its own troops present to avoid this very issue. 12

History of Arms Trafficking

Soviet delimitation, historical border disputes, and chaotic transitions towards independence resulted in numerous conflicts between and within former Soviet states. This flurry of conflict in the region meant that arms left behind by the Soviet Union were in high demand. Similarly, the poor quality of transition governments left states in need of economic gain by whatever means necessary. The massive stockpiles of arms were lucrative and made for relatively easy profit. 13 Between 1992 and 1998, the Ukrainian military “lost” $32 billion of military equipment: equipment that had a habit of emerging in conflicts within Africa. 14 Specifics surrounding illicit arms transfers, especially recent ones, are scarce at best. Details related to the greater arms trafficking market are difficult to pinpoint because, by nature, an illegal arms transfer is only successful when undetected. Most data relevant to the illicit arms market in Europe is revealed only when weapons have been seized, at which point authorities are able to trace them back to the country and conflict of origin.

‘A Russian Oblast called Ukraine’ is a vision either forethought or enabled by Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Crimea’s occupation did not just make way for today’s war, it was also succeeded by a civil war in the Donbas region. Donetsk and Luhansk held questionable Russian-backed referendums in which each voted to secede from Ukraine, resulting in two self-declared separatist states. 15 Armed conflict rapidly followed these results, and Ukrainian troops fought the Russian-assisted separatists. In 2015, France and Germany helped Ukraine and Russia broker a ceasefire and bring an end to the active conflict. 16 However, the separatists' proclamation of independence never came to a formal resolution, and the Donbas region remained troublesome. The illegitimacy of these states after the attempted secession created a fundamental barrier to maintaining a healthy economy and foreign investments, thus fostering an economy based largely on criminal markets. 17 Before the 2022 war in Ukraine, illicit weapons seizures allowed for approximations of trafficking routes across and out of Ukraine. Poland and Belarus emerged as common exit routes, with a notable 2,000 percent increase in seizures. 18 The Ukrainian market for illicit arms, while not the most prominent in Europe, is comparable to the much larger Balkan market, as both primarily trafficked small arms. Following several consecutive wars in the Balkans, former Yugoslavia has been traced as the source of many illicitly obtained arms. The region is often provided as a case study in the danger posed by surplus weaponry after conflict. In the past, Ukrainian illicit arms fueled conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 19 In addition to other types of trafficking and organized criminal activity, such as drugs, cigarettes, and counterfeit money, black markets have been a crutch for the Donbas’ economy. 20 The outcomes of the Russian invasion may be crucial in determining the existence of organized crime within Ukraine. Since the beginning of the invasion, the armies of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) have joined Russian troops, although seemingly to little avail. 21 Following months of failure to take full control of the separatist regions, Russia staged new illegal referendums in these areas and declared them to be under Russian control. It is unclear whether civilian opinion in the DPR and LPR reflects the results of the referendums, but Russian and separatist military authorities are known to stifle dissent and very likely coerced civilians to ensure a vote for secession. 22

Lessons from the Post-Cold War Era: Modern Conflict and Illicit Markets

The gravitation of former Soviet Union states towards conflict has remained a challenge— although a laudably consistent one—in Europe and Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. If a war in Ukraine was not indicative of declining stability in the region, then a resumption of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in NagornoKarabakh or a death toll nearing 100 after border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan certainly are. The presence of geopolitical violent conflict invites arms trafficking for two primary reasons. First, and perhaps obviously, violence requires weapons. While fighting between two legitimate governments may not require illegal arms, instability paves way for militant groups that don’t often have legitimate means of purchasing weapons. Second, the financial incentive for groups in states with troubled economies–especially those actively declining–is often hard to resist. Continued clashes in Central Asia would contribute to arms trafficking risks in Ukraine. A case study in geopolitical turmoil begetting trafficking is found in South Asia. The region is home to a major nexus of trafficking between several countries in the area, all embroiled in some type of conflict and each with a specific geographic paradigm. Trade between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, is made easy by the nations’ shared land borders, while the Bay of Bengal serves trafficking among Southeast Asian countries as well. 23 The India-Pakistan conflict, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and its spillover into Bangladesh, and spillage from Afghanistan keep the demand for weapons high in the region. 24

To draw similarities between the former Soviet Union and this model, it’s worth noting that both Armenia and Tajikistan have previously accepted ‘covert’ arms transfers from Russia to aid in Armenia’s fight against Azerbaijan and the Tajik civil war, respectively. 25 If this pattern of rising conflict continues in the region, it leaves nations vulnerable to the risks of arms trafficking. Insurgency forces or rogue actors in these nations could become potential customers for ‘leaked’ Ukrainian arms. Alternatively, the countries could serve as intermediaries along trafficking routes, as some historically have. The financial incentive for states with troubled economies–especially troubled by conflict–is often hard to resist.

Another troubling repetition of history in Ukraine is the presence of foreign fighters. The Wagner Group, a clandestine Russian private military company has recruited mercenaries from Syria and Libya to abet their war effort. 26 The Wagner Group unsurprisingly does an excellent job of obscuring its activities and understanding its nexus is a project on its own. Wagner employs a convoluted network of actors, including, but not limited to, other Russian and foreign private military/security companies, legitimate companies in related industries, and individual contractors and mercenaries – all spanning across the scale of legality and legitimacy. The Wagner Group fights far beyond Russia’s borders though. In recent years, Wagner has been quietly fueling conflict in Syria and African nations such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Libya. 27 While the group primarily provides additional manpower, private military companies are also involved in supplying weapons, very often in violation of embargoes. 28 Given Wagner’s ongoing engagements in conflicts in Africa, this poses a risk of further arms and conflict spillover. A 2022 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime details the ways in which small arms proliferation has given rise to a lucrative black arms market in Somalia, which has in turn fueled other regional conflicts, such as the Ethiopian civil war. 29 One associated organization, Russia’s (legitimate) Moran Security Company, saw nine of its guards arrested by the Nigerian government on gun-smuggling charges. 30 While these companies aren’t legally considered to be partners, lots of crossover can be found among their personnel and geographic activity.

Unfortunately, infrequent headlines about these military and security companies are typically the only concrete insight into their illicit dealings, and hard proof of their involvement in any type of organized crime is non-existent. However, even looser affiliations shed light on Russia’s otherwise opaque military-industrial complex, and many realities of Ukraine’s war suggest that to be wary of the Wagner group’s presence is not to be overly cautious. Three things should be examined as related circumstances. First, the Wagner Group is financed and armed by the Russian government, and as such is a tool for their agenda, including the promotion of their arms sales. 31 Second, Russians have been the “main vector of diversion so far.” 32 Any trafficking-related arrests while the conflict is active have mostly been—and will likely be—Russians or Russian sympathizers. 33 Third, Russia’s defense production cannot keep up with the current rate of conflict and will likely continue to struggle to supply adequate numbers of munitions. 34 These three facts contextualized against each other suggest that the idea that Wagner and Russians could play a mutually beneficial role in trafficking arms is not entirely unreasonable. Yet the density of Wagner mercenaries fighting in Ukraine is unknown, as is the ratio of Russian manufactured against illicitly supplied weapons in their armaments. But most importantly, the presence of foreign fighters is known to assist in the proliferation of arms following conflicts, and the Wagner group's global network raises concern. 35

It’s rather easy to consider warnings about arms trafficking potential only in the context of Russian false-flag operations, designed to vilify Ukraine in a desperate attempt to slow the world’s military aid. And while it is true that Russia has already attempted to convince Ukraine’s allies of manufactured examples of arms trafficking, the only prop that could bolster Russia’s disinformation campaign is the possession of actual weapons from the battlefield; a threat that the Department of State already flagged in their anti-diversion plan. 36 This example serves to underscore the most important reality: demand for trafficked weapons is virtually ubiquitous. And yet, revelations on the abundance of risk factors in Ukraine were superseded by incomprehensive preventative measures. Gaining enough knowledge on trafficking routes to significantly inhibit them or uncover them while they are in operation is incredibly difficult. An underlying theme in attempts to understand arms trafficking, though, is a proliferation of small arms and light weapons following conflict. States engaged in or recovering from conflict are in no position to take effective control over loose weapons, and this period is the opportune moment for weapons to fall into non-state hands.

While battles persist in Ukraine, and perhaps even dwindle, the massive stock of arms will still be there, and many actors stand to gain from their exploitation. While there may be recognized governments that seek to profit off of or obtain illegally sourced weapons, such as Russia, the greater threat is in organizations that are more difficult to see. The relative carelessness of status quo arms transfer procedures is staging

Europe for an explosion of new weapons entering the black market, and end-use agreements will not stop unlawful actors from seeking out a profit. Of course, a flawless approach towards mitigating this risk is unrealistic, but continuing the U.S.’s approaches ought to adapt from previous failed protocols in past conflicts and move to trying future mitigation strategies. An honest assessment recognizes that Ukraine’s collateral violence would insignificantly affect the United States, but greater stability, especially in Europe, is desirable for any well-intentioned nation. An explosion of small arms across Europe, Asia, and Africa could disrupt any fragile balances and exacerbate any existing conflicts. Sympathy for a war-torn nation’s plight is admirable, but forethought extending beyond the timeframe of an active war is a responsible foreign policy.

References

1 Katelyn Bushnell et al. “Ukraine Support Tracker,” IFW, Kiel Institute for World Economy, last modified October 11, 2021, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukrainesupport-tracker/

2 Hanna Duggal and Marium Ali, “What weapons has Ukraine received from the US and allies?” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media Network, June 15, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/6/15/infographic-what-weapons-has-ukrainereceived-from-the-us-and-al

3 Kim Willsher, “Arms sent to Ukraine will end up in criminal hands, says Interpol chief,” The Guardian, Guardian News & Media Limited, June 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-handssays-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

4 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/

5 Congress.gov, "Text - H.R.2471 - 117th Congress (20212022): Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022," March 15, 2022, pp. 136, sec. 8141, http://www.congress.gov/

6 John Hudson, “Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling,” The Washington Post, The Washington Post, May 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/

7 Ibid.

8 “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/28,” Office Journal of the European Union, January 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0038&from=EN

9 B “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/28,” Office Journal of the European Union, January 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0038&from=EN ureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https://www.state. gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certain-advancedconventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/

10 “Informal Home Affairs Council: EU launches the Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova,” European Commission, European Union, July 11, 2022, https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4462

11 Jack Detsch, “The U.S. Left Billions Worth of Weapons in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, The Slate Group, April 28, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/28/the-u-s-left-billionsworth-of-weapons-in-afghanistan/

12 A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Cato, Cato Institute, March 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/policyanalysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy?TB_ iframe=true&height=658.8&width=370.8

13 Berryman, J. "Russia and the Illicit Arms Trade." Crime, Law, and Social Change 33, no. 1-2 (2000): 85-104. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-94-015-9335-9_3

14 Rachel Stohl and Elias Yousif, “The Risks of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine,” Stimson, The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 13, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-risks-of-u-smilitary-assistance-to-ukraine/

15 Shaun Walker, Oksana Grytsenko, and Howard Amos, “Ukraine: pro-Russia separatists set for victory in eastern region referendum,” The Guardian, Guardian News & Media Limited, May 12, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk

16 “Conflict in Ukraine,” CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 20, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/globalconflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine

17 Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti, “Rebellion as Racket: Crime and the Donbas conflict, 2014-2022,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Global Initiative, July 11, 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2022/07/GITOC-Donbas-Rebellion-as-racket.pdf 18 Ibid

19 Rachel Stohl and Elias Yousif, “The Risks of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine,” Stimson, The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 13, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-risks-of-u-smilitary-assistance-to-ukraine/ 20 Ibid

21 David Axe, “In 100 Days, a Separatist Army in Ukraine Lost Half Its Troops,” Forbes, Forbes Media, June 13, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/06/13/aseparatist-army-in-ukraine-lost-half-its-troops-in-100days/?sh=545e436a3dbe

22 Pavel Polityuk, “Russia holds annexation votes; Ukraine says residents coerced,” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, September 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainemarches-farther-into-liberated-lands-separatist-calls-urgentreferendum-2022-09-19/

23 Mohammed Sinan Siyech (2022) Arms Smuggling in India: Exploring Links between Crime and Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 45:5-6, 445-462, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678875

24 Reinier Bergema, Tanya Mehra, and Meryle Demuynck, “The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance,” ICCT, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, September 28, 2020, https://icct. nl/app/uploads/2020/09/SALW-Synthesis-Report.pdf

25 Berryman, J. "Russia and the Illicit Arms Trade." Crime, Law, and Social Change 33, no. 1-2 (2000): 85-104. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-94-015-9335-9_3

26 Tanya Mehra and Abigail Thorley, “Foreign Fighters, Foreign Volunteers and Mercenaries in the Ukrainian Armed Conflict,” ICCT, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, July 11, 2022, https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters- volunteers-mercenaries-in-ukraine/

27 Declan Walsh, “Putin’s shadow soldiers: how the Wagner group is expanding in Africa,” New York Times, The New York Times Company, May 31, 2022, https://www.nytimes. com/2022/05/31/world/africa/wagner-group-africa.html

28 Damien Lilly et al., “Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Acts,” Biting the Bullet Briefing 10, International Alert and Saferworld, 2001, https://gsdrc.org/document-library/private-militarycompanies-and-the-proliferation-of-small-arms-regulating-theactors/

29 Jay Badhadur, “The Price of Civil War: A survey of Somalia’s Arms Markets,” Global Initiative, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 19, 2022, https:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Price-of-civilwar-13.04-web.pdf

30 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2018): 181-204. https://doi.org/10.1080/106058 6X.2019.1591142

31 Candace Rondeaux, “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,” New America, Arizona State University Center on the Future of War, November 5, 2019, https://efile. fara.gov/docs/6170-Informational-Materials-20200227-287. pdf

32 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/

33 Lara Jakes and John Ismay, “U.S. Program Aims to Keep Sensitive Weapons in Ukraine,” New York Times, New York Times, The New York Times Company, October 27, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/us/politics/weapons-aidukraine-russia.html

34 Eric Tegler, “A New Kremlin ‘Committee’ Won’t Accelerate Production of Weapons for Russian Troops in Ukraine,” Forbes, Forbes Media, October 26, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/ sites/erictegler/2022/10/26/a-new-kremlin-committee-wontaccelerate-production-and-delivery-of-weapons-for-russiantroops-in-ukraine/?sh=35150ae54ef3

35 Kerry Chavez and Ori Swed, “Weak states and loose arms: lessons and warnings, from Afghanistan to Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, Metamorphic Media, https://warontherocks. com/2022/07/weak-states-and-loose-arms-lessons-andwarnings-from-libya-to-ukraine/

36 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/