REGION The Creeping Arm of Populism in Italy

by Erica MacDonald edited by Andrea Gomez-Watson

Italy just elected its most far-right Prime Minister since Mussolini, and the global news cycle is spinning with concerns about parallels and accusations about the neo-fascism. These fears have been lurking for years, especially with populist parties starting to poll with significantly higher numbers. With populism on the rise across Europe and the United States, centrists and leftists are more apprehensive than ever about far-right stances and the politicians that champion them. Giorgia Meloni and her campaign in Italy are prime examples of the new age of far-right politics. Will she take after Mussolini, lean more Trumpian, or neither? Meloni’s brand of populism feeds off existing discontent among the Old Guard of Italy—calling forward traditional and regional ideals to blockade internationalist progressive politics. Populism’s roots in Italy span decades, and the progression of its popularity can be somewhat linearly tracked. For the purposes of investigating the modern iteration of Italian populism, most academics start at the fall of the Berlin Wall and the genesis of the Italian Second Republic in the 90s. This marked a shift from ideological based politics to a gradual refocusing on “issue-oriented” politics. 1 Voters associated themselves less with a strict political identity and more with a stance on a topic; their opinion varied play-by-play. This often goes hand-in-hand with the personalization of politics, where individual politicians associate themselves strongly with certain viewpoints, and thus become widely associated with them. If the politician becomes a conduit between the voter and their goal, they can become inseparable from the movement itself. This personalization works particularly well in populism because the foundation of populism is an “us” (the underrepresented general public) versus “them” (the corrupt, bureaucratic elite), with the populist politician serving as a political Robin Hood. 2 This dynamic is even easier to foster in Italy, where only five out of 16 government coalitions since 1994 have been recipients of the majority vote in elections, and the image of a disingenuous, self-interested elite political class thrives. 3 With these factors, it’s not surprising that Italy has the predisposition to favor populist movements in recent years. The people feel their values aren’t reflected in their politics.

“Italy and Italians first!” promises new Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. 4 Her words are steeped in populist sentiment but have even darker implications for some Italian residents. Meloni runs her political platform as an advocate for native Italians and ultraconservative agendas. Looking at her career, this dual-pronged approach is unsurprising. At just fifteen years old, Meloni joined the youth wing of the Italian Social Movement party, which has been hailed as neofascist, nationalist, and nationalist-conservative— all of which aligns with her current public stances. 5 She has led far-right movements for decades, was elected to the Italian Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies in 2006, and by 2008, became Italy’s youngest minister. 6 Her position as Youth Minister was engineered that very same year by Berlusconi’s government. 7 Her trajectory only grew, with her Brothers of Italy party gaining larger percentages at each poll, especially once they became the only opposition to Draghi’s coalition government. Some suggest that it was the novelty of her as the opposition to a disliked government that landed her this election, not resolute support for her party personally. 8 Yet, even if she was elected for her contrarian policies to Draghi, Meloni’s “Italians first” has a broad, but divisive appeal. Meloni co-founded Brothers of Italy, which stands on the pillars of national conservatism, nativism, Euroscepticism, and opposition to immigration. The party aims for less European bureaucracy, low taxes, and a halt to immigration, as well as the opportunity to renegotiate EU treaties. 9 Meloni has yet to outline the specific nature of her objections to the EU, and the ambiguity has Europeans wary. 10 However, there are positions that Meloni has made startlingly clear. Meloni was quoted from her speech to a far-right Spanish party, outlining her stances as such: "Yes to the natural family, no to the LGBT lobby, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology... no to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration... no to big international finance... no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!" 11 These stances are aligned with familiar conservatism trends we see in the United States and across Europe. Her talk of borders and anti-immigration is certainly reminiscent of Trump. But most of all, in one sentence, Meloni invalidated the idea of a diverse Italy. Meloni, and her party, have made it clear they want their Italy their way: homogenous and anti-pluralist. With the recent election, Brothers of Italy is now the majority party, and its ideals will undoubtedly form the political climate of Italy while it’s in power, raising red flags for many in the international community. In the wake of Meloni’s election, France’s Prime Minister, Elisabeth Borne, notably said Europe must be watchful and careful that states continue to respect human rights, including abortion access. 12

In Italy itself, those who belong to atrisk communities are more concerned than the general Italian population. Predominantly, this includes immigrants, members of the LGBTQ+ community, religious minorities, etc.—all of whom are more likely to face discrimination and feel the ramifications of bad policy. Statements made in the wake of her election by minority group members tend to express wariness, as they wait for the breadth of her discriminatory stances to be made apparent in law. Human Rights Watch has even identified some of her rhetoric as a potential challenge to human rights. 13 Italian Jews, many of whom fear the fascist political legacy of parties like the Brothers of Italy, have adopted a “wait and worry” approach regarding Meloni’s policy. 14 According to former board member of the Jewish community of Milan, Stefano Jesurum, “some Italian Jews are willing to overlook the fact that far-right leaders are ‘intrinsically fascist,’ focusing on their parties’ championing of Israel.” 15 In this way, populist leaders like Meloni sometimes tamper down outrage across their constituencies—by appealing to specific issues that garner support, but don’t necessarily reflect the general leaning of their stances. The Italian Jewish community is not the only community unwilling to outright condemn Meloni’s party. Some in the international relations sphere caveat the neo-fascist rumors by offering Meloni’s pro-Ukrainian and pro-NATO stance as ideological proof that she is unlike other neofascist and populist parties abroad. Meloni herself utilizes this stance to deter fascist and authoritarian comparisons, particularly when compared to Mussolini, Hitler, and Putin. 16 But suffice to say, one deviation from the party line does not bolster that much confidence.

Perhaps the line Meloni is most famous for is “I am Giorgia, I’m a woman, I’m a mother… I’m Christian.” 17 This line delivered at a rally became somewhat of a meme in Italy; a sound bite was created with a techno beat and her words overlayed. It may have been a joke back then—but the reality is quite serious now. Meloni’s rhetoric here appealed to a larger audience than the younger generation that was turning her line into an amusing audio clip. Her words appeal to the older Italian voters that strongly prioritize a sense of Italian identity. Meloni’s statement creates distinct self-identifiers that are very traditional and quite aligned with Italian values that have often reigned supreme during conservative, populist, or even fascist eras. Her statement reinvigorates labels that Italian nationalists perceive as “lost” to the “bland, unisex form of identity” that is advanced by the European Union. 18 Meloni, with her viral phrase, asserted that she stands for all those traditional principles—including a nationalistic outlook—a win for the Eurosceptics.

Meloni is not just her words; she has enumerated plans that bolster her traditional principles. She published a program consisting of 25 points that outlined her party’s initiatives. One very prominent feature is her plan to boost Italy’s fertility rate. 19 As seen in other European nations like Germany, falling birth rates can, over time, skew the old-age-dependency ratio. This means the population that is over 65 is unequally supported by a shrinking younger generation. This can cause major issues within the welfare system, and eventually, spell disaster for the workforce. There is no debate that a falling birth rate can cause a country some real complications, but Meloni is keen to address it from the angle of a politician, not with her experience, knowledge, or potential empathy as a woman. Her parenting plan incentivizes and rewards families having children, even including monthly bonuses for parents of children under six. 20 This platform had great success for Meloni, but it seems to be more about populist politics than supporting women in the workforce having children. According to some Italian women, Meloni’s views on the traditional family may actually contradict the advancement of women’s rights. 21 Meloni has made it clear that she is not a feminist 22. Her stances on Italian abortion laws are vague and undefined but have caused concern amongst women about maintaining accessibility to safe, legal abortions. In a much more defined stance, Meloni has said she is against the so-called ‘pink’ quotas in the workforce. 23 She does not believe in the Italian government’s diversity initiatives for women, citing herself as evidence that there is no disparity anymore. 24 Meloni’s populism is anti-feminist enough that areas where Italy has lagged behind its European neighbors (women in the workforce, female CEOs, women with economic independence) are likely to remain stagnant, and in the worst case scenario, Italy could be subject to a regression of women’s rights. 25

Another one of Meloni’s identity platforms is her nationalism, which often teeters over the edge to xenophobia. The Brothers of Italy have promoted policies that are undoubtedly discriminatory. They want “Muslim religious services to be conducted in Italian not Arabic, and to limit the number of foreign pupils in schoolrooms.” 26 Meloni has taken numerous hard-line stances against immigrants and anyone outside what she deems the Italian ideal. Yet another of her slogans has sparked great controversy: “Dio, Patria. Famiglia” or God, Homeland, Family. 27 The language is evocative of one of Mussolini’s slogans—a fact not unremarked upon by those who worry about Meloni’s potential neo-fascist leanings. 28 But the slogan itself aside, the ideals it promotes are a threat. Meloni, and the Brothers of Italy, have been quite vocal on who does and does not fall into the acceptable bounds of “Dio, Patria. Famiglia.” According to Italian author and essayist Roberto Saviano, Meloni’s is pushing a conservative and discriminatory agenda: “God, for her, does not seem to represent faith, but rather a brand of Catholicism imposed as the only religion worthy of rights. The homeland’s borders must be defended, with violence if necessary, and the family is not the cradle of affection, but of imposition, obligation, and prescription. The family is always heterosexual, its children born and recognised in the imposed form.” 29 This is not a progressive Italy, a European Italy, a diverse Italy. It is a nationalist Italy that is beginning to resemble its EU counterparts—like Hungary—facing democratic back-sliding. Many fear Meloni will go the way of Victor Orban in Hungary, but such fears have been tempered by Italy’s position in the European Union, and Meloni’s apparent strength in supporting Ukraine, as previously mentioned. Meloni has declared that her government will be both proNATO and a part of Europe. 30 Time will tell if that is a mere placation rather than a good omen. Italy’s election of Giorgia Meloni packs a punch. Although unsurprising, as the strength of populism in Italy has been growing for years, the election still rocks the boat of what the world has come to consider European democracy. Nationalist initiatives that impede European integration will always alarm those working towards a deeper, wider EU. There is a whirlwind of fears surrounding Meloni—many of them legitimate—but the initial outrage over her election may have focused too heavily on neo-fascism and neglected the very real implications of right-wing populism itself. Meloni doesn’t have to be the next fascist Mussolini to incur damage, being an anti-democratic like Trump will suffice in regressing Italy’s policies. With her ultraconservative ideals, hard-line approach regarding immigrants, and limited definition of ‘Italy’ whilst championing “Italy and Italians first!”—there’s plenty to be concerned about all on her own. 31 Even if her plans can’t progress too far due the oversight of Brussels and the multi-party nature of Italian politics, Meloni has the potential to grow her platform and change the political geography of Italy, pushing it once again into the arms of the far right.

References

1 Chiapponi, Flavio. “The Main Roots of Italian Populism.” TruLies Europe, The Institute for European Politics, Berlin, http://trulies-europe.de/?p=611.

2 “Populism.” ECPS, European Center for Populism Studies, 28 Dec. 2020, https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/ populism/.

3 Chiapponi, Flavio.

4 Riegert, Benrd. “Italy Election: Who Is Giorgia Meloni, the Star of the Far Right?: DW: 26.09.2022.” DW.COM, Deutsche Welle , 26 Sept. 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/italy-electionwho-is-giorgia-meloni-the-star-of-the-far-right/a-62604896.

5 Riegert, Benrd.

6 Riegert, Benrd.

7 “Italian PM Launches Strategic Guidebook to Support Youth.” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/516074. shtml.

8 Mounk, Yascha. “Italians Didn't Exactly Vote for Fascism.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 26 Sept. 2022, https:// www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/italy-election-farright-winner-giorgia-meloni-fascism/671556/.

9 Riegert, Benrd.

10 Wintour, Patrick. “EU Holds Its Breath as It Waits to Discover Giorgia Meloni's True Political Identity.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 26 Sept. 2022, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/26/eu-giorgia-melonitrue-political-identity-italy-elections-far-right.

11 Kirby, Paul. “Giorgia Meloni: Italy's Far-Right Wins Election and Vows to Govern for All.” BBC News, BBC, 26 Sept. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63029909.

12 “How Are European Politicians Reacting to Italy's Election Result?” Euronews, 27 Sept. 2022, https://www.euronews.com/ my-europe/2022/09/26/how-are-european-politicians-reactingto-italys-election-result.

13 Tranchina, Giulia. “The New Italian Government Poses a Human Rights Challenge.” Human Rights Watch, 29 Sept. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/28/new-italiangovernment-poses-human-rights-challenge.

14 Somekh, Simone, et al. “Italian Jews Worry and Wait as Giorgia Meloni, Far-Right Leader, Prepares to Take Power.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 30 Sept. 2022, https://www.jta. org/2022/09/30/global/italian-jews-worry-and-wait-as-giorgiameloni-far-right-leader-prepares-to-take-power.

15 Somekh, Simone, et al.

16 Riegert, Benrd.

17 Chotiner, Isaac. “‘I'm a Woman, I'm a Mother, I'm Christian’: How Giorgia Meloni Took Control in the Italian Election.” The New Yorker, 28 Sept. 2022, https://www. newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/im-a-woman-im-a-motherim-christian-how-giorgia-meloni-took-control-in-the-italianelection.

18 Chotiner, Isaac.

19 Binnie, Isla. “Leading Lady of Italy's Right Campaigns for A Baby Boom.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 31 Jan. 2018, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-election-meloni/leading-ladyof-italys-right-campaigns-for-a-baby-boom-idUSKBN1FK21S.

20 Binnie, Isla.

21 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani. “Giorgia Meloni Could Be the First Woman to Lead Italy. Not All Women Are Happy.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Sept. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/world/europe/ giorgia-meloni-italy-women.html.

22 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.

23 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.

24 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.

25 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.

26 Binnie, Isla.

27 Saviano, Roberto. “Giorgia Meloni Is a Danger to Italy and the Rest of Europe .” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 24 Sept. 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ commentisfree/2022/sep/24/giorgia-meloni-is-a-danger-toitaly-and-the-rest-of-europe-far-right.

28 Saviano, Roberto.

29 Saviano, Roberto.

30 Amante, Angelo, and Crispian Balmer. “New Italy Government Will Be pro-NATO, pro-Europe, Says Meloni.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 19 Oct. 2022, https://www.reuters. com/world/europe/new-italy-government-wont-be-the-weaklink-west-says-meloni-2022-10-19/.

31 Riegert, Benrd.