ASIA A New Global Nuclear Triad Chinese Nuclear Forces in the 21st Century

by Joseph Su

edited by James Rhee

For the past decade, China has been the United States’ primary competitor in the 21st century in all political and economic aspects. While discussions of economic interdependence, shifting global political power dynamics, and conventional warfare in the Pacific over Taiwan and the South China Sea have dominated the public eye, relatively few outside of relevant fields have paid attention to a growing nuclear arsenal which may upset 80 years of a delicate nuclear balancing act.

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

The largest branch of China’s nuclear forces is the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, which controls land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This force controls roughly 200 to 250 warheads, two-thirds of which are capable of reaching the contiguous U.S. The remaining nuclear forces are intermediate to short-range, which are meant for conflict closer to the mainland and deterrence missions amongst regional nuclear powers.

China’s nuclear force capable of reaching the continental United States consists of 20 silobased Dongfeng-5B/C ICBM’s (DF-5B/C) and 72 road-mobile Dongfeng-31A/AG (DF-31A/AG). 12 These are long-range ballistic missiles which act as China’s current land based nuclear deterrent. While the DF-5 is a capable delivery vehicle, it is an outdated system, introduced in 1981, requiring extensive fueling times. In comparison, China’s newer solid fueled missiles require no fueling and less maintenance allowing for a quicker response time in the event of nuclear attack and matching U.S. and Russian counterparts. However, both of these weapons hold a strategic advantage over their U.S. counterparts. Due to the New START treaty signed in 2011, the U.S. has decided not to retain Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capabilities on its ICBM force, due to numerical limitations and strategic needs. 3 MIRVs are either multiple nuclear warheads on one missile or a singular warhead with fake warheads acting as decoy projectiles to confuse defense systems. Washington opted to retain MIRV capability on its submarine force and allow a larger sea-based force in turn so as to not exceed the numerical limitations agreed upon this treaty. 4

Aside from modernizing its re-entry vehicles, land-based nuclear missiles have also been proliferated by China, in an effort to increase the size of its arsenal. Beginning in 2019 5 and in 2021 respectively, China started manufacturing new, modernized ICBMs and rapidly constructing new silo sites to raise total force numbers. China is currently constructing three new missile fields and a training site, which include 300 new silos for the new Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) near Yumen, Hami, and Ordos, in Northern China. 67 These silos alone nearly triple the size of China’s land based nuclear forces and bring them much closer to parity with the United State’s 450 deployed/non deployed ICBM force. 8 Additionally, DF-41 road mobile launchers will be slowly rolled out to operational brigades to replace older systems. 9 The DF-41, unveiled in 2019 is China’s third-generation ICBM program meant to replace aging DF-5s and older DF-31s. The DF-41 boasts an increased range of up to 15,000km and an increased nuclear weapons payload. China is clearly seeking parity or to exceed the U.S. land based nuclear force and are on track to do so. Similar to the U.S. force, ICBMs are a critical aspect of China’s nuclear mission and would assure that any ‘first strike’ would have to sink a significant nuclear force to eliminate them, leaving other areas protected. Furthermore, their geographic location lends itself well to further harden them against strike. These silos are located in the Northwestern deserts of China, removed from the range of regional cruise missiles and far away from the heavily populated Pacific coast of China. The U.S. operates their nuclear forces in a similar manner. U.S. ICBM bases are located in North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana, insulated within the North American continent and far from population centers.

An ICBM force of this size is not a minimum deterrent; it is a drastic shift in policy which departs from 60 years of policy as China seeks to upend the balance of power and the international order.

People's Liberation Army Navy

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has historically been the smallest and tightest controlled branch of China’s nuclear forces. However, in recent years, their rapid development has marked a staunch departure from their historical role. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has launched and operates six Type-94 nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) since their satellite spotting in late 2006 which are responsible for carrying China’s nuclear force at sea. However, “The Office of Naval Intelligence reports that it is likely that at least five Type-94 submarines are necessary to maintain a continuous peacetime presence, which falls in line with the generally accepted four submarines for one at sea ratio meaning China likely is only capable of deploying one to two submarines at a time. These submarines are China’s small sea-based deterrent force however they are outdated and are plagued by geographical and technological challenges. While stable platforms, the Type-94 submarines are reported to be thre-times as loud as US submarines constructed in 1989. This presents a major challenge for China’s sea-based nuclear force. The SSBN's primary advantage is being as undetectable as possible to guarantee a retaliatory nuclear strike. Given China’s geography, these submarines would have to pass by Western-friendly nations risking detection as they pass. Furthermore, these submarines are equipped with 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles with a debated range of 7,000-9,000km. With these ranges, Chinese submarines are not capable of reaching the contiguous U.S. from Chinese waters and are still limited by their technical setbacks. However, in 2020, construction likely began on China’s third-generation SSBN class, the Type-96. While not much is known about the specifications of the Type-96, it assuredly makes leaps to address the previous limitations of the Type-94 and would give China a much more capable and survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent. The DOD projects that China could have eight SSBNs in operation by 2030, bringing that number much closer to the U.S. number of 14. The Type-96 will also carry a next-generation ballistic missile with greater range and survivability. The sea-based nuclear force remains the most survivable, most forward deployable, and most lethal. A growing SSBN force represents a major shift from a policy of minimum deterrence to forward deployed nuclear weapons and a desire to project the pinnacle of military power in support of its political aspirations.

People's Liberation Army Air Force

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force

(PLAAF) is the newest and smallest nuclear force amongst the three service branches with a nuclear mission. Revealed in 2019, the PLAAF operates a small force of modernized soviet-era H-6N bombers capable of aerial refueling, long-range strike, and are nuclear mission capable. 10 This new long-range bomber is capable of carrying a modified DF-21 air-launched ballistic missile with a 2,000 km range. 11 While the H-6N would have to fly across the Pacific and past Hawaii to reach the West coast of the continental United States, as well as avoid detection, it does signal a significant development and provide China with a globalstrike capability as well as complete its burgeoning nuclear triad.

The most significant of all though is China’s development and future fielding of the H-20 bomber. 12 Since 1997 with the introduction of the B-2 Spirit, the U.S. has retained a monopoly on flying-wing, stealth, heavy bombers. These bombers are capable of carrying large payloads deep into hostile territory due to their advanced stealth designs to strike strategic targets. Most notably when B-2’s flew over 44-consecutive hours to Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks. 13 The H-20 is China’s version of this capability. A long-range stealth bomber is a massive leap into the 21st century for China’s military clearly aiming for parity with the United States. While this new bomber has yet to be fully analyzed, and given China’s longstanding history of IP theft and failure to replicate and match American aircraft technology, China’s third leg of its nuclear triad represents a significant departure from homeland defense to power projection abroad. 1415 16

For almost 80 years, the Soviet Union, then Russia, and the United States have had a duopoly on a nuclear force of this scale and crafted a delicate, yet relatively stable relationship in the nuclear world. Arms limitations have brought down respective arsenals by over 80 percent each from their respective peaks at the height of the Cold War. However, China has refused to engage in the international scene and maintained a tight veil over its nuclear weapons, drastically raising the chance for miscalculation and misunderstanding in times of peace which inevitably leads to increased chances of the gravest situation in a potential war. This is not something to be taken lightly. Under the current U.S.-Russian arms agreements, there are mutual verifications and inspections alongside direct lines of communication which are wellestablished and maintain clarity within the realm of the highest consequences. As of now, China has no such procedures and has not entered into dialogue with the United States. In a world where two global superpowers are the future, without communication between them, the challenges become ever so vast. It is clear that China views generating a larger nuclear force as a way to maintain and enable future international priorities from a position of strength and ensure a higher barrier of entry for those who seek to challenge China in the future. While many scholars argue that any nuclear capabilities above ensuring a second strike are excessive, policymakers and military leaders have historically disagreed. A larger nuclear force inherently enables leverage in times of crisis, coercion in times of peace, and a higher cost of war for opponents. Furthermore, China’s nuclear developments are drastic shifts that do not align with its historical minimum deterrence policy. Modernizing its existing force is one thing, nuclear power projection abroad is another. Nuclear weapons are the pinnacle of military strength and carry exclusive privileges when leveraging them in the global political scene. The examples in recent years are all too present. Russia has repeatedly made reckless nuclear threats to restrain NATO and the US in the Russian-Ukrainian War, North Korea has a history of using its nuclear weapons program as a sanctions relief tool, and Iran has done the same all unified through a shared belief that nuclear weapons act as a protective measure against perceived blackmail by the West. For the most part, it has worked. The U.S. is restrained to certain types of aid in Ukraine, North Korea still has its weapons program, and the 2015 JCPOA has fallen apart with talks stalled.

However, China is the only nation that can truly present a sustained and realistic challenge to the United States across all fronts. With nuclear backing, China can make more aggressive foreign policy goals from a stronger position. This is especially concerning as then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley believes China could have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027, while a more concerned Admiral Davidson believes an intent to attack by then. China is constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and building military installations on them, laying claim, and militarizing international waters. This buildup has massive consequences for American foreign policy in the Pacific. If a conflict arose in the Pacific, would the U.S. be willing to trade cities like Los Angeles or New York for Tokyo or Sydney? An ever-growing and hawkish China may very well present this very dilemma in the future and seek to erode confidence in the United States’ nuclear protection of its allies in both East Asia and in Europe. In the international political scene, the United States has wielded its military and its guarantees to sway allies and build an alliance network unparalleled in history: will China be able to do the same? Combined with China’s economic and political strength, this nuclear buildup is only one small part of a growing challenge in the Pacific and it comes at a time when America has suffered a turbulent period domestically and internationally. With its own alliances frayed and forced to meet challenges across the globe, the U.S. is at a critical point. With these forces, China is one step closer to parity and its goals of upending the longstanding American-led global order.

References

1 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2020) Chinese nuclear forces, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:6, 443-457, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432

2 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2020) Chinese nuclear forces, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:6, 443-457, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.

3 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S-RUS, Apr. 10 2010

4 Ibid, 2

5 Missile Defense Project, "DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, last modified July 31, 2021

6 Korda, Matt, and Hans Kristensen. “China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field.” Federation Of American Scientists, July 26, 2021.

7 Korda, Matt, and Hans Kristensen. “A Closer Look at China’s Missile Silo Construction.” Federation of American Scientists, November 2, 2021.

8 Bugos, Shannon. “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START.” Arms Control Association, April 2022.

9 Ibid, 10

10 Ibid, 3

11 Missile Defense Project, "DF-21 (CSS-5)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2016, last modified March 28, 2022

12 Ibid, 3

13 Haulman, Daniel L. “44 Hours.” Air and Space Forces Magazine, January 2017

14 “Chinese National Admits to Stealing Sensitive Military Program Documents From United Technologies.” The United States Department of Justice, December 19, 2016.

15 “Jury Convicts Chinese National in Aviation Espionage Case.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, November 5, 2021.

16 Kidwell, Deborah. “Cyber Espionage for the Chinese Government.” Cyber espionage for the Chinese government > Office of Special Investigations > Display, September 17, 2017.