Ramifications of the Yazidi Genocide: Sexual Slavery, Forced Displacement, and Identity Erosion

by Charlotte Stant edited by Gideon Gordon, Keegan Mitsuoka and Ava Rheeve

In August 2014, the Yazidi population, an ethno-religious minority group indigenous to the Northern Sengal (‘Sinjar’ in Arabic) Mountain Region of Iraq, experienced insurmountable change and collective trauma. On the morning of August 3rd, members of the Islamic State, a global terrorist organization concentrated primarily in Iraq and Syria, seized control of Sengal, deploying truckloads of IS militants, who would subsequently launch a violent genocide campaign against the Yazidis. 1

During the Yazidi genocide, men, women, and children were forcibly separated from their families. Men and boys over the age of six were required to convert to Islam and join the Islamic State as military fighters, 2 while women and young girls, also subjected to forced conversion, were captured as hostages and sold into sex slavery, after which they would be trafficked across the Middle East. 3 Many Yazidis attempted escape by migrating up the mountain only to become trapped, facing starvation, dehydration, and inevitable capture. 4 Seven years after the genocide, an estimated 3,000 captured Yazidis were still missing in 2021. 5

The origins of the Islamic State, previously known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL, trace back to the early 2000s and are rooted in another terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda. 6 IS’ founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had been a member of Al-Qaeda, but eventually broke away from the group to set up an Islamic ‘caliphate,’ an objective IS has held ever since. The formation of a caliphate would entail a united sovereign state governed by a single Islamic ruler. 7 The Islamic State’s extremist ‘jihadist’ ideology promotes violence as the primary mechanism to achieve political, religious, and territorial ambitions. 8 As the group began to conquer territory in Iraq and Syria, IS’ intolerance toward any individual not considered a ‘true’ Muslim according to its criteria created an environment in which the Yazidi population signified an obstacle to IS’ pursuit of religious homogeneity and, thus, an immediate target for territorial conquest and subjugation. 9

One of the most tragic instances of violence targeted against the Yazidi population is the rape, sexual torture, and enslavement of Yazidi women captured by IS during the genocide. Personal accounts from survivors revealing the level of organization in their transport and containment methods suggest that IS likely premeditated the sexual enslavement of Yazidi women prior to the attack in August. 10 In describing their experience, the majority of victims have maintained that the facilities they were initially brought to had been thoroughly prepared to hold prisoners. 11 Others recounted the transportation mechanisms following their ini - tial capture: women were forced into large white vans with no windows, ensuring invisibility on the journey. 12 IS’ meticulous planning suggests that the purposes of the Yazidi genocide were not limited to achieving territorial gains in Iraq, but included the additional goal of forcing Yazidi women into the market for sexually enslaved women.

Yazidism: Religious Background

The Islamic State’s atrocities against the Yazidi population are rooted in religious misconceptions and historical tensions in Iraq between Islam and Yazidism, the Yazidi belief system. With around 550,000 followers worldwide (predominantly located in Iraq, Turkey, and Northern Syria 13), Yazidism boasts origins as early as the twelfth century and is thereby considered one of the oldest religions in the world. 14 Dating back to the sixteenth century, when the region was governed under Ottoman rule the persecution of Yazidi people is largely attributed to their worship of the first of seven sacred angels, Taus Malik. According to Yazidi beliefs, Taus Malik fell from the sky and now resides under Mount Sengal, amplifying the spiritual significance of this mountain to the Yazidi population. 15 16 However, this ‘fallen angel’ is interpreted as Satan or the Devil by many monotheistic religions, 17 and the subsequent misinterpretation of the Yazidis as ‘devil worshippers' has isolated the population and subjected them to centuries of faith-based violence. More recently, in the 1970s, the Iraqi government attempted to expel the Yazidi community from the country by forcing them to migrate away from their ethnic homeland. 18 Scholar Majid Hassan Ali explains how in some cases, non-Yazidis were explicitly encouraged to settle in or around Yazidi villages with the aim of subjecting them to religious violence. 19

In June 2014, two months prior to the Yazidi Genocide, the Islamic State had captured Mosul, Iraq, and was continuing their territorial conquest eastward towards Mount Sengal. 20 As IS moved into the region, they were met with little military resistance. 21 By August of that year, the only defensive force left in Northern Iraq was the Kurdish Government force known as the Peshmerga. 22 The Sengal region is classified as disputed territory by the Iraqi Constitution, and although the area is considered a part of the Niwea Providence, the Kurdish Regional Government had controlled it from 2003 until the summer of 2014. 23 Eventually, and for reasons still unknown today, the Peshmerga deserted their military outposts, leaving the Yazidi population unaware of the incoming attacks and without a safe evacuation route. 24 This rendered the Yazidis completely defenseless in the face of IS’ invasion. 25 Peter Nicolaus and Serkan Yuce have theorized that the Kurdish military forces strategically allowed the Islamic State to invade Sengal in hopes of reconquering the Yazidi held territory after a possible IS defeat down the line. 26 The Peshmerga’s assumed desire for territory likely stems from the large population of Kurdish people inhabiting the area near and around the town of Sengal in Northern Iraq. 27

Ultimately, the Peshmerga’s abandonment had cataclysmic consequences for the Yazidi population and directly threatened the relatively peaceful relations the Yazidis had held previously with their surrounding neighbors. 28 For example, in accordance with Yazidi tradition, the father of a family unit is responsible for selecting a male non-relative as the kefir (or ‘blood brother’) of their son. 29 This process occurs when a young male undergoes circumcision, or sunnat . 30 After the kefir is established, a reciprocal obligation of protection emerges between the Yazidi son and his chosen male protector, 31 which creates a blood-brotherhood, or kerefat , between the men. 32 This partnership is held in fortune and misfortune, and creates kinship between the two families. 33 Traditionally, many Yazidis have chosen Arab and Kurdish individuals to fulfill the role of the kefir , ensuring that the family maintains good relations with its Arab and Kurdish neighbors, yet these bonds have seemingly diminished since IS’ invasion in 2014. Since the genocide, it has been reported that many fathers now select only fellow Yazidi men for this position. 34 This shift in such a salient aspect of Yazidi familial identity is a clear demonstration of the Yazidis’ increased ethnic and religious isolation in response to recent violence.

The Islamic State’s “War Spoils”

Regarding the Islamic State’s tolerance and justification of slavery, the terrorist organization employs internal “war spoils” departments responsible for coordinating the flow of natural resources, as well as the sale and movement of enslaved captives throughout conquered territory. 35 Since 2014, this department has organized the capture, sale, and distribution of enslaved Yazidi women, subjecting them to sexual violence sans consequences. 36 Moreover, the classification of Yazidis as religious ‘infidels’ has led to notable discrepancies between the treatment of Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic groups in the territories seized by IS. For instance, Yazidis were not subject to the minority tax ( jizya ) offered to Christians when IS captured the city Mosul in June of 2014. 37 The jizya permitted Christians to maintain their religious faith through monetary compensation and protected them from enslavement. 38 Instead, Yazidis were forced to convert to Islam in place of execution. 39 Obligatory conversion derives from the fact that Yazidis are not considered ‘people of the book’ (a Quranic classification reserved for Christians, Jews, Muslisms, and occasionally Zoroastrians). 40 Ultimately, the refusal to recognize Yazidism as a legitimate religious affiliation forms the ideological foundation for the violent treatment they have been subjected to throughout history, including during IS' recent genocide. 41

Prosecution for Sexual Violence and Genocide

Iraq has refrained from ratifying the Rome Statute, meaning the International Criminal Court (ICC) faces notable challenges in prosecuting the Islamic State for its actions against the country’s Yazidi population in 2014. 42 However, scholars Peter Nicolaus and Serkan Yuce note that the Iraqi Government has formally recognized the attacks on August 3rd as genocide. 43 Additionally, Iraq has been party to the United Nations Genocide Convention since 1959, yet, the government lacks the legislation and judicial recourse required to properly prosecute the Islamic State. 44 Therefore, if the United Nations Security Council were to refer one of the prosecution cases from Iraq to the ICC, the prosecutors of the ICC would be able to begin collecting evidence for trial. 45 Of equal importance is the international prosecution process for those guilty of committing sexual violence and enslavement during conflict. In May of 1993, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) formally classified rape a crime under international law. 46 This decision signified a landmark moment in interpreting the atrocities of wartime rape as acts of violence rather than as acts against one’s honor and social status. 47 Furthermore, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum indicated in a report in 2016 that there exists ample evidence collected from survivors that the sexual violence, rape, and slavery experienced by Yazidi women qualifies as a prosecutable offense under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 48 The ICC Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as including the forcible displacement of a civilian population. 49 The statute further classifies “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”, as such crimes. 50 One of the most jarring pieces documenting the traumatic and violent enslavement of Yazidi women is a highly circulated video of IS members openly discussing the buying and selling of Yazidi women as sex slaves. 51 One IS member stated, “Today is the day of [female] slaves and we should have our share.” 52 Another individual can be heard saying, “Where is my Yazidi girl?” 53 The lack of international accountability against IS members is no less inexcusable when recorded footage such as this exists.

In Rukmini Callimachi’s article with the New York Times, she describes an interview conducted with a 12 year old Yazidi girl who successfully escaped her enslavement. 54 The girl recounts the religious-based ‘justifications’ an IS fighter repeatedly vocalized after violently abusing her. 55 Ultimately, he maintained that her status as a non-believer meant that it would not be considered a sin for him to subject her to rape and sexual torture. 56 IS fighters have continuously justified the enslavement of Yazidi women with the perception of non-Muslims as non-human, a line of thinking that represents an extreme and thoroughly opposed misinterpretation of Islam. 57 IS’ unfounded and warped claims about Islam serve as catalysts for the organization’s violent activities, not as accurate representations of the vast majority of those who practice Islam. 58

In addition to the physical trauma inflicted upon Yazidi women through rape, the sexual enslavement of a Yazidi woman is believed to strip her of her honor, a value of extreme importance in Yazidi culture. 59 After the genocide initially began, widespread fears emerged that women who escaped captivity would not be permitted to re-join their community due to their honor being violated in the eyes of her community. 60 Such exclusion risks severely impacting the birth rate of the Yazidi population, threatening the extinction of the community since conversion into Yazidism is not permitted. 61 (In an attempt to mitigate this risk, Yazidi leader Baba Sheikh issued a religious exemption in 2015 which explicitly allowed for survivors to rejoin the community and participate in a cleansing believed to restore the religious honor of victims of sexual assault and enslavement. 62) The culmination of video evidence and survivor interviews possibly illuminates the true intent behind the systemic sexual abuse of Yazidi women: to ethnically cleanse the Yazidi population through rape, torture, and enslavement.

Beyond holding identified IS members legally accountable for their crimes, Francis O’Connor and Rosa Burç of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt emphasize the importance of a collective international effort to re-establish a politically and economically secure homeland in the Sengal region for the Yazidi community. 63 The forced regional displacement of Yazidis since the capture of their homeland has sparked a mass refugee crisis: around 300,000 Yazidis have been relocated to approximately 20 refugee camps within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG). 64 These locations are overcrowded with refugees from various countries, severely underfunded, and lack the resources to adequately care for asylum seekers. 65 The severe loss of infrastructure in the Northern Senegal region also represents a barrier to the Yazidi population achieving stability in Iraq. Thus, it is vital that the Iraqi government re-establish border security at Sengal to allow the Yazidis who are willing and able to return to do so while mitigating future security risk. The creation of an autonomous territory and the protection of their primary holy site Mount Sengal will enable the Yazidis to restore their community and prevent their ethnic identity and cultural traditions from future erasure.

On a personal level, Yazidis face severe psychological barriers to their return to a state of stability. It is estimated that up to 50 percent of the population has experienced various forms of traumatic and post-traumatic stress disorder. 66 For a report issued by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2015, interviewers traveled to various camps across Iraq and Syria to speak with genocide survivors. Every single Yazidi they conversed with named a family member or friend who was missing or reportedly kidnapped. 67 Although humanitarian assistance directed towards Yazidis thus far has overlooked treatment for genocide-inflicted trauma, a program launched in Germany seeks to mitigate this scarcity.

In 2015, Professor Jan Kizilhan, a Yazidi expert and psychologist, established a special visa arrangement for Yazidi women and children to be brought into Germany and receive psychological care. 68 The project was initially created for a group of around 1,000 Yazidis. 69 In a live interview with a German newspaper, Kizilhan explains the features of his program and the necessity to combat multi-generational and genocide related trauma within the Yazidi community. 70 He places emphasis on survival and reveals that the Yazidi population has experienced 74 genocides in the last 800 years, which have left lasting impact on individuals’ mental and emotional wellbeing. 71 While Professor Kizillhan’s program specifically focused on assisting young Yazidi women who had escaped the captivity of IS members, his approach serves as a model for long-term psychological care and intervention on behalf of the Yazidi population.

In her formal address to the United Nations in 2019, Amal Clooney amplifies pleas from sur - vivors to prosecute IS members and declares that, regardless of the decline in territorial and political power of the Islamic State, no individual who participated in the Yazidi Genocide should live free of consequence. 72 In order to successfully aid in the recovery from the physical, psychological, and sexual trauma that the Yazidi community has faced since the Islamic State’s attack in August 2014, the international community must take decisive steps to prevent the continued endangerment of the population. The first move towards accountability would be the prosecution of identifiable IS militants, leaders, and members who participated in the genocide, sexual enslavement, rape, and human trafficking of the Yazidi people. Legal action could take place within Iraq’s national courts, or the United Nations Security Council and the ICC could sponsor and supervise the collection of evidence for trial within the ICC’s court. 73 The second step towards recovery would entail the Iraqi government securing Mount Sengal by granting the Yazidis politically autonomous status over the territory. 74 This would grant the community safe return and minimize security risk. Further, it would provide Yazidis a safe environment to rebuild political and cultural stability within, thus strengthening their ethnic identity and recultivating their sacred relationship to the mountain. Thirdly, it is vital to provide the community sufficient treatment with which to recover from the psychological trauma accompanying the experience of genocidal attack. Professor Jan Kizilhan’s treatment program represents a strong reference point that can initiate the process of providing Yazidis the psychological care necessary to alleviate the trauma IS has inflicted upon the community. While the scars and trauma of the Yazidi genocide will never fully heal, it is the duty of the international community to ensure that events like these cease to take place without consequence or accountability.

References

1 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. “ENDANGERED FUTURE: Yezidis in Post-Genocide Iraq and the Need for International Support.” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24412.

2 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce. “Sex-Slavery: One Aspect of the Yezidi Genocide.” Iran & the Caucasus 21, no. 2 (2017): 196–229. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44631115.

3 Rukmini, Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape”, The New York Times, August 13th, 2015, https://www.nytimes. com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theologyof-rape.html.

4 Abouzeid, Rania. “WHEN THE WEAPONS FALL SILENT: RECONCILIATION IN SINJAR AFTER ISIS.” European

Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/resrep21655.

5 Arraf, Jane, and Sangar Khaleel. “3,000 Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some of Them Are.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 3, 2021. https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/world/middleeast/yazidismissing-isis.html

6 Johnsen, Gregory D. “The Rise of ISIS.” Great Decisions, 2016, 13–24. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44214817.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Rukmini, Callimachi. 11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.

14 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Yazīdī." Encyclopedia Britannica, September 5, 2022. https://www. britannica.com/topic/Yazidi.

15 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”, United Nations High Commision, Human Rights Council, 15 June 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.

16 “Yezidis Faith ديانتنا.” Yezidis, Yazidi International , http:// www.yezidisinternational.org/abouttheyezidipeople/religion/.

17 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia.

18 Ali, Majid Hassan. “The Forced Displacement of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Disputed Areas in Iraq: A Case Study of the Post-2014 Yazidi Minority.” AlMuntaqa 5, no. 1 (2022): 76–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48677172.

19 Ibid.

20 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.

21 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”.

22 Ibid.

23 Abouzeid, Rania.

24 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”.

25 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.

26 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

27 “Who Are the Kurds?” BBC News, BBC, 15 Oct. 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440.

28 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

29 Ibid.

30 Nicolaus, Peter. “Yezidi Circumcision and BloodBrotherhood (Including the Circumcision of the Dead).” Iran & the Caucasus 20, no. 3/4 (2016): 325–45. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/44631091.

31 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

32 Nicolaus, Peter.

33 Ibid.

34 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

35 Ibid.

36 Chertoff, Emily. “Prosecuting Gender-Based Persecution: The Islamic State at the ICC.” The Yale Law Journal 126, no. 4 (2017): 1050–1117. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44863340.

37 Ali, Majid Hassan. “The Forced Displacement of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Disputed Areas in Iraq: A Case Study of the Post-2014 Yazidi Minority.” AlMuntaqa 5, no. 1 (2022): 76–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48677172.

38 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

39 Ali, Majid Hassan.

40 Ibid.

41 “The People of the Book and the Hierarchy of Discrimination.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015. https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ iraq/case-study/background/people-of-the-book.

42 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

46 Jarvis, Michelle. “PROSECUTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES: HOW FAR HAVE WE PROGRESSED AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

SOME THOUGHTS BASED ON ICTY EXPERIENCE.” In Imagining Law: Essays in Conversation with Judith Gardam, edited by Dale Stephens and Paul Babie, 105–32. University of Adelaide Press, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.20851/j. ctt1sq5x0z.9.

47 Ibid.

48 Kikoler, Naomi, “Our Generation Is Gone” the Islamic State Targeting of Iraqi Minorities in Ninewa. 2015. United States Holocaust and Memorial Museum, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/IraqBearing-Witness-Report-111215.pdf.

49 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, para 4.

50 Ibid.

51 Winer, Stuart. “IS Fighters Talk of Buying Yazidi Girls as Slaves for $100-$300.” The Times of Israel, November 5, 2014. https://www.timesofisrael.com/is-fighters-talk-of-buying-yazidigirls-as-slaves-for-100-300/.

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.

54 Rukmini, Callimachi. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.

57 “Jan Kizilhan: On the Yezidi Trauma.”

58 Halimi, Mahfuh Bin Haji, and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman. “RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM: CHALLENGING EXTREMIST AND JIHADIST PROPAGANDA.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 13, no. 1 (2021): 112–17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26979991. 59 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid 62 Ibid. 63 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. 64 Ibid 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid 67 Kikoler, Naomi. 68 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. 69 Ibid. 70 “Jan Kizilhan: On the Yezidi Trauma.” De Balie, January 27, 2021. https://debalie.nl/programma/jan-kizilhan-on-the-yeziditrauma-10-12-2019/. 71 Ibid.

72 United Nations Security Council Open Debate: Women, Peace and Security- Sexual Violence in Conflict, Remarks by Amal Clooney, April 23rd, 2019, https://www.doughtystreet. co.uk/sites/default/files/media/document/FINAL%20 Security%20Council%20speech%20230419%20.pdf. 73 Ibid. 74 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.