E U R O P E Editor's Note

Europe today faces unprecedented struggles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war, the energy crisis and food insecurity caused by that war, the proliferation of arms, and political turmoil particularly related to the increase in populist movements are only the tip of the iceberg.

The writers of the Europe section chose to highlight topics related to these challenges. Katie Rouse maps out the EU’s path towards centralized European Defense with the European Defense Fund, Senthil Meyyappan captures the ongoing tensions between Greek and Turkish relations, and Erica MacDonald raises questions over Italy’s new populist premiership. Overall, the Europe section this semester shows the unity and disunity in the pursuit to develop a shared European identity.

I thank them for their hard work, effort, and dedication in providing a snapshot of Europe’s current crises in this semester’s issue. We hope you enjoy their pieces.

FIONA CAPTAN, CAS '23

Senior Editor, Europe

to you by

by Kathleen Rouse edited by Jessica Swanson

"

When, if not now…do we lay the foundations for an enlarged union of freedom, security and democracy? Who, if not us, could protect and defend Europe’s values, both internally and externally?” 1 These questions, posed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech at Charles University in Prague on August 29, 2022, reflect the growing debate about the European Union’s (EU) role in subsidizing its member states’ defense capabilities. After Russia’s attack on Ukraine catalyzed the movement for a unified EU defense effort in February 2022 , the controversy over whether or not to expand European centralized defense came to a head. The EU’s decision to jointly fund arms for a conflict for the first time and the subsequent delivery of weaponry to Ukraine from EU member states sparked a revisiting of the structure and budget for the European Defence Fund (EDF). 2 Launched in June 2017, the EDF is the latest battleground for the defense debate. As part of a chain of EU-sponsored defense spending programs, the EDF suggests an EU priority to expand its involvement in member states’ military oversight, an issue becoming more and more relevant in European politics in light of questions concerning the extent of the EU’s role in providing aid to Ukraine. However, critics fear the EU’s burgeoning central power and possible encroachment on individual countries’ defense strategies and independence.

Foundations of the ED F: Politicians are working to shift popular opinion surrounding the militaryindustrial complex within the purview of the EU toward a more favorable view of government intervention since the EDF was first implemented. In his 2016 Statement to the Union address, former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Junker stressed that “Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others.” 3 He argued that “for European defence to be strong, the European defence industry needs to innovate,” leading to his proposal for the application of the EDF “to turbo boost research and innovation.” 4

The EDF pushes two main agendas: to “strengthen the military capabilities of the EU member states” and by extension, their strategic autonomy, and to “contribute to growth and jobs in Europe” by encouraging competition and innovation in the defense sector. 5 By distributing public funding to largely for-profit, private companies and applied research groups for military research and development (R&D), the EDF will concentrate on developing and producing cutting edge technologies. Examples of 2022 EDF project proposals include R&D of covert sensing, advanced radar technologies, hidden threats detection, sustainable components for underwater applications, airborne electronic warfare, semi-autonomous vessels, naval collaborative surveillance, and tactical cargo. 6 Research continues into new project areas such as autonomous systems, cybersecurity, maritime security, and intelligence-surveillance, foci that show a growing emphasis on conflict preparedness for both physical and cyber attacks.

The EDF works in complement with the European Peace Facility (EPF), which increases the EU’s support to peace operations by third parties worldwide. An off-budget funding mechanism for the EU, it aims “to cover joint costs of Common Security and Defence Policy military missions, to enable the EU to engage in broader actions aimed at supporting partner countries; armed forces with infrastructure, equipment, or military technical assistance.” 7 The EPF works to supplement EDF defense action funding with the goal of avoiding conflict and building peace. The use of EU funds for the military sector is not unprecedented. Between 2007 and 2020, the

EU budget allotted €3.1 billion to the European Security Research Programme, and the Internal Security Fund received €3.8 billion for 2014 to 2020. The Preparatory Action on Defense Research (PADR) is a direct precursor of the EDF and included a provision that limited funding exclusively to defense technologies and systems, rather than military operations, and was followed by the European Defense Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). 8 However, unlike prior similar legislation, the EDF does not include any limitations on spending on military operations, possibly due to the changing view of the role of the EU in the defense industry. It does include other safeguards to prevent misuse of its funding power. For example, only collaborative projects with participation from at least three different member states of the EU are eligible to receive funding. Focus areas set with member states define projects’ scope, with priority given to solidifying and bolstering security and defense interests of the Union. 9 These broad goals give EDF funds the potential to be put toward a wide variety of enterprises after the projects are selected

Funding cycles typically span three years. The first is spent on administrational preparation, followed by calls for proposals and submission of proposals the next year, concluding the cycle with selection of projects and grant agreements in the final year. A new cycle commences annually, meaning that at any given time, procedures for each of the three respective phases will be occurring simultaneously. 10 The EU itself will also not own any capability of the products manufactured. Development of common prototypes will only be funded with the intent of member states purchasing the final product or using the technology. 11

Given varying timelines for designing and producing a working prototype on top of a threeyear selection process, it will be years before any of the projects reach completion and the Union sees any of the results used. These lengthy timelines could prove problematic for the defense industry as technology advances and what is needed to effectively fend off threats continues to change rapidly, potentially rendering projects obsolete before they even reach the production line. The results may also be required sooner rather than later, and the EU may not be able to wait so long to make use of the results.

Between 2017 and 2020, the European Commission allocated €590 million to the Fund’s military industry budget, with plans for continued future funding and expansion. Over the next seven years, the EDF is budgeted to receive €8 billion: €5.3 billion for “collaborative capability development projects” and €2.7 billion for defense research to address emerging future challenges and threats from hostile world actors. 12 The latest development is the acquisition of €500 million from the EU budget between 2022 and 2024 for the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). Established by the European Commission this past July as a “short-term financial instrument worth €500 million to incentivise common defence procurement among Member States,” it was designed as an interim solution to allow for a quick response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 13

The Brewing Divide:

In light of member states’ independent responses to the conflict between Russian and Ukraine, the question of a necessary centralized defense has been pushed to the forefront of security issues. Commission Executive Vice President Margarethe Vestager attributes the desire for such a unified defense spending body to a sense of reciprocity; “Member States have taken bold steps by transferring urgently needed defence equipment to Ukraine. In the same spirit of solidarity, the EU will help member states replenish supplies by incentivising joint procurement, allowing the European defence industry to respond better to these urgent needs.” 14 In this context, Vestager is referring to joint procurement as the process by which states cooperate to acquire goods and services necessary for their armed forces. She argues it will benefit member states’ defense capabilities by allowing for more coherent, coordinated defense efforts. Vestager also contextualizes the creation of the EDIRPA within a larger agenda, praising it as a “historical milestone in establishing the EU Defence Union, increasing the security of EU citizens and making the EU a stronger partner for our allies.” After Juncker’s call in 2016 for an expanded EDF and the EU’s general role in member states’ military capabilities, proponents have advocated for a streamlined, internationally-cooperative approach to defense as the best way to be prepared against future threats from other nations, including the growing nuclear threat from Russia and possible conflicts with China. They argue that the combined forces of the EU operating in a cohesive manner would be much more effective than stunted efforts of individual nations.

European popular support for collective EU defense has consistently polled above 70 percent in the last five years. 15 However, passionate discourse over the degree to which the EU should be involved in independent states’ defense is still taking place among EU citizens. On the other side of the controversy, there are those that argue it is a tremendous overstep for the EU to continue to allocate such massive budget funds to defense, a tenet of governing historically left up to sovereign states. There are also concerns about how far this funding will go, and how much will ultimately be put toward the military industry. Critics raise doubts about the possibility of the EDF evolving into a fully fledged Defense Union or military alliance, overstepping the bounds of the role Europeans believe the EU should play in member states’ defense. Though anything similar in scale to NATO is unlikely to develop for the foreseeable future, some Europeans are fearful of how and why unified military efforts might eventually be used.

Another issue raised by EDF expansion opponents is the diversion of funds from civilian tax-funded facets of the EU budget, including portions of the environmental protection budget. This is especially troubling to them because the budget is also suffering from the effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, an estimated €10 billion annual net loss. All national contributions to the EDF budget have been made voluntary, causing many to fear that funding for public works and existing civilian programs will continue to be depleted. Challengers also question the extent to which EDF contracts will serve wealthy megacorporations as opposed to small businesses with money raised from taxpayers. Funding is mainly provided through grants which recipients are not expected to reimburse. This means the military-industrial complex is simultaneously “benefiting from extremely favorable conditions regarding ownership of results,” since due to intellectual property rights, only the private companies will own what’s produced – not the EU or its member states. 16 Despite these advantages, projects still do not need to meet all award criteria to receive funding. This is another point of contention, as critics feel that given the freedom with public funds that the contracts allow, the proposals should be required to fulfill all standards. There is also pushback against the argument that new funding will provide new jobs in addition to the 1.4 million people already directly or indirectly employed by the defense sector. 17 Critical analysts claim that investments in military R&D would only serve to shift jobs from civilians to the military labor pool. Defenders of this ideology maintain that rather than shore up jobs for that target audience, the money would be better spent developing new jobs for civilians, as Europe lacks highly-skilled workers in engineering and technological research. They also feel military personnel are better suited to retrain for jobs in other sectors. 18

Economically, a collective fund would save money across all member states. According to the EU, inadequate or nonexistent defense and security cooperation between member states costs an estimated €25 billion to €100 billion annually because of “lack of competition, costly duplication, lack of interoperability, technological gaps, and insufficient economies of scale.” 19 Projections claim up to 30 percent of annual defense expenditures could be saved through joint procurement. 20

Strategically, the disconnect between EU members’ military efforts also detrimentally affects military preparedness and functionality. “Dysfunctional cooperation and EU-wide fragmentation in defense,” or countries’ inability to share information and collaborate effectively, inhibits the EU’s ability to deploy large numbers of troops worldwide. This is demonstrated in sending approximately 40,000 EU men to Europe’s border with Russia versus 100,000 American troops. 21

Developments in Ukraine have accelerated Europe’s EDF expansion debate by encouraging member states to support unified military action in response. The EU responded swiftly first through the use of economic means, imposing asset freezes and travel bans on 1,212 Russian officials and legislators, freezing the assets of 108 entities as of July 2022. It also expanded sanctions on Russia’s financial sector, including debt and equity restrictions on certain banks and companies. 22

Despite a history of intense debate of whether the EU should be directly involved in conflict, military aid was passed soon after, but the EU struggled to provide Ukraine with the heavy weaponry many believed was required without direct funding designated for conflict aid. This lack of organization and resources fueled calls for a better equipped EU military reserve to be established for use in times of crisis. “It’s been argued for a very long time that if [the EU member states] work together, if they cooperate, they’ll be one of the world’s biggest military forces. But that cooperation has been very slow in coming,” Naomi O’Leary, Europe correspondent for The Irish Times, says of the hesitation prior to the conflict. 23

A Newfound Cooperation: Temporary or Permanent?

After Russia’s invasion, EU members shifted toward a much more cooperative approach, coming to an incredibly quick agreement to jointly dedicate €450 million for arms in Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. This sudden unity stems from the implications of the conflict for the EU. As Russia became bolder in blatantly attacking Ukraine and threatening the use of nuclear weapons on the rest of the world, it inched the country closer to war with Europe and the United States. The EU found it necessary to act quickly in efforts to curb Russia’s aggression before it extended any further. One aspect of that strategy included the EPF. Designed and passed last year, the EPF had never before been used for lethal aid, or military aid designed to kill people. Under that program, antitank systems from the Netherlands among other weapons systems reached Ukraine in February. 24 Though there are concerns about member states being forced to participate in such efforts, they have already been proven unfounded. Ireland, Malta, and Austria, traditionally neutral countries, opted out of contributing funds to military aid through a process known as constructive abstention, which allows individual countries to abstain from voting while permitting others to make a decision on the basis of unanimity. 25

Still, citizens worry that the EDF’s very existence signifies the abandonment of the peaceful basis upon which the EU was founded – a protest that might have some truth in it. Historically, the EU was a civilian project, originally proposed as an economic union to prevent war in 1950 by then French minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman, who likened it to “a first step to a federation of Europe, to change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacturing of war materials, of which they themselves have been the most constant victims.” 26 In recent years, defense has become an increasingly sizable focus area as more defense spending programs are established and subsidized, a trend likely to continue as the EDF procures more funding.

The EDF is evidence that the EU is taking concrete steps to redefine European defense efforts. Given the exponential growth in funding for member states’ military capabilities in the past five years, programs like the EDF represent a turning point toward more open and invested EU participation in the oversight of member states’ militaries and defense capabilities. In the shortterm, this funding will change how member states will respond to conflicts in the near future, but more lasting impacts are still up in the air. Upon the resolution of the crisis in Ukraine, it remains to be seen whether EU representatives will continue to cooperate on the expansion of defense spending and unification of military efforts. It is possible that without a common cause, the debate could regress into a stalemate. But there is also the possibility that Ukraine will permanently alter how Europeans view their role in defending other nations, generating an invigorated rigor for a defense union. As tension between China and Russia and their western adversaries continues to brew, the long term implications of this legislation on Europe’s role in the global defense industry remain to be seen.

References

1 Scholz, Olaf. “Rede Von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz.” Webseite Der Bundesregierung | Startseite, 29 Aug. 2022, https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-vonbundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-2079752.

2 Scheimer, Dorey, and Meghna Chakrabarti. “Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War.” Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War | On Point, WBUR, 28 Feb. 2022, https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/02/28/ europe-response-russia-eu-invasion-ukraine-putin.

3 “The State of the Union 2016: Towards a Better Europe – A Europe That Protects, Empowers and Defends.” European Commission - European Commission, 14 Sept. 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_3042.

4 Ibid.

5 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 “Preparatory Action on Defence Research (Padr).” Defence Industry and Space, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/ eu-defence-industry/preparatory-action-defence-research-padr_en.

9 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.

10 “European Defence Fund: Ground and Air Combat.” EuroSatory, European Commission, 2022.

11 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and

Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.

12 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.

13 “Stronger European Defence.” European Commission - European Commission, 8 Aug. 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/stronger-european-defence_en#timeline

14 “Press Corner.” European Commission - European Commission, 19 July 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ IP_22_4491.

15 Bergmann, Max, et al. “The Case for EU Defense.” Center for American Progress, 1 June 2021, https://www.americanprogress. org/article/case-eu-defense/.

16 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.

17 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 “The European Defence Fund: Questions and Answers.” European Commission - European Commission, 7 June 2017, https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/memo_17_1476. 21 Ibid.

22 “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union Responses and Implications for U.S.-EU Relations.” Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ pdf/IN/IN11897.

23 Scheimer, Dorey, and Meghna Chakrabarti. “Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War.” Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War | On Point, WBUR, 28 Feb. 2022, https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/02/28/ europe-response-russia-eu-invasion-ukraine-putin.

24 Ibid.

25 “Constructive Abstention - Euabc.” EUabc.com, http://en.euabc.com/word/221.

26 European Network Against Arms Trade, 2019.