The International Relations Review Spring 2014

Finding A Middle Ground in Mexico Food Insecurity Plagues War-Torn Central African Republic

Special Report:

Religious Conflict

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Index 2

Briefings

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Water Security in Yemen

Top news updates from around the world.

Yemen’s water resources are trickling to a halt, while corruption continues to flow.

Incompetent government agencies and selfserving local leaders obstruct attempts to reform water distribution and conservation.

This piece argues that the government must become transparent before it can make headway in its reform efforts.

By Caroline Thompson, CAS ‘14

11 Finding A Middle Ground

Mexico aptly exemplifies the intersections of local community economies and global institutions. Coupled with a close investigation of specific Mexican communities, this article on globalism addresses a contemporary problem in regions that continue to embrace tradition.

By Eve Cheri Krassner, CAS ‘14

13 Post-Arab Spring Egypt

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s emergence as Egypt’s most likely future president, reinforces the role of the military as the main institution of the nation. With el-Sisi’s promotion to the highest military rank, his candidacy announcement and role in the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi, it seems possible that the military will regain the leadership of Egypt,.

By Jason Feinman, CAS ‘14

18 Multiple Modernities

Religion plays an important role in world affairs. Authors are now analyzing how religion has played a role in political and economic events through various movements and organizations. Applications of Islam and Christianity show how religion can affect political outcomes even in an effort to be modern.

By Eliza Berg, CAS ‘14 SPECIAL REPORT

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PHOTO BY MADDIE ROSENBERGER, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14

SPECIAL REPORT: Religious Conflict, p. 17–27 22 The Diverse Influences of Religion on Political Change

Religion is traditionally polarizing.

However, the modern political trend is to promote movements by infusing religious values. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood and the women’s mosque movement in Egypt both use Islamic morals to influence the mindset of the people.

By Samantha Fox, CAS ‘14, SPH ‘15 SPECIAL REPORT

25 Islam in the American Media

The terms “Islam,” “Muslim” and “Arab” are used extensively in the American media without recognition of the vast religious and ethnic makeup of these categories. This article analyzes how the media portrays Islamic societies, especially in the wake of oil crises, 9/11 and, most recently, the Boston Marathon bombings.

By Amy Gorel, CAS ‘14, COM ‘14 SPECIAL REPORT

29 U.S.-Iran Impasse

Sanctions have brought Iran to the negotiating table, but to avoid squandering an opportunity to improve relations with the

Islamic Republic, Obama must resist pressure to impose further sanctions.

By Annis Khalil Saniee, CAS ‘15

30 Food Insecurity in the Central African Republic

The number of people not getting enough food in the Central African Republic has doubled to 1.6 million this past year.

Because of increased violence in the Central African Republic since December 2012, there are significant losses of food, cash crops, livestock and other valuable assets that support the livelihoods of the nation’s people.

By Sara Jabbari, CAS ’15

34 Photo Spread:

Commercialism in Antarctica

A series of photos give us a glimpse into Antarctica, shedding light on the wildlife and the Southern Coast’s current state.

By Valeria Giachetti, CAS ‘16

36 Editorial:

Curbing Japan’s Whaling Practices in Antarctica

The IR Review gives its take on Japan’s long history of commercial whaling.

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BRIEFINGS Brazil

Brazilian security forces have been sent to slums, or favelas, in order to curtail violence and drug trafficking. The 5-year-old “pacification” program is an attempt to prepare the regions ahead of the 2014 World Cup tournament. The 150,000 Brazilian troops plan to occupy the areas until July 31, when the World Cup has concluded.

Drug gangs and a recent escalation of violence have permeated the slums, prompting extra security measures in preparation for the influx of tourists.

Mexico Mexican officials freed 44 Guatemalan migrants who were held captive by human traffickers near the Guatemalan border.

Six Guatemalan smugglers were charged with human trafficking after being caught, according to the Associated Press. The National Immigration Institute of Mexico said the smugglers transported migrants from Guatemala to the United States, and that migrants would be held captive for money from their relatives.

Authorities stated that the group of smugglers was led by Sebastian Rocael Milton Cardona, according to the Washington Post. Cardona, 42, is one of the most wanted criminal suspects by authorities in his country.

Venezuela

After months of deadly protests and violent armed response, the Venezuelan government and the opposition started talks about the future of Venezuela on April 11.

Although not yet confirmed, Venezuela has requested that Cardinal Pietro Parolin, a representative from the Holy See and former ambassador to Venezuela, act as the mediator. Several delegates from different Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) states are mediating the talks, although there is some concern

PHOTO BY GISELLE BLANCO-SANTANA CAS’16

Brazilian citizens have taken to the streets to promote the need for “mais amor” or “more love” in response to recurring gang violence. Along with troops occupying regions of Brazil, the “mais amor” movement has made its way across the country, emphsizing the power of love.

about there being a bias in favor of the government.

Malaysia Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 mysteriously disappeared on March 8, 2014 on its way to China. Although authorities

have been searching for any remnants of the plane and its voyagers, no definitive evidence of wrong-doing or error has been found. The Malaysian government has come under widespread criticism for its treatment of the crisis and for withholding details.

Although there was much speculation on the causes of the crash, it has

Spring 2014 officially been deemed an accident. Nevertheless, stories of terrorism, conspiracy and cyber attacks have been propagated by major news organizations. Most recently, developments indicate that the plane is still emitting signals from somewhere in the Indian Ocean. However, these signals may fade within weeks.

Indonesia

Preliminary voting for Indonesia’s presidential elections have started, marking Indonesia’s third direct presidential election since 2004. Incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is barred from running for a third-term; however, Indonesians seem to have no opposition because after the first round, the polls show that the major opposition party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, is leading. Its presidential candidate, Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo Jokowi, appears to be the most popular contender.

Recent reports say that the former prime minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, prays for Jokowi’s victory. With the recent political uprisings, world leaders will be paying close attention to the July 9 election.

Canada

The Canada Revenue Agency reported that 900 people’s social insurance numbers were stolen due to cyber thieves exploiting the Heartbleed bug that was reported in April. The tax agency was one of the first major organizations to cut services as a result of this technological flaw that affected companies and individuals around the world.

The Revenue Agency was unable to shut down the flawed OpenSSL–cryptographic software that is supposed to keep data transmissions private–before the Heartbleed bug breached the taxpayer data for a total of six hours.

Nigeria

A car bomb detonated inside a crowded bus station in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. The explosion ripped through

3 16 luxury coaches and 24 minibuses, triggering several other explosions when vehicle oil tanks caught on fire. Over 70 people were killed in the blast and at least 125 were wounded, making it one of the most lethal attacks to strike the country.

President Goodluck Jonathan blamed the homegrown Islamist extremist group, Boko Haram. For years now, Boko Haram has been attacking schools, government officials and civilians. However, its members have not yet claimed responsibility for this particular attack.

Ukraine

The security situation in Ukraine has deteriorated rapidly following the departure of former president Viktor Yanukovych in February.

Pro-European protesters demanded his departure after he scraped an association agreement with the European Union in favor of joining a Russian-led customs union composed of former Soviet States.

After his departure, “self-defense forces” overran Ukrainian military bases in the autonomous region of Crimea, which Russia quickly annexed in a referendum widely condemned by the international community. Unrest in the eastern part of Ukraine, which is predominantly ethnically Russian, and the mobilization of Russian troops along the Russian-Ukrainian border threatens to further escalate this crisis.

Somalia

Residents of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, are experiencing culture shock as faster internet speeds and fiber optic services have been launched throughout the city. Until now, access to the internet, when available, has been via dial-up or satellite links.

Islamist militant group al-Shabab, who has links to al-Qaeda, cut off all internet service and 3G mobile phone service in the capital earlier this year.

Currently, the high-speed internet connections are only available in Mogadishu and not the surrounding rural areas or smaller towns, causing many to flock to hotels and internet cafes to try out the new fast service.

Many residents are reporting the use of video platforms and social media networks like YouTube and Twitter for the very first time.

Iran On Monday April 14, Iran requested a meeting with the United Nations Committee on Relations with the Host Country regarding the United States’ ban on their new U.N. ambassador appointee.

The U.S. Congress voted to refuse a visa to Hamid Abutalebi and if it is approved

by President Obama, the legislation will become law.

The U.S. refused to grant Ambassador Abutalebi a visa because of his involvement when the Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy and took 52 Americans hostage in 1979. He said that he was only a translator throughout these events.

According to the UN Headquarters Agreement, the U.S. must admit foreign diplomats into the country for access to the United Nations. However, the American government can deny visas for diplomats relating to matters of security and terrorism that would threaten the U.S.

Nepal

Over half of the teams climbing Mount Everest began their descent after an avalanche killed 16 guides. Foreign climbers wanted to continue despite the harsh weather, but guides threatened to boycott, forcing many teams down the mountain. Sherpas, a name for local guides on Everest, are demanding better rescue and treatment facilities for guides injured on the job. Three hundred foreign mountaineers planned to climb Everest this season, but amidst the harsh conditions and the recent accident, many are abandoning their mission of reaching the top. If several more teams begin to descend, the Nepal Mountaineering Association will have no choice but to declare this climbing season over, recalling others off the mountain and refusing entry to other climbers until next season.

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Spring 2014

5

Water Security in Yemen: Governance and Conflict Caroline Thompson, CAS ‘14

Good governance of critical natural resources is essential in promoting domestic stability and security. Since the the founding of Yemen in the second half of the 20th century, the Yemeni central government has manipulated water resources as a political tool to promote the legitimacy of the state. As a result, government-led water access projects have not reflected the needs of the Yemeni people. Not only is water the key natural resource for survival, but it also provides the foundation for economic growth in any society. Frustration over inadequate access to freshwater was a crucial factor in the revolts of 2011. The Yemeni people came to view former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s poor and inequitable management of the nation’s water resources as a reflection of his politically corrupt regime as a whole.

In Yemen, disputes over natural resources are the most pervasive causes of tribal conflict. Water conflict has weakened the structures of tribal authority as well as exacerbated tensions between local tribal leadership and the national government. However, water management has the potential to develop as a source of cooperation, rather than of conflict.

The United States, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany and other nations have pledged monetary aid towards improving water infrastructure in Yemen. Reforming domestic water governance will ensure the success of these projects and a more efficient and transparent distribution of aid to the most water-stressed communities.

A sustainable future for Yemen depends on a strong commitment to water reform on the national and local levels, as well as implementing policies that will emphasize water conservation and work towards creating new sources of water.

Literature concerning natural resources distinguishes between absolute physical scarcity and structural, or economic, scarcity. Physical water scarcity indicates that a country persistently faces shortages due to insufficient sources

of water while structural water scarcity concerns inadequate water-delivery infrastructure, water distribution and poor water management. Unfortunately, Yemen suffers from both types of water scarcity and is one of the most waterstressed nations in the world. The country has no perennial surface sources of water. Instead of rivers, Yemen relies on rainwater, groundwater tables and flash floods. Various estimates indicate that annual per capita water availability is between 115 and 150 cubic meters, which is only two percent of the world average and ten percent of the regional average.1 In recent decades, reliance on groundwater basins has increased sharply, such that the rate of pumping water from the ground exceeds the recharge rate. This unsustainable practice has caused groundwater basins to decline between one and seven meters per year.2 Urban centers are most susceptible to groundwater depletion due to the abundance of illegal wells drilled in concentrated areas. The capital city of Sana’a has experienced such an extreme decrease in freshwater availability that it may be the first city in the modern world to run out of water–possibly as soon as 2025.

While Yemen has always been an arid country, high rates of population growth in recent decades further strain essential natural resources. Yemen’s demographic changes are driven by a fertility rate of over five children per woman, which will cause the population to at least double, if not triple, by the year 2040.3 As the population increases, groundwater aquifers will continue to be depleted significantly faster than the replenishment rate. Moreover, a serious mismatch has developed between areas of high population and areas of greater water availability. The largest proportion of Yemen’s population is concentrated near the western highlands, far from major unexploited underground water sources, such as the Hadhramaut aqui-

fer.4 Water scarcity can stunt economic development in urban centers such as Sana’a and threaten the survival of rural communities.

Agriculture employs a majority of the working population, profoundly increasing water stress. Governance of this sector has not included sustainable policies aimed to conserve water. Agriculture uses 90 percent of all available water in Yemen due to inefficient irrigation methods, leaving little to satisfy the needs of other industries and households.

Moreover, farmers often choose to grow water-intensive crops because they have a higher market value. In the 1970s, deep tubewell technology became available to small farmers, allowing them to expand cultivated land under irrigation by creating new wells more easily.5 No longer constrained by annual rainfall to grow their crops, many farmers began to produce water-intensive crops such as bananas, citrus and other fruits to increase competitiveness with the world market.

Despite its short-term economic advantages, tubewell irrigation places a greater burden on underground aquifers and depletes community water resources over time. Moreover, poor farmers do not have the capital to match the increased water irrigation and cultivated land with modern, water-conserving farming techniques This leads to lower than possible yields.

The production of a mild narcotic called qat has addicted Yemen’s consumer base. While it contributes to 6 to 10 percent of the country’s GDP,6 its cultivation extracts one-third of all extracted groundwater and 40 percent of the water drawn from the Sana’a basin.7 Lobbyists actively block the government from allowing cheaper Ethiopian imports, allowing an unsustainable cash crop to exhaust a sizeable portion of Yemen’s water supply.

Several national institutions are charged with the improvement of water management, including the Ministry of Water and Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The establishment of a National Water Resource Authority in 1996 demonstrated a newfound commitment to water conservation and sustainability on behalf of the national government. However, these organizations continue to have a low capacity to

6 implement water reform projects and to enforce water conservation regulations across Yemen, especially in remote rural areas. A major obstacle for these institutions was Saleh’s regime itself, which prioritized short-term political goals over long-term water security needs.

The major stakeholders in water management often resist attempts to change the power structures involved in water resource control. Local tribal sheikhs seek to retain their traditional authority in their communities by monopolizing rights to water by resorting to violence. For example, 16 people were killed in an explosion a water well at Jebel Sabr in 2009.8 Large landowners use their substantial amounts of capital to resist reform as well. These powerful individuals became important players in the struggle to capture groundwater in subsequent decades after the introduction of tubewell technology in the 1970s. Tubewells became a sign of status and wealth during this period, encouraging the expansion of illegal wells and groundwater abstraction. Thus, “Those who are most able to influence water sector reform are the most strongly opposed to it.”9 In contrast, the poor pay the most for access to water because they cannot influence its distribution. Poor farmers and the rural landless often suffer the most from water scarcity when public water delivery infrastructure does not serve their communities.

The Saleh regime attempted to coopt tribes into the Yemeni state through a network of patronage that heavily influenced natural resource distribution. The Yemeni central government’s inadequate water management system laid the foundation for today’s water security crisis.

During Saleh’s 33 years in office, he developed a complex system of patronage designed to allocate water resources to his supporters to maintain his authority.

Saleh turned water into a political tool.

In order to ensure cooperation from various tribes, the president strategically ignored, created and prevented water conflicts. He shrewdly failed to intervene in disputes that did not favor him or his supporters. Saleh’s regime elicited support from tribal sheikhs by rewarding his followers with cash payments from oil revenues and with favorable outcomes in government contacts for resources.10

The International Relations Review The president manipulated enemies and bought friends by selectively managing water crises, leaving the system in a continual state of volatility. When haphazard uncertainty is the status quo, sustainable development of water resources is difficult to implement.

In the short term, Saleh’s patronage system allowed him to exercise control over tribal politics and consolidate authority. However, tribal sheikhs lost influence in their communities by engaging in the regime’s cronyism. Traditionally, sheikhs needed to prove their ability to mitigate disputes and protect the tribe’s resources in order to retain legitimacy and authority.11 The resource distribution policies promoted by Saleh’s turbulent corruption did not spur economic development or water reform for the Yemeni people. This undermined the tribal leaders’ control over water allocation and conflict mediation. Therefore, in the long-run, the system eroded and revealed Yemen’s underlying water security issues.

Saleh’s neglect of sound water management resulted in poor water infrastructure throughout the country. For example, government supply lines continue to lose large quantities of water through leakage. In 2001, estimated water losses were 50 percent in Sana’a, 40 to 60 percent in Taiz and 25 30 percent in Aden.12 Unless the government invests in the water system infrastructure, it will remain rusted and outdated.

Saleh’s corrupt water distribution methods were a trigger of unrest in the 2011 revolution. Those who opposed Saleh’s regime complained of water shortages resulting from economic and structural water scarcity. By favoring political loyalty over sustainable national welfare, “President Saleh ensured the collapse of his own political legitimacy.”13 Governance issues also produce and expedite conflict within and between tribes. Tribal systems play a central and complex role in Yemen’s political structure. Throughout Yemen’s history, tribal leaders have mediated conflict and administered justice. Tribal communities were especially important for providing a degree of stability and security during the events of the Arab Spring.14 Yemeni tribesmen resisted central state control

of natural resources because they wanted to maintain traditional structures of local power. They also sought independence because they lacked confidence in the national government’s ability to manage water resources and deliver water services and security. “Tribal law and allegiances provide social order, employment and a justice system outside the realm of the government that is often seen as highly inefficient and corrupt.”15

However, many systems of tribal governance eroded when their leaders fell prey to Saleh’s corrupt patronage network. The sheikhs who profited from Saleh’s system of patronage and accepted his bribes lost legitimacy and the support of their people. Local tribal leaders have also begun to utilize patronage as the principal method of water redistribution in their communities.16 By allocating water resources and land to their favorites, local sheikhs foster unstable and inequitable systems. Tribal leaders have become some of the largest consumers of groundwater, exacerbating the gap between the wealthy and the poor. In such volatile environments, systems for mediating conflict weaken as the poor stop respecting and adhering to tribal customs.

Social and political tensions over water have triggered a “race to the bottom” scenario: as Yemen reaches a great threshold of water scarcity, people scramble to appropriate as much water as possible before others do, thus greatly accelerating the rate of water depletion.

This self-defeating process unfortunately has exhausted water resources faster than solutions can be found; “just at the moment when there is the greatest need for conservation of the resource, a zero-sum competition for the remaining shares of the ‘resource pie’ intensifies.”17

Individuals in Yemen perceive the state and local powers as inefficient in the allocation of water resources and unreliable in settling disputes over resources. Thus, people seize water resources for themselves, which has several negative consequences. Illegal drilling severely depletes underground water basins and promotes inequitable access to water in communities for irrigation and household use. Water scarcity has significant impacts on food security, increasing the

GRAPHIC BY JESS VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, CFA ‘15

YEMEN’S WATER CRISIS

BY THE NUMBERS

115 –150 cubic meters of water are available annually per capita

agriculture uses

90%

of all available water

up to

cultivation of Qat extracts

70% 1/3 of violent conflicts arise over issues of water security

which translates to

10%

of all ground water

of the regional average and

2% of the world average

25 –50% of water loss is due to poor infrastructure

8 likelihood of violent disputes over natural resources.

Up to 70 percent of Yemen’s violent conflicts result from water security issues.18 The deterioration of traditional dispute mechanisms “has led to an upsurge of water-related violence that has aggravated tribal divisions and social cleavages.”19 Poor people feel trapped in an exploitative system where water access is limited; this has encouraged more people to turn to violence in order to secure the resources they need. Although water is perpetually scarce for many citizens of Yemen, guns are not difficult to acquire. At least 4,000 people die each year as a result of land and water disputes.20

Violent conflict is perceived as a means of resource-based dispute settlement; tribesmen may not consider vio-

The International Relations Review transparency and decentralizing water management.

Yemen must devote resources to investing in and disseminating modern farming technology and better water infrastructure. As Yemen relies on inconsistent rainfall as its only renewable freshwater source, the government should introduce superior methods of collecting and storing rain, such as rainwater harvesting tanks, to decrease pressure on strained groundwater basins. Supply-side forces can also play an important role in reforming water used for agricultural purposes. Changing the behavior of irrigating farmers is crucial to increasing water conservation. Reducing water waste is in the best interest of small farmers, who benefit from increasing returns per unit of water. Public programs have emerged that subsidize modern, more ef-

cost of the technology. This year, Saudi Arabia agreed to fund the $180 billion cost of building a new desalination power plant in Mocha, Yemen.24 The project will include transmission lines to Ta’izz and Ibb, major cities in desperate need of new water resources.

Although increasing international assistance towards water management and water creation is a step in the right direction, historically much of the foreign aid coming into Yemen is wasted due to corruption. Improvement of water security can only result from improvement of governance: “As long as the cronyism which is endemic to Yemeni politics and economics remains unaffected, assistance funds and conserved water resources will continue to be squandered.”25

In order to enact meaningful change, all major stakeholders must believe that

A sustainable future for Yemen depends on a strong commitment to water reform on the national and local levels, as well as implementing policies that will emphasize water conservation and work towards creating new sources of water. lence to be a crime if it achieves a political purpose, especially related to resource security. The most common resource-related conflicts include disputes over water distribution and access to wells and wadis, dry riverbeds that fill with water during foods.21 As a result, water conflict and poor governance develop into a vicious cycle: individuals engage in a violent grab for dwindling water resources when they perceive the state as unable to efficiently allocate water. In turn, the government must utilize its governing resources to quell the violence instead of focusing on water reform. Social conflict compromises critical government services, such as water delivery.

Several key technological and institutional water reform initiatives are critically linked with governance reform and have important consequences for water conflict. Water governance in the new regime of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi should emphasize producing efficient agriculture, stabilizing population growth, gaining foreign investment in water infrastructure projects government

ficient irrigation equipment for farmers.22 The expansion of these programs could offer more farmers access to spate irrigation and drip irrigation technology, which reduce water losses. As stated, agriculture consumes 90 percent of available freshwater in Yemen, leaving insufficient amounts for households. The government should prioritize developing mechanisms to deliver water to highest use values, especially transferring it to potable use.

Foreign investment in water has great potential for improving the situation in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, Japan, the United States, Germany and the World Bank have assisted in financing water projects, such as improving water infrastructure.23 In addition to major improvements in water conservation, Yemen will need to actively design methods for creating new water sources. Desalination of seawater offers an exciting new opportunity to increase the availability of freshwater in water-stressed regions. Developing countries such as Yemen have not been able to fully take advantage of desalination opportunities due to the high

water reform is beneficial. Water shortages endanger the health and the livelihoods of millions of Yemenis, which the new regime cannot ignore. On the national level, Hadi must acknowledge water scarcity as seriously as he regards the threat of terrorism. His government’s new water management policies should emphasize investment in the modern farming techniques and technological advances discussed above. The state can best achieve this by empowering the Ministry of Water and Environment with real authority and implementation capacity.

Major stakeholders on the local level must also support water reform.

According to Mark Zeitoun, the most opportune methods for promoting water policy reform through local sheikhs may arise by: “a) influencing people to influence the sheikh; b) influencing the sheikh himself to gain legitimacy… or c) developing bargaining power through constant build-up of legitimacy, in the longterm.”26 As evidenced, the national govern-

Spring 2014 ment has failed to disseminate efficient, effective and equitable water service delivery across the country. Even if the state completely ends its corrupt practices and transforms into a model of transparency, it will not have the capacity to provide water security to each community in Yemen and meet their individual needs. Multiple analyses of water politics in Yemen agree that decentralization of water governance can more effectively enforce regulations and address localized concerns.

While local authority has eroded due to corruption and conflict in many rural areas, independent and transparent organizations are emerging to manage water resources. Often known as water user associations, these institutions allow Yemeni people to challenge the entrenched power of corrupt sheikhs and large landowners over natural resources. The state should empower water user associations by building their managerial and technical capacities to protect local water resources.27 Such organizations need not exclude the tribal mediation systems that have operated for centuries in many ar-

9 eas. Without compromising the integrity of the new institutions, the frameworks for addressing water management should include tribal traditions: “tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution need to be integrated with the formal system so that they work alongside and complement formal institutions.”28 Improving the efficacy and legitimacy of dispute mediation structures reduces violent water-related conflicts. With state support, communityled water governance can reduce unsustainable groundwater consumption by preventing illegal drilling and massive resource capture by a few major landowners.

Civil unrest and tribal conflict are intrinsically linked with water governance issues. Powerful stakeholders in the water sector manipulate control over water resources as a political tool, intensifying the country’s extreme water scarcity. National security and stability in Yemen cannot be achieved without significant attention to water-related risks. A strong commitment to water reform by the state would solve issues of structural water scarcity. Superior water

governance would in turn lay the foundation for lessening physical water scarcity through technological advancements such as desalination. Water conservation policies must emphasize Yemen’s longterm economic and social needs. Conservation policies can help to curb social panic and the struggle to capture natural resources in “race to the bottom” situations.

The state alone cannot effectively manage Yemen’s limited water resources.

A holistic approach to water governance must involve the empowerment of decentralized, transparent institutions to manage water needs on a local level. A stable political environment in Yemen is the key to successfully implementing water projects financed by foreign assistance. The Yemeni people rose up against Saleh’s corrupt regime and inability to deliver crucial domestic services, such as water. Political actors in the new national regime and on the local level must prioritize water security as a central concern to the sustainable development of the nation’s economy, government, and society.

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The Mexico City Metropolitian Cathedral in Mexico City, Mexico.

PHOTO BY XIA LI, CAS ‘17

Spring 2014

11

Finding a Middle Ground:

Balance in Mexico’s Globalizing Economy Eve Cheri Krassner, CAS ‘14 Although the international political economy is planned by global institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that enshrine capitalist and neoliberal policies, it is still significantly shaped by small local communities. These are economic activities grounded in social relationships and cultural history. In Mexico, these two models are deeply conflicting, yet they manage to exist embedded in one another. Mexico is a country that stands as a poster child for “development” and “growth,” while simultaneously continuing its community-based practice of Usos y Costumbres. The former promotes economic competition in its many forms, while the latter values community service and fights for equality.

These principles are what allow Walmart to be the biggest employer in Mexico, without growing at the expense of smaller businesses. These opposing forces function across different social settings. From street markets in Santo Domingo to organic farms in Oaxaca, from traditional healing practitioners in Santa Ana del Valle to ecology-based NGOs in Etla, the global and local, dominant and alternative and institutional and communal continue to work together.

Tourism is inherently a global force: money, goods and people move across borders every day. In Mexico, tourism serves as a main source of economic revenue. However, Mexico’s tourist destinations are predominantly smaller peripheral communities, as opposed to major urban centers. This is the government´s attempt to encourage foreigners to engage with locals while stimulating the economic activity of otherwise marginalized communities. In Oaxaca, such communities include Mitla, Arrazola and Capulalpam de Mendez, among many others. Arrazola depends on tourism as a market for its prized Alebrijes, painted wood carvings made from Copal trees.

Sales are high when tourism is strong.

“Things were extremely difficult in 2006,” noted Betsa Morales Santiago, an artisan from the neighborhood. As she patiently decorated a carving of a bull, Betsa described how a political uprising in 2006 had deeply disturbed business in Arrazola. If people see this type of conflict on television, they get too scared to come to Mexico,” she explained. ¨Then, it’s much harder to get customers.”

Alternatively, residents have now started using email and online ordering, both representative of globalization at work. In spite of such modernization, the production of Alebrijes remains collaborative and community-oriented.

Betsa works alongside her husband, her mother, her father and her in-laws to complete and process orders. The community even organized a larger cooperative called EcoAlebrijes, run by the all of the families involved. Together they found a way to localize a global force by using tourism in a way that benefits their community.

Arrazola not only successfully incorporated community based economics into the international market, but it also managed to abide by Usos y Costumbres, despite exposure to Western ideologies.

Their tradition is one that encourages the sharing of wealth between community members. Usos y Costumbres recognizes that one person’s prosperity is often connected to another’s poverty and so aims to achieve equality via fair resource use and distribution. People from the ages of 18 to 60 hold different responsibilities in order to meet the needs of their group, and their work is unpaid. This stands in stark contrast to the capitalist model, where the focus is to achieve success through individual hard work. Arrazola’s governance strategy is founded on the principles of solidarity, community service and consensus-based decision making. It celebrates collective action, whereas capitalism incentivizes competition.

Similar patterns can be observed in

markets throughout Mexico. Family and community have as much to do with business as goods and services do, and different regions exhibit different degrees of involvement with formal and informal economic structures. In Santo Domingo, women can be heard bantering and joking about the nature and success of their small businesses, in terms of both financial income and social relationships.

Small businesses build relationships with their customers over long periods of time and function on a different level than markets, as discussed in economic terms.

Nevertheless, dominant political structures are also very much a part of their reality. In weekly markets—often called tiangis—spots need to be bought.

Vendors in these settings are required to have particular certifications or licenses in order to sell their goods. Most of the fruit and vegetables sold in these weekly markets come from a centralized and controlled warehouse called Central de Abastos, one of the largest in the world. This means that their produce come from all over Mexico and abroad and are brought to Mexico City to be bought and re-sold.

Vendors would not have access to these goods without some sort of organized distribution and exchange. However, once products reach these small stands in the street, the nature of the trade changes.

Central de Abastos is representative of concentrated economic activity, but their individual stands can incorporate their own characteristics, like the participation of extended families and the importance of socializing with buyers. “I like to buy from and sell to the same people,” one of the vendors admitted. “It builds trust.”

Trust proves to be fundamental in economic exchanges in Oaxaca as well.

All organic farms have to go through a process of Participatory Certification, a method they have developed as a way of locally validating products as “organic.”

The idea of certification comes from a Western ideology that values the standardization of goods. The World Trade Organization even created the International Standards Organization (ISO) to facilitate this process. If a farm meets the conditions determined by the ISO and pays a fee of 15,000 pesos, then it gets the stamp of approval and is free to call

12 its products organic. Oaxaca has taken that concept and re-worked it to better fit its needs. Instead of spending an unnecessary amount of money on a formal certificate, Oaxacans have simply decided for themselves how to evaluate their products. They created a system in which the actual consumers—along with a committee of vendors from organic markets and a small team of scientists from the local university—inspect fields to determine whether the produce can be considered organic. This process is completely voluntary.

Participatory Certification may only be valid in Mexico, but it works just as well as, if not better than, the ISO. It is a system based on real relationships between producers and consumers and a sharing of responsibility over sold goods.

It calls for the participation of the community but nonetheless adheres to international expectations, functioning as an alternative to the universal system.

The tensions that exist between international standards and alternative cosmologies exist not only in regards to the exchange of goods, but also in regards to the exchange of services. More often than not, “global” and “local” are understood as being mutually exclusive terms.

One is either subjected to the dominant paradigms or lives completely outside of them. Traditional methods of healing, for example, can be particularly problematic for Western medicine. Educated doctors feel entitled to disregard traditional healers for their lack of “proper” training and are often cynical of their effectiveness. However, some traditional healers, or curanderas, from Santa Ana del Valle, have a different relationship with local doctors. Their relationship has become one of mutual trust and understanding, what they call “intercambio de trabajo.”

Local healers share their knowledge with the hospital doctors, and the doctors in turn provide them with training they would otherwise not have access to. In this way, they have found collaboration where many find only resistance.

Mexico is an extraordinary case study for understanding how two worlds can exist in their many forms and function on multiple levels at once. One model is not necessarily better than the other.

They are simply different, each with benefits and with shortcomings. Mexico City

The International Relations Review

PHOTOS BY XIA LI, CAS ‘17

A substantial part of Mexico’s economy is maintained by tourism. Tourists in Mexico are often encouraged to flock to destinations in smaller communities rather than large urban centers to drive the local economies of the country’s more marginalized populations.

is one of the largest cities in the world, and the presence of the University of the Americas (UNAM) is a symbol of its accumulation of power, resources, people, diversity and intellect. The country serves as an example for economic prosperity, continuing to be the second-largest supplier of oil to the United States.

The richest man in the world is Mexican, and his success is the result of changes in economic policy, the same legislation that has also caused significant socioeconomic inequality. While Mexico is plagued with corruption and violence, it is also a country that celebrates and fosters community.

Usos y Costumbres brings plural-

ity into politics, rather than division; it is marked by cooperation, not competition. Families continue to work together to keep tradition alive. Some may suffer from migration to the United States, but the same sons and daughters who leave often come back. These two conflicting systems are what allow Mexico to suffer from world health problems characteristic of both developed and developing countries; to suffer from social division while working to even the playing field and to privatize industry, but continue to recognize 80 percent of the land as communal. It is possible to find ways to bridge this gap.

Spring 2014

13

Post-Arab Spring Egypt Jason Feinman, CAS ‘14 The emergence of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the likely future president of Egypt solidifies the military’s role as the dominant institution within the country.

Egypt has a long history of military rulers, from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. While the Arab Spring that ended the presidency of Hosni Mubarak may have been accompanied by the fall of some institutions, those institutions which make up the “deep state” of Egypt still remain.

The deep state, made up by the military, police, press and judiciary, was described by Nathan Brown of George Washington University as “this underlying set of structures that’s running things.”1 He stated that while the military may not have direct rule over the politics of Egypt, it certainly has a large quantity of influence.

With el-Sisi’s promotion to field marshal, the highest rank within the military, his announcement that he is running for president in the upcoming elections and his role in the ousting of former president Mohamed Morsi, it appears likely that the military will once again gain the leadership of Egypt after briefly losing it with the election of Mohamed Morsi. This emergence of military leadership confirms that, although the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt may have toppled some smaller institutions, those institutions that make up the deep state

still remain unaffected and wield significant influence within the country.

The post-Arab Spring situation in Egypt was largely a continuation of the struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular institutions that make up the deep state. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic political group formed in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, has functioned both openly and in secret within Egypt throughout its existence.

The group was banned by Nasser, while party members ran as independents during Mubarak’s rule. The Brotherhood gained wide support amongst some parts of the population by providing social services such as schools and hospitals.

Throughout its existence, however, there has been tension between the Brotherhood and the military. The two groups functioned alongside each other during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, battling Israeli forces in the Sinai.

However, following the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy and Nasser’s assent to power, the group was banned from participating in Egyptian politics.2 Although it has functioned silently within Egyptian politics, the Brotherhood has never able to gain leadership of the country, which passed largely from military leader to military leader.

The overthrow of Mubarak during the Arab Spring and subsequent democratic elections allowed, for the first time, the

Muslim Brotherhood to come to power in Egypt.

While Mohamed Morsi was the first democratically elected president of Egypt, his position as leader may have been merely symbolic. The four institutions of the deep state all remained outside of his control. These institutions still retained their niche of power and control within Egypt and frequently marginalized Morsi and possibly led directly to his overthrow. Amidst the last weeks of Morsi’s presidency, Egyptian citizens were burdened by power outages, gas shortages and a lack of police presence.

However, immediately following the removal of Morsi from power, these issues disappeared. Many, including the Muslim Brotherhood, have speculated that the military and other members of the deep state were responsible for the issues which led to the coup that overthrew Morsi.3 While state media have called these allegations a conspiracy and blamed the energy shortages and lack of order on the incompetence of the Morsi government, one can only wonder whether the sudden change in issues was really a function of a change in leadership or the last piece of a plan to remove Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The recent designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization will further impede the group from rising to power again in the near future.

While under the Mubarak presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood operated behind the scenes, the recent designation forbids all individuals from being members of or funding the group. The Mus-

Egypt’s referendum to pass a new constitution, January 2014 In January 2014, a new constitution was put to a vote in Egypt. Among other things, the draft stated that the president may serve two four-year terms and can be impeached; Islam is the state religion, but the country guarantees freedom of belief; and the state guarantees equaliy between men and women.

With a voter turnout of 38.6 percent, the constitution passed with 98.1 percent of the vote.

REFERENDUM RESULTS

GRAPHIC BY STEPH SOLIS

14

The International Relations Review

lim Brotherhood was formally labeled a terrorist group by the government following a deadly bombing in an Egyptian city that killed 15 people. Although a separate jihadi group claimed responsibility and the Muslim Brotherhood denied any links to the killings, the interim, military-backed government seized the opportunity to legally bar their likely

Some speculate that, even though Hosni Mubarak had a military background, the military was willing to support his overthrow because he was grooming his son to succeed him. Gamal Mubarak, the son of Hosni Mubarak, does not have a military background but is a successful businessman. Gamal openly supported the privatization of many industries which at

whether Morsi truly believed that these decrees were the proper way to govern in his ideal Egyptian society, or whether they were last ditch efforts by a leader who recognized the power of the deep state and acted out of desperation.

Whether or not these power grabs would have been enough to lead to his overthrow without the alleged intru-

Although the presidency is a civilian position, his [el-Sisi’s] ties to the military all but ensure that the institution that has historical had so much influence in Egyptian politics will continue to do so. source of future political opposition.4 The Sisi-led overthrow that removed Morsi from power promoted the then-general to the height of popularity amongst the Egyptian people. Reports stated that following the removal of Morsi from power, protesters could be heard chanting “The Army and the People are one hand.” Ironically, this is the same phrase protesters are said to have chanted during the overthrow of Mubarak.

The recently written Egyptian constitution which granted extended powers to the deep state, including the right to try civilians in military courts and gave the army direct control over appointing the defense minister, passed with 98 percent support from the Egyptian people.5 The military retains a sizeable control over Egypt. By current estimates, the Egyptian military’s industries account for between 5 and 40 percent of Egypt’s gross national product. Furthermore, the majority of the regional governors and many heads of corporations and agencies in Egypt have military backgrounds.

the time were controlled by the military.6 By siding with the protesters and preventing Gamal Mubarak from succeeding his father, the military was able to retain its popularity and power in Egypt.

The 2012 constitution under Morsi, which was approved by Egyptian voters, protected the finances of the military and allowed the institution to function more or less autonomously, including naming the defense minister.

Whether or not Morsi ever had a chance to lead is questionable. Certainly, he made mistakes throughout his presidency, which were seen as granting the Muslim Brotherhood an excess of power, and led to resentment amongst the Egyptian people. His executive decree which exempted any of his decisions from judicial oversight brought-upon fears of a return to dictatorship. Amidst the protests that followed Morsi’s expansion of power, the then-president rescinded the order but still planned to go forward with a referendum on a new constitution giving opposition groups little time to build support against it.7 It is questionable

sions of the military and other members of the deep state cannot be determined.

Without question, energy shortages and a lack of social control did give some momentum and public support to the military-led coup which eventually toppled an already unsteady presidency. The result was a continuation of previous Egyptian politics with a new figurehead.

El-Sisi looks poised to be the new leader of a country which will still be led by the deep state. Although the presidency is a civilian position, his ties to the military all but ensure that the institution which has historically had so much influence in Egyptian politics will continue to do so. The Arab Spring revolution in Egypt, therefore, was not much of a revolution at all, but rather a temporary superficial detour from the norm.

The brief, one-year Morsi presidency did nothing but convince the Egyptian people that the status quo was sufficient.

Whether or not the Egyptian people had any real choice in coming to that conclusion is questionable.

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Special Report: Religious Conflict

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The International Relations Review

The Multiple Modernities of Religion in World Affairs Eliza Berg, CAS ‘14

PHOTO BY MADDIE ROSENBERGER, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14

The golden top of the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem. An understanding of the multiple roles of religion in politics and society throughout the world can provide a deeper understanding of international affairs.

In the August 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made a public statement emphasizing the importance of understanding the relationship between religion and contemporary world affairs.

In his announcement of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiative at the White House, Kerry stated: “In fact, if I went back to college today, I think I would probably major in comparative religion because that’s how integrated [religion] is in everything that we are working on and deciding and thinking about in life today.”

Far from the hopes and dreams of secularization theorists, Kerry’s comments reflect the growing awareness of how religious ideas and actors can influence major outcomes in contemporary society.

Indeed, Jose Casanova aptly suggests that “it is time to revise our monological and teleological conceptions of a global cosmopolitan secular modernity against which we can characterize the religious ‘other’ as ‘fundamentalist’’’ to make room for “more complex, nuanced and

reflexive categories which will help us to understand the emerging global system of multiple modernities.”1

Authors like Carrie Wickham, Saba Mahmood, Toby Mattheisen, Michael Barnett and James Hoesterey are a part of this important project to rebuild a system for understanding the multiple roles of religion in modern political, economic and social life.

Since its inception in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has undergone a series of religious and political developments,

Spring 2014 characterized by both progressive and conservative stances on certain issues and variable levels of political involvement.

As Carrie Wickham explains, the Brotherhood does not follow a linear trajectory, and it is instead reactively involved with surrounding political, economic, social and religious forces.

During the beginning of the Mubarak regime in the mid-1980s, individuals and leaders within the Brotherhood, such as Umar al-Tilmisani sought out partnerships with secular political groups. Wickham notes that in the 1984 elections, the “Brotherhood entered into a tactical alliance with the secular nationalist Wafd party.”2 However, they campaigned using religious slogans and ideas, such as “Islam is the solution” and maintained that their participation in political life would help them advance their fundamental religious interests. Wickham writes that al-Tilmisani was not discouraged by the small number of seats the Brotherhood could reasonably win in the 1984 elections, instead emphasizing that they could “use parliament as a minbar (pulpit) from which to disseminate their ideas to the public at large.”3 Despite internal tensions regarding the validity of participating in a political system that did not align with its core values, the Brotherhood maintained its devout religious identity and dedication to shari’a law throughout its entry into electoral politics.4

The Brotherhood also used “secular” tools and ideas to bolster its influence in the political realm. Due to heavy influence and pressure from what Wickham calls the “reformist” trend within the Brotherhood, the group began to emphasize “public freedoms and citizenship rights” and avoided a clear definition of what shari’a rule would mean in practice.5 However, the Brotherhood remained clear that its motivations and intentions were purely Islamic. Although the group advocated for democracy in their efforts to gain political power, it used the Islamic principle of shura (consultation) to legitimize the claim for a “peaceful alternation of power through elections.”6 Additionally, reformers within the Brotherhood used examples from the Qur‘an and the life of the Prophet to show that Islam values freedom, pluralism and human rights.7

Saba Mahmood’s study on the Egyptian women’s mosque movement is char-

19

PHOTO BY MADDIE ROSENBERGER, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14

A cross sits outside an Austrian convent and overlooks the city of Jerusalem.

acterized by similar religious themes, though its methods and effects differ from those of the Brotherhood. Like the Brotherhood, “the women’s mosque movement emerged in response to the perception that religious knowledge, as a means for organizing daily life, had become increasingly marginalized under modern structures of secular governance.”8 However, participants in this movement chose not to operate through a political party, and instead focused on the daily actions and interactions of Muslims. As one of Mahmood’s interlocutors stated, the challenge was “how to make our daily lives congruent with our religion while at the same time moving with the world.”9

Without a strong emphasis on implementing shari’a law in society, the mosque movement does not appear to put forth any blatant political demands, giving it the ability to bridge the supposed publicprivate divide somewhat unnoticed. According to Mahmood, “The mosque movement’s solution to the problem of Egypt becoming increasingly secularized does not directly confront the political order, even though the social transformations it seeks to bring about necessarily involve changing sociopolitical institutions and

ethos.”10

Whether noticed or not, the women’s mosque movement does pose a threat to the aspect of differentiation inherent in many definitions of secularism. If the movement seeks to “introduce a common set of shared norms or standards” that are based on Islamic practice, and apply them to all areas of life, it challenges the claim that religion is and can be separated from the rest of “secular” modern life.11

Unlike some of the strategies that the Muslim Brotherhood pursues, the women’s mosque movement focuses on creating an “Islamic awareness” in already existing institutions. Mahmood explains that within the education system, the women’s mosque movement focuses less on “creating a new curriculum” and more on “emphasizing the study of religious materials that are already part of the curriculum.”12 The women’s mosque movement also seeks to authenticate Islam and the practices of Muslims. Members of the movement therefore distinguish between “folkloric” practices and the actions of a truly virtuous and pious Muslim.13 Yet these strategies have led to objections by Islamist political organizations and activists who want concrete regulations on Islamic

20 ethics and morals in society (shari’a), arguing that the mosque movement keeps “matters of worship and piety incarcerated within what for them is a privatized world of worship.”14 Even with these criticisms, Mahmood argues that the women’s mosque movement blurs the lines between what is private and what is public. The movement shows that religion is not “relegated to its own differentiated sphere”15 and that it can be embedded in all aspects of political modern life.

Not surprisingly, other variations of da’wa (inviting to Islam) have become in-

The International Relations Review seeks to address Indonesia’s perceived “moral crisis.”19 The movement Gema Nusa, which was founded in 2004 by “several prominent religious leaders and politicians…from each of the officially recognized religions in Indonesia,” is one example of a trans-religious organization that exhibits “tolerance without universalism.”20 The spiritual leader of Gema Nusa, Gymnastier, draws on a combination of Islamic and nationalist narratives in order to inspire the movement’s followers. For example, Hoesterey notes that Gymnastiar “looked to the Prophet Muhammad as the

tors and tensions also helps to clarify other contemporary political conditions. Indeed, Toby Mattheisen shows how both the Gulf rulers and protesters involved in the 2011 uprisings drew on religious rhetoric and sectarian tensions in order to achieve their goals. The gulf rulers in particular played upon religious divisions to secure themselves against a perceived threat posed by a united, primarily Shia opposition.

According to Mattheisen, the ruling families in the Gulf states of Bahrain, Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar “had to come up with a narrative that di-

Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia utilized the media to spread propaganda about the “true” motivations of the protesters, hoping to alienate Sunni and leftist supporters who originally participated in the movement. creasingly popular in the Muslim world.

In his work on “prophetic cosmopolitanism,” James Hoesterey shows how “poppreachers” and “self-help gurus” in Indonesia use Islamic ethics and the teachings and example of the Prophet Muhammad to promote a modern cosmopolitan identity.16 Much like the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, Hoesterey’s prophetic cosmopolitanism seeks to rearticulate the meaning of and relationship between “citizen and believer, nation and umma.”17 Prophetic cosmopolitanism does not have a single, all-encompassing political goal, and yet it acts and influences public and political spheres by the very nature of its aims.

Hoesterey finds this phenomenon unique in that it is “inspired by, in dialogue with, even rupturing and revising, the pop psychology of the so-called West,” making it “at once both inspired by, and in opposition to, Western understandings of science, self and citizenship.”18 This form of cosmopolitanism presents an alternative to a secular understanding of the concept, which largely ignores and separates religion and religious identity from the possibility of a transnational, trans-religious community with shared morals and ethics.

Hoesterey’s research exhibits the ways in which prophetic cosmopolitanism

ideal ethical citizen, yet [he] also valorized the heroes and volunteers of Indonesia’s nationalist struggle.”21 Gymnastiar draws heavily upon Islamic history and the example of the Prophet Muhammad in order to illustrate the values of selfknowledge and ethical discipline, but he also appeals to non-Muslim individuals through his emphasis on Indonesian independence and freedom.22 Yet, as Hoesterey notes, this distinction did not necessarily mean that members viewed every religion as equal.23 Hoesterey’s work shows the existence of a pluralistic yet ambivalent prophetic cosmopolitanism: one that is shaped by religious ideas and actors who seek to “reclaim modernity;” is informed by nationalistic tendencies and influenced by “global discourses about psychology and self.”24 The strategies and outcomes of prophetic cosmopolitanism are likely to change in the future, but, will most certainly “depend on how Muslims imagine, summon, and emulate the civic virtues of the Prophet Muhammad.”25

The variations of da’wa practice in Egypt and Indonesia provide excellent opportunities for rearticulating the relationship between religion and politics, but they are context specific and therefore limited in their predictive power. However, taking into account religious ideas, ac-

vided the protesters and prevented a possible common opposition front.”26 One of the Sunni monarchs’ biggest concerns was that the politically marginalized Shia protesters would be able to create a “crosssectarian opposition front”27 with other Sunni protesters, thereby strengthening the opposition and its possible impact.

This was a legitimate concern for the ruling elites: in Bahrain, the majority of protesters present at the Pearl Roundabout were Shia, but there were also a large number of Sunni and leftist groups calling for “national liberation, justice, freedom, and socialism.”28 Mattheisen affirms that the backgrounds of the protesters merely reflected those present in society and that the demands of the protesters were not sectarian in the beginning.29 It was the potential for “cross-sectarian mobilization around basic values and demands,” that prompted the Gulf monarchies to call on the language of the “Sunni-Shia divide” to fracture the opposition.30

Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia utilized the media to spread propaganda about the “true” motivations of the protesters, hoping to alienate Sunni and leftist supporters who originally participated in the movement. They did this by claiming that the protests were part of an “Iranian plot carried out with the help of the local

Spring 2014 Shia populations.”31 Mattheisen exemplifies the effectiveness of this campaign with the story of a young Sunni woman who was active in the beginning of the protests at the Pearl Roundabout, but later decided to support the regime. As the anti-Shia propaganda spread, Shia protesters responded with statements and chants aimed at Shia solidarity centered on the “nationalist myth” that the Shia were the original inhabitants of Bahrain.32 When the Sunni woman confronted her Shia friends about these slogans she could not relate to, they “started to think of her as a traitor.”33 Though Mattheisen ultimately points to a culmination of processes (including violent crackdowns and secret negotiations) for the failed outcome of the protests, it is clear that this government led initiative was partially responsible for the “sectarian inclinations of parts of the protest movement.”34

Political actors do not always draw upon religious sentiments in intentionally divisive ways, as Mattheisen’s example maintains. In contrast, Michael Barnett’s Empire of Humanity shows how religious ideas and actors can mobilize imagined communities of the faithful and compassionate, which effectively created the modern system of humanitarianism. Combined with Enlightenment thinking and the technological advances of the 17th and 18th Christian evangelism amplified the social reform movement by advocating for the salvation and liberation of all peoples.35 The evangelist movement emphasized that individuals “could choose to be saved,”36 and therefore embarked on a mission to spread this knowledge to the nonChristian world. Preaching about the virtues of “chastity, sobriety and hard work,” missionary work often complemented the spirit of colonialism: Barnett notes that “colonial administrators and foreign traders found such projects highly desirable… if successful, the local population would become more compliant, easier to control, and develop tastes and values that were consistent with the interests of the West.”37

Barnett carefully specifies that humanitarian motivations are not without their own contradictions. Early missionary work also shaped the narrative of paternalism that runs through both the history of and current trends in humanitarianism. As Barnett explains, “Although humanitarian-

21

PHOTO BY MADDIE ROSENBERGER, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14 The courtyard outside of Jerusalem’s well-known Dome of the Rock mosque.

ism contained discourses of human equality, they also existed alongside discourses of Christianity, colonialism and commerce that deemed ‘civilized peoples’ superior to the backward populations.”38 Although missionary work was intended to spread an “emancipatory spirit,” it also created and sustained hierarchies and “mechanisms of control,” through which certain individuals were targeted.39 Far from being eradicated by the contemporary discourse of “universal human rights,” paternalism still flourishes in the actions of contemporary aid agencies. In the 1990s, Catholic Relief Services turned their focus inward in an effort to “return to [their] Catholic identity.”40 One of the CRS’s tactics was to reconnect with Catholic Social Teaching by examining “systems and structures” that promote the “common good.”41 Consistent with Barnett’s definition of paternalism, CRS’s tactics resemble the idea that “the most important people to have around the table are the experts and the professionals, not the end users.”42 Barnett’s work therefore illuminates how humanitarian actors and Barnett carefully specifies that humanitarian motivations are not without their own agencies use Christian concepts of compassion, moral obligation, and cer-

tain forms of superiority to justify their tactics and actions.

The religious and political ideas and actors represented in the works discussed here are just a sampling of the ways that religion can influence political outcomes.

It is possible and useful to draw parallels between examples such as the women’s mosque movement and prophetic cosmopolitanism or to contrast the situation in the Gulf with the history of humanitarian aid. However, one must proceed with caution. As the theory of multiple modernities warns, there are diverse ways to be modern and each comes with its own religious, political, economic and social context.

But this does not mean it is impossible to make some informed generalizations. In more cases than not, religious ideas and actors have a significant influence on multiple aspects of public and private life. This generalization must be further broken down into the specific ways that this influence may manifest in a given situation. The results may be frustrating because one is unable to theorize them into a neat package, but this imperfect method is all the more useful for promulgating meaningful understandings of modern life.

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Institutionalized and Informal The Diverse Influences of Religion on Political Change

By Samantha Fox, CAS’14, SPH’ 15

PHOTO BY ANUSHKA PINTO, CGS’15, CAS’17

The Qur’an is the main sacred text of Islam and is believed to be a revelation from God. Secular politcal parties may draw upon relgious belifs ilustrated in the Qur’an in order to move toward a more ideal society. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood look to Islamic sacred text to reinforce their politcal beliefs.

The salience of religion among the global population is an undeniable factor in current world affairs. Political actors utilize both institutionalized and informal mechanisms to disperse ideas they hope will drive political change. These actors often draw upon religious values and organizations because they are imbued with some element of spirituality themselves, which ultimately impacts the way in which they work towards their diverse goals. Such goals include garnering votes for elections, bolstering support for policies and shaping a more ideal society.

Political actors’ strategies of affecting political change can differ, depending on whether they are explicitly secular or religious; however, this difference is largely

rhetorical, not substantive. Religion influences identity much in the same way that other characteristics do and therefore shapes the foundation from which political motivation emerges. This process occurs in varied and contingent ways that can utilize both formal and unofficial channels.

Political parties represent a prevalent institutionalized form of political mobilization that can either expressly utilize religion or remain more secular. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt specifically draws on Islamic texts and values in order to legitimate its positions. In her book, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham analyzes the ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood has interacted with

Islam throughout its political trajectory.

During the drafting of the Egyptian constitution after the 2011 uprising, a Brotherhood spokesman justified the party’s desire to apply the principles of Shari’a. Specifically, he stated, “The Shari’a is what God handed down to the people as a source of guidance. It is a system for all dimensions of life.”1 He goes on to explain that Shari’a regulates the economic system, the organization of the family, punishment for crimes and all other aspects of society. Wickham asserts that this message connects with the Brotherhood’s base because of its religiosity.2 In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood differs from explicitly secular parties by incorporating religious rhetoric. Comparably, secular parties justify themselves in similar

Spring 2014 ways, but through different means.

Instead of pointing to a verse from the Qur’an, for example, a secular political party may employ the language of human rights or cite a legal ruling. Religious parties are dynamic, though, and they also utilize these types of justification. Therefore, a political party’s ability to draw from sources that resonate with its base spans across the political spectrum, threading secular and religious parties together through the process of institutional civic participation that necessitates popular support.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also operate in the formal channel of influencing political outcomes. Suzanne Brenner’s research on religious democratization and gender in Indonesia discusses the NGO Rifka Annisa’s use of religiously infused feminism in order to alter the gender discourse of the public sphere. The NGO employs women who are skilled at reading and interpreting Islamic texts and who demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and feminism.3 The organization then uses its Islamic orientation to push for political change that aims to improve gender equality in Indonesia.

It does this by engaging in community outreach, publishing a weekly newspaper advice column, promoting public education about sexual violence and advocating for policy change regarding gender-based violence at the national level.4 Rifka Annisa employees argue that any form of abuse against women does not align with the moral spirit of Islam, and they once used Islamic legal framework to lobby for an anti-domestic violence bill that eventually was signed into law.5 NGOs often mobilize to affect political change, and, as seen with religiously affiliated ones such as Rifka Annisa, they invoke sacred principles to achieve their goals.

State policy represents another bureaucratic mechanism by which political actors can institute change. Political scientists researched how state policies can exacerbate ethnic conflict or encourage ethnic cooperation in a study that examines the treatment of Jewish people in Romania during the Holocaust. One region of what eventually reunited as Romania, formerly known as Transnistria, fell under the Soviet Union while another area, Bessarabia, joined Romania from 1918 through 1921.6 During the period when the two regions were under dif-

23 ferent rule, the Soviet Union promoted inclusive policies in Transnistria through the Communist Party’s emphasis of national equality, while Bessarabia continued to rule under anti-Semitic policies.7 The researchers then show the increased willingness of Transnistrian citizens to show compassion towards and extend help to Jews during World War II, even at the expense of personal safety.8 The USSR, a state that was not just secular but actively decried religion, purposefully integrated the Jews into society to foster unity and strengthen the Republic, which altered the anti-Semitic outlook. This study demonstrates how state policies can change interethnic relationships by implicitly establishing that there is nothing inevitable or static about religious identities.

States, whether secularly or religiously defined, can therefore use policy to disseminate religious ideas and attitudes that foster certain interactions between individuals of different religious groups, who, in turn, will both react to and pursue new political change.

Political actors also mobilize in less formal ways that seek to establish a religiously inflected moral order for society, rather than maneuvering exclusively through state channels. Da‘wa, a tenant of Islam, aims to inculcate individuals with religious virtues. It does so by expanding the responsibility of Muslims to engage in encouraging others towards greater piety within all aspects of daily life, which in turn affects personal political behavior. Propagators of Da’wa reside throughout the world, and Egyptians serve as one example of them.

Social anthropologist Charles Hirschkind reflects on Da’wa’s use of religious media, specifically cassette-sermons, as a means to cultivate Islamic virtues throughout society and how it then serves as the ethical foundation upon which public discourse can take place.9 Hirschkind argues that religious actors producing cassette-sermons draw upon the evolving Islamic traditions of civic duty to engage individuals in Islamic interaction “with the institutions, concepts, and technologies of modern political life.”10 In his research, cassette-sermons create a space within Cairo’s public sphere, whether in taxicabs, cafes, workplaces, classrooms or other locations, where religious debate can occur autonomously from the policies of the state. These sermons widen the possibility for Muslims to dis-

Egypt’s ranking for women’s rights The Thomson Reuters Foundation’s third annual poll of gender examined the best and worst Arab countries for women since the Arab Spring.

In a poll of 22 Arab countries, Egypt ranked at the bottom.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Comoros Oman Kuwait Jordan Qatar Tunisia Algeria Morocco Libya United Arab Emirates Mauritania Bahrain Djibouti Somalia Palestinian Terr.

Lebanon Sudan Yemen Syria Saudi Arabia Iraq Egypt

24 cuss explicitly religious matters, such as the debate over whether or not music is forbidden in Islam11 and frame everyday activities in an Islamic way, such as remembering to thank God for successful business ventures.12 Once these religious ideas permeate the social fabric of people’s daily lives, they necessarily influence preferences and influence political opinions and choices.

Women’s movements can also utilize informal channels to shape a religiously-

The International Relations Review certain values that do not necessarily aim to change the state, but to encourage a moral order that influences all of society, including politics.

Mahmood’s study of Egyptian women goes beyond the exploration of their efforts to construct a more pious environment.

She demonstrates the feminist impulses of the movement that still ascribe to religious morals, challenging Westerners’ strictly secular conceptions of feminism. Mahmood

and liberal Western secularists by outlining Muslim women’s ability to interpret and contextualize for themselves. She therefore demonstrates that women in the Mosque Movement construct their own future and advocate for their rights from their particular perspectives. Through this line of reasoning, Mahmood makes it clear that, while different from secular women’s motives and goals, Islamic women’s movements are also feminist. Therefore, although this

Political actors operate through formal and informal methods in order to encourage political change. While those operations can either expressly incorporate religion or promote secularism, they ultimately serve similar functions. aware society. The Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement responded to the secularization of Egyptian society under military rule by teaching women how to integrate Islam throughout their lives. Saba Mahmood, a professor of social cultural anthropology at the University of California—Berkeley, explores this movement and explains how women engage with and interpret Islamic sacred texts in order to deduce a set of functional guidelines that can alleviate the issues found in their daily lives.13 Women involved in the Mosque Movement differentiate between superficial outward expressions of piety and authentic application of Islamic virtues. Mahmood describes a discussion about the true meaning of wearing the hijab, in which an Islamic female teacher argues that the hijab does not have significant meaning without the understanding that women should wear it to promote the modesty that Islamic morality stresses.14 This example demonstrates how women interact with religious tradition as part of promoting

explains how modern women’s movements utilize religion by stating that “modern interpretations of Da’wa often draw upon those verses of the Quran that enjoin women and men equally to undertake [religious pedagogy].”15 She highlights how women revisit Islamic texts in the context of women’s rights by pointing out egalitarian passages that espouse justice and fairness for all members of society. She emphasizes that Egyptian women do not aim to prove that they are on equal footing with men, but rather that they have a parallel function that is just as important as their male counterparts.16 Through such explanations, Mahmood explores how a women’s movement can orient itself along the religious lines of modesty, patience, intersectionality and fear of God, rather than the rhetoric of choice so often emphasized in the secular-liberal feminist concepts of agency.

Mahmood challenges the idea that Muslim women are simply pawns in the binary between conservative Islamic jurists

Islamic women’s movement differs from a secular one, both espouse feminist beliefs and consequently are substantively similar.

Political actors operate through formal and informal methods in order to encourage political change. While those operations can either expressly incorporate religion or promote secularism, they ultimately serve similar functions. The Muslim Brotherhood may look to the words of the Qur’an or the Hadith for political justification, as opposed to a discourse of secular law or human rights utilized by a secular party, but both do so in order to converse with and gain support from their popular base. The Egyptian Women’s Mosque Movement and other secular women’s movements, while differing in rhetoric and aspiration, both embody feminism and encompass women who are not ambivalent about politics. The strategies may diverge, but religious ideas and institutions prove just as effective as secular ones and both forms influence the major political outcomes of today.

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Islam in the American Media Amy Gorel, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14 After bombs exploded on April 15, 2013 during the Boston Marathon, the terms “Islamic,” “Muslim” and “Arab” populated the news media. Before meaningful evidence was found, the police held a Saudi man for questioning, causing many news outlets, including CNN, to jump to the conclusion that he was the culprit.

When Rolling Stone magazine's cover featured the bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev wearing an Armani T-shirt, looking like a typical American teenager, audiences were outraged because they perceived the magazine to be portraying him as a “rock star.” People expected photographs of a gruff Arab man, most likely wearing a turban.

The media pays little attention to differentiating the complex makeup of the Muslim population and fails to adequately represent the large portion of Muslim society not connected to terrorism or radicalism. The stereotyped image of Muslims and the Islamic world projected by the American media is influenced by historical tradition, the structure of newsgathering, and the political ambitions of both parties.

Edward Said’s Covering Islam traces anti-Islamism in America to the concept of Orientalism in the 18th century.

Orientalism promotes the radically simplified geography that divides the world into two unequal parts—the Orient and the Occident. Since the Islamic world is part of the Orient, an underlying tension with the West, or Occident, is inevitable.1 During the 20th century, films like Sheikh of Araby used a theme of foreign, dark-skinned Arabs as villains, which was typically the extent of exposure most Americans had to the Arab world.2 Hollywood created films like Elvis Presley’s 1965 Haram Scarum, in which an American hero eventually defeats the violent and barbaric Muslim villain. News accounts of incidents where Muslim groups took Westerners captive, like the 1979 hostage situation in Iran, borrowed from this cultural and narrative model, using the archetypes of heroes and villains to tell the story.3 These underlying prejudices became

PHOTO BY MADDIE ROSENBERGER, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14

The Boston Marathon Bombing Memorial in Copley Square, set up in May 2013.

more pronounced in the 1970s with the oil crisis and Iran’s transition to an Islamic Republic. The oil prices rose when OPEC, a secular organization that happened to include many Muslim nations, as well as Venezuela, introduced foreign pressure on America—provoking a strong reaction of anti-Muslim, anti-Arab, and anti-Iranian sentiment in America. During the Iranian Revolution and particularly the hostage crisis, Persians and Arabs were barely distinguished from each other in media coverage and Islam was associated with the radicals who held the hostages.

The Gulf Conflict from 1990 to 1991 only reinforced the concept that Islamic militancy was the new post-Cold War threat. The attacks on Sept. 11 confirmed for the U.S. that the Muslim world was the new “Other” in conflict for the current era.4 The tendency to juxtapose Islamic images with stories of terrorism and general lack of knowledge among both reporters and the public have promulgated the American public’s stereotypes of the Muslim world.

Said, who was writing about the media in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, found that Westerners in general viewed Muslims as oil suppliers, terrorists and

bloodthirsty mobs in the 1970s. Much of this stems from the fact that “there has been very little place either in the culture generally or in discourse about non-Westerners in particular to speak or even to think, much less to portray, Islam or anything Islamic sympathetically.”5 According to in-depth media studies and interviews about the 1979 Iranian revolution, Americans seem to have accepted the revolution as a defeat for the United States—“a victory of dark over light.”6 Journalistic narrative often employs this good-versus-evil dichotomy. The Muslim community has come to occupy the imagery in America previously held by communists and before them the Japanese through the simplifying efforts of journalists and political actors. Said claimed that “the overall idea about Muslims is that they are the ‘Other’ against whom the collective ‘Self’ should be on guard.”7 The most prevalent terms used in news media, “Islam” and “Muslims,” refer to a group so broad and diverse that the media, through its word choice and its images, confuses the religious and the radicals, the terrorists and the citizens.

The adjective “Islamic” is used

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PHOTO BY STEPH SOLIS, COM ‘14

Boston Marathon participants crowd the Back Bay area after being stopped less than a mile from the finish line. A wave of Islamophobia emerged shortly after the marathon bombings. Later that day, a Saudi was reported to be in custody and his apartment was searched. The man, who was wounded in the attack, was subsequently cleared.

to describe the criminal activities of terrorists in a way that would not be used if they were referring to a similar criminal act committed by a Christian or a Jew.8 Headlines in The New York Times, Newsweek, The Atlantic and Time have read: “Islam versus the West,” “The Sword of Islam” and “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Though the 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” explains the complexity of Muslim communities, the controversial title was more influential on the public than the details of the seven-page article.9 These titles play into the “Self and Other” narrative, the notion of good versus evil, America versus Islam.

Image choice in stories concerning the Muslim population and radical Islamist terrorist attacks adds to the misconceptions. Visual representation of “Islamic fundamentalism” tends to come from a specific stock of images including: the hijab, the cloak and turban worn by the Muslim ulema, people prostrating in

Islamic prayer, mosques, Arabic writing, camels, and desert dunes. These images communicate a great amount of information without verbalizing it. The idea of a Muslim enemy in the eyes of the public has been validated by the onslaught of these type of images associated with words or stories that cause a person to recall airplane hijackings, western hostages, Islamic law, and the suppression of human rights.

These frames are deeply entrenched in cultural assumptions over many generations and even, as some like Karim argue, over the past 14 centuries in Western civilization.10 A Time magazine issue in 1979 devoted its major story to Islam.

Its cover was a bearded muezzin in a minaret calling the faithful to prayer with the headline “The Militant Revival,” even though the spread of militancy in the Middle East is not inherently linked to the specific Muslim prayer.11 The “Bloodshot Lens,” a term coined by Karim, is the tendency of the American media to only portray the

Muslim world through the lens of conflict.

Islam, Muslims, and the Arab world got very little coverage in America before Sept. 11, other than during other crises or acts of terrorism.12 “More significantly, the occasions for public discourse on Islam, by experts or by non-experts, have almost always been provided by political crises,” claims Said, even though numerous other achievements and activities before Sept. 11 were newsworthy.13 Despite a population of more than one billion Muslims in the world, American news only highlights those who dramatically break the law.

Those Muslims who are presented in a favorable light from accomplishments or performances are often discussed without mentioning the terms “Islam,” “Muslim,” or “Islamic.”14 A common theme in the reporting of terrorist attacks, hostage situations, or political crises involving the Islamic world is the over-coverage of the victims (not to mention the under-coverage of alternative

Spring 2014 motivations and broader contexts). By emphasizing the plight of the victims, the media heightens the sensitivity of the audience to perceive the innocent Americans and the barbaric, evil “Others.”

However, The New York Times was found to be an exception in their coverage of Islam in light of the 9/11 attacks, according to Christopher Vecsey’s analysis. Unlike

27 goals, but so does the smooth narrative of a violent attack, which feeds the news appetite for a story with a villain, heroes, and victims. “They believe that the most spectacular and the most bloody events will result in the most extensive media coverage,” and it does in terms of quantity if not quality.19 Nacos cites an example of the suicide

Times issued apologies on their front pages for falling victim to “groupthink.”

They ignored all voices skeptical of the initialization of violence and pushed onesided news through the papers without realizing the misinformation and the sources in the administration and Iraqi opposition that were fed to them. As Karim concludes, “in short, media on both sides

The main misconception in the media that every action a Muslim takes must be connected to Islam ignores that Muslims are also influenced by their different societies, cultures, socioeconomic backgrounds, and levels of conservatism. other media outlets, The Times made some distinctions between the Muslims who attacked America and the innocent Muslim faithful, as well as identified villains through in-depth profiles of the men responsible for the attacks. With the media as the teacher of all things Middle East and Islam, The Times provided an example of how to cover the subject fairly.15 The framing of a news story affects the result in many ways. Journalists, editors, and producers have the choice of the topics, sources, language and photographs they use to depict a story. “The media tend to report the news along explanatory frames that cue the reader, listener, and viewer to put events, issues, and political actors into contextual frameworks of reference,” Nacos concludes.16 News is framed along traditional concepts and perceptions of the society, which results in persistent patterns of how the media portrays and how people perceive race, ethnicity and religion.17 The media is projecting a “false” Islam in relation to the “real” Islam elsewhere in the world.18 Acts of terrorism are inherently acts of publicity that take advantage of the media’s coverage. Acting in the name of Islam, radical Muslim terrorists have a broader goal in mind than just killing three or even 3,000 people in an attack.

Terrorists commit violence to spread their propaganda, and with today’s modern communication technology, terrorists know their message will be spread rapidly and to a broader audience than ever before.

Not only does new technology aid their

bomber in August 2003 in Jerusalem.

Strategically, the Palestinian Hamas group released a written press statement claiming responsibility for the bombing and a pretaped video of the bomber explaining his deed. This video was released to media who were craving content on the event and did not have information about the victims yet. To be successful, terrorists need access to the triangle of political communication consisting of the mass media, the public and governmental decision-makers. “The media report—and over-report—the public watched, and decision-makers pay attention to both the media’s frenzy and the public’s fearful reactions,” writes Nacos. 20 By putting on these horrific “dramas” on an international stage, they gain access to the triangle and become the topic of all three platforms.”21 There are also political motivations from the U.S. government at work. The media is a platform that is forced to work with what it can find.

Its stories are based on the words and actions of government officials, citizens and international actors. Former President George W. Bush said in a memorable sound bite, “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward.” He fed off the American prejudices and the need to have a scapegoat for the terrible attack.

The media had to use the Bush speech in their content, and a sweeping statement of this kind left no room for the discussion of other causes and motivations on the public stage.

During the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Washington Post and The New York

were ‘weaponized,’ transformed from channels of understanding to tools of violence.”22 To rectify this stereotyping promoted by the media, historian Fred Halliday suggests that it is more important to analyze the history and culture—not just what Muslims say and what they believe, but what they actually do.23 The main misconception in the media that every action a Muslim takes must be connected to Islam ignores the fact that Muslims are also influenced by their different societies, cultures, socioeconomic backgrounds, and levels of conservatism. The media and those who fuel it advance these stereotypes of Muslims and the Islamic world.

Islamophobia in American media is both a result of a culture accustomed to stereotypes, as evidenced by the critiques of the Tsarnaev cover on Rolling Stone, and a main player in promulgating the stereotypes. The news media is in more of a position than the average American to generate a more fair view of Muslims, Islam and the Arab world, but in light of the way media is created and framed that is easier said than done. The “weaponized” use of the media by both the United States and the terrorists seeking a way to develop their propaganda only makes the situation more intractable. These factors result in a media-validated view of Muslims, Islam, and the Arab world as a unified front, without highlighting variations among its people who act on different motivations, practice their religion differently and represent different ethnic backgrounds.

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Breaking the U.S.-Iran Impasse Annis Khalil Saniee, CAS ‘15 In his 2002 State of the Union Address, U.S. President George W. Bush included Iran in his list of countries that constituted an “axis of evil,” squandering an opportunity to embark on a path of a more symbiotic, trusting relationship between the U.S. and Iran.

Bush’s deliberate affront came at a time when the reform-minded administration of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, which existed on a platform of forging a more conciliatory relationship with the United States and its allies, was calling for constructive dialogue with the West.

The Iranian administration was working cooperatively with the Americans in

actions indicated an openness, like Khatami, to improve relations with the West and increase trust. Since his election, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, have broken new ground in U.S.-Iran relations. The September 27 phone call between Obama and Rouhani was the first of its kind since the 1979 Revolution. Recent talks between the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France and Germany) and Iran in Geneva resulted in a groundbreaking, albeit limited, interim agreement struck on November 24. While it is wise to remain skeptical of a regime whose real power lies in the hands of its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has shown a consistent,

Washington is swarming with legislators adamantly loyal to AIPAC, warmongerers and neo-cons obsessed with the idea of regime change and eager to legitimize a military strike, all of which aim to perpetuate the current crisis. their struggle to evict the Taliban from Afghanistan following the 2001 invasion, even agreeing to support Afghanistan’s new American-backed president, Hamid Karzai.

This temporary and fragile alliance between the two bitter enemies could have served as the foundation for a reconciliation of various complex issues that have plagued their relationship since 1979. The American approach toward the troubled U.S.-Iran relationship in recent times, particularly in 2002 and 2003, was not smart. However, recent political developments have given the United States and Iran the opportunity to start making better choices in their relationship, and it would be wise for the United States to take this opportunity, in spite of past tensions.

After eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s confrontationalist attitude and the perpetuation of an international crisis over nuclear proliferation in a misguided search for national solidarity following the 2009 Green Movement protests, Iran inaugurated a new president, Hassan Rouhani, on August 3. His words and

uncompromising disdain toward the West, it would not be wise to now resume the preGeneva policy toward Iran, which included steadily intensifying crippling sanctions on the Iranian economy and military threats like “all options are on the table.”

The United States cannot afford to keep squandering opportunities like the 2010 Turkey-Brazil proposal, in which Iran agreed to ship 1.2 metric tons of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 120 kilograms of enriched isotope for a Tehran medical nuclear reactor. The United States rejected this deal in the UN Security Council in favor of another round of sanctions. These types of pressures only serve to perpetuate tensions between two nations in both of whose best interest is to negotiate openly and honestly to reach a peaceful long-term agreement. Doing so would deter, rather than bolster, the ultra-conservatives and neocon equivalents, the “principlists,” in Tehran who aim to make any attempt at détente unsuccessful in pursuit of their own goals.

The failure of the Almaty, Kazakhstan Nuclear Talks with the P5+1 in April

2013 was not only a consequence of the Ahmadinejad administration’s confrontational attitude, but also because of the Americans’ uncompromising stance.

If the United States had really been serious about making Tehran a solid proposal, it would have included at least a willingness to reel back the heavier sanctions on the Iranian economy.

Unfortunately, Congress has been consistently intransigent with sanctions.

Just days before Rouhani’s inauguration, the House passed a new sanctions bill on a vote of 400 to 20. It was followed by a letter backed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to the White House signed by 76 U.S. senators published merely two days after the inauguration, urging Obama to impose yet more sanctions and to stress the military option. Even now, in the aftermath of the breakthrough Geneva agreement, there are hawks in Congress drafting new sanctions bills.

Washington legislators must set aside their bellicose attitude and interventionist rhetoric and instead continue to show a serious willingness to listen, to treat their Iranian counterparts with respect and to make certain compromises. So far, American diplomats under Kerry’s leadership have done fairly well in this regard. However, Washington is swarming with legislators adamantly loyal to AIPAC, warmongers and neo-cons obsessed with the idea of regime change and eager to legitimize a military strike, all of which aim to perpetuate the current crisis. If America really wants to show the world that it has legitimate moral authority and methodological ability to competently and effectively assist other parts of the world when needed, it needs to at least ensure a modicum of stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and meticulously push for a diplomatic solution to the debacle in Syria.

America needs Iran for both these things.

America must embrace this opportunity to reconcile with an old and bitter rival in continuing to pursue a more substantial nuclear deal. Sanctions may have played a role in pressuring Iran to come to the table in the first place, but the U.S. must be willing to make concessions to the Iranians in negotiations. The alternative is to accommodate an interminable feedback loop of crisis perpetuation. It will take prudence and a healthy dose of skepticism to make a breakthrough in one of the longest-standing rivalries in the international community.

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Food Insecurity Plagues WarTorn Central African Republic

Despite the efforts of international peacekeepers, such as French and African Union troops, the violence continues to worsen. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), internal displacements in CAR amount to more than 900,000, while more than 200,000 individuals have taken refuge in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon and principally Chad, a predominantly Muslim country. It is recorded that one in five people in Central African Republic have fled their homes in fear for their survival. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs affirms that “an estimated 2.5 million people–well over half of the country’s 4.6 million residents– are in need of humanitarian assistance.”

The intensifying violence in CAR capital Bangui, as well as that in other major northwestern towns such as Bossangoa, Bozoum and Bouar, is causing the major dislocation of shelter-seeking Muslim communities. This is an impetus for high food insecurity in CAR, where about 90 percent of people eat just one meal a day.

Such large-scale population displacements have caused a significant decline in crop and livestock production, as farmers cannot access their fields, or find them ruined and looted. This presents a catastrophic economic problem, since the agricultural sector makes up more than 60 percent of CAR’s national GDP and encompasses 80 percent of its working population. As a result of the aforementioned political instability, most individuals find themselves without any source of income. The number of civilians without physical and economic access to food has considerably exacerbated the security crisis in CAR. Moreover, the inability to export agricultural products has marked a significant decline in foreign exchange earnings, worsening the situation. Central African Republic, already one of the poorest countries in the world, has a GDP per capita of U.S. $450 and was ranked 180th of 187 countries by the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index in 2012. The disruption in production activities caused by the civil conflict has left 1.6 million people in dire need of food assistance and has brought the food insecurity problem to the forefront of the nation’s priority challenges.

An article in the Economist warns

By Sara Jabbari, CAS’15 Central African Republic, a landlocked and sparsely populated country, has a long history of sectarian violence, which has impeded its economic development and fostered its socio-political disorder.

The profound inter-religious tensions between its significant Christian and marginal Muslim populations explain Central African Republic’s (CAR) legacy of coups, mutinies and rebellions. These have been especially predominant in the last three decades and have plunged the country into permanent instability.

The most recent religious conflict in CAR highlights its deeply rooted sectarian divisions, as Muslim Séléka and Christian anti-balaka forces clash. This violence has forced the displacement of thousands of Central African Republic civilians and has created a country-wide food insecurity crisis, further devastating the already impoverished country. This article will identify the food insecurity problem that is deeply affecting the largely at-risk population of the conflict-ridden Central African Republic. It will first highlight the underlying causes and sources of the religious civil conflict, then discuss food insecurity and its repercussions on the vulnerable population and finally analyze the responses or solutions proposed by many humanitarian agencies working to restore hunger relief and human safety in the Central African Republic.

The concept of food security is central to the development of nations and the security of human life. It is therefore a crucial issue in today’s world. The current situation in Central African Republic demonstrates that food security presents a global challenge that must be met with worldwide humanitarian assistance. Underdeveloped countries beg the international community to recognize the urgency of humanitarian responsiveness; however, as some literature will suggest, realizing these solutions may present logistical problems.

In December 2012, an alliance of Muslim rebel forces known as Séléka, the local Sango term for “coalition,” launched

an attack on the former government of Francois Bozize, then-president of CAR. The Muslim rebels subsequently took control of the country and in April installed their leader the first Muslim president of CAR, Michael Djotodia, as the transitional head of government. However, in response to the killings and lootings carried out after the Muslim ascension to power, the Christian militias and supporters of Bozize, known as anti-balaka (“anti-machete”), carried out reprisals on the Muslim minority. Since December 2013, the country has experienced brutal sectarian violence.

Due to increased international censure regarding his inability to assuage the crisis, Djotodia stepped down and Bangui mayor Catherine Samba Panza replaced him as interim president. Nonetheless, atrocities continue to mount as the ongoing and increasingly volatile conflict has transformed into a humanitarian emergency.

The combination of human rights violations, the lack of justice and protection for the civilian population, and the absence of economic development provoke a grave sense of insecurity in CAR. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, who is currently investigating the potential crimes against humanity during the conflict, says the crimes comprise “hundreds of killings, acts of rape and sexual slavery, destruction of property, pillaging, torture, forced displacement and recruitment and use of children in hostilities.” Christian militias, with the orchestrated intent of expelling their religious opponents, continue to perform a vindictive mass “ethnic cleansing,” (considered an appropriate term by Amnesty International) of the Muslim community that makes up a mere 10 to 15 percent of the nation’s population. In fact, “the cultural border separating Muslim North Africa from Christian Sub-Saharan Africa runs right through the Central African Republic,” a clear indication of the magnitude of religious discord and the struggle for power that has claimed thousands of lives and displacing nearly one million people.

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PHOTO BY PAOLA PAYNETTI VELÁZQUEZ, CAS ‘15

In an effort to alleviate the food insecuirty crisis in CAR, the United Nations has heavily asserted their prescence in the cause by coordinating the Food Security Cluster which provides sustenance to displaced citizens.

that “the exodus of Muslim traders and cattle-herders could lead to catastrophic famine and economic collapse,” as prices of staples continue to soar and the potential of generating income remains nonexistent. Due to the displacement of many cattle herders, meat is both scarce and expensive, while corn prices have doubled and supplies of sugar and flour have fallen remarkably. The price of cassava, a main staple food in CAR, has gone up 20 percent. Currently, approximately 1.6 million people, more than one third of the CAR’s population, require life-saving food assistance. In response to the hunger crisis, several humanitarian agencies have coordinated a “strategic response plan” for the beginning of 2014 that aims to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected population of CAR. The emergency plan targets 1.9 million people and prioritizes the hunger crisis. It underlies its severity by confirming, “households’ financial access to food is already very limited and would further deteriorate if no emergency livelihood restoration and protection ac-

tion is taken.” Two United Nations humanitarian actors working closely together, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), collectively known as the “Food Security Cluster” rely heavily on donor support in order to sustain their operational capacity in Central African Republic. Their foremost objective is to deliver food to the displaced populations whose nutritional status is quickly deteriorating amidst the brutal conflict.

Since December, the World Food Programme (WPF), “the world’s largest humanitarian agency fighting worldwide hunger,” has provided emergency food relief to over 280,000 displaced persons in CAR. Bangui is its primary distribution site, since it contains the highest proportion of displaced persons living in makeshift shelters. Huge crowds gather at distribution sites like the Bangui Airport when the WFP distributes food, consisting of mainly rice and maize. In an interview with the WFP, Fideline Begio, a mother of five who is currently residing in the Bangui Airport

camp, highlights how the emergency food aid may help reduce chronic malnutrition affecting children in CAR: “I’ve lived here with my five children for over two months. Food is complicated. We don’t have money. Sometimes, all we can eat are cassava leaves. There is a market in the camp, but without money it’s complicated. We can spend two days without eating. These cereals will help us to prepare porridge for the children in the morning.”

Nonetheless, challenges confront the WFP’s food distribution endeavors. Due to the violence obstructing supply routes, many trucks are blocked and unable to deliver the food they are carrying. The relief organization notes that at one point, “43 vehicles remained stranded at the Cameroon border as drivers refused to proceed mostly due to the insecurity along the road.” Some of these convoys have relied on military escorts to deliver food. However, in response to the concerns raised regarding the security of aid workers, the

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WFP has resorted to airlifting food from Cameroon.

On February 13, the first cargo landed in Bangui carrying 80 tons of rice, marking the agency’s “biggest emergency air operation in a long time.” Despite some successes, the airlifts will not be sufficient to reach the largely at-risk and vulnerable population of Central African Republic.

This method of transportation has drastically increased the cost of their operations: “The WFP has said that the price of transporting by air the estimated 1,800 metric tons of mostly rice – enough to feed 150,000 people for a month – would be $2 million, roughly five times more expensive than transportation by road, which is insecure and deemed too unreliable to transport all the food aid.” At the onset of the Strategic Response Plan, the Food Security Cluster estimated that 180 million U.S. dollars would be needed to effectively achieve its objectives. The World Food Programme relies heavily on funds voluntarily donated by various governments, although, since its petition in January, it has not recently received additional funding since. A United Nations report asserts: The current WFP funding situation is insufficient to cover needs. WFP’s emergency operation running from January to August 2013 currently faces a $95 million shortfall (88 percent of resources), for food, nutrition and emergency school means. Additional commitments are urgently required to secure stocks in time, especially in light of the required pre-positioning ahead of the rainy season which starts in April.

Without the necessary funding, the food stocks provided by the WFP will soon be depleted. According to the members of the Food Security Cluster, “some 60 percent of household respondents indicated that they no longer have any food stocks and 85 percent indicated that they will be running out in two weeks - in the midst of the country’s dry season.” In addition to the insufficient food reserves due to low crop production, the large deficiency in seeds, agricultural equipment and other livelihood assets pose a serious challenge for farmers in the upcoming main planting season in March. In order to resume cultivation and re-immerse these rural communities in their “productive livelihoods,”

the WFP’s close partner, the FAO has emphasized the need to supply farmers with essential materials and seeds as the next harvest approaches.

A Multisectorial Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) performed by various UN agencies states that “94 percent of communities report that they do not have enough seeds to plant for the next agricultural season.” In response, the FAO has demanded that supplies of quality seeds and essential agricultural tools be delivered to farmers to ensure successful land preparations for the March planting season.

An FAO representative in Central African Republic claims that the upcoming agricultural season can be a “critical turning point for food security in the country, where around 75 percent of the population relies on small-scale agriculture for their food and income. He adds that “if we can make seeds and tools available, farmers displaced within a few kilometers of their villages will return to their fields in time to plant if the security situation permits, while others will plant around their camps.” John Ging, the UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs’ operations director, emphasizes the need to help farmers resume productive activities: “The most urgent needs are… assistance with seeds and tools for helping people to recover their livelihoods. We in the international community have to mobilize very strongly in support of agriculture in this country. We’ve got to focus on helping people to help themselves.”

Prioritizing long-term sustenance, the FAO has mobilized resources to supply farmers with agricultural inputs. So far 40,000 out of 150,000 farming families targeted in the Strategic Response Plan have received essential seeds and tools.

The agency’s funding, which consists of contributions from “the Africa Solidarity Trust Fund, Belgium, the Central Emergency Response Fund, Sweden and the United States of America as well as from FAO’s own funding mechanisms” faces a $37 million funding gap prohibiting it from assisting the remaining 110,000 individuals. However, the humanitarian goals of FAO are constrained not only by money but also by time: “loss or sale of productive assets, will also affect the production of the next agricultural season.”

These organizations underline the importance of acting quickly before the

rainy season in Central African Republic, where the majority of the population live in rural areas and “agriculture is the only option.” However, without continued funding and donor support, the Food and Agricultural Organization will not be able to support and prepare farmers for the upcoming harvests of local staple crops like maize and sorghum.

Currently, the FAO “is in the process of rebuilding CAR’s seed stocks: it’s collecting seeds from neighboring countries, as well as Nigeria.” The emergencies director of FAO, Dominique Burgeon, emphasizes that “if the organization fails to support CAR farmers now, the population will need protracted food assistance”, which will produce an even more “terrible situation” for the country.

Central African Republic’s legacy of religious tensions has consistently contributed to the country’s violent chaos, political instability and economic hardship. The current crisis is the most horrific civil conflict the population of CAR has witnessed.

Bloodshed against religious communities, including civilians, has provoked an international humanitarian outcry. The anti-balaka forces have carried out countless human rights abuses against their opponents and have caused a large percentage of the population to flee their homes. Due to ongoing violence, the internally displaced populations are left without access to food and without means for production.

The Food Security Cluster, a United Nations coordinated effort with the World Food Programme that delivers immediate food assistance, and the FAO, which provides the means to re-engage in productive capacities, have implemented initiatives to assist the affected populations in CAR since the outbreak of the food security crisis.

With the inability of international peacekeeping forces to mediate the conflict, the likelihood that the violence will soon end remains unlikely. It is therefore critical that farmers proceed with agricultural activities in order to generate the necessary means for human sustainability and economic revitalization, though “the immediate challenge is to mobilize the international community to provide the funds required to both prepare the country’s agriculture sector for the next harvest and tackle the grinding poverty that so many face.”

Featuring Venice

The IR Review accepts stand-alone photos for publication.

This issue includes a feature photo from Venice.

Venice is working to protect its city against flooding. The city successfully tested a $7 billion flood-protection project in October. The project, known as the Moses System, has gates designed to lower the intensity of tidal currents and prevent flooding.

Photo Credit: Anushka Pinto, CGS ‘15, CAS ‘17

Exploitation in

Antarctica

PHOTOS BY VALERIA GIACHETTI, CAS ‘16

36

The International Relations Review

Editorial: Curbing Japan’s Whaling Practices in the Southern Coast Japan has long been a leader in commercial whaling. In the 1930s, Japan took to the Southern Ocean, killing whales for their meat and oil. The Germans bought whale oil from the Japanese to in the years leading up to World War II. Since then, Japanese whaling has increased exponentially, becoming more commercialized and more damaging to the environment. Whale populations are dwindling in the Antarctic, being mined rather that sustainably fished. Many of the 13 “great whale” species are endangered or seriously threatened because of whaling practices, most notably those of Japan.

In May 2010, Australia and New Zealand brought a case against Japan in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based in the Hague, claiming that Japan’s whaling operations in the Antarctic violated their legal obligations under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Under this convention, Japan is prohibited from engaging in commercial whaling operations, using factory ships for the processing of whales and whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.1 Japan signed off on this convention, agreeing to abide by its rules and provisions. However, Norway and Iceland who also whale in the Southern Ocean, refused to sign the convention.

While Japan claimed that the whaling and processing of whales was for scientific research, which is allowed by the convention, Australia provided evidence to the contrary claiming it to be “commercial whaling in disguise.”2 In 1982, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) established a zero catch limit for all whaling with two notable exceptions: aboriginal whaling for those native tribes whose subsistence is based on whaling, and scientific research. Both examples are limited and must be reviewed by committees before any whaling actually occurs.3 In 1994, the IWC banned all whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary and prohibited the use of factory ships, which could be used to kill whales and process the meat while on board. Japan’s Whale Research

Program (JARP II) was granted a special permit in the Antarctic to capture and take samples of limited numbers of whales for scientific research, with permission to kill only a select few species and only when absolutely necessary to obtain samples for study.4 Although it has been clear to the international public that Japan’s whaling operations were malicious and dangerous to the environment, the ICJ finally conceded that there was a preponderance of evidence that Japan abused their whaling privileges and violated three of the convention’s provisions.5 After years of deliberation, on March 31, the ICJ ruled in favor of Australia and declared that Japan must immediately cease its whaling operations in the Southern Ocean. They based their decision largely on Japan’s killing and processing of fin, humpback and minke whales, all prohibited by the scientific permit. On average, JARP II killed 450 minke whales annually in the Antarctic, which is about half the target sample size of minke whales in the area. In addition, the program has killed 50 fin and 50 humpback whales per season.6 Throughout its investigation, the ICJ found that since the JARP II was granted the permit in 2005, some 3,600 minke whales have been captured and killed while providing very little scientific output, yet boosting whale meat commercially.7 While Japan still disagreed with the Court’s decision, believing it to be an attempt by Australia to implement its own cultural norms in Japan, they initially agreed to abide by the decision, which is legally binding. However, just a few days after they announced their cooperation with the convention, Japan did an about-face and announced that they would continue their whaling operations in the Antarctic with a “redesigned program.”8 They celebrated this new program with a whale buffet for hundreds of officials and lawmakers. Japan’s lack of concern for the environment and the whaling population in Antarctica in the past, leaves little hope for any improvement in this new program in the future.

Japan claims whaling to be a part of their culture, but one must wonder where the line between culture and commerce is drawn. Tribes around the world, like the Makah in Washington state, whale on the premise of cultural survival, but are not so controversial. Tribes such as these are granted permission to whale under the provision that they need the meat to sustain themselves and their society. They also kill on average only two or three whales per year, use the entrails and blubber for clothing and the bones for constructing shelter–no part of the whale goes to waste in tribal societies. Japan, however, cannot make such claims. They kill hundreds of whales every year, whale meat is not the sole staple in the Japanese diet and the entrails and bones are thrown out with the trash. Japan is killing off whales faster than they can breed, causing a massive decrease in whale populations.

Much of present-day media attention focuses on Japan’s whaling in the Antarctic. News articles, magazine features and the increasingly popular TV show, Whale Wars all discuss the criminality of Japan’s commercial whaling system. However, it is important to remember that Norway and Iceland also have a very strong whaling presence in the Southern Ocean. Although they do not pose as much of a threat to whale populations and seem to take relatively more measures to whale sustainably, they still do perpetrate commercial whaling in this region. The Northern Ocean is also heavily whaled by all three nations, yet almost no media coverage is given to the region and this or any other ICJ case comes to its defense, leaving it open to exploitation.

Policymakers are standing and taking notice of the whaling practices in Antarctica, but it is too early to say whether policies will curb commercialized whaling from Japan.

The staff editorial was written by Maddie Rosenberger, COM ‘14, CAS ‘14. For more information about the IR Review editors, visit irr.buiaa.org.

The IR Review Editorial Board Maddie Rosenberger, Editor-in-Chief Abbie Gotter, Managing Editor Steph Solis, Senior Layout Editor Vincent Jordan, Layout Editor Anushka Pinto, Layout Editor Kelsea-Marie Pym, Ad Manager Jatnna Garcia, Ad Manager Nisha Shah, Senior Copy Editor Sam Coyle, Copy Editor Jesse Crane, Copy Editor Sophia Qadir, Copy Editor Becca Shipler, Copy Editor Paulina Limasalle, Copy Editor Pariza Lovos, Copy Editor

CAS ‘14, COM ‘14 CAS ‘14 COM ‘14 CAS ‘15 CGS ‘15, CAS ‘17 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘14 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘15 CAS ‘17 CAS ‘17

About The IR Review The International Relations Review, ISSN 2152-738X, is a subsidiary of the Boston University International Affairs Association. The IR Review is an international relations magazine serving the undergraduate students at Boston University. With a circulation of nearly 1,200 the IR Review has striven to create a forum for students interested in international affairs. It recently launched a website, irr.buiaa.org, that publishes articles on historical topics. The website is open to submissions from graduate students and others outside of Boston University’s undergraduate population.

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Cover Photo

The cover photo used for the Spring 2014 edition of the IR Review was taken

by IR Review Editor-in-Chief Maddie Rosenberger, COM’14, CAS’14.

Special Report Photo

The photo introducing the Special Report of the Spring 2014 edition was taken by IR Review Advertising Manager Jatnna Garcia, CAS ‘14.

INTERNSHIPS FIND YOUR CAREER ABROAD.

4 bu.edu/abroad