The Irrawaddy Magazine (May 2013, Vol.20 No.4)

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China Sizes up a Changing Myanmar

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EDITOR and DIRECTOR: Aung Zaw

MANAGER: Win Thu

TheIrrawaddy

The Irrawaddy magazine covers Myanmar, its neighbors and Southeast Asia. The magazine is published by Irrawaddy Publishing Group (IPG) which was established by Myanmar journalists living in exile in 1993. The IPG is an independent, non-profit organization providing in-depth news and information.

EDITOR (English Edition): Kyaw Zwa Moe

COPY DESK: Neil Lawrence; Paul Vrieze; Samantha Michaels

CONTRIBUTORS to this issue: Aung Zaw; David I. Steinberg; Edith Mirante; Kyaw Phyo Tha; Kyaw Zwa Moe; Marwaan Macan-Markar; Mu Sochua; Wai Moe; William Boot; Yun Sun

PHOTOGRAPHERS: JPaing; Steve Tickner

LAYOUT DESIGNER: Banjong Banriankit

MAILING ADDRESS: The Irrawaddy, P.O. Box 242, CMU Post Office, Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand.

YANGON OFFICE : No. 197, 2nd Floor, 32nd Street (Upper Block), Pabedan Township, Yangon, Myanmar. TEL: 01 388521, 01 389762

EMAIL: editors@irrawaddy.org

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In Brief

In Focus

44

Business Roundup OPINION

12| Viewpoint

Myanmar’s Buddhists and Muslims

Divided by Fire

51| Guest Column

SALES&ADVERTISING: adversiting@irrawaddy.org

adversiting@irrawaddy.org

PRINTER: Chotana Printing (Chiang Mai, Thailand)

PUBLISHER: Thaung Win (Temp-1728)

Lessons from Cambodia LIFESTYLE

46

Travel

Serenity Over Inle Lake

48

Food

▪ Lapet Thoke and the American Dream

▪ Kim Jong-un’s Ladies in Yangon

50

Books

Crispy, Spicy, Pungent

52

Q&A

Back to the Land of Green Ghosts

FEATURES

14 | Conflict: Sectarian Violence Rages in Central Myanmar

Tensions are high between Buddhists and Muslims in the wake of a recent wave of religious violence. What caused it, and will it threaten ongoing reforms?

20 |

Regional: In Malaysia’s Election, a Focus on Rainforest Graft

As Malaysia’s rainforests fall victim to corruption, its ruling party could be next to get the chop

24 | Regional: Vietnam’s Internet Dilemma: Online Censorship

Another name has been added to the growing list of Vietnamese bloggers accused of crossing a red line in the communist-ruled country, where the guardians of the one-party state brook no criticism that challenges its supremacy.

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COVER The Great Game Over Myanmar

As the former pariah state shakes off pawn status, the playing field transforms—and world powers make moves for influence

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COVER The Road Past Mangshi

With more leverage in the West, Myanmar looks at its powerful northern neighbor in a new light

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COVER China’s Tug of War

Beijing’s grip slips as Myanmar changes course, but the Asian superpower isn’t stepping aside yet

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Profile: Cooking for the Lady

How did the democracy icon eat under house arrest? Her former chef tells us about a hidden kitchen, meal deliveries past the military, and more

40

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Business: SE Asia Ready to Build, But Will Investors Come?

The region is expected to spend 600 billion on infrastructure over the next decade, but but foreign investors have been slow to get on board

42 | Business: Beer Wars

Myanmar is set for a frothy fight, and locals can expect to drink up

Press Freedom, With Limits

As Myanmar moves to reform its media sector, reporters have received some mixed messages: While President U Thein Sein’s government has won praise for abolishing pre-publication censorship, releasing journalists from prison and allowing private daily newspapers to publish for the first time in 50 years, the Ministry of Information recently released a controversial draft of a new press law that critics say will tighten the state’s grip on media content.

The ministry’s draft came as a surprise to many, as it was released without input from local media at a time when reporters and editors on the newly formed Press Council were collaborating with the government to write their own version of a press law which would have likely allowed for greater media freedom.

In this context, one the world’s major international media watchdogs, the USbased Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), came to Yangon to investigate the state of Myanmar’s press freedom. CPJ’s representative on Southeast Asia, Shawn Crispin, met with more than 30 journalists and editors to ask how their situation had improved and to determine areas of lingering concern. He plans to compile the information into a comprehensive report over the next couple of months, but in this interview, he gives Irrawaddy editor Kyaw Zwa Moe and senior reporter Kyaw Phyo Tha an early preview of his findings.

After talking with journalists in Yangon, can you see any concrete signs of press freedom?

To my mind, this is very much a ‘freedom with limits’ situation. The government has allowed for more openness for the media. The media are able to cover political topics and they’re able to put opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on the cover of their newspapers. … All of these were no-go areas about three or four years ago.

But to our [CPJ’s] mind, and to many of the journalists and editors I spoke with, the feeling is that the reforms are incomplete, and that more still needs to be done so journalists here can truly

operate without fear of reprisal for their reporting. Some of the same laws that were used in the past to imprison and prosecute journalists are still on the books. … These [laws] are still very much—and we believe, intentionally— in place, as a way to try and force journalists to censor themselves. … Although they [government officials] are not applying these laws against journalists now, it doesn’t mean they won’t in the future.

What do you think of the ministry’s draft Printers and Publishers Registration Act?

There are censorship guidelines in this [draft] law of areas that journalists

could be punished for reporting, using the same vague language of the old laws. Journalists are not allowed to write against the Constitution or present news that could incite violence, and these are very vague terms that have been used and abused in an arbitrary fashion in the past. So they [the government] are attempting to retool themselves with new powers that effectively will allow them to re-impose the old regime. So it’s a mixed-message sort of situation.

Many journalists who were engaging the government in putting together a [different draft] of the new media law for the country were completely caught off guard by this draft Printers and Publishers Act; it came completely out of the blue. So to us, and to the journalists and editors I spoke with, this raises real questions about the genuineness—the sincerity—that this government has about truly reforming the media. My fear is that many government officials are not comfortable with this new era [of limited press freedom in Myanmar] and want to reimpose some of the controls of the past. Our concern is that this represents a backtracking from what was a pretty hopeful situation.

Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, how much press freedom does Myanmar have?

To my mind, and this is not necessarily from a scientific survey, Burma has moved out of the bottom league. You’re no longer with Vietnam and Laos, which are complete totalitarian regimes where the state dominates the press and there’s almost no criticism allowed. … Burma no longer has journalists in prison. There’s not total censorship of the media like in the past. But again, it’s a “freedom with sharp limits” situation. So I think Burma has moved out of the bottom league but has not yet achieved even the middle ground of say Malaysia or Singapore.

My feeling is that Myanmar authorities are trying to get up into that Malaysia area, where there are newspapers that are nominally free but closely aligned with the ruling party. [In Malaysia], you

must renew your license on an annual basis, and the minister of information has the authority to decide whether or not to renew your license in any given year. This obviously creates a culture of extreme self-censorship, knowing that if you’re too critical you could lose your license outright.

I feel that what authorities here [in Myanmar] have tried to embed in this draft Printers and Publishers Act is somewhat similar. … Although they’re not censoring your news beforehand, after the fact they most certainly are monitoring, taking notes and deciding who is who among journalists and what their critical views are. They’re effectively trying to create a situation where they hope journalists and newspapers will selfcensor for fear that they could lose their license. … This is the new order of media control.

The CPJ has been pushing the Myanmar government for a long time to improve press freedom. What results have you seen?

We like to think our advocacy at least played some role in the release of the journalist prisoners as well the end of the pre-publication censorship regime. We’ve been beating the drum on these issues, making a hue and a cry on these issues, for years and years. So I think yes, we did see some success, in that one of the first things they did was let the journalists out of prison and end this pre-publication censorship regime. And hopefully,

ideally, they’ll listen to our latest hue and a cry and remove these existing draconian laws that still hang over the press, and they’ll put this draft Printers and Publishers Act where it belongs, which is straight in the trash. We [CPJ] will continue to beat the drum, continue to engage, [and] ideally put pressure on the US to not unjustly and prematurely reward this regime for democratic reforms when 1) they’ve been incomplete and 2) most contrary to what [former] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, they are reversible. We’ll continue to

What would you suggest to the minister of information regarding media reform?

I think there has been healthy engagement between the media and the Ministry of Information. After a couple of hiccups, the creation of the Press Council—which the media has genuinely engaged, with some legendary former imprisoned journalists there to help draft a media law—represented to many what we saw as a healthy engagement.

track this and put pressure on, or expose, these Western governments that are willing to look the other way when some of this very preliminary openness is taken back as they pursue their commercial interests in the country.

The concern is that they [ministry officials] were not negotiating in good faith, that they presented one channel [for media reform] which everyone assumed they were following, but there was this back channel where they were developing their own Printer and Publishers Act. This shows a lack of sincerity in their intentions. … So the concern here is that the Ministry of Information is not negotiating these media issues in good faith, that they’re playing this same old game of open and close, the way the old military junta has exercised power for decades, and that they don’t genuinely intend to allow for real press freedom in the country, that they very much want to put forward a process that looks as if though it’s consultative with the media as a way of selling it to the international community that [Myanmar is] on the path to democracy, but in reality they intend to maintain power.

Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s representative for Southeast Asian, says there are concerns among journalists in Myanmar that the Ministry of Information is not acting in good faith when it asks for their input on proposed press laws.

Photo: JPaing / The Irrawaddy

quotes

—Myanmar President U Thein Sein in a national speech calls out those he thinks are behind the violence between the country’s Buddhist and Muslim communities.

—Former US President Jimmy Carter discusses his meetings with Myanmar government leaders, opposition members, ethnic groups and rights activists.

“Our group will be working as a political party on one side and as an NGO on the other. We all have agreed on that.”

—88 Generation Students activist U Min Zeya talks about the group's plans to form a political party ahead of the 2015 elections.

—Daw Aung San Suu Kyi defends the findings of her parliamentary report on the controversial Letpadaung copper mine during a visit to the area.

“I was in post-Gaddafi Libya, Afghanistan, of course, I was even in North Korea, which is a really wacky place, and I’m convinced that you are all in for the ride of your life right now"

—Google’s executive chairman Eric Schmidt speaks to Myanmar students during his visit to Yangon.

“I would like to warn all political opportunists and religious extremists who try to exploit the noble teachings of these religions.”

“Everyone I asked, what is the biggest problem in Myanmar? You know what they answered? A lack of trust.”

“I have tried my best for the commission report because I think it’s right. I take responsibility for it. You have the right to disagree with the report.”

Let’s hope it all comes out in the wash. (Cartoonist: Wa Lone)

Sweeping violence under the rug (Cartoonist: Kyaw Thu Yein)

13 Children Die in Fire at Islamic School

A fire engulfed a residential school for Muslim boys in Yangon on April 2, killing 13 students. Officials blamed the blaze, which came after weeks of anti-Muslim riots in central Myanmar, on an electrical

Private Dailies Return to Newsstands

short. The government held two press conferences on the day of the fire to counter rumors that it was related to the earlier violence. Most of the 73 children living in the school dormitory, which was located inside a mosque compound, managed to escape, but smoke inhalation claimed the lives of 13 young boys sleeping in a small loft on the first floor of the building. The building burned from the inside and was put out soon after firefighters were alerted.

approved for publication. Despite the lifting of a ban on private dailies, the draconian 1962 Printing and Registration Act remains in place until a new media law is enacted.

reconciliation in Myanmar, organized the trip. The Japanese government has also granted more than $12 million through deals between the Myanmar Peace Center and Japanese NGOs.

third girl to escape three days later. An interpreter for the girls alerted Thai police, who raided the home of a family that had been holding them captive since January, forcing them to work without pay and have sex. Five people were arrested in connection with the incident, including the father, who allegedly impersonated an army officer to maintain the girls’ obedience. The girls, from Tanintharyi Region, were aged between 15 and 18.

Myanmar Detainees Clash in Indonesia

A woman sells newspapers in Yangon on April 1, 2013.

Four privately owned daily newspapers were launched on April 1, ending a decades-old monopoly by state-owned publications such as Kyemon and The New Light of Myanmar. The ruling Union and Solidarity Development Party now has its own daily, The Union, while the opposition National League for Democracy has also been licensed to publish a daily version of its journal D-Wave. Altogether, 16 daily newspapers have been

Myanmar Minority Leaders Travel to Japan, Meet PM

Leaders of 11 ethnic armed groups from Myanmar traveled to Tokyo in the first week of April for talks on aid for Myanmar’s conflict-affected border regions. Representatives of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an ethnic alliance, met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other senior officials during the visit. The Nippon Foundation, a major Japanese philanthropic organization that has pledged US $3 million to support national

Abducted Myanmar Girls Escape

Thai Captors

Buddhists and Muslims from Myanmar clashed at an immigration detention center in Indonesia on April 5, in an incident that left eight Buddhists dead and 15 Muslims injured. The eight Buddhists were among 11 fishermen who had been detained for illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, while the Muslims were Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Witnesses told police the clash started after a Muslim Rohingya confronted a Buddhist fisherman about sectarian violence in their homeland, although it was later claimed that the incident was provoked by the rape of Rohingya women at the center, allegedly by the Myanmar Buddhists.

Shan Farmers Demand Pipeline Compensation

Thai

ac-

Two Myanmar girls who had been abducted and repeatedly raped over a period of three months fled their captors in Bangkok on April 2 and helped a

Farmers displaced by the Shwe Gas Pipeline project in Shan State say they have been cheated out of compensation they were promised. At a press conference in Yangon on April 9, the Taang Students and Youth Organization said that authorities in Man Satt village, where more than 20,000 hectares of land were seized for the project,

police escort suspects

cused of abducting three young Myanmar women.

PHOTO: THE IRRAWADDY

Police and ambulance staff stand outside a Muslim boarding school in Yangon on April 2, 2013, hours after a fire broke out killing 13 students.

PHOTO: THE IRRAWADDY

PHOTO: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

stole from a fund set up by China National Petroleum Corporation. A local MP for Hsipaw Township denied the charges, however.

Support People, Not Govt, Daw Suu Tells Japanese

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi attends a news conference at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo

Opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said Japanese aid for Myanmar should focus on the needs of the country’s people, not its government. Speaking during a week-long visit to Japan in mid-April, the

Nobel Peace Prize laureate urged her hosts to support development that benefits ordinary citizens. “We hope that the aid that is given to my country will be given with the people in mind, rather than the government. Governments come and governments go, but the people are forever,” she said. She also criticized the government’s ongoing reform process, saying that it has “no structure, no sequencing or establishment of priorities regarding what is needed at this moment.”

EU Lifts Sanctions on Myanmar, Keeps Arms Embargo

The European Union lifted all sanctions on Myanmar except for an arms embargo in recognition of reforms instituted since President U

Thein Sein assumed power as head of a quasi-civilian government in March 2011. The move, first agreed by EU ambassadors on April 17 and given ministerial approval less than a week later, will allow European companies to invest in Myanmar’s economy. However, in an official EU document endorsing the change in policy, the Myanmar government was also urged to release remaining political prisoners and deal with communal violence. A ban on selling weapons to Myanmar will remain in place amid concerns about human rights abuses by the armed forces.

Chinese Fishermen Face Charges for Ramming Reef, Poaching

Twelve Chinese fishermen are facing multiple charges

China Says US ‘Pivot’ to Asia Destabilizing the Region

A Chinese Defense Ministry report released on April 16 accused the United States of destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening its military alliances and sending more ships, planes and troops to the area. The US policy, known as the “pivot” to Asia, runs counter to regional trends and “frequently makes the situation tenser,” the report said. The pivot will see 60 percent of the US Navy’s fleet deployed to the Pacific by 2020, and comes amid concern in the region

over China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes with its neighbors. Beijing sees the move as part of a strategy aimed at containing a rapidly rising China.

in the Philippines after their ship ran aground on an atoll in the Tubbataha National Marine Park, a UNESCO-designated World Heritage Site, on April 8. In addition to fines for damaging a protected coral reef, the men could get up to 12 years in prison and up to US $300,000 in fines for poaching pangolins, an endangered species also known as the scaly anteater that is prized in China for its meat and scales. More than 10,000 kg of pangolin meat was found aboard the ship, whose crew is also accused of attempting to bribe park rangers to avoid arrest and carrying explosives for fishing.

North Korea Tones Down Rhetoric

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un

More than two months after Pyongyang’s third nuclear test on Feb. 12 provoked a new round of international sanctions, the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un continued to issue threats against the United States and its allies. By late April, however, there were signs that the crisis was abating, with North Korea saying it was ready to talk if the sanctions were dropped. Although there was no immediate prospect of negotiations restarting under these conditions, the change in tone—after months of threatening to launch nuclear attacks on targets in the US— was welcomed by some observers, even as others warned that the regime might be preparing to launch a missile.

The USS Emory S. Land, a submarine support vessel that is part of a US military buildup in the Asia-Pacific, is docked in Subic Bay, the Philippines, in November 2012.

PHOTO: REUTERS

No Time for Child’s Play

A child in Yangon collects cans and bottles while all around her, people several times her age take part in the annual Thingyan “water-throwing festival,” held to celebrate the traditional Myanmar Buddhist New Year. Although Thingyan is a festive time for most Myanmars, for many the need to earn a living trumps the desire for fun. Even with recent moves to improve the country’s economy, many Myanmars earn barely enough to feed themselves from one day to the next, and in especially poor families, small children spend more time trying to earn an income than studying for their futures.

PHOTO: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

Myanmar’s Buddhists and Muslims Divided by Fire

Within hours of the fatal fire that killed 13 children at a mosque in Yangon on the morning of April 2, three explanations began circulating among people about its possible cause. The first was that it was sparked by an electrical short; the second, that it was an act of arson; and the third, that it was set by radical Muslims to provoke outrage against Buddhists.

Setting aside the last theory, which only a tiny handful of conspiratoriallyminded Buddhists in the neighborhood thought plausible, the other two explanations represent, on the one hand, the official version of events, and on the other, a view that betrays the deep-seated distrust that has grown between Myanmar’s Buddhist and Muslim communities.

By KYAW ZWA MOE

When Irrawaddy reporters, including myself, arrived at the scene, we saw that the street leading to the mosque had been blocked and that riot police had been sent as precaution against possible unrest. There were even army trucks full of soldiers on the main road nearby, ready to move in if necessary.

Most of the bystanders were Muslims, looking stern and suspicious. Several journalists, including foreign ones, were interviewing the authorities and witnesses.

I asked Win Myint, a Muslim businessman, what he thought caused the fire. Standing in front of the blue Islamic school on 48th Street, he pointed to a window and said that a bundle of fuel-soaked rags could easily have been dropped through it by anyone with a bamboo pole.

As a former student of the school, Win Myint hurried to the scene when he heard the tragic news of the fire. He arrived shortly after dawn, and like many other Muslims gathered there, he entered the building soon after the fire was extinguished in search of evidence that it had been deliberately set.

The divide widens between Myanmar’s Buddhists and Muslims after a deadly fire claims the lives of 13 Muslim schoolboys

Pulling out his smartphone, he showed me photos that he said strongly suggested foul play.

“See,” he said. “We found this pile of women’s clothing soaked with diesel near the window.” He added that he also found an iron bar—although it was not clear what role it might have played in the criminal act that he was implying had taken place. It was also unclear that the bundle of cloth he had discovered was “women’s clothing”— something that would have been very incriminating, as all the students inside the school were boys.

When police officer Thet Lwin, who arrived at the scene before dawn, declared after a cursory investigation that the fire was triggered by an electrical short “and not due to any criminal activity,” the crowd was furious.

“Every time he mentioned the word ‘electrical short,’ angry Muslims shouted and began banging on vehicles with their fists,” according to a report by AP.

In stark contrast to the conviction held by many Muslims that the fire was no accident, many local Buddhists I spoke to said they didn’t believe the fire was caused by arson.

“It’s impossible. You should ask our private security personnel who take care of this street at night,” said members of a family who lived next to the mosque, speaking from behind a locked iron door.

Myint Aung, one of three security guards who were on duty that night, said he was the first person outside the

mosque to notice the fire inside. “When I tried to wake up the people inside, there was no response,” he said. “I don’t know what they were doing. Perhaps trying to put out the fire themselves.”

He dismissed the idea that the fire was the act of criminals. “There were no strangers around here, and we were always alert. We didn’t see anything suspicious,” he said, referring to rumors circulating among members of the local Muslim community that shadowy intruders had been seen in the area shortly before the blaze started.

public that the fire was not related to the violence that began in late March.

The state-run broadcaster, MRTV, reported many details of the ongoing investigation, and carried interviews with Muslim leaders, eyewitnesses, electricians, fire department officials and police officers.

During the first press conference, Yangon Division Chief Minister Myint Swe stated categorically that the fire was accidental, and accused school officials of blaming it on an act of malice to cover up their own neglect. Later the same day, he reiterated the official stance that the fire was caused by an electrical short, and said that one of the school’s teachers, Zeya Phyo, had admitted to starting rumors about its cause.

Still, many local people found it difficult to believe that the fire was accidental. The fact that it occurred so soon after deadly anti-Muslim riots in Meikhtila and other parts of central Myanmar made many wonder whether the school fire was part of this recent wave of sectarian violence.

This is no doubt why the government was so quick to react, holding not one but two press conferences on the day of the fire in an effort to reassure the

A second teacher, he said, was still at large and being sought by police for questioning. For Myanmar’s Muslims, however, this isn’t likely to be the end of the story. Muslim leaders have vowed to cooperate with the investigation, but even if the final report shows no evidence of wrongdoing, suspicions will continue to linger among the country’s Muslims that they have once again been targeted because of their religion.

Sadly, while most Buddhists have readily accepted the government’s version of what happened, Myanmar’s Muslims will remain convinced that the 13 children who died that night were victims of a hate crime. Whichever side is right, one thing is abundantly clear: trust between Myanmar’s Buddhist majority and Muslim minority is at an all-time low, and could take a very long time to recover.

thing could

PHOTO: STEVE TICKNER / THE IRRAWADDY

A Muslim man peers through the window of the Islamic school that was destroyed by fire on April 2.

man

Sectarian Violence Myanmar

Tensions

between

By THE IRRAWADDY

YANGON — Ko Aung Thu used to run a small electrical shop in Okpho, a town in Bago Region where he has lived since he was born there 43 years ago.

But like thousands of other Muslims, his life was turned upside down in late March after a wave of sectarian violence between majority Buddhists and minority Muslims rocked 13 towns in central Myanmar.

The violence hit Okpho on March 25. Dozens of unknown men suddenly showed up in the town’s center at around 7 pm that day, Ko Aung Thu said.

“They were holding knives, slingshots and sticks, and were shouting: ‘Kill all the Muslims!’ Local people then began gathering on the streets as well,” he said, adding that he closed his shop and quickly went home to his family.

“The crowd destroyed and looted my electrical shop at 8 pm,” said Ko Aung Thu (who prefers not to have his real name published). After ransacking the shops the frenzied mob, numbering a few hundred people, headed towards the Muslim residential area.

“I took my two children and wife to my Buddhist neighbor, but they could not guarantee our safety,” he said. So, after a few hours, his family sneaked through the streets at night to reach the police station, where they stayed for two nights before escaping to Yangon.

“I felt so scared that the crowd would stop us when we walked to the station. If they found us, they would have tried to kill us,” he said. “This is the first time I’ve had such a terrible experience.”

The mob also destroyed his sister’s teashop and his parents’ home, he said, along with Okpho’s mosque and about 60 other Muslim-owned buildings.

are high

Buddhists and Muslims in the wake of a recent wave of religious violence. What caused it, and will it threaten ongoing reforms?

Rages in Central

A young man clutches a broken brick as he surveys the damage in the wake of a night of violence in Meikhtila.

PHOTO: STEVE TICKNER/THE IRRAWADDY

Like Ko Aung Thu, many Muslims in the five violence-hit townships in Bago Region managed to flee to the old capital Yangon, located about 100 miles (170 km) to the south.

But further north, in Mandalay Division, the outburst of violence was more sudden and devastating. A dispute between a Muslim gold shop owner and a Buddhist customer on March 20 reportedly sparked rioting and arson attacks in Meikhtila. Many in the Muslim community—who made up a third of the town’s approximately 100,000 residents—were killed or chased away by mobs. Some were lynched in the streets and their bodies were burned where the fell.

The violence left 13,000 people displaced, 43 killed and 93 hospitalized according to police. Although most victims are believed to be Muslim, the town’s Buddhist community suffered, too. Some were killed or injured and hundreds were displaced.

After three days of violence, a state of emergency was declared in Meikhtila and three surrounding townships,

and the army restored calm. But the riots subsequently spread to two other Mandalay townships and south to Bago Region.

President U Thein Sein finally addressed the unrest on March 28, warning that the government would use force “as a last resort” to end the violence. Soon after, the attacks subsided.

Nine days of unrest had left a total of 1,227 homes, 77 shops and 37 mosques destroyed in central Myanmar, according to police, while 68 suspects were detained, with half facing criminal charges.

Myanmar has a history of communal tensions between its Buddhist majority and minority Muslims, who are estimated to represent at least 5 percent of an estimated population of 60 million. Many of them live in urban areas and often dominant in trade and business—a situation that at times creates resentment among the Buddhist majority.

Muslim leaders, prominent local activists and UN officials have said,

Top right: One of the main Muslim quarters of Meikhtila goes up in flames at the height of the anti-Muslim rioting.

Below left: A resident of Gyobingauk, Bago Region, wanders through a mosque that has been ransacked by an anti-Muslim mob.

Below

Below center: A burned-out truck sits in front of the main mosque in Meikhtila.

right: The smouldering wreckage of two motorcycles sit in one of the main streets of Meikhtila after police belatedly move in.

PHOTO: TEZA HLAING / THE IRRAWADDY

PHOTO: STEVE TICKNER / THE IRRAWADDY

PHOTO: STEVE TICKNER / THE IRRAWADDY

TheIrrawaddy

PHOTO: TEZA HLAING / THE IRRAWADDY

however, that the recent violence was incited by outside interests seeking to fan lingering anti-Muslim sentiment, possibly with the aim of destabilizing the government’s reform agenda.

“They have intentionally formed groups and organized violence against the people,” 88 Generation Students group leader U Min Ko Naing said on March 25.

“I learned that there are still some hardliners in the ruling [USDP] party who are against the reforms. I was told they’ve hired some thugs on daily wages to fan the unrest,” said U Tha Aye, the chairman of the Union National Development Party, an Islamic political organization. “Because the riots can halt the government’s reforms.”

International human rights groups also condemned nationalist religious leaders such Mandalay-based monk U Wirathu, whose “969” campaign calls on Myanmar people to shun Muslim businesses.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy, U Wirathu denied responsibility for the unrest and claimed instead that

Above left: Shwenyawa Sayadaw, a prominent Buddhist monk, speaks with a local Muslim leader in Meikhtila following anti-Muslim riots.

Above center: Buddhist monks speak to security forces in Meikhtila. (Teza Hlaing)

Above right: Residents of Meikhtila move their belongings to a camp for people displaced by the wave of violence in late March.

Right: A man helps a victim of the violence.

PHOTOS: TEZA HLAING / THE IRRAWADDY

the Muslim minority in Meikhtila “systematically” organized the violence that wrecked their community.

In his speech, President U Thein Sein stated that “political opportunists and religious extremists” had engineered the unrest. “We must expect these conflicts and difficulties to arise during our period of democratic transition. With a united effort, we must face and overcome these challenges,” he said.

Meanwhile, opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said little while the communal violence raged, and remained largely silent until April 8, when she spoke to Muslim leaders and said that she would help to end the violence by promoting rule of law.

Despite U Thein Sein’s tough words, his government has been strongly criticized for what some saw as his lack of decisive action in protecting Muslim communities during the unrest.

“The government has simply not done enough to address the spread of discrimination and prejudice against Muslim communities,” UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana said on March 28.

Quitana said the government failed to foresee that last year’s sectarian violence in western Rakhine State— which killed 180 people and displaced 125,000—could spread to other regions.

The envoy said he had even received reports of cases in which state security forces ignored atrocities “committed before their very eyes”—a claim that the President’s spokesman U Ye Htut has strongly denied.

In Okpho, calm was restored by early April; the authorities had relaxed their curfew hours and markets were reopened. Ko Aung Thu and his family had returned to the town. But, like many other Muslims in central Myanmar, the remain deeply uncertain about their future.

Local authorities, he said, had not made it clear if the Muslim community would receive government support and protection if they reopened their shops and mosque.

“It will take time to rebuild trust. The authorities have not even come to the Muslim areas yet to tell us that it’s safe for us. So how can we have trust so that we can reopen our business?” Ko Aung Thu asked.

He added, “I did not see the government take any action against the rioters.”

In Malaysia’s Election, a Focus on Rainforest Graft

As Malaysia’s rainforests fall victim to corruption, its ruling party could be next to get the chop

By NILUKSI KOSWANAGE

KOTA KINABALU, Malaysia

— The island of Borneo may be all that stands between Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and an unprecedented election defeat for his ruling coalition.

Borneo’s two Malaysian states— Sabah and Sarawak—have been a bastion of votes for the National Front coalition headed by Najib’s party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

The two states, among Malaysia’s poorest despite vast natural resources, kept the National Front in power in 2008 even as a groundswell of support for the opposition deprived the government of its iron-clad two-thirds parliamentary majority.

That could start to change. Allegations of corruption in recent months have dogged the chief ministers of both Sabah and Sarawak, long-time rulers who hold vast sway over some of the world’s largest tracts of tropical forests.

The National Front is favored to win the election that will be held on May 5, a month after Najib dissolved Parliament. But it could be the closest his ruling coalition has faced in its 56year rule. Corruption scandals threaten to undermine one of Najib’s central messages—that he is making Southeast Asia’s third-largest economy more transparent and competitive.

Sabah Chief Minister Musa Aman,

who is also the state’s top UMNO official, has been under scrutiny the past year after whistleblower website Sarawak Report published documents from the Hong Kong and Malaysian anti-corruption agencies.

The two agencies started investigating Musa in late 2008. The probe was based on a tip-off that the chief minister was extracting money from businessmen seeking timber concessions and funneling it to UBS bank accounts in Hong Kong and Singapore, sources close to the investigations said. They declined to say who gave the tip-off.

The Hong Kong anti-graft agency froze a UBS account managed by a lawyer on behalf of Musa, the sources said, and began a joint investigation with its Malaysian counterpart.

The agencies closed the case three years later and unfroze the funds after the Malaysian government publicly said the money was donations for

UMNO, not bribes. The Malaysian government has not explained why political donations had to be routed through Hong Kong and Singapore.

Musa told Reuters in a statement that he has been cleared by both anti-graft agencies. However, an independent panel overseeing the Malaysian graft agency has recently requested the case be reviewed.

“These are the same old stories, rehashed over and over again,” Musa said. “It is just the usual silly season before the general election, when the opposition gets up to their usual monkey business.”

The opposition, which argues the fruit of Malaysia’s brisk economic growth is largely concentrated in the hands of a well-connected elite, has vowed to keep pouring it on.

“How Musa manages Sabah in favor of the government rather than the people will certainly be a prominent part of election rallies on the opposition

Grasslands and upland rainforest in eastern Malaysia’s Sabah State.

PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA

and

side,” said Lim Kit Siang, a leader in the opposition coalition headed by former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim.

The Hong Kong anti-graft agency told Reuters it investigated a number of Malaysian nationals, including a government official, for breaching the prevention of bribery ordinance in connection with the UBS accounts. It neither confirmed nor denied that Musa was the focus of the investigation.

Malaysia’s anti-corruption agency said it provided assistance to its Hong Kong counterparts but declined to give details. Malaysian anti-corruption officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the leaked documents obtained by Sarawak Report were genuine and Musa was, indeed, the focus of the investigation.

Sarawak Report said the Hong Kong and Malaysian anti-graft agency documents it acquired showed that US $90 million in illegal logging proceeds from Sabah were channeled to the UBS accounts. That prompted Swiss prosecutors to open a criminal money laundering probe into UBS last August.

The investigations into UBS and its relationship with Musa are continuing, a spokesman for the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland said. UBS said it was fully cooperating with the authorities but declined to give more details.

As chief minister, Musa is in charge of the Sabah Foundation, which manages a state forest reserve covering 3,861 square miles. The foundation allows timber companies to annually log a tiny fraction of that area. The logging proceeds are supposed to fund education and welfare projects in the state.

As chief minister, Musa signs off on all the logging permits that its board of directors agree to award to timber firms, or at least in one case, to a family member.

One of the Malaysian anticorruption agency documents listed companies that won permits from the foundation. It shows the foundation awarded 2,000 hectares (7.7 sq miles) of primary forest to Musa’s younger brother, Foreign Minister Anifah Aman, at a special board of directors’ meeting on May 7, 2004.

The same Malaysian anti-graft document shows Musa consistently signed off on concessions that exceeded, or even doubled, the allowable timber cut. While not illegal, it shows the state was exceeding its own guidelines on deforestation.

Some of the companies on that list made payments into a UBS corporate account belonging to a former Musa associate, bank statements on the account obtained by Reuters shows. From the same account, withdrawals were made by the associate to fund Musa’s sons who were studying in Australia, the statements show.

Two timber firms in Sabah transferred two payments totaling $4.04 million on Aug. 16, 2006 into the corporate UBS account belonging to the former Musa associate. Six days later, on Aug. 22, the exact same amount was transferred into a personal UBS account belonging to Musa’s lawyer. The Hong Kong anti-graft agency described that account as “held in trust” for Musa, according to the bank statements and investigation documents.

Aug.

That same day, the firms won a 32,000 hectare (124 sq miles) timber concession and a contract to maintain a

road to a logging camp, according to the Malaysian anti-graft agency document.

The owners of those two timber firms confirmed to Reuters that the $4.04 million transactions were “donations” to Musa and UMNO to secure the contracts. They requested their names and the names of their firms not be identified.

Malaysia’s government has said all the funds in that UBS account were

“For UMNO, Musa is almost indispensable in Sabah. You lose him, you may lose your whole regime.”

—Oh Ei Sun, former political secretary to Malaysian PM Najib Razak

ultimately sent to UMNO as political donations. Other firms on the list of companies that received timber concessions could not be reached or declined to comment.

While there is no published data on how much forest has been cleared within the Sabah Foundation forest reserve, official data shows significant deforestation throughout the state.

In 1992, the state’s total forest cover stood at 17,000 square miles, about half the size of Ireland. By 2011, it had shrunk to 13,900 square miles, based on the latest available data from the forestry department. Primary or virgin forests have been particularly hard-hit, declining from 1,595 square miles in 1992 to just 348 square miles in 2011.

With diminishing forests left to cut, logging revenues fell by half over five years to less than 250 million ringgit ($80.6 million) in 2011.

Musa has made a push for Sabah to diversify into agriculture and oil and gas, which helped state budget revenues hit a record 4.1 billion ringgit last year. But the state’s unemployment rate remains at 5.4 percent, the highest of any state in Malaysia, where the national average is 3.0 percent.

Musa’s popularity ratings have declined as well, to 45 percent in 2012 from 60 percent in 2009, according to a survey by the Merdeka Centre, Malaysia’s most respected pollster.

Law Minister Mohamad Nazri Aziz told Parliament last October the funds in the UBS bank account held on behalf of Musa were political donations, without giving details about the source of the money or explaining why such funds had to be routed through foreign countries.

Based on evidence submitted by the Malaysian anti-graft agency, Malaysia’s attorney-general found no indication of corruption or linkages with the Swiss government’s investigation into UBS, Nazri said.

But an independent panel overseeing the Malaysian anti-graft agency has since written to the attorney-general requesting a review of his decision to close the case on Musa, a high-ranking anti-graft official said at a public forum held by the Bar Council. The official did not disclose why the review was requested and declined to respond to Reuters requests for comment.

The attorney general did not respond to requests for comment.

As UMNO’s party leader in Sabah, Musa is expected to find ways of raising money for the party—and to get out the vote.

“For UMNO, Musa is almost indispensable in Sabah. You lose him, you may lose your whole regime,” said Oh Ei Sun, senior visiting fellow with Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University and a former political secretary to Prime Minister Najib.

The opposition, campaigning on an anti-corruption platform, is banking on winning 20 seats in Sabah and Sarawak in the election, which could put it within sight of a 112-seat simple majority in Parliament.

Sarawak has also been under the spotlight over allegations of timber corruption. The Malaysian anticorruption agency said it has been investigating Sarawak Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud since 2011 in response to environmental activists’ complaints about corruption in the forestry industry. That investigation continues and any new evidence will be taken into account, the agency spokesman said.

He was referring to environmental activist group Global Witness, which posted a video in March that went viral. It showed Taib’s cousins and associates apparently offering thousands of hectares of forest land to the group’s undercover investigators and formulating plans to book the land sales in Singapore to avoid Malaysian taxes. The cousins could not be reached for comment.

Taib publicly denied the allegations raised as a result of the video. “I saw the so-called proof. It has nothing to do with me,” he told local media. “Everything has to be done with government procedure.”

In an interview with Reuters on April 2, Prime Minister Najib declined to discuss details of the investigations into the Sabah and Sarawak chief ministers, and said he was against corruption in “any form.”

Asked about the Global Witness video, Najib said: “It’s OK, everything will be investigated, and due process will take its course.”

Malaysia's state of Sabah Chief Minister Musa Aman waves his ruling National Front coalition flag during a pre-election campaign on Feb. 22, 2013.

(PHOTO: REUTERS)

on

Vietnam’s Internet Dilemma: Online Censorship

Another name has been added to the growing list of Vietnamese bloggers accused of crossing a red line in the communist-ruled country, where the guardians of the one-party state brook no criticism that challenges its supremacy.

By MARWAAN MACAN-MARKAR

BANGKOK — Another name has been added to the growing list of Vietnamese bloggers accused of crossing a red line in the communist-ruled country, where the guardians of the one-party state brook no criticism that challenges its supremacy.

The latest victim is Nguyen Dac Kien, a journalist at the state-run Family and Society newspaper. He was fired from the publication recently following a critical post targeting Nguyen Phu Trong, the powerful general-secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), which he uploaded on his blog.

Kien’s political comment followed a nationally televised speech that Trong had delivered, reprimanding a growing chorus of outspoken critics, including a petition signed by 72 academics, calling for a multi-party political system and a greater respect for human rights.

In justifying the firing of Kien, his newspaper said that the blog post, which questioned the right of Trong to rebuke the critics of the VCP, had “violated the operating rules,” according to Voice of America, the US government-funded broadcaster. “It warned he will be ‘held accountable before the law for his words and behavior’.”

The timing of this nod towards censorship brings to sharp relief the dilemma that the Vietnamese authorities are grappling with as they proceed with a rare political exercise: soliciting public opinions ahead of amending the Southeast Asian nation’s constitution—the first such changes to the charter in over 20 years.

After all, the government has also turned to the Internet since the beginning of this year to seek feedback from citizens. These carefully stagemanaged online discussions have been hosted on official websites. They are expected to run until March 31, the deadline for the public consultations aimed at taking this country further down the road of modernization.

The planned amendments this year—the fifth such occasion since the constitution was first approved in 1946—places greater emphasis on political themes, hinting at possible reforms impacting the executive, legislature and judiciary, in a thrust to drive home the message that “the people are the masters,” Vietnam News, a government mouthpiece, has reported.

By contrast, the slew of amendments that was approved by the Seventh National Party Congress in 1991set its sights on economic reforms. Hanoi had

wanted the country to shed its image of being a predominantly agrarian society with a centrally planned economy, and take tentative steps to becoming a modern industrialized society that embraced a free-market economy.

But the Internet was not a feature of the political landscape then, as it is now. And it’s little wonder that cyberspace has now become fertile ground for commentary about political reform on personal websites, blogs, Facebook and even in e-mails sent to the online media considered “more progressive,” given their reportage exposing corruption.

“A large percentage of the comments [by the public] are about Article Four,” says Hoang Thuy Chung, a journalist at VietNamNet, a news website. “The next thing is human rights and citizens rights.”

Article Four in the current constitution ensures the political monopoly enjoyed by the VCP. And

when used together with two other legal weapons a climate of censorship becomes pervasive. They are Articles 79 and 88 of the Criminal Code, with the former targeting activities deemed as attempts to “overthrow the people’s administration” and the latter coming down hard on citizens accused of “propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”

Trenchant critics of Hanoi living in exile drew attention to these legal weapons when they made submissions this month at the annual sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva.

“Vietnam does not only use violence and police coercion, but also invokes a host of broadly-interpreted laws to suppress freedom of expression,” argued Vo Van Ai, president of the Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, a Paris-based Vietnamese exile

lobby. “Article 88 on ‘anti-Socialist propaganda’ or Article 258 on ‘abusing democratic freedoms to encroach on the interests of the state’ are routinely used to detain cyber-dissidents.”

And the jails affirm this repressive climate, with Vietnam being ranked as the second worst country for imprisoning online commentators after China. The last 12 months has seen 22 bloggers and netizens imprisoned with severe sentences, including a group of 14 who were judged guilty in January in one-sided political trials. The harshest punishments targeted Ho Duc Hoa, Dang Xuan Dieu and Paulus Le Son, who received 13 years in prison and five years under house arrest each.

Even names associated with stalwarts of the VCP have not been spared, given the jailing of Cu Huy Ha Vu, one of the country’s leading legal activists and a son of a national

a

poet who was a close confidant of independence hero Ho Chi Minh, for his outspokenness about the ruling party.

And as last year revealed, Hanoi’s push to spread the use of the Internet across the country — where more than 31 million of its 91 million people are online — has also meant this communication platform being exploited by government and party insiders to expose rifts within the VCP. Such infighting targeted the three main factions that call the shots: Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s loyalists, President Truong Tan Sang’s wing and the group headed by Trong, the party’s general-secretary.

A website launched in 2012 that enraged some in the VCP’s hierarchy was called “Quan Lam Bao” (Officials Doing Journalism). Its tabloid-style narratives targeted senior political figures’ love lives and links to corruption, and even had posts calling Dung “a dictator.”

Another website that has emerged — even though it runs critical commentary — is the popular Bauxite Vietnam, whose writers range from respected intellectuals, VCP veterans, scientists and journalists. They have not shied away from sensitive topics like land rights, human rights and the tensions between Vietnam’s relationship and with its northern neighbor China.

Such a lack of uniformity in enforcing censorship stems the dilemma Hanoi faces after it decided a decade ago that it wanted the country to be one of the most online connected countries in Southeast Asia. “Vietnam authorities then developed the Internet without thinking that they would be overwhelmed by a flood of critics on the web,” notes Vo Tran Nhat, executive secretary of Action for Democracy in Vietnam, a Paris-based Vietnamese exile group. “The people found on the Internet information they could not find in the official press.”

Hanoi’s tough reaction to a politically aware public followed, first as arbitrary arrests and “administrative detentions,” before the harsh crackdowns launched in 2010.

“After 2010 there has been an escalation of repression of bloggers,” Nhat said. “The problem is that for a couple of years bloggers and other people in Vietnam got used to speaking freely on the Internet and to investigate and expose the real face of the regime. That is a real danger for the power of the Party.”

A Vietnamese woman looks at a government website. Guardians of Vietnam’s one-party state have stepped up their efforts to control citizens’ online activities amid increasingly outspoken criticism of senior Communist Party officials.

PHOTO: REUTERS

The Great Game Over Myanmar

As the former pariah state shakes off pawn status, the playing field transforms—and world powers make moves for influence

By AUNG ZAW

Myanmar President U Thein Sein, left, stands next to then Chinese President Hu Jintao during a signing ceremony in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on May 27, 2011. The two countries upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership and inked economic agreements during the visit—U Thein Sein’s first trip abroad after becoming president two months earlier—but by October, relations suffered a setback when the president ordered the suspension of the controversial Chinesebacked Myitsone dam project.

The recent political opening in Myanmar surprised many neighboring countries, including China. The government’s reforms have received welcome applause, but for Myanmar’s traditional friends and foes, they have also created room for new competition in the country. The rules of the game have changed quickly in Myanmar, and the world is watching to see how international relations, particularly with China, shift in turn.

Since Myanmar regained independence from the British in 1948, leaders and diplomats at the Foreign Affairs Ministry have devoted most of their time, energy and resources to improving ties with China. We have seen rocky relations as well as honeymoon periods between the two countries.

In the past, China has openly supported Myanmar’s banned Communist Party. At points, the East Asian superpower even dispatched

troops to the northern territory of Kachin State—forcing Myanmar to set rounds of border demarcation meetings in the 1950s and 1960s. Myanmar also saw anti-China riots in 1967, as Beijing stirred up disturbances by encouraging Chinese agents to support Communist cells in the country during the Cultural Revolution period.

Although both countries signed a treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression based on five principles of peaceful coexistence, China has sometimes breached these core principles to test the paukphaw, or fraternal, relationship, while Myanmar has avoided antagonizing its northern neighbor.

Though many Myanmar political observers dislike Gen Ne Win, who came to power through a coup in 1962 and ruled Myanmar with an iron fist until his regime was ousted in 1988, some give him credit for playing a “neutral” foreign policy during the Cold War, which they say saved Myanmar from becoming the puppet of any giant power in the region or the West. For the Chinese Communist Party, Myanmar

PHOTO: REUTERS

served as a buffer zone to deter proxies of the West along with India and the Soviet Union.

Certainly, however, in the back of their minds, Myanmar’s leaders have always feared China. Myanmar’s late Prime Minister U Nu, who held numerous meetings with Chinese leaders to settle several disputes, once publicly expressed this fear in a statement after the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949. “Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power,” he said. “And least among these, could Burma afford to quarrel with new China?”

But the situation is changing now. In early April, Myanmar’s President Thein Sein visited China, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During his three-day visit for the Boao Forum, a summit of government and business leaders, U Thein Sein played relatively safe but firmly stressed that Burma would practice an independent and active foreign policy while still adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. He said Myanmar would focus more on developing ties with other countries in the Southeast

Asian region. He also urged China to invest responsibly in Myanmar and to earn the trust of the country’s people.

As Myanmar’s leaders continue to forge close relations with the West and other Southeast Asian nations, the Chinese, like everyone else, are preparing to adapt.

Recently, the outgoing Chinese ambassador publicly met democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw. Chinese diplomats have acknowledged previous meetings between them. To handle Myanmar going forward, China has appointed a veteran diplomat in Asian affairs, Yang Houlan, who served in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. His appointment is reminiscent of the past. In 1963, a year after U Ne Win took power, China appointed Geng Biao as vice foreign minister to Myanmar. Geng Biao was a senior diplomat who had served missions in Europe soon after the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

In the face of rising Western influence, it is likely that China will employ “soft power” to win back the hearts and minds of the Myanmar people. During a previous visit, U Thein Sein confessed a fondness for Chinese television dramas. “Since childhood, I’ve been watching Chinese television,” the president told China Radio International.

On the political front, Yang Houlan’s appointment as ambassador and China’s involvement in ceasefire talks between Kachin rebels and the Myanmar government are signs that Beijing is serious about settling Myanmar’s lingering ethnic conflicts, which have threatened border stability as well as Chinese gas pipelines and a railway project in the country. Kachin military leader Gen Gun Maw, who is now involved in ceasefire dialogues with the Burmese government, told The Irrawaddy that Kachin leaders asked international observers, including the US, the UK and the UN, to attend the peace talks, but that the Chinese did not want any outsiders (i.e., Westerners) getting involved. Instead, China invited the Myanmar government and Kachin leaders to hold a series of meetings on Chinese soil.

A stable and prosperous Myanmar will no doubt benefit everyone. However, Myanmar’s improved relations with the West, and particularly with the United

States, will complicate relations with China. The more Myanmar improves ties with the West, the more Western influence in the country is expected to rise.

Myanmar has seen growing antiChina sentiment at home. Most ordinary people in the country were repulsed by Beijing’s support for the previous brutal regime, and many continue to protest against China’s extraction of natural resources with little regard for the environment and local populations. Some critics say China has only given its support to exploit Myanmar’s natural resources and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

China is Myanmar’s largest investor, channeling between US $14 billion and $20 billion into the country since 1988. Energy-hungry China has poured money into hydropower projects in the country’s ethnic regions, and its three major oil corporations have a strong foothold. Many in Myanmar worry that Chinese investments and aid programs are like a Trojan horse. Given the government’s suspension of the China-funded Myitsone dam project and public protests over the controversial Letpadaung copper mine, it seems likely that civil society groups will target many more Chinese-backed projects in the future and that these investments will become political time bombs.

The fact is that Myanmar no longer needs to hide behind China. Nevertheless, pundits argue that Beijing will not let go easily. When former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar for the first time in November 2011, Chinese leaders played it coy. The Global Times newspaper, a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, wrote during Ms. Clinton’s visit that China did not resist Myanmar’s attempts to improve relations with the West but would not accept “seeing its interests stomped on.” The message was clear: China would not tolerate Myanmar becoming an ally of the United States.

In October 2011, Myanmar announced its decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State, a project that had provoked strong public opposition. China was bewildered by the announcement, which came just five months after U Thein Sein’s first official

Many in Myanmar worry that Chinese investments and aid programs are like a Trojan horse.

visit to Beijing, where he signed nine cooperation agreements including a $765 million credit package and a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

But the question remained, would Myanmar turn against China? The answer is simple: no. Myanmar doesn’t yet have that luxury.

It will be interesting to watch how Myanmar handles the delicate balancing act between China and the rest of the world, maintaining its old alliance while proving it is not a satellite state. Myanmar’s generals are well versed in the art of pitting international powers against one another. But if Myanmar falters at the game this time, the country’s leaders will no doubt face accusations of playing with fire.

Just before her trip to Myanmar in 2011, Ms. Clinton, who announced the US policy of a pivot toward Asia, received a counterbalancing message from Naypyitaw: Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, commander in chief of Myanmar’s armed forces, flew to China to meet with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The military chief signed a defense cooperation agreement, and the two sides talked of enhancing their comprehensive strategic partnership.

At home, U Thein Sein told Ms. Clinton that Myanmar would continue its relationship with China while strengthening ties with other countries. He pointedly called Beijing a strong, geopolitically important partner that had encouraged Myanmar to improve relations with the West. Ironically, China secretly hosted a rare meeting between Myanmar and US officials in Beijing just four years earlier, in 2007.

In September 2012, before making his first official visit to the US, U Thein Sein traveled to China. U Ne Win, the former dictator, likewise received Chinese leaders in Yangon before making trips to the West, and they urged him not to make political commitments to the United States.

Washington is also being careful not to upset China. During his historic visit to Myanmar in November last year, President Barack Obama said in a speech that the United States welcomed China’s peaceful rise. And when asked whether US policies in Myanmar centered on relations with China, US Ambassador Derek Mitchell told The Irrawaddy that his country’s increasing

engagement was “about Burma.”

“It’s always been about Burma,” he said, referring to Myanmar by its former name. “There’s a misunderstanding in China, and even among some commentators, that everything we do in Asia is about containing China or encircling China, but that’s simply not the case. Our policy toward Burma has been about Burma for 20 years, 25 years, before China was so-called rising or reemerging. Our policy toward Burma is evolving because Burma itself is evolving.”

Myanmar and the United States both understand they must not agitate China. But almost everyone else in Myanmar, except for those embedded with the Chinese, seem more than ready to welcome the West. They know it is the best way to counter Chinese influence.

Though it has sparked ongoing debate in Naypyitaw among top leaders and opposition members, Myanmar’s bid to escape China’s shadow is obvious. Last year, Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing visited China’s historical adversary Vietnam before going to Beijing. In addition to visiting China soon after his appointment to the presidency, U Thein Sein went to India, indicating a desire to diversify Myanmar’s portfolio of strategic partners in the region. His former boss Snr-Gen Than Shwe did the same, making two state visits—to China and India—before leaving his throne.

Myanmar also seeks to expand defense ties with its neighbors. In the past, Myanmar leaders allegedly allowed China’s listening posts and a radar facility on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, reportedly to monitor regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal, and to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically important tri-service facilities at Port Blair o n South Andaman Island. But in March, Myanmar and India conducted joint naval exercises and patrols in the Bay of Bengal, while India also reportedly ran a training program for Myanmar’s armed forces, including exercises for pilots of the Russian-built Mi-35 helicopter gunships.

In February, Myanmar also sent its two frigates, UMS 561 and UMS 562, to the Thai island of Phuket for the first time in 18 years. Thanasak Patimaprakorn, supreme commander

of the Thai armed forces, said in Bangkok that the visit of the Myanmar ships was intended to celebrate 65 years of diplomatic ties between both countries, with expectations for closer military ties going forward.

Since improving relations with the West, Myanmar has been invited by the United States to observe the annual Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. In the near future, the United States will likely provide nonlethal training to Myanmar’s army officers. And last month, Australia announced it was lifting restrictions on military engagement with Myanmar in recognition of the country’s democratic reforms.

Myanmar will probably bolster relations with Japan as well. Ties between both countries date back to the World War II era, and Japan’s interests run deep in Myanmar. Not wanting to miss the train now, Tokyo recently decided to resume aid in Myanmar, and more Japanese companies and NGOs will soon play a counterbalancing role against Chinese influence.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), Myanmar could also assume a proactive role in the regional grouping, as it did during the golden days of the 1950s. Ironically, Asean allowed Myanmar to join in 1997 because it wanted to pull the pariah state from China’s sphere of influence, but Myanmar’s reliance on its northern neighbor deepened. Now, 15 years later, Myanmar must act with urgency to develop a foreign relations strategy for the world—not just China— as it integrates more with Asean, India and the rest of Asia.

Of course, Myanmar must get its house in order first, paying serious attention on the domestic front to its northern territory, where the national government has never been able to establish its law and order. (In 2010, Myanmar could not hold elections in the Wa region, and soon afterward fierce fighting broke out in Kachin State.)

But as the country continues opening up, Myanmar will test its independent and active foreign policy when it hosts Asean foreign ministers in 2014 at a summit in the country. Everyone will watch to see how the former pariah state exerts its emerging international status to placate neighbors and new friends from the West.

The Road Past

Past Mangshi

With more leverage in the West, Myanmar looks at its powerful northern neighbor in a new light

By DAVID I. STEINBERG

An impressive memorial to Sino-Myanmar friendship in the Chinese town of Mangshi, Yunnan Province, commemorates the paukphaw (sibling) friendship that idealizes relations between these two countries.

This relationship was also captured in an emblematic Chinese poem from 1956 about the two peoples drinking the same river water, living by the rivers and climbing the mountains; they “share everlasting happiness.” A symbolic statue of two ethereal figures carrying water frames one of the border crossings, representing both countries. Zhou Enlai, the first prime minister of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and U Nu, Myanmar’s

first prime minister under the 1947 Constitution, developed a close, warm relationship.

And yet, when the Cultural Revolution came to Yangon a decade later with riots, the public’s economic and political frustrations against Myanmar’s government were redirected at the local Chinese population, leading to dozens of Chinese deaths and extensive looting. The Chinese privately deplored Gen Ne Win’s socialist ideology, known as the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” which they called state capitalism and antiMarxist despite official endorsement.

Following these riots, China actively supported Myanmar’s Communist Party that sought to overthrow Gen Ne Win’s administration, reasoning that party-to-party relations were quite different from state-to-state relations. China did not criticize Myanmar’s

Myanmar’s former dictator Snr-Gen Than Shwe, right, and then president of China, Jiang Zemin, review the guard of honor at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Jan. 7, 2003. Collaboration between the two countries intensified to an unprecedented magnitude in the years after Myanmar’s military crushed a pro-democracy uprising and seized power in a bloody coup in 1988.

PHOTO: REUTERS

government for the repression of nationwide pro-democracy protests in 1988; the next year, Myanmar did not condemn China over the Tiananmen Square protests.

In the era of Myanmar’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which later became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), collaboration between both countries intensified to an unprecedented magnitude. China opened borders, increased trade and provided massive investment in military equipment and training, infrastructure and extractive industries. The illegal migration of about two million Chinese into Myanmar with their business acumen increased China’s negative visibility. This relationship culminated in May 2011 when both countries signed a comprehensive strategic economic partnership.

Relations were, however, circumspect. To China, Myanmar was “a beggar with a golden bowl,” asking for aid despite extensive natural resources. The people of Myanmar, always careful about their northern neighbor, developed a saying: “When China spits, Myanmar swims.”

To the West, especially in journalistic circles and even some governments, Myanmar was known as a “client state” of China. This was, however, a simplistic analysis, equating money and presence with dependence.

True, China was a “protector” of Myanmar in 2007 when it joined Russia in vetoing a US-introduced resolution that claimed the Southeast Asian pariah state was a threat to regional peace and security. Meanwhile, as a condition of Chinese diplomatic recognition, Myanmar stated from its inception that there was only one China, which included Taiwan.

There were other mutual bonds. Myanmar’s government wanted Chinese protection against what it anticipated might be a US invasion, with worries stemming from US policies of “regime change,” or recognition of the National League for Democracy’s sweep on the 1990 elections, under former presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

Although ludicrous to Americans, this was a palpable fear in Myanmar, perhaps providing a partial rationale for moving the capital from Yangon to Naypyitaw, an air command from Mingaladon to Meiktila in central Myanmar, and a naval regional headquarters from Sittwe inland to An.

China wanted access to the Bay of Bengal and Myanmar’s natural gas and hydroelectric power, along with the ability to bypass the vulnerable Malacca Strait, which is subject to bottleneck by any power attempting to contain China. A strong Chinese position in Myanmar might also strengthen China’s claims to the disputed 96,000-square kilometer area of Arunachal Pradesh, occupied by India.

Although contemporary Myanmar relations with China seem to mirror the traditional Confucian Sino-centric tribute system under which the court at Mandalay sent delegations to Beijing, there are significant differences.

Other factors now play critical roles. Myanmar won the border dispute with China, whose Nationalist and Communist governments both claimed large areas of northern Myanmar as Chinese territory. In the settlement of 1960, negotiated by Gen Ne Win but signed by U Nu, China wanted to show the international community that it was not a predatory state, and Myanmar was the easiest country with which to demonstrate this attitude.

Americans, its

Today, Chinese critical investment in Myanmar is not like that of a developed state seeking low-cost, labor-intensive sites for its industries; companies cannot quickly pull out their sewing machines or equipment and move to other, even lower-cost labor markets.

Rather, major Chinese investments are permanent structures coordinated with China’s national developmental plans and investment. The productivity and usefulness of these investments to China depend on good relations with Myanmar. Myanmar thus has a distinctly advantageous position: China needs it more than it needs China.

Because of the attempted isolation of Myanmar by the United States and the European Union through

incremental sanctions policies, China assumed a far larger role than might otherwise have been the case, but the East Asian superpower never had a free hand in Myanmar.

Myanmar’s government quietly vetoed a Chinese plan to turn the Ayeyarwady River port of Bhamo, near the Chinese border, into a container site for shipments into the Bay of Bengal. More obvious was the example of President U Thein Sein’s decision to stop construction of the Myitsone Dam in 2011 on the basis that he was listening to negative public opinion. This $3.6 billion dam was intended to supply power to Yunnan Province, but public outcry on environmental and emotional grounds was too great.

China was disconcerted by that event, not believing public opinion in Myanmar could play an important role after some half-century of military control and repression. Beijing unofficially but authoritatively blamed the United States for fomenting antiChinese sentiment through Myanmar’s NGOs. The level of trust between China and Myanmar seemed to have precipitously dropped after that time.

This distrust was exacerbated by Myanmar-US relations, which improved as Myanmar’s government continued to liberalize, with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visiting the Southeast Asian country in December 2011 and President Barack Obama stopping by in November last year.

The Chinese formal response to these changed international relations have been judicious and moderate, but in the country’s controlled press, one paper said the Clinton trip was “undermining the [Chinese] wall in Myanmar.”

Considerable speculation exists as to why U Thein Sein’s government has so assiduously endorsed improved relations with the United States. Many factors seem likely, but one relates to the Myanmar-Chinese relationship, which some in Myanmar have regarded as too close. An improved US relationship not only brings US assistance, but more importantly opens lending by the World Bank and

the Asian Development Bank. It also encourages large-scale assistance from Japan, which views too close a Myanmar-China relationship as inimical to its long-term interests by strengthening China in East Asia.

To the Chinese, US direct assistance cannot replace or even compete with Chinese support. One Chinese wrote that US aid was likely to be as “beautiful moonlight on the river,” nice to view but ephemeral and unsubstantial.

Myanmar had a tradition of neutralism that was important to its survival during the Cold War. Although the policy was anathema to both China’s Chairman Mao and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, it was a sound approach to, as they say, “living in a dangerous neighborhood.” Myanmar was always neutral, but “in China’s shadow.”

The current movement toward the United States, which has resulted in the best US-Myanmar relations since independence in 1948, will likely evolve into a more balanced, more modern neutralist stance, although China continues to perceive US relations with Myanmar as part of a US “containment” policy.

Still, China’s interests are partly served by the reforms on which improved US-Myanmar relations are based. China likely fears two potential events in Myanmar. The first is a general uprising along the lines of the failed people’s revolution in 1988. This chaos, whatever the result, would jeopardize Chinese infrastructure security, especially at two vital pipelines for offshore Myanmar gas and Middle Eastern and African crude oil. It would also limit the development of Yunnan Province, which is now effectively dependent on trade with Myanmar to improve low standards of living.

Although Myanmar’s political and economic reforms have strongly reduced the possibility of a popular uprising, they are a double-edged sword: the reforms improve the business climate with positive impacts on the Chinese, but they will also increase international competition. More liberal censorship policies may placate the public, but they also

allow freer expression of anti-Chinese sentiment.

The second issue is minority unrest and insurrections in Myanmar that directly affect important Chinese infrastructure. For example, fighting in Myanmar’s Kachin State between armed rebel groups and the government army have caused instability along the Chinese border, with an influx of refugees and shells falling into Yunnan Province. The unrest has become a major hindrance to Chinese businesses.

A large percentage of the Yunnan population are also ethnic and linguistic cousins of the Kachin people; Beijing does not want the conflict to result in ethnic problems in China or the potential support of Jinghpaw (Kachin) people in Yunnan Province to their brethren in Myanmar.

So, despite China’s continued insistence that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states, it has moved somewhat uncomfortably to participate in the negotiating process (“intervening but not interfering”) between Kachin rebels and Myanmar’s government. In addition to resolving a potential danger, perhaps China has gotten involved in negotiations in a bid to prevent the United States from doing so.

Myanmar’s army, the Tatmadaw, is said to be highly nationalistic in Kachin State toward both the Kachin people and the Chinese. China may have a vested and economic interest in tranquility there, but they cannot be seen as weak or subservient to internal or external pressure.

Myanmar must obviously act gingerly with Beijing, as it has always done, but the strong nationalism of its diverse peoples will prevent it from becoming a pawn of any state, even one as powerful as China, the colossus looming over their northern frontier.

David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. His latest volume (with Fan Hongwei) is “Modern ChinaMyanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence” (2012).

Myanmar thus has a distinctly advantageous position: China needs it more than it needs China.

China’s Tug

Beijing’s grip slips as Myanmar changes course, but the Asian superpower isn’t stepping aside yet

By YUN SUN

yanmar’s democratic reform has produced both winners and losers. The country’s transition to democracy has revitalized the government, opposition groups and civil society, and it has brought the people unprecedented development opportunities. On the other hand, some former military leaders and cronies have lost their previous political status and economic privileges.

MExternally, the West has applauded democracy’s victory in Myanmar and eagerly embraced the country’s rich business potential. However, one of Myanmar’s old patrons, China, has perhaps suffered most from the former pariah state’s unexpected waves of change.

Indeed, Myanmar’s reform has unveiled tremendous challenges and unpleasant uncertainties for China’s national interests. Suspension of the controversial Myitsone dam project in north Myanmar was seen as “a slap in the face” for China; the victory of “the will of the people” against the unpopular Chinese project

Myanmar’s President U Thein Sein, center, takes his place in a group photo alongside US President Barack Obama, left, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao and Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, right, at the East Asia Summit in Nusa Dua, Bali, on Nov. 19, 2011. Myanmar’s improving relations with Washington have been a major source of concern in Beijing.

PHOTO: REUTERS

Tug of War

encouraged broad scrutiny and criticism of other business ventures signed off by Beijing during the military government.

This anti-China criticism was particularly signified in the protests against China’s joint venture in the Letpadaung copper mine near Monywa in northwestern Myanmar. Other protests have raised concerns about the future of a strategic Chinese project to build oil and gas pipelines across Myanmar. Both countries seem to recognize that the pipelines, expected to be completed in May, are too important to jeopardize, but as Myanmar’s political, economic and social spheres continue evolving at dazzling speeds, uncertainty about the project has grown.

Politically, the preliminary success of Myanmar’s democratic transition has raised questions about China’s own political system and long-postponed reforms. Although official Chinese media have characterized Myanmar’s reforms as “too early to tell” and “untested by reality,” academics and media commentators cite similarities between the former military government and China’s authoritarian system, and they use Myanmar’s smooth democratic transition to argue for the necessity and feasibility of China’s own political reform. For the fifth generation of Chinese leaders stepping into their new positions, this is certainly not the most pleasant message.

In north Myanmar, the Kachin conflict has touched upon China’s sensitive nerves on border stability. There may not have been a causal relationship between Myanmar’s

political reforms and the hostilities, which flared in June 2011, not long after President U Thein Sein took office. However, there are rampant complaints from China about U Thein Sein’s inability to control the military and stabilize the border.

This dissatisfaction directly resulted in China’s open intervention in peace talks between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Myanmar government in China’s Yunnan Province in February. In an unprecedented move, China assumed a mediation role in the internal conflict between the central government and a local rebel group in another sovereign nation. In this sense, China deviated from its traditional principle of nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs, which has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy since the founding of the nation in 1949.

The changing Myanmar has not been the best news for China’s strategic landscape on the global stage either. The dissolution of Myanmar’s international isolation and the country’s rapidly improving relations with the West have undermined Beijing’s original blueprint regarding the strategic utilities of Myanmar at regional forums to defend China’s unpopular positions and in the Indian Ocean to advance China’s strategic presence and national interests.

As Myanmar develops close ties with the West, China has seen rising competition with other powers inside the country for economic opportunities and strategic influence. This competition did not exist before the democratic reform. Among competing powers, the United States has been singled out as a main source of China’s mishaps in Myanmar.

The US government has taken exhaustive efforts to reassure Beijing that US engagement in Myanmar is not targeted at China in any sense. Instead, US policy makers say engagement has been motivated by Myanmar’s democratic reform. According to an anonymous US diplomat, “To think that all we have done in Myanmar is because of

Politically, the preliminary success of Myanmar’s democratic transition has raised questions about China’s own political system and long-postponed reforms.

China is delusional and only reflects Beijing’s paranoia about the US.”

However, Beijing could not agree less. Chinese leaders firmly believe the US rebalancing to Asia is aimed at encircling China and curtailing China’s regional influence. In this vein, they reason that President Barack Obama’s engagement with Myanmar, as a part of this rebalancing, must likewise be hostile to China. Leaked diplomatic cables about US government funding for anti-dam organizations before the suspension of Myitsone project have been cited as evidence of a US attempt to “sabotage” Chinese interests in Myanmar.

This antagonism has been reinforced by US actions that may remotely relate to China. American interest in the Kachin conflict and US Ambassador Derek Mitchell’s visit to Kachin State raised fears in China that the US would intervene and assert its presence right on the Chinese border. The United States has also invited Myanmar to observe the Cobra Gold joint military exercises in Thailand, leading to concern in Beijing that close US-Myanmar military ties might somehow threaten China’s national security either in the near term or the long run.

Even if Washington did not originally intend to contain China through its engagement with Myanmar, some analysts argue that Chinese interests have nonetheless been damaged as a result. For Washington to deny responsibility in China’s losses only reflects its lack of consideration and respect for China’s national interests.

Therefore, at a US-ChinaMyanmar trilateral dialogue in Beijing in December, when discussing how the United States and China could cooperate in Myanmar, Song Qingrun from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a government think tank, openly urged the United States “not to damage China’s interests inside the country and to take concrete measure to strengthen the Sino-US strategic mutual trust on Myanmar.”

In light of the perceived China-

unfriendly changes in Myanmar, Beijing has not been slow to convey displeasure. Of the war in Kachin State, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly issued harsh statements about the escalating conflict and expressed its concern over border security.

Economically, China also dramatically reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) to Myanmar last year. According to Chinese official media, FDI to Myanmar dropped from US $8.5 billion in 2011 to $1.02 billion in the first 11 months of 2012.

Given that China provided the majority of FDI to Myanmar in 2011, the reduction of investment inflow represents a major policy shift. The cutback might be justified in that the anti-China sentiment in Myanmar has created major problems for Chinese investments, but in the long run, its impact on Myanmar’s prospects for economic growth could be profound.

Official bilateral ties seem cordial to the public. Senior Myanmar leaders including U Thein Sein and U Shwe Mann, the speaker of Myanmar’s lower house of Parliament, have both visited Beijing since the nominally civilian government came to power in 2011.

However, during the peak of reforms between April 2011 and September 2012, none of China’s top leaders visited Myanmar. This constitutes a sharp comparison to three such visits before Myanmar’s democratization from March 2009 to June 2010.

Meanwhile, China is seeking to diversify its relationships with different political forces in Myanmar, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy party. Beijing has also launched a major public relations campaign to improve its image and

relations with local communities in the country.

Despite prior losses, China remains hopefully about the future of Sino-Myanmar relations. This confidence stems from a belief that regardless of Myanmar’s political system or international status, China will always be its largest neighbor and China’s political, economic and social influence will always persist.

As Western companies hesitate on the best timing to invest in the country, China believes its abundant foreign investment could encourage closer Sino-Myanmar cooperation once Naypyitaw realizes its ties with the West are not bringing the desired economic growth.

China recognizes this relationship may not be as good as during the junta years. However, as it observes and adjusts, the Asian superpower hopes for new opportunities.

For Washington to deny responsibility in China’s losses only reflects its lack of consideration and respect for China’s national interests.

Yun Sun is a visiting fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Cooking for the Lady

How did the democracy icon eat under house arrest? Her former chef tells us about a hidden kitchen, meal deliveries past the military, and more

By KYAW PHYO THA

When he took over sole responsibility of cooking for Myanmar’s most famous resident in 2004, U Myint Soe’s first job was to find a secret location where no one could see what he was doing.

His next job was to buy a small gas stove, some pots and pans, and then he got to work. Every morning around 9:30 the chubby man with a speckled-gray ponytail emerged from the unmarked room, holding two large plastic bags of food and setting off across Yangon to University Avenue.

“It was my secret kitchen. I can’t let you know where it is. Nobody knew,” the 61-year old told The Irrawaddy. “It was for her safety.”

The reason for all the secrecy was that U Myint Soe was preparing and delivering food for pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during her house arrest. If anyone knew where his kitchen was located, he was afraid someone might poison the meals.

U Myint Soe, also known as U Pho Lay, originally became the personal cook for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in July 1995, taking over from her long-serving family chef.

Up until her house arrest in 2003, he prepared food at the Nobel laureate’s lakeside villa kitchen, but when her detention began, the Lady was held incommunicado with two female companions.

On her request in 2004, U Myint Soe and one of his friends were ordered to prepare food outside and deliver it.

“During those years, I missed my duty only one day, when Cyclone Nargis hit Yangon on May 3 in 2008, because all the way to her house was totally blocked with debris,” he said.

In preparation for his job, U Myint Soe had to learn the “dos and don’ts” of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s menu from his predecessor.

“She doesn’t eat red meat. She shuns MSG and oily food. She wants less salt in her food. Fish, prawns and vegetables are her meals of choice. Plus, chicken and duck,” he said.

For breakfast, he brought some traditional Burmese food at around 8 am or 9 am every day. He prepared a small portion of rice, soup, vegetable salad and meat curry for her. She usually ate lunch around noon and dinner at 7 pm.

“She is very health-conscious,” he said. “She told me to use sugar as a substitute for MSG. She doesn’t want to be fat, either.”

U Myint Soe actually had no formal training when he first took on the job of feeding the country’s most famous person. But he was a keen helper in his mother’s kitchen as a young man, and his cooking skills became well known among his friends and fellow party workers.

“When she said she wanted a new chef, my friends simply nominated me and I became her cook. She never made a comment on the food I prepared for her, nor told me what she wanted to eat,” he said.

The cook recalled the tedious

security arrangements he passed every time he made his deliveries to 54 University Avenue, with a group of plainclothes military intelligence personnel camping inside a building in front of the house.

“They always inspected the meal to make sure I brought only food, not something else, and took pictures. They did it every day!” he said.

After the security check, he would hand over the plastic food containers at the front gate of the villa to one of the women staying with Daw Aung San

PHOTO: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

Suu Kyi, making the transfer under the watchful eyes of the police standing next to him. Then he would jot down the list of items that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wanted during the next visit.

“I made the daily delivery on purpose because it was the only way to know whether Ama [big sister] was OK or not,” he said.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Gen U Aung San, was a childhood hero for U Myint Soe, who remains a staunch supporter of the National League for Democracy and was the 15th person to join the party when it formed in 1988.

“They are ‘like father, like daughter.’ I just admire those who sacrifice their lives for their people and nation,” he said.

The chef has earned a reputation for his commitment to the democracy icon.

“Given his decade-long daily service to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and hardship he endured at that time, everyone can easily gauge how loyal Myint Soe is to her,” said U Win Tin, one of the cofounders of the NLD.

Since Daw Aung Suu Kyi was released in November 2010, U Myint Soe is no longer the only cook for the NLD leader. Now in his early 60s, the

chef is trying his hand at writing. His recent memoir about the democracy icon and her close friends, “Aung San’s Daughter,” became a best-seller.

“I have surrendered my duty to someone I trust. I believe they can do a good job for her,” he said. “Now I have time to document Ama’s life. As one of the people who had lived very close to her, I have so many things to write about her.”

Old habit dies hard, though.

“I still cook once or twice a month for her when she is not attending the Parliament in Naypyitaw.”

U Myint Soe, former chef to Myanmar democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is now also a best-selling author.

SE Asia Ready to Build, But Will Investors Come?

The region is expected to spend 600 billion on infrastructure over the next decade, but but foreign investors have been slow to get on board

By STUART GRUDGINGS & NEIL CHATTERJEE

KUALA LUMPUR/JAKARTA

— Indonesia is seeking European investors for US $9 billion worth of water, road, air and seaport projects in what will be a litmus test of Southeast Asian countries’ ability to seize on ripe financial conditions to upgrade decrepit infrastructure.

Easy global liquidity and investors’ eagerness to tap one of the world’s few fast-growing regions should create a sweet spot for the region to fill the $600 billion in infrastructure needs the Asian Development Bank identifies over the next decade.

But infrastructure experts say a shortage of projects offering compelling returns, coupled with stifling bureaucracy and regulatory uncertainty, threatens to undermine the ambitious plans of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

“There’s a lot of money floating around but it’s money looking for a return,” said Bert Hofman, the World Bank chief economist for East Asia and the Pacific.

After years of chronic underspending, governments in the region of 600 million people have begun to sharply raise their infrastructure budgets to improve transport and energy networks.

Indonesia, the biggest regional economy, estimates it alone needs $150

billion worth of new infrastructure, but is only willing to finance 15 percent and has seen few takers so far for the public-private partnerships (PPPs) it is relying on.

Jakarta hopes that will change after a roadshow to Europe this year to market 16 projects from water treatment to ports.

“We’re market-sounding,” Chatib Basri, chief of the country’s investment board, told Reuters. Speaking in Jakarta after a trip to Paris to meet potential investors, Basri said he saw demand coming from France and Germany.

The projects include water and waste treatment plants in the country’s most populous Java island, a sector that could be of interest to firms such as France’s Veolia Environment, the world’s largest private supplier of

drinking water, or German industrial giant Siemens.

The projects also include an airport in Java and seaports, in an archipelago of 17,000 islands where an inadequate transport network means high logistics costs.

Having fixed their public finances following a regional financial crisis in the late 1990s, Southeast Asian governments can borrow more cheaply than ever, while local conglomerates and banks are cash-rich on the back of robust economic growth.

A rapidly growing middle class is pressuring politicians to ease nightmarish traffic conditions in “mega-cities” such as Jakarta and Manila, while the massive plane orders being placed by low-cost airlines AirAsia and Lion Air attest to the

dramatic growth in regional air travel.

In March, Thailand’s cabinet approved a plan to borrow $68 billion to build rail, roads and water plants by 2020. That came days after the operator of Bangkok’s SkyTrain, BTS Group Holdings Pcl, said it would raise up to $2.1 billion by listing an infrastructure fund in what could be Thailand’s biggest IPO.

Indonesia and the Philippines, farflung archipelagos with a combined population of 340 million, have passed laws to improve cooperation with the private sector to solve their bottlenecks.

But attracting private funds remains difficult. Project finance lending in Southeast Asia fell 6.3 percent last year to $13.5 billion, Thomson Reuters data shows.

The Philippines, whose recent

history is littered with failed or delayed infrastructure plans, has prepared at least 16 PPPs worth more than $4 billion.

in Indonesia and the Philippines often fail to reflect such risks, said Johan Bastin, chief executive of Singaporebased infrastructure private equity firm CapAsia.

“In my view, the institutional capabilities at local administrative level are underdeveloped, the regulatory regimes largely untested and the judiciary systems somewhat arbitrary,” he said. “The returns we see in the markets seem to assume that these problems will be dealt with over time.”

He said annual returns on projects were often about 3-5 percent below an “acceptable” level of around 15-20 percent.

The passage of a new land acquisition law last year should help jump-start Indonesia’s infrastructure pipeline, although it will only apply to future investments.

Meanwhile, the struggle to attract private investors means governments may have to play a bigger role. Longdelayed plans to build a mass-rapid transit system to relieve Jakarta’s 10 million people of monster traffic jams are a case in point.

After plans for a pure private-sector solution were abandoned long ago, it has been held up for years by wrangling between Jakarta and the national government over how to pay back a $1.6 billion Japanese loan for the project.

While public infrastructure spending is rising in the region, it remains well below where it should be, economists say.

Indonesia, which spends only around 3-3.5 percent of its GDP on infrastructure, plans to raise its infrastructure budget by about 11 percent this year. The Philippines aims to double its infrastructure spending from 2.6 percent of GDP. China spends about 9 percent of its GDP on infrastructure.

firms—which face tight restrictions on

So far, only two projects have been successfully bid out. Some foreign firms—which face tight restrictions on investment—say they have been put off by a lack of government guarantees on pricing.

In Indonesia, only two PPP projects offered since 2006 have made it to the construction phase—a 2,000 megawatt coal-fired power plant in Java and an expressway in Bali. Even then, the power project has been delayed by land acquisition problems.

As well as investor-unfriendly lands laws, projects can be held up by sometimes conflicting national and local authorities. Moreover, returns

Some governments’ ability to expand infrastructure spending is hampered by heavy outlays on subsidies. Indonesia spent about $22 billion last year on fuel subsidies, and the prospects for reform are dim ahead of a presidential election in 2014.

“Southeast Asia has to rethink radically its strategy on infrastructure,” said Frederic Neumann, co-head of Asian economic research at HSBC. “I’m not inclined to bet this is happening really on a broader scale.”

Vehicles drive past the construction site for a new highway in Jakarta’s business district. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy, estimates it alone needs $150 billion worth of new infrastructure.

Beer Wars

Myanmar is set for a frothy fight, and locals can expect to drink up

By WILLIAM BOOT

Myanmar is about to become a business battleground for two old brewing adversaries intent on capturing the region’s last great untapped beer market.

One-time partners Carlsberg of Denmark and Thai Beverage of Bangkok, who fell out in a business dispute seven years ago forcing Carlsberg to quit the lucrative Thailand market, are both planning to brew and sell their brands in Myanmar.

The fallout between the two big brewers was acrimonious, leading to a court action in Singapore in which

Carlsberg ended up paying US $120 million damages to Thai Beverage, which had unsuccessfully sued for $2.5 billion.

Carlsberg has only just re-entered Thailand after an eight-year absence, teaming up with Thai Beverage rival Singha Corporation. Now the two firms will be competitors in Myanmar, where Bangkok-based Singha also plans to sell its beers.

“Burma [Myanmar] is a brand new market for beer where per capita consumption is very low, not much more than 10 percent of the volume drunk in Thailand and Vietnam,” said

an industry insider in Singapore, who spoke to The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. “Burmese don’t have a lot of disposable income, so I think we are going to see some fierce competition with stuff like a price war as the competitors try to garner market share and knock rivals out.”

Carlsberg has formed a partnership with Myanmar Golden Star Breweries, which has links with the Myanmar military. The Danish giant sought a joint venture with Golden Star 15 years ago, but human rights groups in Europe brought the firm’s links to the military to light, effectively blocking the deal.

Carlsberg says its new partnership will initially involve distributing its brands in Myanmar, but there are also plans to build a new brewery.

Thai Beverage—also called ThaiBev—is owned by one of Asia’s wealthiest men, Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi, ranked in the world’s top 100 richest people by Forbes Magazine with over $11 billion. His company has gained a foothold in Myanmar by acquiring Singaporebased Fraser and Neave, primarily a non-alcoholic sporting drinks producer that also includes Myanmar Brewery among its assets.

Charoen now owns 55 percent of Myanmar Brewery, whose other major shareholder is the army-controlled Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings.

People in Myanmar at present drink on average less than four liters per year—that’s only about 10 small bottles—of local brand beers, which are still luxury drinks for many lowincome workers. In neighboring Thailand, annual per capita beer consumption is 25 liters, and in Vietnam it’s 30 liters.

“The two brewing companies will be banking on an economic boom in Myanmar turning beer into an everyday commodity accessible to most adults,” the Singapore industry insider said. “The potential is big but it’s a business gamble, especially because there will be two large investors fighting for

dominant market share which in the medium term will keep retail prices down and profits slim.

“Thai Beverage needs to expand abroad because its home market is saturated and maturing. There isn’t the volume potential in Laos and Cambodia with much smaller populations, while religious objections to alcohol stymie markets in Malaysia and Indonesia.”

The arrival of the two major brewers in Myanmar might also lead to an injection of money into sports in the country. Both Carlsberg and Thai Beverage are major sponsors of football teams in the English Premier League.

For years the Carlsberg logo was emblazoned on Liverpool players’ shirts, while across town the name Chang adorns the strips of rival club Everton. Carlsberg has now moved in to provide sponsorship at Arsenal.

“The combination of F&N [Fraser and Neave] and Charoen’s Thai Beverage creates a powerful, multifaceted player in the region,” said Michael Schaefer, the chief of drinks research at Euromonitor International, a London-based consumer markets analyst.

“What’s more, one of F&N’s most successful brands, sports drink 100 Plus, gives Thai Beverage a foothold in one of Southeast Asia’s fastestgrowing categories, one where it has long struggled to gain traction. F&N’s 55 percent stake in Myanmar Brewery

offers entry into one of the region’s most intriguing emerging markets, with the potential for massive expansion over the next decade.”

Carlsberg is primarily a beer producer, but Thai Beverage built its base in Thailand making dirt cheap whisky and white liquor, popular among poor, rural Thais. Charoen then created the Chang beer brand and succeeded in wresting Thailand market dominance from the older and better established Singha Corporation.

Singha beer is also scheduled to go on sale in Myanmar, but proposals outlined by the Bangkok company in May last year to also open a new brewery there may be undermined by the Carlsberg and Thai Beverage developments. Another idea by Singha Corporation is to build a brewery in Mandalay, primarily to export into southern China.

Whether Myanmar eventually has two new breweries or three, it looks like there is going to be a lot more of the frothy amber liquid on sale.

The selection of beers available to consumers in Myanmar is set to expand, with international brands joining some popular local brews.

PHOTO: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

Chinese Investment in Myanmar Still Welcome, Says President

than that 11 are in shallow water and 19 in deep water. The closing date for bids to the Ministry of Energy is June 14, and the licenses will be awarded later in the month.

Bidders can apply for up to three blocks. Shallow water licenses will require a local partner but the deeper water blocks can be 100 percent foreign-operated due to the technical expertise and cost involved.

China’s businesses and investment are still welcome in Myanmar, President U Thein Sein told the state-controlled newspaper China Daily. In an interview with the paper, the president rejected reports that Myanmar’s opening up to the West had made China less welcome.

“Chinese investment in Myanmar has not only benefited Chinese investors but also helped Myanmar people,” China Daily quoted him as saying.

The impression that China was less welcome now follows U Thein Sein’s surprise decision in 2011 to suspend construction of the multi-billion dollar Myitsone hydroelectric dam project that was being built by Chinese firms in Kachin State. Most of the huge volume of electricity to be generated by the dam was to be exported to China. The project was suspended on environmental grounds.

The Myanmar president met China’s new President Xi Jinping during a three-day visit to China that started on April 5. He was there to attend this year’s Boao Forum, a summit for government and business leaders.

No details on the transparency of the selection process have yet been published and it appears that the state Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) will retain close involvement. MOGE was closely linked with the former military regime’s secretive manipulation of Myanmar’s offshore gas riches to date and is widely reported to have been the main reason why plans to hold an offshore blocks auction last September were postponed until now.

1,300 Foreign Firms Enter Myanmar Since Early 2011

More than 5,000 new businesses have officially registered in Myanmar since the beginning of 2011, according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DCIA), a government agency.

Offshore Gas, Oil Bids Open, and MOGE to Get Involved

Major Western oil companies BP, Shell and Chevron are tipped to be among the likely bidders for 30 new offshore exploration blocks now being offered for licensing by Myanmar’s Ministry

of Energy.

Other large firms expected to make offers include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Petronas of Malaysia, PTTEP of Thailand and India’s GAIL—all state-owned enterprises.

Details of the blocks have not been made public, other

The total of 5,200 includes 1,300 foreign companies opening branch or representative offices in the country for the first time, said the agency. The foreign firms came from 32 countries and have invested about US $6 billion, while the new domestic businesses had invested $1.16 billion in the last two years.

The latest major foreign company to set up a branch in Myanmar was Germany’s Bosch, a global brand in engineering. Bosch opened a branch in Yangon to promote

sales of fire and safety equipment. The company was said to be negotiating with the Myanmar Fire Services Department to develop fire prevention systems and a centralized monitoring system for fire control.

systems

Dentsu Wins Deal to Promote Myanmar’s SEA Games

One of the world’s biggest advertising and public relations companies, Dentsu of Japan, has won the contract to promote Myanmar’s hosting of the Southeast Asian Games in December. Toykobased Dentsu “has been appointed by the government of Myanmar as its sponsorship management consultant,” the conglomerate said in a statement.

Dentsu, with dozens of subsidiaries across the world and thousands of employees, said the contract would be handled by Dentsu Sports Asia, based in Singapore.

“In its role as sponsorship management consultant, Dentsu Sports Asia will work with the Dentsu Asia branch in Myanmar and other Dentsu Group companies under the Dentsu Asia umbrella to offer integrated advertising communications proposals related to the 27th SEA Games to existing global, regional and local clients as well as to attract new clients,” the Tokyo statement said.

The Games will be held from Dec.11-22 and involve participation by the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus tiny Timor Leste. Sporting events are scheduled for Naypyitaw, Mandalay and Yangon, but concern has been expressed in some quarters about the adequacy of sporting facilities and athletes’ accommodation.

By WILLIAM BOOT

PHOTO: REUTERS/CHINA DAILY

Myanmar’s President U Thein Sein, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a signing ceremony soon after his arrival for the Boao Forum, in Sanya, Hainan Province, on April 5, 2013.

Serenity Over Inle Lake

Floating markets, villages and monasteries dot the way during a relaxing freshwater ride in east Myanmar

By THE IRRAWADDY

Shortly after your longboat sets off from shore, gliding silently through channels choked with water hyacinth, a narrow waterway opens to the secondlargest freshwater lake in Myanmar, and your cruise over Inle Lake has officially begun.

The shoreline seems to fade away. In the distance, green mountaintops shrouded in clouds are the only reminders that this tourist hotspot is 900 meters above sea level.

With its floating gardens and wooden houses on stilts, Inle Lake in Shan State is never short of visitors, whether local or foreign. The 45-square-mile lake, which sits at the foot of the Shan Hills in the state’s southern Taunggyi District, takes on different rhythms throughout the course of any given day. When dawn breaks, the scene is almost otherworldly, with a thin veil of mist hanging over the water and floating houses silhouetted

against a pink and orange sky. The silence is almost overwhelming.

But as the sun peeks out from the mountains to the east, Inle Lake comes to life. The lake dwellers, known as Inthas, load their wooden boats with long conical nets for fishing and head out for the day. They stand with one foot on the stern as they wrap the other leg around an oar, in a paddling style not used anywhere else in the world. For visitors, the lake has much to offer, with villages and monasteries rising from the water. The only way to get around is by longboat. During your cruise, be sure to visit the market at Phaung Taw Oo Pagoda for traditional Shan fabrics and merchandise, and meet hill tribes as they come by with colorful turbans and shy smiles.

Alternatively, stop for souvenirs at the textile and silverware shops on stilts in nearby villages. If you come across boats of local fishermen on your way to a floating restaurant for htamin chin, an Inle

signature dish of rice, tomato and fish, don’t hesitate to record the rowing—these fishermen are not camera-shy. For architecture buffs, clusters of ancient pagodas are worth a visit on shore.

Tourists looking for a busier schedule should visit in late September during the Phaung Taw Oo Pagoda Festival. During the 18day celebration, four heavily gilded Buddha images are removed from pagodas and taken down to the lake, where they are transported on barges decorated like a mythical bird. The barges are towed by several boats of the one-legged rowers, gliding together in an impressive procession.

Twilight over Inle Lake is when serenity reigns, as the occasional roar of inboard diesel engines from larger tourist boats becomes less frequent. As darkness moves in, a lone fisherman rushes his longboat home. Lights flicker on at the floating residences, and minutes later, tranquility descends on the vast waters.

The sights, sounds and tastes of Shan State’s Inle Lake region make it one of Myanmar’s most appealing tourist destinations.

PHOTOS: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

Lapet Thoke and the American Dream

A husband and wife team earn culinary praise by introducing the flavors and culture of Myanmar to California

By EDITH MIRANTE

SAN FRANCISCO—Restaurants can be unofficial cultural embassies for their countries. Even the smallest towns in America now have Thai restaurants, and the pho and salad rolls of Vietnam are ubiquitous as well. But the rich and varied cuisine of Myanmar has had little exposure, despite the diaspora of refugees, exiles and immigrants.

An exception is the critically acclaimed Burma Superstar, with a flagship restaurant on San Francisco’s multicultural Clement Street and branches in Oakland and Alameda. Desmond Htun Lin, who owns the restaurant with his wife Jocelyn Lee, recently told The Irrawaddy about his journey to the United States from Myanmar, also known as Burma, and about his work turning dishes such as lapet thoke into California “foodie” favorites.

When did you first come to the United States?

My family came to San Francisco in 1979. I think our dream was very similar to the dream of others who have come to this country from all over the world: to turn hard work into a better life. We

arrived as a family of six with less than $200 and limited English.

How have you adapted Myanmar cuisine to present it to Americans?

Our customers generally are just beginning to become familiar with Burmese cuisine, so our servers have to be more knowledgeable about the dishes than they might at another type of ethnic food restaurant. When we serve our tea leaf salad, we explain each of the ingredients to the diner, and then combine them right there at the table so they can see the culinary design behind the dish. Giving our customers fresh produce, organic when possible, something that is a combination of Burmese, Shan and Chin, is how we “adapt” the cuisine to their taste.

Burma Superstar has always been “politically correct” in support for democracy. Do you think that has affected your business?

We strive to be responsive to the needs of others and to work in their best interests. That extends to our employees and our customers, but also to the Burmese people. It’s not a business-based decision, it’s a moral decision. We have an unusual ability at Burma Superstar to be a window into the entire country of Burma, a part of which is to call attention to the challenges faced by the people there.

Do you have any plans to do business in Myanmar?

While I don’t have any immediate plans to open restaurants in Burma, I am interested in business ventures that include corporate social responsibility, environmental protection and transparency in business operations. I am a founding board member of the San Francisco-based USA Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and the San Francisco-Yangon Sister City initiative, both of which are aimed at strengthening the ties between the two countries.

What are the most popular dishes at Burma Superstar?

Tea leaf salad, samosa soup and our curries are delicious.

What are your own personal favorite Myanmar foods?

Joycelyn and I enjoy anything prepared with shrimp paste and fish sauce, but it is unfortunately not always well received by the American palate. We can eat a bowl of mohinga every day.

PHOTOS: LARRY FELSON

PHOTOS: AMY THOMAS

PHOTOS: AMY THOMAS

Myanmar’s relationship with North Korea has been tested in recent months, with the world raising questions about possible nuclear ties. But if Myanmar’s government wants some distance, its erstwhile partner in arms is making a good impression on the people of Myanmar in another way: its cooking.

In Yangon, diners looking for a bite of North Korean fare head to one spot: Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant on Saya San Road.

The restaurant, which opened in 2011 and doubles as a karaoke joint, is staffed by 12 North Korean waitresses.

“I’m not only a waitress, but also a good singer,” said 22-yearold Kim.

The waitresses perform traditional Korean songs and popular Myanmar songs, though they are not fond of another international music sensation.

“We don’t like that song,” one waitress said of “Gangnam Style,” by South Korean pop star Psy.

The North Korean government operates a chain of Pyongyang restaurants around Asia, including in Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

In Yangon, customers can rent one of 12 karaoke rooms for 20,000 kyat (US $23) per hour.

Like North Korean diplomats working in Myanmar, the waitresses cannot travel independently.

Kim Jong-un’s Ladies in Yangon

By WAI MOE

“We visited the famous Shwedagon Pagoda and some shopping malls, with permission from the embassy,” one waitress said. “But the rest of the time … we just stay at the restaurant compound, watching television and learning Myanmar.”

North Korea’s relationship with Myanmar has been strained over the years. Ties came to an abrupt end in 1983, when a North Korean assassination plot against South Korea’s president killed 17 South Korean officials and four Myanmar officials while injuring dozens more. Within hours of the bombing, Yangon kicked out all North Korean diplomats from the country.

Myanmar’s former military junta decided to publicly resume ties with North Korea in 2006, hoping for assistance with arms and technology.

In Yangon now, the waitresses show support for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

When asked whether they knew about US President Barack Obama’s visit to Yangon last year, one waitress said: “We knew he was here, but we don’t like him because he’s not our leader.”

In addition to the female waitresses, the restaurant hired three male security guards. From a building on the compound, they watch customers through hidden CCTV cameras, bringing a bit more of Pyongyang style to Yangon.

At an eatery and karaoke joint, North Korean waitresses offer Myanmar a taste of their homeland.

PHOTOS: JPAING / THE IRRAWADDY

Crispy, Spicy, Pungent

Canadian traveler and food writer Naomi Duguid is hooked on Myanmar’s cuisine

By EDITH MIRANTE

Although “Burma: Rivers of Flavor” has dozens of recipes and plenty of instruction on ingredients and techniques, it is much more than a cookbook. Like Naomi Duguid’s earlier books, which were co-authored with Jeffrey Alford, this is also a travelogue, ethnography and photo gallery.

An intrepid Canadian, Duguid has made repeated trips to Myanmar, also known as Burma, since 1980. Visiting much of the country, including seacoast, hills and delta, she has sampled a great array of local dishes and closely observed how they are prepared and served.

Duguid previously approached Myanmar’s borders in “Hot, Sour, Salty, Sweet,” which focuses on cuisines of the Mekong region, and in my favorite, “Beyond the Great Wall,” which includes China’s Yunnan Province. Her Indian subcontinent “Mangoes and Curry Leaves” contains the samosas and biriyanis also found in Myanmar.

She dedicates her newest book to “the people of Burma, whose resilience in hard times and generosity to a stranger, are remarkable and moving,” and writes that she is “hooked, not just on Burmese food, but also on the country.”

Since Duguid believes in presenting her recipes within social context, in “Burma: Rivers of Flavor” she often references Myanmar’s ethnic diversity. The Kachins, she notes, only recently began cooking with oil, and northern Chins use corn porridge as their staple grain rather than rice. Several recipes have a Rakhine variation, adding galangal and more chili than central Myanmar versions.

Shan State is well represented in this book, and Duguid notes that Shan cooks are very efficient, capable of making a meal using only one pot. Gaeng gai sai aloo , a one-pot Shan chicken curry with potatoes and lemongrass, was especially well received by my dinner guests when I followed her recipe, although it had much more broth than the picture showed (not a bad thing).

Healthy turmeric, ginger and shallots are omnipresent in the recipes, along with the pungency of fish sauce, ngapi (fermented fish/shrimp paste) and balachaung (a dried shrimp and shallot condiment).

Like a supportive auntie, Duguid reassures first-timers with “don’t be intimidated.” Useful instructions are provided to not-from-Myanmar readers for frying crispy sliced shallots (a skill I have now mastered, thanks to her step-by-step instructions) and preparing “Shan tofu” from chickpea flour. Experienced Southeast Asian cooks can learn to make their own tua nao (soybean disks) or sweet moun lon

yei bo (“magic rice balls”).

Duguid has a down-to-earth approach to cuisine, and her culinary choices mostly come from humble street stalls and bus stop restaurants. Home cooking is also important—she gives special credit to local cooks Daw Mya Mya in the central Myanmar town of Pakokku; Daw Cho Cho in Taung Be, near the ancient city of Bagan; and Daw Shwe Nwe in Mrauk U.

Enticing photos show many of the prepared recipes presented in shabby chic style on chipped enamelware and faded china plates. The tone throughout is appropriately thrifty, as Duguid advises reusing oil, not wasting fruit and cutting whole chickens into small pieces.

The recipes are her personal selections rather than a comprehensive “Joy of Cooking” for Myanmar—sadly there’s no pork curry, and readers from Myanmar will certainly notice other omissions.

But for overseas cooks, this is a very valuable resource, and even readers in Myanmar’s central cities can find some intriguing new tastes, like the Tavoyan fish soup or Kachin beef with herbs and spices pounded into it. I would suggest inviting a group of friends to a meal using the Kachin recipes in the book and charging them a fundraising fee to benefit Kachins internally displaced by the current war in the north.

In the interspersed travel recollections, Duguid writes affectingly and unpretentiously about her encounters with ordinary working people. A man she calls Sai took her on a motorcycle tour of food-related cottage industries around Hsipaw in Shan State, including a peanut oil press, salt wells and a small cane-sugar processor, all traditional ways of using local materials.

Kachin in

She emphasizes that in the nation’s darkest hours, food has often been a source of comfort. This book should serve as a timely reminder of the ongoing need for integrity in food: Myanmar must not surrender to international agribusiness plantations pushing out local sustainability, environmentally damaging and unhealthy palm oil as a substitute for traditional peanut oil, the use of MSG instead of ngapi, or fast-food chain restaurants replacing quickly prepared fresh street food.

Edith Mirante is director of Project Maje and author of “Down the Rat Hole” and “The Wind in the Bamboo.”

Burma: Rivers of Flavor

Naomi Duguid Artisan New York, 2012

Lessons from Cambodia

By MU SOCHUA

What can you share with me about Cambodia’s experience on economic sanctions?”

This was one of the questions put to me by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi when I had the privilege of meeting her early 2011 during a visit by the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats and during another discussion that year with the National League for Democracy’s Women’s Wing.

International sanctions were imposed on Cambodia throughout the 1980s during the occupation of the country by Vietnam, which had ousted Cambodia’s murderous Khmer Rouge regime in 1979.

The answers to Daw Suu’s profound question came from what I have lived with as a citizen and a Cambodian opposition member. An immediate positive result of the lifting of sanctions in 1992 was the open contact that Cambodians were able to have with the outside world.

It allowed the return home of the members of the Cambodian diaspora like myself. It brought in an atmosphere of hope, of a new beginning. There was an immediate boom of nongovernmental organizations, small and medium-sized businesses, and the local and international media made its re-appearance at newsstands and in the city’s cafes. People enjoyed the new sense of freedom.

It also allowed the UN to sponsor and conduct the 1993 election, which had over 98 percent of voter participation. The elections led to the victory of the royalist party Funcinpec over the Cambodian People’s Party (led by current Prime Minister Hun Sen).

The international community poured in significant amounts of aid for Cambodia’s physical reconstruction,

including schools, health centers, roads and bridges. Currently, Cambodia receives more than US $1 billion in international aid annually with close to no conditions.

But what has since gone wrong in the Cambodian peace and democratization process? That was another question that Daw Suu asked.

I pointed out the facade of democracy that has been created in Cambodia today. I also cautioned against a lack of independence of national state institutions, such as the police and armed forces. And I warned of the complacency of the donor community to violations of human rights, as the West wants Cambodia to be a success story of a rebuilt post-conflict nation.

This latter experience serves as a warning for Myanmar as the international community will be keen to term the country’s reform process a successful transition to democracy.

One key lesson that Myanmar can learn from Cambodia is that a genuine democratic reconstruction process begins with the moral commitment of a country’s top leadership to human rights, to freedoms and to liberties of the people and the media, with no marginalization.

A strong, independent electoral institution and system for free and fair elections, with the support and respect of voters, must be established early on to avoid conflicts and the return of a one-party system or dictatorship.

Another point is that national reconciliation requires full recognition of the role of a loyal opposition beyond the arena of Parliament. The people should have the same duty and privilege as their leaders to come to the negotiating table.

A program of reforms of key national institutions in charge of

national defense, citizens’ security and justice to establish rule of law should also be part of peace and reconciliation negotiations.

Development aid to a country must be comprehensive, with key priority sectors and clear and well-defined benchmarks for measurable results. Promotion and protection of human rights must be a condition for receiving aid.

Training and support for smalland medium-sized entrepreneurs should be a top economic priority, instead of relying on trickle-down effects of the growth of big businesses that monopolize large swathes of the economy, as we have seen happen in Cambodia.

Programs for decentralization of power from the national to the local level should be established with the engagement of local civil society organizations, and local government positions should be filled through elections.

After two decades of receiving development aid, Cambodia still has a poor track record on human rights, and it is unlikely that the upcoming parliamentary elections on July 28 will be free and fair.

The challenges that Cambodia now faces began at the early stages of the political reform process: The transfer of power by the country’s political elite never took place and the international aid community continues to maintain the status quo. Myanmar would do well to avoid these pitfalls in its current, early phase of reform.

Two decades into its difficult transition to democracy, Cambodia is well-placed to warn Myanmar of the pitfalls that lie ahead on the road to reform

Mu Sochua is a former Minister of Women’s Affairs and a leading member of the Cambodian National Rescue Party, Cambodia’s main opposition party.

Mu Sochua

Back to the Land of Green Ghosts

Myanmar welcomes home award-winning writer Pascal Khoo Thwe

After 24 years in exile, Pascal Khoo Thwe, an ethnic Kayan author known for his autobiography, “From the Land of Green Ghosts: A Burmese Odyssey,” is now visiting the country of his birth. His 2002 book about growing up under military rule was awarded the Kiriyama Prize, an international literary award to encourage greater understanding of and among the peoples of the Pacific Rim and South Asia. He recently spoke to Irrawaddy reporter Kyaw Phyo Tha about his trip back to Myanmar, also known as Burma.

As a native of Myanmar returning after many years in exile, is there anything about what you’ve seen here that surprises you?

I see freedom here, but it’s only in its infancy. What makes me surprised is the media coverage of issues like the conflict in Kachin State. I have to say, they report quite thoroughly on the issue by adding voices from both sides—the Kachin and the government. Even though we see that kind of good sign, we shouldn’t stay where we are now. We have to keep pushing the government for more freedom.

Some people are cautiously optimistic about the current reform process in Myanmar. They are worried about the possibility of backsliding, like the war in Kachin State. Do you share these concerns?

I’m worried because we have many problems at all levels of society. I’m concerned not just because I’m an ethnic Kayan. Based on what we’ve seen in other countries, we can assume that it will take some time for society to heal completely. I want the fighting in Burma to stop so that the rehabilitation can begin.

Take what happened under the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia or during the

Cultural Revolution in China. Those in positions of power abused those with less power. But when it was all over, those who committed atrocities said, “We didn’t realize that what we were doing was wrong.” What I mean is that both parties— those who committed the atrocities and their victims—will suffer psychologically. That’s why I’m worried.

What was your first reaction to the reforms?

I didn’t believe it. Even now I hardly believe it. I mean it. Now reform is under way only where it is urgently needed, but not in sectors where it should be. The leader of the reforms isn’t making the most of his

chance; instead he’s doing what he is asked to do. It’s not good enough.

Tell me about your homecoming trip.

This is actually my second time back in the country. I first visited Burma in July of last year after 24 years in exile. I also went to my home village. I’m thinking about renovating my grandfather’s house.

Has there been any change in your village?

Yes, it’s changed a lot physically. I came to realize that the people there have real stoic endurance. That’s how they survived all those years of government repression. Now they are being reborn, both physically and emotionally. I think that makes them unique. They have really earned my respect. I’m looking for some way to do something for them.

So, no more writing?

I’ll continue to write, but I’m poor in time. I have lots of ideas. I’m thinking about working on a sequel of “From the Land of Green Ghosts.” Plus, I want to write about the food of the Burmese countryside— let’s say a kind of jungle cookbook. I also would like to pen a family saga, based on three generations. I will keep writing in English, because I’m not good at typing in Burmese. If I type in Burmese, I have to struggle to find the right key, and by the time I find it, the idea I was thinking about is gone. I’m also interested in the hardships people face. Writing about this will be good for our future generations, as they can learn from the experiences of those who came before them.

Your autobiography is now freely available in Myanmar. How do you feel about that?

I’m thrilled and proud to see that my book is now for sale in bookshops [in Myanmar]. There was a time when people here could only read my book secretly, but now those days are over. Some of my readers have asked for a Burmese translation of the book. I want someone who knows both Burmese and English to translate it.

PHOTO: THE IRRAWADDY

Pascal Khoo Thwe, author of “From the Land of Green Ghosts: A Burmese Odyssey,” says Myanmar’s newfound freedom is “only in its infancy.”