Divided Mali splits between Intervention and Negotiation Talks By Alessandro Casarotti
Summary
On 12th October 2012, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 provided the mandate to ECOWAS (and every other regional actor involved) to deliver a military action plan in 45 days for solving the Malian crisis. The plan was drafted on 7th November and it should be voted on at the UNSC at the beginning of December. However, wide divisions between interventionists and negotiators infringe on the prospect of success on every level: international organization (ECOWAS-AU), partner countries (FranceAlgeria) and the Malian government (Green-Red berets). Divisions are also a reality among the rebels themselves: the MNLA withdrew its claims on Azawad and is currently requesting peace talks; same can be said for AD; MOJWA and AQIM who are in the midst of re-organizing, feeling the increasing pressure of a likely intervention.
Analysis
Although it has the potential to worsen the humanitarian crisis (ICRC source), the intervention has now become a “done deal”. Even the Malian population gathered to a pro-intervention demonstration the day before UNSCR 2071. Nevertheless, there are some issues to solve before an international contingent enters Azawad. First, the UN avoided taking a political position and waited for a compromise solution, which doesn’t completely persuade the U.S.A. and Germany, who are pushing for democratic elections. However, this claim is counterproductive and naïve, for Al-Qaeda linked groups control two thirds of the country. The merits of “free elections” seem more than doubtful. France and England are leaning towards an interventionist approach. However, they will only deliver logistic and intelligence related support. The internal political situation is still in turmoil and the current outlook confirms that holding on to the Interim government is the only practical and viable solution at the moment.
Second, the UN and Western actors do not want to lead the intervention. There is strong commitment to avoid another Afghanistan and be labeled as “new-colonialist”, which would help the extremists’ tilt the balance in their favor. The proposal of the Malian army leading the international contingent presents two core issues: timing, as it delays the intervention to after March 2013; cohesion, due to rebuilding and reorganizing the army after the coup. Therefore, the most effective solution should include an ECOWAS leadership. Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Guinea have always supported the intervention; Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger have increased their troop levels at the frontier. Contrariwise, the AU president Diamini-Zuma is still pushing for a negotiated solution. Similarly, Algeria is not persuaded by the intervention. It is afraid the implications of the Mali conflict might create negative spillover effects, falling into Islamist upheavals like neighboring countries. On the other hand, it pursues its military intelligence actions in cooperation with the U.S.A. and France at the Azawad border. Third, the MNLA has asked for peace talks several times since it was defeated by AQ-linked groups, but Bamako always rejected. The military junta does not seek compromise, its hard line is necessary to restore legitimacy. AD sent envoys to Algeria and Burkina Faso, even though removing its terrorist linkage is impossible. AQIM is currently feeling the pressure: it released videos calling for Jihad against Westerners invading Mali (one by al-Zawahiri); it changed the Saharan Emir to face the growing power of MOJWA. Finally, in the last weeks foreign Jihadists have been arriving in Azawad, mainly Sudanese and Sahrawi.
Scenarios
1. Heavy military intervention results in a temporary solution. The plan arranges up to 4000 troops in Azawad. However, this solution risks to foster a massive extremists in neighbor countries, owing to the uncontrolled borders in the desert. This involves risks of negative spillover effect and not an Al-Qaeda defeat. 2. Wrong intervention results in “accidental guerrilla”. This is the main risk since the “Afghanistan experience”. Al-Qaeda’s terrorist actions aim to gain power in the controlled region, while provoking an external intervention in order to recruit allies within the local population. A direct fight with extremists in Azawad will increase terrorist tendencies and recreate “accidental guerrilla” against “Western Invaders”. 3. Late intervention strengthens rebel positions. The attempt to find a negotiated solution (or more legitimacy) will prompt extremist groups to increase and re-organize their militias. 4. No intervention but peace talks. This solution will happen if the Malian government accepts peace talks and integrates MNLA\AD militias in its army, aiming to exploit their local connection to remove terrorists. At the moment, the Malian government does not intend to accept Tuareg claims.
Main Variables
1. Algeria: without giving its green light there won’t be any intervention, since it is the main regional power. U.S.A. and France are trying to persuade Bouteflika, but he might prefer to continue with precise intelligence attacks. 2. Ansar Dine: its leader Iyad Ag Ghali is a master negotiator and opportunist. Since an external intervention would be against his intention to return the privileged speaker between Tuareg and governments, he initiated talks. However, he lost legitimacy acting as Janus bifrons. 3. New government legitimacy: the military junta is the main power behind the interim government. At the moment there is extensive support for this solution, but in case of elections the situation might deteriorate. 4. Local population: it is exhausted by the crisis. The success of the intervention relies on its reaction. Only if it is proactive and participatory, the intervention will turn in a success.
Sources
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 ISS Africa, Peace and Security Council Report, n°40, November 2012 AlertNet ESISC – World Terror Watch Stratfor International Committee of Red Cross, statement of Thursday 8th November 2012.
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