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Lesbian, gay, and queer criticism
a group activity, for oneself alone (as in masturbation) or for a variety of differ‑ ent partners. Other dimensions of sexuality don’t even involve object choice. For example, Sedgwick notes, the definition of one’s sexuality might be based on such oppositions as “orgasmic/nonorgasmic, noncommercial/commercial, using bodies only/using manufactured objects, in private/in public, spontane‑ ous/scripted” (57). Or the definition of one’s sexuality might be based on one’s preference for particular acts, sensations, or physical types. For queer theory, then, our sexuality is socially constructed (rather than inborn) to the extent that it is based on the way in which sexuality is defined by the culture in which we live. We saw examples of the social construction of sexu‑ ality earlier, when we discussed ancient Athens, where sexual categories were based on a caste system that didn’t differentiate between male and female, and the very different definitions of homosexuality operating in Mexico and South America, early twentieth-century working-class America, and white middleclass America today. The belief that sexuality is socially constructed is behind efforts to read literature from the past not just in terms of our own definitions of sexuality, but in terms of those definitions operating in the culture from which that literature emerged. Clearly, the word queer has a range of meanings in literary studies today. As an inclusive term, it can refer to any piece of literary criticism that interprets a text from a nonstraight perspective. Therefore, any of the examples of gay and lesbian criticism discussed earlier could be included in a collection of queer essays. How‑ ever, if we restrict ourselves to its narrower theoretical meaning—its deconstruc‑ tive dimension—queer criticism reads texts to reveal the problematic quality of their representations of sexual categories, in other words, to show the various ways in which the categories homosexual and heterosexual break down, overlap, or do not adequately represent the dynamic range of human sexuality. These kinds of readings can be rather complex. Here are a few simplified examples. A queer reading of William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” (1931) might exam‑ ine how traditional definitions of gender identity (masculine versus feminine) and sexuality (homosexual versus heterosexual) fail to explain or contain the character of Emily Greirson. Her gender categorization is not fixed but crosses back and forth between the masculine and the feminine. She’s both the slen‑ der virgin in white dominated by her father and the defiant individualist who violates class norms and moral law to take what she wants from Homer Barron, including his life. She’s both the childlike recluse who teaches the feminine art of china painting and the dominant presence with iron-gray hair, like that of a vigorous man, who imposes her will on the male power structure, including the post office, the tax collectors, the church, and, in the person of the pharmacist, the medical profession.
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