CHAPTER
XII
PURVA-MlMAMSA THE
distinguishing
feature of this
system,
as
compared
with
the others
so far considered, is its adherence to the Veda as
an
in itself
infallible
authority. to
Jainism refusing altogether others like the
other.
the Veda or exact place
own
now
its
authority
like
and
from them
all in that it places on a footing peculiarly its own. As to the assigns to reason, we have to refer the reader to
differs
ruti
it
what was stated suffice
have seen systems
to subordinate it to some
Nyaya attempting
The Mimamsa
We
recognize
an earlier
in
chapter (pp.
It will
180-2).
though thus authoritative in its revealed truth comes to us through the medium
to observe that
right,
of words whose interpretation is
mimamsa
the need for
by no means
easy. Hence
or the investigation of the principles to which the texts enshrining that truth are to be according
only when thus assisted by reason that the import. The primary aim of the Mimamsa be described as as a branch of learning may, therefore, getting back from the the to the idea behind it, expression of the of the relation of solving important problem speech and thought. Since the view taken of language here is that it interpreted.
Veda
is
It is
1
will disclose its true
independent
of the individual
using
it,
2
the
system
involves a great deal of discussion relating to social or folk
psychology.
This
contains
much
that
psychological inquiry is valuable for the modern science of Semantics or the branch with of relation to knowledge dealing meaning in linguistic forms.
The Mimamsa
in
respect serves as a necessary
this
or Grammar, whose treatment of
to
complement Vyakarana words is mainly formal. The indirect advantage thus resulting and forms one of the most to psychology
1
See e.g. PP. p.
assists a
svayam
Mimamsa
a pramana. Cf. Note
Compare ismahe
(p.
SD.
122).
important
philology,
104.
i
is
on p.
Sabda-sadhutve
viewed as a form of tarka, since 182.
hi
prayoga-paravasa
Yatha-lokam ca sabdarthavadharanam na yatheccham (p.
vayam
127).
it
na
PORVA-MlMA&SA
299
Mimamsa. The laws of interpretation
features of the study of
by Jaimini and his successors are quite general, and they are applicable as much to works outside the Veda as to that ancient text. They have, in fact, become widely
formulated
current and are utilized for arriving at a right interpretation old treatises texts, particularly legal (dharma-Sastra).
we
Speaking generally,
may
that
say
of all
Mimamsa
the
attaches greater importance to the Brahmanas than to the Mantras,
which means that
looks
it
upon
the Veda as essen-
tially a book of ritual. It not only subordinates the earlier but also the later as Its Mantras, Upanisads. designation
Purva-mimamsa has reference to this latter phase, viz. its concerned with the teaching of those portions of the beinj Veda that come the the darana Upanisads,
before
dealing with
the latter being termed Uttara-mimarhsa. ficial
sacri-
the main subject-matter of the inquiry which forms no of the old. It is the chief
Mimamsa
doubt, very
is,
Srouta-sutras and and
The
discussions
purpose
the Brahmanas. ritual are but
found even in
is
regarding
Doubts
natural, especially
when once the stage of its inception is passed. The Mimamsa only extends the scope of the inquiry and makes it more deals systematic. We must not understand from this that it
with
precisely as taught
sacrifices
Separated as
it
must have been
the
in
Brahmanas.
in its origin from
the
Brahmanas by
several generations, the Mimaiiisa marks both as a in of ritual. It its does, conception growth and decay and in matter of fact, reinterpret reinterpreting considerably modify the old system of rites. The doctrine as known to us
also exhibits a far more important change, viz. the subordination of the idea of sacrifice itself to that of the attainment of
moka. The aim it
in
of life
as originally conceived was, to state
general terms, the attainment of heaven (svarga). The of this aim by the ideal of moksa points to a
replacement
radical transformation of
ceases to be a mere
a darsana.
the doctrine. By it, commentary on Vedic
It is therefore in its
from what
its
other
The emphasis that as that emphasis
it
is still
the
Mimamsa
ritual
and becomes
present"form vastly different
name, Karma-mimamsa, may suggest.
lays on
the
performance
of
rites,
preserved, has now in effect become
so far
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
300
about
by a
desire
Mimarhsa to bring of
should have been important change brought on the part of the later exponents of the
This
quite secondary.
it
into line with the other
thought and not
allow
a mere liturgical
remain
to
it
systems
discussion bearing upon rites which probably had
time become more or
place in the Kalpa-sutras, self-realization
(atma-labha)
by that The change has not taken
defunct.
less if
in
we leave out the few them but it is 1
;
references to
seen
clearly
on the
in
Upavarsa and Sabarasvamin, early commentators and is very common in their successors. The darsana of it late. The is, therefore, comparatively aspect it is not new to the Veda as a Sutra of Jaimini,
speculative spirit underlying whole,
for
it is
found
in
the
in the
Upanisads and
allegorical
sometimes given in the Brahmanas the of special type philosophic theory
interpretations of rites
themselves. But
which
now represents follows quite other lines. It is not derived from the philosophy of the Mantras neither does it continue it
;
Upanisadic speculation. It is traceable to sources other than the Veda and is therefore neither a religion of nature nor a philosophy of the Absolute. Some of its minor tenets may be allied to what is found in the philosophic portions of the Veda; but, the as it of them strange
may
seem,
and the more
larger part
as
shall
important among them have, we see, been Brahmanas borrowed from the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The spirit of the was to the the of the supersede simple nature-worship Mimarhsa is of the spirit fully developed
Mantras;
to supersede ritualism as taught in the Brahmanas and later
systematized neither stage
in is
But the supersession
the Srouta-sutras.
complete, so that the
Mimamsa
as
is an admixture of the rational and the dogmatic, the natural and the supernatural and the orthodox and the heterodox.
with the darsana aspect of the here and not with
system that we
ritualistic
its
theories
or
in
now known It
shall deal its
exegetical
principles.
The main source
of
authority
in
regard
to this
system
is
Jaimini's Mtmdmsd-sutra. Its date, as in the case of the other
but it is philosophical Sutras, is quite indefinite; commonly believed now to have been the earliest of them all and assigned 1 See Note i
on p.
93.
is
PORVA-MlMAMSA to about 200 A.D.
much
The system
older, references to
as the Dharma-sutras
of in
number and
sections in
all.
thought
being found
and possibly also The sutras are
1
2
Patafijali (150 B.C.).
it
of
301 itself,
however,
is
such early works
in
in the
Mahdbhdsya over
considerably
2,500
chapters with sixty subnearly a thousand topics dis-
are divided into twelve
There are
cussed so that the work
is
by
far the biggest of the philoso-
phical Sutras. Like the others of
class the
its
work when read
most part unintelligible, and the aid of a which the traditional preserves interpretation Such an aid we have for it.
itself is for the
by commentary is
understanding
indispensable
in the
of
it
Sabarasvamin, who wrote probably about bhasya A.D. Tradition fondly associates Sabara with King 400 Vikramaditya, who is supposed to have lived in the first century B.C., but there seems to be no truth in it. There was at least
one earlier
(A.D. 350),
but
extract from it in in two
Sabara's bhasya.
ways by
explained
rila
commentary on the work by Upavarsa a of it is known to us, except possible
nothing
Bhatta (A.D. 700), who
essential respects.
as the Brhatl
is
The bhasya has been
3
Prabhakara differ
(A.D. 650)
from each other
Prabhakara's 'great in
yet
and Kumain certain
commentary
manuscript, except
known
1
for a small
ment which has been published; and the same is the the Rju-vimald, commentary upon it by Salikanatha,
fragcase with
believed to have been a pupil of Prabhakara. The views of the
school have therefore to be gathered from the Prakaranawhich also has not been of the latter, unfortunately writer recovered completely. Bhavanatha was another influential of the school with his yet unpublished Naya-viveka. As regards
pancikd
the second school, which for a long time has we have the first, adequate practically superseded reference.
Rumania's own huge and important work and consists of a or
fully printed called the Sloka-vdrtika
general
material
philosophical part
and two others Tantra-vdrtika and
Tup-tlkd. The first of these has been commented upon in a most lucid manner by Parthasarathi Mis"ra in his Nydyaratndkara.
Mancjana Misra, 1
*
probably
a
pupil
of
Rumania,
See Proi. Reith: Karma-mlmdmsa, p.
Cf. IV.
i.
14.
for
is
3
Li.
2. 5.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
302
was a famous thinker who has
Mimamsa
the
to his credit
many
Several other works of this school are also known, which we
may
(A.D. 1650).
of Jaimini. Several
istic
amongst
note Parthasarathi's Sdstra-dtpikd, Madhava's
(A.D. 1350) Nydya-mdld-vistara These follow in their
also are
works on
and the Bhavand-viveka.
like the Vidhi-viveka
and
Bhdtta-
Kharujadeva's the
explanation
dfyikd
order of the suttas
independent treatises serve as useful manuals on the ritual-
known which
or the interpretative
side of the
Such
system.
the
is
and a of Mimdmsd-nydya-prakdia Apadeva (A.D. 1650) digest the chief basis1 of it to or, according some, by Another work which the Laugaki Bhaskara, Artha-samgraha. deals with the philosophic teaching of the school of Kumarila
or the Bhatta school, as It has come to
it is
termed, is the and is the
light only latterly
Mdna-meyodaya.
composition
of
writers who lived about the sixteenth century A.D. Our treatment of the system will be general but wherever there are important divergences between the two schools from the
two
;
philosophical view-point, we shall notice them. The chronological relation of these schools is yet a matter of dispute
;
but, speaking on the whole, the Prabhakara school seems to be the older and to preserve better the distinctive lineaments of the original Mimamsa or at least to be nearer in spirit to it than the other. 2
The conception of atman but both schools, first
somewhat
is
agree regarding
the school of Kumarila
:
The view
is
different in
the two
its
plurality. To consider very much like the
one and atman is conceived as both an agent an enjoyer (bhokta). But while the NyayaVai&esika admits no action in the self neither change of here nor of form place (spanda), change (parinama) though 3 admitted. That the is, the former is the latter is Nyaya-VaiSesika and
(karta)
denied,
system recognizes self. 1
Though undergoing
Prof.
22-3.
the possibility
Edgerton: *
Prof.
of
modifications
Mimdmsa-nyaya-praka&a
Keith, op.
cit.
t
pp. 9-10.
modal change in it is
(Yale 3
the
regarded as Uni.
Pr.),
SV. p. 707,
st.
pp.
74.
303
PORVA-MlMAiasA for Kumarila rejects the view that even internal militates change against permanence. Experience acquaints with us that almost daily many things change constantly, but maintain their a or yet identity. Jftana knowledge is
eternal,
mode
of the self.
and
It is described as is
naturally spoken found in so ethereal a 'substance' as the 1
(vyapara)
an act (kriya) or process of as self.
or disturbance which takes place in the
a certain relation with the hypothesis omnipresent,
is
since
supersensible,
it is
This change
atman brings about The
self, being by object known. in relation with all
necessarily
existent objects; but that relation is not the same as the one would arise in now considering. If it were, jnana
we
are
objects as long as they existed. The relation and is described as is unique 'compreThe act or hension' of (vyaptr-vyapyatva). process jnana is respect
resulting
of
all
from
jfLana
viewed as transitive so that
its result
(phala) has to be sought
something other than where it manifests itself. The act of cooking, for example, is seen in the agent, but its result in
'softness' (vikleda) is found in the material The former is the and the
grain.
object.
When
subject;
jnana
arises in the self
affected in a particular is
a
not
way
cooked, viz. the the
rice-
latter,
to relating it
an
so that experience
object, the latter is
but
has
also
wholly subjective modification, modification to it. The objective corresponding object and its becomes 'illumined' (prakaa-viista) thereby;
being
thus illumined or made known (prakatya or jnatata) serves as the
means for our concluding that jnana must have arisen previously. The arising of jnana is thus only to be
in the self
inferred. While
manifest
known
itself.
can reveal other objects, it has no power Though knowable, jnana is conceived here inference and not
it
indirectly through as in the introspection Myaya-Vaiesika
as
directly through
(p.
251).
The new
feature of being illumined which characterizes the object, as
a
to
that in of jnana arising it, may mean respect or to this it is mediately immediately. According double nature of the is either result, jnana mediate (paroka) or immediate consequence
of
known
(pratyaksa).
The proximate cause
of perception which leads to direct '
SD.
pp. 56-7.
an
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
304
knowledge (viadavabhasa) is the contact of the senses with The that we so their is respective objects. knowledge get in the first instance quite
alocana as in
the
vague and
Sankhya-Yoga
and definiteness only afterwards. 'determinate'
later,
stages here
(nirvikalpaka)
(savikalpaka).
Another
is
Nyaya-Vaisesika serves no
the
that
1
The
and
;
conception
here
nirvikalpaka It is
based
is,
growth
promptings of elderly people
is
this
upon
or
primitive stage
imperfect of
do the same when in a
the two
not
a
merely
savi-
kalpaka,
quite
may
and
whose under the
animals
act
perception flurry.
be,
and
Children
it.
incomplete
of
from the
is
supposition which, beyond explaining the
useful and the Mimamsaka admits that activity
mental
this
important divergence
practical purpose (p. 251).
actually
gains clarity
stage in
therefore different from that in the
is
Nyaya-Vaisesika. theoretical
earlier
named It
285).
(p.
The
is described as 'indeterminate'
process the
indefinite and is
2
only and even
That
is,
the
is not here a mere hypothesis formulated to account for some known phase of experience, but is a part
nirvikalpaka
normal
experience
Mimamsa
itself.
Like the
of
Nyaya-Vaisesika,
the
recognizes manas as a sense (indriya) in addition to the five admitted by all and its co-operation is the for all laid down as also
indispensable character of the senses also, there
jiiana. Regarding structural a general odour and the first four senses of
agreement
is
sight, flavour,
touch being taken as derived from the elements whose distinctive qualities are their respective objects. In the case of the manas, the from the elements view is that it may or may not be derived As the (bhutas). regards remaining sense, viz. that of sound, the that 'the of on the Vedic statement organ hearing school, relying
from
proceeds
connect
it
without
dik/3 makes it delimited space (dik)4 and does not with akaa. The senses including the manas, with or
contact
with
immediate or
mediate, furnish
1 children Mundaka
according
external
as
the
knowledge
conditions, which
Up.
40 (com.). The reference to the behaviour of animals and is noteworthy. II.
i.
4.
4
See SD.
p.
is
induce
SD. pp. 36 and 40.
SD. p.
3
the
objects
36.
PCRVA-MlMAMSA in the self
change
constituting knowledge;
sociation once for self free as in the
all
from them
in
305
and
moKa
the dis-
it is
that will set the
Nyaya-Vaieika.
So far we have taken into consideration the waking or less the same to dream also description applies
state.
More
only
;
the co-operation of the five external organs of sense is there
withdrawn. In regard to sleep (suupti), Rumania holds a somewhat peculiar view. He admits of course that the self endures in it as other Indian thinkers generally do; but in consonance with his view of knowledge, he regards the self as In characterized then by the potency to know (jfiana-Sakti). this, which he differs from the Nyaya-Vaieika, denies jnana in every form to the self in sleep. He also dissents from the Upaniads because he recognizes no happiness then. The later reminiscence of happiness to which the Vedantin pointedly draws our attention (p. 72), Kumarila
explains negatively
as
due to the absence
at the
time of
all
consciousness of pain. If the self were really in the enjoyment would be he of the to bliss highest then, it says, impossible, which a the of feels afterwards explain feeling regret person if
he comes to know that by going to sleep he has missed
some common pleasure.
1
one other point to which we must allude before we the of the is it way in which, part subject and according to Kumarila, we become aware of our own self. It is known the or the There
is
leave this
directly
through
we render and may
aharh-pratyaya
in
a
This forms an important point Kumarila the teaching requires explanation. understands 'selfconsciousness' literally and holds that the 'I-notion' as
self
it.
can at once be both subject and object
the
known (jada-bodhatmaka) and adduces common saying: 'I know myself .'3
as well as the
therefor the Ascribing such an apparently contradictory character harmonywith the rulingprinciple of his thought,
which, as we SD. 1
3
This
p. 124.
saying
is
shall see,
is
that
to
the nature of
the
self
is
quite
in
things cannot *
to be viewed as
knower
as evidence
Ibid., p.
122.
only partially representing experience as
it
actually occurs, for it necessarily includes a reference to an object (say, a 'jar') other than the self which is left out here.
u
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
306
be rigidly determined as such and such (bhedabheda-vada). 1 of like 'I In a sample know the jar/ there are two knowledge
the (aham-vrtti) and comprehending object question (e.g. ghataconstant and self-awareness is That is, accompanies vrtti). absent in all states of consciousness, being only deep sleep where no object is known. When we say that the self is thus known in all experience, we must not take it to mean that it elements
one
other
is
known
knowing
comprehending the the
as the subject in the act of
is itself
pointed out,
known
not
self
We
fact of
already
has,
cannot, therefore,
know
by or as owning such knowledge,
meant by the term 'subject/ But yet the cannot be unknown, for that would go against the felt
which
what
knowing. The and as
at the time
to be inferred later.
the self then as characterized
self
in
is
is
personal
identity explained as being
in
all
one's
known then
It is therefore experience. as the object of the 'I-notion/
If we take this along with the view that the self to be known at all we see must at the time become aware of some object or other, that to self-consciousness, according Kumarila, implies not only an internal difference a self which is opposed to itself as its object, but also an external difference self which is distinguished from the not-self. Prabhakara disagrees with Kumarila in two important respects in his view of the self, and in both he sides with the
a
Nyaya-Vaiesika. a Not believing in parinama, he does not admit that the self suffers change. Again he objects to the description of the self as 'knowable,' and avers that agent and object can never be the same in any act. It is only objects that are knowable. The self, on the other hand, is a subject and is revealed as such in all jnana. If it were not so revealed simultaneously with the object, one's jnana would be indistinguishable from another's. From this, it should not be thought that the atman is self-luminous. It is wholly non-sentient (ja<Ja), and therefore requires for its revelation the presence of some knowledge to which the character
self-lnminousness
an aid the 1
3
SD. p.
1
self,
01.
PP. p. 51.
is
to
assigned.
be
3
Though
thus
does not
realized, See PP. *
chap,
of
dependent upon
require
viii,
a
separate
especially pp. 152
ff.
PCRVA-MlMA&SA mental
30?
whenever
manifest
it act, being any object is equally or known. The word which the Prabhakaras use for knowledge self-luminous is sarhvit experience which, being (sva-prakaa), needs else to make it manifest.
Though ultimate
nothing
in this
as it not eternal. It appears and dis-appears; and, sense, and both does the the reveals so, self simultaneously object with itself. This triple revelation is it
is
what
is described as triputi-jnana. So far as other psychological details are concerned, it will suffice to remark that there is a still closer approximation here to the Nyaya-
Vaiesika than
in the
previous school.
II
The main object of the Mimarhsaka is to establish the but he does not like to do so of the Veda; solely authority on dogmatic considerations and therefore tries to seek rational
He
grounds
for
merely
delivering
in
astra),
but
it.
is
contends that his system does not settled
judgments (upadea-
a reasoned
inquiry (pariksa-Sastra).
The
1
consist
very
classification by him of revelation along with perception and inference under pramana shows it. The testimony of the Veda means of and whatbut a truth knowing particular
is
;
ever value there
is
the Mimamsaka holds,
in it,
being a pramana like perception or he enters the arena of
is
due to
its
inference. It is thus that
logic; and, thor.gh
he
not be a
may
rationalist in the full sense of the term, he cannot at the same
time be described as a mere dogmatizer. The system starts by postulating what is called the svatahboth in or the of pramanya self-validity knowledge (p. 260) and ascertainment of its 2 respect If a> b, and
origin (utpattau)
c (say)
themselves
causes
(jnaptau).
account for the genesis of knowledge, those
explain
its
validity
also. Similarly
validity is
of
known
known when the knowledge itself is and no additional means required therefor. All valid and an is is called
knowledge ;
knowledge
the
is
presumably
1 See
SD. p.
explanation
18
and
cf.
Jaimini-sutra.
SD. pp. 19-23 and 48-50; PP. ch.
iv.
I.
i.
3.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
308 for
only
where
to act
proceed but ;
true
if
any particular knowledge on the
always
any part of
it
supposition
to be so.
fails
that the
We
knowledge we get
is
discovered to be not so,
is
we
seek for the cause of its invalidity in extraneous circumstances that must have interfered with the free functioning
of this means. The cause of invalidity is some defect in the Thus a means or source of knowledge (karana-dosa). person may think that he sees a while it is particular thing, silver,
is defective. This is how eyesight only found out with wrong knowledge arises. It is by its incompatibility When the subsequent experience (badhaka-pratyaya). who fancies that he sees a at a
because his
shell
person,
approaches
and
it
discovers
it
to
serpent, be a rope,
distance,
he concludes
that his previous knowledge was erroneous. While thus the MImamsa agrees with the Nyaya-Vaiesika in its view of the with it in of invalidity knowledge (apramariya), it disagrees respect of the view
it
takes of
its
validity (pramanya). The
chief reason for the disagreement
is
the nature of truth as defined in the
the disaccord between
Nyaya-Vaiesika and
the manner ii: which it proposes to verify it. Truth is stated with but the test does to be not, reality, correspondence So the doctrine indeed ascertain that cannot, correspondence. an indirect test fruitful proposes
What
activity
serves as the test
that of thirst given.
Now
without
verifying
example already
experience cannot validate the first and about
being similarly validated; mean on ad
would
(samvadi-pravrtti).
thus really another experience to cite the
being quenched,
this second
itself it
is
only
going
that this second
setting
infinitum.
Even
needs no
verification, experience of a corresponding reality outside knowledge. A person may dream of water and also of There is fruitful his thirst quenching by drinking it. activity no the test finds here, but What objective counterpart. actually and to whether two out is experiences cohere, only such a test as the to accept adequate is virtually give up
supposing it cannot vouch
realistic
for the
position
presence
because the
reality is left wholly unverified.
Nyaya-Vaiesika
starts
as
with
supposed correspondence Thus we see that though the to maintain fails it
realism,
position in the solution of what is one of the crucial
problems
its
PORVA-MlMA&SA philosophy that of truth and
of
determined
Mimamsa,
ab
extra
adhere
The
error.
to
fact
is
view that
the
That
(paratah-pramanya).
which likewise
view of
opposite to be
cannot
doctrine
realistic
309
validity
why
is
upholds realism, advocates
svatah-pramanya and, by presuming with the need for
that a is
the
the
all
knowledge
valid, normally dispenses
testing
it.
We may now the
pramana upon
point out the bearing of such a view of the Veda which is of authority para-
mount importance
to the
of
Mimamsaka. Neither the circum-
stance that renders knowledge invalid nor that which leads to
its
discovery
Veda. There can
exists in the case of the
be no flaw at the source the case of verbal
(karana-doa) is
the source in
for
;
the
and
or
writer, speaker testimony and the to the Veda, according Mimamsaka, is self-existent has had no author at all (apauruseya). Nor is there the possi-
of its coming into conflict with perceptual or other what it teaches form of common experience, for refers, by bility
hypothesis, only to matters beyond this We unverifiable empirically (p. 180).
life
and
is
therefore
may think that though common be not the Veda contradicting experience, may discrepant with itself one here and by teaching thing another there. But no such will be it is discrepancythe Veda.found, understand It is in if maintained, we properly what a of it is that the determining proper understanding to are rules of which we referred above, interpretation, laid down. This view, which is peculiar to the Mimamsa,
requires further elucidation.
The Veda here stands
in this sense that the
He
bases his view mainly (i)
The
for a
form of uttered words and it is holds it to be self-existent.
Mimamsaka upon
the following considerations
relation between a word and its
and therefore necessary and
eternal.
We
meaning
is
:
natural
ought not to think
that things were there already before they were named. The word and the thing it names go together and it is impossible to think of either as
having had a beginning
in time.
1
But we
must carefully note what in this view is meant by the terms 'word* and 'thing/ In order to know the character of the 1
SD. pp. 90-7 and 116-17. See
also p. 44,
com.
OUTLINES
310 former, dhvani.
it
is
to
necessary
A var$a
is
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
'OF
distinguish
an articulate sound.
between varna and
first
It is conceived as
and
and
integral (niravayava) omnipresent (sarva-gata) therefore also eternal (nitya). That a varna can be uttered several times or
ways
in several
many
as
mean that there
does not
particular cases of
it
are
with a universal running through
What thus diversify it are its accidental features; and, however a varna much they may change, remains the same. One of them.
the important arguments adduced in of its is
the support permanence ready recognition have when the same varna is uttered more than once, which implies that
We
all
we
those utterances refer but to an identical thing.
say for example that the a-sound
uttered ten
is
times and not that ten a-sounds are uttered.
If they did not refer to the same the recognition would have to be
explained
without adequate reason for doing so between the identity being possible
as an
illusion,
no
utterances
fleeting
themselves. The latter, viz. dhvani, is viewed as the means of been there and the varna which has all manifesting along ;
may be compared to the written symbol, the chief difference being that, when there are several varnas, we have a but a series of utterances in the one temporal case, spatial it
which a
series of written signs in the other. The variety of ways in with different is may be uttered, as e.g. stresses, explained as due to differences in this means of utterance.
varna
The nature of dhvani is explained in alternative ways, but we need not enter here into a discussion of such details. enough
means
for our
purpose
to
regard it
of revealing varnas,
must be
as 'tone different
1
which,
It is
as the
from them.
It is
and limited to the place where it is heard. A as 'word' (abda) is two or more of these varnas, and is regarded and not as a whole an
also transient
merely
aggregate (samudaya)
(avayavin) distinguishable
from each of
its
constituent
parts
and from all of them. But yet the necessity is recognized case of every word for the varnas in it occurring in a for like
in the
otherwise words dma ('pitiful') and nadi which consist of the same varnas but placed
specific order;
('river'),
in
a
different
This order,
order,
would not
however, can refer
only
to their
differ in their connotation.
manifestation
PCRVA-MtMAttSA to
and not
3
the varnas themselves which are,
and at present everywhere
all
times. Their
1 *
by hypothesis, gradual of
gressive utterance does not interfere with the unity which also is the for instance, perceptual process,
or
pro-
as
the word
gradual, does not affect the unity of an object like a tree when we are it is seen. As regards the 'things' signified by words, not to understand the particular facts of experience which come into and but the unibeing disappear, corresponding versals which are eternal and of which the passing individuals That than the are of the is, signs. significance nothing more
word is general form a
1
sentence,
the
meaning being
them
also is
though, when associated with other words to come to denote a The word may and particular. both the relation between
it
eternal,
necessarily
so.
It
does not follow from this that
Mimamsaka
the
rejects the conventional clement in language. a subordinate a only assigns place (sahakari) to_ it though the that serves illustrated it necessary one, being by purpose of light in seeing. 2 If the conventional element were not admitted,
tuition or instruction
by one who be
is
necessary
regarding the meanings
of
words
already familiar with them, whicL is known would become a
for
learning
language,
He
to
super-
The problem discussed here is a philological one and the solution reached is that language is not a creation of the fluous.
human
or even of the divine
vie^r held in
a natural
modern and the
phenomenon.
4
mind
the former being the
latter, in ancient
In
holding
such a
Nyayas view,
the
Mima-
but
msa resembles the older school of modern philolologists, which maintained that philology was a natural science. The permanence
(2)
meaning, even though 1
The meaning
of
it
of the relation
between a word and
its
be granted, does not establish the
proper names
is
regarded
as
due to mere convention
(See PP. pp. 135-6 and SV. p. 674, st. 120). But even here the connotation is in any particular stage general, e.g. 'Devadatta' means not the person so named of life but the individual in who, spite of minor changes, endures throughout life. Cf.
Mammata's Kavya-
3 SM. p. 361. involves a conventional element. The as the result of of is diversity existing languages explained corruption That is to the cart before in an ideal original speech. put
prakata, It
is
ii,
the horse.
*
8.
social
also in
so far
SD. p. 91. as it
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
312
eternity of the Veda. It merely serves as a negative aid to
by
precluding the conclusion which one
draw
may
it
at once
must necessarily have had an in time. The Veda consists of words, and so far it is origin like any other literary work. If the permanence of the word that whatever
verbal in form
is
and meaning constituted the criterion of eternity, all literary in fact all uttered alike be works, statements, would eternal. If the Veda alone is so and not other works also, it should be traced to some unique feature it possesses; and such a
the order feature, it is said, is particular (anupurvi)
which the several words occur in
in
Veda
states that the
is
eternal,
it
it.
When
the
Mimamsaka
permanence
this
is
of the
text that he means. He views the Veda as produced by no author human or divine and he maintains that it has been ;
a
intact
preserved
down from
during beginningless period by being teacher to pupil With scrupulous care. 1
handed
based on the circumstance that tradition, though been has antiquity, throughout while of the to the silent in regard authorship Veda, This belief
going
is
back to a far-distant
in the case of even
the
very
ancient works like those of
Mahabharata mention
is
made
of
Buddha
While the order of the words in those works was determined their authors, Veda. This silent
it is
authorship
lead to nothing that
is
upon
that tradition
Veda,
is
negative
is
really
and can
decisive.
Thus the Mimamsaka doctrine text rests
by
self-determined in the
argument again, granting of the
on the
or
some author or other.
of the fixity of the
a certain view of language
the supposed absence of
it
takes and
Vedic
upon
long-standing tradition to its having been composed by one or more authors. In neither the to case, it is clear, is support premise adequate the important conclusion that is drawn from it. The belief all
reference in
in its present form is therefore nothing more than a dogma. of late and 'idolatry scripture* appears comparatively seems to
This
have been arrived at by extending to the form of the
Veda what was once taken
to hold
good
of its content.
The
truth concealed under this purely scholastic view, therefore, is that the Veda embodies eternal verities. In the case of 1
Jaimini-sutra.
Li.
27-32.
PCRVA-MlMA&SA smrtis,
as
distinguished
from the
ruti,
313
even now held
it is
content constitutes the truth revealed, though an
attempt now
is
made, under the influence of views similar to the
considering,
to trace
it
91) eventually
(p.
some ruti which is no longer instructive to cite the
that this
one we are
to
extant. In this connection it is
of the
opinion
grammarian
Pataiijali
of the second century B.C., that while the sense of the Veda is eternal the order of the words in it is not so. 'Is it not said
that the Vedas were not so
;
but
it is
but
are eternal
Quite
?
1
in them.'
Coming
now
to the
have to note that
and Prabhakara to a point is here
composed
their sense that is so, not the order of the syllables
Mimamsaka
and there
of
we
knowledge,
both according to Rumania
it is realistic, ;
theory
no knowledge which does not outside it.* But all knowledge
is
corresponding object to be
to the
of self-
true, according theory presumed validity and verification becomes necessary only when any doubt cast upon its validity. The one kind of knowledge
is
that does not come under this description is memory. to the recollection is not valid for According Bhattas, novelty is not a necessary condition of validity. 3 Truth should not only be contradicted it by subsequent knowledge (abadhita); should also point to something not hitherto known (anadhi-gata). Prabhakara does not for all this condition, experience (anubhuti) accept known whether the be object already or not is valid for him. Even the so-called error, as
immediately see,
we
shall
satisfies this
requirement.
differentiates recollection from anubhuti, for ence in the sense of the
a former one is
valid, it
primary
(sapeksa).4
may
question
and
differ
their
also
not experi-
term, being dependent upon nature its experience by very
If all
be asked how error arises at
and Prabhakara
it is
But he
Kumarila
all.
in their answers to this
considerably are known
explanations
and
It
respectively
as
would be better to
viparita-khyati akhyati. begin with a description of the latter and then contrast the former
with
it.
(i) Akhyati. 1
IV.
J
SD. p.
iii.
The word khyati means 'knowledge'
101. 45;
SV.
p.
431,
st.
See e.g. SV. p. 217,
104-6.
4
and
3; PP. PP.
st.
iv.
66.
pp. 42-3* 127.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
314 the term
akhyiti,
which
is
know-
to 'no
literally equivalent
Prabhakara's theory to indicate that error, ledge/ is applied to but a to is not a unit of it, knowledge, compo-site of according two jnanas. 1 When shell is mistaken for silver and we
say as
to
ourselves,
This
is
silver/
the
'this' is
which
certain features of the shell
also
it
actually perceived possesses in
common
with silver. The knowledge of those features revives in our mind the impression of a former experience and we recollect silver. The so-called error here really
these two
consists of
jnanas
followed by memory. Of these the
not
first
perception immediately true so far as it
is
far. Its 'this' is go sufficiently object not sublated afterwards since, even when the error is dis-
goes, though
it
may
covered, we feel 'This be said of the second
The same, no doubt, cannot because its is not
shell/
is
jiiana object, silver, given context. But in this it only exhibits its we at the time normal for it is character; memory although lose 2 of that fact and does not as sight (smrti-pramoa)
found
such
in the
that the
signify
object
is
That
then.
present
former knowledge claims to be valid and the claim
is,
the
is justi-
fied; the latter 'does not
put forward any such claim at all. Prabhakara does not admit that knowledge can
Indeed, ever
no
play
false to its
error, according
to
logical
him,
nature
in the
;
and there
is
consequently of the term.
common acceptance
In what passes for error, we overlook the fact that there are two as a natural
jnanas ;3 also fail to notice the
and,
of their
separateness
consequence,
we
respective objects.
This failure to know, however, cannot by itself account for the 'error' ; because, if it did, errors would occur in dreamless
sleep,4 which also
The negative 1
Strictly
this
terminology schools, 2
we
in
is
use
by
characterized
factor of failure
should
be
is
absence of knowledge.
therefore viewed as
'samvit.'
But
to
secure
operating uniformity
considering this topic of truth and error in the two 'jfiana.' to are Prabhakara, memory without the con-
Dreams, according
sciousness at the time that they are so. See
NM.
p. 179.
3
Recognition likewise partakes of the character of both perception and memory, but one is aware at the time of the recollective element there. It is therefore different from the instance we are considering. See SD. p. 45.
4 PP, iv. st.
5.
of
PORVA-MIMAMSA
315
with a positive one to which we have of the 'this' as characalready perception terized by the features that are common to shell and silver. We may therefore describe what is commonly supposed to be in
giving
rise to error
referred,
error as
partial
must be
viz. the
or
incomplete knowledge
careful to
remember that
knowledge to which that term
is
;
in so
only
doing
we
there is no single unit of applicable. To take another
A white crystal placed by the side of a red flower be There also we have as a red may wrongly regarded crystal. two jiianas, viz. the perception of the crystal minus its true colour and the sensation of the redness alone of the instance
:
flower.
Each
of these
jiianas
is
quite
valid so far as
it
goes
;
only
here
both the jiianas are derived through the senses. As before they a of the viz. the convey partial knowledge objects, crystal and .he flower; but the basis of error here lies in the not in their of the as in the contiguity objects, similarity there are two previous example. Further, objects bodily given here instead of one and the features comprehended are what characterize them singly and not their common ones.
But the distinction between the two jiianas as well as that between their objects is not as before grasped and we are therefore said to fall into error. Here also the akhyati view lays down two conditions one positive and the other negative knowfor error at all a becoming possible partial ledge of the and a failure to note the distinction between things presented them.
1
2
Rumania also maintains that Viparita-khydti. knowto an itself. In shell-silver, ledge always points object beyond there is for viz. the 'this' instance, something directly given, (2)
;
but the silver
is
not so given. Yet
it
taken as ideal or non-existent, for of a former suggestion
objective counterpart. the
previous one,
splits
into two parts is 1
should not on that account be its
notion, being Tsack
experience, goes like view,
This up
the
the
object
'this'
of
erroneous
due to the to an
eventually
knowledge
(visaya) and the 'what' (parakara)
and explains them separately. The first of them as before not sublated when the mistake is rectified; and the Compare the
earlier
Saflkhya view
of error,
set forth
in the
previous
chapter.
a
SV.
pp. 242-6;
SD.
58-9.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
316
the second element also
explanation of same
must have been experienced before not at all have been fancied in is
between the two views
the
practically
here and now, the silver
Though not given
as before.
is
for otherwise
;
the
The
shell.
that while, according
to
it
could
difference
akhyati,
due to a losing sight of the fact that the presentative and the representative factors stand apart unrelated here in ascribed to a (asarhsargagraha), viparita-khyati it is them In the former case of
error
is
wrong synthesis error,
(sarhsarga-graha).
so far as that term
because
is
applicable
to grasp
the discarding of
the error
is
all,
due to
it
omission
takes place, does not
feature previously cognized. In
any
becomes
at
some relevant part of what
only given. Hence its discovery, when fails
it
one of
commission, warrant for
for
the
includes
it
is
mean
latter,
as
its
content more than there is In other that is in the illusion is words, reality presented. here as instead of as two explained unitary knowledge jnanas.
The
and
elements
subject seem related in
predicate consequently while are not so in it, they reality. Similarly and the two in the case of the red viz. the relata, crystal, crystal the are are not redness, actually given but while they the unified in so in error. As a fact, they appear consequence shows itself redness of the instead of flower, standing apart, and makes it in the crystal appear differently (viparita) from what it is. 1 This view is no doubt more in accord than ;
the
one with
previous
illusion as
a
synthetic whole,
presents a difficulty,
viz.
which
experience
but
points
to the
epistemologically
object
of
it
the inclusion of an ideal element
within the content of knowledge. However unconvincing the view may be, it is true to its realistic postulate in akhyati admitting
may
no
subjective
not be
element
to the
whatsoever. but
Knowledge it
never
adequate given reality, goes which accounts for the the This/ by way, name viparita-khyati, means and as other.' See SV. st. literally 'appears p. 245, 117 p. 312, 1
1 60 (com.). The Bhatta view is with the commonly identified There is no doubt much that is common Nyaya-Vaisesika one. between the two, but there are differences in matters of detail. The what is Bhattas do as alaukikafor not, example, recognize known which is essential to the of pratyaksa Nyaya-VaiSesika explanation st.
errors like
'shell-silver.'
PORVA-MlMA&SA beyond
Here, on the other hand,
it.
it
317 1
overshoots the mark.
and to admit that is is, partial misrepresentation; can even be its knowledge misrepresent object, though it only part, is to abandon to that extent the realistic That
error
in
principle on which the doctrine claims itself to be based. These views of error imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of
Mimamsa
in their
conception
of
knowledge.
Rumania recognizes error as such, and it can from truth. to According
easily distinguished
on
therefore be
Prabhakara,
there being truly no error at hand, The distinction, however, being disappears. must have some and if Prabha-
the other distinction
universally recognized
all
basis;
kara would explain it, he cannot like Rumania do so from but has to seek another. of view, purely logical point The new standpoint he finds in the view he takes of know-
the
the
essentially a means to an end and that its or subserve vyavahara, as it is guide action to said. All knowledge, according him, prompts activity2 and, truth this fresh criterion of by practical utility, judged becomes Irom error. no can quite distinguishable Rnowledge, doubt, but it never deceive on its be logical side; may such as does or does not 'work.' in the one case, we have that
ledge
it
is
sole function is to
;
truth
the other, error.
in
;
The
latter
has cognitive value as
much as the former, but it lacks practical worth and when we describe it as error, we only mean this that it is decep;
tive in respect of the claim it puts forward to be serviceable.3 Accordingly when after rectification error yields place to truth, what not modification of its happens is any logical meaning but
only the abandonment it.
4
of the activity that has been prompted by In other words, the effect of the discovery of error is seen on
the reactive side of consciousness
not on
receptive
its
side.
In viparita-khyati also
covery arrests activity; but that is looked upon the immediate one a further being
result,
1
Compare the Compare
3
PP.
4
In cases where error has led to suspension of activity,
iv. st.
the view of 37
of error as stated on p.
sabda-pramana
its
dis-
only a
readjustment
*
later
Sankhya view
as
as stated in PP.
291
of ante.
pp. 91-94.
ff.
its
discovery
will
prompt
it.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
3 i8
Any
our cognitive attitude towards the object. have on our volition is readjustment may to
it.
ily
Rumania's attitude towards knowledge
detached and
scientific;
this
thus primar-
is
that of
effect
only subsequent
Prabhakara, pragmatic.
The Mimamsakas of the Bhatta school recognize six pramanas, while those of the other accept only five of them :
(1)
Perception (pratyaksa),
(2)
Inference (anumana).
which has There
with the Nyaya-Vaiesika,
as,
a
is
for
inductive generalization (vyapti).
upon them or upon the
the views of the two
this
(3)
in
Mimamsa
Mimamsa
remains
to
differences
resemblance here
general in the view
taken of
away from our purpose features distinguishing
schools in their conception of
pramana. Verbal
sidered.
example, But there are
differences also. It will take us too far
here to dwell
already
been con-
Testimony (abda).
The
J
of
place
this
pramana
has been indicated already and it now point out one or two of the more important logic
between the two schools
:
The Prabhakaras, unlike the
Bhattas, adhere to what appears to have been the earliest view of with the abda as a pramana (p. 178) and equate it Veda, other forms of verbal as mere inference explaining testimony a verbal to 3 Again statement, according Rumania, may (p. 257). to an existent something point (siddha)
or
to
something
that
is
to
yet
be
accomplished
(sadhya). For example, the sentence There are fruits in the next room' refers to a fact, while 'Fetch a cow' refers to
a
Though thus admitting the two-fold character of the import of propositions, he restricts it to the sadhya or what task.
is
yet to
be
Prabhakara
done, when he comes declines to admit
whether Vedic or not, and limits their
scope
pragmatic view he takes
of all
to
speak
that
of
the
to the
Veda.
3
verbal statements,
can ever point merely to
things
should be relevant
to
sadhya,
in
existent
keeping
with
the
knowledge. All utterance
some context
therefore point to an action as
its
in
ultimate
practical
life
meaning. What-
and
i
SD '
pp. 72-3;
PP.
pp. 87
ff.
*
See PP. p. 94.
3
J
aimini-sutra
,
I.
ii.
1-18.
PORVA-MlMA&SA
319
ever be the difference between the two thinkers in this respect,
we
see
that
they agree
in
holding that action
of the Veda. Assertive
import
as
explain,
is
found
propositions
the in
it,
when construed with
fully significant only
final
they
an
found in the or appropriate injunction prohibition particular context. On this view depends the well-known division of the Veda broadly into two parts, viz. vidhi or The and artha-vada or 'injunction' 'explanatory passage/ latter, are as of statements they consisting describing things have no or status were, and are to accordingly independent logical in the other be understood as complementary to what is taught viz. vidhi. As complements of portion, commend what is as injunctions they prescribed; complements of prohibitions, they condemn what is forbidden. 1 The on of this view of bearing scripture Upaniadic statements like Tat tvam asi, which are not injunctive, is that
they also are to be construed with reference to some action taught in the Veda a point to which we shall recur when treating of the Vedanta.
Mimamsaka
The
the
like
(upamana). 3 Naiyayika disagrees with the view that this is not an indeand can be under or pendent pramana brought wholly partly
Comparison
(4)
one
or
other
the
of
altogether differently it
Nyaya,
may
be
other
from the
pramanas.
latter.
remembered,
this
But
According
he
conceives
to the
has for
pramana
its
it
sole
object the relation between a word and its meaning learnt under certain conditions (p. 259). Here it is reciprocal
known through it. When a person who is cow (say) casually comes across a gavaya, an animal of the same species, and notices the resemblance of the latter to the former, he discovers that the cow is also
similarity that
is
familiar with the
similar to the 1
i.
To give
gavaya.
It is this
the stock illustration:
second resemblance or, to be
There
is
in
the
Yajurveda
(II.
i.
an injunction 'One should sacrifice a white (animal) to Vayu,' and the same context is seen the assertive proposition 'Vayu i)
verily is the swiftest deity.' The latter is a glorification of
to the
according former.
When
sacrifice
;
Vayu and
principle stated above, to be construed
so construed, it
for the
SD. pp. 74-6; PP.
reward 1
10-12.
signifies that it is
will be speedy.
good
is,
with the
to offer this
in
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
320
more exact, the
recollected
known through upamana.
This
pramana
liable to
saka defends inference,
cow characterized by view,
no
doubt,
it
that renders the
is
be classed under inference. But the Mimam-
by pointing out that the basis for of inductive relation knowledge (vyapti)
his position
a
viz.
is
not needed here. The relevant major premise here would signify that if one is similar to another, say A, that other thing, say B, is similar to the first. As giving expression to a the simultaneous observation of general truth, it implies
A
both
and
B. But the
conditions
upamana do
of
not
who has never
seen two similar require things together but meets with a cow and thereafter a it,
in the
gavaya
conclusion in here
is
similarity
(5)
as even a person
that
manner described above
question.
A
being
is
(sadriya)
'similarity'
of A to B
is
able to arrive at the
matter of metaphysical importance conceived as
distinct from that of B to
Presumption
1
(arthapatti).
This
dual,
the
A.
is
postulating some-
thing to account for what apparently clashes with experience and otherwise state therefore in the nature of a hypothesis. We may as
what
rendering explicit
is
is
it
already implicit in two truths both of
which have been properly
Thus but which tested, appear mutually incompatible. know that Devadatta is alive and do not find him in his house,
we
conclude
that
he
should
be
somewhere
if
we
else.
of
Another example commonly given in this connection is that a not continues to be person who, though eating by day, healthy and strong, which leads to the conclusion that he should be eating.
by
night. That this
is
a valid form of
discovering the unknown from the known is clear, but may appear to be only inference. Some like the Naiyayika therefore class
distinct
it
under anumana, and do not regard it as a The of the in argument support opposite
it
pramana.
is as follows The result here cannot be represented as reached through inference inasmuch as there is no middle term at all to serve as its means. To take the first of the above cannot serve that alive' examples, 'being by itself purpose,
view
:
for that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion in question
viz.
that Devadatta SD.
is
outside his house.
76-83;
PP.
pp.
113-18.
He may then
as
PORVA-MIMAMSA well remain in his house as elsewhere. his house
321
Nor can
'not
being
may
by itself take that place, since that reason properly lead to the conclusion that Devadatta is 1
in
equally
no longer alive. So we are forced to view the middle term formed by combining both these 'being alive and 'not
as
1
home/ But
at
being
reference to
what
that Devadatta
viz.
the conclusion
is,
which
in
combined form
this
is
included in
already
is
the inference
through somewhere outside his house.
add another
reason: while in inference the ground ('the fact of smoke')
the conclusion
explained by alive and not
clusion
here the
('fire'),
That
1
middle term
the
We might
never the case in inference.
is
involves a
it
to be established
is
is
ground ('being
being found in the house') explains the conThe truth is that 2
arthapatti is
('being elsewhere').
and
disjunctive reasoning
is
not
the
in
syllogistic
ordinary
sense of the expression. If we reduce it to the syllogistic the universal will be a form, referring to negative major premise things beyond the universe of discourse
;
and
it
therefore
ceases to be significant. In this connection
it may Mimamsakas
unlike the Naiyayikas, the
that,
schools reject the negative universal as the
a
They
syllogism.
in a
consider that
form. The
positive
scope
for
it
can
be stated of both the
generally is
arthapatti
in
major premise be
expressed
where
just
it
cannot be
so expressed. (6)
Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).3 This
pramana by absence of
which
negation, not nothing,
is
atoms somewhere. Like the
a jar or of
known,
is
the
specific
the
e.g.
Nyaya
facts 237), the Bhatta school of Mimamsa admits negative a unlike it it (abhava) but, formulates separate (p. 249), means them. The word pramana for knowing anupalabdhi the 'absence (p.
;
of apprehension/
the absence of
knowledge This of the five foregoing pramanas. means as of the that, pramanas knowledge got through any
derived
through any
points to
such
i.e.
the existence
(bhava) of objects,
indicates,
other
the-
absence of
conditions remaining should be their same, non-existence (abhava). Only it
knowledge
remembered that the absence, to serve as the index existence, SV. '
must be
p. 455,
st.
19
aided
ff.
by
of non-
the mental presentation =
NM. x
p.
44.
3
SD.
of the pp.
83-7.
the
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
322
object. There may be several objects not found in a but we think of the absence of that alone particular place ; among them all, which some other circumstance has made
relevant
1
us
think
The Naiyayika divides 'negations as their correlate classes according (pratiyogin) of.
two
into is
perceivable
or not. The means of knowing the former kind, he holds, is that of the inference. Here in the Mimalatter,
perception; sixth
as the
prama^a is postulated both varieties of of knowing negation,
is
it
contended,
is
common means The
negation.
objects arises
of negation.
knowledge even when no organ
of
knowledge
1
the
this
no
of
in the first
perceptual. For,
sense-contact which is necessary for such
conceivable in the case instances where a
knowledge
msa,
no
place,
is
Secondly, there of
negation
are
perceivable
of sense is functioning.
Thus a person who did not think of an elephant on a later come to particular day, may morning
at all in the realize,
owing to some circumstance or other, that he did not see knowledge, because it refers to the past, cannot be
then.
it
The
connected with the functioning of the senses at the time of the
realizing functioning viz. the
negation. Nor can it be ascribed since the correlate
to
their
in the
morning, (pratiyogin), was not of then for elephant, by hypothesis thought which to be the its negation apprehended. Again pramana by
negation is the if it is,
there
is
known cannot be
major premise
absence of
of the
knowledge of
brought
under
syllogism a thing,
will there
inference; for,
be 'Wherever
other
is
circumstances being the same absence of the corresponding object/ This as an inducrelates two negations and, premise be based should tive generalization eventually upon perwhich it assumes that their ception, knowledge is perceptual is the contention that it is inference. The against present
Prabhakaras do not admit
which
this is
pramana, for they do not sole object. They explain
its
recognize
negation
abhava
terms of the positive factors involved in
we
in
shall see in the
next section.
2
it,
as
SV.
p. 479,
st.
18.
PP.
pp.
118-25.
PtJRVA-MlMAMSA
323
III
The Mimarhsaka
a realist, and his realism has some features
is
of its own. Unlike the Sautrantika
and the Vaibhasika,
for
example, he believes in the existence of permanent dravyas are which are the substrata of qualities and not merely So the doctrine of aggregates
far, agrees fleeting sense-data. with the Nyaya-Vaieika. But it differs from that doctrine also to confine our attention first to the Bhafta school
in not
admitting that
recognizing is
the
principle
a
much
its
forms or attributes
brown now, and red hereafter. But tions the same material
modes alone
may
another time into a saucer; it
jar, at
and
appear
and
produced anew, Every dravya
change. The clay that we see before us
be made into a
rila
instead.
change
eternal, and endures however
may
can be
dravya
of
at one time
may be
in all these transforma-
The
persists.
disappear.
1
dravya endures;
In other
words,
its
Kuma-
dismisses the notion that things are self-identical units
which ever remain the same, excluding all difference. 2 This view of with the exhibits in reality kinship Sankhya-Yoga It is parinama-vada, and the relation between the material cause and the effect is, as in the other system, one One of in difference identity (bhedabheda). important difference between the two doctrines is that here the
general.
are
changing dravyas Another difference,
ultimately
by the way,
is
many
in that the
and not
only
one.
Mimamsa
extends the notion of modal transformation to the atman also which
is
absolutely static and passive according to the
other doctrine. The change that characterizes the physical reality is ever in progress. It never began and is never going
to end, the Mimamsaka recognizing no creation (sfti) or dissolution (pralaya) of the universe as a whole.s "There was never a time/ he says, 'when the world was otherwise than now': Na kadacit anidrSam jagat. Individual things, no doubt, come and go; but that is accounted for by the self-evolvent character of reality. Whatever stimulus is
required SV.
3
SV.
pp. 443,
p. 673,
st.
st.
113.
32-3.
Cf. SV. p.
476,
st.
12.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
324 for such
to take place comes from the past karma of the life's pilgrimage at the time. This means the
change
selves that are on
God1 from
abolition of the idea of
strange tenet to be held
par
excellence.
by
the system, which
is
indeed a
a school claiming to be orthodox view in one word, it is
To characterize the whole 2
pure empiricism excepting only one of of a viz. the point, recognition supernatural sphere being and of a revealed which a in
authority through
knowledge of
As regards the other sphere that
attained.
common experience it beats every known to In fact, a at least in one
MJmarhsa,
can be
naturalistic school of thought
standing charge against
history.
the
it
of
stage
of its
growth,
was that
it
3
was thoroughly materialistic in its outlook. The Mimarhsaka is also a pluralist and believes that variety is at the root of the physical universe.4 The school of Kuma-rila accepts all the nine dravyas known to the NyayaVaiSesika and or
perceptual
to
them,
Time
'5
'sound.
conception of them
its
two more
It adds
is
experience,
viz.
is
more or
less
the same.
abda
tamas or 'darkness' and 6
perceivable, the view being that what sense it no matter through
all
is
acquired, includes a reference to this element. It cannot,
but with apprehended by itself, only along some other object. Other dravyas also are regarded as perceivable the manas which is known be
however,
excepting only
curious that darkness should be regarded to the positive dravya preference Nyaya-Vaisesika which is also with the of view, Prabhakara's,8 equating it absence of light. The reason assigned, viz. that it is character-
mediately
ized
by
.7
It
is
as a
in
colour and
movement which can only be found
in
too naive to appeal to anyone. Salikanatha describes as 'crude/ The statement that it cannot be nega-
dravyas,
tion
is
since
(abhava),
its
it
correlate
supposed
(pratiyogin), 1
The
gods
offerings,
of Indian it is
mythology
explained,
ante. s 4
5
if
*
SV. p. Cf.
sacrificial
also are repudiated, and are made as there were
4, st.
Cf.
See p. 36
gods.
Yatha sarhdrsyate tatha: SV. p.
552,
st. 29.
10.
Vilaksana-svabhvatvat bhavanam. SD. p. 102. 66.
Mana-meyodaya,
p. 7 Mana-meyodaya, pp. 78-80. 8 PP. pp. 144 ff . ; MSna-meyodayat p. 68.
6
SD.
pp.
45-6.
PORVA-MIMAMSA not thought of wherever darkness
'light,.' is
unconvincing. Of these dravyas, the
325 is
seen
is
equally
four as well as darkness are stated to be of atomic structure and the are as infinite
remaining ones, including
By
ultimate.
'atom' in this
first
and
described
soul,
system should not be understood
the infinitesimal paramanu of the Vaisesika, but the smallest
which
us viz. the experience acquaints with, mote in the sunbeam which corresponds to the tryanuka of the other particle
doctrine.
as
The Vaisesika conception of atom is described but it does not seem to be
purely speculative, From all the atomic 1
rejected.
as
magnitudes may,
altogether
substances, objects
in the
of different
be
Nyaya-Vaisesika,
only the relation between the material cause and the
derived;
effect is here
viewed as bhedabheda or tadatmya ('identity in instead of in accordance with
samavaya
difference'),
Bhatta
belief in
support, of
or
it
as
which
it
were,
categories
the
the
other features
are divisible into three classes guna,
which
jati,
239),
(p.
sat-karya-vada. These dravyas form only of the universe. There are also
with
together
of Kumarila's
karma and
form the four
dravya
system. But
samanya
positive
must be remembered
it
that they are not conceived as entirely distinct from the dravyas
which they belong. The relation between them is one of here of 2 so that the significance 'category' identity in difference, to
not
same
the
as in the
Nyaya-Vaisesika.
includes negation (abhava),
list
also
five
categories
them has already been described and it sufficient for our purpose to state that the notion of the others for the most part like that in the Nyayain
all.
3
The
Kumarila's
and we therefore have
first
is
of
is
is
Vaisesika.
The Prabhakaras accept four more positive categories of which we need refer here only to one, viz. samavaya. Its recognition means
the
difference
entire
rejection
(bhedabheda)
of
the
admitted
relation by
the
of
identity
Bhattas.4
As
in a
consequence substance and attribute, universal and particular, material cause and effect come to be conceived as altogether distinct, and the doctrine does not subscribe 1
3
SV.
Id.
p. 404,
p. 65.
st.
183-4.
2
to
Mdna-meyodaya, 4
pp.
p.
6.
p. 27.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
326
the sat-karya-vada. This signifies a vast difference between the two schools in their conception of reality. While siding
with the Nyaya-Vaiesika in
this respect, the
differ from it in discarding abhava as an
gory,
their view
being
that
can
it
Prabhakaras
independent be
always
cate-
represented
positive something. Thus the absence of a jar in a room
mere
and so
the
its
ception
in the
the forth.
is
empty room; clay; prior negation, the the Amongst eight positive categories recognized, dravyas are nine as also is
as a
1
Nyaya-VaiSesika, and their con-
generally
the same.
IV The admixture
of the rational with the
dogmatic which we
noticed in connection with the theoretical teaching of the Mlmarhsa is equally striking on its practical side. So far as a the doctrine of view ordinary morality goes, adopts point
which is severely secular and explains virtue as a conscious or semi-conscious adjustment of conduct to interest. Sabara says that charitable acts like providing water-huts (prapa), though for the benefit of others and therefore good, are not 2
That is, the Mlmamsa judges conduct by a standard; but it is not egoistic and, as is indicated based the the by very example given by Sabara, is upon
yet dharma. utilitarian
realization of the social nature of
founded upon such a principle
history of that
ethics.
But what
is
man.
A
scheme of morality
not without parallels in the
is
peculiar about the
Mimamsa
is
refuses such morality the highest place in life's ideal. in metaphysics, here also it conceives of another sphere
of
it
activity
whose
significance
is
extra-empirical
and confines
the title of dharma to it alone. Common morality, according an to the affair which none Mimaihsaka, is purely empirical but the short-sighted fail to understand. True spirituality consists in fixing one's attention on dharma or such acts of as lead to success in the It duty li{e bfcyond. may appear that such a shifting of the attention from the present
coming one
will
Cf. SD.
pp.
throw morality 83
ff.
life
into the shade
to the
and thus tend I. iii.
2.
As
PCRVA-MlMAMSA to reduce
its
exclude
founded in
does nothing of the life does
It
Mimamsa, ceremonial
kind. For, as conceived in the
not
man.
value in the eyes of
327
common morality;
it
on the
is,
hand,
other
The Vedas
cleanse not the unrighteous.' 1 not viewed as the ethical is Though highest, purity regarded as a as well as a of it.
necessary accompaniment
pre-condition
The few occasions on which the dictates of common morality seem to be neglected, as for or spiritual
religious
life.
immolation of an animal in a rite, are the the rule. Howthat as explained only exceptions prove ever the of in unconvincing explanation given justification
example in the
these acts,
supports In the
it
should be admitted that generally the Veda
conclusions that are
present case,
to living beings:
for
(p.
an
explicitly
forbids
injury
bhutani.
understood in this unique sense, it naturto make it known
equally unique pramana
That pramana for
109).
ethically quite unexceptionable.
it
Na himsyat sarva
When dharmais ally requires
instance,
2
the Veda.
is
While the standard of that for dharma
is
common morality
human, judgment 'We should Kumarila superhuman. distinguish/ says, 'between what relates to dharma and moksa which is known from the Veda and what relates to artha and kama which is is
learnt
by worldly
human experience but
that
also
adharma,
'3
intercourse.
the
recognized for the purpose
Vaiesika
of
is
no
higher
It
not merely
is
avail
in
faculty
of
in doctrines like the
The
name
common
knowing dharma and yogic
perception
Nyaya-
of
(p. 262). single apurva* (literally meaning 'never before') which Prabhakara gives to dharma and adharma emphasizes their inaccessibility to the other pramanas (manantarapurva). It is conceived by him as
the
result
of
sacrificial
such
arid
other acts
themselves as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika punya and papa
and
not
corresponds
of the other doctrine. But it abides like the
latter in the self
jective leading *
distinguished
it.
Acara-hinam na
VS. 3
(atma-sarnavayi), so that apurva from the feature to be to
iii.
i.
those acts to the
According punanti
Vedah
to Kumarila these forms of :
Quoted
by
Samkara in his com. *
10.
Tantra-vartika,
I. iii.
is
2.
a sub-
objective
4
act
activity
on
Jaimini-sutra, See PP.
I. i.
pp. 187, 195.
2.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
328
dharma and adharma
are themselves
1 the former standing deeds a the latter for or for like permitted obligatory sacrifice, and deeds like an animal or
prohibited
know what
drinking
to seek
killing
it is
;
to
prescribed or prohibited that we have
is
aid of the
there
That,
is
the Veda. is, nothing though transcendental about the acts themselves described as dharma the fact of their the and adharma, being means of a super-
natural good
standpoint
not
is
that
humanly are
they
ascertainable. It
represented
from
is
known
here as
revelation and revelation alone.
The Veda reveals dharma, according
as the
subject
mandate
of a
or
(vidhi
to both
this
through
the schools,
as
niyoga)
something
to be accomplished, in accordance with the Mimarhsa conclusion that action is the final import of the Veda. But they differ
considerably mandate. In
in
view
their
this
fact,
of
question
Mimamsakas into several camps. them all. 3 We shall only note the
2
the motive of the
that
obeying
for
motive has split the
It
is
not necessary to refer to
commonly recognized distinction between the two schools. the not us to the According Bhattas, Veda only acquaints but also with dharma the desirable and adharma, specifies results to be obtained
from the other,
by following the one and abstaining the attainment of some pleasure
avoidance of some pain. In the usual
stoma sacrifice, end;
or
viz.
it
in the case of
example
heaven (svarga) that
is
destroying
life,
it is hell
is
the
of the jyotiheld out as the
(naraka) against
which one
is warned. Thus the Bhatta school, like the NyayaVaisesika (p. 263), believes that pleasure and pain are the only ultimate motives. 'Not even the stupid act/ Kumarila
1
Yagadireva
dharmah: SD.
for a certain resolve which sacrifice
and
is
is
explained
pp. 25-6.
The term
yaga
strictly
stands
the prelude to the performance of a
as
tyaga,
or,
the
spirit
of renunciation
away what belongs to oneself. (Cf. the formula 'no more mine' na mama uttered at the time of the IV. ii. uddisya dravya-tyago yagah (Nyaya-mala-vistara,
involved in
giving
this sense, *
See
dharma would
Tantra-rahasya,
offer.) 27-8).
of course be a characteristic of the subject.
ch. iv.
3 For a fuller discussion of this and allied topics, reference Dr. S. K. Maitra Uni. to Ethics the of Hindus, by (Calcutta
Pr.).
Devatam
In
may
be
{made
329
PpRYA-MlMAttSA in
remarks
a parallel context, 'without some good
in
view/1
But we should not conclude from this that the end is included in the behest and that it commands us either to seek pleasure or to 2
shun pain.
The desire for good
already there
is
in
man, and
Veda merely admits it as a psychological fact on the value of without pronouncing any judgment pleasure the
it in pain. In other words, we have here described as psychological hedonism and not ethical hedonism. But it should be acknowledged that the injunction,
or on the lack of
what
is
in this
the
utilizes
view,
incentive
demur
desire
subjective
make
to
itself
to
by appealing
as
it
The Prabhakaras
operative.
to the admission of a hedonistic aim as necessary for
The to imperative operate. Veda, they say, 3 is not so helpless as to need an extraneous aid in enforcing its mandatory It neither coaxes nor threatens power. anyone and the only the Vedic
;
motive
presupposes
it
Vedic injunctions
is
like 'one
reverence
should to
all. They are addressed only that desires heaven'
to
for
mandate
the
(svarga-kama) found in them do not point to any benefit
to be derived
by obeying them,
limit the
of its
But
itself.
(yajeta) do no apply and like 'he some, expressions sacrifice'
as the Bhattas
assume, the
but
by specifying set forth.4 In injunctions those will the case of any particular injunction, only respond
only
sphere
persons (niyojya)
whose
applicability
duty
those
who answer
to the description contained in
them
is
to act
(karyata-jiiana), desire that
may
What prompts
it.
this consciousness that it is their
they
and never the
may
have
prospect
duty
of
(ita-sadhanata-jnana).5
The
good or
result therefrom is accordingly looked
a rather than as an end upon as consequence at.
to do so
satisfying
There
is
no doubt that the idea of the
the
evil that
aimed
directly
fruit resulting
ritualistic activity is pushed farther into but for all here than in the other school;
any
from background
practical purposes
the two views are the same, because both alike admit that
an end 1
* 4
*
is
attained
no matter what name they give
Prayojanam anuddisya mandopi pravartate: SV. p. 125, st. 266. na
PP. p.
It
is
p. 653,
SV.
i
viSesana
55.
3
191.
termed here not phala but niyojya-
st.
:
Ibid.,
PP. p. jgi.
it.
NM.
6
The
p. 350.
pp. 177 and
180.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
330
specially important point to note here is the concern which both the schools exhibit to maintain that it is not of the essence
command
of a
contain
to
either
a promise or a from Vedic teaching
threat and the consequent exclusion proper of the idea of recompense, which doubtless constituted originally the sole motive of sacrifices.
We
have
thus
what
considered
far
karmas or
pratisiddha constitute the
are
termed
and forbidden deeds
optional of the sphere hypothetical imperative,
and seen that there
is
(p.
and kamyawhich 108),
practically no difference between the
Bhattas and the Prabhakaras in their attitude towards them. There
is, however, an important distinction between the two views and it comes out clearly in the case of the third
variety of 'unconditional duties' (nitya- karma) like the regular which after all constiof offering twilight prayers (sandhya), the essential as of the of tute, we shall see, discipline part the Mimaihsa regarded as a darana. In accordance with the
hedonistic basis of conduct accepted in the Bhatta school, these duties also are conceived as serving an end, viz. overadherence to sin coming past (durita-ksaya). Further, by one the that is sure to result sin off them, keeps (pratyavaya) from their neglect. 1 In neither case does their performance but are not without an aim. bring any positive gain, they According to the other school,
such deeds have no conse-
quence whatsoever and are to be performed for their own sake. They are not a means to an end, but are themselves the end.* While
according
in
to the Bhattas dharma even of is
form of nitya-karmas
its
instrumental value, it supreme good, regarding pursues as definitely above artha and kama or empirical motives Here we have a taken in their of totality. conception duty and that in a sense far for school
this
in
it
duty's sake,
the
heart'
Gita,
since
as
only
the
even motives so
and 'subserving the purposes
of
more rigorous than
pure
God
1
as
'cleansing (p.
the
125) are ex-
cluded and the doing of duty is placed on a basis of absolute disinterestedness. The law governing dharma here may there-
SD.
>
p. 130.
Apurva,
in
general,
is
described as
svayam-prayojana-bhuta. See
Tantra-rahasya, p.
70.
331
PORVA-MlMAfiSA fore be said to
Kant. But
correspond
what,
it
the Prabhakaras,
if
maybe
to the
'categorical imperative'
is
of
the
penalty, according one should disobey such mandates ? The asked,
to
question we shall state in the words of the Tantrarahasya* one of the few published works of the school: reply to
this
The
mood
,
such
personal
as
ending teaches
that
of
the
potential
as a to be accom(lin), you say, apurva duty In that case one not set about it plished. may it, although is known as a duty, because it serves no end.' which are known to 'Even in of
respect
optional deeds,
have an end, one may not act. What
is to
be done? The
function of a pramana ceases with the mere revealing of
its
object/
the failure to optional deeds, perform them means missing their fruit and that is the 'Well,
in the case of the
What
penalty. duties?'
is
the penalty in the case of unconditional
'The Vedic mandate
'What That
will
not then have been carried out/
of that?*
punishment, for obeying the Vedic (puruartha). It is on the analogy of these karmas that we say that carrying out the mandate is the true end even in the case of optional mandate
itself
is
the
itself is of ultimate value
deeds and that the attainment of the so-called phala incidental/
'How can
their
non-accomplishment
punish-ment?'
be
is
itself
the
The good, who praise those that obey the Vedic behest and blame those that do not, will answer that question. Or which feels one's own of conscience, guilty having proved faithless to it, will do so/ The appeal
here,
it
will
be seen,
is first
to the
judgment
of
the better mind of the community and then to the verdict of our own conscience.* But it is conscience not in the sense *
P. 66.
The former
of these
two explanations seems
with the Pr&bhakara ideal; the latter Gita teaching of sattva-uddhi.
ia
hardly
to be
different
more
in
from the
keeping
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
332 that
it
an
is
in
independent guide
from
discriminating right
dharma once known. The communication of what is right or wrong is still left to an external code. The appeal in its we double conceived that form, may add, implies man is but also as a member here not as a wrong, but
when
it
in the sense that it constrains us to follow
is
merely
of a
of
society
In one
spiritual being himself, spiritual beings.
important respect
the
aim
of the
Mimamsa,
clear, should differ from that of the other systems.
it
is
should
It
pursue not the ideal of moksa but dharma, whether as a means to an end or as an end in itself. Such seems to have its aim till a certain stage was reached in the history system. In that early period in the growth of the Mimawere artha and kama
been
msa, only dharma,
human
1
also.
the
accepted
(tri-varga)
and not the fourth one of moksa To speak generally, dharma is still the highest ideal in form has but the doctrine in its
109) as
(p.
of the
Kalpa-sutras
practically
values
present
;
thrown
it
overboard,
and
replaced
it
the ideal
by
moksa. The transformation means the virtual abandon-
of
of many of the rites taught in the Veda. 2 But the of a far more subversive kind in the case of the Prabhakara
ment
school
dharma the
is
than in that of Rumania. The latter conceive of a
as
moksa
means
ideal
for another.
change
If
to
an end and the introduction
means only the substitution
of one
of
end
the old aim was svarga, the attainment of some one of the new one is the apavarga, negative
positive good,
escape from sarhsara. But in dharma as its own
the case of the former, which the of the new end, acceptance cherished ideal means of deserting its principle doing duty and over for its own to the side of the sake, going completely
pursued
Bhattas; for
its
idea of moksa, to judge from Salikanatha's
1 Compare NM. pp. 514 ff; VS. 2 In this connection we may draw attention
later Gita,
exponents replace
single
one of
prakdsa, p.
of the doctrine
111. iv. to the
273).
This
God'
change
is
by
view of some
who, following
their
the
teaching
several
the divergent phakis of the
'pleasing
18.
performance
quite against
the atheistic
thought.
the
by the
(Mimdmsd-nydyaspirit
the Mimarhsa and shows how completely the Gita ideal influenced orthodox
of
karmas of
333
PttRVA-MlMAlVTS* the
trials
We new
and
shall
now
knowledge
of the
of an
seeking
travails of sarhsara.
viz.
end,
upon
laid
down
much use here,
nature
the
of
for its attainment.
Nyaya-Vaisesika conception
release will be of
escape from
1
touch
briefly
and the discipline
ideal
and
also the
is
description,
of
this
Our
bondage
two doctrines
for the
resemble each other in this respect so very much. We may add that almost the same criticism applies to the one ideal as to the other. The self is conceived in the Mimamsa as eternal as a matter of it is conand omnipresent; but, fact,
by various adjuncts which are not at all indis-pensable to it. Its 3 empirical encumbrance is three-fold To which alone it there is the as limited begin with, by physical body or there are the enjoys pain pleasure secondly, organs ditioned
:
;
of sense which are the sole means relating
world
and lastly, there
;
is
to the outside
it
that world
itself so far as it
the object of the individual's experience.
with things other than
that constitutes
itself
means
separation from them Mimamsaka refutes the Vedantic view world is sublated or transcended in release
once that
forms
connection
It is this
bondage, and for
The
all.
the
moksa.
physical Nor does he
admit that the relation between the world and the individual self is unreal as the
the world
when
is
and endures
real
to According him, exactly the same form even
a self becomes free
in
and moksa means only the
;
tion that the relation of the self to sary.
This state with
is
does.
Sarikhya-Yoga
described
it
as
negatively also.
it all
3
realiza-
real is not neces-
though
excluding
There
all
pain to
and along seem, however, pleasure have been one or more interpreters of Kumarila who maintained that it is a state of bliss or ananda.4 It is controverted
by 1
Parthasarathis and a consideration
PP.
pp. 156-7.
This
that the stress laid
glaring
discrepancy
upon dharma
can be
as the ultimate
of
Rumania's remarks6
explained only by supposing
puru-
sartha, or the disinclination to bring duty and pleasure into relation with each other, was a characteristic of an earlier phase of the
Prabhajcara doctrine and that it remains as but a relic in Salikaof natha's exposition of it. For evidence in support of the existence such a see Oriental Research phase, Journal of (Madras) 1930, 2 SD. 3 SD. pp. 99-108. pp. 125. pp. 126-7. 4 5 SD. 6 SV. Mana-meyodaya, pp. 87-9. pp. 127-8. st. 670,
107.
p.
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
334
in that connection seems to
support him. No such
of opinion seems to have existed in
difference
the case of the other
school. In this condition, all the specific characteristics of the The self is and self such as jnana, pain pleasure disappear. not conscious then even of itself, for the manas has ceased to
Mimamsa
operate. But unlike the Nyaya-Vaiesika, the
of the
Bhatta school maintains that the capacity for manifesting The such features this persists. only advantage gained by deviation from the Nyaya-Vaisesika
consistency advocates
which
is
in
regard
to the
is
the maintenance of
parinama-vada
for the latent capacity to know, to feel or to will
;
to persist in the self then is never
supposed
fested again.
Distinctions like
agreement
with the
mani-
these, moreover, affect
the state attained after death. So far as the condition of the represent is entire
which the school
moka may in this
enlightened
only
be taken there
to
life,
Nyaya-Vaiesika, doctrines, detachment from
As in the other worldly concerns and faith in the teaching are needed here also as Without no serious effort preliminary requirements. them, is
possible towards securing final freedom. The direct means
of release the
deduced from the general Indian
is
Mimamsaka the cause
When to be
karma
shares that
is
belief
the cause of
effect
is
removed, the must necessarily and abstention from karma, the Mimamsaka thinks,
;
should original
which
bondage.
cease
result in restoring the self to automatically The to be abstained karmas from, however,
its
state.
the optional (kamya) and the of the one performance gives rise to some merit; that of the other, to some demerit. are
not
all
but
those
only
prohibited (pratiiddha) types.
They
of
The
are thus a means of renewing bondage and have to be
eschewed by a person that
is
seeking freedom. The third or
should law
the nitya variety of karma, even the seeker after moksa for otherwise he will be the Vedic perform disobeying ;
enjoying
them.
prohibited deeds,
1
That would be
the
only
difference
equivalent
being
to
in
indulging
that while the
first
counts as a sin of omission, the second does is one of
commission. It 1
to
The
is
to avoid
influence of the Gita
nitya-karmas.
is
becoming entangled again
in the
again clear in this restriction of activity
PCRVA-MIMA&SA miseries of samsara as a
335
consequence of such
sin, that
one should
carry on the nitya-karmas. Thus the course of discipline
down
here
forbidden
two-fold:
is
and
deeds,
(2)
abstention from the optional adherence to the
(i)
obligatory ones. In neither case,
anything positive
effected,
it
should be added,
the
conception
is
of
laid
and
there
moka
being
negative in the system, viz. the restoration of the self to its normal condition. As regards the exact part which a knowof the to in ledge self, according Rumania, plays securing freedom, there is some doubt to a owing between discrepancy the Sloka-vdrtika and the Tantra-vartika in that respect. 1 we Without into the of this entering polemics question may knowa Parthasarathi's that state, following ledge of the self or
upon
its
true
interpretation,
more
nature,
is
strictly the insight
a
contributory
born of meditation so that
aid to
freedom,
what is technically described as jnana-karmasamuccaya-vada. The followers of Prabhakara agree in this do not admit ance of in the any purpose performrespect only they Their the call of of nitya-karmas beyond obeying duty. acceptance the need for as a means of the
doctrine
is
;
release, along
jiiana
with the
performance
explicitly stated.
Cf.
PP.
of
unconditional
duties,
is
quite
2
SV.
pp. 669
p. 157-
ff.
and
Tantra-vartika,
I. iii.
25.