Philosophy notes29

CHAPTER

XII

PURVA-MlMAMSA THE

distinguishing

feature of this

system,

as

compared

with

the others

so far considered, is its adherence to the Veda as

an

in itself

infallible

authority. to

Jainism refusing altogether others like the

other.

the Veda or exact place

own

now

its

authority

like

and

from them

all in that it places on a footing peculiarly its own. As to the assigns to reason, we have to refer the reader to

differs

ruti

it

what was stated suffice

have seen systems

to subordinate it to some

Nyaya attempting

The Mimamsa

We

recognize

an earlier

in

chapter (pp.

It will

180-2).

though thus authoritative in its revealed truth comes to us through the medium

to observe that

right,

of words whose interpretation is

mimamsa

the need for

by no means

easy. Hence

or the investigation of the principles to which the texts enshrining that truth are to be according

only when thus assisted by reason that the import. The primary aim of the Mimamsa be described as as a branch of learning may, therefore, getting back from the the to the idea behind it, expression of the of the relation of solving important problem speech and thought. Since the view taken of language here is that it interpreted.

Veda

is

It is

1

will disclose its true

independent

of the individual

using

it,

2

the

system

involves a great deal of discussion relating to social or folk

psychology.

This

contains

much

that

psychological inquiry is valuable for the modern science of Semantics or the branch with of relation to knowledge dealing meaning in linguistic forms.

The Mimamsa

in

respect serves as a necessary

this

or Grammar, whose treatment of

to

complement Vyakarana words is mainly formal. The indirect advantage thus resulting and forms one of the most to psychology

1

See e.g. PP. p.

assists a

svayam

Mimamsa

a pramana. Cf. Note

Compare ismahe

(p.

SD.

122).

important

philology,

104.

i

is

on p.

Sabda-sadhutve

viewed as a form of tarka, since 182.

hi

prayoga-paravasa

Yatha-lokam ca sabdarthavadharanam na yatheccham (p.

vayam

127).

it

na

PORVA-MlMA&SA

299

Mimamsa. The laws of interpretation

features of the study of

by Jaimini and his successors are quite general, and they are applicable as much to works outside the Veda as to that ancient text. They have, in fact, become widely

formulated

current and are utilized for arriving at a right interpretation old treatises texts, particularly legal (dharma-Sastra).

we

Speaking generally,

may

that

say

of all

Mimamsa

the

attaches greater importance to the Brahmanas than to the Mantras,

which means that

looks

it

upon

the Veda as essen-

tially a book of ritual. It not only subordinates the earlier but also the later as Its Mantras, Upanisads. designation

Purva-mimamsa has reference to this latter phase, viz. its concerned with the teaching of those portions of the beinj Veda that come the the darana Upanisads,

before

dealing with

the latter being termed Uttara-mimarhsa. ficial

sacri-

the main subject-matter of the inquiry which forms no of the old. It is the chief

Mimamsa

doubt, very

is,

Srouta-sutras and and

The

discussions

purpose

the Brahmanas. ritual are but

found even in

is

regarding

Doubts

natural, especially

when once the stage of its inception is passed. The Mimamsa only extends the scope of the inquiry and makes it more deals systematic. We must not understand from this that it

with

precisely as taught

sacrifices

Separated as

it

must have been

the

in

Brahmanas.

in its origin from

the

Brahmanas by

several generations, the Mimaiiisa marks both as a in of ritual. It its does, conception growth and decay and in matter of fact, reinterpret reinterpreting considerably modify the old system of rites. The doctrine as known to us

also exhibits a far more important change, viz. the subordination of the idea of sacrifice itself to that of the attainment of

moka. The aim it

in

of life

as originally conceived was, to state

general terms, the attainment of heaven (svarga). The of this aim by the ideal of moksa points to a

replacement

radical transformation of

ceases to be a mere

a darsana.

the doctrine. By it, commentary on Vedic

It is therefore in its

from what

its

other

The emphasis that as that emphasis

it

is still

the

Mimamsa

ritual

and becomes

present"form vastly different

name, Karma-mimamsa, may suggest.

lays on

the

performance

of

rites,

preserved, has now in effect become

so far

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

300

about

by a

desire

Mimarhsa to bring of

should have been important change brought on the part of the later exponents of the

This

quite secondary.

it

into line with the other

thought and not

allow

a mere liturgical

remain

to

it

systems

discussion bearing upon rites which probably had

time become more or

place in the Kalpa-sutras, self-realization

(atma-labha)

by that The change has not taken

defunct.

less if

in

we leave out the few them but it is 1

;

references to

seen

clearly

on the

in

Upavarsa and Sabarasvamin, early commentators and is very common in their successors.

The darsana of it late. The is, therefore, comparatively aspect it is not new to the Veda as a Sutra of Jaimini,

speculative spirit underlying whole,

for

it is

found

in

the

in the

Upanisads and

allegorical

sometimes given in the Brahmanas the of special type philosophic theory

interpretations of rites

themselves. But

which

now represents follows quite other lines.

It is not derived from the philosophy of the Mantras neither does it continue it

;

Upanisadic speculation. It is traceable to sources other than the Veda and is therefore neither a religion of nature nor a philosophy of the Absolute. Some of its minor tenets may be allied to what is found in the philosophic portions of the Veda; but, the as it of them strange

may

seem,

and the more

larger part

as

shall

important among them have, we see, been Brahmanas borrowed from the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The spirit of the was to the the of the supersede simple nature-worship Mimarhsa is of the spirit fully developed

Mantras;

to supersede ritualism as taught in the Brahmanas and later

systematized neither stage

in is

But the supersession

the Srouta-sutras.

complete, so that the

Mimamsa

as

is an admixture of the rational and the dogmatic, the natural and the supernatural and the orthodox and the heterodox.

with the darsana aspect of the here and not with

system that we

ritualistic

its

theories

or

in

now known It

shall deal its

exegetical

principles.

The main source

of

authority

in

regard

to this

system

is

Jaimini's Mtmdmsd-sutra. Its date, as in the case of the other

but it is philosophical Sutras, is quite indefinite; commonly believed now to have been the earliest of them all and assigned 1 See Note i

on p.

93.

is

PORVA-MlMAMSA to about 200 A.D.

much

The system

older, references to

as the Dharma-sutras

of in

number and

sections in

all.

thought

being found

and possibly also The sutras are

1

2

Patafijali (150 B.C.).

it

of

301 itself,

however,

is

such early works

in

in the

Mahdbhdsya over

considerably

2,500

chapters with sixty subnearly a thousand topics dis-

are divided into twelve

There are

cussed so that the work

is

by

far the biggest of the philoso-

phical Sutras. Like the others of

class the

its

work when read

most part unintelligible, and the aid of a which the traditional preserves interpretation Such an aid we have for it.

itself is for the

by commentary is

understanding

indispensable

in the

of

it

Sabarasvamin, who wrote probably about bhasya A.D. Tradition fondly associates Sabara with King 400 Vikramaditya, who is supposed to have lived in the first century B.C., but there seems to be no truth in it. There was at least

one earlier

(A.D. 350),

but

extract from it in in two

Sabara's bhasya.

ways by

explained

rila

commentary on the work by Upavarsa a of it is known to us, except possible

nothing

Bhatta (A.D. 700), who

essential respects.

as the Brhatl

is

The bhasya has been

3

Prabhakara differ

(A.D. 650)

from each other

Prabhakara's 'great in

yet

and Kumain certain

commentary

manuscript, except

known

1

for a small

ment which has been published; and the same is the the Rju-vimald, commentary upon it by Salikanatha,

fragcase with

believed to have been a pupil of Prabhakara. The views of the

school have therefore to be gathered from the Prakaranawhich also has not been of the latter, unfortunately writer recovered completely. Bhavanatha was another influential of the school with his yet unpublished Naya-viveka. As regards

pancikd

the second school, which for a long time has we have the first, adequate practically superseded reference.

Rumania's own huge and important work and consists of a or

fully printed called the Sloka-vdrtika

general

material

philosophical part

and two others Tantra-vdrtika and

Tup-tlkd. The first of these has been commented upon in a most lucid manner by Parthasarathi Mis"ra in his Nydyaratndkara.

Mancjana Misra, 1

*

probably

a

pupil

of

Rumania,

See Proi. Reith: Karma-mlmdmsa, p.

Cf. IV.

i.

14.

for

is

3

Li.

2.

5.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

302

was a famous thinker who has

Mimamsa

the

to his credit

many

Several other works of this school are also known, which we

may

(A.D. 1650).

of Jaimini. Several

istic

amongst

note Parthasarathi's Sdstra-dtpikd, Madhava's

(A.D. 1350) Nydya-mdld-vistara These follow in their

also are

works on

and the Bhavand-viveka.

like the Vidhi-viveka

and

Bhdtta-

Kharujadeva's the

explanation

dfyikd

order of the suttas

independent treatises serve as useful manuals on the ritual-

known which

or the interpretative

side of the

Such

system.

the

is

and a of Mimdmsd-nydya-prakdia Apadeva (A.D. 1650) digest the chief basis1 of it to or, according some, by Another work which the Laugaki Bhaskara, Artha-samgraha. deals with the philosophic teaching of the school of Kumarila

or the Bhatta school, as It has come to

it is

termed, is the and is the

light only latterly

Mdna-meyodaya.

composition

of

writers who lived about the sixteenth century A.D. Our treatment of the system will be general but wherever there are important divergences between the two schools from the

two

;

philosophical view-point, we shall notice them. The chronological relation of these schools is yet a matter of dispute

;

but, speaking on the whole, the Prabhakara school seems to be the older and to preserve better the distinctive lineaments of the original Mimamsa or at least to be nearer in spirit to it than the other. 2

The conception of atman but both schools, first

somewhat

is

agree regarding

the school of Kumarila

:

The view

is

different in

the two

its

plurality. To consider very much like the

one and atman is conceived as both an agent an enjoyer (bhokta). But while the NyayaVai&esika admits no action in the self neither change of here nor of form place (spanda), change (parinama) though 3 admitted.

That the is, the former is the latter is Nyaya-VaiSesika and

(karta)

denied,

system recognizes self.

1

Though undergoing

Prof.

22-3.

the possibility

Edgerton: *

Prof.

of

modifications

Mimdmsa-nyaya-praka&a

Keith, op.

cit.

t

pp. 9-10.

modal change in it is

(Yale 3

the

regarded as Uni.

Pr.),

SV. p. 707,

st.

pp.

74.

303

PORVA-MlMAiasA for Kumarila rejects the view that even internal militates change against permanence. Experience acquaints with us that almost daily many things change constantly, but maintain their a or yet identity. Jftana knowledge is

eternal,

mode

of the self.

and

It is described as is

naturally spoken found in so ethereal a 'substance' as the 1

(vyapara)

an act (kriya) or process of as self.

or disturbance which takes place in the

a certain relation with the hypothesis omnipresent,

is

since

supersensible,

it is

This change

atman brings about The

self, being by object known. in relation with all

necessarily

existent objects; but that relation is not the same as the one would arise in now considering. If it were, jnana

we

are

objects as long as they existed. The relation and is described as is unique 'compreThe act or hension' of (vyaptr-vyapyatva). process jnana is respect

resulting

of

all

from

jfLana

viewed as transitive so that

its result

(phala) has to be sought

something other than where it manifests itself. The act of cooking, for example, is seen in the agent, but its result in

'softness' (vikleda) is found in the material The former is the and the

grain.

object.

When

subject;

jnana

arises in the self

affected in a particular is

a

not

way

cooked, viz. the the

rice-

latter,

to relating it

an

so that experience

object, the latter is

but

has

also

wholly subjective modification, modification to it. The objective corresponding object and its becomes 'illumined' (prakaa-viista) thereby;

being

thus illumined or made known (prakatya or jnatata) serves as the

means for our concluding that jnana must have arisen previously. The arising of jnana is thus only to be

in the self

inferred. While

manifest

known

itself.

can reveal other objects, it has no power Though knowable, jnana is conceived here inference and not

it

indirectly through as in the introspection Myaya-Vaiesika

as

directly through

(p.

251).

The new

feature of being illumined which characterizes the object, as

a

to

that in of jnana arising it, may mean respect or to this it is mediately immediately. According double nature of the is either result, jnana mediate (paroka) or immediate consequence

of

known

(pratyaksa).

The proximate cause

of perception which leads to direct '

SD.

pp. 56-7.

an

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

304

knowledge (viadavabhasa) is the contact of the senses with The that we so their is respective objects. knowledge get in the first instance quite

alocana as in

the

vague and

Sankhya-Yoga

and definiteness only afterwards. 'determinate'

later,

stages here

(nirvikalpaka)

(savikalpaka).

Another

is

Nyaya-Vaisesika serves no

the

that

1

The

and

;

conception

here

nirvikalpaka It is

based

is,

growth

promptings of elderly people

is

this

upon

or

primitive stage

imperfect of

do the same when in a

the two

not

a

merely

savi-

kalpaka,

quite

may

and

whose under the

animals

act

perception flurry.

be,

and

Children

it.

incomplete

of

from the

is

supposition which, beyond explaining the

useful and the Mimamsaka admits that activity

mental

this

important divergence

practical purpose (p. 251).

actually

gains clarity

stage in

therefore different from that in the

is

Nyaya-Vaisesika. theoretical

earlier

named It

285).

(p.

The

is described as 'indeterminate'

process the

indefinite and is

2

only and even

That

is,

the

is not here a mere hypothesis formulated to account for some known phase of experience, but is a part

nirvikalpaka

normal

experience

Mimamsa

itself.

Like the

of

Nyaya-Vaisesika,

the

recognizes manas as a sense (indriya) in addition to the five admitted by all and its co-operation is the for all laid down as also

indispensable character of the senses also, there

jiiana. Regarding structural a general odour and the first four senses of

agreement

is

sight, flavour,

touch being taken as derived from the elements whose distinctive qualities are their respective objects. In the case of the manas, the from the elements view is that it may or may not be derived As the (bhutas). regards remaining sense, viz. that of sound, the that 'the of on the Vedic statement organ hearing school, relying

from

proceeds

connect

it

without

dik/3 makes it delimited space (dik)4 and does not with akaa. The senses including the manas, with or

contact

with

immediate or

mediate, furnish

1 children Mundaka

according

external

as

the

knowledge

conditions, which

Up.

40 (com.). The reference to the behaviour of animals and is noteworthy.

II.

i.

4.

4

See SD.

p.

is

induce

SD. pp. 36 and 40.

SD. p.

3

the

objects

36.

PCRVA-MlMAMSA in the self

change

constituting knowledge;

sociation once for self free as in the

all

from them

in

305

and

moKa

the dis-

it is

that will set the

Nyaya-Vaieika.

So far we have taken into consideration the waking or less the same to dream also description applies

state.

More

only

;

the co-operation of the five external organs of sense is there

withdrawn. In regard to sleep (suupti), Rumania holds a somewhat peculiar view. He admits of course that the self endures in it as other Indian thinkers generally do; but in consonance with his view of knowledge, he regards the self as In characterized then by the potency to know (jfiana-Sakti). this, which he differs from the Nyaya-Vaieika, denies jnana in every form to the self in sleep. He also dissents from the Upaniads because he recognizes no happiness then. The later reminiscence of happiness to which the Vedantin pointedly draws our attention (p.

72), Kumarila

explains negatively

as

due to the absence

at the

time of

all

consciousness of pain. If the self were really in the enjoyment would be he of the to bliss highest then, it says, impossible, which a the of feels afterwards explain feeling regret person if

he comes to know that by going to sleep he has missed

some common pleasure.

1

one other point to which we must allude before we the of the is it way in which, part subject and according to Kumarila, we become aware of our own self.

It is known the or the There

is

leave this

directly

through

we render and may

aharh-pratyaya

in

a

This forms an important point Kumarila the teaching requires explanation. understands 'selfconsciousness' literally and holds that the 'I-notion' as

self

it.

can at once be both subject and object

the

known (jada-bodhatmaka) and adduces common saying: 'I know myself .'3

as well as the

therefor the Ascribing such an apparently contradictory character harmonywith the rulingprinciple of his thought,

which, as we SD. 1

3

This

p. 124.

saying

is

shall see,

is

that

to

the nature of

the

self

is

quite

in

things cannot *

to be viewed as

knower

as evidence

Ibid., p.

122.

only partially representing experience as

it

actually occurs, for it necessarily includes a reference to an object (say, a 'jar') other than the self which is left out here.

u

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

306

be rigidly determined as such and such (bhedabheda-vada). 1 of like 'I In a sample know the jar/ there are two knowledge

the (aham-vrtti) and comprehending object question (e.g. ghataconstant and self-awareness is That is, accompanies vrtti). absent in all states of consciousness, being only deep sleep where no object is known. When we say that the self is thus known in all experience, we must not take it to mean that it elements

one

other

is

known

knowing

comprehending the the

as the subject in the act of

is itself

pointed out,

known

not

self

We

fact of

already

has,

cannot, therefore,

know

by or as owning such knowledge,

meant by the term 'subject/ But yet the cannot be unknown, for that would go against the felt

which

what

knowing. The and as

at the time

to be inferred later.

the self then as characterized

self

in

is

is

personal

identity explained as being

in

all

one's

known then

It is therefore experience. as the object of the 'I-notion/

If we take this along with the view that the self to be known at all we see must at the time become aware of some object or other, that to self-consciousness, according Kumarila, implies not only an internal difference a self which is opposed to itself as its object, but also an external difference self which is distinguished from the not-self.

Prabhakara disagrees with Kumarila in two important respects in his view of the self, and in both he sides with the

a

Nyaya-Vaiesika. a Not believing in parinama, he does not admit that the self suffers change. Again he objects to the description of the self as 'knowable,' and avers that agent and object can never be the same in any act. It is only objects that are knowable. The self, on the other hand, is a subject and is revealed as such in all jnana. If it were not so revealed simultaneously with the object, one's jnana would be indistinguishable from another's. From this, it should not be thought that the atman is self-luminous. It is wholly non-sentient (ja<Ja), and therefore requires for its revelation the presence of some knowledge to which the character

self-lnminousness

an aid the 1

3

SD. p.

1

self,

01.

PP. p. 51.

is

to

assigned.

be

3

Though

thus

does not

realized, See PP. *

chap,

of

dependent upon

require

viii,

a

separate

especially pp. 152

ff.

PCRVA-MlMA&SA mental

30?

whenever

manifest

it act, being any object is equally or known. The word which the Prabhakaras use for knowledge self-luminous is sarhvit experience which, being (sva-prakaa), needs else to make it manifest.

Though ultimate

nothing

in this

as it not eternal. It appears and dis-appears; and, sense, and both does the the reveals so, self simultaneously object with itself. This triple revelation is it

is

what

is described as triputi-jnana. So far as other psychological details are concerned, it will suffice to remark that there is a still closer approximation here to the Nyaya-

Vaiesika than

in the

previous school.

II

The main object of the Mimarhsaka is to establish the but he does not like to do so of the Veda; solely authority on dogmatic considerations and therefore tries to seek rational

He

grounds

for

merely

delivering

in

astra),

but

it.

is

contends that his system does not settled

judgments (upadea-

a reasoned

inquiry (pariksa-Sastra).

The

1

consist

very

classification by him of revelation along with perception and inference under pramana shows it. The testimony of the Veda means of and whatbut a truth knowing particular

is

;

ever value there

is

the Mimamsaka holds,

in it,

being a pramana like perception or he enters the arena of

is

due to

its

inference. It is thus that

logic; and, thor.gh

he

not be a

may

rationalist in the full sense of the term, he cannot at the same

time be described as a mere dogmatizer.

The system starts by postulating what is called the svatahboth in or the of pramanya self-validity knowledge (p. 260) and ascertainment of its 2 respect If a> b, and

origin (utpattau)

c (say)

themselves

causes

(jnaptau).

account for the genesis of knowledge, those

explain

its

validity

also.

Similarly

validity is

of

known

known when the knowledge itself is and no additional means required therefor. All valid and an is is called

knowledge ;

knowledge

the

is

presumably

1 See

SD. p.

explanation

18

and

cf.

Jaimini-sutra.

SD. pp. 19-23 and 48-50; PP. ch.

iv.

I.

i.

3.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

308 for

only

where

to act

proceed but ;

true

if

any particular knowledge on the

always

any part of

it

supposition

to be so.

fails

that the

We

knowledge we get

is

discovered to be not so,

is

we

seek for the cause of its invalidity in extraneous circumstances that must have interfered with the free functioning

of this means. The cause of invalidity is some defect in the Thus a means or source of knowledge (karana-dosa). person may think that he sees a while it is particular thing, silver,

is defective. This is how eyesight only found out with wrong knowledge arises. It is by its incompatibility When the subsequent experience (badhaka-pratyaya). who fancies that he sees a at a

because his

shell

person,

approaches

and

it

discovers

it

to

serpent, be a rope,

distance,

he concludes

that his previous knowledge was erroneous. While thus the MImamsa agrees with the Nyaya-Vaiesika in its view of the with it in of invalidity knowledge (apramariya), it disagrees respect of the view

it

takes of

its

validity (pramanya). The

chief reason for the disagreement

is

the nature of truth as defined in the

the disaccord between

Nyaya-Vaiesika and

the manner ii: which it proposes to verify it. Truth is stated with but the test does to be not, reality, correspondence So the doctrine indeed ascertain that cannot, correspondence. an indirect test fruitful proposes

What

activity

serves as the test

that of thirst given.

Now

without

verifying

example already

experience cannot validate the first and about

being similarly validated; mean on ad

would

(samvadi-pravrtti).

thus really another experience to cite the

being quenched,

this second

itself it

is

only

going

that this second

setting

infinitum.

Even

needs no

verification, experience of a corresponding reality outside knowledge. A person may dream of water and also of There is fruitful his thirst quenching by drinking it. activity no the test finds here, but What objective counterpart. actually and to whether two out is experiences cohere, only such a test as the to accept adequate is virtually give up

supposing it cannot vouch

realistic

for the

position

presence

because the

reality is left wholly unverified.

Nyaya-Vaiesika

starts

as

with

supposed correspondence Thus we see that though the to maintain fails it

realism,

position in the solution of what is one of the crucial

problems

its

PORVA-MlMA&SA philosophy that of truth and

of

determined

Mimamsa,

ab

extra

adhere

The

error.

to

fact

is

view that

the

That

(paratah-pramanya).

which likewise

view of

opposite to be

cannot

doctrine

realistic

309

validity

why

is

upholds realism, advocates

svatah-pramanya and, by presuming with the need for

that a is

the

the

all

knowledge

valid, normally dispenses

testing

it.

We may now the

pramana upon

point out the bearing of such a view of the Veda which is of authority para-

mount importance

to the

of

Mimamsaka. Neither the circum-

stance that renders knowledge invalid nor that which leads to

its

discovery

Veda. There can

exists in the case of the

be no flaw at the source the case of verbal

(karana-doa) is

the source in

for

;

the

and

or

writer, speaker testimony and the to the Veda, according Mimamsaka, is self-existent has had no author at all (apauruseya). Nor is there the possi-

of its coming into conflict with perceptual or other what it teaches form of common experience, for refers, by bility

hypothesis, only to matters beyond this We unverifiable empirically (p. 180).

life

and

is

therefore

may think that though common be not the Veda contradicting experience, may discrepant with itself one here and by teaching thing another there. But no such will be it is discrepancythe Veda.found, understand It is in if maintained, we properly what a of it is that the determining proper understanding to are rules of which we referred above, interpretation, laid down. This view, which is peculiar to the Mimamsa,

requires further elucidation.

The Veda here stands

in this sense that the

He

bases his view mainly (i)

The

for a

form of uttered words and it is holds it to be self-existent.

Mimamsaka upon

the following considerations

relation between a word and its

and therefore necessary and

eternal.

We

meaning

is

:

natural

ought not to think

that things were there already before they were named. The word and the thing it names go together and it is impossible to think of either as

having had a beginning

in time.

1

But we

must carefully note what in this view is meant by the terms 'word* and 'thing/ In order to know the character of the 1

SD. pp. 90-7 and 116-17. See

also p. 44,

com.

OUTLINES

310 former, dhvani.

it

is

to

necessary

A var$a

is

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

'OF

distinguish

an articulate sound.

between varna and

first

It is conceived as

and

and

integral (niravayava) omnipresent (sarva-gata) therefore also eternal (nitya). That a varna can be uttered several times or

ways

in several

many

as

mean that there

does not

particular cases of

it

are

with a universal running through

What thus diversify it are its accidental features; and, however a varna much they may change, remains the same. One of them.

the important arguments adduced in of its is

the support permanence ready recognition have when the same varna is uttered more than once, which implies that

We

all

we

those utterances refer but to an identical thing.

say for example that the a-sound

uttered ten

is

times and not that ten a-sounds are uttered.

If they did not refer to the same the recognition would have to be

explained

without adequate reason for doing so between the identity being possible

as an

illusion,

no

utterances

fleeting

themselves. The latter, viz. dhvani, is viewed as the means of been there and the varna which has all manifesting along ;

may be compared to the written symbol, the chief difference being that, when there are several varnas, we have a but a series of utterances in the one temporal case, spatial it

which a

series of written signs in the other. The variety of ways in with different is may be uttered, as e.g. stresses, explained as due to differences in this means of utterance.

varna

The nature of dhvani is explained in alternative ways, but we need not enter here into a discussion of such details. enough

means

for our

purpose

to

regard it

of revealing varnas,

must be

as 'tone different

1

which,

It is

as the

from them.

It is

and limited to the place where it is heard. A as 'word' (abda) is two or more of these varnas, and is regarded and not as a whole an

also transient

merely

aggregate (samudaya)

(avayavin) distinguishable

from each of

its

constituent

parts

and from all of them. But yet the necessity is recognized case of every word for the varnas in it occurring in a for like

in the

otherwise words dma ('pitiful') and nadi which consist of the same varnas but placed

specific order;

('river'),

in

a

different

This order,

order,

would not

however, can refer

only

to their

differ in their connotation.

manifestation

PCRVA-MtMAttSA to

and not

3

the varnas themselves which are,

and at present everywhere

all

times. Their

1 *

by hypothesis, gradual of

gressive utterance does not interfere with the unity which also is the for instance, perceptual process,

or

pro-

as

the word

gradual, does not affect the unity of an object like a tree when we are it is seen. As regards the 'things' signified by words, not to understand the particular facts of experience which come into and but the unibeing disappear, corresponding versals which are eternal and of which the passing individuals That than the are of the is, signs. significance nothing more

word is general form a

1

sentence,

the

meaning being

them

also is

though, when associated with other words to come to denote a The word may and particular. both the relation between

it

eternal,

necessarily

so.

It

does not follow from this that

Mimamsaka

the

rejects the conventional clement in language. a subordinate a only assigns place (sahakari) to_ it though the that serves illustrated it necessary one, being by purpose of light in seeing. 2 If the conventional element were not admitted,

tuition or instruction

by one who be

is

necessary

regarding the meanings

of

words

already familiar with them, whicL is known would become a

for

learning

language,

He

to

super-

The problem discussed here is a philological one and the solution reached is that language is not a creation of the fluous.

human

or even of the divine

vie^r held in

a natural

modern and the

phenomenon.

4

mind

the former being the

latter, in ancient

In

holding

such a

Nyayas view,

the

Mima-

but

msa resembles the older school of modern philolologists, which maintained that philology was a natural science.

The permanence

(2)

meaning, even though 1

The meaning

of

it

of the relation

between a word and

its

be granted, does not establish the

proper names

is

regarded

as

due to mere convention

(See PP. pp. 135-6 and SV. p. 674, st. 120). But even here the connotation is in any particular stage general, e.g. 'Devadatta' means not the person so named of life but the individual in who, spite of minor changes, endures throughout life. Cf.

Mammata's Kavya-

3 SM. p. 361. involves a conventional element.

The as the result of of is diversity existing languages explained corruption That is to the cart before in an ideal original speech. put

prakata, It

is

ii,

the horse.

*

8.

social

also in

so far

SD. p. 91. as it

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

312

eternity of the Veda. It merely serves as a negative aid to

by

precluding the conclusion which one

draw

may

it

at once

must necessarily have had an in time.

The Veda consists of words, and so far it is origin like any other literary work. If the permanence of the word that whatever

verbal in form

is

and meaning constituted the criterion of eternity, all literary in fact all uttered alike be works, statements, would eternal. If the Veda alone is so and not other works also, it should be traced to some unique feature it possesses; and such a

the order feature, it is said, is particular (anupurvi)

which the several words occur in

in

Veda

states that the

is

eternal,

it

it.

When

the

Mimamsaka

permanence

this

is

of the

text that he means. He views the Veda as produced by no author human or divine and he maintains that it has been ;

a

intact

preserved

down from

during beginningless period by being teacher to pupil With scrupulous care. 1

handed

based on the circumstance that tradition, though been has antiquity, throughout while of the to the silent in regard authorship Veda, This belief

going

is

back to a far-distant

in the case of even

the

very

ancient works like those of

Mahabharata mention

is

made

of

Buddha

While the order of the words in those works was determined their authors, Veda. This silent

it is

authorship

lead to nothing that

is

upon

that tradition

Veda,

is

negative

is

really

and can

decisive.

Thus the Mimamsaka doctrine text rests

by

self-determined in the

argument again, granting of the

on the

or

some author or other.

of the fixity of the

a certain view of language

the supposed absence of

it

takes and

Vedic

upon

long-standing tradition to its having been composed by one or more authors.

In neither the to case, it is clear, is support premise adequate the important conclusion that is drawn from it. The belief all

reference in

in its present form is therefore nothing more than a dogma. of late and 'idolatry scripture* appears comparatively seems to

This

have been arrived at by extending to the form of the

Veda what was once taken

to hold

good

of its content.

The

truth concealed under this purely scholastic view, therefore, is that the Veda embodies eternal verities.

In the case of 1

Jaimini-sutra.

Li.

27-32.

PCRVA-MlMA&SA smrtis,

as

distinguished

from the

ruti,

313

even now held

it is

content constitutes the truth revealed, though an

attempt now

is

made, under the influence of views similar to the

considering,

to trace

it

91) eventually

(p.

some ruti which is no longer instructive to cite the

that this

one we are

to

extant. In this connection it is

of the

opinion

grammarian

Pataiijali

of the second century B.C., that while the sense of the Veda is eternal the order of the words in it is not so. 'Is it not said

that the Vedas were not so

;

but

it is

but

are eternal

Quite

?

1

in them.'

Coming

now

to the

have to note that

and Prabhakara to a point is here

composed

their sense that is so, not the order of the syllables

Mimamsaka

and there

of

we

knowledge,

both according to Rumania

it is realistic, ;

theory

no knowledge which does not outside it.* But all knowledge

is

corresponding object to be

to the

of self-

true, according theory presumed validity and verification becomes necessary only when any doubt cast upon its validity. The one kind of knowledge

is

that does not come under this description is memory. to the recollection is not valid for According Bhattas, novelty is not a necessary condition of validity. 3 Truth should not only be contradicted it by subsequent knowledge (abadhita); should also point to something not hitherto known (anadhi-gata). Prabhakara does not for all this condition, experience (anubhuti) accept known whether the be object already or not is valid for him. Even the so-called error, as

immediately see,

we

shall

satisfies this

requirement.

differentiates recollection from anubhuti, for ence in the sense of the

a former one is

valid, it

primary

(sapeksa).4

may

question

and

differ

their

also

not experi-

term, being dependent upon nature its experience by very

If all

be asked how error arises at

and Prabhakara

it is

But he

Kumarila

all.

in their answers to this

considerably are known

explanations

and

It

respectively

as

would be better to

viparita-khyati akhyati. begin with a description of the latter and then contrast the former

with

it.

(i) Akhyati.

1

IV.

J

SD. p.

iii.

The word khyati means 'knowledge'

101.

45;

SV.

p.

431,

st.

See e.g. SV. p. 217,

104-6.

4

and

3; PP. PP.

st.

iv.

66.

pp. 42-3* 127.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

314 the term

akhyiti,

which

is

know-

to 'no

literally equivalent

Prabhakara's theory to indicate that error, ledge/ is applied to but a to is not a unit of it, knowledge, compo-site of according two jnanas. 1 When shell is mistaken for silver and we

say as

to

ourselves,

This

is

silver/

the

'this' is

which

certain features of the shell

also

it

actually perceived possesses in

common

with silver. The knowledge of those features revives in our mind the impression of a former experience and we recollect silver. The so-called error here really

these two

consists of

jnanas

followed by memory. Of these the

not

first

perception immediately true so far as it

is

far. Its 'this' is go sufficiently object not sublated afterwards since, even when the error is dis-

goes, though

it

may

covered, we feel 'This be said of the second

The same, no doubt, cannot because its is not

shell/

is

jiiana object, silver, given context. But in this it only exhibits its we at the time normal for it is character; memory although lose 2 of that fact and does not as sight (smrti-pramoa)

found

such

in the

that the

signify

object

is

That

then.

present

former knowledge claims to be valid and the claim

is,

the

is justi-

fied; the latter 'does not

put forward any such claim at all.

Prabhakara does not admit that knowledge can

Indeed, ever

no

play

false to its

error, according

to

logical

him,

nature

in the

;

and there

is

consequently of the term.

common acceptance

In what passes for error, we overlook the fact that there are two as a natural

jnanas ;3 also fail to notice the

and,

of their

separateness

consequence,

we

respective objects.

This failure to know, however, cannot by itself account for the 'error' ; because, if it did, errors would occur in dreamless

sleep,4 which also

The negative 1

Strictly

this

terminology schools, 2

we

in

is

use

by

characterized

factor of failure

should

be

is

absence of knowledge.

therefore viewed as

'samvit.'

But

to

secure

operating uniformity

considering this topic of truth and error in the two 'jfiana.' to are Prabhakara, memory without the con-

Dreams, according

sciousness at the time that they are so. See

NM.

p. 179.

3

Recognition likewise partakes of the character of both perception and memory, but one is aware at the time of the recollective element there. It is therefore different from the instance we are considering.

See SD. p. 45.

4 PP, iv. st.

5.

of

PORVA-MIMAMSA

315

with a positive one to which we have of the 'this' as characalready perception terized by the features that are common to shell and silver. We may therefore describe what is commonly supposed to be in

giving

rise to error

referred,

error as

partial

must be

viz. the

or

incomplete knowledge

careful to

remember that

knowledge to which that term

is

;

in so

only

doing

we

there is no single unit of applicable. To take another

A white crystal placed by the side of a red flower be There also we have as a red may wrongly regarded crystal. two jiianas, viz. the perception of the crystal minus its true colour and the sensation of the redness alone of the instance

:

flower.

Each

of these

jiianas

is

quite

valid so far as

it

goes

;

only

here

both the jiianas are derived through the senses. As before they a of the viz. the convey partial knowledge objects, crystal and .he flower; but the basis of error here lies in the not in their of the as in the contiguity objects, similarity there are two previous example. Further, objects bodily given here instead of one and the features comprehended are what characterize them singly and not their common ones.

But the distinction between the two jiianas as well as that between their objects is not as before grasped and we are therefore said to fall into error. Here also the akhyati view lays down two conditions one positive and the other negative knowfor error at all a becoming possible partial ledge of the and a failure to note the distinction between things presented them.

1

2

Rumania also maintains that Viparita-khydti. knowto an itself. In shell-silver, ledge always points object beyond there is for viz. the 'this' instance, something directly given, (2)

;

but the silver

is

not so given. Yet

it

taken as ideal or non-existent, for of a former suggestion

objective counterpart. the

previous one,

splits

into two parts is 1

should not on that account be its

notion, being Tsack

experience, goes like view,

This up

the

the

object

'this'

of

erroneous

due to the to an

eventually

knowledge

(visaya) and the 'what' (parakara)

and explains them separately. The first of them as before not sublated when the mistake is rectified; and the Compare the

earlier

Saflkhya view

of error,

set forth

in the

previous

chapter.

a

SV.

pp. 242-6;

SD.

58-9.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

316

the second element also

explanation of same

must have been experienced before not at all have been fancied in is

between the two views

the

practically

here and now, the silver

Though not given

as before.

is

for otherwise

;

the

The

shell.

that while, according

to

it

could

difference

akhyati,

due to a losing sight of the fact that the presentative and the representative factors stand apart unrelated here in ascribed to a (asarhsargagraha), viparita-khyati it is them In the former case of

error

is

wrong synthesis error,

(sarhsarga-graha).

so far as that term

because

is

applicable

to grasp

the discarding of

the error

is

all,

due to

it

omission

takes place, does not

feature previously cognized. In

any

becomes

at

some relevant part of what

only given. Hence its discovery, when fails

it

one of

commission, warrant for

for

the

includes

it

is

mean

latter,

as

its

content more than there is In other that is in the illusion is words, reality presented. here as instead of as two explained unitary knowledge jnanas.

The

and

elements

subject seem related in

predicate consequently while are not so in it, they reality. Similarly and the two in the case of the red viz. the relata, crystal, crystal the are are not redness, actually given but while they the unified in so in error. As a fact, they appear consequence shows itself redness of the instead of flower, standing apart, and makes it in the crystal appear differently (viparita) from what it is. 1 This view is no doubt more in accord than ;

the

one with

previous

illusion as

a

synthetic whole,

presents a difficulty,

viz.

which

experience

but

points

to the

epistemologically

object

of

it

the inclusion of an ideal element

within the content of knowledge. However unconvincing the view may be, it is true to its realistic postulate in akhyati admitting

may

no

subjective

not be

element

to the

whatsoever. but

Knowledge it

never

adequate given reality, goes which accounts for the the This/ by way, name viparita-khyati, means and as other.' See SV. st. literally 'appears p. 245, 117 p. 312, 1

1 60 (com.). The Bhatta view is with the commonly identified There is no doubt much that is common Nyaya-Vaisesika one. between the two, but there are differences in matters of detail. The what is Bhattas do as alaukikafor not, example, recognize known which is essential to the of pratyaksa Nyaya-VaiSesika explanation st.

errors like

'shell-silver.'

PORVA-MlMA&SA beyond

Here, on the other hand,

it.

it

317 1

overshoots the mark.

and to admit that is is, partial misrepresentation; can even be its knowledge misrepresent object, though it only part, is to abandon to that extent the realistic That

error

in

principle on which the doctrine claims itself to be based.

These views of error imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of

Mimamsa

in their

conception

of

knowledge.

Rumania recognizes error as such, and it can from truth. to According

easily distinguished

on

therefore be

Prabhakara,

there being truly no error at hand, The distinction, however, being disappears. must have some and if Prabha-

the other distinction

universally recognized

all

basis;

kara would explain it, he cannot like Rumania do so from but has to seek another. of view, purely logical point The new standpoint he finds in the view he takes of know-

the

the

essentially a means to an end and that its or subserve vyavahara, as it is guide action to said. All knowledge, according him, prompts activity2 and, truth this fresh criterion of by practical utility, judged becomes Irom error. no can quite distinguishable Rnowledge, doubt, but it never deceive on its be logical side; may such as does or does not 'work.' in the one case, we have that

ledge

it

is

sole function is to

;

truth

the other, error.

in

;

The

latter

has cognitive value as

much as the former, but it lacks practical worth and when we describe it as error, we only mean this that it is decep;

tive in respect of the claim it puts forward to be serviceable.3 Accordingly when after rectification error yields place to truth, what not modification of its happens is any logical meaning but

only the abandonment it.

4

of the activity that has been prompted by In other words, the effect of the discovery of error is seen on

the reactive side of consciousness

not on

receptive

its

side.

In viparita-khyati also

covery arrests activity; but that is looked upon the immediate one a further being

result,

1

Compare the Compare

3

PP.

4

In cases where error has led to suspension of activity,

iv. st.

the view of 37

of error as stated on p.

sabda-pramana

its

dis-

only a

readjustment

*

later

Sankhya view

as

as stated in PP.

291

of ante.

pp. 91-94.

ff.

its

discovery

will

prompt

it.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

3 i8

Any

our cognitive attitude towards the object. have on our volition is readjustment may to

it.

ily

Rumania's attitude towards knowledge

detached and

scientific;

this

thus primar-

is

that of

effect

only subsequent

Prabhakara, pragmatic.

The Mimamsakas of the Bhatta school recognize six pramanas, while those of the other accept only five of them :

(1)

Perception (pratyaksa),

(2)

Inference (anumana).

which has There

with the Nyaya-Vaiesika,

as,

a

is

for

inductive generalization (vyapti).

upon them or upon the

the views of the two

this

(3)

in

Mimamsa

Mimamsa

remains

to

differences

resemblance here

general in the view

taken of

away from our purpose features distinguishing

schools in their conception of

pramana.

Verbal

sidered.

example, But there are

differences also. It will take us too far

here to dwell

already

been con-

Testimony (abda).

The

J

of

place

this

pramana

has been indicated already and it now point out one or two of the more important logic

between the two schools

:

The Prabhakaras, unlike the

Bhattas, adhere to what appears to have been the earliest view of with the abda as a pramana (p. 178) and equate it Veda, other forms of verbal as mere inference explaining testimony a verbal to 3 Again statement, according Rumania, may (p. 257). to an existent something point (siddha)

or

to

something

that

is

to

yet

be

accomplished

(sadhya). For example, the sentence There are fruits in the next room' refers to a fact, while 'Fetch a cow' refers to

a

Though thus admitting the two-fold character of the import of propositions, he restricts it to the sadhya or what task.

is

yet to

be

Prabhakara

done, when he comes declines to admit

whether Vedic or not, and limits their

scope

pragmatic view he takes

of all

to

speak

that

of

the

to the

Veda.

3

verbal statements,

can ever point merely to

things

should be relevant

to

sadhya,

in

existent

keeping

with

the

knowledge. All utterance

some context

therefore point to an action as

its

in

ultimate

practical

life

meaning. What-

and

i

SD '

pp. 72-3;

PP.

pp. 87

ff.

*

See PP. p. 94.

3

J

aimini-sutra

,

I.

ii.

1-18.

PORVA-MlMA&SA

319

ever be the difference between the two thinkers in this respect,

we

see

that

they agree

in

holding that action

of the Veda. Assertive

import

as

explain,

is

found

propositions

the in

it,

when construed with

fully significant only

final

they

an

found in the or appropriate injunction prohibition particular context. On this view depends the well-known division of the Veda broadly into two parts, viz. vidhi or The and artha-vada or 'injunction' 'explanatory passage/ latter, are as of statements they consisting describing things have no or status were, and are to accordingly independent logical in the other be understood as complementary to what is taught viz. vidhi. As complements of portion, commend what is as injunctions they prescribed; complements of prohibitions, they condemn what is forbidden. 1 The on of this view of bearing scripture Upaniadic statements like Tat tvam asi, which are not injunctive, is that

they also are to be construed with reference to some action taught in the Veda a point to which we shall recur when treating of the Vedanta.

Mimamsaka

The

the

like

(upamana). 3 Naiyayika disagrees with the view that this is not an indeand can be under or pendent pramana brought wholly partly

Comparison

(4)

one

or

other

the

of

altogether differently it

Nyaya,

may

be

other

from the

pramanas.

latter.

remembered,

this

But

According

he

conceives

to the

has for

pramana

its

it

sole

object the relation between a word and its meaning learnt under certain conditions (p. 259). Here it is reciprocal

known through it. When a person who is cow (say) casually comes across a gavaya, an animal of the same species, and notices the resemblance of the latter to the former, he discovers that the cow is also

similarity that

is

familiar with the

similar to the 1

i.

To give

gavaya.

It is this

the stock illustration:

second resemblance or, to be

There

is

in

the

Yajurveda

(II.

i.

an injunction 'One should sacrifice a white (animal) to Vayu,' and the same context is seen the assertive proposition 'Vayu i)

verily is the swiftest deity.' The latter is a glorification of

to the

according former.

When

sacrifice

;

Vayu and

principle stated above, to be construed

so construed, it

for the

SD. pp. 74-6; PP.

reward 1

10-12.

signifies that it is

will be speedy.

good

is,

with the

to offer this

in

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

320

more exact, the

recollected

known through upamana.

This

pramana

liable to

saka defends inference,

cow characterized by view,

no

doubt,

it

that renders the

is

be classed under inference. But the Mimam-

by pointing out that the basis for of inductive relation knowledge (vyapti)

his position

a

viz.

is

not needed here. The relevant major premise here would signify that if one is similar to another, say A, that other thing, say B, is similar to the first. As giving expression to a the simultaneous observation of general truth, it implies

A

both

and

B. But the

conditions

upamana do

of

not

who has never

seen two similar require things together but meets with a cow and thereafter a it,

in the

gavaya

conclusion in here

is

similarity

(5)

as even a person

that

manner described above

question.

A

being

is

(sadriya)

'similarity'

of A to B

is

able to arrive at the

matter of metaphysical importance conceived as

distinct from that of B to

Presumption

1

(arthapatti).

This

dual,

the

A.

is

postulating some-

thing to account for what apparently clashes with experience and otherwise state therefore in the nature of a hypothesis. We may as

what

rendering explicit

is

is

it

already implicit in two truths both of

which have been properly

Thus but which tested, appear mutually incompatible. know that Devadatta is alive and do not find him in his house,

we

conclude

that

he

should

be

somewhere

if

we

else.

of

Another example commonly given in this connection is that a not continues to be person who, though eating by day, healthy and strong, which leads to the conclusion that he should be eating.

by

night. That this

is

a valid form of

discovering the unknown from the known is clear, but may appear to be only inference. Some like the Naiyayika therefore class

distinct

it

under anumana, and do not regard it as a The of the in argument support opposite

it

pramana.

is as follows The result here cannot be represented as reached through inference inasmuch as there is no middle term at all to serve as its means. To take the first of the above cannot serve that alive' examples, 'being by itself purpose,

view

:

for that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion in question

viz.

that Devadatta SD.

is

outside his house.

76-83;

PP.

pp.

113-18.

He may then

as

PORVA-MIMAMSA well remain in his house as elsewhere. his house

321

Nor can

'not

being

may

by itself take that place, since that reason properly lead to the conclusion that Devadatta is 1

in

equally

no longer alive. So we are forced to view the middle term formed by combining both these 'being alive and 'not

as

1

home/ But

at

being

reference to

what

that Devadatta

viz.

the conclusion

is,

which

in

combined form

this

is

included in

already

is

the inference

through somewhere outside his house.

add another

reason: while in inference the ground ('the fact of smoke')

the conclusion

explained by alive and not

clusion

here the

('fire'),

That

1

middle term

the

We might

never the case in inference.

is

involves a

it

to be established

is

is

ground ('being

being found in the house') explains the conThe truth is that 2

arthapatti is

('being elsewhere').

and

disjunctive reasoning

is

not

the

in

syllogistic

ordinary

sense of the expression. If we reduce it to the syllogistic the universal will be a form, referring to negative major premise things beyond the universe of discourse

;

and

it

therefore

ceases to be significant. In this connection

it may Mimamsakas

unlike the Naiyayikas, the

that,

schools reject the negative universal as the

a

They

syllogism.

in a

consider that

form. The

positive

scope

for

it

can

be stated of both the

generally is

arthapatti

in

major premise be

expressed

where

just

it

cannot be

so expressed.

(6)

Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).3 This

pramana by absence of

which

negation, not nothing,

is

atoms somewhere. Like the

a jar or of

known,

is

the

specific

the

e.g.

Nyaya

facts 237), the Bhatta school of Mimamsa admits negative a unlike it it (abhava) but, formulates separate (p. 249), means them. The word pramana for knowing anupalabdhi the 'absence (p.

;

of apprehension/

the absence of

knowledge This of the five foregoing pramanas. means as of the that, pramanas knowledge got through any

derived

through any

points to

such

i.e.

the existence

(bhava) of objects,

indicates,

other

the-

absence of

conditions remaining should be their same, non-existence (abhava). Only it

knowledge

remembered that the absence, to serve as the index existence, SV. '

must be

p. 455,

st.

19

aided

ff.

by

of non-

the mental presentation =

NM. x

p.

44.

3

SD.

of the pp.

83-7.

the

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

322

object. There may be several objects not found in a but we think of the absence of that alone particular place ; among them all, which some other circumstance has made

relevant

1

us

think

The Naiyayika divides 'negations as their correlate classes according (pratiyogin) of.

two

into is

perceivable

or not. The means of knowing the former kind, he holds, is that of the inference. Here in the Mimalatter,

perception; sixth

as the

prama^a is postulated both varieties of of knowing negation,

is

it

contended,

is

common means The

negation.

objects arises

of negation.

knowledge even when no organ

of

knowledge

1

the

this

no

of

in the first

perceptual. For,

sense-contact which is necessary for such

conceivable in the case instances where a

knowledge

msa,

no

place,

is

Secondly, there of

negation

are

perceivable

of sense is functioning.

Thus a person who did not think of an elephant on a later come to particular day, may morning

at all in the realize,

owing to some circumstance or other, that he did not see knowledge, because it refers to the past, cannot be

then.

it

The

connected with the functioning of the senses at the time of the

realizing functioning viz. the

negation. Nor can it be ascribed since the correlate

to

their

in the

morning, (pratiyogin), was not of then for elephant, by hypothesis thought which to be the its negation apprehended. Again pramana by

negation is the if it is,

there

is

known cannot be

major premise

absence of

of the

knowledge of

brought

under

syllogism a thing,

will there

inference; for,

be 'Wherever

other

is

circumstances being the same absence of the corresponding object/ This as an inducrelates two negations and, premise be based should tive generalization eventually upon perwhich it assumes that their ception, knowledge is perceptual is the contention that it is inference.

The against present

Prabhakaras do not admit

which

this is

pramana, for they do not sole object. They explain

its

recognize

negation

abhava

terms of the positive factors involved in

we

in

shall see in the

next section.

2

it,

as

SV.

p. 479,

st.

18.

PP.

pp.

118-25.

PtJRVA-MlMAMSA

323

III

The Mimarhsaka

a realist, and his realism has some features

is

of its own. Unlike the Sautrantika

and the Vaibhasika,

for

example, he believes in the existence of permanent dravyas are which are the substrata of qualities and not merely So the doctrine of aggregates

far, agrees fleeting sense-data. with the Nyaya-Vaieika. But it differs from that doctrine also to confine our attention first to the Bhafta school

in not

admitting that

recognizing is

the

principle

a

much

its

forms or attributes

brown now, and red hereafter. But tions the same material

modes alone

may

another time into a saucer; it

jar, at

and

appear

and

produced anew, Every dravya

change. The clay that we see before us

be made into a

rila

instead.

change

eternal, and endures however

may

can be

dravya

of

at one time

may be

in all these transforma-

The

persists.

disappear.

1

dravya endures;

In other

words,

its

Kuma-

dismisses the notion that things are self-identical units

which ever remain the same, excluding all difference. 2 This view of with the exhibits in reality kinship Sankhya-Yoga It is parinama-vada, and the relation between the material cause and the effect is, as in the other system, one One of in difference identity (bhedabheda). important difference between the two doctrines is that here the

general.

are

changing dravyas Another difference,

ultimately

by the way,

is

many

in that the

and not

only

one.

Mimamsa

extends the notion of modal transformation to the atman also which

is

absolutely static and passive according to the

other doctrine. The change that characterizes the physical reality is ever in progress. It never began and is never going

to end, the Mimamsaka recognizing no creation (sfti) or dissolution (pralaya) of the universe as a whole.s "There was never a time/ he says, 'when the world was otherwise than now': Na kadacit anidrSam jagat. Individual things, no doubt, come and go; but that is accounted for by the self-evolvent character of reality. Whatever stimulus is

required SV.

3

SV.

pp. 443,

p. 673,

st.

st.

113.

32-3.

Cf. SV. p.

476,

st.

12.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

324 for such

to take place comes from the past karma of the life's pilgrimage at the time. This means the

change

selves that are on

God1 from

abolition of the idea of

strange tenet to be held

par

excellence.

by

the system, which

is

indeed a

a school claiming to be orthodox view in one word, it is

To characterize the whole 2

pure empiricism excepting only one of of a viz. the point, recognition supernatural sphere being and of a revealed which a in

authority through

knowledge of

As regards the other sphere that

attained.

common experience it beats every known to In fact, a at least in one

MJmarhsa,

can be

naturalistic school of thought

standing charge against

history.

the

it

of

stage

of its

growth,

was that

it

3

was thoroughly materialistic in its outlook.

The Mimarhsaka is also a pluralist and believes that variety is at the root of the physical universe.4 The school of Kuma-rila accepts all the nine dravyas known to the NyayaVaiSesika and or

perceptual

to

them,

Time

'5

'sound.

conception of them

its

two more

It adds

is

experience,

viz.

is

more or

less

the same.

abda

tamas or 'darkness' and 6

perceivable, the view being that what sense it no matter through

all

is

acquired, includes a reference to this element. It cannot,

but with apprehended by itself, only along some other object. Other dravyas also are regarded as perceivable the manas which is known be

however,

excepting only

curious that darkness should be regarded to the positive dravya preference Nyaya-Vaisesika which is also with the of view, Prabhakara's,8 equating it absence of light. The reason assigned, viz. that it is character-

mediately

ized

by

.7

It

is

as a

in

colour and

movement which can only be found

in

too naive to appeal to anyone. Salikanatha describes as 'crude/ The statement that it cannot be nega-

dravyas,

tion

is

since

(abhava),

its

it

correlate

supposed

(pratiyogin), 1

The

gods

offerings,

of Indian it is

mythology

explained,

ante. s 4

5

if

*

SV. p.

Cf.

sacrificial

also are repudiated, and are made as there were

4, st.

Cf.

See p. 36

gods.

Yatha sarhdrsyate tatha: SV. p.

552,

st. 29.

10.

Vilaksana-svabhvatvat bhavanam. SD. p. 102.

66.

Mana-meyodaya,

p.

7 Mana-meyodaya, pp. 78-80.

8 PP. pp. 144 ff . ; MSna-meyodayat p. 68.

6

SD.

pp.

45-6.

PORVA-MIMAMSA not thought of wherever darkness

'light,.' is

unconvincing. Of these dravyas, the

325 is

seen

is

equally

four as well as darkness are stated to be of atomic structure and the are as infinite

remaining ones, including

By

ultimate.

'atom' in this

first

and

described

soul,

system should not be understood

the infinitesimal paramanu of the Vaisesika, but the smallest

which

us viz. the experience acquaints with, mote in the sunbeam which corresponds to the tryanuka of the other particle

doctrine.

as

The Vaisesika conception of atom is described but it does not seem to be

purely speculative, From all the atomic 1

rejected.

as

magnitudes may,

altogether

substances, objects

in the

of different

be

Nyaya-Vaisesika,

only the relation between the material cause and the

derived;

effect is here

viewed as bhedabheda or tadatmya ('identity in instead of in accordance with

samavaya

difference'),

Bhatta

belief in

support, of

or

it

as

which

it

were,

categories

the

the

other features

are divisible into three classes guna,

which

jati,

239),

(p.

sat-karya-vada. These dravyas form only of the universe. There are also

with

together

of Kumarila's

karma and

form the four

dravya

system. But

samanya

positive

must be remembered

it

that they are not conceived as entirely distinct from the dravyas

which they belong. The relation between them is one of here of 2 so that the significance 'category' identity in difference, to

not

same

the

as in the

Nyaya-Vaisesika.

includes negation (abhava),

list

also

five

categories

them has already been described and it sufficient for our purpose to state that the notion of the others for the most part like that in the Nyayain

all.

3

The

Kumarila's

and we therefore have

first

is

of

is

is

Vaisesika.

The Prabhakaras accept four more positive categories of which we need refer here only to one, viz. samavaya. Its recognition means

the

difference

entire

rejection

(bhedabheda)

of

the

admitted

relation by

the

of

identity

Bhattas.4

As

in a

consequence substance and attribute, universal and particular, material cause and effect come to be conceived as altogether distinct, and the doctrine does not subscribe 1

3

SV.

Id.

p. 404,

p. 65.

st.

183-4.

2

to

Mdna-meyodaya, 4

pp.

p.

6.

p. 27.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

326

the sat-karya-vada. This signifies a vast difference between the two schools in their conception of reality. While siding

with the Nyaya-Vaiesika in

this respect, the

differ from it in discarding abhava as an

gory,

their view

being

that

can

it

Prabhakaras

independent be

always

cate-

represented

positive something. Thus the absence of a jar in a room

mere

and so

the

its

ception

in the

the forth.

is

empty room; clay; prior negation, the the Amongst eight positive categories recognized, dravyas are nine as also is

as a

1

Nyaya-VaiSesika, and their con-

generally

the same.

IV The admixture

of the rational with the

dogmatic which we

noticed in connection with the theoretical teaching of the Mlmarhsa is equally striking on its practical side. So far as a the doctrine of view ordinary morality goes, adopts point

which is severely secular and explains virtue as a conscious or semi-conscious adjustment of conduct to interest. Sabara says that charitable acts like providing water-huts (prapa), though for the benefit of others and therefore good, are not 2

That is, the Mlmamsa judges conduct by a standard; but it is not egoistic and, as is indicated based the the by very example given by Sabara, is upon

yet dharma. utilitarian

realization of the social nature of

founded upon such a principle

history of that

ethics.

But what

is

man.

A

scheme of morality

not without parallels in the

is

peculiar about the

Mimamsa

is

refuses such morality the highest place in life's ideal. in metaphysics, here also it conceives of another sphere

of

it

activity

whose

significance

is

extra-empirical

and confines

the title of dharma to it alone. Common morality, according an to the affair which none Mimaihsaka, is purely empirical but the short-sighted fail to understand. True spirituality consists in fixing one's attention on dharma or such acts of as lead to success in the It duty li{e bfcyond. may appear that such a shifting of the attention from the present

coming one

will

Cf. SD.

pp.

throw morality 83

ff.

life

into the shade

to the

and thus tend I. iii.

2.

As

PCRVA-MlMAMSA to reduce

its

exclude

founded in

does nothing of the life does

It

Mimamsa, ceremonial

kind. For, as conceived in the

not

man.

value in the eyes of

327

common morality;

it

on the

is,

hand,

other

The Vedas

cleanse not the unrighteous.' 1 not viewed as the ethical is Though highest, purity regarded as a as well as a of it.

necessary accompaniment

pre-condition

The few occasions on which the dictates of common morality seem to be neglected, as for or spiritual

religious

life.

immolation of an animal in a rite, are the the rule. Howthat as explained only exceptions prove ever the of in unconvincing explanation given justification

example in the

these acts,

supports In the

it

should be admitted that generally the Veda

conclusions that are

present case,

to living beings:

for

(p.

an

explicitly

forbids

injury

bhutani.

understood in this unique sense, it naturto make it known

equally unique pramana

That pramana for

109).

ethically quite unexceptionable.

it

Na himsyat sarva

When dharmais ally requires

instance,

2

the Veda.

is

While the standard of that for dharma

is

common morality

human, judgment 'We should Kumarila superhuman. distinguish/ says, 'between what relates to dharma and moksa which is known from the Veda and what relates to artha and kama which is is

learnt

by worldly

human experience but

that

also

adharma,

'3

intercourse.

the

recognized for the purpose

Vaiesika

of

is

no

higher

It

not merely

is

avail

in

faculty

of

in doctrines like the

The

name

common

knowing dharma and yogic

perception

Nyaya-

of

(p. 262). single apurva* (literally meaning 'never before') which Prabhakara gives to dharma and adharma emphasizes their inaccessibility to the other pramanas (manantarapurva). It is conceived by him as

the

result

of

sacrificial

such

arid

other acts

themselves as in the Nyaya-Vaisesika punya and papa

and

not

corresponds

of the other doctrine. But it abides like the

latter in the self

jective leading *

distinguished

it.

Acara-hinam na

VS. 3

(atma-sarnavayi), so that apurva from the feature to be to

iii.

i.

those acts to the

According punanti

Vedah

to Kumarila these forms of :

Quoted

by

Samkara in his com. *

10.

Tantra-vartika,

I. iii.

is

2.

a sub-

objective

4

act

activity

on

Jaimini-sutra, See PP.

I. i.

pp. 187, 195.

2.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

328

dharma and adharma

are themselves

1 the former standing deeds a the latter for or for like permitted obligatory sacrifice, and deeds like an animal or

prohibited

know what

drinking

to seek

killing

it is

;

to

prescribed or prohibited that we have

is

aid of the

there

That,

is

the Veda. is, nothing though transcendental about the acts themselves described as dharma the fact of their the and adharma, being means of a super-

natural good

standpoint

not

is

that

humanly are

they

ascertainable. It

represented

from

is

known

here as

revelation and revelation alone.

The Veda reveals dharma, according

as the

subject

mandate

of a

or

(vidhi

to both

this

through

the schools,

as

niyoga)

something

to be accomplished, in accordance with the Mimarhsa conclusion that action is the final import of the Veda. But they differ

considerably mandate. In

in

view

their

this

fact,

of

question

Mimamsakas into several camps. them all. 3 We shall only note the

2

the motive of the

that

obeying

for

motive has split the

It

is

not necessary to refer to

commonly recognized distinction between the two schools. the not us to the According Bhattas, Veda only acquaints but also with dharma the desirable and adharma, specifies results to be obtained

from the other,

by following the one and abstaining the attainment of some pleasure

avoidance of some pain. In the usual

stoma sacrifice, end;

or

viz.

it

in the case of

example

heaven (svarga) that

is

destroying

life,

it is hell

is

the

of the jyotiheld out as the

(naraka) against

which one

is warned. Thus the Bhatta school, like the NyayaVaisesika (p. 263), believes that pleasure and pain are the only ultimate motives. 'Not even the stupid act/ Kumarila

1

Yagadireva

dharmah: SD.

for a certain resolve which sacrifice

and

is

is

explained

pp. 25-6.

The term

yaga

strictly

stands

the prelude to the performance of a

as

tyaga,

or,

the

spirit

of renunciation

away what belongs to oneself. (Cf. the formula 'no more mine' na mama uttered at the time of the IV. ii. uddisya dravya-tyago yagah (Nyaya-mala-vistara,

involved in

giving

this sense, *

See

dharma would

Tantra-rahasya,

offer.)

27-8).

of course be a characteristic of the subject.

ch. iv.

3 For a fuller discussion of this and allied topics, reference Dr. S. K. Maitra Uni. to Ethics the of Hindus, by (Calcutta

Pr.).

Devatam

In

may

be

{made

329

PpRYA-MlMAttSA in

remarks

a parallel context, 'without some good

in

view/1

But we should not conclude from this that the end is included in the behest and that it commands us either to seek pleasure or to 2

shun pain.

The desire for good

already there

is

in

man, and

Veda merely admits it as a psychological fact on the value of without pronouncing any judgment pleasure the

it in pain. In other words, we have here described as psychological hedonism and not ethical hedonism. But it should be acknowledged that the injunction,

or on the lack of

what

is

in this

the

utilizes

view,

incentive

demur

desire

subjective

make

to

itself

to

by appealing

as

it

The Prabhakaras

operative.

to the admission of a hedonistic aim as necessary for

The to imperative operate.

Veda, they say, 3 is not so helpless as to need an extraneous aid in enforcing its mandatory It neither coaxes nor threatens power. anyone and the only the Vedic

;

motive

presupposes

it

Vedic injunctions

is

like 'one

reverence

should to

all. They are addressed only that desires heaven'

to

for

mandate

the

(svarga-kama) found in them do not point to any benefit

to be derived

by obeying them,

limit the

of its

But

itself.

(yajeta) do no apply and like 'he some, expressions sacrifice'

as the Bhattas

assume, the

but

by specifying set forth.4 In injunctions those will the case of any particular injunction, only respond

only

sphere

persons (niyojya)

whose

applicability

duty

those

who answer

to the description contained in

them

is

to act

(karyata-jiiana), desire that

may

What prompts

it.

this consciousness that it is their

they

and never the

may

have

prospect

duty

of

(ita-sadhanata-jnana).5

The

good or

result therefrom is accordingly looked

a rather than as an end upon as consequence at.

to do so

satisfying

There

is

no doubt that the idea of the

the

evil that

aimed

directly

fruit resulting

ritualistic activity is pushed farther into but for all here than in the other school;

any

from background

practical purposes

the two views are the same, because both alike admit that

an end 1

* 4

*

is

attained

no matter what name they give

Prayojanam anuddisya mandopi pravartate: SV. p. 125, st. 266. na

PP. p.

It

is

p. 653,

SV.

i

viSesana

55.

3

191.

termed here not phala but niyojya-

st.

:

Ibid.,

PP. p. jgi.

it.

NM.

6

The

p. 350.

pp. 177 and

180.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

330

specially important point to note here is the concern which both the schools exhibit to maintain that it is not of the essence

command

of a

contain

to

either

a promise or a from Vedic teaching

threat and the consequent exclusion proper of the idea of recompense, which doubtless constituted originally the sole motive of sacrifices.

We

have

thus

what

considered

far

karmas or

pratisiddha constitute the

are

termed

and forbidden deeds

optional of the sphere hypothetical imperative,

and seen that there

is

(p.

and kamyawhich 108),

practically no difference between the

Bhattas and the Prabhakaras in their attitude towards them.

There

is, however, an important distinction between the two views and it comes out clearly in the case of the third

variety of 'unconditional duties' (nitya- karma) like the regular which after all constiof offering twilight prayers (sandhya), the essential as of the of tute, we shall see, discipline part the Mimaihsa regarded as a darana. In accordance with the

hedonistic basis of conduct accepted in the Bhatta school, these duties also are conceived as serving an end, viz. overadherence to sin coming past (durita-ksaya). Further, by one the that is sure to result sin off them, keeps (pratyavaya) from their neglect. 1 In neither case does their performance but are not without an aim. bring any positive gain, they According to the other school,

such deeds have no conse-

quence whatsoever and are to be performed for their own sake. They are not a means to an end, but are themselves the end.* While

according

in

to the Bhattas dharma even of is

form of nitya-karmas

its

instrumental value, it supreme good, regarding pursues as definitely above artha and kama or empirical motives Here we have a taken in their of totality. conception duty and that in a sense far for school

this

in

it

duty's sake,

the

heart'

Gita,

since

as

only

the

even motives so

and 'subserving the purposes

of

more rigorous than

pure

God

1

as

'cleansing (p.

the

125) are ex-

cluded and the doing of duty is placed on a basis of absolute disinterestedness. The law governing dharma here may there-

SD.

>

p. 130.

Apurva,

in

general,

is

described as

svayam-prayojana-bhuta.

See

Tantra-rahasya, p.

70.

331

PORVA-MlMAfiSA fore be said to

Kant. But

correspond

what,

it

the Prabhakaras,

if

maybe

to the

'categorical imperative'

is

of

the

penalty, according one should disobey such mandates ? The asked,

to

question we shall state in the words of the Tantrarahasya* one of the few published works of the school: reply to

this

The

mood

,

such

personal

as

ending teaches

that

of

the

potential

as a to be accom(lin), you say, apurva duty In that case one not set about it plished. may it, although is known as a duty, because it serves no end.' which are known to 'Even in of

respect

optional deeds,

have an end, one may not act. What

is to

be done? The

function of a pramana ceases with the mere revealing of

its

object/

the failure to optional deeds, perform them means missing their fruit and that is the 'Well,

in the case of the

What

penalty. duties?'

is

the penalty in the case of unconditional

'The Vedic mandate

'What That

will

not then have been carried out/

of that?*

punishment, for obeying the Vedic (puruartha). It is on the analogy of these karmas that we say that carrying out the mandate is the true end even in the case of optional mandate

itself

is

the

itself is of ultimate value

deeds and that the attainment of the so-called phala incidental/

'How can

their

non-accomplishment

punish-ment?'

be

is

itself

the

The good, who praise those that obey the Vedic behest and blame those that do not, will answer that question. Or which feels one's own of conscience, guilty having proved faithless to it, will do so/ The appeal

here,

it

will

be seen,

is first

to the

judgment

of

the better mind of the community and then to the verdict of our own conscience.* But it is conscience not in the sense *

P. 66.

The former

of these

two explanations seems

with the Pr&bhakara ideal; the latter Gita teaching of sattva-uddhi.

ia

hardly

to be

different

more

in

from the

keeping

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

332 that

it

an

is

in

independent guide

from

discriminating right

dharma once known. The communication of what is right or wrong is still left to an external code. The appeal in its we double conceived that form, may add, implies man is but also as a member here not as a wrong, but

when

it

in the sense that it constrains us to follow

is

merely

of a

of

society

In one

spiritual being himself, spiritual beings.

important respect

the

aim

of the

Mimamsa,

clear, should differ from that of the other systems.

it

is

should

It

pursue not the ideal of moksa but dharma, whether as a means to an end or as an end in itself. Such seems to have its aim till a certain stage was reached in the history system. In that early period in the growth of the Mimawere artha and kama

been

msa, only dharma,

human

1

also.

the

accepted

(tri-varga)

and not the fourth one of moksa To speak generally, dharma is still the highest ideal in form has but the doctrine in its

109) as

(p.

of the

Kalpa-sutras

practically

values

present

;

thrown

it

overboard,

and

replaced

it

the ideal

by

moksa. The transformation means the virtual abandon-

of

of many of the rites taught in the Veda. 2 But the of a far more subversive kind in the case of the Prabhakara

ment

school

dharma the

is

than in that of Rumania. The latter conceive of a

as

moksa

means

ideal

for another.

change

If

to

an end and the introduction

means only the substitution

of one

of

end

the old aim was svarga, the attainment of some one of the new one is the apavarga, negative

positive good,

escape from sarhsara. But in dharma as its own

the case of the former, which the of the new end, acceptance cherished ideal means of deserting its principle doing duty and over for its own to the side of the sake, going completely

pursued

Bhattas; for

its

idea of moksa, to judge from Salikanatha's

1 Compare NM. pp. 514 ff; VS. 2 In this connection we may draw attention

later Gita,

exponents replace

single

one of

prakdsa, p.

of the doctrine

111. iv. to the

273).

This

God'

change

is

by

view of some

who, following

their

the

teaching

several

the divergent phakis of the

'pleasing

18.

performance

quite against

the atheistic

thought.

the

by the

(Mimdmsd-nydyaspirit

the Mimarhsa and shows how completely the Gita ideal influenced orthodox

of

karmas of

333

PttRVA-MlMAlVTS* the

trials

We new

and

shall

now

knowledge

of the

of an

seeking

travails of sarhsara.

viz.

end,

upon

laid

down

much use here,

nature

the

of

for its attainment.

Nyaya-Vaisesika conception

release will be of

escape from

1

touch

briefly

and the discipline

ideal

and

also the

is

description,

of

this

Our

bondage

two doctrines

for the

resemble each other in this respect so very much. We may add that almost the same criticism applies to the one ideal as to the other. The self is conceived in the Mimamsa as eternal as a matter of it is conand omnipresent; but, fact,

by various adjuncts which are not at all indis-pensable to it. Its 3 empirical encumbrance is three-fold To which alone it there is the as limited begin with, by physical body or there are the enjoys pain pleasure secondly, organs ditioned

:

;

of sense which are the sole means relating

world

and lastly, there

;

is

to the outside

it

that world

itself so far as it

the object of the individual's experience.

with things other than

that constitutes

itself

means

separation from them Mimamsaka refutes the Vedantic view world is sublated or transcended in release

once that

forms

connection

It is this

bondage, and for

The

all.

the

moksa.

physical Nor does he

admit that the relation between the world and the individual self is unreal as the

the world

when

is

and endures

real

to According him, exactly the same form even

a self becomes free

in

and moksa means only the

;

tion that the relation of the self to sary.

This state with

is

does.

Sarikhya-Yoga

described

it

as

negatively also.

it all

3

realiza-

real is not neces-

though

excluding

There

all

pain to

and along seem, however, pleasure have been one or more interpreters of Kumarila who maintained that it is a state of bliss or ananda.4 It is controverted

by 1

Parthasarathis and a consideration

PP.

pp. 156-7.

This

that the stress laid

glaring

discrepancy

upon dharma

can be

as the ultimate

of

Rumania's remarks6

explained only by supposing

puru-

sartha, or the disinclination to bring duty and pleasure into relation with each other, was a characteristic of an earlier phase of the

Prabhajcara doctrine and that it remains as but a relic in Salikaof natha's exposition of it. For evidence in support of the existence such a see Oriental Research phase, Journal of (Madras) 1930, 2 SD. 3 SD. pp. 99-108. pp. 125. pp. 126-7.

4 5 SD. 6 SV. Mana-meyodaya, pp.

87-9. pp. 127-8. st.

670,

107.

p.

OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

334

in that connection seems to

support him. No such

of opinion seems to have existed in

difference

the case of the other

school. In this condition, all the specific characteristics of the The self is and self such as jnana, pain pleasure disappear. not conscious then even of itself, for the manas has ceased to

Mimamsa

operate. But unlike the Nyaya-Vaiesika, the

of the

Bhatta school maintains that the capacity for manifesting The such features this persists. only advantage gained by deviation from the Nyaya-Vaisesika

consistency advocates

which

is

in

regard

to the

is

the maintenance of

parinama-vada

for the latent capacity to know, to feel or to will

;

to persist in the self then is never

supposed

fested again.

Distinctions like

agreement

with the

mani-

these, moreover, affect

the state attained after death. So far as the condition of the represent is entire

which the school

moka may in this

enlightened

only

be taken there

to

life,

Nyaya-Vaiesika, doctrines, detachment from

As in the other worldly concerns and faith in the teaching are needed here also as Without no serious effort preliminary requirements. them, is

possible towards securing final freedom. The direct means

of release the

deduced from the general Indian

is

Mimamsaka the cause

When to be

karma

shares that

is

belief

the cause of

effect

is

removed, the must necessarily and abstention from karma, the Mimamsaka thinks,

;

should original

which

bondage.

cease

result in restoring the self to automatically The to be abstained karmas from, however,

its

state.

the optional (kamya) and the of the one performance gives rise to some merit; that of the other, to some demerit. are

not

all

but

those

only

prohibited (pratiiddha) types.

They

of

The

are thus a means of renewing bondage and have to be

eschewed by a person that

is

seeking freedom. The third or

should law

the nitya variety of karma, even the seeker after moksa for otherwise he will be the Vedic perform disobeying ;

enjoying

them.

prohibited deeds,

1

That would be

the

only

difference

equivalent

being

to

in

indulging

that while the

first

counts as a sin of omission, the second does is one of

commission. It 1

to

The

is

to avoid

influence of the Gita

nitya-karmas.

is

becoming entangled again

in the

again clear in this restriction of activity

PCRVA-MIMA&SA miseries of samsara as a

335

consequence of such

sin, that

one should

carry on the nitya-karmas. Thus the course of discipline

down

here

forbidden

two-fold:

is

and

deeds,

(2)

abstention from the optional adherence to the

(i)

obligatory ones. In neither case,

anything positive

effected,

it

should be added,

the

conception

is

of

laid

and

there

moka

being

negative in the system, viz. the restoration of the self to its normal condition. As regards the exact part which a knowof the to in ledge self, according Rumania, plays securing freedom, there is some doubt to a owing between discrepancy the Sloka-vdrtika and the Tantra-vartika in that respect. 1 we Without into the of this entering polemics question may knowa Parthasarathi's that state, following ledge of the self or

upon

its

true

interpretation,

more

nature,

is

strictly the insight

a

contributory

born of meditation so that

aid to

freedom,

what is technically described as jnana-karmasamuccaya-vada. The followers of Prabhakara agree in this do not admit ance of in the any purpose performrespect only they Their the call of of nitya-karmas beyond obeying duty. acceptance the need for as a means of the

doctrine

is

;

release, along

jiiana

with the

performance

explicitly stated.

Cf.

PP.

of

unconditional

duties,

is

quite

2

SV.

pp. 669

p. 157-

ff.

and

Tantra-vartika,

I. iii.

25.