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ETHIOPIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE
by Robert Allen Sedler B.A., LLB.
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Published by the Faculty o,f Law Haile Sellassie I· University Addis Ababa
in association witl1 Oxford University Press Addis Ababa 1968
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ETHIOPIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Robert Allen Sedler B.A., LLB . ..,-...i:n_,-
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lished by the Faculty of Law Haile Sellasie I University Addis Ababa
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Copyrigl1t by
Faculty of ·Lavv Haile Sellassie I University
1968
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reserved,
including
the right to reproduce this Book or portio11s thereof in any form
Printed at
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Central Printing Press
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PREFACE
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The pu �pose o.f �his bo?k i � to analyze the process of litigation in Ethiopia and to prov!de a basic text in Civil Procedure for judges, lawyers and students of the law. This book can represent only a beginning. Tl1e Code of Civil Procedure is ��w, and its provi �ions h �ve . ye! to be interpreted by tl1e courts. It may be ant1c1pated tl1at experience will indicate the need for n1odifications and additional provisions. Other con1mentators ma.y disagree witl1 son1e of my interpretations of the Code and some of n1y views on civil procedure in Ethiopia. Time may de monstrate that such interpretations and views are unsound. Indeed the n1ost endur ing value of tl1e book may be that it will stimulate thought and discussion of procedural law and the administration of justice in Ethiopia. It is n1y hope tl1at it will make some small contribution in tl1is area. TJ1e book is organized so as to deal functionally witl1 tl1e 1najor problems of procedure. It does not comment on the Code, article by article, but refers to the articles of the Code and other legislation where relevant. The appropriate provision of the Code, supporting a statement in the text, will always be cited i11 tl1e foot notes. At some places, I have paraphrased the text of the provisions. In otl1ers my statements are based on what I conceive to be tl1e necessary intendment of the applicable Code provisions. Where tl1e matter is subject to interpretation, I have tried to indicate that the particular interpretation is mine and that other interpreta tions are possible. I frequently make reference to and discuss cases that l1ave been decided by cot1rts of other nations with procedural systems similar to that of Ethiopia. The rationale for this method is discussed in Chapter I. As pointed out there, these cases are not cited as ''authority," but are merely illustrative of how procedural questions have been resolved by otl1er courts. The case often will be one that has reached the result which I contend is required under the provisions of the Code that I consider applicable to the particular issue. It is important tl1at the reader distinguish between the following situations: (1) the conclusion I have stated follows from the express language of the Code provision, so that often my statement will merely be a paraphrase of the Code's provision; (2) the conclusion I hav� stated fallows from the necessary intendment of the relevant Code provisions; (3) the con clusion that I have stated is based on my interpretation of the relevant Code • • prov1s1ons. This book is based on my researches durir1g the period from September, 1963, to August, 1966, when it was my good fortune to be a member of the Faculty of Law of Haile Sellassie I University. The text was substantially completed before l left Ethiopia, but some additional work was done after I returned to the Un�ted States. As do all expatriate instructors, I learned a great deal about the practical problems in the administration of justice in Ethiopia from my students. I am also appreciative of the information I received fron1 various members of the Ethiopian Legal Profession, particularly Ato Nirrayo Essayas, Vice-Minist7r of Justice, �to Assefa Liban, then Registrar of the High Court of Ethiopia. During the pre�arat1on of the work, I consulted with practically all of my colleagues on substantive law matters that were relevant to the procedural questions I was discussing. I should like to thank Ato Okba Mikael Walde Yohannes who took charge of proof reading, indexing, etc. My appreciation also to Professors Kenneth R. Redden a11d Norman Singer, who supervise the publication of mant1scripts for the Faculty of Law. V
Since I left Ethiopia before the book was published, much of the editorial work that I should have done had to be done by someone else. Professor Lau rence W. Knowles assumed tl1is thankless task that should have been mine, and I extend to l1im my very real appre�iation. �rofessor �tanley Z. Fisher read every chapter of the manuscript, at great 1nconven1ence to himself, and offered a number of very important suggestions and criticisn1s. He called to my attention various inaccuracies and many points that needed furtl1er clarification. The quality of the final prodt1ct owes much to these efforts, and the reader may join me in expressing gratitude to Professor Fisher. Finally, l could not conclude tl1is Prefac;e without acknowledging the very special contribution of Professor Jan1es C. N. Paul, the fot1nding Dean of the Faculty of Law. It was Dean Paul who invited me to join the Faculty, and his leadership and dedication were a constant source of inspiration to me and my colleagues. It is l1e wl10 n1ust bear a major sl1are of the credit for the success of the Faculty of Law and for any work wl1ich has emanated from it, a very small part of wl1icl1 p1ay be represented by this book. ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER
Lexington, Kentucky, U.S.A. April 1, 1968.
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Summary of Contents Chapter I
It1trod�.ctio11
to
Chapter II
Tl1e
Syste1n
Chapter ID
Jt1risdictio11
Cot1rts
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Chapter IV
Parties & the Di1ue11sions of tl1e Dispute
51
Chapter V
I11stitt1tio11 of the St1it a11d Service of Process
110
Chapter VI
Pleadi11g
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-Chapter VII
Proceecliogs
Chapter VIII
Tl1e Trial
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Chapter IX
Revie-v.1 of Judg111ents
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Ch.apter X
Exect1tion of Decrees
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Chapter XI
Res Jl1dicata & Splitti11g of Claims
319
Chapter XII
Other Procedural
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Jt1dicial of
Civil
Prior
Procedure
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Ethiopia
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M'at. ters
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Table of Contents Title Page Preface Su111lt1ary of Co11te,-1ts Table of Contents Table of Cases Table of Lal-vs c;1ed
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xv xxviii CI-IAPTER I
INTRODUC'fION TO CIVIL PROCDEURE A. Tl1e Nature of Civil Procedure B. CiYil Procedure in Ethiopia: The Civil-Procedure Code of C. The Major Problems of Procedure CI-IAPTER
1 1 2 6
II
TI-IE JlJDICIAL SYSTEM OF ETI-IlOPIA A. Tt1e Cotirts B. I-Iis Imperial Majesty's Cl1ilot
8 8 12
CI-IAPTER ill A.
B. .
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C.
D. E. F.
19 19 19 20
JU.RISDICTION OF co·URTS Judicial Jurisdiction I . General Considerations 2. Natio11ality or Domicile 3. Tl1e Doing of an Act 4. Consent 5. In Rem J11risdiction Material Jurisdiction I . Jurisdictional Limits of Courts 2. Determination of Amount in Controversy 3. Matters Outside the J11risdiction of Courts Local Jurisdiction 1 . The Basic Place of Local Jurisdiction 2. Suits Regarding Contracts 3. S11its For Wrong Done to Persons or Movable Property 4. Suits Involving Immovable Property 5. Suits Upon Several Causes of Action 6. Transfer of Suits Notice Objections to Jurisdiction Conflicts of Jurisdiction
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46 48
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CHAPTER A.
B.
C. D. E.
F. G. H.
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PARTIES AND THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DISPUTE Party Plaintiff and Party Defendant 1. The Real Party in Interest a. Who is the real party in interest b. Substitution of parties c. The interest of the defenda11t 2. Representative Suits a. Suits by legal representative b. Representative class suits Joinder of Parties and Causes of Action: Permissive Joinder 1. Joinder of Cat1ses of Actio11 2. Joinder of Parties a. Joinder of plaintiffs b. Joinder of defendants 3. M.ultiple Parties and Causes of Action Indispensable Pa.rties Mandatory Joinder 1. Wh.o Are Indispensable Parties 2. Joi.nder of Indispensable Parties Third Party Practice 1. Ge11eral Principles 2. Rigl1t to Contributio11 or Indem11ity Interpleader I . Conditions For Interpleader 2. Restricted Actions 3. Procedure in Jnterpleader Inter,'ention I . Intervention by Interested Party 2. Intervention by Public Prosect1tor Rules Relating to Suits Involving Special Classes of Parties Death and Insolvency of Parties 1. Death 2. Insolvency
51 52 52 52 57 59 60 60 62 66 66 69 70 73 78 81 81 85 87 87 88 92 93 94 95 96 96 99 100 104 104 108
CHAPTER V INSTITUTION OF THE SUIT AND SERVICE OF PROCESS A. Institution of Suit and 1-Iierarchy of Service B. Methods of Service C. Lack of Proper Notice CHAPTER
I 10 110 112 117
VI 120 122 122 125
PLEADING A. Technical Requirements 1. Pleadings Generally 2. Alternative Pleading IX
3. 4. B.
The Stateme11ts of Clai1n The Statement of Defe11se
Effect of Failure to Plead 1. Variance 2. Failt1re to Deny
C. Rejecting of Pleadings I. Procedure for Rejection 2. Pleading Jurisdiction 3 . Pleadi11g a Cause of Actio11 a) Pleading facts e11titling the plai11tiff to relief b) Pleadi11g Co11clusions c) Pleading facts 11egating the claim 4. Pleading a Legally St1fficie11t Defe11ce D. Amendment of Pleadings I . Approacl1 to Amendment • 2. Ame11dn1e11ts Necessary to Deter111i11e the Real Qt1estions 111 Dispute 3. Tl1e Proble1n o.f Li111itatio11 a) An1end111e11t by tl1e Plai11tiff b) Substitution of parties c) An1endme11t by the defenda11t 4. A St1111mary E. Con1pulsor:;1 An1endn1ent of Improper Pleadings
127 129 132 132 135 139 139 139 140 140 142
143
144 145 145 149 150 150 154 156
157 158
CI-IAPTEli VII Pl{OCEEDINGS PRIOR TO TRIAL A. The First !{earing 1. No11-appeara11ce a) Actio11 upo11 11on-a1)1)eara11ce b) Effect of 11011-appeara11ce c) St1fficient Cat1se 2. Exami11ation of Parties Objectio11s 3. Preli111inary 4. Fra1ni11g of Isst1es B. Adjudication \-Yitl1out Trial 1 . Agreeme11t on Issue 2. Parties not at Issue 3. Dispositio11 of Issues at tl1e First !{earing C. Compromise and Witl1drawal I . Con1pro1nise 2. Withdrawal of Suit
161
161 l6 1 162
165
168 171 173 176
180 180
181
183 186 186 190
CI-IAPTER VIII
THE TRIAL A. The Production of Evidence B. The Conduct of The Trial I · Order ?f Proceeding 2. Production of Evidence b y the Pa.rties X
194 194 199 199 201
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3. Powers of the Court C. Judgment and Decree
204 208 CHAPTER
IX
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS A. Review in the Court of Rendition 1. Procedural Irregularities 2. Newly Discovered Evidence 3. Opposition
212 212 212 213 216 218 218 221 224 224 225 228 230 232 234 237 237 238 239 245 247 247 248 249 253 254 255 256
B. Review by Appeal to a Higher Court 1. Right of Appeal 2. Interlocutory Appeals 3. Taking the appeal a) Memorandum of Appeal b) Time for appeal c) Cross - objections ·, d) Additional parties e) Stay of execution 4. Grounds of Appeal 5. Procedure on Appeal a) Hearing of parties b) Framing of issues c) Additional evidence d) Review of findings of fact 6. Judgment on Appeal a) Reversal for Substantial error b) Remand c) Powers of appellate Court d) Pronouncing of judgment 7. The Second Appeal 8 . Restitution C. Revision in Chilot CHAPTER X
259 259 A. Jurisdiction in Execution 259 1. Transfer for Execution 262 2. Powers of the Court upon Execution 265 B. Proceedings in Execution 265 I . Application for Execution 265 a) General provisions . . • 267 s ree dec int b) Application by holders of Jo • 268 , s· ee fer ns tra by n tio ica pl c) Ap ··· 270 s ive tat en res rep d an ies ret Su st ain ag n tio d) Applica ' 271 : .. 2. Limitation 273 . 3. Process of Execution . judgment-debtor··· . · 273 · the ri' 'of ti6 a) Receipt of"application an d ex'ilmina 275 · y ne mo t of en ym · pa e r th fo es cre de b) Execution of 278 es re ec s-d os Cr ution of EXECUTION
OF
DECREES
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d) Execution of other decrees 4. Rateable Distribution C. Attachment and Sale I . Attachment a) Methods of attacl1111ent b) Objections to attachment 2. Sale a) General rules b) Sale of movable property c) Sale of immovable property 1 . Special provisions as to the Sale 2. Setti11g aside the Sale 3. Confirmatio11, delivery of possession a11d resista11ce a) Confirmation b) Delivery of possession c) Putting into possession d) S11bsequent Suit
281283 285 286 286 292 295 295 300 303 303 305 311 311 312 313 316
CI-IAPTER XI RES J·unICATA Al\T]) SPLITfING OF CLAIMS A. Judicata I . General Pri11ciples 2. Persons bound a) Parties to st1it b) Persons clain1ing 11nder C parties to prior suits c) Otl1er sit11ations 3. Matter Directly and Substa11tially in Issue 4. Matter ,vhic11 Has Been I-Ieard and Finally Decided a) Iss11es decided by the Court b) Res judicata and issues of. law 5. Scope of Res Judicata a) Matters to be raised b) Relief not granted B. Splitting of Claims I . General Principles 2. Whole of the Clain1 witl1 Respect to the Cause of Action a) Wl1at co11stitutes tl1e whole of the Claim b) Single or multiple causes of action 3. Omitting of Relief
319 319 319 322 322 324 327 328 331 331 335 337 337 342 343 343 347 347 348 354
CHAPTER XII OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS A. Agents and Pleaders B. Arrest and Attachment before Judgment 1. Arrest before Judgment 2. Attachment before Judgment C. Temporary Injunction, Interlocutory Orders and Appointment of Receiv er 1. Temporary Injunctions 2. Appointment of a Receiver ••
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358 358
360 360 362 365 365 370
D. Consolidations of Suit
E. Habeas
Corpus F. Time Provisions and Adjournment G. Security for Costs H. Payment into Court I. Summary and Acceleration Procedures I . Sun1mary Procedure 2. Accelerated Procedure • J. Procedure ID Arbitration K. Costs
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Table of Cases ENGLAND Benecke v. Frost, Qt1een's Bencb, (1876) 90 Buckingham v. Daily News Ltd., Ct. App., Eng., (J 956) 207 BL1Jliva.nt v. Attorney General, House of Lords, Eng., (1901) 125 Chjld v. SteL111ing, Ct., App., Eng., (1877) 77 • Corbett v. Corbett, Hot1se of Lords, Eng., (1953) 241 Duckett v. Gover, Cl1ancery, Eng., (1877) 54 Feyerick v. Ht1bbard, King's Bench, Eng., (1902) 24 Finlay & Co. v. Scott. & So11, Chancery, Eng., (1884) 91 74 Frankenburg v. Great 1-Iorseless Carriage Co., Ct. App., E11g., (1900) 68 Gledl1ill \'. Hunter, Cl1ancery, Eng., (1880) Gray v. Bartholomew, Qt1een's Bench, Eng., (1895) 380 80 Harris and Another v. Asl1\vortl1, Chancery, Eng., (1962) Hugl1es v. Pun1p Hotoge Hotel Co., Ct. App., Eng., (1902) 57 Isaacs v. Hobhouse, King's Bench, Eng., (1919) 242 Jones v. Cory, Bros. & Co., Ltd., Ct. App., Eng., (192.l) 64 Kedford v. Ellis, I-Iouse of Lords, Eng., (1901) 64 Ladd v. Marshall, Ct. App., Eng., (1954) 241, 242 London Association v. Greenlands, Ltd.. Hot1se of Lords, Eng., (19.16) 64 Market & Co. v. Krught Steamship Co., Ct. App., Eng., (1910) 63 Mercantile Marine Service Assoc. v. To1ns., Ct. App., Eng., (1916) 63 Murray v. Epsom Local Board, Chancery, Eng., (1897) J59 Murrietta v. South American Co., Queen's Bencb, Eng., (1893) 94 Oesterreichiescl1 Export v. Britisl1 Indemnity Inst1rance Co. Ltd., Ct. App., Eng., (1914) 75 Oxford & Cambridge Uni\1ersities v. Gill (George & Sons) Chancery, Eng., (1899) 72 Palmer v. Palmer, Queen's Bencl1, E11g., (1892) 124 Padrick v. Scott, Cl1a11cery, Eng., (1876) 69 Payne v. British Tin1e Recorder Co., Ltd. & W.S. Ct1rtish Ltd., Ct. App., Eng., (1921) 76 Rassam v. Budge, Queen's Bencl1, E11g., (1893) 159 Rex v. In1rie, Ct. Crim. App., Eng., (19.17) 205 R.iddell v. Earl of Strathmore, Ct. App., Eng., (1887) 124 Rodger v. Cornptoir d'escompte de Paris, Privy Council, Eng., (1871) 256 Rumbold v. London County Council & Scott, Ct. App., Eng., (1909) 226 Saccharine Corp., Ltd., v. Wild, Ct. App., Eng., (1903) 67 Sanders v. Windsmith, Queen's Bencl1, Eng., (1893) 71 Smith v. Cardiff, Ct. App., Eng., (1953) 63 Spear's Glasswork, Ltd., v. Spear, Chancery, Eng., (1902) 68 Spiller v. Bristol Steam Navigation Cok., Ct. App., Eng., (1884) 91 Stewart v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., Queen's Bench, Eng., (1886) 157 Throp v. Holdsworth, Cl1ancery, Eng., (1876) 130 Tredegar v. Roberts, Ct. App., Eng., (1914) 69 Val de Traverse Aspl1alte Co. v. London Tramways Co. Ltd., Queen's Bench, Eng., (1879) 57 Viscount Gort v. Rowney, Queen's Bench, Eng, (1886) 391 Watson v. Cave, Ct. App., Eng., (1881) 65 Weait & Another v. Jayanbee joinery Ltd., Ct. App., Eng., (1962) 156 Weldon v. Neal, Queen's Bench, Eng., (1880) 151, 152, 153 Wright v. Bennet, Ct. App., Eng., (1948) 344
xv
ETHIOPIA igh Ct., Addis Ababa, Civ. l Ita, Pro nes han Yo o At v. any mp Co g din Tra e otiv Autom 30 , 140 . . Case No. 323-54 (1962) , C1v. dis aba Ad Ab , h Ct. Hig ., Ltd a) itre (Er ti cen Sec n rso Ma a rar Car v. A. Ethiopia S. 25 . Case No. 510-51, (1958) . Addis Ababa Fogstad Wood\vorks Labour Un.ion v. Jacob Fogstad, Sup. Imp. Ct., 32 Civ. App. No. 1381-55 (1963 G.C.) 31 Forti v. Forti, I-Iigh Ct., Addis Ababa Civ. Case No . 174-55 (1963 G.C.) 31 I-Iallock v. I-Iallock, Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, Civ. App. No. 249-50 (195� G.C.) Weizero Jan1anesh Amare v. Ato Teferra Wolde Amanuel, Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, . 31 Civ. App. No. 101-56 (1965 G.C.) A.to Kidane Malakue Tsedek v. The Ministry of Finance, Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 32 Civ. App. No. 57-55, (1963 G.C.) Ato ?vfan1mo Yinberberu v. Ato Yirgu Abebe, High Ct., Addis Ababa, Civ. Case No. 32 454-55 (1963 G.C.) Ato Mcngistou Alernau v. Giorda no Concetta, Sup. ln1p. Ct., Civ. App. No. 1147-54 60, 70, 84 (1963 G.C.) Koospol Foreign Trade Corp. v. Alex Karibian, Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, Civ. App. 22 No. 1135-55 (1963 G.C.) Shatto v. Shatto, Sup. Imp. CL, Addis Ababa, Civ, App. No. 784-56 (1964 G.C.) 31 Tadesse Delncssahou v. Bekeletch, I-Iigl1 Ct., Addis f\baba,Civ. App. No. 759-54 (1962 G.C.) 171 Fevi v. Fevi, Sup. In1p. Ct., Addis Ababa, Civ. ;.\1 Jp. No. 1109-50 (1964 G.C.) 31 INDIA Abdul v. Maryarn, 1-ligh Ct., Rajahstan, India, (1926) Abdul Aziz v. Punhab National Bank, Ltd., I-Iigl1 Ct., Lahore, India, (1929) Abdul Rahman v. Amin, J-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1918) Abdullamiya v. Mohan1edmiya, I-:ligh, Ct. Bon1bay, India, (1949) Adernrna v. Subbamn1a, 1-.ligh Ct., Ivladras, I11dia, (1942) Aden1n1a v. \f aradareddi, Higl1 Ct., l'Yiadras, India . (1948) Adivappa Channappa v. Racappa Balappa, l·Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1948) Ad,vaita v. The Chiltagony Co. Ltd., 1-ligh Ct., Calcutta India (1923) ' Allabhai v. Buhra, I-ligh Ct., Bombay, India, (1937) ' An1ar. v. Sardarni, I-Iigh Ct., Punjab, India, (1960) Am�uJa v. Appadurai, 1-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1912) An11r v. Karan, l -Jigh Ct., Lahore, I11dia, (1927) Ahn1ed v. Lilarm, 1-Iigh Ct., Saurashtra, India, (1942) 1-\mo_delal Bur,van v. Girija Sankar Cbandhury, I-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1942) A.mr1t v. Annapurnan1rne, I-Iigh Ct., Andl1ra Pradesh I11dia ' (1959) Anandapriya v. Bijoy, I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1925) Anant v. Mahlesh,var,_ I-Iigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1930) Anant v. Nagappa, I-I1gh Ct., Bon1bay, I 1 1dia, (1908) Aoaotanarayana v. Savithri, l�Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1913) Anderson v ..Kalayarla, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1886) Appa �- Yenkappa, I-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1930) Ardesh1r v. Usn1an,_ l·ligh qt., Bombay, India, (1929) Arumuga v. Na1nas1vaya� I-I1gh. Ct., Madras, Ind.ia, (1925) Arunachala v. Subbaran11ah, High . Ct., ?vfadras, India, (1923) ArunacbeUam v. A�·unachellan, Privy Council, India, (1889) Asa v. Ganesh, I-I1gh Ct., Lahore, India, (1930) . As�alata Ba�u v: Moo1n dra Nath Basu, High Ct., Calcutta, India ' (1941) Az�n1 v. Ah, I-I1gh Ct., Saurasl1tra, India, (1944) Az1zan v. Matuk Lal, High Ct., Calcutta, India (1894) B.B.C.I.R. v. Sasoon, I-Jjgh Ct., Boo1bay India' (18 Babula! v. Ganpat, . Higl1 Ct., Patn a, India, (1958 94) a_dl M han v. Eliza Jane 1-IiJt, I-IigJ1 Ct., Allah ) abad India (1947) �a1 �aroa� a v. Sl1ankerao Laxmanrao 1-Iigh Ct B om' bay, ia, (1943) ct Ba!�nath v. Moheep High Ct., Calcutta' I� Ba�Ju _v. Thakur, High Ct. Patna l� dia (1889) Ba1sl1r1 Majirajha v M ni I H" 'h dia (i938) Bal Makuoda v. B:N.R��� Jigh �t �� ' Bombay,_ India, (1895) cutta, I1:1dia, (1927) Balaraju v. Masilamony, lligh Ct·, ., Balmakunda v. Beogal-Napur R . Madr�s, India, (1930) Higl1 Ct , �alcutta, India, (1927) Ban Behari v. Bhukan Lal Hig6 c7 . °· ,c a lc ut ta , IJ: id1a, (1933) Banarsi v. Ma.harani lligi1 Ct·, Aii'aha bad, India, (1883) '
in ·
XVI
172 360 363 229 263 391 83 279, 280 231 317 241 171 101 370 146 276 352 269, 270 350 349 315 291 105 169
310 321 297 242 278 97, 277 261 326 154
3 00
317 150 210 363
281 296 269, 270
Banga r v. Ka!!dindi, l-�igh �t., And.bra Pradesh, India, (1956) 261 Banguru v. ViJayan1achi, Hig!1 Ct., Madras, India, (1889) 331 Bank: of Benga! v. Lucas, _High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1924) 240 Ct., Bans�dhar v. Sita Ram, J:I.1gh Allaha bad, India, (1900) . 234 BaraJabala v. �urud�s, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1906) 3:15 h H1 Sm1�t, Ct., Allahabad, India, (1891) Basdeo v. � 247 High Ct., H1ra, v. Allal1abad, India, (1932) Bashar at 71 Basiran1 v. Kattya:yani, fligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (191 I) 364 Bebari v. Ram, High Ct., Allahabad, India (1949) 338 Bel�ari Lal v. Srim�ti B�rao, Higl� Ct., AUdhabad, India, (1895) 192 Beliram v. Chaudhr1, Privy Council, India, (1948) 320 Bengal-Napur Ry. v. Behari Lal, High Ct., Calcutta, India (1925) 249 Beresford __ v. Ramasubb�, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1890) ' 62 H1gh C:t,, Bon1bay, India, (1922) Bhaa DaJi v. Patlu, 349 Bhagavandas v. Abdul �usein, I-Iigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1897) 288 Bhagwan v. �w��ka, _ l-ligh Ct., Saurashtra, India, (1948) 292 Bhagwan v. H1ra.i1, l-l1gh Ct., Bombay, India (1932) 266 Bhim v. Sarwan, High Ct., Calcutta, India,' (1889) 308 Bhola v. Madl10, High_ Ct., Nagpur, India, (1928) 294 Bholanath v. Hara, Privy Council, India, (1932) 315 Bhuklal v. Ramdayal, _High Ct., Patna, India, (1952) 314 Bbullan v. Dasrath, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1929) 19 3 Bhura Mal v. Har Kisl1an Das, Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad, India' (1902) 167 Bilasirai v. Cursondas, High Ct., Bombay, l11dia, (1919) 170 Bilasra.i v. Durgadutt, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1956) 268 Bimala v. Khoka, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1951) 149 Birendra Nath v. Purna Chand, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1938) 283 Bis\va Kesan Ramanju Dass v. Krishna CI1andra, High Ct., Orissa, India, (1951) 255 Bireswar v. Pancl1 Kouri, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1922) 310 Biru �ahata v. Shyama Cl1urn, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1895) 26--1 Bisl1esbar Das v. Ambika, High Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1915) 364 Brij Gopal v. Masuda, 1-:ligh Ct., Orissa, l11dia, (1935) 380 Brij Indar v. Jai Indar, Privy Council, India, (1932) 372 C. J. Phillips v. A. E. Mitchell, High Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1932) 339 C. T. K. M. S. R.. M. Chettyar Firm v. 0 .A. P. K. C. J. Cl1ettyar Firm, I-Iigl1 Ct., Rangoon, India, (1933) 382 Chajmal Lal v. DJ1aram, HiglJ Ct., Alla.habad, India, (1902) 280 371 Chanditatd v. Padmanand, High C., Calcutta, India, (1895) Chandra Kumar v. Sandl1yaman.i, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1909) 109 71 Cbandulal v. Dagdu, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1925) 239 ChanduJal v. Lakhmi Chand, High Ct., La.bore, India, (1921) 251 Charu Bala v. Nihar Kumari, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1927) 101 Cbaudhari Alma Ram v. Mian Umar, High Ct., Lahore, India, (1940) 377 Chettiar v. C., High Ct., Madras, India, (1938) 35 5 Chhabit Das v. Massu, High Ct., Patna, India, (1914) 95 Chbagnalal v. B. B. C. I. R., High Ct., Bombay, India, (1914) 67 Chidambara v. Ramasami, High Ct., Madras, India, (1882) 269 Chimanlal Hargovindas v.. Gulamali, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1945) 272 Ch.innan v. Manager, High Ct., Madras, India, (1949) 66 Cbinta.haran v. · Gt1jaraddi, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1951) 312 Chockalingam Cl1ettiar v. Lakshmana-Chettiar, High Ct., Madras, India, (1945) 231 Chokalignam v. Seethai, Privy Council, India, (1927) 272 Chowdhry Paroosh Ram v. Kali, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1890) 277, 305, 311 Chowdhuri Abdul Subhan v� Kanti Ramanna, High Ct., Madras, India, (1945) 108 Chuni Lal v. Amin Chand, High Ct., Lahore, India, (1933) 284 Chunni Lal v. Jugal Kishore, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1905) . . 283 Co-operative Society, Central Bank Daryapur v. Ganpat, Rig? Ct., Nagpur, Ind.ta, (1935) 74 Corporation of Culcatta v. Radha, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1952) 42 Crisp v. Watson, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1893) 365 Daily Gazette Press, Ltd. v. Karachimun, High Ct., . Saurashtra, India, (1930) 348 Dampanaboyina v. Add.ala, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1902) 262 Darsan v. Baldeo, High Ct., Patna, India� (1946). 108 Daya Singh v. Buta Singh, High Ct., PunJab, ln ?1a, (1916) 155 Davies v. Elsby Bros., High Ct., Rangoo1_1, India, (1936) 190 6) (192 ia, Ind ad, l1ab Alla Debi v. Porbhu, High Ct., 166 Debi Bakhsh v. Habib Shah, Privy Council, India, �1913) 312 43) (19 ia, Ind ta, cut Cal , Ct. hDebi Prasad v. Satischandra, I-Iig ••
XVJI
9) 88 (1 a, di In y, ba m B? t., C h ig H , oa sb _ , India, (!883) Dl1anjibhoy v. Li tta lcu Ca D li aram Singl1 v. Kisben Singh, Jf1gh <;t.,1 <;t 45) (19 a, di In , ay mb Bo ., gl H1 , nt wa l Ba an om W Dllondo Khando v. ) 97 (18 a,_ di In , tta cu l Ca ., Ct igh I-l a, dh Ra v. D horoney ) 47 (19 _ ia, Ind , tna Pa ., Ct h ig l I, ari eh njb Ku v. Dilorana 14) Dino Natl1 v. Jogendra, 1-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (19 Dominion v. Bl1ikraj, High Ct., �atn�, India, (f 957) ia, (1879) Doorga Persad v. Doorga Knwar1, Privy Cou?c1I, Ind Draksharam v. Gunda, Jligh Ct., Madras, India, (1926) Duncan v. Jeetmull, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1892) . Dundappa v. An11aji, Higl 1 Ct., Born�ay, India, (1952) Duraiswami v. Dindigal U.C. Bank, Hig h Ct., Madras, India, (1957) Durga v. Ramrati, I-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, India, (19?7) Du.rga Das v. Dewarj, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1906) Durga Das v. Nahn Chandra, I-ligh Ct., Cal cutta, ln�a, (1934) Dwarka v. Municipal Board, I I- igh Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1958) Dv,arkanath v. Ramcl1and, lligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1899) Dwijsh Chandra Roy v. Naresh Chandra Gupta, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1945) Ebrahim v. Cherian, l-Iigl1 Ct., Travan-Core, India, (1956) Ekram v. I-lol dhur, 1-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1873) Errikulappa v. The Official Assignee, I-Iigh Ct., Madras. India, (1916) Esv1ariab v. Rameswarayya, High Ct., Madras. India, (1940) Fasabat v. Board of Review, Hig h Ct., Allahabad, India, (1957) Fateh v. Dai1n, I-Iigh Ct., Lahore, India, (1927) Faleh v. Nandlal , l-ligh Ct., Rajasthan, India, (1961) Fatn1abai v. Aishabai, I-ligh Ct., Bon1bay, I11dia, (1889) Fir111 Ran1 I<ishun Shah Jtwari Sahu v. Jamuna Prasad, High Ct., Patna, India, (1951) Firm Srinivas v. Mahabir, Sup. Ct., India, (1951) Fran1ji v. I-Iorn1 asji, High Ct., Bombay, I11dia, (1878) Gailu v. Lakha Singl1, 1-Iigh Ct., Orissa, India, (1935) Gajraj v. Suraj, I-Iigh Ct., Orissa, India, (1948) Ganapathy v. Krish11 an1achariar, Privy Council, India, (1917) Ganapati v. Subraya, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1935) Ganesh v. Baikuntbesh , I-Iigh Ct., Patna, India, (1954) Ganesh Ran1chandra v. Gopal Laksh1nan, I-Iigl1 Ct., Bombay, India' (1943) Ganeshi :· K.11airati, I-ligl1 Ct., Allah abad, India, (1894) Ganga �1shan v. Murree !3re\very Co., High Ct., Lah ore, India, (1928) GangaraJu v. Venkata, I I- 1gh Ct., Madras, India, (1942) Ge�reeb�lla v. Ch_u1:1dun1 . I<.unt, l-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1885) GeJuralh v. Moh1d1n, I-I.1gh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1932) Genesh v. Jewach, Privy Council, India, (1904) Genu v. Sak.baram, I-Iigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1898) Ghansl1um v. Moroba, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1894) Ghar:y v. Gowrya, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1922) Ghasi Ram �- l\1aogal Cha_nd, I�igl1 Ct., Allal 1aband Idia, (1906) G!1�lan1 Kadir v. Mus_ta Kim, High Ct., All al1abad, India, (1896) G1r1sh Chan�er v. . Sas1 S�khareswar, Hig h Ct., Calcutta, India, (1906) Glulam Kad1r Sahib v._ V1s!1wanthayyar, I-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1943) Gob�rdban v. Makund1, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1928) Gob1nd v. Taruck, High Ct,. Calcutta India (1878) Gocul v. Ganesh, H!gh Ct., Bombay, india, (1880) Goculdas M��ufa�tur1�g Co. v. Scott, I-Iigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1892) Gok11 al v. I_(ish or1, High Ct., Lahore, India, (1941) Gopal�as H1rala� v. �al1adu Dagdu, I-Iigh Ct., Bomb ay, India, (1943) GopalJi v. Samr1t, H1gl1 Ct., �atna, India, (1932 Gopee La� v. Chu�draolee,_ Privy Council , Indi ) a, (1872) GoshV:'aral1 v. Adh1klal , High Ct., Patna, In di (1947) 1 oney y. Guru Pershad, H igh Ct., Caal�utta , India, (1885) �� ull k u Govindanath �n �� ;�ja 1;e�a: �� ��.,m� �ulilck , �igl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1943) a ras, l ndia, (1950) . Gowri Koer v A db Koe.�,' Hig h Ct., Calcutta, India, (1884) Guddappa v. Tirk�. -, B mbay, India, (!901) Gulab Singh v. Kish�!' � h � Lah o India, (1934) Gunga v. Tiluckram, Privy Coun : . !l I!ct·ia,_ ( l :s) . Gur Prasad v. Gur Prasad ,J ' t.d Oriss!l, India, (1944) ,H.abib v. Baldeo High ct' H h � Habib-ullah v . L�l ta Prasad' H h a a , India, (1901) ' i\ g Ct., Allahabad, India, (19 12)
g�:�
s1!!�
•••
XVlll
233 232 252 369 166 255 132 340 342 349
284
94 242 282 362 286 323 204 324 329, 333 364 237 308 233 210 343 366 134 302 293 171 263 311 161 345 191 391 216 64 63 68 298 391 276 294 236 231 219 295 322 114 181 260 362 276 150 338 368 307
73 335 340 311 172 332 239 249
Han�appa Shiddapl?a v. Ningappa Rangappa, High Ct., Bombay, India, (194�) • 272 Han1f v. Kulsam, High Ct_., Bombay, India, (1922) 379 '' , •- ' Hanmant v. Subbabhat, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1899) 278 Har Swarup v. Anand Swarup, High Ct., Allahabad India (1942) 332, 348 Hara Chandra v. Begin, High Ct., Calcutta, India (1911) ' 320 ' Har�hag\van v. Ra�unatb, I-Iigh Ct., Saurasl1tra, 'India, (1940) 263 Hart v. Chandra, High Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1908) 115 Har! Das v. Natiot?- al Insurance Co., I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1931) 260 Har� Prasad v. �al1ff Sn1all C�use C?urt, Higl1 Ct., Rajasthan, India, (1941) 286 Har�bans v. National St1gar �ills, High Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1933) . 370 Har�cl1aran v. Kedarnatb, I-I1gh Ct., Calctttta, India, (1931) 290 Har�dra Nath v. . BI1o!a Nath, I-Iigl1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1937) 307 Har1ram v. Lalba1, H1gl1 Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1902) 379 Harn�m v._ Muhammad, H �g�1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1905) 264 Ha.shim Ali K11an, v. Hanucl1 Begun1, 1-ligh Ct. Calct1tta India (1942) 294 Hasso!-1 Arra v_. Ja,va�ooru1issa, I-ligh Ct., Calct1tta, India,' (1897) 283 Hawkrn � v. Misra, I-l1gl1 Ct., Nagpt1r, India, (1952) 197 ', I , Hemanginee v. Kyumode Cl1ander, I-Iigb Ct., Calcutta, India, (1899) 371 Hik:matulla v. Imam Ali, HjgJ1 Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1890) 348 292 Himatram v. Khu.shat, I-ligl1 Ct., Bombay, India, (1894) IDrabi Gendalal v. Bhagiratl1 Ramcl1andra, I-Iigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1945) 247 Hiralal Murarka v. Mangtulal Bajoria, Higl1 Ct., Calcutia, Inrua, (1944) . 334 ; ... 1-Iiralel v. Loonkran, Sup. Ct., India, (1962) 371 • 241 Hriday v. Rajaoi, High Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1923) 267 Hurris:h Chunder, v. Kalisunderi, Privy Cou.ncil, India, (1883) ,, 357 Thandt1 v. Ruldi, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1937) 311 lnre Vina.yak Nara�1an, Higl1 Ct., Bombay, India, (1900) 263 Isl1an Chunder v. Beni Madhub, High Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1897) 322 Isup Ali v. Cour Chandra, High Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1923) 278 lswar Chandra v. Haris Cl1andra, High Ct., Ca.lcutta, India, (1898) 204 Jadu v. Bhabataran, Privy Council, India, (1890) • 326 Jagannadbam v. Venkatasubha, Rao High Ct., Madras, India, (1927) , 229 Jai Gopal v. Muna Lal, High Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1923) 304 Jaibal1adur v. Matukdhari, High Ct., Patna, India, (1923) 370 Jaikisondas v. Zenabai, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1890) 314 Jairam v. Nowroji, High Ct., Bombay, Indja, (1921) •• 69 Janarda.n v. Jankibati, High Ct., Patna, India, (1917) 261 Janendra v. Rabindra, Privy Council, India, (1932) 271 Jang Babadur v. Bank of Upper India, Privy Council, India, (1928) 215 Jankiram Co. v. Cbunilal Shivram, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1944) 274 Jaswalla v. Amulya, I-ligl1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1940' Jatindra Nath Roy Cbowdht1ry v. Heramba Chandra Roy Chowdhury, High Ct., Ca�cutta, 273 India, (1945) 251 Jawal1ar Bano v. Sbujaat Hussain, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1921) 343 Jiban v. Durga, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1894) 27.2 Jit Mal v. Jwala Prasad, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1899) 81 Jivandas v. Narbada, Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1959) 261 Jnanendra v. Rabindra, Privy Cou.ncil India, (1933) . '.. 210 ) (1949 , Jogddish v. Brajendra, High Ct., Calcutta, India 371 Jogendra v. Debendra, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1899) 323 Joy Chand v. Dolegobinda, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1944) 363 . . Jyotish Cl1andra v. Har Chandra, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1928) 360 Jwala Devi v. Bhrigunath, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1944) • 369 7) (193 a, Indi a, K. L. & S. Co. v. Secretary of State, Higl1 Ct., Patn 317 (1945) Kaleswar Mills Ltd. v. A. P. Govindaswami Naicker, High Ct., Madras, India, • 231 ·9) Kali Dayal v. Nagendra, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (191 63 Kalish v. Goswami, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1950) ' 328 1) (188 ia, Ind a, cutt Cal Ct., h Hig r, nde Chu r al nku Gop v. Kalisha 250 Kalka v. Barish, High Ct., Allahabad, li?dia, (1957) 164 6) (192 ia, Ind tra, rash , Sau Ct., KalJa v. Shivji, High _ 263 • • 1932) ia, Ind s, dra • � K.alu v. Tband.avan, 1Iigh Ct., Ma .. _ia, (1934) 27.6 Kalyanji v. Dharamsi, High Ct., Bombay, Ind •, 103 46) (19 ia, Ind na, Pat , Ct. h Hig gh, Sin ar shw Kamani Debi v. Sir K.ame 328 .. .. ' 46) (19 ia, Ind na, Pat , Ct. h Hig ar an, v. Baw Kamcharit • • • 3 39 . . ) 945 ( ia, Ind na, Pat , � Kameshwar v. Nebi, High Ct. . 94) 193 (18 1a, In , tta , lcu Ca � , Ct. · · . " 295 Kamini, v. Ramnath, High • ..T • ;. J Kandadai v. Ragbava, High Ct., Madras, India, (1943) •
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XlX
...
•
1
•
•
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•
Kangasabhai v. Poornathamrnal, !"ligh Ct., . Madras,_ Ind ia, (1947) Kanha iya v. Secretary of State, High Ct., Or1sa, India, _(1947) Kanhiya Lal v. Ashraf K.11 an, I-Jigh Ct.,_ Allah_abad, India, (1924) Kannatbal Achi v. Vaduganathan Cbett1�r, H1�h Ct., Madras, lndi�, (1944) Kanriatbal Acbil v. Vaduganathan Chett1ar, High Ct., _Madras, India, (1945) Kannu Swami v. Jagatha,n1bal, H igh Ct., Madras, India, (1918) Karam v. Tailor, High Ct., Lahore, India, (1929) Kashi v. Ram, I-Iigl1 Ct., Nagpur, India, (1948) Kashinatl1 v. Natl1 00, 1:Jigh Ct., Bombay, India, (1914) Kathersa Rowther v. Abdul Rah i m, 1-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1942) Kedar Nath v. Sheo Shankar, 1 l- igh Ct., Allahabad, India, (1923) Kedarwat i v. Radhey Lal, I-Iigh Ct., Patna, India, (1937) Keshab v. Manirudin, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1908) Keshavlal v. Balbhai, Sup. Ct., India, (1958) Keshavlal v. Sakliidas, l{igh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1933) Kesri Chand v. Natio11al Jute Mills Co., 1-figh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1913) Khad i m v. Abdur, I-ligl1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1956) Khardal1 Co. Ltd. v. Durga Charan, I-I igh Ct., Calct1tta, Ind ia, (1909) Kl1udu v. Bbin1, I-l igb Ct., Patna, India, (1950) !Chulna Loan Co. v. Jnanendranath, Privy Council, India, (1917) I<.iran Singl1 v. Chaman, Sup. Ct., India, (1954) Kisa,ndas v. Rachappa, I-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1909) Kishore v. Chunder, l·Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1887) Kishore v. Gisborne & Co., l'-l i gl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1890) Kripa v. Maogal, I{� igh Ct., Allahabad, India, (1922) l(rishna v. Nripendra, I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1933) Krishna Pershad v. Motichand, Privy Council, India, (1913) Krishna Prasad v. Ma Aga, I-Iigh Ct., Rangoon, India, (1936) Krishnaj i v. Madhusa, I-Iigh Ct., Bo1nbay, India, (1934) J(ristna1na v. Mangan1 n1al, I-:ligh CL, l'v1adras, India, (1903) Kunl1i v. l(utti, l·figh Ct., Madras, India, (1897) J(uppana v. J(umara, H igh Ct., Madras, India, (1911) J(uppus\va,n i v. Singaravelu, I-Iigh Ct., Ivladras, I11dia, (1923) Kuppus,van1y v. Comn1ander, I-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1939) Lachn1an v. Jarbundan, J-fjgh Ct., Allahabad, Ind ia, (1928) Lackshn1an Chandra v. Ramdas Modal, I-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1929) Lakshmi Narayan Khatni v. Gopal Lal Pathak, l-Jigh Ct., Patna, Ind ia, (1943) Lalbu Bai v. N1ohan, I-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1925) Lalta P�asad v. Ram Kara11, High Ct., Bon1bay, Iudia, (1919) Lasa Din v. Guiab Kunwar, Pri vy Council, India, (1932) Lat i fannessa v. Alin1ulla, I-Iigh Ct., Patna, India, (1929) Luckumsye v. Fazulla, l-ligh Ct., Bon1 bay, Ind ia, (1881) Madan Mohan v. H?llovi1_ay, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1886) Madho �as v. Ran1J1, High Ct., Allahabad, Ind ia, (1894) :r,.1adhuba 1 v. An1thalal, I-Iigh Ct., Bo1nbay, India, (1946) Madhu�dun v. Brae, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1889) Mahabir v. Collector of Allahabad, I-Iigl1 Ct. Allahabad Ind ia' (1914) ' Mahab�r v. R., High Ct., Patna, I11 dia, (1940) Mahabir Pershad v. Macnaghten Pri vy Council In d,ia ' (1889) Mahadeo v . Brij, Chief Ct., Ondh, Ind ia, (1946) Mahalaksh_m1. v. �ammi, I-ligl1 Ct., Orisa, Ind ia, (19 Mah�nand1 Redd1 v. Venkatappa I-ligh Ct. Madr 58) as Ind ia (1941) l\1ah1ndra v. Aswinj, I-Ii gh Ct.,' Calcutta, in ia, (1920) ' ahon1ed K�an Bahadur v. Mal1on1ed Munadwa r, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India (1903) �a!10n1ed Mir� Rav�ther v. Savasi Vijaya Raghunatha, Privy Counci·' l India, (1900) MaJor v. Nabm, I-l1gl1 Ct., Calcutta, In a�han Lal v. B�ldeo Pra�ad, I-Iigh Ct.,d.ia, (1931) Allahabad, India, (1938) �akund_ v. Bahar1 Lal, High Ct., Allahabad, Ind ia (1881) Makui1d 1 v. Pa�bhu, . Higl1 Ct., Alla Malaya v. Fakir, ll1gh Ct., Calcu habad, India, (1926) Malchand v. Osman, High Ct., C tta India (1947) alc�tta, I�dia (1923) v �:�:�i sar: ney �haoci, .High Ct., Rajastl1an, I11dia, (1959) su enkataswami, H i_gl1 Ct., Madras, Manavedan ; �ee�a::; ��� India, (1943) � g t. ' , M i ad _ras, India , (1939) Manibai Gulahchand Su Manilal v. Gulam Hu;�in �f�a�f' �rivy Coun c�, India, (1948) bay, India, (1889) Manila! v. Sardar, Sup. Ct. , India;' (l�5 �)
xx
315, 316 179 340 299 299 192
277
164
355
346 329 284 321
237 356 163 267
191, 349 212
273
261 154 312
168
34
308
310
155
237
272
239 313 107 63 288 264 273 264 170 351
195 75
77
288 205 329 216
287
340
317
332
268
391
276
309
250
311 247
166
321 189 33
206 63
242 170 308
Manila! v. Venkata, High Ct., Madras, India, (1943) 37 Manmohan v. Msst. Ran1edi, Privy Council, India, (1931) 173 .Nlannibi v. Can1bat;a &_ Co., High Ct., Nagpur, l11dia, (1948) 41 Manohar v. Parwati, High Ct., Nagpur, India, (1953) 191 Maruda�ayagan1 v. Mnika �asak�m, _Privy Council, India, (1945) 308 v. Lakshm1}?atl11, High ddappa Ct., Maysore, Indi, (1950) 1Vlarulas1_ 273 Mata Din v. Jamn � Das, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1905) 249 High Ct., Kota, v. Madras, India, Maturi (1905) 41 Maung Ba.n Gyi v. Ma N�wo Bon, Higl1 Ct., Rangoon, India, (1929) 256 Mawazzall? v. Sheb�h, I-I_1gh Ct., Calcutta, I11dia, (1927) 369 Mayadhar! v. Ch_urulal, High �t., Lahore, India, (1931) 198 Meenaks�1 v. Ch1dambram, !"f1gl1 Ct., _ Madras, India, (1947) 261 Ivtehbunn1ssa v. Meh�edunn1ssa, H1gl1 Ct., Bombay, I11dia, (1924) 277 Ivlg Ba v. U Tok, High Ct., Rajast11an, India, (1937) 313 Za. mindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresl1 Narayan Roy, Privy Council India (1924) Ivtidnaptlr 332, 334 ' ' l Miller v. Mad. 10 Das, Privy Council, India, (1896) 204 Misrilal v. Sobhachand, l-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1956) 189 Mohamed Baclsha v. Nicol, I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1879) 91 Mohan1ed Buksh v. Hooseini, Privy Council, India, (1888) 178 Mohamed Harnidulla v. Toburennissa Bibi, Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1898) 167 Mohamed Khan Babadur v. Mohamed Munawar, High Ct., Madras ' India ' (1903) 277 Mohana-velu v. Amnarnalai, High Ct., Madras, India, (1923) 82 Mohideen v. TinneveUy Co. Ltd., High Ct., Madras, India, (1928) 301 Monomobini v. Nara Narayan Roy, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1899) 168 Moti Laul v. Bh,vaani, I-ligb Ct., Calcutta, India, (1902) 308 Motilal v. PuJchand, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1924) 298 Mrituntoy Das v. Sm Sabitrimoni Dasi, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1950) 252 Msst. Afzala.nnissa v. Fayazuddin, Higl1 Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1931) 340 Muhammad Payaz v. KalJu Singh, High Ct., Allal1abad, India, (191 I) 357 Muhammad v. Mahmt1d-un-Nissa, Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1916) 240 Muhammad Hafiz v. Muhammad Zakariya, Privy Cot1nci1, India, (1922) 344, 347, 355 Mul1amn1ed Ibrahim v. Umatullal1 Jan, I-ligh Ct., Pu11jab, India, (1917) 178 Mu.hammad Kasim v. Rukia Begam, High Ct., AlJal1abad, India, (1919) 263 Mukba v. Ranchariter, High Ct., Patna, I11dia, (1956) 166 Mullick v. Ganga, High Ct., Patna, India, (1925) 222 Multan Chand v. Bank of Madras, l-ligl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1904) 287 Mundrika Singh v. Nadnlal Singh, I-Iigh Ct., Patna, India, (1941) 306 Munni Babu v. Kunwar Ka1nta, High Ct., Allal1abad, Inclia, (1923) 356 Munni Bibi v. Tirloki Natl1, Privy Cot1ncil, I11dia, (1931) 324 Munsl1i Ram v. Radba, Higl1 Ct., Lahore, India, (1924) 108 Murti v. Bhola Ram, Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1894) 345 Mussammat Janakbati v. Maharajadhiraj, Higl1 Ct., Patna, India, (1921) 298 378 Mussamat Hafizan v. Abdul Karim, Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1908) 66 Muthu v. Appavoo, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1943) 305 Muthu Kurnarasami v. Mt1tht1sami, High Ct., Madras, India, (1927) 383 Muthukarupan v. Habib, High Ct., Madras, I11dia, (1955) 351 Naba Kumar v. Radl1as Ryam, Privy Council, India, (1931) 279 Nagar Mal v. Ram Cl1and, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1911) 218 Nagendra v. Suresh, Privy Council, India, (1932) 266 Nambudirpad v. Kooda]ur, High Ct., Madras, India, (1945) 297, 308 Nana Kumar v. Golam Cl1under, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1891) 365 Nanabl1ai v. Janard]1an, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1888) 307 Naranappier v. Chedambaram, High Ct., Madras, India, (1932) 240, 243 Narasim.ha v. Hayat, High Ct., Madras, India, (1940) 265 Narsidas v. Manharsingl1, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1930) 64 Natahar Saswal v. I<rishna Chandra Bera, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1942) 260 Nehar v. Anath, High Ct., Patna, India, (1956) 362 Nowroji v. Deccan Bank, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1921) 333 Nundo v. Bidhoo, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1886) 192 Nunusingh v. Muni, High Ct., Patna, India, (19?4) 367 Nusserwanji v. Gordon, High Ct., Bombay, I1_1d1a, �1882) 307 Official Receiver of Ramnad v. Veerappa Chett1ar, High Ct., Madras, India, (1943) 291 OhnMg v. M.a Mya, High Ct., Rajasthan, India, (1933) 102 Orde v. Deacon, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1952) 170 The Oriental Corp. v. The Mercantile Corp., High Ct., Bombay, Ind,a, (1866) 219 Pakruniss a v. Izarus, Privy Council, India, (1921) 231 Palacherla v. Mallipudi, High Ct., Andhar Pradesh, India, (1958) XXl
907) (1 a, di I� y, ba m Bo t., C l1 ig H i, ba ra nd Panachand v. Su a, (1933) ?1 ln y, ba n1 Bo t., C h ig H d, n a. ch an at R v. Panaji (1_941) a, di In , tta cu al C t., C h ig t, H ra Sa v. an Pa.ncban (1961) a, di In , ta ut alc C t., C . igh H a, nd pa ra Ta v. n Panchana 6) 91 (! , dia I� , ar. mb ?:3o t., C igh H d, vin Go v. .., Bombay, India, (1943) Pandurang Ct igh _H , rm Fi Pannaji Devichand Firm v. LakkaJ1 DalaJ1 , (1920) Parmsehri Das v. Fakiria, High Ct., Lal1ore, India ) 31 (�9 , dia In , cil un Co ivy Pr , an oh ln1 Lo v. tim rso Pa 48) (19 , d1a � , tia lcu Ca ., Ct gl1 Hi ti, pa ha Us v. ti pa shu Pa Pathak v. Renuka, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1959) Payanna v. Pa na Lana, Privy Council, In�ia, (1914) Peary v. A.n1bica, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1897) Perumal v. Kndamna, High Ct., Madras, India, (1939) Peru111al v. Kottaya, Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1946) Pestonjee v. lvlirza, I-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, Ii1dia, (1878) Pestonji v. Jamesdji, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1926) Phani v. P., I-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1957) Phani Bhusen, v. Rajendra, I-ligb Ct. Calcutta, India, (1947) Pitchi v. Bharata, l-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1924) Prannath v. Mal1adayal, High Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1932) Pren1sukh Das v. Satyanarai11 Si11gh, I-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, I11dia, (1945) Prenoath v. Bisnalh, I-ligh Ct., Allahabad, India, (1907) Priihv,i v. Oranba, I-Iigh Ct., Patna, 1I1dia, (1949) Probhat v. I-lari, l·Iigh Ct., Calcut!a, India, (1916) Pudn1anund v. Chundi Oat, I-Jigl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1896) Punjab National Bank v. Official Receiver, I-Iigh Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1940) Purshotan1 v. I·Iargu, I-Iigh Ct., Alla.habad, India, (1921) Pyari v. I(edaorath, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1899) Raclha Kishcn v. Radha Prasad, I-!igh Ct., Calct1tta, India, (1891) Raghavayya v. Cbamaria, I-Iigh Ct., Andl1ra Pradesh, India (1957) Raghubar v. Jv.,ala, I-Iigh Ct., Allahabad, I11dia, (1903) Rai Radha Krishna v. Bisheshar Sahay, Privy Cotmcil, India, (1922) Raj Chandra v. l{ali, I-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1922) Raja Joyt v. Jadu, High Ct., Calcutta, fudia, (1921) Rajbana v. Askaran, I--ligh Ct., Patna India, (1921) Rajlakshmi v. Banamali, 1-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1954) Rajlakshn1i v. Muthuswan1i, I-ligl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1958) Ran1 v. Vengama, High Ct., Madras, India, (1938) Rani Chandra v. Digambar, High Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1959) Ran1 C�1andra Y: R_agh pati, I-ligh <;t., Patna, I11dia, (1954) Ran1 Gita v. Pr1thv1, l-I°:1gh Ct., PunJab, fudia, (1956) Ram Lakshn1an JaJ1kiji v. Mujund Lal, High Ct., Patna, India, (1948) Ran1 Lal v. Tula Ran1, High Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1882) Ram P?. _v. Manal_1ar, _High Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1959) Ram P1ar1 v. SuraJ, I-ligh Ct., Jamn1u & Kasl1n1ir, India, (1959) Ram Prasad v. Radha Panday, I-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, India, (1941) Ran1 Tahal v. Sukeswar, I-ligh Ct., Patna, India, (1916) Raman v. Jai Ram, 1-Iigh Ct., Allahabad, India, (1920) Ramaoatl1 Panda v. Dan1�dar Sahu, 1-Iigb Ct., Orissa,.India, (1949) Ramaswam . y v. Tuntha, I-I1gb Ct., Rangoon, India, (1939) Ramayya v. Subbarayudu, I-ligh Ct., Madras ffidia (1890) Rambrohn10 v. Bu�i, I-I_igh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1882) Ran1dhan v. Lachm1, Privy Council, India, (1937) Rameshwar v. Ganga, 1-Iigh Ct., Allahabad India (1950) Ramgopal v. I-Iarkisham, l·Iigl1 Ct.,_ Lal1ore: India: (1925) Ram¥opal v. Sec�etary _of State, I-l1gl1 Ct., Bombay, India, (1933) Ram�ah v. Gopa!1er, _H1gl1 Ct., Madras, India· , (1918) RamJas v. Barun1, Higl1 Ct., Patna, India, (1929) Ramlall v. Bhajahari, High Ct., Calcutta fudia (1896 Ran1mayya v. Ratnaswami, High Ct., M�dras, India ) (1959) Ranirao Bbagwantrao v. Babu Appa.nna l-ligh C Ramswarup v. Kesav, High Ct., Rajastban In t' 13��b ay, India, (1940) angam Lal v._ Jbandu, _H jgl1 Ct., Allahab�d, dia ' (1 ) India, (1912) �ango v. �ud1ye ppa, High Ct., Bombay India (1889) Ratnaswam1 v. Arcot's Endomn1ont H ' 'h C ' Madras,.. Inpia., (1938) R.ayalu Ayyar v. Ra rnudu A ar �·gh � t., adra�, India, (1926) Rohni Singh v. Rodding ' Hyy igh 'Ct·, Calcutta, Iiid1a, (1894)
J·•
••
XXll
270 347 94 26 306 284 355 240
271
282 350 33 4 164
261
75 382
167
353 332
261 295
348 240 64 281 346 232 86 346 288 67 298 307 240 307, 308
271
371 235, 237 298 294 323 351 321 242 268 345
252
264 304 265
236
325 146, 247 92 107
393 361
189 345
212 191
369
251
333
64
345 255
Ross & Co. v. Scriven, High Ct., Calcutta India (1916) Roulet v. Fetterle, High <:;t'., Bombay, Indi�, (1894) Rug-l1unath v. Ganesh, High Ct., Allahabad, India (1932) Ru.khf!linibbai v. Venkatesh, _High Ct., Bon1bay, In'ctia, (1901) Rukm1namrna v. Ramaya, High �t., Madras, India, (1943) Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer, Privy Council, India, (1885) Sabitri v. Savi, High Ct., Patna, India, (1933) Sadajiwat v. Chandr �ni, High . Ct., Sanrashtra, India, (1946) Sadasheoppa v. PunJabra�, High Ct., Nagpur, India, (1932) Sal1ul v. Arunachalam, Hi � Ct., Madras, India, (1945) Sakharam v. Mah �deo,. I-Iigh Ct., Nagpur, India, (1939) Sangram v. Electric Tribunal, Sup. Ct., India, (1955) Sankaralinga v. Official Recei�er, High Ct., Madras, India, (1925) Sarab Sukh v. Prem Dutt ? :1J1gl1 Ct., Lal1ore, India, (1936) Sara] Chand v. Mobun. Bibi, l-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1898) Sarala 1?ala v. Shy�m, I-l1gh Ct.! Calcutta, India, (1953) Sardar1 Mal v. H1rde Nath, I-Ugh Ct., Lahore, Inclia (1925) Sarogin� v. Lakhi P!"iya, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1924) Satnaram v. Mahabir Prasad, High Ct., Patna, India, (1932) Satya v. Namayya , High Ct., Madras, India, (1937) Satya v. Ve.nkata , Higl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1937) Satyabadi v. Kanhei, High Ct., Patna, India, (1943) Satyanarayan v. Chotelal, High Ct., Nagpur, India, (1949) Satyanarayan Banerjee v. Kalyani Prasad, Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1945) Satyanarayana v. Seetha, High Ct., India, (1938) Secretary of State v. Saminatha, High Ct., Madras, India, (1914) Serajul Huq v. Abdul Rahman, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1902) Seth v. Zuli.ka, High Ct., Madras, India, (1943) Setbura:ma v. Chota, High Ct., Madras, India, (1917) Sewdat Roy v. Sree Canto, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1906) Shaikh Muhammead v. Chulhai Mahto, High Ct., Patna, India, (1919) Shankar Hari v. Damod.ar Vyan.kaji, Higl1 Ct., Bombay, India, (1944) Shanmugsundara v. Ratnavelu, Hig11 Ct., Madras, India, (1931) Sheik Maula Bux v. Raghubar, Higl1 Ct., Patna, India, (1918) Shelly Bonnerjee v. Raj Chandra Datt, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1910) Sbeo Ratan v. Sheo Sahai, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1884) Sbeo Sh.ankar v. Chunni Lal, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1916) Sheoambar v. Lallu, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1887) Sheosagar v. Sitara:m, Privy Council, India, (1897) Shew Narayan Singh v. Brahmanand Singh, High Ct., Calc11tta, India, (1950) Shiam Narain v. B.B. & C. L. Ry Co., High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1919) Shib Charan v. Raghu, High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1895) Shib Narain v. Bepin Behary, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1878) Shibkristo v. Abdool, Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, India, (1880) Shibu v. Chandra Mohan, High Ct., Calc11tta, India, (1906) Shio Singh v. Sita Ram, Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, India, (1890) Shital Prasad Singh v. Surendra Nath Chatterjee, High Ct., Patna, India, (1949) Shivbai v. Yesoo, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1919) Shivlingappa v. Chanbasappa, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1906) Simon v. Hakim Mohamed, High Ct., Madras, India, (1896) Sinnu v. Santhoji, High Ct., Madras, India, (1903) Sitarama v. Surya, High Ct., Madras, India, (1899) Solaiman v. Jatindra, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1939) Sorabji v. Govind, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1959) Srikakula v. Paonapati, High Ct., Madras, India, (1953) Srinivasa v. Ayyathorai, High Ct., Madras, India, (1898) Subbaraya v. Krishna, High Ct., Madras, India, (1883) . Subodhh Gopal Bode v. Province of Bihar, High Ct., Patna, Ind1a, (1950) Subramanian v. Lutchman, Privy Council, India, (1923) Subrao v. Mahadevi, High Ct., Bombay, Ind�a, (1914) Subraya v. Rathnavelu, High Ct., Madras, lndJa, (J 909) Suderhaiya v. Hamdass High Ct., Allahabad, India, (1957) Sukhalal v. Deepchand: High Ct., Rajasth �, India, (1954) Sundar v. Nighaiya, High Ct., Lahore, lnd1�, (1925) Sundarbai v. Ganpat, High Ct., Nagpur, India, (1934) . Sunder Spinner v. Makan Bkula, High Ct., Bombay, I 1;1d1a, (1922) Surendra Lal v. Sultan Ahmed, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1935) •••
XXlll
164 383 249 327 291 330 188 188 284 363 284 164 364 265 149, 357 260, 262 356 339 291 311 289 212 191 370 219 77 65 277 363 377 267 256 309 95 328 279 248 332 74 39 334 261 150 343 288 268, 277 255 304 382 280 256 117 298 297 306 354 365 371 364 352 63 235, 239 222 292 116
256
I
� Surja v. Chandra, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1924 (1936) St1rjah Singl1 v. Ram Singh, I-ligh Ct., Pesl1ewar, � od.1a, Surno Mo yee v. Dakl1ina, I-ligh Ct., Calcutt�, l11d1a, (1897) Surput v. Mal1araj, High Ct., Calcutta, lnd�a, (1933) Su\vabi v. Krisl1na, High Ct., Nagpur, India, (1948) . Swamirao v. Kasl1inath, I-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1891) , Calcutta, India, (1936) Ct. h Hig ra and Ch sik Ra v. k Ban l I ' Tov. tive era -op Co Sylhet ? (1933) ia, T.N. Firn1 v. Mohamed, High Ct., Madras, Ind Tapesril Lal v. Deoki, Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad, India, (1897) Tarruk v. Divendrao, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1883) Tarsen1 v. Jagindra, J-!igh Ct., Punjab, India, (1959) Tassaduk v. Ah1nad, Privy Council, India, (1894) Tej v. Ramlal, 1-ligh Ct., Lahore, India, (1938) Thaivanai v. Ramanathan, 1-I.igh Ct., Rajasthan, India, (1941) Tin1appa v. Maajan1ya, High Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1923) Toponidhee v. Sreeputty, I-ligh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1880) Unnan1alai v. Baghya, I-Iigl1 Ct., Madras, India, (1940) Upendra v. Janaki, High Ct., Calcutta, India, (1918) Ulta.1nran1 v. Thakordas, High Ct., Bombay, India, (1922) Valchand v. Munekbai, I-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1952) Vasant v. Tuk:aram, 1-Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1960) Vcerappa v. Su11daresa, High Ct., Madras, India, (1922) Velji v. Bharn1al, I-ligh Ct., Bo1r1bay, India, (1897) Venkanoa v. Parasuran, Madra.c;, India, (1929) India, (1956) Venlcappa v. L<'lkshmikant, I-Iigh Ct., Ilydcrabad, Ct., lvfadras, India, (1883) Venkata v. Krishnassaini, IIigl1 Venkata v. l\fagoji, 1-Iigh Ct., l\1adras, India, (1946) Venkata v. V, Higb Ct., "t.1adras, India, (1947) Venkatachalapati v. I<.rishna, IIigl1 Ct., t,1adras, India, (1890) Venk.atachcllam v. Subrahn1aniam, High Ct., Madras, India, (1940) Venkalaraghavan1ma v. Sugqarayya, High Ct., Mad1·as, India, (1931) Venkalaran1a v. Venkatta, I·Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1901) Venkatasan1i Gurusan,i v. Chaobasapp, I-Iigh Ct., iv1adras, India, (1891) Venkatas,van1i v. Laksl1n1inarayana, High Ct., Andhra l)radesb, India, (1957) Venkatesv.1ara v. Ayyan1mal, Higl1 CL, Madras, India, (1949) Vishnu v. Ram, l�ligh Ct., Bombay, India, (1932; Vishnu v. Ran1ling, J-ligh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1902) Visvanadhan v. Arunachelan1, I-Iigh Ct., Madras, India, (1920) \ 1olkart v. Sabju, 1-ligh Ct., Madras, India, (1896) Walchand v. Yeshwant, 1-Jigh Ct., Bon1bay, India, (1948) \Valeyatunnissa v. Chalakhi, I·ligh Ct., Patna, India, (1931) \\Tatson v. Dhoncndra, I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, India, (1878) Ycgnanarayanan1urthi v. Balakrishnayya, Higb Ct., Madras, India, (1933) Yusuf v. Salleb, Chief Ct., Sind (1927) Zamorin of Calicut v. Narayanan, 1-Iigh Ct., lvfadras, India, (1899)
84 230 310 383 339 278 297 180 299 268 212 308 133 65 352 330 292 345 359 267 167 360 292 198 321 41 223 241 329 285 297 354 303 393 296 187 329 290 350 262 106 341 109 267 341
KENYA Baron Uno Carl Samuel Akerhiclm v. Rolf de Mare, Privy Council, Kenya, (1959)
245
NIGERIA Daniel K �io v. Chief Marian Braid, Div. Ct., Nigeria, (1926) G. _B: Oll1vant � Co. v. S. Akinsanya & A. W. Pamu, Div. Ct., Nigeria, (1930) L u1� Arnbros�n1, Ltd. v. Victor Ade Allet1, Full Ct., Nigeria, (1928) 1 ive _Au hor1ty of Nat Akpabuyo v. Effion Enan, I-Iigl1 Ct., Nigeria; (1926) � Olufen�u Richard �arn est Bla1_ 2e v. Frederick \Villiam Dove & s1·erra Gold Trust Lt d ., ll1gh Ct., N1ger1a_ , (1936) Severino v. Witt & Busch, Full Ct., Nigeria, (1912) •
141 145 146 236 22 242
SUDAN
A�dul Gesim Abdel Rahim v. Heirs of Hassam El Ib rahim, Ct., App.; Sudan, (1960J Ali Basaeed v. El Surra Basaeed, Ct., App., S.udan, (1957) •
xxiv
82 208
Fuhrmeister & Co. v. Abdel Ghani Ali Musa & Mohamed Abdel Ghani· AJ" 1 Musa, H.1gl1 Ct., Sudan, (1960) 149 George Ed,vard Batekha v. Mahdi Abdel Cader Mohammed Mohammed lbraI· ' 11m & El Insurance Co., High Ct., Sudan, (1960) Sha reg . of Mo amed B y Ha 89 ssan v. George Nicola Diab et. al, High Ct., Helf� � � dan, (1960 141, 142 Maeirna Isrna1l v. . Heir� of Mahmoud Mohamed Gabil, Ct., App., Sudan, Su (1959) 241, 244 Moh �med El �min Ali v. Ahmed El Siddik, Ct., App., Sudan, (1957) 40 Yass1n El. Gaily v. Mohamed Abdel Ha g and Another, Ct., App. Sudan, (19 60) 138 UGANDA
The Central District Maize Millers Assoc. v. Maciel and Co., Ltd., High Ct., Uganda, (1944)
147
U.S.A.
Adam v. Saenger, U.S. Sup. Ct., (1938) 24 American Life Insurance Co. v. Bradley Mining Co ., U .S. Di'st . Ct ., N.D . Ca1·" 11orn1a, (1944) 84 Arnstein v. Porter, Ct. App., U.S. 2nd Cir., (1946) 185-186 Ash v. Mortensen, Sup. Ct., California, U.S., (1944) 353 Audibert v. Michaud, Sup. Ct., Maine, U.S., (1920) 203 �an.le _of California Nati�nal Association v. Superior Court, Sup. Ct., California, U.S. (1940) 82, 83 B�ro_ ruo v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., Sup. Ct., California, U.S., (1890) 349 B1gg10 v. Magee, Sup. Ct., Massacl1usetts, U.S., (1930) 320 Boos v. Claude, Sup. Ct., Soutl1 Dakota, U.S., (1943) 353 Brown v. Cranston, Ct. App., U.S., 2nd Cir., (1942) 88 Brune v. McDonald, Sup. Ct., Oregon, U.S., (1938) 97 Bruszews.ki v. United States, Ct. App., U.S., 3rd Cir., (1950) 325 Buckley v. Altheimer, Dist. Ct., U.S., N.D. Illinois, (1942) 160 Burke v. Owens Illinois Glass Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D., West Virginia, (1949) 184 Chicago & Soutl1ering Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., Sup. Ct., U.S., (1948) 16 Churchill v. Bigelow, Sup. Jud. Ct., Massachusetts, U.S., (1955) 26 Cunningham v. Brewer, Sup. Ct., Nebraska, U.S., (1944) 82, 85, 236 D.L. Stern Agency v. Mt1tual Benefit I-iealtl1 & Accident Association, U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. New . York, (1941) 54 Derderian v. Union Market National Bank, Sup. Ct., Massachusetts, U.S., (1950) 346 Dyer v. MacDougall, Ct. App., U.S. 2nd Cir. (1952) 184 Edgington v. Nichols, St1p. Ct., Iowa, U.S., (1951) 97 Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., D., Massachusetts, (1960) 327 Engle v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Ct. App., U.S. 2nd Cir., (1943) 185 Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hammer, Ct. App., U.S. 4th Cir., (1949) 326 Federal Housing Administrator v. Cl1ristionson, U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Connecticut, (1939) 78, 80 Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Crandall Horse Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D., New York, . (1942) 84 FisctLS v. Kansas City Public Service Co., Sup. Ct., Kansas, U.S., (1941) 347 Ford Motor Gp.. v. Bisanz Bros. Inc., Ct. App., U.S. 8th Cir., (19 ) 98 26 Freeman v. Alderson, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1886) 142, 158 Garcia v. Hilton Hotel's International, Dist. Ct., U.S., Puerto Rico, (1951) 325 Gil v. Morris, Sup. Ct., Tennessee, U.S., (1872) 94 Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D., Pennsylvania, (1945) 152 Green v. Walsh, Dist. Ct., U.S., E.D. Winsconsin, (1957) 44 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1947) Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. Ct. App., U.S., 7th Cir., 339 (1946) 23 Hess v. Pawloski, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1927) 223 Kaishke v. Baker, Ct. App., U.S., 10th Cir., (1944) 323 Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co., Ct. App., Maryland, U.S. (1957) 98 Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Duggas, Ct. App., U.S., 6th Cir., (1948) 134 Knudsen v. Boren, Ct. App., U.S. 10th Cir., (1958) 99 Kozak v. Wells Ct. App., U.S., 8th Cir., (1960) . . 142 Kramer v. Kansas City Power & Ligl1t Co., Sup. Ct., M1ssour1, U.S., (1925) 187 Lane v. Greyhound Corp., U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Kentucky, (1952) 143 Legget v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Ct. App., U.S. lOt� Cir., (1949) 153 Levey v. Newark Beth Israel Hospital, New Jersey Superior Ct., U.S., (1952) 132 Lewis v. Soutl1 San Francisco Yellow Cab Co., California Ct. App., U.S., (1949) XXV
Lohn1an v. Edgewater Ilolding Co., Sup. Ct., Minnesota, 1:J.S., (1948) . Maine Lu.mber Products Corp. v. U.J.\1/. Stepl1ens Ltd., U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Maine, (1952) .l\1cCullougl1 v. Maryland, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1819) Milliken v. ti.1eyer, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1940) !vlissouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United Slates, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1941) Morgeosten Chemical Co. v. Shering Corp., Ct. App., U.S., 3rd Cir., (1950) Norn1an v. Leach, Sup. Ct., Oklahoma, U.S., (1953) . Northeast Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brandet1berg, U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D., New York, (1948) Oklahoma Wheat Pool Terminal Corp. v. Rodgers, Oklahon1a, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1937) Orvis v. Brickn1an, U.S. Dist. Ct., of Columbia, (1951) Orvis v. 1-.Iiggins, Ct. App., U.S., 2nd Cir., (1950) Pa110s v. Great Western Packing Co., Sup. Ct., California, U.S., (1943) Tl1e })eople v. Gongalez, Ct. App., New York, U.S., (1866) Pioneer, Mutual Compensatio11 Co. v. Cosby Sup. Ct., Colorado, U.S., (1952) Rae v. Ca111eron, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1941) Robbi.us v. Jordan, Ct. App., U.S., Dist. of Colu111bia, (1950) Roberts v. Green, Ct. App., I(eotucky, U.S., (1949) • Rudd v. Dewey, Iowa Sup. Ct., U.S., (1903) Russell v. Bar11es Foundation, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D., Pe11nsyl\rania, (1943) Schvv1artz v. I-loro\vitz, Ct. App., U.S., 2nd Cir., (1942) Sheldon v. Sill, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1850) Sparks v. England, Cl. App., U.S., 8th Cir., (1940) Spencer v. Standard Chemicals & Metals Cor1J., Ct. App., New York, U.S., (1924) Stewart v. Roberts, Ct. App., U.S., D.C. Cir., (1946) Stratford Arn1s I-lotel Co. v. General Casualty & Sttrety Co., Sup. Ct., !vlicl1igan, U.S., (1930) Sullivan v. Gist, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Pe1msylva.i1i.a, (1958) Tbibattlt v. Lambert, Sup. Ct., Hun1pshire, U.S., (1934) Tl1on1pson v. Washington National Banlc, Sup. Ct., Washington, U.S., (1912) Tho1nson v. Talbert Drainage District, Ct. App., California, U.S., (.1959) United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. Sup. Ct., U.S., (1949) United States v. Bo\ver, U.S., Dist. Ct., E.D., Tennessee, (1951) United Slates v. Moser, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1924) United States v. Stone (.r:.., Dovv'11er Co. , St1p. Ct., U.S., (1927) Varley v. Motyl, Connecticut SuJ). Ct., U.S., (1952) Vineseck v. Great Norther11 Ry. Co., Sup. Ct., Minnesota, U.S., (1919) Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peat1ut Co., Ct. App., U.S., 4th Cir., (1951) Walker v. City of Hutchinson, Sup. Ct., U.S., (1956) \1/aterhouse v. Levine, Sup. Ct., Massacl1usetts, U.S., (1903)
235, 23r. 330 18 21 96 222 183 85 127 186 246 338 194 89 53 147 330 J 26 .184 59 8 140 53 222
98 326 331 33] 83, 98 55 321 337 337 134 354 9S 46, 117 332
WEST AFRICA
v. lbrahin1 Allie, Ct. App., West Africa, (1951) Al �n1ed Alhadi 209, 247 _ Bright v. Bright, Ct. App., West Africa, (1943) 133 Chukwura Akunne v. Mathias Ekwane et al Ct. App., West Africa, (1952) 206 Johannes England v. J. M?pe Palmer, Ct. App., West Africa, (1955) 14 9, Shon,ade and D1su Shon1ade v. Ran1otu Ogunbiye et al Ct. App., West Africa, Kas (��6) 149
XXVI
e
•
..
Table of Laws ETHIOPIA Civil Procedure Code 3, 9 172 84, 130, 174, 190,214,263 319, 327 Art. 5(1) 58, 99,217, 265, 282, 319 321, 322,323, 332, 340 Art. 5(2) 265, 320, 323, 329, 333,337,344 Art. 5(3) 320, 337, 342 Art. 5(4) 65, 319, 322, 327 Art. 6 214, 220, 241, 243, 244,359 Art. 6(1) 104, 213 Art. 6(2) 215 A�rt. 6(3) 215 Art. 6(4) 215,220 Art. 7 49, 319, 372 Art. 7(1) 48 Art. 8 49 Art. 8(1) 49, 174, 175,319 Art. 8(2) 49, 320,322 Art. 8(3) 50, 322,372, 373 Art. 9 139,192 Art. 9(1) 47 Art. 9(2) 48, 175, 236 Art. 10 139 Art. 10(1) 47, 48 Art. 10(2) 48, 175, 248, 261 Art. 11 50,345 Art. 11(1) 372 Art. 11(2) 373 Art. 11(3) 373 Art. 11(4) 373 Art. 11(5) 373 Art. 13 1 o, 28 Art. 14 10, 28 Art. 14(a) 389 Art. 15 10 Art. 15(1) 28 Art.· 15(1)(a) 345 Art. 15(2) 47 Art. 15(2)(i) 374 Art. 15(2)(3) 28 Art. 16 389 Art. 16(2) 30, 128, 140 Art. 16(3) 29,173 Art. 16(4) 29 Art. 17(1) 29 Art. 17(2) 29,261 Art. 17(3) 29, 131 Art. 18 31 Art. 1(1) Art. 3 Art. 5
Art. 19 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40 Art. 19(1) 39,44 Art. 19(2) 34 Art. 20 34,37 Art. 20(1) 34,35 Art. 20(2) 35 A.rt. 21 36, 37 Art. 22 37 Art. 22(1) 35 Art. 22(2) 36 Art. 22(3) 36 Art. 23 36 Art. 24 36,38 Art. 24(1) 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 Art. 24(2) 37, 38 Art. 24(3) 36, 38 Art. 24(4) 38 Art. 25 39 ' 40, 42, 43, 67 Art. 25(1) 40, 41 Art. 25(1)(a) 260 Art. 25(1}(e) 40, 41 Art. 25(1)(d) 42, 44 Art. 25(2) 40 Art. 26 42 A.rt. 26(1) 42, 260 Art. 26(2) 42 Art. 27 38 Art. 27(1) 38, 39 Art. 27(2) 39 Art. 28 36 Art. 29 42 Art. 31 40, 43, 48, 206, 345 Art. 31(1) 52 Art. 3l(l)(b) 45 Art. 3l(l}(c) 44, 45 Art. 3 J (l)(c)(i)(ii) 43 Art. 31(2) 43 Art. 32(2) 107 A.rt. 33(1) 52, 61 Art. 33(2) 52, 53, 55, 56, 173 A.rt. 33(3) 59,128 Art. 34 60, 62,324 Art. 34(1) 52, 60, 62 Art. 34(1)(2) 173 A.rt. 34(2) 61,175 Art. 34(3) 100,249 Art. 34(4) 101 Art. 34(5) 279 Art. 35 29, 70, 71, 72, 73, 96,267, 322 •••
XXVlll
-
73, 78, 79, 97 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 191, 270 Art. 36(1)(2) 88 Art. 36(1)(2)(5) & (6) 73 75 , 79 Art. 36(2) 73, 85 Art. 36(3) Art. 36(3) & (4) 81 Art. 36(3)(4) 76 73, 83, 282, 323 Art. 36(4) 76, 77 Art. 36(5) Art. 36(6) 77 Art. 37(b) 77 60, 62, 63, 66, 161, 267, 328 Art. 38 63, 65 Art. 38(1) 80, 81, 82, 86, 191 Art. 39(1) Art. 39(2) 80, 85 176, 216, 217 Art. 40 57, 58, 59, 99 Art. 40(1) 58, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, Art. 40(2) 87, 93, 154, 192 Art. 40(3) 86, 154 Art. 40(5) 231, 250, 254 96, 97, 216, 217, 294 Art. 41 Art. 41(1) 93 Art. 41(2) 99 Art. 41(3) 99 Art. 41(4) 99 Art. 41(5) 99 Art. 42 96, 99, 100 76, 85, 87, 91, 92, 164 Art. 43 87, 88, 89, 376 Art. 43(1) A.rt. 43(2) 87 Art. 43(3) 87 Art. 43(4) 92 Art. 44 101, 149 Art. 45(3) 101 Art. 45(1) 101 Art. 46 101 Art. 47 47 Art. 48(1) 104 Art. 48(2) 106, 107 Art. 49(1) 106, 166 Art. 49(2) 107 Art. 49(3) 108, 269 Art. 50(1) 106 Art. 50(3) 107 Art. 50(4) 108, 271 Art. 51(1) 107 Art. 51(1)(a) 107 Art. 51(2)(b) 107 Art. 52 108 Art. 53 108 Art. 54(1) 108 Art. 54(2) 108 Art. 54(3) 108, 269 Art. 55(2)(3) 108 Art. 56 109 Art. 57 53, 161, 162, 358 Art. 58 360 Art. 58(a) 358 Art. 59 359 Art. 60(1) 359 Art. 60(2) 359 Art. 61 113 Art. 61(1) 359 3-co Art. 61(2) Art. 36 Art. 36(1)
Art. 61(3) Art. 61(4) Art. 62 Art. 62(1) Art. 62(2) Art. 62(3) Art. 63 Art. 63(1) Art. 63(2) Art. 63(3) Art. 64 Art. 64(1) Art. 64(2) Art. 65(1) Art. 66(1) Art. 66(2) Art. 67(1) Art. 67(2) Art. 67(3) Art. 68(1) Art. 68(2) Art. 69(1) Art. 69(2) Art. 69(3) Art. 70 Art. 70(a) Art. 70(b) Art. 70(c) Art. 70(d) Art. 71(1) Art. 71(2) Art. 72 Art. 73 Art. 74 Art. 74(1) Art. 74(2) Art. 74(3) Art. 75(1) Art. 75(2) Art. 76 Art. 76(1) Art. 76(2) Art. 77 Art. 78 Art. 78(1) Art. 78(2) Art. 78(3) Art. 79(2) Art. 80 Art. 80(1) Art. 80(2) Art. 81 Art. 82 Art. 83 Art. 84 Art. 85 Art. 86 Art. 87 Art. 88(1) Art. 90 Art. 91 Art. 91(1) Art. 91(2) Art. 91(3) Art. 91(4) Art. 91(5)
J.,
•
xxrx
359 359 113 61 359 359 360 359 359 359 358 360 360 161, 358 161 162 162 162 162 162 162 161 161, 165, 166 162 45, 110, 163 117, 118, 119, 163, 277 118, 163 119, 163 163, 165, 166 165 165, 168, 169, 170 164, 165 166, 377 329 166 166, 168, 169, 171 166 165 J 65, 168 164
169 118 161, 171 45, ]10, 118, 119, 167, 169, 171 375 118, 119, 167, 168, 169, 273 167 238 4 120, 138, 237 122, 159, J 60 124 123, 130, 136, 137, 172 129 125 125 125 125 125 138 132, 147, 222 145' 146, 148, 149, 150, 151 375 134, 158 159, 160 146
Art. 92 Art. 92(2) Art. 92(3). Art. 92(4) Art. 93 Art. 94 Art. 95(1) Art. 95(2) Art. 95(3) Art. 96 Art. 96(1) Art. 96(2) Arl. 96(3) Art. 97 Art. 98 Art. 98(2) Art. 98(3) Art. 99 Arl. 99(1) Art. 99(2) Art. 99-100 Art. 100 Art. 101 Art. 102(1) Art. 102(2) Art. 103 Art. J 05 Art. 105(3) Art. 106 Art. 106(1) Art. 106(2) Art. 107 Art. 108 Art. 109 Art. 1.10 Art. 111 Art. 111-121 Art. 112 Art. 112(1) Art. 112(2) Art. 113 Art. l 13(1)(2) Art. 113(3) Art. 114 Art. 114(1) Art. 115 Art. 116 Art. 117 Art. 118 Art. 118(1) Art. 118(2)(a) Art. 118(2)(b) Art. 118(3) Art. 119 Art. 120(2) Art. 120(3) Art: 122 Art. 123(1) Art. 123-126 Art. 125(1) A.rt. 125(2) Art. 126 Art. 127 Art. 127(2) Art. 127(3) Art. 127(4) Art. 128(1)
Art. 128(2) Art. 129 Art. 129(1) Art. 130 Art. 131 Art. 132 Art. 132-136 Art. 133(1) Art. 133(2) Art. 133(3) Art. 134 Art. 135 Art. 136 Art. 137 Art. 137(1) Art. 137(3) Art. 137(4) Art. 138 Art. 139(1) Art. 139(2) Art. 140(1) Art. 140(2)(a) Art. 140(2)(b) A.rt. 140(3) Art. 141 Art. 142 Art. 143 Art. 144(1) Art. 144(2) Art. 144(3) Art. 145(1) Art. 145(2) Art. 145(3) Art. 146 Art. 147(1) Art. 147(2) Art. 148(1) Art. 148(2) Art. 149(1) Art. 149(2) Art. 149(3) Art. 149(4) Art. 150 Art. 151(1) Art. 151(2) Art. 151(3) Art. 152(1) Art. 15·2(2) Art. 153(1) Art. 153(2) Art. ]53(3) Art. 153(4) Art. 153(5) Art. 154 Art. 155 Art. 155(1) Art. 156(1) Art. 156(2) Art. 157 A.rt. 158 Art. 159 Art. 160 Art. 161(l)(a) Art. 16l(l)(b) Art. 161(2) Art. 162(1) Art. 162(2)
123, 295 123 123, 359 123 123, 247, 295 11 l 111 , 163 111 111, 116. 118 21, 112, 114 113, 115, 358, 360 113 l13, 359 113 113, 162 113 113 112, 113 114 114 112 112, 114 112, 114, 118 1.11, 115 112 112, 115, 116 112, 115, 116 116 111, 115, .116, 117 116 116 Ill, 115, 116, 117 112, 117 115 115 194, 195, 377 388 391 195 195 207 195 195 198 195 198 195
··
195 196 195 .196 196 196 198 196 196 196 196
392 .196
196
196 196 196 196 196, 392 · 196
x�x
196
39 2 39 2 392 392 207 179, 181 207 207 207 207 207 207 369 177, 197 197
197
198 198 198 198
198 198
198 198
204
199, 204 199 199 199
198 198 198
198
360, 361 361 361 361 361 362
361
361 361, 362 362 362 363 363 363
363
•
364 364 363
363
197, 365, 366, 367, 368 365, 367, 368
368
368, 369 368 36& 368 368
369
369 369
36 9
369 369
Art. 163(1) Art. 163(2) Art. 164 Art. 165 Art. 166(1) A.rt. 166(l)(a) Art. 166(1)(b)(c) Art. 166(2) Art. 167 Art. 168(a) Art. 168(b) Art. 168(c) Art. 168(d) Art. 169 Art. 176(l)(cl) Art. 177(1) Art. 177(2) Art. 177(3) Art. 178(1) Art. J 78(2) Art. 179( l) Art. 179(2) Art. 179(3) Art. 180 Art. 181(1) Art. 181(2) Art. 182 Art. 182(1) Art. 182(2) Art. 182(3) Art. 183(1) Art. 183(1)(a) Art. 183(1)(d) Art. 183(1)(f) Art. 183(2) Art. 183-184 Art. 184 Art. 184(1) Art. 185 Art. 185(1) Art. 186 Art. 186(1) Art. 186(2) Art. 187 Art. 188 Art. 189 Art. 190 Art. 191 Art. 191(1) Art. 192(1) Art. 192(2) Art. 192(3) Art. 193(1) Art. 193(Z) Art. 193(3) Art. 194(1) Art. 194(2) Art . 195 Art. 196(1) Art. 196(2)(a) Art. l 96(2)(b) Art. 196(3) Art. 197(1) Art. 197(2) Art. 197(3)
Art. 197(4) Art. 197(5)
370 370 370 369 371 370 371 370 371 372 372 372 372 372 361 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 208, 225, 253 208, 253 209, 253 259 209, 253 209, 250 209, 248, 253, 331 209, 253 253 259 254, 259 210 21 254 211, 224 210 377 266 210 210 210 211 211, 213, 224 . 211 130, 211 130, 280 375 375 375 375 375 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 376 377 376 377
Art. 197-199 162 Art. 198 52, 115 Art. 198(1) 377 Art. 198(2) 378 Art. 199(2) 378 Art. 200(1) 378 Art. 200(2) 378 Art. 200(3) 378 Art. 201(1) 379 Art. 201(2) 379 Art. 201(3) 379 Art. 202(1) 379 Art. 202(2) 379 Art. 202(3) 379 Art. 203 197 Art. 204 197 Art. 205 197 Art. 207 212 Art. 208 212, 359 Art. 209(1) 212 Art. 209(3) 212 Art. 210(1) 212, 213 Art. 211(1) 213, 235, 236 Art. 2l l(2) 247, 248 Art. 212 213 Art. 213 110 Art. 213(1) 320 Art. 214 110 Art. 215(1) 110 Art. 216 59, 320, 337, 343 Art. 216(1) 343 Art. 216(2) 256, 344, 345 Art. 216(3) 344, 345 Art. 216(4) 320, 327, 344, 354 Art. 217 29, 42, 66, 78, 79, 80, 146, 345, 350, 372 67, 68, 351 Art. 218 68, 351 Art. 218(a) 68 Art. 218(b) 68 Art. 218(c) 68, 106 Art. 219 66, 72, 78, 80, 130, 131 Art. 221 95, 142, 160 Art. 222 127 Art. 222(l)(a)(b) 127 Art. 222(l)(c) 127 Art. 222( 1 )(d) 128 Art. 222(1)(e) 128 Art. 222(1)(f) J28 Art. 222(1)(g) 128 Art. 222(1)(h) 128 Art. 222(1)(i) 123, 127, 128, 140 Art. 222-228 110, 129 Art. 223 194 Art. 223(1)(a) 125, 177, 197 Art. 223(1)(b) 110 Art. 223(2) 129 Art. 223(3) 128 Art. 224(1) 128, 209 Art. 225 30, 128 Art. 226(1) 30, 128 Art. 226(2) 30, 129 Art. 226(3) 30, 129 Art. 226(4) 30 Art. 226-228 129 Art. 227 110. 123, J 39 Art. 229 110 Art. 230
xxxi
Art. 231
Art. 256 Art. 256(1) Art. 256(2) Art. 257 Art. 258 Art. 258(1) Art. 259(1) Art. 259(2) Art. 259(3) Art. 260(1) Art. 260(2) Art. 261(1) Art. 261(2) Art. 261(3) Art. 261(4) Art. 262 Art. 263 A.rt. 263(1) Art. 263(2) Art. 263(3) Art. 264 Art. 264(1) Art. 264(2) Art. 264(3) Art. 265 Art. 266 Art. 267 Art. 268 Art. 269 Art. 269(1) Art. 269(2) Art. 269(3) Art. 269(4) Art. 270 Art. 271(1) Art. 271(2) Art. 272 Art. 272(2) Art. 273 Art. 274(1) Art. 274(2) Art. 274-277 Art. 275(1) Art. 276(1) Art. 276(2) Art. 277 Art. 277(1) Art. 277(2) Art. 277(3) Art. 278 Art. 278(1) Art. 278(2) Art. 278(2)(b) Art. 278(3) Art. 279 Art. 279(1) Art. 279(2) Art. 280 Art. 281 Art. 281(1) Art. 281(2) Art. 282(1) Art. 282(2) Art. 283(1) Art. 283(2) Art. 284 Art. 285(1 )
47, 95, 103, 110, 137, 139,
140, 146, 174, 180 47
Art. 231(1)(b) 147 Art. 232(1)(b) 139, 222, 329 Art. 232(2) 110, 111, 135, 161, 163 Art. 233 172, 177, 194, 197 Art. 234(1) 130, 138, 174 Art. 234(1)(c) 130, 136 Art. 234(J)(d) 129 Art. 234(1)(e) Art. 234(1)(f) 24, 130, 131, 280, 342, 346 123, 135 Art. 235 130 Art. 235(1) 135, 172, 328 Art. 235(2) 25, 131, 280, 342 Art. 236 246 Art. 236(2) 126 Art. 237 123, 131, 132, 139, 171 Art. 238 346 Art. 238(2) 123 Art. 238(3) 131, 132, 135 Art. 239 Art. 239(1) 346 Art. 24,0 369 Art. 241 121, 123, 132, 146 Art. 241(1) 171 172, 173 Art. 241(2) Art. 241(3) 172 Art. 241(4) 172 Art. 242 173 Art. 243 173 24, 48, 50, 175 Art. 244 Art. 244(1) 74, 173 Art. 244(2) 173, 174 Art. 244(2)(a) 24, 4 7 Art. 244(2)(b) 320 Art. 244(2)(c) 50 Art. 244(2)(d) 149 Art. 244(2)(g) 187 r\rt. 244(3) 48, 175, 235, 320 Art. 245 47, 50, 173, 175 Art. 245(1) 187 Art. 245(2) 176, 320 Art. 245(3) 176 Art. 245(3)(4) 176 Art. 245(5) 174 Art. 246 146 Art. 246(1) 176 Art. 246(2) 176 Art. 247 121 Art. 247(1) 178, 328 Art. 247(2) 177 Art. 247(3) 178 Art. 247(4) 179 Art. 248 177 Art. 248(a) 132 Art. 249 177, 195 Art. 250 179 Art. 251 132, 135 Art. 251(1) 145, 146, 177, 180, 209 Art. 251(2) 144,177, 180 . ·.180, 181 Art. 252 Art. 253 180 Art. 254 139, 140, · 144, 183. Art. 254(1) 181 Art. 255 28, 183, 184, 185, 186, 222 Art. 255(1) :, . . 1�9. . . 266 Art. 255(2) ,
..
XXXII
205
177, 180
197
195, 198 216 199 200 200 200 201 201 201, 202 202 207 204 205 204 202
202, 203 203 197, 198 205
205, 208 205 205
205 162, 198, 205 198, 205
224 203 206 206 206 206 206 206 207 187 208
186
•
188, 189 66, 263 187 187 187, 381 ' 273
188
188 188 81, , 105, 271 190 191 ' . .. . . 379 192 , . 81, 150 65;, · 190, 320 · ·. 65, 192 ... . . .. . .. . •
.. . ..
193
391 380
380 380 380
380
380 380
. 381, 382
Art. 285(2) Art. 286(1) Art. 286(2) Art. 286(3) Art. 287 Art. 288(1) Art. 288(2) Art. 289 Art. 290 Art. 291 Art. 292 Art. 293 Art. 294 Art. 294(a) Art. 296 Art. 295(1)(a) Art. 297(l)(b) Art. 297(2) Art. 297(3) Art. 298 Art. 299 Art. 300(1) Art� 300(2) Art. 301(1) Art. 301(2) Art. 301(3) Art. 302(1) Art. 302(2) Art. 303(1) Art. 303(2) Art. 304(1) Art. 304(2) Art. 305(1) ArL 305(3) Art. 306(1) Art. 306(2) Art. 307 Art. 308(1) Art. 308(2) Art. 308(3) Art. 309(1) Art. 309(2) Art. 309(3) Art. 309(4) Art. 309-311 Art. 310(1) Art. 310(2) Art. 310(3) Art. 311 Art. 312(1) Art. 312(2) Art. 313 AJ1. 314(1) Art. 314(2) Art. 315(1) Art. 315(2) Art. 315(3) Art. 315(4) Art. 316(1) Art. 316(2) Art. 316(3) Art. 317(1) Art. 317(2) Art. 317(3) Art. 317(4) Art. 318(1) Art. 318(2)
382 382 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 93 93, 95 94 96 95 96 96 96. 94 96 385 385 384 384 384 384 384 38 4 384 38 4 38 4 385 385 384, 386 384 385 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 384 386 386 386 386 387 387 387 387 387 387 387, 388, 388 387 388 388 388 388 388 388 388. 388 388
Art. 318(3) Art. 318(4) Art. 318(5) Art. 319(1) Art. 319(2) Art. 320(1) Art. 320(2) Art. 320(3) Art. 320(4) Art. 321 Art. 321 (1)(a) Art. 321(I)(b) Art. 32l(l)(c) Art. 321(2) Art. 322 Art. 323(1) Art. 323(2) Art. 323(3) Art. 323(4) Art. 324(1) Art. 324(2) Art. 324(3) Art. 324-326 Art. 325(1) Art. 325(2) Art. 325(3) Art. 326(1) Art. 326(2) Art. 326(3) Art. 326(4) Art. 327 Art. 327(1) Art. 327(2) Art. 327(3) Art. 327(4) Art. 328(1) Art. 328(2) Art. 328(3) Art. 329(1) Art. 329(2) Art. 330 Art. 330(1) Art. 330(2) Art. 331 Art. 332 Art. 333 Art. 334 Art. 335(1) Art. 335(l)(c) Art. 335(2) Art. 336 Art. 337 Art. 338 Art. 338(1) Art. 338(2) Art. 339(1) Art. 339(2) Art. 339(3) Art. 340 Art. 340(1) Art. 340(2) Art. 340(3) Art. 340(4) Art. 341 Art. 341(1) Art. 341(2) Art. 342 •••
':XXXlll
388 389 389 389 389 218, 263 220 103, 221, 369 221 9, 10, 18 220 220, 389 17, 220 220 8, 1�, 17, 221, 256 224 225 224 224 225 225 225 257 225 225 225 225 226 225 225 215 224 224 224 224 234 234 234 206, 235 227, 234 115 225 225 251 261, 266 232 232 232, 233 270 233 233, 255, 270 237, 379 111 238 238 238 238 238 344 228, 230 229 229, 230 229 255 248 248 146, 230, 237, 249, 332
Art. 343
Art. 344 Art. 345 Art. 345(1) 1 ) 345(1)( a · Art. Art. 345(1)(a)(b) Art. 345(1)(b) Art. 345(2) Art. 346(a) Art. 346(b) Art. 347 Art. 348 Art. 348(1) Art. 348(2) Art. 349 Art. 349(1) Art. 349(2) Art. 349(3) Art. 350(1) Art. 350(2) Art. 350(3) Art. 350(4) Art. 350-357 Art. 351 Art. 35 l(a) Art. 351(b) Art. 351(c) Art. 351(c)(i) Art. 351(c)(ii) Art. 351(d)(i) Art. 35l(d)(ii) Art. 351 (d)(iii) Art. 352 Art. 353 Art. 354(1) Art. 354(2) Art. 354(3) Art. 355(1) Art. 355(2) Art. 355(3) Art. 356 Art. 357(1) Art. 357(2) Art_. 359(1) Art. 359(2) Art. 359(3) Art. 359(4) Art. 359-360 Art. 360(1) Art. 360(2) Art. 361 Art. �61(1) Art. 361(2) Art. 361(3) Art. 362 Art. 363 Art. 364(1) A.:rt. 364(2) A.rt. 365(1) Art. 365(2) Art. . . 366 Art. 367(1) Ar�. 368(1) Art. 368(2) Art. 369 A'rt. 370 Art. 370(1)
••
Art. 370(3) Art. 371(1) Art. ·371(2)
258 259 259 259, 260 Art. 372(1) 260 Art. 373(1) 260, 261 Art. 373(2) 261, 263 Art. 374(1) 261 Art. 374(2) 270, 274, 277, 298, 312 Art. 375 262 Art. 375(1) 263 Art. 375(2) 262 Art. 376(1) 262 Art. 376(2) 262 Art. 376(3) 262 Art. 376(4) 265 Art. 377 259 Art. 378 262, 266 Art. 378(1) 266 Art. 378(2) 266 Art. 378(3) 285 Art. 378(3)U)(ii) 286 Art. 379 -266 Art. 379(1) 266 Art. 379(2) Art. 380 52, 267 Art. 381 265 Art. 381(1) 268 Art. 381(2) 266 Art. 381(3) 268 Art. 381(4) 269 Art. 382 270 Art. 383 270 Art. 383(3) 273 Art. 384 266, 271, 274, 378 Art. 385(1) 273 Art. 385(2) 273 Art. 386(1) 260, 273 Art. 386(2) 274 Art. 386(3) 274 Art. 386(4) 273 Art. 386(5) 274 Art. 387(1) 274 Art. 387(2) 274 Art. 388(1) 274 Art. 388(2) 274 Art. 389 282, 285 /',.rt. 389(1) 275 Art. 389(2) 275 Art. 390 285 Art. 390(1)(a) 275 Art. 390(1)(b) 275 Art. 390(2) 275 Art. 391 275 Art. 392(1) 274 Art. 392(2) 274 Art. �92(3) 275 Art. 392(4) 275 Art. 393(1) 275 Art. 393(2) 274, 275 Art. 394(1) 276, 285 Art. 394(2) 276 Art. 395(1) 276, 284 A.rt. 395(2) 276 A.ft. 396( 265, 268 Art. 396(1) 276 Art. 396(2) 277 Art. 396(3) 277
237, 238, 255 238 146, 195 239 247 240 240 245 245 245 146, 247 146 247 247 233, 359 255 255 256 389 389 389 389 389 52 389 389 389 389 390 390 390 390 389 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 391 391 217 217 217 218 390 218 218 18 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 258 258 258 258 258 257 259 258 XXXI V •
•
Art. 396(4) Art. 397 Art. 397(l)(a) Art. 397(1)(b) Art. 397(1)(3) Art. 397(2) Art. 397(4) Art. 398 Art. 398(a) Art. 398(b) Art. 399 Art. 400 Art. 400(]) Art. 400(2) Art. 401(1) Art. 401(2) Art. 401(3) Art. 401(4) Art. 401(5) Art. 402(1) Art. 402(2) Art. 402(3) Art. 403 Art. 404 Art. 404(f) Art. 405 Art. 406 Art. 406(1) Art. 406(2) Art. 407(1)(a) Art. 407(1)(b) Art. 407(2) Art. 407(3) Art. 408(1) Art. 408(2) Art. 408(3) Art. 408(4) Art. 408(5) Art. 408(6) Art. 409 Art. 409(1) Art. 409(2) A1t. 409(3) Art. 409(4) Art. 409(5) Art. 409(6) Art. 409(7) Art. 410 Art. 411(1) Art. 411(2) Art. 411(3) Art. 412 Art. 413 Art. 414 Art. 414(1) Art. 414(2) Art. 415 Art. 416 Art. 417(1) Art. 417(2) Art. 418 Art. 418(1) Art. 418(2) Art. 418(3) Art. 418(4) Art. 418-421 Art. 419
..
. .
277 265, 266 280 280 278 280 278 266 281 281 281 367. 282 282, 356 283 283 283 283, 301 283 281 . . 282 ' 281, 369 283, 290 ' 271, 286, 364 289 285 300 286 287, 297 287 287 287 287 287 .. 287 287 .. 287 287 287 281, 286, 300 288 288 289 288, 289 288 289289, 292 281, 289 289 289 289 288, 290 290 316 290 290• 282,. 284, 291 291 291 292 300, 306, 315 292 -, 293 293 293. 293 281, 318, 364 315
Art. '419(1) Art. 419(2) Art. 420 A.rt. 421 Art. 422 Art. 422(1) Art. 422(2) Art. 422(3) Art. 423(2) Art. 423(2)(a) Art. 423(2)(b) Art. 423(2)(c) Art. 423(2)(d) Art. 423(3) Art. 424(1) Art. 424(2) Art. 425(1) Art. 425(2) Art. 425(3) Art. 426 Art. 427 Art. 428(1) Art. 428(2) Art. 429 Art. 429(1) Art. 429(2) Art. 429(3) Art. 429(4) Art. 430(1) Art. 430(2) Atr. 430(3) Art. 431(1) Art. 431(2) Art. 432(1) Art. 432(1)(a) Art. 432(1){b) Art. 432(2) Art. 433(1) Art. 433(2) .Art. 434 Art. 435 Art. 436(1) Art. 436(2) Art. 436(3) Art. 437(1) Art. 437(2) Art·. 438 Art. 439 Art. 439(1) Art. 439(2) Art. 439(3) Art. 439(4) Art� 440(1) Art. 440(2) Art. 441 Art. 442 Art. 443 Art. 444(1) Art.• 444(2) Art. 444(3) Art. 445 Art� 446 Art. 447(1) Art. 447(2) Art. 447(3) Art. 447(4) Art. 447(5)
l
'
•
>
l
. - ... XXXV
293 293 293 264, 293, 3Q1, �15, 316 . . 303 295 295 295 I 293, 296 294 293 308 .. i99 296 296, 308• · 296·' 296 297 .. . 297 297 297 . 282, 299� 304, 306 · ., 296, 299 .
299
298. 299, 298, 305 299 ... 299 '· 297 • 298, 304 298 298 298 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 302 • 300 300 3()1 • ,. 301 301 301 306 303 303 303 304 299, 304 • 304 304 . 196, 305 ' ' 304 " 305 307, 31Q 307 ' , 264, 307 . · 302, �05 311, 311 . ' 311 • 311 ' 312 I •
Art. 448 Art. 449 Art. 450 Art. 450(1) Art. 450(2) A.rt. 451 Art. 451-461 Art. 452 Art. 453(1) .l\rt. 453(2) Art. 453(3) Art. 454 Art. 455 Art. 456(1)(2) Ari. 456(3) Art. 457 Art. 458 Art. 459(1) Art. 4-59(2) Art. 459(3) Art. 460(1) Art. 4-60(2) Art. 460(3) Art. 46I(l)(a)-(d) Art. 461(1)(e)(f) Art. 461(2) Art. 462 Art. 4-63(1) Art. 463(2)
Art. 464(1) Art. 464(2) Art. 464(3) · Art. 464(4) Art. 464(5) Art. 465 Art. 465(1) Art. 465(2) Art. 465(3) Art. 466 Art. 467(2) Art. 469(3) Art. 469(1)(2) Art. 470 Art. 471 Art. 472 Art. 474(1)(2) Art. 474(2)(3) Art. 474(3) Art. 475 Art. 475(1) Art. 475(2) Art. 476 Art. 477 Art. 478 Art. 479 Art. 480 Art. 482 Art. 483
312, 313, 356 313 282 313 313 282, 313 19 31,i, 415 314, 315 314 314 316 316 392 394 394 19, 394 394 394 394 394 394 392, 395 395 395 392 391 393 393
393 393 393 393 393 391 393 393 393 392 102 102 102 103 103 103 103 103 227 103 103 104 102 104 104 102 301 4 4, 327
Revised Constitution Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.
26 35 36 39 43 44 51
14, 15 15, 16, 221 18 20 46 46 374
Art. 62 Art. 63 Art. 75 Art. 92 Art. 108 Art. 109 Art. 110
9, 2, 8, 9, 15, 8, 11, 2, 8, 15,
33 16 28 3 17 13 17
Civil Code Art. 10 Art. 17(1) Art. 42 Art. 43 Art. 49(1) Art. 116 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 127 Art. 129 Art. 139 Art. 146 Art. 154 Art. 156 Art. 159 Art. 174 Art. 174-182 Art. 177(2) Art. 193 A.rt. -198 Art. 199(2) Art. 209 Art. 211 Art. 220 Art. 229
105 188 385 385 386 99 385
Art. 234 Art. 238 Art. 239 Art. 287 Art. 319 Art. 339 Art. 340 Art. 341 Art. 343 Art. 347 Art. 351 Art. 353 Art. 354 Art. 358 Art. 359 Art. 369 Art. 377 Art. 380 Art. 382 Art. 383 Art. 388 Art. 394 Art. 448 Art. 451 Art. 454
100
385 385 385 385 244 100 244 379 379 33 61 61, 115 61 385 386 386 386
xxxvi
100 386 385 385 386 61 61 61 61 61 61 100 100 61 61 385 100, 385 61 61 386 61 1 386 1
1
-
Art. 455 Art. 470 Art. 505 Art. 516 Art. 522 Art. 523 Art. 526 Art. 528 Art. 535 Art. 545 Art. 572-574 Art. 585 Art. 592 Art. 592(2) Art. 596 Art. 601 Art. 608(1) Art. 609 Art. 612(1) Art. 628 Art. 630 Art. 633 Art. 647 Art. 663 Art. 666(3) Art. 683(3) Art. 725-728 Art. 729 A.rt. 733(2) Art. 734 Art. 736 Art. 749 Art. 759(1) Art. 763 Art. 766 Art. 767 Art. 773 Art. 775 Art. 776(2) Art. 776(3) Art. 779 Art. 781(1) Art. 786 Art. 793 Art. 795(1) Art. 804 Art. 807 Art. 826(1) Art. 948 Art. 950 Art. 1149 Art. 1149(3) Art. 1172 Art. 1195 Art. 1196 Art. 1206 Art. 1225 Art. 1226 Art. 1257(1) Art. 1265 Art. 1266 Art. 1371 Art. 1489 Art. 1623 Art. 1630 Art. 1643 Art. 1648(b)
·1, 101 385 386 62 386 385 62 385 385 21 188 11 385 100 385 385 100 100 100 385 385 385 38 105 105 56 31 31 388 388 389 385 105 385 385 385 385 106 106 106 385 106 385 106 106 385 331 36 62 62 313 317 68 184, 291 184, 291 301, 315 105 105 82 86 291 328 64 385 385 366 186
Art. 1654(2) Art. 1677(1) Art. 1692 Art. 1696 Art. 1697 Art. 1704 Art. 1705 Art. 1706 Art. 1710 Art. 1716 Art. l725(a) Art. 1727 Art. 1727(2) Art. 1729(1) Art. 1776 Art. 1791 Art. 1792 Art. 1792(2) Art. 1793(a) Art. 1793(b) Art. 1808(1) Art. 1845 Art. 1846 Art. 1848 Art. 1848(1) Art. 1848(2) Art. 1848(3) Art. 1851 Art. 1852 Art. 1856(2) Art. 1896 Art. 1896-1897 Art. 1897 Art. 1898 Art. 1908 Art. 1908(1) Art. 1940 Art. 1904(3) Art. 1962 Art. 1967(1) Art. 1971 Art. 197l(a) Art. 1986 Art. 2001 Art. 2001(1) Art. 2005 Art. 2027 Art. 2028 Art. 2029 Art. 2031 Art. 2038 Art. 2039(b) Art. 2044 Art. 2047 Art. 2047(1) Art. 2047(2) Art. 2050(3) Art. 2051(b) Art. 2061 Art. 2067(1) Art. 2067(2) Art. 2082(1) Art. 2086 Art. 2095 Art. 2121 Art. 2121(2) ••
XXXVll
186 271 37 137 137 137, 141 137 137 183, 188 188 136, 179 136 189 136 40, 128, 282, 367 137 177 172 182 182 137 123, 271 92 375 375 375 375 172 172 138, 174, 176 75, 78, 106, 353 34 75, 78, 88, 269, 279 285, 353 353 88, 269 88, 89 98, 376 98 53 53 269 231 104 199 317 184, 234, 339 39 138 138 148 2, 143, 321 143 126, 142 125 144 144, 182 14 3 143 156 138 138 156 : 156� 157, 353 39 282, 365 367
.....
199, 317 104 321 251 89 133 34 351 350 154 154 171 40 41 387 187, 188 188 188 189
Art. 2141 Art. 2144 Art. 2149 Art. 2160 Art. 2161(1) Art. 2162 Art. 2199 Art. 2386 Art. 2386(1) Art. 2534 Art. 2535(2)(3) Art. 2636 Art. 2892 Art. 3042 Art. 3132(2) Art. 3307 Art. 3307-3324 Art. 3308 Ari. 3308(2)
Art. 3309 Art. 3312 Art. 3313(1) Art. 3313(2) Art. 3313(3) Art. 3314(1) . Art. 3314(2) Art. 3316 Art. 3325(1) Arts. 3325-3346 Art. 3336(2) Art. 3344 Art. 3345 Art. 3347 Art. 3348 Art. 3350(1) Art. 3351 Art. 3362 Arts. 3363-3367
189 189 189 190 190 190 190 188 . 387 12, 387 388 176 387 11 335 335 3 21 128
Arts. 537-539 Art. 617 Art. 636 Art. 721(1)(a)
2 11 104 52
Penal Code Art. 1 Art. 100
1
321 52 368 123, 393
Art. 217 Art. 443 Art. 446
Cr�minal Procedure Code Art. 29
374 201 321
Art. 136(3) Arts. 154-159
Art. 181 Art. 182 Art. 183
13 8, 13, 221 13
Commercial Code Art. 138 Art. 216 Art. 255 Arts. 258-270 Art. 260(1) Art. 260(3) Art. 261 Art. 286 Art. 293 Art. 294 Art. 309 Art. 333 Art. 333(2)(b) Art. 365 Art. 367 Art. 375(1) Art. 416 Art. 441 Art. 630
101 101 101, 113 357 107 107 107, 386 101 386 101 74 301 301 �4, 174 54 290 386 385 38
Art. 647 Art. 683 Art. 683(1) Art. 683(3) Art. 685 Art. 687(1) Art. 690 Art. 701 Art. 735(b) Art. 823(b) Art. 827(a) Art. 868 · Art. 872 Art. 975(c) .Art. 978(1)(b) Art. 980(2)(b) Art. 998(3) Art. 1004(4) Art. 1017
'
37 56 55, 99 56 90 97, 326 55, 56 93 382 382 382 75 75 100 100 100 100 100 100
Maritime Code Art. 78 Art. 79 Art. 94 Art. 96
. .'.'
,..
No. 1 Art. 10 Year No. 2 Art. 10 Year No. 19 Arts. 50-58 Year 1965 No. Arts. 59-60 Year
102 102 102 102
Art. 121 Art. 208 Art. 237
•
286 37 39
Decree . 9 12 32 32
No. 'Art. 61 Year No. 49 Art. Year No. 49 Art. 12 Year No. 52 Art. Year 1965 •••
XXXVIII
'
32 31 8 3
Proclamations No. Note Note Note No. Note No.
Art. 3 Year 1942 Art. 3 Year Art. 8 Year Art. 9 Year Art. 16(1)(b) Art. 23 Art. 33
6 6 6 2 9
9 10 10 10 28 11
No. 2 Year 1942 2, 8 No. 12 Art. Year 1942 11 No. 62 Art. Year.1944 11 No. 90 Art. Year 1947 10, 11 No. 195 Art. Year 1962 9 No. 195 Section 15 Year 1962 2 No. 203 Art. Year 1963 9
Legal Notice Art. 21 No. 176 Art. 33
2,
76 70
No. 33
130
Order 16A Rule l(c) Order 18 Rule 6
91
Rules 6 No. Art. Art. 11-12 13 Art.
52 70 76
80
Court Pro. Rules Art. 3 No. 33 Art. 25 No. Art. 26
28 130 130
No. 33 No. 155
3 3
Year 1943 Year 1951
Administration of Justice Proclamation Art. 17 No. 2 Year 1942
221
FRANCE French Civil Code
•
. 23
Art. 14
INDIA Indian Code of Civ. P. Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order
1 Rule 1 Rule 1 Rule l
1 1 1 6
6 9
14 20 21 21
Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule Rule
73 3 62 8 81 9 ·81 10 18 illustration (b) 279 18 illustration (c) 279 18 illustration (d) 279 127 2 146 17 162 3 181 6 130 19 267 15 283 32
Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order Order
21 Rule 36
282
91
305
21 Rule 21 Rule 24 Rule 24 Rule 24 Rule 35 Rule 35 Rule 37 Rule 38 Rule 41 Rule 41 Rule 47 Rule
Indian Limitation Act of 1908 Section 5
226 XXXIX '
306
89
4 illustration (a) 380 4 illustration (b) 381 4 illustration (c) 381 5 illustration (a) 95 5 illustration (b) 95
1 9
381
22( 4) 1-9
9
363
1
224 22
213
UNl'l'ED STATES Fed. Rules Pro. Art. 21(1)
93
U.S. Constitution Art. 4 Sect. 2 Art. 11 Sect. 2
Art. 111 Sect. 2
152 16
XL
8
•
.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.
The Nature of Civil Procedure
Procedu!e re�ers to �l1 � n1etl1od by wl1jch claims of persons are adjudicated and by_ wb1cl1 r1g�1ts, pr1v1leges anct duties are deter111ined and enforced by tl1e ap.l?ropr!ate legal tr1bt111als. It for111s the main part of what is called adjective la�v,1 wlucl1 1s that part of the law dealing witl1 lio�v rigl1ts, privileges and duties are er1forced. Tl1at p,1rt of the law wl1icl1 defines st1ch rigl1ts, privileges and duties is called tl1e �i1b�tar1tive la,1,. Tl1is for111s tl1e greater part of the law, and it wottld seem tl1 �t .1t 1s tl1.e n1ore i1n1Jortant IJ,lrt, since it defines wl1at rights, privileges and duties 011e perso11 1nay l1ave against or owe a11other. However, tl1e rights, privileges and d11ties tl1at exist tinder s11cl1 law will 111ean not]1jog unless they can be enforced. I _t is the f11nctio11 of adjective law to i11s11re tl1at sucl1 rigl1ts, privi leges �1od d11t1es are enforced, bt1t witl1out an effective system of adjective law, they will 11ot be e11forced, and for all intents a11d p11rposes, will be 111ea11ingless. This is why adjective law is jt1st as important as the substantive law, indeed if not more so. As we l1ave said, procedu1·e for1ns the n1ai11 part of acljective la\:v. Civil proce dL1re m.ea11s sin1ply tl1e procedLtre tl1at · is followed in civil cases.2 A civil case is one that is institt1ted by a perso11 - i t 1nay be an individ11al or a legal person3 or even tl1e govern111ent4 - against at1other for tl1e pt1rpose of obtai11ing redress for a wrong allegedly com111itted against lum. Usually he will be seeking tl1e payment of money,_ aJtl1ough sometin1es he may be seeki11g specific relief, e.g., tl1at tl1e otl1er person convey. land·· to hi111 as h.e l1ad agreed to do. Tl1e person wl10 initiates a civil case is called tl1e plai11tiff; the person wl10 is sl1ed in a civil case is called the defendant. The opposite of a civil case is a pe11al prosec11tion. A penal JJrose cution is in.stitt1ted by the govern1nent for the p11r.pose of sec11riog obedience to its laws by tl1e p11nisl1ment or correction of the lawbreaker,5 and a separate body of law governs the procedt1re to be followed i11 s11ch cases. 6 T11t1s, wl1etl1er a case The other major part of adjective law is evidence. An evidence code l1as not yet been pro mulgated, althougl1 some provisio ns of the Civil Procedure Code and the substa.nt ive codes deal witl1 evidence. In tl1e broad sense adjective la\,v refers to any area of Jaw n ot classifiecl as "subs tantive." 2. The definition of civil procedure and tl1e material dealing with tl1e distinction between civil and criminal cases is take11 from R. Field an d B. Kaplan, Materials orz Civil Proceclure (1953), pp. 1-2. 3. A legal person refers to an e11tity otl1er than a physical person wl1icl1 can be the subject of rights a.nd duties. An association or a trade u111on wotlld be an exan1ple of a legal per son. See Civ. C., Arts., 451, 454, 455. 4. The State is regarded by the law as a person and can, therefor�, s_u� to obtain redress in the same manner as an individt1al. See Civ. C., Art. 394. lf an 1 nd1v1dual damages govern ment property, for exan1ple, the governme nt can sue him iL1 a civil action to recover damages for the injt1ry to tl1e property. 5. See the definition of the ptirpose of pena 1 law in Pen. C., Art. I, 6. The Criminal Procedure Code was pron1ulgated in 1961. Mt1cl1 of pe11al procedure i_nvolv tl1e "procedural rights'' of the acct1sed, and_ if such rigl1ts have been violated dur1ng t,:e _ proceedings, a conviction might not be st1sta1ned. 1.
-1-
is civil or penal depends upon (1) who is instituting the action, (2) the purpose ror wbicl1 the action is instituted and (3) the relief that will be given. Note that the same act n1ay constitute botl1 a penal offence and a civil wrong. If Ato A attacks Ato B, he l1 as committed a penal offense ; 7 he has also committed a civil wrong against tl1e person of Ato B, for whicl1 Ato B may claim redress. 8 To repeat, a civil case is one instituted by an individual for tl1e purpose of securing redress for a wro11g v1l1ich l1as been con1111itted against hin1, and if l1e is successful, he will be a\varded mo11 ey or otl1er personal relief. Civil procedure is the procedure tl1 at is e111ployed in sucl1 cases, and it is tl1 at kind of procedure with wh.ich th.is book will be concerned. Tl1e purpose of procedure is to insure that legal disputes will be l1 andled in a fair and orderly way and as expeditiously and econo1nically as possible. Where a dis.1Jute is brot1gl1t before a legal tribunal sucl1 as a cotirt, 9 it is the function of tl1e cot1rt to adjudicate the diSJJUte in accordance with the la\v. 10 In order for the cot1rt to perform properly tl1at function, it 111 ust operate under a well-defined and effective procedure. Tl1e clai1ns of both parties m11st be l1eard in an orderly n1 anner. Tl1e issues for decision must be clearly presented to tl1 e co11rt. The court's judg111ent m11st be e11forced. It is tl1e responsibility of lawyers and judges to see tl1at the proper IJrocedure is followed and tl1at tl1e litigation will e11d with a deci sio11 i11 accorda11cc witl1 tl1e law. 11 Tl1is JJt1r1Jose of procedure m11st a.l,vays be kept i11 mind. Proced t1 re is but 1nea11s to a11 e11d; it is 11ot a11 end in itself. Procedure l1 as utility 011ly insofar as it e11 ables tl1e court to 111alce a fair a11d proper disposition of a case before it. Wl1e11 deter111ini11g the proper proced t1re to follow excessively delays the trial of tl1e n1 erits of tl1e case or vvl1en a party's rigl1ts are lost beca11se of procedural errors, JJrocedt1re is not serving its inte11ded purpose. Procedure exists solely to ins11re tl1e proper e11force111ent of rigl1ts, privileges and d l1ties existing llnder the st1bstantive law. TI1is n111st aJways be bor11e in nund when dealing with procedural n1atters� and it is within this frame of reference that we will approac]1 tl1e law of ci\1il procedure. B.
CiYil Procedure in Ethiopia : Tl1e Civil Procedure Code of 1965
Historically tl1ere \Vas little empl1asis 011 procedt1re in Ethiopia. In order for procedure to be effectively employed, lawyers must be trained to use it. WI1ile untrai11 ed persons can after son1 e experience deal with tl1e substantive law, tl1e use of modern procedure req11ires a special expertise tl1 at \\'as lacking J1ere. Thus, at tl1e time wl1en, f oJlowing the Restoration, Etl1iopia bega.n to n1oder nize lier legal system, no procedural law existed at al]. Tl1 e Adn1inistration of J t1stice Procla 1nation of 1942, 12 wl1icl1 established a systen1 of cot1rts, a t1thorized the courts to promulgate procedural rules with the approval of tl1e Minister of Se e Pe11. C., Arts. 537-539. S ee Civ. C., Art. 2038. Se e Ch apter II., infr., for the definition of a court witl1in the meaning of the Constitution. Se e Rev. Const., Arts. 108, 110. Proce�ural rules also have cert ain specific purposes. Professors Field and Kaplan list the . the fol lowmg:. (1) to provide means of disclosing wl1at the contest is about; (2) to disclose tJ1e real dispu te between the parties; (3) to confine the parties to the pre sentation of materi a ls �elevant to the real dispute and l1elpful to its resolution; (4) to insure that neither side obtains an undeserved forensic advantage in presenting its case to the court. R. Field and B. Kapl an, supra, note 2 at pp. 3-4. 12. Ad1uinistration of Justice Proclam ation, 1942, Proc. No . 2 , iveg. 11.r Gaz., year 1 , No. 1 .
7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
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Justice. !n 1943 !he High Cot1rt promu�gated some proced11ral rules, which governed _ act1011s 1n the_ H1gl1 Court and subordinate co11rts, 13 and in subseqtient years son1e additional_ rules were promt 11gated. 14 However, tl1ese rules, on tl1e whole, were not very deta1led, and a n11mber of areas of proced11ral law were not covered. It was generally agreed that _t�e a�sence of a comprehensive civil procedure code adver sely affected tl1e_ adn11111s1! �t 1on of jt1stice in civil cases,15 and work was begun on such a code 1n the M1n1stry of J11stice. Unlike tl1e other codes, the basic text of tl1e Civil Procedure Code was drafted by the Codi·fication Department of tl1e Nii11istry of Justicet& rather tl1an by foreion experts. 17 In so111e iosta11ces tl1e Code incorporated existing provisions of law, altl1011;l1 in a nun1 ber of· P. laces tl1e existing provisions were substantially modified or enlarged. Many of tl1e new :provisio11s were ba.sed on provisions contai 11ed in otl1er codes such as tl1e I11 dia11 Code of Civil Procedure, 18 but tl1 e borrowing was highly selective. A foreign code was not ''i11corporated'' or t1sed as a model as such, and tl1e Code 11111st be consiclered a distinctly Ethiopian work. It was draf ted witl1 a view toward in1proving tl1e ad1ninistration of jt1stice in Eth.iopia19 and providing a code that co11ld be effectively en1 ployed by lawyers a11d j11dges here. The Code was pron111lgated as a decree20 by I-Iis Imperial Majesty, the E1n_per or, acting in accordance with Elis powers under Art. 92 of the Revised Constit11tioo.21 It is effective as of October 8, 1965, and is applicable to all suits pending on that day or instituted tl1ereafter. 22 Most i111portantly, all r11les 1)revio11sly in force concerning matters governed by the Code are repealed.23 Tl1is means tl1at if a n1atter of proced11ral law is covered by the Code, any other r11le dealing ,:vitl1 that matter is repealed, even tho11gl1 tl1e r11le is not inconsistent witl1 the Code. 2-1 The intention is that the Code sl1all replace any other r11le on a 1natter with wl1ich tl1e Code deals. All the law relati11g to civil procedt1re is to be co11tained in t· 'he Code. 13. 14.
Court Procedtrre Rules, 1943, Leg. Not. No. 33, Neg. Gaz., year 3, no. 2. For example, rttles relating to appeals to tl1e Supreme Imperial CoLLrt. Supreme Imperial Cou.rt Procedu.re Rules, 1951, Leg. Not. No. 155, Neg. Gaz., year 10, no. 11. 15. The major problem has bee11 the delay in tl1e :final disposition of the case. It is not un common for son,e cases to take a number of years to be fmally decided. 16. The master text was drafted in English and then translated into An1J1aric. 17. The Civil Code, for example, was drafted by Professor Rene. Da�id of the University of Paris and tl1e Penal Code by Professor Jean Graven of tl1e Uruvers1ty of Geneva. 18. It sl1ot1ld be noted that son1e of tl1e CotLrt Procedtrre Rules of 1943 were based on the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. Thjs code was used as a model for the procedural codes of some Britisl1 colonies in Africa st1cl1 as the Suda11, and was of widespreacl application. Since British judges assistecl in the drafting of tl1e_ !943 rules, it was on1y natural tl1at they should turn to the Indian Code. Tl1us, some prov1s1ons of the new code tl1at are based on the 1943 rules are indirectly based on the lnd.ian Code. 19. See the Preamble to the Civil Procedure Code. 20. Decree No. 52 of 1965. It was publ.isl1ed in an extraordinary issue of the Negarit Gazeta. � en Parliaf n,ent 21. Under Art. 92, His Imperial Majesty may pr?mulgate emergeoc� le�islation v.;h is not sitting. Upon publication in the Negar1t Gazeta, sucl1 leg1slat1on bas t.i.1e force o 1 aw unless it is disapproved by Parliament. . . c 22. Civ. Pro. ., Art. 1(1). Tt1is is in accordance witl1 the general rule_ appl1c_able to procedural t oac .retr al�y t1su 1s lon slat l leg1 ura ced pro , cted e aff not are ts righ tive legislation. Since substan . Art . C., e C1v par . Com ent ctm ena of e dat the at g din pen es cas all to ive and applicable 3351 . 23. See the Preamble to tl1e Civil Procedure Code. a v L 24. As to the effect of such a repeals provision, see G. Krzeczu?o�icz,c'.'1 �e; �gif� Jb � o e o 1v1 n 1a. 11op , Etl the of ion vis Pro ls' pea 'Re e T11 w: La ry ach ma pro to Custo Ap J. Eth. Studies, vol. 1 ( 1963), p. 57.
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Tb.e Code is concise, containing only 483 articles. 25 It is divided into nine books 26 atid further divided i 11 to cl1apters and paragraphs. �he chapter dealing with modes of execution also contains s11b-paragrapl1s, but that 1s the only instance of such. a further divisio1 1. Tl1e topics . � f the boo�s ar� . as f?llows: !urisdiction of Courts; Parties to Suits; G·eneraI Provisions regarding C1v1l S111ts_;. Ordinary Proceed ings in the First Instance; Special Procedures; Appeal, Oppos1t1on a11d Revision; Execution of Decrees; Costs; Final Provisions. A Table of Contents by article is appe11 ded. Two features of the Code deserve s1)ecial co1ru11 e11t. In tl1e first place, it con tai 11s four scl1edules of for1ns gover 11ing pleadings, process, n1iscella11eous matters and executio11 . Tl1ese forms n111st be used, 27 ancl t111ifor1n for1ns will help to simp lify the proceedings. Lawyers and co11rt officials will kno1vv what kind of forn1s are to be 11sed, and 0 11 ly the details 111t1st be ·filled in, so to speak. Tl1e judges will expect to see certai11 l<ind of forn1s a 11d will becon1e acct1sto111ecl to dealing witl1 tl1en1. Since lawyers, judges a11d cot1rt officials can consult tl1ose for1ns, the provi sio11 of tl1e Code reg11lati 11g 1natters st1cJ1 as J)leadiog will be easier to follow and aJ)l)ly. Seco 11 dly, the Minister of JL1stice is give 11 tl1e power to 111ake r11les tl1at a.dd to or a111e 11cl tl1e provisio11s of tl1 e Code. 28 Tl1 is e11a bles tl1 e Minister to n1ake cl1a11ges deen1ed 11ecessary in light of ex1)erience witl1ot1t having to go tl1ro11gl1 the enlire legislative J)rocess. Moreo,1er, procedt 1re sl1ot1ld be the expertise of j11dges a11d J\rI i11istry officials. Parlia11 1e 11t's i.11terest in ''controlling'' the procedt1ral law is 11ot the same as its i11terest in defi 1 1i11 g ,vl1at rigl1ts, privileges and duties sl1all exist i11 Etl1io1)ia. Tl1e operatio1 1 of tl1e Code ca11 be careft 1lly observed, and needed changes can be 111ade expeditiot1sly. The only lin1itation on tl1e Minister's power is tl1at l1e can 1 1ot J)ron1t1lgate rt1les inco11sistent ,vitl1 tl1 e provisions of the Code relating to 1naterial a11d a1)J)ellate juriscliction. Tl1e Civil Procedure Code n111st be rea. d in conj11nction \Vitl1 tl1e st1bstantive codes. As ,ve will see, certain provisions of the st1bstantive law have an a1)preci able effect on procedural matters, and certain J)rovisio11s of tl1 e Civil Procedure Code 11111st be interpreted in ligl1t of tl1e s11bsta11 tive la\V. In this con11 ection s0111e problen1s n1ay arise, beca1 1se the s11bsta 11tive codes and tl1e Civil Procedure Code \\'er� dr�t_ed independently. Tl1 e for1n of tl1 e substantive codes follows that e1uploy ed 111 c1 V1l la\v cou11 tries while tl1 e for111 of tl1e Civil Procedltre Code follows tl1at e_ n11)loyed in_ co1nn1 011 law cot111 tries. Some conft1sion in termi 11ology 1nay res11lt, a1 1d it 1nay be d1ffic�1lt to relate certain proced11ral co11cepts to tl1e precise ter1nino logy of tl1 e substantive codes. We will clisc11ss these proble111s of interaction in tl1e co11text of tl1e areas of procedttral law in wl1ich tl1 ey arise. �t tl1 is j u 11ct11_re a word sl1ot1ld be said abo11t interpretatio11 of tl1e Code. T 1i1variably, there will be problen1s of interpretatio n, and tl1e q11estio11 is wl1at app roacl1 should be t�ken to �ode interpretatio11 in tl1e procedural area. I would suggest that such 1nterpretat1on be ''practical," tl1at is, the provisions sl1 ould. be Compare tlle size of the Indian Cod e of Civil Procedt1re, whi d by sections, orga nize is cl1 schedules a11 d orders. 26 · ihere is a printer's error repeating Boo ks IV and VII twice. Book V should be Specia l , o d t Book V J, A .ppeal, _Oppositio!l and Revision, Book VII' Execution of Decrees , � i: �r B ' Cos t s, B00 k IX, Fmal Prov151.ons. 27. See, for example, Civ. Pro. c., Art. 80 · · 28. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 483. He sh all a.1 so . . under make prescribed regulations matter any concerning the Code· c1·v· pro. C., Art. 482.
25.
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interpreted i11 the way tl1at will best facilitate tl1e purpose of procedural law _ to ins11re that the �ase will be h �ndled in a fair and orderly way and as expeditious ly �nd. ec?nornically as �oss1ble. When there is do11bt as to the rneani11g of a prov1s10?, 1t_ should be assigned . the meaning that . will enable the co11rt to proceed roost .effectively. Concept11al �ot1ons are far less important i 1 1 the procedt1ral area tl1an 1 n the area of s�1bst �nt1ve law. Since the Code was not enacted by Parlia ?1e1:1t, there are no l �g1slat1ve ?ebates, nor is there anytlung p11blished that wo11ld 1nd1cate tl1e _drafter , s 1 _nterpret�t1on of doubtfL1l articles. Conseq11ently the ''intention'' n1etl1od of 1nterpretat1on29 will be of little 11se except insofar as ''intention'' can be ?leaned fr?n1 t!1e .ter111s of_ the _otl1er articles. A pragmatic and practically orie11t ed 1 nterpretat1on, 1t 1s s11b1111tted, 1s the so11ndest, and it is hoped that tl1e Code will be interpreted in tlus way. A related q11estio11 involves tl1e sig11ifica11ce to be attached to previously decid ed cases involving procedt1ral la\v. The fact tl1at a q11estion has been passed on before 1 11ay be very l1el1)fL1l to anotl1er co11rt w]1en confronted witl1 tl1e same q11es tion. E,1 e11 i11 co111 1tries w]1ere co11rts are not bo1rnd by decisions of higher co11rts or by tl1eir previo11s decisions,30 tl1ere is a tendency to look to past decisio11s and freqt1ently to follow tl1e111. 31 Tl1is is u11derstandable and desirable. The co11rt whicl1 first dealt \:vitl1 tl1e problen1 will l1ave foc11sed 0 1 1 the legal issue ancl set fortl1 the reasons for its decision. Tl1is 111akes tl1e t11sl< of tl1e second co11rt easier: it 1nay agree witl1 tl1e res11lt a11d follow tl1e prior decision, or, if it is free to disregard that decision, tl1e reaso11s given by the cot1rt it1 tl1e for1ner case for decidi11g as it did may l1e1p tl1e other court to defi11e its ovvn reasoni11g and i11dicate wl1y the case sl1011ld be decided . differently. In eitl1er event, it is very 11seft1l to co11sult prior decisions on the san1e q11estion, si 11ce the i11sigl1ts obtai11ed thereby 111ay be hel1)ful i11 enabli11g tl1e court to decide tl1e q11estion no\v before it. Tl1e proble111 in Ethiopia is that there is not yet, nor is tl1ere lil<ely to be for some time in the fut11re, a body of Ethiopia11 case law dealing vvith civil procedure. 32 Tl111s, if a11 Ethiopian co11rt is to cons11lt prior decisions, it 0111st for the time being t11r11 to cases decided by foreign co11rts. 33 If foreig 11 cases are to be consulted, it n1l1st be witl1 a great ·deal of care and discretion. In the first place, we. must ask wl1at foreign ca.ses wo11ld be relevant for the p11rpose of assist ing the co11rt in its interpretation of tl1e Etl1iopia11 Civil Proced11re Code. Relevant cases would be cases fron1 cou11tries l1aving tl1e same kind of civil J)rocedure code as Etl1iopia. As we said earlier, a n11111ber of provisions have been based on corresSee the discL1ssion of tltls metl1od of interpretation in M. Planiol, Treatise on tl1e Civil Lalv (12th ed. 1939) (translation, Louisiana State L. Inst., 1959), vol, 1, part 1, pp. 159-160. 30. In common law countries coLrrts n1ust follow the decisions on questions of law en1anating from hierarcl1ially superior coL1rts. Under the �rinciple of st�re �lecisis, appellate. courts . �ollo� their own decisions in previo11s cases except in the rare s1tuat1on wl1ere a pnor dec1s1on 1s overruled. In Ethiopia, under § 15 of the Courts Proclamation of_ 1962, Proc. No. J 95 _, Neg. Gaz., year 22, 110. 7, decisio11s on n1atters of Ia,v �endered. by 1:ugl�er courts are. b1nd1ng_ ?n subordinate co11rts. This would have the effect of 1ntrodL1crng b1od1ag precedent 1n Etl11op1a, but the Proclan1ation is now suspended. 31 . It it said that even where decisions of higher courts are not binding, they are ''highly per suasive." See tl1e discussion of this point in R. David and M. de Vri�, T_l1e Fre��lz Legal System (1958), pp. 116-117. As to the tend:ncy of courts to follow tl1e1r prior dec1s1ons and arrive at established solt1tions, see M. Plan1ol, supra, note 29 at p. 125. 32. In addition, no organized system of case reporting exists, altl1ougl1 selected cases are reported in the Jour11al of Ethiopian Law. ing to f?re !go g look � 33. There is also little commentary on Etl1iopian procedural law, _necessitati . s of tl1e Etl11op1an 1s1on commentators. Any sucl1 writings n1ust be related t? tJ,e spec�c prov Civil Procedure Code and used with the same caution as fore1gn cases. 29.
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}
po11 ding provisions of tl1e I·ndian Cod.e of Civil Procedure (thoL1gh . frequently witl1 a high d.egree of selectivity) and codes of ''comn1on la.w'' countries. Although a detailed discussion of the differet1ce between procedt1re in common law and civil law cot1ntries is beyond the scope of this book, 34 it is proper to observe that common law countries place mucl1 greater emphasis on procedure tl1an do civil law cot1ntries. Tl1e 1naterial contained in Section A a.bove is written from the orie 1 1tation of tl1e co11 1n1on law approacl1 , under whicl1 a g-reat deal is expected of procedure. The Etl1iopia11 Civil Procedure Code clearly follows tl1e common law approacl1 and contains the kind of pro, 1isions tl1at are found in tl1 e procedural codes of common law countries. Tl1erefore, cases con1 ing fron1 sucl1 countries 1nay be relevant in i 11 ter1Jreting the Etl1 iopian Code. But, in each situation, tl1 e Ethiopian court n1ust be st1re tl1at tl1 e provisio11 of procedt1ral law on whicl1 the decision of t11e foreign court is based is sin1 ilar to tl1 e JJrovision co11 tained in tl1e Etl1iopian Code. Moreover, tl1 e fact tl1at st1cl1 cases are relevant only n1ea11s that they may be l1 elpft1l in eoabling tl1e Ethiopian court to decide tl1 e procedt1ral question before it. Sucl1 decisio 11 s ca11 l1 ave 110 bindi11g effect. Merely becat1se the India 11 courts, for exan1 JJle, l1 ave decided a qt1estion i11 a partict1lar way does not n1ean tl1 at tl1 e Etl1iopia11 courts n1 t1st decide the qt1estion the san1 e way, even tl1ougl1 the provis io11s of tl1e Etl1iopia11 Code a11 ct tl1e I11dian Code 111 ay be qt1ite si1nila 1· or the Etl1io1)ia11 JJrovisio11 is based 0 11 tl1e In.dian 011e. Nor does the fact that the quest io11 l1as been resolvecl i11 a certai11 \Vay by 1 nost or all of tl1e otl1er courts that l1ave IJassed on it necessarily n1 ean tl1 at it sl1 ot1ld be resolvecl tl1 e sa 1 ne \Vay by the Et hiopia 11 cot1rts. Tl1is 111ay be a. very perst1asive factor. Bt1t each question tl1 at arises l1ere 11 1L1st be co1 1sidered in tl1e Etl1iopian context, wl1 icl1 n1 ay require a different solutio 1 1 in a particular case. Tl1is is 110\v foreig11 cases will be approached i11 this book. We ,vill consider a 11 11n1ber of foreign cases in detail and make reference to 111any otl1 ers. T11ese cases are not cited as ''autl1ority''35 in tl1 e sense tl1 at tl1ey are in any way bind ing ot1 the Etl1iopia11 courts. Tl1ey are illi,strative of the legal problen1 s that arise in the proced11ral area and l1 ow st1cl1 problems l1 ave been resolved by cot1rts in otl1er countries. Tl1e)' 111 ay also be used to den1 onstrate principles o·f general appli catio11, wl1 icl1 sl1 ot1ld be fo]lo,ved in Etluopia. We n1t1 st co11 tinue to use foreign cases a11d 111 aterials until a s11bstantial body of Etl1iopian case law anq commentary is developed, bLit s11cl1 use 11 111st be a li1nited one and• done very careft1lly. C.
The l\1Iajor Problems of Procedure
As stated in tl1 e Preface, this book is not intended to be a cor11mentary on tl1e Civil Procedure Code. It is designecl to deal IJrimarily witl1 the major problems of procedt1re, the problen1s tl1 at are most crt1cial to the efl'icient adj11dicatio 1 1 of legal disptites. 36 Let tis now review tl1 e 1najor problen1s of procedure a11 d approacl1 tl1 em in tern1s of the variot1s stages of litigation. Tl1e first qt1estion t11 at 1nust be asked 011ce litigation is conte111plated is where may suit be brougl1t? This is tl1e qt1estio11 of ji1risclictio11. The cot1rt i n which suit is brougl1 t n1ust have power to l1 ear t11 e case: tl1is n1 eans that it 1nust have the power to s11bject tl1 e clefenda11t or his property to its processes, it must be able 34. A dis�ussio � of the di.ff �rence in the approach taken in France and in tl1e Anglo-American countries w1.II be found m R. David ru1d M. de Vries, supra, note 31 at pp. 73-77. 35. Thus, all refer�nc� to foreign cases are preceded by "see." This is intended to den1onstrate that the case 1s cited for purposes of illustration and not as authority. 36. The list of ." �ajor problems of procedure" is taken in part fron1 A. VanderbiJt, Cases on Modern Jurl1c1al Adrninistration and Procedure (1952), pp. 25-26.
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to h.ear the 1?nd of case that is brot1ght, and it must be the court in which the s Recific c�se 1 � t? �e . hea�d. Jurisdiction lies at the threshold of litigation, and we will co11s1der JUr1sd1ction 1n Chapter III. After it is cle�r where suit is to be bro11ght, tl1ere is the question of parties. �t . must be determined wl10 ca � sue or be sued, who can join as plaintiffs or be Joined as . defendan!s,_ what cl �11!1s n1ay be joined against a party or parties, and wl1at parties n1ust JOin or be Joined. This is not as simple a question as it mi0ol1 t first appear. Chapter IV deals witl1 parties and the dimensions of the dispute. Once the plaintiff knows where l1e is to file suit and whom he is to sue the next question is l1ow l1e is to bring tl1e defendant before the court. Thi� involves institution of suit a11cl service of process. TJ1e plaintiff m11st institute his case in accordance witl1 a prescribed procedure, and the defendant m11st be notified that a st1it has been filed agai11st lum. Chapter V covers institt1tion of suit and service of process. After a suit l1as bee11 instituted, the parties must place tl1eir respective contentions before the court. Tl1ey m11st ap_prise tl1e co11rt and their opponents of what positions tl1ey will be taking. The statements of tl1eir positions are known as pleacl ings, and pleading plays a very important part in the process of litigation in Eth iopia. As we will see, what l1appens during the pleading stage significantly affects · the entire case. We will discuss pleading in Cl1apter VI. After the pleadings l1ave been filed, the case is prepared for trial. TJ1ere are proceedings prio,· to trial, in wltlch this takes place. These proceedings will be discussed in Chapter VII. How do the parties prese11t the merits of their case to the court, and l1ow does the co11rt decide who sl1all prevail? All that went before c11lminates in the trial. It is here that the parties present their cases for the co11rt's decision and the court renders a judgment, disposing of tl1e controversy. Chapter VIII will be devo ted to the trial. A party who is dissatisfied with the judgment against llim may obtain a revie�v of the decision. In Ethiopia review may be sought before tl1e court whicl1 rendered the decision, before an appellate court and before I-Iis Imperial Majesty's chilot. We will consider review in Cl1apter IX. The last problem before the case is finally closed concerns the rea� on why the plaintiff .instituted suit - to obtain redress. from . the ?efendan�. �f the Judgm�nt has been for the plaintiff, l1ow does he obtain satisfaction? This 1s the q11est1on of executiorz of judgll1ents, which will be disct1ssed in Chapter X. Even after the case I1as been closed, a question may arise as to the effect of the judgment upon fut11re litigation. This is the matter of res juclicata and splitting _ of claims, and Chapter XI will be devoted to that subJect. In Chapter XII. we will briefly discuss some other areas of procedural law that do not fall under the heading of ''major problems of procedure_. " Howe� er,. be�ore we can discuss any questions of procedure, we must fir� t consider the 1nst1tuti?ns by which the law is administered i n Ethiopia, a� d '!'e will now tt1rn our attention to a consideration of the judicial systen1 of Ethiopia.
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CHAPTER II Tl-IE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF ETHIOPIA The jt1dicial. system of Ethiopia consists of two parts, the courts and His Imperial Majesty's chilot. In tl1is cl1apter w_e wi� con_�i9�� the p l�S7�:_o� both insti tt1tio11s in the jt1dicial system and tl1e relat1onsl11p bet�]} .. the11;1. '-=t• 4
A.
I\•
••
Tl1e Courts
Tl1e judicial power of Etl1 iopia is vested in the courts establisl1ed by law. 1 TJ1e Revisecl Co11stitt1tio11 provides for tl1e existence of tl1e St1preme In1perial Court and ''s11cl1 otl1er courts as may be establisl1ed by law." 2 Tl1e judicial power is defined as tl1e power to decide cases i11 accorda11 ce witl1 tl1e Ia,v. 3 In Iigl1t of tl1 ese constitt1tio11al 1Jrovisions, we n1ay defi11 e a cot1rt as a tribi111al establis/1ecl i111der tl1e /a1v to clecicle cases i11 c1ccorcla11ce 1vitl1 t/1e la1,v. Otl1er tribL1nals 111ay perfor.1n what a1J1Jear to be a11 d wl1at so111 eti111 es are, in fact, jt1dicial functions, bt1t sucl1 tribt111als are not cot1rts \vitl1i11 tl1e constitutional definitio11, a11d, tl1erefore, it is 11ot correct to refer to tl1e11 1 as cot1rts. Tl111s, altl1ougl1 a11 adn1inistrative agency st1cl1 as tl1 e Labour Relations Board 111,1y in so11 1e instances be adj11dicati11g cases, 4 it is 11ot a court i11 tl1e constitutio1Jal se11se. It js 11ot established as a court in tl1e laws allocating judicial po,ver, a11d its 111e1nbers are not j11dges as tl1 e ter111 is 11sed in tl1e Constit11tio11. As ,ve vvill see in Part B of this chapter, I-Iis I111peria] Majesty exercises a ty1Je of judicial power in cl1ilot, bt1t again tl1 is is 11ot j11dicial power as ll1 e tern1 is 11sed i11 tl1e Constitution, and tl1 e exercise of s11cl1 po,¥er differs i11 signi.fica11 t res1Jects fron1 tl1e exercise of j11clicial po\ver b)' the co11rts. Clulot is not a cot1rt in tl1e legal se11 se of tl1 e ter111. Since tl1e Su1Jre111e I1nperial Co11rt is provided for in tl1 e Constitt1tion, it can never be abolisl1ed by legislation, altl1011gl1 its jurisdiction, as tl1a.t of tl1e other courts, is to be deter1nined by Jaw, i.e., legisl:1tion. 5 Tl1 e basi.c strt1ctt1re of tl1e Etl1iopia11 co11rt syste1n was establisJ1 ed by tl1e Ad111 inistr,ttion of Jt1stice Procla111atio11 of 1 942. 6 Until tl1is JJrocla1natio11 is re1Jealed or s11perseded, it re111ai11s tl1e ''law a11tl1orizing otl1 er co11rts," as tl1 e ter111 is lised in Art. 109 of tl1e Revised Consti tition. Tl1e j11risdiction of the courts is now defined by tl1e Cri111 inal Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code. The 1942 proclan1atio. n provided for, in addit io11 to tl1e Supren1 e In1 1Jerial Co11rt, tl1e I-Iigl1 Court a11cl Provincial (Ta]<lay Gtiezat) Courts. It furtl1er pro,,icled tl1at ''it sl1all l1e lawful for u·s to establisl1 by ,varrant 1 . Rev. Const., Art. 108. 2. Rev. Const., Art. 109. 3. Rev. Const., Art. 110. • 4. See Labour Relations Decree, 1962, Art. 12, Decree No. 49, }leg. Gaz., year 21, no. 18. Unlike the courts, the Board is directed to conciliate ancl arbitrate disputes as well as to adjudicate them. 5 · Rev. Con�t., � rt: 109. Its jurisdiction in civil cases is detern1i11ed by Art. 322, Civ. Pro. C., and 10 cr1n1�nal cases . by Art. 182, Crin,. Pro. C. The constitutional pattern follows _ t�at. of th e �m�r1�a1:1 C<?11st1tut1on, whe :e the Supreme Court is established by the Constitu _ tion, b ut its Jur1sd1ct1on 1s to be detern11ned by Congress. Congress is also to estabHsl1 courts _ subordina te .t<;> the_ Supreme Cou�t a�d to define their jurisdiction. See U.S. Const., Art. III, _ 2, and Lhe d1scuss1on of tl11s point u1 Sheldon v. Sill (Sup. Ct. ' U.S.' 1850) U.S. Sup. Ct. ' Rep. (Lawyers' ed.), vol. 12, p. 441. 6. Adnlinistration of Justice Proclamation, 194 2, Proc. No. 2, 1veg. 11.r Gaz., yea.r J , no. 1.
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under Our h �� other cour!,� of crinii1 �al and civil jurisdiction which shall be st1bordinate to the Provincial Cotirts. . �11bord1nate courts were subseqt1ently established, but . them and setti11g jurisdictional '*. tl1 e orders. formally establ1sl11ng llniits not were _ _ the e a. It is beli .In Negar1t Ga eved that this was acco1nplisl1ed p ubl1shed by a ! � _ . _ The cot1rts so established were the circular publisl1ed by the M1n1stry of Justice. Awradja Gt1ezat Court, the W oreda Guezat Court and tl1e Mektl-Woreda Co11rt. s he 1942 Proclamation has _never been repealed or stiperseded, and the courts � . establ1sl1 �d under that procla11�at1on and the s11bsequent circular must be considered to constitute tl1e cot1rts establ1shecl by law witl1in the 111eaning of Art. 108. Tht1s, it is tech11ically correct t? say t11at there a�e six levels of courts in Ethiopia. _ Proceclure Code did 11ot co11fer any criniinal jurisdic However, t]1e 1961 Cr1m1nal tion on tl1e Mektl-Woreda or Tal<]ay G11ezat Courts. In 1962 Parliament enacted a Co11rts Proclan1atio11,9 wl1ich abolisl1ed those two courts and increased the juris dictio11al li111its of tl1e otl1ers. Tl1at proclamatio11 has been suspended1o except for Eritrea,11 and was not reinstated, so tl1ose co11rts contin11ed to exercise jurisdiction in civil cases in accordance witl1 tl1e 1942 Procla1natio11 and the s11bsequent circular. The 1965 Civil Proced11re Code, like the Crinlinal Proced11re Code, did not vest any j11risdictio11 in those courts, a11d for all practical purposes they I1ave been abolished. 12 But t1ntil the 1962 Proclamation is reinstated, tl1ose two co11rts techni cally forn1 part of the judicial syste111, tl1011g]1 tl1ey do 11ot presently exercise jtiris diction.13 Today, tl1en, tl1e judicial system of Etl1iopia consists of fot1r levels of co11rts: tl1e S11pren1e Imperial Court, the High Co11rt, tl1e Awradja G11ezat and tl1e Woreda Guezat Cot1rt. We n1ay now consider these co11rts in more detail. The S11preme Imperial Cot1rt has always exercised only appellate jt1risdiction, hearing appeals from cases originating in or varied by the High Cotirt. 14 The Afe Negi1s is the 7. Id., Art. 18. 8. The Mektl-Woreda Court was staffed by the acln1inistrator of tl1e Mektl-Woreda. It should be noted that governors- general, governors ancl n1islenies were authorized to sit as presidents of the T aklay Guezat, Awradja Guezat and Woreda Guezat CoL1rts respectively. Administrat tive R egulations, 1942, Art. 10, Decree No. 1 , Neg. Gaz., year l, no. 6. For the most part, this power J1as rarely been exercised, particularly in recent years. 9. Courts Proclamation, 1962, Proc. No. 195, Neg. Gaz., year 22, no. 7. JO. Courts (Amendment) Proclamation, 1963, Proc. No. 203? !'feg. Gaz., �ear 22, no. 16. It was to go into effect only upon special order from the Mtruster of Justice, and no such order has been issued. 1 1. Following the promulgation of Proc. No. 195, _Eritrea imme�ately impI�mented it, since Erit rea had recently been incorporated as a prov1n�e and des1red _to e1 1m1oate t 1 1e cumbersome court structure tl1at ]1ad existed under Federation. When Parl1an1ent vote_d to suspend t�e proclamation, Eritrea bad no other system tl1at it coL1ld �mplo�. By s�ec1al . order �f Hts Imperial Majesty, the proclamation was permitted to continue 1n �ffect rn. Eritrea. W1tl1 the enactment of the Civil Procedure Code, the problem ceased to exist. 12. Judges assigned to the Taklay Guezat Courts l1ave bee0: t�an �f�rred !o other courts. The 1 JU clic1a1 d ut1es. administrator of tl1e Mektl-Woreda simply is relieved of us 1 3 . This \Vould mean that they could be given juri�dict i<?n by an am_ endme �t to tl1e Crin una.1 1 Procedure Code or Civil Procedt1re Code. Any suit wh1c 11 was pend1ng b_e1ore a T ak ay 0 t1e zat Court or Ivlektl-Woreda Court was to be completed by tl1at court. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 1(1) 14. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 321. It had the same jurisdi<::tio_n _un_der Art. 3 _of. ��e _Ad11!i11is�r�r�� �f Justice Proclanlation of 1942. All references .to. Jurisd1ct1on are to Jur 1s ict 10 n 1n ��'e .l .s . r 1mma 1 • d 1"c.tion. ,,of the cot1rts tl1e cr1mrn.al cases, see genera11y R . . S edler, A S . t� tl. 1e �· UrlS . Jur1sd1ct1on m Eth1op1a, J. Eth. L., vol._ 2 (1965), pp. 480-486. . t t�pon cl1arges rial e�e Cour tl1� Impe e Supr befor tr1�d be only Note that a Minister may connection w1tl1 ]11s official functions. Such prosect1t1on may �e er . of an 011ence com . mi"tted m· · r1ty · . vote of both Houses of par u· a· ·t·1ated e1·ther bY order of tl1e Emperor or by. a maJo 1n1 · · ·sd'1ct·10n. R ev. const ., Art. 75. org·1nal Jt1r1 ment. In stlch a case the Court would be exerc1s1ng
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President of tl1e Supreme Imperial Court, and Vice-Afe Neguses have also been _ for branch appointed. The Court sits in Addis Ababa, but there is also a Eri�rea, sitting in Asmara. It sits in divisions, consisting of three judges, usually presided over by the Afe Negi.1s or a Vice-Afe Negus. Wl1e11 tl1e panel is not un.animous, decision is by n1ajority vote.1 5 Under the J942 Proclamation, judges of the High Court were to be appointed to hear particular appeals in the Supren1e Imperial Court. Now judges are appointed to tl1e Supreme Jn1perial Court for indefinite periods, a]tl1ot1gl1 they retain the ra11k of a jL1dge of the Higl1 Cot1rt. Tl1e Higl1 CoL1rt is a court of nationwide jurisdiction. Originally it sat only in Addis Ababa, but now tl1ere are brancl1es sitti11g pern1anently in most of the pro vincial capitals, 16 and tl1e cot1rt on circuit sits i11 the other capitals when judicial business warrants it. 17 Tl1ere is a President and a Vice-President of the High Court of Etl1iopia, and tl1ere are President Judges in each of the branches. It has origi11al jL1risdictio11 i11 tl1e 1nore in1porta11t cases and appellate jurisdiction over cases con1ing fro111 tl1e Awradja G11ezat Cot1rts. 18 In Addis Ababa and in soine of the capitals wl1ere this is warranted, it sits i11 divisions sucl1 as appellate, criminal, civil, co111111ercial, govern111e11t cases a11d land cases. The cases are l1eard by a panel of three jt1dges, \Vitl1 decisio11 by majority vote. 19 Tl1ere is an Awradja GL1ezat Co11rt, sitting in every Awradja Guezat. In addit io11 to its origi11al jurisdiction, 20 it l1ears aJ)peals fro111 tl1e Woreda Guezat Court. 21 U11der tl1e 1962 Procla111ation it was to co11sist of three judges w}1en exercising appellate j11riscliclion a11d one jL1dge when exercising original j11risdiction. Si11ce tl1e Procla111ation has been sus1)ended, l10\\1ever, tl1e co11rt appears to have continued tl1e for111er J)ractice of l1aving tl1ree jt1dges l1eari11g original cases as well as appeals. Lilce tl1e Awradja Gt1ezat Co11rt, tl1e Woreda G11ezat Co11rt sits in eacl1 Woreda G11ezat. It is tl1e lo\1/est cot1rt l1avi1Jg j11risdiction in civil cases. 22 Under tl1e 1962 Procla111atio11 it is to be constitt1ted by a si11gle j11dge, and I believe tl1at tl1is is tl1e practice tl1at it follows. I11 addition to tl1e cot1rts, there are also local judges, wl10 exercise a sort of judicial po\ver, and tl1eir role can be co11sidered conveniently ,vith tl1at of the courts, Tl1e Local Judges Proclan1ation of 1947 23 was designed to elin1inate delay and cot1rt co11gestion caused by 111inor dispt1tes which cotild be settled informally by a respected figL1re in tl1e con11nL1nity. In a sense it was an atten1pt to formalize tl1e traditional Etl1jopian instit11tion of the sl1amagile (elder), altl1011gl1 in practice today tl1ere is so111etin1es conflict between the A.tbia Dania, as the local judges are called , and tl1e shan1agile (the person appointed as Atbia Da11ia may not always be recognized as a ''sl1amagile'' b y �l1e con11u11nity). The procla1nation provides 15. 16.
17. · 18.
19.
20.
21. 22. 23.
Administration of Justice Proclan1atioo, supra, note 6, Ar i. 3. The High Court sits pern,auently i11 I-Iarrarghe, Bege1nder, Gojjan1, Kaffa, Sida1110, Eritrea, \Vollo, Wollega and Tigre Provinces. !,t is p �ovided � Art. 9_ of the Administr�ti�n of Justice_ Proclamation supra, note 6, that the H.1gl1 Cot1rt may sit at any place \v1th1n Our E1np1re as n1ay be convenient for the despatch of business." Its original J .urisdictioo is governed by c1·v• Pro . C ., Art . 15, a 11d 1·tS appe11at e JUflS · · a·lCt·IOil by Civ. Pro. C., Art. 321. Administration of Justice Proclan1at.ion, note supra 6, Art. 8. Civ Pro. C., Art. 14. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 321. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 13. Establislm1en.t of Local Judges Proclamation, 1947, Proc. No. 90, Neg. Gaz., year 6, no 10.
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for the appoint�ent of an Atbia Dania in each ''locality." Jurisdiction is limited to .�as �s not _ exceeding Eth. $ 25. Tl1e -�tbia Dania is to try to settle the dispute, but if this 1s 1mposs1ble, he may render a dec1s1011. The parties may ''appeal'' l1is decision to the Woreda Guezat Court, but that cou.rt hears the case over again, so· tl1is is not an appeal in the true sense. The Atbia Danias are appointed by the Minister of Justice from lists submitted by the Presidents of the Awradja G11ezat and Woreda G11ezat Courts, who are to consult witl1 local elders. They are not paid by the Governn1ent, and reportedly son1e charge fees for their services, altl1ough tl1ey are not supposed to do so. Tl1e 1962 Proclan1ation expressly provided that the Atbia Danias sho11ld exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the · 1947 Proclamation, which reflects the view that s11cl1 officials will be necessary for some time to come. However, they sho11ld be considered as the ''minor j11diciary," a11d are not a part of the regular court system. A final question concerns tl1e status of Mohammedan religio11s co11rts. Such courts were established in 1944,24 and 11nless abolished by s11bsequent legislation, they constitute courts authorized by law witl1in the meaning of Art. 109 of the Revised Constitution. The 1944 Proclan1ation provided for three levels of courts: Naibas Co11ncils, Kadis Co11ncils and t11e Court of Shariat, wl1icl1 is the court of last resort. Tl1ese co11rts have j11risdiction i11 two classes of cases: (I) questions regarding n1arriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors and family relation ship, provided tl1at tl1e marriage to which the question relates was con cluded in accordance witl1 Mol1amn1edan law or the parties are all Mohamn1edans; (2) questions regarding Wakf (religious e11dowment) gift or s11ccession or wills provided that the endower or donor is a Mohammedan or tl1e deceased was a Mohammedan at the tin1e of l1is death. Of course, they apply Mol1a1nmedan reli gious law. Tl1e Minister of Justice was authorized to forn111late r11les of proced11re and to define tl1e territorial j11risdiction of the Naibas and Kadis Councils. Like other judges, the judges of these cot1rts are appointed by tl1e Emperor. Tl1e 1944 Proclamation has never been expressly repealed, and neither tl1e 1962 Courts Proclamation nor the Civil Procedure Code n1akes any reference to these co1trts. 25 Tl1is is not necessarily significant. Tl1ese courts were establisl1ed and their j11risdiction defined by tl1e 1944 Proclamation, and tl1e exercise of such jurisdiction is not inconsistent with tl1e provisions of the 1962 Proclamation or tl1e Civil Procedure Code any more tl1an it would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Admini stration of Justice Proclamation of 1942. The more serio11s q11estion is w]1ether the 1944 Procla.mation has been in1plied1y repealed by the Civil Code of 1960 . The provisions of the Code dealing witl1 family law and s11ccession 111ake n_o exception for Mohammedans. 26 Tl1ese co11rts were created for the purpose of applying Mol1an1medan religious law in matters tl1at, for persons of that faith, are essentially of a religious nature. If the Civil Co�e is to es_t� blish . a uniform law for the Empire 27 and to bind all persons irrespective of rel1g1on, 1t can be contended that Mol1am medan law is abolisl1ed along with all other prior law and tl1at courts can no 24. 25.
26. 27.
Kadis and Naibas Councils Proclamation, 1944, Proc. No. 62, Neg. Gaz., year 3, no 9. This repealed the Kadis Courts Proclan1ation of l 942, Proc. No. !2, Neg. Gaz., y�'lT 1, no. 2. 1962, �upra, note 9, It is interesting to note tl1at Art. 23 of the Court� �r�cl�n1at!Oll . expressly provided that the Atbia Danias sh?u !d have J_�1sd1ct1on _in c1v1l ca_ses 1n accordance with Proclamation No. 90 of 1947. No s1m1lar prov1s1on was inserted w1tl1 respect to the Mohammeda.11 courts. Tlle 1930 Penal Code, for example, only 1nade P<?lygamy ru1 offence _ when committed b?' Christians. TI1e Penal Code of 1957, A!t, �17, provides tl1at .P?lygamy 1s no� an offence if recognized under civil Jaw, but no exception 1s made by the C1v1l Code. See C1v. C., Art. 585. See His Imperial Majesty's Preface to tl1e Civil Code and Art. 3347.
or
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longer exist for the purpose of applying such law. It would follow then that the 194-4 Proclamation is impliedly repealed by the Civil Cod.e. On tl1 e other hand, it could be contended that si11ce such courts were in existence and were applying Mol1amn1edan law, tl1e provisions of the Civil C� de were not intended to abolish tl1 eir jurisdiction nor to prevent tl1 em from applying Mol1 a.n11nedan law in tl1 e cases assigned to the111 by the 1944 Proclamation. The latter i11terpretation see1 11 s to l1ave been adopted by tl1e exect1tive brancl1, since it is reported tl1at sl1ortly after the promulgation of the Civil Code, tl1 e Minister of Justice, by circular, instructed tl1 ese courts to contin11e to exercise j urisdi� tioo in accorda. nce witl1 the provisions of the 1944 Procla1nation. Tl1 ese courts continue to ft111ctio11 today - in fact the Court of Shariat sits as a brancl1 of the Supreme In1 perial Co11rt - and new j11dges l1ave been appointed to fill vacancies. The ques tion of wl1etl1er the 1944 Proclamation was repealed by tl1e Civil Code has not been IJassed 011 any of tl1e civil co11rts. TJ1e Etl1iopia11 Ortl1odox CI1urcl1 l1as been de1Jrived of all jurisdictio11 in civil 111atters. 28 Tht1s, a cl1urcl1 court is not a court witl1in the meaning of the Consti tutio11 and ca1.111ot bind IJrivate persons in civil matters, tho11gh in practice, it n1ay f11nction as a cot1rt i11 ecclesiastical n1atters and in cases that parties voluntarily s11 b111it to it. 29 In su111 n1ary, tl1ere are four levels of co11rts i 11 Ethiopia. TI1 e S11preme Im1Jerial Co11rt, \Vl1icl1 l1ears arJ_peals fro1n tl1 e Higl1 Court; the High Cot1rt, wl1 icl1 exercises original jurisdiction in tl1 e 111ore imJJortant cases and whicl1 l1 ears appeals from tl1e A,vradja Guezat Court; tl1e A,vradja Guezat Co11 rt, ,vlucJ1 exercises original juris diction is cases of inter111ediate i1nportance and whicl1 l1 ears appe,tls fron1 tb.e Wore da Gt1ezat Cot1rt; tl1 e Woreda Guezat Co11rt, whicl1 exercises original jurisdiction in tl1e less i1nportant cases. TJ1ere are also local judges who l1ear cases of a very minor 11 att1re, ,,1l1ich may be tried over again in tl1e Woreda Guezat Co11rt. Moham111 edan courts contin11e to f11nction, although there is a q11estion as to whether tl1e Proclan1 ation establishing tl1em has been impliedly repealed by tl1 e Civil Code. B.
- Imperial Majesty's Chilot 1 Iis
Tl1e instit11tion of I-lis In1perial Majesty's chilot has long existed in Et11iopia and continues to exist toda)'. It is, tl1erefore, necessary to define tl1e place of cbilot in tl1e judicial systen1 of Etluopia, tl1at is, to define the legal basis of the institut ion today and tl1e relationsl1 ip between j11risdiction in chilot a11 d tl1 e exercise of judicial power by tl1e courts. I l1 ave discussed chilot in greater detail elsewl1ere,30 and the discussion in tlus sectio11 is based on the previous writing. In approaching tl1 e n1 atter, we n1ust first consider the ki11 d of legal institution that cl1 ilot represe11ts. Is it a court? Or is it something other tl1an a court? The layn1a11 would answer a.s follows: ''Of course, it_ is a <:011 :t. In chilot tl1e Emp�ror l1ears a case a11d renders tl1 e fi 11 al judgment. Since this 1s what courts do, chilot m11st be a co11rt." Obviously, this is not the way tl1at the lawyer answers. The question for hin1 is whetl1 er cl1 ilot is a court in 28. Regulations for the Administration of the Church, 1942, Art 10, Decree No. 2, Neg Gaz., year 2, no. 3. 29 · Where the part!es voluntarily st1bmit to the jurisdiction of the church courts it is as if they _h�ve sub1U1tted their clain1 to arbitration, and the provisions of law regarding arbitral subm1ss1on would apply. See Civ. C., Arts. 3325-3346. 30. R. S edler, "The Chilot Jurisdiction of the Emperor of Ethiopia," J. Afr. La•v, vol 8 (1964), p. 5 9 .
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the legal sen.se, that is, in the sense that tl1 e term 1·8 used 1n · the provisions of the Constitution and laws defini11g judicial power. It is �lear_ that i � tliis sense cl1 ilot is _ not a court. Chapter VI of the Revi. . . vides for the exercise of J·udicial power by the courts, and. sed Const1tt1t1on pro · · nti m IlO t · th�t Cl1apter. �rt. 108 provides that the judicial power � one d Ill �111·1ot lS 1s to �e vested in the courts (1n the Aml1ar1c, fire/ biet, literally ''I-louse of Justice'') established by law. Under �t. 109 tl1e Sttpreme I111perial Court is provided for, and . other courts are at1tl1or1ze� to be established . by law. Since the Coi1stittttion provides for the Supren1e In1per1al Cot1rt and at1thorizes the establislunent of other courts, prest1111ably tl1e Supreme ln�perial Co11rt is to be at tl1e apex of the co11rt str11�ture. It wot1!d ?e ano111 alous 1f tl1ere were yet another ''co11rt," not provided for 1n tl1e Constitution, also exercising t11e jt1dicial power as defined in Cl1 apter VI. A clear distinctio11 between tl1e courts established under A1·t. 109 and clulot is n1ade by tl1e provisions of the Cri1ninal Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code. Art I 81 of tl1e Criminal Proced11re Code provides tl1at ''an appeal sl1all lie in accordance with tl1e }Jrovisions of Art. 182." The final tribunal 111entioned in Art. 182 is the S11pre1ne I111perial Court. 1-Iowever, Art. 183 provides tl1at: ''Nothing in Art. 182 shall preve11t an applicant who l1as exl1at1sted lus rigl1ts of appeal ttnder Art. 182 from applying to His Imperial Majesty's Cl1ilot for a review of the case." A sin1ilar provision is contai11ed in Art. 322 of the Civil Procedure Code. Tl1e distinction then is drawn between the right of appettl (in the Amharic, yeyigbagn ,nebit) to a11 appellate court a11d a 1·evie1,v31 of tl1e case (in the Amharic, e11dib ayi/et) in chilot. Cl1ilot is th11s treated as separate and clistinct fro111 the regt1lar cot1rt systen1. Since we have establisl1ed tl1at chilot is not a court in the sense that the term is used in tl1 e Constit11tion and laws defining j11dicial power, we must 110w ask just what chilot is, or to put it another \Vay, \vhat is tl1e legal basis for the exercise of chilot jurisdiction today. Since clulot is not mentioned in the Constitu tion, the source of sl1cl1 jt1risdictio11 must be fo11nd elsewhere. To find the sot1rce, we must first trace tl1e history of this institt1tio11 in Ethiopia. From ti1ne in1memorial the people of Etluopia have looked to the En1peror as the ultimate sotirce of jt1stice. To adjudicate dispt1tes was the d11ty of tl1e 32 Tl1e exercise of this . ence evid is e ther ch whi of s tin1e iest Emperor from the earl power during the different periods of Ethiopia's history has been described in detail by a number of writers. 33 It has been concl11sively de111onstrated tl1at tl1 e legal tradi _ e: after a tion of Ethiopia established the Emperor as . tl1 e ultimate source of justic case had been heard elsewhere, e.g., by a king or otl1er rl1ler of territory, a party could petition the Emperor for review, and His . decision was final. Ev�n after courts were established, He continued to exercise tl1e power of review He had always possessed. As one observer put it, ''It is a tl1ought dear to 1nost 31. 32. 33.
is synonymous \vith The• English ter m used in Art. 322, Civ. Pro. C., is revision, wllicl, review. M. Perham, T}ze Governme,zt of Etl1iopia (1948), P· 145. . . It . t1n n ha°"! & G.w. 1ng a�k B .F. c . by (ed ies I11d the of 11 ; �, Joh er est Pr e Th See F. Alvarez, oi,�ce o1 t 1e 1 e t,ze r S ove 1sc D 1 to s ve Tra e, uc Br J. y); tur cen th en . ), ford, 1961), p. 128 (sixte 15 s (19 gu z Ne De rra Te lla Ne o, Castr (1790), vol. 3, p. 265 (late eigbteentl1 century); L. DeM. Perban1, supra, note 32 at pp. 145vol. 2, pp. 131-132 (time of Menelik II). See also 147.
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Ethiopia.ns that they can obtain justice from His In1perial Majesty even if the courts have failed them."J 4 The concept of the sovereign as the ultimate source of ju.stice is not unique _ to Ethiopia. A similar concept existed in England, for example, when the King of England possessed the sovereignty under the ''unwritten constitution'' that the Em·per or possesses under tl1e Etl1 iopian Constitution. 35 Tl1e King was early recognized as the ''fot1ntain of justice and the conservator of the peace of tl1 e kingdom."36 Through the King's power to administer justice courts were established, but even after the establisl1ment of cot1rts, tl1e King was deemed to possess a residuum of justice to wl1icl1 persoi1s co11ld turn. 37 This residuum of justice played a major role in the development of the English legal system. 38 Since tl1e sovereig11 prerogative of tl1e king to do justice was recognized as an integral part of tl1e English legal systen1 , legal principles were developed to explain tl1 e 11att1re of tl1is prerogative, a11d these principles 1nay be l1elpful in defin ing tl1e 11ature of tl1e i11stitution of cl1ilot in Etl1 iopia.. Tl1e prerogative of the sovereign to see tl1at justice was done incl tided tl1e following elements. 39 First, he possessed the J)O\Ver to establish courts to adn1inister tl1 e law of the land; as the King's at1thority was consolidated, tl1e jurisdiction of tl1ese courts superseded that of a11y otl1er tribtinal. 40 Seco11dly, tl1e sovereig11 possessecl a residut1m of justice to ,vl1icl1 people could tt1rn �1l1e11 tl1e courts ''l1ad failed them." Tl1e fajJ11re of the courts n1ay l1a.ve been eitl1er due to defects in tl1 e law they were applying or due to the n1anner in ,vl1icl1 tl1ey adn1inistered. tl1at l:1w. In otl1er words, tl1 e courts may ha,,e 111isapplied tl1e la�,, tl1eir proceedi11gs may l1ave been ttnfair, or the law itself may ha v e bee11 inadeqt1ate to n1 eet tl1e needs of jt1stice i11 tl1e particular case. 41 In sucl1 circun1stances, people could tt1rn to tl1 e so,,ereign and ask for the exercise of l1is prerogative to see tl1at j11stice was done. Tl1e concept of the sovereign's prerogative to see tl1at jt1stice is do11 e can best explain the 11aturc and legal basis of chilot jurisdiction in EthiOJJia. Tl1e develop n1ent of tl1e Emperor's J)ower in cl1ilot exactly parallels tl1 e de velo1-1me11t of sove reign prerogative in E11gla11d, and tl1 e legal J)rinciples applicable to the sovereign prerogative of tl1e King of England are eqt1ally applicable to tl1e cl1ilot jurisdiction of tl1e En1peror of Ethiopia. We n1ay say tl1at l1istorical])' jt1risdictio11 i11 cl1ilot represented tl1e exercise of tl1e Emperor's sovereign prerogative to see tl1at justice
34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
41 .
E lian1bro, "The Rebellio11 Trials in Ethiopia", Bull. Int'!. Co111n1. of Jurists, vol. 12 (1961), pp. 29, 30. See Rev. Const., Art. 26. H. Phillips, Constitutional ancl Ad1ni11istrative La1v (3rd ed. 1962), p. 254. See the discussion of this point i11 F. PoUock and F. Maitl.a11d, History of English La1v (1895), vol. 1, p. 12. See generally the discussion of this point in R. Sedler, supra, note 30 at pp. 61-65 See the discussion icl. at p. 64. Under Rev. Const., Art. 35, the En1pcror bas the right a11d the duty to ma.intain justice tlirough the . courts. .If the establislllllent of courts were otherwise not provided for in Chap ter VI, or 1f for sonJe reason courts ,vere not established, this article would give the · Emperor tJ1e power to establish them. . It may be noted tbat with the consolidatio11 of tl1e E1npire by Menelik II, tl1e jurisdic tion of _ the government courts superseded that of the courts of the local king or other ruJer of territory. See particularly the discussion of the inadequacies of the common law and t11e subsequent development of the English Court of Chancery in R. Sedler, supra, note 30 at p. 63.
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was done, a prerogative wl1ich H e continued to exercise after tl1e establishmen t of courts, as was the case in England. 42 examine tl1e status of this prerogative in ligl1t We must now _ of the Constitut _ ion a11d determlne �hetl1 _ er it \Vas affected by tl1e promulgation of the Constit11t ion. By _ tl1e Const1t11t1on, tl1e Emperor l1as delegated so1 11e of His powers and _ s of tl1e govern111ent prerogatives to . other agencie and i 1 nposed certain Iin1itatio11s . upon tl1e ex�rc1se of s01�1� of I-I1s powers. 43 Bt1t sovereignty remains in Hin1 in accordance with tl1e prov1s1011s of tl1e Co11stitution.- 14 The fact that cl1ilot is not men tioned in the Constitt1tion does not n1ean tl1at it is abolisl1ed by tl1at doc11ment. It is subn1it_ted that si11ce b� tl1e Constit�1tion I-Je volt1�tarily Iin:i ited t}1e absol11 te power He pre�1011sly p_ossessed 5 �11d continues to retain sovereignty, the powers and prerogatives prev1011sly exercised by f-Iin1 remain unless they are specifically abol islzed by the Co11stitL1tion or their exercise wo11ld be inconsistent witl1 tl1e other provisions of tl1e Co1 1stitution. In otl1er words, although, chilot (wl1ich, as we have said, is based 011 tl1e sovereig 11 prerogative of the En1peror to see tl1 at j11stice is done) is not n1e11tioned i11 tl1e Constitutio 11, since it is not specifically abolished by it, tl1e power to exercise cl1ilot j1 1risdiction continues to exist, that is, such exercise is constit 11tio11al, 11nless for tl1e Emperor to exercise cl1ilot j11risdiction wo11ld be inco11sistent w.itl1 tl1e other provisions of tl1e Constitt1 tion. By \Vay of analogy, it n1ay be noted that in England, even thottgh, unlike Etl1iopia, sovereignty is no longer vested in tl1e Cro\vn, the Crown is dee1ned 11ot be boL1nd by an Act of Parlia 1nent except by express words or 11ecessary implication; there is a presu111ption in favour of imn1unity. 46 Cl1ilot j1 1risdiction is fully coi1siste1 1t with the otl1er provisions and tl1e basic struct11re of tl1e Co11stitt1tion. Tl1e co11rts possess tl1e judicial power, which is the power to decide cases in accordance witl1 tl1e law. 47 Tl1e exercise of cl1ilot jt1ris dictio1 1 does not i11terfere witl1 this f11nction, since tl1e cot1rts are free to decide cases in accordance with tl1e la\V and l1e11ce to carry out tl1eir co11 stitt1tiooal po\ver. If tl1e Emperor I-Iimself or an exec11tive official tried to sit in the cot!rt and to pronou.nce j11dg1ne11t i11stead of tl1e co11rt, the cot1rt co11ld 11ot perforn1 1_ts respon _ official exect1tive or 1peror 1 E1 tl1e of action and the on, Constit11ti sibility under the would be i11consistent with Chapter VI of the Constitt1tion:18 Bt1t tl1is is not wl1at happens wl1en the E 1 11peror exercises jttrisdiction in _cl1ilot : Tl1e cot1_rt is free . to decide the case. The sovereion n1ay s11bseq 11ently exercise I-I1s prerogative to review the case, and si11ce He is tl1e ultimate source o. f jt1stice, His decision in a parti42.
43 44.
45. 46. 47. 48.
For a discussion of the exercis e of tl1e residL1um of justice possessed �Y the King of Eng land after the establishn1ent of tl1e Court of Cl1ancery, see R. Sedler, ,cl. at PP· 63-64. TllLIS, all the gLiara11tees of Cl1 apter I� (�ights and _Duties of tl1e People) would apply to action by tl1e Emperor wl1icl1 would 1nfr1nge sucl1 rights. Rev. Const., Art. 26. Tl11s · was accomp 1·1sl 1ed by the pron1ulgation of tl1e Constitution of 1931 The 1955 Revised e ap1 · c1p · 1 t · 1s pr1n I ng ki ma 1, · t101 · st1tu Con 1 193 the es difi mo es, icat ind e nam Constitution, as its plicable to the 1955 Co11StitL1tio11. 9. -25 257 · at PP 36 te no ra, sup ps, illi Pl1 1t in 1 i po s tl1i n of See the discussio Rev. Const., Arts. 108, 110. ,s Rep., ,,01. 12, �ce �, Co 607 l g., In the case of Prollibitions del Roy (Common Pleas, En .. I-I,e contended g h gl�s Kin En tl1e of_ e: pow the s ard reg as ed olv res s wa pp. 63-· 64' this isstie · 111g s courts. It K the 1n ent . gn1 Jud give ld coLi be ice ·ust of n 1 a_ t that since he was tl1e �oun d er a judgn1ent. ren ld cou ges jud tl1e y onl ent Jres be' ld coJ Kin g e tl was held _tl1at al_though_ � indeJendent' in conducting trials and giving ) udge1:1ents be to . The J udges � ��I11oj1: ar official, even His MaJesty, no e, � for ere Tl1 _ . 110 t. Ar ., nst Co . ;ev tn accord ance WI h 1e . a • . efor e tl1em. b e cas a ii, ot e d · gm . ,. U J g 1 'i1n g of n t1o 11c fu coLild interfere witl1 tl1e1r
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·-
cular case supersedes tl1at of the courts. I-Iowever, the fac t tl1at . the decision of the co11rt is 11ot ''final'' does not mean tl1at there has been an interference with. the exercise of j11dicial power. Unlike tl1e United Stat es, for example, sovereignty is not divided among the three branches of govern1nent ; t11ere is no strict separa tion of powers in tl1e sense t h at t he doctrine exists in American la� . Wl1ere _ th e courts possess a portion of sovereigi1ty, tl1en it may be contended, as 1n t h e Uruted States, t hat tl1eir judg1nents cannot be subject to exect1tive revision. 49 Bu t wl1ere tl1e courts do not possess sovereignty, th en it cannot be said tha t tb.ey cannot properly perform their f11nction unless tl1eir judgments are absolutely fma1. Tl1eir function is simply to decide t he case before tl1e111 in accord,1nce with the law, and tl1ey l1ave perfor111ed tl1at· f1111ctio11 before th e case reacl1es chilot. Even in tl1e ·u11ited States, wl1ere th e exec11tive does possess a sovereign prerogative such as the po\ver to pardo11, 50 the exercise of tl1at J)reroga:tive s11persedes t he decision of a co11rt in a particular case. 51 So, \Ve see tl1at eve11 wl1ere finality of j11dicial deci sion is a constitutio11al req11ire111ent, tl1e exercise of a. so,1ereign prerogative by the executive is 11ot i11co11sistent witl1 tl1e exercise of j11dicial power by t h e courts. In Etl1iopia, botl1 tl1e co11rts and t he E1nperor have a role to play in tl1e adnlinis tration of justice, tl1c co11rts accordi11g to tl1eir grant of power llnder tl1e C_on stit11tio11 a11d la\VS a11d tl1e E1nperor according to I-Iis prerogative to see tl1at just ice is done. Since tl1e exercise of tl1e Emperor's prerogative is not inconsistent witl1 the exercise of judicial JJower by tl1e courts, i t is not re1)ealed by Chapter VI of tl1e Constit11tio11. Tl1e legal l1asis of cl1ilot, tl1e11, lies in tl1e sovereign prerogative of t he En1JJeror to see t h at jt1stice is done. Tl1is j11risdiction is distinct fro111 tl1e jurisdic tion of tl1e courts 11nder tl1e Constitutio11. And since cI1ilot is based on tl1is sovereign prerogative, its exercise is significantly different fron1 exercise of j11dicia] power from tl1e courts. Tl1is is so i11 tv,-10 \1ery in1porta11t respects. Firstly, tl1e exercise of jurisdiction i11 cl1ilot is cliscretio11ary. Th e EnJJJeror is not required to l1ear a particular case nor to exercise cl1ilot jurisdiction at aJJ. Tl1e on1ission of cl1ilot in tl1e Cons titution is sig11ifica11t. Under tl1e Constit11tion tl1e En1peror is given certain duties, s11cl1 as th at of 1naintai11ing j 11stice t h.rougl1 t he co11rts, 52 but H e is not given tl1e d11ty to exercise jurisdiction i11 chilot. People have a right to prese11t petitions to Him,53 \1/l1icl1 \Vould i11cl11de, of co11rse, petitions seel<ing tl1e exercise of I-I.is prero gative to do justice. B11t now h ere are tl1ey give11 tl1e rigl1t to l1ave tl1eir case l1eard on tl1e merits in cl1ilot. T he difference, th en, between revie,v i11 cl1jlot and an appeal to a court estab lisl1ed under the Constitl1tion is as follows: a party l1as a rigl1t t o appeal to tl1e in cl1ilot. For exa111ple, _ �p�ropriat� court, b11t no rigl1t to l1av � l1is case reviewed it 1s provided that ''a.n appeal sl1all lie from a JUdgn1ent of tl1e Higl1 Court in 49.
See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Watern1ann S.S. Corp. (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1948), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (f-:- awyers' ed._), vol. 92, p. 568. :8ecause the decisio11 in the particular case would J1ave been subJect to review by the executive branch, the Supren1e Court held that it would not be performing a judicial function if it heard the case and refused to bear it. 50. The_ P!esident of the 1:Jnit �d Stat�s is given this power under U.S. Const., Art. IT., 2. In Eth1op1a, the Emperor 1s given this power under Rev. Const., Art. 35. 51. See the discussion of this point in Ex parte Grossn1an (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1925), U.S. Sup. c t., Rep. (Lawyers' ed.), vol. 69, p. 527. 52. Rev. Const., Art. 35. 53. Rev. Const., Art. 63.
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its original jur!sdictio11 to the Supreme Imperial Court."s� This means that the Supreme Impenal Court must l1ear the case on the n1erits and render a decision affiir ?Ung or _re· versing the decision ?f the High <;:ourt. The party who is unsuccess ful 1n . the High Court can take this appeal to the S11preme Imperial Court. But if he 1s unst1 :cessf �l there, all he can do is to petition the Emperor for a review of the case 1n ch1lot ;55 he has no right to have the case heard on the n1erits in chilot_ as he does �n a� appeal. Since cbilot is based on sovereign prerogative, its exercise mt1st be d1scret1onary, for only the sovereign can decide whether tl1ere is a need for st1ch exercise. A co11trary interpretation wo11ld be inconsistent with the nature of a sovereign prerogative.56 Secondly - ancl tl1is is the n1ost i1nportant difference - in chilot the EmJJeror is riot boi,ncl to decide tl1e case in accorclance l-vith th e provisio11s of the for111al !a,v, but may base His decisio11 011 principles of ''justice and fairness'' without reference to the law. I-le 1nay mitigate tl1e rigors of tl1e application of the strict law in a partict1lar case. Tl1e courts, of co11rse, cannot do tl1is since they must exercise judicial power i n accordance witl1 the law, i.e., tl1e Constitution, codes and statt1tes, and subn1it to no authority other than tl1e law.57 This does not mean that sometimes the provisio11s of tl1e forn1al law may not be sufficiently flexible so tl1at the judges can interpret them to meet tl1e needs of ''jt1stice'' in the part icular case. But other times tl1ey are not and cannot be. Tlus n1ay be especially true in the earlier periods of code application in a developing legal system. The law must be certain so tl1at all persons may ascertain tl1eir rigl1ts and obligations.58 However, a provision of law whicl1 111ay be so11nd and just for the great run of cases may produce an unjust res11lt wl1en applied in a particular case, e.g., a con troversy between persons living in a re1note part of tl1e Empire where all affairs have been governed by custom tl1at is inconsistent witl1 the written law. In cl1ilot the Emperor can grant relief from tl1e effect of the law, which tl1e courts cannot do in tl1e exercise of tl1eir judicial power. The power of the sovereign is to ''do justice'' rather tl1an to decide cases limited by tl1e provisions of the law. 011e of the l1istorical reasons for tl1e main tenance of the prerogative in England long after the establisl1ment of a formal court system was to provided a device by whicl1 the rigors of tl1e strict law might be mitigated in a partic11lar case. 59 The prerogative of the En1peror l1as long been recognized as the power to ''do justice'' witl1011t being bo11nd by the provisions of the strict law, and this feat11re remains today. This does not mean tl1at the En1peror 1nay not set aside a j11dgn1ent because He believes that the apJJlication of the law in the particular case was _incorrect or beca11se the proceedings were unfair. This_ is_ also a p� rt of tl1e sovereign preroga tive to see that justice is done. But tlus 1s a fu?ct1on t� at tl1e appellate _co11rts _ can perform as well. The real 11tility of � l�lot 1s . that 1t I? rov1des a dev1� e by _ which the rigors of the strict la,v can be ? 31t1gated _in a particular � ase which 1s _, extremely important while the legal system 1s developing and the appl1cat1on of the
54. 55. 56. 57. 58 . 59.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 321(1) (c). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 322. Y of I /;1e Lal The ey, . Dic A.V in e ativ rog pre ign ere sov of ure nat the See the discussion of Co11stiti1tion (lOtl1 ed., Wade, 1961), p. 424. Rev. Const., Arts. 108, 110. See His Imperial Majesty's Preface to the Civil Code. . -65 . 63 pp at te 30 no ra, r, sup dle Se R. ip . int po is 1 tl e Se the discussion of
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strict law in a particular case may produce an unjust result. 60 At tl1 is juncture we may consider the legal position of the Fird Mirmera and the Sebre Semi. Althot1gl1 tl1 ese bodies are loosely termed ''cou.rts, '' they are not, of course courts in tl1 e legal sense of the tern1, since they do not possess the judicial p�wer - the power to decide cases in accordance with the law. Tl1 ey have no po,ver to render a jt1dgn1 e11 t, but can only make a recommendation to His In1perial Majesty. Tl1ey sl1011ld be considered as agencies established by Him to assist l-Iin1 i11 tl1e exercise of His sovereign prerogative to see that justice is done. 61 Tl1 e main f1111ction of tl1e Fird Mirn1era is to screen petitio11s for review in cl1 ilot a11d decide \Vhether they l1 ave any 111erit. It 11 1akes recom11 1endations to the En1 peror as to \Vl1etl1er the case sho11Jd be reviewed in cllilot and may m.ake reco1nrnendatio11s as to the disposition. Wl1 e11 tl1 e Fird Mirmera decides that tl1e petitio11 for review lacks 111erit, it l1 as tl1e autl1 ority fro1n the Emperor to dismiss it. Tl1 e fu11 ction of tl1e Sebre Se111 i is to give an opi11 ion on questions of Jaw wl1en sucl1 q11estio11s have bee11 referred to it by tl1e E1nperor. Tl1e Fird l\1.ir111 era also l1as tl1e JJower to recommet1d tl1at anotl1er appellate court l1ear tl1e case, ::1lthot1gh witl1out sucl1 clirection that appellate court wo11ld 11ot l1ave j11risdiction. For exa1n1Jle, if a case originated i11 tl1.e Awradja Guezat Cot1rt, tl1ere cot1ld be a11 appeal to the l:-Iigl1 Cot1rt, bt1t if tl1e Hig11 Co11rt did 11ot vary tl1e judg111ent, tl1ere co11Id be 110 ft1rtl1er appeal. 62 B11t the Fird. Mirmera 111 ay reco111111end a11d the E . 1111Jeror 111ay orcler tl1 e St1preme In. 11Jerial Court to l1ear tl1e case, tl1 ot1gl1 in tl1e abse11ce of sticl1 order tl1 e S111Jren1 e I111perial Cot1rt would 11ot l1ave jt1risdiction. Tl1e En1 JJeror's power i n tl1 is regard steins :fro111 Art. 35 of tl1e Revised Co11 stitt1tion, wl1 ich i111 poses 011 Him tl1e d11ty to 111 ai11 tain j11stice tl1rougl1 tl1e co11rts. The gra11t of tl1 is po-vver e11 co111passes tl1 e power to take such steps as are necessary for its exercise, 63 ,vl1 icl1 wo11ld inclt1de tl1at of directing a co11rt to l1ear a partictila.r aJJJJeal, altl1ot1gl1 i11 tl1 e abse11ce of st1cl1 direction tl1e litiga11 t would l1ave 110 right to aJJpeal to tl1 at cot1rt. I-Iis I11 1perial Majesty's cl1ilot for111 s a very in1portant part of tl1 e j11dicial system of Ethiopia. I-Iowever, it is necessary to recogn.ize tl1at ch.ilot is not a court in tl1 � legal sense, and tl1at tl1e exercise of jurisdictio11 in chilot is a very differe11t tl1 111 g tl1a11 tl1 e exercise of juclicia] power by tl1e cot1rts.
:"f
In a well-known case flis lmJ)erial Majesty directed that a n1a11 wl1 0 had been living \vitb a an should P�Y l1er a su1n of n1oney when he turned l1er out, a.ltbougl1 she was not � e�tit e to sucl1 relief under the la\v. See R. Sedler, supra, no te 30 at pp. 71-72. 6.1. Ci v'. o. C , 361, r�fers t� "His Imperial Majesty's Chilot." Tl1is includes the agencies f � es t a b 15 1e d bY JS Imperial MaJesty to assist llin1 it1 the exercise of chilot jurisdiction . · c 62. 1v. Pro. C., Art. 321. · 63. Re v. Const. Art 36 For a ct·tscusston d f the· breadtl1 of power u.nder a "necess ary an ° . proper" c'la�se ;ee M Cu11 t1g11 v. Maryland (Sui). Ct., U.S., 1819), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Lawyers' ed.),' vol 4, � - 31 � .
60.
'i-��-
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CHAPTER ID JURISDICTION OF COURTS Once �t l1a� been decided to !itigate a case, tl1e first question that the plaintiff m11st consider is ':l1�re_ may su1t �e brougl1t. A suit can only be brought in a _ _ _ co11rt that l1as ;ur1scl1ctlo11. J �1r1sd1ct1on 1nay be broadly defined as the power of a c ?ur� . to _I1e�r . a�d determine � case. Tl1ere are tl1ree elements of jurisdiction: (1) Jud1c1al Jur1sd1ct1on; (2) n1ate:1al jur!sdiction; and (3) local jurisdiction. All of these elements must be present 111 a given case in order for the court to ''have tl1e j11risdiction. '' . Moreover, failt !re of tl1e court to provide the defendant with _ legally sufficient notice that a suit l1as been instituted against him, as a result of wl1ich he does not appear and defend, can destroy the court's jurisdiction. We will now proceed to consider each of these elements. A. Judicial Jurisdiction 1 . General Considerations J11dicial jurisdiction refers to tl1e power of the courts of a particular nation or state 1 to render a judgn1e11t binding an individual or his property. We must first ask whether Etl1iopia - some co11rt i11 Ethiopia - l1as the power to subject a particular person or particular property to its j11djcial processes. Where a court of one state l1as judicial jurisdiction - tl1at is, it has s11.fficient contacts witl1 the defen dant or tl1e transaction or property that is involved in the suit to make it reason able that it exercise power over such person, transaction or pro1Jerty - its judg n1ent will 11sually be recognized and enforced in another state. Tl1e state in wl1ich enforcement is sougl1t will not review tl1e merits of tl1e case. It will merely deter mine wl1ether the court wl1ich rendered tl1e j11dgment l1ad j11risdiction to do so, and if i t finds tl1at tl1ere was j11risdiction, it will enforce tl1e jL1dgment against any property that the defendant may have in that state. 2 So, if a foreigner \Vith011t property in Etluopia is s11bject to tl1e judicial j11risdiction of tl1e Ethiopian courts, an Ethiopian j11dgment will be enforced against hin1 in his home state. Tl1e plaintiff will not have to bring anotl1er suit on tl1e merits in that state. 3 I-Ie will merely bring an action to enforce the Etl1iopia11 j11dgment and obtain exec11tion against the defendant's property there. For the present at least, problems of judicial j11risdiction are not likely to arise too frequently in Etluopia. Us11ally both parties are Ethiopians as tl1e trans action which is i11volved in the s11it has occLtrred l1ere. Tl1us, tl1e co11rt ''assumes'' tl1at there is judicial j11risdictio11 except in tl1e rare case where an objection is rais ed on this ground. Ho\vever, as more international transactions are brot�gh! before the Etl1iopian co11rts, the question will arise \Vi�h �eat�r � re�11�ncy, and 1t 1s, there fore, necessary to consider the law relating to Jt1d1c1al JUr1sd1ct1on. 1.
2. 3.
A state may be clefined as any . geograp�ic port!on_ of the eartl1's surface having an i11de pendent system of law. Under tl11s defirut1on, Et�1op1a would be a state, as woul? the co1n ponent parts of a federal system st1ch as a S\.v1�s canton or a state of the United States. During federation, Eritrea would have been considered a state for tl1ese pt1rposes. . See Civ. Pro. c., Arts. 456-461, particularly Art. �58. _Sections (b) _throt1gl1 (e) o f tl1at article set forth the general conditions under wl11cl1 foreign Judg1nents \.V1ll be enf orced . . . It will no doubt be more convenient for him to litigate tl1e case on the merits m Etl110pia, since tl1e witnesses are likely to be J1ere.
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There are no written provisio11s of law governi11g this kind of jurisdiction. In most countries juridiction is treated as a question of private international law ratl1er tl1a11 one of civil procedure (although, in practice, it is as much a procedu ral problem as one of private international law), and the provisions of law app lica.ble to it are found in the latter area. In Ethiopia, the draft provisions of the Civil Code dealing witl1 private international law· were not adopted by Parlia� e� t, 4 so wl1atever private international law tl1 ere is in Ethiopia depends 011 tl1e dec1s1ons of tl1e Etluopia11 courts when faced with sucl1 questio11s. Consequently the ''law'' of jt1dicial jt1risdiction is re1Jresented. by tl1e practice followed by the Ethiopian courts. Fortt1nately, the practice is clear, and tl1ere is no· difficulty in determining tl1e grot1nds 9n wlucl1 the Ethiopian courts will take judicial jt1risdiction. We will 110w discuss tl1 ese grounds and the general principles of la\\'. applicable to judicial jt1risdictio11. At tl1e ot1tset it is necessary to distingt1isl1 between jt1dicial jurisdiction in persor1a111 (over tl1e 1Jersori) and judicial jt1risdiction in ren1 (over tl1e thing), since tl1 e basis for tl1e exercise of these two ki11ds of jt1dicial jt1risclictio.n differs. rhe distinctio11 will be fot111d in tl1 e type of action tl1at is brougl1 t and tl1 e type of relief tl1 at t]1 e JJlai11tiff seel<s. A11 action in perso11c1111 - which is tl1e usual kind is brought agai11st a JJerson, natt1ral or legal, and relief is s_ot1gl1 t agai11 st tl1e person of tl1e defendant, i.e,. a11 order reqt1iring hi111 to pay a st1n1 of n1oney to the l)laintiff or to do or refrair1 fro1n doi11g a11 act. A s11it for da111ages or an in ju11 ctio11 wot1lcl be a11 i11 perso11a1r1 suit. An actio11 in rer11 is, i11 effect, brougl1t agai11st a tl1ing, tl1ougl1 an individt1al is t1st1ally na111 ed as tl1e defenda,nt, and tl1e relief is sot1gl1t \1/itl1 respect to tl1e tl1ing itself, e.g., tl1 e plaintiff seeks an order clirecti11g tl1at certain 111ov,tble property be tra11 sfe1·recl to bjn1. W·e will consider tl1ese t\vo types of jurisdictio11 separately. The Etl1io1)ia11 courts ,viii exercise judicial jt1risdiction i11 persona,11 ,vl1 ere eitl1er (1) tl1e defendant is an Etl1io1)ia11 11 atio11al or do111iciliary, (2) tl1e act wl1jch i s the ot1bject 111atter of tl1e suit occurred i11 Etl1 iopia., or (3) tl1e defendant l1 as consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by tl1e Etbio1Jia11 court. These are a.lternative grot1nds; it is 011ly necessary tl1at one of the1n be prese11t in a given case. Tl111s, if the act vvl1icl1 is tl1e s11bject n1 atter of the suit occt1rred l1ere, there is j11dicial j11risdic tion even if tl1 e defendant is n.ot an Ethiopian 11 ational or don1iciliary. 2.
Nationalitj1 or Don1icile
Tl1 e first basis of jt1dicial jt1risdictio11, and tl1 e n1 ost co111 1non, is tl1 at tl1e de fe11dant is a11 Ethiopian national or domiciliary. If the defendant l1 as st1cl1 status, l1e is st1 bject to Etluo1Jia's judicial jurisd.iction, even thot1gl1 the transaction on ,vhich tl1e st1it is based occt1rred ot1tside of Etl1iopia. Note, howe,,er, tl1 at it is the defe11dant's status tl1 at deternunes judicial jurisdictio11 on this grot1nd, not tl1e plaintiff's. If tl1e defendant is not an Ethiopian national or do111iciliary (and not otl1 erwise st1bject to the jt1risdiction of the Et11iopian courts), the court can11ot take jt1dicial jtrrisdiction 011 tl,e grot111d that the p/airttiff possesses sucl1 status. An Etl1iopian national is 011e wl10 may clai1n st1cl1 11ationality in accordance with the provisions of tl1e Nationality Law of 1930. 5 A domiciliary is a person ,vl1 0, while not 4. 1
See the discussion of this point in R. David, "A Civil Code for Ethiopia," Tulane L. Rev., vol. 37 (1963), p. I 96. 5. L�\v of 24 July, 1930. It is provided in the Revised Constitution that ''the law shall deter mine. th,'; conditions of acquisition and loss of Ethiopian nationality and of Ethiopian citi zenship. �ev. �onst., Art. 39. Tbe 1930 Law is the only on.e on the subject. See generally the d1scuss1on 1n R. Sedler, "Nationality, Domicile and the Persona.I Law in Ethiopia," J. Eth. L., vol. 2 (1965), IJ, 161.
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ij
principal sea' t of 111· 5 bus1n · ess and of an·· · Ethiopian . national, has establisl1 ed tl1e . . · · · 1t h t w 1 h he e r� nt1 ?te on .of res1d1ng here permanently, or more ts nte res . his i rea list ifi 6 n1t d e pe e r10d . of time. It is well-recognized in all le cally, for an 1n al sys tem s . tio na son's · sta.tus as - a· na l or do111iciliary makes it reasonable 1or that a per . � h11n to · · · · · be ·subJect to Jlld1c1aI Juris d1ct1on 1 n the courts of ]1 is nation or domicile. As one court stated: '' .... As in tl1e case of tl1 e authority of the United States over its absent citizens .... , the autl1 ority . of a state over one of its citizens is not tern1ina t�d by .tl�e n1ere fact of his abse11ce fron1 tl.1e state. Tl1 e state w11icl1 accords h�1n pr1�1l�ges a11d affords prote�tion to hi111 and l1 is property by virtue of his . do1ruc1l� 1�1ay also exact reciprocal dt1ties. 'Enjoyme11t of the privilege of res1?ence w1tl11�1 �l1e state, and tl1e attenda11t right to invoke the protection of its laws, are . IJ?-�eparable' fro1 11 the variot1s incide11ces of state citizenship . . .. Tl1e res�o11s1 b1 l1 t�e� of tl1at citizensl1ip arise out of the relationship to tl1e state \Vl11cl1 do111 1c1le creates. Tl1at relationsl1ip is not dissolved by n1ere �bs�nce fron1 tl1e . �tate. Tl1 e atte11dant dt1ties, like tl1e rigl1ts ancl privileges 1nc1dent to do1111 c1le, are not dependent 011 conti11t1ous presence in tl1e state. 011 e st1cl1 incidence of do111 icile is a111 e11ability to st1it withi11 tl1e state eve11 dt1ri11g sojour11 s witl1out tl1e state .... '' 7 In other \Vords, \\1here a person is a 11ational or domiciliary of a state, lie sl1ot1ld not be unwilling to defend st1its in the cot1rts o.f that state. Since that state ex te11ds benefits to l1in1 , it can de111and in excl1ange tl1at he st1 bmit to the jurisdic tion of its courts . Moreover, everyone n1ust be an1 enable to st1it so1newl1ere. So1 11e states do not tal<e jurisdiction on tl1e grot111d tha.t tl1e act wl1icl1 is tl1e st1bject matter of the suit occt1rred tl1ere. If the act occurred in st1ch a state, tl1 e defend ant n1ust be sued in tl1e state of l1is nationality or domicile or l1 e cannot be stied at all. So, wl1enever tl1e defe11dant is an Etl1 iopian national or domiciliary, there is jt1dicial jurisdiction in Ethiopia irrespective of where tl1e act \vhicl1 is tl1e st1 bject matter of tl1 e suit occt1rred. Just as physical persons are st1bject to jt1dicial jt1 risdictio11 in the state of their nationality or do1nicile, legal perso11s are st1bject to st1it in the state \vl1icl1 created them. Tl1erefore, any associatio11 establisl1ecl i11 accordance witl1 the JJrovi sions of tl1e Civil Code or the Com111 ercial Code is st1bject to tl1 e jL1dicial jt1risdic tion of Ethiopia, eve11 thot1g]1 the transaction on which st1it is brot1gl1t occured elsewhere. A qt1estion does arise with respect to foreign assoc�ations, . tl1a.t . is, �sso . ciations created under the law of another state. They are subJect to Jt1d1c1 al JUrts siation in Ethlopia with respect to st1 its arising out ?f. tl1.eir act.ivit.ies condt1cted here. 8 In order for such associations to carry on act1v1ty 111 Eth1op1a, tl1ey n1t1st obtain an autl1 orization from the office of associations in Addis Ababa. 9 Prest1111 a bly, a foreign association is reqt1ired to execute a consent to. be sued in E.tl1i�pia and to appoint an agent to receive process 10 in order to o_bt.a1n st1cl1 at1tl1or�zat�on. If a foreign association carried 011 activities without obta1n1 ng sucl1 autl1 or1zat1on, 6. See Civ. c., Arts. 183-184. See generally R. Sedler, supra, note 5 at pp. 170-172. . 278 p. 85, vol ), ed. ' ers \vy (La ., Rep Ct. . Sup . U.S 0), 194 ., U.S 7. Milliken v. Meyer (Sup. Ct., : ed urr occ t" sui the r of tte ma t jec sub tl1e is icl1 \vl1 act e "th 8. This would be so wI1etJ1er or not in Ethiopia, altl1ougl1 ustralJy tl1at will be the case. . . n1ust s 011 at1 oc1 ass d an d, n1e for n bee t no s l1a c offi a1;1 li 9. Civ. c., Art. 545. At JJresent suc � register wit h the Minister of the Interior. C1v. C., Art. 3362. basis 10. See Civ. Pro. c., Art. 96. n1ey are, tlierefore, st1bject to judicial jurisdictio11 on tl1e of a continuing express consent.
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it would l1ave no standing to object to being sued in the courts of Ethiopia for claims arising out of tl1e activities carried on here. 3.
The Doing of an Act Tl1e second basis of j11dicial jurisdiction that . we will consider is tl1a_t o� ''the reviously, that_ the act which . 1s . the p doing of an act," or as we hav� stated _ subject 1 natter of tl1 e suit occurred 111 Etl1 1opia. 1:'hat the doing ? � an act Justifies tl1e exercise of jt1dicial jt1risdiction was well-explained by tl1e op101011 of the Sup 1 . bia11 Kari Alex . v. Corp l Tr,1c igri Fore spol Koo of case the � rt in � ren1e Imperial Cou _ not s subJe w� �t to suit � In tl1at case tl1e defendant, Koospol, contended that 1t in Etl1iopia because it \Vas a Czecl1oslovakian trade corporat1on, and registered in Czecl1oslovakia only.
It did not carry on bt1sioess activities in Etl1iopia generally, 12 but the Czechoslovak ian Com111 ercial A.tt,tche entered into an agreen1ent in Addis Ababa on behalf of KoosJ)Ol, involving the sale of certain products of tl1e corporatio11 i.n Addis Ababa and tl1e pay1nent of co11 11nissio11s. The st1it was for 1)ayn1ent of tl1 e commissions. In l1oldi11g tl1at tl1e defenclant was st1bject to tl1 e jurisdiction of the Ethiopian courts, tl1e SuJ)reme I11 1perial Court observed as follo\VS: ''A very esse11tial point to emphasize and draw tl1 e attention of the parties to is tl1at a cor1)or,1tio11 ca11not came over to Etl1iopian, sign agreements, bind itself for tl1 e futt1re witl1 third parties and otl1 ers, etc., and fi11ally, when tl1e ti11 1e for accot111ts co111es over, de11 y jt1risdiction to the Courts of the cot1ntry wl1icl1 J1as welco11 1ed it. Tl1at would be literally unfair!!!'' In otl1er words, tl1e cot1rts of tl1e state where a contract l1 as been n1ade have juciicial jt1risdiction to l1ear a suit involving the contract. Tl1at state l1as an interest in providing a forun1 for the plaintiff \vl10 n1 ade a contract tl1ere and expected it to be enforced tl1ere. Tl1e ''st1bject matter of tl1e suit'' is the contract whicl1 was made i11 Etl1iopia, and tl1e Ethiopia courts l1ave jt1dicial jt1risdiction to l1 ear a suit in,1 0Iving tl1at co11tract. I-Io\vever, the exercise of jt1risdiction on tllis basis is not lin1ited to the sitt1a tion wl1ere tl1e contract was actually n1,1de i11 Ethiopia. Even though tl1e contract itself may l1ave been n1 ade elsewI1 ere, tl1e transaction to wl1 icl1 tl1e contract relates may involve Etl1iopia, and tl1 e contrc1cts that Etl1io1Jia l1 as \\1itl1 tl1is tra11 sactio11 n1ay be sucl1 as to make it reasonable tl1at Etl1iopia exercise jt1risdictio11 over it. ·For exa111 ple, two business1ne11 l1aving their main place of bt1siness in Etl1iopia, conclude a contract in Kenya for tl1 e sale and delivery of goods in Etl1iopia. Si11ce the contract was to be perfor1ned in Etl1iop. ia, Etl1iopia l1as strfilcie11t contact \vitl1 the transaction to make it reasonable tl1 at tl1e defenda11t defend a suit 011 tl1at transaction l1ere. Therefore, tl1ere is jt1dicial jt1risdiction on tl1e basis of tl1e doing of a11 act, the IJerfor11 1ance of tl1e contract in Etl1iopia. The Nigerian c,1se of Olufe111i Ricl1arfl Ernest Blaizer v. Freclerick William Dove 13 �11c ( 8_ie1 :,·c1 Go/cl T �·ust, �tel., f11rnisl1es a good exan1 ple of tl1 e exercise of judicial JL1 �1sd �ct1011 on tlus basis. Tl1 e defenda11 t aJJproacl1 ed tl1e plai 11 tiff for a loan in �1g�r1a. !n �l1 ana, lie executed a11 agree1ne11t of loan, wl1ich was sent to tl1 e plai11tiff in N1ger1a. Wl1en the plaintiff received tl:us agreen1 ent, l1 e instructed l1is bank I1· 12 · 13.
(Sup. �mp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 1963, Civil Ap p. No. 113 5-55) (u.npublished). Tl1 us� it would :°?t. be. subjec� to suit here on the gro und that it was a foreign association carrying on act1v1t1es 1n Eth iopia. (Ffigh Ct., Nigeria, 1936), Nigeria L. R • ep., VOI • 13 , p. 66.
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in Nigeria to ca?le th e su� o_f � oney specified in the agreeinent to the defendant in Ghana, c:11arg1ng the pla1nt1ff s account.. Tl1� defendant repaid part of the loan by telegraphic transfer fro m London to ·N1ger1a. When the balance was n t pat·d, · N'1ger1a to recover this amount. · 1·tr sued the de1f:'.endant 111 the plrunt Th� Nigerian col1rt_ he ld tl1at it l1ad jud�cial jl1risdiction on tl1e ground tllat the act wl11cl1 was tl1e subJect matter of tl1e st11t occurred in Nigeria. Tllis was a suit on a_ con�ract of loan. Th e col1rt _co?cluded tl1at the co11tract was made in Niger ia, since 1t wa s there that t�e J?la1nt1ff ''accepted tl1e offer'' by directing his bank to cable the 1no�1ey fro111 N:�e1;1a _to tl1e d�fenda1 _ 1t in Gl1ana. Btit, more ituport antly, tl1e cas e 111volved a_ N1ger1an loan, since the loa11 was made when the bank in Nige�i a c �ble� tl1e n1oney to tl1e _ defenda11t in Ghana, and repayment was to be n1ade 10 N1ger1a. Tl111s, even 1f tl1e actt1al contract l1ad been 1nade in Gl1ana, Nigeria would l1ave jl1dicial jurisdiction, becal1se the loan itself was effected in Nigeria, and payment was to be n1ade tl1ere. Nigeria l1ad an interest in provid i11g a forum for party wl10 111ade a loa11 in Nigeria and who expected to be paid tl1ere.
°
Therefore, we can say tl1at the Etl1iopia11 courts wot1ld l1ave j11dicial jL1risdic tion wl1ere tl1e contract which is the s11bject matter of tl1e st1it \Vas n1ade in Etl1iopia or was to be performed tl1ere or where the transaction to which the s11it relates is clearly an ''Ethiopian tranaction. '' The same principle is applicable to acts otl1er than co11tracts; \vl1enever tl1e act which is the subject 1na.tter of tl1e st1it occt1rred in Etl1io1Jia, the Ethiopian courts have ju.risdiction. Consider tl1is exa1nple. The defendant, a Kenyan national a11d do1niciliary, drives his vel1icle fron1 Kenya to Ethiopia. While in Ethiopia, he in jt1res the plaintiff witl1 tl1e vehicle, and immediately rett1rns to l(enya. I-Ie is sub ject to s11it in Etluopia 011 a clai111 for personal i11jt1ries arising ot1t of the accident. The accident occurred in Etl1iopia, and Ethiopia l1as a11 interest in providing a forum for someone who was inj11red l1ere. The act wl1ich is the subject 1natter of the suit - the accide11t - took place in Etl1iopia, ft1r11isl1i11g a basis of jt1dicial jurisdiction. 14 It should be noted, as stated previot1sly, tl1at the Ethiopian courts do not ta�e jurisdiction simply becat1se tl1e plaintiff is an Etl1iopia11. Where tl1e defendant 1s not an Ethiopia11 national or donuciliary, the act wl1ich is the s11bject n1atter ?f tl1e s11it must have occurred in Ethiopia. So, if an Ethiopian made a contract rn Gern1any with a Germ.an, which was to be performed entirely in Germany, t11e 15 . ract co11t the of ch brea Ethiopian courts would not hav e jtirisdiction in a sttit for To conclude, jt1diciaJ j11risdiction exists eve11 _whe�e the de�endant is 11ot an Ethiopian natio11al or domiciliary if (I) the act which 1s the s11bJect 111atter of the suit occurred i11 Etl1iopia or (2) althougl1 some of acts ?ccurred elsewhere,_ t�e t_rans action has s11fficient contact with Ethiopia so that it 1s reasonable for Ethiopia to hear a s11it involving the transaction. 71, . vol ) ed. ' ers wy (La p. Re Ct. . Sup . U.S 7), 192 S., U. , See Hess v. Pawloski (S11p. Ct. }). 1091. · ' · d 1c 15. Compare Art. 14 of tlie Frencl, Civil Code, which a�tl1orizes French cot1rts to ta�e t tt1r1sc n: 1e f g tion over a foreigner wl10 entered into a contract with a Frencl1 n1 an, even tl1oti 0 · t t�� ce. an F� 11 ! e� rm �fo pe _be to t no . s wa d an ce an F� tract was conclucled ot1tside of . e . Se . ion ict isd Jur of sis _ba � th! on red de ren t 1en courts will not recognize a French Judg11 .afll1e a, ,np Co ry ntu Ce tli XX disct1ssion in K. Nadelman, ''Jurisdictionally In11)roper Fora, 10 and Cor1flicts La•v (1961), p. 329
14.
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4.
Consent
The third basis of judicial jurisdiction is consent. Eve n though a party is not otherwise subject to Etl1iopia's judicial ju.risdiction, he ca� c�nsent to th� exercise of sucl1 jurisdiction. By consenting, he unde�takes . an . obl1g�t1on to submit to the jt1risdiction of the Ethiopian courts, and this obl1gat1on will be enforced as any otl1er. 16 Co11sent ma)' be express or implied. Suppose tl1at two foreign businessmen, wl1 0 11f1ve offices in Ethiopia, enter into a contract in Aden, where they also have offices. Tl1 e contract is to be performed entirely in Aden and does not involve tl1eir Etl1 iopian oJnces at all. I-Iowever, tl1e parties agree tl1at all disputes arising t1nder the co1 1tract sl1all be subn1 itted to tl1e Ethiopian courts. Although the part ies are foreign b l1si11ess 111en aod the subject 111 atter of tl1e suit bas no connection witl1 Etl1iopia, tl1ere is judicial jt1risdictio 11 . The parties �ave agreed �o submit to tl1e jurisdictio11 of the Etl1iopian courts, and tl1e cot1rts will enforce this agreement. Tl1 e defe 11da11t will be bot1nd by J1 is promise to submit to Ethiopian jurisdiction. 17 Implied co11sent will be fot1nd wl1ere a party does in fact submit to the court's jurisdiction, althot1gl1 I1e does not expressly admit that ]1 e l1 as done so. In such cases . l1 e ca1 111ol later de11y tl1at tl1e co11rt can exercise jurisdiction over l1im. Sup1)ose that a Ke 11 ya11 natio11 al a11d do1 11iciliary is s11ed in Etl1 iopia for breach of a contract n1ade in Ke11ya and to be performed tl1 ere. He appears and defends. Al first l1 earing, lie does 11ot file a prelinlinary objection on tl1e ground tl1 at the court lack :s jurisdictio11.18 Tl1e case proceeds to trial, botl1 parties present tl1 eir evi dence and mal<e arg11111ents to tl1e co11rt, and tl1 e judgment is for the plaintiff. Tl1e defendant tl1en conte11ds tl1at tl1e cot1rt lacked judicial jt1risdiction over him. ,\.lthougl1 l1e is 11 ot an Etl1iopia11 n,1tional or domiciliar)' and tl1e act wl1 icl1 is the s11bject matter of tl1 e st1it dicl not occ11r in Etl1iopia, tl1 ere is judicial jurisdiction. He consented to l1aving l1is case tried by tl1 e Etl1iopian courts by appearing and defending on tl1e n1erits, a11d ca 11not s11bseqt1ently repudiate this consent beca11se tl1e jt1dg111ent we 1 1t against hi111. However, if l1e appeared for 1l1e sole pi1rpose of contesti11g _ji1risdictio11, he is not dee111 ed to have conse11ted to the exercise of st1cl1 jurisdiction. ]f a defendant s11ed in tl1ose circt1msta11ces l1ad an advocate appear for l1 in1 a11d enter a11 object io11 under Art. 244, l1 e would not be said to have consented to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction, since all the while lie \Vas denying tl1at tl1e co11rt l1a.s JJower over l1in1 . 19 Tl1is is called a special appearance - an apJ)earance for tl1e sole basis of contesting jurisdiction - a11 d does not constitute conse11t. W 1 ere tl1 e plaintiff files st1it in Etlliopia, l1e sttbniits to tl1e jt1risdiction of tl1 e � . Etl1 1op1an courts not o�ly . for _ tl1e pttrpose of adjt1dicatiog tl1e JJartict1lar claim, but for tl1 e J)llrpose of adJ11d1cat1ng any co11 11 terclaim or set-oft' filed by the defend a11 t.20 Etl1 iopia11 la.w per11lits a defendant to assert co11nterclain1s 11nrelated to tl1e main claim21 and to set off against tl1e plai 11 tiff's claim any a 111 ount legally recover16.
See the discussion of this point in G. W. Ross, "The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction" Min nesota L. J:. ev., vol. 17 _(1933), p. 146, quoted in C. Brown, A. Vestal and M. Ladd, Cases anci Materials on Pleac!Ing ancl Procedure (1953), pp. 12-13. 17 · See F yerick v. Hubbard (King's Bench, Eng., 1902), La1v Jou rnal, 1902, p. 509. � 18. See C1v. Pro. C., Art. 244(2) (a). 19. See In re Dulles' Settlement (No. 2) (Ct. App. Eng. 1951) 195 1 All-En g. L . Rep., vol . 2 , p. 6 9- . , , , 20 · s am v. Saenger (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1938), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep . (Lawyers' ed.), vol. 8 2, �641� P 21. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 234(1) (f).
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22 Assume th at tl1e plaintiff, hi m. a foreign national and domiciliar able by s s bre of ac a for co tra nd ct � ant ma de 1;1 and to be performed in Eihio �: the defe · P cou ms nte rclr for u reli ef dan t bas ed on another contract made and to be The defen · . · t · 1 I op1a o E Al f . e "d thou outs 1 gh the Ethiopian courts would not h ave had � med erfor P · · jurisdiction. to hear a c 1 a im �n the . se�ond . contract if the defendant had filed an contract 1n Eth1op1a, since the plaintiff consented t0 the on original ·suit the exer· . " . cise of JU r�sd 1?t1on bY th . e Eth·1opian courts b y filing his claim here, he is subject to the Eth1op1an 1 aw with respect to c?unterclaims and set-offs and, therefore' has · on the sued counterclaim. consented to be
�nother qu�stion .is whether the pa�ties can clestroy a cou.rt's jurisdiction by agreeing !hat suits s_hall not be brot1gl�t 1_0 that court. This question was presented to t�e High C?ur� In the case ?f Et/1.1opza S.A.v. (!�rrara Marson Seccenti (Eritrea) Ltd.- That su�t involve? a claim for dan1ages ans1ng out of an agreement evi denced b_y � �11� of lading. The defendant contended that the courts of Ethiopia bad no }ur1sdict1on to l1ear t�1e case on tl1e ground that under the bill of lading the parties agreed that all d1sp11tes should be submitted to the Court of Piraeus in Greece. The issue was whetl1er the co11rt would recognize this provision as oust ing its ju.risdiction. The court h.eld that it would, since the clause in question was enforceable, and declined to exercise jurisdiction. It said that it would only refuse to enforce s11cl1 a �laus': if �o do so would be against Ethiopia's public policy, and there was nothing In this clat1se that wo11ld affect Ethiopia's public policy. Such clauses are common in in.ternational co1nmercial contracts and are enforced by the courts of other countries. Therefore, the co11rt held that it wo11ld en.force the clause and refuse to exercise jurisdiction. However, it is possible t o imagine a situation where the enforcement of such a clause depriving the courts of jurisdiction wo11ld be against Etl1iopia's pt1b]ic policy. Suppose an Ethiopian parent sent his son to be educated in England. He agreed with a relative there that the latter wot1ld take care of the cl1ild and super vise his education and further agreed to pay the relative a sum of money for doing so. The clause contained a provision that all disputes were to be st1bmitted to the English courts. Tl1e father reft1sed to pay, claiming that tl1e relative did not properly supervise the child. When the relative s11ed the father in Ethiopia, the father moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. It is likely that tl1e Ethiopi an courts would ref t1se to enforce the clause in the contract depriving them of jurisdiction. This contract involves the edt1cation of an Ethiopian minor, and Eth iopia has a strong interest in hearing disptrtes involving this contract. A]l st1ch disputes desirably should be bro11ght before the Ethiopian co1uts, since Ethiopia has the greatest interest in the contract. Therefore, the court would probably hold that to enforce this clat1se would be against Etl1iopia's public policy, and it would hear the suit.
5.
In Rem Jurisdiction
We may now consider jt1dicial jurisdiction in rem. An actio� i� _reni is essen tially an action tli at is brought against property (although an 1ndiv1dual mfl:Y be named as defendant) and the relief so11ght is with respect to tl1e property itself, that is, the plaintiff does not seek an order bi1;1ding the person of the_ defendant. or incorporeal. The property which is involved may be mov�bl_e ?r. 1mn�ovable, corporeal . . The only state that can exercise in rem JUr1d1ct1on 1s tl1e state wl1ere the property 22. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 236. 23. (High Ct., Addis Ababa, 1958, Civil Case No. 510-51) (unpublished).
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is situate (the situs), or to put in another way, the situs of property has juris diction to hear any case where tl1e relief is sought with respect to the property itself. Tl1 e exercise of in rem jurisdiction is well-illustrated by the case of Churchill v. Bigelol<v. 24 In tl1 at case tl1e ancestor of the defendants had agreed to sell the land to tl1e plaintiffs. The defendants refused to l1onor the contract, and the plain tiff brougl1 t suit in a cot1rt at tl1e situs to obtain an order transferring the land to bin1. The defenda11 ts were not subject to in persona111 jurisdiction at the situs. 25 Tl1 ey entered a special a1)peara 11 ce and rnoved tl1at tl1e case be dismissed for wa 11t of jurisdiction. Tl1e court denied the n1otio11 on tl1e ground that there was i11 re11·1 jt1 risdiction. Since the land was situate there, the court had po11 1er over it and could isst1e a11 order transferri11 g it. Inasn1ucl1 as in re111 jurisdiction was JJresent, it did 1 1ot 111 atter tl1at tl1e court Jacked i11. persona111 jurisdiction. 26 Wl1e11 a cot1rt is exercising in ren1 j11risdictio11, it can only grant relief with respect to tl1e JJropert)' itself. It cannot isst1e any ki11d of personal order against tbe defe11cla 1 1t. So, a11 orcler taxi 11g tl1 e costs of the JJroceeding against tl1e defend �tnt wl1 ere t] 1e basis of j11risdictio11 ,1vas i11 re111. would be voicl ; 27 since the cou.rt lacked i11 perso11a111 jurisciiction, it co11ld not impose any kind of personal obliga tion. Of cot1rse, if a defendant in st1cl1 a case a1J1)ears a11d defends on tl1e merits, ]1e l1as conse 11ted to the exercise of i11 perso11a111 jurisdiction, and tl1e court can isst1e a J)erso11al decree. Re 111 en1 ber tl1at i11 re,11 jt1risdiction exists witl1 respect to all types of property. Ir a 1 1 at1to111obile ,1vere i11 storage in Addis Ababa, tl1e Etl1iopian courts wo1tld have jurisdiction to l1ear a st1it i11volving co11 flicting claims of O\.Vnersl1ip, even thougl1 tl1e defencla 11t n1igl1t be a forejg11 1 1ational and do1 niciliary and the claims of own ersl 1i1J 111 igl1 t 11ot l1ave arise 11 i11 Et11 iopia. Tl1 e sa1ne would be trt1e witl1 respect to securities i11 a safe de1Josit box in tl1 e Comn1ercial Bank. As long as tl1e property is sitt1ate in Ethiopia, tl1e Etl1 iopia11 cot1rts can exercise i,z rein jurisdict io11 over it. Tl1 e fallowing set of facts will demonstrate the distinction bet,veen in ren1 and i11 perso11a111 j11risdictio1 1. Tvvo State A 11atio11als and do1niciliaries enter into a con tract tl1ere for tl1 e sale of an at1tornobile tl1at is sitt1ate in Etl1iopia. Wl1 en tl1e ve 11dor refuses to transfer o\1vnersl1 i1), the ve11 dee s·ues lli111 in State A for a11 order reqt1iring l 1 im to do so. State A l1as jt1dicial jurisdiction, because the relief sot1ght is an order against the person of tl1 e defenda11t ordering l1 i1 n to transfer owner sl1iJJ. Tl1is is i11 JJerso11c1111 relief, and there is i11. perso11a111 j11riscliction in State A. Bt1t tl1e State A co11rt cot1ld 11ot iss11e an order transferring ow 1 1ership by tl1e force of tl1 e order. Tl1 is is itz re,11 relief, and 011 1y tl1e sitt1s, Etl1 iopia, ca11 grant sucl1 reljef. On t] 1e other l1and, if tl1 e plai11 tiff wot1 ld bring s11it i11 Etl1iopia, the co11rt co11 ld order tl1 e transfer of tl1e a11tomobile to hi111. Since it only has irz re,11. •
24.
(Sup. Jud. Ct., Massacbtisetts, U.S., 1955), 1,fassachusetts Rep., vol 333, p. 196, in M.. Van 1-Iecke, Cases on Equitable Re,neclies (1959), p. 638. 25. Tl1ey we�e not d?rniciled ther� �n � �ere not physically present i11 t11e state (co111n1011 Ia,1/ . courts �ill tak.e ''!· perso11a1n Jttr1sd1ct100 1f _the defendant is physically present in the state �t _th� !•n1e of su1t and has been served \.Vtth process). Apparently the court did not take Jur1sd1ct1on on the ground tl1at the contract vvas to be perf orn1ed in Massachusetts. 26. See also Panchanau ':· T�apada _(ll_ig� �t., . Calcut�a, 1961), 1961 All-Inclia Rep., p. 193, _ tl1e cottrt exercised 111 renz Jltr1sd1ct1on 1n an 1de11tical case. where 27. ee111an v. Alderson (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1886), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (La\.vyers' ed.), vol. 30, e �� 3i2�
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..
·urisdiction, it could do nothing else;_ it could not, for exam ple order the d efendJan . t to . pay the costs of the proceed ings, beca11se it lacks zn per' sonam jt1risdiction over him. We may now sumn1arize judicial jurisdiction Judicial jurisdict·I on z ,� personan1 on to bind the person of the defend�nt' that - i· s, to order l11m to pay is J·urisdicti · · a s�m of m_ . . oney_ or t? �o or refrain from doing an the_ �la!nt1ff _ act. Judicial . . jtirisdi ct1�n in pe, sonan! _e_xists 10 Etl11op1a 1f e1tl1er (I) the defendant is an Ethioact or transactio pian national or · d0Illlcil1ary, or (2) tl1e · n whi"ch 1· s the sLIb. �ect · . . · E th1op · 1a or has significant contacts witll Ethiopia matter of th e s11 1t occt1rred 1n . e c?n sent, e�press ?� .11�pli_ed� �o the exercise of j·udicial ju 0! �3)_ there has b en_ osd1ct 1on_ by . tl1 e Eth1op1an co1trts. _Jt1d1c1al Jur1sd1ct1on in rem is jurisdiction to grant rel ief wi th res�ect . to property 1t�elf: _It �xis_ts _only in tl1e courts of the place wl1er� t�1e property 1s s1t11�te_. ��ere JUd1c1_al Jt 1r1 sd1ction is lacking, the case n1 ust be d1sm1ssed [o� �a�t of Jt1r1sd1cti on, and 1 t is not necessary to consider the other elements of Jur1sd1ct1on. B.
Material Jurisdiction
Material jt1risdiction refers to tl1e power of tl1e court to bear the kind of case tl1at is before it. Usually it will involve the q11estion of whicl1 level of courts should hear tl1e case. As we saw in Chapter II, tl1ere are th.ree le vels of courts in Ethiopia tl1at l1ave original jurisdiction. We will now consider wbetl1er the suit is to be brought in. the High -Co11rt, the Awradja G11ezat Cot1rt or the \Voreda · Guezat Court. Mat erial jurisdictio11 also i11volves the question of wl1etl1 er the case is to be beard before the courts at all, e.g., n1ay the case not have to be brougl1t before an administrative tribunal or some otl1er agency?
1. Jurisdictional Limits of Courts The provisions of the Cod e dealing with material ju.risdiction represent an attempt to apportion tl1e judicial bt1siness among the vario11s levels of cot1rts in the hierarchy. Essentially, material j11risdiction is based on the amount of 111 oney that is involved in the case. The the ory is that the 1nore important cas es sl1 ould be heard by the courts l1igher in tl1e 11ierarcl1 y, and in the absence of a better method, tl1e importance of a case is deter1nined by the an1 ount of money tbat is involved.28
The Civil Proced11re Code makes s,veeping changes in the j11risdictional limits of the various courts. 29 To so111e extent this reflects tl1e increased prospe rity of Ethiopia in the years si 11ce tl1 e enactment of tl1e original limits. Bt1t the provisions reflect something more, namely a desire to red11ce tl1e n1 1mber of cases that cotne before the l1igher co11rts, particularly tl1e High Court. Also, !l1e Code_ dr�\vs a distinction between suits regarding immovable property and. s111ts not . 1n�o!v1ng immovable property, a distinction tl1at was not drawn pre�1o_usly. J11 nsd1ct1onal limits are lower for cases not involvi11g.ioJ1novable property. This 1 � no d?u?t _dt� e to the fact t11 at lan d disputes are very con1mon in Etl1iopia, and: h 1gl1er �11r1sdict1ooal e r co11rts. h hig the t 1 10 gh 1 bro es cas of er its mb · u lim for s11ch cases will reduce the n 1em with �l g rin pa · � co by its lim al on cti di ris j11 We may be st consider the ne,v t ur Co gh 1 I-li e tl in t gh ou br be uld co s se those previously establisl1ed. Forn1erly, ca ure ed oc Pr l ina im Cr tl1e to ule d l1e Sc t irs tl1e by ! 28. Jurisdiction in criminal cases is governed _ ed. tri Code. It is specified in wl1ich court eacl1 offence is to be n Act of io at lam oc Pr ts ur Co d de en sp su w no e th of 29. The Code incorporates th e provisions 1962. See tl1e disct1ssion in Chapter II, s11pra.
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if the amount in controversy exceeded Etl1. $ 2000. 30 Now, in order for a case to con1e before High Court, the amot1nt involved must exceed Eth.$ 5000 if the case does not relate to immovable property and Eth.$ 10,000 if it relates to immovable property.31 The _previous juridictional linuts of the Awradja Guezat Court were between Eth, 100 and Eth.$ 500. 32 Now, in cases not involving immovable property it l1as jurisdiction wl1ere the amot1nt in controversy exceeds Eth.$ 500 and does not exceed Etl1. 5000, and in cases involving immovable property, where the am ount i11volved exceeds Etl1.$ I OOOand does not exceed Etl1.$ 10,000. 33 The Woreda Guezat Court forn1 erly had jurisdiction in cases involving between Eth.$ 50 and Etl1 . 100. Now its jurisdiction is 11p to Eth.$ 500 in cases not relating to immo vable IJroperty and Etl1.$ 1000 in cases relating to imn1ovable property.34 However, in certain types of cases the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction, wl1icl1 n1eans tl1at tl1 at kind case n1ust be brought ii1 tl1e Higl1 Cotlft irrespective of tl1e a111ot111.t i11 volved. Tl1e I-Iigl1 Co11rt has exclusive j11risdiction in the follo\ving classes of cases: (I) tl1e for111 atio11, dissolutjon and liquidation of bodies corporate; (2) cases involvi11g negotiable instru111 ents, bankrt1ptcy and n1aritime law; (3) suits 011 inst1ra11ce JJolicies; (4) cases involving trademarks, patents and copyright; (5) expropria.tio11 and collective exploitatjo11 of JJroperty; (6) any q11estion concerning tl1 e liability of pt1blic servants for acts do11 e in tl1 e clischarge of tl1 eir official dut ies ; 35 (7) ql1estio11s of 11ationality; (8) q11estions of filiation; (9) petition for ,vrit of l1abeas cor1)us; 36 (10) ap1Jlicatio11s for the e11 forcen1e11t of foreign judg ments a11d arbitral awards. 37 Tl1 is 1neans that if the JJlaintiff is s11i11g on a negoti able i11strt1111 e11t i11 the amou11 t of Etl1.$ 2000, st1it is to be bro11gl1t in the High Cot1rt ratl1er tl1a11 i11 tl1 e Awradja Gt1ezat Cot1rt•. Tl1is is a a case in whicl1 the I-Iigl1 Co11rt bas exclt1si\1 e jurisdictior1, so tl1e general provisions as to a1not1nt in con troversy are not applicable. tl1e st1bject 1 11atter of tl1 e s11it cannot be expressed in 1noney, the Awra dja Gt1ezat Co11rt bas 111 aterial jurisdiction. 38 Thus, the variot1s ''petitions'' such as a petition for J10111 0Jogation of a divorce, wo11ld now be addressed to the Aw Co11rt, as in the past. I-Iowever, the fact radja Gt1ezat Cot1rt i11 stead of to I Iigl1 tl1at tl1e plai11 tiff is not seeking da111ages as relief does not necessarily 111ea.n that the Sl1bject 1natter of tl1e suit cannot be expressed in money. Assume tl1 at the pla.i11tiff sues for a declaration tl1 at l1 e is tl1 e owner of certain land tl1 at l1 as been claimed by tl1e defendant. T J1 e s11it can be valt1ed; tl1e val11e of tl1e Ia11d deter mines tl1e a111 ot111t i1.1 controversy, and if tl1e valt1e of tl1e land is Etl1 .$ 1000 or less, suit is to be brought in tl1 e Woreda G11ezat Co11rt ratl1 er tl1 a11 in the Awra dja Guezat Cot1rt. \\ 1l1ere
30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.
37. 38.
Administration of Justice Proclaination, 1942, Art. 16(1) (b), Proc. No. 2, ]'leg. Gaz., year 1, no. 1; Court Procedure Rules, 1943, A1·t. 3, Leg. Not. No. 33, Neg. Gaz., year 3, no. 1. Civ Pro. C., Art. 15(1). TJ1e order establishing tJ1is jurisdiction was not publisl1ed; the san1e was true of tl1e order establishing the jurisdiction of the Woreda Guezat Court. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 14. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 13. Note, J1 owever, that under Rev. Const., Art. 75, Ministers 1nay be tried only before the Supreme In1peria1 Court upon charges of offences comn1itted in connection witl1 their offi cial duties. E �en thougl1 the writ is usually sought by persons i11 custody on a charge of having com n11tted a penal offence, the action to obtain tl1e writ is considered a civil action' and l1 ence' governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 15(2) (3). the H.igl1 Court. of jurisdiction exclusive the witl1in Except, of course, for cases .
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Where more than one cla im ha s be en joined against the de"11endant or the same · 1y, 39 matena · l Juris · · · d"1ct1on JOint · depends on the aggregate amount of the ts ndan defe an · d A B 1 ·f JOi n us, · In · a Th sui t against C not involving immovable s.40 o clair . . , . . cla im be 1�g f ?r . E�h-� 2500 and B's claim being for Eth.$ 250 A s wit h y, er� prop 0 the High Co_urt has material JUrisd1ct1on, although if t'he suits llad Ilot bee� joined, the High Court would n?t have mat�rial jurisdiction. However, where suits separately filed have bee n co�solidated for . tr1a], the aggregate amount is not con sidered. If A_ had sued � In the AwradJa Guezat Court for Eth.$ 3000 and B bad sued_ C 1n the AwradJa � :uez�t Court for Eth.$ 2500, tl1e court could decide to consol1�at� the cases for trial without tl1ereby destroying its material jurisdiction.41 Where pr1nc1pal and accessory or alternative claims are made, the jurisdiction of the court �epends_ 01;1 the value of tl1e higher principal claim.42 For exan1ple, in a case not involving 1mn1ovable property, the plaintiff s11es for breach of cont ract in the Awradja G11ezat Cot1rt, clai1ning dan1ages in the amount of Eth.$ 5000. Alternatively, he claims retur11 of tl1e down payment of Eth.$ 450 if tl1e court finds that there was no c�ntract. Material jurisdiction depends on the higher claim, and tl1erefore, the AwradJa Guezat Cot1rt has j11risdiction. Tl1e same principle is applicable to counterclain1s; tl1e j11risdiction depends on the valt1e o·f tl1e higher claim.43 So, if i11 a case 11ot involving inuuovable property, the plaintiff sued in the \\,'oreda Guezat Cot1rt for Eth.$ 400, a11d the defendant filed a counterclaim for Etl1.$ 600, the ca,se would l1ave to be transferred to tl1e Awradja G11ezat Cot1rt. The Code also deals witl1 the effect of subsequent cl1anges in tl1e an1ot1nt of money involved. Where part of the claim is adn1itted before evide11ce is produced, the s11bject matter of the s11it is accordingly red11ced. Bt1t tl1e co11rt in which suit was filed bas discretion whetl1er or not to transfer the case to the sub ordinate court.44 The decision wou ld probably depe11d on the amo11nt by \vhich the claim \Va.s reduced, altl1ough it sl1ould be e111phasized that the cot1rt has f11ll discretion in this regard. If the plaintiff filed s11it in the High Court in a case ld wou ly bab pro rt co11 the , 500 .$ Eth g 1uin clai y, pert pro ble ova g imm not involvin not transfer the case. On the other l1and, if he admitted owing all bt1t $ 500, tl1e rt, Cou h Hig the t; eza G11 a red Wo tl1e to e cas the er nsf _ court wol1ld probably tra h wit ned cer con be not ld u · sho on, icti isd jur ive l11s exc it� i11g olv inv es in cas ept exc suits having a value of Eth.$ 500. ces tan ms c c c�r mi no eco i ge an � cl1 a to e du it su tl1e of � lue va the A change in r �la n do p1a h1o Et tl1e , ing nd pe s wa t slu ile wh If, . ion ict isd jur does not affect material e tim the at an th s les rth wo be 11ld wo rsy ve ro nt co were devalued th e am ou nt in uld wo d file lly na igi or s wa it su e th ich wh in t ur the suit was filed. However, the co retain jurisdiction.45
2. Determination of Amount in Controversy w ho ) (1 rn nc co n io ct di ris ju � l ria te a . m of The two most significant questions in th e area at m e th is n he w ) (2 d an se ca a is it determin ed how m uc h money is involved in 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.
inSt th� s� e ag or nt da � fe de le ng si ; � a t As to joinder of claims by a single plaintiff agains i s, ot a1. pl le tip ul m by s m ai cl of r de in defenda nts j ointly, see Civ. Pro. C., Art. 217; as to jo see Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 17(1). Ibid. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 17(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 17(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 16(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 16(4).
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ter not to be brought before the courts at all. The first problem is illustrated by the case of A1.1ton1otive Tracling Company v. Ato Johannes Prota. 46 At that time, the High Court l1ad jurisdiction if the amount in ·controversy exceeded Eth.$ 2000. The plaintiff clain1ed. Eth. $ 2100 consisting of tl1e sum of Eth.$ 2000, which rep resented the debt due to the plaintiff. and Eth.$ 100, which represented the ex penses incurred by tl1e pla.intiff in bringing su.it. The. defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction, since the actual debt was 011Jy Etl1 .$ 2000 and the plain tiff was 11ot entitled to recover Eth. $ 100 as expenses in connection with the suit. Tl1e court h . eld that there was jurisdiction, since the plaintiff claimed an an1ount 1vit/1in tlze juriscliction of t/1e court. Whetl1er or not he was entitled to the extra Etl1 .$ 100 went to tl1e 111erits of I1is clain1 and not to the qt1estion of jurisdiction. The principle tl1at the cot1rt enunciated was that tl1e amot1nt of money involved was to be detern1ined by tl1 e a111ount of 1noney tl1at the plaintiff reaso11ably claimed in l1is staten1e11 t of clain1. Tl1is 1Jri11ciple is en1 bodied in tl1 e Civil Procedure Code. Tl1e Code provides th::1t i11 decidi11g \vl1 etl1 er it l1 as pecuniary jurisdiction tl1e court sl1all l1ave regard to tl1e a11101111t stated in tl1e state111ent of clain1. 47 Arts. 226 - 228 govern tl1 e an1 ot1nt to be stated in tl1e staten1e11t of clai111. Where tl1e plaintiff seeks tl1e reco very of 111011ey, tl1e precise a111 ount clai1ned sl1all be i11dicated i11 tl1e state.n1ent of clain1.48 Subject to the q11alification to be disc11ssed st1bseqt1ently, tl1is an1ount re_pre se11ts the a111ou11 t that is i11 volved for pt1rposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. If the IJlaintiff sues for a11 amo11nt \Vl1icI1 will be fo11nd to be dt1e l1im upon taking inventory of unsetllecl accot111 ts, e.g., tl1 e pri11 cipal sties tl1e age11 t to recover tl1 e proceeds fron1 tl1e sale of tl1e pri11cipal's goods, l1 e is to indicate an approxi1nate a111011n.t claimed, a11 d this deter111 ines tl1e a111ount involved for IJlirposes of pecttniary jtirisdiction. 49 Wl1en the clai111 relates to a SJJecific tl1ing, l1 e sl1 all state tl1e a.ctual val11e of tl1e thing; 50 \Vhe11 it relates to a ge11eric tl1iog, sucl1 as grain, tl1e current price of tl1e tl1ing deter111i11 es tl1e a11 1ou11t involved. 51 Where tl1e plaintifl" seeks to establish, e11force or ter111i11 ate a rigl1t tbe valt1e of which cannot otl1 erwise be detern1 .ined, l1e sl1 all indicate tl1 e esti111ated pec1111iary benefit whicl1 wo·uld accrue to l1i1n. if jt1dgment were i11 l1is favor. For ex,1111 ple, if tl1 e IJlaintiff s11es to enforce a servi t11cle to gra.ze l1is cattle on tl1 e defendant's land, l1e m11st indicate bow n1t1cl1 pec11niary benifit J1e \Vould receive if contint1ed to use the land for the period of tl1e ser\1 itude. Tl1is wotdd be tl1e an1011nt involved for p11rposes of pect111iary j11ris diction. These provisions de1nonstrate tl1at tl1e an1 ot1nt i11 vol\red is tl1 e amot111 t clai1ned by the plaintiff i11 l1is staten1ent of clain1, as was l1eld i11 tl1e /1i1to111otive Trad ing Co111pany case. To tl1is pri11ciple 111 t1st be added one qt1alifi.catio11: tl1e an1ot1nt clairned n1 11st be reaso11 able. In otl1er words, if it is clear tl1at tl1e plaintiff could not possibly recover the a111011nt clain1ed aod is 111erely alleging tl1is a1nount for tl1 e p11rpose of bringi1Jg tl1e case in tl1 e l1igl1er court, tl1e court will l1old tl1 at tl1is a111_ot1nt is 11 ot involved.52 If i11 that case tl1 e plaintifT l1 ad st1ed on a Etl1. $100 cla1n1 and sot1gl1 t Etl1.$ 2000 as expenses for bri11ging suit, Etl1 . $ 2100 wo11ld 11 ot l1ave been reasonably claimecl. B11t it is 011 ly wl1ere it is clear tl1at the 46. 47.
(High Ct., Addis Ababa, 1962, Civil Case· No. 323-54) (unpublished). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 16(2). 48. Civ. Pro. C., 226(1). 49. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(2). 50. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(3). 51. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(4). 52. See the d.1s· cuss1·011 of plead·Jag Jur · 1sc · 1·1ct·100 10 Chapter VI, infra.
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•
. . . plaintiff could no t possibly recover . an amount within the material Ju riSdic. . tha the t cou co 11rt rt sl1o the t1ld disregard tlle amount cla1med . The am tion of . . o u · o t 1s us th I d . ve o d et 1n er m in ed b y the amount reasonably claimed by of mone_y y . th e t en tem of . sta 1ID his cla plaintiff 1n 3. Matters Outside the Jurisdiction Of Courts The second question is whether the cot1rt may 11ot have material jurisd· t· at all, on the groun� t ?at the _c_ase is to . be tried by some other agency.IC clearest exa�p_ le o_f this_ !s a pet1t1on for divorce. It is provided under tile Civil Code that. d1fficult1es ar1s1ng ou t of the 111arriage 1nust be subn1 itted to· the fami ly arbi�ators . and they . hav e tl1e power an.d t�e duty to pronounce a divorce in a.ppropr1ate c1rct1msta11ces ; 53 tl1e role of tl1e court is merely to decide whether 54 pro not bee 1nce n s d. ha. As tl1e Supreme I1nperial Court pointed 011t in divo rce a the case of W/o Ja,nanesh An1ara v. Ato Teferra Wolde A,nanue/:55 ''As regards the qt1estion of divorce, the Civil Code lias established certain r11Ies \vl1icl1 11111st be compljed with . 111 tl1e first pl�ce, the Civil Code has establisl1ed a body of persons called tl1e family arbitrators to whom all diffict1lties arising between the spouses dt1ring 1narital life 1nust be subn1itted . .. Petitions for divorce 1ut1st be sub111jtted to the family arbitrators; and until st1ch ti1ne wl1en tl1e petition for divorce l1as been st1b1nitted to tl1e fa111ily arbitrators _a;nd when tl1e latter have pronounced tl1eir decision, tl1e Cot1rt l1as no jurisdiction to deal with divorce; tl1e Court ca.n, l1ow ever , decide whether or not a divorce l1as been pro11ounced by tl1e arbitra.: tors."
{i�
As thls lang11age makes clear, tl1e courts _have no 1naterial jt1risdiction to e11tertain a petition for divorce. 56 Tl1ey do have tl1e po\ver to decide whether a divorce bas been pronounced, and, therefore� can entertain a petitiqn for l10111ologation. 57 More over, where tl1e arbitrators have disagreed, the court can deter111jne wl1ose actio11 was in accordance witl1 the law, as vvas done by tl1e St1preme I111perial Cotu·t in tl1e case of Zevi v. Zevi. 58 Anotl1er area where there is a question of the cot1rt's jurisdiction is that of 59 �stablish�s 196� of e Decre ions Relat t1r Labo e employer-employe relations. Tl1e the Labour Relatio11s Board which l1as the power to hear ca.ses 1nvolv111g unfa1r labor practices. To what e;tent does this Decree ot1st the cot1rt's j t1risdiction .in cases between en1ployer and en1ployee? Thls ql1estion was presented to the I-I1gl1 53. 54. 55. 56.
See Civ. C., Arts . 725-728. Civ. C., Art. 729. (Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 1965, Civil App. No. 101-56) (unpublished). ( n See, l1owever, Forti v. Forti (High Ct., Adws Abab�, 1963, Civil Case No. I74·f5 ? � a; d t ?e rt cou e TI1 n. now unk s wa ties published)· There tl1e wherea.bouts of one of the par the in st1ch a case the re-appointment of family arbitrators wo�1ld be . inipractical, and smce plaintiff had seriot1s grot1nds for divorce, it decreed the d1vorce itself. . . suri _ s wa re l1e t er eth wh rs de nsi co y rel me t J ur 57 . In. he · · · · , tl1e co · aring a petition for l1omologation t11e d1vorce 1er et wh d an a pi hio Et in ' was e c1 om1 1 d d1ct1on to divorce, i.e., that the marital 1 clis Ad Ct . 1 mp ' · . up (S · o. att Sl1 v. o att Sl1 . See s. tor itra arb was in fact pronounced by the tiris e p (1964), . 1 J vo . , �b�ba, 1964� Civil _App. �o._ 784-56), J. Eth. !-,l .: ��e Hal r s tlie e 1f il_ d1ct100 to divorce 1n Etl11op1a t1nless_ tl1e n1arital doini� t1ed). lis ub � np (u ) 50 9_ 24 N . pp il i C , 958 lock v. Hallock (��P· Imp. Ct., Adchs_ Ababa, 1 t za ue G a dj ra � w A e til · i�, ig ht rot b Note that a pet1t1on for homologat1on ,vould now be Court. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 18. . 58 (Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 1964, Civil AIJ.P. N o. 1109-56) (unpublished·) 59 · Labour Relations Decree, 1962, Decree No. 49, Neg. Ga.z., year 21, no. 18• -
��f� 1� 1: ��
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Court in the case of Ato Ma,nmo Yinberberu v. Ato Yirgu Abebe. 60 The employee who had been discharged brought suit to recover damages for wrongful dismissal. The defend ant contended tl1at tl1e case had to be brought before the Labour Relations Board. In rejecting the contention, the High Court observed as follows: ''In our opinion, the Employer and Employee's Proclamation was intended to deal with general difficulties arising between employer and employee. The scope of the proclamation extends to such areas as the following: guida.oce of tl1e relationship between employer and employee, progress of work, advan cen1ent, and the expeditious settlen1ent of understandings. The Proclamation does not restrict tl1e ernployee's rigl1t to claim compensat�on for wrongful dismissal in a contract of hire 11nder the Civil Code.'' In fact, Art. 33 of the Proclamation specifically provides that ''nothing herein con tained shall be deemed to pre,1ent any employee fron1 enforcing the terms of his contract before the appropriate CoL1rts or bodies so long as such enforcement is not inconsistent witl1 the tern1s of any collective agreement or decision or award of tl1e Board tl1et1 in effect.'' Tl1e distinction then n1ust be drawn between cases wl1ere the en1ployee is suing to enforce an individual rigl1t t111der l1is contract against the en1ployer and cases involvi11g e1nployer-e111ployee relations generally. Tl1e former 1nay be bro11ght in the cot1rts; tl1e latter 11111st be brougl1t before the Labour Relations Board, and the cot1rts do 11ot l1a,1e j11risdiction in st1ch cases. 61 Suppose that under a collective bargaini11g agreen1e11t between a labo11r union and tl1e en1ployer, it is provided. tl1at tl1e en1ployees sl1all not l1ave to work on Saturday. Tl1e employer issues an order to tl1e effect that tl1e en1plo)1ees n1ust work a l1alf-day on Saturday. If the union see.ks to l)revent tl1e employer fron1 carrying out this action, it m11st institute pro ceedings before tl1e Board a11d not before the courts. Tl1is qt1estion involves rela tions between tl1e e1111)loyer and all the en1ployees, and tl1e courts are witl1out jt1risdiction i11 sucl1 cases. A11otl1er exan1ple of proceedings tl1at must be brot1gbt before an adminjstrative agency is fou11d in tl1e area of income tax. A person wl10 is dissatisfied witl1 an income tax assessn1ent made by tl1e Income Tax A11thority 1nl1st appeal to tl1e Con1mission of Tax Appeal and 1nay not take l1is case to court.62 An appeal is authorized to tl1e I-Iigh Court fron1 tl1e decision of tl1e Con1111ission of Tax Appeal, 63 b11t proceedings must be begun before that body and not before the cot1rts. A very interesting case involving tl1e question of whether the co11rts l1ave ju risdiction to l1ear a clai1n is A to Kidane Mel/cue Tsedek v. Tl1e Mir1istry of Fi11a11ce.64 An employee of tl1e Mi11istry of Finance brought Sllit against the Ministry to 60. (High Ct., Addis Ababa, 1963, Civil Case No. 454-55), J. Eth. L., vol. 1, p. 136. 61 . Note,. ho\vever, that an apl?eal from the Board's decision may be taken to the Supreme In1per1al Court. T11e Court 1s to return the case to the Board with binding directives if it fi !lds . tl1at tl1e Board erred on a question of law or that tl1e procedure followed was in v1olatton of the la\V. For an example of sucl1 a case see Fogstad Woodworks Labour Un.ion v. Jakob Fogstad (Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 1963, Civil App. No. 1381-55), J. Eth. L., vo]. 1, (1964), p. 185. 62. Income Tax Decree, 1965, Arts. 50-58, Decree No. 19, Neg. Gaz., year 16, no. 1. 63. �come Tax Deere �, supra, note ?2, Arts. 59- ?0· Tl1e Higl1 Court is only to determine ques tions of. law and 1s not to consider tl1e mer1ts of the assesstnent. Tl1e decision of the High Court 1nay be furtl1er appealed to the Supre1ne Imperial Court. Income Tax Decree, id., Art. 61. 64. (Sup. Imp. Ct., Addis Ababa, 1963, Civil App. No. 57/55) (unpublished).
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rec?v �r salary and .oth�r be�efits due him. The Ministry contended that the pla1nt1ff had to subm1t his claim to an adininistative tribunal in the P rime Minis ter's O:ffi �e. It �as .held that the coltr ts had jurisdiction to hear tl1e case. The Cou.rt said that 1n light of Art. 62 of the Revised Constitt1tion claimants could bring any clai� �g�in�t the government for wrongful acts in· the' courts and that, therefore, the JU r1sd1ct1on of the courts could not constitutionally be limited in such cases. C.
Local Jurisdiction
Local jurisdiction refers to tl1e arect of Ethiopia in whicl1 the case is to be tried. Assuming that tl1e courts of Ethiopia have judicial jurisdiction and that the �ase i � within the_ material jurisdiction of· the Awrq.dja Guezat Courts, the question 1s which AwradJa Guezat Court shall hear the case. The rules relating to local jurisdiction exist pri1narily for the convenience of the parties. It may 111ake quite a practical difference whether the case is to be tried in Addis Ababa or Debre Sina, and the Ci vil Procedure Code covers tl1e matter of local jurisdiction very explicitly. 1.
The Basic Place of Local Jurisdiction
For purposes of local j11risdiction, tl1e n1ost important place is \Vhat may be called the ''basic place of local jurisdiction." This is the place where local jttris diction lies unless a specific p rovision of tl1e Code prohibits tl1e exercise of local jt1risdiction there or authorizes tl1e exercise of local jurisdictio11 in anotl1er place. Tl1e basic place of local jurisdiction is set fortl1 in Art. 19, and it is the place r e the defendant actually resides or carries on business or personally works for whe • gain . ''Resides'' is to be understood i11 the ordinary sense of tl1e te rm; tl1e place where a person r esides is sin1ply the place where he li ves, as a layma.n would understand ''lives." It is tl1e place where a person has bis ho1ne. So, if a person bas a ho11se in Addis Ababa, where he spends 1nost of lus time, but goes to visit bis pare11ts in Dessie every other week-end, he is residing i11 Addis Ababa and not in Dessie within the meaning of Art. 19. 65 Ho\vever, a pe·rson n1ay have several residences, and it may be asked at whicl1 o·ne he resides within tl1e mean ing of Art. 19. One way to look at it is to say that he resides at all of then1. Perhaps this would be a sound interpretation if be spent an eq11al amou.nt at all of them, but tl1is is not 11sually what l1appens. Art. 177 (2) of tl1e Ci vil C.ode provides tl1at one of tl1 ese residences may have the character of principal residence and the others that of secondary residences. A person's principal residence sl1011ld be the place wl1ere he resides for purposes of local jt1risdiction; that is proba.bly the place wJ1ere it is most convenient for him to defend the st1jt. This interpre tation would 1nean that if a person l1as a house in Addis Ababa and a cottage at Awassa, wl1ere l1e goes on week-ends, he wo11ld be deemed to reside in Addis Ababa and not in Awassa, as the term, ''resides," is 11sed in Ar t. 19. A person may l1ave his b11siness or _may . work in a place di�erent fro111 �he place wher e he resides . TJ1is problem will arise 111ost freq11ently 1n cases conung before the Woreda G11ezat Court. If a perso11 li ves i11 one Woreda G11ezat and has a b11siness or works in another Woreda Guezat, he is st1bject to local j11ris diction in each Woreda Guezat Court, since Art. 19 provides that tl1e suit n1ay 65.
See Mannalal v. Paneychand (High Ct., Rajastban, 1958), 1959 All-India Rep., p. 166.
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be institt1ted before eitl1er tl1e court of tl1e place where tl1e defendant resides or carries on bt1siness or personally works for gain. Moreover, a person may carry 011 bt1si11ess throt1gl1 an age11t, 66 and wl1ere l1e does so, he is subject to suit �t the place wl1ere tl1e agent carries on busi11ess on lus behalf, even though he 1s not pl1ysically present tl1ere - l1e is carryi11g on business within the n1ea.ning of Art. 19 tl1rot1gl1 tl1e age11t. Thus, if Ato A lives in Addis Ababa= but owns a store i11 Nazareth, wbicl1 is operated by a11 agent, l1e is subject to suit in the Yerer -Kereyt1 Awradja Guezat Co11rt (Nazareth) as \Vell as i11 Addis Ababa. 67 111 a case involvi11g joint defe11dants, st1it 111ay be institt1ted in the cot1rt of a11y of tl1e pla.ces where a,1y of tl1e defenda11ts resides or carries on business or JJersona.lly works for gain. 68 Joint defe11dants are defe11dants wl10 are liable to the plai11tifr 011 tl1e sarne obligation. 69 Asst1111e tl1at Ato A, Ato B and Ato C have joi11tly pron1ised to JJay Ato D Etl1.$ 25,000 a11d have failed to do so. Ato A resides i11 Go11der a11d owns a store in Debre i\1larl<os, operated by an age11t. Ato B resides i11 IIarrar, and Ato C resides i11 Addis Ababa. St1it n1ay be institt1ted eitl1er before tl11e I-Iigl1 Court sitting 011 circt1it i11 Bege111der (tl1e place ,vI1ere a joint defe11da11t resides), tl1e I-Iigl1 Co11rt sitti11g on circt1it in Gojja111 (the place \Vl1ere ::1 joint defenda11t carries 011 bt1si11ess), tl1e I-Iigl1 Co11rt sitting on circuit in T-f arrar (the IJlace wl1ere a joint defe11da11t resides), or tl1e I:-Iigl1 Cot1rt at Addis Ababa (tl1e JJlace \Vl1ere a joi11t defe11da11t resides). Art. 20 deals witl1 the place of suit \Vl1ere tl1e defenda11t does 11ot reside, c.arry
I
,,
011 busi11ess or v.1ork for gai11 in Etl1iopia. l:;-irst let us consider 110\1/ st1ch a situa tio11 111igl1t arise. The defe11da11t co11ld be an Etbiopia11 11ational or do11uciliary wl10 at the tin1e of st1it is residi11g abroad.70 Or he cot1ld be a foreigi1 11ational or do111iciliary i11 a case "vl1ere tl1e act wl1icl1 is tl1e st1bject 111atter of tl1e st1it occ11r red i11 Ethio 1Jia. Fi11all_y, lie cot1ld be a foreig11 11atio11al or don1iciliary \1/110 l1as co11se11ted to tl1c exercise of jt1risdictio11 by tl1e Etl1iopian cot1rts. Art. 20(1) provides tl1at \vl1ere tl1e defe11dant resicles, carries 011 bt1siness or perso11ally works for gain abroad, tl1e suit sl1all be i11stituted i11 sucl1 cot1rt i11 Ethiopia as tl1e plai11tiff may cl1oose, 1111less it relates to in11novable l )roperty wl1icl1 the defendant o,vns in Etl1iopia, in \vl1icl1 case tl1e s11it sl1all be institt1ted i11 tl1e co11rt of tl1e place \vl1ere st1cl1 J)roperty is situate. It is 11ot necessary tl1at the plaintifI have any connection \:vitl1 that JJlace. If, for exa111ple, tl1e defenclant, a11 Ethiopian natio11al ,vl10 resides a11d carries 011 busi11ess in Kenya, is stied for breacl1 of a contract 111ade a11d to be J)erfarm.eel i11 Ke11ya, a11d tl1e case is \Vitl1in tl1e 111aterial jt1risdiction of the .t\wradja Gt1ezat Co11rt, tl1e plaintiff, vvl10 resides i11 the Tegt1let-B11lga A\vra.dja G11e zat, 1nay institt1te suit in tl1e Menz-Yefrata Awradja Gt1ezat Co1u·t or i11 a11y otl1er A\Vradja Gt1ezat Court i11 Ethiopi�t. Note, 110\vever, tl1e qt1alification as to ·a case relati11g to in11110\1able property o\vned by tl1e defendant. As \Ve ,vill see, certain cases relating to i111n1ovable pro1)erty 1n11st be instituted at tl1e situs, but tl1is does not include all cases, and in son1e cases, even tl1ot1gl1 tl1e st1it relates to ·111movable property, tl1e plai11tiff 111ay elect to bring suit in accordance with tl1e provisions of Art. 19. I-lowever, wl1ere the suit ca11not be brougl1t t1nder Art. 19, since tl1e defendant does not reside, carry on b11si11ess or personally work for gain in Etl1ioJJia, Art. 20 requires tl1at it be brot1gl1t :it tl1e sitt1s of tl1e i1nmovable 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.
See Civ. C., Art. 2199. See Kripa v. Mangal (}ligh Ct., Allahabad, 1921), 1922 All-Inclia Rep., p. 367. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 19(2). As to the liability of joint defendants see Civ. C., Arts. 1896-1897. A _per�on who is le'!1porarily residi11g outside of EthioJJia, but \Vllo inte11ds to return to Et111op1a and make his permanent l101ne here retains his Ethiopian don1icile.
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property. For exampl�, the plaintiff sues to require specific. performance of a. con ract to sell land aga1 n�t a d �fe�dant wl10 does not reside, carry on b11 siness or perso�ally �ork for �run Etluop1a. A� we �ill _ see, ordinarily he is not req11ired to br1 n_g s111t at _ the situs, but may bring suit 1n accordance with Art. 19. But here, since suit �annot be b �ougl1t under Art. 19, Art. 20 (1) requires that it be brought at the situs of the 1mn1 ovable. Art. 20 (I) wo11 ld seem to cover all tl1e situations we have given: Wl1enever the . de_fendant do�s . not resi ?e, . carry on business or personally work for gai11 in Eth1op1a, �l1e plainti:ff may 1nst1 tt1te suit in any co11 rt having material j11 risdiction tl1at 11� w1sl1es. Howev �r, Art. 20 (2) refers to a ''foreig11 defendant,'' who does not reside, carry on bt1 st 1 1ess or perso11ally work for gain in Etl1iopia. It says that where such a defendant owns 111 ovable or i11u11ovable property in Etl1iopia, suit may be institut ed at the place wl1ere tJ1e property is sitt1,tte. It is 1 1ot necessary that the suit involve the property. Wl1at does tl1is provision mea11? If Art. 20 (1) is applicable to all non-resident defendants, foreign and Ethiopian, tl1en Art. 20 (2) is unnecessary, since tinder Art. 20 (1) the plaintiff has complete discretion as to wl1ere 11e will sue and does not need anotl1 er provision authorizing l1im to s11e at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e defenda.nt l1as property. Since Art. 20 (2) refers to foreign defendants, it can be contended that Art. 20 (1) i s intended to be applicable only to Ethio_pian defend ants who are not residing, carryi11g on business or personally \vorking for gain in Ethiopia. Wl1ere the defe1 1dant is a foreigner, then, the plaintiff \.Vould have to s11e at the place where l 1e l1ad property, or tl1e place where the act whicl1 is tl1e sub ject matter of tl1e suit occurred; as we will see, s11it can also be bro11gl1t at that place. So, where the defendant was s11bject to Ethiopia's j11dicial jurisdiction on the basis of tl1e doing of an act, even if l1e did not have property here, tl1ere would be no problem as to local j11risdictio11, since tl1e plaintiff cot1 Jd institt1 te suit at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e act was done. A problem wot1ld arise, however, where the foreign defenda11t who was s11 bject to Etl1iopia's j11 dicial jLirisdiction on the basis of consent , e.g., by agreen1 ent to st1b1 11it to s11ch j11 risdictio11, did not have proper" ty here. If tltls constr11 ction is p11 t upon Art. 20 (2), then, there would be no place in Ethiopia tl1at l1ad local jurisdiction. -
I wo11ld l1ope tl1at A1·t. 20 (1) wol1ld be construed as applicable to all cases where the defendant did not reside, carry on b11siness or J)ersonally work for gain in Ethiopia, and. Art. 20 (2) wo11Id be construed as merely elaborating 011 Art. 2? (1) ; the plaintiff's s11iog a.t the place \Vhere the defe11dant had ·property would faci litate execution of the decree. Ho\vever, the constrt1 ction s11ggested in the previo11s paragraph may be p11 t on tl1at article. To avoid_ a problen1, where the defenda�1t is a foreigner who does not reside, carry on business or personally work for gain in Eth.iopia, the pla.intiff should instit11 te s11it at the place wl1ere tl1e defendant l1as . _ property or where the act wl1icl1 is tl1e s11bJect matter of tl1e suit occ11r� ed. WI1ere the foreign defendant is s11bject to j11 dicial jurisd.iction only on t�e ba�1 s of cons ent, tl1e plai11tiff will simply have to try to persuade the court tn which he files suit that Art. 20 (1) is applicable to s11ch cases. Jt1st as the Code provides a basic place_ of l?cal jt1risdiction for s�1it aga�nst individ11als, it provides s11ch a place for s111t against legal persons. St11 ts aga111st a business organization are !o be inst�t11 � ed at tl1� pl_ ace �� ere �l1e head of!1ce. or the branch office against wluch the s111 t 1 s 1:1ad� 1 s s1tt1ate. . S111t n�ay_ be 1nst1t11 ted at t}1e place where the brancl1 � ffi�e 1s s1t�ate 011ly 1f the st11t involves the branch office. Let us say tl1at th.e pl,11nt1ff, a res1de11t of tl1e Menz-Yefrata Awra71.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 22(1).
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dja, made a contract to deliver a product to a business organization at its head office in Addis Ababa; the company also l1as a branch office at Debre Sina, but tllis brancl1 was not involved witl1 the co11tract. Therefore, suit is not mad.e against tl1e bra.ncl1 aL1d cannot be flled in tl1e Menz-Yefrata Awradja Court. S11it regarding the liability of an officer of a body corporate may be instituted at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e l1ead office is situate or, if he carries on l1is activities at a bra11cl1 office, at the place wl1ere the brancl1 is sit11ate; if tl1e suit is for com pensation for a wrong done to a person or to 111ovable property, it may also be instituted at tl1e place where tl1e \vrong was done. 72 St1its against an association, com1nittee, trust or e11down1e11t are to be instituted at the place where the associa tion, co1nnlittee, trt1st or endown1ent was formed, or at the place where it is regis tered, if it is req11ired to be registered. 73 Tl1ese places may be considered analog011s to a reside11ce of a nat11ral person; they are tl1e closest thing to a residence tl1at a legal JJersou l1as. 111 a st1it agai11st the state or a govern111en.t clepartn1ent or agency, regard is I1ad to tl1e plaintiff's co11venience, since presu111ably the government is prepared to defend a suit a11ywl1ere. Tl1e plai11tiff 111ay sue at tl1e place where l1e resides, car ries 011 busi11ess or perso11ally ,vorlcs for gai11 or at tl1e place where tl1e contract i11volved was 111acle or to be perforn1ed or ,vhere tl1e act giving rise to liability occurred. 74 Local jt1risdictio11 111ay also depend 011 tl1e kind of case that is ,involved. Tl1us, st1its regarding st1ccessions sl1all be instit11tecl at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e succession was OJ)ened, 75 wllicl1 is tbe place wl1ere tl1e decedent l1ad l1is principal residence at the tin1e of l1is deatl1. 76 Suits regarding bankrt1ptcy shall be instit11ted in the division of tl1e l-ligl1 Cot1rt 011 circuit in tl1e Ta.klay G11ezat i11 ,vl1ich the principal place of b11sioess of tl1e ba11krt1J)t is sitt1ate.77 This provision reflects concern for tl1e conve11ie11t ad111inistration of tl1e bai1lcr11pt's estate. Most of tl1e assets are likely to be tl1ere, as are 111ost of tl1e creditors l1aving claims agaiL1st tl1e estate. There is no OJJtion to instit11te s11it at tl1e J)lace where the bankrupt resides or has a brancl1 of l1is bt1si11ess. 2 Suits Regardi11g Contracts Art. 24 governs local jt1risdiction in suits regarding contracts. It refers to fou.r kinds of co11tracts: (1) contracts generally; (2) contracts of carriage; (3) contracts of i11s11rance; and (4) co11tracts of pledge, deposit, or bailment. The article sl1ould be interpreted as contai1ting fo11r m11t11ally excl11sive rtiles. Tl1t1s, tl1e provisions of Art. 24 (1), for exa1nple, referring to contracts generally, should not be construed as being applicable to contracts of i11sura11ce, which are go,,erned by Art. 24 (3). As to co11tracts generally, it is provided under Art. 24 (I) that the plaintiff may, in l1is discretion, sue at tl1e place wl1ere the contract was made or to be executed unless some otl1er place is mentioned i n tl1e co11tract.78 This means that 72. 73.
74. 75. 76. 77. 78.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 22(3). See also Civ. Pro. C., Art. 27(1) a11d tl1e discussion, infra, note 87 and accompanying text. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 22(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 21. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 23. Civ. C., Art. 826(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 28. If the contract provided that suit was to be brought at another place, this provision autho rizes suit to be brought at that place and not at the place of contracting or the place where the contract was to be executed.
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in such a case the plaintiff may either sue i n a place authorized by Art. 1919 or at the place where the contract was made or to be exec11ted in accordance with Art: 24 (I). For example, tl1e defendant resides in Debre Markos and carries on ?us1ness . there, the co�trac� �as made i n Addis Ababa and was to be performed 1n _D �ss1e. The _ case . is . within . th� material_ j11risdiction of the High Court. The pla1nt1.ff may either 1nst1tute suit 111 t �e High Cot1rt at Addis Ababa (tl1e place where the contract was made) or the High Court sitting on circuit in Wollo (whe re the contract was to b � exec11ted) o� the Higl1 Court sitting on circuit in Gojjam (wl1ere the defendant resides and carries on business).
An interesting question is l1ow it shall be deter1nined wl1ere the contract was made where the �e�otia !ions inyolve different areas of local jurisdiction. Suppose _ that the offerer, l1v111g 10 Dessie, writes a letter to tl1e otTeree in Addis Ababa. The offeree �ends hi_ s letter of acce_ptance fro111 Addis Ababa, which is received by the offerer 1n D_ess1e. Where was tl1 e contract made within the meaning of Art. 24(1)? Tl1e 9uest1on sho�ld be detenuined by a consideration of tl1e provisions of the substantive law relating to contracts betweet1 absent parties. Art. 1692 of tl1e Civil Code provides tl1at a contract- made betwee11 absent parties shall be deemed to be made at the place wl1ere and tl1e time wl1en tl1e acceptance was sent to tl1e offerer. Since the acceptance was sent f ro111 Addis Ababa, the co11tract was made at Addis Ababa wi tbin the meaning of Art. 24 (I) of tl1e Civil Proced11re Code. so .
St1its regarding contracts of carriage are to be institt1ted in accordance with the provisions of the Maritjme Code (carriage by sea) and the Commercial Code (carriage by air).81 Suits involving contracts o.f carriage by sea are to be institt1ted at the court sitting at the port of arrival of the goods. 82 This provision n1ust be read in conjt1nction with the provisions of tl1e Civil Procedure Code relating to material j11risdiction, and the term, ''court sitti11g at the port of arrival,'' mtist be construed to n1ean the court that is exercising j11risdiction over where the port of arrival is situate. If the port of arrival were Massawa and tl1e a1not1nt in con troversy were Eth.$ 15,000, proceedings wo11ld have to be institt1ted i11 the Higl1 Cotrrt sitting in Asmara and not before an Awradja Guezat Cot1rt sitting in Mas sawa. Suits involving contracts of carriage by air are to be instit11ted, in th� di� cretion of the plaintiff, eitl1er before the court of the place where the carrier 1s domiciled has his principal place of business, has an agent who n1ade the cont ract or before the cou.rt of tl1e place of destination. 83 The ''domicile'' of the carrier raises some question, since presu1nably the ca.rrier will _ not be a _ n_att1ral person, and under the Civil Code, only natural persons are . given � do1?1c� Ie. It must mean the place where the carrier was formed or. r�gtstered, if this 1s the case. The other provisions present no difficulty. The plaint� _ then ? as _ a number of options. Assume the plaintiff was a passenger on an Ethiopian Air 1:1nes plane _ flying to Gambella. He boarded the plane in Jimma and purchased his t1ck: t . fr? m an agent there, e.g., at a hotel in Jimma. The plane crashed �t Gore? _ 1nJ� r1ng , (where the company 1s ''doID1c1led and the plaintiff. He could sue in Addis Ababa
79. 80 . 81. 82. 83 .
l inc ude the d to e end inJ is n;=e ere !e� t�e t,. tex con s thi in to ed err ref is Whenever Art. 19 l cl asses of persons, a ec1 sp .1or n t1o d1c r1s Ju al other articles dealing with the basic place of loc e.g., Arts. 20, 21, and 22. p. 471. See Manila! v. Venkata (High Ct., Madras,' 1943), 1943 All-India Rep., Civ. Pro. C., Art. 24(2). Maritime C., Art. 208. Comm. C., Art. 647.
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------------------� l1 as its princi_pal place of 'busi11ess), Jimn1a (wl1 e�e he ptirchased the ticket from the agent and, in effect, wl1 ere the contract of carriage w�s 1 nade) or Gan1bella (the place of his destination). He could not s1 1e in Gore, since Art. 647 does not au thorize su.it in the court of the place of injury. 84 Suits regarding a contract of insurance 1nay be insti_tute� in tl1e co� rt of the place where tl1 e l1 ead office of tl1e ins11rance con1pan_y 1s situate ?r registered or where the object insured is situate. 85 If tl1e contract involved the insurance of an object against dama.ge, e.g., an a11tomobile, suit co11Jd be_ bro�gl1_t. at the place wl1 ere the auto111obile was kept. If. it involved inst1 rance against l 1 ab1 l1ty for dama ges it cot1ld be brougl1t at tl1 e place wl1ere tl1 e object which caused the damage \Va� situate, e.g., wl1ere a landowner l1 ad a co11 tract of ins11rance against liability to tl1 ird persons, J1 e could s11e at tl1e sit1 1s of tl1 e land. If it involved insurance against injury to a person or life i11surance, s11it could be bro11gl1 t at the place wl1ere tl1 e i11s11red person resided. Note tl1at Art. 24 (3) does not a11tl1 orize st1 it to be bro11gl1 t at tl1e place where the contract of inst1r::1nce was made. S11its regardi11g a pledge, deposit or bail111 ent n1ay be instit11ted in tl1e court of tl1e place wl1ere the property is sitttate. 86 Tl1e article; ttses ''may," which could in11)ly that suit co11ld also be bro11gl1t i11 accordance \Vitl1 A1�t. 24 (1) at the place where the contract v,1as 1nacle or exec11ted. I·:Io\vever, si 1 1ce Art. 24 covers four l<it1ds of co11tractual situatio11s, as we pointed ot1t earlier, eacl1 r11le sho1 1 ld be inter preted as con1JJlete. In tl1 e absence of a co11 trary i 11 terpretation by the co1irts, \\'e can a.ss11111e tl1at Art. 24 (1) is 11ot applicable to contracts of pledge, deposit or 1er, it wo11ld see111 tl1 at a s11it i11volvi11g s11cl1 a contract could be b,1iln1e11t. llo\ve, instit11ted in accorda11 ce witl1 tl1e provisions of Art. 19. Althougl1 Art. 24 (3) does 11 ot contai11 tl1e words, ''in tl1e discretioi1 of tl1 e JJlaintiff," as does Art. 24 (1), it does s,1y ''111ay be i 11stit11ted' a11d not ''sl1all be i11stitutecl," as does Art. 24 (2). Tl1ere is no reaso11 wl1y s11cl1 s11its cannot convenie11tly be brought at the place ,vl1ere tl1e defenda11t resides, carries 0 11 business or personally works for gain, and ,ve 111 a)1 ass11111e tl1at Art. 19 is apJ)licable to s11 cl1 st1its. 3.
Suits For Wrong Done to Persons or Movable Property
Art. 27 governs suits for ,vrong done to persons or to 111 ovable pro1Jerty. Under Art. 27 (I), st1cl1 st1its, exce1)t for collisions at sea, 11 1ay be instituted in t �� court of tbe J)lace where tl1e \\1ro11 g was do.ne or i11 accordance with tl1e pro v1s1011 s _of _ ��t. 19.87 . For exa111ple, if the defe 1 1da11t, a. reside 11 t of Ambo, i 11j11red tl1e pl �1ut1ff 1 11 Wol J 1s0, a11d tl1 e case was witl1io tl1 e 111aterial j11risdictio11 of tl1 e .t\ ,vradJa G11ezat Co11rt, tl1 e plaintiff could instit11te s11it eitl1 er before tl1 e Cl1ebo G11rage Awrad)a G11ezat Co11r � (Wolliso), since tl1 e wro11g was do1 1e there, or be _ fore tl :e Cha1lia-Mecl1 a AwradJa G11ezat Court (Ambo), si11ce tlie defeoda11t resid.es tl1ere 111 accordance witl1 Art. 19. J11st as there \.Vas a q11estion of wl1ere tl1e contract ,v�ts 11 1�tde \Vitl1i 11 the n1 ean1 1�g of Art. 24 (1), '-"'J1 ere tl1 e negotiatio11 s involved different areas of local j11ris . . _ _ ci1ct1on, so too 1s tl1 ere a q11est1on of wl1ere tl1e \vrong \Vas done witl1 in the mean-
.
84 · 85. 86. 87.
!11 such cases �be basis of liability is contractual rather than extra-co11tractual. The theory that the carrie� l1as breach �d the dut ontained in the contrac t carriage. See Con1n1. �' Art.. 630. This n,ay explain why suirt �1s not autl1orized at tl1e of place of the \vrong. : C1v. Pro. C., Art. 24(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 24(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 27(1).
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¥5
ing o� �rt: �7 (I), where the ac� and the harm occurred in different areas of local JUr1sd1ct1on. Suppose th at a tir e was carelessly placed on a trtlck in Deb re _ tl1 tr e W 11c he k n re ac l1e an d . Debre Sina' tl1e tire fell. off· , an Berh · · , d ti1e trt1ck went · . · I I nJ out of �ontro .' � ur111g t ie _plaintiff . W as tl1e wrong done in Debre Berhari or in Debre Sina withtn tl1e ID:ea?-tng of Art. 27 (I)? In resolving the q11estion of where t�e. contract was 1nade_. within the meani11 g of Art. 24 (1), we looked to tlle pro v1s1o·ns of the substantive law , an d tl1e sa1ne approach sl1ot1ld be followed i n deter mining _wl1��e tl;1e ,v1·ong was done witlu11 tl1e meaning of Art. 27 (1). Since there is ?o l1ab1lity 10 s�1ch a cas e unless the J)lai11tiff s11ffers injt1ry as a result of tl1e action of the defendant, �8 tl1e wrong was do11e at tl1e place where tl1e injt1ry was sufef r ed. Conseqt1e11tly, 1n 011r example, the wrong was done at Debre Sin,1' and st1it .n1ay be bro11gl1t tl1ere, as provided in Art. 27 (1). In this connectio11, consicler tl1e following sit11ation. The defendant injures a person ,vith his at1to1 nobile i11 Debre Markos. Tl1e victim is taken to a hospital in G·ondar, where l1e dies tl1ree ,veek s later. It is IJrovided 11ncler Art. 2059 of tl1e Civil Code tI:iat in case of fatal accide11t, the s1Jo11se, ascendants a11d descen dants of tl1e vict1n1 111ay claim co111pensation i11 the form of a maintenance allow ance for tl1e da111age tl1ey l1ave suffered as a resL1lt of the victim' s deatl1. In a st1it by st1cl1 _perso11, ,vas the wro11g do11e at Debre Markos or Gondar? In a very f tecl111ical se11se, tl1e wro11g ,vas do11e i11 Goodar, since tl1e l )laintif s s t11Tered no injury 11otil tl1e victi1n died, and one co11rt h... 1sl1eld tl1 at in st1cl1 a case tl1e place where the wro11g was done for purposes of local jt1risdiction is the place vvl1ere tl1e victi1n died. 89 St1cl1 a constr11ction, it is s11bmitted, is 1111so11nd. Tl1e accident that cat1sed the deatl1 occ11rred at Debre Markos, and the ,vitnesses a11d any physical evidence are likely to be there, It was happensta11ce tl1at the victim was taken to Gondar. Since tl1e p11rpose of Art. 27 (1) i s to a11tl1orize s11it at tl1e place where the i11jt1ry was done and wl1ere tl1e witnesses are lilcely to be, tl1e place of \Vrong sl1ot1ld be constr11ed to mean the place where the accident occurred rather tl1an the JJlace wl1ere the victi111 of the accide11t died. Under Art. 27 (2), it is provided that st1it s regardi11g collisions at sea are to be institt1ted in accordance witl1 Art. 23 7 of tl1e Maritime Code. Tl1at article autl1 0rizes the plaintiff to s11e in one o.f four places : (1) the _place of collision, ,vbere the 90 (2) the ; waters rial territo 1 i1 or port a f o. li1nits the collision has occurred within place where the defendant is domiciled ; 91 (3) the place of registry o f. tl1e sl1ip. ? f · ipowner against \Vho1n tl1 e a.ction is institt1ted; (4) the place_ wl1 ere the s_l1ip the sh has been arrested.92 Note that the provision is mandatory, so s111t cannot be_ 1n.s tituted in accordance witl1 Art. 19, e.g., at tl1e place where the defendant resides.
4.
Suits Involving Immovable Property
1 lies �t the sitt� s o1 icti isd jt1r al loc ty, per pro le vab 1111o 11 i ing olv n st inv ts mo stii I _ an? if Art. 25 1s a11cl at no other place. Tliese s11its are governed by �rt. 25, _ found to be applicable, the provisions of tl1e other articles, 1ncl11d111g those relat-
See Civ. C., Art. 2027. 1 50' p. l -30 . vo s, ase ian Ind 9), 191 , ad ab lah Al ., Ct l igl � (I-J . Ry . _- r 89. Shiam Narain v. B.B. & c.J n1co or ts stn to · · 11g at1 1) rel 27( t. Ar · of s ion vis pro the as 90. Th"1s provision 11as tl 1e sam e ba' sis ·ty. el op pr e bl va pensation for wrong to perso11s a11cl mo .1 . l1 ug l1o alt ), 9(1 t. Ar t for tl1a as e sam the be to · ar pe ap tild 91. The bas1s · ·on wo · for t 111s · prov1s1 . ide domicile is em1,loyed ratl1er tban res nce. . s been or.dered ha se ea at rel tl1 t fac · fectecl by the · · ct· t'1on at ti11·s place is not af 92. LocaI Jur1s·1c upon bail or otl1er security. 88.
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==
"
iog to the basic place of local jurisdictio11, do not a�ply. 93 The following_ suits n1 ust be instituted in tl1 e court of tl1e place where tl1 e immovable property invol ved is situate: (I) suits for tl1e recovery of i1nmovable property with o: �ithout rent or mesne profits; (2) suits for partition ; (3) suits for the determinat1on of any right to or i11terest i11. immovable property; (4) suits for compensation for wrong to ill11novable property. Tl1e reason for sucl1 a rule is not difficult to understand. It n1 ay be necessary for tl1 e court physically to view the property. The case n1ay involve a bot1ndary dispute, and measurement of tl1e boundaries may be necessary. If ownership is in dispt1te and records have been kept, tl1 ese records are likely to be at the situs. 94 Wl1ere tl1 e case is depe11 de 11 t upo11 tl1 e testi 1nony of witnesses, sucl1 witnesses probably reside at tl1e sitt1s. Tl1erefore, such suits must be institt1ted at the situs and not elsewhere. Tl1ere is one exce1Jtio11 to tl1 e general rt1le. Wl1ere the immovable property is l1eld by or on behalf of tl1 e defendant and the relief can be obtained. entirely tl1rougl1 l1is perso11al obedience, suit may eitl1er be institt1ted at tl1e situs or in accorda.11ce witl1 tl1e provisio11s of Art. 19. 95 Tl1is provision is prin1arily designed for cases \Vl1ere tl1e plaintiff seel<s specific perforn1 ance of a contract by wl1 ich tl1e tl1e defe11 clant agreed to transfer i1n111 ovable property to l1in1 . 96 Tl1 is is not mt1ch differe11 t fron1 tl1e ordinary contract sitt1ation, and in such a case it is less likely tl1at the practical considerations 11ecessitating tl1e requirement of Art. 25 ( 1), e.g., tl1 e need for a view or bo11ndary 111east1re1ne11t, will be present. Note, ho,vever, tl1at suit to e11 f orce tl1is k:i11d of contract cc1n11ot be brought at the place of contract ing. Si11ce tl1e case involves tl1e determination of an interest in i1nmovable property \vithi11 tl1e 1nea11 ing of Art. 25 (I) (c), Art. 24 (I), a11thorizing st1it at the place of contracti11 g, \vo11ld 11 ot be applicable. Tl1e case is governed by tl1 e provisions of Art. 25, and the only exce1Jtio11 to tl1 e operation of Art. 25 (I), whicl1 requires that st1it be i11stituted at tl1e situs, is Art. 25 (2), which a11tl1 orizes suit to be bro11gl1t in accordance with tl1e provisio11 s of Art. 1 9, bt1t not in accordance witl1 tl1e provisions of Art. 24 (1). In st1cl1 a case, tl1 erefore, tl1 e plai11tiff can institt1te st1it at tl1e sitt1s or at tl1e place wl1 ere tl1 e defendant resides, carries on bt1siness or personally \Vork.s for gain, b11t not at tl1 e place where tl1 e contract was 111 ade. Problems of interpreta.tio11 will revolve aro11nd Art. 25 ( 1) (c) - wl1a.t is a rigl1t to, or interest in, i111111ovable property ,vitl1 in the n1 eaning of tl1at s11bsection? The fact tl1at in1 n1 ovable 1Jroperty is somel10\v connected with tl1 e case does not neces saril)' 1nean that the st1it is 011e for tl1 e deter111 ination of a rigl1 t to or interest i11 in11novable JJrOJJert)'. I::;-or exan1ple, is a s11it for rent a suit tl1 at i 11,,olves the detern1 ination of an interest io in1 111ovable property, i11 ,vl1 icl1 case Art. 25 (I) (c) \Vot1ld ap1Jly, or is it si1111Jly a st1it to e11 force a contractual obligatio11, in wl1 icl1 case Arts. 19 and 24 ( l ) would be applicable? TJ1is qt1estion ,vas presented to tl1 e Suclan Co11rt of Appeal in tl1e case of 111·011a111ecl El A111i11 Ali v. Al1111ed El Siclclilc,91 ,vI1ere a st1it to recover rent tl1 at was clue was bro11gl1t at tl1e JJ!ace wl1ere tl1e Except for Art. 31, v.,hich relates to change of venue. See the discussion' infra' notes 109� 110 and accon1panying text. 94. See Civil Code, ��ok Ill, Title X, \V�1ich relates to Registers of 1Inn1ovab]e Property. At present these prov1s1ons have 11ot been 1mJ)]e.n1ented, though records are kept in Addis Aba ba and. in son1e of the provincial capitals. 95. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 25(2). 96. See the _ d� scussio11 . in S. Sarkar, The Lau, of Civil Proceclure (4th ed. 1963), vol. J, p. 41. I1� Eth1op1a, specific performance is always available to tl1e buyer of an in1movable. See C1v. C., Arts. 1776, 2892. 97. (Ct. App. Sudan, 1957), Sudan L. J., 1961, p. 70.
93.
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contrac� of lease was m_ de ratl1er than �t the situs of the land. The court held � that. this w�s n?t a SU.I . ·�or t he deternunation of an interest in land and that therefore, suit d1d not have to be bro·ught at the situs.98 The cotirt drew a dis: tinction between benefits that would arise out of the land and benefits th t h l already arisen out of t_ l1e land. _The former involved an interest in inJrnovabfe pr: perty, �ut _ the latter did not, since at tl�e time of s11it, tl1 e benefit the plaintiff was cla1m1ng--was n? longer connected w_1th tl1 e Iand.99 If the claim involved rent that would �ccr_ue 1n tl1e fut11re, tl1e st11t would be one for the determination of an in_terest _ 1� 1mn1ovable property and wo11ld have to be bro11ght at the sittis. But since 1t 1n�olv�d rent that had already accrued, it was a suit for the enfor ceme11t of an obl1gat1on to pay 1nooey ,111d co11ld be brought at the place of contracting.
Tl1e san1 e result shot1ld be reacl1ed in Ethiopia. W]1en the plaintiff is suing to recover rent tl1 at h,1s accrt1ed, l1e is not asking for a deter1nination of ltis inte rest in the in11novable property; he is asking for a determination of his rigl1t to collect rent that has accrued _p11rsuant to a contractual obligation. On tl1e other l1aod, if tl1e case . involved rent tl1at l1ad not yet accrued - s11ppose the plaintiff wanted a decl,1rat1on that tl1e defendant wo11ld owe hin1 rent if J1e contint1ed to use the land - it would be a suit for a determination of tJ1e plaintiff's interest in immovable property. In s11cl1 a case tl1e plaintiff is asking the court to define his rights witl1 respect to tl1e land itself, bis rigl1t to receive benefit from the defendant's further use of tl1e ]a11d. Tl1e distinction may seern to be a technical one, but it must be remembered tl1at tl1ese are technical rt1les and tl1at in a suit for rent tl1e practical considerations ,vl1ich are tl1e basis for Art. 25 ( 1 ) t1st1ally are not present. Tl1erefore, unless the s11it is tecb11ically witl1i11 the provisions of that article - which a suit for accrt1ed rent is not - tl1at article, whicl1 displaces the general rules of local j11risdiction, shot1ld not be applicable.
Anotl1 er example of a sit11ation where A1·t. 25 (I) (c) sl1ot11d. not be applicable is the one where a party is st1i11g to recover a sl1are of proceeds realized fron1 the sale of land. Assume that tl1e plaintiff and tl1e defendant owned tl1e land jointly, that the defe11dant, 011 tl1eir bel1alf, l1as transferred tl1e land to a third party, and that l1e has not paid tl1e plai11tiff the latter's share of the proceeds. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover his share, no i11terest i11 tl1e land is involved, since the land l1as already been transferred.. The st1it merely i11volves the pJai.ntiff's right to receive a sum of mo11ey fro1n the defendant, and, therefore, Art. 25 (I) (c) is not applicable. too However, a s11it by tl1e . vendor against t_he �endee to recover the unpaid pt1rchase price wot1ld be a st11t fo� tl1e deter1!1lnat1on of an interest in immovable property, even tho11gh the ve11dor 1s only seeking n1 on�y. At the time of the s11it tl1 e purchase is not yet complete, a� d the vendo� retains �n interest in the land until the purchase price is paid. 101 Since at tl1� t11:11e of sl11_ t, the vendor has an interest in the land, the st1it involves a deternunat1on of 111s interest in immovable property within tl1e meaning of Art. 25 (1) (c). 102 Again, these cases may see1n to be decided on tl1e basis of tech�cal distinc tions, and often they are. Btit this sl1ould not obscure tl1e fact tl1ere 1s a definite 98 . 99 · 100. 10 l.
102.
v�r, vve . f lo y." ert op pr bl� va nJo in1 to ng ati rel ts i u_ ''s Tl1e ·provision of the SL1dan law read ! 1nt erest 111, or , 1t to rig r he ot y a11 · of ,, ion at in m ter de e th.1s 1s no d·i:r IJ,eren.t fron1 su1·ts for tJ1 . . immovable property." . ,a Rep., p. 286, nd l-l Al 48 19 ), 97 , r 19 t. pt ag N Ct , gh " i (H . · See aI so Mann1 bat· v. camb at a & Co ., · · where the san1e result was reached. 4. 34 p. 6, l. ., vo ep R . L an di In ), 83 18 , as r . See Ven-kata v. Krishnasa1ni (H ig·1 J Ct., Mad See Civ. C., Art. 3042. 227 · P· , 28 l. vo . ep R , . L an di l11 ), 05 19 See Mattt.ri v. Kota (1-ligb Ct., Madras,
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I
I
I
purpose bel1ind the requirement of Art. 25, and tl1is purpose is not always present merely beca11se the case in son1e wa.y involves imn1ovable property. The purpose of Art. 25 apJJears in a case such as the 011e where the defendan!, a resident _ of Jimma, co1n1nits a trespass on the plaintiff's land situate an Addis Ababa. Suit must be bro11ght in Addis Ababa and cannot be brot1gL1t in Jimma, since tl1e case is one for con1pensatio11 for wrong to i1nmovable property within tl1e mea11ing of Art. 25 (I) ( d). 1 03 Tl1e desirability of tl1is case beiog tried in Addis Ababa is readily apparent. A vie\v of tl1e land n1ay be necessar)' to determine tl1e extent of the damage; a11y wit11ess to tl1e trespass will be in Addis Ababa. It is with cases of this sort tl1at Art. 25 is prio1arly concer11ed, and where st1ch considerations are not JJrese11t, Art. 25 shot1ld 11ot be found applicable unless tl1e case is technically with in ils J)rovisio11s, l1ence the 1Jecessity so1netin1es to 111ake technical distinctions. Art. 26 gover11s local jt1risdictio11 where tl1e i11J1novable is sittiate witl1in the jurisdictio11 of differe11t cot1rts. If tl1e strit 111ust be bro11gl1t at the sit11s in accor da11ce \Vith tl1e reqt1ire111e11ts of Art. 25 and tl1e in1111ovable is not con1pletely situate witl1in tl1e jt1risdictio11 of a. si11gle court, tl1e Code provides that s11its may be ins titt1ted in a11y cot1rt witl1i11 the local lin1its of wl1ose jurisdiction a part of the i111111ova.ble 104 is situate. Wl1ere it is uncertai11 witl1i11 tl1e local jurisdiction of whicl1 of several courts tl1e in11110\1able is sitt1ate, any co11rt witllin tl1e jurisdiction of wl1icl1 tl1e i11J111ovable 111a_11 be situate, if it is satisfiecl tl1at tl1ere is gro11nd for the alleged uncertai11ty, n1ay record a sta.tement to tl1at effect and proceed to try tl1e case. Tl1e i111111ovable is the11 co11sidered situate \Vitl1io tl1e li111its of t]1at court's j urisdictior1 for JJt1rposes of A.rt. 25, a11d tl1e decree is not subseq11ently open to . attacl< on tl1e grol1ncl tl1at tl1e la11d was not actt1ally ,vithi11 the limits of that court's j11risdiction. 105 5.
Suits Upon Several C .. 1usesof Action
Wl1ere a s11it is basecl 11pon several cat1ses of a.ction arisi11g in different places, tl1e suit 111ay be instituted i11 a11y co11rt that l1a.s jt1risdiction over one of tl1e causes of actio11. 106 As ,.ve ,vill see, tl1e plaintiff ca11 join in a single s11it any n11m·ber of clai1ns agai11st tl1e defendant, even tl1ot1gl1 tl1ey may be tinrelated. 1 07 For example, tl1e plai11tiff joins clain1s against tl1e defendant for breacl1 of a contract made and to be perforn1ed i11 1-Iarrar a11d for breacl1 of a contract made a11d. to be per forn1ed i11 Addis Ababa. l-Ie 111,ty iostitt1te s11it eitl1er in I-Iarrar or i11 Addis Ababa or at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e defe11da11t resides, carries on business or perso11ally worl<s for gain. Tl1e court in wl1icl1 st1it is filed need 011ly l1ave local jurisdictio11 over one of tl1e c]ai111s, 11ot over botl1. Note, l1owever, tl1at this rt1le would be st1bject to tl1e provisio11s of Art. 25 so tl1at, in effect, tl1e plaintiff co11ld 11ot join st1its involving i111111ovable property wl1ere tl1e property is sitt1ate \Vitbin tl1e local jurisdictio11 of diJferent courts. If the defendant co1nn1itted a trespass on tl1e plaintiff's la11d located i11 Addis Ababa. a11d a11otl1er trespass 011 tl1e plai11tiff's land located in I-Iarrar, tl1ese suits cannot be joined, even tl1ougl1 joi11der is proper 11nder tl1e pro visions of tl1e Code relati11g to joinder. This is becat1se A.rt. 25 (I) (d) requires st1cl1 suits to be i11stitt1ted at tl1e sitt1s of the land, a11d since tl1is is impossible, joinder cannot be permitted. 103. See Crisp v. Watson (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1893), Jn.clian .L. Rep., vol. 20, p. 689. 104. Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 26(1). 105. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 26(2). 106. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 29. 107. See Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 217.
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marize, ·the ba sic place of local J·uriscliction is the PI ace w To sum 1e 1 re · th e de car on b ries us1n · ess or personally works for gain St · ts fendant res1d es, may a 1w_a s c ept where tl1e suit is one regarding im�o;abl� p r be instituted there ex ope:tY within the meaning of Art. 25, in whicl1 case it .must be instituted at t he s1ttis, or c1· a ·1 ruIes? s�c1 1 as � st11 t regarding sp� d b � rne _ go ve ?n� bankruptcy. However, tile is . intiff may, 1n his d1scret1on, 1nst1tute suit at a place otller than the b as· la 1 c p 1ace P · · " c.t 1· on w . · . · here t h"1s is at1tl1or1zed by anotI1er provision of ti1e c·ode. of local Jllr�sd1 . Suits regard1ng contracts generally 11 1ay be 1nstututed at the place where the contract was ma de or was to b e execut�d, . a1 1d suits for con1pensation for wrong done to persons or movables 1nay be 111st1 tuted at the place where the wrong was done. 6. Transfer of Suits The Code provides a device by wl1icl1 a case instituted in one cot1.rt can be transferred to a11otl1er cot1.rt. Under the Cot1rt Procedt1re Rules of 1 943 10s a party could 11.ave his c�se transferred fr?m a st1bordinate court to tl1e High 'cot1rt tipon payn1ent of sec11r1ty for costs. Tl11s led to a substantial increase in tl1e nun1 ber of cases co111ing before tl1e I-Iigh Court, since any defendant wl1 0 could afford to post security co11ld have l1is case l1eard by the I-Iigh Court. Tl1is often forced tl1 e plaintiff to litigate tl1e ca.se at a place tl1at was very inconvenient for him, and sucl1 a provision was inconsiste11 t witl1 tl1e p11rpose of both tl1e rules relating to material jurisdiction and the r11les relati11g to loc al j11risdiction. Tl1erefore, tl1e prac tice of transfer to the Higl1 Cot1rt 11pon tl1e posti11 g of sect1rity l1as been discon continued under tl1e Code, and a transfer can now be effected only in accor dance witl1 the provisions of the Code. Art. 31 sets forth the lin1ited gro11nds on wl1ich a case ca1 1 be transferred and the proced11re for such transfer. When a case has been instituted in tl1e Woreda Guezat Court or tl1 e Awradja Guezat Court, the party seeking a transfer n1t1st file an application in the High Court. If the Higl1 Court finds tl1at transfer is warranted 11nder Art. 31, it n1ay either transfer tl1e case to another co11rt having material jurisdiction or bear it itself. 109 If tl1e case were instituted in the Woreda G·uezat Cot1rt, for exa111ple, tl1e High Court could transfer it to anotl1er Woreda G11ezat Cot1rt or co11ld 11ear it itself; it could not transfer it to an Awradja G11ezat Court, beca11se tha.t co11rt wot1ld lack mater ial jurisd.i ction. If the case is filed in the Higl1 Cot1rt, application for transfer must be n1ade to tl1e S11pre1 11 e Imperial Cot1rt, and if that Court fi11ds transfer warranted, it transfers the ca.se to a11otl1er division of the Higl1 Co11rt. 110 It is important to remen1 ber tl1at an application for tra11sfer ca1111ot be 11Jade to tl1e court in which suit has been institt1ted, but n1 t1st be made to the High Court or to the Supreme I111perial Co11rt, if the case has been institL1ted in tl1e High Cot1rt. There are tl1ree gro11nds j11stifying transfer un?er . Ar�. 31. Transfer may �e authorized if it appears to the cot1rt to wllich application _is 1nad� t�at: (I) a fair and i1npartial trial cannot be l1 ad in the court wl1ere st1 1t was 111st1t11ted.; or (2) o t_ er ord _an ) (3 or se; ari to ely lik is ty l 1. e fic1 som question of law of 1111 11su,1l dif . 18 or s sse tne wi or es rti pa the of ce ien transfer would te11d to the general conven expedient for tl1e p11rpose of j11stice. The first two sitL1ati�ns present no problem of interpretation. If a case were i 1 1stit11ted before a particular �ored� Gtie�at l tia ien :flt in an 1s t an 1� fe1 de e tl1 at 1 tl n ow . Court, for example, and it co1tld be sl1 . fer ns tra r, vo fa s 11 I 1n ed as bi be d t1l wo figure in the com m t1nity so that th e judges l08 · 109. llO.
3, no. 2· ar ye z., Ga g. Ne , 33 . No t. No Court Procedu.re R ttles, 1943, Art. 93, Leg. • Civ. Pro. C., A:rt. 31(1) (c) (i) (ii). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 31(2).
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woulcl be proper. So too, if tl1e case were instit11ted in a Woreda Guezat Court and wot1ld be likely to involve interpretation of comJJlicated code provisions that have not been interpreted before, tl1e Higl1 Court could decide t11at it would be better if it l1eard the case itself. Art. 31 (I) (c) n1ust be interpreted narrowly so tl1at it will not be abused. Tl1at sL1bsection incorporates the well-known doctrine of fori,111. non conveniens (in conve11ie11t forL1m). Tl1is doctri11e means simply tl1at even tl1ough a court has ju risdictio11, it sl1ould not l1ear tl1e case ,vl1ere it is obvio11s tl1at the plaintiff l1as cl1osen tl1e forL1111 witl1 a view tov,ard malcing it very i11co11venient a11d expensive for tl1e defe11da11t to defend the case in tl1at place. It does not n1ean that a trans fer sl1ould be ordered merely because the defenda11t would prefer to try the case so111ewl1ere else. Tl1e proper application of tl1is doctri11e is de1nonstrated by a consi deratio11 of the case of Gi,lf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 111 This involved states of the United States, bt1t tl1e same tl1ing cot1ld occur i11 provinces or areas of Etl1iopia. Tl1e suit vvas to recover dan1ages for pro_perty loss caused by an exp]osion. 112 Aln1ost Eth.$ 1,000,000 was cl,1i111ed as dan1ages. Tl1e plaintiff was a resident of State A, \vl1ere tl1e defe11da11t, a corJJoration, carried on bt1siness, and wl1ere tl1e explosion occurred. Tl1e defenda11t carried 011 bt1siness in State B and was subject to suit there. Suit was brougl1t before a cot1rt sitting in a large city in State B. It was l1elcl tl1at tl1e case sl1ould be transferred to State A. The court stated the princiJ)les applicable to foru111 11011 co11ve11ie11s as fol/oJvs.
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''If tl1e co111binatio11 and ,veigl1t of factors reqt1isite to give11 rest1lts are cliflicL1lt to forecast or state, tl1ose to be considered are 11ot diffict1lt to name. An interest to be co11sidered, a11d tl1e 011e likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of tl1e litigant. Important consideratio11s are tl1e relative ease of access to sources of ]Jroof; availability of con1pt1lsory process for attendance of un,villing, a11d tl1e cost of obtaini11g attenda11ce of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of pre111ises, if view \\1ould be appropriate to tl1e action; and all otl1er practical JJroble111s tl1at n1ake trial of a case easy, expeditious a11d inexpensive. . . . Tl1e coL1rt will vveigl1 relative advantages a11d obstacles to fair trial. It is ofte11 said tl1at the pla.i11tiff 1nay not, by cl1oice of an inconvenient fort1n1, 'vex, 'l1arass,' or 'oppress' the defe11dant b:y inflicting t1pon hin1 expe11se or trouble 11ot 11ecessary to his o,vn right to pursue J1is ren1edy. But t1nless tl1e balance is stro11gly in favor of tl1e defenda11t, the plaintiff's cl1oice of fort1m sl1ould rarely be disturbed.'' 111 otl1er words, tra11sfer sl1ould not be ordered on tl1is grot111d u11less it is clear tl1at tl1e JJlaintiff is trying to l1arass tl1e defe11dant by 11.is cl1oice of tl1e forum so tl1at tl1e defe11dant ,viii be Jess able to defend tl1e case and, tl1erefore, will be n1ore ,villing to settle on tl1e plaintiff's ter111s. I-Iere the court concluded tl1at tl1e doctrine shot1ld be apJJlied and tl1e case tra11sferred. Everytl1i11g l1appe11ed in State A - all the ,vitnesses ,vere there, and the injt1ry occL1rred there. It would l1ave _bee11 very inco11ve11ie11t and expensive to trans IJOrt all tl1e witnesses to State B. Tl1e defe11da11t argued tl1at si11ce a very large 111. (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1947), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Lawyers' ed.), vol. 91, }). 1055. 112. It_ sho �ld be _11oted tl1at this question \vould not a.rise in precisely the san1e way in Et11io JJ1a. Since this was a suit for con1pensatioo for \Vrong to in1n1ovable property, it would ha_ve _had to. be brot1ght at the situs under Art. 25(1) ( d). Hov,,ever, the question could a.rise m a suit _fo� con,pensation for wrong to 1Jersons or 1novable JJroperty, since in sucl1 a case the plau1t1ff coultl file suit iI1 the place where tl1e defe11dant carried on business under Art. 19(1).
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of money was involved, the case should be tried be�ore an ur an rt, cou � · s ed. wa ect n rej tio It ten 1 ld n cou co t no be sai ' d t tlat a court 1n a rural b ut this an ers d t d e th un cas e as well as a court in an uroa not d wou l 113 a are , n one . . Her e , . . · · ve t n n co to 1e ry n e tr v y th a e w c�se in State B, and tl1 e plaintiff � clea:IY it ; � wa� . arass h e e fi o t d d en ant trying by h1s choice of forum. obviously We may easily imagine the same kind of case arising 1· n Eth·1op·1a. Assume · . Gore, where tl1e plaintiff and defendant tllat the wron� occurred . 1n resided. The t in Addis Ababa, , and, therefore, defendant carried on b11s1n ess tl1ro11gh an aoen O · ct to su1·t tI1ere u n der Art. 19 (I). If tlie plai 11 tiff filed suit i n Addis was subJe Ab aba, a11 order . of tran�fer 11nder Art . 31 (I)_ (c) might well be proper. All the events occurred 1n Gore , the defe11dant has little contact with Addis Ababa. In any event, . he wo11ld �av� to tra 1 1sport all l1is witnesses there, wI1ich would 'be very expensive. T�e _plain tiff n1ay l1�v� believed tl1at tl1 is would force tlle de·fe nd ant to abando11 his defe11�e, and tl11s ts the kind of case that is contemplated by Art. 31 (1) (c). B11t, aga111 remember tl1at trans·fer sho111d not be ordered inerely beca 11se tl1e defenda11t prefers to l1ave the case tried elsewhere. amount
D.
Notice
I n cl1apter V we will con sider tl1e detailed provisions of tl1e Code relat _ f . p�o�ess. Here we wil.l consider tl1e relationship of ing . to notice and .service o nonce to tl1e q11est1on of JUr1sd1ct1on. We have earlier defined jt1risdiction as the power of a cot1rt to l1ear and detern1ine a case. Even tl1ougl1 tl1e cot1rt may have jurisdiction - jt1dicial, material, and local - if the defendant l1as not received legally sufficient notice, tl1e court cannot proceed against hi m and tl1ereby loses its power to l1ear the case. Thus, legally s1ttlicient notice is an essential element of jt1risdic tion an d may properly be considered i n that context. Underlying the concept of notice is the idea that ''every defenda nt is e11 titled to his day in court." 114 If l1e is to appear and defe11d, he 1n11st be n otified of the fact tl1at l1e has been sued and of tl1e time and place wl1ere l1e is to pre sent his defence. Where a defendant l1 as received legally sufficient notice, lie m . 11st appear, or the co11rt will proceed in his absence.115 He obvio11sly ca nnot destroy the court's jurisdiction by failing to appear. The question of legally sufficient notice will arise where a defenda nt who h _ as not actually received notice of the s11it s11ffers a j11dgment to be entered agrunst him and subsequently finds out abo11t tl1e j11dgme nt (11s11alJy when it �s so11ght . to be enforced against him). He will either move to set the judgm� nt as1d� or resist enforcement on the ground that he did not receive legally s11ffic1ent notice.. Where a defendant has actually received notice, as we will see, he ca1;1-Ilot contest 1ts legal sufficiency. And where the attempted notice was legally sufficien t, t_he coiirt d? es not lose j11risdiction, even though, in fact, the defenda11t did no_t rec�1ve the notice. Although in tl1e latter case the co11rt may set the j11dg1r�ent aside,. since .tl1e def� n da.nt did not actl1ally receive notice, 116 the j11dgment 1s n�t void for lack 0� Ju risdiction. However, where the attempted notice is not considered legally s 11.fficient
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s l 113. Empha sis was placed on the fact that the jury ';Vould n_ot be able 0 1 l�vl��:e c: �o�i 0 th� point might not be too re evant in tl1e Et l11op1an context. Note . ) (b (1) 31 rt. l r de a; llll er op pr y 111a be pl1cated question of Jaw is invol ved, trans fer . · · ing 011 Plead' ls ,a er at lvl d · an es as c 114. See the discussio11 in C. Brown, A. Vestel and M· Ladd, and Procecl11re (1953), p. 3. 115. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70. 116. See Civ. Pro. C. Art. 78. ,
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t11e court loses jurisdiction. This means that tl1e judgment is void and can be attciclcecl at c1ny time. We will now proceed to consider what constitutes legally sufficient notice. Tl1e general principle of Jaw is that notice will be considered legally sufficient if tl1 e 1nea11s enJployed to apprise tl1 e defe11dant of tl1e st1it were reas_onable und.er tl1e circu 1nstances. We must examine the kind of notice tl1 at was given and ask wl1ether it ,vas reasonable that tl1e court employ this kind of notice to advise the defendant that had been sued and was subject to tl1e co·urt's jurisdiction. This pri11 ciple can be illt1 strated by a consideration of the case of Wa/1<:er v. City of J-/1,1tc/1i11s011. 111 In tl1at case a 111unicipality expropriated a person's land for ptiblic t1se. It set a l1earing to fix the corn_pensation to be paid.118 Tl1e owner did not appear at tl1 e l1earing, and tl1e board proceeded to fix tl1 e co111pensation in his absence. Tl1e only type of notice given was pt1blication i11 a newspaper, wliich t1sually is ver)' i11 effective, and, as we will see, is to be used in Etl1iopia only as a last resort. \Vl1en tl1e owner st1bseqt1ently discovered tl1at J1is land had been ex1Jro1Jriated, l1 e brot1gl1t sL1it to enjoin the 1nu11icipality fron1 taking l1 is land and to I1ave the orcler of ex 1 Jro1Jriatio11 set aside. It \Vas J1eld tl1 at the 11ot.ice en1ployed was 11ot legally st1fficient a11d tl1at tl1e effect of tl1 e proceeding was to deprive hjn1 of tl1e IJrO[Jerty \Vitl1ot1t due J Jrocess of Jaw.119 DL1e l)rocess ob,1io11sly reqt1ires tl1at a person wl1ose property is to be expro priated be given a l1eari11g at wl1icl1 l1 e can i 11 troduce his evidence as to the value of tl1e property a11d raise an)' qt1estion regardi11g tl1e legality of tl1e expropriation. In order for tl1e OJJJJortt111ity to be 1neaningful, the person n1 ust receive adequate nolice of tl1e l1earing. \VJ1at co11stitutes adeqt1ate - or legally strfficient - notice de1Je11ds 011 tl1e circL1111stances of eacl1 case. If tl1 e defendant \Vere a 11 00-resident a11d I1is v. 1 hereabouts 11nl(11 0,vn, the11 perl1 aps tl1 e only kind of notice that cot1ld be give11 ,vo11ld be notice by pt1blicatio11 , and in tl1ose circu 1 11stances, st1cl1 notice ,vould be cleen1ed legally st1fficient. But tl1is was 11ot the case l1ere. The defendant ,vas a resident a11d co11ld I1ave been served witl1 notice J Jerso11 ally, or at least a letter cot1ld l1a,1e been sent i11 forn1i11 g l1i1n of tl1e proceedi11gs. Tl1e municipalit)' used tl1 e least effective n1eans of 11otifyi11 g l1i111 when mt1cl1 more effective n1 eans v,1 ere readil)' a,,ailable. It al111ost appeared as if tl1 e m11nici1Jality was trying to pre,1e11 t l1in1 from attending tl1e heari11g. Tl1e means e111ployed to apprise tl1e defen dant of tl1e s11it ,vere not reaso11 a.ble t1 1 1der tl1e circu 11 1sta11ces, and, tl1erefore, tl1e board lacked jurisdictio11 to render a jL1dg1nent agai11 st J1i111.
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V-./e tl1 en n1ay restate tl1 e principle of legally suft1cient notice as follows: i 11 order for tl1e notice to be legally sufficie11t, tl1 e 1neans en11Jloyed to app1-ise the defe11daut of tl1e sL1it n1 t1st be reaso11able t1.nder the circt11nsta 1 1ces; tl1 ey \vill 11ot be found reasonable if a 111etl1od of notice likely to be i11eflective ,,,as e111 ployed ,vl1e11 a 1nucl1 more effective 1netl1od was reaclily available. WI1 ere tl1e defendant l1as 11ot act11ally received 11otice, and tl1 e notice tl1 at was atte111 pted was not legal))' s11fficient, tl1 e cot1rt loses its j11risdiction to l1ear tl1 e case, an)' jt1dgi11 ent it re11ders is absolt1tely void, and it may be atta.cl<ed at any ti111e. E.
Objections to Jt1risdiction
Lack of jL1risdiction 111a)' be raisecl botl1 by tl1e cot1rt a11d by tl1 e defe.nda11 t wl1 e11 he files l1is prelinli11 ary objections at tl1e first l1earing. Tl1e court 111t1st reject a 117. 118. 119.
(Sup. Ct., U.S. , 1956), U,S. Sup. Ct. Rep., (Lawyers' ed. 2nd), vol. 1 p. 108. Con1pare Rev. Const., Art. 44. Con1pa1:e Rev. Const., Art. 43. f
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staten1ent of claim s_ubmitted to it_ wl1ere ''the suit appears from the particulars of 1 cla1 to be f uts1de the ement 2o For exanl jurisdiction of the c011rt." ta � the � � ? ? . ple, 1f 1n a suit fil_ed Ill tl1e Higl1 CotLrt, the allegations of the staten1e11t of claim show tl1a� the_ s1:1bJect matter . of tl1e st1it involves Eth.$ 500 and do not show that �h � case IS within tl1_e excl11s1ve jurisdiction of the Higl1 Court under Art. 15 (2), 1! IS_ cle �r tl1at tl1e I-I1gl1 C o111·t does not l1ave material jt1risdiction. Or, if the plajn _ trff 1n 111s statement of claim alleges that tl1e defendant is a resident of Jimma and that tl1e .w :ong for �hie� h� seeks co1npeosation took place in Jin1ma, the Higl1 Court sitting on c1rct1-1t ID Gojjam lacks local juriscliction. In both cases the statement of clain1 n111st be rejected on tl1e ground that i t is 011tside tl1e j11ris diction of tl1e co11rt i11 whicl1 it is filed.121 Shot1ld the state111e11t of claim be disnussed on the grot1nd tl1at it does 11ot disclose jt1dical jurisdiction? A closer exainination of tl1e question indicates that tl1e question really is 'vvl1etl1er a state1nent of claiin sl1011Id be dis1nissed for lack of jurisdictio11 where it does not clisclose jt1dicial jt1risdiction on tl1e ground that tl1e defenda11t is an Etl1io1)ia11 11atiooal or do111iciliary or that tl1e act wl1ich is the s11b ject n1atter of tl1e s11it took place in Etl1.i.opia. If tl1e defendant does not raise lack of jt1risdiction on tl1ese gro11nds, the11 tl1ere is jt1dicial jurisdiction on tl1e basis of consent. Conseq11ently, at tl1e ti1ne tl1e statement of clai111 is filed, the co11rt ca11not k.now wl1ether all tl1e bases of jt1diciat j11risdictio11 are lacking. Art. 9 (1) says that a state1nent of clai111 filed in a cot1rt not having material jurisdiction shall be rejected in accordance witl1 Art. 231, a11d Art. 10 (1) says tl1e san1e tl1ing as to a state1nent of� claim filed in a court not l1aving local jt1risdiction. J t1dicial juris diction is not expressly 1ne11tioned in tl1is context. 122 Since at tl1e tin1e of tl1e filing of the state111ent of claim tl1e co11rt ca11not deter111ine wl1ether all tl1e bases of judicial jurisdiction are lacking, it is st1b1nitted that Art. 231 n1ust be read in light of Arts . 9 (1) and 10 (1), wl1icl1 only a11tl1orize rejection for lack of material and local jt1risdiction. The court sho11ld not consider the q11estion of lack of j11di cial j11risdiction 1111less the defendant raises an objectio11 on that grot1nd at tl1e first hea.ring. If the court does not dismiss the staten1e11t o·f claim for lack of jt1risdictio11, eitl1er i11advertantly or because lack of jt1risdictio11 does not ap_pear from the allega tio11s of the state1nent o f clai111, tl1e defendant 1nay challenge tl1e j t1risdiction of tl1e cot1rt at tl1e first 11earing by :filing a preli111i11ary objection on tl1at grotind.123 At tl1at time, he m11st also raise lack of j11dicial j11risdiction, or l1e will be deemed to l1ave consented to the exercise of sucl1 j11risdiction. Tl1e co11rt is to rule on any objection to its j11risdiction. and if it finds tl1at jt1risdiction is lacking, it shall dismiss the case on tl1at ground. 124 We may 110w consider tl1e effect of the defendant's . fail11re to r_ ais� _ lac� _ of jurisdiction at the first hearing. Of co11rse, if be fails to r,11se lack of Jltd1c1al Jt1r1s diction at that time, jt1dicial j11risdiction exists on the basis_ of _ c? ns�n·�- But tl1ere js a distinction between tl1e fail1ue to raise laclc of n1ater1al JUr1sd1ct1on and tL1e failure to raise lack of local jt1risdiction. Material j11risdiction represents_ a decisio11 .as to how tbe j11dicial b11siness is to be apportioned amo11g the various co11rts Civ. Pro. C., Art. 231(1) (b). Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 9(1), 1. 0(1). to ting ons rela visi pro tl1e d .in ere cov lly 1era ge1 is on icti isd jur As we said earlier, jucLicial private international law, a.nd sucl1 provisions are lacking i11 Ethiopia. 123. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244(2) (a). 124. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 245.
120. 121 122.
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sed t rai at no the is n tio st r fi. jec ob ry ring' ina hea lim · e pr a ere Wh · . hy arc 11e r, ·ID ·ti1e l . ground o f o b" · n IS sueh as to t1o �ec e prevent unless ''th · 1·t IS de e 1n ed to be waived · 25 • The o b' o ac f k l f n o I t1o �ec ma!erial juris" en. giv ing e b m fro nt e . gm jud id val a r e flects suc l1 an Important policy, a cour 1t se cau e B ry. go .t e cat s thi o int diction falls e r to h �ar the case. Tl1e obje c w po no s ha ply sim on icti isd jur 1 ria 1 ate n . that lacks id Judg�1e�t �ro� being a val ven pre to as h suc is � and d e iv wa be t _ no can tion . l er1a lack t ur mat it J 1 sd1ct1on,_ it � give n. TI1erefore, l-vlie11ever t_ l1e cou_rt IS aware tl1a _ t did not raise the question 111ust dismiss tl1e case notw1 thstand1ng tl1at the defendan126 244 . If t? e �bje ction has . t. Ar der un on cti e j ob ary iin li11 pre a by fiJing . . . bee n raised ancl tl1e court fmds tl1at the re 1s n1ater1al Jur1sd1ct 1on, after the case f1as b;en decided, tl1e ruling on 111aterial jurisdictio11 is fully appealable. If tl1e a1Jpellate co11rt finds tl1at 1 11ate rial j11risdiction was lacking, tl1e judgment will be se t aside. Tl1e r11les witl1 res1Ject to raising lack of local j11 risdiction are e ntirely different. As we sa\v, tl1 e reqt1iren1ents of local j11risdiction are prin1 arily for tl1e convenie nce of t l1e JJarties. If tl1 e defe 11dant fails to object to lack of local j urisdiction at the earliest possible 01Jport1111ity, i.e., at tl1e first hearing , he is deeme d to waive this objection. Nor can tl1e co11rt, after tl1 e ti111e for the filing of preliminary objections at the first l1 eari11g l1as passed, raise Iaclc of local jt1risdiction on its own initiative.127 Moreover, wl1ere a JJrelimi11ary objection l1 as bee n filed on this gro1111d, tl1e rt1ling of tl1e co11rt is not a.JJJJe alable even if erroneous.128 A rul ing 011 local jurisdictio11 is aJJpealable only wl1 ere an obje ction was take n c111cl tl1e decision l1as caused a failure of justice. If tl1e defendant was co1npe ]led to try the case i11 a ver)' i11co1 1ve11 ient place and \Vas 11nable to bri1 1g ]1is witne sses, tl1ere n1ay l1ave been a failt1re of j11stice and the j11 dgn1e nt tl1en \vould be se t aside . But if this wa.s not tl1e case, a11 i 1 1correct r11lit1g 011 a1 1 objection to local jt1 risdictioi1 is 11ot considered serio11s, and tl1 e j11dgn1ent may 11ot be invalidated on that grot1nd. Note finally tl1at a court l1aving local j11risdiction doe s not l1ave tl1e power to disn1iss a case 011 tl1 e ground tl1at it 111ay be 1 11 ore conve1 1ie ntly tried in anotl1e r co11rt tl1at also I 1as local j11risdiction. 129 Tl1is wo11ld an1011nt to a cl1ange of ve1111e, and as we sa,v, a n1otio11 for cl1a11ge of vei111e mt1st be addressed to a higl1er court in accordance ,vitl1 the JJrovisio11s of Art. 31. F.
Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Altl1ough it is provicled that tl1e sa111e s11it 111a)' 1 1ot be i 11stit11te d i r 1 11 1ore than on_e co11rt,130 tllis s0111 etin1es l1appe ns. More over, J.Jarties 111 igl1t l1ave fil ed separa te . _ sti ! ts tl1at actually 1 11v?lve tl1e_ san1 e clai111 . l:;-or exan1ple , ai1 i 11s11rance co111pany _ 111�gl1t � on_te nd that it 1 s 11 ot liable on a policy, as a re st1lt of whicl1 tl1e ins11red niigl1t 111st1 tt�te a1 1 a�tio11 to recover 011 tl 1e policy. At tlie sa111e ti1 11e tl1 e insura11ce con1pa,1 y niight 11_ 1�t1 t_11te a.11 _action i11 a diffe rent co11rt for a declarator)' jt1dgi11 ent to tl! e e �ect th_at !t 1s not liable 011 tl1e policy. Tl1 ere is also tl1e Jossibility tl1at a_ suit w1ll be 111st1tute � 11 th sa,ne clai1n i11 a11 Etl1 iopia11 court al11d i11 a for � � _ eig.n cotirt, � .g., tl1e J.Jla1 n�1 ff_ 1111gl1t s11e an EtI 1io_pia11 nat 1 i 11 Ethiopia., and t]J e io1 al defeiidant 1n1gl1 t file a s111 t 111 volving tl1e sa111e case at tl1e place wl1ere tl1e act was 125. 126. J 27. 128. 129. 130.
Civ. :Pro. C., Art. 244(3). Civ. :Pro. C., Art. 9(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 10(2). Ibid. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 10(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 7( l).
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done. Finally, the same issue m.ig �t be in:7olved in n1ore than one case. Suppose that A sues B to . recover poss�ss1on of immovable property that B is now occu pying. B, wh o claims �o be entitled to possession, might file a suit against A to recover damages for A s alleged trespass to the same land. In both cases the issue is the same: who is entitled to possession. Arts. 7 and 8 deal with conflicts of jurisdiction. Art. 7 covers the problem of priority, where the plaintiff has filed more tl1an one suit on the same cla�m in . different courts. Of course, this is not permissible. In such a case the court 1n wl11ch the staten1ent of claim was first filed I1as juris diction. So, if the plaintiff files suit in the High Court sitting on circuit in Kaffa he cannot file anotl1er suit on the same claim in the Higl1 Court at Addis Ababa although local jurisdiction n1ay also lie tl1ere. Art. 8 covers the proble1n of pendency. We earlier gave the example of the two suits involving the san1e insurance policy, one filed by tl1e insurer against the insured for a declaratory judg1nent of non-liability and tl1e other filed by the in sured against the insurer for recovery on the policy. The second suit would l1ave to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Tl1e rule is that no court shall try any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and s11bstantially in issue in a previously instituted suit bet\veen the same parties in anotl1er co11rt in Ethiopia having jurisdiction. 131 If tl1e ins11red has filed suit on the policy in Addis Ababa where the head office of tl1e company is situate, the inst1rance con1pany cannot subsequently file a declaratory j11dgment suit on tl1e policy in Debre Berl1an wl1ere the object of tl1e policy is sit11ate. It must litigate tl1e first s11it. Tl1e rule is also applicable to suits involving parties claiming throt1gl1 persons who a1·e }jtigating tl1e same question in another suit. Suppose tl1at the owner of property brings an action against a person who caused i11j11ry to that property. Tl1e property was insured, and the insurer wl10 paid compensation to the owner also files s11it against tl1e wrongdoer, seeking to recover tl1e amount paid fro1n him. Tl1e ins11rer derives h. is rights from the owner, and since tl1e question of tl1e wro11gdoer's liability to the owi1er is being litigated in t11e st1it brought by the owner, tl1e co11rt has no j uris diction to hear insurer's s11it. 132 However, the pendency of a s11it in a court of a foreign country cloes not preclude the Ethiopian court from trying a suit founded on tl1e cause of action. 133 It is immaterial wllicl1 case was filed first, since the Ethiopian court is directed to pay no attentio11 to the proceedings in the foreign co11rt. If the plajntiff sued tl1e defendant, an Ethiopian national, at the place wl1ere the act was done, l1e is not precluded from filing a s11it on the san1e claim in Ethiopia. The Ethiopjan co11rt 134 . n co11rt foreig the of ion decis tl1e to d regar ut will decide the case witl1o The final situation is where the claims of tl1e parties are separate (unlike the insurance case where the same insurance contract is involved in both suits), but tl1e matter in issue in 011e s11it is so closely connected witl1 a Sltit pending i11 another court that it should not be tried separately. Tl1is is tb.e example of a suit ,.
131. 132. 133. 134.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(1).
As we will see, tL1e instirer should L1ave been made a party to the fu·st suit. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(2). . . . . If the judgment of tbe foreign cour� were sot1g�t to be enfa.reed 1n Etl11op1a,_ 1t would n ?t, Eth� o� of course, be recognized. Tl1e foreign court,_ 1n turn, �v�tild . not recog_ n1ze tl1e dec ide 1ld wo 1t nts, gi:ne Jud ttng l11 the co1t th w face � e r we. � e ? stat d thir ! pian ju.dgn,ent. If a . rnat1onal law, which one to recognize in accordance _w1tl1 its rules relating to private 111te and the rules in th.is regard are not uniform.
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to recover property by one clain1ing a right to possession and a suit by the poss essor clainling that tl1e plai11tiff in tl1e other action l1as com1uitted a trespass to the san1e pro_perty. In both cases the issue is tl1e same - who is entitled to poss ession - and it would be very tindesirable if one Etl1iopian court held that one party was entitled to possession and anotl1er ]1eld tl1at tl1e otl1er party was entitled to possessio11. 1 1 1 st1ch a situatio11, tl1e provisions of Art. 11 or Arts. 244 and 245 are to be applied. 135 U11der Art. 244 (2) (c), a preli1ninary objection can be taken on tl1e gro11nd tl1at tl1e suit is pending in a11other court, and wl1ere tl1e issue to be detern1inecl is th.e san1e, the Sltit may be considered to be pending in �1ootl1er court witl1it1 tl1e 111eaniog of tl1at article. If tl1e objection were n1ade to tl1e cot1rt in wllicl1 tl1e seco11d suit was filed, it ,vot1ld conclt1de that the issue is pending in anotl1er cot1rt ,:vithin tl1e mea.11iog of Art. 8 (3) and, therefore, dismiss tl1e suit on grot111ds of peodency. However, either party can make an application to a hig I1er court 136 tl1at tl1e cases be consolidated for trial under Art. 11. I11 such a case tl1e l1igher court, 11 1)on granting the applicatio11, will clirect one of tl1e subordi11ate co11rts to try tl1e case. Tl1e poi11t to remen1ber is that tl1e sao1e isst1e shall not be resolved by two different co11rts.
135. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(3). 136. If the case were flied in the High Court,
perial Cou.rt. If it were filed in another application would be mad.e to U1e Supreme In1court, application would be n1ade to the 1-ligh Court.
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CHAPTER IV PARTIES AND THE DIMENSIONS OF TI-IE DISPUTE In tl1is chapter we wi�J . be conc �rne_ d with the parties to a lawsuit - wl1o 1nay sue or b � �u ed, wh ? may Join as pla1nt1ffs or be joined as defendants, wl1at clai1 ns may be JOI �ed against a par�y, what parties n1t1 st join or be joined, what parties 1nay �ome 1 1 1 or be brot1gl1t 10 and all o ther questions affecting the dimensions of _ the ?�spt1te. We n111st c �ns1der e acl1 e]e1nent of tl1e problem separately, since tl1e prov1s1ons of law governing tl1ose ele111ents are entirely different. First we must a&k wl10 n1ay s11e as a plai11tiff or be sued as a defendant. We will see that certain co�ditio11s must be present for a party to bring suit or be made a defendant. W e will also see tl1at where parties have '' t l1e same interest in the suit,'' wl1at is called a class suit n1ay be filed. Tl1en we n1t1st ask what cl �ims a � individ�al_ J?laintiff or plaintiffs with a joint interest n1ay tinite in single st1 1t aga1nst a 1 1 1nd1v1dt1al defendant or the sa111e defendants jointly. The terms, ''plaintiff having a joint interest'' ancl ''san1e defenda11t jointly'' r efer to tl1e sit11a tion where tl1e right or liability i11volves two or 1nore persons, bu t it is as if one one person possessed the rigl1t or owed tl1e obligatio1 1, e.g., tl1e defendant isst1es a pron1issory note to A and B so that A and B l1ave a joint interest in tl1e note. ''Joint in.terest'' for the se pt1rposes n1eans son1ething different tl1an ''same interest'' as tl1e latter tern1s is 11sed for p11r1)oses of a class st1it. Tlus is illustrative of tl1e kind of disti11ctiot1s we will find. Next there is the question. o .f per1 nissive joinder of J)arties: what perso1 1s n1a.y join as plaintiffs, a11d what persons n1ay be joined as defe11dants. We will see that tl1e tests for joinder of plaintiffs and joinder of defendants are not the san1e. More over, p ermissive joinder is qt1ite differ ent f ro1n n1andatory joinder; in son1e cases certain parties must join as plaintiffs or be joi1 1ed as defendants, a11cl in tl1eir absence the suit cannot proceed. After tl1e s11it l1as been i 1 1stitt1ted, a q11estion may arise as to what parties may intervene or 111ay be bro11ght in tl1e action. 111 deter1ni1 ung tl1at qt1estion it is irrelevant t l1a.t st1ch parties co11ld have originally joi1 1ed as plaintiffs or could l1ave bee n joine d as defendants. Since tl1ey did not join or were not joined at tl1at ti111e, tl1e matte r is governed by very different r11Ies than those applicable to original joinder. It is important to keep the se differences in 11u11d tl1ro11gl1ot1t the disc11ssion. The disct1ssion will be divided into tl1e following parts: (l) party plaintiff and party def endant; (2) joi11der of parties and cat1s es of action; (3) indispensable part ies; (4) third party practice; (5) interpleader; (6) inter ven tion; (7) special 1:,�rties and st1its; (8) effect of d eath o r insolvency of a party . 1 1.
Book II of the Civil Procedure Code deals with Parties to Suits, a11d n1<;> st of the . materi':1- 1 discussed in this cI1apter will resolve around tl1at part of . the Code.. However, since this book is organized on a function.al basis ru.1d is _not an article by a� t1cle con1me1?-tary, we _ _ w-ill not be discussing all tl1e articles contained 1n Book II, and \VIII be di�cussing SOJ!le matters that are not covered in Book II, but seen, to relate to the q� 1estion _ o f J?art1es and dimensions of the dispute. We \-Vili consider joinder. of c?uses of actio_n, which 1s go . o verned by Book IV, since such joinder det�r� 11ines the d11� 1ei1s1ons . [ tJ,e d_1sput_e, a11d s111ce there are some 1,roblenis tf1at inv_? lve both Joinder of p_art1es a11d J? inder of claii:n s. So to?, . _ 1n although interpleader is treated 1n the Bo?k on Spe� 1_al �rocedu1es, we will _ discuss 1t . . The rttles re!ating to agen s tL1 is chapter, since it is a11 aspect � f mt1lt1ple-party l1t1gatio11 � . and pleaders, covered in Book II, \-VIII be d1sct1ssed m_ Cl1apter_ XJI. Tl1e eflect ?f a party s failure to appear, also covered in Book I�, will be discussed 111 Chapter VII, 1nasn1uch as _ the problem of no11-appea.ra11ce tisttally arises at the first J1ear1ng.
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-A . Party Plaintiff and Party Defendant r n fo ts a rso en m pe ire s suing qu re e th th wi d ne er ' nc co be ll wi we n tio sec is In th r e de e th un bl pa ca law may n rso pe y An . nt da fen · de a · ' ' as ed su • g • n i' be or t"ff as pl a1n 1 . he 1·s · n h ow na 1n , 1s e it su e tl1 s file � be a pa.rty to a stiit.2 Tliis 1nea1Js tl1at he o wh n are rso ab Pe ap nt. inc da fen le de d me na _ or � iff i11t pla d n1e na the referred to as 3 .- cannot sue 1n tl1e1r own name , ns rso pe ed ict erd i11t � under tI1 e law - minors and _ th gh ou JS, they sue t tha their t, s111 ve ati ent res rep _ � a led cal is at 1 wl file ist int btit legal representatives.4 We w.ill st1bsequently disc11ss such represe:°tat1ve suits. �ssum ing that tl1e plaintiff or defendant is ca1)able _ 11nder t�1e _ law, 1n order _for him _to be a party J1 e n1 ust be ''interested'' in the suit, and 1t JS to tl1e question of ''in terest'' tl1 at we will now tur11. 1. The Real Party in Interest a. \tVl10 is the real party in interest
It is J)rovided 11nder Art. 33(2) of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code that ''no person n1 ay be a plai11tiff unless he l1 as a vested interest in the subject matter of the suit." As i t is so111eti111 es said, tl1e plaintiff m11st be tl1e real party in interest. There are two reaso11s for s11cl1 a req11ire111e11 t. TI 1 e n1ost obvio11s is to prevent suits by a person wl10 \Vants to litigate so111eone else's claim �gainst the defendant. If A assaults B, a wro11 g l1 as bee11 con1 111itted agai11 st B, and it is Ul ) to B to decide if l1 e wants redress for tl1 at wrong. C sl1011ld not be able to decide that he wants to e11 force B's rigl1 t agai11st A and file suit against A for tl1e benefit of B. Since no wrong l1as bee11 co111111 itted agai11st C, tl1ere is no reason to permit l1im to file a suit. Wl1ere tl1 e co11duct of tl1 e actor constitutes a criminal offence, a person otl1er tl1a11 tl1 e ,1icti111 can n1ake a complaint to the appropriate a11thorities. 5 As an i11 terested perso11, l1e can advise tl1 e autl1orities that a wrong has been con1mitted agai11st tl1e state. I-fo,ve,1er, in a ci,,il case a person is st1ing to obtain redress for a \Vrong con1n1itted agai11st hi1n, and only the victim of the wrong can decide wl1etl1er l1e \\rants redress. Of co11rse, 111ost cases will not involve tltis situation. The n1 ore in1 portant rea so11 for tl1 e r11le, as a practical matter, is to preve11t two s11its against a defendant for a single wrong. \\'here tl1 e interest in the s11bject n1atter of the s11it has been transferred, the defendant sl1 011ld not be s11bject to suit botl1 by tl1e person who had tl1e interest originally and by tl1e person to wl1om the interest has been trans ferred. I-I_ e is liab]� on one o?ligation and not t\vo. Since tl1 e person \Vho transfer r :d tl1 e rnterest will not receive the benefits of tl1e suit, it ordinarily is not up to l11n1 to s11e tl1 e defe11da11t. Th11s, it is ope11 to tl1e defenda11 t to co11tend tl1at the plaintiff wl10 is su.ing is not tl1e real party in i11terest tl1at is l1e does not ha,,e a vested interest i11 the s11bject matter of tl1e s11it. In ' s11cl1 a 'case, as we will see, tl1e real party in interest is substit11ted as plaintiff or tJ1e suit is dis111 issed. T . �e best exa11 1ple t? il111strate this principle is tl1e assign111ent of a contractual obl1gat.Jon. One contracting party may usually assign his rig11 ts to a third. party with2. 3·
Civ. Pr o. C., Art. 33(1). See Civ. Pro. �-, .�ts 198, 351, 380. Under tl1e former rt1les a fen1ale \vas considered a p�rson tinder d.1sab1hty. Co urt J?rocedure ltules, 1943, Art. 6, Leg. ot. No. 33, Neg. Gaz., N . Y� ar 3, No. 3. Under the Civi l Code, no d.isability is attached to a fe1ua.le whethe r mar ried o r not. 4. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 34(1). 5 · �ot_e, lio\vever, that s01ne criminal offences are punisl abl 1 e up onl y on the complaint of the v1ctu11. See Pen. C., Arts. 217, 721(1) (a).
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out the consent of the other party. 6 Once the assignment is complete, that is, the rights unde� th e _contract ha ve be �n tr _ ansferred to the assignee, the assignee and not the assignor 1s the _re al p �rty 1 n 1nterest.7 Therefore, it is well settled tllat the assignor cannot �he n bring suit . on the claim.8 It does not matter that under the terms of t�e as�ig?ment the . assignee m ay_ have to pay over some of the proceeds to the ass!gnor , since the_ rigl1t to require performance of th_e obligation is vested i� the assignee, only l1e _ is th e_ . �eal party in i nterest with respect to that obliga t1on, and only he can bring swt. It should be noted that o nce the debtor is aware �hat a � assig �m.ent has_ be en �ade, �e ca11not satisfy tl1e oblig tion by paying � So 1f ass , 1n ign a or. suit by the assignor, the defendant who 1s aware of the the assign ment, does n. ot object that tl1e assignor is not the real party in interest under Art. 33(2), an d judgmen t is for tl1e assignor, which the debtor satisfies he is sub ject to a further st1it by the assignee, a nd will l1ave to pay him tl1e s�me amount that he paid to the assignor. 11 When the objection is made on the ground that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, tl1e cot1rt mt1st deternune whether he has the right to reqt1ire performance of tl1e obligation . This qt1estion was presented in the case of Spe11cer v. Standard Che111icals & Metals Corp. 12 Tl1e plaintiff brot1ght suit to recover tl1e balance of tl1e purchase price of certain ore sold by one Quan Kai to the defen d,ant. The plaintiff alleged that tl1e claim had bee11 assigned to him, and tl1e defen dant co.ntended that an actual assignn1en t had not been effected. If tl1e assignment had 11ot been effected, the plai ntiff did 11ot l1ave tl1e rigl1t to require JJerforn1ance of the obligation a. n d cot1ld not bring st1it in his own naine. 13 The instrL1ment named the plaintiff as ''attorney'' for Quan Kai and gave him the power to prose cute an action for dan1ages on an y claim that QL1an Kai might have in the United States. He was also authorized to settle any clain1 and to ''sell, assign, tra11sfer or dispose'' of tl1e claim which was the subject 1natter of the suit. T11e cot1rt l1eld that an assignment had not been effected. It said that the i11strL1ment was sirnply a power of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff to collect what was dL1e to Quan 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11 .
12. 1 3.
Civ. C., Art. 1962. Rights may be assigned except wl1ere such assig1m�ent is for bidden by law or the contract, or is barred by the very natur e of the transaction, e.g., a contrac t invol ving the n1utual performance of personal ser vices. See the discussion of this point in Spencer v. Stanclard Cl1emicaJs & i\1eta ls Corp., infra, no te 12. See the discussion in Rae v. Cameron (Sup. Ct . Montana U.S. 1941), Pa cifi ;,, Re P_., 2ncl Series, vol. 114, p. 1060, in C. Brown, A. Vestal and M. Ladd, Cases arz d Jviaterza ls on Pleading a,zd Procedure (1953), p. 600. Ibid. Civ. c., Art. 1967(1). If tt1e debtor pays the assignor in good faith -�efore_ the assign ;11;;t e was brought to his knowledge , h e sl1a ll be released. It follo\vs t·h at II 11 e ts a�are O assignment, J1e is not jtistified in paying the _ass!gnor and wou ld have to obJect on the ground that the assignor is not the real party m mterest. . . tor being aware of the assign· 7(1) ' sinc T h1sI a so f o1 · 1 ows f rom c·IV. c ·, Art • 196 . e the deb :=>· e jud 0 · th red ffi e SU h ave . t no ld' _ou b s he h; fait d _ goo in r ment, will not have pai d the assig11o . . "'r th b l t ·tib is It on. 1 ec! obJ the g n �1 ra1 ut tl1o wi lum ment to be ent ered against tiv. �·, � r�s. ; 1:, s e e or. ign ass the such a case J1e could recover the amount pai d from 2165. . n (Ct. App., Ne\v York, U. S., 1924), NortJ1eastern Rep., Vol. 143, P· 651, in J · Cl1 adbotir and L. Levin, Cases on Civil Procedure (1961), P· 5 4 4. . . . . One of the reas?ns w�y , t he defend �t �:?; t:v: ��!:d tl�! ���e�1i�� ��gl�� �� t��! �: o , se to a wl 1, _Ka n a Qti. bad a counterc latm against . e a.i1otber riz tJ1o au lly era gen y ma n o s _ per a e c n 1 s , 1 1 so per necessary for Qu an Kai to app ear in 1e poin t is that Quan Kai l1ad to be the to sue in l1is nam.e. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5 7· T J named plaintiff.
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D
-e Q t1a n Kai ld receive nc ou Si w . ai n ua Q � _ to ds ee oc pr . Kai and to transtiljt 10 interest, an d suit w ou ld have to y rt pa al re e th as w lie it, the benefits of tile su be brougl1t in l1 is na·me. Tlle dissenting judges argt1ed tl1 at · tl1e i11stru1nent effectively assigned the claim to tlle plaintiff. Since t]1e plaintiff was autJ1ori�ed to a_ssig� the cl� im, 11e could assig11 it to himself, and tl1e terms. of the instrument . 1mpl1ed aJ? � ss1gn ment to tl1e plaintiff. They pointed 011t tl1at 1� tl1e defendant paid the pla1nt1ff, he wotild be satisying J1is obligation to_ Qua11 �a1, and tl1e purpose of tl1e real part7 j 11 interest requirement wot1ld be satisfied. Tl11s was a close case. Howey e�, the posi tion of tl1 e dissenting jt1dges seems preferable. It ,�as . clear tl1at the pla.1ntiff control led the right to require perfor1nance of tl1 e obl1gat1on. !he cotl!"t could have re q11ired hirn to execute a tecl111ical ass��1J1e11t of tl1e cl,1im to b11nself. T�ere_ was 110 dai1ger of a second st1it by Qt1an l\..aI.. TI!e JJurpose of the real party 1 0 inter est reqt1ire111 ent was satisfied, and the pla1nt1ff sl1 ot1ld have been deemed to be the real party in i11terest.
tI1e
tl1e qt1estion of wl10 l1as tl1e right to require performance of the llo\vever, obligatio11 is tl1e crt1cial 011e. Tl1ere 111 ay be different legal entities involved, and tl1e one that , as a11 entity, l1as tl1e rigl1t to reql1ire JJerfor111a11ce of the obli gation is the real party i11 i11 terest. 111 one case 14 tl1e plai11tiff assig11 ed the contract to a JJrivate Ii111ited co1111Ja1i:y tl1at \Vas forn1ed by l1im. TI1e defenda11t continued to deal witl1 tl1 e plai11tiff as a11 i11dividual, altl1ot1gh l1e was aware of the assignment. It \Vtls l1elcl tl1at si11ce tl1 e co11 tract l1ad been assigned to the private limited co1u pa11y, it alone l1ad tl1 e rigl1t to req11ire perforn1a11ce of tl1e obligation, and it rather than tl1e plaintiff \Vas tl1e real party in i11terest. 111 assign11 1ent cases tl1e11, the real party in interest is tl1e person wl10 I1as the rigl1 t to require perfor111a11ce of tl1 e obligation fro111 tl1 e defendant. It does not 111 atter tl1at l1e 111 ay l1ave to tL1r11 over s0111 e or even all of tl1e proceeds to the assignor or 1Jerso11 who tra11 sferred the claim to l1i1u. Since l1e alone l1as the rigl1t to reqt1ire perforn1a11ce of tl1e obligatio11, he is tl1e one who111 tl1e defe 1 1dant 111ust satisfy, and 011ly l1e ca11 bring st1it against tl1e defe11dant. l n cases that do not involve a for1nal transfer or assign11 1e11t of the claim, tl1e real party i11 interest is tl1e one wl10 will directly receive tl1e benefits or proceeds of tl1e litigation. SUJ)pose that tl1e s11arel1olders of a private Iinuted co1n1Jany sued to cancel a contract tl1at tl1 e company made witl1 a11otl1 er party a11d to recover 1 �1one)1 tl1at w�ts due to tl1 e con1 1)any. The plaintiffs, being shareholders, \Vould ul t1n1ately benefit by the s11ccess of tl1e con1pany. I-Io,:vever, tl1e coinpan)' \Vot1ld receive tl1 e proceeds of tl1e litigation, and, tl1 erefore, it wot1ld be tl1 e real party it1 interest. 15 1 e ql1estion of real p,:1rty in interest freqt1e11 tly arises in i i 1sur,:1nce cases, wl1 ere Tl _ tl1� insurer I1 as been co111 1)elled to pay tl1 e i11 st1red and seeks to reco,,er the ai11ot1nt pa1 ? fro111 tl1e person wl10 cat1sed tl1e i11jt1ry. Or it may be tL1at tl,e victin1 , wl10 ts 111sttred and wl1 0 l1 as bee11 paid, seeks to recover the sa111e an1ot1nt fro111 tl1e wrongdoer. Tl1e q11estion of \vl10 ca11 st1e i11 such a case has freq11ently bee11 liti-
14·
D.L. Stern Agency v. Mutual Benefit l�[ealth & Accident Associatio11 (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. : Ne,v York, 1 �41), Federal Supp len1e11t Rep., vol. 43, p. J 67, j 11 C. Bro,vn, A. Vestal and _ M. Ladd, Cases and Materials on Pleacling ancl Proceclure (I 953), p. 599. 15 · �ee D�icket t v. ��ver (Cl1an�ery, Eng., 1877), L.J., vol. 46, p. 407. Note that in Ethiopia, ,ere_ 13 110 JJroviston by ,vh1cl1 a shareholder as suc party thir d a l1 aga brin can inst suit g " 1or the be11efit of the conlpany. Wt1 ere he has n be i.IJjur e d personally due to the fault or _ . � . . fraud· 0f tIle d'trectors, he can bring an action also See aga ms t . . 7 the . m Co . n1m ., C Art . 36 C011101. C., Art. 365.
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ii.
16 ere ia, howe· ver, tl1e qt1estion of wllether . In Ethiop gated els· ewh · . .1rer or the th e 1n st · · insured IS !he . re� I part y 10 . I?terest IS governe� by tl1e provisions of the st1bstantive law, and 1t 1s hose P:ov1s_1o�s that deternune wl1o I1as a vested interest in the subject 1natter of th e_ suit w1t�1n tl1e meaning of Art. 33(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.. Tl1e proble1n 1s co1npl1c�ted by the fact tl1at tl1 e rigl1ts of th e insttrer and are dealt with 10 bo th tl1 e Civil Code and the Co..mm insured to . sue er · c1a . I . c . . o e, d o .ti1e C1vz·t C�cl, e ancl t�1e . Co1111ne!·cial Code on tlzis poi, �nd t.h e p1 ovLszorzs if . 1t c,re 1nco11s1st�11t. U11der �rt. 209_3, .Civil Code, 1t 1s J)rov1ded tl1at tl1e inst1red victin1 01a_y claim con1p_ensat1on as if l1e l1ad 11ot been insured. Tl1 e insw·er inay 11 0t clai� con1pensat1on fro m tl1e person wl1.o has br?t1gl1t abot1t the injtiry covered by tl1e �nst1rance contract t1nless_ the co�tr�ct J)rov1des for subrogation. In tI1at case the 1�surer rather tl1an tl1.e 1nst1recl . v1ct1m 1nay st1e. The crt1cial point tl1en is stlb rogat1011. In the a?se11ce of st1bro�at1on, tl1 e victii11 is to sue (and hence he would be tl1e party l1av1ng the vestecl 111terest in tl1e st1bject matter of the st1it witl1in tl1e n1eaning of Art. 33(2) of the Civil Proced11re Code), eve11 thot1ol1 be was ins11red agai11st the inj11ry arid. l1as been paid. Tl1e insL1rer may not st1e tbe wroncroer. w-h�re tJ1e. co�tract pro,,id�s for_ s11brogation, how�ver, tl1e i11surer is st1brogated to tl1e 1nst1red- s rights as provided 111 tl1e contract, wlucl1 n1 eans that as to tl1e a1no1111t paid, tl1e inst1rer can s11e (\vbich makes hin1 tl1 e party having tl1e vested interest in tl1e subject 1natter of tl1e suit and deprives tl1e ins11red of such interest). r-To distinc tion is made as to tl1e ki11d of injtrry against which the victim was insL1red. 0
An entirely differe11t approach is taken tinder tl1e Commercial Code. Tl1e cr11ci al point is not st1brogation, bt1t tl1e kind of injt1ry against which the victi1n \Vas i11su.red. Art. 683(1) provides tl1at in tl1e case of insurance against iojt1ry to objects, the insurer who has paid the agreed compensation shall substit11te himself to the extent of the a1nount paid by l1in1 to tl1 e beneficiary for tl1e pt1rpose of clainli11g against third parties wl10 cat1sed tl1e dan1age. It does not n1atter \v.hetl1e r tl1e co11tract provides for subrogation or not. Tl1us, where compensation has been paid, tl1e insurer a11d not the insured is tl1e real party in interest witl1io the n1 e,1ning of Art. 33(2) of tl1e Civil Procedtire Code. On tl1 e other ha11d, Art. 690, deali11g with i11st1rance agai11st inj t1ry to p erso11s, provides tl1at notwithstandi11g any provision to the contrary, the inst1rer wl1 0 11as paid the agreed a11101111t may 11ot st1bstit11te l1in1self for the subscriber or beneficiary for tl1e purpose of clai111ing against tl1ird part ies wl10 caused the dan1age. It wot1ld not 111atte r tl1at tl1e co11tract provided for subrogation. As long as it involves insurance of persons, the inst1rer cannot maintain an action against the wro11gdoer, and in s11cl1 a case tl1e inst1red and no� tl1� i? surer is the party l1aving a vested interest in the st1bject matter of tl1e sL11t w1th111 the meaning of Art. 33(2) of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code.
In other words, to determine whether tl1e inst1rer or the inst1red has the vested interest in tl1e st1bject matter of tl1e st1it witl1in the n1eaning of Art. 33(2), we mtrst cons11lt the provjsions of the st1bstantive law dealing witl1 _tl1e 1J1_ a tter, and when we constilt sucl1 provisions, we find that they are completelj' 1ncons1stent. Tl1e Civil Code answers tl1e question witl1 reference to whetl1er or ·no_t tl1e . contract provides for subrogation, and the Co011 11 ercial Code. answers tl1e qt1est1on with refer ence to whetl1er tl1e inst1rance is against damage to obJects or to p ers?� 5- TJ1 e Co1111ner �ial Code specifically regtllates all contrac_ts of inst1rance whereas t�1e C1v1l _Code refers to . 1 to tl e e ffect of 111st1ra?�e on a 1nst1rance in a single article and onJy wit11 refere11ce claim for damages. Since tllis is so, it is ��under to l1o�d. that the pr�v1s1ons of the Commercial Code prevail over the prov1s1ons of tl1e C1v1] Code and that, tl1ere16.
For a thorotigh cliscussion of the problem see U1uted tates v. Aet11a Cast1alty & Surety � Co. (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1949), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep., (La\vyers ed.), vol. 94, p. 171.
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...
I
the real pa rty in interest within the is d t1re ins the or r ure ins fo e, . .wb ether the h s to be e Cod in erm det ure i ced ed Pro by l Civi t the e mera�t�g Of A t. 33(2) of de. al Co ci er n u n Co e th f o 0 69 d an 3 68 . prov1s 1ons of lrts . . . 1 ns u_ r er who ha s insured against dam e th of on uti tit s b su the s Art. 683 require 1 l� wa s damage� by Ato Y to the b 1no to au s X' o At at th e os pp Su age to an object. e ai a t nc ag ur ns 1ns of t mage to his rac d� nt co a s l1a X o At 0. 50 . h.$ Et of extent sur�nce Co., �nd er which the com In e E th tl1 1 w e) nc ra su in n io lis ol auton1obile (c e. The company has b�l mo o _ �is aut to age dam all for im 1 I e sat pen com pany is to 1 erefore, bri ng suit_ against At o Y !o rec�ver tl , ca� It . 500 .$ Eth 1 e tl X paid Ato es vid for ct atio pro tra rog con sub n. Since nce ura ins the not or er 1 etl wh 500 .$ the Eth s to be subs tituted for the_ insured as i it n, atio s 1pen con ed agre e 1 tl paid s a 1 J it . . provided in Art. 683 (1), and it is the pa�ty l1 av1ng the vested 1nteres� _1n the sub ject matter of tl1 e s1 1it witlun tl�e mea11 11 1g of Art. 33(�) of the C1v1l Procedure Code. Si11 ce Ato X }1 as been paid tl1e agreed con1pensat1on, he no longer has a vested i11teres t i 11 tl1 e recovery of tl1e Etl1 . $ 500 and cannot mai11tain a suit against Ato Y. If tl1 e ins 11rer had paid 01 1ly Etl1.$ 300, and tl1e dama.ge was Etl1.$ 500, tl1 en botl1 t11 e ins11rer and tl1e ins1ired wo11ld l1 ave a vested interest in the subject rnatter o f tl1e s1 1it, tl1 e ins urer to tl1 e exte11 t of Eth.$ 300 and tl1 e insured to the exten t of Eth.$ 2 00. Art. 683(1) provides that tl1e insL1rer shall st1bstitute himself to the exte11t of tl1e a1nou11t paid, a11d s ince it l1 as paid Etl1 .$ 300, it has a vested i11teres t i1 1 recovering tl1at a1not111 t. Tl1e ins 11.red bas a vested interes t in the Eth.$ 200, and botl1 ca 11 join i11 a single suit. 17 We will s11 bs eq11ently discuss tl1e prob lem tl1 at arises wl1 en on ly one s11es. Tl1 e point to note at prese nt is tl1 at in case of partial pa.y 1nent, tl1e insurer and the i ns 11red both have a vested interest in the s11bject 1i1 atter of tl1 e suit:, tl1 e insurer to tl1 e extent of tl1 e an1ou11t paid and the i11 sured to tlie extent of tl1e los s lie suffered that was not compens ated by insurance. Art. 683 (3) provides tl1 at tl1 e i11 s11rer 1nay not claim agains t tl1 e ascendants' descen dants, age n ts or employees of tl1 e ins1 1red JJers on nor against persons living witl1 him unless s11ch persons l1ave acted 1i1 alicio11sly. It does not 1natter v.1l1etl1 er the contract a11tl1 orizes l1in1 to clain1 ag,:1ir 1st st1cl1 persons. As to s11cl1 persons , only tl1e in sured l1 as a vested interest, a1 1d only h e can bri 11 g s uit. So, if tl1e in s ured's at1toniobile was da111aged by l1is son, the i 11s 11rer \Vho l1as paid tl1e clain1 cann ot bring sttit agains t tl1e son to recover that an1011nt_ 1s Ar�. 690 cov�rs insura11ce agains t injuries to tl1 e persor1 a 11 d flatly prol1ibits any suit by tl1e 1ns 11rer_ agai1ist tl1e pers on wl10 ca 11s ed tl1 e injl1ry. S11ppose that Ato X has _a contract w1_tl1 tl1e E Ins urance Co., wl1icl1 provides tl1at tl1e co111pa�y sl1all pay I11 m co�11pe11 sat1on for any accident l1 e suffers "'l1 ile usi11 g l1 is automobile a n d_ furtl1er provides tl1 at tl1 e co111pany shall be s t1brogated to any claim he l1as aga� 11 s_ t the_ person \Vho ca11sed tl1e injtiry. Ato Y's a11ton1ol1ile is involved in a � o_Ilis_ion witl1 Ato X's a1 1to1n obile, as a res ult of wl1 icl1 Ato X s11 fters personal . •nJuri�s ._ �lie ins�rance co n1 1Ja11 y pays Ato X Eth.$ 100 to co111per1 sate hi111 �or 0 th?se 1 nJt1r1��- I n ligl�t of tl1e express JJrol1ibitio11 of Art. 690, tl1e co111 1)any cannot ma�11ta� n an ac�ion against Ato Y. As to pers o11 al i 11j uries only tl1 e victi1n · can n1a1n· · ta1n tl1e suit and tl1us , O111 tl1e v1c ' er tt ma s11bJect 1 t· l · 111 e 1as Y 1 tl vestecl a 1 1 1 interest . . ' . . t W1tl11n . 0f tile Slu tl1 e 1neani 11 g of Art. 33(2) of tl1e Civil Proce dure Code. 19 SeeCiv.Pro· c·, Art· 35 an d th . . e d1 scuss1on, infra. 18 · Under the .insurance contra · SU n1s t y n a. J c le for l · mt t it be_ insurer required to rein1burse he ? J1e received from su I1 sd u sons e th_ s e q 1th ct e aff ass1g i not and i1or does nee, s th assig 'Y .- � tion of who is thee Pfr p rti e insur 111 the st, e 1�te1: 011ly since, 683(3), in Iigl1t of A.rt. may require perform:::e O ; t le obligation from sucl1 persons. 19. Agai · n � tm · der t1l·ie cont·ract h t . . . � y mou n e a inigllt · e an b reqwre ,or d to msurer reimburse the l1e has recovere d rronl ti'1e wrongdoer.
17.
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b. Substitution of parties
In_ c �nnection with the req11:i :ement that the suit be prosec11ted by the real part � 1n 1nteres�, ":e should �ons1der the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to subst1tut1on . of . parties. If the case has been institt1ted by a plaintiff who js not the re �l party 1n interest, tl1e court i s not to dismiss the case, but should add o : subst1t1;1te _ the }?arty wl10 has tl1e vested interest in the subject 111atter of saves the suit . as pla1n_t1ff. This p�ocedure per as time, the not is it for necessary _ son hav1n� _tl1e 1nt�re�t 10 1nst1tute a ne, � s11it; he is merely added or substituted for the or1g1nal plaintiff. 2 Art. 40(1) provides tl1at ''where a s11it has been institut ed in the 11ame of a wrong perso11 a.s plaintiff or wl1ere it is doubtf11l whetl1er it has been i �stitt1ted i11 t �1e �1an1e of tl1e rigl1t plai11tiff, tl1e co11rt, on being satisfied that the s111t l1as bee11 1nst1tutecl tl1ro11gl1 a [Jona ficle n1istake and that it is neces sary for tl1e detern1ination of tl1e real 111atter in disptrte so to do, may at any tin1e order tl1at any other person. be s11bstituted or added as plai11tiff on such ter1ns as it shall fix." So, where tl1e Party wJ10 s11ed as pla111tiff had made a valid as . signment of his clain1, the assignee sl1011ld be substit11ted as plaintiff and the suit ,vill continue. 21 Substitution may also be ordered wl1ere it is do11btf11l if the case 11,\s been instituted in the name of tl1e rigl1t plaintiff. In such a sit11atio11 the named plain tiff n1ay be willing to withdraw, and it is not necessary for tl1e co11rt to rule on the question of \Vl1ether he has a vested i11terest in the s11bject 1natter of the suit so long as it is clear that the st1bstitt1ted plai11tiff l1as tl1at interest. In 011e case22 tl1e plaintiff had contracted with J Jroperty owners to kee1J their pave1nents in repais. Tl1e defendant b11ilt a tramway whicJ1 causecl 11noecessary dan1age to the pavements. The contractor sued the defendant to recover dan1ages for the inj11ry to tl1e pave person ments. The q11estion was raised as to \Vl1etl1er the co11tractor was the proper . to bring the action. The contractor volunta.rily witl1drew, and the pro1Jerty owners were substituted as plaintiffs. In order for substit11tion to be made 11nder Art. 40(1), it is necessary tl1at the in.stit11tion of the suit in the name of tl1e wrong :plaintiff was d11e to a bor1a ficle mistake as to wl10 l1ad tl1e vested i11terest in tl1e subject 111atter of tl1e s1tit. If the purpose of bringing tl1e suit in tl1e na111e of tl1e original pla111tiff ,vas to obtain some advantage from the defendant, tl1ere has not been a bona ficle nustake, and s11bstitution will not be per1nitted. Tl1e original su.it will be dismissed, and tl1e pro per plaintiff will l1ave to file a new suit. S11ppose that A has a co11tract11al claim against B, which l1e assigns to C. B l1as an outstanding claim against C, on which he bas not filed s11it, a11d A and C believe tl1at if C files s11it, B will raise tl1e counterclain1. 23 To avoid tl1is, A files suit. When B, who is aware of the assignmet1t, A question would arise as to 1,vhetl1er such party could . be substituted afte� tl1e period of liinitation Jiacl nin. It wot1ld seem not, since at that time l1e l1ad no right to recover against the defendant. Just as tl1e plaintiff cannot � end � is plea� fing to � dd a 11ew party defencfant after tile period of limitation has run, wl11ch 1,v1ll be d1sct1ssed 10 Chapter VI, a pla.intiff whose right to sue is barred by limitati�n should � ot b� able to become a party by virtue of tJ1e fact that anotl1er party had inst1tt1ted a stut against the defe11dant. See Hughes v. Pump House l-Jotel C?· (Ct. App., . E? g., _19�2), 1902 King's Bench Rep ' 21 _ '. vol. 2, p. 485. In tbe case of sub�t1tut1on of. �la111tiffs, 1t 1s not n�cessa! y for tbe ne\v plaintiff to file a new statement of claim. Tl1e original statement of claim will be an1ended, and he will be substituted as plaintiff. 22. Val de Travers Asphalte Co. v. London Tramways Co., Ltd. (Qt1een's Bench, Eng., 1879), L.J., vol. 48, p. 312. 23. As we 1.vill see in Chapter VI, it is possible for tl1e defendant to file a counterclaim un related to the plaintiff's suit. 20.
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objects that A is not tlie real pa rty in interest, A seeks !� sttbstitute C as plain tiff. If the cotirt is convinced tl1at tl1e r� a so11 A_ _:fil�d suit wa s _to pre�ent_ B f�om a sserting a counterclaim tI1a t l ie l1,1d aga1n�t �' 1t will not pern1tt st1bst1tution, since tl1ere wa s no n1istake as to tl1e proper pla 1o ttff at all. Rel ated to tl1e proble1n of st1bstit1 1 tion is t�e prob�en1 of addit ion o� pla .intiffs. A good exa1111JJ e is tlie case of inst1rance ag�1nst obJects, where th� insurer has onl y paid part of tl1e loss. Where A's automobtl� was da maged by B 10 the. amount of EtI1. $ 500 a nd the insurance comp a ny paid A Etl1. $ 300, as we said, both J.'\. a11d tl1 e c�1 11J)any l1ave a vested interest in a s11it aga inst B, A t o the extent of Etb.$ 200 and the ins11ra nce co111p a ny to the extent o. f Etl1.$ 300. Another exam ple wot1l d be the case of a pa rtial a ssign1ne11t. A l: a s a cla im a.gainst B for the Etl1.$ 5000, and J1 as a ssigned Etl 1.$ 4000 of tl1 e cla1111 to C. Both ha ve a vested i11terest i11 tl1e subject 111atter of the diSJJt1t e, A to tl1e extent of Eth.$ 1000 and C to tl1 e exte11 t of Etl1.$ 4000. Assu 11 1ing tha t tl1 e i11s11rer and the insured or tl1e assigner and assignee join tl1eir clai111s i11 a si11gle st1it, a s tl1ey 1na y do 24 there is no problem. The issue will be Utigated on tl1e 111erits, ,1nd eitl1 er both plaintiffs will prevail or neither \Vil!. There is 110 danger of tl1e defendant's being s1 1bjected to a seco11d suit on tl1e san1 e clai 111. Su1Jpose, 110,vever, tl1at 011ly 01 1e p arty s11es: the insurer sues wjtb011t the ii1sured, or tl1e i11 sured st1es witl1011t tl1e ins1 1rer; the part ial assignor sues witl1011t tl1e assignee, or tl1 e a ssig 11ee s1 1es witl 1out tl 1e assignor. Each party h as hjs o,v11 clain1 against tl1e defe11da 11t, a11d as to that clai111, he J1as a vested interest. I-Io,ve\'er, if tl1e defendant can11ot br.i11g i 11 t he other party and force l1im to litigate l1 i111 cl ai111 , tl1e defe11da 11t 111a y be subject to t\.vo suits on what is really one c] ain1. If tl1e party l1olding tl1e origi11 al cla i. 1n, tl1at is, t l1e ins11red or t he assignor, sues, the decisio11 ir1 tl1at suit on t he q11estio11 of lia bilit y ,vo1 1ld. bi11d the insurer or assignee, since tl 1e i11surer wot1ld be clain1 i11 g tl1ro11 gl 1 the ins11 red and the assignee ,vould be clai1ning thro11gl 1 the a ssigi1or.25 Still, tl1e defendant co1 1ld be sued a g. ain, and ,,,011l d l1 ave to assert tl1e clefence to a void Ii,1bility. And, wl1ere tl1e s11.it was bro11gl1t by. tl1e ir?surer or the assig11ee, tl1e defence of res judicata would probably 11 ot be availa ble 1n the second suit.26 It is clear tl1 at tl1e defendant who is sued in s11 cl1 a ca se needs a device by w�icl1 the otl1er pla intiff can be forced t o beco111e ,t party or forego l1is right to br1ng . a seco11d su_it. A J)arty sho11ld not be subject to t wo s11its on what is esse11 tially one cl a1111. Tl1e fact tl1at two J)eople l1 ave an interest i 11 t hat clai1n is 11ot due t o a ny a ct on tl?e _pa rt of tl1 e defe11dant. Art . 40(1) provides tl1a t a per son ca n be aclded a s plaintiff. TJ 1ere is cl question a s t o vvl1etl 1er tl1e addition of a .party "'110 l1as a cla in� �gainst tl1e. defe11cla nt t 1a l t is really a JJa rt of the s a�e _ claiin tl�a t tl1e 1 1a 1n � pla1nt 1ff ha s a gainst I1i 111 wo1 1 1d come tinder Art . 40(2), wl11cb cleals w 1tl1 tl1e adcl1�t_ 1on of a perso11 ''wl10 otiglit to 11a ve been joined as JJlaintiff ?r l1ose. ��esence 1s nec�ssary for tl 1e determinatio11 of all tl1 e q11estio11s invoI,,ed � 111 tl1e s111t. Tl1at s11b-a rt1cl.e sa ys that 110 0 11e c a n be added \1/itho11 t lus consent , an� � !� ere is a question to be disc11ssed subseq{1e 11tly,.. as to whether a n absent ? _ int ff ca i 1 _ be brouglit into the s11 1_ t over l1is objection. 1-Iowever, it is not neces��: t y O consider Art . 40(2) l1ere. We may solve the J)ro ble111 by a11 analogous a p24. S�e Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35 and th e discus sion, infra. 25. C iv. Pro . C., Art. ?(l) _provides that p ersons clain1ing under parties to a former suit are . d b oun bY the dec1s1011 tn that suit. 26. lt1 . tb e second suit, tl1e insured or or er insu as r sig no r w ou ld the through claiming b not e assignee, so the defence of res J·udi'cata would not be availa ble u11der Art. 5(1).
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. plication of the prov isions of Art. 216. Tl1 at article prov ides that ,, ver y tiit sha11 . clai t/1e of m who le which the plaintiff is entitled to 01 �e WI t� r include the s1)ect acti on, and of t l 1at a plaintiff who omits to Slle : to the cause i re pect O� a y claim shall not afterwa r ds s11e with respect to tlie por t.ton bis of n ortio ? � so on1 1 t P · · ted.". The :purpose of _t h1s ruI � 1s to protect the defendant from being Sllbject to rotilt1ple suit� o� a single cla1 n1 . In , otl1er wo r�s, . a _plaintiff may not ''split his cause of action. If, . for example, A s automobile 1 s involved in a collision wit1 1 B's, as a result of �bicl1 1:,- strffers pers?nal i11jt1ries and daiuage to llis atltomobile, be has b11t one clam1 against B - a cla11n for damages rest1lting from tl1e collision. H·e cann?t sue B to recov er damages fo r tl1e injt1ry to tl1e autoniobile and later 'file a su1! !o recove r da111ages fo r tl1 e J)ersonal injttries. Tl1 is is precisely what Art. 216 prohibits. By_ the sa111e token, wl1e r e A suffers clan1 ages to l1 is al1ton1obile in the amount of . Eth.$ 500, Eth.$ 300 of wl1 �cl� is paid by the ins11re r , tl1ere is sti]l only one clrum. There has been but 011e InJtlry to the at1ton1 obile. J11st as A cannot sue frrst to r ecov er Et.11. $ 300 a11d later to recover Etl1. $ 200, tl1 e inst1rer wl1 0 has paid tl1 e Eth.$ 300 sl1ot1ld not be able to bring a s11it for tl1e Etl1 .$ 300 wl1 ile A would s11bseq11ently bring another s11it to recov er the Etl1.. $ 200. There is b11t 011 e cause of action, wl1icl1 , in ligl1 t of the p11 r pose bel1i11d Art. 216, cannot be split, Tl1t1s, where tl1ere l 1 as been a partial assign1nent, it l1as been held that i11 a suit by tl1e assignee only, tl1e assignor 111t1st be joi11 ed at the insistence of the defe11dant.27 \Vl1eneve r two o r 111 ore parties l1 ave :portions of tl1 e same clai1n joinder sl1ould be required. Art. 40(1) should be read togetl1er \Vitl1 Art. 216., a11d tl1e court sl1ot1ld iss11e an order requiri 11 g that tl1e other party be added linder Art. 40(1) or be fo r eve r p r ecluded from bringing suit on that clai1n. Art. 216 f11rnishes the jt1stificatio11 for sucl1 an orde r. 28 c. The interest of the defendant
Just as no person may be a plaintiff liniess l1e l1as a v ested interest in tl1e st1bject matter of tl1 e s11it, no pe rson n1 ay be a defendant t1nless the plaintiff alleges some claim against hiin.29 Tl1 e J)t1rpose of civ il litigation is to provide relief for a wrong that one person l1as s11ffered at tl1 e l1 ands of a11otl1er. Wl1ere tl1e plaintiff does not seek sucl1 relief from tl1e defe11 dant, tl1 e r e is no reason to bri11g the case to court. Cou r ts do not exist to give abstract opinions, b11t only to give relief to an injured plaintiff. As Art. 224 sa.ys, ''The statement of clai1u sl1all st,tte specially the relief which tl1e plaintiff clai 1ns. '' Wl1e re the plaintiff does not seek some kind of relief against tl1e defendant, l1e is 11ot alleging any claim against h.i 11 1 and cannot make him a defendant in a Sllit. Fo r exa1n1)le, A and B enter i11to a co11 t ract by which A is to deliver goods to B for the price of Etl1 .$ 1 per kilogra1n. A does not perfo r m, clai111 ing tl1at tl1 ere is not a ,,aJid cont ract. At tl1e time _performa11ce was due, the price of tl1e goods had fallen, a11 d they could be obtained on the open ma r ket for the price of Etl1. $ 0. 75 per kilogram. Tl1e b reach of tl1e contract, if tl1e re was one, was adva11tageous to B, and he has suffered no da111 age thereby. l �eries, vol. 1�1, 2nc ., Rep ! /era Fee 2), 194 ., Cir 211d ., U.S p., Ap . rtz (Ct itz wa Sch v. 1-Iorow Pleacbng on ,als ter lvfa and ses Ca , dd La M. a11d l sta Ve A. , w11 p. 506, discussed ill c. Bro ancl Proceclure (1953), iJP. 608-609. ., . . . . . s Juris 28. A problem would arise wJ1ere tl1e other cla_1ma1;1t wo11Jd _not be subJect to the co111 tsha be ll l1e r, pea ap t no es J1e do 1f t tl1a 1ng ect d1r er ord diction. TJ1e court could issue an '. tl1e defe11dant r pe a . t 11o es do �e if us, TL1 . � pia � hio Et in im , barrecl from litigating tf1e cla co11rt a of 1on 1ct 1Sd Jtir the to ct bJe su s wa lie 1f ly 011 would be subject to a second stdt elsewhere . 29. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 33(3).
27.
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e t s th ur nt co wa he to rule 00 d an , ct ra nt co a s wa e er tli · at i l t' ts s · · • . . Ho\.vever, B 1 ·nsi· H · t_ · . a. no e ki IS n1 ng a1;1y claim A. t ns ai ag it su e tl1 111 ta 1 1 ai 1 n ot nn ca e th is qtiestion. H 1s t 1d ch no a1 ea br ed king any eg see all e th by s los 0 1 1 red ffe sti · lie e nc · 81 · aga1· nst A, · .by ta k'1ng up · . ' t1r t s e co e h t tim to decide ed rv se be d ul wo ty ili tit No A. _ tl1er e was, B suffered relief fron1 1f no en ev ce harm sin re, ]1e ct ra nt co a s wa ere tli whether due to A's non-performance. TI1 e relief sougl1 t t1sually \Vill be in the form of darnages, i.e., the plaintiff seeks an order reqt1iring the clefendant to pay a st�m of 1uoney . to co�pensate him for tile J1arm 11 e suffered. 30 Or l1e 111ay seek wl1at 1 s called specific rel1ef, an order reqt1irino that tl1e defendant do or refrain fro111 an act. Finally, tl1 e plaintiff may seelc de�laratory relief, or as it is called, a declarat<?ry jL1dg1nent.31 But, he may 011ly seelc st1cl1 relief 1v/1ere it 1vill be of be11efit to l1i111. A party may not seek a decla.ration of rights in tl1e abstract. 111 our previot1s exa111 ple, · tl1e co11tract, if any, was at an e11d, so tl1ere wot1ld be no reaso11 for tl1 e cot1rt to decide any questions i11volving tl1at co11tract. BL1t Sllppose tl1at tl1e contract was a continL1ing one under wl1 icl1 tl1e defendant \vas to deliver goocls 011 Marcl1 1 and again on September 1. 011 Ma.rcl1 1 the market price of tl1 e goods was less tl1 an the contract price, so tl1e JJ!ai11tiff suffered 1 10 loss due to tl1 e alleged breacl1. However, on September 1, tl1e 1narlcet price cot1ld be l1igl1 er, and the J Jlai11tiff l1as an i11terest in determining ,.vhetl1er there is a ,,a}id co11tract. If l1e obtai11s a declaration to this effect, the defendant n1 ay perfor111, a11d tl1e pl�tintiff \Vill 11ot st1ffer loss i1 1 the ft1ture. He tl1e11 is 111al<i1 1g a clai1n for relief against tl1e defe11 dant-he wants a declaration that the defenda11t is Jegally bot111d to JJerfor111 in tl1e ft1tt1re. Even thot1gl1 l1e is not seel<i11g da1nages or specific relief, l1 e ,,,ill be be1 1efited by a declaration to tl1e eflect tl1at the defencla11t is bot1nd to perfor111 - he is not seeking a decision on an abstract qL1estion. Tl1erefore, ]1 e is n1alci11 g a claim, a.nd tl1 e suit for declaratory relief ca11 be 111aintai11ed. 2.
Representative Suits
� represe11tative suit is one in wl1icl1 tl1e JJerson named as plaintiff or defend ant 1s re �resent�11g tl1e i11terest of a11 otl1er. The Code provides for two kinds of representative st11ts. In one tl1e representative is acti1 1g solely for anotl1 er person; in tl1e otl1er, l1e is acti11g for l1i1 11self as well. Art. 34 cleals witl1 the for111er situation, ,vhere st1it is brot1gl1 t by or against tl1 e representative of a natt1ral or legal person. Art. 38 deals witl1 ,vl1at is called a class action, wl1ereby a n1ember of a class is tl1e 11an1 ed party, represer1ting tl1e otl1er 111en1bers of the class. I11 sl1ch a case l1e is pro�ecting l ?is own interest as ,veil as tl1 e i11terests of tl1ose wl1om l1e represents. We \VIII consider the t\vo lcinds of reJJresentative Sltits separately, first co11sidering tlie case wl1 ere tl1e na1ued party is solely represe11ting the i r1 terest of a11other. a. Suits by legal representatives 32 . A person tinder disability mc1y st1e or be stied tl1 rot1gh his legal representative JO· l n cert� in c ases . dan1 ages may be awarded, ev en thougl1 the pl aintiff bas not suffered a_ny �c�non11c _ lo�s. 1-Je h a s , no_nethel ess , been inju red, and the ID allow s da1nages for the law Jury to his interest. See C1v. C., Arts. 2105-2115. 31 · The power of tl1e Ethiopi an cou rts to is sue d ecl ar atory judgn1e nts was recognized i11 the c ase �f Ato MengiSlou Alo1nau v. Giorclano Con , 21o 4 Art . C cett i 96 e • v i11·'i· C not a ., e • • · ' '.I' ' autb or1zes tl1e awarct·� n� 0f _ 11om·.1na! dan1 ages 1 h "'."�t ole!Y s ough � t h�r r e the b been actio n J1as a vi e\v to ard _est _ abl1sh1ng th at a right of tb JJ t J la1ntif e f ringed or tbat a f 1 ab1h y 1 as inf be n 7 e h as been nc rred b� tl_1� de fe ndant. l-Io\vev r, sbment IJ � est ab ff e tl?e tl1e 11 l fit inti by n e 1 u b e h t s � of h.is right r �he liability of the defenda.n t. Tl11 arti r ued to ant.hocons s l1oul t d b cle e not s rize an ac fion i. or a11 abst ract decl ar ation of rigl1ts. . 32. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 34(1). ,
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di sa bi lity is defined as one who is not capable un un de r on pe rs A der the 1aw. 33 · res Its fro m th · · . e age or menta1 cond1t1on of persons or fro u Incapacity m . cri ininal 4 be ha en pa ve sse tl1a d ag ai nst t�1e�. � P�rsons under th e age of eig t sent�nces llte en 5 . 3 as pe ar rso e ab ns le, who are Jud1c1ally 1nterd1cted. J6 Judicial interdict are i ncap ion 7 3 ins pe an an rso e n or an infirm person who l1as been assimilated to results when 38 ha s be en de pe rso n cla red n inca1)able by the court.39 A question arises an insa. e . _ as to wl1ether �n insane. or i nfirm. person �l?o l1as not been j11dicially interdicted is capable of being a party to a suit. Tl1e C1v1l Code dra\vs a distinction betwee11 pers?ns. whose insanity or. in:fir !11ity is_ not�riou � and �l1ose whose insanity or in firmity 1s not. Where t�e 1nsan1ty or 1nfirn11ty 1s notor1011s, 40 the juridical acts o f sucl1 a pers?n may b � 1;111p11gned,41 b11t where it is not, sucl1 acts ordinarily 1nay 42 Since tl1e Jt1r1d1cal acts be. of a notorio11sly insane or infirm person may not be in1 _pugned, i t follows that l1e lacks capacity to s11e or be sued, and he is to be considered a person under disability. I11 terdiction by law res11lts fro1n the passing of a criminal sentence; as a consequence of a crimi11al sentence, the law may withdra,v the adtninistration of property fro1n tl1e convicted person, and tl1e cases in \Vl1icl1 a perso11 is considered as interdicted by law are deter11 1ined by the penal law. 43 Tl1e i11terdiction lasts only as long as the perso11 is servi11g his sentence. 44 Whenever a party is incapable, s11it is to be brougl1t by or agai11st his legal repre sentati,1e, a11 d if tl1e incapable party is not so represented, tl1e proceedi11gs shall be stay ed 11ntil a legal representative is appoi11ted in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.45 Minors and judicially interdicted J)ersons are to be repr·ese11ted by tl1eir g·uardians. 46 There is a problem with respect to a notoriously i11sa11e or infirn1 person who l1as not been been placed 11nder interdiction, becat1se that JJerson will not b.ave a guardian. However, where tl1e co11rt is a,:vare that a party is noto riously insane or infirm, i t obviously ca11not pen11it liim to direct tl1e con ?uct _of the su.it. Under Art. 351 of tl1e Civil Code, the co11rt 1nay pronot111ce the 1nterd1c tion of an i11sane or infirn1 person wl1ere bjs interests so reqt1ire it, and sl1ot1ld 47 suit. the i11 him represent to ardian u g· a ng appointi of the for purpose do so Persons interdicted by law l1ave no gtiardian,48 and tl1e questio� i� how �l1ey shall be represented. Under Art. 62(1) of the Civil Proceclure Code, 1t 1s provided that 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42 · 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 33(1). Civ. C., Art. 193. Civ. C., Art. 198. Civ. C., Art. 358. For a defi11ition of an insane person see Civ. C., Art. 339. See Civ. C., Art. 340. Civ. C., Art. 351. . . l pita a hos f o e t ma n 1_ n is � � e p rso tl1e on, diti con l · nta me I1is of 1 Tl1is is · so ·where · , by rea · so1 tor1ous only so · or an 1nst1tt1t1on .f or insane persons or ,a nurs1.·0I:>° home T b e 1nsan1tY 1s no long as he remains an inmate. Civ. C., Art. 341. Civ. C., Art. 343. · time the at t tl1a ow sh can e 1 l if y onl s act s i _h_ of ent lm Tl1e 1nsane person ca.n obtain annu_ · defects. Civ. m fro e fre t sen con a e giv to ion dit con a ID t he performed tl1em he wa s no C., Art. 347. Civ. C., Art. 380. Civ. C., Art. 388. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 34(2). . . rs�ns)· pe ted <lic ter (m 8 35 t. Ar , C. v. Ci s); or in ) v. Ci C.' Art. 199(2 (m . n. c·1v. C ., rso pe ed 1ct · erd 1nt a11 r fo ian rd g ua . a t · oni app The court l1as the gener�l power t� esqu e th r ide ns co d an it su e tlJ · · iLl 11 111 ' 1 t en es pr Art. 359. It should appoint a guardian to re tion of a final appointment subsequently. Civ. C., Art. 382.
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n leave to appear may tai ob ot nn ca o wh d an . it su ' a to rty pa · a s 1 · 10 1 · erd'1cted by w r e n so ri a p . n 111t .rso e p a ce Sin ce. law pla I1is can in r pea . aJ) · to n so · er p y n a ze r1 o th 11 a de1e r.- nd a suit, he obv iously or . · e 11t ec os pr ot nn ca , . e i ·· , ts ac · , 1 not perforn1 JtlrI d 1·ca an agent. Th at agent would be 1nt JJ0 ap st n1u d an ear · app to . cannot be· given leave (1) f t I1e c·1v1·1 procedure Code. o . rt 34 A of 1 g 1 1 n ea m e th itl his representative with ing ern ert nc s ol? co ca pr in s it s n mi ad _ ive � tat is en res 7 rep �� Art. 34 also atitliorizes . _ 50 here th e suit 1s bet� e�n W 1 111strator. m ad or or ut ec ex 9 e,4 u ste . _ tered by a tr , executor or admirus ee 1st e tr1 th , on er p d tlm a d an � d ste ere int ly ial _ ersoos benefic y to 1nake them parties sar ce� t n� no 1s 1t d an , ies iar fic ne be the t en res rep . irator sliall _ 1 ty. Th e represe11 tat1ve can cal ct1 pra of e on 1s le 1 r1 is 1 TJ s. t ec J dir so i rt cot unless t 1e ve t o1:1 ien be inc to ght 1ni it d _ make all an es, ari ici f � e ben tl1e of st ere int tl1e protect 1 1e 1 11ber tl1at sucl1 a suit 1s aut?or1zed only re1 to t tan por 111 i is It ies. t 1 par 1 1 e tI1 . of . v.;l1ere the case invol ves the property and a tl11rd party. It 1s 11ot applicable where tl1ere is a dis1J11te betwee11 tl1e be11 eficiaries of a tr11st or tl1 e heirs of the decedent 52 in w11icl1 case all tl1 e beneficiaries or l1eirs n1 ust be , ares 1 sl 1e ecti\ res1J eir 1 tl t as o J)arties. 53 Moreover, a representative suit wo11Id not be at 1 tl1orized where tl1e i11terest of tl1e reJJresentative is potentiall y adverse to tl1 at of tl1e beneficiaries. Suppose that a JJerson sties tl1 e trustee clai1ni11g tl1 at certain J)rOJ)erty, allegedly a part of the trust, belongs to I1in1. �fhe tr ustee conte11 ds tl1at he is to receive tl1e J)roperty as co1 n1Jensatio11. Since lie is clain1 ing against tl1e i11terest of the beneficiaries, lie obvi 54 parties. be m11st made 1eficiaries 1 be the d 11 ,1 terests, 1 i1 eir 1 tl 1t 1 represe ot 111 ousl y ca1 B ut wl1ere th.e disJJtt te is bet\.veen tl1e beneficiaries and a tl1ird party, a11d the re presentati\1e is tr)1ing to protect the i11 terests of tl1e beneficiaries, a re1Jrese11tative st1it is a11tl1 orized. Tl1 e ru l e is a1)plicable bo th to suits by tl1e representative as plaintiff and against hi11 1 as defe11dan t : t l1 e test is sin1 1Jly wl1 etl1er tl1 e st1it concer 1 1s tl1e property being ad 111i11istered by tl1 e re1)resen tative. So, in a suit to recover a debt due to the decec l e11 t, tl1e executor or ad1ninistra tor could s11e, and it \.Vo11ld not be necessary tl1at tl1 e l egatees or I1eirs join as pl aiI1tiffs. Tl1 e sa111 e would be tr11 e \.Vl1ere a creditor sues tl1e re1Jrese11 tative to recover a debt O\:Ved to l1 in1 by tl1e decedent.
b. Representative class suits. Art. 38 provides for a reJJresentative s11it i11 class actio11s. It defines a class actio� as 011e \vl1ere ''se\1eral perso11s l1a,,e tl1 e san1e i 11 terest i 11 a s1 1it," a11d sa.ys tl,at 1 � sticl1 a case, one or 111 ore re1)rese11 tatives of t l1 e class may st:ie or n1a.y be � utl1 ori zecl by tl1e_ co:1rt to defe11d 011 bel1 alf of tl1 e other persons l1 avir1g tl1e sa1ne interest, tipon sat1sfy111 g tl1e cotLrt tl1 at tl1 e otl1er perso11 s l1ave agreed to be so re . presented. Tw � poin ts sl1 ot1l d b� 11 oted. Tl1 ere is no reqL1iren1 ent tl1 at tl1 e class ?e large. The Indian Code, of C1. v1I Procedure, Order I., R11le 8, atithorizes st1cl1 suits wliere 11 i1111 erou s persons 11,1ve tl1 e sa111 e interest. Tl1e drafters of tl1 e Etl1 iopian Code _ careful !)' sti bstittit ecl several for n111nero11s, 111a](ing it clea.r tl1 at tl1e class does not 49.
50. 51.
52. 53. 54.
For a definition of � tr�ist�c. see Civ. C., Art . shall 516. Art tl . prov 526 1at the trustee ides represe11t the trllst 1n Jud1c1al l)roceedjngs. A n executor is the person cIes,gna . . He is · t· d e ,vill. to decedent's acln11n1ster tl 1 e estate in the . ret"'1;;rred . o ·as testamentary executor. Civ. C., Art. 948. � . The ad1111n1strator is tlie person I testamen t� : v 10 riqt1!d_ · no a tes is ere the succession wl1ere tl1 . ary executor. I-Ie 15 retierred to 1 1 1 the C1v 1l Code as the Hquidator. See Civ . C., Art. 9SO. . See the d'1scuss1on of th·is point · . . Procedt1re (4tl1 ed., 1963), 1 s s ·k 11 ar, · ar The La,v of c,,,,/ vol. 2, p. 627. As w e will see subsequently' th . ey are consi. dered .1nd1sp ensable pa . rties. s ee Beresford v. Ran1asubba (lligl1 Ct., M adras, 1890), Indian L. Rep., vol. 13, p. 19 7.
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Misnc
th ou gh i t would have to include nlore la . r ge , be to av e h 5� S th an · ' tw · o · pe rs on s ec on d · su ve it · se 1s nt au at t. h i or 1z ed re pr e on · ly where all the m·embers of the c1ass Iy' a l1 a ve re d e pr t ese . u n d n be er th to e · . In dian Code' tl1e pa' rty Or part·1es see ag ' ·reed · · k'1ng to as as t h s I k e c pe r11 th e 11s s1o nt n of th e court ' a1.1d tile other men1e·bers represe . o h f t e an ie nl d d b · fi no ay ti ec om e ar parties. But tl1ere is no requirement tl1 class e . at th ey re pr es en . te be If tl 1 to e court believes tl1at a representative suit ? . cons e� t is desir pe rm gr a1 1ss 1t 10 1;1 n1 ay fo r Sl1�l1 a st1it notwithstanding that some of able, 1t til e cla ma ss y th ob e Jec of t. Their remedy is to become parties. 56 n members I· Ethiop1a, . m em e e th b O s f tl_ 1e .c·1ass �11us t agree to be represented. Moreo l1owever, all � ve r, an _ y be wh ha ose lf a �u1 t 1s 111st1tt1ted or defe11ded on sticl1 a rep per� on on resentative basis may apply to tl1e cot11 t to be 111ade a J)arty. Tl1e conditions, tl1en, for mai11 tai11ing a reJ)rese11tative st1it under Art. 38 are (1 ) several perso11s 1nt1st l1ave tl1e san1e i11 terest in a st1it; (2) all per as follows: _ so_ns. so 111terested 1nt1st agree to be repr �sented ;__and (3) tl1e cot1rt intist give per nuss1011. We ma)' ass11me, 110\vever, tl1at if co11d1t1011s (I) and (2) are satisfied' the cot1rt would 01·dinarily grant per1nission. The djffic11lt qt1estio11 is wl1a.t constitutes ''t}1e same i11terest'' within the n1eaning of Art. 38(.l), and tl1ere has been a great deal of litigation on tl1is question 11nder sinular provisions else\vhere. As one co11rt J)11t it, ''For a representative s11it to lie, it n1t1st be sl1own tl1at all the n1embers of tl1e alleged class have a com111on inter est, that aJl ha\1e a co1nmon grievance and tl1at tl1e relief is in its 11at11re be11eficial to then1 all." 57 Same i11terest does not 1nea11 tl1at tl1e claims arise 0L1t of the same 58 As we \Vill see, parties may joi11 transaction. as plaintiffs where tl1eir claims arise · fron1 the same transaction and t11 ere i s likely to be a con1n1011 qt1estion of lavv or fact. But if the claims are separate in tl1e sense that eacl1 party seeks recovery for a separate wrong do11e to hi111, the parties do not 11ave tl1e sa1ne i11terest i.11 the s11it. Wl1ere a s11ip carryj11g tl1 e goods of a 11umber of persons was lost, a representative s11it could not be filed against the owner of tl1e sl1ip. 59 Each plain tiff sought recovery for tl1e loss of Jus goods, a11d his interest in tl1e sL1it - recovery for the loss he suffered - was differe11 t fro1n tl1e interests of tl1e otl1er plai11tiffs. So too, where different persons l1ad been defamed by a single publication, a representative suit would not be at1tl1orized, as a separate libel wo11ld have bee11 co1nn1itted against eacl1. 60 Or, wl1ere so1ne persons claimed as owners of the proper:ty an� otl1ers clai1ned as tenants, each had a dift�erent interest, and a representative suit. cot1ld not be brougbt.61 Anotl1er example wo11ld be wl1ere the defenda11t owed cl1fferent 55. See Suderl1aiya v. Ramdass (I-:Iigl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1956), 1957 A;ll-/1zclia Rep., P· 2�0. Al though the court was construing ''nt1n1erot1s'', the san:1e cons_ truct1on_ shot�d be �� -plte? to ''several." Where only two persons are involved, tl1ere 1s no mconven1ence ID re�u1.ring Lbeln to join. .However, as an lI1dia.n cot1rt . observed? "Nu1ne�ou� . does �ft me�n inownera �le: It means a group of perso11s 1nconven1e11t to 1mplead 1n�1v1?ually. Kalisl1 v. Gosv,r, �11 m an ch, r�a app nd ? sou a 1s 1s TI1 . 405 p. . Rep clia gh -/11 (l-Ji Ct Allahabad 1950) 1950 All venie1.1t Ethiopia, · the court ;J1 otild �011 sider wl1ether tl1e 'class is st1cl1 that it would be 111con for all the members to be parties. - 56. See Gejuralli v. Gol1idin (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1931), 1932 All-Jnclia Rep:, P· 65, an� the ol. l, 3), 195 r, tte Mi R. by ed. tl1 (12 e dur oce Pr il discussion in D. Mulla, T/1e Code of Civ p. 51o. so a l ee · S 373 1 I;; 2, . ,,ol f?,, Re cl 11 1gla -E1 57. Smith v. Cardiff (Ct. App., Eng., 1953), 1953 All P· 151· p., Re a 7cli l-J, 1ll 9 193 ), 39 19 s, dra Ma na Ma vedan v. Veerayao (fligh Ct., 58. See the discussion of tl1 is poi11t in I? · Mulla, supra, 11o�e 56, 05· 1 p., R rr' B s en ch K in e 0 1 g. ' 59 · See Markt & Co. v. Kt'light Stearnsl11p Co., (Ct. A1Jp., IJ , vol. 2, p. 1021. g's Bench in K 16 19 1 6) 19 ' og., E ., App 60, See Mercantile Marine Service Assoc. v. To1ns (Ct. Rep., vol. 2, p. 243. . 28 4 . p ., ep R lia nc -J ll A 9 93 l ) ' 6 l. See Kuppuswamy v. Con1mander (fJigl1 Ct., Madras, 1938 ' ·
;f
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1�t
.--------o uld be trying t o rec over the debt due to w each since o p s u l·o· Var s 62 The same principle _is st. ere int lic e app sam the 1 able ave J t �� ��� ffs inti pla t�� :!� endants w o uld b e asserting separate def tl1e ere Wh s. ant end def of on tati , Sen re rep to . 63 st. re te in e m sa e th defences, they do not have 11tati�e s11i t to be mai11 tained, _tl1e in re�e rep a for er ord in that 1 en tJ ee s We . . y s� 1 nt1ffs, tl�e mu be pla 1f seeking the l: 1t1ca ide1 be st 1 m11 s tie par 1e t of sts tere same relief against the defendant for tl1e same ,vrong c omm1�ted agains t . al� of them; if defendants, they must be asserting the same de_fenc� against the pla1nt1ff o_ n the .1ons where the same interest s an1 e trans action. We may 11 0w consider son1e s 1tuat was f0110d to exist a11d a representative suit ,vas per111 itted.
Q1 1e example would be a s t1it involving property that was being c ollectively exploited. Art. 1489 of tl1e Civil Code provides _tl1at land may b� o wned by an aoricultura1 co1n 111t111ity s 11cl1 as a ,,i]Iage or a tribe and be exploited co11ect1vely. 1i any suit i11volving sucl1 la11d a representative of tl1e village or tribe may sue or be stied on bel1alf of tl1 e otl1er 111 e111bers of tl1e village o r tl1e tribe. 64 All members J1ave tl1e san1e interest i11 the lat1d, a11d, tl1t1s, in tl1e s 11it. Or, wl1 ere a number of J)erso11s l1ave a rigl1t of wa)' over tl1e land of tl1e defe11dant, with wl1ich l1e is i11terferi11g, a reJ)resentative of tl1e I1 olders of tl1e servitt1de cot1ld s 11e to prevent such interl'crence. 65 All l1olders of tl1e servitude l1 ave tl1e san1 e interes t in tl1e s uit, tl1at tl1e defe11 da11t cease tl1e interfere11ce \.Vitl1 the co1 n 111on servitt1de. So too, where growers of fruit s and vegetables ]1ave bee11 give11 a statt1tory rigl1t to certain stalls i11 a 111arket, a represe11 tative of tl1e growers wl1 0 have been 11 sing the stalls may sue to enforce tl1 :=tt rigl1t. 66 All l 1 ave tl1 e s ame interes t in s eeing tl1 at the statutory rigl1 t was enforced. Finally, 'A'l1ere tl1 e exect1tor of a will reft1ses t o di sclose the will, 011e legatee or l1 eir ca11 sue 011 bel1 alf of tl1e otl1 er legatees or l1eirs t o compel th.e exect1tor to disclose tl1e \vill. 67 All l1ave tl1e sa111e i11 terest in tl1 e st1it, whicl1 i s to see that tl1e \Vil] is proved. An interesting ca se demonstrating tl1e distinction between san1e and separate i11 terest i s Jo11es v. Cory Bros. & Co., Ltc!.68 Tl1 e e1nployer allegedly had not taken _ recautio11s, as he wa.s required by la\v to do,69 a s a res11lt of wl1icl1 proper safety p a 1111n1ber of e11 1ployees stayed a\.vay fro111 worl<. The representative s t1it sot1gbt t\VO tl1ings, an order reqt1iri11 g tbe en1pl oyer to take the proper safety preca11tio11s and da111ages for tl1e \Vages Jost by tl1e i11di\1idt1al e111ployees whe11 tl1 ey \Vere t1nable to :"ork . It \Vas l1eld tl1 at a representative s t1it wa s l )rOJ)er for tl1e J)l1rpos e of requir� 1ng t�1e e1n1 )loyer to talce l?roper safety precat1tions, bt1t n.ot f or tl1 e pt1rpose of re ?over1ng . dao 1 �ges for tl1e t1 n1 e lost. A s to tl1e former, t11 e en1JJloyees l1 ad the same interest 1n s eeing tl1 at tl1 e e111ployer provide a s afe pl,1ce for tl1e111 to ,,,ork. B11t, as to damages for the ti_ n1 e lost, eacl1 en11 )loyee l1 ad a se_parate i 11 terest, tl1e recovery of dama?es f or the t11ne l1e lost frorn work. Tl1 erefore, the court per111itted a re presentative st1it on tl1e co11dition tl1at tl1e clain1 s for dan1 ages were -v,1itl1drawn. 62. 6 3·
See Rataaswami v. Arcot's Endow1nents (lfigh Ct., Madra s, 1938), 1938 All-lnclia Rep., p.755. See Loa . don Association v. Greenlands, Ltd.' (Jiouse of Lords' · Eng ., 1916) ' 1916 AP'P· Cases vol. 2, p. 16. 64· See Prob at v. Hari (High Ct., Calcutta, 1916), Calcutta Wee/cly Notes, vol. 24, p. 206. h 65 · i :�.,N�� ab� Saswal v. I<.rish11a Chandra Bera (1-Iigh Ct., Ca.lct1tta, 194-1), 1942 All-lnclia l. . 66 · Se c Bedford v. Ellis (I-louse of Lo rds, Eng., 1901), 19 01 App. Cases, vol. 1, p. 1. 67 · S e Geereeballa v. Cl1undum Kunt (High Ct. Calcutta� 1885), Indian L. Rep., vol. 11, p.2I3, � 68. ( t. App., Eng., 1921), L.J., vol. 56, p. 302. 69. Cornpare Civ. C., Art. 2548.
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· ft1r can nis a l1 sou cas nd es gui de for se tl1e interpretat1011 0f ,,sa.1ne interest'' Th e · . . · the meamng of Art. 3 8( 1). R.epresentat 1ve . sui ts and J oi ilder of part'1es are within . . . . t s. con A cep t repr esen eren tati ve difli suit · 1s desi gne · d rely to ena ' ble per sons h av1ng enti · · · . . i nterest 1n t he st11t to be represented by one party same t exac , ·th11s avo1d1ng tile · · · . the necessity o f m· uI �1p1e I?art1es wl1ere one can easily represent the class. The class aspect of representative s111ts sho11ld be stressed. Although the class need not neces sarily be a fo�n1al one, e.g., 1ne1nbers of a village, tl1ere m11st be a well-defined class, a�d the interest n1ust ? e tha t of t�e class - the interest of each nlenlber Dl tist inter ests are involved, joinder of parties may be proper be identi cal. Wl1e�e separate _ btit a representative st11t cannot be brought. .
Since aJI the parties l1avi 11g t]1e sa111 e inte �e�t l1�ve agreed to be represented by tl1e nan1ed party, tl1ey are bot1nd by tl1e dec1s1on 1n the case. The decision is res jt1dicata, and a n1e1nber of the class cannot st1bsequently instit11te a s11it or be sued on tl1at clain1.70 It has been l 1eld in I11dia tl1at personal liability ca.nnot be impos 71 who o class tl1e not was f pa.rty. a ember For examJ)le, tl1e plaintiff 1 n a : ed 011 sties a n11111ber of persons w.l1 0 are members of an agric11 ltt1ral comn1unity, contend ing that tl1e n1 en1bers of the co1111nunity l1ave \Vrongft1lly grazed tl1eir cattle on 11is land. Some n1em.bers are gi,1e 11 permission to defe11d on bel1alf of the co111 m11nity. Under the Indian rule, only those na111 ed defendants would be personally liable for damages. The co1nm·unity as a11 entity 111igl1 t also be liable, b11t tl1e otl1er 1uembers of the comm11nity wl10 were 11ot na1ned defendants wot1lcl not be. In l11dia, l 1ow ever, tl1e permission of tl1e other n1embers of tl1e class to be represented is not required. while in Etl1iopia it is. Since every 1ne111ber of tl1e class in Etluopia n1t1st give his pern1 ission to be represented, he sl1ould be personally bo1111d by any jt1dg n1eot that is entered against tl1e class. Also in India, it l1 as been l 1eld that when a represe11tative suit is abandoned by the named plaintiff and s11bsequently dismjssed, tl1is does not operate to prevent a me1nber of the class who was riot a party from fili11 g a fresl1 s11it 011 tl1e sa1ne claim. 72 111 Ethiopia, where a plai11 tiff withdraws vvitl1 01rt the per11ussion of tl1e court to file a fresh suit, 11e is precluded fro111 filing s11cl1 a s11it. 73 Again, since the otl1er parties l1 ave consented to be represented, tl1ey sl1011ld be bot1nd by tl1e with drawal of tl1eir representative a11d sbo11ld not be able to i11stitt1te a f�e�J1 st1it. However, the co11rt n1 ay not perniit 0 11e of several persons wl10 have Jo111 ed as plaintiffs to withdraw tl1e s11it without the consent of tl1 e others, 74 and the sa111e principle sho11ld be applicable to re1)rese11tative suits_. Before tl1e _ s�1it is witl1drawn, the court should require tl1e representative to obtain th.e pernussron of tl1e other class members. Once a representative is appointed, he has control o_ver the �ond11ct of the s1 1it. Other members of the class may apply to becon1e parues, b11� if . tl1ey do .not so apply, they ca.nnot object to the way in which tl1 e represe11 tat1ve 1s concl11ct1ng tl1e case. So, where the representative bas obtained an order of the court, another n1em ber of the class cannot appeal tl1e granting of that order. 75 Also, the representative
70. 71 · 7273. 74. 75 ·
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(4). 1. 53 p. ., en R ia . d In llr A 43 19 ) , 43 See S eth v. Zt1 I1ka (H"1gh C t., Madras, 19 p. 24· ., ep R ia nd I llA 41 19 ), 40 19 , on See Tbaivanai v. Ramanathan (HigJ1 Ct., Rango Civ. Pro. C., Art. 27 9(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 279(2). . 3 3 · 4 P , 9 2 l. o v ., ep R ly l, e s ee watson v. Cave (No. 1 ) , (Ct. App., Eng., 1881), 1¥e
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......----1 npro111ise binds th e other members of co a 1 · cl st1 d an 76 se ca · , .. � mpronu se the may co · b h 1ve a s n en a . ee e pr re a i po ce ap on at th � � nted, tes tra � ns . the class.11 All of this demo al 1du it . d1v su 1n e n Th a. re we res it rep if as en sis ba 1e 1 1 sa e th on ds ee . oc pr se ca tlle _ ive tat a en res ve r �1a rep to r the t ien en nv co than re n1o is it � se cau be , ed ow all is ion _ tat t e of the sui tur l na 1s not to tia en ess tl1e t b11 , t1rt co tl1e e for be es rti IJa the several be affected tl1ereby. B. Joinder of Parties a11d Causes of Action: Permissive Joinder To son1e extent, joinder of parties and joinder of c,tuses of action are separate 111atters ,111 d are treated as such in tl1e Civil Procedure Code. However, in some respects tl1ey are related, and \Ve will see tl1a� bot�1 questions n:iay arise in the same case. Moreover, both serve to define tl1 e cli1ne11s1ons of tl1e dispute, and they ca11 conve11 ie11tly be considered together. On the otl1er l1and, it is important to dis ti11 ot1isl1 bet,vee1 1 tl1 e vario11s aspects of joinder of parties and ca.uses of action. We 111u�t distinguisl1 between (1) joinder of ca11ses of a.ction by a single plaintiff or JJlaiotiffs J1aving a joint i11 terest against a si11 gle defendant or tl1e satne defendants jointly, (2) joi11 der by tvvo or 1 11ore plaintiffs against a single defendant, (3) joinder by a si11 gle plai11 tiff against two or 1 nore defenda11 ts, and (4) joinder by two or more plai11tiffs agai1 1st two or n1ore defenclants. Tl1 ere are different rules governing eacl1 type of joinder, a11d tl1e ap1)ropriate rtiles 1nt1st be applied to each type of situation.
Tl1rougl1011t tl1 is section \Ve will be considering per111issive joinder. We wiJl not be co11cerned \Vitl1 the sitt1atio11 wl1ere certain parties n1ust join o r be joined; the 111atter of indis1)eosable l )arties \vill be disct1ssed i11 tl1 e next section. N·or is there any reqt1ire1nent tl1at se1Jar,1te cat1ses of action be joined in a single st1it. The plain tifl� 1 11ay 11 ave a number of separate clai111s agai11 st the defendant, and altl1ough as ,ve \Vi]l see, l1e 111aJ' joi11 tl1 ose clai111 s in a single st1it, l1e is not required to do so. Tl1e 011ly reqt1ire111 ent is tl1at tl1e plaintiff does not ''split l1is cat1se of action," tl1at is, l1e can1 1ot divide 011e ca11se of action into two. We \Viii f1rst consider joinder of cat1ses of actio1 1, tl1en joi1 1der of parties a11 d fi11ally cases wl1 ere both problems are presented. 1. Joinder of Causes of Action Tl1e general r11le allo\vs unrestricted joi11der of cat1 ses of action by a single plaintiff or JJlaintiffs witl1 a joint interest ,1oainst tl1 e same defenda1 1t or tl1 e san1 e de�endants .jointly.78 Exc_ept _for cl,1i111 s for �l1e recovery of i111 movable property and cla11ns _ aga111 st_ � person 1n _ h1s representative capacity, to be discussed subseque11 tly, !h�re 1s ?O l111ut on tl1e kind or 11t11 11ber of cat1ses of actio1 1 that tl1e plai1 1tiff may Join against tl1e sa111 e defenda11t. For exa1111Jle, the plaintiff could join clain1 s on t,vo tinrelated co11 tracts or a clain1 based on a cor1tract witl1 o:ne based 01 1 extra contracttial liability. I-Iowever, the cot1rt may order separate trials wl1 ere it concJ11 des that tlie ca11ses of action wl1 ich l1 ave been joi 11ed ca1 111 ot convenie11tly be tried to getl1er.79 Not � tl1 a� the court does not dismiss tl1e st1it. It n1 erely orders that the _ _ causes of action Joined 111 a single suit be tried se1)ar�1tely. Tl1e co1u·t l1as a good 76.
S e . iv. Pro. C., _Arts. 274-277 a�d the disc�1ssio11 in Cl1 apter VII, infra As to the pov.ier . 194;)�e re res 1) en tat1�e to compron11se the suit, see Muthu v. Appavoo (l-Iigh Ct., Madras f , - , l 9 4 3 ·A / -/ l nd1a Rep., p. 161. 77. S �e Cliintabaran v. Gujaraddi (Higl1 Ct., Calcu tta, 19 49), 1951 All-India Rep., p. 456. · a · · · 78. C1v. Pro. C. Art 217· Where tl · 1 ere is e same tl 1 Joint " · interest l1ave , tl1e obvious parties ly · l·nterest · w't' 1 LlL· ?n · ti1e n1eaom . g of Civ p o . C., Art. 3 a. n d 1f tl1ere are several part1es,. a 8, · . · r . d . Hov class suit would be aut.· or1ze in,�ve r, sam e as \Ve hav the e seen e hav , part may ies � terest in the suit, even 1o l ugh that interest is 11ot a join . ··t one · 79. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 221.
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tllis reg ard , since its o rder in etio n dis cr of merely relates tO the number of deal · � . a k p Iace. Wher e th e �la1ms were totally t1nrelat t ·11 w t ha t ria ls ed, and each i nt � volved complica ted 1act11al or I.egal questions the court might c1 d � th �t sep� rate ted. Or, the plaintiff n 1ay have joined warra n are ls t oo m ��� � tria c a1m s in a s1 gle so � nsuit. In one case the pl aint iff, who was th e owner of 23 patents, Slle d the d eie . gement o_f a11 tl1e pa tents. The cour t l1eld that no mo dant for a11eged. t"nfr1n re than three of the cla1n1s co11ld be tr ied togetl1er. The r11le allows unrest ricted join der by a single plaintiff or pla·i nt·1 fl:s 1lav � ng a .oint interest agains t a single de fendant or the same d;fe ndants 1- 01· n tly. The ter n1s J · · , , · . · · a inte Join t rest a\'l ng and h ''sa m e defendants J oi11.tly'' rei1 ''plaintrffs ce r t o - th e s1·t. ua-' . . · 1 1ty 111volves two or more persons, but i t is as if one tion \vl1ere t he r 1 gl1t or . 1tab'l' perso� possessed the r�ght or owed tl1e obl�gatio·n. For exa111ple, A issues two promissory 11 otes, and _1� eac� note he prollJses to pay the amount owed to B and C. B and C are Jo intly in terested i11 ea cl1 note, and it is as if there was a single clai1n on eac�1 _note �gai nst t l1e def e11dan t. Since, if tl1e notes were issued to B alone, l1e co11ld JO in claims on tl1 em botl1 i1 1 a single suit, tl1e result is n o dif ferent beca11se tl1e notes were iss11ed to B a1 1d C jointly. So too, if B an d C to gether issued two no!es to A, � could joi11 clai1ns 011 both 11 otes i n a single suit just as lie cot 1 Jd do 1f B alone 1ss11ed the notes.
There are two limitations on joinder of cat1ses of action. One arises fro1n the nature of tl1e cause of action and th e otl1er from tl1e positio11 of the person by or against wl1om the cl ai 1 n is made. Claims for the recovery of in11novable property may not be joined witl1 otl1 er kinds of clai1ns except tl1ose involving s11cl1 property, i.e., a claim for n1e sne profi ts or r ent with respect to tl1at property, a clai1n for damages for brea.ch of co nt ract 1111 der which the property is l1eld, or a claim in. ,vhich the relief sought is based on t l1 e same ca11se of action.81 Tl1e theory is tl1at such cases are often difficult to decide - tl1ere is likely to be disp11te over owner ship - and tl1e court should be able to concentrate its ft1ll attention 011 tl1e q11estion 1 1s, in effect, at1thorize claims tl1 at \.Vo11ld of who is entitled to the l and. Tl1e exceptio . be decided only after tl1 e co11r t decided whetl1er tl1e IJlai11tiff was entitled to recover the property. Also, st1its for t he recovery of immovable property 1 nust always be brought at tl1e situs,82 and although tl1e co11rt 111ight l1av e local j 11risdiction over tI1e related claim, if the facts giving rise to tl1e clain1 occ11rred elsewl1ere, it will proba bly not be convenient to try the otl1er claim there. Tl1erefore, joinder is not per mitted where tl1 e claim is for tl1e rec ove ry of i111movable prope,rty except for clai1us that are rel ated to t he recovery of the i111movable property.
Since the r 1 1l e is tl1at no ca.11se of actio1 1 sl1all be joined \Vitl1 a s11it for the recovery of immovable JJroperty, it l1as been interpreted to pern1it83joinder of claims rlowever, b�tl1 for the recovery of two separate pieces of i1nn1ovable proper ty. properties wo11Id have to be within t l1e jurisdictio n of the same c_o11�t; . o�l1erwise ct100 over d1 r1s Jt1 a! loc k lac uld wo t r ot1 c e l1 t e t1s er a c nd joi could not be pe rm itted, be one of the clairn s.s4 Th e clai ins th at can be joined, as we l1ave said, ar e tl1ose that 80. 81. 82 · 83. 84 ·
· 410 p. l, l. vo , . Re r;, ce ran p Cl 3 0 .19 3), Saccharine C orp., Ltd., v. Wilcl (Ct. App., Eng., 190 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 218. supra. , I II ter p a. Ch 1 ii t 1 i1 po is tl1 f n o Civ. Pro. C., Art. 25. See tl1e discussio _ 6 . ol 2), J,,clia n_ -�· ;����n� ripe�ie; See Chidarnbara v. �an1asa�i (Hig_h Ct., M adras, 18�. ns The mortgagee may, in a single suit, enf?rc e two n101 tgages ai�1 , Jnc n L ep., vol. 25, i · · 9 ) 1 lia d, ba ,a tl,e mortgagor. See Raghubar v. Jwala (}l1gh Ct., Allal p. 229. i1. o ti ic sd ri ju l ca lo of ts n 1e en ir The fact that joinder is permitted wotild n o t override tl1e reqt1
�r
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involve tlle property sougl1t to be recovered. Wl1ere the defendant wrongfully occupy ing the property Jias received a benefit tl1ereby, e.g., has sold a crop, he must turn the profits over to the rightful posse_ssor, 85 a�d un,der Art. 218(a), the plain tiff can join his clain1 for t11ose profits with tl1e suit for recovery of the land. So too wJ1ere t11e defendant is a te11ant who has not vacated the property when re qu;ed, tl1e landlord seeking �ec?�ery �a_n join � claim for tl1e rent that is due. Art. 218(b) autl1orizes tl1e pla1nt1fl to JOin a cla1n1 for damages for breach of the co11tract t1nder wllich the property is held by tl1e defendant. If the defe11dant, who ,vas occt1pying tl1e 1Jroperty, was to purchase it and failed to do so, the plaintiff coulcl join a clai1n for dan1ages for breacl1 of t�1� co�t: act to pt1r�l1ase_ in l1�s suit for recovery of the property. Art. 218(c), at1thor1z111g JOinder of clru1ns 1n which tbe relief sought is based on the same cause of action, needs some interpretation. For tl1ese J)UIJJoses the cause of action sl1ot1ld be construed to n1ean the wrong which n1ade tl1 e suit for the recovery of im1novable propert)' 11ecessary. The pt1rpose of per1nitti11g joinder l1ere is to enable tl1e cot1rt to dispose of all claims con11ected witl1 tl1e recovery of tl1e it11111ovable property. Where tl1e defendant, in addition to wrongft1lly occt1pyiog tl1e i1n11 1ovable J)ro1Jerty, also 11usappropriated n1ovable proper ty located on tl1e land, tl1 e 1)lai11tiJf cot1ld joit1 a clai1n for recovery of the mov able property witl1 tl1e suit for recovery of tl1e in1movable, since botl1 claims arose as a res11lt of tl1 e \Vro11 gft1I occttJ)ation. In one case86 the plaintiff had p·urchased in11novable property fro111 011e l1eir of tl1e decedent and 111ovable property fro1n an otl1er l1eir. Tl1e defend,111t l1ad unlawfully obtai11ed possessio11 of both tl1e immov able a11d 111ovable property a11d reft1sed to s11rrender the property to the plaintiff. . It \Vas l1 eld tl1at the pl,tintiff cot1ld join botl1 claims in a single s11it, since they arose fro111 tl1e sa1ne ca.11se of action, the clispossession by tl1e defendant of the rightful owners and tl1e ref11sal to s11rrender tl1e property to the plaintiff. Finally, it sl1011ld be noted tl1at Art. 218 refers only to s11its for the recovery of immov able property; it does not refer to a11y action i11voI,,i11g i111111ovable property. So, wl1ere tl1e plair1tiff sties for a declaratior1 tl1at l1e is the owner of immovable pro })erty ratl1er tl1an for recovery87 or for a11 injt111ction restraining a trespass to im movable property, 88 he is not prol1ibited fro111 joini11g other claims tinconnected \Vitb tl1e in1111ovable IJroperty. Wl1ile it 1nay be diffict1It to see the reason for such a distinctio11, since tl1e exeception to the general rule only refers to suits for tl1e re co,,ery of i111movable property, joinder in otl1er cases involving in11novable property 111ay not be restricted. T!1e . seco!1d li11litation is tl1at a clai111 by or against an exec11tor, administrator or l1e1r 10. l11 s r �pres�ntative capacity cannot ordi11a.rily be joined with a clai111 by _ _ or ag a1nst _ h11'? In lus personal ca.pacity. 89 Tl1e representative cru1not st1e or be _ S\Ied 111 his cl1fferent capacities, si11ce, in effect, tl1 is would be a suit against two d1ffere11t per�ons 011_ 11nrelated clai1ns. Tl1e rule is also designed to avoid tl1e prob Jen1 of conflict of nterest: tl1e representative sl1011 wher e posit io11 ld not a be pt1t in � . I1 e n1t1st �rotect 111s own inte rest and tl1e interest of tl1e beneficiaries in tl1e same . . 5\1It. Consider tlus exan1IJle. A is e11titled to · certain property for l1is life, ,ind a.fter �Is deatl1 ,tl1e . propert� 1s to �o to B. A leased the property to C for tl1e dtira _ tion of A s life. A died, leaving a will of whicl1 B w,1s tl1 e exec11tor. B sued C to recover the back rent whicl1 was d11e to tl1e estate of A a11d the rent wl1ich 85. 8687 · 88 · 89 .
See Civ. C., Art. 1172. Geoesh v. Je,vach (Privy Council, India 1904), Jnc lian L. Rep., vol. 31, p. 262. See � ledbill v. 1-Iunter (Cba,ncery, Eng., 1880 ), Chancery Di•'· Rep., vol. 14, p. 492. S�ear s Glass Work, Ltd. v. Spear (Chanc ery, Eng., 1902), L.J. ' vol. 37' p. 578. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 219.
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for the six months after A's death. Joinder is him to dtle 90 . . was not prop er. B is . tiing for the !ent_ du� t ? t �1e_ estate of A in his representative cap _ acity and for the s 1nd1v his 1dua l 10. capa city. In the htm . to due same · t su i h e . is re rent p resenti ng tl1e . . · 11s · d e 1 o_ a� w t n a t 1nt�rest. Tl11s 1s exactly what is interest of the es robibited' I. ce it po! con ent1 fl. 1 c� of interest, . e.g., c might claim �ha al wotlld create a t be P� � tl1e . h peri od to A wb 1 Je he was alive. rent dt1e for the six mont .1s c11t or flowever, a claim by or against · tlJe exe adnJ iru·s tra tor · · or h · e1r 1n b . ' . · · e capa_c1 ty in ay b e Jo · d w1�l1 a �la1m by or against him in hi s i 11 · 111e repr esentat�v dividu�l capacity prov1 de d th �t the Ia_tter cla1�1 ar ises �itl1 re�erence to llis representative duties. St1ppose tl1�, A di�s, leav,ng a will of wlucl1 B is executor. Tl1e will directs s . b11s1_ness, and B does so. I-fowever, l1e pt1rchases goods for that B . carry o n tlle b�s1�e�s from C 111 111s own na111e. C ca11 st1e B for tl1 e price of the goods, both 1nd1v1d�ally a�d as exect1tor .of tl1e estate o� A, since the clai i n agai ilst him personaJ_ly arises w i th resp�ct . t_o the estate of wl11cl1 he is the a.dniinistrator, that is, J1e 1ncurre? personal . l1ab1l1t1 for tl1e benefit of the estate.91 As a IJractical matter, . tl1_e�e 1s 110 �011��ct of 1nteres� . Tl1e reaso11s whicl1 l1e would pt1t forth to avoid J1ab1l1ty as . an 111d1v1dual wot1ld likely e11a?le the estate to avoid liability as well. Of cot1rse, 1f lie 111.ade another contract w1tl1 C for l1is o\vn business C cot1ld not join clai1ns against B for tl1e purcl1ases 1nade for the business of A and for the purcl1ases 1nade for B's own b11siness, si11ce the latter claim does not arise witl1 respect to the estate tl1at B is ad1ni11isteri11g. 92 In 011e case93 it was l1eld that an heir could not join a s11it to recover l1is sl1are of i1nmovable property from the adn1i11istrator witl1 a st1it to recover dan1ages against tl1e ad1ninistrator for 111alfea sance. However, it would see111 that joinder s]1011ld have been allo·wed, si11ce tl1e claim for malfeasa11ce arose with respect to tl1.e estate tl1at the defendant was admin istering. The plai11tiff joined a claim against 11in1 in lus individt1al capacity tl1at arose with reference to tl1e estate in respect of wl1icb be was st1ed in llis represen tative capacity. Joinder is also proper wl1ere tl1e st1it i11volves a claim in ,�1l1jch tl1 e representa tive and the decede11t had a joint interest. Suppose that A and B jointly {)t1rchase goods from C. A dies, leaving a will of wl1icl1 B is exect1tor. C 1nay sue B as an individual and as representative of the estate of A to recover tl1e price ?f tl1e goods, since the representative, as an individ11al, \Vas jointly liable f�r the price of the goods with the decedent. 94 Since the interest was a joint one, tl1ere wot1ld not have been a conflict of interest; either botl1 he and the estate were liable, or neither was. tl1 wi s i int pla ff or iff int pla e 1gl si1 a d, sse cu dis st ju ve t ha ns cep we the limitatio Ex a joint interest ma y unite an y n·wnber of claims against !he same def· endant or tl1e same defendants jointly. Where s11ch joinder is impract1.cal,. tl1e . co.11rt may order separate trials, bu t tl1e right to jo in all claims in a single suit exists 2. Joincler of Parties ff I · ed as .Plainti · · ? 111V � 1s . rty pa e �n an th D i·fferent rules apply as soon as more f. c� run ? er . � in JO an th er th ra es rt1 p� or defendant . This is th e question of joinder of � � ng i in Jo s ie rt pa e tl1 by and such joinder is perrnjtted on ly w11ere tl1e cla1n1s made 9o. 91 · 9J-· 93 · ·94.
3· 28 p. l, vo , p. Re h nc Be \5 See Tredegar v. Roberts (Ct., App., Eng., 1914), 1914 Kir,g's p. 73 · 2, l. vo p., Re iv. D ry 1ce 1a1 See Padrick v. Scott (Chancery , Eng., 1876), Cl by R . . ed th 2 (1 e ur cl ce ro P . il . iv . . C cOde 0'Jr ·1 s ee the discussion of this point 10 D. Mula1 , 7,,,e Mitter, 1953), vol. 1, p. 551. 0· 86 p. , 4o l. vo , ses Ca Ja11ardan v. Jankibati (High Ct., Patna, 1917), India,, S ee the discussion, si,pra, note 92.
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plaintiff or against tl1e parties join�d. as defenda�ts _are somehow related . �his _ relationsl1ip must be shown before JOln�e� of parties . 1s proper, while n? relation ship is ordinarily r�quired as regards Jo1nder of 7 Ia1ms. W�ere th� cla1�s by ?r against multiple parties a.re related, tl1ey can be tr,ed _ conven1e�t!y 10 � single suit, and it is for t11e purpose of acl1 ievin� sucl1 convenience t�at Jo1nder . 1s permitted. w11ere tI1e claims are unrelated, there 1s no reason to per1n1t the parties to join, a. Joinder of plaintiffs We will first consider joinder of plaintiffs . Here, more tl1an one plaintiff seeks to file suit agai1 1st the sa111e defen�ant or defenda_nts. Perso1�s are entitl�d to joi1 1 as plaintiffs if two conditions are sat1sfi� d: (I) the r1g_ht_ to relief must ar1se _ from the sa111e transaction or series of transactions, ,vl1 etl1er Jointly, severally or 1n the alter11 ative; a11cl (2) if s11ch persons brougl1t separate acti? ns, � � ommon question of law or fact would arise. 95 As we will see wl1 en \Ve consider Jo1nder of defendants, only tl1e seco11d co11 ditioi1 is i1ecessary in order for 0 1 1e plaintiff to join two or more JJersons as defenda11 ts. Even tl1ougl1 there 1 nay be a co1111110 1 1 q11estion of law or fact, se1Jarate clai1 ns by different }Jlaintiffs may not be ]Jarticularly related, and the drafters 111ay J1ave believed tl1at it \vo11ld 1 1ot be convenient to try the claims of cli ITerent JJersons togetl1er 1111Iess a greater degree of relatio11ship were sl1own, i.e., tl1e cla.ims arose fro111 tl1e sa111 e tra1 1sactio11 or series of transactions. Whereas, where 011e plai11tiff l1as clain1s agai11st two or n1 ore defendants that involve a common q11estio11 of law or fact, tl1e clai111s will 1Jrobably be connected in some way, altL1ough tl1e tra 1 1sactions fro111 \Vl1icl1 tl1 e clai1ns arose 111 ay 11ot be tl1 e sa 111 e. In any event, it is in1 porta11t to note tl1 e different criteria applicable to joinder of plaintiffs and joi11der of defe11da11ts. It sl1ould also be noted tl1at since all plaintiffs will be joining as 11a1 ned parties, tl1e criteri,1 for pern1itting sucl1 joi11der is different tl1an that applicable to a repre sentative suit. The plai1 1tiffs seeking to join as 11 a1ned parties need not l1ave the sa111e interest i11 tl1 e stiit as long as tl1eir clain1s arose from tl1e san1e transaction or series of tra 11sactions and tl1 ere is Iil<ely to be a comn1on qt1estio11 of law or fact. . The q11estion of joinder of plaintiffs was carefully considered by the Supre111e I1nper1 al Co11rt 111 the case of Ato A1a11gistou A/0111ai, v. Giorcla110 Co11cette.96 In that ca.se 1 �9 en1 ploy�es j?i1 1e� st1it against tl1eir en1ployer, clai1 11 i11g tl1at tl1ey were wro11 gfully d� sc�arged In VIolat101 1 of tl1eir contracts. They sot1gl1 t da1nages for tl1e \Vrongful d1s1n1ssal. Tl1e case arose before tl1e e11act1 11e11 t of tl1 e Civil Procedure Code and was decided 1111der Arts. 11 a1 1d 12 of tl1e Co11rt Proced11re Rules of 1943. 97 These rules a11tl1ori_zed 11nrestricted joinder except wl1ere s11cl1 joinder wot1ld ''en1barass or dela)' _ tl1e tr�al of tl1 e case." TJ 1e cot1 rt interpreted these r11les as allowi11g joinder _ only if tl1e rigl1 t to relie f arose 011t of the san1e tra 11sactio11 or series of transactions �ncl tl1 ere was a con1n1 011 q11estion of law or fact - tl1e sa1ne test as tl1at set fortl1 in Art. 35. Tl1u �, tl1is case �an ser,,e as at1t11ority for i1 1terpreti 11g Art. 35. The cotirt lield .that Jo1. 1 1der was 1n1proper. There was a co1 n1n on question of law or f��t, nainel)', was tl1 ere a wr 11gf11 l dis111 issal. ApJ)arei1tly, tl1 e contracts were inde11t,�al, ai,d �lie einpl?yer J.1_ 1 st1f?ied t!1e disnlissal of all tl1 e e111 ployees on the same �tit, ti,� clain1s did not arise fro1 n tl1e sa 1 11e transaction or series of trans. .i · Tlle clatnis were for da111ages for breacl1 of contract · Eacl1 plai1 1tiff bad a. se1Jara' te co11trac ' t, ai1d h"IS cIa 11· 11 c1 or da1nages arose fro1 n tl1e cor1tract tl1 at l1e had
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95. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35. 96. (Sup. Imp. Ct., 1963, Civil AJJp. N·o. 1147154) (unpublished). 97. Leg. Not. No. 33, Neg. Gaz., ye ar 3, no. 3,
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wi·tli the employer.· It was the contract that gave the cause of a· ct'ion rath . er t an h 1s as D1 1 su 1_s d' sa e I . h f u T wr h11s, althoug� they were dismissed toge ong_ the_ ther, their ar no fro ise t m tl1 di e same transaction. The coltrt observed that clai_m� d if th e ? ug o ht ad da rr1ages for bre�ch_ of their contracts, bu t had pla intifsf � : :ie sti ed fo r a res t pond�nt was not Justrfied in dismissing then1 for a declaration . . the rea son cla 11ns �or relief - a declaration that tl1ey J1ad been wr he gave, their ongfully dis charg ed - ":ould ha ve arisen from th e same transaction, the discharge of all employ ees. But since th_ey sought ?amages f �r breach of contract, tl1eir clain1s arose from separ ate transactions, tl1at ts, the cla1n1 of each e111ployee arose from his contract and joinder was not proper. In otl1er words, the col1rt must deternune what is the transaction that· is the basis for the clain1 of eacl1 _plaintiff. If they are different, joinder is not proper, even thot1gl1 a con1n1on q11est1on of law or fact 1nay be involved in both transact ions. So, where five persons contracted separately with a processor to sell cotton, and the processor a11no11.nced that be wot1ld 11ot honor any contracts he l1ad 1nade for the p11rchase of cotto11, the five persons co11ld not join as plaintiffs i11 suits to re cover dan1ages fron1 hi111. 98 Eac.h clain1 arose fro1n tl1e separate contract tl1at tl1e plaintift� had witl1 tl1e processor, and therefore, tl1e clai1ns did not arise frotn the same transaction. In this connection, it should be noted that ''series of transactions'' refers to transactio11s tl1at are related. Se1Jarate, tinrelated transactions do not consti tute a ''series of transactions'' witl1in tl1e 111eaning of Art. 35. For exa111ple, where there was a riot i11 wl1ich four persons were injtrred, all 1nay joi11 it1 a suit agai11st the persons responsible for tl1e riot.99 TJ1e riot 111ay be considered to constit11te a series of transactions; the plaintiffs may l1ave been inj11red by different acts, b11t all these acts ,:vere a part of the riot. Tl1ere wo11ld be �L com1non q11estion of law or fact in all suits - whether the defe11da11ts were respo11sible for the riot. 1-Jo\vever, where the defendant entered i11to a contract ,vitl1 A and an t1nrelated co11tract with B, tl1e separate contracts do not co11stit11te a series of transaction within tl1e meani11g of Art. 35. But s11ppose that A entered into a contract with B to SllJ)ply B with certain goods. A found tl1at be could not supply all the goods and so inforLned B. B consented to modify the contract so tl1at A wo11ld l1ave to s11pply only a · art of the goods, and on B's behalf A entered into a contract with C by wbicl1 p C was to supply tl1e remainder. B refused to accept any of tl1e goods. A and C could join claims for breach of contract against C, since their clai1ns arose ot1t of the same series of transactions - A's original co11tract with B and his contract with C on behalf of B. The contracts are related and, therefore, constitute a series of transactions within the 1neaning of Art. 35. There is clearly a common qL1estion of law or fact, which is wl1ether B refused to honor any of his contracts; also, the ,questions as to the damages each suffered may be tl1e same. Very often the q11estio11 of whether the rigl1 t _to relief arose . from_ the same transactjon or series of transactions may be deternuned by a cons1clerat1on of tl1e method by which each ,:vrong was conunitted and the time ,vl1en it took place. If on o·ne day A falsely tells B tl1at C is a thief and on another day false}y tells B tl1at D is a tliief the claims of C and D arise from a separate tra11sact1on and joinder wo11ld not b� perniitted. 100 However, if ft1nds are missing from. a bank, and during the course of a police inv estigation, the n1anager falsely states that an empl?Y ee, A, took the funds, an d when h e is q11estioned a few days later by the pol.ice, 98. See Chandulal v. Dagdu (I-ligt1 Ct., Bon1bay, 1925), 1925 All-lriclia Rep., p. 342. 99. See Basharat v. I-lira (High Ct., AJlal1abad, 1932), 1932 All-Jnclia Rep., P· 401. 100. See Sanders v. WindsmitJ1 (Queen's Bench, Eng., 1893), 1893 Queen's Bench Rep., vol. l, p. 771.
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L.
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s e m ai ca� be said to th cl s, n? fu e m so ok t? B, e, ye lo 1i) en r lie ot an states tliat also · fro n1 the saine transaction or series of. tra· nsactions, tl1e· manager s state s nt me · . arise b e ht a question as Tb . IIllg on er� ti ga t1 es 1 nv e 1 tl of se �1: co e th g in ir dt to tlle police _ D: or of t10 la� es ct, would qu fa. on m 1:1 co . a of at tl1 , on iti nd co nd co 1 se e to whether tl ich e wl1 1n es th nc sta 1n g na ?u c1r ma e tl1 er on nd pe de uld wo is th d an d, be satisfie d an A at ow th sh B acted in _ to 1n� try s wa e 1 l at 1 tl ng n1i su As t. 1 en ten sta the made . 10 bo th cases, e.g., was the ise �r to ely lik be uld wo s ion est qt1 . concert, common 1 n concert to co mm 1 t th e tl1 eft. ted ac y tl1e at 1 tl ing ect sp su ed in 11 1anager jt1stifi An interesting case involving joinder of plaintiffs is Oxford and �ambriclge, U11 iversities v. Gill (George a11cl Sons) . 101 Tl1e defendant was a book publisher who, witl1ot1t a·uthorization, ,vas publisl1 ing books indicati11g tl1at tl1 e books ca.me from tl,e two 11niversities. Tl1 e t1niversities were per111itted to join claims to restrain him fron1 pt1blisl1 ing tl1 e books in that 111anner. TI1e clain1 s arose f�o� the sa1:1e series of tra11 sactions, pt1blisl1i1Jg bool<s 1111 der tl1 e na1nes of both pla111 t1ffs, and 10 both claims tl1 ere wot1ld be a con1 n1 011 question of law or fact, wl1 ether tl1 e public was misled. Wl1ere an i11surer is autl1orized to sue tl1 e wrongdoer, 102 the insurer and tl1 e i11 sured ca11 always joi11 as plaintiffs, tl1 e inst1rer to recover the an1ouot paid the insu1·ed, a11d tl1e instired to recover any an1ount not covered by insurance for any claii1 1 for wl1 icl1 tl1 e i 11 surer ca 1 1not st1e. St1ppose that A's l1ome was damaged by a11 explosion. Tl1e da11 1age to tl1 e ]10111e was Etl1.$ 10,000, and A suffered serious perso11 al i 11jt1ries. TJ1e insura11 ce con1pany paid l1i1n Etl1 .$ 5000 for the da111 age to tl1 e l1011 1e and Etl1. $ 2000 for tl1e JJerso11al i11jt1ries l1 e st1ffered, The insurer can sue to recover tl1 e Etl1.$ 5000, a11 d A can st1e to recover the re1naining Eth.$ 5000 da1nage to tl1e l1 01ne. On]y A can st1e to recover for the perso 11 al injt1ries he suf fered. 1 1 1 a si1 1gle st1it tl1 e i1 1st1rer can s·ue to recover tl1 e Etl1. $ 5000 it has paid A, and A can st1e to recover tl1e ren1 aini11g Etl1 .$ 5000 and to recover damages for tl1e JJersonal inj11ries. Tl1e clain1 s of the ins11rer a11d the inst1red clearly arise ot1t of the san1e tra11saction - tl1 e explosion - and tl1e qt1estions in botl1 cases will be identical. As a gei1 eral propositio11 ,ve ca11 say tl1at when one party is c]ain1 ing derivatively, tl1at is, l1 is c]ain1 against tl1e defe 11 dant is based ori tl1e claim tl1at a 1 1otl1 er party l1as against l1 in1 , botl1 tl1e original and derivative l1 olders of the clain1 can joi 1 1, since tl1 eir clain1s will, by defi 1 1itio11 , have arise11 fro111 tl1e sa111 e tra1 1sact ion, and tl1e facts and law deternuning liability 011 both clain1s will be identical. It is �ery imp?rtant _to ren1�mber tl1 at joi11der is proper where tl1e conditions of_ Art. 3::, are satisfied 1rres1 )ect1 ve of t11e 1111111 ber of plai11 tiffs and tl1e fact that t!1� dan1 age� �acl1 st1ffered may_ be differe11t. Tl1ere is no req11ire11 1ent tl1at tl1 e plain tiffs ?e cl8:1 1111ng tl1 e san1e relief. Nor does it 1 natter tl1at tl1 e defendant 11 1igl1t be asserting differe 1 1t defences against tl1e plaintifis. So long as tl1 eir rights to relief arose from_ tl1 e same transaction or series of transactio11 s clod tl1ere will be a con1n1 on quest1_0�1 of law or fact, joinder is proper. Ilov,1 ever, wl1ere tl1 e claims that 11�,,e been Jo_in�d can11ot be conveniently tried toget11er, tl1e cottrt n1 ay order separate · · · wh·ere · · · · tr1als. 103 It 1s 1m1)o · rta ' nt · t 0 b ear 1n n1 1 - nd the d1stinct1 0. n between tl1e s1tuat1on . . . . . Jo_1t1der is Itnproper and tl1e sitt1ation wl1ere, even tl1 ougl1 joinder is proper separate sl1;0tlld, 0 ?net eless, be ordered. St1ppose tl1at fol]owii 1g a 1nurder, a 'relative of _ I � ��! � tct m i det a11 1 s tl1ree brotl1 ers, contendi11g tha and r, mu rde the com t tl 1 1ni ey tte d . · turns them over to tl1 e p 01·ice. A-ll are re I · · · eased and bring suit against the reIatrve 101. (Cl1a.ncery, Eng., 1899), 1899 ·c 1a 1 ncery Re p. ' vol · 1 ' p · 55 · 102. See the discussio·n' ·su,,r n a, 00tes 16-19 a11d accompanying text 103. c·1v. pro. C., Art. 221.
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for wrongful imprison.ment. The relative contends that he had good caus� to t so4uspect mu rde r, in which case he . ·would not be l that they commit · · t ed the · 1able. . He IS d er no t JO proper, since the question of whether he contends that I� ha d g oo d diff as ere e to nt b eac wo h uld de fen dant and he would ·have to prod11ce d1.f... cause · • . · s11p t t por o e h 1s . de1en enc c- ce 1n each case. Joinder is ·proper, sin d fere· nt evI ce e th . rro cla s a:ose f r �m the same ser 1e� of transact1ons .. the detentio11 of the plaintiffs by the relat1ve .. an there w�uld ob v1ous1 y be common questions of law or fact. l-Iow ever, the fact th_at the ev1_dence to st1pport tl1e defence asserted against e ach defeiJd ant would be different might cause the co11rt to order separate trials. This is wlJat the defendant should reqt1est, and he cannot argue that joinder is improper. Finally, it sho11ld be noted_ tl1at !l1e pl�ntiffs must b e seeking relief against the defe�dant and n1ay not _ be_ seeking relief against each other as well. In other words, the interests of tb.e plaintiffs must not ?e antagonistic; all must seelc relief against tl1e defendant and cannot contest tl1e r1gl1t of tl1e other plaintiffs to relief against him. In one case 105 a person l1ad died leaving a widow and an adopted son. The decedent's brother was occupying certain lands tJ1at he alleged the decedent gave to hin1. The widow and son claimed tl1at the lands formed part of the estate and that tl1e decedent had never made a gift o.f tl1e land to tl1e brother. The widow also contended that the adoption of tl1e son was invalid and that she alone was entitled to tl1e land. The widow and son joined s11its against tl1e defe11dant to recove.r tl1e land and, incidentally, to l1ave the validity of tl1e adoption litigated as betwe en then1. It was l1eld that since the clai111s of the plaintiffs were antagonistic, they could not join. In other words, joinder is not proper where one plaintiff con tests the right of the otl1er to recover from the defendant. To allow such joinder would broaden the dimensions of tl1e dispute, and there is no provision by which parties having antagonistic clai111s are a11thorized to join and l1ave sucl1 clain1s liti gated as well. The theory is that related claims against the same defendant may be disposed of conveniently in a single st1it, but tl1at claims between the plaintiffs uno.ecessarily complicate the dispute and should be heard separately. T'he parties could litigate their claims against the defendant in a single st1it and l1ave tl1e question of the validity of the adoption - in which the defendant is not interested determined subsequently. b. J oinder of defendants
We may now consider joinder of defendants. l-Iere, one plaintiff (or plaintiffs . 36 deals Art nt. nda defe one n e tha entitled to join under Art . 35) is suin g mor 106 . der join ing ern gov s rule t eren diff of es with joinder of defendants, and there is a seri As.. long as 011e of them satisfied, joinder is proper. Art. 36 (1). sets forth the general rule, wl1icl1 is as follows: ''All persons against whom th� right to a�y. re lief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in t�e alternat1.ve, may be J01Ded as defendants where, if separate suits were bro11ght against such pe!�ons, an� �om mon q11estion of law or fac t would arise." There is only one con? 1 t10? for Jo 1nder is tht le ru 1e Tl se. ari :11? wo t fac or law f o· ion est qu r de un this rule .. that a commo:r1 I, r de Or re, du ce ro P _ 1 l v �1 of de Co 1;1 dia In e th in differs fro m the corresponding rt1le e n:i e sa th of t ou ise ar f l1e r� to . ht rig e tl1 at tl1 rule 3, which r eq11ires in addition ed . in er id iis co � ar s. se ca an di In 1en wl , re efo er transaction or series of transactions. Th an di In d an 1an 1 l1 op Et e tl1 at th ed er 1b en m connection with this rule, it m us t be re 104. See Civ. C., Art. 2042. 760 · a ., di ep P· In R llA 50 19 ) 49 19 s ra ad M ' 105. G ov1n t C ., (H . igh · danath an v. A.nJaneya · .. ' s(S)which will be �) t' )( (°1 ne l� al on 1ti nd co d 106. Art. 36(3) and (4) deal witl1 indispensable an :.j �� ). (6 d an 6 _ ith w d ne discussed in the next section. We Will now be concer
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rtiles are different, and tl1e Indian . case should only be consider_e 107i f it turned on whetller there was a common question of law or fact, In �ne cas� . tw�lve persons wJ10 occupied the same apart1nent house failed to pay their electricity bills, and the electric company brought sujt against al! twelve to . recove� the amounts due. It was held tl1at joinder was not pro1Jer, since . tl1e claim ag�nst each ar?se. from a separate transaction, tl1e con1pany's co�tract . with the subscriber. TJ1e Eth.1op1an court cot1ld not dispose of the case on. this basis. It_ wot1ld hav e to. a �k whether there would be a comn1011 qt1estion of fact or law 1n tl1ese cases. If 1t appeared that tl1 e coinpany \Vas 111erely co111bining all ·tl1e suits in a single action and that tl1ere was no relationsl1ip between the failure of the different tenants to pay, then there would 11ot be lilcely to be a con1mon question of Ia,v or fact in tl1e case, aod 108 . al to pay tl:iat tl1e refu was red aJJpea it if � Bt1t r prope be 11ot joinder wot1Id _ a joi11t one, e.g ., tl1e tenants contended that tl1 e n1eter 10 the building was defect ive and that the cl1 arges ,vere i11acc11rate, tl1 e11 joi11der ,vould be proper. There would be a co111n1011 q11estion of fact in tl1e case - ,vl1ether tl1e meter was defective - and joi11der is at1tl1orized tinder Art. 36(1). Tl1is case den1 011 strates the distinction be twee11 tl1e ap1Jroach to tl1 e JJroblem tinder tl1e I11dian Code and under Art. 36( 1). Co111n1on question of la\v or fact 111 eans tl1e san1e specific ]egal or factual q11estio11. Joi11der is not proper n1erely becat1se tl1e two cases involve generally the sa111e l<.i11d of legal of fact11al q11estio11s. If A l1as 11nrelated claims against B and C, arising fron1 breacl1es of contracts tl1 at eacl1 l1as vvitl1 A, l1e cannot join B a.nd C in tl1e sa111 e s11it. It does not 111atter tl1at in both cases the cot1rt ,vill l1ave to consult tl1e san1e provisio11 s of tl1 e Civil Code relating to contracts or that in botl1 cases l1e ex1Jects tl1e defenda11ts to set ltp tl1e defe11ce of force majeure. Tl1e speci fic qt1estio1Js are differe11t - does B l1ave tl1e defence of force 1najeure a11d does C l1a.ve tl1e defe11ce. rfo tl1e exte11t tl1at tl1e plai11ti.ff's claims agai11st tl1 e defendant arise fron1 separate tra.11 sactio11s, it is less likely that tl1 ere will be a con1mon qt1estio11 of la\v or fact, altl1011gl1 i11 some cases there n1ay be. Tl1e point to remem ber is tl1at tl1e questio11 or qt1estions in the t\vo s11its n1 t1st be tl1e sa1ne. \Ve ,vill no\v co11sider s0111 e exan1ples of this req11ire1nent. A s11es B to reco,1er dan1 ages for breacl1 of contract and C to recover dan1a.ges fron1 hi111 for indt1cing B to 111 alce a contract \Vitl1 l1i1n as a rest1lt of whicl1 B was t1nable to perforn1 l1is contract witl1 A. 109 I-Ie can join botl1 clai1ns, si11 ce there will be co111n1on questions of la\v and fact, revolvi11g arot111d wl1etl1er B breacl1ed tl1e contract ,vitl1 A: if B did not breacl1 tl1at contract, C ,vould not be liable.1 10 Or, A bt1ys stock i11 a con1 1Ja11 y for Etl1 .S 5000 on tl1 e stre11 gtl1 of state111ents isst1ed by the directors telling of tl1e compa11y's s011nd financial conditio11 . Tl1e stateme11ts were fa.Ise. A sues the company to cancel the sale and to reco,,er tl1e Eth.$ 5000. In the san1e st1it l1e joins tl1 e directors to recover dan1 ages of Etl1. $ 5000 for their n1 isreprese11tations. Joi11der is proper.111 Tl1is is an exa1nple of alternative relief wl1ere the questions of 107. 108.
Corporation of Calcutta v. Radha (1-ligh Ct., Calcutta, J 949), 1952 All-lnclia Rep., p. 222. The questio� would be raised at the first l1earing since that is the tin1e ,vl1en the defend niust raise prelimi11ary objections sucl1 as 111i;joi1Jder of parties. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244
ct ) � 109. See Civ. C., Art 110.
111
._ 2_056. If bot11 are found liable, judgments wot1lcl be e11tered against both; l1owever, the plarnt1ff would 01lly be entitled to one sat isfaction. See She,v Narayan Singb v. Brahn1anand Si 11g (l-ligh 1f//-Jn clia 195 Ct 0 195 Cal 0) cut ., ta ' ' p Re ., p. 479. �:e Fr�� kenburg v. Great �-Iorseless C_ar�iage Co. (Ct. App., Eng., 1900), 1900 Queen 's Bench ., . 1 · l , p. 5o4. Aga�n, the platnt1tf would, if successful against botl1 parties, be e nf . ly 011e s�t.isfaction, i.e., tit ed to on he could either recover tl1e Eth. $ 5000 from the com pany or fro1n the directors. See also Co mm. c., Art. 309.
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,
would be the same. The pla intiff can cancel fac t and w th la · e · sa e 1 an · d re co ve r 1 y l n ors ·r e th m t c 1s r r e re d" p e re s� h n t . tations were false, and this questio against � A ' n is . 1 n d s h u w h t s er . b o e tw o to i nsurance companies iss. common _ued P 01·1cies up? n goods that were lost, the insure , u·es, since 1n b oth suits . d could join both compar , ld be common questions as to whether the goods were 1ost and as to there wou 11 2 s. d o e go th f o e lu va the
Joinder is improper ?nly whe!e the clai1ns against the different defendants are so unrelated tha t there 1s not 11kely to be a comm011 question of law 0 1 t For example, B agreed to sell cert�in land to A. A found 011t that B was �il��� to s�ll, but _that C, wl10 had th� title_ deeds, :"?uld not part with them. A sued B, seeking �pec1fic �erform�nce against l11m an d Joined C, seeking a declaration tllat c had no interest 1n _the title deeds. Tl1e cour t l1eld that joinder was not proper, one of the grounds being that ther� would not be co1nmon questions of law or fact 113 Wl1ether C w�s 111terested in tl1e title deeds had nothing to do with case. the in whetl1er :8 was bound to specifically perform tl1e contract. Apparently, C's possession of the title deeds wot1ld not l1ave been a defence to tl1e action of specific perfor mance against B. Wl1at tl1e plai11tiff sl1ould l1ave done was to sue B and C, seek ing specific perf orrnance against B and seeking an order restraining C from interfer i11g with B's specifically perfor ming the contract. I n both cases tl1ere would be common q11estions revolving aro1111 d B's failt1re to specifically perfor111 tl1e contract. But as tl1e plaintiff frame d tl1e case, the questions in botl1 suits would be entirely different, and joinder was not proper. Ordinarily, wl1ere tl1e claims agai11st tl1e two or n1ore defenda11ts are related, there are likely to be common q11estions of law or fact. If tl1is .is so, join der is proper whether or not the claims agai11st tl1e defenda11ts arose fr om tl1e sa111e trans action. Art. 36(2) provides tl1at tl1e plaintiff 1nay join as par ties all or any of the per sons severally or jointly and severally liable on the same contract, incl11ding pa rties to a negotiable i nstrument. Here tl1ere is 110 req_t1irement tl1at tl1ere be comn1on questions of law or fact. The pt1rpose of this rttle is to enable the plaintiff to l1ave his rights under a contract determined witl1ot1t l1aving to file se_parate s11its against all persons involved in the tra11saction. 1 14 Suppose that A draws a cheque payable to B. B endorses tl1e cl1eque to C, wl10 endorses it to D, who i11 t11rn endors�-s it to E. When E p resents the cheque fo r payment, the ba11k refL1ses to. l1on�r 1t d s. Under the law E 1s eot1tled fun nt ficie strf e hav t on the gro no es do un A t d tha o . 11 s In D d . an C B, s, r e ors end to recover against the draw er A, and against all 11 6 or 11e n1ay t, s11i gle sin a in_ D and C light of Art. 36(2), he may j�i n A, B, sue any one of them. They are jointly and severally ltabl_e, _a1;1 d und. er tl1e st1bsta11tive law, which Art. 36(2) implements, he n1a y sue them 1nd�v1dually as well as col rot1nd that g the on t Jec ob t no n ca 11 y the , d s11e lectively. 1 Thus, if some or all are 112. 113. 114.
115. 116. 117.
., 1914), . g En , p Ap t. (C . td . Co L See Oesterreichische Export v. BritisJ1 Indemnity Insurance L.J., vol. 83, p. 971. 5, p. 177· . 1· :0 p., Re L. ian d . I,r ), 81 18 . , bay m Bo Luckurnsey v. Fazu lla (High Ct., and t ar ble p · sa n spe d1 in t . no e ar ey tl1 e, l b : Si nce ·the parties · ar e jointly and severally lia f , • See 1 v 1 t e b an t s su o r te at n1 a ' as J • t"1 ff J·oin th. em th ere 1s no requtrement that th e Pam . . may iff nt ai pl e th · 1 c1 h· w b y 11 is10 ov �r g Civ. C., A.rts. 1896, 1897. Art. 36(2) is a� ena blw �· 189 t · Ar , C. v. Ci r de un f es rti pa all en orce bis right to proceed against Comm. C., Art. 868. 54 1 p. 3, l. vo ., ep R . L z a, di In ), 78 18 See Pestonjee v. Mirza (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, Comm. C., Art. 872.
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-------they should not have been joined, and if some are sued, they cannot object that the otl1 er parties were not sued. 1 18 The third situation where multiple d.efendants n1ay be joined 119 is that provided in Art. 36(5), which says tl1at ''Where the pl�i� tiff is in doubt as to tl1e person fro1n wl1om he is entitled to redress, l1e may Join two or more defendants so that tl1e question as_ to wl1 ich, if any, of the d�fe� dants is liable, � n_d to what ex�ent, , may be determ111 ed as bet\veen all tl1e parties. The sa111e prov1s1on was contained in Art. 1 3 of tl1 e 1943 rules and is a ,,ery important one. Again, there is no requirement tl1at tl1 ere be a conm1on q11estion of law or fact, although it is likely tl1at tl1 ere will be. Tl1 e in1port of tl1is r11le is t]1at probably only one of the parties is liable to tl1e pla.intiff, b11t l1e does not k.now wl1icl1 one. Or it may be possible tl1at t\vo or 1nore defer1dants 1nay be liable to tl1 e plai11tiff, but l1e does not know the exte11t to wl1icl1 eacl1 \Vill be liable. Under Art. 36(5), he may join them and force tl1e111 to litigate the q11estion of liability bet,veen then1selves. In order to justify joi11der t111der Art. 36(5), the plaintiff would have to show that, assuming l1e is entitled to relief, it \Vould be agair1 st one or the other na1ned defendants. They are then joi11 ed a11d, after tl1e plaintiff sl10\vs l1e is entitled t o relief against one or th.e otl1er of tl1en1, tl1ey will litigate tl1e question of \Vhicl1 one is liable to tl1 e plaintiff120 Tl1 e 011ly req11ire111e11t for joi11der 1111der tl1is rt1le is tl1e plaintiff cannot specify which of tl1e defenda11ts l1e joi11s is liable to l1i1n or to what extent. In PaJ,11e v. Britis/1 Ti111e Recore/er Co., Ltcl. & W.S. Ci,rtis, Ltd. , 121 the plain tiff entered i11to a co11tract vvitl1 A Co. to su1Jply it with a prod11ct to conform to SJJecifications desig11ed b:y tl1e con1pany. He in tt1r11 made a contract with B Co. to su1Jply hin1 ,vitl1 tl1e prod11ct according to tl1 e specifications 111ade by A Co. A Co. ref11sed to acce1Jt tl1 e procl11ct 011 tl1e ground tl1 at it was not made accord ing to tl1e SJJecifications. Tl1e JJlai11tiff joined A Co. and B Co. as defendants, seek ing as agair1st A Co. to recover tl1e JJrice of tl1 e JJrod11ct, a.nd alternatively, as agai11st B Co. to recover da111ages for breach of the co11tract. In otl1er words, if tl1e goods co11for1ned to tl1e specifications, A Co. ,:vould be liable for tl1e price of tl1e goods; if not, B Co. wo11ld be liable for d;;11nages for breacl1 of contract. The plaintiff is obvio11sly e11titled to son1e relief, and tl1 e only question is whetl1 er be �s . entitled to the relief against A Co. or B Co. The English cottrt decided tl1at Jo1nder \Vas proper 011 tl1e ground tl1at tl1e claims arose fron1 the san1e series of transactions and tl1at tl1ere wo11ld be a co1nmon q11estion of law or fact. 122 Ap p are11tly, tl1e English rules did not contain a provision s11ch as Art. 36(5), a.nd this is a clear case fo1: the ap1Jlication of that st1b-article. The plaintift� is eitl1 er entitled to recover tl1 e pr1ce of the goocls fron1 A Co. or dan1ages for breacl1 of contract fro111 B Co. lle can join the1n as defenda11ts, a11d tl1 ey will litigate the question of \Vl1ether tl1e product conformed to tl1e specificatio11s. Art. 36(5) _ would also be applicable i11 tl1e following case. A lectses his land to B for a period of t\VO years. At the end of tl1e first year A sells tl1 e land to C, 118. 119. 120. 121. 122.
How� v� r, to the extent tl1at t hey are e11titled to contribution or indemnity from the parties n<?t JOLlled, tl1ey n1ay, as we will see, join tl1ose parties as t hird party defendants under C1v. Pro. C., Art. 43. As we h ave said, Art. 36(3) (4) do not deal witl1 pern1issive jou 1der. 11 ere. bo! h may _be _liable to tl1 plaintiff, one could cross-claim against th e other for a � eterm.1nation of h is right to contribution or inden1nity agains t l1in1. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 43(4). �t. �P P·, Eng.? _1921), 1921 King's Benc/1 Rep., vol. 2, p. 1, in R. Field and B. Kaplan, ate11a 1 s o,i C1v1l Procedure (1953), p. 1003. The English rule, like the lndia11 one thus dif f e rs t of from h e Ethiopia n Civil 36(1 Art ) Procedure Code. '
f
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and C demands th e rent for the second year from B. B says that he paid the rent for both year � 1? A. C sties B an d A, seeking recovery of the rent from B if lte. bas no t pr ud it to . A, a?d from A, a reduction in the purchase price if B 'has 1ia1d th� rent to A. Jot�der ts clearly proper. 123 C is entitled to the rent for the second ye �r, either f �o.m .B directly or . fro m A by. '!'ay of a reduction in tl1e purchase pnce.. C ca n JOtn both and require the1n to l1t1gate the question of whether or 11ot B paid the rent to A. cas� w 11nder nother be wol1ld 36(5) Art. joinder ere the where is proper � � . plru11trff cannot 1dent1fy th� cause of �l1e har1n or tl1e instrumentality by which it was caused. Sltppose that A s property ts da1naged by a fire whicl1 broke out either on . t?e p�operty of �, wl1icl1 �.djoi11s J �s on the left, or the property of C, wl1icl1 adJ01ns 111s on the r1gl1t. If his allegations sho\v that tl1e fire ori!rinated on either B' s or �' .s . property, l1e can_ join botl1 as defendants. Or, suppos� that A and B l1ave adJ01n1ng places of bus111ess and each maintains a parking lot on his J)art of the land. There are no marked bou11deries on tl1e lots, and it looks like if there is one lot. If the plai11 tiff SL1ffers an injL1ry on the lot and does not know whetl1er it was on tl1e porti�n. of tl1e lot owned by A or that ownecl by B, l1e can join botl1. Tl1e test for Jo111der 1111der Art. 36(5) is sim1 Jly \Vl1ether the plaintiff is in dot1bt as to tl1e ,person fron1 whom he is entitled to recover or as to the extent of recovery from various defendants. It sl1oltld be noted that i t is not 11ecessary for every defendant to be i.11terested as to all tl1e relief clai111ed in any suit agai11st 11im. 124 It is 110 gro11nd for objec tion tl1at tl1e defendan.t n1ay not be liable for all the relief tl1e IJlaintiff claims. The plaintii'I may also clain1 alternatively, tl1at is, he seeks so111e relief against 011e defen dant and different or alternative relief against others. Tl1e poi11t is that tl1e plaintiff may join all defenda·nts fro111 wl10111 he seeks so111e relief. I-Ie does 11ot have to claim tl1e same relief against all defenda11ts, and tl1e cot1rt will enter a jt1dg1ne11t against each defendant to the extent tl1at he may be fot1nd to be liable to tl1e plainti.ff. 125 The relie.f claimed against 011e defendant may be inco11sistent \Vitl1 that claimed against tl1e otl1er defendant. The follovving cases will ili11strate tl1e extent to which the plaintiff may seek differe11t relief against the different defendants. A continually crossed over land which B ]1ad leased, to w .hich B objected. A contended that be was given a rigl1t of way over the land by C, tl1e owner, \Vho bad leased the land to B. B sl1ed C a11d A, seeking an injtinction against A if he had not been given a r.ight of way, and if 11.e bad, da111ages against C for breach of the contract of lease. Joinder is proper, since the.re is a comn1on ql1est ion of law or fact - did C give A a right of way - a11 d it does not matter that the relief sought against bot h defe11dants is incoosistent. 126 He seeks alternative relief against the defendants, which is authorized ltnder Art. 36(1). Anothe� ca_se involvino- alternative relief would be where A, who purchased land. from B, 1s dis possessed by C, who clajms ownership. A ma y SLte B, claiming a refund of tl1e p11rchase price, if C is entitled to the land, and C, for a de�ree to tl1e e�ect tl1at A is the owner if i t is determined t11at B had a better clrum of ownership tl1an t. Ar of se rpo 127 pu e Tl1 . ner ow the is C or B er . eth wh is The com�on q11estion C .. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.
. 555 p. 12, . vol p., Re L. ia11 J11d 6), 188 , tta lcu Ca See Madan MoJ1 an v. Hollo\vay (Higl1 Ct., Civ. Pro. C., Art. 36(6). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 37(b). See Cl1ild v. Stennjng (Ct., App., Eng., 1877), L.J., vol. 46, P· 523. 29, l. vo p., Re L. ian [11d 2), 190 , tta lcu Ca ., Ct See Serajul Huq v. Abdul Rahaman (Higb p. 257.
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·--------� s on l rs t al pe o may ns ai wh ag s l1t rig s I1i e in rm te de to tiff ain pl e tl1 36 is to enable e d ar d an ne oa sig br de e ar d s on to isi ov pr e Th s. l1t rig e os th tl1 wi ed fer ter in ve ha ts an nd t1s fe rio de va e ay be th m st ain ag ,,e ba ay m f tif ain pl e th s im cla all insure that 128 it. su gle sin a in ted adjudica 3. Multiple Parties and Causes of Action We will now consider tl1 e relationsl1 ip between the qt1estio11 of joinder of parties and joinder of causes of action. Let us first review the different rul� s. A si!lgle plaintiff or plaintiffs jointly interested ca11 joi11 any nu�ber of ca�ses of action against. the sa 1!1e defendant or tl1 e same defendants jointly. Tl1 ere 1s 110 requ1ren1 ent that the claims arise fro111 the same transaction f or tl1 at tl1ere be a common question of law or fact. Wl1 ere t\VO or n1ore plai11 tif s join, their clai111 s 111ust arise from the sa1ne transaction or series of trai1sactions ai1d tl1 ere 111t1st be a co1111no1 1 question of law 01 fact. Wl1 ere two or 11 1ore defe11 da11 ts are joined, tl1ere n1t1st be a co1nmon question of la\v or f::1ct, or all tl1 e defendants n1l1st be parties to tl1e san1e contract, or the JJlaintiff 1nust be i11 doubt as to tl1e JJerso11 against wl1on1 l1e is entitled to relief. Tl1e JJroblen1 of joinder of 1Jarties a11d cat1ses of action arises whe11 mt1ltiple parties sue or are sued on 11 1t1 ltiJ Jle clain1s. Tl1 ere are no provisio11 s dealing witl1 joinder of n1ultiple parties and clain1s, so wl1 en faced \Vitl1 st1 cl1 a problem, tl1e court m·ust co11 sider boll1 tl1 e rttles as to joinder of causes of actio11 and the rt1les as to join der of IJarties. Tl1 e proble111 of n1 t1ltiJJle parties a11 d cat1ses of action was gra JJhicaJly presented i11 tl1e case of Feclerc1I J-Ioi1si11g Ad111i11istrator v. C/1ristianso11. 129 Tl1 e plaintiff brougl1t st1it against tl1ree defenda1 1ts 011 two pron1isso1:y notes. Tl1e first was signed by all tl1ree defenda11 ts, a11d tl1 e second ,vas signed by two of tl1 e1 11. TI1e cot1rt held tl1at joinder was 11 ot proper. If botl1 11 otes l1ad been sigi1ed by two defendants, the qt1estion ,vould not l1ave bee11 011e of joinder of parties, bt1t joinder of causes of action. In Ethiopia, st1cl1 joinder \VOt1ld l1ave been pro1Jer, becat1se the defendants \VOt1ld be joi11tl:y liable 011 botl1 notes witl1i11 tl1e 111eaning of Art. 217, 130 and t11 1der tl1at article tl1 e l )laintiff 111 ay l111 ite several cast1es of action against defendants joi11tly liable, e.g., if A a11d B isst1e two 11 otes to tl1 e plai11tiff, l1e n1ay sue on both notes �l1 �t as �f A alo11 e l1 �d issue� the 11 otes. Ho,vever, as tl1 e cot1rt poi11 ted out, once �0 �11 der !11 volves n1 t1lt1 1Jle parties, tl1 at is, parties who are not jointly interested or JOin�ly liable, tl1e case 11 1t1st be decided according to tl1.e rt1les gover11i11 g joinder of p�rtres. Tl1 e rule a? to joinder of defendants was si1nilar to Art. 36(1) in tl1 at J01 �1der \\1 as pro �er 1f tl·1ere wot1ld be a co1nn1 on qt1 estion of law or fact. 011 tlris point, tl1e follo\v1ng qttotation fron1 the cot1rt's OJ)inio11 is significant: ''Clearly tl1 ere is no con1 111 00 question of f[1ct in,,olved 11.ere. For eacl1 11ote 11 ecessarily in, 1olves �eparate questio11s of fact. Nor, I I1old, is there l1ere involv of law. For tinder tl 1 e first cou11t tl1 e 011ly qt1estions of ed a co111 n1 on qt1e�t1on _ _ I a\v relate to tl1e l1 ab1 l1ty of tl1 e _tl1 ree defendants 11 1)011 tl1 e first 11 ote and t1nder _ tl1e second cot111 t the only quest1 011s of la\v relate to tl1e liability of tl1e two defe 11da1 1�s upo1: tl1e second note. Wl1 etl1er tl1e sa111 e general princiJJles of law are a1Jplicable rs not JJart of tl1e prescribed test. 1"o rule other,vise would in •
· · Where the clain1s J.oined agains · t ti ie severa I defendants cannot converuently be tried togetI1 er, . . t 1 1e cou� t n1ay order se parate trials. Civ. Pro c., Art. 22 1. . 129. S Ct., D. C . cticut, . 1?39), Fee/era! Supple,nent Rep., vol. 29, p. 419, in R. Fi eld ��d .BD � ��: . · . aplan, Mate, 1als on C111 1/ Proceclure (I 953), p. I 008. 130. n a �i� �u�� �l ie n:a �s tl�at botl, are liable on the obligation. It does not mean t 11at the pla�n 01t 97 ,nee each lias an Civ. See indivi dual pla.in tiff. oblig ation to the pay ; � C., Arts. 1 s 96, 128.
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effect permit a cr�dit? r, Sl1ch as a bank, to bring a single action against all debtors whose o�ligat1ons arose o�t of promissory notes, ll pon the tlleory tllat a common qu estion of law was involved." In. other wo rds, al�h?u gh the plaintiff co�]� l1ave joined two defendants on two l e1n. JointlY, he could not Join s t1its t y 1 b d issu e s note on one not e iss . . u ed by two . . and an�ther .110te iss ued by th ose tw o p�rties plus someone els pa.rties e. The pr e· the qt1est1on from one of Jo sence ·of tl1e thi rd de· f e· ndant conv e rted · inde r of cau ses · . of action to one o_f J0111der . of part1es, a11d tL1ere wo11ld 110t be a common q tiestion of Jaw or of fact 1n tl1e s111ts tl1,1t \Vere joined. The sa1ne I?rinciple wot1ld apply "':here tl1e plaintiff joi11 s claims against two defendants. that 1°:volve a co111mon qL1est1on of law o r fact, b tit also joins an tin related cla.1�11 ag�nst one of tl1� ?efendants. Sup_pose tl1at he sues two defendants on a negotiable 1nstr�.11�e11t a11d J01 11s a . clai1n for breach of contract agai1 1st one of tl1e defendants. Tl1e Jo1nder �f. tl1e cla1111� on tl1e negotiable instrLiments is p roper under Ar�. 36(2). I-Ie cotlld Join the cla1111 on the negotiable instrL1ment witl1 the c]ain1 agrunst the 011e defendant for breacl1 of co1 1tract tinder Art. 217 - since tl1ere is one plaintiff a 11d on.e de f. e11dant, tl1e qL1estion is one of joinder of cat1ses of action. But he ca1111ot joi11 the claim agai11st tl1e :first defendant for breach of contract witl1 tl1e clai1n. agai11st the :fi rst a11d second defendant on the 11eaoti able 0 instrL1111ent. Since tl1e clai111 for breacl1 of co11tract is only against tl1e o11e defen dant and he has 1nade anotl1er defendant a. party, tl1e rt1les as to joi11der of defen dants apply rather tl1an tl1ose a.s to joi1 1der of caL1ses of action. There is 11ot a con1mon question of la\V or fact i11 the suit on the contract and tl1e sL1it on the negotiable instrument, and joinder is 11ot _proper. On the other l1and, joinder of 1111related clai1us n1ay be perrnjtted if the reqL1ire ments of both Art. 36 and Art. 217 are satisfied. A and B l1ave isst1ecl two promis sory 11.otes to the plaintiff. A l1as also made a contract \Vitl1 the IJlaintiff, whic}1 h. e \Vas unable to perfor1n, beca11se B, aware of the contract A hacl witl1 tl1e plaintiff, indL 1ced A to enter into a contract witl1 l1im, thereby 1naking it in1possibJe for A to perfor·n1 his cont ract with tl1e plaintiff. The plaintiff 1nay joi11 i11 a si11gle st1it l1is clai111s on. botl1 n egotiabl e i11strt11uents, his clai1n agai 1 1st A for breach of co11t ract and his claim against B for cat1sing A to breach tl1e co11tract. I-l e 111ay join the clai1ns on tl1e negotiable instru1nents and for breach of co11tract agai11st A tincler Art. 217; he may join the claims on the negotiable instrt1n1ents and for causi og the breach of contract ae1,1in st B t1nder Art. 217. The claims on tl1e negotiable instni O ments n1ay be joined under A rt. 217, since tl1ey involve the same defendants jointly. TlJe only qt1estion of pa11ies arises with respect to the joinder of tl1e claim for breacl1 of contract with. tl1e clai111 for indu cing the breach. Since tl1ere is clearly a com n. 1on q11estion of fa. c t or law in both claims - did A breach tl1e contract - joinder is prope r u nder Art. 36(1). Since joinder of the claims on the negotiable instr11rnents is proper tinder Art. 217, and joinder of A and B as de·fe11dants on tl1e ot�e.r claims is proper tinder A .rt. 36(1), tl1ere can be no objection on gro11nd of 1111sjoinder. · e tl,e parties er h w_ e on e tl1 1 o11 r f 1ed isl 1 gi. tin v dis Howe er, this situation n1l1st be may be joined on on e caL1se of action, bl1t not on tl1e otl1ers. If,. 1 n ot1r exa111ple, the notes were on ly issued by A, tl1e plaintiff could joi� A on tb.e notes ao<l_. 0� the claim fo r breach of contract or A an d B on the cla1111 for b reacl1 of coiitract 0111 �r te ra pa se re we te 11o e tl1 d an tl1e clai 1 n for ca t1sing th e breach. Tl1e clai1ns on e bl lia t no s �a B 1ce si! d ,tn the claims fo r tl1e ·brea�h an d. for causing tl1 e breacl1, e n sa e th t nS ai ag n tio ac of on the notes, th e provisjons as to joinder of ca uses ; defendants jointly wo11Id no t be applicable. Tl1e questio11 as to B wottld be l?u£e · e tis sa be t no lld Ot \\' one of joind.e r of parties, an d th e conditio11s of Art. 36(1)
J
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......------Tl1 ere is no provision i11 the Ethiopicln r11les t� the effect that wh�re joinder of parties is proper, unrelat�d clc1:ims held by or against one of th� p art1es may �e _ joined with the former clrums. In � ngland,. for example, the pla.1nt1ff m�y, as 1n . but 1t sa 1s a!so Ethiopia, unite several :a� ses of a�t1?n ag� 1nst . tl1e n:ie defendant, J)rovided t11at wl1ere pla1nt1ffs may Jotn tl1e1r cla�s agamst a defend� nt, any plain tiff may also joi1 1 in tl1e same suit separate claims tl1at he has agrunst the defen dant. 1 3I Consider this recent English case. 1 :i2 Tl1e plaintiffs were a mother and son, and the defendants \Vere tl1e daugl1ter (and sister) and the son-in-law (and brother in-la\v). In the first cause of action, the son s11ed botl1 defendants to cancel a deed of fan1ily arrangeme1 1t regulati1 1g the disposal of l1is fatl1er's estate on the ground that it was procured by fra11d. In the second cause of action the mother and son joi 11ed claims against botl1 defendants for tl1e recovery of improperly appropriated imn1ovable property. In tl1e tl1ird cause of action tl1e motl1er s11ed tl1e defendants to cancel certain documents s11e l1ad executed allegedly dL1e to tl1e fraud of the defendants. The court l1eld tl1at joi1 1der was proper. Si11ce tl1e n1 otl1er and son could join as plait1tiffs in tl1e secon.d cause of actio11 - tl1eir claims arose fro1u tl1e misappropria tio11, a11d tl1e qL1estio1 1s of law and fact wo11ld be ide11tical - each coL1ld. join separate "' clai11Js Linder tl1e rL1les. 1 11is \Vo11ld not be so in Etl1jopia. Tl1ey could join on the second caL1se of action, bLtt as tl1e other claims i11volved separate transactions, join der \Voulcl 1 1ot be pro1)er 11 1 1der Art. 35. Since tl1ere were multiple p · arties, tl1at article a11d not Art. 217 \\1ould be applicable, and since Ethiopia does not l1ave a rule aL1tl1orizing IJlaintiffs wl10 ca11 join in one s11it to add separate claims, th.ere ,vo11lcl be 110 wa;' by ,vl1icl1 s11cl1 joinder coL1ld be effected. Fi 11ally, \Ve 111a)' consider tl1e effect of 1uisjoi11der. Suppose that two plaintiffs ,vl1ose clai1 11s do 11ot arise frorn tl1e same transaction have joi11ed in a single suit. The qL1estio11 is wl1at tl1e coL1rt sl10L1ld do in s11cl1 a case, and tl1e Code is very explicit on tl1is poi1 1t. Art. 39(1) provides tl1at ''No s11it shall be defeated by reason only of tl1e misjoinder or 1 1onjoinder of parties and tl1e court n1ay in every Sltit deal \-Vitl1 tl1e 1 11atter i11 disp11te so f,1r as regards tl1e rigl1ts and interests of tl1e parties actL1ally before it.'' In otl1er words, tl1e co11rt is not to disn1iss the suit. It n1erely orders tl1at the sL1its be severed, and proceeds to l1ear tl1e separate suits.133 No L1tility \\1ould be served i,1 req11iring tl1e plaintiffs (or plaintiff, wl1ere tl1ere l1as been 111isjoinder of defendants) to file a new s11it. This wo11ld also be i111portant if the statute of lin1itations I1ad r11n ,vl1en t11e objection was take1 1, since a new suit wo11ld be barred by limitation. It also provided in Art. 39(2) that any objectio11 on tllis ground is \vaived if not raised at tl1e earliest IJossible opportu11ity. The objection n111st be raised at tl1e first l1earing, whicl1 would be tl1e first OJ)J)OrtL1nity tl1at tl1e defenda 1 1t woL1ld have to do so, 134 and if not raised at that time, it is waived. Tl1e defendant or defe11d ants could still move for separate trials 11nder Art. 221; l1owever, they could not argL1e that separate trials sl1011ld be granted beca11se of 111isjoinder. Art . 4 ?( �) provid.es . t�1 �t tl1e co11rt may order tl1at tl1e nar11e of any party . 1111,pro1 JerJ _y J?tned as pla111t1fl or defe·nclant be strL1clc oLtt. But tl1is provision must b� read 1n l1gl1t of Art. 39(1), wbicl1 directs tl1e court to deal with the matter in d1 s1)ute so far as regards the rigl1ts and interests of tl1e parties actually before it. 131 132. 133.
Rules of the Supreme Court. Order 18, rule 6. �;rris and Another v. Ashw? rtl1 �Chancery,. Eng., 1962), 1962 U'eekly L. Rep., vol. 1, � · 523. the order of the court 1n this regard 10 Federal Housing Administrator v · Christ1a,ison, supra, n.ote 129. 134. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244.
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The court cannot dismiss th e suit of a plaintiff who has improper1 J. 01ne . d o . the r � . nt nda defe a who has nst agai been rope imp suit rly J oin·ed· If the Pl a1ntiff:s w1 · · · l 0 ha ve es1 d · re J0 d 1ne to co y nti . nu e the suit the cotirt should sever th improperl . . e su . ' it an d I vv ,1,h s. tr1 a ere sep so me ara te do no t desire to continue the su1·t, then, order o r· cou rse , . 1 d th p . e� 1 ro ay 35 Where . th ere has been improper joinder of de tl1e cou_r·t _ m fe nd an ts s� be ou ld giv en _ th e option to drop the defendants i inproperl the pla1nt.Iff ·oi Y J ne d or ' to proceed with separate suits. · far, we· ha· ve been on· ly considering pe Th us · rn lis siv ·es e oin J de , r · tI1a t s i , wh a pa t t r · · I .i:r.: · 1 a1n !111 or p s as e b JO ioe JOJ n may � as ��fe11�ants. There is ordinarily 110 requirement !h�t all parties whose _ r1_gl1t_ t_o relief arises 011t of the same transaction join as plrunt1ffs or �hat the plaintiff JOin all defendants as to wl1om ltis rigl1t to relief is alleged to �x1st wher� tl1ere wo11ld ?e. co1�mon questions of law or fact. It is, as_ we l1ave said, �er� tmp?rtant to d1st1ng·u1sh permissive joinder from mandatory j?1nder. T�e . n1ater.1al J�I�t d1scusse? deals only .witl1 permissive joinder by tl1e plain tiff or plaintiffs wl1en f 1l1ng tl1e suit, and we will now turn our attentio11 to mand atory joinder. C. Indispensable Parties: Mandatory Joinder 1. \\'ho Are Indispensable Parties In thjs section we will be concerned w.itl1 wl1at parties 111ust join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants. Except for Art. 36(3) and (4), wluch require the joinder of parties i11 certain ca.ses, tl1e Civil Procedure Code does not expressly deal witl1 . the questio11. And Art. 39(1) provides tl1at 110 st1it sl1all be defeated for 111isjoi.nder or non-joinder o .f parties. However, tl1e rule as to indispe11sable parties is dictated by tl1e requirements of tl1e substa11tive law. In com111enting on Order I, rule 9 of the Indian Code of Civil Proced11re, which is identical with Art. 39(1) of tl1e Ethio pian Code, Judge Sarkar observes as follows: ''Tl1e rule is a rule of procedure a.nd l1as no application wl1ere tinder the s11b stantive law, the rigl1ts and interests of tl1e parties actually before tJ1e cot1rt cannot be determined and no effective decree passed . . . Rule 9 tl1erefore does not apply when a ca11se of action arises against a n11mber of persons jointly, beca11se when one of such persons is eli1ninated, 110 cause of action s11bsists against some of tl1e1n. " 136 The same would be true wl1ere a nu111ber of persons l1ave a joint interest in the claim and only one of the111 files suit. The other parties l1aving a joint interest would be indispensable since tl1e claim b· elongs to all of tl1em and no� to one of them. So too, where the rights of a person not a party wo11ld necessarily be �ffec� ed by a decree rendered in a suit, tl1at person m11st be n1ade a party; 10 h1s absence no effective decree can be passed. A.rt. 39(1) must be rea d in conjunction with Art. 40(2), wl1i_cl� a11thorizes_ t� e court to add the name of any person who ought to have ?ee� JOtned as pla1nt1ff or defendant or whose prese11ce i s necessary for the detern11nat1on of all tl1e ques tions involved in the suit. S11ch a person is an indispensable party, as we_ ha�e bee11 using the term, 131 a ·nd he mu st be added. In other words, the cot1rt, 1n l1gl1t of 135. However, if they do not withdraw witl1 pern1ission to file a fresh suit agai?st t� e d�feJldant : ap CJl m on ssi cu dis 1 tl e d an 279 8, 27 ts. Ar , such a st1it wot1Jd be barred. See Civ. ·Pro. C. ter VU, infra. 136. S. Sarkar, T/1e Lalv of Civil ProcecltLre (4tl1 ed., 1963), vol. 1, P· 230. n pia bio El e th of ) (2 40 rt. A th \Vi al tic en id 137. Order 1 rule 10 of tbe I11dian Code whicl1 is . h Ct., Calcutta, ig (H da Code, h�s been interpreted i n this m'anner. See Jivandas v. Narba 1959), 1959 All-I11dia Rep., p. 519.
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Art. 39(1), does not dismiss a suit for· failure to join �n indisp�nsable party! but adds that person as a party under Art. 40(2). We will �st . d1�cuss what 1s � n indispensable party aiid then discuss the procedure for adding 1nd1spensable parties when a.n objectior1 l1as been 1nade on t�at gro11nd. Tl1 e general definition of an i 11dispensable party is one . whose in�eres!s, rig�ts or duties vvill in·�vitably be affected by a decree ren�ered 1n an action 1n � h�ch l1e is not a nan1ed l )arty . 138 Tl1e clearest exa1nple . 1s a party V:'ho has a Joint interest in tl1e clain1 or obligatio11 which is tl1 e subJect of tl1e s111t. 1f A and B are tl1e joint owners of immovable J)roperty, 139 \vl1icl1 is vvro11gfully occupied by C, botl1 A and B must join in an action against C to recover tl1 e proi)erty. 140 Neither A 11or B l1as ai 1 individua.l rigl1 t in tl1e land; the rigl1 t is a joi11t one, and both l1olders of the riol1t 111ust sue to e11 force it, since tl1e result in tl1 e suit will affect tl1e i11 terests of b�tl1. If C had s11ffered i 11 j11ry on la11d owned jointly by A and B, he \Vould l1ave to join botl1 as defendants. I-lis rigl1t is against tl1em jointly, since I1e s11flered tl1e i 11j11ry on land as to \vbicl1 they l1ave a joint obligatio1 1. It should be r1oted tl1at A.rt. 36(1) refers to a rigl1t to relief a.gai1 1st persons jointly. In one case 141 a l1usba11d a11d wife \Vere joi11t owners of in11novable property, and conve)1ed tl1 e J)rOJJerty to tl1e defeoda11 t. Tl1e \vjfe, co1 1te11di 11 g that the conveyance ,vas void, s11ed to cancel the tra11sactioi1. It ,vas l1eld that l1 er l111sband ,vas an indispensable party. Botl1 l1ad co11veyed tl1e pro1Jerty to tl1e defendant. Whe1 1 a transaction is ca11celled, the proJ)erty js ret11r11ed to the transferor, a11d in order for a decree rett1 r11 i11g tl1e JJrOJJerty to be effective, botl1 owners had to be before tl1e cou.rt. Tl1e co11rt co11ld 11ot ca11ccl tl1e transfer a 11d order tl1e property retu1·ned to the \vife ; the JJrOJJerty l1ad to be ret11r 11 ed to the ,vife and 1111 sband as joint o,vners, a11d, tl1 erefore, tl1e l1t1sband was an indispe11sable party. Or to p1 1 t it another way, tl1e ,vife l1ad 11 0 rigl1t to l1ave tl1e sale ca11celled. Any s11cl1 rigl1t belonged to the ht1sband a11d ,vife as joi11t O\Vners, and botl1 l1ad to be parties to tl1e s11.it. Tl1e more difficult questio11 re,1ol\ 1es aroL111cl l Jersons vvl1 ose rigl1ts will necessarily be affected by tl1e decree i11 tl1 e ca.se. Tl1ey 1n.ay not have a joint interest with tl1 e JJlai11tiff or defenda11t, as we l1ave defi11ed tl1at term, b11t tl1ey l1a.ve an interest that ,vill 11ecessarily be affected by tl1 e decree rendered i 11 tl1e s11it. This is likely to l1a1Jpen \Vl1en tl1e s11it i11,1olves specific 1Jroperty, a res, as it is called, and the decision ,viii dispose of tl1at prOJ)erty. All persons wl1 0 1nigl1t have an i11terest in ?ucl1 JJroperty are indispe11sa.ble JJarties, since the decree will necessarily affect tl1eir interests. St1p_pose tl1 at tl1 ere are a n11 111ber of be 11 eficiaries of a tr11st, and one benefici,1ry brings s11it agai11st tl1 e trLtstee for ,t deter111inatiot1 of J1is rigl1ts in the trust prOJJerty. Tl1 e otl1 er beneficiaries are indispe 1 1sable JJart.ies, si 11ce a decision as to tl1e r1gl1ts of one beneficiary will 11 ecessarily affect tl1e rights of the others. 142 If tl1e court finds tl1at l1e is entitled to 50% of t]1e inco111e, this 111eans that tl1e _ an1ount to wl11cl1 tl1e otl1er be11 eficiaries collectively are e 11 titled ca.oo.ot exceed 50%. Tber �fo:e, tl1eir rigl1ts will necessarily be affected by tl1 e decree renclered, and tl1ey _ 143 Or, in a st1it to e 11 force a mortgage, wl1ere tl1e land are 1 1 1d1s1Je11sable pa.rties. 138.
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See Ba�1k ?f Califor11ia National Associa1io11 v. Superior Court (Sup. Ct., California, U.S., 19_4�), Pacific Rep., 2ncf Series, vol. 106, IJ. 879, in J. Chadbour11 a11d L. L evin, Cases 011 C1v1/ Proceclure (1961), JJ. 550. 139. A thing 111 ay be o,vned by sev eral JJersons as joi11t o,v11ers. Civ . C., Art. 1257(1). 140. See 1':f ohanavelt1_ v. Amna1naJai (J:ligl1 Ct., Madras, 1923), 1923 All-India Rep., . 33 . 7 p 141. Ct1.nningbam v. Brewer (Sup. Ct., Nebraska, U.S., 1944), North 1vestern Rep. 211d Series, v ol. 16, p. 533, .1n J. Cbadbour11 and L. L evi11, Cases on Ci11il Proceclure (196,1), p. 560. . 142. A bu� Gesini Abdel Ral1in1 v. l-Ieirs of Hassan EI Ibral1in1 (Ct. App., Sud , 960) an 1 �;�0 s uc,a11 L .J., , p. 209. 143. See the discussion of thjs point it1 Bank of California Nationa Ass Superior Court, · ocia l v. tion supra, note 138.
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tha one n mo re mo rtg to age , all ct the sub mo je rtga gee s are is ind·1spensable part l·es.144 The decree will affect the lan d which is secttrity for all the mortgages. and · teres t o f th.e oth_er mortgagees. I.f the land is sold to satisfy the_reby afliect t·he 1n tile 1no rtgagee, the security of the . otl1er mortgagees will be destro claim of one yed. Another s�ch case would be �here the debtor l1as made an assignment for the beiie fit of credrtors, and on� �red1tor sues tl1e assignee for recovery of his sllare of the ited, and any recovery I1e obtains will limit the amount assets. The assets are lim 1 45 reco ver. Under the sa1ne pri11ciple, it is held that in a Stlit for can othe rs the partition of land, all co -owners n1t1s� be 1nade parties, and in a partnersltip accotint 146 The mt1st partn be ers JJarti es. the all suit, . case involves specific property, and . t11e interests of all perso11s 10 that property will be affected by the decree. Tl1e rigl1�s of o�l1er parties �11ay . also be affected by a decree, even tliough a res as sucl1 1s 11ot involved. Tl11s will ust1ally occur wl1ere tl1e defendant wlio is sued has a relationship with anotl1er person tha.t will be affected by tl1e decree in tl1e suit. In 011e_ case' 47 the defendant permi_tt�d- oil companies to use bis drainage lines for the dtspos�l . of waste waters. AdJ01r11ng landowners stied to enjoin the defendant fron1 per011tt1ng such use on tl1e ground that it was deterimental to their Ia.nds. It was l1eld that the oil co1npanies l1avi11g leases \Vitl1 tl1e defendant \Vere indjspensable parties, since if tl1e plaintiffs were st1ccessf L1 l, any use of the drainage lines would be prol1ibited. In another ca.se tl1e lessee st1bleased tl1e premises, as l1e had a rigl1t to do. The co11tract of lease specified tl1at tl1e occt1pant would not engage in certain activities; if he did, the lease wo11ld be forfeited. Tl1e lessor sued the sublessee, clajnung tl1at tl1e st1blessee l1ad engaged in sucl1 conduct, tl1ereby forfeiting tl1e lease. It was held tl1at the s11blessor (tl1e original lessee) was an indis pensable party, since if the plaintiff were successft11, tl1e lease wo11ld be for·feited against the original lessee as well. 148 It is a general principle tl1at in a st1it for the recovery of immovable property, all persons l1aving an interest in tl1at property are indispensable parties. 149 This rule is embodied i n Art. 36(4), wl1icl1 provides th.at wl1ere the plaintiff sties for tl1 e re covery of immovable property free of occ111Ja11ts, all occ11pants, wl1atever tl1eir title, shall be made pa.rties. The rigl1ts of those occt1pants in the property would neces sarily be affected by the decree rendered in tl1e st1it, and tl1ey are i _ndispe11sable parties. In determini11g wl1etl1er a party not joined is an indispensable party, regard t must be had to the req 1ire1nent that tl1e rights of tl1e pa1·ty woul� necessc,rily be affected by the decree ren.derecl in the sitit. TI1e cot1rt 111t1�t consider tl1e ·factual circumstances of tl1e particular case and ask whether the 1s�t1a�1.ce of the. decree would necessarily affect tl1e rights of the party alleged to �e . 1nd1spensable.. w_e are not now concerned with wl1etl1er that pa1iy cot1ld l1ave Joined as a plaintiff or 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149.
ia nd l-I Al 48 19 ), 46 19 , ay n1b Bo ., Ct igh (H pa See Adivappa Chan.nappa v. Racappa Balap Rep., p. 211. r Court rio pe Su v. 11 tio ias soc As l na tio Na nia or lif Ca See the discussion of th.is point in Ba,1k of supra, note 138. 063), 1 ed., J.,, tl (4 e ur ed oc Pr vil Ci of lv See the djscussion of tl1is point in S. Sarkar, The La vol. 1, p. 230. · · (C App , Califor11ia US , 1959) Pacific Rep., 217d · Thon1s011 v. Talbert Drainage D1str 1ct t. . .· . 'Cases· .011 Cil'/t · Procedure (1961), 1n, ev L L. Series, vol. 336, p. 174, in J. Chaclbourn and · p. 557. er,or up s v. on ti ia oc ss A I ,a ,o, · t a }l za • ;r, rn See tl1e discussion of sucl1 a case in Ban/c of Cali:,o Court, supra, note 138. P· 230· at 6 14 te no a, pr su , ar rk Sa See the discussion of this point in S.
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I
1111111•-----e �o cerned with whether he w e ar �r ? t: an d en ef d a as � fi could have been joiiied ty e d Ir ar h t p a as �t� which enda d e in J? e b _ ld t1 co e l1 r 1e 5 tl he w r . o 0 cotlld intervenet t r he h� us m �t wh �e Joined in y pl sun S n tio es qu I 1e Tl . ly nt ue eq bs su we will djscuss ly 1s 1s �o on tl1 d if his right s an , se ca e th ith w d ee oc pr to . t ur co . order for tile ar . ut ul ic sr rt 1e pa tl 1n ee cr de e th by ed ct wotild necessarily be affe d or co�ld have been ne joi ve I1a uld co o ,vh es rti pa n ee tw be TJ1e disti iiction ng wi e !h llo by fo d a�e r tw o cases. st_ on 1:11 de is d �e joi be st n1u at th se tl1o d an joined 11ld 1n g against dan1age by fire. He bt s l11 red st1 1 111 d l1a nt I5 da fen de e 1 tl J 11 one case 1pa11ies. Tl1e policie_s were for pro rata n o c_ t ren e f dif e 11in l1 wit ies lic took ot1t nine po n tio of por loss tl1at the the :pro for ble _lia be t1ld ,vo ny 11pa co1 l1 eac is, liability, that ty. tl1e per ng pro eri J In other cov nce ura 111s e 0 ,vl1 tl1e to re bo nce t1ra ins ainot111t of d it ure for ins . Co Etl1.$ 1000, B 0, 200 .$ Eth for ty per pro the red insu . Co A if words, 1.$ s Etl wa s 3000, A Co. los tl1e and 0, 300 1 .$ Etl for it ed 1sur 1 i Co. C and would be liable for Etl1. i I 000, B Co. wot1ld be liable for Etl1.$ 500 , and C Co. would be liable for Etl1.$ 1 500. Tl1e defe 1 1da11t n1 ade claims agai11st each of the c.01111Ja1 1ies for tl1e an1011nt in whicl1 tl1ey woulcl be liable on tl1e IJolicies they issued. All tl1e co1npanies reft1sed to JJay, claimi11g that tl1e defendant ]1j 1nself caused tl1e fire, i 1 1 \Vl1icl1 case tl1ey would not be liable on tl1e policies. Seven of tl1 e compan ies joi11ed in �t st1it for a declaratory j11dg111ent to tl1e effect tl1at they ,vere not liable on tl1eir policies. Joi1 1der was JJro1Jer, si11ce tl1eir clain1s for declaratory relief arose 011t of tl1c sa1ne tra11saction - the bt1r 1 1i11g of tl1e buildi11g152 a11d the questions i11 all cases \vouJd be tl1e san1e. Tl1e defe11da11t co11tended tl1at the other companie.s ,vere i. ndis1Je 11sa.ble 1Jarties. Tl1e co11rt rejectecl tl1is co1 1tention 011 tl1e gro11nd that the rigl1ts of the otl1er co 1 111Ja11ies wo11ld 11ot be affected by tl1e jt1dg111ent in the s11it. The 1Jlai 1 1tiffs ,vere sui11g to deter111ine wl1 etl1er tl1ey were liable on tl1e policies tl1ey l1ad isst1ed. Tl1e cot1rt vvo11ld 11ot be adjt1dicati11g any questions regarding the liability of tl1e otl1er co111panies. Since tl1eir rigl1ts wot1ld 11ot be affected by tlJe decision i11 tl1e suit, 153 they ,vere not i11dispensable IJarties, even tl1ouol1 tl1ey could l1ave joined as JJlaintiffs. 154 So too, wl1ere several persons were grant:d a servitude ?Y tl1e defenda 1 1t to t1se 11is drive\vay, a11d he refuses to allow the parties to use 1t, eacl1 can st1e to e 1 1force l1is individt1al servitt1de. The otl1ers are not indispens able parti�s, sin_ce �heir rigl1ts witl1 respect to tl1eir servitudes \Vill not be adjudicated. Tl1e question \VI]! simply be wl1etl1er tl1e named plai 11tiff l1as a servitt 1 de to use tl1e driveway'. 155 150. 15 l 152. 153. 154.
155 .
v-yhere . an indisp e11sa_bl e party has not been joined, J1e cot1l d, of col1rse, intervene. See the d1scuss1on of the point, infra note 211 and accompanyiJ1g text. Fir me,1's Fund Insurance Co. v. Cranda l l I-Iorse Co. (U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D., New York, ; Fecl ra/ Supple,ne ,t Rep., vo l 194-), . 47, p . 78, in C. Brown, A. Vestal and M. L.add, Cases e_ � a11c/ A1ater1als on Pleac/ing a11cl Procedure (1953), p. 576. S�e the discussion o� joinder of p l aiotifl's in a suit for a decl aratory judgn1 ent in Ato lvfen g1stou Alo,nau v. G1orc/ano Co11cette, supra, 11ote 96. The decisio� would not be biL1ding 011 t l1e other con1panies since each co111 1,any had a eparate cl a_m�, and the ones_ who did not joi 11 would 11ot be' clain1ing through tl1ose that �1 led tl 1e or1g1nal su.it. See C1 v. Pro. C., Art. 5. · · · A contrary resul t \\1as re"'':cl1ed Lll · A 1ner1ca11 (US · Insurance Co. v. Braclley Jvf1111ng c · · o. Life . nta, 1944), Dist· C t·, N.D.,_ Ca)ifor Fee/era/ S11pp/en1ent J�ep., vol. 57, p. 545, in M. Rose�berg z:.. and J. Weinste1n, E/e111ents of Ci1 1i/ Procedure JD n decisio the , However , 1122 p (l96") · · · · .... · . tl1e 1·1reme11's ca �e is cIearIY correct, since the rigl1ts of tbe absent con1panies \v ould not necessari.lY be aflected by the result il1 th e suit. See SurJa v Cl1 dr (II' I 1 Ct., al so tIle See Calcutta, 050. I 1924), Rep., 1924 All-I11dia11 discussio,1 i� D ai l �a,_ ' · vo 1953), e Code Mitter, of c�·vil R. Proc�dure (12th ed. by I the p. 514. The author i.n cat-�es s t th ere 1s authority to the contrary. Ho wever, h e fa'-:or tha � � rul e tbat j 11 a11 actio to enforc own e an easen1ent, eacl1 party may st1e to protect bis interest.
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Whether � party is �ndispensable m ay depend on the precise na ture of the th pa e rt1 cula.r case. In Northeast Mutual Lire1 Insura claims made 1n .nce Co • V. ':/ · 156 tlle deceden t had made a creditor the beneficiary of . , Bran den be,g his ins ura nc e re qu he este? that Bra�denberg should receive the proceeds · policy. Lat�r but did not endorse this on tile poli�y as requ1r�d, tlJereby creating a question as to whether Bran · denberg or . tl1e credito! was entitled �o th� proceeds. The inst1rance company ed tha t it was no t liable on tl1e policy, since the deceased l1 ad misrepresent contend _ state of l1eaJtl1. It sued Brandenberg and tl1e creditor to cancel the policy ed lJis _ _ due to tl1e m1sre_presentations of tl1e decedent. Tl1e defendants contended that tlle estate of the decedent was an indispensable party, since if tl1e claims of either tl1e creditor or Brandenberg (whichever was fot1nd to be entitled to the proceeds if rescission wa� not ordered) did. not exhaust tl1e amot1nt of the policy, tl1e estate wot1ld be entitled to tl1e bala.nce. The cot1rt held th.at the estate was not an indis pensable party. In tl1e first place tl1e claims of tl1 e creditor were dot1ble tl1e face value of tl1e policy. More i1111Jortantly, tl1e claim o·f the estate against the co1n pany, if any, wot1ld 11ot be a claim against tl1e policy - there was 110 res as such. Tl1e co111pany would be liable to tl1e estate for any excess irrespective of wl1at disposition was n1ad.e of fhis case. Since tl1e rigl1ts of the estate woulcl n. ot be affected by the jt1dgn1ent in tl1e suit, tl1e estate was 11ot an indispensable party. Fi11ally, we may co11sider the req11iren1ent of Art. 36(3), whicl1 may be called a require1nent relati11g to conditionally necessary parties. Where a st1it co11cerns property adminstered by several tr11stees, executors or ad1ninistrators, ,111 st1cl1 persons shall be n1ade parties to a suit against 011e of them. Tl1is is only applicable, J1ovv ever, wl1en one representative is sued a11d not wl1e11 011e representative is st1ing. Moreover, such joi11der is not ordinarily req11ired as to representatives residing ot1t side Ethiopia. 157 Th.is is why I refer to tlus rtile as relating to conditionally ne cessary parties. Such persons must be joined, except wl1ere tl1ey are residi11g outside Etl1iopia. The SLiit cannot then fail because of tl1e inability to join the other repre sentatives.
2.
Joinder of Indispensable Parties
Now that we l1ave de-fined an indispensable party, we n1ay consider the proce dure to follow where an indispensable party l1as not joined or been joinecl. !lie defendant should raise this objection as soon as lJossible, namely at the �rst �ear1ng. If he does 11ot raise it at tl1at time, the qt1estion is whether he can raise it �ub sequently or whether the cot1rt can raise it on its ��n n1otion. �rt. 39(2) prov�des ed rais l be shal rties p of r nde that any objection on grot1od of misjoinder or_ nonJ01 � _ at the earliest possible opportt1nity and any obJect1on no� so rrused sball_ be dee111ed to have been waived. However, i t is st1bmitted that 1s not_ b � applicable where there has been a failt1re to object to tl1e nonjoinder of an 1nd1spe11sable pa.rty. It is generally recognized that st1ch an object!on cannot be waived � nd t11at the co1irt, .158 Art. 40(2) provides tl1at the cottrt if necessary, must raise it on its ow n mot1on. : in R. 156. (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D., Ne w York, 1948), Fee/era! Rules Decisio,,s, vol. 8, p. 151, Field and B. Kaplan, 1\1aterials 011. Civil Procedttre (1953), p. 982. . und tl1at gro · the on es rt pa de ma b e s . tl ler J i 0. 1e t t_ tha ve 157. Tl1e named representatives can n1o _ h suc if e11 Ev 43. t A r . nde . u tl1en1 . y 1 r t n le they WOLUd be e1 1titled to contr1b ut1on _or 1n c m 1 � ? i:1- _ b e·y woul� be subiect to tJ,e · t s, r1e 1a l 1 11c • J · n nationals or don representati ves were not Eth·1op1a 1.ng be n io ess cc su or st tru a d lve vo · .1n ·t Stll e ·th jurisdiction of the Etl1iopian courts so long as • administered in Ethiopia. . case tl1e .e�fr at th In . 41 l te no ra I v. m l,a 158, See the discussion of this point m Ci,r,ning gpur, 1939), Na . Ct , igl (H a� · ' · s1 � an so a I ee S t. ur defect was noticed by tl1e appellate co 1941 All-/11dia1i Re p., p. 5.
·J
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· 1 e application of either party, add the tl on or n tio u1o 1 1 w . ay at �i�y t1111e of its 0 iu n tiff p as ain or ed oin l d en en be def ve j ha a t to t gl1 OlJ or · o ' wh v · son · i · · pe · 1J name of ,11 ue st 1o ns 1nvolv:d in 1 nat1o 11 of aII tl1� 1. � er �t d e th r fo ry sa es ec n i wl1ose presence is ti t r ec es 1s l ot pa ? p� e b e sa th en sp d1 1n of isind le ru e th r fo on as re ie Tl the suit. . ise its power under erc ld ex ou sh t ur co e tl1 d an ed oin t J no ' is · o · wh · pensable Party . . ive t, t he nghts of_ a wa ec ffi 1 1not, 111 e_. ca nt da fe� d� 1e Tl 1 u1. h t ec ot pr Art. 40(2) to e e tl1 I1k , absence of material rty pa bie sa en 1sp nd 1 an of ce sen ab ie Tl tllird part)'. d. ee oc pr to t 11r co e tl1 r fo le ib ss po im it s er nd re jurisdiction, ered, the court should cov dis is rty pa e abl ens isp ind an of e enc abs the Wl1.en . 39(1) ?irects that the Art 2). 40( . Art ?� ons visi pro tl1e l1 wit e anc ord acc ir1 d procee 1 nder, an d Art. 40(2) giv es the court J0 non to dtte sed mis dis be not ll sl1a suit tl1 e power to in1plement tl1at r11le, even i11 tl1e case of_ indjsp�ns�ble parties, by bri11 ging tl1e indispensable party into the case. However, 1f the 1nd1spensab]e part)' is 11 ot subject to the jurisdiction of tl1 e coL1 rt, the11 tl1e court 1nust dismiss the case. Tl1is would not be likely to l1appe11 often, bttt it could l1appen. Suppose that A, an Etl1iopian 11ational, is ad111inisteri11g a trust in Kenya for the benefit of two Ke 1 1yans, 011e of wl1om s11es l1 i1n i11 Etl1iopia for a declaration of l1is rights under the trust. The otl1er I(e11)1a11 , \1/]10 is an indis1)ensable party, is not subject to the jurisdiction of tl1e Etl1iopian cot1rts and ca1111ot be bro11ght i11. Tl1 erefore, the suit 111 ust be dis1nissed due to tl1e absence of an i11dispe1 1sable pa.rty. Actually, it would l1 ave bee11 better if tl1is case had bee1 1 brougl1t in Ke11 ya, since tl1e trust res and tl1e be11eficiaries are tl1 ere, so tl1 e disnussal \1/0rks no injustice. It will be rare for a suit to be dis111issed in Etl1iopia lJecat1se a11 i11 dispensable party is not subject to tl1e court's jurisdiction . Wl1 ere tl1e i11dispensable JJart)' is joined as a defendant, 110 proble111 arises. The staten1e11t of clai111 is an1eoded accordingly, and a copy is served on the new de fend,:1nt.1 59 I-Iowever, wl1 ere an indiSJJensable party plai11tiff does not join, a prob len1 11 1ay arise, since Art. 40(2) J)ro\1ides tl1at 1 10 perso11 shall be added as plaintiff \vitl 1out l1is consent. Suppose tl1at /\, B a11 d C are joint owners of land, whicl1 is oc�upied by D u11der a clain1 of o-v,1nershi p. A and B s11e to establisl1 tl1eir O\Vner ?l1_1p �nd to _recover tl1e la11 d fron1 D. C, a11 i1 1dispe11sable part)', si1 1ce l1e has a J�1nt_ 1� 1terest 111 tl1 e land, reft1ses to join. Tl1 e q11estion is wl1 etl1 er Art. 40(2) prevents 111s Jo1 nder at all or m,erely l1is joi11 der as party plaintiff. It v1011ld be 11nfair to deny A a11d B tl1 e OJ)J)Ortt1nity to recover tl1eir land, becat1se C refuses to joio. 160 Order 1, rule IO of tl1 e I1 1dia11 Code of Civil Procecl t1re is ide11tical with Art. 40(2), a i1d tl1e cot1rts there l1ave i11ter1Jreted tl1 e provision to tl1 e effect tl1at no perso1 1 sliall be added as plaint�ff �vitl1?t1t his co1 1sent to 111ea11 that a, person 111ay not be added as the 11an1ed JJla1nt1ff; 111ste<:1d lie n1ay be joined as a defenda11t. Wl1ere a �erso1 1 :Wl1 ? otiglit to l1ave bee11 joi11ed as plai11tiff witl1 i1 1 tl1e 111ea11ing of tl1e rule (in Ethio ' read Art._ 0(2) ), _refL1�es to join as plai11tiff, l1e may be joi1 1ed . as � �efeo<lant.��� S11 cl1 an 1 nterpretat101 1 1 s very so1111d. Tl1e rights of the 1 1amed plrun ttffs sl1o11ld 11ot be defeated beca11se an indispe11sable J,trty plaintiff refuses to join. I �n tl1e o�he!_ lia11.d, a perso11 sl1ould not be 1na de a plai11tiff against hls wilJ, since if the pla111t1 ffs _ are 11ns11ccessful, 11 e 1 nigl1 t be lictble for cos ts. By joi11ing Iu111 as a 159. 160.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 40(3). . owners. ·under Civ C Art 1265 propertY . j Jointly . owned . sl!all be ad.n1inistered by .tl�e o!nt acting tog�th�� ai;d d �51_ 1 s ould s hal o b� by h l n i�� rnaJo a adm1n1str�ti However, r1ty vote. ; _ � not be constr�ed· to _ a suc a u � d h since ecision on a J�nd, suit recover for th� of _ � suit . involves a part ,5 ri ht. t . r r ne s ov. t e � the Joy 1t of rna land T 1f even re, refo a h The � or . y en J decl ined to bring 8 1-t' · t le ot 1 ers ners. co-ow should t t be relucta able n . o a11d the join sue , r1 v. Kedar11at 16 [. see. p,a b D (Calcu tta l:ligh Ct., 1899), Incl · an d 409 , p. 26, vol. Rep iarz ., L. the discussion in D · Mtilla',· supra, note 155 at p. 521. a.
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-defenda?�,. he would .n.ot .be liabl� for tl1e costs and would no t even have any resp ons1b1l1ty for_ th e l1t1gat1on. I-le 1s merely on the record' so that a decree affecting his rights will not be passed in l1is absence. Tl1e_ rules relating to in�is�ensable parties, as we have said, are required by tlle substantive . I�"�· Wl1ere an indispensable J)arty l1as not been joined, tl1e court has . 40(2) to bring l1im in as party plaintiff or party defen Art under s1b1l1ty respon the dar1t, as t1 1e case may be. D . Third Party Practice
1.
General Pri11ciples
Third part� practice �eals witl1 the 111etl1od by wl1ich the defendant may bring another party into the suit on tl1e grout1d tl1 ,1t if l1e, the defe11 dant is f0·und to �e liable �o the plain_tif�, t_I1e tl1ir? party, called tl1 e tl1ird party defe�dant, will be liable to l11n1. Tl1e pla111t1ff ts not 111volved at all, as l1e J1as 111ade 110 clain1 against tl1� _third I?a:ty defenda�t. Tl1erefore, it does 11ot n1 atter tl1 at tl1 e 1:;lai11tiff cot1ld have or1g1nally Jo111ed tl1e tl11rd party; tl1e defenda11t ct1nnot co11te11d that tl1e tl1 ird party shotild be added on tl1 e grot1nd tl1at the plaintiff cot1ld l1 ave joined him as a11 origi11al defe11dant tinder Art. 36. The qt1estion is \Vhetl1er the clefe11d,1nt ca11 bring l1im in as a tl1ird pa1·ty defe11dant, and l1is right to do so is governed by 1\rt. 43. As the court adjt1dicates the claim of tl1e plaintiff against t]1 e defenda11t, it also adjudicates tl1e clain1 of tl1 e defendant agai11st tl1e third party defei1dant, and the claim bet\vee11 tl1e defe11clant a11d the tl1ird J)arty sl1all be tried in such 111anner as tl1e cot1rt shall direct. 162 The court does 1101 adjt1dicate a11y clai1n bet\\'ee11 tl1e plaintiff and tl1 e tl1ird party defe11dant t1nless tl1e plaintiff obtains tl1e per1nissio11 of the court to add tl1e tl1ird IJarty as a defendant tinder Art. 40(2). Tl1e purpose of allowing third party joi11der is to settle all claims i11volvi11 g tl1e sa.ine transactio11 i11 a si11gle st1it. By permitting the defendant to join tl1e third party defendant, separate st1its can be avoided. Tl1 e defendant \Vl10 l1as a right agai11st tl1e tlurd party will not have to bring a s11bseqL1ent st1it agai11st hin1; l1is claim against the third party can be adjt1dicated in tl1e san1e st1it \vl1 ere tl1e plain tiff's claim against the defenda11t is bei11g adjt1dicated. As a practical 111 atter, if the court finds tl1at the defendant is liable to tl1e _plai11ti.IT a11d that tl1e tl1ircl lJarty is liable to the original defe11dant, t l1e tl1ird JJarty n1 ay J)ay t11e plaintiff directly. I-low ever, note tl1 at a decree is not entered i11 favor of tl1e plaintiff against tl1e tl1.ircl party, since the plaintiff I1as not 1nade any clai111 agai11st hi1:1·. Tl1e decree is it1 favor of tl1e plaintiff against tl1e origi11al defendant, a11d tl1e or1g111al defenda11t may be given a decree against the tl1ird party defenda11t. Art. 43(1) at1thorizes joinder of a third party defer1dant 1vvhere the defe11dar1t ''claim s to be entitled to co11tribt1tion or inde11111ity'' from tl1at person. If the de fenda11t seel(s to join a third party defe11dant, he 111t1st, in . his_ staten1�nt of �efence, show cause ,�1hy tl1e third party is liable to malce contr1but1on or 1ndcn1111ty _ and the extent of st1cl1 liability and apply to the cot1rt for an ?rd7r tl1a� st1cl1 pe1 �on be made a party to the suit. Tl1e cot1rt decides o_n the �ppl1cat1on \VI�ho��t I1ear 1�1 g the third party. If tl1e defenda11t makes ot1t a P_rt1n� fac1a. case, !hat 1s . if. l1e sa�is fies tl1e co11rt tl1. at he may be entitled to contr1bt1t1on or 111de1nn1ty fro1�1 the tliird party, tJ1e third JJ,trty is served \Vitl1 a copy of tl1e staten1e11t of_cla1m and �� e state1uent of clefence and ordered to appear on st1cl1 day ,1s tl1e co111 t sl1all fix. 1
162.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 43(3). 163. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 43(2).
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At that time tl1e court considers any objections . he migl1t ha�e to being joined �s a third party, and if it conclt1des tl1at join�er IS not authorized by Art. �3(1), 1t orders tliat he be dropped as a party. If 1t con� ludes that he may be l1a�le to make contribution or inden1nity to the defendclnt, 1 t proceeds to try th.at claim as well as tl1e plaintifl�'s clain1 against tl1 e defendant. 2. Right to Contribution or Indemnity Wl1ether tl1e defendant is entitled to contribt1tion or indemnity is detern1.ined by the substantive law. The defendant must sl1 ow tl1at, at tl1e time he seeks to join tl1e tl1ird party defendant, 11 e has a rigl1 t to cont� ·ibution or indemnity against him _ under tl1e law. Contribt1tion refers to tl1 e s1tt1at1 on where n1 ore tl1 an one person has coinn1 itted t}1e sa111e \vrong agai11st tl1e plaintiff or l1as the sa 1ne obligation to l1i111 . 111 sucl1 a case, tl1 e plai11 tiff can s t1e one wrong�oe_r � r �u_e them all 164 except wl1ere tl1e obligation is completely joint, e.g,, tl1 e JJlaint1ff 1s 1nJu�ed on land owne_d . joi11 tly by two persons. Wl1ere one debtor or \Vrongdoer l1 as paid 10 excess of his sl1 are l1e can recover tl1e excess a111ot111 t fron1 the co-debtors or other ,vrongdoers.165 Tl1 is 'right is called 011 e of contribt1tion. I11 demnity refers to tl1 e situation in _which a JJarty \vl1 0 l1 as I1ad to pay a clain1 is e11 titled to recover the amount paid, in wl1ole or i11 J)c.1rt, fro111 a11 otl1 er person. Tl1 erefore, in order for tl1e defendant to joi11 ,1 tl1ird JJarty defenda11t, he n1 t1st sl1 0\.V tl1at l1e is entitled to contribution or inde11 1nity fro1n tl1at JJerson tinder tl1 e substa11tive la\V.
TI1e relationsl1 iJJ bet\veen tl1 ird-JJart�/ joi 1 1der and tl1e substantive right of contri bt1tion or inde111nity is de111011strated by tl1 e case of Bro11 111 v. Cra11sto11.1 66 In that case M artl1i1 Brow11 and Saral1 Tl1omJJS011 were passengers i11 a car O'\,Vned by Rans ford Tl1on1psoi1 a 1 1d dri,1en by Franle TI1 ompson. Tl1 e car was involved in a col lision witl1 a car driven by tl1 e defe11da11t Cranston. Bro\vn was injt1 red, and Saral1 Thon1 pson \Vas lci1led. Brown a 11d Saral1 Tl101npson's exect1tor stied Cranston to recover dan1ages for tl1e personal injt1ries and deatl1. Cranston sought to join as tl1ird party defendants Ransford Tl1on1 1Json and Franlc Tl1 ompso11 on the ground that sl1e \.Vas entitled to contribt1tion fron1 tl1 e111 . The law of that state with regard to contribution was t111 11s11al in tl1at tl1ere \.Vas no right to contribt1 tion except ,vl1ere tl1 c judg111 e11 t was recovered agai11st 1 nore tl1 an one defenda 1 1t, all of \Vl1 om were joi11 ed by tl1e plai11 tiff in tl1e original action. It did not autl1 orize contrib11tion against a co-\'i1ro11 gdoer, wl10 ,vas not originally joined as a defendant by tl1e plaintiff. Tl1erefore, tinder tl1e st1bstantive law, Cransto11 did not l1ave a rigl1t to contribt1tion against Ransfor �d _Tl1 on1 pso11 a11d Franlc Tl1 0 1 11pson - tl1ey v.. ere not joined as defend ants by tl1 e pla1nt1ffs - a11d, tl1 erefore, tl1 ey cot1ld not be joined as tl1ird JJarty defend ants. Tl1e _ princi�le . tl1at tl1 e substa11 tive law gover11s tl1ird party joi 11der creates a proble1n 1n Ethiopia, /Jecaitse if tlze JJrovisio11s of Art. 43(1) a,,cl tlrose of tl1 e Ci•1il Code regarcli11g contribzttio11 are i11terpretecl literal!;,, it lvoi,!d be i, 11possible to joitz a third JJarty clefenc!a11t 0 11 t/1e grou11 cl thc1t t/1e clefe11da11t is e11tit!ed to co,·z tribz.1tiotz fro111 l1i111. Art. 1908(1) of tl1 e Civil Code, wl1icl1 covers co11tribt1 tion betvveen co-debtors ?n a _ co11 tractt1 al o ?lig�tion, p�ovide� tl1at a debtor u,/10 JJGJJS irl excess of fiis sfz are against l 1 is ?o-debtors. Art. 2161(1), which covers contri 1s �nt1tled to co!1 tr1bt1t1on _ bt1t1on betv.:een J?Int wrongclo �rs, . provides likewise tl1at a person •r/10 /zas paid tl1e •v/10 /e clebt 1s e11 t1tled to contr 1 b t1t1on fro111 tl1 ose liable witl1 J1 im. Tlitis, there is no �
1
164. See C !v. C., Art. 1897. Joinder is proper under Civ. Pro. c., Art. 36(1) (2). 165. See C1v. C., Arts. 1908, 2161. 166. (Ct. App. , U.S., 2nd Cir., 1942), Federal Rep., 2nd Serie Cl1 ad s, J vo _ l · 132 63 p. 1 , , m · • bour·n and L. Lev1n, cases on c·1111·1 Procedure (1961), p. 648.
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substantive right to contribution until a co-debtor or co-wrongd er has tua y pa d the to cred itor nt due or· victim. At the time of su� he �� ll u e amo ie th 1 no t hav paid and, assuming he is contesting liability it cannot be det;rm. n � .whether or not be will have to pay. In other words, at 'the time of suit, no de1 ; 1e n d an t would · h 'b t· contr1 u 10n i wit n h to t e e meaning of Art. 43(1) . be , ntitled no is th �� t is at wa us s int_ended. T�e. problem may arise be lr, Ob vio . cause the . ba on c1v sed 1l law , while. the Civ1l Procedure Code em Civil Code 1s p1oys t.he . · · c m tenninolo� 11se d I � i ��; Iaw c ountr1es,. re�ult1ng in an apparent inconsistency. Th� �lear Im.port o t e 1v1 p roce dure Code IS that the defendant should be able to JOl_n as third party defendants those fro m whom he may be able to claim con tribution. Art. 43(1) should be cons!rt1ed to mean that a defendant who if he had paid the whol� _debt, w�uld be . entitled to contribt1tion under Art. 1998(1) or Art. 2161(1), _n1ay JOI� as t,h1rd par.ty d�fendants tl1ose wl10 would be liable to make contribution to 111m under those articles. Any otl1er interpretation wotild r ende r the contribution part of Art. 43(1) ineffective. Indemnity, a.s . we . l1ave . said, refers to the situation by which a party who has ha.d to pay a cla!m 1s e�t1tled _to recover_ tl1e amount paid, in wh.ole or in part, from another. A right to 1nd:n1�1ty may aris e fron1 a contract, or it may be impos ed by law. Ii1 such cases 1t IS clear that the person required to indemnify the defendant may be brought in as a third party de fendant 11nder Art. 43(1). We will first discuss such cases and then consider whether indemnity may not have a broad er meaning so that third party joinder may be authorized on grounds of ''indem nity," even though the defendant does not l1ave a contractual right to indemnity or the law does not specifically require the other party to ''indemnify'' him, as we will be using the term. The most common example of inde mnity by contract is a contract of insurance against liability. Suppose that the defendant who is sued for damages resulting from the operation of his automobile, has a contract of insurance by whicl1 t11e insurance company is to pay any liability for damages h e might incur by tl1e op eration of his automobile. When he is sued by the victim, he n1ay join tl1e i11surer as a third party defendant, since if he is found liable to the victim, the ins11rer will be requir ed to indemnify him. 1 67 It should be noted tl1at the contract of ins11rance may provide that the insurer shall control any civil case originating from a claim bro11ght by the injured party. 168 Such provisions are common, and as a l)ractical m.atter, the insured will only seek to join the insurer as a third party de fendant where the insurer denies that he is liable to make indemnity. 169 ntract, There is a question of whether the insurer may, by the insurance co·110 provide that it cannot be joined as a third party de fendant. In one case _ the insurance contract provided that ''no action sl1all lie against tl1e co1npany �nt1l the amount of the insu.red's obligation to pay shall have been :finally determin ed b_y judgm ent against the insured after actl1al trial." The company c�nten?ed that it could not be brot1ght in as a third party defendant, since at tl1e t�me it would be brought in, the insured's obligation would not have been determin ed. The court and 167. See George Edward Batekha v. Mahdi Abdel Cader Mohammed, Mol1 ammed Ibrahim re the t tlla te No . _85 P· J., . _L n 1da S1 60 19 EI Shareg Inst1rance Co., (High Ct., Sudan, 1960), is no provision in Ethiopia authorizing tl1e victim to sue tl1e insurer directly. 168. Comm. C., A.rt 687(1). 169. See the discussion of this point in th e Batef,lza case, supra, note 167· . c R ep., · Pacifi ), 52 19 · . .S U do 0 l o C t · C .170. Pione (Sup. er Mutua.l Compensation Co. v. Cosby e ur d ce ro P il iv C 1 0, es a; C , evin 211d Series, vol. 244, p. 1089, in J. Chadbourn and , L · (.1961 ), p. 652.
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, i�y bil e o� lia on at h t_ s �a is, licy :po the the at h t_ d saf It n. tio ten con the rejected . 1 ch the insure? Illlght be subjected. 1: he wl1 to y 1l1t ab 1 I � an y pa to eed agr ny compa ble only for sums �h1 ch lia be uld wo ny pa com the ich wh by e on t no s wa licy po e the insured actually was compelled to pay. It would no t hav to pa y until the insured's obligation was determined at trial; all that would . happen would be that the insurer· would be a party and any dispute between the insurer and the insured . s per wa der pro join ty par However, d thir re, refo The l. tria the at ed udg adj wo11ld be y pan would be liable com the ch whi by one e wer icy pol the if that said rt cou the to tl1e ins11red only after he had been compelled to pay, joinder of the insurer 1tvould not l1ave been proper. In sucl1 a case the insurer would hav e had a substan tive rigl1t to avoid joinder, as tl1e ins11red would l1ave had no claim against him until he 11ad been co1npelled to pay the victim. Since procedural rules cannot alter substantive rights, tl1e co111pany could not have been joined. This problem sho11ld not arise in Ethiopia, as the provisions of the Commer cial Code see1n to conten1plate only ins11rance against liability. Art. 685 refers to ''insuring a liability for damages." It would seem, tl1erefore, that the contract could not provide tl1at tl1e ins11rer wo11ld be liable only after the insured had. paid, since this \Vould be i11demnity insurance rather than ins11rance against liability. However, the prit1ciple tl1at if a11 i11s11rer l1as a contractl1al right to avoid being joined as a defendant in a s1ijt, he ca11not be joined, would be applicable. For example, if the contract provides tl1at all claims involving the insurance contract be submitted to arbitration, and tl1e con1pany denied liability on the policy, the insured could not join tl1e company as a tl1ird party defe11dant. The company has a right to have an)' clain1 detern1ined by arbitrators rather than by the court and, therefore, could resist being n1ade a JJarty to the court proceedings. Another exa111ple of contract11al inden1nity is where one person l1as acted as agent for another, and tl1e JJri11cipal has promised to indemnify tl1e agent for any liability i11c11rred 011 bel1alf of the principal. So, wl1ere the plaintiff sued tl1e defend ant to recover damages for failure to accept goods, and tl1e defendant had bo·ught the goods on bel1alf of a principal, tl1e defendant was entitled to join the principal as third party defendant. 171 In Ethiopia, the agent is also entitled to indemnity from tl1e principal for any damage be sustained on his behalf as a matter of law_ 112 A party is entitled to indemnity as a matter of law where tl1e law imposes on another person a duty to reimb11rse him for a liability be has incurred on be half of th_at _ person or due to llis actions. 1�he right of a11 agent to be indemnified by t �e pr1nc1pal �or damage he s11stained on beh,11f of the principal is one example �f �h!s. �nother 1s that provided for in A1·t. 2136. The Code also imposes vicarious l1ab1l1ty 1n. a nurnber of sit11ations; vicario11s liability means that a person is liable �or �he . actions of another, even tho1 1gl1 he hin1self is without any fault. S11ch liabil1�Y 1s unposed for reasons of social and economic policy, i.e,, the person made liable can bear t_he _loss and tl1e victim can st1e a fi_ 11ancially responsible defendan . t. Thus? the Sta!e 1s liab�e for wrongs committed by a civil servant in the discharge of his pr_ofess1ona! duties, 173 bodies corporate are liable for the acts of agents and workers in the discl1arge of their dltties, 174 as is an employer for the acts of his employees. 175 In all such cases, it is provided tinder Art. 2135, that the actor is 171. 172. 173. 174. 175.
See Benecke v. Frost (Queen's Bench, Eng., 1876), 1876 Queen's Bench Rep., vol. 1, p. 419. Civ. C., Art. 2222. Civ. C., Art. 2126(2). Civ. C., Art. 2129. Civ. C., Art. 2130.
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liable· to the perso n up on whom vicarious liablit y is iinposed, an . d· 1· 1 1s · specifica 11y · or t c ma h a t b r �·m ad e_ a p arty to the proceedings broug provided th_ at e ht by the pe rso he v1c n ar1ously liable. The actor must indemnify tli e victi� agru�st t . pe rso n tha � T?er son may, therefor �, bring the actor in as a third party vicar1ous�y I1ab] e :'1n d defendant._ Even 1f sucl1 JOIJ?der w ere not pr?v1d_ ed for by tlie Civil Code, i t ,vould . be authonzed by Art. 43� since tl1e person v1car1ously liable is en ti tled to indemnity from the ac tor . as a I? atter of law . In any cas e _wl1ere t�e st1bstantive law requires to 1ndemn1fy another, tl1e person entitled to indemnity can coinpel t I1ird one p�rson _ party Jotnder u nder Art. 43. Th� n ext q11estion to consider is wl1 etber a third party who is not required to . d. in emnify tl1e defe.ndant 11n �er a contract or by express provision of Jaw can be . joined on th� groun� that r_ f the defendant is l1eld liable, in tl1e broad sense, l 1e will b e re91�1red t� 1ndenm1fy tl1e .defe n ?an t. 0 � to pu t in anotl1er way, can the defendant JOin a third party wl1ere, if he 1s l 1eld l1able, l 1e will have a claim against that party? Suppose tl1at A had a contract witl1 B to supply certain goods. A obtained tl1ose goods fron1 C in order to fulfill l1is co11 tract with B. B s11es A to recover damages for breacl1 of warranty on the ground tl1at tl1e goods are defect ive.1 76 Jf the goods are defective, A will have a ca11se of action for breacl1 of warranty against C. Asst1ming, l 1o wever, tl1at under tl1e contract C did not agree to inden1nify A for any l 1arm l 1e migl1t s11ffer dt1e to defects \Vben l1e resold tl1e goods , it cannot b e s aid that A l1as a contract11al rigl1t to inden1nity fro111 C. But he would have a rigl1t fo recover damage s for breacl1 of vvarranty if the goods are defective. If B recovers from A, and A wot1ld l 1ave to institt1te a separa te s uit against C, t\VO s11its are necessary where tl1ere is really only one qt 1estion - are the goods that C supplied defective. In light of t11e purpose of Art. 43, wl1ich is to settle all claims involving basically tl1e same transactio11 in a single sui t, it \Vot1ld seem sottnd to interpret Art . 43 as permitting joinder in st1cl1 a case. In den1nity should be b roadly construed to include a situation involving inden111ity i11 tl1e prac tical sense. In our example, if A is held liable to C, B will have to i11de111nify him by paying dan1ages for breach of warran ty. It has been l 1el d that wl1ere the seller who purchased goods from others is sued for breach of \Varra11ty, l1e ca11 join as a third party defendan t the persons from wl1om l1e p11rcl1ased tl1e goods to sell to the party with who1n be had a con tract of s ale. 177 I--Io\vever, so111e co11rts l1ave taken the opposite view.178 They wo11ld say tl1at the liability o f C to A l1a.d nothing to do with A's liability to C, since tl1ere were separate cont�act s and A had no right to in den1nity against C. Again, it seems t hat both q11est1ons can be conveniently settle d i11 a s ingle suit, and ''indemnity'' sl1ould be broadly co11strued t o include this 1<.ind of sit t1ation. In one English case it was held that tl1e char terer of a vess_el who \Vas s11ed by a passenger for injuries allegedly res11lting from tl1e unseawortl11ness ? f tl1e ves_sel coulp not join tl1e owner as a third part y defendant. � 79 Tl1e r1tles re lating � o t�d _ darty joinder were subseqt1ently amended; and now JOI? der wo11Id be permitted 10 sucl1 a case.1so It is hoped t11at the Ethiopian courts will constrl1e Art. 43 b ro adly 176. See Civ. C., A.rt. 2287. }J. 8 , tes 1Vo cf;, ee/ W 84 18 ), 84 18 g., En , ery nc l1a . 177 See Finlay & Co. v. Scott & So n (C 355. 178. See Mof1amed BadsJ.1 a v. Nicol (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1879), J11rlia11 L. Rep.: vol. 4, p. , 5o l. vo p., Re es rn Tz iv La ), 84 18 g., En 179. Spiller v. Bristol Stean1 Navigation Co. (Ct. App., p. 41Q· . m r te at m e tl1 e er ,vh er op pr is r de in Jo ] (c) 180. �ltles of the St1pre,r1e Coc,rt, Ord er 16A , ru . _ Je ,,subs.a 11 the defendant ee tw be e su · is 1 ·n ia Ily t n ·t issue between the plaintiff an d defendant 1s and tl1e third party.''
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-----nt wo u. .Jd, in effect, be liable to the n ?a efe d ird th e th r_ ve ere wh and allow joinder l e to t he plaintiff. l b 1a e b to d n u fo 1s t n da n fe de defendant if the between the defen_dant and the third p shi ti�n rela the r side con now We may dant against �he third ��rty fen e de _th of 1� cl� . e tl1 id, sa we As party defendant. � d all an at ere _th im cla 1s s no 1ff 1nt pla provision tl1e ect aff t no es do defendant t im !ns y cla aga an the plainti ff. The ke ma to_ t an en? def rty pa rd thi tlle . . ing authoriz on between the defen 11t1 tr1b or con y n1� em 1nd of n stio que tl1e s ate c udi adj court merely d par�y d��endant may assert any thir the a11d , ant end def ty JJar d tl1ir the arld t dan 181 If !he de fen da nt 1s fou nd to be t. an 11? fe de entitled e th defences 11e has against to contribtition or indemnity against the tl11rd par ty defend�nt, a decree will be entered in his favor. The decree i1nposes an obligation against the third party defen dant to ti1e defendant, bt1t no obligation against lli1n in favor of the plaintiff. If the third party defe11da11t ref11ses to pay the plaintiff directly, the plaintiff will . proceed against the defendant, and tl1e . defendant �annot object on the ground that a decree was entered in his favor against the third party defendant. By the same toke11, tl1e plaintiff is not entitled to enforce his decree against tl�e third party defendat1t. Art. 43 is also aJJtJlicable by a11alogy where one named defendant claims to be entitlecl to contribt1tion or inde1n11ity fro111 any other defendant in the suit. Here, tl1e 1Jlai11tiff bas joined 111ore tl1an one defendant, ,1nd one defendant so joined claims to be entitled to contributio11 or indemnity against tl1e other. Suppose that the plain tiff \Vas it1jured by an en1ployee, and joii1s st1it against the e1nployee and en1ployer, \vl1icl1 l1e may do, since obviot1sly th.ere will be common questions of law and fact. Tl1e en1ployer is er1titled to indemnity fro111 the employee, as we have seen. He 1nay asl< tl1at if judg111e11t is entered against llim, tl1e col1rt issue a decree in his favor against tl1e en1ployee, a11d under Art. 43(4), the court is a11thorized to do so. IIowever, this c annot be do11e to tl1e prejt1dice of the plaintiff, as Art. 43(4) express ly provides. TJ1js means tl1at if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, a jl1dgment will be entered in l1is favor against botl1 defe11dants, and a judgment will also be enter ed �11 favo� of tl1e employer against the e1nployee. The plaintiff 111ay obtain �atis fact1_011. �gainst tl1e e�pl_oyer, and the employer cannot contend tl1at he is relieved of l1ab1l1ty to tl1e pla111t1ff because of l1is judgn1ent against the employee. . TJ1e prov!sions _r�lating to tl1ird party joinder provide an effective de,,ic� by ':l11cl1 a� cla11ns ar1s1ng fron1 tl1e san1e basic tra11saction ca.n be determined in a single st11t. Tlus proced11re only involves tl1e defendant and the third party defend ant, a_n? tl1e plaintiff's rights against the original defendant cannot be affected by SUCh _Joi�der. Joinder is proper wl1ere the defe11dant show s that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity from a tl1ird person, as we l1ave defined tl1ese terms. E. Interpleader AJtbou�h i�terple�de: is treated in Book IV of tl1e Code a.s a Special P�? ce d_tire, we will d�scuss it _ 111 this chapter, sin ce it is an aspect of 11111lti-party litJga on. In proc �edings of interpleader, tl1e plaintiff that e pro bl the witl ote 1 is d co11 ro f m one t inay be lia_ble to more than one person on the sa·me claim. If he pays . cl:. m nt, autl it fiiially tur11s out tha e er, reco v to t tl1e other claimant is entitled hto w11� f1ave to pay the latter claimant. Perhaps l1e can recover the amot1nt paid 181. See Ramesh\var v G at 98 Th 5 a. n ga case involved the ·d £e ce (H.�g� <=:t., Al lahaba.d, 1950), 1950 All-India Rep_., P· . · arty for contribution 0 e_ �e 1 �f l1. mitation. In Etl1iopia, tl1e defendant's claim aga1n� t a fbrr�.1P c., w ould no t arise until l1e was compelled to pay. See 0�t Art. 1846. Tilus ttem 1 ':1 m ty barred by limit�tion �t �� 0� the defendant against the third party defendant could e time when the third party would be joined.
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182 but if he ca nn ot , he ant, w ill ha ve paid the same obliga claim . . t . • s r fi . the tio n .on, a procedure is twic e. s1tuat1 a . such provided by wh ch he can force_ To avoid e aimants to litigate their respective claims. Such a procedure1 Is . t�10 ca Cl l l e d a su it · · ,, · d efi_ned as a suit wherein a person in poss is_ h c w hi ader , erple ession of property int or is whic may be claimed adversely by two or mo h mon ey g owin or r e persons · e: om a_ I ne h c n be li_able, see ks to be relieved from lia to one or oth1 of w h bi � � � t or e1 er t o a1m � an t m e , with regard to the disposition of such , tsJ lity to the c Suppose t l1at t h_e decedent �rovided in his policy of property or money. lif e eeds should be paid to ''n1y wife." This is a val·d · insurance that the proc d s1gnae I · any must pa y t he proc�e�s to the woma co mp ts4 • an d th e . n w110 was the wife tion, of the insured. Two wome.11 ap�ear, eac_l1 cla1m1�g that she was his l egal wife. The insu.ranc e comp�y can . re�t�s� to p11� e1the� claimant, and to avoid being sued by one or both, 1t c�n 1nst1tl1t� a st11t of 1nterpleader to reqttire the clajmants to adjudicate the question of wl11cl1 one was the lawft1l wife of the instired.
1.
Conditions For Interpleader
�� order for tl1e �laintiff to institut� �n action of interpleader, the following condit.J.ons must be satisfied: (I) tl1e pla1nt1.ff 1nust not c1ain1 any interest in the subject matter of the dispute otl1er than for charges or costs; (2) the clai111s mu st be such as to expose tl1e plaintiff to multiple liability on a single obligation; (3) there must be no collusion between the plaintiff and any of the defendants. 1 8 5 Tl1us, the plaintiff m ust be a ''stakeholder," that is, he m ust adnlit owing tl1e obLiaation. He cannot institute a suit in interpl e ader and at tl1e sa111e time de11y tl1at::i l1e is liabl e to any of the claimants. 186 In our exam.pie, if the iost1rance con1pa11y de11ied that it was liable on the policy, it could not institu te a11 action of interpleader.
This creates a problem, since the inst1ranc e company could be sl1ed by botl1 claimants separately and. might be held liable to botl1, e.g. different cot1rts might find that both claimants were ''the wife of tl1 e insured'' and tl1at tl1 e inst1rance company was liable on the policy. Althot1gh one claimant would not be an indis1Jens able party in the suit by tl1e other claimant, since her claim vvot1ld not be litigated in the suit, perhaps she could be added as a party tinder Art. 40(2) on the gro11nd that ''her presence would be necessary to deter1nine all the questions i11 dispt1te. '' Such an interpretation would ·be desirable, since otherwise tl1e insl1rance co111pa11y would be fac ed with a diffict1lt dilemma: if it institt1tes a st1it of interpleader, it cannot contest liability on tl1e policy, while if it contests liability (and as a . result cannot institute interpleader) it may be s u bject to do u ble liability on tl1e same obl igation. Also, one claiman.'t should be able to intervene in �he s11it by the other._187 The point to remember is that in order to institute a su it of 1nterpleader, the plain tiff must admit his liability on the obligation. He cannot institll�e a suit of inter pleader and at the same time contest the right of any of the claimants to r ecover. �; 182. See Civ. C., Arts. 2164-2167. It can be contended � 1at since he cot1ld [orce tl1 e rivalancla tl1 e lo an!s to interplead, · payment to one would no t constitute payment by mistake, ao<l pa1d could not be recovered. 183. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 293. 184. See Comm. C., Art. 701. 185. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 294. rsely to ve . ad s m ai cl ff ti in la p 1� tl e ier 1 v.,· 186. In some cou.ntries, interp]eader is authorized even . icate abili is li f o n io st e u .1ud t�e defendants in interpleader. I-le ca n interp . lead thenl, �d 1s in a cl l a v ri ir le tl te iga q 1 �� t{ lity on the claim, an d if he is found liable, force tl1e clainiants to See Federal Rules of Procedure (U.S.), Rule 22(1). ). 187. He would be terested in th e suit within tl1e meaning of Civ. Pro. C., Art. 4l(l in
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he ms are charges or cost s· S clai all re wl1e ve�, owe 1 J stijt a ' ng · brl o , He nlay · l r ie h t· p� c era hl I · sev e c d 3:1m . w to ?e entitled, ds to goo red ive del � ad lro rai a where ds t� t e _r1ghtful claimant up o �o tl�e r de ren sur to g lin wil s wa on . and the railroad a f su1� o _ a un rpl� untr 1nte mr ld cou der 1t s, rge cl1a against all ght frei e 1 tl of ayment ple ely con 1s1ntere e �ted 1n the ou tcome also � J 1ss ff ust � ? 1 n plainti The . ts an m ai ihe cl her ist eit ass to imant and must not ng cla thi �ny ne do e hav t no ust 01 lle t; sui of tlle ds t A hol tha e a sum of Eth.$ 5000 pos Sup . suit the n fro1 cr tbin any gain to o d stan ' nt wit . h B to !he effect that if which is claimed by B and C. A l�as an �greeme $ p! Etl1. a�ce will 1n 4000 A full suit, der plea settlement inter an in ssful succe . is B 1 n n!a1 r an. ma1 �?e rple not 1nte can A tl1at . suit l1eld been 89 The l1as It n. of 11is claii purpose of interpleader is to enable to party to avoid multiple l 1 ab1l1 ty on the same claim. WI1ere I1e l1as a11 interest in seeing one part y recover, he would have an interest i11 tI1e subject 111atter in dispute ,vitl1in tl1 e meaning of Art. 294(a) and can not 111aintain interpleader. However, tl1e test is only wl1etl1 er he will be subject to multiple liability oo the san1e claim. If so, l1e can maintain interpleader, even though the conflicting _1,st Co. v. Vctnce, 190 the plaintiff offered T, cl Girar clai 1ns l1ave different so11rces. In stock for sale t11rougl1 varioLIS brokers 011 what is called a non-exclusive agency, tl1at is, eacl1 broker cot1ld try to n1 al(e tl1e sale and the one tl1at was successful wot1ld be entitled to tl1e co111n1ission. Tl1 e sale was executed, and each broker claim ed tl1at l1e was res1Jo11sible for it a11 d tl111s e11titled to tl1 e commission. Tl1e plaintiff institL1ted a,1 action of ir1terpleader against tl1e tlu·ee brokers. They contended that the suit could not be n1ai11tained, since tl1e claim of eacl1 arose from a separate contract. Tl1ey arg11ed tl1at \vl1ere the claims of tl1e variot1s claimants were unrelat ed, i11ter1Jleader ,,,as not a11tl1orized. S1Lch an argu.ment, if accepted, would limit interpleader to tl1e cases ,vl1ere tl1e claims arose out of a single contract or relation sl1ip. e.g,, ,vl1ere two perso11s clain1ed to be tl1e be11eficiary of a life insurance cont ract. The court rejected this contention. It said tl1 at tl1 e test for interpleader was simply whet1 1er tl1e plaintiff might be exposed to 111t1ltiple liability on wl1at was in essence a single clai111. It is in1111aterial tl1at tl1e cla.i111s of the defendants arose from different sot1rces. Only one broker would be entitled to the co1nn1ission , and the plaintiff cot1ld force then1 to interplea.d to cleter1nine who was entitled to that co1 11mission. So too, wl1ere two persons clai1ned to be entitled to money in a bank accot1nt, tl1e bank co11ld bri11g a s11it of interp]eader. 1 9 1 2. Restricted .c-\ctions . It is �xpr�ssly provided tl1at interpleader s11its cannot be brought by agents a�a1 nst tl1e1r pr1nc1pals or tenants against tl1eir landlords to force tl1em to interplead \-Vttl1 otl1ers except perso11s claimi11g thro11gl1 the principals or landlords. 19� So, \-Vllere a clai.m_ l1 as been made agai11st tl1e lessee for rent, I1e n1ay not interplea� 19 the landlord with anotl1er person wl10 l1as also clai rent . e 111 ed to be entitled to th. ., He can defend a SLiit by tl1e landlord for tl1e ren t, and if he is ordered to pay the 188. See B.B. .I.R. v. Sassoon (I-ligl1 � Ct., Bon1bay, 1894), J11.dia11 L. Rep., vol. 18, P· 231· 189. See Mu r1etta v. South Atneric an Co . (Queen's Be11cl1, Eng., 1893), L.J., vol. 62, p. 396. � 190. (U.S. D1st. Ct ED P e · . 2 in R 55 , · nn� I ·, y · var ua, p. 45) 19 , Field an · ·d B · Kap1an, Mater,als on Ci1 il P Fee/era! Rules Decision-'f, vol. 4, rocedure (1953)' p · 1027 · 191. See Duraiswan11· v. n·iu<li· p. Rep gal ., (l U.C . A(lInd Ban i k (High Ct., Madras, 1956) , 1957 745. 192. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 298. 193. See Panchanan v. Sara t (1-:I.1 h C,;,·• Calcutta, 1941), 19 . Rep., p. 512. See generally tl1e djscussion in D · M 1 Al l-I 11d1a 4 �,a, .1. 11e Cocle of u Civil Procec/ure (12th ·ed. by .R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 2, p. 1131. 1
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o tected agai nst a subsequent claim for the p r is he ord same rent· But suppose I andl ' er per�on c1aim · ed . the rent on_ the gr ound that the landlord no th a sol d that the lan d rig� !he t t ed o rece ive assi gn the ren t and as part of the sa1e. s·Ince the him to . · · s 11:1 t im th a e k a c g e· t en a I th an _ t g is in claiming through the landlord this a m . person excepti on t o the rule, . and the tenant can t�e wit hin es com case interplead the . andlord. and the claimant to determine who 1s entitled to the rent · 194 1n ot h l er · · e h CI aim :of the o t11er partr l� adverse to that of t r e h w , s � d r the landlord, o w _ _ ot autl1or1zed, · bl1t 1f his claim 1s tl1roug11 the landlord n 1s ader erple (h" · ght int c onferred ?Y the landlord, altl1011gh, in effect, he is bee . n · hav e any , conte��in� t;; if rece ive to the rent), tl1e tenant 111ay 1naintain interpleader. land lord. the of t rigli The same rule i� applica�le . t? clai1ns. involvin_g an agent, his principal and a third party. A deposits__a box of Jewels with B, l11s age11t. C demands that B sur render tl1e jewels �o h11;11 _on the ground that l1e and not A is the rightful owner of the jewels. He 1s clrum1ng adversely to the principal - his claim is not based on any relationsl1ip between them - and the agent can.not maintain interpleader. 19s Jf 11e is sued by C, L1e can defend on the gro11od tl1at A is the rightful owner and can contend tl1at A is an indis_pensable party. I-Iowever, if A l1as made the jewels secur ity for a debt that lie owes C, and C claims the je\vels from B, contending that A has not paid t11e debt, and A maintains tl1at he has, B can i 11stitute a suit of interple ader. 196 C is claiming on tl1e basis of an i11terest created by A, and tl1e case comes within the exception. It s]1011ld be noted tl1at ''agent,'' as usecl in tllis context, should be defined as it is in Art. 2199 of tl1e Civil Code: an aget1t is one who l1as agreed to represent the principal and to perform on his bel1alf one or several legally binding acts. It should not refer to a11y person \V.ho for one reason or anotl1er p ossesses property on behalf of anotl1er. A railroad, for example, should not be considered an agent for these p11rposes so as to prevent it from instituting an interpleader suit against the consignor of goods and one wl10 clain1s the goods against the consignor. 197
3.
Procedure in Interpleader
The plaintiff initiates an action of interpleader by filing a state1nent of claim, which, in additi on t o the particulars required by Art. 222, shall state (1) tl1at the plaintiff claims n o interest i n the s11bject matter in dispute otl1er than for charges (3) or costs, (2) the claims that hav e bee n made by the defendants severally and 198 _ As _ nts. a nd_ defe e 1 tl of that there is no collusion between tl1e plaintiff and any sunting that tl1e court finds that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action 1n 111te! pleader, 199 it will serve tl1e copies of the statement of claim on the defendants 1n interpleader and set a date f or the first hearing. At that time the defendants may argue that the case is no t a proper on e for interpleader. If the court fin�s � �at 1ty b1� l1a all m fro ed arg ch dis is iff int pla le erp the int ader is prope r it ca n declare that 200 Where the thing it. su the l award hin1 his cost;, if any, an d dismiss /1in1 _frott 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199.
l. vo p., Re L. ian 11d l ), 10 19 , tta lcu Ca ., See Shelly Bonnerjee v. Raj Chandra Datt (Higl1 Ct 37, p. 552, and th e discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 19 3, at PP· 1131-2· (a). on ra st iJlu 5, le ru , V. � XX.X r de Se e Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Or ). (b on ati str illu 5, le ru , V. X:XX Se e Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order _ Cases, vol. 28, - 948· � . See Chaganlal v. B.B.C.I.R. (High Ct.� Bombay, 1915), I11d1a11 of 1nteron ti ac 0 a g in t' · 1tu st · 10 r fo Civ. Pro. C., Art. 294. These are the conditions necessary pleader. I, V r te ap h C in n o ti ac f o S. ee Civ. Pro. C., Art. 231, and the discussion of Statl·ng a cause infra.
200. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 297(1) (a).
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ced n or i pla rt t he custody cou he t o t in id pa . d 1s ng of th e bei . of ble pa ca . me clai ert y , t he co u r t may r q u ro p 6 ec11c sp or p y ne no i of e ire m fi su ed ,, e.g ci spe a u co rt, . er t Y 1n t he cu st o dy of the co urt op pr e . th e ac l p or y ne mo the the 1ain t1·tr to pay t he claimants will litigate h.. · d an it su e th , fro ar m pe t e1r ap dis y ff ma . h t P i int . pla e . , us h T t he po w er . t o requ1r� �h ti as �n pl h t ff ur �o to � th , e� ev ow reH � 1s. in cla respective 201 exa mple, tf t l1e pla1nt1ff s evidence w ould or . F 1on t s1 po dis al ai. a party until fin h uld � rt bir wo ?a cou pro he r s i der cla th al ! riv , m a t _ �he ine e :e �ecessary to determ t tl1e first _hearing if 1t can do so a n o 1_ est qu e th te 1ca Jud ad y ma t ur co . remain. The t he pa rt1�s �r oth er ev1d�nce available to it at of s on ssi mi ad tl1e of . on tile basis t r ial 1s n ecessary, 1 t wil l set a date for ale l-sc ful a t 20 tl1a es iev bel If 2 it l that tin e. roceed to t ry the sui t in the ordinary manp and l tria for · es issu e 1 tl trial, fran1e 11er.203 the nts 011e of r ma n clai afte eve has filed ed itut inst be y 1na suit r ade rple inte _ An er ead rpl an file inte y n1a suit, joining er 1old kel sta The r. lde eho stak tl1e inst suit aga r claimants. If t he in t e rpleader suit is filed e otl1 and luro s11ed l1as wl10 on pers the 204 the , suit t filed man clai e court in th ch wl1i in a court otl1er tl1a11 tl1e cou rt i n l inform the other court of this fact, and ,vl1ich tl1e interpleader suit is filed sl1al 205 In othe r words, all questions are to be ngs. eedi proc all stay shall tl1at court deternlined i1 1 the interpleader suit , si11ce s11cl1 a s11it is designed to settle all clain1s 06 2 on. gati obli le a sing 011 t1g arisi F.
Intervention 1. Intervention by Interested Party
Intervention has been defi11ed as tl1e proced11ral device wl1ereby a stranger can present a clain1 or defence in a pe11ding action or in a proceeding thereto and become a party for the l )Urpose of tl1e claim or defence presented.207 Intervention is governed by Art. 41, whicl1 provides tl1 at ''any person interested in a suit between otl1er parties n1�y intervene tl1 erei11 at_ any time before j11dgment. '' Art. 42 deals \\�th ,vl1at 1s called intervention by the p·ublic prosecutor, and we will discuss this sub seq11ently. T l1is is not necessarily ''tr11e intervention," since in many instances the p11blic prosecutor 111ay i1zitic1te tl1e proceedings. Intervention as we are no\V using �l1e te�111 refers to the sit11ation where an ''interested'' party inter,,enes i11 litigation 1nvolv111g otl1er parties. !he cru�ial . words are ''interested in a suit betwee11 otl1er parties." The te5t for !ntervent1on 1s not tl1e same as tl1e test for permissive joinder. Tl1 e fact that tl,e 111terveno r could have joined as plaintiff u11der Art. 35 o r been joi11ed as defen201. iv C . Pro. C., Art . 297(1) (b). 202. Civ. Pro. C., Ar t. 297(2). 203. iv. C Pro. C., Ar t. 297(3). icto i n 204. It 0_a 1 y be neces�ary to file h t e suit in a d iffere11 t cot1rt i1 1 order to l1ave local jurisd place
al_ � the claimant s, e.g., lt 1ey woul d all be subjec t t o local jurisdic i t on at the ��_1er ere tie cootract was n1ade or \Vas to be performed . t 205. Ctv. Pro. e., Art. 296. The cotut may a\v e ey t h ar no ar d th·e plai ntiff his cost s' b ut if · awa r de d , tb e y n1ay be ad de d to l 1 · 1 · s costs 1n the 1nterpleader suit . . ·v e notie 206. It shoul d be 11oted that . g ay i f e c is any par t y against who1n a clai111 might be made m o t a claima t t ac cept a o h t e f him . �um of money or other propert y fron1 I � n �; the not answerer 11� ma dep<;>s1t of a cou1.t (_ nts th_ r e mone)' n p regist ry pr the r t or y i o e cou rt in whi'h against lTLm on the cl� in1 is p end ing). !he claimant or cla� / �iv. h s all be advis�d �,a�u-��e money . h t e cou , l as fr o be en 1t m c ] al D l deposit e d and may Pro. C., Ar .t 299. 207. Missour i-Kansas Pipe L ' Ct.., Rep., Sup. ' 1�. U.S. v. Utlited States (Sup . Ct., U.S., 1941), (Lawyer s ed .), vol. ' 35
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�nder Art. . 36 does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to intervene in an action to w �tch h e �as not an original party. Once a case has begun, the court shoul� not rea �ily be d !spose � to pe rmit the dimensions of the dispute to be widen ed, s1n:e the 1ntervent10 � might raise new issues and cause further delay in the proceedings. Art. 41 re quires that the intervenor be interested in tl1e suit that has been file_ d between otl!er parties; it d oes not permit him to add bis own indepen ent claim to that suit merely because he could have originally joined that claim. For example, the owner of an automobile sues the driver of anotl1er at1tomobile to recover for person�l in �uries and �amage to bis automobile resulting from an accid ent. A �a �se�ger �n. 111s automobile seeks to intervene to prosecute her claim for per�on�l 1nJur1�s ar1s1ng out of the accident. Intervention should not be permitted.208 It 1s_ imma�er1al that . she could have ?riginally joined as plaintiff t1nder Art. 35. She ts not 111te�ested 1n the owner's claim against tl1e defendant. Her claim against the defend ant JS separate, and it is of no i1nport to her whether the original plaintiff is successful or not. Tl1erefore, where tl1e .intervenor seeks independent relief on his own cla.in1, he is not interested in the st1bject matter of tl1e suit between the original plaintiff and the defendant, and is not entitled to intervene under Art. 41.
dant
One test tl1at been proposed to d eter1nine wl1ether intervention is proper is whether the intervenor will gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judg n1ent to be rend ered in the suit between other parties. If so, tl1en he wot1ld be said to be interested in tl1e st1bject matter of their suit. In the case in which this test was formulated, 209 the victim of an automobile accident had brougl1t suit against tl1e driver of t l1e auton1obile in which he l1ad been riding. The driver's insurer sougl1t to intervene, allegin.g tl1at the plai11tiff and defendant \Vere conspiring against it, tl1at is, the defendant wanted the JJlaintiff to prevail and wou.ld not make a meaningful defence, since he would assume tl1at the inst1rance con1pany wot1ld ultimately have to pay. Tl1e -inst1rance co111pa·ny conte11ded t11 at it was not liable on the policy and wanted to intervene to l1ave the clai111 of' the plaintiff against the defendant insured stayed until its liability to l1in1 tinder tl1e inst1rance policy could be determined. The petition for intervention was denied on tl1e grottnd tl1at the insurer. would not gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the jt1dgn1ent in the case bet\-veen the defenda11t and the inst1red. If tl1e defendant prevailed, obviously the company wot1ld not be liable on tl1e policy. Its jt1stificatio11 for inter vening was that the parties were collusively trying to 1nake it bear tl1e liability, but th.is defence wou]d be open to it wl1en st1ed by the ins11red, as wot1ld be tl1e defence that the company was not liable on the policy. The�e _defences wo�ld not be affected by the jt1dgment in tl1e case betw� en tl1e pla111t1ff and . the insured. Therefore, it did not have an interest in the subJect n1atter of tl1e s111t and cot1ld not intervene. However, if the company admitted liability on the polic�, then . it wot1ld have an interest, since jf the plaintiff prevailed, it would have _to. 1ndem-:1- 1fy tl1e defen� provi ant-ins11red. Under Art. 687(1) of the Commercial Code, tt 1s prov1d�d that _ sion may be made to the effect that tl1e insurer �h� ll have the direction of _any civil case originating from a claim brought �y tl1e 1nJt1red party. Wl1ere tl1� t r1? bt exists under the contract, the i11st1rer could intervene for tl1e ptrrpose of d1rect1ng 1ester11 Rep., 2nd Series, vol. h.11 ort 1), 195 ., Y_ U.S a, Iow , Ct. ! p. 208. See Eddington v. Nichols (Su . . 658 , p 61) (19 e dt1r oce 1l Pr C1v on ses Ca , vin Le L. d an urn 49, p. 551, in J. Cl1adbo . _ . 75, vol , l ,es Ser 2n r t por Re c cifi Pa 8), 193 ., � U.S n, ego Or � ,, Ct. _ 209. Brune v. M ! . . cDon.aid (Stlp. ) P, 62 e , (19 dur oce rl P, C,v of 11ts ,11e Ele 1, te1t 1ns We J. d an · M Rosenberg ·p . 10 , d"1scussed 1n ' 1184.
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t provide for direction ct do es no tra con nce ura ins 1 e tI th ere . wh ' e . . . Ven e d n A . . se. ca the I the _Ju dgm e� t is in fa�or of c � s1n e, en rv te n i . t? ed itt e rm th pe be ld ou sl1 r re su in t e h ste 1s us H re te �n l Yl� d �o e 1n tl1 on e sub� th � . bl l1a be ll wi . r re sti in e th laintix, e d. to t� re 1ty l _ su b1 in l1a s hi e ct ow fe H f �. _ 11 r �1 ve 1 icl , he wh �t, su e th of ter feet mat d e an en y erv lic int po on e th on the grou nd ty 1 b1l l1a ny de e 1 t n 1 nle sa e i 1 t1· a t . ca, 1 1not 210 t 1 e an a. 11t 1 · ·ff d h p h re a1 e · su t. 1n n ee tw be it su e tl1 in tliat he has an interest 1 e n1igl1 t s·u�ges t t�at. in terventio n wi ll only_ be permitted o\ ab ed tlin Tlle test ou ns 3:ble party, _but 1n!er �ention i s e 1sp 111d an 1s e ven ter n i t? g n ki see where tile party enor 1s an 1nd1spensable erv int the e 1er wl e, t1rs co Of . on ati situ at 1 tl to n ot litJlited n ce on�e the cou rt i_s aware that si d, nt� gra . e b_ l wil ene erv int to n itio . party, lus pet 1 t n1t1st provide for suc h JOinder. Thus, , ned Joi n bee t o n has ty par ble an iiidispensa nt, ede the other heirs, the dec by ed cut exe es leas cel n ca to heir 011e by in a stiit 1 However, a person might 21 e. n rve _ inte stand ld cou , ties par wl,o were iodispe1 1sable to gain or lose by the direct operation of tl1e jt1dgment, even though the judgment itself wot1ld not necessarily affect I1is rigl1ts, as we l1ave defined that concept when disct1ssi1Jg i11 dispensable parties. An i11surer is bot111d to i nden1n ify the defend.ant because of tl1e instirance contract; this is an i ndepe11dent obligation, which is not being litigated as sucl1 in the suit between the plaintiff and the defe ndant, so it cannot be said tl1at tl1e inst1 rer is a11 i11dispensable party. But sin ce his obligation to tl1e i 11sured will be affected by tl1e j Ltdgn1ent in tl1at suit, he may intervene. A11otl1er exan1J)le \Vo11ld be interve11tion by tl1e principal i n a suit against tl1e surety. Wl1ere proceedings l1ave been i 1 1stit11ted against the surety, the pri ncipal who must i11demnify tl1e sttrety,212 n1ay intervene.213 So too, wl1ere property ow ners sued to enjoin a railroacl fro111 operati11g traclcage 11sed for tl1e temporary storage of freight cars in the vici11it)1 of an a11ton1otive assen1bly plant, the operator of the assembly plant, wl10 bad a contract \Vitl1 the railroad by whicl1 the railroad was to furnish freigl1t service to lu111, was per 1 11itted to interve ne. 214 If the inj11nction was granted, tl1e railroad \votild I1a.ve bee11 tinable to J)erforn1 its contract with him, since it cou!d 1 10 longer operate tl1e trackage. 1,1,e suit of the plaintiffs was not directed against tl1e contract tl1at tl1e operater l1ad with tl1e railroad, so, unlike the case c�isct1ssed earlier involving a suit to enjoi n tl1e defendant from leasing his drainage ! 1 nes t? _oil �oinpanies,215 the operator was not a11 indispe nsable party. B ut since, if tl1 e 1 11J_u nct1o n w�s granted, tl1e railroad co11ld not carry 011t its contract witl1 l1im , he_ was interested 1n the subject n1atter of the s11it between tl1e plai ntiffs and t11e ra.1Jroad and \vas per1 1litted to intervene . . I11terventio�1 l1as also been pern1itted in tl1e case where son1e owners of proper ty i n a towns1te sued to enjoin the defendant fro1 n interferi ng with the townsite,
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210. TJ1e ins�r�r 111ay have some interest, i:e., if the plaintiff prevailed, t11e insurer ,vas li� ble on the pohc), 1fY the and 1 there w inden l s no � co lus to 1on, the required insurer � ,vould be . _ defeodant.. But srnce l�e IS. contesting llis liability on t}1e l)olicy a11d clain1ing collusion , he does not have a sufficient mterest in that suit to justify interve11tio11. , Rep 211. eral Fe Ke ucky Natural 1948), Gas Cor�. v. Dt1ggas (Ct. App., U.S., 6tl1 Cir., d : ��: �! e,,;�, viJ . 165, p. lOll, m R. Field and B. Kapla 11, Materials on Civil Pr ocedu,e f (195) 1 4 212. See Civ. C., Art. 1940. 213. 111s Hotel Co. v. Gener�l Cat1alt� & Surety Co. (Sup. Ct., Mich!gan,_ U.S., i 93o), 1�::::i�d j 11 JP·, vol. 229, p. 506, discussed Ill M. Rosenberg and J. We1nste1n, Elerne,:s 0 of Civ"l roce ure (196�), p. 118 . ote w_ surety the ? � that under Civ. C., Art. 1940(3), llas b�n s ed mu�t not1fy tl1e pr1nc1 claim to able be al, not and if he does not, l1e will indemnity �rom l 1101· Upon such no J? t16cation, the principal may intervene. 214. See Ford 11d , 2 Rep. 0 al Bisanz Feder Bros, Inc. (Ct. App., U.S. 8th Cir., 19), Series, vol:'1�!�: ; ·2{· 215. Thomson v. Talbert Drainage n,s · trict, supra, note 147.
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and_ _ other owners of pr_ope:ty in . that . same townsite sought to intervene.216 The decision would affect their ,?ghts, since if the plaintiffs were successful, their property would be protect�d , an d 1f_ the y were not, there would be the danger that the defendant would 1nte�f�re w1th the other propertie� as well, Finally, in a suit to recover damages for 10Jury to property, the insurer of the property was permitted 211 If the pl aintiff ene . int erv were successful, the insurer would be entitled to to reimbursement fo� the a?1ount paid, and if the plaintiff were unsuccessf 11l, the insur er could not �la.11:11 ag;�nst the ?ef �nd�nt sine� the decision in the plaintiff's case would be res . JUdtc�ta.. In Etluop1a, 1ntervent1on should definitely be permitted in such a case, since, 1� l1_ght of Art. 683(1) of tl1e Commercial Code, only the insur er is tl1e real party in interest as to the an1ount l1e paid to t11e plaintiff. He should, therefore, be �dded a� a pl�in�iff 11n der Art. 40(1), and tl1e q1 1estion is not so much 011e of 1ntervent1on as 1t 1s one of substitution of the real party in interest. It should also be noted that the intervenor 1nay be claiming adversely to both parties. Suppose that in an a ction by A against B to recover certain property, C seeks to i11tervene on tl1e ground that he is the owner of the property ratl1er tl1an A or B. Since the suit involves property, the ownership of which he clain1s, he is directly interested in the s11bject matter of the suit and may intervene. The question of ownership now becomes a three-sided one, and the court will decide whether A, B or C is the owner. The party seeking to intervene must file with the court a separate statement containing the grounds which justify his intervening.219 The court then deci des whether intervention should be allowe d. If it is, tl1e proceedings are stayed until the named parties have been served with a copy of the statement of the intervening party, 220 and if they are not served due to the fa11lt of tl1e intervenor, he sl1all be deemed to l1ave withdrawn l1is request for intervention. 221 When interve·ntion is allowed, the intervenor retains that status and is not given tl1e statt1s of plaintiff or defendant. As we have said , he could be claiming adversely to the name d parties. The intervenor should always be treated as a separate party and not as an addi tional plaintiff or defe1idant. Also, note that the fact t11at a pa rty i11terested in a suit could intervene does not affect llis rigl1t to bring an action of interpleader.222 If A has filed suit against B and a conflicting clajm on the san1e obJjgation l1as been made against B by C, B m ay institute an action of interplead�r against A �n� C and obtain a stay of proceedings under Art. 296. A ca°: not obJec� to tl1e � nng1ng of the interpleader action on the gro11nd tha� C � oul? 1nterve11e 1_n tl1e action be tween him and B. The purpose of proceed1ngs 1n 1nterpleader 1s to protect tl1e person against whom conflicting claims have been made ratl1er tl1an to protect tl1e claimant. 2 . Intervention by Public Prosecutor Art. 42 provides t11at the public pros_e c�tor shall in� ervene :Vl1ene�er his inter vention is required by law. In a sense this 1s not tr11e 1ntervent1on, since 111ost of 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222.
, 278 . vol ;es, Ser 2nd p., Re l era Fed 0), 196 ., Cir 8th ., U.S See Kozak v. Wells (Ct. App., p. 104. ), · · 1951 1r., c· 4th p., S., U. Ap t. (C . Co ut n a. Pe ina s,:;,ee_, v·1 rgiRnia Elec tri· c &. Power Co v CarolField & B. Kaplan, Mate,·;a/s on Civil Proceclure - R· I:euera1 ep., 2 11c., s er1es, vo1 . 1816, in (1953), p. 1061. t1·ff• a1n · I p tl1e r de un ing i1n cla b� d ul wo er ur C.1v. pro. c., Ar. t . 5(1) . The ins Civ. Pro. C., Art. 41 (2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 41(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 41(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 41 (5).
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efe rre d to in Art. 12 authorize the publ r law ive nt ta bs su ic . the· provisions of the e en erv int 1n them. Howe ver thi·s to as ll we as· ts sui h suc e . t tia ini . . prosecutor to · pa Y, r pr e t t he publie 1v · a y · ' a t b d e t t1 u pr 1r os ec e r e w s it utor su e th � if _ does mean that _ ss es of cases 1� which th.e p lic cla ur fo ts lis 42 . Ar . ht rig ub � of as _ . . . could intervene y; ; ) c1t ge (3 pa n� ca ar 1n m d (4) bank) (2 an s; tu sta 1l c1v (1) : ne e v ter in all sh or prosecut ruptcy. en judicially declared r e app ears, h.e may be s ha th dea ose wl1 son per a Where ent ma y be obtained by the ulm ann h suc or , ent gm jt1d e th of t 1e11 uln ann obtai11 the 223 The public prosecutor may also become a party to proceed r. uto sec pro public 224 An d he n1ay apply for th e cor rection of any e. enc abs of ings for a declaration record of civil status.225 apply for the removal of In regard to incapacity, tl1e public prosecutor n1ay 227 and if he has appli ed person, a guardian or tutor,226 for the interdiction of any 228 H e has broa d intervention powers on. dicti inter of for interdiction, for the re111oval 229 and n a to riag sitio , e mar oppo e n1ak 1nay He . well in t11e area of marriage as 230 consangu.inity or a.flinity2 J1 or , age of nds grou on may ,tJJply for its dissolt1tion
bigai11y. 232
I-Ie n1ay institute a proceeding i11 bankrt1ptcy233 including one following the deatl1 of a trader ,vl10 l1as st1spended payn1e11ts, 234 and may give his opinion as to wl1ether a trustee sl1ould be removed.235 I-Ie is also directed to secure the attend ance of tl1e debtor at tl1e closi11g of the books, 236 and h e has the right to be present at the pre1Jaratio11 of tl1e inve11tory and to inspect any documents, books or papers in tl1e bankruptcy proceedings.237 It sl1ould be 11oted, as stated previot1sly, that tinder Art. 42 he can intervene in any of the proceedings enun1erated tl1erein, even though h e did not initiate the proceeding. G. Rules Relating to Suits Involving Special Classes of Parties I11 thi � se�tio� we will co11sider certain rules applicable to special clases of _ parties, Tl11s will include bodies corporate, partners, parties in maritime suits and p�upers. Art. 34(3) provides that bodies corJ)orate may be r epresented in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil or Commercial Code. The term ''body corporate'' . would · refer to associations and to any kind of business organization _ for in the Civil Procedure Code. When an association sues or not otherwise provided 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237.
Civ. C., Art. 116. Civ. C., Art. 156. Civ. C., Art. 122. Civ. C., Art. 234. Civ. C., Arts. 353, 354. Civ. C., Art. 377. Civ. C., Art. 592(2). Civ. C., Art. 608(1). Civ. C., Art. 609. Civ. C., Art. 612(1). Comm. C., Art. 975(c). See also Comm. c. . Art. 978(1) (b). Comm. C., Art. 980(2) (b). Con1m. C., Art. 998(3). Comm. C., Art. 1004(4). Comm. C., Art. 1017.
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is sued, i_t �hall be . represented by such person or persons as are authorized to represent It In lawsuits b� the memorandum of association.23s A business organiz'a tion shall be represented In legal proceedings by its agents 239 which wo·uld usually. .' . . be the manager or managers of the enterprise. _., ... -· Two or mo�e persons claiming or sought to be held liable as partners may sue. or_ ��o sued in the n�me of . the fir1:1, where they are carrying on business in Where t�ere IS a claim a_ga1nst a partnership, the creditors may claim Eth!opra. aga inst the partnership assets and against tl1e personal property of the partners.241 Thus, they may sue tl1e partners as individuals instead of as the firm and since Art. 44 says ''m�y .s�e'' rather than ''must sue," it would seem that the partners may be sued . as_ Ind1v1duals r�ther tl1an in the firm name.242 However, by suing the firm, the pla1nt1� would subJect tl1e :fi.r1n assets to the judg·ment.243 Note that if 11e wisl1es to subject the assets of the individual partner to the judgment, he must join him as a named defendant, altl1011gl1 i n the case of a general partnership, no action may be take11 against individual partners 11ntil payment has been at least demanded from the partnersl1ip. 24 4 Since Art. 44 provides tl1at the partnership 1nay sue or be sued in the fir1n name, it is sufficient if the manager or managers act for tl1e partnership. However, under Art. 44, tl1e other party may apply to the court for a stateme11t of the names and addresses of the persons who at the tin1e the cat1se of action arose were partners in the firm. And, where a suit is instituted by partners in the name of the firm, the defendant may make a written demand tl1at the plaintiffs declare in writing th.e names of all persons constitt1ting the firm on whose behalf the suit is instituted.245 When the names are declared, it is as if tl1e partners were original ly named as plaintiffs,246 though the proceedings contint1e in the name of tl1e firm. 247 A person may carry on business in a name other tl1an his own,248 and \.Vhere he does so, he may sue or be sued in the name in which he is carrying on busi ness; all provisions applicable to suits by or against firms are applicable to sucl1 suits insofar as tl1e nature of the case will permit.249 These provisions are also applicable to suits between a firm and one or more of the partners and to � uits 250 Where a person 1s a on. comm in rs e . partn more between firms having one or pa.rtner in two firms that have a disp11te, st1it should always be i n the names of the firms so as to avoid having the same party as plaintiff and defendant. Art. 34(4) of the Civil Procedure Code prov.ides tl1at representatio� in maritime matters shall be as provided for by the Maritime Code. The manager 1s the person 238. Civ. C., Art. 455. 239. Comm. C., Art. 216. 240. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 44. See also Comm. C., Art. 286. re y ma rty pe l pro na rso pe his on d sue is o wh er rtn pa the 241. Comm. c., Art. 255. However, . hip ers rtn pa the of y ert op pr the in tra dis st or quire that the credit fir ., Ct igh (H ar Um ian M v. m Ra ma Al ari dh au Ch e 242. This has been permitted elsewhere. Se Lahore, 1940), 1940 All-India Rep., p. 256. . Rep., p. 93. 1a 243. See Amhed v. Lilaram (High Ct., Sind, 1942), 1942 All-Ind 244. Comm. C., Art. 294. 245. Cjv, Pro. C., Art. 45(1). ter · t1n co rt se as ld u co y 1 t ren pa ap nt da fen de e th d 246. Thus, each wou.Id be liabJe for costs, an cla.ims against the individual partners. 247. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 45(3). 248. Comm. C., Art. 138. 249. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 46. 250. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 47.
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ed to m be sti re p the manager.251 is r 11e ow ip sh e th d an . , ip sh Of e th es at er op ho 1 w t 11 e master, w 10 1s the person res er, Howev 2s2 sued be may .'253 is the agent of the n1anager and may p onc?urse, the roanag � r· ture rep re. adven me · 1 t mart . · e th 254 . for · s1ble . e d re a 1m u 1t nt ar ve m h e t g 1n lv vo 1n gs tn d · I ega1 procee · in . him sent ons dealing with suits by isi ov e pr . siv ten ex ins nta co de Co ure ed . The C!VI-1 Proc t possessed of suffi c1en no . 1s t means to who one as ned defi is per pau pau pers. A fee, and rt cou such ed crib pres a the of t par pers011 may or all ay · · to . m l 1 1 e l p enab 255 h b een h as o InJured should not w p�rson A . er p u a p a s a e su to ve . apply for lea e us ly ca he �annot pay court re be 111e 11n cla s 1 h_ t en es pr to ty tni rtt po op e til be denied l1e can ftle_ without paying the er, up pa a 1s l1e t tha s ate str on dem he fees. Once ed inst tax aga to b� the a�e ts cos rt cou 1e l t ul, f cess stic is he . . unsuccessful fees. If se, t11e a c_ 1n but paid this risk must 1� fee 110 1e11 l t 2s6 : sful cces unsu is he If party. d _be of r!v� �ep not the opportunity will ns 1nea 1out w1tl on pers a that so 1 1 be take ted 1s l1m1 sm to per1 the ability to pat1 of tes! tl1e ver, ov11,e I I1. clain 1is l e ecut pros to pay the cot1rt fee. A JJerso� �a11not obta in le�ve to sue _as a pauper on the ground tl1at J1e is poor ge11erall y; 1t 1s onl)' where lus poverty 1s st1cl1 that tl1e cannot pay tlie prescribed court fee tl1at lie is conside�ed a patrper within tl1e 111eaning of the who can obtain mon rul e. An i1 1teresting case invol ved tl 1e q11est1on of wl1etl1er one 257 The plaintiff sued to r. paupe is a fees cot1rt the pay to se l e e s0111eon n 1 fro ey SLJecifically enforce a contract by wl 1icl1 tl1e defendant agreed to sell certain land to lier. Sl1e co11tended tl1at if sl1e were st1ccessft1l in the suit , her daughter would st1pply tl1e 111011ey to pay for the land. Tl1e cot1rt l 1eld that the test was whether tl1e pl aintiff l1erself could pay tl1e costs of tl 1e proceeding and, therefore, allowed l1er to s11e as a patiper. Tl1e rest1lt is sot1nd, si11ce tl1e scope of inqt1iry would be i111n1ense if tl1e cot1rt l 1ad to determine wl1etl 1er son1eone else would sup ply the an1ot111t of tl1e fee to the plaintiff. As long as the plai11tiff himself is not p ossessed of st1 ffi.cient means to pay tl1e fee, tl1e court sl1oul d allow hin1 to sue as a p aup er. The plaintiff seeking to st1e as a pauper must file an applicatio11 in the form provided by tl1e Tl1ird Schedule togetl 1er \Vitl1 l1is statement of cl aim. The Third Scl 1edul e, No. 18, requires i11for1natio11 in st1pport of the clain1. ancl an a ffi . da.vit. Tl1e . affidavit 1 1:t1s� contain tl1e follo,ving infor1 11ation: (1) tl1e occupation of the appl icant; (2) 111s 1 11come, if any, and tl 1e sot1rce of tl1at inco111e; (3) any im1no� able _or i:n ovable propert)' tl1at he l1as; (4) the amount of rent l1e pays for his d\velling, if any; (5) wl1etl1er I1e is n1arriecl o r not a1 1d the 11ames of l1is dependents. 1-Ie rnt1st also sw ear tl1at l1e has no other propert)'. When_ the applicatio1� is filed, tl1e cot1rt may , if it tl1inks it proper, exaniin_e tile applicant on tl1e merits of tl1e clain1 a1 1d tl 1e extent of bis ro ert . 258 r i v· O iet · · p r)· · 111ay base 1·1s decis Tl · ion one. on l t 1e l a app l 1 a1n1 cat1 on l a 1 c 1d of t l1 stat en1e e nt . court sh �ll r�Je ct tlie a1Jpl ica�ion wl1ere it appec1rs tl1at: (!) tl1e applicant is not a pauper, that_ is, tl1e cotirt bel ieves tl1at tl 1e applica.nt !)Ossesses sufficient n1eans to pay 251. Maritim e C., Art. 78. 252. Maritim e C. ' Art · 79 . · ab'1 1Ity ·1 1 d ef i ne s t 1 e 1 of tl1e shipovv11er . .1m ' 253. Mar1t e C., Art. 94. 254. �ariti1ue C., Art. 96(2). 255. C v. Pro. C., Art. 457(2). '. 256. C1v. Pro C., A rt 476 . See also Civ. Pro C. . . Art 479 257. .See OreIe v Deacon . (I-I'igI1 Ct., AJlababad, 19' 49), . 19 . 2 All-I11diu Rep., p. 582 . 258. Civ. Pro. �- ' A1 5 · ·t • 469(.l) (2) . 1, the · . orn . f r . court n1ay require the a J)pr · If tile a1)p 1cat1on has not been ma.d e 111 the JJrop er icant to ame11d it. Civ P ro. C ., Art. 469(3) .. .
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the _fee; . (2) the . st �tement of clain1 doe� not state a cause of action ;2s9 (3) the applicant has, w1th1n two m ?nths preceding the filing of t he application disposed sed of it in order to be able to stie as 'a pauper ., of property fraudulently· or dispo . · . 1· t as h an ve. n an interes � 10 t he subJect matter of the sttit to another (4) the app ic �ci _ 2 em nt. e e ag This makes 1t _ clear that leave· to sue as a pauper is only r by person to be granted to ": �ers?n wl10 genuinely lacks the mea11s to pay tlle fees. It is . re t he pla1nttff _1s a bona fide pauper, as we have defined the term, that only whe st1ch _leave �I1ould b e given.. T!1e 2�ourt does not decide upon tl1e merits of t he cas� 10 :passing on the appl1cat1on. 1 So J_ong as the plaintiff appears to l1ave a valid claim, he 1nay :proceed as a pauper rf tl1e otl1er conditions are satisfied. Tl1 e merits of the case will be deternuned at tl1e trial. W!1ere the cot1rt se�s no reason �or rejecti11g tl1e application, it sets a date for a hearing on tl1e .qt1est1on of pat1per1sm, and tl1e opponent is to receive ten days notice of the l1earing. 262 At the l1earing tl1e court is to examine such witnesses as eitl1er party n1ay prodt1ce on t he issue of pat1perism, l1ear all argun1ents on tl1e qt1estio11, and make a final ruling on tl1e qt1estion of \vhetl1er the plaintiff shall be given leave to st1e as a patiper. 263 Where tl1e applicatio11 is granted, tl1e applicant is given a certificate to this effect, and. tl1e suit proceeds in all other respects as ,l suit instituted in th e ordinary n1anner except tl1at tl1e plaintiff is not liable to pay any court fees, i.e,, l1e does not pay tl1e fili11g fee and, if he is unst1ccessft1I, costs \Viii not be taxed agai11st him. 264 Tl1e cerfificate is valid for tl1e trial in tl1e cottrt of first instance, and if the defendant appeals from tl1at judgn1ent, tl1e certificate is valid so as to e11able the plaintiff to defend tl1e appeal as a pauper. 265 fiowever, if the plaintiff is un successful, the certificate is not valid so as to e11able hi111 to ap_peal as a pat1per; 266 appeal. an s11cl1 1te prosect to leave for court he must apply to the appellate During tl1e course of the proceedings, the plaintiff n1ay be dispaupered \Vl1ere (1) he fails without good cat1se to appear for a hearing or is g11ilty of vexatious or improper cond11ct, (2) it appears that l1is means are st1cl1 that l1e sl1ould not l1ave been permitted or ougl1t 11ot to conti11t1e to st1e as a. pauper, or (3) he l1�s entered into an agreen1ent by whicl1 an interest i11 tl1e subJect matter of tl�e s�11t 11as been given to anotl1er person. 267 Conditions (2) a11d (3) vv_ot1ld ord1nar1I!' . 10volve a sitt1ation which l1as arisen s11bseq11ently to the granting of tl1e or1g1nal motion, e.g., the plai11tiff wl10 was origina.11y 11nemployed, l1as fo1111? emplo_yment 111 tl1 e st e er_ 1nt an on ers r tl1e ano ing � giv t 11en ee1 agr an or he has since entered into ess 1nl sm eri up pa of ion est qu the � ate itig rel rily ina ord suit. The cot1rt sh o11ld no t ble na ta1 ob t1n s wa t tha t1e iss at h t on e nc de evi w ne the defendant I1as con1e up with e us ca a tes sta im cla of t en tem sta a en wh of on ssi cu 259. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 231 ancl th e dis of action in Cl1apter VI, infra. 260. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 470. Rep., 1· ,a I nc II A , 46 19 ), 45 19 a, tn Pa ., Ct igh (H 261. See Kamani Debi v. Sir Kamesl1war Singh 262.
263. 264. 265.
266. 267.
p. 316.
. · no t appeaI able. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 471. 1e 1s t1n at tl1 at n tio es qu e th on g lin ru t's Lrr Civ. Pro. c., Art. 472. TJJe co Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 473. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 474(1) (2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 474(2) (3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 475(1).
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is dispaupered on grou plaintiff 6s the .2 Where g n ri a e h nds at the tinle of th e earlier h fees as he would have suc y pa to d ere ord be ll slia he . 269 o f c o nd·1 ti,· ons (2) or (3), . er p u A . n a p a as e orde su to d te it m er p � refusn ee b . t o n . d ha e h if ay p to ad h r s g de dt or nn pe an au or er J? u him is a pa a as e su p to t an ic pl ap e . th w lo al . ing to e it su e am as a pauper, but th te tu st1 1n to � m hi by n tio ica pl ap nt bar to a subseque th ed t h. e first pays the id ov pr s, fe e th � f t en � ym pa on � up . it sti a lie can institute n tio ca e pli for leave to sue th ap g sin po op 1n nt ne p op ? his by red ur inc costs, if any, D a claim as er a aup sue to ve � le� ks see A if ? t tha ans me is Tli .210 as a pauper . tl1e c !atm a�atnst B, but on io? cat pli l1 suc a� r the ? ao ke ma t no can he against B, _ . C or 1n a different claim tins aga 1n1 cla a 1n n tio lica app r tl1e ano ke ma he can against B. Finally, wl1ere a pauper becon1es possessed of sufficient means to pay the court sm peri bas been issued or pau of te ifica cert cl1 a wl1i in ings ceed pro the ing dur fees witl1in ten years after tl1e certificate was iss11ed, he must immediately inform the court of tl1is fact. 271 Presumably, if the costs l1ave not otherwise been paid, e,g., tl1e applica11t was successf11l as a result of wl1icl1 the costs were taxed against the defendant, J1e will have to pay them. If he fails to inform tl1e court, he is deemed gt1ilty of fra11d11le11t n1jsreprese11tation under Art. 636 of tl1e Penal Code. I-I. Deatl1 and Insolvency of Parties Special rules as to tl1e effect of deatl1 and insolvency are necessary so that these circt1111stances will not necessarily require the discontinuance of a suit brought by or against sucl1 a person, and st1ch rt1les are contained in tl1e Code. I. Death Tl1e ge11eral rule is tl1at tl1e deatl1 of plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if tl1e rigl1t to sue sur,1ives. 272 To deter1nine wl1etl1er the rigl1t to sue st1rvives, ,ve 11111st consult tl1e provisions of tl1e s11bstantive law. As to suits on a contract, Art. 1986 provides tl1at tl1e l1eirs of a party sl1all be substituted for hin1 in contracts to \vl1icl1 he was a part)', 11nless tl1e contrary \Vas stipulated or flov._ 1s fron1 tl1e nature of tl1e contract. In light of tl1is provision, it follo\VS that a s111t on a contract would never abate unless the nat11re of the contract was such that continu�d _ perforn1ance b), �l1e decedent liin1seLf would be reqt1ired. For example , if tl1e _pla1nt1ff sued to reqt11re tl1e decedent to specifically perforn1 his contract to publish . a book tl:iat wa� not co1npleted, and tl1e plaintiff died, tl1e suit would � bate, since tl1� l1e1rs obv1ot1sly co11ld not be substit11ted for tl1e plaintiff. But except in cases of this sort, a suit on a contract \Vould not abate due to tl1e deatl1 of one of the parties. Art. 2144, \vliicl1 go,,erns tl1e effect of death on extra-contractual liability, pro vides as follows: ''(l) Tl1e victin1's l1eirs 1nay claim co111pensation for tl1e n1aterial damage he bas s11ffered. (2) Unless o�l1erwise provided by law, tl1 ey n1ay not clai coi11pensation for m . moral 1.11Jury 8t1ffered b � tl1e victim t1nless a11 action for compensation for _ _ . suc11 lDJtiry l1as bee11 1n tt1ated by tl1e ,,ictim dttring 11.is lifetime.
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268. "{] 1is is analog ous to a reviev,1 of s ion of a pro jucl vis g111 p ent a11d the sl1o by uld be govern•>d -.. iv. ro. C., Art. 6(1). 269. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 475(2). 270. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 477_ 271. Civ. ·Pro. C., Art. 478. 272. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 48(l).
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(3) The succession of th e person w ho is liable for t]1 e injury shall be liable as he himself wa s to make good the damage." Applying these provisions, we see th at wbez:e a suit has been brought to recover damages for extra-contractual wrongs, the suit would never abate due to the death of a party. Th�. estate of . tl�e defendant re1nains lia?le notwithstanding his death. Since, by defin1t1on, the . v1ct1m has brought �he action in Iiis lifetime (otlJerwise, there would be 110 qt1�st1�11_ of abatement),_ his l1eirs may claim compensation for both_ moral and n1ater1al 111 Jury, an� �l�e right to st1e st1rvives. The only tim e an 1l1ty wot1ld not s11r,,ive wotild be where it action b�s�d O? extr�-contractt1al l1ab f relie f 1nJ� for ct1v tl1e e be11 � i� of or agai11st a particular person who died inv?lved during the st11t. �or e�amJ.?le, the p_la1nt1ff sties tl1 e defendant to restrain tl1e defend g h1111 ; in �h . cas� of t1nlayvft1 I 11 olestation, tl1 e victi1:1 may seek ��t fr�n1 mo_Ie�;�� � _ � . _ the If plain relie f tiff dies, tl1e r1gl1t to st1 e does not st1rv1ve a11d the tnJuncuve stiit abates, since tl1e relief sougl1t was 011ly that the defe11daot cease molesting tl1 e plaintiff. Tl1e san1e wottlcl be tr11e if the defendant died pending sucl1 a st1it si 1 1ce relief was sot1ght agaj11 st l1 in1 as an individt1al. I-Iowever, where the injt1nctive ' relief sot1gl1t i11volves an interest tl1at passes to the l1eirs of tl1e decedent, the SLiit ,vill not abate. S11ppose tl1at an owner of property sues to enjoin a neigl1 borino0 land ow·ner fro111 using his la11d i11 st1cl1 a way as to i.t1 terfere \Vitl1 tl1 e plaintifl''s enjoy ment of lus property. 274 If d11ring the course of tl1e st1it either party dies, tl1 e st1it will not abate, si11ce tl1e property will pass by succession, a11d tl1 e right ,vill be enforceable by or against t11 e new o,vners. Now suppose that tl1 e pla.i 11 ti.ff sues a person to restrain tl1at person from trespassing on the plaintiff's land. If tl1e plain tiff dies, tl1e st1it does not abate, si11 ce tl1e right can be enforced by the ne,v owners of the land. However, :if tl1e defendant dies, the suit abates, si 11 ce the plain tiff sought injunctive relief agai11st the defendant as an individt1al, a11 d with l1is death, such relief is not necessary. Of course, if tl1e plaintiff l1ad joined a clai1n for damages with the inj11nctive relief, the claim for da111 ages wo11ld sL1rvive against the defendant 's l1eirs. Thus, it may be said that a suit will abate wl1ere it involves tl1e personal perforn1ance or actions of one of tl1 e parties. A suit for tl1e removal of a trustee would abate due to the deatl1 of tl1e trt1stee, tl1ot1gl1 a st1it against hi111 for 1noney owed to tl1e trust estate wottld not. 275 An interesting feat11re of EtbiOJ)ian law is that suits involving perso11al statt1s ordinarily do not abate becat1se of the deatl1 of a party wl1ose statt1s is .in isstie. A divorce proceedi11g c1oes abate - tl1e death of a spouse which occurs before a divorce l1as bee11 ordered pt1ts an end to tl1 e proceed ings - 276 but this is becat1se the n1 arriage is ter1nin� ted by d� ath as well a� by divorce 211 and tl1ere wo11Id be no pt1rpose in contint11ng tl1 e divorce proceedings. Howev�r where the declaration of status would be sig11ifica11 t even after tl1 e death of a pa�ty, the suit does not abate. If tl1 e mother l1 as brot1�ht an �ction �or a decla.ration of paternity, follo\-ving an ab?t1ctio11 or rap�, and �1es pe�clrng s_urt, tl1 e _ action n1ay be continued by tl1 e gu.ardian of the child. So2 8 too, 1f a child l1as 273. See Civ. C., Art. 10. 274. See Civ. C., Arts. 1225, 1226. p., p. 162 Re ia ncl l-I Al 26 19 ), 25 19 s, ra ad M Ct. 1 igl 275. See Artrmug a v. Nm , a asiv a y a . (H 276. Civ. C., Art. 666(3). 277. Civ. C., Art. 663. "' th� b 1 d e t 1tt t s · · Y m e b n ca n tio a c · 1 a 1 · l1 c 1 t s 278. It is . prov1·ded th �a w l1e�e �he ��th;�9(1s ) dead ld follo\.v t l1 at if sl1e dies pendi ng s uit, u wo It ·· · guard 1an o f t h e ch 1ld • C1v. ., -qu iring tl·1e· gu ra re in 1 'ty 1 t'l u 110 e b d tl l tl1e guardian could be substitt1ted for l1er. There WO di n a to institute a new suit.
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ing s uit, the action nd pe es di d an tio ia .fil . 111 ai cl � _ may be an action to _ d te institu o wh se im cla tho to be the f:at·her or , 1rs e h. . ian ard g11 s ld' · clii · ' or ·e . · continued b Y tb an I 10m w ion act inst aga to son per t con a ere est Wh · s tatus 219 · Id · . Chi . e .· th . f o motlier 2so J u 1e st d 1nt ain nt ag co be his n ca lie s n tio ac . tl1e · _. st·ltuted dies ' · A so . . l1as ·beetl in d"1es, the action can b e contin·ued b' n ow dis o t n tio c a ail . riongi bri · 0 , ty 281 a.n d w her e • . Y . \VI1ere the Par • , ter sis e th or er tl1 o d chil against or _b1 _ . 11ts _ da e11 asc _ ts, an nd sce de his ion n act ca tl1e be s, n die nti d co 1te t1tt 1ns ued en be s 1ia again st l ior act an ll suc . l il l \V. lO 1s 10 w so1 I per can b. 1e tl ··ri 1es c1 ring spe e Cod or 282 il Civ de'-'11end the . · . . ce Sin . 5 11 1e 1 h1s 1 o , d 1v t 1s 11 ve s h t at Se e st os l1 w persons would on rs pe ? � 1e tl of ti Iie in . _ lS oi ti ac l l stic s of tl1e C1v1l Procedure Code ion vis pro tl1e d an 1, l1in for d ute stit sub . )Jave to be ent would no t be appli cable. ced de the of ive tat en res rep tl1e in ing ng bri relating to g a sui t wl1ere a party has 11in ti con for t1re ced pro the ? r side con now will We the s, 1rt, die co1 ant end upon an applica def e sol a or _ iff int JJla e sol a e 1er w1 died. tive nta rese of the decedent to be l rep lega the se cau ll sl1a ct, effe tl1at to de 111a tio11 283 The an1e . s11it tl1e procedt1r� is to be vit ceed J)ro l sl1al � � and y � JJart a made followed wl1ere 011e of several pla1nt1ffs or defenda11ts dies and the nght to sue does 11ot st1rvive to tl1e ren1aining plaintiff_ or plaintiffs or ag�inst the ren1ainin g defe11dant or defe11cla11ts. 284 Btrt wl1ere tl1e r1gl1t to s11e does st1rv1ve to the remain ing J)lair1tiff or pltti11tiffs or agai11st tl1e ren1aining defendant or clefendants, the court 111erely causes an entry to tl1at effect to be 111ade on the record a11d proceeds \Vith the case.285 SuJJJJose tl1at A and B jointly entered i11to a contract with C, on wl1icl1 C brings st1it. Pe11di11g suit B dies. Si11ce tl1e parties are jointly and severally liable, 286 it follo\vs tl1at tl1e rigl1t to s11e B does not s111·vive against A, and the plai11tiff \\1011ld l1ave n1ove to join B's legal represe11tative. In one case, 287 A and B had isst1ed a pro1nissor)' 11ote to C, 011 wl1icJ1 tl1ey vvere s11ed. Pendi11g litigation, B died, lea,1i11g a ,viii of ,vl1icl1 A was executor. Since tl1e rigl1t to sue B did not survive against A as an individt1al, it was necessar)' tl1at C 111ake A a party as legal represe11tative of tl1e estate of B. 288 I-Io,vever, if a fatl1er left land to bis sons, A a11d B, and pro,1ided_ tl1at upo11 the deatl1 of 011e tl1e latter was to be the sole o\vner, and pending litigation involving the land, B died, i t ,vo11Id not be necessary to join _ his . legal representative. Upon l1is deatl1 lus i11terest i n tl1e land passed to A, a11d vv1tl1 1t, tl1e rigl1t to s11e as well. This is tl1e t)' l)e of case co11ten1plated by Uoder Civ. C., Art. 775, such persons are autl1orized to i11stitute tl1 e action, so it follo,vs th a_t they could be substituted for the child. J·Iowever the guardian or the persons who cla_in, to . be the father or n1other may 011Jy institute th'e action during the n1ino rity of t�e cl� ild, Civ. C., "?-rt. 776(2) , and the l1 eirs 1nay 11ot institute the actioi1 unless the c�ild died before re�ch_i og the age of 20. Civ. C., Art. 776(3). It follows then tha� th� guard1 an re w� 0[. perso?s claiini ng ! 0 be the he _if child pare11t coulcl only be st1bstituted for the cbJld s Lil a minor at the t1n1e of l1is death and the f i only st1bst:it uted the were uoder 20 at_ the tirne of his d;ath. the J1eirs could be to due abate ot1ld Failing this ' the action vv deat !1 of the child. 280. 'fhis is because the ac · . . . . 781(1) · Art ti· ' o n cou Id 11ave been 111stituted against tbe1n. Civ. c., . . 793. · 281. This is because the acrion . Art . c ou J1av� bee11 rnstitu ted by sucl1 ]Jer�ons. Civ. , __ndants, . That article sets f or.th the � Id _ 111ay be st1bstitt1ted : first desce 01 der _ In \Vhicl1 such 1Jart1es . then parei,ts or asceudant& . , th en brotl1ers or sister . ·s· 282. T.his .is because if h e . o ns pers . h ere dead, tl1e actiot1 cotild have bee11 instituted against SUC Civ. c. , Art. 795(!). \V 283. Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 49(1)' 50(1) · 284. lbicl. , 285. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 48(2) . 286. See Civ. C., Art. 1896. 287. Waleyatun nissa v Chai�/u k . (I-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, 1930), 1931 All-India Rep., P· 164· 288. This would . wh ich be ;er on 1 one der is they were jointly v. claim Ci �ro. Art. , the C., 219 since w �th��1 the n1 ea.rut1g of th at provision . 279.
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. c
Art. 48(2); the cour� will merely . m�ke an entry on tl1 e record to the effect that the right to . sue survived to !'i- and wil l the.n proceed witI1 the stiit. In oth. er wor ds, 11n1e ss the right . to s11e survives to or against anotl1er named party or parties, the the of decedent n111st be bro11gl1t in. tative represen gal le If no app. lication is made withi_ n one year fron1 the deatl1 of the party, the suit abates _so far . as the decedent 1s _conceri �ed.289 No for1 nal order is necessary, since none 1s req�1re? b� tl1e appropr1�te �rt1cles of tl1e Code.290 WI1.ere a plaintiff dies and no appl1cat1011 1s made to br111g 1n tl1e representative, tl1e defendant 111ay apply for an order for tl 1e costs l1e 111ay have incL1rred in defending that stiit, and such costs are recoverable fron1 tl1e deceased pl aintiff's estate. 292 Note t]Jat when tl1e . pJajnti.ff dies, tl1e b11rden o : f m�ki1 1g tl 1e applicatio11 is on tJ1e p laintiff's t d1 s, tl1e bu1· d en of making tI1 e application representative,_ a_nd �l1ere_ tl1e defendai � � _ is on tl1e pl,11nt1ff, s111ce 1f no a1J}Jl1cat1on 1s 1nade, tl1e s11it abates. It is not provided tl 1at if tl1e defend,1nt's representati,,e does not ma·ke an application, j11dgmei1t will be entered against tl 1e defenda 1 1t; tl111s, if tb,e plaintiff \vants tI1 e s11it to contintLe, lie 1n11st n1ake tl1e appl ication. Of co11rse, tl 1e deceased's re1Jresentative may apply 292 b11t si11ce, as we will see, a fresl 1 s11it cannot be brot1gJ1t party, a n1ade be to fol lowing abaten1ent, the defe11da11t's representative is not likely to ap1Jly to be brought in unless t11e defe11dant l 1as fi l ed a cou 11terclai1 n, which the re1Jresentative wants to litigate. We will s11bseq11e 1 1tly disc11ss wl1en the abate1nent of a s11it 1nay be set aside, but if it is not or cannot be, tl1 e c laim is lost. \Vl1ere t\vo or 111ore JJersons l1ave s11ed or have been sued in the 11ame of a t firm and one of them dies wl1etl1er before or d 1ring tl1e pendency of tl1e s11it, it is not necessary to join the legal representative of tl1e decedent. 293 Tl1e p11r1Jose of pennitting suit i11 tl1e fir111 name is to l1ave the p roceedings instituted by or agai1 1st an entity rather tl1an an individ11al, a11d, therefore, the individ11al's represe11tative n1ay apply to be 1nade a, party to the s1tit, 294 and, i11 any eve11t, I1e n1 ay enforce any claim of tl1e decedent against tb.e surviving parties.295 It J1as been l1el d, 110\¥ ever, that in a suit for clissol 11tion of a partnership, the represe1 1tative of tl1e deceas ed partner must b e joined or tl 1e suit abates.296 In Etl1iopia, a partnership is to be dissolved upon the deatl1 of a JJart11er,297 so if a suit ,vere bro11gl1 t to eXJJel that part1 1er, 298 t11e suit \Vo11ld necessari ly abate, as the partnership wo11ld be dis sol ved upon his death. If l1e were p l aintiff in a s11it to co1 npe1 tl1 e expL1lsion of another partner, the s11it would also abate, since the s11bject 1natter of the s11it, tl1e partnership, would be dissolvecl by tl1e operation of l aw.299 The pro,,jsions as to abatement are applicable to aJJpea1s as well as trial s. ''Plaintiff'' means ''appellant'' and ''defe11clant'' n1 eans ''responde 11 t."300 This is s011.11d,
Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 49(2), 50(3). p. 598. p., Re dia -In All 5 .192 5), 192 re, l1o La ., Ct igh (H n she See Ramgopal v. I-Iarki Civ. Pro. C., Art. 49(2). p., p. 679. Re ia , nrl l-I ,.-1/ 23 19 , 23) 19 ras ad M ., Ct igh (H elu See Kyppuswami v. Singarav Civ. Pro. C., Art. 51 (1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 51(2) (a). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 51(2) (b). , p. 71. 31 l. vo p., rfp 1z dia J11 ), 04 19 a, di In , cil t1n Co See Rajushu�der v. Ramqati. (Privy Comm. C., Art. 260(1). See Comm. C., Art. 261. . partncr 1e t 1 g 1n u a· cl · ex ip sh er rtn pa a rm fo en tl1 d His heirs and the surviving partners coul . they sot1ght to expel. See Con1m. C., Art. 260(3). .. ble ca pl1 ap e ar 11 . ok Bo of s on 1s1 ov pr e tl1 l 300. See Civ. Pro. c., A,rt. 32(2). Where relevant, al to appea.ls.
289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 29.7. 298. 299.
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e appeal� as th e plaintiff is the th g in ut ec os pr is 10 wl e on e tl1 _ . l1as been Sltccessful 1n th e court since tl1e aJJpellant is 1ff 1nt lo be pla the w' the If se. ca tlie g . n llti ec os one pr · �gin · b · r r1 � g 1o 1ty ·i· ·b 1 ns 1n ! po the representare e th ve ha ld ou sh � nt lla pe ap . dant as fen de d ide ly ov pr cal that the rules are crfi spe 1s 1t . , ver we Ho . rty pa ed eas dec t ive of the . . . exec11t.·1on of a decree or order. 301 Th. e n pri Ill ciple s ng di ee oc pr to le ab ic pl ap not en heard, even though a decision b s l1a se ca tl1e er aft � le ab lic pp ina is . of abatenlent tl1at tl1ere sh all be no abate d ide ov pr y all fic ecr sp o als is It . red de ren et1 . llas not be _ e�n tl1e . conclus1on of the hearing tw be ty r pa r l1e e1t of ath de the of 1 so1 rea n1ent by _ . as 1f tl1e Jt1dgment were pronounced and the pronou11ce111ent of tl1e judgment� 1t IS before death. 302 A qt1estion 111ay arise as to wl1ether a particular person is or is not the legaJ representative of tl1e deceased party. l? such a case the co11rt. may determine that qtiestio11 or, if it dee111s it more c? nven1ent . to do so, n1ay appoint an administrator cld lite111 to re1Jresent tl1e estate 1n the s111t. 303 2.
Insolve11cy
TI1e insolve11c)' of a plai11tiff i11 a suit does not cat1se the st1it to abate, and tl1e assignee or receiver n1ay elect to coi1tin11e tl1e s11it. 304 However,. the court may req11ire L1i 111 to post sect1rity for costs. If l1e ref11ses to contin11e tl1e suit or to give sec11rity if reqt1ired by tl1e co11rt, tl1e defenda11t may apply for dis1nissal on the grot1nd of tl1e JJlai11tiff's i11solvency, ancl tl1e co11rt will dismiss tl1e su.it, awarding tl1e defendant tl1e costs ,vhicl1 l1e l1as i11c11rred in defending the suit, to be recover ed fro111 the insolvent plaintiff's estate. 305 Note tl1at tl1e suit does not abate of its o\vn force, a11d tl1e defe11da 1 1t mt1st ,1pply for a11 order of dis1nissal. \'Vl1ere a suit abates d11e to tl1e failt1re to join tl1e representative of the deced ent or is dis111 issed becat1se of the plaintiff's insolvency, no fresl1 suit sl1all be brot1gl1t on tl1e sa111e cause of action. 306 I-Iowever, the 1Jlaintiff or tl1e person clain1ing to be tl1e legal re1Jrese11tRtive of the deceased plaintiff or tl1e assignee or receiver of a11 insolvent plaintiff 1uay apply for an order to set aside tl1e abatement or disn1issal \vitl1in six rnontl1s fron1 tl1at date; if tl1e cot1rt finds that the applicant \Vas pre,,ented by s11fficient ca11se fro111 co11ti11 11i11g tl1e st1it, the cot1rt sl1all set aside tl1e abaten1ent or dis111issal, and tl1e s11it 111ay contin11e. 30 7 In deter111ini11g w]1�th �r tl1ere ,vas good Cc.tuse, tl1e cot1rt si111JJly considers wl1ether the a1Jplicant was JUSti_ _ _ fied 111 fa1li11g to talce tl1e necessary steps at tl1e apr)ropriate ti1ne. T]1e fact tbat he 308 s . ,vas tina,v�re of the reqt1irement obviot1sly cloes not constit11te sttflicient cau e I-Iowever, it l1as been l1eld that ig11ora11ce of tl1e deatl1 of tl1e part)' or of tl1_e wl1ereabouts of tl1e re1Jresentative n1ay be strfficie11t ca11se l1nless dt1e to tl1e negb gence of tl1e a.pplicant. 309 The JJlai11tiff col1lcl be 11na\¥are of tl1e deatl1 of the d.e301. Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 49(3), 50(4). 302. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 53. 303. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 52. 304. C1v. Pro C., Art. 54(1). . i. 305. PCiv. Pro. C., Art. 54(2). These provisions ngs. roceed t applicable to execution 1, are no i Cv ro. C., Art. 54(3). 306. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 55(1). 307. ';;v tb!ro� c ., Artt. 55(2). (3): The application 1nust be n1ade witl1in six n1ootl1s fr om the date bat en1en or d1srn1ssal. 308. S ee Cl1uni Lal v· ·A n111 · 1 Cl1and (Hi. gh Ct., Lahore, 1933), 1933 AII-J11dia Rep., P· 356 · bi 309. See Daya s·' 7 Mun s ingl1 v. Buta Si11gb (I··l'Igl1 Ct., 1)unJ. ab, 1916), J11dian Cases, voI. 38, p : · ssion in Ran1 v. Radha (Higll C t L 11 ds D. Mulla. The Code o f c!lVl�rfa 1923), 1924 All-J,1c/ia Rep., p. 461. See also the i c�59 rocedure (12th ed. by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 2, JJ,
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fendant, e.g., the litigation was . delayed and the plain tiff did not find out abotlt the death o� . the �efe°:dant unt1l ��re than a year had elapse d, or, it rnigl1t be f that after dt ligen t .1 °:qtllry! tl�e Plainti · f cot1ld not locate the represe11tative of the decedent so as to brin g him in to tl1e case. In one case310 a judgment was entered against co:defendants and both appealed. Pend!ng tl1e appeal, one died. Tile legal representative of the deceden t was_ led to believe that the otI1er defendants were continuing the appeal and cha]l�ng1ng . tl1e entire d_ecree. Thus, he did not apply to be made a party. I-Iowever, tl1ey did . not cont1n11e the appeal, and the appeal abated. It w as l1eld tl1at there was s11ffi.c1ent ca11se for· l1is failt1re to come into the appeal, and the ab a tement was set aside. Eacl1 case will be different, and it is dif fictilt to state general rl1les as to tl1e existence of st1fficient cat1se. I-Iowever, the cot1rt 1nust be convinced tl1 at tl1e failt1re to join the representative was not dt1e to negligence or i11diff erence, a11d tl1at tl1e a1Jplica11t l1ad no reason to believe that it \.Vas necessary to beco111e a JJarty or to bri11g i11 a representative or, where l1e was a,vare of the necessity of doing so, tl1at every effort was made to locate the repre sentative.
It 1nay l1appe11 tl1at dt1ring tl1e cot1rse of a st1it, tl1e i11terest whicl1 is tl1e sub ject 111atter of tl1e suit 111ay be transferred. For exa111.ple, tl1e plai11tiff 1nay l1ave assigned l1is rigl1ts to another, tl1e bt1siness involved i11 the suit 1nay have been sold, 31 t or an insurance co111pany 111 ay l1ave n1ade pay1nent to the plaintiff for tl1e injury. Wl1ere there has been an assignn1ent, creation or devolution of any interest on grot1nds otl1er tl1an death or insolvency d11ring tl1e pendency of the sL1it, the co11rt may, 11pon applicatio11, permit tl1e st1it to be contint1ed by or against tl1e person to or upon whom such interest has con1e or devolved. 312 _ In this cl1 apter we l1ave ex1Jlored at length tl1e rt1les relating to parties and the dimensio ns of the disp11te. Hopefully, we l1ave den1onstrated tl1at tl1e qttestion of \Vho can sue or be s11ed is 1nt1cl1 1nore co111plicated tha11 111ight first ap1Jear. In sofar as possible, all claims arisi ng fro1n a single tra11saction or ir1vol,1i11g the same interest sl1ot1ld be adjt1dicate d in a single stut. At tl1e same ti111e so1ne limits must be i111posed to the dimensions of a dispute. Tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Code represent a very careful effort to arrive at a sou11d solt1tion to tl1is problem.
8. 41 p. . 1, 36 l vo ) , p. Re L. an di , In 09 19 R ., 310. Chandra Kumar v. Sa11dhyan1aoi (l-ligl1 Ct., Calcutta, / ), 1933 Al -Jnc.,a ep 32 19 s ra ad M , ., Ct gl1 -li (1 yy 31 1. See Yeg nanarayanamt1rthi v. Bala kr.1s111ia a p. 411. 312. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 56.
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CHAPTER V INSTITUTION OF THE SUIT AND SERVICE OF PROCESS t the n Ot1 of ntio and atte tl1e to must see e cas his ? ng bri � st mL1 ff inti I)la Tlie t 1s, 1s made a party tha rt, cou tl1e ore bef ed on nm su1 is t an end def the at 1 tl to it 1 e defendant tha t a suit l1as been tl ng ifyi not by hed plis on1 acc is s Thi . suit to a . In end this r def pte cl1a and ear app we will to him g ctin dire and him inst aga d file consider 1 10\v such notice is to be effected. A.
Institution of Suit and I-Iierarcl1y of Service
The J)laintiff institt1tes st1it by filing a state111 e11t of cla.in1 in tl1e registry of a court l1avi11g jt1risdictio11 over the case. 1 The staten1 ent of claim sets forth the allega tions 011 whicl1 the J)laintiff's clain1 is based, and we will disc11ss tl1e statement of clai 111 i11 detail in CI1a1)ter VI. \Vhere n1ore tl1an one defendant l1as been joi11ed, tl1e l)laintiff 111 11st file sufficient copies of tl1 e staten1e11t of clai111 and other required doct1 1 11e11ts2 for tl1 e J)11rpose of service on all the defendants. 3 The Registrar examines tl1e state11 1e 11t o. f clai111 to ins11re tha,t it is in tl1e proper form and that it com p]jes \Vitl1 tl1e rules relating to tl1 e filing of the staten1 ent of claim. 4 If the state111ent of clai111 is satisfactory i11 tl1is regard, tl1e Registrar enters tl1e s11it in the register of civil st1its a11 d assig11 s a nu1nber to it. 5 TJ111s, the first s11it filed in the Higl1 Co11rt i11 1958 E.C. \Vo11Id be nt1111 bered Civil Case 1-58. I-le also indentifies a11y docu111 e11ts tl1at l1a\1e bee11 filed witl1 tl1e staten1ent of clai1n and st1bmits t11e stateme11t of clai111 a11d tl1e doct1111ents to tl1 e co11rt. 6 When l1e files the statement of clai111, tl1e plai11tiff m11st pay the prescribed co11rt fee. 7 Wl1en tl1e co11rt receives tl1 e state1ne11t of clai1n, i t exan1ines it to determine \Vl1 etl1 er the facts sl1ow tl1at the court bas jurisdiction and whether the facts alleg ed state a cause of action. 8 Assun1ing tl1at tl1e statement of clai 1 11 is sufficient on both co11nts, tbe court ca1 1 ses t11e state111ent of clain1 to be served. on tl1e defendant togetl1er \vitl1 a s11n1n1 ons requiring l1in1 to aJ)l)ear in court witl1 l1 is state111e1 1t of defence 011 tl1 e date specified in tl1e st11n1nons. The s11n1mons also states tl1at if l1e does not appear or a1)J)ears withol1t I1is state1nent of defe1 1ce the case will be J1eard �11 l1 is abse11ce. 9 It is important to remen1ber tl1at all the 'defendant is entitled to 1s a11 opJ)Ortu ?ity to ap1)ear and . defe11d. If l1e does not apJ)ear af'ter J1avi11g receiv ed proper notice, tl1e co11rt n1ay proceecl in l1is absence a11d render a va.Iid decree. As pointed 011t in CI1apter III, tl1e defenda11t cannot prevent the court fron1 pro ceeding by faili11g to appear.
1. 2· 3.
4·
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 213. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 223. TJ1e requireu1e11t will be discussed in Cl1apter VI, infra. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 223(2). es e Civ. Pro. C., Art. 229. Tl1is fu11ction of tl1e Registrar in this regard will be discussed in . C11apter VI, inf ra. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 214. Civ. ·Pro. C., Art. 230. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 215 (1). See Civ. Pr · o• C ·, 231 • Tl11·s .WI·ti be ful ly discussed in Chapter VI, i1,fra• . C1v. Pro. C., Art. 233 .. See also Civ . Pro. C., Arts. 70, 78.
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p
Art. 94 provides that the summons shall be served in aceord·ance w.ith the pr o'>33 10 an d tha t 1·t sh aJI be · t r f A o In the f orm prescribed by · the Second visions · .... . . 11 Pro C1v ced 1l ure the Co de. to Where tl1ere is m o re th dul e Sche · · an one de1cendant ons 1s t o be served on each of s11 m e h t f o co py them.12 Tile summons is t� a 11;. h d ant d e1en h e t Y any person a11tho1ized t o do so by t·he c o11r , n o d e v r be se t an d . · rtz d · 1s e re e th fi rre ? au d o a person s . to a� tl1e serving officer. t3 This means that the cotlft n1ay at1thor 1ze any persoI?, 1nclt!d111 g t]1e plaintiff, to serve the 81101mons on the d�fendant. It wot1ld be desirable 1f every court had its own serving officer so that 1t would not frequently b e necessary to rely on tl1 e pl,tintiff, who may be teml?ted t? serve the su.n1111°.ns !ate or 11 ot at all. Certainly, it is likely that a court oJfic1a1 will exert gre�ter efforts to find the d_efendant so tha.t }1e n1ay be served personally. However, 10 the abse11ce of a serving officer, tl1 e co11 rt may atithorize the plaintiff to serv e the su.1n111011s. A11_ examination of tl1e p��visio�s of tl1e Code relating to service of pro cess 1na.kes 1t clear tl1at these prov1s1ons 1ncor1Jo r,1te a bierarcl1y of metl1 ods of service, designed to insur_e that tl1e defe11dant recei�es tl1e best ki 11d of service that is pos sible ltnder the c1rc11n1stances. In ter1ns of likely effectiveness, the methods o f service a11thorized by tl1e Code can_ be divided i11to four categories: (1) persona]; (2) con strt 1cti'v'e; (3) post; (4) s11bst1tuted. Personal service n1eans that a copy of tl1e s11n1 1no11s and tl1e staten1 ent of claim l1ave actL1ally been delivered to the defendant, Yt1ho must sign an acknowledgme11t of receiJJt. 14 Personal servic e is obviously the best n1ethod of service, becat1 se it actt1aJly informs the defendant that a suit l1as been institt1ted against l1i1n. 15 He has ack.no\vledged receipt of the 11o tice and ca11not late r contend tl1at, in fa.ct, l1e \Vas not notified of tl1e 1Jroceedings. T/1e c/a11ger t/1at t/1e defenrla11t }Viii not acti1ally receive notice is present }v/1enever a11y otl1er 111etl1od of service is en1ployed. Therefo re, Art. 95 (3) provides tl1at, i11sofar as possible, the
st1n1D1ons sl1all be se rved on the defe11dant in person.
Constr11ctive service is tl1e seco nd best ldnd of service. It is based on the like lihood tl1at tb.e d efendant will receive tl1e notice, since service is made 011 a person wl10 it is asst1med will transmit the s11mm.ons to tl1 e clefenda11t. Service by post represents an atte1npt to reach tl1e defendant by sencling hin1 tl1e s11m111ons, eitl1er directly as pro vided in Art. 106, or tbr o11gl1 a c o11.rt wl1ere the defendant resides within tl1e jurisdicti on of anotl1er court i11 EtI1iopia, as provided in Art. 107. Tb.e least effective method of service is s11bstit11ted service, a11d in n1aoy cases it is eq1u valent to no service at all. T11e most co1111no o exa111ple of s11bstit11ted service is service by publication in a 11ewspaper. Tl1 e defendant is advised by a 11 otice in the newspaper that suit has bee11 instituted against hitn a11d tl1at l1e n1 ust a�pear and defend o .n a certain day. There is the great danger that the defe�dant will no_t see the notice in the newspaper, and, t11erefore, l1e will n ot have received any .notifica tio11 o f the s11it. In Etl1iopia, s11bstit11ted service is to be used only as a. last resort. ze � by the ri tho au are ds tl1o me r fou all e il 1 \Vl t The p oint to re1nen1 ber is tha er ord 1g cll1 cen des � i _ yed 1;lo em be to are cl an Code, they are n o t alternative methods of effectiveness. This is den1onstrat ed b oth by the specific provisions of th e Code 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15 ·
. 338 t. Ar of ns isio ov pr the th wi ce an ord acc In case of appeal, it is to be served in See Summons No. 5: Summons for Appearance of Defendant. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 95(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 95(1 ). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 102(1). 1'\1aterials d an es as C , dd La . M d an l ta es V . See the discussion of this point in C. Brown, A on Pleading a11d Procedi,re (1953), p. 4.
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I
I
'
visions relating to notice taken as a whole. o pr e tl1 of As and by tlle cle5ar . he su� ons be ser ved on th� defendant person t q r (3 tha es ui ! e ) � _ . we saw, Art. 9 ts. , h � ch pr� v1de for Ar 1�1 , 99ore ref the ; ble 1 :Y oss mp 1 is s tlli conere ally except wh l v i ce IS Impossible. na ser rso pe s les 11n ble ca pli ap t Art. 99' no are ice . ' StTllCt·ive ser v 1e d e1e an om b h tl t:'. d c w t rr1 es on busin y nt age an _n 1 1 � ice 0 v ser r fo ess, ides . v pro wl1ich resid e w1tl11n the local s 11ot doe ant end def tl1e ere wh yed limits plo eni can 011ly be 16 S al be v son ser per ed t not !� . can ere s, � tl1u and o too, on, . of tlle cou rt's jurisdicti a11 �gen t 10 c harge of 1� o vable pro n e vic r se for ing vid pro : 101 � Arts. 100 and 1ly, state tl1at suc h ser vice can only 1 fan s t n nda defe tl1e of r nbe mei a, on perty and be emplo),ed whe re the defe1711dant c�11not per�ona!ly be s�rv ed and has no agent ser vice IS autl1or1 zed by Art. 105, but it _ empo,vered to accept ser vice. Subst1 tuted r1zed only wl1en p�rsona l or const r uctive ser _ is provided tl1at s11cl1 service is a11tho . vice is not possible.18 Tl1at art�cle also a11tl1o r1zes service by _ post? and the clear in1plication is tl1 at tl1at metl1od 1s to b� e1 11ployed . ,vl1ere _feasible, 1 n preferen ce to substitt1ted service. Finally, A 1·t. 108, wl11ch deals wrth serVI ce on a defendant resid ing 011t of Etl1iopia, sets f'ortl1 a l1ierarcl1y and �irects t�at it be foilowed: if the defet1dai1 t has an, agent e111po,ver ed to accept service, service m11st be n1ade on the agent; otherwise, tl1e st1111111ons is to be se11t to tl1e defendant by registered mail at Ius foreign address if tl1is is known; it is only where· his address is not known that service by JJt1blicatio11 is a11tl1o rized. Tl1e i 1npo rt of the Code is clear: the de fendant is to receive tl1e best lund of notice that it is possible to give under the circt1n1 stances. Tl1is follo\vs fron1 the basic concept of wl1at is essential for a fair trial - tl1e defe11dant 11111st be given an opJJOrtu11ity to appear and defend, a.nd in order for l1i 111 to do so, l1e m11st be given tl1e best notice tl1at is possible, advising l1im tl1at a suit l1as been filed agai11st l1i1n. We will now consider eacl1 of the 1uetl1ods of ser,1 ice.
in1port
B.
l\1etl1ods of Service
As we have said, personal service is the delivering of the summons to the defendant and reqt1iri11g l1im to sign an acknowledgme11t. Where a defendant wl10 l1a_s been served refuses to sign the ackno\vledgn1e11t, tl1e serving office r sh.all rep ort this fact to tl1e co11rt. Ass111ning that tl1e co11rt finds tl1at the defen.dant has been 19 l1is fail tire to sign the acl(nowledgo1ent bas no significa11ce, and served, ff e ctivel 7 � 1_f 11� fails to ap1Jear on the da)' a1J1Jointed for tl1e hearing, tl1e cou rt will proceed 1n l11s absence. In . certain cases service on a person otl1er tl1an tl1e defendant is ''assi 111ilated" to service on tl1e defenda11t, and it is as if tl1e defendant l1i111self ,vere serve d per sonally. St1�l1 service is a11thorized \vl1ere tl1e defendant has a11 agent en1po,vered to accept service, and service 11pon tl1e age 11t is considered personal service on the �Vl�e . J�erson al service is ref�rred to, it n1ea11s 111� o lin:Lit s f loca l pers the onal service witl1i11 J't ri is �1c! 10� of tl1e court wl11ch issued act bey on ca11 11ot the sum 111o offic ns er serv l'l1e ing · · · those ILffilts. 17. As _\vill be _discussed Subsequently, ept acc to ere wl d 1ere tl1e defendant l1as an em po w · agent service serVIce 011 tl1e agent is .' s · deen1e d servi. ce on Pro c·v c . 1 · ee the defendant perso11aUy. Art. 96. 16 ·
18. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 103. 19. See Civ. Pro. c. Art the . t 1 e lO ?( ?) d W here n the perso11 refuses to sign tl1e acknov-. 1� gm provisions of Art ' 103 · . �ci l1.- · se' o are n h . the J)re_lu_�e to substituted service or the servi g f :rson co11d sun1mons at the' r; bas been duly served. w ·qlteSt of the pla1nt1ff_, apply 11nless the. court fu1ds that theen� the here tl1� defet1dan t l11n1self refused to s1gu the ack11owledgD1 'y court wou·ld fi·nd that ie ssar · 1 was duly served, and nece n u e b would further proceedings
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20 This refers to a per son . t. nda specifical! n J' aut l oriz e,.l defe . i to . �, . , ece1ve service and . . . . . o,. that· purpose. For. example, a foreigner seel<ing to do bt1s1n ecl o1nt fi ann es s 1n E... t1110rr . . d ap _ �e t o fo1nt a� age�t fo r tl1e. pt1rpose of receivi11 g pia _may be qu1re service, and serv1ce on this agent ts equivalent to pe1 sonal service t1pon tl1e defenda11t. I-Iowever, service made l�pon any agent th:ough wl1 0111 the. defenda11t inay carry on business does not_ constlt�1te p�rs?na l service . on tl1 e defenda11t, althoug[1 it wotild aJllOlltJt to cons_trt1ct1ve s�rv1ce :v1tl1 111 �l1e mea_ning of Art.. 99. It is 011 Iy wl1ere tile agent was specially appo111ted to receive service tl1 at service 11pon tl1e agent is assiinilated to service on the defenda11 t. By tl1e sa1ne toke11, wl1ere tl1 e defe11dant has appointed a plead�r, tl1e s�1n1_D n101 1s n1 ay be serv�d 0.1 1 tl1 e pleader or left at his office, arJd this const1t11tes ass1I1latecl 1-1ersonal service 111)011 tl1e defer1 da11t _21 Art. 98 gover 11s servi�e on perso11s wl10 are stied as partt1ers in tl1e name of tl1e �m. Wl1ere s11cl1 � st1it_ l1as beet1 filed, service 111)011 a11y of tlie partners at the princrl?al place o.f _b�1s1ness 1� dee111 ed _go�d perso11al service on all of tl1e partners, includtng tl1ose res1 d111g ot1ts1de of Etl1101)1a. Tl1 is is a very practical approacI1 . The s11it is agai11st the firn1 ratl1er tl1an against tl1e partners i11 divicl11ally, 22 and it will be defended by tl1 e fir111. Tl1e notice is, i11 effect, notice to tl1e firn1, ,t11d the persons cl1arged ,:vitl1 representing the firn1 will certainly be aware tl1at tl1e suit 11,ts been filed. Hovvever, if tl1e plaintiff l<nows tl1at tl1e partnersl1ip l1as bee11 dissolved, the s11n11nons must be served t1pon every perso11 in Ethiopia wl1on1 tl1e l )lai11tiff seel<s . to hold liable.23 Tl1e l)erson served 1n.t1st be given written notice as to \Vl1etl1er l1e is served as a 1)art11er or as a 111a11ager or i11 both capacities; i 11 clef atilt of st1cl1 notice, he shall be dee111ed to l1 ave been served as a part11er. 24
111 a suit against a body corporate, it is provided tl1,1t tl1e st1111111ons 111ay be served personally 011 tl1e secretary or on any director or otl1er pri11cipal officer of the body corporate or it 1nay be de_posited or sent by post addressed to tl1e body corporate at tl1e registered office, or if there is no st1cl1 office, at tl1e })lace \Vhere the body corporate carries 011 its activities. 25 Altl1 ol1gl1 tl1ere is no express provision to tliis effect, si11ce these metl1ods are of varying degrees of effectiveness, tl1ey sl1ot1ld be employed in tl1 e followi11g order; (I) personal service on the secretary, a direc tor or principal officer; (2) deposit: at tl1e registered office or place wl1ere tl1e body corporate carries on its activities; (3) J)osti11 g to tl1e registerecl office or place where the body corporate carries on its activities. Fi11a.lly, in a s11i! agai11st . tl1e govern 111ent, the s11n1mo11 s is t o be served on tl1e gover11 111ent pleader; 1f there 1s no pleader, tl1e court 1 nust direct anotl1er 111etl1od of service. 26 Constr11ctive service is based 01 1 tl1e lilcelihood tl1at tl1e defendant \vill act11ally l1 vvit sl1ip tion e rela a clos g 1 i1 11av e eon 11 so1 1 01 ed serv is it if ns ive mo rece tl1e stim 2 0.
21. 2 2. 23. 24. 25. 26.
an and ces ed For �rm th e of er mb me a is ant end def e 1 1 t ; 1ere w1 . Civ. Pro. c., Art. 96(1) ze a person _to de1end or1 h aut ll sha he t, sui a ing e11d def of se rpo tJ pu 1e for n ve not obtai lea ointed, Art. n be� app has nt age l1 c su_ no e 1er Wl 61. t. Ar C., . Pro . Civ the suit 011 t1is behalf. t mo 0 car \Vl1 er son pri A . cer offi ng 1 d_ an 1m con the on de n1a be 96(1) provides that service is to t. 52. Wl1er� no agent Ar , _C. . Pro . Civ . end def to nt age an ii,t po ap obtaiLl leave n,ust also n. iso the pr of nt de ten r1n sup h t on e vic ser es riz tl,o au � Iias been appointed, Art. 96(1) _ � ader ple s of the res add the ce sin , 1on ,,1s pro cal cti tJra y c ver a Civ. Pro. ., Art. 96(2). TJ1is is . will be k11own (asst1ming l1e is a licensed advocate). . . 1ersb1p assets to sat1sfy rt1 pa st ain ag eed oc pr st mu e 1 1 n,, fir the c ., Since tl,e creclitor llas sued c m. om s. er rtn a 1 pa idu div in e th · sets of , ain ' st tl1e as a JU 1e can proceecl ag · dgment be1or r- e I Art. 255. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 98(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 98(3). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 97. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 96(3).
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I"
nsl rel ip tio h s�c uld ing wo l1av son per tr�nsmit the tl1e � � � at i tl is ory tlle e hini. Th 1s io1 10 wl11cl1 ?onstruc tive serv s1 t1at ee tl1r are ere Th � . ar1t et1d def ice sun11 11 0115 to tlle 1s1ness r . \¥o�k a�ainst a person who bt any !o. ting rela sujt a In e. mad � may be 1 sst1111g the surnmons, 1rt _ cot tl1e of 1ts J1n1 al loc tl1e I1i11 ,:vit service . does 110t reside the t1n1e of ser�1ce personally car t a. wl10 1t age1 or ager 111an tlie 011 e iuad be may 27 In orde for st1cl1 service to t. da� 1 be effective 1 defe � ries 0 1 1 tJ1e btisiness for tl1e te 1nt1 t rela to the bt1si11ess or � tlie follo\:vi11g co1 1ditio11s 111t1st be sat1sfied. Tl1e st11t . _ _ 111g 111 Dessie, cat1sed injury to res1d o11 JJers a If t. ,vork carried 011 by tl1e agen 50111e011e in f,.ddis A.baba \Vitl1 lus at1tomobile a1 1cl l1ad a.11 age11t carrying on busi r1ess for J1i1 11 in Addis A...ba.ba, service co11ld not be 111ade on the agent under this article since tl1e st1it does 1 1ot relate to tl1e bt1siness carried on by the agent. Se co1 1dly, tl1e defe 11da 1 1t 111t1st be residing ot1tside tl1e Ioc�l li1:1its of _the jurisdiction of tl1e co11rt isst1ing tl1e st1 1 nn1ons. SttJJpose tl1at Ato A lives 10 Addis Ababa a11d 11.as a store tl1ere, \vl1icl1 i. s n1 anaged by an agent. Ato A 11i1nself takes no part in the J 1 11a11agen1ent of ti1e bt1si 1 1ess. T 1e plaintiff files a s11it in,,olviog tl1e b11siness i1 1 the A\vradja Guezat Co11rt in Addis Ababa. Since tl1e defe11da11t resides i1 1 Addis Ababa, service 111ust be 111ade 011 l1i111 JJerso1 1ally, a 11d ca.n11 ot be rnade 011 tl1e age1 1t, even tl1ougl1 tl1c s11it i11volves tl1e bt1si11ess a11d tl1e defenda1 1t takes 1 10 part in tl1e 111aoage1ne1 1t of tl1e busi 11ess. Fir1 ally, service 1 11ust be 1 11ade o .n tl1e 1 11a 11ager or agent i11 cl1arge of tl1e bt1si 11ess. lt ca11 1 1ot l)e 111ade 011 a11y otl1er e1111)loyee st1cJ1 as a clerk or a ,v,1tcl1111an. 28 l:;-or tl1ese 1J11rposes, tl1e 111aster of a sl1ip is dee111ed tl1e agent of Lbe O'.v 1 1er or cl1arterer. 29 The seco11d sitt1atio11 \Vl1ere co11strt1ctive service is at1tl1orized is ,vl1ere, i11 a case involving t.l1e defe 11da1 1t's i 1 11111ovable JJI"OJJert:y, service cau 1 1ot be 111ade 011 tl1e defen da11t JJersonally a1 1d ]1e l1as 110 age11t e1111)0Wered to accept service i. n accordance \vitl1 Art. 96. Service 111ay tl1e1 1 be 111ftde on any agent of tl1e defe 1 1da11t i11 charge of tl1e J)roperty. 30 II- ere, tl1ere is no req11ire111ent tl1at tl1e defendant be a non-resid e11t t)r tl1at tl1e agent be the 111anager of tl1e property. For exa111J)le, the plaintiff sL1es to recover da111ages for an injtlr;' l1e strffered on t]1e defe11daot's Ia11d. The defe11da11t is 110,v vacatio11i11g in Kenya a 11d l1as left a \Vatcl1n1an in cl1arge of the JJrOJJerty. Since t11e defendant ca11not be served JJersonalJy a11d l1as no agent c1 11pow ered to acceJJt ser,1ice, service 111ay be 111ade on tl1e watcl11na1 1. Remen1ber, I1owever, tl1at ,ve are referring to co11str11ctive service, wl1icl1 ca11 only be en1ployed wl1ere the : def� 1 1�ant cannot be ser,1ed 1Jerso11ally. fvlerely beca11se the s11it in,;olv es tl1e defe�d ar1t s 1mn1ovab]e J)roperty does 11ot 1nea11 tl1at service 011 tl1e aaent in cl1arge of the . 0 lJfOJJerty 1s proper. Tlie most con1111on ty1Je of constrt1ctive service is service 011 a 1 11en1ber of the defenda11t's fa 111ily i11 lie11 of service on tbe clefenda11t. In a11y st1it wl1ere tl1e defen d ai1t _cannot be fo11nd a11d l1as no age11 t en1po,verecl to acceJJt ser,,ice 11nder Ar !·· ?6 , se_rVlCC !llaiI be lTI �de Oll a11f adt1]t ITie!nber of t}1e defenda11t' s family VlbO is res�ding \Vt th h1111Aga111, tl1ere 1s no reqt11re1nent that tl1e defendant be a non-resident t mean is wb. a t 11 btit 1erely that l1e ca11not be fo11ncl. A q11estio11 n1ay arise as to 5e 11 n. provisio S �P?ing �Y _"::ltl adLilt 111e111?er of tl1e fa1nily'' ,vitl1i11 tl1e 1neani 1 1g of tl1is 111.�t tlie st111�111ons 1s served on the defendant's fifteen year old son, wl10 is resid . ne _ anyo si11ce wit!, liini. It cotild be contended tl1at service was 11ot validly effected, 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
Civ. Pro. c., A.rt. 99(l). See Gocu.l v . Ga11asl1 (I-ligl1 4, p. 4.16 . vol. Ct., Rep., Bombay, 1880), L. Indian Civ. Pro. C., Art. 99(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 100. Civ. Pro. c., Art. lOl.
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siclered_ a _ 111.inor in �tllio1Jia.J2 J11 otJ1 er words, if ''adult' under tl1 e age of 1 � is con ' f for tl1ese purposes 1s deined as It 1s de:fi11 ed 10 tl1e Civil Code, service cotild not be made ?n a11y perso11 tLnder tl1 e ��e of 18. I-lo'vvever, tl1 is wotlld 110t be a sotlncl inter pretat1011. The pt1rpose of reqt11r111 g tl1 at tl1e st11n111ons be served 011 a,1 ''adtilt 111e1nber of tl1e defe11 da11t'� fa111ily'' is to inst1re that service is 1nade 011 a respo11sible person and not on a cl11ld. Any f)CrSOJl o.f 111att1re years shot1lcl be co11sidered an adt1lt within tl1e 111eani11g of tl1 e reqt1iren1e11t, an.cl st1cl1 a11 a1Jproach I1as been talcen elsewhere. 33 It n1ay be 11 otecl tl1at � 11 1inor 11 1ay be e1nancipatecl at the age of 15, 34 a11 cl st1rely a person of tl1at age 1s co1npete11t eno11gl1 to t1ndersta11d tI1at he 111t1st oive the sl1n1 n1011s to tl1e defe11 da11t. 0 Art. 109 1 orizes a type of service tl1,1t a1Jpears to be a cross betwee11 per autl _ _ _ so11 al service and co11strt1ct1ve service. It provides tl1at wl1 ere tJ1 e defenda11 t is a pt1blic servant or is e111ployed by a11 orga11izatio11 , institt1 tiou or co111pa11y, tl1 e cot1rt may, if it decides tl1 at tl1 e sl1 1111 11 01 1s 111ay be most co11 venientl)' served i1 1 tl1is w;;1y, send it for ser,1ice to tl1e l1ead of tl1 e office in \Vl1 icl1 the defe11 dant is ernployed. T\vo copies of tl1e st1111n1 ons are to be sent, one to be retai1 1ed by the defe11dant and one to be rett1rned \\1itl1 tl1e sig11 at11re of tl1e person wl1 0 servecl it ancl tl1e vvritten acknowledg111e11 t of tl1 e defe11da11t. Tl1 e sig11 atl1 re is e\1idence of service. 35 Tl1 ere is r�o req11ire111 e11t tl1at tl1 e de.fendant ca11not be served perso11 ally, so strictly speaking, tl1 is is not constrt1ctive service, tl1 ot1gl1 it part,1kes of tl1 at for111 . Si11 ce street addresses are rare i11 Etl1iopia, it 111 ay be very diJiicttlt a11d ti11 1e-co11su111ing to try to locate a JJerso11 in order to serve 11i111 perso11 ally. \Vl1ere ,1 1Jerso11's resi dence is 11ot kno\,10, it is n1ore conve11ie11 t to serve ltim i11 tl1 is way. Tl1 e cot1rt \.\ ill 011ly a11thorize tl1is ki11 d of service if it is satisfied that tl1e l1 ead of the office tl1 at tl1e defendant is served. Si11 ce tl1e ret11r11ecl st1111 n1 011s is sig1 1ed \\ il.l see to it by the bead of tl1 e office a11d acl<11 o'vvledged by tl1e defe11 da11t, the defendant c::11111ot deny tl1at 11 e was served, and st1cl1 service l1as tl1 e same effect as J Jersont1l service. Note, l1owever, tl1at the st1n111 1ons 1n11st be se11 t to tl1 e l1 ead of tl1 e office; it ca1111ot be give11 to a11) 7 other e111 ployee. 1
1
It sl1011l d be observed tl1 at wl1e11ever constr11ctive service is 111 adc� tJ1e person receiving tl1 e st1n1.111 ons 1n·ust sig11 at1 ack110,vledg1nent of service 011 tl1e original st1mn1011s. 36 Tl1 e p11rpose and effect of tl1 is req11ire111e11 t is tl1 e sa111 e as tl1 at of tl1e require1nent that tl1 e defenda11 t wl10 is personally served sig11 an aclc11owledg111 ci1t. Wl1ere personal or constr11ctive service is 1 1ot possible, tl1e serving officer sl1 all return tl1e s111m11011s to the co11rt fro111 wllicl1 it ,vas issL1ed together witl1 a11 affidavit of the facts \Vl1ic]1 iJre,,e11 ted hi1n fro111 serving it. 37 In s11cl1 a cas�, tl1e cot1rt is to . . _ apply the provisio11s of Art. 105, \Vl1ich at1thorize st1bst1tt1ted service a� d service by post.38 Art. 105 does not ex1Jressly say tl1 at service by_ post, as a11 tl1or1zed by :'-rts. _ 106 and I 07, shall be en1ployed in preference to �t1bst1tL1ted service, bt1� there 1s 11 0 dot1bt tl1 at it sl1 ould be. As we said, tl1 e clear .1mport of the Code 1s tl1at tl1ere is to be a hierarcl1y of service, designed to inst1re that tl1 e defe:1dant receives �l1 e best notice possible. It is 11 1uch 1nore lil<ely tl1 at the defenda11 t will act11ally receive 32. 33. 34.
35.
Civ. C., Art. 198. P· 286. See .1-:Iari v. Chandra (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1908), Inc/ian L ..Rep,, vol. 25. Civ. C., Art. 330. agent at1 011 e vic ser es of cas i11 ble lica a1Jp o als is 1 io1 vis pro Civ. Pro. c., Art. .110. TI1is en1powered to receive service under Art. 96(1).
36. Civ. Pro. C., Art. -102(1). 37. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 103. . · lift in pla the of st ue req the at 1s 101 11n su1 sl1 fre 38. Jbicl. The court 111 ay also issue a
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. ·r the stiinii1ons is sent to him by post tl1an if substituted service is used · ' notice 1 t · sor e ore r h e f d is a · d b to_ the 1 ot�ld be t.r1e ethods of sl m od 1 tl e 111 t tha , ore ref the and . . 106 says tl1at serVIce by t � � 5 10 . t Ar 111 for registered . substittited service provided addition t? . the ?tl1er metl1ods of service. 1 1 or of. . Iietl iii ed loy emp � be post nlay 1al se1 v1�e, _ s inc e Art. 95 �3) requi 1 _ so )er of t1 l1e 1 111 11 ea 1 n e, urs co of res t, no Tliis does . 1 11ea n 111 l1et1 of constructive servic rt es do or le. sib N pos ,,er ene vVll e. e ,,ic ser ersonal t. 103 sa�s tl1at . tl1 e . provisions Ar and , 105 . Art by ed oriz 1 l t ti a is of t pos b)' �ervice e serv1�e 1� impossible. ctiv stru con ?r al son per re wl1� y onl ble lica aJ)p are Art. 105 1 ployed 1� lieu of or in be e? o 1s t _ t pos by ice serv t tl1a ns 111ea ply siin 106 Art. 1 ave said , st1bstitt1ted service alone should l we as and ice, serv ited stitt sub to ition add �ot be tised t1oless service by J)OSt is not l)ossible. However, service by post migJ1t be used i11 additio11 to coi1strt1ctive service. Tl1e su1n111011s is to be addressed to the defenda11t or to his agent empowered to acce1)t service at tl1e I)lace wl1ere tl1e defe11?a11t or bis agent ordinarily resides, carries 011 busi11 ess or I)ersonally worl<s for ga.1 11. 39 An aclcnowledg1nent purporting to be sig11ed by tl1e defenda 11t or l1 is age11t is pri111a facie proof of ser,1ice, as is an endorse111e11 t by a postal en1ployee tl1at tl1e defe11dant or age11t reft1sed to accept delivery. 40 As witl1 a refusal to acl<nov.dedge personal or co11strt1ctive service, the fact tl1at tl1 e defendant or ]1 is age11t refL1sed to acce1Jt tl1e registered st1 mn1 ons cannot 11ulli[y tl1 e legal effect of sucl1 service. 41 I-Iovve, 1er, it is always open to the defend an t to sl1ow tl1at tl1e sL1111111.011s ,vas 11 ot actt1ally served 011 l1im or his agent and tl1 at tl1e aclcnowledg111e11t ,vas false.42 Art. I 07 l)rovides a co11venient 111etl1od by wl1icl1 a defendant wl10 resides in Etl1 iopia, bl1t ot1tsicle tl1 e jL1risdictio11 of tl1e cot1rt fro111 wl1icb tl1e st1mmons is issu ed, n1 ay be served. Tl1e cot1rt isst1i11g tl1e s11mn1 011s 111ay se11d it, either by one of its officers or by post, to any cot1rt l1 avi11g jt1risdiction in tl1e place where tl1e defenda11t resides or is l<11ovvn to l1 ave last resided, carried 011 bt1siness or perso nally ,1i1orke? for g�in. Tl1at cot1rt n1t1st try to serve JJersonally tl1e st1n1n1ons there, 3?d follo\v111 g service, rett1rn a copy of tl1e su111111ons to the cot1rt of issue togetl1er \V1th a record of a11 y })roceecli11gs it 111ay l1ave taken. St1bstitt1ted ser,1ice, at1tl1orized b)' Art. 105, 111ay be c l1aracterized as tl1e service to be 111�de_ as a last resort. Tl1e cot1rt cloes 11ot lose its power to l1 ear the case becat!se 1t 1s tin able to give tl1e defendant a type of notice tl1at is likely to ?e effective. As _ long as i_t gives tl1 e defe11dant tl1e best notice possible t1nder t�e ctr cti111sta11ces, it l1as satisfied tl1e reqt1ire111e11t of fairness to the defendant. It is not tl�e c_otir�'s fatilt tl1 at b�tter notice is 11ot possible. Tl1erefore, wl1en substitt1ted se �; vice IS giv�n, tl1e effect 1s tl1e sa1ne as if tl1e defeuda11t l1ad been personall)1 served, al�hotigl1, 10 fact, it is dot1btft1l if tl1 e defenda11t \vill �1ctt1ally recei,1e 11otice of tlie Slllt.
There �re t l 1ree typ�s of st1bstitt1ted service : (1) affixi 1g a . copy of tl1e suinm ons 1 in : co�spict iotis place In tl1e c t1 tho11se; (2) affix on up s n mo 1 sun the i11g a copy of ? � . _ a laSi 11spictio�1s place of the bu1ld1ng wl1ere tl def ave 1 l o t kno wn 1e e11da11t is resi ed, carried on business or per of e not ic ng so11ally worked for gai11 ; (3) pt1blishi
.J
39. 40. 41. 42. 43 ·
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 106(!). Civ. Pro. C., Atr. 106(2). See the discussi n in S S o · . arkar. The Lalv of Civil Procec/1,re (14th ed., 19 63) ol. 1 , p . 252. v See Sunder Spinner v. M aka , n Bhula (Higl1 Ct. Bombay 1 22), Indian Cases, vol. 64' p . 386· ' ' 9 civ · . pro. C., Art. 105(3).
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the suit _in newspapers. The first and second 111ethods are to be employed togetl1�r., and all tl1ree methods ma y be· employed in addition to serv1·ce b Y pos . t or service pr ov ·a � d �s t co e ur 1n er A l r t. · an 107. The hope is tI1at somehow tlle by ot1 defendant no rec t1c eiv e. e lly Pe rl1 a ac tua ·ps . someon.e will see the Slimm011s a niay · t tl 1e· courtu1 ng o 'ldi h t r e b· e h n? t t1c e. or tn tl�e newspaper and advise h.in1. Perh l1? t1se aps he . spape�. Tt ffi . 1e o w th b e v1 ne ot 1s _ 111e. c1�ncy of Sl1cl1 service a11d t11e ll11li w1l 1 see ke lihood wi de ac ll fen tt1 all da y nt receive notice 1nake it clear that Stlbstittited that .tl1e ser vice be used as only a last resort. shot1ld Ar�. �08, disc11ssed earlier, gover11s tl1e sitt1ation where tl1e defendant resides out e en1powered to accept service. If bi's I-es·d of Etl11op1a a11d has 110 agent l1er 1 ence · · · .krno,,vn, tl1� sl1.1u1!1011s 1s to be sent to l1in1 by JJost.44 If it is not. tl,en abr?ad 1s notice sha _ ll45be p11bl!shed 111 s_ 1 1cl 1 11ewspa1Jers circ11lating i11 EtJ1iopia as the· r ourt may direct. There IS n,o req111reI11e_11t tl1at 11otice be pt•! in a 1 1ewspaper circt1 lating ovvn, tl1en It 1s 11ot lil<ely that the cot1ntry _ �broa �. If tl1� defe11dant � res1de11ce 1s 11 nlcn 1tl1e r. Tl1 ere may also be practical diffictilties � �n ,vl11c� 1 _he 1s pr�se11_t vv1ll be kno w11 _ 1n obta1n1ng :pt1bl1c�t10!1 o� a11 Etl11�p1an legal 11otice in a foreign newspaper. For pt1bl1cat10? 1s to be .111 a news1Japer circ11l�1ti11g in Ethiopia. Agai11, these � easons, _ tl1e effort 1s n1ade to give tl1e defenda11t the best 11otice JJossible ' even thouoh l1e 0 is residi11g 011tside of Etl1iopia.
Lack of Proper Notice We may now co11sider tl1e effect of lack of }Jroper notice. In Cl1apter II I, we saw that wl1ere tl1e defenda11t did not receive legally st1fficient 11otice, tl1at is, \vl1ere ineffective n1eans were t1sed wl1e11 111t1ch 111ore effective 1neans \Vere readily available, the court lost jt1risdiction to l1ear tl1e st1it. 111 a case st1cl1 as Wa!!{er v. City of Hutchi11so11, 46 the failure to give legally st1.ffi.cient 11otice \Vas l1eld to constit11te a denial of d11e process, and tl1e judgine11t was void. No clot1bt tl1e sa111e rest1lt would be reached in Ethiopia.. I-lovvever, tl1at was an extre1ne case. Tl1e defe11cla11t was a resident and the tribunal emplo)1ed notice by JJllblication - tl1e least effective l<ind. It cannot be said that the fail11re to give tl1e [Jest notice possible wo11ld necessarily be so improper as to destroy the co11rt's j11risdiction. The court in that case indicated tl1at notice by registered mail wo11ld l1ave been s11ffi.cient to satisfy tl1e reqt1ire1nents of dt1e process, even tho11gh personal service was also possible. The qt1estio11 witl1 which we will now be co11cerned is not tl1at of loss of j11risdiction d11e to tl1e failure to give legally s11ffi.cient 11otice. Ratl1er it is wl1etl1er tl1e fail11re to give tl1e best notice possible - to follow tl1e l1ierarchy set fortl1 in tl1e Code - prevents the summons from being ''dt1ly served'' a11d re11ders the service ineffective. C.
Consider this exan1ple. Service was 11ot made perso11ally on the defendant, al though this was possible. Tl1e servi11g officer \,Vent to tl1e _ defendan�'s l1ouse, and when told that be was not l1ome made no effort to find lum, b11t 111stead left tl1e summons with the defendant's nineteen year old son, \vl10 was residing witl1 11�m. The son did not give the su1nmons to the father, and of co11rse, t11e _fa�ber, being unawa re of the suit , did not appear at the first hearing: '\Yhen t?e pl�1nt1ff appears for the hearing and tl1e defendant does not appear, 1t 1s provided 1n Art. 70 (a)
44. There is· n o express requirement tha t this be sent by _registered post, bu t since Art. 106 tl1e summons
refers to registere d post, this reqtiireme nt should be rea? into Art. 108. Where is sent by registered post, a rettirn receipt ca n. be obtained by the postal en1ployee. 45. For a case holding that service by pt�blication . cannot be e1nployecl wl1ere tl1e def�ndant s a lcutta, 1929), 1929 Al/-J11d1a Rep., C , Ct. gh a (Hi dr a t1n J addres v. . n s a aim is Sol known see 3 5 5 p. 46. See the discussion, sz,pra, Chapter III, n otes 117-119, and a ccompanying text.
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y served, tl1e suit shall be hear cltil was ns 1111o sun tl1e t tl1a ved pro d' . . l 1·t is t 1-1at ,,·r • t :1cl .hr,tve t o de ter1n1ne 1s_ wl1ether "''Ol r cot1 _tl1� st�?n que rst i f the e:r. parte." Tlie of Art. 70 111ea. 0 111g (a), a11d it wotlld llav·e tl1e w1th111 ser,,ed ''dti1y \. ,as . ,. , ,, S I1 Sllllll110 . ·1 u 1a1r y . 1s f· o �11e good s�rvice when 1lt 111embe1. ad1 an 011 e vic ser er etll wli ide dec to 1t des . cl11 If ally con son tl1a t it was not, per ant en? def tl1e ve ser to le sib pos s wa it ond a sec er st111unons to be served. ord . 11st 111 1t ::1nd te, pc1r ex d cee pro it ca11110t r wl1e . 78, �rt er_ a decree has been Und . ,vay tl1er ano i11 e aris ld coti � Tlle qtiestion . 1 th 1e 0 111on 1th1 J from Jl) the da)' 11e � }Jassed e;c parte, tl1e defe11dant may _:11 I , , . ,:-v ? becaine a\vare of tl1e decree, for an 01der seLt111g 1t aside. One of tl1e grou 11cts for settino aside tlie decree is tl1at ''tl1e st11111no11s \Vas not d11ly served." Tl1e q·uestion tI1 en beco111es wl1c1t is ''d11ly served'' witl1in tl1e 111 ea11i11g of arts. 70 (a) ,tnd 78 (2). T11 e answer to tl1 is question de1Jends on 110\v we interpret Art. 95 (3) req11ir j11g tl1at, i11sofar as possible, tl1e st1m!11011s be ser,,ed 011 the defenda11t personally, aiicl Art. I01 , ,vl1icl1 a11tl1orizes service 011 an adt1lt me1nber of tl1e defendant 's fa11 1ily only ,vI1ere tl1e defendant l1i111self ca11not be fol111d. Tl1ese 1Jrov1..,1ons cotild be 1 nter1Jreted as clirector:y 011ly, tl1at is, as directi11g tl1e serving officer l1ow to · proceed. I-Iowever, f,1ilt1re to co111ply ,vitl1 tl1ose reqt1ire111e11ts ,vol1ld not, l111der tl1is iuter J)retatio11 , 111ea11 tl1at tl1 e sl111 1111011s was not ''d11ly servecl." So long as the 111eans e 111ployed were reaso11ably adeqt1ate, tl1e service wol1ld be valid, notwitl1standing that tl1ere \Vas failure to co111 1Jly witl1 tl1e {Jrovisio11s of tl1e Coc1e. Tl1is wot1ld 1nean that if a ''good'' 111etl1od of service, i.e., constr11ctive service and JJossibly service by registerecl JJost, \Vere e1111 JlO)'ed, tl1e s11n1111011s wot1ld l1ave been ''dt1ly served,'' even tho11gl1 1Jerso11 al service V\1as possible. .I
.(:'
Tl1e otl1er i11terpretatio11 wottld be tl1at tl1ese provisions are n1 andatory. Failure to follo\v tl1e l1ierarcl1y of ser,1ice set fort11 i11 tl1e Code · ,vot1ld necessarily re11der tl1e ser\1ice ineffective, ai1d tl1e st111 1111011s woL1lcl not ha.ve been ''d11ly served." If, at the first l1earing, tl1e co11rt were a.\vare tl1 at tl1e 111ost effective 1nea11s of ser, rice hacl. 11ot bee11 11sed, it ,vould refuse to }Jroceed ex pl1rte, or if it did. proceed e:r pctrte, tl1e s11111111ons ,vo11ld be set aside when tl1e defe11da11t filed a 111otion to this effect 11ncler Art. 78. It is subn1itted tl1at tl1e latter iuterpretatio11 is preferable. Wl1en a Sl1111 1nons l1as not been dl1ly served, all tl1at is req11ired is tl1at a second sl1n1111ons be serv�d. 47 1�his_ worl<s 110 real l1ardsl1ip 011 tl1e plai11tiff and ir1s11res that _the defendant ,v1ll l1 ave 1 11s day in col1rt. So too, ,vl1en a11 ex JJarte decree is set asrcle, tl1e 011ly result is tl1at the case is l1eard a b oain witl1 tl1e defe11da11t l1aving the op. JJOrt11111t)' to present l1is side. The clear i11ter1tio11 of tl1e drafters is tl1at the de.fenda11t sl1011ld receive t_I1 e best notice l)Ossible. Tl1ere are fe,v regt11arl)'-3JJpointecl s�rving offi?er_s, and tl1ere 1s tl1e da11ger tl1 ,1t t11e servi11g officer - partict1larly if l1e 1s the JJla1nt1f,f as often l1aJJpe11s - will en1 1Jloy tl1e n1eans 111ore co11venient for hin1, e.g., tise constr11ctive service i11stead of 1 Jerso11al service. 1�11e pro ,,isio11s of tl1e C�de sl1.o�ld be co11strued as 111andatory, a11cl 11011-co111plia11ce sl1ot1ld rest1lt in a fi11 ding tha t tl1e sunm1 011 s was no t dt1ly served witl1in tl1 e 111ea11ing of Arts. 70(a) a11d 78(2)Ho,vever, where tl1 e defenda11t l1c1s act1.1c1l!J' receivecl 11otice, l1e canr1ot contei1d tl,at tl1e service was defecti,,e, sin1ply beca11se a better t)rpe of service cot11d J,ave been_ e111ployed. !l1e_ p11rpose of service of JJrocess is to inform tl1e defe11d ar1_t that �1 :�11t l1.as be�ri 111��Itlited agai:1st_ l1�n1, and 011ce l1e J1as bee11 i11 for111e � of this _fac t, ptirpose �s satisfied a11d 1t 1s 1rreleva11t r pio pe tl1e .111 ser that l1e \Vas not ved wa.y. To requue tl1e serving of tl1e iog not ll ish su1 n111 acc 0 om pl 1 . ove 1s r as:rai11 wo11Id a.ild mer�ly delay tl1e trial of tl1e to e ti11 1 in cas e. ser If ved tl1e s111 no 110 t. - ,;n · s was eo,1ble l111n to properly p . ' be iepare l11s · state111ent o·f defence, an adJour11n1e11t n 1ay
47. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 70 (b).
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8 In 011r example, if tl1e father .4 �1a� l actually received the sun,inoi,s it Wolild red orde be deemed to have been dL1ly. served w1tl�1n the meaning of Arts. 70(a) �nd 78(2) . Eve11 wl,ere the nleans ei nployed \Ver� _ ld �ot contend otherw1se and t.l1e fathe� co11 _ not Iega�ly s11ffic1ent, t�e defendant wl10 111 :fact, receives notice, is deemed to l,ave been validly �erv� cl. lf rn the Wa!!(er case, for example, tl1e defendant l1ad actually seen the notice 1� the 11ew�paper, he ,vould have I1ad to appear and could not contend. tha� 11� did I�_?t recetve legally s1rfficient notice. Siii ce t11e purpose of requir ing service .ts to a_pp11se � defend�nt o.f the fact tl1at I1e bas been sued, a defetld ant wl10 has actually received notice of tl1e s11it cannot co11tend that tli·e rJotice WclS in1proper. I-le l1as been noti�ed and 11111st aJJpear and defend.
111 s111T1111ary, tl1e follo �i11g 1na � be saicl abo11t lack of proper notice. W11ere the defencla.nt has actually rece1veci not ice, lie ca1111ot contencl that tl1e service was defec tive beca11se a b �tter typ_e o� service sl1ould have been e1nployed. Assumi 11g he has riot act11ally r �ce1ved not1ce, rf tl1�re J1as not been com1)lia11ce \vjtl1 the req11ireme11ts of tl1e Code 1n tl1at a less effective means was e111J)loyed altl1ot1gl1 a n1ore effective 1nea11s could have been 11sed, t11e s11n1111011s l1as 11ot been d11ly served witl1i.n tl1e n1eani11g of Art. 70(a). !11. s11cl1 c�tses the· co11rt sl1011ld 11ot proceed ex JJarte, and it it does, tl1e ex 1Jarte decree sl1ot1ld be set aside wl1e11 tl1e defe11da11t files a 111ot _ior1 to tl1at effect 11nder Art. 78. St1cl1 a n1otion must be filecl witl1in a n1onth fro1n tl1e tirne he is a\).1are of tl1e existe11ce of t11e e.,t parte decree. 1'-Tote, l1ovvever, that tl1.e fact that tl1ere has not been co1np.liance witl1 the provisions of the Code constit11tes a procedt1ral irreg11larity, whicl1 11111st be raised by a motion to set the decree aside 1111der Art. 78. If, i n our exa1nJJle, the co11rt proceeded to l1ear the case e.'C pc1rte, and tl1e defe·ndant did not 1nove that tl1e decree be set aside, tl1e decree is valid des_pite tl1e lack of proper 11otice. Lael<: of proper 11otice 11111st be distingt1isl1ed from legally ins1rfficie11t notice, which we have disc11ssed in Chapter Ill. Where tl1e means en1ployed to advise tl1e defe11dant of tl1e s11it were clearly t1nreason able tinder the circt11nstances, i.e., a 1netl1od likely to be ineffective was e111ployed . \.Vben a 1n11cl1 more effective metl1od was readily availa ble, tl1e notice was legally insufficie11t, and the ins11fficie11cy of tl1e 11otice destroyed tl1e court's jt1risdiction. Tl1e judg111e11t is ,,oid and ca11 be attacked at any tiine, or to pt1t ir1 anotl1er way, is subject to coll.ateral attack. The distinctio11 betwee11 lac!< of pro1Jer notice a11d legally ins11fficie11t notice be con1es significant 011ly wl1ere tl1e clefendant has vvaited n.1ore tha� tJi irty days aft�r l1e has become a,vare of the decree to n1ove to l1ave rt set as1cle. lf li e files l1ts motion \vithin tl1e tl1irty day period, tl1e decree will be set aside jf _ there l1a.s not b� en con1pliance with tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Code. If lie files tl�e n1ot1on_ after tl1e th1 _ rty day period or otherwise q11estions the validity of the notice: e.g., 1 n . a proceed111g to obtain execution of the decree, tb.e decree will be set asi de only if tl1e metl1od employed was legally ios1rfficient, as we l1ave defined that term. In order to avoid a11y problem.s, tl1e co11rt sbo11ld always in� ist that the provi sions of the Code - designed to inst1re tl1at the defendant recei ve tl1e best notice possible under the circ11n1stances - be strictly followed.
48. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70(c).
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ClIAPTER VI PLEADING In order to l)roperly 1111der�tand tl1e 1naterial _d�scu_ssed in . this . chapter and in Chapter VII, we n1ust first exa1n1 ne tl1� process of l1 t1gat1 on as 1t exists �n Etltiopia. Tlie two cl1 aracteristic feat11 res of tl11s l)roce_ss are (l? party presentation a11d (2) bilaterality of tl1e l1eari11g. Alth_o11gl1, as ,ve � 1_11_ see, the �011rt has s�me responsibi lity for develoJ)ing tl1 e case, J)r1mary respons1 b1 lity rests w�th tl1e parties. Each party 111 l1st J)rese11t I1is version of the case to tl1e co11 rt, tl1 at 1s, l1e n1ust allege facts to SLll)port l1 is clai1 11 or defe11ce a11d introd11ce evidence tl1at ,viii prove tl1e existence of those facts. Seco11 dly, tl1e l1e�1ri11g in tl1e co11rt of first i11stance is divided into two well-defi11ed stages: (l) tl1 e pleadi11g and pre-trial stage; and (2) the trial stage. In tl1e J)leadir 1g and !)re-trial stage tl1 e iss11es in tl1 e case are developed. In tl1e trial stage eacl1 J)arty introd11ces evidence to s111)J)Ort l1is side of the issue, and tl1e court arrives at a decisio11. Tl1e bilateral 11,1t11re of tl1e l1eari11 g ,vill beco111e evident from our disc11ssion in tl1 is cl1 a1)ter a11d in Cl1a1)ter VII. D11ring tl1 e first sta.ge, that of plead i1 1g a 11 d !)re-trial, a party 111 ust do certain tl1i11gs, and if l1e fails to do tl1em at tl1 at ti1 11e, l1e 1 11ay 11ot be able to do tl1 en1 s11bseq11ently. Tl1is is the principle of stage preclL1sio11 . 1 Beca11se tl1e rJrocess of litigatio11 takes tl1is for1n, ,ve will see that J)leadi 11 g l1as a11 i111 porta11 ce i11 Etl1iopia whicl1 it does not have in legal systen1s tl1at do 11ot employ party l )resentation a11d bilaterality of heari11g. Tl1is is because in Ethio1)ian litigation it is by tl1e pleadi11gs tl1at tl1e parties JJresent tl1eir allegations to tl1 e co1 1rt, a11 d it is dL1ri11g tl1e J)leadi11g and pre-trial stage that tL1e iss11es to be determined at the trial are developed. Pleadi11g 11 1ay ge1 1erally be defi11ed as ''tl1at brancl1 of legal scie11ce wl1icl1 deals \vitl1 the pri11 ciJ)les gover11ing tl1e for111al written state1ne11ts made to the court by tl1e parties to a SLtit of their respective claims and defe1 1ces as to the suit." 2 Or, as tl1e Ci,,il Procedure Code st,1tes, pleadings are ''tl1e written doc11 1nents originating proceedings or filed i11 reply tl1ereto. " 3 We will no,v be concer11ed ,vitl1 the two rnost inlJ)Ortant pleadi11gs, tl1 e state.n1ent of clai111 and tl1e statement of defence. Tl1ese are tl1 e pleacli11 gs b:y \vl1icl1 tl1e case is origin,1ted and tl1 e isst1es developed in !l1e court ?f fi�st inst,1 11ce. As we saw in Cl1 apter V, tl1 e plaintiff initiates })roce�d1ngs by fi_I 1 ng l1 1s s!atement of clai1n. Tl1e Registrar exa111ines the state111e11t of cla1�11 f�r tecl1 111_cal suffic1e�cy, a1�d tl1e co11rt ex,l1nines it for legal sufl'icie11cy. We wi} l _ d_isctiss_ tl�1s process 1n detail subseq11e1 1tly. If tl1 e state1 11e11t of clai111 is found SUfi! 1 bis vitl co11rt 11 cient, it is served on tl1 e d�fe11da11t, wl10 is directed to apJ)ear i � ed call 1s what statement of _defence on a gLve11 day. At tl1 at tin1e tl1e court holds e rst 1 the 1 e rst hearing, ! fi wl1icl1 will be discl1ssed i 1 1 C.l1apter VII. 1�ollo\ving h ar fi ing, tl1e co11rt sets a date for tl1e act11 al trial of tl1e case.
f!
1· �� �ei1erally C. Clark, Coc/e Pleac/ing (2 nd ed. J 947) , IJP. 11-12. See also the discu�5!00 g app�,o�c �es _ to tl1e process f litigation in c ivil law and con1n1on Jaw coun tries ev. � B. ��P lan. , Civil Procedure - Reflectio Buffalo L. R rl " ns Syste ms, 011 tl e of Com paris 1 on rre vol 9 196 0), pp 4 09-414 As ve e n1a what saw ( · . · , i r I E i y be r fe i11 Cl1 apte ' th op a follows to as t 11e common law app roa cI1 to t·1t1g . at1. on and procedure. 2 · Clar k, supra, note 1 a t 1-3. 3. Civ. Pro. C Art 80 (1 · moranduOl e ) T l1� defin1t100 1 n the . s . _i� inclt1de a very broad one and of appeal as.'well �s the . tance, . pleadit1gs that or1gn1ate the proceedings i n the court of fu5t ins
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The primary purpose of _tl1e pleading a11d pre-trial stage is to cleter,ttine tlze issues that. mus! be r:so/ved at trzal. Issues . may_ be defined as the points 011 whicli the parti es disagree. The�e are many p�ssible 1ss1�es that could arise in a case, and the purpose of . tl1e plead1n� �nd pre-trial sta¥e 1s to deter1nine just wl1 at those issues are. Tl1e trial will be l1nuted t � a resolt1t1 on of tl1ose issues, so the cotirt and the parties do not h_ av� to waste time on matters that are not really in dispute. For example, t�e pla1nt 1 ff sues t�e defendant to recover damages for breacl1 of a cont cla t en 1n1, l1e tells tl1 e co11rt a11 d tl1 e defendant precisely of ract. By. h1� statem why _ _ he is br1 ng1ng the suit - ,vl1at wrong the defendant co1 1nnitted and what redress the plaintiff seeks for the wrong. In order to recover damages for breacl1 of contract the plaintiff \Vould have to sl10\V tl1at he and the defendant entered into a valid cont�act, that �he defenda.nt breached tl1e co n. tract a11 d that the plaintiff st1ffered certain econonuc loss tl1ereby. Wl1en tl1e defendant receives tl1e statement of claim. he will know exactly wl1 at tl1 e plaintiff is claiming and wl1 y l1e is doing so. Whe� b.e knows this, tl1e defendant can plan l1 is defence accordingly. Perl1aps l1 e ,viii admit that there was a contract between tl1e parties, b11t will co11 tend tl1at he did not breach it. WI1en tl1 e cot1rt exan1 ines the statement of claim and the statement of defence,5 it will be readily apparent tl1 at there is no dispute as to whether tl1ere was a contract; the only issues are wl1ether tl1 e defend.ant breached tl1e co11 tract, and, if so, how m11 ch dan1a.ge tl1e plaintiff suffered. Therefore, at the trial it will not be necessary for tl1e court to l1 ear any evidence as to tl1e existence of the con tract, since this is adnlitted by tl1 e defendant. Tl1e issues in tl1is case are wl1etl1 er there was a breach and, if so, wl1at dan1 ages tl1 e plaintiff st1ffered. This example sbot1ld den1onstrate that if pleadings are properly utilized, tl1ey can significantly assist i n expediti11 g tl1e litigation. The trial will be Jin1 itecl to tl1 ose questions on whicl1 there is actually disagree111 ent. The parties and tl1e court will understand what tl1e dispute is ail about before tl1 e case gets very far. Wl.1ere it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 1 1 11der the law or that tl1e defe11 d ant does not have a good defence, the case can be terminated witl1 out a ft1ll-scale trial. Since the iss11 es are clarified early, the possibility of a settl111 ent is more likely: the plaintiff or defen.dant n1ay realize that he JJrobably will not prev::1il and will be more disposed to settle. On tl1 e other hand, wl1ere a party makes mistakes dt1ri11g tl1e pleadi11g and pretrial stage, his substantive 1·ights could be affected. In order to 1ninimize tllis possibility, the court, as we will see, is given a good deal o·f control over tl1e liti gation durin o- tl1is stage and can often relieve a party fron1 tl1 e conseq11ences of pleading misrakes. The rules of pleading sl1 011ld be construed with a view toward preventing the loss of substantive rights dt1e to pleading errors. I-Iowever, tl1ere will be instances where s11cl1 mistakes will be fatal. If pleading is properly employed, the litigation can be 11 andled expeditiously, and the court is more li½ely to reacl1 a sound decision when it comes to adj11dicate tl1e case. So that tl11s goal can be realized, pleading rules must be enforced even if occasionally �. party'� rigl1ts are affected d11e to pleading errors. The good that will_ accn1e to 11t1gants 1 11 tl1e gi:e�t _can . have t1pon tl1e adm1n1run of cases and the improvement tl1at proper plead1ng _ stration of jt1stice in Ethiopia justify the exceptional s1tt!at1?� wher�. tl1 e res111t of the enforcement of pleading r·ules will be harmft1l to tl1e 1 nd1v1dt1al l1t1gant. Let us now examine the two stages of litigation in tJ1e co11rt of first insta1 1ce. In lus pleadi11g each party sets fortl1 the facts, his version �f wl1at happened. In our previous example, the plaintiff wot1ld allege facts showing tl1 at there was a 4. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 247. 5. This is done at the first l1earing. Civ. Pro . C., Art. 241.
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--1 e suffered certain �amage l at tl1 d an it, ed 1 cl ea br er th t an nd e fe de e t.ll at th , ct ra cont le�e facts showing he is not d al ul wo t aQ 11d fe de e 1 tl e, nc fe de of _ by. In tile state inent 1 t tl1e pla1nt1ff al]�ges facts showing tl e· os pp Su t. ac 1tr o1 e th � � liable for breacli of g ts in fac es ow eg sh all nt that the goods da fen de e 1 tl d an e tiv fec de re \Ve s od oo that the O r go the od he et wb we �e defective, to as i_,e iss an n the is � ere Th e. tiv fec de _ _ were not 1ff the 1nt al pla tri tl1e l wil At al. tri intro duce tl1e at ed olv res be l wil . tie iss and this e, tiv re fec and the defendant de we s od g tl1e t th 1 1 tio ega all � l1is rt po � stip to evicletice tl1at t]1e goods \Vere not defective. ion gat alle l11s t por st1p to ce den evi uce rod int ,vill t_ and evidence. A pleading fac of ns tio eg all en we bet 1 isl gt1 tin dis � to nt rta po im Jt is ly ''a statement in a on tain con and tain con to is it ce; den evi n 1tai co1 er nev st niti concise form of tl1e material facts on wllicl1 tl1e party relies for his claim or defen J1ave said, represent a party's version of wl1 at happened. An ce."6 Tl1e facts as we f 'wot1ld be an allegation of a en' rott e wer es 1 ato to11 e 1 ''tl at 1 tl ect ef the allegation to 1naterial fact. Evidence refers to the meai1s by wl1ich suc l1 allegations are proved at tl1 e trial. Ust1ally evidence consists of doct1111 ents and tl1e testin1 ony of ·witnesses wl10 observed tl1e event. Tl1t1s, a staten1 e11 t that ''Ato X exar11ined the tomatoes and saw tl1at tl1ey were rotten'' wot1ld be evidence, since this st 1 pports the plaintiff's allegatio11 tl1at tl1e tomatoes were rotte11 . 111 otl1er ,vords, dt1ring the pleading stage a party sets fortl1 l1is allegatio11 s of fact; dt1ri11g tl1e trial stage he introduces evidence to su1)port the· allegatio11s of fact set fortl1 i11 tl1e pleadings. It is very important to se1)arate tl1ese two sta.ges of litigatio11 a11d to re1nen1ber that certa.in things 111ust be done at 011 e stage ancl certair1 tl1i11gs at the otl1er. Our co11sideratio11 of J)leadi11g will be divided into the following areas: (1 ) tecl1oical reqt1ireme11ts; (2) effect of failtire to plead; (3) rejection of pleadings; (4) a111e11d111e11ts. A. Tecl1nical Requiren1ents 1 . Pleaclirigs Generally Tl1e 111ost i1111)ortan.t tecl111ical reqt1ire111ent is that the pleadi11g sl1all contain a state111 ent of tl1e 111aterial facts on ,vl1icl1 a. party relies for his claim or defence. \Ve have distingl1ished facts fro111 e,1 ide11ce and have pointed ot1t tl1at the pleading sl1otdd nev �r conta in evide11ce. In additio i1, a party is 11ever to set fortl1 legal argt1111ents 111 tl1 e pleadi11 gs. If a J)arty vvisl1 es to J)resent legal argun1 er1ts to the cot1rt, l1e sl1ot1ld do so in a separate doct1111ent, i.e., a 1ne1norandt1r 11 of la,v. In order for tl1 e cot1rt to t1tilize tl1e pleadings properl)', tl1 ey 11 1ust be lin1ited to the facts; tl1 e J)Urpose of tl1e 1)leadi11 gs is to i11form the cot1rt a11d tl1 e otl1er party about the facts i11 tl1e case. Tl1 e cot1rt sl1011 Id not I1ave to sift tl1rougl1 evidence ai1d legal argun1ent� to get at tl1e facts, and. this is wl1y Art. (80)(2) requires tliat _ the_ pleacl1ngs co11�a1n and co11tai11 011ly a concise state111ent of tl1 e 111::1terial facts on which a l)arty relies for 11.is clai11 1 or defe11 ce. 111 order to facilitate proper pleadir1g, tl 1e drafters of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code l,ave prepared 111odel for111s of J)leacling vvl1icl1 are i 11clt1ded in the First Scl1edtile to · and ' . . tl1e C0 de. Tl11s · sched11le sets fortl1 tl1 e var1o · t1s k1.ncls of staten1ents of claim .. se the tate n 1 e11ts of defence and i11 clicates ing foll ow By wl 1at eacl1 1nust contai11. } orr�s tlle J)leader ca11 _be Stire tl1at l1 e is drafting a tecl1 uically }Jroper pleadiiJg. Tile _ aod cotii t c�n easily etlt, exaD 11i1e suffic i tl1e IJlead ing to detern1ine if it is legaily . e Th st1 cl1 for�11s redtlce tl1 e da11ger that tl1 e plea r. n1at te er imp di i1 0 con 0 will tain · rop ·• · P 1eader 1s requ a · the p· · irecl to d1� to · 1 ft 1s I I e p ea I d' 1ng poss1b 111 a as forn1 as 11ear • . pro pr1.ate forn1 in the First Scl1 edule.1
6. 7.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 80(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 80(2).
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For exampl�, supp ?se tl�e plaintiff is suing to recover money tl1at 11e loaned to tlie d�fendant. In draft1�g l11s . statement of clain1,. he wot1ld consult the portion of tlJe First Scl1edule dealing with Form of Pleadings. First 11e would see tinder ''A-TITLE OF _Sl!IT�'' that he _ must ind �cate tl �e . court in wl1ich be is· stiing and the na.me, descr1pt1on, and residence of the pla111t1ff and defendant. He would tllen const1lt ''STATE.MENTS OF CLAIM'' and would see tl1at No. I refers to a state ment o:f cl�in1 for mo11ey lent. Tl1e staten1ent of clain1 for 111011ey lent must contain _ facts sl1ow1ng tl1e follow1ng: (1) tl1e date tl1e loan was 1nade, the an1ount of the loan and the date wl1en· it was re1Jayable; (2) a11 allegation tl1at tI1e defendant has not paid the loa11 or,_ if l1e l1as paicl a part, l1ow 11111cl1 he paid and wJ1e11; (3) wl1e11 tl1e cause of action arose; (4) why tl1e cot1rt l1as jurisdiction; (5) wl1at is the valt1e of tl1e subject 1 11atter of !l1e s11it for pt1rposes of j11risdiction;9 (6) }1ow mucl1 he clai111s, tl1e perce11tage of 1nterest a11d tl1e date from whicl1 interest is to be paid. If any of tl1ese allegatio11s is lacl<ing, the Registrar sl1all reject tl1e staten1ent of clai1n in accorda11ce witl1 Art. 229 of tl1e Civil Procedure Code. In replyi11g to tl1e state111ent of clai111, tl1e defendant wot1Id also const1lt tl1e portion of tl1e First Scl1edt1le dealing witl1 For111 of Pleadi11gs. I-le \VOt1ld follow ''A-TITLE OF SUITS'' a11d ''D-STATEMENTS'' OF DEFENCE." ''D'' indicates that l1e 1nt1st first ad111it or deny tl1e allegations of tl1e state111ent of clai111, 10 a11d it inclt1des tl1e proper for111 for tl1e possible defe11ces l1e may l1ave. For exa111ple, if l1e contends tl1at tl1e st1it is barred by 1in1itation, l1e 1 nt1st allege tl1at ''Tl1e st1it is ba1·red by Art. I 845 of tl1e Civil Code 1960." If l1is state111ent of defence is not in tl1e proper form, it shall be rejected b�/ the court in accorda11ce ,vitl1 Art. 238 of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code. 11 The pleadings 111t1st also be verified, tl1at is, tl1e party n1ust affir111 tl1at the allegations contain.ed i n tl1e pleading are trtte. 12 Tl1is 1 11ea11s tl1at lie 1nt1st reaso11ably believe that s11ch allegations are tr11e, a11d l1e ca11not allege facts tl1at he does not expect to be able to pro\1e at trial i11 the hope tl1at tl1is \Votild conft1se tl1e other party. Wl1ere a part)' i11cl11des allegations i 11 a pleading tl1at l1e l(11ows to be false, he wo11ld be st1bject to a crin1i11al prosect1tion for perjt1ry. 13 Tl1e Code contai11s special rules for verification by legal perso11s: i11 st1its involving a corporation, the pleadi11g may be veri'fied by the secretary or by a director or otl1er officer ,vl10 is able to depose to tl1e facts of tl1e case ; 14 i11 s11its i11volving tl1e govern111ent, mt1st appoi11t a J)erso11 to verify tl1e pleadings; 15 i11 s11its_ i11volving a p� rt11ersl1ip suing or being stied in tl1e fir111 nan1e, any JJa1: t11er may ':'erify. 16 The _ IJle� �1ng 111t1st also be signed by tl1e party or perso11 at1tl1or1zed to verify tl1e pleading. 8. TI1e requirements for tl1e descriptio11 of the parties are set forth in "B". 9. This is to be done in accordance witl1 tl1e requiren1e11ts of Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 226-228. 10. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 235. l ,vitl1 tl1e case. ds cee pro , less etl1e non rt, cou tl1e , cted reje is e enc def of ent en, . stat ere the ] 1 . Wh 1�t of me e _ 1e stat t f o s 1011 gat alle the ies den or 1its adn l1e er eth wJ 1 al1t I t must ask the defend ct reJe 1s e e11c def of_ t 1en ten sta tl1� ere wh e�, wev Ho . 241 l anc ciajm, See Civ. Pro. c., 238(3) sucl� def�nces e sin es, enc def e ativ rm affi e rais � t u1o car ant ei1d def the t ed, it wotlld seen1 tl1a 111/ra, n, s1o cus the chs See 82. t. Ar C., . Pro . Civ e. e11c def of t n1ust be raised in the staten1en notes 81-91 and accon11Ja11ying text. 12. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 92. 13. See Pen. C., Art. 446. 14. Civ Pro. C., Art. 92(2). 15. Civ Pro. C., Art. 92(3). . 16. Civ. Pro. •C., Art. 92(4) . 17. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 93. ,
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A ver)' important qt1estion is tl1e de¥1"ee of specifici_ ty t �at is . required in the pleading. Tlle party mt1 st allege the n1ater1al facts on . which his claim or defence is based or to pttt it another way, l1e must tell precisely wl1at happened. He may not ;lead a ''conclusion''. Tl1e plaintiff may 11ot 111erel� allege, ''the . defendant neg ligently i11j11red n1e." ''Negligently'' represents a co�cl1 1 s1on .- !he question �o _be deter mined i11 the case is wl1ether tl1e defendant negligently 111Jured the pla1 nt1ff. Such 311 alleaation tells the co11rt and tl1e OJJposing party nothi11g at all. The plaintiff rum: he must 1nust all.ege tl1e facts tl1at sho,v that tl1 e �efendant negligently injured _ alleae \Vl1at the defendant did and how this cat1 sed bar111 to l11n1. He would allege, O for exa 111 ple, ''tl1e defenda11 t, without looking, dropped a brick, wl1icb struck the plai11tiff 011 the foot, causing a bone to break." Note tl1a_t l1e does not allege that tl1 is co11stitt1ted oeglige11ce; tl1 is is for the court to deternune. But the facts ''speak for tl1e111 selves." If tl1 ese facts are true, the defendant will be liable to the plaintiff for negligence. As we will see, vvl1ere tl1 e JJleading contains only conclusions, it will be rejected as not stating a cause of action or legally st1 ffi.cient defence. Tl1 e pleader tl1 en 1nt1st be careful tl1at he is pleadi1Jg the material facts and not conclusio11s. We n1 ay co11sider so111e exa111 ples of tl1is requiren1ent. In a suit to recover possession of land, tl1 e plai11 tiff alleged ''u11 der and by virtt1 e of a certain deed, I a111 e11titled to tl1e land." Tl1 is was instrfficient. 18 Tl1 e plaintiff must allege facts sl1owing wl1 y l1 e is entitled to recover tl1 e land becat1se of the deed, e.g., tl1e la11 d was solcl to l1im by the previous O\vner, \vl10 tra11sferred t11e title deed to him. Or, i11 a case wh.ere tl1 e plaintiff clain1 ed land by i11heritance, he alleged ''plaintiff is e11 titled to tl1 e property by virtt1e of tl1 e law of st1ccession." TL1is was insufficient, si11 ce l1 e failed to allege facts sl1owi11 g his relatio11sl1ip to tl1e decedent \Vl1ich would entitle l1 im to i11 !1 erit, e.g., tl1 e property was ow11 ed by the plaintiff's fatl1er, who died \vitl1 011t leaving a will, and tl1e plaintiff is the only child of the decedeot. 19 Anotl1 er exa11 1ple wottld be ,x.1l1 ere, in a st1it for breach of co11tract, the plainti.ff sin11Jly alleges tl1 at ''tl1 e defendant breacheel tl1e contract." He mt1st allege facts sl10,vi11 g precise!:>' vvl1at tl1e defe11 dant was SllJ)posed to do tinder the contract and vvl1at l1e failed to do. Oridinarily, it is s11ffi.cient that tl1e plaintiff allege tl1e facts in the detail just described. As long as l1e does 11ot plead conclt1sions and follows the forn1s prescrib ed by the First Scl1edt1le, tl1e JJleading is tecl111ically s11:fficient. I-Iowever, the Civil Procedt1 re Code co11tains special rules as to pleading certain matters, whicl1 n1 ust be followed. One concerns tl1e pleading of conditions precedent - a co11dition tl1at n1ust occur before liability or a defence exists, e.g. , wl1ere t l 1e defendant is not obligated to perform the co 11 tract if it rai11s on the day 1Jerfor11 1ance is dt1e, rai11ing would be a condition precede11 t. \Vl1 ere the perfon11ance or occ11rrence of a conditiot1 pre cedent is in�ended to be contested, tl1is condition mt1st be ''disti 1 1ctly specifi.ed."20 _ TI11s 111 eans 1t n111st be set forth in greater detail tl1 an ordinarily reqt1ired. For exam _ ple, It wot1ld not be st1fficient for tl1e clefenda11t to allege that ''it rained on the day performance was d·ue, �xcusing tl1 e defenda11t from perforn1ance. " He would ha,,e to allege as fol.lows: ''1t was agreed by tl1 e parties that the deferidant would not ha,,e to perforn1 if it rained on the day performance ,vas due , January 1, 1966, and on January 1, 196 6 it did rain.'' is Tl1e sa1ne ct is true with cont ra respe ct to a deni al Whe re of cont a ract. . denied, the d :nial means that the parties did not enter into an agreement, n t that � tl1 ey entered into an agreen1ent wliicl1 is unenforceable on grounds of illegality or 18 · See Riddell v. Earl of Stratbmore (Ct. App., En g., 1887), Times L. Rep., vol. 3, P· 329 · , 19· 8 :e P almer v. Palmer (Queen's Bench, Eng., 319 · P· 1, vol. , Rep 189 Ben . 2) ch 189 Que 2 en's ' p 20. C1v. ro. C., Art. 81.
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21 If the plaintiff law. in alleges facts showing that th J) rt·ies en y insufficienc te re d � � defe the nda nt alleges ''defendant de11ies tha'' t tl1e1e 1 s a cont contract and l·oto a ract ''' e t at · that the parties entered 1·010 any agre means h h d.en1es · the allegation ement at 1 all. Based· on s 1ch an allegat1on, he coul . . d . not contend that wl11-1e there was a contract, 1t cannot be en1J:'orce d becat1se 1 t 1s illegal.22 However, _the Ethiopian Code is no t as strict with respect to matters tliat other codes. When a party seeks to nitist be specifically pleaded as are some . of min · d s11�11 _as 111al1 ce, fra11dulent intention or knowledge, lie ·· allege a cond1t1on . . may alle �� the sa111� as a fact � 1 tl1011t ,,setting 011t the circurnstaiices from wltich 3 For may be 11nd r of inferre d.1 00 coud1t exan1ple, 11nder A rt. 2047 of the 1_ tlie Civil Code, tr:1tl1 1s � defe11ce . t? a11 action :for defan1ation tinless tile defendant acted solely with tl1e intent to 111J11re. If tl1e plaintiff ad1nits that tl1e charges \Vere true, �t1_ t conte11d� tl1at the defendant acted solely witl1 t]1e intent to injure Iiim, it is s11fI1c1e�t for. l11m t� _all�ge tl1at ''t?e . defendant published tl1e defamation solely witl1 . tl1e 1 nte11t101 1 of 1n111:1ng tl1e . pla111t1ff.': _It is not necessary for him to allege the circumstances from v1l11 ch tl1e 1 11tent to 1nJt1re ca11 be inferred. The same is true as regards notic �, wl1icl1 ca11 be alleged as a fact unless tl1e precise terms of the notice are 111ater1al.24 If tl1e contract req11ires notice of intention to abandon, it is s1tfficie11t for tl1e defe11da11t, in a st1it for b reach of the contract, to aver that he notified tl1e plaintiff of his intentio11 to aba11don the contract. I-Iowever, if the con tract reqt1ired that the notice be give11 within a certain time, the pleade r must allege tl1e precise date by \vl1icl1 11otice was to be given and vvher1 he gave tl1e notice.
It is also permissible for a party relying on a doc11ment to state the effect of the contents wjtl1011t setting forth the precise vvords unless the precise words are n1aterial.25 In a st1it on a contract the plaintiff may ordinarily allege what tl1e contract required tl1e defendant to do without setti11g fortl1 tl1e exact \vords of the contract. B11t, if tl1e plaintiff were st1ing to recover da111ages for defan1ation due to an article p11 blisl1ed i11 a newspaper, I1e 111t1st set fortl1 tl1e exact words alleged to be defamatory. Here the exac.t words of tl1e doc11n1en t a re 1naterial, since st1cl1 words determine wl1etl1e r the article is defa111atory. Finally, wl1e re a contract or relation between perso11s n1ay be implied fron1 circ11111stances, it is s11fficie 1 1t to allege the contract or relatio11 as a fact and to refer generally to the circumsta1 1ces witl1out setting them ot1t in detail. 26 Tl1is n1eans that it wot1ld be s11fficient to allege that the offeree sent the offeror a letter on February 1, 1966, accepting tl1e offeror's offer of January 30, 1966. It is not necessary to allege the conte 11ts of the letter , assuming tl1at tl1e tern1s of the contract l1ave otl1e rwise been specified. 2. Alternative Pleading We will no w consider tl1e kinds of alleoations tl1at may be contained in plead ings, or to p11t it another way, ,vl1ether a �leading may contain alternative or l1y tl1at ect eff the to io ega all an is ! on ati eg all tic ve � the ati po al allegations. An altern at either one thing or another J1appened. For example, the pla1 nt1ff wot1ld allege th 21. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 84. l, l. vo , ses Ca al pe Ap 01 19 ), 01 19 22. See Bullivant v. Attorney-General (I-louse of Lords, Eng., p. 204. 23. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 86. 24. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 87. · · a l and t . on en m cu do 1e tl of y op 25 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 85. Note, however, tl1at tl1e or1gm . . in l1is possession. � c. f 1t 1s lnl I l a c f o t 1en ten sta the w�ich a party sues must be attached to C1v. Pro. C., Art. 223(1) (b). 26. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 88(1).
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he at th ed someone else or us tiff ca in la e t t �s ai a el lib � . � a _ d � tl1 e defendant p11blisl1e tion 1s found to be true, the ga le al 1er 1tl If . 1ff nt ru pl � e th t ns ai _ to ptiblish a libel ag 7 a d 1.e wishes t? .�l �ad b? th sets o_ f �act�. Hypo r,� ve co re � � plaintiff is en.title� to s, b s 1t ist ct f,1 ex If It is_ foun d o( et s _ e on �t � tb g in leg al es lv vo in ng tlletical pleadi 1l11 ch .\vo11ld be tl1e ba sis . of a va l id v. s, ist ex im cla cts fa of t se r he ot an , ist ex to t no e at tl1 es th rti e pa eg all ver entered ne 1tld wo 11t da fen de e tl1 , ple aiu ex r Fo or defence. hen tl1 e contract was subse t ct, ra nt co a s wa re tl1e if t b11 , into a valid contract to be true, t]1 e defendant would 1?d fo1 re \Ve ts fac of set r he eit If . led cel can quently ly referred to as alter 1al us1 are ing ad ple of es typ tl1 Bo . ity bil lia m fro ved be absol t. a11 fic ni sig t no is n tio nc sti di e 1 tl d a11 g, in ad ple native In tl1e early stages of pleading in Engla11d a11d tl1e United States, tl1is kind of pleading was not perinitted, but today it genera.lly is. Art. 237 o� t_ he Civil Proce dure Code expressly autbo1izes tl1 e defenda11t to rely 011 several d1st1nct grounds of defence fot111 ded on separate and disti11ct facts. 1-\1tl1ot1gh no provision expressly refers to tl1e rigl1t of tl1 e plaintiff to plead alteri1atively or l1ypothetically, tl1ere is no pro vision J)rol1ibiting sttcl1 I Jleading, and 110 do11bt, it wottld be permitted. Tl1e reasons for JJer111ittiug st1cl1 J)leadi11g \Vere well stated by a11 An1.e1·ican state co11rt. 28 In tl1e partic11lar case, tl1 e plaintiff sougl1t to recover for tl1 e alienation of 11.is wife's affec tio11s by tl1e defendant, alleging tl1at tl1e defencla11t had sex11al relations with her. ·under tl1e law of tl1a t state, if tl1e plai11tiff l1ad consented to tl1e defendant's having relations \Vitl1 tl1e wife, tl1e J)lai11tiff wo11ld not be e11titled to recover. Tl1e defence co11sisted of t,vo J)arts: first tl1e defe11 dant denied that l1e had relatio11s witl1 the plaintiff's wife; seco11dly, l1 e a.lleged tl1at ''wl1atever relations tl1e defenda11t l1ad \Vith tl1e plaintiff's wife \Vere Vl'ith lcno,vleclge, acqt1iescence, a11d consent of tl1e plain.tiff." In l1olding tl1 at tl1 e defendant co11ld plead botl1 defences, the court observed as follov-,1s: ''Absurd as it may seem at first blt1sl1 to allow defendant, charged \¥itl1 l1a,,ing negligently broke11 a borro,¥ed kettle, to a11s,ver tl1at l1e never bor ro,vecl tl1e l(ettle, that it \Vas broke11 Vl'l1e11 l1e borrowed it, and tl1at it ,vas s01111d wl1e11 retur11ed, nevertl1eless, wl1e11 it is reflectecl tl1at tl1 e controverS)' n1ay be abo11t a kettle borro,\1ed by defenda11t's servant, as to ,vluch defe11dant l1ad 110_ l(nowledge wl1ate,,er, and tl1at, tl1 e servant l1avi11g disa_ppeared, defe11 dant ,:v1ll be entirely clepe11de11t on s11cl1 cas11al evidence as he n1ay be able to scra1Je up i11 tl1 e neigl1borl1ood, tl1e rt1le is not by arJy 1neans unreasonable or witl1011t SllJJport in p11blic policy. Tl1e defeoda11t n1ay 11ot know wl1at set of facts he \vill be able to establisl1. He is absolutely depende11t 111Jon tl1e testiinony of witnesses as to 1natters not ,:vitl1in J1is per_s?nal kno\vleclge, and l1e 011gl1 t not to be defeated if on tl1e trial a11y le� 1t1� 11ate d �fense ,vhicl1 l1e l1as !)leaded is esta.blisl1ed b)' tl1 e evide11ce (c1�at1011s 01:11tte?). Tl1� c,1se before 11s ill11strates tl1e JJolicy of this rule, for def �n���t, 1_n his test11no11y absol11tely cle1ued sex11al interco11rse \1/ith tl1.e �. JJla�ntiff s wife and also test1f1e nd, l111sba d t]1e as to by a pro Jositio ma, 1 d e 1 _ 1 \Vlitcl1 . if trtlly related, would l1ave jt1stified defenda11 t in believi1 1g tl1.at s11ch 111terc�11rse wo11ld 11ot be objectionable to tl1e ht1sband. Wl1atever d�tibts � he Jllf)' 111igl1t I1�tve entertained witl1 refere11ce to tl1e credibility of !hts test 1 mo11 :Y, clefe11cla11t l1,1d tl1e rigl1t to l1a,,e it considered by tl1em , as Jttdges of tl1e facts." 01eans 27. See Civ. C. Art ?044 A p s 11 .s a e l . � · · e1: � con1m1t tl1e offe11ce of defa.n1atio11 ,vl1er by ny · � acts in uch � a.y as to 11lJUre anotl1er perso11's reputation. Ru dd v. Dewey (Iowa S up Ct US 973, in J. . 9 9 p 6 vo1. , Chadbourn and L· L-ev,·in, c· ases., on• ·, . 1 • 03), Nortl1•vester11 Reporter, Civil Procerlure (1961), pp. 235-6. 1e
28.
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Since a party must usually . rely on the testimony of witnesses to prove his case, he cannot_ know what . test1.mony the court will believe. It may believe some part of the . evidence and !eJ:�t another part. Therefore, a party s11011Id be able to present all his g:ou�ds of liability or defence to the court and have tl1e court decide which gro11nds 1t will accept . It 1s for tl1is reason that alternative pleading is permitted. There is . a question as to whether a.ny limitations should be imposed on this type of _ pleading: In the early . stages of pleading in England and the ·u11ited States, alternative pleading, . as we said, was not permitted, and the pleader l1ad to elect _ the gr�u �ds . on wl11c}1 he wo11ld r �ly : Altl1ot 1 gh Stich pleading is now JJermitted, some lim1tat1011s are placed upon 1t 1n those countries and in otl1ers that allow s11ch pleading. Tl111s, although Order VI, Rt 1 le 2 of tl1e Indian Code of Civil Procedt 1 re, per11uts alt�rnative pleading, it l �as bee11 interpreted to req11ire a party to elect where the allegations are ''absolutely 1nco11siste11t and where eacl1 is destructive of the other." 29 Allegations are absolt1tely i11consisten.t where proof of tl1e existence of one allegation :ne �essarily disproves the existence of the other. For exam.pie, in o�e case30 tl1e pla1nt1ff alleged that a step of a ladder broke, ca11sing tl1e decedent to fall. 1-Ie also alleged that tJ1e decede11t slipped and fell dt 1e to tl1e slippery condi tion of tl1e step. An election was req11ired, since proof of the existence of one set of facts (the step broke and the decedent fell) necessarily disproved the ex.istence of the otl1er (the decedent slipped). f[e eitl1er slipped. or the step broke: botl1 sets of facts co11ld not have happened. Should s 11ch a limitation be placed on alter11ative pleading in Ethiopia? I do not tbit1k so. No s11 cl1 linutation is contained i11 the Civil Procedtire Code, and since it complicates pleading even further, I do not think tl,e doctrine of inconsis tency sl1oltld be read into the Code. The doctrine is i11tended only as a ''brake'' on too n1any allegations and, even ·wl1ere it is in effect, it is not applied if all tl,e proof lies in the l1ands of tl1e other part)1•31 Since l)leading law is just being deve loped here, the court sl1ot 1ld not readily in1pose n1ore li1nitation.s on tl1e pleader. Therefore, t111Jess tl1ere is a co11 rt decision to tl1e contrary, let 11s ass1m1e that tl1e rule of inconsistency \vill not be a1Jplied and tl1at tl1e pleader 111ay allege tvvo or n1ore co1npletely inconsistent sets of fa.cts witl1011t bei 1 1g pttt to a11 electio11. 3. The Statement of Claim Now that we l1ave considered the r1 1 les relating to pleadi11g generally, let 11s co·nsider the specific rt1les applicable to the statement of claim and state111ent of defence. The req1 1 ire1ne11ts for tl1e staten1ent of claim are set forth in Arts. 222-228 of the Civil Procedt 1re Code. Tl1e state1nent of claim 111ay be divicled into Jive basic portions: (1) the caption; (2) parties; (3) the facts constjtuting the cause of action; (4) jurisdiction; (5) relief. In tl1e caption portion tl1e _plaintiff mtlst state tl1e name and place of tl,e cot 1rt in wl1icl1 tl1e action is bro11ght a11d the t_itle of the actio11 (Ato A v. Ato B).32 In the portion dealing witl1 pa� ties, be mt1st include t11e n�n1e, _ 33 description, place of residence and address for service of all parties. Where either party is a person t1nder disability, there n:i t1st be �tatement to that effect. 34 And . . where the plaintiff is s11ing in a representative capacity, e.g., he 1s st11ng o·n behalf 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
See the discussion in S. Sarkar; Tl1e La•v of Civil Procedure (4th ed. 1963), p. 268. Oklahoma w11eat Pool Termit1al Corp. v. Rodgers (Oklahoma Sup. <;t., U.S., 1937),_ !' acific., Ct.vi 1 Pro Reporter, 2nd Series, vol 70 , p. 180 8, in J. Chadbourn a11d L. Levin, Cases on cedure (1961), p. 236. Se tl1e discussion, supra, not e 30, in J. Chadbour11 a11cl L. LevirL at p. 238. • Civ Pro. C., 222(1) (a) (b). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 222(1) (c). Civ. Pro. C. , Art. 222(1) (d).
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of the estate that he is adnlinisterii1g, tl1e pleading must contain a staten1ent show ing the capacity in which he is_ suing. 35 . �inally, ]1e must all�ge the . fac�s showing that the defe11dant is interested 1n the subJe_ct-n1atte_r of the suit and 1s liable to be called 11pon to answer tl1e clai111. 36. T�e tl11rd port1011 of �he statement of claim is tile most important, the fa �ts c?nst1tut1n� �l1e c�11s� of action. a�d wl1en and where _ . 38 7 plaintiff mttst allege facts the JUr1sd1ct1on. involves portion fot1rtb Tl1e it arose.3 showioo that the cot1rt l1as judicial, n1aterial39 and local j11risdiction. Tl1us, in a case in° the Higl1 Co11rt at Addis Ababa, the plaintift� could allege as follows: the defendant is an Etl1iopian national U11dicial jurisdiction) residing in Addis Ababa (local jurisdiction); tl1e ca.se involves an auto1nobi�e "':orth EtI1.$ 600� (material juris diction). The fifth portion of tl1e stateme11t of claim involves the relief sought. The state111eot of claim sl1all state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims.40 Th11s, l1e 1nust allege ,vl1etl1er ]1e ,vants da111ages and if so, l1ow m11ch, or if not, what otl1er ki11d of relief l1e wants. I-Ie 111ay also ask for alternative relief. For example, the plai11tiff might s11e for specific JJerfor111ance of a contract, bt1t if specific perfor mance \vill not be ordered, 41 tl1en in tl1e alternati,,e, lie seeks damages. Ho,vever, it is not necessary tl1at l1e ask for general or otl1er relief, e.g., interest on the debt. The co11rt may always give general relief w]1etl1er asked for or not. 42 Tl1e subject matter of tl1e s11it 11111st be clearly indentified in tl1e statement of clain1. 43 Where the clai111 relates to a specific tiling, e.g., an auton1obile, it must be described witl1 partic11lars. It ,vould not be s11fficient to allege tl1at the plaintiff seelcs to recover an a11to111obile fro111 tl1e defendant. I-Ie sho11ld describe the automo bile by n1ake, year and color. Wl1en the claim relates to in1J11ovable property, it shot1ld be described by bo11ndaries or n11mbers in a IJt1blic record. 44 Arts. 226-228 gover11 tl1e pleadjug of tl1e amo11nt of tl1e claim. This is very in1portant, since the a111011nt pleaded in the statement of claim in accordance with tl1ese articles deter111ines tl1e an101111t in controversy for p11rposes of n1aterial jurisdic tion. 45 \Vl1ere the plaintiff seeks tl1e recovery of 111oney, he shall indicate tl1e pre cise a1no11nt clain1ed.46 Wl1ere tl1e plaintiff is s11ing for an a111ot1nt which wi]l be f 011nd due to l1i111 on tl1e taking of t1nsettled accounts between him and tl1e defend ant, e.g., tl1e defe11dant as the plaintiff's agent ca1·ried on b11siness and did not turn over_ to the plaintiff, tl1e plaintiff m11st indicate the approxin1ate an1ouot the pr?ceecls _ l1e ant1c1pates will be found due.47 Wl1ere the claim relates to a specific thi11g, e.g., 35. 36 · 37. 38. 39 · 40. 41. 42. . 43.
44.
45. 46.
47.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 222(1) (e). Civ. Pro . C., Art. 222(1) (h). No person n1ay be n1ade a defe11dant unless the plaintiff a.lieges some clai m against l1in1. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 33(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 222(1) (f). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 222(1) (g). Where appropriate, the plaintiff mt1st n1ake a st:aten1ent of tl1 e value of tl1e subject n1atter of tl1e action. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 222(1) (i). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 224(1). �pecific perform ance will only be ordered wl1ere it is of special interest to the party seeking It,. and the contract can be enforced without affecting tl1e personal liberty of the debtor. Civ. C., Art. 1776. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 224(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 225. Title X of the Civ. C. contains elaborate provisions regarding tbe registration of immo vable property. At �rese1:1t, ho�ever, . these provisions l1ave not been implemented, although some s�Slem of registration exists In Addis Ababa and som of ee also . capi tals prov e incia the l S C1v. c., Arts. 3363-3367. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 16(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(2).
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----be indicated in tl1e statemeiJt of cla·IID. 48 T1·11e an auto111obile, !he_ actual value must · · tiff wouId 1nd· 1cate the cost price 1ess estimated depreciat Plrun ' ion ·. . W here. t•·11e cl aim · relates to _a generic th'tng, e.� ., five b11sl1els of grain, the plaintiff mtlst indicate the ctrrrent price of the commodity.49 Art: �27 . cover� money dt1e at periodic intervals. For exanii)le, · let us say that the plaintiff 1s e11t1tl _ ed to tl1e ren t of property for six montl,s. In stlch a case since the .money _ IS payabl� for a SJJecified period of tin1e, he must indicate th� value of the capital. producing tl1e money, i 1 1 011r exa111ple, tl1e value of tl1e rental property..Ho\vever, If �l1e 111on _ � y .is _ payable for an t1nspecified period of tin1e, tl1en for pt1rposes of pect1n1ary JUr1sd1ct1on, tl1e valtie of the a11nua] amot1nt dtte mtilti plied by twenty shall be stated. Finally, wl1e11 tl1e plai11tiff seeks to e11force a rigl1t, the valt1e of ,vl1 icl1 cannot otl1erw·ise be determined, for _p11r1)oses of pecuniary jt1risdiction, he n1 t1st j 11dicate the estimated pec11niary benefit wl1 .icl1 wo·uld. accr11e to l1in1 if jt1dgn1ent were rendered in his favor. For exa111ple, if the plaintiff st1es to enforce a servitt1de to t1se the defendant's la11d to pastt1.re l1is co\vs, be n111st estimate l1ow much pecun.iary be11efit he \Vould receive if tl1e servitt1de were recognized. The plaintiff 111t1st attac.h certain a11nexes to the statement of clain1. so Tl1ese are as follows: (1) a list of tl1e witnesses to be called by 11i111 at trial togetl1 er witl1 tl1eir addresses and tl1e pt1.rpose for wl1ich they are to be c�tlled: (2) a list of docun1ents on wl1icl1 he relies, specifyi1 1g in wl1ose possession tl1ey are; (3) tl1e original and a CO})Y of any doc1111 1ent in his l)Ossession on wl1icl1 l1e sues, e.g., a negotiable instrun1ent.51 If l1e has no doct1me 11 ts or \vitnesses to prodt1ce, l1e must file a declaratio11 to that eftect. The purpose of tl1js reqt1irement is to let the defendant know wl1at witnesses tl1e plaintiff will call and 011 wl1at doct1111ents l1e will rely so that the defendant can prepare rebt1ttal evidence. Tl1 us, if tl1e plaintiff indicates tl1at l1e will call Ato A, wl10 will testify t hat he saw tl1e defe11da11 t exect1te the contract, the defendant can know tl1at l1e sl1ottld call Ato B, \vho ,vill testify that the defendant was elsewhere at tl1e ti111e tl1e contract allegedly was sig 11 ed.
4. The Statement of Defence In tl1e statement of defence the defenda11t 111ay do tl1ree tl1 i11 gs: (1) l1e 111ust first deal with tl1e factual allegations of tl1e state111ent of clai1n; (2) l1e 1nay raise affirmative grounds of de·fence; (3) be also n1ay file a co11nterclai1n or set-off. Tl1e defendant 1nt1st res1)o·nd to eacl1 allegation of fact cot1 tained i.n the state1ne 1 1t of clain1, admitti11g or · denying it.52 As 1vve ,:viii see, a.llegations not denied_ are deen1ed admitted. He may not deny all tl1e allegations of tl1e state1ne11t of claim generally, e.g., ''the defenda11t denies each and every allegation of tl1e plaintiff and avers tl1at 1e tl er 111 te rmit p J'', 1i de al ener d '' 3 all so-c ? The J1 e is not liable tiff." plain to � tl1e � � � � � � _ older practice of some common law co11ntr1es, 1s not permitted 1 n Etl110J)1a. The on.ly exception relates to da 1 nages. Since tl1e defendant is 1 1ot likely to _be awa1·e of the extent of the plaintiff's damages, he 111ay generally deny tl1e existence _of damages ru1d thereby put the matter in iss11e. 1'.Ioreover, where the defendant denies 48. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(3). 49. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 226(4). · 50. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 223. where 1t 51. The court may atitfiorize tlie plaintiff to deposit tl1e document in tl1e regis�ry, 1t _ tl1e on g vin ser a11d e11t un1 doc the g yin cop of d tea ins nt, a . can be instJected by the defend defendant. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 223(3). 52. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 234(1) (e). 53 . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 83.
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54 . t ely no siv d eva an ly For example, ect dir it an allegation of fact, l1e must de11y _ . not proper for the defendant to allege that in a sttit for breach of contract, 1t 1s n wee ent bet eem agr himself and the the of s term tl1e t tha ies den ''the defendant e an siv is eva de� ial. is Th .'' ged alle as on up eed agr ely nit defi plaintiff were : �e must answer whetl1er or not tl1ey agreed on the terms alleged by tl1e pla.1nt1ff; 1f they st allege the ones on which they agreed. 55 mu he , ers otl1 not and ne so1 00 eed aar 0
SecoiJdly, the defendant n1l1st raise l1is grounds of defence. Tli.is would include facts sl10\ving tl1at tl1e claim is i11admissible on grou11ds of want of capacity or jl1risdiction or Ii1rutatio11. 56 It ,vot1ld also inclt1de tl1e . mat�rial fact� on which he relies for I1is defe11ce and any ground of defence wluch if 11ot raised, would be lik.ely to ta.ke tl1e plaintiff by surprise or raise isslles of fact not arising out of the state1-11ent of claim. 57 We will sl1bseqt1e11tly discuss what these grounds are and the effect of tbe defe11d,111t's failt1re to raise then1 i n tl1e state1ne11t of defence. Thirdly, tl1e defendant 1nay raise a claim of cou11terclain1 or set-off. Tl1ere is so111e problen1 i11 tl1is area. A cot1nterclaim ordinarily refers to any claim that the defe11da11t 1nay l1ave agajnst the plai11tiff. It 11eecl not be related to the original clai111 tl1e p]ai11tiff filed against tl1e defendant, a11d it need not be for an ascertained su111. Tl1t1s, if the plaintiff sued tl1e defe11dant 011 a clain1 for breach of contract, t111cler Art. 234(1) (f), the defendant cot1ld co1111terclai111 for breach of another con tract or e,1e11 for a clai111 based 011 extra-contract11al liabiljty. There is no lin1it on tl1e l(ind of cot1nterclttin1 tl1at can be asserted, althot1gl1 if the cot1rt believes that tl1e pri11ci 1)al clai111 a11cl tl1e cot111terclai111 can11ot be tried togetl1er, it has tl1e power to order se1)arate trials. 58 Tl1is follo\vs prior practice. Under Arts. 25 and 26 of tl1e Cot1rt Procedt1re Rt1les of 1943, 59 tl1e defend;:111t could set tip any cot111terclaim wl1etl1er for da111ages or otl1erwise, and if tl1e balance was in favor of tl1e defendant, tl1e co11rt cot1ld give jt1dg111ent for that an1011nt. ·under Art. 191 of the Civil Proced11re Cocle, tl1e cot1rt is lil<e,vise to issue a decree for tl1e st1m dt1e either party. 60 Tl1erefore, 11nder prior a11d JJresent f)ractice, wl1e11ever a co11nterclain1 is filed, the cot1rt \vill l1ear botl1 tl1e origi11al clai111 and the cot1nterclai1n. If it :finds in fa.var of tl1e p]ai11tiff 011 tl1e original clai111 ,1nd in favor of tl1e defendant on the cot1nter clai1n, it enters a j11dgn1e11t i11 favor of each61 ,1nd issues tl1e decree in favor of tl1e party to \-Vl10111 the balance is dt1e. If it fi11ds in favor of tl1e plaintitr on tl1e origi11al c]ai111 and in favor of tl1e plaintiff on tl1e defendant's cot1nterclain1, tl1en it enters a decree in favor of tl1e plai11tiff. If it fi11ds in favor of t}Je defendant 011 tl1e plaintiff's clai111 and i11 favor of the defendant 011 11is cot1nterclai1n, tl1e11 it enters a decree in f,1vor of tl1e defendant for the amo11nt it fi11ds owing to hin1. For J)t1rposes of jurisdictio11, the amot1nt in controversy is deter111ined by tl1e ,,alue of Civ. Pro. C., Art. 235(1). See Tl1orp v. Holdsworth (Chancery, Eng., 1876),) J 876 CluincerJ' Div. Rep., vol. 3, P· 637 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 234(1) (c). 57. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 234(1) (d). S ee also Art. 82. 58. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 221. 59. Leg. Not. No. 33, }leg. Gaz., )'ear 3, 110. 2 . 60. T:1e Article o �ly refers t o set-offs. This is necessary to n1ake it clear tl1at the b8;1ance can b� recovered in case of set-off. T.he traditio11al distioctio11 between a cot1ntercla 1ro aod. a �et-off was that in the case of cou11terclain1, the defendant· could recover t he balance �Jule 1.n the case 0 f set-o_ff l1e �ot1ld not - J1e could only reduce or "set-off" t he amount cl ainJed . is_ not _ ; _ by the _ plau1t iff. Tl1 1s prov1s1on n1al<es it clear tl1at the traditio11al rule as to set-off be applied. See also the lnd.ian Code of Civil Proced ure Order 20 rule 19. 6,1 . Ci�. Pro. C., Art., Art. 191(1). The judires be would decis ion s�t-of f on or the cou11·te�clain1 cata. See generally C1_v. Pro. C., Ar t. 5.
54. 55 · 56.
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.......62 wh ich i t eve ma r cla y im r be. · So if the plaintiff , in a case not 11· 1 vo v1n hig he the ' . 1 · g · l ·t d fi su1 e Y, pro rt 1n pe t e 1 h� A :"radJa Gt1ezat Cot1rt to recover Etll.$ i.romovab 400 0, ed de fi l a fen c da un nt ter cla 11 11 1n a case no t involving and the inlinovable property _ . . � for Eth.$ 6000, tl1e Jttr1sd1ct1on of tl1e Awradja Guezat Cotirt would be destroyed, and the case wo11Id l1ave to be transferred to tl1e Higl1 Cottrt. The 19 43 rules di? no t refer to set-offs. However, Art. 236 of the Civil Proce dure Code does provide F"or a set-of'.f..In a suit for tl1e recovery of money tlie defendant n1ay set-off �ga1nst tl1e pla11:3t1�'s de1nand a11y ascertained sum of 11�oney legally recoverable by h1111 fro111 tl1 e pla1nt1ff. Bt1t tl1e st1n1 claimed 1nt1st 11ot exceed the pect1niary li111 its of tl1 e cot1rt's jurisclictio11 , a11d botl1 parties must fill the san,e cl,aracter as tl1 ey fill in tl1e plai11 tiff's st1it. TI1 is 1nea11s tl1 at tl1e defenclant 111t1st be settino off a specific s11m of n1 oney, e.g., a debt of Eth.$ l 000. He cot1ld not s11e o� an unliqt1idate_d � laim, e.g., a clai1n f�r da111ages arising from a personal injt1ry jnflicted by the plaintiff. Seco11dly, tl1e parties 11111st fill tl1e same cl1aracter tl1 at is tl1e claim 1nust be made by tl1e clefe11 da11t in il1e sa1ne capacity as tl1e cl;in1 on ;l1icl1 he i s stied by tl1e plaintiff. If tl1e plaintiff sties tl1 e defendant as an individual, tl1e defen dant cannot set-off a clai111 l1e n1ay l1ave against tl1e plai11 tiff in a represe11tative capacity, e.g., tl1e defe11dant is the ad111inistrator of an estate that 111ay l1ave a clai111 against tl1e plaintiff. Finally, tl1e clai1n sot1gl1t to be set-off 111 ust not exceed tl1e pec11niary limits of tl1e co11rt's jt1risdictio11. If the case were filed in tl1e A \vradja Gt1ezar Co11rt, the defendant cot1ld 11ot set-off tl1e clai111 not relating to i111111ovable property in excess of Etl1 .$ 5000. None of tl1ese limitatio11s is applicable to a coun terclaim. As with a counterclai111, tl1e cot1rt can give jttdgn1ent in favor of tl1e defendant for tl1 e balance: \vl1ere tl1 e plaintiff claims Eth.$ 1500 and tl1e defe11dant sets off a clain1 of Etl1.$ 2000, if tl1 e cot1rt fi.11 ds for tl1e plai11tiff on l1is clai111 and the defendant on l1is set-off, it 111ay award the defendant Eth.$ 500.63
Ho\V are tl1ese provisio11s to be reconciled? If the defendant labels l1is clai n1 a set-off, tl1en the pro,1isions of Art. 236 aJ)!)ly: tl1e clai1n 11111st be for an ascertai11ed sum, the parties m11st fill tl1e sa111 e cl1aracter as they fill in tl1 e plaintiff's suit, a11d the amount of tl1e set-off mt1st be within the pect1niary jt1risdictio11 of tl1e court. 011 the otl1er l1and, if l1e labels his clain1 as one of cot1nterclain1 tinder Art. 234(1) (f), these limitations do not apply, and it is expressly provided 11nder Art. 17(3) tl1at when a cou11terclain1 is 111ade, the jurisdiction of the co11rt sl1all depe11 d on tl1e val11e of tl1e l1igl1 er clain1, wl1icl1 111ea11 s tl1at tl1e defendant ca11 file a co11r1 terclai111 in an amount in excess of tl1 e jt1risdictio11 of tl1e co11rt i11 wl1icl1 tl1e 01iginal clai1n was filed. Otl1er articles of tl1e Code, e.g., Arts. 238, 239 refer to botl1 a cot1nter clain1 and a clain1 of set-off. In view of tl1e fact tl1at both are autl1orized by tl1e Code, the best way to resolve tl1 e proble11 1 wo11ld appear to b� _ to conclt1d� tl1at the defendant n1ay either file a set-off, i11 w11ich case tl�e p_rov1s1011 � ?f Art. 236 apply, or may file a co11nterclain1, i n which case, the c]a111_1 1s not linuted by :A,-rt. 236. This would n1ean· that tl1 e plaintiff ca11 file a . cot1ntercla1n1 for an t1nascerta1necl amot1nt in excess of tl1e j11risdiction o. f tl1e court i11 ligl1t of . Art. 234(1) � f) and Art. 17(3). However, where the co1111terclai1n js filecl i11 a different capacity, tl1e court sl1ot1ld probably order separate trials 11nder Art. 221.. Tl1e defendant _wo11ld be v1ell-advised to assert a cot1nterclain1 ratl1er than a claim of set-off, since a cot1nterclain1 is not stibject to tl1e restrictions i'n1posed tipon _ a_ clain1 of set-off. A11 d, wl1ere 11e I1 as filed a clain1 of set-off tl1at 111ay not be ma1nta1ned, tl1e court sl1ot1ld 62. 63.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 17(3). . . .. ti ; $ l 500 u 1t of $Et;,o·oo 1 no a1 the in ft 11t1 : 1 a pl e , tl r fo 11t me dg Ju The decree sl1oul d read as follows: 1e ; 1� of E �t l1. ! �ou an tl1e tn -off set of i.1n a cl ]1is 011 t judgerne nt for tJ1e defenda11 1fl. 1nt a pl the 1n fro 0 50 11.$ Et er ov rec to led tit nda en efe t d 11 is, tl,erefore,
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permit hin1 to amend to assert a co1111�erclain1. As a practical matter, the eX!stence of a procedtire for asserting counterclaims renders a procedure for the assertion of a cla.in1 of set-off unnecessary. Where the statement of defence contains a set-off or counterclaim, the court 11111st exa 1 ni11e it for legal s11fficiency, as it does a statement of claim64 and deter1uu1e whetl1er it states a ca11se of action. 65 Wl1ere tl1e stateme11t of defence con taini11g a co11nterclain1 or set-off is not reje�ted, the IJlaintiff is . to be asked whether J1e wishes to file a reply to tbe co1111terclain1 or set-off, and 1f he does, the court fixes a ti111e ir1 wl1icl1 tl1e reply is to be sub1nitted. 66 After tl1e reply is filed, the IJleadings are closed.
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B. Effect of Failt1re to Plead I. Variance As \Ve l1ave said, t]1e prin1ary IJUrpose of tl1e IJleadings is to develop the issues for trial. At tl1e first l1earing, tl1e co11rt fra1nes tl1e iss11es for trial, and the issues are ge11erally [rained 0 11 the basis of tl1e allegations contained in the pleadings. 67 At tl1e trial tl1e 1Jarties introd11ce evidence to s111Jport tl1e allegations of fact contain ed i11 tl1e JJleadi11gs arid p11t i11 isst1e by tl1e co11rt at the f1Ist l1earing. The theory is tl1at eacl1 JJarty will pre1Jare l1is case based on tl1e iss11es tl1at l1ave been framed for tria.l. I-I e vvill l1ave evide11ce to SlIIJJJOrt his side of tl1ose iss11es and will not be JJreJJared to introcl11ce e,1idence on otl1er isst1es. It follows the11 that if an allegation of fact is 11ot co11tai11ed i11 tl1e plead.i11gs and, tl1erefore, not p11t in issue by the cot1rt a.t tl1e first l1eari11g, 68 evidence to stlJJJJort that allegatio11 ca 11not be introduc ed at trial. It is a ge11eral JJrinciple of pleading tl1at ''1 10 amo11nt of evidence can be Jool<.ed into 11po11 a JJlea wl1icl1 was 11ever p11t forward." 69 Where evide11ce is i11troducecl of a fact tl1at was 11ot I JUt in issue, tl1ere is a vari[111ce, and tl1is is a JJroper grou11d of objectio11 to the i11troductio1 1 of tl1e evidence. It would not be fair to req11ire tl1e otl1er party to prod11ce evidence on an isst1e tl1at be \Vas not 11otified ,vo11ld be invol,1ecl at tl1e trial. Tl1e co11rt n1ay permit an amendment to tl1e pleadings to incl11de tl1e allegatio11 as to wl1icl1 evidence is sot1ght to be intro d11ced and thereby p11t tl1e allegatio11 i 1 1 isstie. 70 I-Iowever, as we will see, tlJere are circumsta11ces ,vl1ere an an1endment 1nay not be permitied, and eve11 where an an1end ment is }Jern1itted, tl1e co11rt n1ay grant tl1e opposite party a contin11 a11ce so tl1at l1e ,vii! ha.ve ti111e to collect evidence to reb11t tl1e new allegation. Whereas, if tl1e �lJe_gat1on can be constrt1ed to be co11tai 11ed i n the pleadings and to l1ave been put 1n 1ss11e tl1ereby, tl1ere is no problen1 of an1end1ner1t. There[ore, at ti 1 11es it becomes 1 1ecessary to �eterrnine wl1etl1er a partic11lar 111atter is vv1itl1in tl1e scope of tl1e issues framed f�r trial by the co11rt. And tl1is will 11s11 ally depend 011 wl1etber the n1�tter . as to \1/luc]1 the evidence is sought to be introd11ced was alleged jo tl1e pleadings. !he problen1 of varjance is den1011strated by a consideration of tl1e case of Le�v,s v. South San Francisco Yel/01,v Cab Co.71 Tl1is involved a suit by a woman 64. See the discussion as to legal sufficiency, infra, notes 101-108 and accompanying text. 65. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 238. 66. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 239. 67. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 248(a). 68 · . TJ1e court may also consider the co11tents of tJ1e documents produced by eitl1er party and· . s by the allegation but m ade by the parties durin g tJ1e exam inati 241, Art. unde r on held aotl large the factual issues will be developed from tl1e allegations of the pleadings. ? _ 69 · See D ? miruon v. Bbikraj (High Ct., Patna, 195 7), 1957 All India Rep., p. 586. s 70. ee C iv. Pro. C., Arts. 91 251 71 · (C1 i7rn a �t. App., U.S., i949), Pacifi in J. Chadbourn 52, p. c i 219, Rep., vol. 2nd Series , an . e•,111, Cases on Civil Procedure (196 l), p. 138.
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pas senger against a taxi con1pany for inj11ries sustained while 1 irin · · g the t i. e . a , m alle ged il tha cla im t tl1e taxi driver failed to follow· tllle Pla1nt1" ff· 's � T st ,,te ent of in struc· 1om e, ut er inst b 1 h ead tions to take . p· p1o .took her . to a . seclLtded spot a, nd ma de 11n er advances. Sb e ran �way fro m h1111,. and 10 doing so, fell into a hole, breaking 1er f�ot. These al�eg�tio11s created a11 1s�Lte as . to whetl1�r the plainti ff ,vas injtired driver. If tI11s were trlle, t e c0111pany 111 trying to escape . f101n an attack by tl1e . b een I1able becat1se of· the 1111proper co11dtict of the dr·iveril. I-I e would hav . o\ve· ver, . . at tl1e tr1a1 she 111trodt1ce d . 110 ev1"denc� to tl1e effect tl1at tlie driver ba.d attacked her. Instead s�e s?11gl1t to 111trodt1�e ev1de11ce which wotild_ s11ow that a fello\.v pas senger 1:1ade 1n1p1 oper a�,,ances to l1er and that the drtver failed to protect lier fro1n tl11s passe11ger, bt1t instead drove l1er to a seclt1ded place so tll at the passerl ger cot1ld 1na�e tl1ose advances. Sl1e ra11 away fro111 tl1e passenger ::ind fell, breakiiig J1er foot. If tl1is were trL1e, tl1 e co111pany wottld I1ave been liable because its employee failed to protect l1er fro111 tl1e fellow passe11ger, as l1 e l1ad a d t1 ty to do tinder the law. It was held tl1at sl1 e could not introdL1ce tl1is evide11ce. She pleaded facts raising an issL1e as to wl1etl1er tl1e defendant vvas liable becaL1se of the in1proper conduct of tl1e driver directed to tl1e passenger .. Since sl1e did not allege tha� tl1e driver �ailed to protect }�er fro111 tl1e attack of a fellow passe11ger, no st1cl1 1ss11e ,vas ra1sed by tl1e pleadings. Tl1erefore, evidence of l1is fajlure to protect her co11ld not be i11trodt1ced at trial - tl1ere was a variance between tl1 e isst1e raised by tl1e pleadii1gs and the isst1e as to which sl1e sot1gl1t to i11troduce evidei1ce at trial. She could l1ave moved to an1end, b11t did 11ot do so. Conseq11ent ly jt 1dgment \Vas for the defe11da11t. Sl1 e cot1ld not recover on tl1e theory of in1proper conduct by tl1e driver toward l1er, because sl1e introdL1ced no evidence to st1p1Jort tl1at allegation She could not recover on tl1e tl1eory tl1ai tl1e driver failed to JJrotect her from a fellow passenger, because tl1 is was not p11t in issue by tl1 e pleadings and, tl1erefore, sl1e co11ld 11ot introd11ce evidence to s11pport it at trial. This case furnishes a clear exan1ple of a variance a11d sl1ows th,1t if an allegation is not con tained in tl1e pleadir1gs, evidence to s11pport it cannot be introdt1ced at trial.
!
We may consider a few ft1rther exa1nples of thjs rule. 111 tl1e statement of claim the plaintiff alleges tl1at tl1e defe11daot breacl1ed a co11tract witl1 tl1e plajntiff, for ,vl:ucl1 the plaintiff seeks da111ages. At tl1e trial it ap1Jears tl1at tl1ere \Vas no contract. The plaintiff then seelcs to introduce evidence to tl1e effect tl1at l1e co11fer red a benefit o n the defendant and tl1at, tl1erefore, l1e is e11titled to relief on the · theory of 11nlawf11l e11ricl1n1ent. 72 He ca11 not do so.i 3 The statement of claim only alleged facts raisincr an iss11e as to wl1 etl1er tl1ere was a contract breacl1ed by the defendant. Tl1ere w�s no allegation tl1at tl1ere vvas a11other relationship by_ whicl1 _ the defendant was unj11stly enriched. Tl1us, there is a varianc� between the _1ss11e raised by tl1e pleadings, and the evidence the defendant seeks to introduce at trial. So too, where the plaintiff alleged that her l111sband removed her separate property fr?m tl1e l she ho11se and did not allege tha t l1e was a trL1stee of the property, at the tria 74 The e. ste tru a s wa d ban hus the could not introduce evidence to the effect that statt1te of limitations wo11ld ]1ave barred the clain1 against an ordinary wrongdoer, but not agai11st a tr11 stee. Since she did no t allege th�t the l1usb�nd was a trustee in her statement of claim she could not introduce evidence showing that l1e was a . to �er t los r eve for be ll wi ue iss the an n1e t e no ste · tr u at trial. Note that' this does s 1ng ad ple tl1e to t en dm 1en an an it rm pe , ces tan n1s e Th co11rt may, i n appropriate circ11 72. See Civ. C,, Art. 2162. 73. See Tej v. Ramlal (High Ct., Lal1 ore, 1937), 1938 All Inclia Rep., p. 571. . 74. Bright v. Brigllt (Ct. App., West Afr., 1943), fVest .1-1/r. Ct . .1-tpp. Rep., vol. 9, P· 48
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in th_e absence of an amend t, is tha r b� 1em ren to i11t po e Th . ue iss new to raise tlle ion gat tl1e alle e was not con tained in sinc , ced odu intr be 1 ot 1 can e enc evid ment the the �taten.1ent of claim. However tl1e court sl1ould find a variance only wl1en it is clear that tl1e plea d cl1 to as w]1i the e isst1 tl1e party seeks to ing rais as ed stru con be n;t ld coti inointroduce evidence. All doubts sl1ot1ld be resolved in favor of the pleade r and against the finding of a variance. If tl1e pl�ader is permitted. to a1nend, the other IJarty may require a continu�11ce, and tl1e trial of the case will be del�yed. In cer tain circt1mstances, as we WIil see, a11 amendment ma,y not be pern11tted, so the error. For tl1ese reasons, co urts issue will be lost to tl1 e party because of a pleading 75 the plaintiff sougl1t to intro tend to construe the pleadings liberally. In one case dt1ce evide11ce that the accident aggravated an existing l1eart condition. In tl1e state n1ent of clai1n I1 e alleged that tl1e injuries s11stained i n the accident ''affected and ii1jt1 red tl1 e plai 11 tiff's h eart." Tl1is \Vas l1 eld to be s1rfficient to put in issue the qt1estion of wl1etl1er tl1e accident aggravated a11 existi11 g l1eart condition and, there fore, there was no varia11 ce. The cot1rt l1eld tl1at tl1e allegation was s1 1 fficie11 t notice to tl1e defendant that tl1 e plaintiff 11 1igl1t clai1n da1nages for aggravation of an exist ing heart co 11 dition. 76 Or, tl1 e IJlaintiff s11es for a11 order reqt1iring the defendant to convey Ia 11 d to l1im purst1ant to a contract of sale. Tl1e co11rt finds that tl1ere was 11ot ,1 valid co11tract. Tl1e plai ntiff tl1 en seel<s to introd11ce evidence that l1e gave tl1e defenda 1 1t a do,vn pay111ent, or ''ear11est 111oney'', as tl1.is is called. He sl1 ould be per111 itted to i 1 1troduce tl1 e evicle11ce.77 T11 e pleadi11 gs raised an isst1e as to wl1 ether tl1ere ,vas a11 agreen1 ent to con,,ey la11d. Us11 ally where tl1 ere is sucl1 an agreen1ent, tl1 e bt1yer give_s the seller a down 1Jay1nent. Since the plaintiff aJJeged tl1at there was an agree111 ent to co11vey la11d, l1 e i111plieclly alleged tl1at l1e gave the defend ant a do,vn J)a�,r111 e11t, and tl1 is v,ras })Ut in iss1 1e by tl1e IJleadings. Tl1ese exan1ples indicate tl1 e liberal constr11 ction of pleadings i 11 order to avoid a fu1ding of variance. Ft1 rtl1 ern1ore, tl1 e doctrin,e of variance is apJJlicable only if an ob jection is raised b)1 the opposi11 g party. Tl1e reason f, or the r11le is that tl1e opposing party wo uld be prejudiced by l1 aving to n1 eet a new isst1e tl1at was not raised by the plea dings. B11t, if tl1 e opposi11 g party does not object, and introduces evidence to meet tl1 e ne\\' iss11e, he l1as not been prejud iced thereby. It is a ge11eral principle of pleading law that wl1en issues 11 ot raised by the pleadi ngs are tried by express or in1plied conse 11 t of tl1e parties, tl1ey sl1all be treated as if raised by the pleadings.is Where a party does not object to tl1 e introd11 ction of evidence 011 a new issue on grounds yariey v. Nloytl (Co1u1ecticut Sup. Ct., U.S., 1952), Atlantic Rep., 2ncl Series, vol. 90, P· 869, 1n J. Chadbourn a11d L. Levin, Cases on Civil Procedure (1961), p. 328. 76. The. court observed tl1at the defendant could l1ave asked that the lJlaintiff be required to specify what he was clairni1Jg See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 91(3). 77. See Firm Sr i11ivas v. Mal1 abir ((Sup. Ct., India, 1951), 1951 Alt-India Rep., p. 177. 78. See !(n�1dsen ,,. Boret1 (Ct. App., U.S., 10tl1 Cir., 1958), Fecleral ReJJ., 2nd Series, vol. 261, p.. 1), 111 J. Cl�aclbourn an.d L. Levi11 Cases on Civil Procedure (1961), IJ. 221. There t ?e dri�er of a vehicle ru1d a passe11ger sued to recover da1nages arising ou t of an au�on1obil� acci�ent. lI1 order to recover ·r11ey had to shov, that tl1e driver of the other vehicle_ "vas 11eg hgeot and that they \Vere 11ot negligent. Tl1e driver IJlaintiff was found to be neg h�e� t, and un�er the _law of tl1at sta�e, if the d iv er and tl1e passenger were engaged_ in a "JOLO! � . , v� �ture • that 1s, tl1ey were us111g the veh1cle for a co1.n.01011 pt1rpose, tl1e negligence of ti� . diiver would be impu ted to tl1e passenger. In the staten1ent of defence the defendant dJd when llOt allege that_ the driver and, the passenger were engag joint ve1 1ture. At trial, Whe a in ed he sought to int_roduce evidence to that efrect n : t obje c not did plai ntjf pas f senger on he sought to raise the Qtlestion of variance �nthe Jon obje ct any that a1Jpeal it was l1eld a grou l 11ad , t bee� waived. Recovery was de nied to ti1e passenger plaintiff on 1;11e grouu<l ,D< !� . at lle all<l t?e drJver were et1gaged i11 a joint ventu·re ' and the driver's 11egligence was tmpt1ted to l11m.
75.
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i111pliedJ_Y consents to th e trial of tl1at issue. It he , an ce . va ri of is as if the pleadings to 1ncl 11de the an1e nde d new issue.. Under Art 251, the co . bad ' been · urt 111ay frame · · an en h issu w d e no t rrused 1s tried by the an · parti·es, the COllft Sh OU1d new issties, · · · 1 1on . l dd't' a a an issu e and g1ve Jt1dgment accordingly. as this e m fra The most important asp.ect. of fail11re to plead occtirs w 1'th respect t o th e state. The su b1lliss1on of the statement enc e . fi de of · of def enc e 1 m ent · s tl 1e crt1c . 1a1 po1nt . · . · · in the fra-1!1-10� of ·1ss11es. p-<or It 1s pr1n�ar1ly by the statement of defence that tlie defendant 1nd1cates wl1at facts an·d q11est1on.s he wants to ptlt in isstie at the tr1a · 1. ·ng a cla1111 of counterc p t r a o1 r ra r, f r n 1· 1s1 a 1e e 'd 1 sa e w � laim or set-off, tlie defenAs _ dant n1t1st do . t\VO things 10 tl1e sta.te111e11t . of defence: (I) J1e 11111st deal witll the (2) factual allegatI? os of tl1e _state1ne.nt of � la1m; and I1e n1ust raise grotinds of _ defence. We will no\V coos!der . tl1ese req111re1nents 111 greater detail witli reference to the effect of tl1e defenda11t s fa1lt1re to do so.
Failure to Deny As we saw, tl1e . defe11da�t .m t1st respond to eacl1 allegation of fact contained in the statement of clarm., ad1n1tttn� or denying it. A11y factt1al allegatio11 not denied in the stateme11t o f. defe11ce specrfically or by 11ecessary i1nplication is dee1ned to be adroitted.79 TJ1is 111ear1s tl1at tl1e defe11da11t does not contest it, and conseque11tly no isst1e arises ,1s to that allegation .80 Tht1s, at trial, the plaintiff would not ordinarily be required to introduce evide11ce to prove tl1at allegation. For exa1nple, in a s11it for breach of contract, tl1e plaintiff alleges tl1e various ter1ns of tl1e contract - the defendant agreed to deliver tl1e goods on Jant1ary 1, 1966, the price \Vas Eth.$ I per kilogram, and so fortl1. In tl1e state111ent of defe11ce, wl1en dealing witl1 the allegations of the pla.i11tiff respecting the terms of the co11tract, the defenda11t pleads, "defendant denies tl1at l1e was to deliver tl1e goods on Ja11uary 1, 1966, bt1t con tends that they were to be deliverecl 011 February 1, 1966." Since l1e did not deny that tl1e price was Etl1.$ 1 per kilogra111, ]1e is deen1ed to l1ave ad111itted tl1e tr11tl1 of tl1e allegation. Tl1ere is an iss11e a. s to tl1e date of delivery but not as to tl1e price of the goods. Tl1erefore, tl1e co11rt will not fra111e an iss11e as to tl1e price of the goods, and at the trial t]1e plaintiff \.Vill ordi11arily not have to inu·oduce evid ence showing that tl1e J Jrice of the goods was Eth.$ 1 per kilograu1. However, tl1e co11rt 1nay, in its discretion, req11ire a11y fact so admitted to be proved at tl1e trial despite tl1e admissio11. This povver is specifically granted under Art. 233. It will be s01ne time before pleadi11g 11nder tl1e new Code is f11Uy 11nder stood by the parties and their advocates, and it is JJossible that ,t careless ple,td�r may t1nintentionally fail to de11y certain cr11cial facts. T11is is �hy if th � co1�rt, 111 light of the way tl1e case has developed, tl1inks a certain fact 1s really 10 d1sp11te, it may require pro of of tl1at fac t despite the admission. Tl1is power sl1o�ld only be exercised w·here it appears tha t a nustake ma y l1ave been . made, tl1at 1s, . a party fa �led to de11y a11 allegation tl1at I1e i11tencled to deny. Wl!ere _the defend�� h � s failed to deny an all�gatio1 1 contained in tl1e state111e11t of clai�, 1t sl101�ld 01din�r1. . _ t A l. tria t e 111r req ly be considered admitted, a11d proof of 1 t sho11ld not be � � � _35 aJso provides that fail11re to deny does no t constitute an ad1russ1on as aga111st a person under disability. t know :W he�?- er or not TJ1er e may b e times wl1en tl1e defenda11t simply does n? an allegation is true. In st1cl1 a case he sbo11ld plead , no t admitted , and tl1is 2.
79 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 235(2). r 80 · This would also apply to the plaintiff's reply filed i11 response to the defendant's counttcof atemen st a e er w it if as e n1 sa e tt1 ed treat claim under Art. 239. The reply is to be defence.
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has tlle effect of a denial. He sl1ould 011ly so plead when he gen_u.inel� d?es not know wJ 1 etl1er the allegation is true or n.ot �lod has no w�y of 1nves�1gat1ng tl1e truth. Finally, note tl1 at, in Jigl1t of Art.. 82, tl1 e defenda11t 1s not required t? deal with alleoati ons of dan1ages. He may s11nply allege that he does not adm1t the O J)laintiff's allegations of da111ag�. As we will see, tl1� defendant m �y l1ave. a �urther opportu1iity to de11y the allegations _ a t tl1 e first hearing and 1nay,_ 111 certain c1!cum stances, be permitted to amend 111s state1nent of defence to include a denial of allegatio11s tl1at previol1sly ,vere not denied. But i11 tl1e �bsence �f tbi�, allegations 11 ot denied are deen1ed ad1nitted, and as to SlICh allegations no 1ss11e 1s created. The more diffic11lt problems revolve around the req11ire1nent of Art. 82 to tl1e efrect tl1at:
''Tl1 e plaintiff or defendant, as tb.e case 1nay be, sl1all raise by l1is pleadi11g all n1atters wl1icl1 s11 0,v the actio11 or counterclaim not to 1uaintai11able, or that tl1 e transaction is eitl1er void or voidable in point of be l,1,v, a11 d all sl1cl1 grou11ds of defence o r reply, as tl1e case n1ay be, as if 11 ot raised ,vould be likely to talce the opposite J)arty by sl1rprise or ,vol1ld raise issl1es of fact not arising Olit of tl1e preceding pJeadings. "81 If tl1 ese 1uatters are no t raised by tl1e defendant in tl1e state111ent of defence, tl1ey will not be IJUt in isst1e a11 d, abse11t an1endn1e11 t, tl1 e defenda11t cannot raise them at trial. The 1)roble1n arises over ,vl1at 111atters 1n11st be pleaded l111der Art. 82. Or, to J )t1t it a11 otl1er v,1ay, l1ow is it detern1 ined wl1 at 1natters show tl1at tl1e action is not maintai11able or tl1at tl1e tra11sactio11 is void o r voidable or \\1hat is a -erot1nd of defence tl1at wot1ld tal(e tl1e opposite party by Sllrprise. Certain 1natters a.re necessarily f)ltt in issue by tl1e plai11tiff's allegatio11s in tl1e stt1te1ne11t of clain1, and tl1 e clefe11dant's de11ial of tl1ose allegatio11s. T·herefore, eve11 tl1ot1gh tl1 e defendant 11as 11ot raised tl1 e specific poi11 t as to whicl1 he is seeking to introduce evidence, l1e 111 ay i11troduce evidence 011 tl1at point, since it l1as been l)llt in isst1e by the plain tiff's allegations and tl1 e defendant's de11 ial of tl1ose allegations. Fo r exan1ple, tl1e plair1 tiff brings suit 011 a contract of gt1ara11tee and alleges in tl1e staten1 ent of clai1n tl1at ''tl1e plaintiff and tl1e defendant agreed tl1at tl1e defendant would 111ake good any losses cat1sed to the J)laintiff by l1is servant, Ato X, to the a111ot1nt of Etl1. $ 1000." In tl1e statement of defence the defenda11 t alleges ''tl1e defe11dant denies that l1 e entered into a contract of gt1arantee witl1 tl1e plaintiff." There is no allega tio11 in the staten1 ent of defence that tl1 ere was a11 a.green1 ent, but tl1at one of the witnesses to the agreen1e11 t was 11ot of age, so tl1 at tl1e agreen1 e11t did not co11stitute a contract. A contract of gt1araotee n111st be in writing,82 a11d "''here ,1 cor1tract is required to be i11 writing, it ml1st be attested to by two wit11esses83 \Vho ml1st be o f age. 84 At tl1 e trial tl1e defencla11 t seeks to i11tro dt1ce evidence tl1 at one of the vvitnesses was not of age, a11d tl1e q11estion is wl1etl1 er he n1 ay do so, since l1 e did not allege this !)articular fact in tl1e state111e11t o f defence. Tl1 e a11swer is tl1at l1e 111ay. Tl1is is not a n1 atter wlucl1 l1 e mt1st raise witliin tl1e 1neaoin o of Art. 82, O because the capacity of tl1 e wit11 esses goes to tl1 e plt1intiff's cause of action ratl1er than tl1 e defenda11t's defence. By tl1is I 111 ean that· if tl1 e arrree1nent was not wit ne�sed as requi1·ed: bl tl1 e Civil Code, a contractt1al obligatio11° wol1ld not co1ne into ex1st�nce. The pla1nt1ff alleged facts intended to establisl1 tb.e existence of a co11tract . !n !1ght ?� the provisions of tl1e Civil Code, tl1is 111ust 1nean an agreement which 1s 1n wr1t1ng and witnessed by two perso11s who are of age. If it were not so 81. Tl1e same requirement is conta1n · ed 1n · c·1v. pro. C., Art. 234(1) (d). 82. Civ. C., Art. 1725(a). 83. Civ. C., Art. 1727. 84. Civ. C., Art. 1729(1).
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could not be a contract. When the defendant denied there d , esse th witn e . eX 1s �� n ce was neces sarily there an issue act, as to whetlier there was compli ce f the contr an the Civil of Co ments d e rela t ing to contracts �f guar�ntee. Tl1is is :itb the require d show that the transaction is void _ woul which atter m 1f a witness was n ot not a . Jd come in · t· o bei· ng - nor 1s it cou t t rac . t]1e type of defience tl1a t 1s con no oe a Of 0 ' · y l Sl1rpr1se, b ff p · runt1 as 1 t 1e he wottld be aware ake t o ' · 0 r w10 t y 1 wi tn es sed the likel · · . · h question o t e · . . e · f h t capacity of wit tiesses was necessan.1y put into Since ent. 1 een agr · · . o I t 1e t a s f egation te111ent of claim tlla t there was a cont.ract of J·s811e by the a.11 · · . . · t' an s d en1al d e1en f:'. of d th e a h t d t a lleg n a a tion tlie , ntee defiend a · nt may 1ntroduce gua. ra · t a w1tne s was not of a ge, even tliough � t a h e11_ e ct_ l1e t to nce he d id not evid� � specifically allege tl11s 1n his statement of defence. On the other hand, let 1;1s say that the defe11dan t contends in a suit for b.reacI1 of contract �-hat l1e en tered Jnto tl1e co11 tract by mistake. I-Te must raise tlle 111atter of m�stake 1 n the statetuent _of �efence.. If he entered. into the contract by mis take,8::i the co�tract _1?a. y be 1?vaJ1dated , but there _ is �till a contractual obligation that l�as con1e into e�ste�ce. Since a contract11al obligation has come into existence, _ ntract a mounts to ''a matter w}1jch shows tl1at anyth111g that Wol1ld 1nval1date that co tlie transaction is voida ble'' witl1in tl1e n1eani11g of Art. 82, and ml1st be r aised in the staten1ent of defence. In tllis category wo11ld fall, i n addition to n1istake, clain,s 87 a11d d uress. 8� 111 otl1er words, for pt1rposes of Art. 80 a _ t en1ents st f . a�se_ fraud, of 82, we ml1st d1st1ng111sh between matters which are a part of the plaintiff's case and matters ,vhich may be called a:ffir1native defences, matters whicl1 wo11ld e11a ble tl1e defeo.dant to avoid an obligation that otl1erwise would exist. Where the matter is a part of the plaintiff's c a se, it m11st , in effect, be p11t in iss11e by his allega.tions; other\vise the statement of claim will fail to state a ca11se of action.89 But affirn1a tive defences must be raised in the sta te1nen t of defence or, a bsent a1ne11d111ent, tl1ey • ca.nnot be raised . at trial. How then is it deter1nined wl1ether a given matter is part of the l)laintiff's case, in which circumstance it will necessarily l1ave been alleged in a state1ne11 t of claim that states a cause of action, or an a ffir1native defence, in wl1ich case it must be alleged by the defendant in tl1e statement of defence. Tl1e question is not always an easy one to answer. However, tl1e best way to a._pproac11 it is to look to tl1e provisio11s of the substantive law and to ask wh.ether they appear to place the matter as part of t11e plaintiff's ca se or as a defence. For example, the req11ireme11t th at a contract of gl1arantee be wi tnessed by two persons of full age is part of the plaintiff's case - if the agreement ba s not been so witnessed, no obligation bas come into being. But, as regards mist a ke, clearly tl1is is a 1natter of defence, for Art. 1697 of tl1e Civil Code provides that ''a contract 111ay be invalidated wl1ere a party gave his consent by mistake or l1nd er deceit or d t1ress," and Art. I 808(1) nt or by the nse co the n i t c efe d a by d cte ffe a is 1 icl wh es t provid tl1at ''a contrac e � ." rty pa !be of st l1e req the at d ate d ali inv be ly on !ncap acity of one party ma y n io est e qu th ise ra _ to t a� nd fe de e th to llp is it ; r a. rt cle impo of these provisions is of defect of consent such as mistake, and he m11st do so tn bis statement of d e 91 17 :t. A de r . n U e. 11r a je m e rc fo of ce fen de e th tl1 fence. The sa m e woltld be trl1e wi a ll be l iab]e to s]1 ns io at lig ob s l1i rm rfo pe to ils of the Civil Code, the party wh o fa 85. Civ. C., Art. 1696. 86. See Civ. C., Art . 1704 87. See Civ. C., Art. 1705. 88. See Civ. C., Art. 1706. \Vill not have t an nd fe de e t11 at th 89 · And, therefore, rejected by th e cot1.rt tinder Art. 231, so lO
file a statement of defence.
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d• he is not released unless an lt, fau at t no is he at 1 tl ing ancl hst wit not .. pay damages re: s ce Thi Jeu 1or ma b y cd prov1s1on makes te ven pre s wa nce ma for per t tha . W sllo l cal he 1ff e 1nt e Th pla enc wo�1ld ordinarily def of tter ma a is re je11 ma ce for t tha : r clea it ant end the def if and wishes to claim 1n, for per t n did ant end def the y wh ? not know . ce fen of de nt ne te1 sta s hi i11 so do 1st mt l1e , 1re jet force 1 na al ctu ntra a-co of extr a liability. If the are e 1 tl in d loye en1p be can test 1e 11 The sa plaintiff sties to recover da1nages for personal inj_u.r�es due to the defendant's negli oence the defenda 1 1t cottld conte11d that tl1e pla1nt1ff suffered no damage from his in tl1e _ state1 nen� �f defe 11 ce. A party ;egli�e 11ce, even thougl1 l1e did not allege this 90 a11d 1f tl1 e pla1nt 1 ff alleges that the age, dam es ca11s act is liable only where bis defe11daut is liable for neglige11ce, l1e necessarily asserts tl1at l1 e suffered harm as a result of tl1e 11 eglige11 ce. However, if tl1 e plaintiff alleges tl1at lie st 1ffered bodily iojt1ry at the hands of tl1e defencla1 1t, a 1 1d tl1e defendant wisl1es to contend that l1e i 11 flicted tl1e i11j ury wl1 ile exercising self-defe 11ce, he 1ni1st raise the claim of self defence i 11 tl1e state 1 11ent of defence. Art. 2067(1) of tl1 e Civil Code provides tl1at a person is liable \Vl1ere l1e inflicts bodily l1 ar111 on a11otl1 er, bt1t Art. 2067(2) provides a11 exceptio11 wl1ere tl1 e act was done i 1 1 legiti1 11ate self-defe 11 ce. Since self-defence is an exceJ)tio11 to the general rt1le of liability, it is a n1atter of defence and n1ust be raised by tl1e defe11daot in l1is state111ent of defence. A fi 11 al q L1 estio 1 1 concer11s ]i111itation. In son1e co11ntries it .is held that if tl1e clai 1 11 is barred by li1nitation, no rigl1 t exists and tl1at, tl1ere·fore, \Vl1 en tl1e plaintiff alleges lie is entitled to recover, he alleges tl1 at the claim is 11ot barred by lin1ita tion. Otl1ers l1old tl1at tl1 is is ,t n1atter of defence, to be raised by the defendant.91 In Etl1iopia, tl1e questio11 is re,1lly one of s11bstantive la\v. Art. 1856(2) of the Civil Code pro,,1ides tl1at lin1itation is waived 11nless pleaded. Conseql1ently, 11nless the defenda11t raises tl1e defe 1 1ce of Ii 1 11itatio11 i11 l1is st,:1tem.e11 t of defe11ce, as a matter of substantive law, l1e is dee111ed to l1 ave waived it. To avoid any possible inconsi stenc:>', Art. 234(1) (c) of tl1 e Civil Procecl11re Code req11ires tl1 e defendant to allege facts sho\\1ing tl1at tl1e cl,1i111 is barred by lin1itatio11. Finally, note tl1c1t no !)leading 111ay, except by vvay of an1endn1ent, raise any ne\v gro11 nd or clain1 or co 1 1tai11 any ,1llegatio11 of fact inconsistent ,vith the previous Pleadings of tl1e party. 92 We sa\V that tinder Art. 80(1) of tl1e Civil Procedure . Code, pleading is broadly constr11ecl, and i 1 1 ,tddition to tl1e staten1ent of clai1n and the stateri:i�nt of defence, i 11clt1cles any applicatio11 or petitio11. So, in filing a st1 b�e qt1ent petition, for example, a J)arty cot 1lcl 11ot allege a fact tl1at is inco 11sistent ,v1tl1 tl1e facts he alleged in tl1e statement of clai111 or state1 nent of defence. As_ we can see f ro 1 n tl1is 111ateria.I, tl1 e !)leadings are designed to raise tl1e issties for trial. In_ order for the pleadi11gs to acco111plisl1 tl1is p11rpose, tl1e parties � nust �tate all tl1 e1r factual allegatio11s a1 1d gro11nds of clai111 or defence in tl1 e pleadings. If they clo not do so at that tin1e, tl1ey may not do so at a later tin1e unless th.e _ COllrt per111 1ts an an1 endment. Altl1011gl1 a1nendn1ents n1.ay be liberally pern1itted, tl1 e allo\vance of amendn1ents cal1ses a delay i 1 1 tl1 e case, and there a.re son1e circum �tancds wl1ere an an1e 11 cl111 e11t w�ll 11 ot be per1nitted. It is very im.portaot, tl1erefore, that . a lawyer pay caref11l atte 11t1011 to tl1e pleadi11gs. If both parties plead P�?perly, _ the issues will be clearly defined, and tl1 e case will proceed to trial exped1tiou Sly. 90. See Civ. C., Arts. 2028, 2029. v. 91. �r a discussion of tl1e rule in England India Gaily El. Yass in see and tl1e Suda11 l a med Abdel H.ag � 1� �nother (Ct. App., Sudan, 1960), 1960 Sudan L.J., P : 217· Ac : �� con c 1g 1 �g , to the court, hm1tat1on l1a d to be ple ded in It . India in not but Engla f nd a c � e that the matter did not J1ave to be pleaded in the Sud�n. 92. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 90.
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..-ings d a le f P o n o ti c je e R C. r Rejection fo re u d ce ro P 1r In this section we are concerned \Vith · rejection of the plead·1ngs bY t 1ie �ou�t Afte the r cien cy. Registrar is satisfied tllat the· s'tatement insu ffi l Jeoa for 0 o f c l a1n1 1s ffi su e h 11ts b · t, e to · I�. c1 · the cou rt. The co11rt must reject the statemetit techni� ally s11 ( f ;� part1cl 1 1ar� of tl1e staten1e t _ro� f 1 , whe ) re 1 nt of clainl it appears to be of clain ( outside the .court s jur1s clict1011 or 2 . ) 1t . does 11ot disclose a cause of act·ton.93 If tile cot1rt _rej�Cts the sta t·en1en. t of c I run1, 1t n1ust . record a11 order giving its reasons for tI1e rejection. It s 11ou_ 1d be 11ote d tl��t tl1e94rejectio11 of a s_tatement of claim by Registrar u11der A1 t. 229 does 11ot of its owri 1, i:-0 1·ce preven the court or by tl1e . t . · · gs . s_o, ·r 1 t I1e c?t1r_t reJects tl1e staten1 ent of claim o f _a new s:u1t: the filing on tlie g_round that 1t !acks Jt1r1sd�ct1?11,. tl�e plaintiff can file a n�w claim in the approp riate co11rt, or if tl1e cot1rt rejects 1t 011 the ground tl1at 1 t does 110t state a cause of action, he ca� file � new_ state111ent of clai111 tl1at does state a cat1 se of action.96 However, tl1e �11°:g ?l a rejected_ st�te111ent of claim does not stop the rtlnning of the statute o_f l1m1ta_t1ons. Tl1e 1:eJ�ct1011 clo�s not of its own force prevent tl1e filing of a new s�1t, bt1t 1f a 11e� s111t is otl1erw1se barred, the fact tl1at a rejected state ment of cl:-11m ,vas filed will not affect the bar. For exan11)le, the cause of action arose on September 1 , 1955. Tl1e period of limitation for such st1its is te1 1 years. The pla-intiff filed s11it on A11gt1st 1 , 1 965. Assume tI1at the stateme11t of clai111 ,vas rejected by the Registrar 11nder A.rt. 229 or by the cot1rt 11nder Art. 231. Tl1e plaintiff files a new statement of claim on October I, 1965. On Septe1nb· er I, 1965, the statute of lin1itations has run, and upon proper objection by the defendant, the suit will be disn1issed on gro1111ds of limitation. It is as if tl1e first suit bad not been filed, since the stateme11t of claim was rejected.
The statement of defence is submitted to tl1e co11rt at the first l1earing. Tl1e court exarn.i11es it for tecl1nical strfficiency under Art. 229, and can reject it if it does not comply with the requ.irements of that article. 97 Ho·wever, even where the court rejects the staternent of defe11ce, it mt1st proceed with tl1e first l1earing not withstanding the absence of tl1e statement of defence. It may be asked \vhetl1er tl1e court can. reject the staten1ent of defence for legal i11s1rfficiency, that is, on the ground. that tl1e statement of defe11ce does 11ot d.islose a legally st1fficient defence. Such po\,,er see1ns to be contained in Art. 254. Under Art. 254 tl1e cot1rt ca11 give judgment at the first l1earing if it find s that the parties are not at iss11e. If tl1e statement of defence does not state a legally s11 fficient defence, it follows that the 98 ly. ing ord acc ntiff plai the parties are not at issue, and the co11rt can give judgment for 2.
Pleading jurisdiction �lie 1 : 01 �d bas If : on icti isd jtLr ing ad ple of m ble pro the We will first consider . on 1ct1 1sd jt1r the e ts1d 011 be to s ear app t sui the i im gat cla alle ons of the statement of of the court, the co11rt mu st dis1ni;s it. In tl1is connection, we sho·uld �eview our a t t�a 1 e. vid pro 0 ? �n � ts: �r . III ter aJ) Ch . earlier disc11ssion of jurisdiction in d1c r1s Jt1 al loc or 1on 1ct 1sd jttr ial ter ma g vin ha t sta.te1nent of clai111 filed j11 a cot1 rt no 93. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 231. 1 apter y, in Cl ar 5tr gi Re e tl1 by im cla of t en 94. See tl1e discussion of the rejection of tl1e statem supra.
95. 96 · 97. 98 ·
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 232(2). Or, as we will se e, amend tl1e existing staten1ent of claim. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 238. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII, infra.
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tion sl1all be rejected in accordance with Art. 231. The court examines the statement of claiin to determine whetl1er it alleges facts showing that the court has material and local jurisdiction. As regards n1aterial ju.risdiction, the court 1nust look to tile provisions of Art. 226-228, since 111�terial jL1risdi.ctio11 is �et�rmined by the amount claimed in accordance witl1 those articles. 99 So, 1f tl1e pla1nt1ff alleges that his claim for personal injuries involves Eth. $ 1 0,000, the court n1ust accept this allegation. It is only when it is clear from tl1e allegations of tl1e statement of claim that the plaintiff co11ld 11ot possibl)1 recover an a1noL1nt witl1in tl1e material jurisdiction of the court that the court should l1old tl1at the claim is outside its jurisdiction. 10° For exan1ple, if tl1e JJlaintiff s1 1es for an orilinary debt evidenced by a writi11g, and the writing shows tl1 e debt is for Eth.$ 1000, tl1e Higl1 Court \vou1d not have jurisdic tion. Even if tl1e plaintiff clain1ed i 1 1 excess of Eth.$ 5000, it is clear fron1 the doct1111ent tl1at be co11ld 11ot recover tl1at amo11nt. It is only in these kind of cases or v1l1ere tl1e case is clearly 011tside tl1e local juriscliction of the court that the state1nent of clai111 sl1ot1ld be rejected for want of j111·isdiction. Also, as we pointed 011t in Cl1a1Jter III, a state111ent of clain1 shot1ld 11ot be rejected on the ground of lack of judicial jt1risdiction. Tl1e st,1te1nent of clai1n 1uay 11ot disclose facts establish ing j11dical jurisdictio11 on tl1e ground tl1at tl1e defendant is an Ethiopian national or do111iciliary or tl1at the act which is tl1e s11bject 111atter of tl1e s11 it occurred in Etl1io1)ia. B11t 011e basis of j11dicial jt1risdiction is co11se11t, and it is not until the defe11da11t ap1Jears at tl1e first l1eari11g tl1at it can be l<nown wl1ether he will object to laclc of judical jt1risdictio11. Tl1erefore, the cot1rt sl1ot1ld never reject the statement of clai111 01J tl1 e ground tl1at it does not disclose jt1dicial jurisdictio11, since whether or 11 ot j11dicial j11risdictio11 exists will 11ot be know11 11ntil the first l1earing. Pleading a Cause of Action Tl1e 111ost i1111Jorta11 t as1)ect of tl1e matter of rejection of J)leadings is tl1e rejec tion of tl1e state1J1e11t of clain1 on the grot1nd tl1at it does not state a cause of action. As we said, tl1e co11rt can also reject a statement of defence on the ground tl1at it does 11ot state a legally strffic.ient defe11ce 11 nder Art. 254, but the usual questio11 involves tl1 e stateme11t of clai111, and we will a1Jproacl1 tl1e problem in that context. Re1nen1ber that there are two stages to litigation in tl1e co11rt of first instance: tl1 e JJleadi11g a11d pre-trial stage, a11cl tl1e trial. If it is clear during tl1 e pleading stage tl1at the plaintiff does not l1ave a legally s11fficient clai111, tl1e 1 1 tl1ere is no reason to proceed f11rtl1er. Tl1ere is no reaso11 to l1ear evidence if on tl1e basis of wl1at was alleged in tl1e statement of ciai111 tl1e plai11 tiff could not recover. Thus, the court examines the state1nent of clai111, and if it fi1 1ds tl1at it does not state a cal1se of action, tl1e court rejects it. We will now co11 sider wJ1 en the staten1e11t of claim may be said to state a ca11se of action.
3.
(a) Pleading facts entitling the plaintiff.' to relief Suppo�e tl1 �t the JJlaintiff alleges as follows: ''Tl1e JJlai11tiff is a poor n1an; the defenda11t 1s a r1cl1 man. '"fherefore, tl1e defenclant sl1ot1ld pay the plaintiff Eth.$ 1000." 99. 100.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 16(2). 8 ;e Auton1otive_ Trading_ Co. v.. Yol1annes Prota, Adn1'r. (fligh Ct., 1962, Civil Case �?· 3-3/54) (u.npubbshed). At that t1nJe that I-Iigh Cot1rt had jurisdiction \\)here tl1e amotult. in coiltroversy exceeded Etl1. $ 2000. Tbe plau1tilf clain1ed ·Etl1 · $ 2100 ' Etl1. $2000 represe nting · tiff· the debt owe · d and Eth.$ · 100 represeI?,tiJ?g a claia1 for expenses i11curred by the plain . nded that the . ant conte and 1� 11e defend JOO Eth.$ the plarnt recov 1ff was er not to entitle d _ tllat, theref� re, tl1e 1-Jigh Court lacked jurisdictio11. The court I1eld that this contention went iuerits of the ca.se rat.h r t 1an to the question of jurisdiction. See also Spar_ks v. � � . R �n d JCt. App., U.S., 8tl Ctr., 111 579, p. 113, 1940), Federal Rep., 2nd Series, vol. � p·Je ct an B. Kaplan, Materia ls 011 Civil Procedttre (1953), p. 376.
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1
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statem ent the of claiin d oes not stat e a that · r . clea is It o f ac�1o n. Tl1is is ns, even if allega true, tio do not en.title the la�:� . because the · 1iff . 10 rellef z11zcler th e pr no ov do t e id that any ricl1 man musf es law Th e , ay 1 ?ne y to a�y p oor :111 i cases u n certai where e ar an obligation t o s ppl ma1 te ce ia:�. There nan exists, but � ge alle ts not fac did sh o g win f ntif l1e is entitled to maint�nance fr · tnh· e plai o m th e o r is n ea o n to er ; e p Tb r o �e ed t . ft 1r tl 1e r. def e11dan_ Even if the plaintiff can prove . . . that he 1s poor and t he de1endant 1s r1cl1, I t wot1ld be to no I·i · Th 1s is clearly . sho and 11ld . cla be im reje cted ndl . ess In otller words i il �:�e�nunin_g t 1l e a (Jrou eg 1 al ate me nt s t of the clai n 1 of tl1e c o 11rt exa mi · · · nes tli' e all Sl1·fficiency ' eg.ations - 1 t does not · · 0 ,,· · ence or d o anyt·I 1100 else. It asks I f these allegati hear. evid ons were t e . ott Id t he ff be entitled to recover t 111 cler tl1e law?'' i If so ' tlle statement orf u c, Ia1�1n states lain t · · P . · ac r. 1dan t wi ll be ordered to file J tio n, �nd t. I1e de1.e1 f o a cause iis state .1nent of defence. If the an_swer 1s _110, the11 tl1e state1nent of claim does not state a catise of action and w1ll be reJect ed. Of cour�e, 111 ost ca�es are no t as si1nple as ot1r_ exan1ple, bt1t the pri iiciple is the same. If tl1e allegations o f the state1nent of claim, e ve11 if true do not entitle tl1e plajntiff to r�lief 11nd�r tl1e law, the staten1e11t of cJai111 does not state a cause of acti on a11d ,v1ll be reJ<:cted. F_or example, in tl1e case of J-Jeirs of 1V.fo/1c11,1111ecl Be.v Jlassar1 v. George N1colc1 Dzabet et al., 101 tl1e plai11tiff sued to set aside a transfer of land on the gro und tl1at the transfer was obtained by frat1d or n1.istake and, therefore , was void. In lus stat e men t o f claim he alleged that tl1e land ,vas sold at a low price. It was held that t]1e staten1e11t of clai1n did not state a cat1se of action, since even if it w ere tr11e tl1at tl1e land was sold at a low lJrice, tllis \vould not con stitute frat1d or 1nistal<e u11der tl1e law.102 There was no allegation of \Vrongdoing or tl1at the buyer took advantag e of tl1e seller. Tl1erefore, the stateme11t of claiin failed to state a cause o f action, and i t was rejected. A variation of tlus r11le is that tl1e state1nent of clain1 cloes not state a cause of action ,vl1ere i t does n o t incl11de a11 allegation of fact that is an essential ele ment of the ca11se of actio n. Certain facts m11st be alleged in order for a cause of action to exist, and if tl1ose facts are n ot alleged, tl1e state1nent of clain1 is i11s11fficient. St1ppose tl1at in a suit to recover dan1ages for breacl1 of contract tl1e plaintiff alleges that l1e sent a11 offer to the defe11cla11t, bltt does not allege tlJat tl1e defendant accepted tl1e offer. Si11ce tl1ere can only be a contract if botl1 parties agree, an essential ele1ne11t of a ca11se of actio n for breacl1 of contract has n o t been alleged. Eve n if it is true tl1at tl1e plai11tiff 1nacle an offer to the defe·ndant, tbis, witho 11t n 1ore, d oes 11o t sl1o w that tl1e parties conclt1ded a contract, and, tl1ere fore, the statement of clai111 does not state a cause of action. 103 However, i n detern1ining \vb e tl1 er tl1e statement of clai1n states a ca11se of acti�n, all dot1bts sl1ould be resolved in favor of tl1e pleader, and tl1e statement_ o� clatm shot1ld be constrt1ed i n tl1e ligl1t n1ost favorable to l1i111. It _is . only wl1en it 1s c�ear fro1n the allegations of the stat e ment of clain 1 tl1at the pla1nt1ff co uld n?t po ssibly recover under tl1e law, tl1at it sl1011ld be dismissed on tl1e gro11nd that it does n_ot state a cause of acti on . Tl1e plai ntiff should l1ave a cl1ance to p_resent. th_e meri ts of hi� case if at all po ssible. This i s particuJarly true at pr�sent. in Et11iopia, ,vlJ_ere pleading law is j11st developing an d there 1s a shorta.ge or trained lawyers. If a 101. (High Ct., Sudan, .1960), 1960 Suda1i L. J., p. 208. ative derm r f af of i rn fo n1e so 102, In order for ere at th d ire qu re to be fraud, it is generally tl1 · ceitful action take place. See Civ. C., Art. 1104. O ·al t • d 1 e 1 r i:a b at . . l 1 . 1n la · · rc J te 103, For an • · un co · d an 1nterest1ng case 1nvolvrng � state�1ei1t Of . c a.Lill ia, 1926), er ig N t. C . iv (D ' c 1 rai · 11 B a 1 r Ma .· lege enforceable contracts see Dao.1el Kal10 v. Chief Ni geria L. Rep., vol. 6, 'p. 126.
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t i� ha� been ?efectively bu , ns tio ega all l1e t on sed ba st exi . _ cause of action u1ay 1p . T 11? 1nc pr cla le 1s demon of t en em t a t s e tl1 � ect rej t �� no ld ou sh t ur co stated, th e l.. na Th.e:e . the plaintiff tzo a n. ter lri els ot H o11 ilt H v. ia rc Ga of se ca lie t strated by , on ati fam r cla1m1ng tha. t the de fo s ge ma da er ov rec to er oy 1pJ en r . me for stled liis a th end def to t 's ho tel for n � me wo lll_ ing ng bri !l of hjm d t1se acc y sel fal �int defend t 1on �XIs ts only 1f _tl1e na fa1 for ion a ccusa of se cau ? A ._ � �� � of prostitt1tion s ose ptirp _ d par ty. o Tl1e statement of claim did _ not tion J1as been comn1un1cated to a th11 _ 1sation,, to a t hird party. expressly allege tl1at the defe11 dant_ c?m111t1ni�a�ed tl1e acc1 It did allege, Iiowever, tl1at the pla111 t1ff was v1o�ently . d1�charged an? was ''falsely and slandero11sly accused'' by tl 1e defendant. Whil e thls 1s poo r pl eading, the allega tions could be construed as implyi11g tl1at the defendant ll ttered t he remarks in the tl1e state!11ent of c!aim wa.s held to state a e, � presence of a tl1ird JJarty. Therefo _ cause of actio11. It is only wl 1en 1 t IS clear, as In tl1e Hezrs of Mohan1med Hassa11 case tl1a t tl1e allegations of tl1e st ate1nent of clain1 could not possibly entitl e the plai�tiff to relief under tl1 e law tl1at tl1e stat ement of claim will be rejected as not stating a ca.use of action.
(b) Pleading co11clusions Tl1 e second circ1111 1sta11ce wl1 ere a state1nent of clai111 does not state a cause of action is wl1 ere the pleader l1as, in effect, pleaded co11cll1sions ratl1er than facts. Altl1ot1gl1 tI,e state111e11t of cl ai1 11 1nay apJJear to tl1e Registrar to contain the facts constit11ting tl1e ca11se of actio11 , tl1us satisf�)'ing Ar t. 222, llpon closer exan1ination, t l1e court ma�/ be co11,1i11 cecl tl,at tl1e ''facts cons titl1ting t l1e cause of action'' n1erely state conclusions. 111 st1cl1 a case tl1 e plaintiff l1as not stated a ca11se of ac tion - l1e has not alleged facts sl10\ving tl1at he is entitled to relief under the law - and the state111 ent of clai111 ,:vill be rejected.
Tl1e distinction between pleading facts and conclt1sions for pt1rposes of stati11g a ca11se of action is brot1gl1 t ot1t in the case of Kra111er v. Ka11sas Cit)' Po1ver & Lig!1t Co. 106 Tl1e plaintiff s11ed to recover dan1ages for injuries st1stained wl1en he fell fron1 a pole \vhile worlcing for the defe11da.nt. Under tl1e law of tl1at state the defendant wo11ld be liable only if negligence were sl1own. In paragrapl1 3 of tbe staten1 ent of clain1 tl1e pl aintiff alleged as follows:
''That tl1e defe11dant negl ige11tly cal1sed. said step to be drive11 and placed i11 said JJole not far eno11gh to 1nake i t reaso11ably safe and sect1re fro1n breaking under a strain; . . . tl1 a t wliile l1e ,:vas so usi11g said step on or about said date it brol<e with l1i111 becaltse of the said negligence of tl1e defe11dant a11d ca11sed l1 i111 to fall a11d be injured." The court . held that this allegation merely stated a. co11clttsion. It did not allege facts sl1ow1ng wl1at tl1e def. endant failed to do tha t l1e shot1ld l1a,,e done to mak e the . s tep �afe. The plaintiff did not allege fc1cts sl1owin er that tl1e defendant was negligent 1n the way he maintained the ste_p; lie did 11ot O allege acts of negl igence . He shol1ld h�ve �lleged how far the step ,vas driven in and J1ow far it sl1ould have been �riven 1n, e.g., ''the step sl1 ot1ld not l1ave been. n1aintained in tl1e pole at a. le�g th In excess of fot1r inches, and it was 1nain tained in tl1 e pole a t a Jength of six inches." He sl1ould l1ave alleged also that l1e placed his foot on tl1at part . 104. t s . Ct., 0- :· Puerto R:ico, 1951), Fee/era/ l i pp , m 5, � � p. it1 R. F e d ao<l B pa n Mate, ,als on Ci.vil Procedure (195 Su le ent vol . 97, 3)., p. 380. � · 105. Otl1erw1se there could be · Art· ,044 . no inJur y to tl1e pl a intiff 's rept1 t a tion. See C1v. C., d . 106. Su Ct ' M'1ssour1, U S , 1925). ao ourn l1adb South1 . vester11 J. 43, in Rep., C 279 vol . p. : : ' L. pi,ev1n. , Cases on C1v 1l Procedure (1961), p. 279.
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ond four inches. · Since l1e did not allege be y_ ste p the Of 1• c-acts s 11owing that the un d�r th e Iaw for negligence, tl1e sta defendant was l:iable_ tement of claim did not o 1 state a cause of action. (c) Pleading facts negating the claim The· third circumstance where the state111ent of claim does not state a caus e of . a1 ff p 1e nt t 1 I 1 · · h as wh er al e le ge d facts wh.icl1 affirmatively show tliat action 1_s lle is rec 1nd ov er �r th e to law led or tl1at tl1e defendant has a good defence. not entit .� For exa1n_ple, tl1e plaintiff _seeks to recover damages for p11y sical assattlt tinder Art. Z038. The . state1;11e11t of clru111 alleges tl1at tl1e defendant str11ck tl1e plaintiff witll his :fist, br� a�1ng l11s 11ose.. It _also a!leges . tl1at tl�e de�endant struck the plaiiltiff after the plrunttff attacked_ 11111� to pu11isl1 l11n1 for 1nst1lt1ng tl1e plaintiff. Tl1e p_ ortion of tlie staten1ent of cla1n1 tl1at alleges the defendant strt1ck the plaintiff witl1 his fist breaking his nose, states a ca11se of actiot1, since, if trt1e, it would entitle tl1� plaintiff to �eli_ef _11nder tl1e_ la,v. J·Iow�ver, tl1e second allegation affi.rn1atively shows that tl1e plaintiff 1s 11ot entitled t? relief and tl1at the defendat1t has a good defence. Under Art. 2039(b) an assa11lt 1s not dee1ned to l1ave been committed where the act is done in legiti111ate self-clefe11ce. Since, of course, there is no rigl1t to assault someone to pu11isl1 l1i1 11 for insult, tl1e plaintiff has alleged facts wl1ich sl1ow tl1at tl1e defenda11t acted i n legitin1ate setf-defence. Tl1erefore, it is clear fro1 n tl1e allega tions of the state1nent of clain1 that tl1e plaintiff is not entitled to recover 11nder tl1e law, and the staten1e11t of clai111 does 11ot state a cat1se of action.108 Anotl1er example might be as follows. Tl1e plaintiff seeks to recover against tl1e defendant for the latter's harbouring tl1e plaintiff's wife in violation of Art. 2050(3) of tl1e Civil Code. Suppose tl1at tl1e state111ent of clai1n alleges tl1at: ''On May 1, 1965, tl1e plaintiff's wife spoke disres1Jectft1lly to hi1n. In order to discipline her and to teacl1 l1er to behave in the proper 1na11ner, he beat l1er witl1 l1is fists and with a belt for fiftee11 n1i1J11tes and kicked lier for at1other te11 min11tes. The defendant, wl10 is the brother of tl1e plaintiff's \Vife, ,vas 1:>rese11t and tried to prevent tl1e plaintiff fron1 disciplin ing his wife. I-le tl1en demanded that she go witl1 hin1 to his home, and she went with l1im despite tl1e opposition of tl1e plaintiff, \1/}10 insisted that the wife stay witl1 l1im." Art. 205I(b) provides that 110 offence is committed by harbo11ring the wife w� 1ere tl1e h11sband has been g11ilty of cr11elty to lus vvife and the defendant l1as received the woman ot1t of ht1maneness. It is clear fro111 tl1e allegations of tl1e st,1tement of cla.im that the defendant bas a good defence. Tl1ere is no dou-bt th� t tl1e acts of the plaintiff wo11ld constit11te cr11elty under Art. 2051 (b). Tl1e allegat1o�s sl1ow tl1at the defendant has a good defence and, tl1erefore, the staten1e1Jt of claim does not state a ca11se of action.
l!
I-Iowever, here too, all do11bts sl1011Id be resolved in favor of the ple� de_ r. 11less it is absolutely clear tl1at the allegations affirmatively sl1ow tl1at tl1e plaintiff IS not · _g a c�tise O f acti 0 011 a different theory. Thus, the 107. Another paragraph alleged facts stat1n � . in Ethiopia
statement of claim was onJy part ly 1nsuffic1ent. It \.VO� se�m ti1at the court remainder. cou ld rej ect certai n allegatio11s of tl1e staten1ent. of claim \ 1th0ut rd.ecf1 OIT the of clain1 In st1ch a cas e, the iost1fficieot 1Jart sl1ot1ld be st�icken,. ao<l t�1�. anien d 5�teinent the dis :lusions see wo u�d be s e rved on tl1e defendant. In connect1 C?0 wit!, IJIea g e state th d, te ci Jes , : e� t: 1 _text. cuss1on, sup�a, notes, 18 and 19 and accon11Ja�ymg l usions. nc co d ne ai nf co ly on 1?-t 1 e atis bec ment of clau11 \.Vot1ld 11ot state a cat1se of act1011, 0 1, _ Co. (Ct <-x. d . ar Vv ry e o1 go nt lo iv 108. An example of a case involvmg v tt e � · · L e� · n JS . t l11s s1tuat1o . d an Field . R in 36 4 · 8 17 1 · ' vo P· ' · App., U.S., 10th Cir., 1949), Fee/era/ Rep., 2nd Se, ,es, B. Kaplan, '/vfaterials ari Civil Praceclure (1953), }J. 401.
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s od a ha �o �ence, the c?urt nt de da fen de e tl1 �t th J or aw e th r de ltn entitled to relief �f a.c_t1on. If 1n ?Ur previous se u . ca s a e t_ sta im cla of t en tem sta e tll . shotlld find that fe l1ad a d1sagreement wi his d an 1ff 1nt pla 1e ''tl t tha s wa n tio ega aJl . ex a1npIe, the · ' . . os ac e s ac e th e h ifi f; a IS few ck r:u st 1ff nt a1 times pl e tl1 1 cl l1i w of se . ur co e 1 . tl g rin � du � !t 1s arguable . 1 re Je e n� ct d . e t 1 1 01 sl 11n cla of t en n1 te sta · th llis open 11and '' t11e 1 e 111earun¥ of Art. 2051_ (b) . Perhaps tl n tlii wi y elt cru es tt1t ti ns co t ttc nd co :�ietller the . 1 �t1ld aw ait furtl1e_r �lar1ficat1 on, e.g., sl r tte n1a the d an ar, cle t no is s thi t btl it does, en 1t 1s wh r ly clea On l. tria at that tlie d 11ce rod int be 11ld wo at 1 tl 1ce dei by tlle evi has ged l1e ts alle fac tl1e shot1ld the of yiew in r ove rec ly sib pos not ld cou ff plainti statement o f c]ai1n be dismissed on thi s grot1nd. Ir1 s11mmary, then, a s· tatement o f clain1 does .not disclos� a cause of action in tl1e followi1100 circumstances: (1) where the allegations, even if true, do not entitle tli e plaintiff to relief 11nder tl1e law; (2) \Vl1ere tl1e plai�ti� l 1as not pleaded facts, but l1as n1erely pleaded con.clt1sions; (3) ,vl1ere the pla1nt1ff has alleged facts tl1at afilrn1atively show l1e is not entitled to relief 1111der tl1e law or tl1at the defendant ]1as a good defence. Pleading a Legally Sufficient Defence Tl1e above principles are also applicable to deter111ine tl1 e legal sufficiency of tl1e state111e11t of defence. At tl1e fu·st l1eari11g tl1e cot1rt 111 ay reject tl1e statement of defence as legally i11st1fficient ,1nd conclude tl1at tl1ere are no real issues under Art. 254, tl1erebJ' giving jt1dgmer1t in favor of the I)l,1intiff. For exan1 ple, if in a suit f or JJl1ysi cal assa11lt, tl1e defenda11t alleges i11 tl1e statement of defence n1erely tl1at ''the defendant and plai11tiff are 111e1nbers of different tribal grot1ps," tl1e state me11t of defence does not state a legally suflicient defe11ce, since even if it is true lhat tl1ey are 111e111bers of different tribal gro 11ps, tl1is does not j11stify the defenda11t's assa t1l ti11g tl1e plai1 1tiff. Ass111ning tl1e defe11da11t l1as admitted the plaintiff's allegations and l1as alleged 11otl1ing 1nore, l1e l1as not alleged facts creating any issue betwee.n tl1e J)arties, a11d judgrnent should be for tl1e plaintiff. So too, if in a suit for assat1lt, tl1e defendant IIJerely alleges tl1at ''tl1 e defendaJ1t has acted in self-defence," l1e l1as 11ot J)leaded a legally st1fficient defence. }le l1as not alleged tl1e facts show ing \vl1y l1e was entitled to act in self-defence, but l1as merely pleaded a co·nclus io11. Fi11ally, tl1e defenda11t 111ay allege facts \Vhicl1 affirn1atively show tl1at l1e is not entitled to assert tl.1e defence on v.1l1icl1 he is relying. For exa111ple, i11 a suit for defa111ation, tl1e defe11dant alleges that ''tl1 e state111ent made by tl1e defendant was trt1e a11d was n1ade by tl1e defendant to ca11se tl1e J)laintiff's wife to leave l1i111 and con1e to the defenda11t." The portion of tl1e allegation stati11 g that tl1 e allegation is true constitt1tes a legally st1fficie11t defe1 1ce, since 11nder Art. 2047(1) of the Civil Code, no defa111 atio11 is dee1IJed to h�1ve been c o11 1mitted wl1ere tl1e defenda.nt proves that the cl1arges were tr11e. However, Art. 2047(2) provides that wl.1ere tl1e cl1arges are trl1e, tl1e defendant is n ot liable 1111 ]ess lie acted solely witl1 tl1e intent to i11j·ure. The second J)art of the allegation sl1ows tl1at t11 e defendant acted solely v.1itl1 the intent to i11 j11re tl1e plaintiff, to ca11se Ii.is wite to leave I1i111. TI1erefore, tl1e defend ant l1as alleged facts wl1 icl1 sl1ow that he is 11ot entitled to tl1e be11efit of tl1e defen ce of truth, and. tl1 e statement of defence does not state a legally sufficient defence. w_e l1 ave seen 110\-V tl1e· case can b e termjnated before u:ial on tl1e basis of the allegations contained in the J?leadings. \Vbere tl1e J)leadings sl1ow that tl1e plai�tiff does not l1ave � ca11se of action or the defendant does 11ot l1ave a legaJly st1ffic ient . defen�e, tl1ere 1s no reason to pro ceed with the triaJ. Even if the allegations in the pleadin�s we�e true, the party would no t be entitle d to relief tinder the Jaw. By employi1;1g th1s. J?rocedure �he co11rt avoids tl1e nec d ess hav ity i1 1 g a. trial that coul of �c�oi�plisli nothing. By tb1s method, needless trials are avoided, and. the volume of l1t1gat1on may be diminished.
4.
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D. Amendment of Pleadings 1. Approach to Amendn1en·t W e have carefully considered th e ru le s of pleading whic11 are des·igned t O ?1a�1·r .y tria Th l. e sys for tem of pleading incorpor� the · issues as it mu · tes ' · st, tl 1e pr1nc 1pl e . · · _n . if a p�r�y fa1·1s to act at a.11 aJJpointed stage, he of stage p reclusio cannot do so . subseque· nt1 y. 1f t he party 1a1 l·s to 1 nclude. a11 allegation in I1is plead , i'ngs, 1· 1 1s · not · put 10 1sst1e, a nd h � can11ot introdt1ce evidence to support that allegation at trial. If the defenda1 1t fail� to . de11y an allegation in the staten1ent of defence, he is deemed to l1 av� a�1111tted 1t. .lf tl1e defenda11t fails to plead a m,:ttter of defence, lie may no t . raise it subseqt1ent]y. In tl1e early stages of pleadi11 g law i n Ei1oiand and th_e United States t11ese rt1les were r.igidly appliecl, and tl1e principle of �tage preclusion enforced. I-lo�ever, .t11e result was tl1at st1bstantive rights were often adver sely affected becat1se of JJl�ad111g errors.. '"fo prevent tl1is from l1appening inore tllan was absolt1tely necessary, 1t was recog1 11zed tl1at in certain circumstances pleadings co11ld be amended. The party co11ld do so111ething tl1at l1e failed to do at the appointed ti1ne, and it was as if l1e l1ad done it at that time. An an1endment, \Vhen allowed, relates back to tl1e date of the original pleading. The approacl1 that is take11 toward amend1nent will, as a practical matter, determine the extent to wbicl1 substantive rigl�ts ca1;1 be a�ect_ed by pleading errors, and we ,vill now explore amend.men· t of pleadings 10 Etl11op1a. Art. 91(1) of the Civil Proced11re Code governs an1endments a11d prov.ides as follows: ''Tl1e court 1nay at any ti111e before jt1dgn1ent al.low eitl1er party to alter or amend his pleading i11 stich 111a1111er and 011 sucl1 tern1s as to costs or otherwise as may be j11st, and all sucl1 amend1 11ents sl1all be made a.s ma.y be necessary for p11rpose of determining tl1e real q L1estio11s in disp11te. '' The provision is broadly worded, particularly the part ''and all sucl1 an1endn1e11ts shall be made as may be necessary for tl1e p11r1Jose of detern1ining tl1e real qt:1estions in dispute." This wo11ld indicate t1 1at the co1ut can order an an1end1nent on its own motion, wluch interpretatio11 is ft1rtl1er b11ttressed by Art. 251(1), wllicl1 says tl1at ''the cou.rt may at any time before j11dg111ent an1end the issues or fran1e additional issues on such terms as it tl1inks fit, and all st1cl1 an1endn1ents or additional issues as may be necessary for determining tb.e 1natters in controversy between tl1e parties sl1all be so 111ade or frained." 109 TJ1 erefore, wl1e11 tl1e co11rt finds that an amendment should be 111 ade, e.g., a party appears to l1ave evidence on a crt1cial point tl1at l 1e did not allege in J1is pleading, it can order tl1e a1 nendn1e.nt even thou · gh tl1e party does not 1nove to an1end.110 This power sl1 011ld be exercised in appropriate cases. Wl1ile the cot1rt should not take over the role of the party's advocate - the principle of party presentatio11 is an !n1p�rta11t �art of the proceclt1ral system - nevertheless, wl1ere it appears tl1at s11bstant1al r1gl1 ts will_ be affected . beca11se of ple.ading errors, the court shot1ld order an amendment on its ow11 n1ot1on. We n1ay co11sider the circumstances wl1ere a party would �eek to 1 nake an an1end ment. One case would be wl1ere after tl1e statement of clarm was filed, tl1 e plaintiff realized t11at he failed to incl11 de an importa1 1t allegation. He wottld tl1en move to an1end to i 1 1cll1de tl1 e allegatio11, and, if allowed, a copy of tl1 e amended statement of claim wottld then be served on the defendant. Another exam:ple wot1ld be an amendm;nt to add a new clai111 tl1at had arisen after tl1e fili.ng of tl1e origi-
j
109. It may also strike OLit issues that it finds \Vere wrongly fra1ned. Civ. Pro. C., Art. (251(2). 110. See o. B. Ollivant & Co. v. s. Akinsanya and A.W. Pamt1 (Div. Ct., Nigeria, 1930), Nigeria L. Rep., vol. 10, p. 73.
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111 Suppose n. li tio ta by ed rr i ba m en be t no that t he had it at tl1 g i11 n1 su as n, tio ac l na 1e r _tl d te af an t, statement of claim u� sa �s an r fo es ag 1n da r ve co re plaiiltiff stied to tl1 cla1ms ca n be joined in a e bo 11c S1 . ain ag 1n I1i ed t1lt sa as nt . da was filed ' the defen . . . e re p th 1·tr to file a new u1 nt . to 9I a1 re on as re no 1s re 1e tl , 7 21 . rt A sinole suit under 1 e to 111 eg cla all e_ th ?f t 1en new cause of ten sta I1is 1d 1e1 an ii '.Vi p1y 111 si suit. I-le t the firs at l1ear1ng, where the te m1t per ? be also l1t 112 n1ig 1ts 1 _ me 1end An action. nt tl1� 1da 1 or fe1 0 at1 de eg all ?s l fin tia en ess that he an � ed itt 1n o he t tlia ds fiii _ . _ plaintiff led t? include a r�qu1red matter fai or ied den ve l1� t1ld sl1o e 1 J int po a y den failed to 1 on of amend111ent a�1se s at the tria l 'rVl1ere one st qt1e a en oft y Ver 3 e.11 enc of def s _on grounds of variance. ect obJ ty par er �tl1 the and ce den evi ce odu intr to ks see JJarty ty ay par tl1e n1 k see but ed, . to amend tain sus 1?e , 1rse cot of st, mu ion ect obj _ The to ght ce sou l1e odu intr cl1 whi to as evidence. on gati alle tl1e t1de incl to 1g 1 di JJlea tl1e e to t an rais 1gl1 sot issue that he ant end def tl1e if l tria tl1e at e aris also ld cou It did 11ot raise in l1is staten1 ent of defence. A \iery interesti11 g qt1estion is whether tl1e appellate cot1rt .can permit amend 114 bt1t tl1ere is a qt1estio11 in Etl1iopia because of ed, allow arily ordin is Tl1is s. n1ent tl1e 1Jarticulctr la11gt1age of /\rts. 91 (l)and 251(1). The Indian Code of Civil Proce dt1re, Order VI, rule 17, vv]1jcl1 at 1tl1 orizes a111end111ents says tl1at ''The court may at c111J' stc1ge of tl,e JJroceecli11gs allow c1111e11dn1e11t," whereas relevant articles of the Etl1io1)ian Code say ''at any ti11 1e before judginent." If tl1is is construed to n1ean before tl1e jt1dg 1 11ent of tl1e trial cot1rt, tl1 e 1 1 tl1e appellate cot1rt wot1ld not l1ave tl1e power to allo\.v a 111 end1 11ents. H O\.Ve\ 1er, if it is const.rt1ed to mean before ''fi11 al judg111 ent'', tl1e 1 1 tl1e ap1 )ellate cot1rt, '.Vl1icl1 can render tl1e fjnal jt1dgn1 e11t,115 would l1a\1e tl1e po\ver to per111 it a111e 11d111e11ts. We cannot kno\v tl1e a1 1swer until the questio11 is I Jassed. on by tl1 e Etl1iopia11 cot1rts, but I wot1ld st1ggest tl1at these articles sl1ould be co11 strued to allow tl1e a1Jpellate cot1rt to pernut a1nendments. TI1is is tl1 e JJractice else\vl1ere, and tl1ere are circt1111stances where it 'rvould be de sirable for tl1e appellate cotirt to be able to J)ern1 it an1endment. For example, sup pose that tl1e trial court per11 1itted tl1e plaintiff to introdt1ce evidence despite tl1e defendant's \ 1alid objection on grot1 11ds of variance. Tl1is evidence is crucial to the plaio �iff's case . . !�stead of reversing becat1se of tl1e error, the appellate court �an JJe �n11t tl1e pl�111t1 ff to a111end l1is J)leadi11g to inclL1de tl1 e allegation as to wh1c� evidence was 111trodt1ced. The defe11clant cai1 be allo\ved to introdt1ce rebuttal e,,i deiice, 116 and tl1e a1Jpellate court car1 render tl1e final decision. Anotl1er in1porta1 1t qt1estio11 is wl1etl1er t]1 e cot1rt can per111it tl1e plaintiff _to a1�1e�id � state1ne11t of clai 1 11 tl1at does i1 ot state a cat1se of actio1 1 instead of d,s1111ssing it u 11der Art. 231. TI1e qt1estio11 is wl1 etl1 er Art. 231 can be read together _ \1vJtl1 Ar\- 91(1), ":l1ich pe1 r its an1e11d111e 11 ts. Tl1is qt1estio11 was presented in a Uga. n : r_i 1 disda case, to and as the e prov1 s1ons Proce dt1r of tl 1 e U gancla Cocle of Civil 7 111. 112.
113. 114.
115. 116. 117.
5· See Anlrit v. Annapurna1nn1e (I�Iigl1 Ct., Al1dhra Prad ., P· Rep a esh, 1959), 1959 All-Indi highe If the new clain1 l1as the effect of brino-ing the case v,itl1i11 tl1e jurisdict ion of a COUf� Ourt, . the c_ourt in \V}UCh the suit WaS iL lSrituted higher �or lllllSt trai1sfer tl1e case to the _ trial. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 9l(S). n bega 11 i} or woul d 1 pr_ o bably 24 occu�· ,vl1e11 the cotu·t examined the JJarties under Art. ; ! o ra,�e t 1e 1sst1es for trial under A rt. 246. . ��� �uigt �lbrosoni, Ltd. v. Victor Ade Allen (Full Ct. Nigeria, 1928), Nigeria L. Refi'. , . · ' p. 24' Ramcthan v. Lacl1n1i (Privy p .. Rep All-In<lia Council, .India' I 936) ' 1937 . . See C1v. Pro. C., Arts. 342, 347, 348. _ ., 111 certain ci·rcu·mstaoces Pro. c· , . C · i, ti1e a1Jpellate court n1ay take additional evidenc e. Art. 34S. , The Central Distr·ict M· . nda Ug . a . . aiz1:" Millers AssocLat1on v. Maciel & Co., Ltd. (High C L., 1944)' ugan. eia l L. Rep., vol. 6, p. 130.
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missal and an1endme�t were identical with tl1e provisions of tI1e Ethiopian Code. the plaintiff to amend. the defective statement of The c �urt hel d tha t 1_t . coul� allow _ claim instead of requrr1n g d1smJssal. It stressed tl1 at the provision ''and all necessary a�end��nts sh�ll be _ made for the p urpose of determinin g the real questions in disputes w �s 1n1perat1ve. Therefore, 1t construed the words, ''does n ot ilisclose a cat1se of act10.n," t? 1nean tl1at ''no amendmen t can be 111ade wliich would niake it disclose a cat1se action." For exan1ple, if the plaintiff pleaded facts wl1icl1 affirmative ly showed tl1 �t he wa� not entitled to relief u n der tl1e law, tl1e statement of claim sl1ould be reJected, s111ce an a111end1ne11 t cot1ld 11ot cl1ange this fact. Btit if the plaintiff f,1iled to state a cat1se of action, becat1se l1e stated conclusions instead of facts, or failed to allege facts constitt1ti11g an essential ele111ent of his cat1se of action l1e sh?uld be give� tl�e opp�rtt1nity �o ame11d tl1e statement of clain1 and allege th; essential facts. Th.ts 1s pa1·t1ct1larly 1111port,1nt wl1ere at the time the state111 ent of claim is filed, t.l1e statute of lin1itatio11s l1as al1nost expired. In such a case tl1e plaintiff could probably not file a new statem.en. t of claim, becat1se by the time i t was :filed, tl1e lin1 itation period \\1 ot1ld l1ave passed. However, if J1e is per1nitted to an1 end, tl1is problem wo11ld not arise, si11ce t11e statute would be tolled when tl1e original state111 ent of claim was filed. Also, it is wastefL1l and time const1ming to require the plaintiff to start all over again. When tl1e state111ent of clain1 is rejected, the regjstrar mt1st reft111d tl1 e filing fee, 118 a11cl v1hen tl1e plaintiff files a new state ment of claim, he wottld ha,,e to again pay the filing fee. Therefore, if tl1e cot1rt is of the opinion tl1at tl1e stateme11t of claim does not state a caL1se of action, but could be made to state a cat1se of action by proper amendn1ent, it sl1ot1ld isst1e an order to tl1e effect that the stateme nt of clain 1 is deficient, bt1t that the plaintiff may file an ame nded statement of claim within a certai11 period of time. II he files an acceptable statement of claim witl1i11 that ti111 e, tl1e st1it will proceed; otl1erwise, the statement of claim wfll be finally rejected. We will n ow consider wl1 e11 amendme11ts shot1ld be permitted. An i1nportant policy quesion is involved: should. tl1 e court's approach to a111e11dn1ent be liberal or restrictive. In other ,vords, sl1ot1ld a1nendments be freely per111itted except wl1ere, for more compelling reasons, it is not possible to per1nit then1, or shot1ld the cot1rt sharply restrict the circun1 stances in which amendme11t will be allowed. It is sub mitted tl1at tl1e clear tenor of Art. 91 is tl1at an1endments sl1011lcl be freely ·permitted except wl1 ere not necessary to deternli n e the real q11estions is dispt1te within the 1neaning of Art. 91, or wl1ere n1ore cornpelling consideratio11s prevent tl1e allowance of an1endn1ents. Liberal allowance of a111end111e11ts \Vilt prevent tl1 e destrt1ction of substa11 tive rigl1ts becat1se of JJleading errors, a11d the cou1t is given the pov.: er to impose conditions on amen d1nents so tl1at the allowance of tl1e an1endment will not prejudice the other party. Consider tllis case.119 The plaintiff brot1gl1t suit against a p l1ysician to recover damages for malpractice, res11lting in injt1ry to tl1 e plaintiff_ whe n her baby w�s delivered. TI1 e statement of claim alleged that tl1e defenda nt failed to take tl1e pelvic 1neast1rements of the woxnan and atten1pted a norn1al delivery. It also alleged that if th.e defendant had taken pelvic 1 11eastrrements, it wotil_d I1ave been clear that a normal delivery was not possible and a � as_earean oper . � t1on wa_s _ n e�essary. Becat1se a normal delivery was attempted, tl1e plrunt1ff st1ffered 1nternal 1nJur1e�.. It was n? t alleged in the statement of claim tl1at the defendant was an obstetr1c1an, tl1at .1s,
118. Civ. Prop. C., Art. 232(1) (b). . I vo s, · rie Se d . 211 p., Re l ra de Fe ), 50 19 a, 1bi lun Co of ist D 119. Robb1ns . v. Jord an (Ct App., U·S . , · 7. 36 ) 53 P· (19 e ur d ce ro . p .· , / vi Ci on ls ia er at M 181, p. 793, in R. Field a11ct B. Kaplan,
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tllat Ile specialized in t]ie delivery of babies.. Wl�en tl1 e case came to trial, the plain tiff sought to a1 11end her staten1ent of cla�1 n to �liege that the defendant was an bstetriciarl. The n1otio1 1 to a 111 end was denied by the court on the ground that the �ase \Va.s ready for trial a11d, tl1 erefore, tl1e defendant wou.ld not be_ prepared to introdtice evidence 011 the poi11t of wl1 etl1 er tl1 e defendant was a q ualified obstetri ciaii and \Vliether a11 obstetrician \Votild l1ave a duty to take pelv1 � measurements. Tlle case was tried, and tl1e cot1rt r11led that, as a 111at�er of law, Judgment would 11�1ve to be for tl1e defendant. Under tL1 e law, a11 _ or_? 111ar� doctor would not be a sp_ec1 al1st Il1lght be req11ired to do required to take l )elvic meast1re111 e11 ts - only _ so. ,20 Tl1e a1 )pe l late court reversed, l10Id1ng tb_ at 1 t was er:ror to_ de�y the amend n1e11 t. Tl1is an1 endn1 ent was necessary to deter1 n1ne the real issues tn dispute, namely, w l 1at wa.s the sta11dard of c,1re ov1ed by the defe11 dant to tl1 e plaintiff. If the plain tiff cot1ld proceed on t l1 e tl1 eory tl1 at the defendant \Vas an obstetrician, then the defendant 111igbt be 11e]d to a l1 igl1 er stancl ard of care. Tl1is allegation was crucial to the JJ l ai11tiff's case, a11d s l 1e sl1 011ld I1ave been allowed to amend the state1nent of c lai,11 to include it. A.s to t l1 e arg11111ent tl1 at tl1e defenda1 1t v'1as 11 ot prepared to proceed on this tl1 eory, tl1 e court obser\1ed tl1at tl1 e \�;ay to J)rotect l1 i1n \Vas not to cleny tl1e amend1nent. BecaL1se of tl1e new issL1e te11 clered by the a111endrnent, tl1e case sl1ould have bee11 adjot1r11ed a11d tl1 e defenda11 t given a contint1a11ce so tl1 at lie co11ld prepare lus evide11ce 011 the 11e,,1 issue. Tl1 e plai11tiff cot1ld l1ave been taxed \Vith tl1 e costs of tl1e ne\v J)roceeding, si11 ce it was her fc111lt tl1at a co11 tin11a11ce was necessary. But tl1e \Va)' to protect tl1 e defendant was 11ot to deny t l1 e otl1er party tl1 e opportunity to prese11t l1er stro11gest case, becat1se sl1e dicl not i11clt1de the allegation in the origi11al pl eading. Wl1e11ever a11 a1 ne11dn1e 11t is 11 ecessary to deter11line tl1 e real ques tions in disJJt1te, it should be pern1itted, and if necessary, the otl1er party sl1ottld be granted ,1 conti11 11ance to n1eet tl1e new iss11e. Tl1 is is tl1e approacl1 tl1 at sl1ot11cl be taken i11 Etl1iopia in light of Art. 91(1)· \Vl1ene,,er an an1 e11d111ent is necessary to determi11e t l1 e real questions in dispute, it s!1 011ld be_ allo\\'ed irres1Jective of ,vhen it is sot1gl1 t to be 1nade. Tl1 e court is at1tl10rized to 1 n1J)ose conditions as to costs and otl1 er 111 atters 011 the allo\va11ce of an a111endn1 e11t, and i11 a proJ)er case it shot1Id gra11t the otl1er JJarty a continuance and tax tl1e a111ending part)' \Vith tl1e costs of tl1 e 11 e,v proceedj 11 gs. Btit it sl1otild 1101 deny tl 1 e _a111 end1 :1 er1t on tl1 e grot1nd t l1 at tl1e otl1 er party is not prepared to 111 eet the new 1ss11 e, since it can grant l1 i m. �l co11ti11l1 a11 ce. E,,e 11 in a fu lly develop e? lega l systen1, ,vl1 ere tl1e parties are represe11ted by trained la.wyers, substan� iv� _ ri�l1t � sl �oul� not _be . affected unnecessarily becal1se of pleading errors. A fort10:1, ��Js 1 8 ti ue In Etl1 1opra __ at prese11t. Tl1erefore, amenclments sl1ould be freely perrrutd, _even tl1o_ugl1 tl1 � effect of the ,11nend1ne11 t 111a)' be to delay tl1e case, because a cont111 ua11 ce IS req111red. !11is is the n1oder�1 view as to a11 1endn1e11.ts, a.11d in 1nost legal systems aroeo dt 1 11ents are free! y perimtted. Fo l ]owi1 1g are so111e exa111 ples of where an am end men llas been per1111t �ed so tl1 at t l e real qt1estio e th In ined . 1 1 1 11 s i11 dispt1te may be deter � . Sfatemei1 t of claim, the J)latntrff alleged tl e h use bec a lan d 1at he was entitled to tl1e wa� !11 e O\Vtier, btit at trial tl1e issue as w He . test ed 11 of ow1 1ersJ1 ip wa' s s11arpl y. co . pern11tted to a11 1end tO a11ege t.1 · . 1at h e \Vas entitl ed to possession 111 other w ords' to ch ange l1is case from o1 1e for r fo one to recovery of land based on own�rship 120.
A SJJecialist w·oDld· be IleId . . .tioner since, , t O a liigl1er practi standard of care than a general to in effect, Ile is a n1ember of a e hav ould · d w ifli . c • ere t for these purposes and observe t11e standa · rds app1.ica·ble to tl1a11t prpro1ess1on ofession See Civ. C., Art. 2031
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reco very based on a �ig�t to possession. 121 In an action to recover land. based on the claim that the p1a1nt1ff :w�s the sole �wner, the plaintiff was permitted to amerld to allege that he 1� as th e Joint ow� er_ w1tl1 the defendant and, therefore, entitled Wl1ere th e pla1nt1ff sued. to recover rent due on to share the land. the land and it appe ared tl1at there was no lease, the plaintiff was permitted to amend to allege damages for wrongf11l use of the land by the defendant_ 123 Where in a suit to reco ver o!-1 a n1ortagage, the defe11dant all�ged tl1at he was a minor, the plaintiff \Vas per1n1tted to a1i1end the state1nent of cla1n1 to allege tl1at tI1e loan was obtained by the defe11dant 11pon frat1dulent representations that J1e was an adult_ 124 These examples de1no11strate a liberal approacl1 toward tl1e a11owa11ce of amendments, ,vhicl1 it is s11bn1itted, sl1011ld be followed i11 Etl1iopia. 2.
Amendn1ents Necessary to Deter111ine the Real Questions in Dispute
Wl1en then sho11ld an1end111ents 11ot be JJer.mitted ? One situation is where the an1end1nent is not necessary for deter11uning the real qt1estions in dispute. Even though a party could l1ave raised a tec]1nical point in J1is pleading, if l1 e I1as not done so, there is 110 reason to permit l1im to do so by amendment. This \viii merely delay tl1e trial of the case a11 d will not affect the decision on tl1e n1erits. In light of Art. 91(1), a reqt1est to n1ake st1cl1 an amend1ne11t wot1ld l1ave to be de11ied. For exampie, in tl1e statement of defe11ce tl1e defendant did not cl1allenge tl1e ca_pacity of the plaintiff to sue as a JJartnership. 125 I-le later seeks to amend to allege that tl1e plaintiff cannot sue i11 that capacity. Tl1e a111endn1 ent shot1ld not be allo,ved. 126 It does not affect tl1e liability of tl1 e defendant to tl1e plaintiff, and if granted, all that ,vould l1appen would be th.at a new suit wot1ld have to be filed by the partners as i11div'iduals. The substantive issues wot1ld re1n�tin the same as before, and tl1e an1end1nent would 1nerely delay tl1e case vvitl1out any corresponding benefit to the defendant. Tl1e ulti1nate dis1Josition of the case wot1ld 11ot be affected. Tb' erefore, the an1endment is not necessary for deter1nining tl1e real q11estions in dispute and sl1ould not be allowed. The Indian co·urts 11ave held tl1at wl1ere a11 a1nencln1ent wot1ld i11trodt1ce a ''to deter111i11jng tl1e tally different' new a11d inconsistent case," it is ''11ot necessary for • 1?7 · real questions in disp11te'' a11d 11ave reft1sed to allow a1ne11d1nent 1n s11c } 1 s1t• �ations. It does not matter that the stat11te of limitation 11as 11ot r11n on tl1e filing of a new claim, which sit11ation we will disct1ss su11seqt1ently. The tl1eory is tl1at. tl1e real questions i n dispute are those relating to the ''case'', wl1ich was developed _by the original pleadi11g, and an ame11dment which wo11ld introcl11ce a ne\V ''case'' 1s not necessary· to determine those questions. 128 In view of tl1is rtile, an1enclment has 121. Johannes England v. J. Mope Palmer (Ct. App., West Afr., 1955), West Afr. Ct. App. Rep, vol 14, p 659 122. Kasurnt1 S.bomade and Disu s·homade v. Ran1otu Ogunbiye et. al. (Ct. App., West Afr., 1936), West Afr. Ct. .1Jpp. Rep., vol. 3, p. 48. 123. Bimala v. Khoka (High Ct., Calct1tta, 1949), 1951 All-J11dia Rep., p. 448. 124. Sarai Chand v. Mohun Bib i (High Ct., Calcutta, 1898), Calcutta Weekly Notes, vol. 2, p. 201. 125. Persons claimjng as partners may generally sue in the :firn1 na.n1e. See Civ. Pro. . c·, Ar t. nt da fen d� the to en �e op uld wo it , ers rtn pa lly ua act t 44. However, if the parties were no . Pr o. to contend that the named plai11tiff, the part11ersl1ip, lacked capacity to sue. See Civ C., Arts. 234(1) (c) and 244(2) (d) . Musa . . 1 Ali an 126. Se e Fuhrmeister & Co . v. Abdel Gilani Ali Musa and Mol1an1ed Abdel Gh (Higl1 Ct., Sudan, 1960), Suda, 1 L_· 1., p. �9· . _ · D MuHa, Tire . d 1�d': �� 127. See the discussion of th e application of tlu� rule . in Engl�nd an ) , vo · 2, PP· 5 6 3 r, 195 tte Mi R. by . ed tl1 (12 ure od ced C e of Civil Pro 128. Id at p. 599.
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iff sued to recover a su nt ai pl e Th s. se ca of nd ki ng wi llo m of in the fo been denied t red appea ant. defe11d that f the I the by i· i r . boats de of endant re . h 1e due ior t mo11ey t'ff·' 1 s age nt to rent the n 1 a. p I 1e 1 t was but . self ts to him boa ' ts boa tl 1e e h' ir t o n d id c that. t he de1e 1 nt ege nda al to s wa end a1n his a°'e to t lgI1 sot · · tiff n lai· O nt 1e Tl. · , P s. otl1er · d 1r-or t·11e h'ire o f t1 1e b oats. The ame eive rec s sum the r ove · ndpay · an d. was 1.1able to · ·na·1 s t�tem�nt of claim the plai 1g1 or e th in at th nd ou gr e tl1 00 n;netlt was denied _ 1p sh on at1 al of rel leg t�e t sor and lessee tha les d un gro tl1e on im cla liis tiff based ent dm 1e11 a11 the uld proceed 00 the wo ile wh ant end def tl1e a11d lum en twe ,· ted be ex1s . . 1. s const1t· ut1ng · 1s t d t e t · _ex 11u , � age d an 1 1pa nc pr1 a totally of p sl1i on ati rel tlleory tllat tlie 1ff sue� �o recover rent and the 1nt pla tl1e ere wh Or, 129 im. cla t ren e f dif new aJld 1ff the 1nt pla 1se, \V�s l101 tl1e not permitted to of 11er ow tl1e was 11e med clai defendant y obtain a declaration of reb tl1e to and 1er ow1 the was l1e tl1at ge alle to anlend 130 • An�ther exa1n1)le wo11ld be wl1ere the party has t. an nd fe de e th o\vnersI1ip against s to i1d seek ame to base the claim and title c rfi spec a 011 1 clain inal orig t1is d base 011 a different title. So, wl1ere tl1e 1)1ai1Jtiff s11ed to recover property on the ground tliat J1e \Vas tl1e adopted son of a person \vl10 was tl1e heir of the decedent, he could 11ot �1111end to allege tl1at l1e l1i1nself was the heir of the decedent. He is basing l1is ai11et1ded clai111 on a differe11t title tl1an131tl1e original clain1, and thus alleging a tota.Ily 11e\v a11d different cat1se of action. We n1ay a.sk wl1etl1er ''necessary to detern1ine tl1e real q11estions in dispute" \Vitl1in tl1e 1nea11i11g of Art. 91(1) of tl1e Etl1iopian Code should be so interpreted. I 11 111y OJ )ioio11, tl1e i11ter1)retatio11 pt1t lll)OD tl1at concept by tl1e Inciian courts is n1ost t111so1111d. In deter111i11ing vvl1at tl1e real q11estio11s are tl1e court should not look: to tl1e l<ind of case tl1e J)lai11tiff has stated in tl1e statement of claim, but to \Vl1at is tl1e real dis_pute betwee11 tl1e l)arties as n1ay appear fro1n subsequent events. In our fu·st exan1ple, tl1e plai11tiff is tryi11g to reco,1er money from tl1e defendant tl1at is d11e becat1se of tl1e leasi11g of a boat. Any fact wl1icl1 would go to tl1e q11estion of whetl1er the plaintiff ca11 recover n1oney from the defendant due to tl1e leasi11g see111s to 111e to involve tl1e real q11estion i11 dispute. If tl1e an1endment is denied and tl1e plai11tiff is forced to continue, 132 he will be denied the opportunity to recover. If l1e 111ay discontinue tl1e slut witl1 leave to fiJe a fresl1 s11it, tl1e case is sin1ply delayed f11rtl1er. The real q11estions are the matters tl1at will deter111ine \vhe ther tl1e plaintiff is entitled to recover from tl1e defenda11t and tl1e nature of the plaintiff's case, as stated in the original staten1ent of claim: sho11ld be irrele vant. It 1s I1oped tl1at tl1� Etl1iopian co11rts will 11ot p11t s11ch an interpretation upon Art. 91(!) .. ":7 11enever it_ appears tl1at the an1encled allegation is 11ecessary to support tbe plaintiffs ca e, as it l1as st1bse9ue11tlr develoJJed, i t shot1ld be per111itted, even_ tboti�h the effect of� the amendn1ent 1s to 111troclt1ce :1 ''totall differe nt, 11e\V and inconsisy tent case." 3·
The Proble1n of Limitation
(a) Amendment by the plaintiff Thus fa r tl1e only restric· t·ton . an 8 n1endwe . tbat 11 . ave 1s p11t an1e t1po ndm 11 ent ment s1iot1Id' no· t b e per1n 1't · · t · · no v ill t e d t wh ere 1t ·1s tecl1nical in the sense tl1at ! ' .. affect the u1t1n1 · ate result in tl1e er th whe e case, that is, it will not 11e)p to deter1n1n 129. 13 0. 131. 132.
Sbibkristo v. Abdool (I-Iigh Ct., C Icutta, 1880), /11diar1 L. Rep., vol 5, p. 602. Bai Sliri Majira"ba v � 303. . p 19, M aga illa ! (High C�. , Bombay, 1895), /11dian L. Rep., vol. Gopee Lal v. �h.und� . aolee �Privy Counc1l, India 1 72) Weekly , ol Rep., v . 19 P: 12 t leave, , 8 , The court m ay no� a fr�s11 suit on the ��n t him leave to file a fresh suit, and if he witbdrav.is wi t�otl)e dis· cuss1on in Chapter VII� i,if�uld be barred. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 278, 279, an .
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tlie plaintiff is entitled to recover fr om th e ·defendant. !llis restriction follows fronl ver' th·ere the · precis e lang11age of·- Art. 91(1): Howe - 1s another si·t11at·ton where ' . · d· An amend1 en. t cannot be permitte bstantzve law, an amendm as a ,natte,. oif su . 11 ent · tted \�hen 1·t wo ul d preJu pe 1 rm ?e . ot ?1ce the s11bstantive rigllts of tile other cann xisting at the time the an1 endment 1 s s011 ght to be ma e art y de · Th P - is wo11ld occur \vher e the effect of. the an1endment �ould b� take away fron1 a party a right whicll 11as accr?ed to him by _ lapse of t11 ne. Tlus JJroblem was graplucally presented in the En�l1 sl1 case of We/clo�z v. Neal. 133 Tl1e plai11tiff s11ed to recover dainages for defan1�t1 0�. He later appli�d for leave to a .mend. to add clai1 11 s for assa11lt and false 11npr1s?n1nent. Y011 w1_ll recall tJ1at a party 1nay a1nend to add a new claim that bad arisen after t�e filing. of the origi�1a� st1�t. Su�I1 an amendinent. is justiJjed on . grot1nd� of conve.n1ence, since tl1e JJla1.ut11I 1 s e 11 t1tled to join any number of claims against_ tl1 e sa111e defe��a11t.. Tl1e sam_e. reaso11j 11 g _ would pern1 it tl1e plaintiff _ t he onutted tha cl� � a 1n tl1e or1 g1 11al pleading. I-Iowever, in tl1is case, to add wl1en the plaintiff sot1ght to a11 1e11cl, tl1e statute of lin1 itation l1ad run on the clai111s for assa11lt and false in11Jriso 1 11nent, altl1011gb it l1ad not rt111 at the ti1ne tl:1 e s11it ,vas filed. Tl1 e motion to an1end was de11ied. At tl1e tin1e the a1nendment was sought to be 111ade, tl1e J)lai�tiff �ould not l1 ave filecl a 1 1ew s11it to recover damages for the assa11lt and false 1 11 1pr1son1 nent, becal1se tl1 ose clai1 ns were barred by lin1i tation, and lie cot1 ld not accomplisl1 tl1e san1e resL1lt by amencling an ex.isting s11it for defamation to incl1 1 de tl1ose clain1 s. In otl1er words, a1nendn1e11 t ca11not be 11sed to enable tl1e plaintiff to bri11g s11it on a clai1 11 tl1at is barred by Iin1itation. On tl1e otl1er l1and, let 11s say that tl1e plaintiff s11ed for defamatio11 , alleging injury to lus general .rep1 1 tation as �L result of tl1e defa 1 11 atio11 . While tl1e st1it is pending, he is discharged from bis employ1 nent as a rest1lt of tl1 e defa111ation. By now, the statute of limitation has expired. Tl1e plaintiff seeks to amend to clai11 1 damages for the economic loss resl1lting fron1 11is discl1arge. Clearly, the a111end 1 11e111 should be permitted despite t11e r11n11 ing of the lin1itation period. The an1endn1e1 1t involves the same clc1i111; the plaintiff is 1nerely allegi11g additional da1nages resLtlting from the wrong on whicl1 be I1ad originally s11ed. I-Ie is not tryi11g to i11 trod11 ce a new clain1 , barred by tl1e stat11te of li 1 nitatio11, t111der tl1 e gt1ise of amending ·his pleading. No right of tl1 e defendant tl1at l1 as accr11ed to 11in1 by lapse of time is aflected by t11e a1nend1ne11t, since tl1 e statl1te of li1 11 itation was tolled by tl1� filing . !n o t10. defa1na sa111e tl1e for recover of the s11it, and the plai.ntiff is still trying to other words ' the fact that tl1e st,tt11te of li111itatio11 l1as r1111 does not necessarily mean tJ1at an a111e 1 1d.111e11t is not l)roper. It is 011ly \Vl1ere tl1 e amendment wor1Jd tal<e away fro1n tl1e otl1er party a rigl1t tl1at bas accr11ed to l1i1n . beca11se of tlJe . running of the stat11te of li111 itation tl1at a .mendme 1 1t cannot be per1111tted. Thus, as lon g as tl1 e a111e11dment is necessary to determine the real questions in djsp11te, as we ]1ave defined tl1at concept, tl1 e q11 estion of wl1etl1 er an_ a1 nendn1e11 t sl1ould be perniitted will arise only ,vl1ere at the ti1ne �l1e amend111e11t 1s. s011ght to be n1 ade, the statute o:f li1 nitation l1as r11n 011 the tl1111g of a ne,v clai111. In �he absence of a proble1n of li11 utatio11, an 11nrelated clai1 n may be �dded, a11d �ss11n11.11g Jted in _ tl i o ]o\ fol 1s ' 1 te' p1 dis in_ . s ion est q11 t tha the s11ggested interpretation of ''real � � pia, an a1nendme11t 1nay be JJer1nitted, eve1;1 tl1 ough 1 t 1ntrod11ces a nevv �nd diffei e�t case. B . 11t \VJ1ere the stat11te of limitation l1a s r1 1 n, a party cannot a111end hls 1v a11cl ne ly tal to a ce t c/1. ro irit to be cl i1/ 1vo t en le 1 c1,1 en di a,n e th g _ , p a .n where the effect of ak to � e away cliffere11t claim beca11se tl1e effect of such a11 an1endment wotild be from the oth�r party a riglit which has accr11ed to l1i.111 by lapse of t1 111e under 133 · (Queen's Bench, Eng., l 880), J 880 Queen's Benclz Rep., vol. 19, lJ. 394 ·
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s ute a ''totally new and stit con at wl1 is n, the n, stio qtie e Tli the substantive I aw. 134 · 1 e. ru s 11 tl f o 1g i1 o ea m 1e tl differe11t clai1 n'' \Vitl1in s ve t r ha u co d an disagreed. There is , er sw an .to _ 11 tio es qu sy ea an This is not l_ na 1e igi Tl or statement of claim . al Ne v. lon elc W as c}1 su se ca a oblern in sougl1t to introduce claims for t en dm en am 1e l t_ ; ion 1at fan de r fo fn°voi:ed a claim rongs. Clearly t·11ese are totally w �e ra pa se 1 ly re t en t, en 11m so ri np i i assatllt · and false h er h mp ot e exa t 1 e t tha 1n ar cle we ly 1al eqt is llav e It ns. i i cla ent 1 .rer r di· 11 d new. an · at on to am e d inc 1 (: ' ude ad�ition al or m 1 · 1 of lru t �n em tat s _ he � n¥ ldi i e am : of t � tlia l, givei a a tot 1 1 _new eg Y a 11 to and _different 1ng e11d a1n not 1s ff 1nt1 � pla tl1e t tha s, age dam _ �1 ong , tl1e defama!10?-, �nd 1s 1nerely e sam the for r ove rec to g kin see clairn. He is 1ff adding an ite1n of damage. Tl1e problem_ ar1s�s wl1en the pla1nt 1s seeking to recover for tl1e same ge11eral wrong, but 1s trying to amend to allege ,111 entirely different tl1eory of liability, an entirely differ�nt set of facts tl1an that which he alleged i 11 tl1e original pleadi11g. The different views can be analyzed by a considera tion of two An1erica11 cases. In Gree,i v. u1c,!s!1 135 tl1e plaintiff filed suit to enforce a jt1 dgment rendered by a cot1rt i11 a sister state. 136 Tl1e defence was tl1at t]1e court whicl1 rendered the j11d gLne11t Iacl<ed j11risdiction. WI1ile tl1e st1it was 1)endi11g, the defendant instituted a proceed.i 11g in tl1e co11rt ,vl1icl1 rendered the judgment to 1 1ave i t set aside for want of j11risdiction. The renderjng cot1rt found tl1at jurisdictio11 l1ad indeed been lacking and set tl1e jt1dgn1e11t a.side. Tl1en tl1e J)laintiff sougl1t to an1end the original state n1ent of clain1 to s11e 011 tl1e u11derlyi11g contract on wl1ich tl1e judg1 nent was based. By tl1is ti111e tl1e statute of li111 itatio11 for bringing suit on the contract l1ad expired. Tl1e defe11 clant contended that tl1e a111end1nent sl1ot1ld not be alJo\ved, since by the an1end1nent tl1e plaintiff ,vas alleging a totally new and different claim that was barred bj' lin1itatior1. T11e court held that the amend1nent did not state a totally ne,v and diflere11t clai111 and sJ1ould be pernlitted. It said that the test to determ·ine tl1is q11estion ,vas wl1etl1er tl1 e clain1 asserted in tl1e an1ended pleading arose 011t of tl1 e san1 e transaction or occL1rrence as that set fortl1 in the original pleading. One ,vay to ascertai11 tl1is ,vas to asl< ,vl1ether tl1e defe11da11t l1ad ge11eraJ notice of tl1e nat11re of t11e plaintiff's cl,tin1 fron1 the beginning. If this \Vas so, the amendinent ,vot1ld not allege a totally new and different clainJ. I-Iere t]1e case basically involv ed tl1e cor1t�·act on \:t.1l1icl1 tl1e plai1 1tiff ,vas now trying to sue. In tl1e origi11a1 state n1eut _of cla1n1 l1e proceeded on tl1e tl1 eory tl1at l1 e was entitled to recover because of a JUdgn1ent on tl1e contract rendered in l1is fa.vor. In tl1e an1ended staten1ent of claim lie J)roceeded 011 tl1e tl1eory tl1at he \Vas entitled to recover on tl1e basis of �he contract. I-le \Vas 1nerely cl1 a11 ging tl1e tl1eory of l1is case fron1 a suit on the Judgment to one on tl1e 1 1 nderlyj1 1g contract. Tl1 e basic wro11g was tl1e san1e , the breacl1 of tl1e co11 tr�ct by tl1e defenclant. Tl1e defendant \Va.s obviot1sly aware from tl1e state111ent of cla1111 tl1at tl1e J)lt1j11 tiff ,vas esse1 1tially trying to recover for brea cli _1 f tl set e cont ract. I-Ie w 1ent s awar e tl 1 judg at 11 if l1e 1 e st1cc tl eedd 1 l1avi ed ng i 1 � �. _ ,lSide, t!1e 11nclerlying cla1111 wot1ld re111ain. Conseqt1entl)', it was held that tl1e an1en_d meot did not a]lege a totally new a11 d difterent claim, �tnd it was per111itted despite .(:'
134. Anie dJllents, \.v�1e11 IJern,itted, . relate if a � s, Th u bac g k ple t o � adi t l n 1 e ori dat gin e tl1e al of n e� t_ st ating a . 11e,v cla 101 barred by .lin1i t ation ,vere pern1itted, it woul d relate back � e a t of the filing of. . the st atemen t of claim of y t pa r her o t rioh o. t, tl1a�. �. 1as accrued to 11101 by lapse of time , tl1ereby depriving the 135. (DiSL Ct., U S E:·D · w·iscon · · J Chad· srn , . . 1957 , Fe der al p. Ru ) les , De isio , vo ns, l. 2:1 J 5 1n · bour11 and L. 'iev1u, Cases o11 c C11 11l Procedure (1961) · ' p · 21?-· 136. One State of tl1e Un1'ted st8tes by d ere . . ren d is · t bound judgm to en recog nize a and enforc e a Cl1urt of a · te st except :Whe:-e tl�e state that re11dered the judgment lack ed juriSdic tio,1 or the ju����10n :� 1s ot 1 1erw1se 1nva hd. Se e U.S. Co1)st., Art. IV , 2.
��f
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the running of the statute of Jimitation. As long as the plajntiff was trying to recover for the sa�e .�rong, an amendment was proper, e\1en tl1 ough he had chang ed the theory <?f . l1ability �d pleaded a set of facts entirely different from tl1 at set _ forth 1n the original pleading. A contrary approach was taken in tl1 e case of Levey v. Nelvarlc Bet/1 Israel Hos P_ital. 137 � en1ployee stied the . l1ospital to recover damages due to his con tracting the d 1 sease ?f n1onont1cleos1s, allegedly througl1 the l1ospital's negligence. In th� staten1�nt of cla 1 01 . he a Jleged tl1at_ l1e suffered tl1 e disease becal 1 se tl1e hospital failed to isolate a patient infected w 1 tl1 tl1 e disease, ,1s a rest1lt of whicl1 it was communicated to the pl�intiff. I-le sought to a 1nend to allege tl1 at he st1ffered the disease becat1se the hospital was negligent i 11 failing to diagnose his condition and to treat it properly. At tl1e time the plaintiff sot1gl1 t to ame11 d the statute of limitatio11 had run on tl1 e filing of a ne\v st1it. The col1rt l1eld tl1 at' the an1endment wol1ld not be pern1 itted, because it alleged a totally new a11d different claim. According to t�e court, since t�1 e plajntiff was alleging different acts of n.eglige11ce, }1e \Vas _ alleging a different cla1n1. Tl1 e grou11 ds of recovery wot1ld be different, and different \Vas alleQ:i evidence wot1ld Sllpport each grot1nd. Therefore, the plaintiff ..., 1 10er a ne\v · and different claim, whicl1 was barred by lin1itation. The two views then are as follo\VS. One view is that \vhere tl1e 1Jlai 11 tiff is trying to recover for the sa1ne wrong, l1 e is not alleging a ne\v and different clai111 , even tbot1 gl1 he is proceeding t1 pou a different tl1 eory a11d allegi 11g an e11tirely new set of facts; it is only where he is alleging a differe 11t wrong i11 tlJe a111 ended statement of claim, as i n fVeldon. v. Neal, tl1at l1e ca11not an1end after tl1 e stat11te of limitation has rt1n. The co11 trary vie\v is tl1 at \Vl1 e11 tl1 e plaintiff is proceedi 11 g upon a.n entirely different theory of liability and alleging a different set of facts to support that theory, he is allegi1 1g a new and different claim, a 11d a111encl1nent cannot be permitted after tl1e statt1te of limitation l1as rt1n. In my OJJinion, the for1ner view is preferable. Tl1e pur1Jose of the statute of li.mitation is to preve11 t tl1e filing of stale clai1 ns; a,fter a periocl of ti1ne, st1.it on a claim should be bru·red. Where tl1 e plai11titf l1 as stied to recover for a \Vrong witl1 in the time JJrescribed by the statute of limitation, tl1e p11rpose of the statt1te l1 a.s been satisfied. I fail to see how tl1 at IJt1rpose is ft1rtl1ered by denying l1io.1 tl1 e 01J1Jortu 11ity to cl1ange the tl1 eory of his case. Tl1e defendant is 11ot being s11ed for a differe11t wrong despite tl1e cl1 ange of tl1 eory and tl1 e allegatio11 of new f� cts. I·'.ljs rigl1t w�s to be free from a st1it on a clain1 after tl1e statt1te I1ad expired, not to avoid replying to new factt:ial ,:1IJega.tions. St1bstantjve rigl1ts sl1 ould not be lost becat 1 se of pleading errors unless this is absolt1tely necessary. Wl1 ere tl1 e plai11 tiff has failecl to allege a claim witl1in tl1e prescribed _period, l1is ri gl1 t is lost, ,tnd l1 e ca1:11 ot be _ permitted to revive tl1at rig11 t by a1nendi11g a plead1 11g filed on anotl1er cla1n1. But the concept of a new and different c]ai111 shot1ld be strictly c� ns!rl1 ed to JJreve 11t _ the loss of sl1bstantive rights dt1 e to pleading errors. Therefore, 1t 1 s st161rutted. tl1a.t so long as the plaintiff is tryi 11g to recover for tl1 e san1e wrong, a111end111 e� t �hol1l.d. be permitted after the statt1te of limitation l�as rl 1 n, even tl1ot1gh tl1 e plaintiff l1 as . cl1anged t11 e theory of rus case and is alleging a cl1.fferent set of facts to st 1pport his claim. Assuming tl1 at this is tlie approacl1 that will be taken by t�1 e Etl1 iopian cot1r�s, let us consider some applications of tl1e proposed rule. Tl1e pla1nt.1 ff sties to obtain 137.
(Nev, Jersey Stiperior Ct., U.S., 1952), ,4t/antic Rep., 211(! Series: vol. 85, p. 827, i11 J. Chadbourn and L. Levin, Cases or, Civil Proceclure (.1961), p. 204.
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, nt e ?a d th an fen de n1 l1j eging that he all n ee tw be hip ers 1 rtr pa a of n tile dissolutio· re t the tha no partnership. He �s 1s �n t ur_ c h . l ita cap 0 400 $ l. Etl .� � � has paid i n 1 tat1on ha s run to allege that he g 3 : li11 ?f te tu sta e th er aft d en ave am then seeks to 1 s entitled t_o rec over. Tl1e amendment should he 1 icl wh t, a11 end def tlie Eth.$ 4000 to �y l1 the ove wrt rec of ely sol the Eth.$ 4000 ned cer �on is iff int pla . e Til 13s . ted mit per be 1 tl�d to recover s_ ent l1e wa t tha d ege _all l1e im, cla of t 11en 1 that te sta 111 tile original 1p, rsh t11� par which he wanted dis a_ for ita� cap as in it d pai J1e e aus anlotint, bec solved. J 11 the amended statement of claim he 1s alleging a defferent theory of re covery. Both tl1e amend1nent and the origi11al clain1 involve the Eth.$ 4000 _ the \Vrong is tl1e fail Ltre of tl1e defenda 1 1t to return tl1e Eth.$ 4000 to the plaintiff - and tl1e a1 nendn1e1 1t should be per1nitted. Anotl1er exan1ple would be wl1ere an employee sties bis en1plo:yer to recover wages due t1nder an alleged contract of employm ent. The coL1rt fi 11ds tl1at tl1ere is no contract of en1ployroent. After the statute has run, tl1e e111ployee alleges tl1at l1e is entitled to recover tl1e value of the services render ed.139 Tl1e amend1 11er1t sl10L1ld be pern1.itted, 140 since tl1e employee is seeking to recover for tl1e sa111e \Vro11g, tl1e failure of tl1e e111ployer to pay l1i1n for services rendered. l n tl1e original statement of clai 1 11, l1e proceeded on the theory that there was a contract of e111ploy111ent. In tl1e a111endecl state1nent of clain1 l1e is proceeding 0 1 1 tl1e tl1eory tl1at lie is entitled to recover tl1e reasonable valL1e of tl1e services. The sao1e services are involved, a 11d a 1 1 a 1 11endn1ent sl1ot1ld be pern1itted. A final exan1ple woL1ld be wl1ere tl1e plaintiff sLres on a pro111issory note, wl1icl1 could not be enforced because it was not i 11 tl1e proper form. After the statute l1as run, an a111end111e11t is soL 1 gl1t to allow tl1e J)lai11tiff to S Lie on tl1e contract wl1ich was the basis for tl1e J)ron1issory note, i.e., tl1e defenda11t's agreement to pay a sum of mo 11ey, wl1ic]1 \Vas e111bodied i11 tl1e 11ote. Tl1e basic clain1 is tl1e sa.me, recovery of tl1e 111011ey tl1e defenclant agreed to pay. 111 tl1e original staten1e1 1t of cla.in1 tbe theor�)' ,vas tl1at tl1e defe11da11t is liable becaL 1 se l1e isstred a promissory note. In the an1e11ded staten1ent of clai111 tl1e theory is that tl1e defendant was liable under a co11tract. Tl1e debt for w]1icl1 recovery is sougl1t is tl1e san1e, and the an1endn1ent sl1ould be perinitted. 141 (b) Substitutio11 of parties A related questio11 co1 1cer11s substit L1tio11 of parties after tl1e statute of limitation l7 as rtin. Under Art. 40(2) of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code, the court is aL1tl1orized to add tl1e 11a111e of a11y J)erson ,vl10 ougl1t to l1ave been joined as a defendant or_ wl1ose presence is necessary for t11e deter1ni 11ation of all tl1e questions in the S Liit, and Art. 40(3) provides that i 11 st1cl1 a case the state111ent of claio1 is to be a111e 11ded accordi1Jgly. So, if tl1e plait1tiff sties A, a11d i t appears that the wrong was also co 1n111itted by B · , B n1a.y be addecl ,1s a defenda11t a 11d tl1e stat e ment of cl�im will be an1e11ded. 1-Iowever, tl1is ca 11not be do11e' .if at the tin1e a_n7 end111ent 1� �ot1gl1t, tl1e statute of li1 nitatio1 1 l1as rt1n agai1 1st B, becatise t that � �1�1e tl1e pla.111t1 1f l1as 1 10 substa11tive rigl1t agai11st B. Si11ce tl1e plaintifl' fruled to orn B b�fore tl1e _st�t11te ?f limitation ·bad rL1n, lie cai111ot acco1nplisl1 tl1is re SLilt Y amend,r1g an existing suit against A to incl L1de B as a defe11dant. By tl1e same toke 11, if tl1e na 1 11e of a part)' l1as been stated. incorr ectly, tl?e tiff plain tl1e e.g., statement of clain1 can be arne 11ded to correct tl1e 111isnomer, be Abe Ato referred to the defendant as A.to Abebe Ayalew, and his real name is
1
138. �ee � �saactas v. Rachappa (I-ligl1 Ct., Bombay, 1909)' Indian L. Rep., vol. 33, P· 644· 139. ee 1:· C., Arts. 2534, 2535(2) ( 3). 140. See Ba1 Kan1ala v · Sl1ank erao Laxmanrao (High Ct., Bombay, 1943), J11dia11 Cases, vol. 209, p. 445_ . 141. See Krishna Prasad v · Ma SJO J ' 165 p. Aga (l-Iigl1 Ct., Rangoon, 1936), Indian Cases, vo ·
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Girrna. This can be done even after. the statute of limitation has rtin on tl 1e ·claim since as to th�t _person, th� statute was tolled when the suit was filed. It is clea; �horn th� pla1nt1ff was trying _ to sue; t�e p�eading is merely being corrected to include his correct. name, and h1s s11bsta·nt1ve rights are not affected thereby. A. problefil: may arise .�h �n the pla.intiff claims t11at by the amendment he is correcting a misnomer, b ':lt _it 1s_ co11 tended tl1at _l1e is really adding a new party as _ to whom the statt1te of l1m1tation h�s rt111. Obv1ot1sly, tl 1e question would not arise of natural :persons, b11t it cot1ld arise in the case of juridical persons. in the cas _ : The pla1nt1ff wot1ld clrum that l1e was correcting a niis no1ner, 'rvhile tl1e juridical person now s ou.ght to be na111ed as defe11dant wo11ld claim that it ,vas a different than t}1e One originally Slled a11d tl1at, . t} �ere rore, tl1e plaintiff \.VaS trying to person· _ JOJO a new party as to wl1on1 tl1e statt1te of l1mitat1011 l1ad run. Tlii� I?robl�� was present�d in . the E11glish case of Davies v. Elsby Bros.142 Tl1e pla1nt1ff originally . filed suit against Elsby Bros., a firm (in Ethiopia this would be called a partnership). After tl1e stattrte of liniitation l1ad r11n, he sougl1 t to amend to cha11ge the nan1 e of tl1 e defendant to Elsby Bros., Ltd. (in Ethiopia tl1 is ,vo·uld be called a private limited con1pany). Tl1e business of Elsby Bros. had taken over by Elsby Bros., Ltd. _prior to tl 1e st1it; in otl1er words, wl1at for111 erly l1ad been a partnership 11ad been converted into a private limited compa11y. Elsby Bros., Ltd. contended tl1at it l1ad not been s11ed before tl1e statute of linutation J1ad expir ed and, tl1erefore, cot1ld not now be st1bstit11ted as a defendant. The plaintifl" conten ded that he was not adcling a 11ew defendant, but merely correcting the 11a111e of the original defenda11t from Elsby Bros., a firm, to Elsby Bros., Ltd. Tl1e issue then was w11ether the amendrnent involved the st1bstit11tion. of a 11evv party, wllicl1 was impermissible, because the statute of li111itation I1 ad expired, or whetl1er it 1nerely involved tl1e correction of a misno111er, i11 wl1ich case the statt1te of limitatio11 wot1ld pres ent no problem. The co11rt agreed witl1 tl1e defendant and denied tl1e a111end ment, which meant tl 1at the plaintiff co11ld not recover becat1se the originally 11a1ned defendant l1ad ceased to exist - its assets a11d liabilities l1acl been taken over by a new entity, as to ,vl1on1 the st1it was barred by limitation. Tl1e cot1rt pointed out that a partnership and a private limited co1npany \Vere different legal entities and that a suit against Elsby Bros., a fir1n, wo11ld not indicate that tl1e plaintiff was trying to st1e Elsby Bros., Ltd. 143 Since tl1ey were separate legal entities, a st1it against one was not a st1it agai11st the otl1 er and tl1e amendn1ent wot11d J1ave to be denied, because it was so11ght to be n1ade after the statute of limitation l1ad expired. It seen1s to me that the result in tl1e case is u11 d11ly tecl1nical and conceptt1al; the court itself indicated that it reached st1cl1 a res11lt only after ml1ch. hesitatio11. It is true th.at t echnically tl1ey were different legal entities. Btit the sa111e b11sine� s · e persons responsible for the ma1� ag� n1e11 t of tl1e partnership enterprise was sued. Tb and the Iin1 ited compa11y were apparently the san1�; 1t 1s not t1t1co1n1non f. or a _ business to cl1ange its form of association. The bu�1ness enterprise ? f Elsby Bros. was respot1sible for tl1e l1arm, and it is tl1at e11terpr1s e that w� s beg111 st1ed. Here, st1bstantive rights are destroyed beca11se of a technical!ty, and _ tl11s defeats the pt1rp� se of the Jaw in allowing liberal an1 endments to plead1n�. It 1s on� y whe_re the plain tiff is seelcing to amend to incltide a defe·ndant wl1 0 1s s11bstantially di:fferent from 142. (Ct. App., Eng., 1960), 1960 All-Eng. L. Rep., vol. 3, P· 6?2.' ost alm d ha e tut sta the til t1n it su d file t no d ba iff int pla 143. The coti.rt a.lso observed tbat tJ1e expired
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' j
'
I
. For exampl· e be ed ni 1ld o1 de sh t en n1 nd ne . . at at th t an nd , 1·r · . . tl1e or1g1na11Y n amed defe . . w1'th d'1.ffier ny ent man agemen t pa 1n . co nt re ffe di a to s es in is bt its llad sold El b B y. rt nt re t here th� sam� pa ffe Bu di a i 11g d ad be d ul wo ny p m _ e a1n _ en�m e t sh ul d h v been per ad� i�g ;�:· otller co � tl1 an? � � d to tte mi d, lve vo � in s � wa ise iJr ter en ess btisin 1 at th e pl a1 nt 1.ff had been try i tl e ris rp te en s es sin bu e tl1 ng of e in incltide tile correct na to st 1 e all along. (c) Amendn1ent by the defenda11t Anotlier problen1 of a111 end1 nent and tl1e statt1te of Iimi� ation arises where the _ defe11da11t seeks to ame 1 1d to allege a defence that would relieve him of liability to tlie plaintiff becat1se of the actions of anotl1er person at . a . ti°:1e w� en tl1e plaintiff's be barred by l im1tation. For example, the clain1 aoa 0 i nst the other person \Vot1ld plaintiff, wl1ile walking on a road, is i11 j11red by an automobile.. He_ may proceed _ 144 agai11 st tl1e driver of tl1e vel1icle and against the owner, who 1s J1able, notwith standing tl1at tl1e da111age was caused by a person \.Vbo was not authorized to use tl1e vel1icle, u11less l1e ca11 prove tl1at at tl1e ti111e tl1 e damage was ca11sed, the vehi cle l1ad bee11 stole11 fro1n l1i1 11. 1 45 Ass11 111e tl1 at tl1e plaintiff sties the owner, and in tl1 e state 1 11ent of defence tl1 e defendant alleges that it was not his vehicle that caused the daJ 11age. St1bseqt1ently, l1e seel<s to ame11d, ad111 itt ing t11at his vel1jcle caused tl1 e I1 arn1 , but alleging tl1at tl1e vel1 icle was stolen fron1 him and that the l1ar11 1 was cat1sed by the thief. At tl1at ti111 e tl1 e statt1te of Iin1 itation J1as run on a suit agai11 st tl1e operator of tl1 e vel1 icle. If tl1e a1nend1nent is perm itted, the de fe11da 11t (ass11111 iug l1 e can prove tl1e alJegat io 11s) \.vill not be Jjable to the plaintiff and tl1 e IJlainti ff's clai111 aga inst tl1e operator wot1ld be barred by l i1n itation. The questio11 is wl1 ether tl1 e a111endn1 e11t sl1oulcl be allowed in sucl1 a case. Tl1e questio11 ca11 be approc:1cl1ed b)' a consideration of tvvo Englisl1 cases in ,vl1icl1 it was involved. In Weait a11cl .,-111otlzer v. Jaya11bee Joiner y, Ltcl., 146 tl1e JJlai11tiff sued to reco,1er da1 11ages for JJerso 1 1al inj11ries resulting from an acc ident allegedly ca11sed by tl1e defendant's 11 egligence. Tl1e accident occ11red on August 14, 1958, a11d st1 i t ,vas filed on Febrt1ary 4, 1961.. As of A11g11st 14, 1961, any cla in1 i 11volving injt1r ies arising 011t of tl1at accident was barred by limitation. On. February 5, 1962, tl1 e defencla11t sot1ght to a111 end to allege tl1 at the injuries were aggravated becat1se of tl1 e 11 egl ige11ce of tl1 e pl1ysicia11 wl10 trea.ted the plaintiff. Under Englisl1 Ia,v . tl1e defe11da 11 t \:Vot1ld not be l iable ·for tl1e 111ore se1-io11s i11jt1ry cat1sed by the 1 17 11egl,gence of tl1e JJl1ys ic ia11. • TI1 e plainti ff resisted tl1e an1e11dn1ent on the grouod tl1 at b� no\.v l1is clai n1 against tl1e pl1ysician for tl1e 111ore seriot1s inj11ry was barred . _ by li1n1tat1on._ TI1e co11rt J1 eld tl1at tl1e amend111e1 1t \.vo11ld be IJern1itted. If tl1e defend , ant s content1 _ 011 were true and ame11d111ent were not per1nitted, tl1e defendant would be l1 eld Iiabl � for a greater a1not111t of dan1 ages tl1an tl1e Jaw pern1itted. The court stressed that it was 1 1ot the defenda11t's fa11lt tl1at tl1 e ame11dment was 11ot sougl1t to be . 111 ade _ . lliltil after tl1 e statute of li111 itations l1ad rt 1 n. In tl1e 11rst place, the plaintiff did not :fl.I� s1 1 i t 1111til two and one-]1,1lf years of tl1e three year period had _ �-xprred.. Tl1 e plati1t1ff l1 ad been exa111 ined by tl1 e defenclant's doctors prior to the 11111e . s.111 �. llad been fi�ed, an� 11 1J to tl1a.t tin1e, all tl1 e parties l1ad ass11n1ed that the IDJlIIJes were relatively 111 11 1or. After tl1e st1it \1/as filed, tl1e defe11dants wanted 144. See Civ. C., Art. 2082(1). 145. See Civ. C., Art. 2061. 146. (Ct. App., Eng., 1962), 1962 All. E1·1g. L. Rep.' vol · -, ? p · 653 · · · 1nac · · · 147. I-1e would re1na111 liable In IS. on versi Ethio pia. . See Englis h Civ. C., (tl1e Art. 2086 . d an curatr-- s111ce the translation aric Amh omits a ''oot" between ''n1ay" and ''relieve·" the h _ , th.e Fv'. · "'Lene 1 version•s 1nak· e 1·1· cI ear that 'of l1a . b'1l'1tY in · sue the relieved not is defendant a case).
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ex pla am int ined by a specialist as they llad a rig iff the e ha v to · llt to do under . . . ' . . t1ff .1ns1 . tor. be present, and 1·t was very a·m the law. The .pI. a1n . ste. d that his doc 1 1cu1.t ex to arrange a Joint am·ination. The exaIU1na· t1on did not take place unti.I the statute · d 10 � IIowing the exam1n · · · ed· , an at1 ' on, the def end ant had expir s special·i·st was convinced · · 11r1e.s �ere aggravated du e to the negligence of pl1ysician who originally that the 1nJ treated the _pla1nt1ff. It then. so11ght to n1ake the amendment. Since the delay could not be attributed to t?e fault of t�e. defendant, the amendment was perrnitted. So _ t responsible for t�1e delay_ (here, if anyone was respon l ?ng a� the defendant. 1s _ no sible, 1t was tl1e plaintrff),_ the an1end1nent 1s pern11tted despite tl1e fact that the effect of the ame_ndn1ent will be tl1,1t �l1e plaintiff cannot recover either against the defenda�t or against tl1e party responsible . On other l1an�, in Stel·vart v. North Jvf etropolitan Tran111. 1ays Co., 148 tlie defend ant was not per1n1tted . to an1end. I� tl1at case tl1e plaintiff s11ed the company for damages allegedly res11lt1ng fron1 negl1ge11ce in n1ai11tai1ung its tracks. In the state1nent of defence the defendant deniecl negligence. Six months after the staten1ent of defence was filed, the con1pany moved to am.e11d to alle ge tl1at tl1ere was a co11tract between tl1e railroad and a11otl1er agenc:y by wl1ich tl1 e latter was to n1aintai11 tl1e tracks and \Vas responsible for tl1e defecti,1e condition. If tl1is were so, tl1e company wot1ld 11ot be liable to th e plaintiff. 149 By tl1en, the plai11tiff's rigl1t to recov er agai11st the agency allegedly responsible for the 11pkeep of tl1e tracks was barred by 1i11utation. I t l1ad not yet been barrecl at the time tl1e original statement of defence \Vas filed. The a1nendn1ent was not J)ermitted, since tl1e defendant knew from tl1e begin11i.ng that another age11cy ,vas responsible for tl1e upkeep, if this was tl1e case. There was no reason why the allegation could not l1ave been i11clL1cled in tl1e original statem ent of defence. Tl1e fact tl1at tl1e })laintiff's claim agc1i11st tl1e agency '.Vas barred by limitation was clearly dt1e to tl1e defendant's fa11]t, perl1aps deliberately so - tl1e defendant n1ay 11ave \'Vaited to an1end t1ntil tl1e Iimjtatio11 periocl l1ad expired to protect tl1e agency against liability. Si11ce tl1e failt1re to raise tl1e question be fore the plaintiff's claim against the other party was barred by li1nitation was dL1e to the fault of tl1e defenda11t, tl1e a1nend1nent was not per111itted. The approacl1 taken by the Englisl1 co11rts is a sound one and can ·be t1sed to solve the problen1 presented in 011r exa1nple. If tl1e defenda11t \.Vas a\Vare fr�m the beginning of tl1e s11it or sl1ortly after, that l1is car bad been stolen at the t1n1e of the accident, he sl1ould l1ave raised tl1e issue earlier. It was l1is fa11lt that tl1e matter \Vas not raised in tin1e for tl1e plaintiff to st1e tl1e operator, and the amendJnent _ e.fenda11t l1ad assL1111ed all. should not be pe rn1itted. On tl1e otl1er hand, if the d alonb° that it was 11ot l1is vehicle tl1at l1ad cat1sed the accident, and only later fo11nd' • 150 the amend me t 1t, en stol l1ad � wl10 out th.at it had , wl1en t1sed by a person should be permitted. It would not be t1nfair to allow �he ame�d1ne11t, becal1se it was not the defe nda11t's fa11lt that tl1 e 111atter was not raised earller. 5.
A Summary
w l eadin pl of rt_ pa i al uc _cr ry ve a is s ing ad In summary, amend1nent of ple � � _ By liberal allowance of amendments, a party's st1bstant1ve rights will not b� affected or destroyed becat1se of pleading errors. Except where tbe. a111endn1ent .is ptire l Y 148. (Queen's Benc11, Eng., 1886), 1886 Quee11's Be11c/1 R.ep., vol. 16, P· 1 ?8. of ed iev rel t be no tild wo y an mp co the , 86 20 t. Ar 149. Note again tliat in light of Civ. c., liability in Ethj� J)ia. . \Vas entruste. l . ob 150. This could ha en jf he were no t aware of tl1e theft, e.g., tl1e at1ton1 1le to ,vl1om �it person to someoile el�� � t the time of the tl1eft, it was recovered, a11cl the was entruste c! did not tell tl1e clefenda11t about the tl1eft.
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questions i n dispute, it should al re e th ct e f af ot 1 1 ll wi it . e ler \Vl . . teehnica1 , that 1·s' ITI!ta 1 on. If necessary, the other party t li f o m le b ro p a is re 1e . b e allowed unless tl the sed by rai s endment, and ue iss am \.V ne the et n1e to ce an 0 nu nti co a n can be O1·ve • 1e a1!1e�d ment. B· ut the an1 endt I ki ng ma rty pa the st ain ag ed . the costs can be tax on s at1 ha 11t lin of run, the amende tut sta the re he W . ed ow all be s ay alw uld n1ent s-ho 1e�e a totally new t g o a · y1n · 1 1s t · t1 ·tr a1n p • 1 tl1e s les � un ed, ow all _ inent should also be of �mending his pleading, e L11s e tl1 r de un n tio ita lim � by d rre ba 1 in cla t en fer and dif ing to add cl_aims for end 1s am and er n sla for � r ove rec to d stie e 1 1 ere 1 w1 e.g., . or r the e ov am rec to � basic wrong, ing try 1s lie � If � . ent onm pris 1 in e fals and t _ assaul ff 1s changing the theory of 1nt1 pla tl1e ugh tho 1 1 eve , wed allo be d ot1l 1 sl nt n1e end am J1is case and alleging a new set of facts to st1pport tl1e tl1eory. Of course, the as . to whom the _ plaintiff cannot, under the guise of an1endroent, add a new party statute t1as run. BLtt this should be co11str11ed to n1 ean an entirely different party, a different legal entity. L.astly, 110t tl1 e sa 111 e e11terprise now so11gl1t to be s11ed as tl1 e defe 11 dant sl10L1ld be permitted to allege a new defence, absolving him of liability due to tl1e actions of a tl1ird p,1rty, eve11 wl1ere tl1 e plaintiff's claim against the tl1 ird party is barred by li11litatio11 except wl1 ere tl1e delay i11 n1aking the an1eodment until tl1 e lii1 1itation period l1 as expired is clearly tl1e fa11lt of tl1e defendant. A word sl1ould be said abot1t tl1e delay i11 ]itigatio11 tl1at may be result from liberal allowa11ce of a1ne 11 dments. Sucl1 dela.y is, of course, very 11ndesirable, but it n1 ay be 11ecessary so tl1at st1bsta11 tive rigl1ts will not be affected because of pleading errors. If tl1e coL1rt is strict ,vitl1 respect to taxing costs against the party seeking to a111 e11d, a party ,vill not seel< to a1ne11 d 11nless tl1e amend1 11 ent is crucial to bis case. Tl1e i111posing of costs sl1 ot1ld be e111 ployed as tl1e sanction to prevent exces sive an1e11d11 1ents. If parties wl1 0 \Va11t to ame11 d will l1 ave to pay the costs of a11y adjoL1 r 11 ed J)roceedi11g, parties \Vill be carefL1l to inclL1 de all tl1eir allegations in tl1 e first J)leadi11 g. E.
Con1pulsory An1endment of Improper Pleadi11gs We \vill 110\v co11 sider wl1at ma.y be called co1111)ulsory an1end111 ent, that is, wl1ere tl1 e court reqt1ires a !)leading to be an1 ended eitl1 er on its own initiative or upo11_ �otion b� tl1e ot_l1 er party. I11 SLtch a ca.se tl1 e pleading is legally sufficient, but it 1s defective or 11nproper in certain respects. Tl1ere are two sitl1ations where c ?n1pt1lsory �111e11 d111ent 1uay be ordered. The first is wl1ere tl1e pleading is not suffi ciently definite. Art. 91(3) J)rovides tl1at ''a furtl1 er and better staten1ent of tl1e clai1 n _ or defe�ce, or furtl1er a11 d better partic11lars of a 1 1y 111atter stated i1.1 any plead1i1 g n1ay 1n all cases be ordered by the co11rt." As we saw earlier, all doubts sl1ould be resolved i11 favor of tl1e pleader, and pleadings tl1at si1 n1Jly are 11?t very good ma � be f �11nd to be legally s11fficient. An i 111 1Jorta 11 t JJUrpose of pleadings,. as . we saw, 18 to give tl1e opposite l )arty a 11 d tl1e court notice of tl1e facts on which tl1e pleader bases I1is cl�tim or defe 11 ce. If the allegations are vaglie and io1precise, tl1e pleader sl1ot1ld be req11jred to a111end liis pleadiilg to nlake the alJegatio11s 111ore _ _ specific, so tl1at tl1e co11rt a11 d. tl1 e otl1er party \\rill know exactly wl1at he is cla11n1ng. 151 )'OU Fo r exa nlJ) le, in a cas e st1c io11 l1 al, as GarcicL v. Ililto11 Ilotels /nternat . . i l rec all 1 l at tl1 e co11rt 11eld an allegatio11 to the effect tl1 at the plaintiff �,as � � � on violently d1_scharged and slanderot1sly accused'' s11fficie acti of cau se a sta te nt to for defa� ation. BLit tlus was J Joor pleadi 11 to red req Lii g. Tl1e plaintiff sholtld be . . state specifically wl1 ether or not the rem 11rd tl a of ce arks were n1ade i n tl1e presen _ party. Uo<ler Art. 91(3), t l1 e court can im order hi111 to amend the statement of cla 151.
Supra, note 104.
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to allege whether or not the remarks we. re so m,tde. Then the COltrt and tl1e de.r l el l. ex tJ ac no Y w w · a . h· 'll · t k ti ie P1 ai· �ttff 1s alleging and whether tl1e st da�t WI at e1nent of do sta es te a re ca al us ly � of action fo r defamation. Thus, wl1enev th clat� er e court . all he ga �h tio at ns , sid tl1o·ugl1 legally sufficjent, do not state precise � _ � con ers wh ly at la ng i c 011 , It ts sb ot pa tld order an a111endmeot. Tl1is insures tl1at tl1 e pleadi the rty _ ng s p ur po th se eir of ser cle · ve arly defining tl1e issues for trial In light of its po will we r . to o�der �mendn1ents th e court 1nay 111ore readily find that a plea.ding is legally sufficient 1n do11btf11l cases. The second sittiation is where tl1e pleading contains irnproper matter or is in s11ch a form tha t the otl1er party cant1ot properly reply to it. Art. 91(4) provides tl1at ''the court n1�y a.t_ a11y t1n1e order to be str11ck ot1t or amended in a11y plead ing any m,1tter wh1cl1 1s �111ne�essary or scandalo11s or which may tend to J)rejudice emb�rrass _o: delay tl1_e fair trial of the s11it." yve 111ay first _ consider_ the ''scanda1011s prov1s1on. Pleadings are a 111atter of public record. It 1s not fair to tl1e other party if a pleading co11ta.ins scandalo11s n1atter 1111necessary to the decision of tl1e case. In order for matter to be stricken, it clearly 1nust be botfi scandalo11s ai1d unnecessary. If the plai11tiff in a s11it to recover JJroperty fro1n tl1e defendant con tends tl1at tl1e defe11d,111t stole tl1e property, the allegation is perfectly proper. It forms the basis of tl1e JJlaintiff's rigl1t to recover a11d is necessary for the decision of the case, even thougl1 it 111ay be ''scandalous." But, if a party inclL1des n1atter that is not necessary for tl1e decision of tl1e case a11d is sca11dalo1is, tl1e court sho11.ld order it stricken. For example, in a s11it against a governme11t agency, the plaintiff alleged tl1at one of tl1e 111em .bers of tl1 e aget1cy l1ad 11sed his inflt1ence for his private interest as a result of whicl1 tl1 e agency failed to meet tl1e j11st den1a1.1ds of the plaintiff. The portion of t.l1e pleading alleging tl1at tl1e 111ember 11sed. liis infltience for l1is private interest was stricken. 152 If tl1e board fajled to meet tl1e just demands of tl1e plai11tiff, for 1,,v/1atever reason, lie is entitled to relief. Tl1ere is no need to frame an iss11e as to the 1ne1nber's 11sing his infl11e11 ce for l1is private interest. This issue is not necessary for tl1e decision of tl1e case, and if 11ntr11e, it co11ld damage that person's reputatio11. It is, tl1erefore, ''sca11dalo11s'' within tl1e n1eani11g of Art. 91(4) and sl1011ld be stricke11 . 111 a11otl1er case, tl1e J)lai11tiff s11ed tl1 e defend ant for libel, alleging tl1at tl1e defenda·nt called l1im a tl1 ief. 111 the staten1ent of defence the defendant de11ied tl1 at l1e called tl1e plaintiff a thief, b11t said tl1at l1e did call bjm an ad11lterer and tl1at tl1at staten1ent w,1s tr11e. Tl1e allegation that tl1e defendant called tl1e plaintiff an ad11lterer s11011l.d be stricken. 153 Th� iss11e i� w·hetl1er t_he defendant called the plainti� a thief; if l:e did 11ot cal� l1i11:1 a tl1i�f, ..11� \.v111 _ not be liable. TI1 e defenda11t's allegation l1as notlung to do w1tl1 tl1e pla111tiff s _cla1111_ ancl is merely designed to make l1is sL1pposed aclultery_ a n1 atter of �ecord. Since 1t l1as nothing to do witl1 tl1e case and is scandalous, 1t should be stricken. The court n1 ay also req ti ire a pleading to be a111ended wl1ere it contain? ''t1n necessary matter which would _ tend to prej11dice,_ einbarrass or_ cl� l}tY the f,11r trial of tl1e stiit." 154 Art. 80(2) req111res tl1at tl1e pleading sl1 all conta111 only a staten1ent
152.
]53.
154.
., 1897), 1897 Chancer)' Rep., vol. 1. g En , ry nce 11a c (· ard Bo cal Lo · See M urray v. Ep som p. 35. . J, JJ. 571 • 1 vo · p., /1 Re nc 's Be een Qu 93 18 ) , 93 18 g En , h nc Be S ee R assa m v. Bu·dge (QLieen' s . . ' eJU�� ce, embarr � ss or pr d to ten ay L icl1 vh (?f 1s lot da can � s !� or , must ,, Art. 91(4) says ''tlnnecessary u alo s nd d sca an ary ess I l ay t.he fair · l of tb e case'' As we l1ave 1nd1ca.ted, .unnec · t r1a ce . d t o pre·Jtl ct·1ce, en, · arra( ss · b ten ·1 r1 y , 111a ore l wiJ r tte ma y'' · sar s ece nn ''u b e read toget·h er s o t oo, . ]1ave bee11 b ett ·r . · 1 tl1e st1b -a1·1·1c I e r ead "un. e1 u]d -.vo t It · · stri · l of t·11e � · t· r1a an · d d elay tl1e 1atr · l1 01ay tend to preJtl · d.ice, en1w b1c r tte ma ary s s ece n11 "u or r'' tte ma . . necessary an · d scan daJot�s . ,, . barrass or delay the fair trial of tl1e s t11t
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ty s the par elie icl1 wh for his claim or on ts fac � al teri ma the of m for in a concise r tte ce, n1a den us evi 1eo ra1 ext argument, un ns tai con ing ad ple a en wh defence." So er ord 4), ( 91 . Art er 11nd !he pleader to amend uld, sho rt cou e 1 t1 ons gati necessary alle the plea.diiig, elin1ina.ting a�l the imRroper matter. In_ the American case of Bu� kley v. Alt/iei,n.er,,ss tlie plead.1n g contained 250 type wr1tte� pag� s. and 43 typewritte n pages of exl1ibits. In addition, to q11ote fro m the co11rt s decision: ''It is replete with the 111ost i�timate and de� ailed rec�tals of the_ friend ship and social and b11siness rel_attons _ of tl1e various parties. It details con versations. Page after page contains copies of contracts, letters, correspondence, pro111issory 11otes, 111e1noranda, agree1nents, le,1�es, inter-? ffi?e correspondence a11d otl1er purely evidentiary matter. 111 many instances 1t rs alleged that the defendant Altl1ei111er makes certain claims and then by arg1101ent and innuendo tl1e sL1ggestion is n1ade tl1at by reason of other n1atters in the bill the claims ca11not be 1naintained. In otl1er words, in many places the comJ)laint is highly argL1111entative both as to the facts and tl1e law." Tl1e IJlaintiff was ordered to file a11 e11tirely 11e,v staten1ent of clai1n containing sim1Jly tl1e n1aterial facts on whicl1 l1is clain1 was based. Tl1e defendant cannot JJroperly re1Jly to sucl1 a pleadi11g, and l1e a11d the cot1rt n1ust sift througl1 much irreleva11t n1a1111er to l<no,v jt1st wl1at the plai11tiff's clairn is. Sucl1 a pleading would be in clear violation of Art. 80(2), and wot1ld clearly OJJerate to prejtrdice and delay the tria.l of tl1e case. Tl1e Registrar v1011ld also be justified in refusing to accept st1cl1 a pleadi11g, since ''it is not in tl1e forn1 reqt1ired by Art. 222." 111 tl1is cl1a.pter ,ve l1ave explored tl1e process of pleading and have seen the JJ �rpose tl1at . pleacli�1g is desigi1ed to serve in Etl1iopia. If JJleading is properly ut1l1zed, the issues 1n the case can be clarified, and the trial of the case ca.11 pro cee? expedit!ously. Tl1e process is ft1rtl1er refined by proceedings prior to trial, to wl11cl1 we will 110,v tt1rn ot1r atte11tio11.
155.
(Dist. Ct., U.S., ND Ulin 1· 5 ? . • 194-?) • Federa.t Rules Decisions' vol. 2, p. 285, in J. Chadou:-n and L. LeVl·n, Case·s ·on C1v 1.l Procedure (1961), p. 334.
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CHAPTER VII PROCEEDINGS PRIOR TO TRIAL Af �er tl1e court finds that the J)laintiff's state1nent of clain1 is acceptable, it causes 1t _to be_ servecl on tl1e defendant togetl1er with a sum1nons reqt1iring t1im to a·ppear with 111s statement of defence on a specified day.1 At that time the court holds what is calle? the first l1earing. �l1e first hearing js the final step in prepar ing the case for trial. At tl1e first l1ea.1"111g, tl1e court reads the statement of defence, exan1ines both parties to determine tl1eir respective positio11s, r11les on any preliminary objections, a11d frames the issties for tri�tl. In certain circu111stances, the court 111ay adjudicate the ca.se at tl1e first l1earing witl1out reqt1iring a full-scale trial. Assuming that a trial is 11ecessary, tl1e cot1rt sets a date for tl1e trial, and at the trial i t l1ears evidence, decides tl1e issues i n dispt1te, and renders a jt1dgn1ent on tl1 e merits. The discussion in this cl1 apter will be divided into three parts: (I) the first l1earing; (2) adj11dicatio11 witl1out trial; and (3) compron1ise and withdrawal. Not a.ll of the matters clisct1ssed relate solely to tl1e pre-trial stage of litigation, bt1t si11ce they ust1ally arise at tl1at time, we will disct1ss the111 in this chapter.
A. The First Hearing 1. Non-appearance We will first consider the problem of non-appearance, i.e., wl1at happens \vhen a party does not appear before tl1e court at tl1e req11ired ti111e. Tl1e provisions of la,v governing no11-appearance are a.pplicable to all stages of the JJroceedings, i.e., . on-appearance is more the first hearing, the trial, a11d review, but tl1e problem of n likely to arise at the first hearing, whicl1 is wl1y it is being discussed in tl1is context. An appearance involves con1ing before tl1e co11rt so t11at tl1e co11rt can adjudicate the case or take a11y other action it deems 11ecessary. 2 Oridinarily a party to a suit is 11ot required to appear J)ersonally at the hearing, b11t 1nay appear throt1gl1 a1.1 agent or pleader. 3 However, the cot1rt may reqt1ire that he appear in perso11, 4 and if a party who has been ordered to appear fails witl1011t good cause to do so, it is as if tl1ere were no appearance.5 W11ere there are several pl�tintiffs or defendants, any 011e of them 1nay be a11tl1orized to appear on bel1alf of tl1e111 all. 6 Such at1fho rity m11st be in ,vriti11g and signed by tl1e party giving it, a11d filed witl1 the
1. 2.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 233. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 69(1). \Vhere an ady ocate appearecl for a . part a!ld asked for au to represent adjournment, whicl1 was deojed, and then said J1e l1ad no further mstructions _ the client it was held tl1at the client l1acl not made an appearance by his advocate. Tl1e presence �f tl1e advocate was not for the purpose of proceeding witl1 tl1e case, but orlly to obtain an adjournment. See Ganesl1 v. Baikuntl1esl1 (f-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, 1951), 1951 AII-Inclia Rep., p. 291.
Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 57, 65(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 65(1). Tl1e cot1�t is not to . require a JJersonal appearance _ t1aJes � it is essential for the proper determination of the suit that the party ap1Jear or act 1n pe1son. 5. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 77. The party is tl1en sttbject to tl1e provisions of the Code regarcling non-appearance. 6. Civ. Pro., Art. 66(1). Note th.at this is not � rel?resentative suit under Art. 38, si�ce all · 1s 0111y for the purpose of appearing or tl1e persons are named parties. The representat1on acti11g in the suit.
3. 4.
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me the of na firm,. each must e th in ers rtn pa as ed su are ns rso pe _ re he court.1 W s ing eed oc nt nu pr ue nti eq co bs st1 e t bu in the , n1e n,1 n ow bis in y all du ivi . appeal· ind . _ , all the partners must me na firm the 1n d sue 1s lup ers rtn pa a if , So _ frrnl 11ame.s 9 te 1s sued, the c �urt ora r dy co bo a e 1er Wl g. rin l1ea p t frrs the at lly ua ivid appear ind _ ctor or ot _ 11e y a y, �er principal � � n1.ay require the personal appearance of t?e secretar 1 e e Th sam t. 1s true with sui the to ting rela ns stio qt1e wer ans can officer who wer ans to le questions in a suit a be y 1na 0 wl1 � s y,ee 1Jlo e1n nt n1e ern gov regard to _ 11 In otl1er ,vords, wl1Jle a personal appeara.nce 1s not involving the gover11n1ent. ordinarily reqt1ired, tl1e cot1rt J1as tl1e power to co1111-1el t�e personal attendance of parties or agents where it conclt1des that st1cl1 attendt111ce 1s necessary for the deter mination of the qt1estio11s in tl1e st1it. V./here a party apJ)ears through a pleader, the pleader 111ust be able to a11swer st1cl1 q11estions or be accompanied by a person wl10 can. 12 As \Ve ,vill see, wl1en a party present in court refuses to give evidence, 13 The parties t him. agains d e11tere are n1ay be ent jt1dg111 , witl1ot1t lawft1l e>�c11se likely to l1a,,e pertine11t infor111ation, and wl1ile tl1ey are not required to appear at all stages of tl1e proceedi11gs, tl1ey m11st see to it that tl1e co11rt l1as all the informa tio11 it 111ay req11ire. (a) Action upon non-appearance
•
Tlie Code is strict 011 the req11ire111ent of appearance. Too frequently in the past, cases l1ave been delayed becat1se one or botl1 parties failed to appear, a11d tl1e co11rt wot1ld ofte11 ,:1djo11r11 tl1e case to a later date. This is not pern1itted z,nder tl1e Coe/el No11-a1)J)eara11ce rest1lts in affirmative actio11 on tl1e part of the court; de1)e11ding 011 ,vl10 aJ)l)ears or vvl10 fails to appem·, tl1e co11rt will eitl1er dismjss the s11it or proceecl to liear the case i11 tl1e abse11ce of tl1e non-appearing party. Except wl1ere tl1e su111111011s l1as 11ot been duly served, tl1e court may 11ot adjourn the case on tl1e grot1nd tl1at a J)arty l1as not a.pJ)eared.14 V/l1ere there l1as been strfficient cat1se of 11011-appearance, tl1e order resulting fro111 such non-appearance may be set aside, a11cl therefore no11-a1)peara11ce 111ay 11ot necessarily entail the loss of a party's rights. I-Io,vever, the cot1rt acts first, and tl1e b11rden is on the non-appearing party subseqt1ently1 to talce ,1ctio11 to relieve l1i1nself from the effects of non-appearance. Tl1is 111arks a radical depart11re fron1 past practice. We will first consider ,vhat. tl1e co11rt cloes wl1en tl1ere is 11011-appearance and tl1e11 consider tl1e effect of its action on tl1e rights of tl1e parties. Tl1e rttles go,,erning non-appearance difler depe11ding on ,vl1etl1er tl1e defe11dant did not appear, the plaintiff did not appear, or neitl1er party _ appeared. Wl1ere neither J)arty aJJpears, tl1e cot1rt n1akes an order that the st11t sl1a.ll . be s!rt1ck ot1t, or in case of apJJeal, tl1at tl1e appea.l be disn1issed. 15 The1�e _is . no discretion to adJourn tl1e case. 16 ¥/l1ere tl1e clefe11da11t appears a.nd tl1e plaintiff
7. 8. 9·
10. I1 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 66(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 67(1). If the suninions l1as been served 011 tl1e perso11 11aving control of tl1e partnership business, uo<ler Art .. 98, t]1at person need not ap�ear t1oless he is a partner. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 67(2) I-I� may also appear and deny that l1e IS a partner. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 67(3). C1v. Pro. C., Art. 68(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 68(2). See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 57. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 267. Tllis �oes not mean that a party \vho has appeared n1ay not obtain a11 adjournment, but � a ournment may be granted only for .specified reasons See Civ . Pro. C., Arts. 197•199· . �. IV'. �. ro . C., Ar�. 69(2). Any party may appear by his pleader. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 69(3). . les thus ffers f�pm Order IX, rule 3, of the Indian Code enab wl1ich , Procedu re Civil of � le . co �i t t o adJourn tl1e case instead of dismissing it ' in its discretion. The drafter s of . the E .11op t l ·1an c ode have 01ade It ·. clear tl1at tl1e Etl1iopian court does n.ot l1ave such d'iscre tion·
!f
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does not, unless the defendant . adm. its all or part of the claim, in wh1·ch . . case the court sha11 pas s _a decre� agains t hin1 based on the admission, the sui t . 1 11ust be 1 1 The d1sID1ssal 1s mandatory, and the defendant cannot . disniissed deinand tllat th. e Slll·t . be cont1nu�d, e:g., to enab} e hin1 to d'1sprove allegatio�s of fraud contained in the 18 If the def end ant cla1 n1. o� J1as asserted a clru111 of cotinterclaim or set-off, eme nt stat the c.ot1rt will proceed to l1ear .tl1at part of tl1e case, since as to s11ch cotlnterclai11 1 or set-off, the defendant occ11p1es the position of plaintiff, and tl1e rules relating to the non-appearance of tl1e defendant apply. Wl1ere tl1_e plaintiff appears a11d the defendant does not appear, tl1 e procedure is djfferent, since s11cl1 non-appearance 1nay be due to tl1e fact that tl1e defendant did not receiv � notice of tl1e proceedin�s. \\'here tl1e defendant does not appear, the first qt1est1on tl1 � cot1rt m11st ask 1s whe. tl1 er l1e was ''d11ly served." As \-Ve said in Chapter IV, 111 order for the st11111nons to have been duly served within the n1eaning of �·t. 70, whicl1 . governs tl1 e fa.il11re of tl1e defendant to appear, tl1 e hier �rchy of serv�ce set fortl1 . 111 the Code m11st l1ave bee11 followed. If personal service was possible, s11cl1 service, 111ust l1ave been en1ployed, ancl so on i 11 descend ing order of effectiveness. The plaintiff n111st prove tl1is to tl1 e satisfaction of the court, L9 and if he does not do so, the co11rt n1ust direct tl1at a second st1n1n1 ons be ser·ved on the defendant, setting a11 otl1er date for the hearing. 20 If it is proved that tl1e sL1n1mons was served 011 the defenda11t, b11t not in s11fficient time to e11able him to appear on tl1e da.y fixed tl1erei11, the co11rt is to adjo11rn tl1e l1 earing.21 Si11 ce the defendant n1ust appear at tl1e first l1 earing witl1 l1is staten1ent of defeoce, 22 it is not s1rlficient that l1e ,vas served in time to be pl1ysically present at tlJe hearing, e.g., that the s11mmons ,vas served on Ium the day before. I-le 111ust have l1ad sufficient time to consider the allegatio11 s of tl1 e state1ue 1 1t of claim and JJre1Jare l1is defence; other,:vise, nothing co11ld be accomplisl1ed at tl1 e first heari11g. \,VJ1ere the s11.rnmons was not served on the defendant at all d11e to the negligence or default of tl1e plaintiff, the co11rt 111ay order that tl1e s11it be str11cl< 011t or t11e appeal dismissed instead of ordering a11 adjo11rnment. 23 As \-Ve saw i11 Chapter IV, 24 and it is necessary , officer serving the be to iff the court may a11thorize tl1e plaint to discourage any lack of d.iligence on l1is .Part. Of co11rse, tl1 e defendant n1 ay 25 es. 1tint1 1 s1Lit co the does, lie if and d, serve bee11 not appear despite the fact that he bas Where the court fmds that tl1e defenda 11t l1as been d11ly served a11d has not appeared, it is directed to proceed ex parte. 26 It is in1 portant to distingt1jsl1 b�tvvee11 proceeding ex parte and rendering a defa11It j11dg1nent. Ex I?ar�e mea11s �1terally ''on one side.'' In proceeding ex parte, tl1e co11rt l1 ears tl1e pla1nt1ff's case; 1t does not grant a judgment in his fa.vor on tl1e grol1nd that tl1 e_ c1efendant has n�t appeared. A jt1dg1nent rendered against a party beca11se of lus non-appearance .1s
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.17. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 73. Rep., L. 1 lia1 Ir1c 3,) 191 , tta lcu Ca t C ., igh (H o . C lls Mi t e Jti 18. Sec Kesri Cliand v. National vol. 40, p. 119. . . . !, 1n ,vl11c�1. c�se, 19. He could also sJ1ow tliat the defendant actually received 11otice of tl1e st11 o t raise t 1 1e o �ect1on n. .Id cou d an ear app to ve ha tild wo as discussed in Chapter IV, he t hat the st1m1nons was n ot dttly served. 20. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70(b). 21. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70(c). 22. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 233. 23. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70(d). a11d tl1is r, fice of g vin ser the e ad m be ay n1 n o rs 24. Under Civ. Pro. C., Ar t. 95(1), any pe wo uld include the plaintiff. In practice, t bis is often done. 25. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70. 26. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 70(a).
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called a default judg 1ue11t, and tl1e court is not authorized to render a default jtidg111ent dtie to tl1e non-appea.rance of _tl1� ?efe°: dant. 2� So, where the defen�ant _ s ev1denc the defendant l1as w 1v d does not appear, tl1e co11rt l1ears _the pla1nt1� :, _ � : the opporttinity to rebt1t st1cl1 evidence. If tl1e . �ourt 1s sat1�fied that _the _plaintiff 11as a valid clain1 and J1as s11ffered damages, 1t renders a_ Jt_tdgment 1n hts favor against tile defe11dant. Bt1t, if it is not sati_sfi�d tl1at the pla1nt1ff l1as a valjd__ claim, it renders judgine11t for the defendant. Tl11s 1� s_o� 1nd pro: ed:ure t? follow, since a cot1rt sl1o11ld 11ot grant a judg111ent for the pla1nt1ff 11nless 1t 1s satisfied that he has 1nade ot1t a case entitli11g hin1 to relief under tl1e law. However, wl1ere a trurd party defendant st1mmoned to aJ)pear under Art. 43, does not appear, he is ?eemed _ to ad111it tl1e validity of tl1e decree passed against tl1e defendant and his own liability to tl1e defendant ; 28 i11 otl1er words, a defatilt j11dg111ent is entered against tl1e tl1ird party defe11dant dtie to l1is non-appeara11ce. \\/l1ere tl1e defe11da11t 11as not appeared, tl1e cot1rt l )roceeds to decide tl1e case at tl1e first l1eari11g. 1-f owever, it n1ay 11ot be possible to make a final disposition of tl1e case at tl1a t tin1e. Perhaps tl1e plai11tiff ca1111ot })rod t1ce sufficient evjdence to enable tl1e cot1rt to re11der a j udg1ne11 t for hi111 (l1e was only prepared to participate i11 tl1e first l1e::1ri11g, 11ot to }Jrese1Jt l1 is wl1ole case). Tl1e co11rt 1nay adjourn the l1earing to a later date. ·Now st1ppose tl1at tl1e clefenda11t seeks to appear at tl1e adjo11rned l1e::1ring. Art. 72 l )rovides tl1at ''vvl1 ere tl1e co11rt l1as adjo11rned tl1e l1earing of the st1it ex parte, and the defe11dant, at or before s11cl1 l1earing, appears a.nd sho,vs good cat1se for l1is previot1s 11011-a1Jpeara11ce, l1e 111ay, t1pon sucl1 terms as to costs or other,vise as the co11rt 1na.y direct, be l1eard in answer to tl1e suit as if l1e l1ad appeared 011 tl1 e day fixed for l1is appearance." We will subsequently disct1ss tl1 e 111eaning of ''good cat1se'' as used i11 Art. 72. If tl1e defenda11t establishes sucl1 ca11se l1 e is J)laced i11 tl1e same position as if l1e had ap1)eared at the proper tin1e. Tl1 e defenda11t files l1is statemer1t of defence, and tl1e court begins aneiv in a.ccorda11 ce witl1 tl1e prescribed JJrocedt1re and frames tl1e iss11es for trial.29 Tl1e qt1 eslion arises as to wl1 etl1er a defenda11t ,vl10 cannot de111onstrate good cause for l1is previous 11011-apJJear�tnce ca11 appear at the adjo11 rned l1earing and defend as of tl1at ti111e. In India, it l1as bee11 l1eld tl1at the defendant has at1 a?solt1te _ rigl1t to a1)pear at tl1e adjourned l1 earing, Qnd l1e 11eed sho\v good cat1se for l1�s prev10L1s 11011 -ap1)eara11ce 0111 :y if l1e wisl1es to retrace l1is steJ)S, e.g., to present 111� stateme11t of defence. 30 If l1 e can11 ot sl10 \v good cal1se l1e is bound by tl1e evidence prese11ted at tl1e previo11s l1eari 11g a11 d can 011ly proceed fro111 the stage already 31 We 111ay aslc ,vl1etl1er Art. 72 sl1011ld be i 11terpreted in tl1is wa)'. Asst1m-eacl1ed. � the only tin1e 1ng tl1at ''good ca11se'' ,;vi]] be liberally constr11ed, as is prob,1ble, 32 tl1at the defen?,lnt ,vould 11ot l1ave l1ad ''good cat1se'' for l1is 11on-appeara11ce ,vo1tld be ,vl1 e1 1 l1e s1111ply l1 ad 11ot botl1 ered to aJ)pear at tl1e reqt1ired ti 1 11e. Tl1ere . se�ms _ to be 110 valid re,1s011 wl1 y a defenda11t w110 \Vas so indiffere11t to his obl1gat1on to appear sho11ld be able to appear s11bseq11ently as of rigl1t becat1se tl1e case 27.
28.
29. 30.
31. 32·
It _ is impro1Jer _for a_ court �o render a judgn1ent for the JJlaintiff in an ex pa.rte proceeding _ withou t requ 1 r1ng h1111 to introduce any evidence. See Ross & Co. ,,. Scriven (1-Iigb Ct., Calcutta, 1916), Indian L. J?ep., vol. 43, JJ. 1001. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 76. See Kalla v. Sl1ivji (High Ct., Saurasl1tra, 1 925), 1926 All-India Rep., p. 181. There 1.1ad been conflicting authority o n tl1is poi11t, but the n1atter was resolved in the 5), a .ffirniati v e b y the �upren1e Court. Sangran1 v. El 195 Indi a, Ct., ectric Tribu11al ' (Sup. _ l / l d 955 1 .A - n 1a Rep., p. 425. S�e Pe.run,�l v. Konclan,na (l-Iigl1 Ct., f\1a. dras, 1938) 1939 AII-I11dia Rep., p. 385, and th e discussion m S. Sarkar, The La.11, of Civil Proced ure (4t11 ed., 1963), vol. I, p. 3l 4_ See Kasht v. Rrun (l-Iigl1 Ct., Nagpur, 1946), 1948 All-I11dia Rep., p. 362.
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.. . to be adjou.•rned. It is this kin d of indifference that has c,.1us happened ed I1t1gatton i..: an d p a o it h E s t1u ould 1n · _ 1 , ed I . t 1·s' theretcore, su bm'1tt to be delaye d · . . not be encourag . ed '. e rea · h Id b d ou . s. on into Art. 72 and. rf the defendant that ·no excepti a t th e · ' · adJOt1rn - ed ' go h o o cau s d t se no for bis non-appearance, he should not � _ l1ear1ng does _ be. .per1 t1on l e 1 tiga tl at that stage. initted to enter Tl1e problem of n. · on-appearance · cas ' e of muIt'1ple parties · · n1ay also arise i11 the . ave Joined, or two defendants 11ave been joined, a. :.A:".s h Suppose that two p 1a1ntu.1 nd one does not appear. vy11 ere one or _n1ore of s �veral p�ai1;1tiffs fails to appear, toe . 1ns tl1e nce ta at of tl1e p _ma y� ear ing pla int court iff or plaintiffs, permit � � _ . . to _proceed as 1f all the pla1nt1ffs l1ad appeare t11t s d, or n1 ay nlake stict1 the . 3� fit. Re11 1e1nber tl1at �he non-appearing plaintiffs have joined in tl11n ks 1t s r orde � the Slltt find are parties of record .. Their_ no11-aJ?pe�rance does not affect the pow er of the _court to enter a decree 1nv?lv1ng tl1e1r r1gl1ts. Striking out or disn,iss iog the. s1�1 t as t_ o the.m wot1�� also requ1_re such action with respect to the appear ing pla1nt1ffs, since by defin1t1on tl1e st11t cannot proceed in the absence of indis pensable pa.rties. Tl1is would be unfair to tJ1e appearing plaintiffs, and since tl1e cotirt n1ay enter a decree as to 1101 1-ap1Jeari11 g plai11tifsf , it sl1ot1ld proceecl \Vitl1 tl1e suit. B11t \vl1ere the clai111s of the plaintiffs are independent, tl1e s 11it of tl1e non appearing plaintiffs 1nay be strucl< 011t or dismissed \VithoL1t any effect on the s tut of tl1ose that have appeared, and this sl1ould be done,. Wl1 ere one or more of several d�fendants? althougl1 dL1ly served, l1as not appeared, tl1e suit JJroceeds, a.nd at tl1e tLme of JUdgn1ent, the court n1akes st1cl1 order as to the non-appearing . defendants as it tl1inks :fit. 34 The plaintiff presents l1is evidence as to l1is clai111 against tl1e 11011-appearing defendants, a11d the co·urt l1 ears tl1at part of the ca se ex parte. (b) Effect of non-appearance
We will now consider the effect of 11on-appearance. Wl1ere there l1as been non-appearance, depending on who l1as failed to appear, fo11r tl1 ings can happen: (l) tl1e suit may be struck; (2) the stiit n1ay be ciismissed; (3) the cot1rt may proceed ex parte; (4) the cot1rt 1nay is sue a clefa11lt decree. Wl1ere a suit is struck out tinder Art. 69 (2) (beca11se 11eit.l1er party appeared) or 11nder Art. 70 (d) (beca11se the defendant was not served dt1e to tl1e neglige11ce or default of the plaintiff), the plaintiff 1 nay as of rig/it bring a fresl1 s11it on payment of fl1ll co11rt fees.35 On tl1e other hand, if l1e satisfies tl1e cot1rt tl1 at tl1ere was st1ffi.cient cause for hi.s non-appeara11ce, the original s11it �i � c�nti11ue i11stead a�d _the plaintif! �ill not I1ave to pay court fees.J6 Note the d1st1nct1on bet�1een cont1n1ung tl1e ext s�ng suit where the plaintiff l1as sl1own good cause for his non-appeara.11ce and filing a fresl1 suit. Where the plaintiff brings a fresl1 s11it, lie n1t1st pay the co� 1rt . fees ver, 1t 1s .as ? in the original actio11 a11cl tl1 e fees to institut� tl1e new action.. _More _ if tl1e first action [1ad not bee n i 11stitl1ted, so if the stat11te of lin11tat1011s l1as expir Wl1erens. ed before he instit11tes the second suit ' tl1at suit will be barrecl by limitatio . . s. 11 nt1 co t t st11 firs tl1e ce, an ear � pp � n-a no the as if be ca n sl1ow sufficient cause for But, even if tl1ere is no t s1r fiicient ca11se, wl1ere a suit is strL1ck 011t, tl1e pla1nt1ff t no or er eth s 1 i wl ion est q11 ly on e th ily can always bring a fre sh s11it, an d ordinar he will have to pay co11rt fees. 33. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 75(1). 34. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 75(2). 35. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 71(1). 36. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 71 (2).
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Where the plaintiff's s�it has �ee11 disn1issed, l1owev�r (because �e did not app - on the same ear while tile defeodailt did), 11.e 1s . p� ecl11ded fron1 br1ng1ng a suit ca.use of action.37 I-:Ie may apply, � 1th111 o_ne mont� from the date of the dis niissal, for an order to set tl1e disn11ssal aside, and if ?e _can �how tha! there was Slifficient catise for bis non-appearance, tl1e or:1er of d1s1111�sal 1s_ �et as1de,Js and . tile court will proceed with the suit ?Y I1old1ng tl1e l1ear1ng or1g1oally scl1eduled. In other words, where tJ1ere was sufficient cause for tl1e non-appearance,. the court \Vill liold the liearing originally schedt1led and proceed therefor: But, if he does not apply in ti1 11e or tl1e court finds that there �as not s�ffic1ent ca11se for bis non-appearance, l1e is i�orever barred fron1 prosec11t111g the claim. Certain qt1alifications sho11ld be noted. It l1as been l1cld that where the plain tiff's no11-appearance \Vas due to l1is death, . his representative m.ay subsequently apply to be made a party, 39 and tl1e order of dis1nissal will be set aside. o Tlus is prOJJer, since it is 11nlilcely tl1at a representative wo11ld J1ave been appointed at tl1e tin1e of tl1e origi11,Ll l1earing. A second qtia.li:fication is that the plai11tiff is only preclt1ded fro1n bringi11g a st1it witl1 res1Ject to the sa111e cat1se of action, and ''sa111e cat1se of action'' is strictly constrt1ed. So, where one co-owner brought suit agai11st tl1e otl1ers for a declaratio11 of l1is rigl1ts and tl1e suit was disn1issed dt1e to lus 11on-a1Jpeara11ce, it was l1eld tl1at tl1is clid n.ot bar a subseq11e11t suit to obtain partitio11 of tl1e la11d. 41 It l1as also bee11 l1eld tl1at a co-o\vner l1as a recu.rring rigl1t to obtai11 partitio11, a11d tl1at, tl1erefore, a fresl1 st1it for partition could be brot1gl1t as 1011g as tl1e pro1Jerty \Vas joi11tly owned. 42 1vloreover, tl1e disn1issal only precludes a fresl1 suit by tl1e J?laintiff; it does not 1Jrever1t J1im fro111 assert i11g tl1e facts \Vl1icl1 s111Jported l1is cat1se of actio11 i11 de.fence to a st1it brought agai11st l1i111 by tl1e defe11dant 011 tl1e sa111e tra11saction. If A s11es B to recover dan1ages resulti11g fro111 B's 11on-performance of a co11tract, tl1e s11it is dismissed dL1e to A's 11011-aJJpearance, a11d A is later s11ed by B on the sa111e contract, l1e can assert as a. defence tl1at B did not perforn1. 43 Finally, tl1e s11it is disn1issed onl)' as to tl1ose defendants tl1at appeared at tl1e l1earing. St1ppose tl1at A sued B and C, a11d at tl1e l1eari11g 011ly B a1Jpeared. As to B, tl1e case co1nes witl1in Art. 73, tl1e suit is dis111issed, and no fresl1 s11it can be broug]1t. Bt1t si11ce C did not appear, as to l1i111 tl1e case co111es witl1i11 Art. 69 (2), tl1e st1it is str11c]< ot1t, a11d tl1e plaintiff can bring a fres]1 st1it by 1Jayi11g the cot1rt fees.44 4
Where the def�ndant. does not appear, the cot1rt _proceeds ex parte and 1nay enter a decree aga111st 1111n; wl1ere a third party defendant does not ap_pear, tl1e cotirt er1ters a decree against l1im by defat1lt. I-Iowever, the defenda11t or third party defendant n1ay, witl1in 011e montl1 from the day J1e beca111e aware of tl1e decree, apply to have it set aside. If he satisfies tl1e court tl1at the su1n1no11s was 37 ·
�iv. _Pro. C., Art. 54(1). TJ1is rule is applicable to appeals, and ,vl1ere a11 appeal bas been dismissed under Art. 69(2) (becau�e 11either party appeared) or Art. 7 0 (d) (because the res . served . 0nde nt was not w1tl1 notice of the app_eal dt1e to tl1e negligence or d.efault of the � llant). or Art. 73 (because tl1e appellant did nor appear), a furtl1er appeal can not be lct� Civ. Pro. C., Art. 74(2). Notice of tl1e ap1)lication n1t1st be served 011 tl1e opposite party so tl1at l1e can contest it. Civ. Pro. C. , Art. 74 (3) . See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 49(1). See Debi Bakl1sh v. Habib SbaJ1 (Privy Counci l, India, 1913), Indian App., vol. 40, P· 151· �ee �ttkba v. Rancl1ariter (Hig]1 Ct., Patna, 1955), 19 56 All-I11dia Rep., p. 143. ee Dilorana v. Kunjbehari (Hjgh Ct. Pa tna' 1947) ' 1948 All-L11dia Rep., p. 244. ' . See the disc · poin · �lssio · n of tl11s · t 111 S. Sarkar, supra, note 31 at p. 317. See · Maktiocii v. Parbl1u (High Ct., A.llahabad, 1925), 1926 All-India Rep., p. 169.
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�-----... not duly served or that he wa s prevented by sufficient cause f om ppear1ng, the decree or order will be set · aside, and th e case will . con,t1'nue · ..� Thi�s means that e hearing at w.h'1ch the defendant originally the court h. oIds th d'd . 1 n o1 appear; · · . . · . . se t as1·a e, It IS as if it was never rendered once the de�ree is N . 0t e tl1at the . . tr'ff seek 1ng t o h ave an order of· a·1s1TI1ssal set aside inust ap pl,iin ply ,vi th in a at e th � of e tl1 e o fro rd m er wl1ereas a defendant seeking to have an e. month x e as 1 d set h as ne o de n1o nth from the time he was aware of the decre parte cree e. J e11dant n1ay no t be aware of tl1e decree t111ti] the plain"t'i·lf tr i·es t o en1orce T 1e def c · 1 e lY t_ o be tl1e c�se wl1ere tb.e sum mo · 1s · l'k it agarnst hin�-t IlIS ns was n ot dtily serv�d-so tl1e. _ period �nly_ r1111s fr?11� tl1at t11ne. If the defendant does not apply with in that tune, o r if . the cot1rt fi11cls tl1at tl1e sum mons ,vas dtily served and t!Jat there w,1s 11ot S\1ffic1ent cat1se fo r 1100-appearance, tl1e decree is valid, and it will be enforced against tl1e defen�la11t 11otwitl1sta11ding tl1at J1e never presented his defe�ce. 1:(e l1ad the opportu�1t� t o a�1Jear and can11ot I1ave the case reope11ed to give him anotl1er cl1au�e. It 1s SJJec1fically JJrovided that tl1e fact tl1 at tl1e app licant was absent at the time tl1e decree was passed does not jtistify setting tl1at decree aside. 46 A pr oble111 111ay arise wl1ere are 1nt1ltiple defe11dants, and an ex parte decree rendered agai11st all o r so111e of the111 is set aside only as t o some. Suppose tl1 at tl1ere are tw o defe11dants, 11eitl1er of whom appeared, and the ex parte decree against one is set aside, but not tl1at against the otl1er. Or, one appeared, jt1dg n1ent was entered against l1in1, a11 ex parte decree was entered against tl1e otl1 er, \Vhich he later has set side. It is provided that wl1ere the decree is st1ch tl1at it cannot be set aside on]y against the 11on-appearing defe11dant entitled to have it set aside, it m.ay be set aside against the otl1er defenclants also:17 Tl1e co11rt should be very hesita11t t o exercise tl1e power to set tl1e clecree aside against tl1e other defendants, but t11ereare times w11en tl1is n1t1st be done. This wot1ld be 11eces sary where the defendants are indispensable parties, si11ce a clecree agai11st some alone cc:1nnot sta11d. In 011e case st1it was brot1gl1t against tl1e heirs of tl1e obligor, 11one appeared, and an ex parte decree was entered i11 favor of the plaintiff. Son1e ce. of tl1e l1eirs de1nonstrated that tl1ere was sL1fficie11t cat1se for their non-appearan . Since the claim was against tl1e ]1eirs t ogether, all are liable or no11e are, and tl1e decree against all 111t1st be set aside. 48 Tl1e san1e wot1ld be tr11e in a s11it to recover p ossession of la11d in the j oi11t possession of two persons, 011e of who1n had su·fficient cause for 11011-a1Jpearance,49 or a SL1it for partitio11 \�1bere some of the other o w1iers l1ad strffi.cient cat1se for non-appearance. 50 Tl1e decree 111ay also be i11divjsible beca.use of tl1e 11att1re of t11e plaintiff's clai111 against the defe11dants. l n 011e cases1 A stied B and C, alleging tJ1at tl1ey were in joint possession of . B �ppear�d, tl1em with ion sess pos the land and tl1at he v1as entitled to sl1are the but C did not. TL1e court fot1nd tl1at A was e11titled to sl1are tl1e possession w1t]1 pa�t y, s� Civ. Pro. C., Art. 78. Notice of l1i� application must be served on the �ppost i 1te ony tlm s te_ 1e er s1d co� t no can rt cou t!1e de, asi set is ree dec that be can contest it. When the , Ct. igh (tl P. v. ani Ph See . ew an begrn st mu gs taken at the former he.aring. The proceedin Calcutta, 1956), 1957 All-lrzdia Rep., p. 170. 46. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 78(3). 47. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 78(2). Rep., 48 . See Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tol1urennissa Bibi (High Ct., Calcutta, 1898)• l11d'tan L· vol. 25, p. 155. ' 1960 All-India Rep., p. 485, ar1d the 49 · See Vasant v. Tukaram (f.Iigh Ct., Bon1bay, 1960,, discussion in S. Sarkar, s11pra, note 31 at P· 32 5. 50. Ibid. 383· 4, p. l. vo ., ep 2 R L. <-in c/i I11 ), 02 19 , d b a a b 51 · Bhura M al v. Har Kishan Das (Higl1 Ct., All a 45 .
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52 . tl1em inst 1 C ag,: dem?nstrated that r favo l1js i11 ee decr a red ente and c d B t he tl1a s n wa e anc ear app entitled to have non s l1i for � se cau � rit cie suffi _ � the�� was _ alleged that rff 111t pla l1e was entitled tile decree against liim set aside. Since tl1e a not Id be 1 : co1 decree to the effect re th C, and l1 B wit ion � sess pos to share the tllat Ile was entitled to sl1are the possession �1th B_ and a decree to the effect that he was not entitled to sl1are tl1e_ pos�es�1on with C. Theref�re, the decree against B bad to be set aside as \vell, since rf 1t were not, there m1ght be inconsistent decrees it1 tl1e same case.
At first glance it 1night seem tinfair to set aside tl1e _decree in favor of the plaintiff� against one defendant simply be�ause the one against the o�he� n1� st be set aside. But whe11 it is reme1nbered that tlus does not mean tl1at the pla1nt1ff 1s de prived of l1is right, only tl1at l1e mu� t establish_ it again, with t�e a�sent defeo_dant 11 avi11g tl1e opportt111ity to prese11t h1s defence, 1 t seems less 11nfa1r. Since the rights of tl1e 11011-::1ppearing defenda11t wot1ld be affected b)1 tl1e decree, and since there was good cause for l1is 11on-appearance, l1e sl1ot1ld have tl1e c11a11ce to present I1is defence, eve11 tl1ot1gl1 this mea11s tl1at tl1e plaintiff n1t1st re-litigate his claim against tl1e otl1er defenda11t. 1-Iowe,,er, tl1e decree against tJ1e otl1er defenda11t or defenda11ts sl1ould be set aside 011ly ,:vl1ere tl1e decree is necessarily i11divisible. Where separate judgments can be e11tered agai11st eacl1 defe11dant, e.g., tl1e plaintiff seeks a n1oney jt1dgment against eacl1, tl1ere is no neecl to set aside tl1e decree agai11st tl1e otl1ers.53 In one case 54 A stied B for declaration tl1at he was the owner of the land and C, ,vl10 ,,,as tl1e te11a11t, to recover possessio11. B appeared, b11t C did not. The court found tl1at A ,:vas tl1e owner as agai11st B and entitled to recover possession fron1 C. C obtained a11 order setti11g aside tl1e decree a.gainst l1im. The court l1eld that it was not necessary' to set aside tl1e decree agai11st B, since the decree invol,1ed o,vnersl1ip ,vl1ile tl1e decree against C involved possession, and decree i11 fa.var of tl1e plaintiff agai11st B ,vot1ld 11ot be inconsistent witl1 a decree in favor of C agai11st tl1e plaintiff. It is 0111y \.Vhere all defendants are indispensable parties or wl1ere tl1e decree i s esse11tially indivisible, tl1at tl1e decree against the otl1er defend ant or defendants sho11ld be set aside. (c) Suffcient cause We n1ay now consider the question of ''sti:fficie11t cause." T.he Code uses '·st1fficient cat1se'' i11 1nore than 011e context. Wl1ere tl1e st1it ]1as bee11 struck out, Art. 71 (2) l)rovides tl1at tl1e plaintiff may contint1e tl1e st1it witl1ot1t paying tl1e cot1rt fees rf th �re was ''st1fficient cat1se for l1is non-appearance." Wl1ere tl1e suit l1_as . been dism1sse?, 0-rt. 74 (2) J)rovides tl1at tl1e I)laintiff may J1ave the order of d1s _ nussa1 set aside if l1e sl1ows tl1at tl1ere was ''sufficie11t ca11se for l1is non-appear ,, ance. Wl1�re an e� J)arte decree l1a.s been passed. ,1gainst a defendant or a default de?ree_ against a tl11rd party defenda11t, tinder Art. 78 (2), tl1e decree 1nay be set �sid� if tl1 e defenda1?t sl1ows that he was ''preve11ted by sufficient cause fron1 appear ing. SI1ot1ld ''s11ffic1ent ca11se'' vi1he11 t1sed in Art . 71 (2) n1ean tl1e san1e as wl1e11 52.
Since the laintiff was cJ auni • • ng agai• nst both, tl1e court had to render a jud gment agains·t � . ·· the non-a� earing defendant. See Civ . Pro. C., Art. 75(2). 53. See the d.1scussion in S. Sarkar, supra note 49 54. � o;����� v. Nara Narayan Roy (High Ct.,· Calcutta, 1899), Calcutta Weekly Notes, voJ.
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an d (2 ) 78 �2)'?·'s 74 Ar �; in If we consider tl1e effect us ed is it of a finding of �n� the wer sho uld cau se, clea rly be no. Under Art 71 ''sufficient t ues q pla int s�a tl1e iff ll be � exc used fron1 payin g court ·fees. �- i,� tion is wl1ethe e� if . tliere � cat for 1se l11s ien t non -ap . ·o,a' y proseCLIte tl1e cl a1n1. H 1Jearance' 11e were not suffic . o w. see I a1n t s p to I tr k h h e ave t a11 wh ere ord er of dism · . issal set as1de under Art · ever' • . :ffi · '' • '' . · t no su c1e nt 1s caL 1er 1se e I , t he ·r 1 1s pre (2) clt ide d froni brl· ging a suit 00 74 . SL1b sta l1is and ntiv � e righ t cla is im, des tro yed e A · i 1 sa� d wlle�·e the de1endant or th ird the . . party defendant se� k s to l 1ave a11 ex . {)arte 01 defa11lt decree set aside LInd er Ar t 78 1'f ' ; fi caus e," tl1e ('suffi cien t Judg me1 1t not will is stan d e witli otit the de enda11t s ever ther · . · · having l1ad the opport11111ty to present I11s defence or contest tl,e tllird party claim.
Cle�rly ''sufficient ca11se'' sl10L1ld no t be construed to 1nean til e saine thiil in g Wh co11 ere tex ts. t tl1e onl y dif feren effect of a fi11ding of insttfficient catise these ·will be th,1t the part_y 111�1st pay co11rt fees, st1fficie11t ca11se sl,ould be strictly constru ed. 56 U�les_s 111s fa1lt1re to a1Jpear was dt1e to factors clearly beyon d 11is contro1, the platnttff sl1011ld. have to pay tl1e cou1i fees an d file anotl1er stiit. But where tl1e effect of a fi11_ding of ins11fficie11t ca11se will be that a party's rigJ1ts are destroyed or tl1at he w1Jl not l1ave l1ad tl1e op1)ortu nity to presen t 11.is defence sufficient cause sl1011ld be constrt1ed 11111cl1 more liberally. One cot1rt l1as st1ooested that the test in tl1e latter case s]1ot1ld be wl1etl1er the failL1re to appear w:: dt1e to s0111etl1iu� eq11jvalent .to misconc�11ct or gross neglige11ce. If the plaintifl. clid I1is best to be 111 court at tl1e prOJ)er t1111e, tl1er� wot1ld be sufficient cat1se, even tl1ot1gh l1e was careless or negligen t.57 Tli is see111s to be a sound test. Un less a part),'s con duct indicates that he was indifferent or ca11011s abo11t his obligation to ap1Jear, the court shot1ld find that there was sufficient ca11se f. or no11-ap1Je,1rance. An ex an1ple of insufficient cause wot1ld be where tl1e party did not i11teod to aJJpear personally on the day of tl1e l1eari11g and failed to advise l1is attorney to appear for him. If he did not i11te11d to appear, he had tl1e obligation to advise his attor11ey to appear for l1i111 a11d to tell l1ir11 wl1en st1cl1 ap1Jearance had to be made. Tl1e party den1onstrated 110 concer11 for lus obligation to appear, a11d, therefore, the co11rt sl1ould not fi11d s11fficie11t ca11se despite tl1e effect of tl1e finding on the party 's substantive rights. Tl1ere are some circumsta11ces wl1ere tl1e existence of s1rfficieot caL1se is evide11t and tl1e court sl1011ld :find s11fficie11t cat1se ,vithin tl1e meani11g of Art. 71 (2) as well as within the n1eani1Jg of Arts. 74 (2) and 78. Strppose tJ1at the plai11tiff has a case in Dire Dawa, in wlucl1 an advocate from Acidis Ababa is to appear for him. CoL1rt begins at 10.00 A.M., and the advocate pla.11s to fly to Dire Dawa on tl1e day of tl1e I1earing. Tl1e flight fro1n. Addis Ababa takes on� hot1r, and tl1e plane is scl1edt1led to arrive at 8.30 A.1\11. However, tl1e p.lane 1s delayed three ho·urs, and wl1en the advocate arrives, the case has bee11 called in tl1e pla58intiff's Tl1e absence and disn1issed. Clearly, tl1ere is sufficien t caL1se for non-appearance. plaintiff an d I1is advocate acted in good faith thro11gho11t. Tl1� advocate allowed ample time, and he was lat e du e to c.irct1n1sta11ces beyond 111s con trol. Or, tl1e " to appear. use ca d oo g "_ 1 ho fai ls ut t�1o \vi v. nt da fen de rty Art. 76( 1) refers to a thi rd pa <l us� au � cre de the ide as g t111 s�t s rd g� re _as s nt da Art. 78(2) refers to third party defen " SufficieJit cause e, cre de e th ide "sufficient cat1se." Since we are concerned \Vtth setting as . should be the test in the case of third party defendants as well. tten: sui! seq u a ut, k uc str s wa it su e th 1e � tin � 1e 56. There could be a problem where at tl � 1e cou d. 00_ 1 d te ec ttld be au wo s ht rig 's iff int pla e th , ce Sin ber n. would tio ita be d by lim barre d i e or n1 ue tr ns 1 • co be en a.:: 1ent • cause'' should th continue the first suit, in such cases ''su111c ally. · 60 p. , 46 l. vo , p. Re L. 71 a rli In 57 · See Arunachala v. Subbararniah (I-Iigh Ct., Madras, 1923), 58 - See Amir Amin v. Karam (High Ct., Lahore, 1927), 1927 All-lnclia Rep., p. 4o.
55 ·
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advoc,:tte had i 11strt1cted l1is clerk to exan1ine the case in wl1icl1 he was to appear the next day. The clerk failed to examine tl1e list with the result that the advocate did not appear. Again, tl1e failt1re to appear was not due to the fault of the JJlaintiff or liis advocate, b11t to the carelessi1ess of tl1e advocate's clerk, and the cause of tl1e abse11ce should be dee1ned strfficient. 59 .
· Tl1e 111ore difficult cases are tl1ose ,vl1ere tl1ere is not bad faith, but where a party or I1is advocate was abse11t at tl1e ti111e tl1e case was Cfllled_, �nd the absence was not due to factors beyond l1is co11trol. Suppose tl1at tl1e pla1nt1ff who planned to ,1p1Jea.r left tl1e co11rtl1ot1se, believing tl1at tl1e case whicl1 prece�ed �is would occt1py s0111 e tin1e. J-:Ie retur11ed a l1alf-l1011r l,1ter and fot1nd tl1at during 111s absence l1is case l1ad been called ar1d disn1issed. Or, tl1 e advocate tl1ot1ght that the case wot1ld be called at a later tin1e, but jt vvas called earlier and was disn1issed; all tl1e while tl1 e piaintiff was waiti11 g in l1is advocate's office. Here the failure to appear is due to the fault of tl1e party or l1is advocate. Cases n1ust be heard at tl1 e apJJropriate ti111e, a11d a party l1 as s01ne responsibility for being tl1ere wl1 en his case is callee!. It can be said that a JJarty or l1is advocate sl1011ld not leave the co11rtl1 011se if tl1ere is tl1e cl1a11ce that tl1e case ,vill be called in l1is abse11ce. For JJurposes of Art. 71 (2), tl1is sl1 ot1lcl not co11stit11te s11fficient cat1se, and the plaintiff sl1ould be req11ired to IJay tl1e costs. I--Iowever, it is a 1nt1cl1 differe11t q11estion as to ,vl1etl1er a party's substantive rights sl1011ld be affected becatise of tl1is ki11d of 111istal<e. There is no indifference or gross 11eglige11ce. Tl1e party or l1is advocate miscalc11lated tl1 e tin1e when the case ,votI!d be called. V/hile tl1is ca11not be condoned, 11evertheless, it may be asked wl1etl1er tl1e effect of st1cl1 a 111 istake sl1ould be tl1 at the plaintiff will be t1nable to ]Jrosect1te bis case or tl1e defe11da11t 11nable to present l1is defence. I11 setting aside a clecree, tl1e court can tax tl1e costs of tl1e forn1er proceedi11g against tl1e 1Jarty ,vl10 did 11ot appear and who no\\1 seeks to set aside tl1e decree or dis mis sal. c,o Tl1e I11clian cot1rts I1a,1e l1eld that in st1cl1 cases, since tl1e failure to �1ppear was dt1e to tl1e fa11lt of tl1e parLy or his advocate, there was 11ot sufficient cat1se witl1in tl1e 1near1ir1 g of tl1e corresponding provisions of tl1 e Indian Code. 61 I-Iow ever, the India11 co11rts l1 ave also held tl1at even tl1ough there is not sufficient cat1se for non-appearance within tl1e r11eani11 g of tl1 e Code, tl1e cotl.fts l1a.ve tl1e i11l1ere111 po1ver to restore a case ,vl1ere it wo11ld be 11nj11st not to do so, a11d in one of tl1ese cases, tl1e court set aside tl1 e order of dis111issal. 62 Tl1is seen1s to me to be an 11nso11nd way of deali11 g with the problem. If tl1ere is not sufficient cause ¥-1itl1in tl1e 111eaning of the Code) I do 11ot see 11 0\V tl1e court can set aside the �isn1 issal or t�1e decree. V/l1 at tl1e cot1rts are really doi11g is establisbi11g two defi11i t1ons of sufficient cause, 011 c witl1in tl1e 1neaning of tl1e Code, and one as it relates �o tl1e cot1rt's inl1erent power to set aside the decree. Since tl1e court is unwill ing to deprive a party of l1 is rigl1 ts beca11se of tl1is kind of n1istake, it should hold tl1at s11cl1 a 111.istake constitutes s11fficient cause within tl1e n1eani11g of the See Tl1e Oriental Corp. v. The Mercantile Corp. (l-ligh Ct., Bom bay, 1866), Bornbay High Ct. Rep., vol. 2, p. 267. 60. Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 74(2), 78(2). 61 · Manilal v. GuJan1 1-Iusain_ (lligl1 Ct., Bom bay, 1889), J11cJia.11 L. Rep., vol. 13, p. 12; Lalta Prasad v. Rain Karan (High Ct., Allal1a bad, 1912,) Indian L. Rep., vol. 34, p. 426. 62 · �alta Prasad v. Ram Karan, s11pra, note 61. See also Bilasiria v. Cursondas (I-Iigh Ct., b 1919) i .Bo,nbay L. !?,-ep., vol. 2J, p. 952. In tl1at case tl1e plaintiff left the court 11���e af� get witn ses, and bis a�vocate was not authori l1im. The advocate for � appear zed to nlo e_d for an adJournment, which was denie t11ere was not altho ugl1 d. � It that was held su ·1 ei nt caus� f0;.. the plaintiff's non-appearance rt cou the Cod e, the � of with iuea in the · ning · wou d under its inherent powers" restore the suit.
59 ·
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a 11d it is: st1b111itted tha t itl Co de , the . of ns vis such cases tlie Ethtop io pro · ian courts . was s1rffic there 1ent caus e within the · nJ eaning of Arts. 74 (2) an should find that d 78. The n1ost difficult case i s wb.ere a party instrt1cted his advocate tO appear a d no do t d sim di s ply o. cat It l1as been I1e td that where t he a dvoc a,t_ e n. the advo e d1d · · wa s occ eca h e t1p1 t1se e b r d 10 anotl1e r case at the time the appe:rance not appea se.63 To so l1old pen· al1' was due, there. wa s not st1fficie11t cati · zes the party 1or th e . . ·eve1, ,vl1ere a party atitllorizes someone conduct of .h1s a dvocate. 1. I- ow o t · · appear for h1m, I1e tak es t I 1e r1sk t11at tl1at J)e rson will not appear and must b e prepared to st1ffe 1· tl1e con seqt1e11:es. A party cot1ld 11ot justify J1is non-appearance on th� ground that l1e was occt1p1e d elsewl1ere, and wl1e11 the advocate is to appear for him, the 1100-appearance o_f tl1e aclvocate can11ot be justified on that ground. The advocate shot1ld have adv1secl the party to appear or asked for an adjourn tnent. Where a11 advoca te l1as not ap1)eared for tl1e clie11t, I1e is liable for ''conlm itting an error, h aving _r�gard to the rt1les of l1is professio11'' \Vitbjn the n1 ean.ing of Art. 2636 of tl1e C1v1l �od_e, ancl tl1e St1preme I111perial Cotirt l1as I1eld that wl1ere tl1e case has bee11 d1s1n1ssecl due to tl1e t11Jexct1sed non-. appeara11ce of the advoca te, the advocate is liable to tl1e client for professional fault. 64 Si11ce tl1ere was no excl1se for tl1e 0011-a_ppearance, the clie·nt cannot assert tl1e existence of sufficient cat1se, even tl1ough he l1i1nself was 11ot a.t fat1lt. I-Ie took st1cl1 a risl<. \\1 l1e11 I1e left the appearance to l1 is advocate.
Wl1ere an ex pa.rte proc ee ding has been acljot1r11ed, tl1e defendant 111ay appea.r at the a djourned l1earing if hjs prior non-appeara1.1ce \Vas occasioned by ''good cause." Here tl1e court l1as not co1npleted tl1 e proceeding, and tl1e effect is not the same as tl1e s etting aside of an ex parte d ecree or order of dis111issal. Con sequently, ''good cause'' n1a y be constrt1ecl even 1nore liberally tl1a11 ''st1fficient cause." It sl1ould only be wl1ere there ,vas a v.1ilft1l disreg,1rcl of the obligatio11 to appear that the court should find an ab sence of ''good catise," 65 e.g., tl1e clefe n 66 But . 1 ]lin for r appea to ate advoc l1is ct instrl1 11ot id d nd a daot did not appear if he entrusted tl1 e appear ance to his advocate� who failed to appear, tl1ere sl1ol1ld be ''good cat1se'' for ti1e se pt1rposes, altl1 ougl1 tl1ere wot1ld not be ''st1fficie11t cause'' if that were re quired. •
In all cases, it mt1st b e re111en1 be red tl1at a case is not to be adjot1rned dt1e to th e non-appearance of parties. St1cl1 non-appearance entails le_gal co·os�q ue nces, and tl1e court must take action in accordance \Vith tl1e appropriate pr ov1s1ons of the Code.
2.
Examination of Parties A st hear i11g. fir e th th �i e s d e oc pr t ur co e tl1 _ _ ssuming that botl1 p arties appear, eads tl1e en � th 1ty It 11� e 1d e 1r tl1 e s rifi e . v W11ere the parties appear in p erson, it _. 67 ery rn i_portant v 1 a s is Th . gs in ad e pl e pleadings and exa 1nines tl1e parties on th 63. 64. 65. 66 · 67.
6· 11 p. p., Re ia nd l-l J1/ 48 19 ), 47 19 , See Gajraj v Suraj (Cl1ief Ct Oudh 7 591)_4 ) o. N . pp A l vi Ci , 62 19 , ba ba A is dd A ., Tadesse Deln�sahou v. Bekel�;cl1 Kassa (Higl1 Ct Journal of Ethiopiarz Law, vol. 3 (1966) 65. See Amir v. Karan1, si1pra, note 58. r e quires 77 . rt A , ar pe ap t no s e do ly al Where a party who has been ordered to appear person "good cause'' to justify the non-appearance. . . st u ro it rm fo e r Civ. Pro. C., Art. 241 (1). Where the s!aten1ent of ?efei, cedis exr: i�� PJ,� defenda�t orally. be rejected but th e court proceeds with the hearing an Civ. Pro. C., Art. 238.
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68 is er r ad ple rty pa 1 acl h s ask whether he � 1rt � part of' tile proceedings. Tb� cot of the other party that ing ad ple he t 1n t fac of ns tio ega all tl1e ies den _ adnlits or , every allegation of r VI pte Ch 1n saw we As � . 1ied 1 de 11 bee \'ise er\ oth . have 110t ent tl1e te1n 1n sta ied of defence is den t 11o is t tl1a i111 cla of ent tem sta fact j 11 the 9 rt's er tl1e cou pow by ed to examine alifi qt1 is e r11l is TL1 d.6 itte adm be deen1ed to ant the end t def tl1a has_ n�t deni s see 1rt cot tl1e If g. rin l1ea t firs tl1e at t]ie parties . t men of _clai1n, 1t gives tate tl1e f . 1on gat alie 1lar tict � IJar � a ed 11itt ad1 ly ress ed or exp J1in1 a second chance, so to speak. Tl1e co1 1rt vvill specifically ask 11101 whether he intencled to adn1it that allegatjon, and if l1e says tl1e11 tl1at he did not intend to ad111it it, tl1at allegatio11 is deen1ed denied.70 Th. e cot1rt records all admissions and Wl1ere a. party makes an admission denials, a11d they form part of tl1e record. at t11e ·first lJearing, that ad 1 nission is co11clt1si,1e, a11d no issue will be framed as to tl1at 111atter. 71 In other ,vords, tl1e defendant 111ay deny or admit the allegations i 11 his state111e1 1t of defence or at tl1e exan1ination. The court makes certajo that l1e intended to ad 1nit wl1at he did admit a11d tl1at there is no ad111issio11 by inadvertance. •
The exa111 inatio11 of tl1e plai11tiff at tl1is ti1 ne ls particularly important, since the JJlaintiff does 11ot file a respo11sive pleading to tl1e stateo1ent of defence. Ir1 the state111ent of defence tl1e de.fe11cla11t raises ,vl1at \Ve have called affi.r1 native defences, e.g., li111itatio11, force majet1re. 72 By exa 111ining tl1e plai11tiff, tl1e co11rt determines ,vl1ether I1e ad111its or de1lies tl1e facts constittiting s11cl1 defences. Suppose tl1at the defe11 da11t raised tl1e defe11ce of li111itatio11. Tl1e pl,tintiff cot1ld deny tl1at tl1e period of li111itation l1ad rt1n, in wl1ich case tl1ere wo11Id be an issue 011 tl1is point. Or, l1e could adn1it tl1at tl1e stat:t1tory periocl 11,1d expirec1, bt1t contend that it l1ad beei1 interrtI J)ted and tl1at a.t the ti1ne of st1it, tl1e period had 11ot rttn. 73 Then, the court ,vot1ld 011ly frame an. isst1e 011 wl1etl1er tl1e period l1ad bee11 interrupted. Perl1aps, in a suit 011 a contract, tl1e clefendant raises tl1e defence of :force 1najeure. Tl1 e plaintiff 111igl1t deny tl1at the defenda 11t ,vas 11nable to perfor1n or he 1njg!Jt co11te11d tl1at wl1ile J Jerfor1nance \Vas prevented, the occ11rrence preventi11g perfor11 1ance was foreseeable, i11 \Vl1icl1 case it wot1ld not an1ot1nt to force 111 ajeure.74 The co11rt tl1en ,vill frar11e tl1e apJJropriate issue. Tl1e oral cxa111ination of the plaintiff at tl1e J 1eari11g serves tl1e f11r1 ctio11 of a reply to affir111ative defences raised in tl1e staten1ent of defe11ce; tl1e cot1rt detern1i11es wl1etl1er t J1e plai 11tifl:� adn1its or de11ies st1cl1 allegations and fra111es tl1e isst1es accordi11gly. Tl1e _purpose of the exami11atio1 1 at tl1e first I1earing, tl1en, is to l1elp tl1e court to clar1fy and de,,elop tl1e isst1es for trial. 75 Tl1e cot1rt exa111jnes eacl1 party, or wl1 ere tl1e party �oes 11ot appear, tl1e person acco1npa11ying tl1e JJleader for tl1e pt1rpose of a11swer1og st1c]1 qtiestions.76 Si 11ce tbe exa 111ination 11111st be conducted
68. The term "J)l eader" is t1sed throughout the Civil Procedure Code. It 111eans an advocate a 11d any IJerson entitled to appear and plead for a11other Civ. Pro. C., Art. 3. 69. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 235(2). 70. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 241(4). 7 1. S:e Abdul v. Maryan1 (l-Iigh Ct., Rajahstan, 1926), 1926 AII-I11clia Rep,, p. 710. 72 . Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 82, 234(1). See the discussion of affirLnative defer1ces i 11 Cl1apter VT, supra. 73. Se e Civ. C., Arts. 1851, 1852. 74. Civ. C., Art. 1792(2). 75. See t l ie statement in Gunga v. Tiluckram (Pr ivy Cou11ci1, India, 1888), J11diar1 App,, vol. 15, p. 119. 76. Civ. Pro. C,, Art. 241(2). Wl1ere tl1e person part y 1 1ot present and tl1e pleader or tb.e is _ ac� ompanymg the pleader cannot or wi l e t� to g relat in l not ques answ tion er mat any erial _ · 5t11t , tl1e court n1ay adJo . ·· urn tl1e hearing a11d direct tJ1at the party appear ·1n person. C1v Pro. c., Art. 241(3)
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he court and only for tl1is p u rpose, it wot1ld n·o t be prope c · t r io r t bY h e c o urt to x a d a ' s t e e _ th t · 11 on m o . n _ th e_ en�ire case and allow tl put a party � � � 7 1e other m 1ne e e x a m e x�m 1nat1on 1s s i mply to determ cross to . arty � ine what adp par t Y h w1s s a es 1 en1a . to d make . and and to ns assist ·ssio th e c o 1 u r t in fram1ng n1 . · . d t d co1 uc e w1 e b 1 I t ·tl " _ 1 re1_e1ence to _the allegations contai tl1e issues. t n1u splem ned i11 the ple the en ad ts i ng s 111 develop i ng tl1e issues for trial. pleading s and st1p_ . Where admissions have been 1nade in the J)leadings or on tl1e ora1 ex. anun a app l 1nay Y part to y tl1e col1rt for st1c11 jtidoment or order tion tl1e otl1er as e ie 1 8 7 a as res lt o · u . f· ti · led to · 1e a d 1n1s · ns. rfl1e case n1 ay be decided i ii · �1� may' be en_trt whole or 1n part 0�1 tl1 e basts of tl1e. adm1ss1ons 1nade by the parties. To take an extreo1e exan1ple, 1f �he clefencla11t ad.n1 1.tte� a�l of the plaintiff's allegations and did not assert �ny affir1nat1ve �e�ences, . tl1 e �larnttff w?t1ld ?e entitled to a jtidginent thos� ad1n1ss1011s. Wl1at 1s 1·11ore likely 1s tl1at a party inay have 00 the basis of adn1itted a part of h1� o_ppone11t's case. Tl1e defei1da11t 1nay admit tl1 at he is liable, but deny tl1at tl1e pla111t1ff sti:ffered tl1 e damages he clai111 ed. Tl1 e cot1rt wotilcl isstte a jtidg111ent to the effect tl1at tl1 e defe1Jdant is liable to the plaintiff in an a111ou11t to be detern1 jned at tl1 e trial, . vvl�cl1 wot1ld tl1 e11 be li111ited to deciding tl1 e ques tiotl of ,vhat dan1ages the pla1nt1ff sufferecl. Or, tl1e plaintiff 1nay l1ave st ied tl1e defendant on two 11egotiable .i11strt1111ents, and tlJe defe11 da11t adn1its tl1 at l1e is liable . that 11e is liable denies on tl 1 e otl 1 er i t 1�he court wot1ld issue a judg on one, bt ment in ·favor of the plaintiff on 011 e of tl1 e i11strt11nents. So too, the plaintiff 1n.ay admit a part of tl1 e defendant's defe11ce. If the plaintiff l1ad sued on two negoti able i1Jstrt1n1ents, both of wl1 icl1 tl1e defenda11t claims l1 e l1ad paid, and at the first hearing tl1e pl,1intiff (after hearing the defendant's testin1ony) admits that one was paid, the cot1rt wot1ld enter a jt1dg111ent in favor of the defe11 dant on the . 011e instrument. A11other example wo11ld be where tl1e plai11tiff stied to recover Eth. $ 15,000, but admits tl1at tl1e defendant IJaid Eth.$ 3,000. The defendant \VOttld be . entitled to an order req11iring the plai11tiff to redt1ce l1is claim to Etl1.$ 12,000 Conversely, the defenda11t could admit tl1at l1e \Vas liable for Etl1.$ 3,000, a11d tl1e plaintiff would be entitled to a jt1dgn1 ent for Etl1 .$ 3,000 at that ti111e.i 9 3.
Preliminary Objections After the court l1as examined tl1e IJarties, it proceeds to decide any preli1nioary objections that have been raised.so A preli1ninary objectio11 may be defined as an objection not goino to tl1 e 111erits of the case, tl1at is, t1ot involving tl1e ql1estion of -;;vhether tli e defendant is liable to tl1 e plai11tiff tinder the substantive law. We have earljer considered the objection of mis-joinder or non-joinder or parti�s. and the objection of wa11 t of jurisdictio11. Tl1 e objectio11 o� �is-joi�de� or non-Jo1nder d.oes not (except where there }1 as bee n a failt1re to JOID an 1nd1spei1sable party) result in dismissal of the suit. Want of jurisdiction obviously does. Art. 244 (2) sets fortl1 certain preliminary objections, a11d when st1cl1 objections are filed, tl1e cotirt is to proceed i n accordance v1itl1 tl1e provisions of Art. 245.. UtJder that article, it js directed to hear the opposite party, order tl1e product i on of Sltcl1 77 · See Manmohan v Msst Ramdei (Privy Council, India, 1931), 1931 All-Incfia Rep., p. 175· Note that u11.der ·Art. 24 1 (2), the parties n1ay suggest questions to the cotirt. . 8 78- Civ. Pr�. C., Art. 242. The court n1ay. also at � later Si ag_e _ of ti ��� t � lj��� � �� �� 1 Y � 01 0 e , on g issi adm to admit a fact or doc1m1ent, and 1f tb ere 1s an cordingly Civ. Pro. C., Art. 243. n , it tio dic · · s · ri Ju 1 1a er at . . . s , M rt 11 co 7 9. I f the _adtn1ss e th 1on redt1ces th� claim to an an1.oun t bel.. ow . ro P . iv C ee S . rt u co te a in or d b may still try tl1e suit, or 1t n1ay tra11sfer tl1e case to a su C., Art. 16(3). 80· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244(1).
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on o1 the ?� jection. s1 Where cis d a r de � ren d an � � ry ssa ece 11 be y ina s a. ce eviden . 1g or striking out the suit ss11 IDJ d1s er ord an kes n1a it , ned tai sus is ion ect obj the t1gh_ th� preliminar y objection� l1o AJt . ion ect obj the of L1re nat the on ing depend lis� 1s no t exclusiv�, and any tl1e , 1on m11 c st n1o tl1e are � (2) 244 t. Ar in d e i specif rits y me tl1e ma to be ng goi raised at that not one on ecti obj ry ina liin pre other tin1e. We will no'vV consider the objections specified under Art. 244 (2), wl1ich are as follows: (1) tl1e court lacks jurisdiction; (2) tl1e . suit is res . judicata; (3) the suit is pending in anotl1er co11rt;_ �4) tl1e other party 1s not q11a;lified for acting in the proceedings; (5) JJrior perm1ss1on to sue _l1as_ 1:ot been obta1n�d, :V hen this is required by law; (6) tl1e suit is barred by I1:-111tat10�; (7) the claim 1s subject to arbitration or I1as bee11 compron1ised. We WJll consider each of tl1ese objections separately. As disct1ssed previously, tl1e cot1rt will reject tl1e staten1ent of claim under Art. 23 1, w11ere it sl1ows tl1at tl1e court does not l1ave jurisdiction. At tlJat time we observed tl1at tl1e cot1rt sl1ot1ld not reject tl1e staten1ent of claim on tl1e ground tl1at it does not sl1ow judicial jurisdiction, since jt1dicial jurisdiction can exist on the basis of consent. At tl1e first l1earing tl1e defendant n1ay e11ter a special appear ance and object to tl1e lacl<: of juclicial jurisdictio11 on tl1e grot1nd tl1at he is not an Ethio1Jian national or do1niciliary and tl1at tl1e act wllicb is the subject matter of t11e st1it did 11ot occt1r i11 Etl1io1)ia. I-le 111ay also conte11d that tl1e court la.cks 111aterial or local jur.isdictio11, argtiing tl1at tl1e allegations of the staten1ent of clain1 in tl1is regard \,1ere not correct. A11 objection tl1at tl1e sL1bject-111,1tter of t11e suit is res jt1dicata n1ust be deter111ined ,vitl1 refere11ce to the provisions of Art. 5 of tl1e Civil Procedtrre Code, whicl1 will be discL1ssed i11 Cl1aJJter XI. \Ve have disc11ssed the problem of pendency i11 Cl1apter III. If tl1e matter is pe11di11g i n anotl1er cot1rt i11 Etl1iopia, tl1e second cot1rt 111u.st st1stain the objectio11 a11d cannot hear the st1it. 82 Tl1e objec tion tl1at tl1e otl1er JJarty is not qualified for acting in tl1e proceedings could arise in a nt1n1ber of ¥la.ys. If a party is a 111inor, the oppo11e11t wo11ld de111and tl1at tl1e legal represe11tati,1e be brot1gl1t in i11 l1is stead. 8 3 Tl1e defendant could also object 011 tl1e ground tl1at tl1e plaintiff does not have a vested interest in tl1e st1b ject matter of the st1it, and tl111s cannot bring tl1e proceedings. 84 In certain cii cu1nsta11ces, prior per11lission to st1e is reqt1ired by law. For exrunple, a body corporate 111ay not institt1te proceedings to enforce tl1e liability of tl1e directors withot1t a resol11tion of a general n1eeting to this effect. ss Wl1ere tl1ere was no st1cl1 resolution, the directors could file a preli111i11ary objection on tllis basis. The contention tl1at the st1it is barrecl by Ii111itatio11 111ust be raised in tl1e statement of defence. 86 It is tl1en treated as a. prelinlinary objection a11d disposed of _by tl1e court at !l1e ·first hearing. Fi11ally, tl1e pa.rties n1ay have agreed that tl1e _ cla� 1s to be subm1tted to ar�itration or n1ay l1ave co111pronused tl1e claim. If the _ JJarties l1ave e11tered into a valid agrec1nent to sub1nit to arbitration or l1ave effect81 · The decision n1ust be recorded together with the reasons for the decision. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 245(5). 82. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(1). 83. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 34(1) (2). 84. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 33(2). 85. Comm. C., Art. 365. 86 . Civ. C., Art. 1856(2); Civ. Pro. C. , Art. 234(1) (c).
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ed a valid cof!)promise, in accordance witl1 the provisions or the Civil Code, the cot1rt cannot proceed to hear the suit; None of these objections go to th e merits of the case - they do not rel t t tl1e question .of wl1ether the �efendant is liable to the plaintiff under the su�:tan� tive law. They s!1ould be d.1sposed of as soon as possible, since it would be a \vaste of t1m� for the co11rt to examjne tl1 e parties and frame issues for trial only to discover that due to �l1e 11on-m.erits objection, a trial will not be 11ecessary. Art. _244 (3), _tl1 erefore, JJr�v1des, tl1at any pre1in1inary objection not rais:d. at the �arl_iest poss_1ble opportL1?1ty, . i.e., at the ti111 e tl1 e court calls for prel�nar� obJect1ons at the first hea�111g� 1s dee1ned \Vaived unless the ground of objectJon 1s s11ch as to_ p�eve11t a valid J L�dg_111ent fro1n being given. TI1ere would appear to be fot1r obJect1ons that fall w1tl1111 tl1e exception. The first is lack of ma!eria� jurisdiction. As stated previously, v1l1er_e a court lacks material jt1risdic tion, 1t s111 1ply ca1111 ot l1ear the case; tl1e q11est1on of n1aterial jurisdiction goes to the co11rt's power to proceed, and a court tl1at lacks 1naterial jurisdiction cannot give a valid j11dgment. Art. 9(2) provicles that wl1 en and as soon as a cottrt is aware .tl1at it has 11?t !naterial j11risdiction to try a st1it, it shall proceed in accordance with Art. 245 {d1snusses tl1e case) notwithstanding that no objection is taken ·under A.rt. 244 to its n1aterial jt1risdiction. The san1e approacl1 111ust be followed whe11 tl1ere is a problen1 of pendency. Art. 8 (1) provides that no court sl1 all try any suit in whicl1 the 111;:1tter in issue is also in issue in a previously instit11ted civil sujt between the sa111e parties or JJersons claiming under tl1 em. TI1ere cannot be inconsiste11t judgments in the sa1ue case, and i11 light of Art. 8 (I), the second court cannot give a valid judg1uent. Tl1e tl1ird sitt1ation wottld be '.l1here a party is under disability. By definition, s11ch a party does not have tl1e ca1)acity to act, and bis opponent cannot ''waive'' \Vl1at is esse11tially tl1e rigl1t of tl1e IJerson under disability. Art. 34(2) provides tl1at the proceedings sl1 all be st,tyed 1111til a legal representative l1as been appointed, and whene,,er tl1e court is a\vare of t11e disability, it must stay the proceedings and appoint a representative. Finally, where there has been a failure to join an indispensable part)', the court cannot render a. valid judgment, since to do so would be to affect tl1e rights of a party not before the court. • In all of these cases, tl1e gro1111d of the objection is not for tl1e benefit of the opposing party: it relates to the po\ver of tl1e co11rt to render a j11dgment or is for tl1e be11 efit. of a party 11ot in a position to 1nake the objec�ion_. Wl�ere tl1e reason for allowing tl1e objection is to benefit a party, or the obJect1on involves his rights, his failure to raise it constitutes a waiver. Since the _rules of l�cal jurisdiction exist primarily for the be11efit of tl1e defe11dant, he waives any obJec tion on tl1at ground if not rais ed 11nder Art. 244. 87 The sa1n� would. be true ?f the defence of res judicata. If a party who has already received a Judgm�nt �n bis favor does no t want to clain1 the benefit of tl1at judgment, he can ,vai,,e it. Like\vise, where a party fails to assert an agreen1en� to s11bmit to arbitration or a compromise, it is as .if l1e has decided no t to claim the benefit of the agreement or compromise. ? ste ve a g vin ha rty pa e th by ed ut ec . The rule req11iring that the sL1it be pros bli o _ �he of t nefi be tl1e for ly ari 1 in er int est in the subject matter of the suit is pr ._ In it ive ,va � ca he ? n a_ gor - he should no t be s11ed twice on .tl1e same claim -n tio lu so re r io pr a g 1n 11r q1 re le ru e �he example of the st1it against th e directors, th ts for tl1 eir protection against action by dissident sharel1olders, and, therefore, they 87-
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 10(2).
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e nc fe de f Ii e tion. Art. 185 th ta is � re l1e t � y, l .l na Fi n. tio ec ot pr 6 _ _ can waive such ce 1s th e defen _ _waived if not plead� at tl1 es v1d pr y all ific ec sp de ? Co (2) of the Civil . ts a valid Judgment �roin being en ev pr 1at t on t Jec ! ob f · o d kin e tll � ed, so it is not ed after th e running of the oy str de t no 1s l1t r1g 's iff int pl e th , pia _ � _ given. In Ethio ce fen s de l1e a to n1s ft1r the defendant iod per the of ng llll rtII e tl 1 ; iod per n tio ita lim wl1ich is waived if not asserted. Wliere tile court sustains an objectio11 011 tl1e ground that the subject matter of tl1e suit is res jt1dicata or tl1e suit is barred by li�ita�ion, the suit is dismissed.8& Eve11 tl 1ough tl1e ol1jection does not go to . tl1e m.er1ts 1n t�e sense that vie have used that tern1 it is sucl1 as to finally dispose of the suit. Once the objecti on l1as been sustained, tl1ere is 110 opportt1nity for tl1e plaintiff to file a fresh suit. Wl1ere a11 objection on any otl1er grot1nd is sustained, tl1e plaintiff 1nay not be precluded fro111 bringi11g a fresl1 st1it, or action otl1er tl1an dis111issal may be reqt1ired. J 11 st1cl1 cases tl1e cot1rt is clirected to strilce out the suit a11d/or make sucl1 order as it tl1i11ks fit. 89 Wl1ere tl1e clai111 l1as bee11 co1npromised, the court sl1ot1ld record tl1e co111promise, and give jt1dg111ent i11 tern1s of tl1e agree111ent. 9o Wl1ere tl1e parties l1ave agreed to st1bn1it tl1e clai111 to arbitration1 tl1e court should order tl1e perforn1ance of tl1e arbitral subniissio11. 91 Where tl1e st1it is pending in another cou.rt, tl1e cot1rt sl1ould iss11e a11 order striking ot1t tl1e st1it and advise the JJlaintiff tl1at l1e sl1ot1ld IJrosecute l1is clain1 in tl1at stiit. 92 In otl1er cases, tl1e order wot1ld ordinarily be one striking ot1t tl1e stiit. 93 The stril<i11g ot1t of a suit does not of its own force preclt1de the institution of a fresl1 st1it ,vitl1 reSJJect to tl1e sa111e cat1se of action. 94 It is as if tl1e first suit l1ad never bee11 filecl, since tl1e cot1rt did not deter111ine tl1e 111erits of the contro versy. I-Io1v11ever, the filing of a f resl1 st1it n1ay be precl11ded by otl1er circun1stances, and, if so, tl1e fact tl1at a s11it ,vas once filed is of no be11efit to tl1e pla,iotiff. So, if at tl1e ti111e tl1e fresl1 st1it was filed, tl1e stat11te of limitations l1ad expired tl1at defe11ce ,vo11ld be ope11 to tl1e defe11dant, even tho11gl1 tl1e statute bad not rut1 at tl1e ti1ne tl1e original s11it was filed. Where tl1e cot1rt strikes ot1t tl1e suit for ,va11t of jurisdiction, it sl1all advise tl1e plaintiff that l1e may st1e in the court l1a,,ing jtiris �iction a.nd sl1all order tl1e reft1ncl of tl1e prescribed portion of the cot1rt fee paid on tl1e filjng of tl1e state1nent of claim.95 4. '·
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Fra1ning of Issues
After tl1e cot1rt has resolved any 1Jreli111i11ary objections, it proceeds to fra111e and record t]1e iss11es for trial, ''tl1e isst1es on wl1ich tl1e rigl1t decision of the Tl1e trial will be Iin1ited to tl1e isst1es, that case appears to depend." 96 tl1e C ?t1rt �ra111es at tl�is ti111e. In fran1i11g tl1e iss11es, tl1e court co11siders . the allegations 111 tl1e plead111gs, tl1e co11te11ts of tl1e docurr1ents produced b)' either 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93 · 94. 95. 96.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 245(2). Ibid. See the discussion it1 note 146, infra. See Civ. C., Art. 3344. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 245(3). the WI1e:� there is a defect of parties, the court shot1ld issue an th wi nce acco rda order in prov1s1ons of Art. 40. Civ. Pro. C., 245(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 245(3) (4). t Civ. Pro. C., AI:t, 246(1). If the defe11dant at cour e 1 tl , tl1e first hearing makes no defence ) · niay pronounce Judgment accordingly and 6(2 24 Art . need not frame issues. Civ. Pro. C.,
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party, and tl1e oral all�gations �7ade by tl1e partie s or tlieir pleaders or their bel1alf. . It sl1ot1ld be noted tliat at tlie persons present . on . firs. t s must prodt1ce all docu1ne1 1tary evidence of every descr · · hea•rin0o the partie 1p · t·1011 11 1 • · . d to rely' and atiy otlie tlieir pos . r docu1 11ent· the · session or power 01 1 wI 11cl1. tl1e y 1nte n . · otl1e� documents v11ll l1ave already bee11 court orders to ·be pro dttce d· 9s. C;;tan1n f l l d ea 1e 1 t s. t o c 11g ·o P _ re It fran1e s tl1e isst1es, tl1e cot1rt may es ex nn filed as � . . e xam _1n at1�n o f a J)e_rson .11ot �efore tl1e court or the _production also re quire tl 1e of a doct1n1e nt _ n ot 1n tl1e . poss ession of e1tl1er party. It 111ay stiii iinon that pers�1 1 �r r e qt1� re t_ h e10frodt1ct _1?11 of tl1e �oct11ne1:t, a11d if ne �essarr, adjourn tl,e hearing 111 tl1e 1 n ter1m A11d if a doct1n1e11t or w1t11css so r e qtiire d is not produc ed due to tl1e de fault of a _party, tl1 e cot1rt I1as tl1e discretion to pro11otince jtidg ment against l 1i111.101 T!1e clear . i1111Jort of tl1ese J)rovisions is that tl,e cotirt 111ust J1ave all tl1e necessary 1nfor1 11a!101 1 a�ailable to it before framing the issues. TJ1e court n1�st fr�111e tl1e correct 1ss L_ 1es 1n orde� for the trial to proceed expeditiotisly. The parti es will be preJ)ared to 11Jtroduce ev1de1 1ce on tJ1ose isst1es, and tl1e cotirt can decide the case 011 tl1e basis of sL1cl1 evidence. Wl1ereas, if tl1e cotirt J 1as otnitted to fran1e an isstie or l1as fra111ed a1.1 i1 Jcorrect isst1e, delay and i11co11veni ence are likely to rest1lt. Tl1 e cot1rt n1a.y later frame the 01nitted isst1e, 102 but it \Vill probably be necessary to adjot1rn the case wl1ile tl1e oppo1 1ent obtai 11s evicle1 1ce to 111eet tl1e new isst1e. And a]tl1ot1gl1 tl1e cot1rt 1nay strike ot1t a11 issue that was \:vro11gly framed, 103 tl1e parties will ]1ave been pt1t to expense and inco11ver1ience in obt,linjng evide1 1ce 011 tl1at isst1e. TJ1erefore, it is very i1111Jortant that tl1e court frame the correct isst1es for trial and tl1at it l1ave at its disposal all tl1e 111aterials necessary to e nable it to fran1 e st1cl1 iss11es. In order to pre cisely define an ''isst1e'', \Ve 1nust first defi1 1e a ''111aterial 1JrOJJO 11 of fact or of law \Vr1icl1 a plaintiff sition." A 1naterial proposition is ,1 propositio . m11st aU e ge in order to sl1ow a rigl1t to st1e or w]1icl1 a defendant n1l1st allege in tifI is suing to recover order to make ot1t his de fen ce. 104 Su11pose tl1at tl1e P1ai11 . damag...,es for breacl1 of contract. To re cover l1e n1t1st show tl1at tl1e clefe11dant did not perforn1 it, and tl1at tl1e plai11tiff st1flered dan1age thereby. Tl1e co11tract, the breach by the defen da.11t, ancl tJ1e dan1ages are all 1naterial propositions, since they are esse ntial to tl1e plaintiff's rigl1t to 111aintain a11 action for breacl1 of contract. St1ppose that the defendant ad1nits tl1at he did not J)refor.� a11 d wisl1es to defend 011 tl1e ground of force 1 najet1re. 111 orcler to estab]jsJ1 tl1at de fe�ce l1e must sl1ow that perfor1na11ce v;as absolt1tely preve11ted by a11 occt1rrence YVh.ich he could .not n.or111ally foresee. 105 TJ1a.t force 1 11ajet1re wa.s �1bsolt1tely preven ted by at1 occurrence a11d tl1at the occt1rrence was s11ch that it co11ld not normally have bee11 for eseen are n1 aterial p1·opositions, si11ce tl1ey are e ssential to e11able tl1e defendant to estab]isl1 tl1e defence of force maj et1re. 97.
98.
99.
100. 101.
102. 103. 104. 105.
Civ. Pro. C., .Art. 248. . . . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 137(1). ssession on po his 1n nt me cu do y an of py co a d an . al n igi The plaintiff must incltide the or ha\ : d u ,vo nt da !en � de tl1e n, tok e sam tJ1e By � . which J1 e sues. Civ. Pro. c. , Art. 223(]) (b) to establish hLs ics rel he ich wh on nt 111e cu do y an of py to include th e original an d a co defence. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 234(1). · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 249. t ur e t t n, tio uc od pr nno e th or e us � � sin��Y Ciy. Pro. C., Art. 256(1). If tl1ere is good ca . � th .ty s PY P les un es os rp pu ese th r fo e t1s ca od go be ld ou n · aring· TJ1er· e sh adJour tl1e l1e · , n ote 66 and ac · ss1·on, sup,a · company· cu d1s e made no effort to produce th e ev1clence. Se e th tng text. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 251(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 25.1(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 247(2). See Civ. C., Art. 1792.
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r ct o fa law is of on iti rm os affi op pr ed by ial ter 1na a 1en wl ses ari . ue _ iss _ An on 106 s1 prop �ned ter1al m by ? Eacl1 one r. he ot e 1 � tl � by ed ni de d an rty 011e pa 107 ct t1n d1s . of a ue iss ct bje su he Let us ms for ! party and denied by tl1e other tract, non-performance by con a of nce ste exi the d ege all s htt iff int pla tlie t tha say e11ce the defendant def of ent tem sta the In . age 1 1 da1 ing 11lt res and t dan e1 1 def tl1e 1 at l1 e did no t per for m it. Since he tl ies den but ct, tra con a s wa re the at 1 tl s nit adi 1 0 iss11e will be framed on that point 1 t, trac con e 1 tl of ce ten exis tl1e d 1itte adn as 1 l is al nce a teri ma ma rfor -pe non it proposi 1 forn per not did l1e t tl1a ied den ,ts 1 1 He tio11 , since tl1e plaintiff must show non-performance in orde� to e �tablish his right to 111 ai11tai1 1 a s11it for breacl1 of contract. Therefore, tl1ere 1s an issue as to whe tl1er t11e defe11 dant J)erfor 1 ned tl1e contract. Or, tl1e defe11dc:1nt admits non-perform ance, but clain1s tl1at perfor111a11 ce was preve11ted d11e to forc e n1 aje11re. When the plaintiff is exa1ni11 ed by the co11rt, l1 e admits tl1at performance was absolutely preven ted by a11 occ11rre11 ce, but conte11ds tl1 at tl1 e occ11rrence was foreseeable. He bas ad1nitted 011 e 111 aterial proposition - that perfor111ance \Vas prevented - and denied anotl1er - tl1at tl1 e occL1rrence v1l1icl1 JJrevented performance was not foreseeable. Tl1e court ,vill tl1 en fran1e an iss11e as to wl1 etl1er tl1e occ· urrence tl1at prevented perfor1 11 a11ce was foreseeable. We tl111s see ]101vv tl1e trial is limited to the questions on wl1icl1 tl1e l)arties actL1ally disagree. 111 ot1r exa11 1ple, tl1 e court need only ad j11dicate tl1 e iss11e of wl1 etI-1er tl1e occ11rre 1 1ce was foreseeable, and its decision on tl1at qt1estion e11ables it to deter111 i11e ,vl1etl1 er tl1e defenclant is liable to the plaintiff for breacl1 of contract . Note tl1at tl1 e court n1 ay fra111e issL1es on tl1e basis of tl1e allegatio11 s n1ade orally by tl1e J)arties as well as on tl1e ·basis of tl1ose contained in tl1 e pleadings In tl1e stater11e11t of clai111 th.e plaintiff alleges tl1at tl1e defendant obtained property fro111 l1i111 by frat1dt11eot 111 isrepresentatio11s. At tl1 e first l1earing lie also contends that tl1 e defe11da11t e 111ployed 11ndt1e iofl11ence. Ass11111 ing tl1e defendant denies both contentio11 s, tl1 e court sl1ot1ld frame isst1es as to botl1 fra11d and 11ndue i11fluence. 108 Moreover, tl1e iss11es tl1 at the court fra 111es will depend on the kind of clainJs and defences tl1e parties can assert. Earlier, we disc11ssed the matter of alternative ple�di11 g and took tl1e position tl1 at tl1 e parties sl1011ld be able to raise alter11 ative cl �1111s and defences e,,en jf absolt1tely inconsistent in tl1 e sense that proof of the existence of one allegatio11 11 ecessarily dis1Jroves tl1 e ex.iste11 ce of tl1e other. I11 India, alternative pleading is not J)errnitted in st1c]1. a sit11atio11, and, tl1 erefore, tl1e court does 11 ot �ra1ne ''absol11tely i 1 1consistent iss11es." So, wl1ere tl1 e plaintiff contend� d tl1 at he d1d not execute a doc11111ent, bt1t tl1 at if he did, it was executed whtle �nder undue infl11ence e111ployed by tl1 e defenda11t, tl1 e co11rt wo11ld not fran1e is _Sues on botl1 execution a11 d und11e infl11e11ce.109 If tl1 e pla.i11tiff showed tl1at he did not exec11te the . doc11n1e11 t, it wot1ld necessarily diSJ)rove tl1 e allegation that t11e documeiit was obta1ned by 11ndue i11fl11e11 ce. Asst1111.i11 cr tl1at tl1e restrictio1 1 of ''absolt1tely in�o11siste11t allegations'' will not be i 1 ni)osed in Etl1 iopia, the court he�e sl :011Id frame 1ss11es on botl1 these poi11ts. If the r11le as to alter11ative pleading 15 different fron1 the Inclian r11le, tl1e rt1le as to tl1 e frami11 g of inconsistent isSues 1nust be different as well.
The iss11es 1nay be iss11es of fact or of law. Tl1e exa11unation of tl1e parties may indicate tl1at tl1ere is agreen1 ent on the facts, but disagreement on the legal 106. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 247(1). 107. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 247(3). 108. See Mul1ammed Ibral1in1 v. Un1atullal1 Jan (High Ct., Punjab 1917 ), /11dian Cases, vol. 39, , p. 798. 109. See Mal3omed Buks.h v. I-Iooseini (Privy Council I11dia, 1888), Indian App., vol. 15, p.Sl. ,
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fa s. Suppos e that th e defendant de ct th os e of cts fends a suit for breacll of effe . contract on the grou.nd that the contract was one of guarant 1· t 1 n t he mea ing of Art. 1725 (a) of tl1e Civil Code and. tllat it was' in::uJ buecause n?t -? In . · 'g, and th .ere 1s no writing. The plaintiff agrees that the contract was . not itl 'writ· in . di·sagreement as to the terms. How�v�r, the pla�tiff takes t11e position tl1at the . _ w1th1_n. the meaning of Art. 1725 (a) and, therecontract w�s n ? t ane of g11aran tee fore, that 1t d1 d not h ave to be 111 wr1t1ng. Tl1e only isstie in this case ' 1·s one 0f · et l1er th . e con tract I� · questio · n \Vas a contract of guarantee witl1in the law : w.h meaning of Art. .1725 (a). It will not ?e 11ecess_ary to order a trial, since the court can resolve tl1 e 1ss11e of la�. at tl1e f1rst hearing. S·uch a procedure is autllorized by Art. 255 (I) of tl1e C1v1l .Proced11re Co�e, to be discussed subsequently. If nec_essary, the court co11ld adJour11 t]1e h�ar111g to enable the ]Jarties to present therr legal arg111nents more f11lly, b11t after 1t l1 eard tl1 e arguments it would resolve the issue and pronoL1oce judgi11ent accordingly.
It may be, however, that there are both_ iss11es of fact a11d of law. Sttppose that tl1e defenda11t aJso conte11ds that eve 1 1 tf the contract were enforceable tl1 e plaintitT did not suffer any damages as a result of the defendant's non-perforn1� 11 ce. lf tl1 e court_ fi11 ds tl1at tl1 e contract is i11valid beca11se it was not in writing, tl1en it can render Judgment for tl1e defendant on tl1at basis, and i t is not necessary to consider tl1e question of wl1 ether the plaintiff s·uffered any dan1ages. It is, therefore provided tha t where issues of fac t and law arise in the same s11it and the co11rt is of tl1e opinion that the case or any part th.ereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it m11st try those issl1 es :first. 110 Tl1e court vvo11ld .first decide whetl1er the contract had to be in ,vriting. If it concluded that the contract l1ad to be in writing, it wo11ld e11ter j11dgn1ent for the defe11 da 11 t; if it conclt1ded it did not have to be in writing, it wo11ld fra1ne a11 iss11e as to whetl1er the pl,:1intiff suffered dan1ages as a result of the non-1)erforma11 ce, ancl tl1e case would proceed to trial on this issue. Or, in a s11it a.gainst it the govern111 ent co11tends tl1at tinder the Ia,v it ca11not be sued in sucl1 a case. The court \VOttld first deter1nine tl1 e ques tion of whether the govern111ent can be s11ed, and only if it concludes tl1at the governm.ent is s t1bject to s11it wo11ld it frame iss11es as to wl1ether a s1 1bstantive wrong has been comn1 itted agai11st tl1e plaintiff. 111 Such a proced11re is very so11nd, since it avoids the fran1ing of un11ecessary iss1 1es of fact ,vhere tl1 e case can be disposed of on the basis of iss11e s of law onl;'·
There n1ay be a disp11te as to tl1e a111011 nt of money or tl1 e val1 1e of the subject matter of the suit. Suppose that the plaintiff s11ed to recover da.mages for injury to his land or mesne profits res11lting from the defendant's use of tl1e land, and the amount of the claitn is contested. Tl1e court ma.y appoint a commissioner or expert to determine tl1e amo11nt of da1nages or the value of a11y property in volved in tl1e s11it. 112 Wl1ere s11cl1 is sues arise at tl1e first hearing, the col1rt n1ay adjo11rn · the fram.ing of the issues and iss11e a commission for the p11rpose of determining the q11estion. 113 1 e f1rst tl at d e m_ fra s ue iss tl1e to ed t i lim be ll As we have said, the trial wi 1e �ourt tl s, ing ad ple e tl1 to de 1na be y ma ts . hearing. However, just as a1nendmen l na 1o d1t ad or ts en dm en am ch s11 aJI d a11 s, 11e may at an y time fra m e additional iss . the n ee t\v be rsy ve ro nt co 1n s ter at m e th g iss11es as may be necessa ry fo r deterininio 110. 111. 112. 113.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 247(4). 9· ZO p. · p., Re ia nd l-J r1l 37 19 ), 36 19 , dl1 Ou See Kanl1aiya v. Secretary of State (C11ief Ct., See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 132-136. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 250.
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IJaid by 011e p,tI·tY to· t11 e otl1e r n,ent or to be ascertained by tl1e cot1rt, sl1al1 be . ' . I 1a e b ' 11 ent1t I s ed · 1e111 l to t so·me r1oh of t or stibiJect to so111e 1Iab'I1 ·1ty as 0 · or one . some pr perty . · ree t n1e , 11 a h t e sl1all be delivered by one party to the ? � s pecified Ill _ _ sl1a do ll or ty ref rai .p�� n on fro e n1 doing a partictilar act. All tJ,e de tails mttst . other; or, _ be clearly specified In the agreen1eI1t. _w11ere tl1e court is satisfied that stich a11 ee�1ent has bee11 mad�, �hat · t�1e JJart1es l 1a�e �t st1b�ta11tial interest in the decis� gr � 100, ,.e., tl1e_ y a.re tl1e p,trt1�s w1tl1 a vested interest 1n tl1e stibject n,atter of tl,e suit or against wl1 0111 a cla1111 11a_s bee11 asserted, and tl1at tl,e isstie is ·fit to be decided, the cotirt shall try __tl1e 1sst1e ancl re11der a decisio11 as jf tile isstie 1,ad bee11 fra1�1ed by tl� e cot1rt. �pon tl1e dete r1ni11ation. of tl1e isst1e, the cotirt pro nounces Jt1dgn1ent 1n ter111s of tl1e agree�11ent. 119 Tl1e corresporiding provision o.f tlie India, ? Code has been tr_eated as creating 011 :1gree 111e11t to be bot1nd by a com proo11se, 120 a11d tl1 e parties ca11 not, tl1eref ore, a JJpeal fro1n tl1at decisio11_ 121 TL1is seems . to be a so:111cl inter�r� tatio11, wh� cl1 sl1 ould be followed in EtL1 iopia. The court 1s 11ot re1 1de r111g a dec1s1on 011 a11 1ssL1e tl1at it has fran1ed for trial bt1t on an isst1e fra1ned by tl1e partie s. It is really perforrning the functions of �n arbit rator, and tl1e partie s - l1avi11g i11voked tl1e assista11c e of tl1e cot1rt in tl1 is regard shot1ld be bound by tl1e cot1rt's decisio11 . Stich a11 agreeme 11t cot1ld take a 11u111ber of for1ns, a11 d it enables tl1e parties to avoid tl1e expense a11d i11co11ve11ience of a ft1ll-scale trial. If the parties do not dispute tl1e facts that tl1ey 1nade an agree1n ent, tl1at tl1e defenda11t did not perform :ind tl1at tl1e plaintiff st1ffered a specifiecl a1not111t of da1nages, but disagree over \vhetl1er tl1e co11tract J1ad. to be in writi11g, tl1ey 111ay decide to accept tl1e decision of tl1e cot1rt 011 this point a11d let tl1e 111atte r e11 d there. Or, tl1e defendant n1 ay adnut liability, bt1t dispt1te tl1e a1not1nt of da1nages; j11st as the parties cot1ld l 1ave st1b1nitted the questio11 of tl1e a111ot1nt of da111ages to an arbitrator, tl1ey can aslc the cot1rt to determine tl1at a1not1nt and accept the cot1rt's decision. 122 It n1t1st be stressed tl1at tl1is procedt1re is o_ptio11al vvitl1 tl1e parties; the court's JJower in tl1 is regard sten1s frorn tl1e parties' agree111e nt, and it ca11not proceed 011 tl1is basis \Vithout sucl1 ,1n agree1nent. If tl1e cot1rt conclt1des tl1at t.here is only 011e issue, it will render its de cision 011 tl1at isst1e and decide tl1e case accordingly. I-Iowever, in tl1e absence of the agreeme.11t t]1 e cot1rt's decision is ap_pea1able. r
2.
Parties not at Issue Since tl1e prima.ry IJt11·pose of tl1e pleadings and JJroceedings prior to _ trial is t o develop tl1e isst1es for trial, it follo\vs tl1 at if, as a resL1lt of st1cl1 proceedings, tl1ere do no t appear to be ,111 y st1ch isst1es, the cot1rt m,1y pronot111ce jt1dg1nent at tl1 e first heari11g, and Art. 254 (1) so provides. It is in tl1is con11ection that tl1e cot �rt ts n11 ad t an end def e 1 tl if e ; nc e _ def of t 1en ten sta tl1e ers sid of con the le gal sufficiency the allegatjot1s of tl1.e state111ent of clain1 an d allege� facts tl1a� � o not constitute a legally sufficient defence, l1e l1a s 11o t joined isst1e with th e pla1nt1ff. StIJJIJose tl1at tl1 e plaintiff ha s alleged i11 tl1� state111ent of claim tl1at l1e _ �a� assatilted by th� O es t�1at ee all t bti 1fl, 1nt JJla e th d e tilt sa as 1 defe11da11t. Tl1 e de·f. e ndant admits that l e 1 01 . 1 at eg all is tl! if e n Ev . ps ou gr l ba tri nt e r �1e and the plaintiff are 111embers of diffe s l1a he e nc Si \v. la 1 e tl r de tin e nc fe e d 1s tr11e, the defendant cloes 11ave a good •
119. 120. 121. 122.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 253. Rep., vol. . L. an di In ), 92 18 y, ba ni Bo ., Ct h See Goculdas ·Manufacturi11g C o. v. Scott (I-Iig 16, p. 202. 63) , 19 ., e d l1 4t (1 e ur ed oc Pr l il'i C of 1v La e See the discussiot1 of this point u1 S. Sarkar, Th vol. 2, p. 561. c· p . ro . 1v 11. tio es qu is th 1e 1iJ r11 te cle to s The court could appoint a conlniissioner or expert C., Arts. 132-136.
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sh s wi act that l1e has ged alle t no � has and s � io11 gat �? aJle s iff' int admitted the pla . y. 1l1t of ion l1ab est e defen qu Th the on 11e s 1 at t no are ties par the e, �_ a go od defenc _ dant 11 as not alleged a material propos !t1011, t�at IS, he has no t alleged facts that , ges ma the court will to a d. as e issu no 1s re the If e. enc def a ute wotild constit ts eriter a judgment for tl1e plaintiff in tl1e_ amount claimed; if the defenda�t contes _ tl1e damages, tl1e court \Vill fra1ne an 1ss11e as to damages, and the trial will be limited to tl1at issue. It may be tl1at in asserting an affirmative defe11ce, the de�endant :Will also have alleoed facts wllicl1 deprive llim of tl1at defence. S11ppose that In a suit for defama tion� tl1 e defendant ad1nits that l1e 1na.de tl1e allegations, but contends that they were true. However, he also alleges or ad111its facts which show th.at he published tl1e defa111ation solely with tl1e i11tentio11 of inj11ring the plaintiff. Since truth is 11 ot a defe11 ce wl1ere tl1e defe11dant acted solely witl1 t11e intent to injure, 123 the defendant l1as not raised a11 iss11e as to tr11th, and the plaintiff is entitled to a judg111ent tl1at tl1 e defendant l1as co111111 itted a defamation against him. Or tl1e defendant l1 as alleged tl1at l1 is perfor111ance was !)revented by force 1najet1re dLie to tl1 e 1111 foreseeable act of a third party. Bt1t he has also alleged or ad1rutted facts ,vl1icl1 show that l1e was responsible for tl1e act of the third party, i11 whicl1 case tl1e act does 11ot an10L111t to force maje11re. 124 So too, tl1e defenda11t 111 ay have alleged a defe11ce in tl1 e for1n of a concl11sion, and on the oral exan1inatio11 , l1e l1as 11ot Slll) l)lied any facts to s11bstantiate the allegation, e.g., l1 e alleged tl1 at tl1e cl1 arges were tr11e, b11t did not allege or testify to facts tl1at sl1ow they were trL1e. In st1cl1 a case )1 e l1 as not raised a11 issue a.s to truth. Th11s, jL1st as t11e plaintiff 111ay not l1ave stated a cause of actio11, t11 e defendant 111ay not l1ave alleged a legally sufficient defence, a11d wl1ere in addition l1 e has ad111 itted tl1e pla.i11tiff's allegatio11s, no issues l1 ave been created on tl1 e question of l1is Ii�Lbilit)' to tl1e plaintiff, and tl1e plaintiff is entitled to j11dgment. Wl1 ere the defendar1t l1as asserted an affirmative defence, the plaintiff n1 ust, on )1 is oral examinatio11, testify to facts whicl1 p11t that defence in issue. St1ppose that in l1is stateme11 t of defence tl1e defenda11t alleges tl1 at l1e did not perfor11 1 tl1e contract beca11se subseqt1ent to its exec11tion, that kind of co11tract was prol1ibited by law, rest1lting in force n1ajet1re . Tl1e plaintiff 111ust deny that s11ch perfom1 ance was prollibited, and if he does not deny tl1is, tl1ere is no iss11e as to force majeure. The defendant wo11ld tl1 en be entitled to jt1dgme11t on the ground tl1 at l1 is non perforn1 ance was excused by force majeure.1 25 •
Ho,vever, jt1st as i11 deter1nini11 g tl1 e legal s11fficie11cy of the statement of ciajm, all dot1bts are to be co11strt1ed in favor of tl1 e pleaders, 126 i11 deter111ining whetl1er tl1 e parties are at isst1e, all dot1bts are to be resolved in favottr of finding . a11_ isst1e. Litigation shoulcl not be ter1ninated prior to trial on this basis unless 1t 1s absolt1tely clear tl1 at tl1e parties are 11ot at issL1e on any qt1estion of fact or law. Consider tlus case. In tl1 e statement of c)ain1 t11e plaintiff, a Ia,vyer, alleged tl1at l1 e l1ad agreed to perfor1u certain services for wl1jc}1 tl1 e defendant agreed to pay $ 750 and that l1e did perforn1 those services. In the statement of de�ence tl1 e defendant admitted that the pl,tintiff perfor1ned certain services, b·ut claimed that t �ey were wor �h $ 25 rather tl1an $ 750. The plaintiff contended tl1�t _ there was no issue as to bis right to recover tlie $ 750, since tl1e defendant did 123. Civ. C., Art. 2047(2). 124. Civ. C., Art. 1793(a). 125. Civ. C., Art. 1793(b). 126. See the discussion in Chapter VI, supra.
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not deny that the plaintiff performed the services I1e agreed to per1or r. m. As 1ong · had done whatever h e agreed to do, the defiend,ant had as , he , to pa y t11e amount parently tl1ere was no procedtire for a first · g. The he had agreed to pay. Ap ea h rin · · t1e, and that the defen pa 1e t r l 1es t were at 1ss h ·t a t Id be court da nt' s all egat·ton t hat · · · · $ 750 tinplied that the JJlaintiff did not perform tl e tl1e .services were �o t wor th 1 services he agreed to perform tinder . the .contract.121 The problem wou Id not aris ·e . · · 1a, _ s nce the Code wisely pro · I y tl1e_ sam_e way 1n E... t1�1op 1se in prec � vides for a first _ heari 11g, at wl11ch t1111e tl1e precise pos1t1on of tl1e defenda11t can be determined. Here l1e . wot1ld be asked_ on tl�e oral exa111inatio11 w�etl1er the plaintiff perforined _ _ e1v1 the � ces 11� agr �ed to JJer�orm. It l1e dented tl11s, tl1ere wotild be an isstie. Btit 1f l1e ad1111 tted 1t, the parties would 11ot be at issue, since if tlie plaintiff did wl1at l1e agreecl to do, tl1e clefe11dant wot1ld be bound to pay J1im the agreed a�ount _ and co�1ld not_ contend tl1at l1e l1ad n1ade a bad bargain.1 2s However, tl1e pr1nc1ple ent1.nc1a.ted 1n tl1at case - tl1at tl1e cot1rt should resolve all doubts in favor of finding tl1at an isst1e exists - is valicl and applicable here. Since the cot1rt ex�1ioes eacl1 partr a11d ca11. reqt1ire tl1e exa1nination of any other person, a111bi can be clar1.fied, a11d 1t sl1? t1ld ordinarily be clear wl1ether the parties are gt11t1es _ at 1sst1e. Wl1ere tl1ey are 11ot at 1sst1e, tl1e cot1rt re11ders jt1dg1ne11t accordingly. It sl1011ld be stressed tl1at tl1e parties 111ay not be at isst1e on . tl1e q11estion of liability, bt1t 1nay be at issue 011 tl1e qt1estion of d,1111ages. 111 such a case the cot1rt fra111es an isst1e as to cla1nages, a11d tl1e trial will be li1nited to tl1at ques tion. Disposition of Isst1es at tl�e First Hearing Even tl1ot1gl1 tl1e parties are at isst1e, tl1e issL1es n1ay be st1cl1 tl1at tl1 ey can be deter1nined at tl1e first l1earing, a11d it is 11ot necessary to order a full-scale trial. Where tl1e co11rt is satisfied tl1a t tl1e iss11es fra111ed for trial ca11 be cletermin ed withot1t arg·u1nent or evide11ce other tl1an tl1at wl1icl1 tl1e parties can at once produce, and that no injt1stice would result fro1n proceecling in. this n1a11ner, tl1e court is a11tl1orized t111der Art. 255 to determine the issues at the first l1eari11g, at1d pronot1nce jt1dgi11ent accordi11gly. It is i1n1Jortant to distingt1isl1 proceedings L1nder Art. 255 fro1n tl1ose under Art. 254. In deter1ni11ing whet11er the parties are at isst1e, tl1e cot1rt considers tl1 e allegatio11s of the pleacli11gs, the doct11nents produced, the oral testimo11y of the J Jarties a11 d any otl1er testi1no11y ta1<en for tl1e pt1r1Jose of enabling the cot1rt to fra111e tl1e issues. In proceeding under Art. 254, tl1e court is 1nerely concerned. \Vitl1 wbetl1er there are iss11es i11 tl1e case, that is, \vl1etl1er a material propositio11 affirmed by one party l1as been denied 1?� the ot!1er. Wl1erea�, in proceeding tinder Art. 255, tl1e cot1rt may l1ear some ad�1t1onal ev1de�ce, bt1t 1t 111t1st be evidence tl1at tl1e parties can prodt1� e at that t_11ne .. Proceed1ngs tinder Art. 255 are no t to be a st1bstitt1te for tl1e trial, and ord1nar1ly the cot1rt sl1ot1ld leave the determi i 1ation of tl1e issues for tl1e t1·ial. It is only where the isst1es can be conveniently disposed of 11pon a consideratio11 of tl1e evidence tl1at tl1e parties can J Jroduce at the first J1earing tl1 at tl1e cot1rt sl1ot1lcl proceed t111der Art. 255. lve r so ld ot1 sl1 t tir co e th w, l � of s ue iss e ar s t1e � iss or re Whe the only isstle them at the first J1earing. It n1 ay adjot1rn the bearing . to �11able tl1e _parties �o ll e wi nc ide ev 110 ce sin al, tri a set t no ld ou s1 1 marshal thei i· legal argun1 ents, bt it it _ 1rt co e tl1 1en ,vl of 1on est q11 e tl1 : nd ou ar s lve be introduced. Tlie real problem revo . 1a11 at th e trial, tl er 1 tl ra g in ar be st fir e th should determine tlle factual isst1es at 3.
p. 127. Norman v. Leach (Sup. Ct., Oklal1 oma, U.S., 19?� ), Pacific Rep., 2nd Series, vol. 252, 0. 52 p. , 1) 96 (1 e ur ecl oc Pr v1I C1 1 01 s se Ca n, 1020, j 11 J. Chadbourn and L. Levi 128. See Civ. C., Art. 1710.
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l1 t suc are tha al tri y tl1e for t1es iss can . tl1e be if re 1 Jy 011 so 0 I Id . 1 01 � · 5� it v ai1 d � ti e tl1e of the at fir m ble st ila ava rin hea ce den l evi g � . e tl f ot a b e 1 . e 11 ed 0 o n tai 1er ob to rtl g ft1 n i11 ar l1e ide ev e tl1 ce t framc rn oti J ad y n,a · ' � SlS . . t t · t_ . tii o c . c l 1 . . . tl1a t . w1 l l 1.e g r1n to o l 1e 1ea l b ta1n furtller evide t n ot11 adJ to zecl ori 1 ' J atit 0t 1 1 nee . • .tl1e 1s · t1��- ca n 0111 y be tl1e issues, 1·t ·ts lv so e re t he W ed 1 es. t by 1ss e 1 tl e olv addires to � r de or , iO _ l. 1,t r t1 fo se ca 1e tl t se t 1s 1t n rt L1 co tior1al e\'idei1ce, tl1e 1_Id p� oc eed u11 de r Ar t. 255 is _wher e the ot sl1 rt o11 c _ tl1e e 1er wl 11 tio re tia '"flte clearest sit ly on doct11nentary e_v1dence. As \Ve ar1 1111 JJr or ely tir en nd pe de ll wi tte iss tl1e soltttion of ted se11 by the tJre be st 1nL1 1ce de1 evi ary e11t u111 doc tl1e . parties at the first ha,,e seen, all sp ss tre to �a �le p�OJ)erty, �or ges �o 1m ma da er ov rec to_ t sui a i11 1 at tl ose llearirig. SLlpJ) � 1 es e tlle defendai1t conte11ds tl1at l1e 1s tl1e ov. 11er and p1odt1c titl deeds JUst1fy1ng his claim of o\vi1ersliip. Tl1 e JJlaintiff l1as also prod11ced tl1e title deeds on whicJ1 he is relying, is such that it Tliere is an issue as to wl10 is tl1e o\vner of tl1e la11d, b11t tl1e issue 129 mtist be resolved by a co11sideration of tl1e conflicting title deeds. Since th e title deeds are before tl1 e court, tl1e co11rt can resolve the issue of ownership at tl1e first l1eari11g.130 If it fi11ds tl1at tl1e defenda11t is tl1e owner, it will enter judg111e11t for l1in1. lf it fi11ds tl1at tl1e plai11tiff is tl1e owner, it \Vil.I e11ter a judgn1ent to tl1e effect tl1at the defendant l1as co111 1nitted a trespass and, if tl1ere is an issue of damages, set a tri,:11 011 that jssue. Tl1e sa111e 111igl1t be true where the plaintiff sties on a written contract, a11d tl1ere is a11 iss11e as to tl1e tern1s of tl1e contract. St1ppose tl1at tl1 e defenda11t conte11ds tl1at tl1ere was an earlier oral agree111ent in \Vl1icl1 tl1e ter111s \Vere differe 11t. TI1e only isst1e is whetl1er the writing relied on by tl1e plaintiff is a contract, since if it is, it ca1111ot be affected by tl1e prior oral agree ment co11tai1 1ed tlierein. 131 Tl1erefore, if tl1e court conclt1des that tlJe writing relied on by tl1e plaintiff is a valid co11tract, tl1e isst1e as to the tern1s of tlJe contract is resolved - tl1e ter111s are tl1ose co11tai11ed in tl1e writing. The resolt1tion of the issue depe11ds 011 tl1e ,vriting, a11d since tl1e writing is before tl1e court, the court n1ay proceed 11nder Art. 255. 132 Wl1enever tl1e iss11e can be resolved solely on the basis of writte11 evidence, tl1e co11rt sl1011ld proceed t11 1cler Art. 255, since that evidence will necessarily be available to it at tl1e first I1earing. Tl1e 1nore difficult cases are tl1ose ,vhere tl1e evidence relatin° to tl1e issue is es_sentiall)' ora.l. Wl1en tl1is is so, tl1e isst1es sl10L1ld ordinarily b; resolved at the trial. The evide11ce will probably be conflicti1 1g and all the witnesses are not likely to b� present at_ tl1e first l1earing. I Iowever, tl1e isst1e may be st1ch that certai11 ev�de nce will conclttSively resolve it, and if tl1e wit11esses who can give st1cl1 evidence ar� present at tl1e first l1eari11g, tl1e col1rt 111ay proceed to decide tl1e isst1e. Bot �111s cai� be do11e 011ly wl1 ere tl1e evide11ce is sL1cl1 tl1at 0 11ce it is presented, the 1sst1e \V1ll 1 1ecessarily be resolved.. A good exa111ple of tich a sitt1ation occt1rred in tl1e An1erica11 case of DJier v. j\facDoiigall. 133 Tliis i 11Svolved a st1it to recove dama12es for defan 1ation. The r 0 . were 129. See Civ. C Arts 1195 , 1196 deeds · t1· t 1f' n 1ctu1g . A . s1tuauo11 con· .·• · · · · · 'vvbere . . could . arise . · . issued. by tl!e \Vhtch one
adn11111strat.,ve authorjties, a11d the court would have to deterllllne ,vas issued in accorcla11ce with tl 1e la'·w· . · . · · 1949), federal 130. See Burke v. Owens Uli 11o is · . Ct., S.D., \Vest Vu g1n1a, .. ·t Proced11re Supplen1ent Re ·, vo1 · 86, JJ. GI ass. Co. (U.S. Dist. · Ctt'I on 663, ses 111 J. Cbadbot1r11 and L. Levin, Ca (1961), p. 522� 131. Civ. C., Art. 2005. le p 132. S ee Rttssell v. Barn es Sup d . i al F 1c1�t,o� . . Ct., E.D., Pennsylvarua, 1943), Fie fJc . . (U . S. Dist me nt R,?p., vol. 50 iterials 011 d . 17� Pleacling and Proc;di�;e (195 ;) C. Bro\vn, A. Vestal and M. Ladd, Cases an· ' IJ. 335. . erg 133. (Ct. App., U.S. 2nd c· enb Ros M. , in 19 2 265, n e r p. · 201, s, Serie d vol. a11d J. Weinstein Eler n� , �r ) , ,F_ de al Rep., 2 ' n s 01 C 11 11! l'rocec/ure (1962), p. 604.
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-dlaintiff alleged that the defe11dant had made- defamatory remark , . . s ab . ot1 t J1n 1 · 1 to per son s, l 11c I 1e w · d ·fi t h e 1 certain spect · 1ss · t1e as to · defendant denied' thtis creat,·ng an e: dant had n1 ade tl1e ren1 arks to tho se r the de1en e wJ1eth persons· Tl, . e de1en " dant. . . · , 134 in · a ffidav1ts · wh"tch tl1ey dented tl1at tl1e defe11dant 111ade obtained the1r tl 1e statements to them. 'Tl1� co11rt granted st11un1ary judg1nent for tlle defendant on tlie ground that tl1e pla1nt1ff wotu.d not be able to n1ake ot1t a case at trial, since 1,e co�ld �1ot show th�t the defe1 1da11t 111 ade t�1e _state111ents to tile named persons. This kind of case ts clearly one for deter1n1nat1on tinder Art. 255. Tl,e issue is wl1 et11er tl1e staten1ents wer� 1 nade to �l1e 11an1ecl JJerso11s, and if all those persons are present �t tl1e first l1�ar111g, tl1� 1sst1e can be resolved at tl1:1t ti 111e, since it is their testimony tl1at \Vtll deter1111 11 e \Vl1etl1er tl1e staten1 ents \Vere made. Tlie court can exan1 .ine tl1 e 111 , and decide the isst1e 011 tl1e basis of the examination. Ai,other of a case wl1 ere_ the res�I uti?11 of tl1e isst1e depended on tl1e testimony of example _ perso ,vas a st11t on ns a life 1 11st1ra11 ce policy, wl1icl1 tl1e co111pany defended certain on tl1 e grot1nd tl1at tl1e decede.nt had 11 1ade false represe11 tations abot1t J1 js const1l tatio11 s \Vitl1 pl1ysicia11 s. It alleged i11 tl1 e state1ne 1 1t of defe11 ce that tl1 e i 11 sured was aware of a gall bladder conditio11, since l1 e l1ad co11 st1lted \vitl1 physicians abot1t that condition. Tl1 e (Jlai11tiff denied tl1at tl1e i11 st1red l1 ad so const11ted \Vith the pl1ysicia11 s. TJ1e issti c cotdd be resolved only by tl1e testimo11y of the pl1 ysicians, and there \Vas 110 need to set tl,e isst1e for triaI. 1 J5 Tn detern1jni11g v.1l1ether tl1e issue may be resolved at tl1 e first l1earing, tl1e crt1cial qttestion is wl1ether all tl1 e evidence tl1at botl1 IJarties can prodt1ce on tl1at issue is available at tl1 at time. Tl1e cot1rt s11 ould ask tl1e parties vvl1etl1er tl1ey have further evide11ce of. otl1er \vitnesses to be produced at tl1e trial. It 111 ay appear that only one party ca11 prodt1ce evide11ce on tl1 at issLte, a11 d if be bas such evidence witl1 l1i1n at the first l1earing, tl1 e isst1e n1ay be resolved at tl1at tin1 e. For example, r\ s11es B, allegi11g that B assaL1lted l1 i111 i11 Addis Ababa on Ja11uary 1, 1966. At the first Ii.earing B introdt1ces c:1r1 affidavit fro.111 l1js commanding officer and an extract frorn 111ilitary records sl10\vi11g tl1at 011 tl1 at date he was in the Ogaden witl1 the Security Forces. A admits tl1at l1e ca11 not produce any wit11esses to tl1e assaL1lt a11d does not raise a cl1 alle11ge to tl1e a11then ticity of tl1e extract. Tl1erefore, tl1e court can resolve tl1e issue at tl1 e first l1eari·ng, since there is no furtl1er evidence otl1 er tl1 a11 tl1a t wl1icl1 tl1e parties can prodltce at that ti.me. Or, in a suit 011 a 11egotiable instrument, tl1.e defendant raises tl1.e defence of pay1nent. At tl1e first I1 earing he JJrod11ces a cancel.�ed. cl1equ� to tl1e order of the JJlai11tiff togetl1er witl1 a re�eipt fron1 l1in1. T�1 e pla1nt.J.ff �ont1nt1es to deny payme11t, bt1t does not conte11d that he l1as any ev1de11ce sb.ow111g that the cheq11e or receipt is not gent1ine. Again, all tl1 e evidence on the issue of ·pay1_J1 ent is present, and the cot1rt . ca11 resolve it. 136 A11othe: exa1nple wot1l� be an 1_sst�e depende11t on a party's knov1Iedge or state of n1111d, and tl1ere 1s no extr1ns1c
Tl1e procedure employed in tJ1e United States. differs from tl1at employed in, Ethiopia, si�ce in the United States tl1ere is no first l1ear1ng as such. A party may �o\e. for a sun,m.:.r_ y judgment on tl,e grotind that tl,ere is no "genuine issue of law or fact·'. He supports this ses rnotion by affidavits of witnesses, tJ,at is, by_ sworn stat�1nents fron1 then,. Tl1e :,v1tnes do er s eth ide \Vh dec rt c�u e m. Th th e n1m exa to _ ty uni ort � opp o n not appear in court so there is . the affidavits. 111 Etl11op1a, l1owever, the ol' is bas the there is a gentline ' issue of fact on witnesses must be present and are exanl.ined by the court. )35. See Engle v. Aetna Life Insttrance Co. (Ct. App., U.S., 2nd Cir., 1943), Federal Re �., 2nd 1als on te, Ma and ses Ca , dd La d M. an l sta Ve A. n ow Br . , · Ser,es, voI . 139, p. 469, 1·n c Pleadi,zgs ancl Procedure, (1953), p. 320. 136. See the discussion of this po i11 t jn Arnstein v. Porter, infra, note 138.
134.
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137 the . o ne &-case ' I f · d I · ·tr a 11 1n t1 P . in m o a ll e te g ed that t� s r o e . g d le w o n k f o e evidenc h b 1or er t e l res 1 ra1nt there' and th ons resp e wer · l JJita hos tal men ' ey the doctors of a ence. She a d IDJ·tted that sh. e di d not h ave es pr r l1e of e ar aw re we . den1ed that they h so e t · 1 1s, t f 1 1t1o · o olt e res ar. aw n of the issue re we ey tl1 at th . . slloWing
any evidence en eir d th ve tern lie �ta be t that they \Vere t ur co e tl1 t no or 1er etJ wh depended on be �x am1ned �t the first hearing. d 11l co ts an nd fe de 1e Tl . nt n1e ne iifi co tina,vare of tile d 1e1 1 t _1or them; if it gn Jl� e a. d ter en d a.11 1y, 101 ti11 tes ir tl1e did ed iev Tlle court bel ff. 1nt1 the In either event, there is pla for ent gn1 jud a d ere e11t ave 1 1 ld wou not , it . 1e s1 1s 1e t1 11 0 l ia tr a t se to 1 10 11eed Hoviever, tl1 e court sho11ld 11ot. res_o1ve tl1e issue� at the firs� hearing simply � tl va1 at 1e �rial. A party is pre to ely lik 1s ty r . pa 1e 1 0 t tl1a es iev bel it e . becatis l, and 1� is only where the the tria at rt_ co11 tl1e to e enc evid his ent pres to eiltitled 11dence tha t tl1e parties can produce e, the by lved reso at be issue ca11 necessarily tl1e first I1 eari11g tl1at tl1e co11rt should proceed 11nder Art. 255. In one casel3B tl1e lJlaintiff stied a well-kn�wn con11Jos�r, contendi°:g. tl1at tl1e co_n1poser had in fringed tl1e JJlai11tiff's co1Jyr1gl1t to 11111s1cal con1pos1t1ons. He claimed that the 139 ns of the ositio . iff co1np tl1e plaint 011 ns ositio The co1111J l1is defendant I1ad based defendant de11ied tl1at l1e ,vas fa111iliar with tl1e worl< of the plaintiff at all, so tl1ere ,vas an isst1e as to wl1etl1er tl1e defe11da11t's con11Jositions were inspired by tl1ose of tl1 e plaintiff. It ,vas ad1nitted tl1at tl1e compositions of tl1e plaintiff had bee11 pt1blished. Tl1erefore, t11ere \\'as the IJossibility tl1 at tl1e defendent had access to tl1ose co1npositio11s, and since ad..1nittedly tl1ere were certain sin1ilarities, tl1 e issue of infringe111e11t was 11ot st1cl1 tl1at it co11Id be resolved ,vitl1out trial .
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Art. 255 provides a co11venient device by ,vl1icl1 the cot1rt can avoid the necessity of a f till-scale trial eve11 ,vI1ere the parties are at iss11e, if the isst1es are st1cl1 tl1at tl1ey ca11 11ecessarily be resol,1ed. Howe,,er, i t m11st be remembered that IJroceedings 1111der Art. 255 are not a s11bstit11te for tl1e trial, and tl1e court should ?e certai� tl1at tl1ere is 110 f11rtl1er evidence the parties can produce before resolv ing a11y 1 sst1es at tl1e first l1earing _1 40 C. Con1promise and \Vitl1dravval Tl1e fact tl1at tl1e iss11es ,vill l1ave bee11 for111ulated prior to trial may have the e�ect of persu_ad!ng a. party tl1at he is not likely to prevail if tl1e case con1�s to trial. Tl1e plaintiff 1111gl1t tl1en decide tl1at he wisl1es to discontinue the suit. Or, tl1e pa_rties migl1t decide to con1promise tl1e case. TI1 e Civil Procedure Code makes specific provisio11s for s11cl1 sitt1atio11s, ,wl1icl1 we will no\v co11sider. 1. Compromise Tile _provisions of the Civil proced11re Code rela.ting to compron1ise refer to conlpromise tl1 at are n1ade after st1it l1as been i nstitute. 141 As a 111att er of sub137. 138. 139. 140.
141.
i le n1 ;�11 5�;:·• �i�is v. Br ����11 �U.S._ Dist. Ct., Di stri ct of Co lurnbia, 1951), Federal S i � ] 95 P · .' , in · Field and B. Ka1Jlan, Materials 011 Vivi! Proced1tre ( 1 9 ) , 54' Arn 1n v. Porter (Ct. App., p. 1 vo s, Serie �4. U.S.,_ 2nd Cir., 1946), Federal Rep., 2ncl :�: in M. Rosenberg and J. Weu1stein, Eleme11ts of Civil Proced11re (1962), P· 5 .' See Civ. C., Arts. 1648(b), 1654{2). tnal . Iu cou ntries su h at · ssue� monY e 1 th U 111ted :s here i States or Kingd tl1e om,. w � United i � �e determined esti if he nt u . ry, the co�1rt may not render a summary �udgme is cotlflicting. Al1. c�n Jicts t��iscussion of . th� f o testimony must be resolved by the Jury. See r of . this poi nt in Ar trie fact, it nJay res�f�:''1 v. _Porter,. supra, 11?te 138. Since in Ethiopia the cou�t 15e ends on an s s i s s ue 1tl1out trial, altl1ough tl1e resolution o f the u p the court's eval.uat·ion i \._" of co11fhcting te stiinony. See c·i v. pro. C., Art. 274(1).
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lise terminate a disp. ute before any sui· t stantive l,1w, the 4 parties may by · con1.pron . . . a contract by whicl1 pe· 1.·sODS. has. been filed . 1 2 A . con1pro1n_1se is s1m. _ pIy _ tb.r otigh . mutua1 conce�!!ons, ter(!1Jnate_ an ex1st111g dispute or prevent a disptite froin If �he parties l1ave com_pron1ised tl1e dispute, and tlie arising 111 the future. plaintiff, nonetl1eless, files_ Sl11t, . tl1e defe �d�nt 111ay assert the compronlise as a defence. He does do so by filing a prel111unary objection on this grotind at tlle 144 Tl1e cour ing � will co11sid_e� w.l1etl1er a valid compromise has been l1ea first � effected 1n accordance ,v1th tl1e prov1s1ons of tl1e Civil Code 14s and it if finds that such a co1npro111ise has been effectecl, it sl1011ld enter j11dgm.ent in terms of 146 The jt1dg111ent \vill 1nise. be res judicata and v;1ill prevent a furt]1er co111pr o the suit by tl1e plaintiff on tl1e cla.i111. . A cof!lpron1ise i � clearly desi_ rab.le _e,,en after litigation l1as bee11 begt1n. It avoids the necessity of a trial, th11s sav111g t11ne and expense for tl1e co11rt a11d tl1e parties. M.oreover, ,t compron1ise denotes a reco.nciliation wl1ile a co11rt judgme11t denotes ''victory and defeat'' i11 adversary proceedi11gs. From a sta11dpoint of social l1ar1nony then, a co111pro111ise is preferable. Tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Code, tl1erefore, are designed to enco11rage tl1e parties to con1pro111ise wl1e11ever possible. Tl1e co11rt n1ay take tl1e initiative i11 atten1pti11g to effect a coin promise, 147 and, 11po11 applica tion of tl1e parties, 1n,1y i11dic,1te tl1e lines on wl1icl1 a con1pron1ise agreement could be roade. 148 Tl1e agree111e11t n1ay be n1ade it any tin1e dt1ri1Jg the proceedir1gs, either in the presence of th.e court at tl1e first l1earing or trial, or 011t of court. 149 The con1promise agreement sl1all co11tain tl1e following: (1) tl1e 11an1e a11d place of the court in wbicl1 the s11it is JJending; (2) tl1e title of tl1e action and tl1e n111nber of tl1e s11it; (3) tl1e na.me, description, place of residen.ce a11 d address of service of the parties; and (4) tl1e matters to \Vl1icl1 tl1e agree1ne11t reJates; 150 it 151 There 1. exec11tio1 a11d dan1ages costs, as s11ch matters accessory settle also n1ay is a question as to whetl1er tl1e con1pro111ise 1nay i11cl11de matters unrelated to the subject n1atter of tl1e suit. For exa1n1Jle, tl1e defe11 dant agrees to pay tl1e plaintiff Eth. $ I 000 i11· settlement of tl1e clai1n, and tl1e plaintiff agrees to pay tl1e defen dant Eth.$ 500 in settle111e11t of a clai111 the defe11clant has against the plaintiff, as to wl1icl1 suit bas not been :filed. 111 India it bas been l1eld tl1at the co1n1)rornise may include such matters where tl1ey f11rnjsh tl1e agreed excl1ange for the com promise of the present disp11te. 152 Tl1e san1e res11lt sho11ld be reacl1 ecl in Etl1io1)ia. 142. Civ. C., Art. 3307. 143. Ibid. 144. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244(2) (g). 145. It may order the prodt1ction of evidence on the issue. Civil Pr�. C., Art. 245(1). Co�1? are 1s1011s. Dec es Rul eral Fecl �), 1�:, y, tuck Ken ., E.� Ct., t. Dis S. (U. p. Cor Lane v. Greyhound . 525 p. 1), (19 ure ced Pr� 1l C�v � on es Cas 1, 1 _ 1 Lev L. and n _ fl sought_ vol. 13, p. 178, i11 J. Cliadbour mt1 tl1e pla The defendant clainied that the parties entered into a con1prorn 1se, w�1chgn1ent, bt1t the c?urt to avoid of grounds of duress. Th e defendant moved for sumn1ary Jud be detern11Iled held that since there was a conflict of testin1ony, the matter would _have l? essary and nec 1s ce den evi ver ate wh e tak ay _m 1rt cot tl1e , pia l 1io Et In by the jury at trial. must determine tl1e question at the first l1ear1ng. . . t_l1at a further an� sed rn1 pro con:i 146. The judgment must make it clear that tl1e case has been .he s.hot1ld 1ff, 1nt pla tl1e to id pa 11 bee suit shouJd not be brought. If tbe money has 11ot yet be able to obtai 11 execution based on tl1e judgment. 147. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 275(J). 148. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 272(2). 149. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 275(1). 150. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 276(1 ). 151. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 276(2). 152. See Vislrnu v. Ram (HigI1 Ct., Bombay, 1932), 1932 All-India Rep., p. 466.
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· ons of tl1e visi pro il Civ tl1e e t Cod tha ed vid rela pro · is ting t · , l lace to p t s 1r fi In tI1e . . . ents agreem co111pron11se · made pending ·11 11gato apply 324) 3307-3 · (Arts 1 54 co111pro1n1se s 0 10 ss nd 111ay create, modif ce a 11 1 . 1 co 1a tt 11 n es at pl m te 11 co 3 15 e is m o pr A . com . n. tio y 1 i tl1e n t nea tha 1 · mi Id 1 pro com wot se s Tl1i · can. nclud e ss s. ion io-at o obl al le 11 · · 8 o u1o . or ext 1ng . ..1 1 Co de pro v1s1 ons are applic C1v tl1e e 1nc s 1d a able to s, tion iga obl _ � _ _ an)' kind of t the tl1a ent could include 111 ee1n see agr ld ,vou 1t ts, 11 st ting exis of ises . Oln · con1pr · . · . 1n · 1 c 1 l s1 an r , , ) nL erp :It 1nt eco S tl1e st11t. � tat1on ts soun d, otller obligations 110 t involved t ven can pre ter a 11at er suit arising with otl1 es lud i11c ? t � tl1a e i11is pro coin a becatise 1 t 11 re. It 1 s des irab le that a nt1 n1ber of clain1s be ft tl1e in ters n1at 1 ose tJ to respect . _ _ tl1e and cot1rt should be able to e, sibl pos s 1 1 s th ere 1 \vl nt eme agre tlie 1 1 settled i accept a co111 pron1ise settli11g sL1cl1 matters. Tl1ere is a distinction i1 1 tl1e JJroced11 re to be followed depe11ding on whether tl1e co111pro1nise is 111ade a.t a J1earing or ot1t of co11 rt. WI1ere it is made at a l1eari1 1g, it must be redL1ced to \¥riting, sig11ed by the parties, a n. d entered in the case file.156 The parties n1 ay tl1en apply for an order tl1at tl1e court gave judgment in ter1ns or tl1e agree111ent.157 Wl1ere tl1e con11 )roh1ise l1as bee11 n1ade out of court, tl1e cot1rt is to be informed, a1 1d tl1 e J)lainti ff 111 ay apply to the court for per111issio11 to witl1draw fro1 n tl1e suit. 158 Wl1e11 tl1e parties l1ave agreed to a co111pron1ise, tl1e co11 rt cannot refuse to record it on tl1e grot111d tl1at tl1e con1pro111ise is 11ot ''fair'', i.e., tl1at it is weighed in ra.vor of 011 e or tl1e JJarties wl1ose case vvas not as strong as l1is opponent's. 159 A con1pro111 ise is a co11 tract, a11d as 101 1g as the parties are con1petent a1 1d there is no defect of co11se11t, the court 1nust enforce the con1pron1ise contract as a.ny otl1er. 160 1�Iov1e,1er, tl1e coL1 rt 111a.)1 11ot record a con1pro111ise decree wl1ere the terms are ''co1 1trary to Ia,v or 1nor,1Is."1 61 111 deter1 nini11g vvl1ether tl1e terms are lawful, tl1e court 1 11t1st first co11sider tl1e provisior1s of tl1e substantive law relating to illegal a11d i111 111oral co11tracts. 162 If a1 1.)' of tl1e provisio1 1s \VOttld be unlawfttl or i1nn1oral if included in i:111otl1er contract, it is t1r1Iav1ft1l or in1n1oral wl1e1 1 inclt1ded in the co111promise agree111ent. 163 SL1ppose that tl1e s11it was one to recover da1nages for breacl1 of a contract to n1arry. 164 Tl1e p�1rties enter i11to a compromise by ,vhich tl1e _ defendant agrees to pay tl1e plai11tiff a st1 111 or n1oney in settlement of the cla1n1 a11d not to 1narry a IJartic11lar i11divid11 aJ. Sjnce tl1e u1 1dertaking of a person 11 0t !� 1 11a�ry is illegal, 165 the co111 pro1nise cai1 not be recorded, beca11se one of its provisio11s 1 s contrary to 1�1 \v. If the offendi11g ter111 were stricken, tl1e court cotild then record tl1e agreen1ent.
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153. 154. 155. 156.
157.
158.
159. 16 0.
161 162.
163. 164. J 65.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 274(2). Civ. C ., Art. 3307. Civ. C., Art. 3308. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 277(1 ). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 277(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 277(3). See Sabitri v. Savi (Iiigl1 Ct. Pa tna ' 1932) ' 1933 All-I/IC t· la Rep., I), 306 . · ' . t• See c· C Ar . 1 71 . A t s er�� i that ont act t u11d t e 111ay gro not ed be lidat 1 th inva o r c O . are su��-tan ia11 .Y inore favorable to o11e party thaD· to the other It is only \vhere th e con�ed of tl1 e 0ther par y l1 as · , · min · . of · b.een obtarnec ·ty 1c1 t · 1· �unp b I Y tak111g adva11tage of l11s ''\vant, senility or n1an1-�est busine . s" . n unco ss 1nexper1e11ce'' tl1a t a contract may be invalid ated as cionable". Civ. Pro . C., Art. 277(1). See also Civ. C . ' Art. 3316 . . See C1v. C., Art. 1716. See Sadajiwat v. Chandr ani (Chief Ct., Sind, 1945), 1946 All-!11dia Re p., p. 8 l. See Civ. c., Arts. 572_ 574. Civ. C., Art. l 7(l ).
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· '·iffects tl1 e r1· g11 ts of third A compromise is not lawful where it adversely sue A s o ti t 1a B t rec?ver on a mortgage and joins C u pos e p S es. arti w110 a1so p pro the per ty, on and is thus an indispensable party Tb has a mortgage e P: O_per�y and botl 00 1 A and C hav e clai 10,0 ,. ms of Eth.$ 10·,000· against 1t. . -15 worth Eth.$ . . . . com a p10 1 ruse 111to agree1n. e11 t wl11ch provides tha ente r A ai1d B . . t A w1-11 accept 1s ion sa ac of the c Ia11 n 'and that J1 e can enforce liis t· u f JI t' t · 10 6,0 00 Eth$ . claim . agaii1st the prorerty_ to t�1 e . extent �f tl1 e Etl1.� 6, 000. TI1 e comproinise is not preJ ud1ce tl1e r1gl1t� of C 1n the nlortgaged property. If A 111 1t s beca u � � ful, la\v st the property , tllis mear.1s' as a prac . call enforce his clrum for Etl1 .$ 6,000 again _ . . . tical 01atter, tl1at . C· can onIy enforce l11s. cla1n1 �ga11Jst t].1 e J)roperty to tile exteilt of Etl1.$ 4,000. Since A and C have claims against B in tl1 e san1e arnotint tile cotirt shot1ld not record a con1 1)ro111ise by wl1 icl1 A ,viii realize a greater a�ount 166 rty n pe tl1a d pro C. age rtg mo e 1 tl from Jt may be that one J)arty will contend tl1at a co1npron1ise has been n1 ade out of court, �ind the otl1er will deny that it was 1J1ade or contend that if it was 1nade, it is i11 valid. In st1cl1 a case the court sl10L1ld deter111 i11e wl1 ether a valid compro111jse was n1 ade,167 since if tl1is is so, tl1e11 as a 111atter of subst,1ntive law tl1e plaintiff n1ay not proceed witl1 tl1e st1it. Whetl1 er a valid comproniise l1as been made n1t1st, of cot1rse, be deter1nined witl1 refere11ce to the relevant provisions of 168 We n1ay briefly co11 sider tl1ese Code. require1nents. The general provis Civil tl1e ions as to consent are eqt1ally ap1)licable to con1promise agreeme11ts. As to· forn1, the agreen1ent 1n11st con1ply with the forn1 s required by law for tl1 e cre,1tio11, modificatio11 or exti11 ction of obligatio11s witl10L1t consideration. 169 As bet,veen tl1e parties tl1e compronuse l1 as tl1 e force of res judicata withoL1t appeal, and they 111ay not contest it on the ground of a mistal<e by one or both of then1 concer11ing the rights on wl1icl1 tl1ey l1ave co111promised. 17° For exan1ple, tl1e plaintiff sues to recover da111ages for breacl1 of a contract to deliver goods. At tl1e time the goods were to be delivered, l1 e tl1011gl1t tl1at tl1 e market JJrice was Etl1. $ 1 per kilogra111 . Tl1e contract price was Etl1 $ . 0. 50 per l<ilogra1n, so tl1e }Jlaintiff claimed da1nages of Etl1 . $ 0.5 0 per kilogram. He enters into a co1n_pron1ise by \.vhich the defendant agrees to pay Etl1.$ 0. 25 l)er kilograin. Despite the mistake as to the 1n.arket price, on tl1e basis of wl1icl1 l1e e11tered into tl1e co1npromise, he is bound. A co1npron1ise may be invaljdated only on the basis of a funcian1 ental mistake relati11 g to void or false doct1111ents or tl1e existence of an unk11own judg rn . ent. Wl1 ere the instr11ment for tl1e perforn1a11ce of 'vvl1jcl1 tl1e compromise agree n1ent is made, is void, the 1nistake is co11sidered ft111 da1ne11tal, and the co1npromise may be invalidated. 171 Suppose A s11es B on a contract of guarantee that was not attested and they compron1ise tl1 e st1it. A contract of gu�rant� e not attested by two witnesses is void 172 so it wo11ld be open to B to 111val1date tl1e com promise on the ground that the instrument for· tl1e perf?rmance of \Vl1ich_ it �s made - the contract of gt1arantee - is void. Tl1 e compromise may also be invali _ dated w]1 ere the agreement of one or both of tl1 e parties was due to the exiS tence 166. See Malchand v. Osman (High Ct., Calct1tta, 1923), 1924 AII-I11clia Rep., P· 159. 167. See Rarnajas v. Baruni (High Ct., Patna, 1928), 1929 All-India R�p., P- 102 (co� rt ca79f ;)ter7;�� ay, . rn Bo ., Ct igh (H d an acb bl1 So v. lal sri er wheth agreement was 1nade) · Mi t) en ns co . in t fec de r fo d ali inv is t e11 em re ag 1er et1 \Vb All-India Rep., p. 569 (court can' clctern1ine 168.
169.
170. 17 l .
172.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 274(2). tiSt ni ts 1 gl ri of n tio ia nc nu re es lv vo in Civ. C., Art. 3308(2). The terms of a con1pron1ise that be iaterpreted restrictively. Civ. C., Art. 3309. Civ. C., Art. 3312. Ci v. C., Art. 3313(1). Civ. C., Art. 1727(2). f
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173 Suppose that A sues B se. fal be · to 11 ow sh on a is c11 u Wl t n e m u c o d . a . f o ty on a debt owe ? by C. e re b su to d ee ag B ch lu w � by . 1sst1 ed by C, an d when such note contract of guarantee, is produ edly eg al te no ! y or iss om pr a es uc A prod n ca ow sh tl1at tl1e note was B If t, me ree ag se 1n1 Jro 1:1 mJ co a o int _ ced B enters 1111se, since the doct1 1nen t on which his pro com the ate alid inv ; can a 1or00e1-vJ, he · e m 1 th 1 ro ne t' mp e t co ·h . ise at · f ' r r, s v wa o l Ise. fal made, s wa sed ba ':"� � : s ,va agree1nent ,. nt s me wa tru id tl1e ins vo t tl1a or 1ty b1l that the ss1 po tl1e of are a,:v re we s e i' t tl1e par· . 174 d l"d e . at va b i e 111 ot nn ca e is om pr document was false, the com TJ1e conlpromise 1 11ay also be i11validated _w11ere the di�pute which it was intended to ter 1. 11inate l1as been settled by · a Jt1dgn1ent having tl1e force of res jtidicata of which one or botl1 of the JJart1es \Vere _u�a�are. 175 S uppose A sued the operator of a vehicle . to recov� r damages for 1nJt1 r1es allegedly suffered due to tl1e operation of tl1e vehicle, and Jt1dg111ent was for tl1e operator on the ground that A did 11ot suffer any injury. Subseqt1ently, l1e sties B, the owner, to recover damages for tl1e sa1ne alleged injt1ry, and tl1ey e 1 1ter into a compromise agreement by ,vllicl1 B agrees to pay f\_ a st11n of n1oney. The j11dg1nent in tl1e suit bet\veen A and operator wot1ld be res jt1dicata i11 tl1e st1it between A and B, since any rigl1ts be l1a.d again.st B Vlot1lcl deJJend on wl1etl1er he was injured by tl1e operation of tl1e vel1icle. 176 Asst1n1ing that B was 1111aware of the j11dgment i11 tl1e former sujt, l1e ca.11 l1ave tl1e con11)ro1nise ngree111ent set aside, 177 Tl1ese are tl1e principles that tl1e cot1rt n1ust apply i 1 1 deter111ining \vl1etl1er a valid compro1nise l1as been effected. It sl1011ld be stressed tl1at it is only in tl1e limited circumstances just disct1ssed tl1at a co1111)ro111ise agreement may be i11validated. 2.
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Withdrawal of Suit
We 1 nay no,v consider the 1Jro,1isions as to witl1drawal. Ordinarily, a party may \vitbdraw tl1e st1it or abandon any of his clai1 n agai11st any or all defendants, a11d asst1111ing l1e l1as not obtai11ed leave to file a fresl1 suit, I1e is liable for costs . 1; 8 11ore significa1 1tly, lie is precl11ded fro111 instituting a fresh suit in respect to the _ s:1bject 111atter of tl1e clai111 or any pa.rt tl1ereof. 179 It is not possible for tl1e pla1ot1ff to l1arass tl1e defendant by repeated st1its; once he l1as ftled the suit, lie mt1st continue it or be forever barred fro1n prosect1ting the claim. Wl1ere tl1e defen dant _l1as filed a cot1nterclai111, tl1e suit wot1ld contin11e witl1 respect to tl1e cot1n tercla1m_ only t1n�ess it too is withdraw1 1 . Tl1t1s, where tl1e plaintiff sties for an a�count1ng an� w1sl1es to witl1draw, if tl1e defe11da1 1t clai1ns tl1at a su1n of 1noney \VIll b� �tle lum follo,ving tl1e accot1nti11g, tl1e cotirt sbot1 1d transpose tl1e parties tl1e orig1�;� defenda1 1t wilI now be J?laintiff ancl tl1e origi1 1al plai11tiff \Vill be _ t�1 e _ _ _ defeiid�iit -and tl1e st11t will cont111t1e.181 Except for sucl1 cases, tl1e plruntiff may . �ithdraw � on:plete]y, bt1t l1e 1 nt1st t111clerstand tl1at wl1en l1e does so, 11e nJa)' be g1v1ng up his r1gl1t to st1e the defe1 1dant on the c]ai 1 11. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181.
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Civ. C., Art. 3313(2). Civ. C., Art. 3313(3). Civ. C., Art. 3314(J). See Civ. Pro. c., Art. 5. ::e�e an ap�eal still _lies fr?m tl1e judgm ent of wl1icl1 on or botl1 of the pa rties is unaware, e . omp ronuse remains valid. Civ. C., Art. 3314(2). C�v. Pro. C., Arts. 278(1), 279(1) . C1v. Pro. C., 279(1). This n1igl1t affect the aw . partY . the a· rd1' ng 0 f costs ; if to a su1n ts not found to be dt1e seeking to continue the su1t , _ . 11e will b e liable for costs. . See Debi v · Porbbu (Hig ll Ct., Allal1abad, 1926), 1926 All-India Rep., p. 582. "
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-·· i des, how eve r, tl1a t whe re tl1e cotirt · pro v ode C 1 s sat·1s1e The fi d th at tl1e s111t c . 1orma 1 some d f ec o 1ect or eason that r t here by are l i other u ffi.� n _ rounds ust fa for so doing, it may grant the plaintiff pe rmis sion to witl1dra: w :� �l bgert y to 1 2 . . ;l 00str ed .1 nstitt1te a fresh suit o n tl 1e claim s This exception sl1011ld be st ic uld not be readily disposed to permit the pla·1 n �1 . Y � sho co11rt t he t ff to d1scont1?nue, . . and . e h r one, t 11ereby 1mpos1ng added e xpe rise can d ·1 nc anot file and on ven1ence to · a Suit . . 1Y w·I 1e re tl1e s111t 1 s proced11rally iinproper th at 1 eave to on 1s It ndant. defe tile 1s3 S11ppo . g�ve11 e . d b ·. h I ou se that t l1� plaintiff joins clai nls against s . suit file a fre sh d o not �t1volve a. �0� 1110 0 q11est1 on of law or fac t witl,i tl1at 1t s 1 1da defe1 n the t,vo meaning of Art. 36 (I). While tl1e s111t 1s not defeated as sucl,, 1s4 it must fail in its present fo� 1 11_ by rea�o�1 of a J):foced11ral defect, so tl1e court is ati tliorized g to rant the pl'\111t1ff_ per�1ss.1on to with.draw with liberty to file a fresh Sliit.1ss The court l1as d1scret1on 1n su cl1 a case, and it 1nigl1t co11sider whether t he defen dants obje ct to tl1e v-.1i tl1drawal witl1 l eave. It 1 11i ght be more convenient for all concer n ed i ntiff to v'\1 itl1draw and tl1e11 to decide wl1ether he wants to file pla tl1e permit . to a subseq11ent st1it agai nst e itl1er or botl1 defendants. The sa1ne wo11ld be true \vhere there has bee11 a n1i�joinder ?f pla intiffs . or fail11re to joi11 an indispensable party. Tl1e court 1nay l ?ern11 t tl1e w1 t]1drawa.l with lea ve to file a fresh s11it \.Vhere it appears 1nore conve111e11t to do so.
Anotl1er example of a formal d efe ct would be a suit by a body corporate to enforce tl1e liabil ity of its directors wl1ere a resol11tion a11t horizing the suit l1as n ot been adopted. 186 Tl1e suit by tl1e body cor porate sl1ot1ld be witl1dravvn with leave to file a fresh su it if t he reso111tio11 i s passed. Leave to file a fresh s11it has also been gi,,e n wl1ere the plaint iff at tl1e tin1e of s11it does not ]1ave possessio11 of a document tl1at i s ess ential to his case.187 He n 1igl1t be able to produce the doc11ment subseque11tly; b11t ratl1er than adjo11rn tl1e s11it, tl1e co11rt may conclL1de that it is . wi tl1 leave to file a fresl1 su it. bette r to permit tl1e plaintiff to witl1dra w
It is more impor tant to stress ttie circt1111sta11ces ,vl1e11 such per111ission sho11ld er or� in e leav w th i \v a dr vvith . t o tecl mi t per e b not f can ntif plai The n. be give not S11ppose that at t11e trial to be able to pres ent a better case at so1ne ot]1er time. the _plaintiff l1as p r es ente d h i s evidence, b11t believe s tl1at it is insttfficie11t to est� blish his case. He s e eks per111ission to witl1drav1 wit l1 leave to file a f resh suit. a Since the case l1as already come to trial, t]1 e defendant sl1ot1ld not be s11bjected_ to second suit so t hat the plai11 tiff can establisl1 a s tronger case . I_n proper circum s wa ce de� ev 1 al 1c1 crt ., e.g ce, n ua tin stances, the plaintiff co11ld b e granted a co n al raw tl1d w1 r fo se u ca t ie n ffic st1 t no is e unavailable at tl1e time, b11t clearly tl1er ted to s 11e req en wh d use ref 188 en be o s al \Vi thdrawal wi th lea ve l1as with leave. 189 The p laintiff may y. r o tl1e t en fer dif a enable the plaintiff to bring a ne w s11it on 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189.
pr oceeding e th of sts co e tl1 se o p im ly i _ ar in Civ. Pro. C., Art. 278(2). T he court should or d leave. . o·n tbe wjth drawing pla intiff as a co ndition to grantIDg the t _ gr 1nd �or ie� flic su er th ''o of n io 1ct trt �oce�u, e See the discussion of this point a11d tl1e cons � 1 · v, C, 1 the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit" in D. Mt1lla, Tl1e Code of by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 2, pp. 971-2. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 39(1). . 1 L. Rep., v ol. 16, p. 279 . a1 d1 I11 See Ganeshi v. Khairati (High Ct., Allahabad, 18 94 ), See Comm. C., Art. 365. . Rep 1?7 1a 11d l-J Al 53 19 ), 52 See Manohar v. Parwati (Higl1 Ct., Nagpur, 19 Ca cutta 1 l · II' vo J ·, _,, ), 09 19 See Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Dt1rga Charan (fligh Ct., Calcutta, p. 45. o ra m a R o ; 1 · P ., ep R ia · Nagpur, 1948) 1949 All-Ind-India Rep., p. 121. See Satyanarayan v. Chotelal (High Ct., All 0 _ 4 9 1 ) 9 3 9 1 , bay Bom Bhagwantrao v. Babu Appanna (H1gl1 Ct.,
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but once the suit ha 1 1ew the ory , tl1e on d cee JJro s . P1 eading and a111 end his · t:d no u b o s t n r: d t I Id � e a d _ en e1 sub1ec e th d n a , e? to t1 n ti n co e a b ld u o 1 sl it begun, 1s only where there 1s so me It . 11n cla e sam the y iall ent ess is · · · · · second su1·t on ,,,bat · · n to withdraw with 1o 1ss rm ng pe v1 g1 er d 1 ns co 1ld t o sl1 t ur co � procedu.ral defect tl,at tl, leave to file a fresh suit. lacks material jt1risdictioiJ, the t t�a 1rt co1 a _ in d file 11 bee s ha t sui Wl,ere tl,e to ve file lea a. th wi sh sui_t. The fre w ra tl�d w1 to_ ion iss r.n1 pe e giv t no uld cotirt sl,o ept exc to strike the suit and e cas tl1e 111 ing yth 1 a1 do to er pow no . court. ],as · I Jt1 · n. 190 The · r1·sd'1ctio 1a er at 111 g 1n 1 av ! t t1r co e plaintiff th . . a dvi·se tl,e plaii,tiff to s11e in . . t d1 d not have the t ur e rs co h fi t �e s1n 1t, s11 a 1 cl su g gin in l1r 1 11 fro d r re ba is not l1 e plaintiff sl1ot1_ld n�t be abl e to witl1draw t er, \:vev Ho e. cas tl,e r hea to . . power 1 on; the la.ck of local ct 1sd1 Jt1r �I Ioc ked lac 1rt cot the at 1 tl und gro 1 tl e on e with leav jtirisdiction 1nt1st be raised by tl1 e defenda.!1 t, and 1.f he doe s not do so, there is no reason for tl1 e court 11ot to proceed ,v,th tl1 e case. W l,en t l 1e plai11 tiff \Vitl1 dra\.\1s witl1 leave to file a fresl1 suit, it is as if the first s11it l1ad never been fileci. I-Ie is bo11nd by the law o.f limitation as if the first suit I1ad not been. i11stitL1ted.191 St11Jpose tl1 at tl1e claim arose 011 November J, I 955, a 1 1d tl1e period of Ii111 ita.tio11 is ten years. S11it is filed on October l, 1965, a11d per111 ission to witl1draw �1itI-, leave to file a fresl1 s11it is granted on October 20, 1965. If tl1e plaintiff files a fresl1 s11 it 011 Dece 1 nber I , 1965, tl1e defendant 1nay assert the defe 11 ce of lin1 itatio11 , si11 ce tl1e periocl was not tolled by tl1 e filing of the fir st st1it. So too, wl1 ere iil tl1e first suit tl1e JJlai11ti.ff sought an injunction agai1 1st tl1 e defe11dant, I1 e 111ay i 1 1 tl1e fres l1 st1it add a claim for damages. 192 He files a new stateme11 t of claim and is not required to an1end tl1e state 1 nent of claim i1 1 the for1ner s11it. Again, it is as if tl1 e forn1 er s11it l1 ad 11ot been filed. A problem arises ,v]1 ere tl1ere are 111ultiJJle plaintiffs and only some se ek to witl1 draw. It is provided tl1 at tl1 e co11rt n1ay not pern1it one of several plaintiffs to \.Vithdraw witl1ot1t tl1e consent of tl1 e others. L93 However,· ·tl1is is applicable only \.Vl1ere tl1e witl1 dra\vi11 g J)l aintiff seel<s leave to file a fresl1 st1it. 1 94 If he does not, and tl1 e clain1 s of tl1 e other plai1Jtiffs are sepa rate, tl1ey are not affected by the co11rt's per 111 itting l1im to withdraw his cla.i111. Bttt if I1e does JJlau to file a fresh s11it, tl1e re111 ai11ing plaintiffs do l1 a\1e a 1 1 interest in l1 is coi1 tint1ir10 tl1e present suit . TI1e parties were }Jrosec11ting their c l ai111s togetl1er, the witnesses.:, would probably be �he sa111�, a11 d tl1 ere 1nay be some inconvenience to tl1e re 1 nai 11i 1 1g plaintiffs tf he IS �erm 1 tted to witl1draw ancl file a fresl1 s11it. Therefore, their consent n,ust be o�tai_ned. Wl1 ere an indispensable plaintiff seeks to \vitl1 draw, tl1e otl1er plaintiffs may 111s1st that l1 e be 1nade a party defendant so tl1a.t the st1it ca11 co 11 ti 1111e, a 1 1d the c�tirt can alw�ys reqt1ire a party to re 1 11 ai 11 if I1 is presence is necessar)' to deter mine all tl1 e 1 ss11es 111 tl1e case.195 Wh � re _tlie plaintiff witl1 draws withot1t lea\ e to file a fres s11it he ca 11 not institute a l1 , f�esl1 suit 111 r�spect to tl1 e st1bject 1natter ·or essatl 1 e clai 11 1 ' b11 t tl1 is \Viii 11 ot r1ec · r1ly prevent h11n fron1 ·fi11·1 11g a seco 11 even , · ndan t d s111t against the san1e defe l'Y
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190. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 9 �nd Kannuswami ,,. Jagatl1a111bal (H1. "gh Ct., Madras , t9 JS), Iudian L: Rep., vol. 41, p: 701. 191 C1v. Pro. C., Art. 2�8(3). 19 2. S ee Bel1ari Lal v. Srimati Baran (H1'-gf1 Ct., Allal1abad, 1895), Indian L. Rep., voI · 17' p· 53. _ 193. CIv. Pro. C., Art. 279( 2). 194. See tl1e discussion 1963), of th.is poi11t in S. Sar kar, The . . d · e 1 h La�v of C1v1/ Procedure (4t vo.l 2, p. 58!. 195. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 40(2) a, . Patn would Ct ., h orize this. See also Nunusingh v . Muni (Hig 1953,) 1954 All-India ���� Rep., p.
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tl1ough tl1e second sui� is related t? the first. Suppose A institt1tes stiit to establish J1is right_ to sell certain property _in satisfaction of a decree against B and with draws w1�hout leave-to file a fres11 st11t..He h. o !ds anotl1er decree against B. He may insti tute a suit to enforce . the latt�r dec_ree aga1 11 st tl1e san1e property, since tli e subject 1natter ?f the first su1} was l1 1s claim 011 tl1e forn1er decree, and now 11e is suing 96 Or, . B l1olds a lease fro111 A . ee �r nt de re ffe di a on a year to year basis, on ,vhich l1e has aJlegedly forfeited beca11se of certai11 condttct. I 11 1960 A sues to eject B, and withdra\VS witl1 ot1t leave to instit11te a fresl1 suit. The lease is con tin11ed, ·and in 1962 agair1 A .sues B to forfeit tl1e lease d tte to a re1Jetition of the same conduct. The second s111 t 111ay be n1 aintair1ed.197 The second suit .involved the 1962 lease and tl1.e JJ1cti 11tiff's rights tinder tl1 at lease, a11 d it is not affected by tl1e s11it l1e filecl witl1 respect to l1is rigl1ts 1111 der tl1 e 1960 lease. We l1ave earlier disc·ussed tbe barring of a seco11d suit after a disn1issal due to tl1e non appeara11ce of tl1e JJl�intiff, a11.cl tl1e JJri11ci 1Jles applicable to deter1nine \V]1at cons titutes a suit 011 tl1e ''sa 1ne cat1se of actio11'' witl1 in tl1 e 111 eaning of tl1 at rule are eqt1ally applicable for tl1e p11rpose of \vl1at constitutes a second suit following withdrawal. 198 I n botl1 inst,111 ces tl1 e seconcl st 1 it is witl1 respect to tl1 e st1bject 111atter of tl1e first s11it, as \Ve l1 a,,e defined tl1 at concept. A q11 estion related to witl1 drawal of suits is that o.f extinctio11 of tl1 e plaintiff's cat1se of action. Wl1ere tl1e J Jlaintiff's ca t1se of actio11 has ceased to exist, J1 e sl1ould withdraw the st1 it, bttt if he l1as failed to do so, tl1e court, once it is satisfied that the cat1se of actio11 has ceased to exist, n1t1st dis111 iss the suit a11 d record a reaso11ed order to tl1 at effect. 199 St1ppose tl1at tl1 e plai11 tiff sued to forfeit a lease a11 d pending suit tl1 e lease expirecl, after wl1icl1 tl1e defendant vacatecl tl1e premises. Tl1e ca11se of action was exti 11 guish ed with tl1e expiratio11 of tl1e ]ease, and the co11rt should disnliss tl1e suit. An otl1er exan1ple would be wl1ere the plaintiff s11ed to specificall)t enforce a. contract by \.vhich the defendant agreed to sell ]1i11 1 a l1orse, a11 cl pe11di11g st 1 it, tl1e . l1or�e died. Unless tl1e plaintiff s11bstit11tes a clai1n for damages, tl1e cause of ,1ct1on 1s exting11isl1 ed with the deatl1 of tl1e horse. In this cl1apter we 11ave co11sidered tl1e proceedi11gs tl1at take place prior to trial. Tl1 e court ]1as deter111.ined wl1 etl1er there are any isst1es to be tried, and if so has fra1ned them a11 d set a date for trial. If tl1e parties l1 ave not comprornised or ' discontinued tl1e suit, tl1 e case _proceeds to trial, wl1 ere tl1e issl1es will be resolv ed and a decision on tl1e 1nerits will be re11dered.
p. 265. , 21 l. vo , p. Re L. a11 di ln ), 94 18 , tta lcu Ca ., 196. See Ka.mini v Ram Nath (High Ct . 67 , p. ) p. Re ia nd l-I Al 9 92 1 , 28 19 d ba , ha ( _ 197. See Bhullan v� Dasratb I-ligl1 Ct., Alla yiiig text. n pa m co ac d an 3, -4 40 s te 198. See the disct1ssion, supra, no 199. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 280.
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CHAPTER vm TI-IE TRIAL trial_. It is at th e trial that the e tl1 in tes i11a lin ct1 re fo be ne go All tllat has g are reso�ved, .a judg ment 1n ar l1e st :fir e tl1 at d an s 11g di ea pl e tli _ issues developed in ly ial nt al se e tri es Th volves the . in ed s pa e� cr de _ a 1 1d a : , its er m e tl1 rendered 00 ce en by the trier of id at ev tl1 of n 1o at er 1d ns co e tl1 d an e nc ide ev of introduction n tio of evidence, that is, uc od pr e tl1 (I) tes ula reg de Co e t1r ed oc Pr vil Ci fact. The 1 1ce are brot1gl1t before the court, (2) the con ide ev y ar nt me ct1 do d an s 110w witnesse ng ssi d of t the pa an e11 lgm jt1c decree. the of i11g giv the (3) d an a.1, tri duct of the tl1e er by tri t of d fac ere sid will con be can ce den evi t 1a. wl ng ini erm det Tl1e rules n, the itio In add d. substantive cte ena is e on e11 wh de, Co 1ce de1 Evi tl1e be fou1 1d in , g tin ons to 1pti rela sun rily pre n1a J?ri , ons visi 1)ro y tiar clen evi 1 tai1 cer 1 1 tai codes con btirden of proof a11d st1fficie11cy of proof, e.g., 110\v a will or obligation is to be proved. l n tl1is cl1apter \Ve will be co11cerr1ecl witl1 tl1ose aspects of the trial governed by tl1e Civil Proceclt1re Code. I11 otl1er worcls, we will be concerned with the proce clure to be followed at tl1e tri�1l of tl1e case ratl1er tl1an with the evidence the court ca11 consider. Again a 1 1ui11ber of tl1e provisions of tl1e Code that we will discuss are aJJIJlicable to tl1e other stages of tl1e J)roceedings, i.e., tl1e first l1earing and tl1e a1)peal, bt1t si1 1ce tl1e)' 2.re most freqtiently i11volved at tl1e trial, tl1ey can be disct1ssed i1 1 tl1is context. Ot1r disct1ssion will be divide d into (I) tl1e production of evide 11ce, (2) tl1e conduct of tl1e trial, and (3) tl1e jt1dgment and decree. ,I\. Tl1e Procl11ction of Evide11ce
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E,,idence co11sists pri111arily of tl1e testi111ony of witnesses and docu1nents and otl1er J)l1ysical proof. 1 It is necessary tl1at a procedure exist by which all the neces sary docun1entary and oral evidence can be brot1gl1t before tl1e court. We will first . consider the procedt1re for obtaining the attendance of 'vvitnesses and oral testin1ony and tl1en tl1e procedure for obtaining tl1e prodt1ction of doct1ments. Wl1en a party files l1is pleadi11g, l1e inclt1des a list of tl1e witnesses to be caJle � at tl1e trial, togetl1er with tJ1eir addresses and tl1e pt 1rpose for wl1ich tl �ey are to be called. 2 Prest1� 11ably, tl1ose witnesses vvill volt1ntt1rily appear at tl1e trial, _ aud tile � n1ay testify w1tl1ot1t any fL1rtl1er for111alities.3 1-Io,ve,,er, it 111ay be that so me \Vltnesses so nan1ed will 11ot apJ)ear ,,olt111tarily or tl1f1t subseque1 1t to the _ . mony ling of tl1e testi l)leadi ngs, °ive a J)arty c�111 discovers a11other J)erso11 wl10 ; n Sllcl� a case, tl1e col1rt will issue a. s0111111011s to tl1at witness re�t1iring lun1 to appear, ancl if_ tl1e lie�triiig l1as already begu 1 1, it . m ay adjot1rn the he::1ri11g so tl1at · 1. Proof otl1er than· oral tesr·in,ony is called
. and . s l ien docun real proof· It consists of \Vr1tten· · ca11ed den on wI1at 1s 1 stra ' ti,,e evi· d ei,ce. Pl1ot�graphs, recordings, and any tangible o b�·ect wou ld ting be classified as real proof,_ as es 1.nter For would experiments made in or out of court . cases iJ,volvin ni n� ral e evidence, see Tl1e People v. Go11zalez (Ct. A pp., N�e. v:�, U.S. 1866) 1:ve�� � 0 � f d Cas:s and Materials �' - E.1e1 1• , cvol. 35, IJ. 49, in E. Morga11, J. McGuire a11 J.Ry. t�� v'. r Henderson (Sup Ct � r �en e (4th Ed.,) 1957), tJ. 73, and Norfolk & w_. cCo a, f· S., 1922, Southern Rep., vol 111, p. 277, 1.n C. M · i �� f , i m ck Cases 011 Evid;nc e 3 E ·, 1956), p. 346. 2. Civ· p · ro. c·, Arts. 223(1) (a), .. 234(l ). 3. C1v . ·Pro. C., Art. 111. 4. Since the name of ul d .t ess . wo the wi . was Include? i11 the annex filed with the pleading, be considered a witnes � 1 s w ose attendance IS Art. of g mea nin required witl1in the
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tile person summoned can appear.5 Either party may ask for such an order. w11 ere the witness sought to be summoned was inclt1ded in tl1e list of witnesses annexed to the ple �d.ing and his absence is not due to the fault of tl1 e party seeking to st1mroon him, the order _should be granted, and if necessary, the hearing shot1ld be adjourned. Wl1ere the witness sougl1t to l,e summoned is a new one tlie cotirt should also grant the order. if it is convinced tl1 at the witness may gi;e valuable testin1011y and that the �\1mmo11s is not sought m.erely to delay the case.,. In order to render a proper dec1s1on, tl1e court shot1ld have all the evidence before it even at the expense of furtl1er prolonging tl1e case. 7 The court, tl1en, may isst1e tl1e sumn1ons eitl1er oi1 its own motion or on the motion of 011e of the parties. Si11 ce tl1e JJarties l1 ave tl1e prin1ary responsibility for prese11tin � their �ases, tl1 e cot1rt sl1ot1lcl isst1e tl1e st1n1mons on its own n1 otion only in exce_pt1onal c1rct1111 stances, i.e., wl1ere a witness who is likely to be able to give crucial testimony ]1as 11ot bee11 called by eitl1er party. The more t1sual sitt1ation \Vi1l be wl1ere �1 party applies for tl1 e isst1ance of the summons. Where tl1e st1m1no11s is isst1ed at tl1 e reqt1est of a party, l1e mt1st pay into tlie court, before the st11nmoos is isst1ed, a sum of money to defray tl1e travelling a11 d ''other expenses'' of tJ1e witness for 011e day's cot1rt attendance. 8 Tlus wot1ld incl tide co1npensation for the ti1ne tl1at tl1 e witness 111 isses fro111 his en1ployment. 9 Wl1ere the cot1rt finds that the sun1 is not st1fficient to cover tl1e expenses or tl1 at the wit11 ess 11 1t1st be detained for 111 ore tl1an one day, tl1e cot1rt vvill order the party \,vho l1as req11ested the issuance of tl1e st1n11nons to pay a11 a.dditio11al st11n into cot1rt. 10 If he does not do so, the court may discl1arge the wit11 ess or order the req11ired sum to be levied from tl1e attachn1ent and sate of the pclrty's movable prOJJerty or 111ay order both the levy and the discl1arge . 11 Tl1 e sun1n1011s rnust specify tl1e ti1ne and place at wl1ich tl1 e \vilness is required to attend and wbetl1er his attendance is reqt1irecl for the p _ urpose of giving evi dence or prodt1cting a doct1111e11t, or both. 12 Tl1e st1mo1ons 111trst l1e served in ac cordance with tl1e provisions of tl1e Code relating to service on a defenclant, 13 and in time to allow ]1 im ,l reasonable time for preparatio11 and. for travelling to the court. t 4 \.Vl1ere a witness who ]1as bee11 st11nmoned fails to ap1Jear at the appoint ed tim.e the court m11st first de1er11 1i11e wl1 etl1er the s11111 n1ons 11 ,ts bee11 cluly served. 15 Asst1mi�g tl1at the cot1rt still be!ie,1es that the evidence to be given ·b� tl1 e witness is material if it finds that tl1e s11n1 n1011s t1as not been duly served: 1t n1ay order ' 5. Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 1 11, 257. 6. See Latifannessa · v. A1irnuJia (Higl1 Ct., Patna, 1929 ), l 929 .4/l-lndia Rep., p. 622. Athe h it r da e acco nc w i ary ne cess s i_ ing l1ear first t}1e at ess \Vitn � a of nce 7. w·here the attenda _ ons o f Ar t . 345 , rt. v1s1 h pro e. t 1 w1tl nc� rda provisions of Art. 249 or at the appeal in acco 11] authorizes tl1e issuance of a sun1mons to tl1at witness. 8. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 112(1). �.l2t11 Ed. by ure c�d Pro il Civ o_f de o G_ Tl1e lla, Mu D. in nt poi this of n sio See the disctis . 9. 1 ve ��1 dence _as an to � ned m? surn 1s s_ nes wit the ere Wh . 703 p. 1, R. Mitter, 1953) , vol. botl1 _ 1n_ g1v1ng tes�1rnooy expert·' the cou·rt may allow compensat ion for the time occupied the 1ng of testm1ony. gtv for ary ess nec ter rac cl1a . ert exp an r . of k wor and 1n pel1. orm1ng any Civ. Pro. C., Art. 112(2). 10. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 113(1) (2). 11 . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 113(3). 12. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 114(1). 13. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 116. 14. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 117. 15. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 118(1).
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1 ds th at the su1nmons ha s been duly :fi1 it If 16 s on 1 mn sti · · · . · . suance of. a fresll the is to c?mply \VJth it, or 1·1 e d. _ e fa t1 ca od go t ou ith w � s 11a s es itn w served and tllat tlle , !t may issue suc]1 ice d rv de se oi av lly na tio ten in s l1a s es tn wi . if it finds that the e th ss, of e tne nc wi tl1e attenda 111cluding a el 1np co to y sar ces 11e . s ve lie be t order as . 1 · t tex Id I s t1 co 1 1o t 1s 1n ly on d . e us as refer to 1 e'' t1s ca � d oo ''G 1 . est arr \Varrailt of 1ted fr?1n . tte 11 d1n g du e to rhysical condi e1 ev pr s . wa ss tne e \1/i 1 t} ere 1 wJ � tlle sittiation of tran�p�rtat1on. A witness 1l1t ab a1l av 11n or s 1es � ill1 ., e.g t, tro 1 1 co Ius tioi1s beyond 1a l 11a to m1 t cr1 jec 11 sub be sec pro o als ay 1 n. tio 11 ned n1o st1m 1 en wl ear app wJ10 fails to ned n mo bee sum e sl1 all attend l1av o \Vh ses nes wit s, ect dir ise erw 1 otl rt U11 Iess tl1e cou rt eacl1 l1earino 11ntil tl1e s11it 11,1s been disposed of, a11 d the cou ma y req11ire a wit11ess i11 afteodance to exect1te a bond tl1at he will attend 11ntil the suit is disposed of.19
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TJ1ere n1ay be circu1nstances wl1ere a wit11ess wl1ose testimony is necessary can11 ot be brougl1t before tl1e co111�t. I-le 11 1ay be i11 firn1 or he may not be resident witl1in tl1e local l1111its of the coL1rt's jurisdictio11, or l1e n1ay be about to depart fro111 tl1e cot1rt's jurisdictio11 before tl1e l1 earing. In SL1c]1 cases the witness may be exami11ed 011 co1n111 ission. 20 A11 exarnination on con1n1 iss.io11 is tl1e exantination of a ,vitness by a i1erson specifically a11tl1orized to exa1nine tl1 e witness or by another co11rt.21 Tl1e coL1rt 111,l)' iss11e the co1n1nission on its own motion or on the app1i catio11 of eitl1er party. 22 Before isst1ing tl1e co1n111 jssion, the cot1rt may require a st1111 for expe11ses to be paicl by tl·1e party at wl1 ose request or for wl1 ose benefit tl1e comn1issio11 is iss11ed. 23 TI1e order a_pJJoi11ti11g a con1missio11 directs tl1e parties 11 amed i11 tl1e order to a1)pear before tl1e con1111issio11er, : 4 and all the provisions of tl1e Code applicable to tl1e a1JfJearance of wit11esses .i11 co11rt are applicable to the appeara11 ce of ,vit11esses before the co111 missio11er, e.g., rem11neration of witnesses and pe11alties for 11 on-co111 1)lia11 ce. 25 Wl1ere the witness resides outside the local lin1 its of tl1e co11rt. issuing the com1nission, tl1e con1n1issioner may apply to any cot1rt v,1itl1in tl1e local limits of vvl1ose j11risdiction tl1 e vvitness resides for tl1e issuance of process agai11st that vvitness, and tl1at cotirt sl1 all iss11e st1ch process as it finds JJroper . 26 Wl1en tl1 e co111 n1issio11 has been exec11ted' it shall be returned to tl1e 16-
Civ. P�·o. C., Art. 118(2) (a). If a party was ordered to serve tl1e sun1mons on the witness and failed to do so, t11e court could tax !Ji1n witJ1 the cost of serying tl1e second sun1mons. 17. Civ. J>ro. C., Art. 118(2)(b) . 18. S e Ci v. Pro. ·c., Art. 118(3) a11d Pen . c., Art. 442. � 19 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 120(2). Where a witness \vho l1as bee11 ordered to exect1te a bond refuses t do so, he inay be detained i n a civil priso11 tlntil tl e trial is co1npleted. TJ1e provisions 1 1 Art. 1,! 8 also apply to sun1mons, a wi�oes a s who, witb l1aving co1np attend liance ed in � parts \\Itliotit lawful exc use l)r1or to the con1pletion of the suit . Civ. Pro. C., Art. lZ0(3 ). � 20. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 127. 21 · �i �. �r?. C., Art. 122. Where tl1e wit11es s is resident v,1itl1i11 tl1e local lio1its of t.he court's Jurisdict1? 0 , tl� e comn,ission rnay be issued to to any l)erson the court tl1inks is qualified l ft e� ute fit . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 127(3). \Vl1ere the wit11ess is not resident withi11 the Joca · · · on niay be . n 1ts O tl1e court's j urisdicti0n 01· is a comn11ss1 out b to leave tl1e Iilnits those ... issued tO an y court wrtl111 1 1 the local Jin1its of whose jurisdi ction the � itness resides or '� C1v. . . . . be present or to any other pecson t · m · _ appo . . t may 1e 1 court 1ssu1ng the comm1ss1on Pro. c., Art. 127(4). · 22. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 127(2) . 23. C �v. Pro. C., Art. 123(.l). . 24. C1v. Pro. C. Art 126 the d an . Tl ses · ;:s . O bvio�sly , witnes would n<;:>t apply to sic� or infirm ord�r sl1ould dir�ct th at ·ve _ gi . an<l nce iey adm it the comn11ss1oner to tl1e1r ._place of reside testrn1ony before h im . 25. C�v. Pro. C., Art. 125(1). 26. C1v. Pro. C., A.rt. 125( 2). 1
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court ·or isst1ance together with the evidence taken under it ·27 the commission a nd tl1e evidence then f?rr_n part of the record in the suit.-"8 Note that wl1ere evidence is taken on commission, !lie oppo?e nt l1as no opportunity to· cross-examine the wit11es?. Ho�ever, the . taking of . evidence on c·o1nmission is autl1 orized only where jt is 1n1poss1ble to b:111g the_ w1tt1ess before. the cot1rt, and wl1en considering the evidence, the cot1rt \V1ll tak e into accot1nt the absence of cross-examination. The cot1rt may . also per111_it a fact to be proved by tl1e affidavit of a witness or allo\V . an affidavit . of a w1t11 ess to be read at the trial, provided tl1 at neitl1er party desires �o call tl1e_ deponen t for cross-exarninatio11.:9 Wl1ere eitl1 er party desires to. cross-exan11n� the w1tne�s ancl l1e ca1J 'be prodt1ced, tl1e evidence n1ay 11 ot be given by affid�1v1t. !f t]1� witness ca1111 ot be .Prodt1ced, then it would seem that the court does l1ave d1.scret1on to a110w proof by 2ffidavit bt1t tl1is power sl1011ld be used spari.ngly. Wl1ere evjdence is given by affida,1it, tl1 e wit11ess is not present for cross-exan1inatioo or exru11inatio11 by tl1e cot1rt. Tl1ere is no OJJportt1nity to observe hjs demeanor and otl1 er factors affecti11g l1js credibility. Perl1 aps an affidavit sl1 01I1d be allowed in the cases wl1ere tl1e taki11g of evidence on con1mission is a11tl1orized. Affidavits ru-e also tised i11 support of a.pplicatio11s. 30 Tl1e affidavits sl1all be co11 .fi11ed to st1cl1 facts as the depone11t is able by bis o\vn k1Jowledge to pro,,e, bt1t 011 an i nterloct1tor:y application, e.g., an application they 111ay i11cl11de facts tl1 at the deponent believes for a temporary injunctio n , 32 to be true. 32 ItJ st1cl1 a case it n1t1st be made clear how rnucl1 of the affidavit is based 011 tl1e depo11 e .nt's k nowledge and l1 ow mt1cl1 is based on facts that he believes to be trt1e.33 Tl1e sot1rces 011 vv1l1ich I1is belief is basecl shoulcl also be disclosed. 3" Tl1e san1e type of provisions apply to the production of docL1ments. As \ve saw, eacl1 party 11111st include with l1is pleadi11g tl1e original and a copy of a_ny doctlffient in l1is possession 011 whic]1 he relies. 35 f\t tl1e first I1earing, tl1e p_ arties mt1st produce all remaini11g doct1n1entary evidence, 36 a11d if a doct1n1 e11t 1s not 7 I-Io �ever, the trial.: of ti111e the at cecl 1 proc/1, t be canno it ti111e, produced at that cot1rt may conclu· de that a doc11rne11t shoL1ld be prodt1�_ecl, and, if so, 1t l1as tl1e 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 128(1). Civ. Pro. C., A r t. 128(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 203. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 204 sets fortl1 tl1e rules for the use of affidavits on applicati�n, �nd requires that at tl1e i nsistence of the other party, the deponent appear for cross-exa1n1 nat10�. v 1t. The facts to support the gra11ting of a teo1porary inju11ction n1ay be proved · by a.ffida See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 154. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 205. See Hawkins v. Misra (High Ct., Nagpur, 194 8), J 95 2 All-India Rep., P· 259. h Ed., 1963), (4t ure ced Pro il Civ of ll' La e Th , kar Sar S. in t n i po See the discussion of this vol. 1, p. 377. Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 223(1) (b), 234 (1 ). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 137(1). f tb� Ind'J�� o 2, l 13 ru r rde e lik un e, icl art s tl1i t Civ. ·rro. C., Art. 137(3). Note tha <?, exceptio i 1o ve _1' 1t 1 ! n . e_ us ca � d oo ''g a. Code of Civil Procedt1re, does not contain � �! intro� �ed n in permit a �� t? r �e po the s l1a urt co eem the 4, 26 tha t. r de Ar t, tin �� ;t \he first bearing. �� s pro to e. fa1lur where there wa s good cat1se for tbe pro1J on ent s negotiable instru a n o d d e n f ou t sui a to See also Civ. Pro. C., Art. 25 6(2 ) witl1 resp�ct i m xa s-e os cr r fo �d uc p ocumen ts mei:it that has been lost. This rule is not_ a (Jp hcable to t :: by the · de fendant or et ase nation of the defe ndant's \Vitnesses or in an� wer t� 11e � �sl1ing of J1is memory. Civ. r f r� . e 1 tl or documents that 1,ave been J1a11ded to any witness 1 Pro. C., Art. 137(4).
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�pp n e th do of o si u1 es t ss en po to !1 s ha � ho w ear in tlle person r de or to er ow P . 1·t. 3s Thi·s would include documents 1n the possess1on of a party ' and. . ent c. court w1t h • 1 s to do so a d um oc e t1c d 1a1 pro to d ere ord en be the ' . where a partY Wllo bas 1. 39 WI 1ere a �erson n ? t a party to 1n h" st n ai ag t en m g d ju ce n u a court inay prono sly discussed relating les iou ru ev pr e tl1 1 ent n cu do a e uc od pr to : suit is ordered 1ons must state 1 e s m1 Th le. cab pli ap are � s sse tne wi wheth er of to tile sunlinoning g cin du a document, and if so pro of se rpo pu tl1e for ed tiir req is e anc h" attend th on wi eas ns ''r 1no ble st1n1 the in accuracy.''.c� bed cri des � be st nti 1 ent ti:! doctim of e ing pos duc pt1r pro le s tl1e a document, for ned mo st1m is ? son per a But wllere nt me ct1 to the do ing be pr?duced even us ca by s 011 1 1nn su e tl1 th wi ply 1 n co he n1 ay 41 ern gov the production of other also es rl e he T · ear. app not s doe . � lly ; ona ! if he pers real proof, e.g., pl1otographs and ex�ib1ts. . The cour t. may also send for the record of any otl1er suit or proceeding e1tl1er fron1 1ts own files or from 43 It wot1ld do this wl1ere tl1e record of the t. cour l1er anot of tl1e files otl1er st1it ,vould be releva11t in tl1e present Sltit, e.g., there is a claim of res judi cata ot1 011e or 11 1ore isst1es. It shot1ld 011ly se11d for the record if the party seek ing the record cannot l1 in1self, witl1ot1t u11reasonable expense or delay, obtain a 44 1 ary parts. necess e tl of If he has an or recorcl the of copy ticated autl1en duly t1nautl1enticated COJ)Y and tl1e oppo11ent adn1its its val.idty, tl1ere is also no need to send for tl1e origi11al record. 45
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Wl1 ere a document l1as bee11 produced, tl1e cot1rt e11dorses on it (1) tl1e number and title of tl1 e stiit, (2) tl1e na111e of tl1· e JJerso11 producing tl1e document, and (3) the date on vvl1icl1 it ,vas 1)roclt1ced. � 6 Tl1is sl1ot1ld be done irrespective of whether tl1e court considers tl1e doct1n1e11 t to be adn1issible in evidence, but where it is inadn1issible tl1e cot1rt n1ust includ.e a statement to tl1e effect that the document has bee11 rejected. � 7 Wl1en tl1e docun1er1t is an e11try in a sl.1op-book or in an accot1nt, tl1e party on wl1ose bel1a1f tl1e book or accot1nt is produced may furnish a copy of tl1e e11try, 43 and tl1e req1.1ired partict1lars are endorsed. on the copy.�9 Wl1 ere tl1e book or account does not belong to tl1e party seeking to introduce it, tl1e cot1rt 111 ay require tl1at party to f11rnish a copy ;so wh ere the court has ordered tl1e production of tl1e book or acco11nt on its own n1otion, i t may require either party to produce the copy.51 \VI1enever a cop:y l1as been furnisl1 ed, the court sha]I compa�e . tl1e copy witl1 tl1e originc:tl, certify t11e copy to be accurate, and return the or1g1nal to tl1e person producing it. 52 Tl1e court, however, may if it deen1 s 38·
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40. 4142. 43 · 44. 45• 46· 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 264. See also Civ. Pro. 3., Art. 257. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 26 ?. However, it 11eed not do so and may proceed aga.inst him in the same n1anner as against. any other witness who l1as Pro. prod faile e evidence. Civ. to uc d C., Art. 268. Civ. Pro. C., Art. I J 4. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 115. Se e also Civ. Pro. C., Art. 119 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 14 6. c;��- �ro. <;., Art. 145(1 ). Note that the documents contained in tl1e record n1ust be adnli!s1. e in evidence. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 145(3) . C1v. Pro. C., Art. 145( 2). S�e Mayadl1ari v. Chunilal (High Ct., Lal1ore, 1930), 19 31 All-India Rl'P·, p. I 19. C �v. Pro. C., Art. 139(1). C1v. Pro. C., Art. 141. C�v. Pro. C., Art. 140(1 ). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 139(2). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 140(2) ( a). C1_ v. Pro. C., Art. 140 ( ) (2) 6 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 140(3).
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it necessary, direct that any document .be in1pounded for such period as it de.ems fit.53 Also, any per�on . who has submitted a11 original document may reeeive back _ _ tl1e or1g1nal by substituting a copy and promising to produce the original if required to do so. 54 Thus, we . see that th� court has broad powers. to compel the attendance of . w1tness �s and the production of docun1ents and generally to obtain evidence that i � :�ns1ders necessary to enable _it to decide tl,e .issues in tl1e suit. Pri1nary respon s1b1I1ty for the attendance of witnesses and the production of docun1ents rests with the _pa.rties, but . the parties' inactio11 will not· prevent the coL1rt from obtajning evidence wl1en tl1e col1rt desires to do so.
B. The Conduct of the Trial At the trial, as ,ve l1ave said, each party introduces the oral and documentary evidence 11ecessary to Sllpport his side of tl1e issue: if tl1e issue is whetl1er there ,vas a contract, the plai11tiff introdt1ces l1is evide11ce to sl1o'vv the existence of a co11tract and the defe11dant i11trodt1ces l1is evidence sl1owing tl1 at tl1ere was no co11tract. V..'e will now consicler tl1e rL1les governing how tl1is evidence is to be introdt1ced .
1. Order of Proceeding .
Tl1e order of proceeding depends on the natt1re of the issues that are i11volved in tl1 e case. The plruntiff is entitled to begi11 tin.less tl1e defendant has ad1nitted tl1 e allegations of tl1e staten1ent of clai. n 1 and l1as raised wl1at we l1ave called affirmative defences, in which case tl1e defendant is entitled to begin. 55 Tl1 is reflects tl1e general rule that the party wl10 l1as bt1rden of proof l1as tl1e rigl1t to begio.56 The plaintiff has tl1e burden of proving tl1at l1e has a cat1se of action, and tl1e defend ant has the b11rde11 of proof 011 the q11estion of wl1etl1er l1e has a valid defence. It is provided that ''tl1e party wl10 dema11ds perfor1nance of a11 obligation sl1all prove its existe11ce, a11d the party wl10 alleges tl1at an obligatio11 is ,,oicl, J 1as bee11 varied or is extiog1.1isl1ed. sl1all prove tl1e facts cat1si11g tl1e n11liily, variation, or extinctio11''. 57 So, in a suit to recover dan1ages for breacl1 of co11tract, the plainti.ff would have to prove the existence of a co11tract, tl1e breacl1 by the ctefe11dant, and tl1e resulting damages: tl1ese are tl1e esse11tial elen1e11ts of l1is cat1se of action. If the defendant adn1itted tl1c1t tl1ere was a contract wl1icl1 l1 e clicl not JJerforn1, but contended tl1 at tl1e contrac.t w::1s void,1ble or that l1is perforn1a11 ce \).,las exc11sed, he would have the btirden of proof on those iss11es. Wl1 enever the plair1tiff l1as the b11rden of .IJroof on or1e of th. e iss11es i11 the case, he has tl1e rigl1t to b �gi11. If, for example, there is an iss11e as to tl1e existence of tl1e contract ancl an lSStle as to force n1ajeL1re, tl1e tJlaintiff l1as tl1e rigl1t to begi11, si11ce he I1as the b11rden of proof on one of the isst1es i11 the case. However, if the defe11dant adnlitted the
53. 54.
55. 56. 57.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 143. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 144(1). No docun1e11t n1ay be returned which b_y force. of the decree_ bas become void . or useless. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 144(2). For example,_ 10 a stnt on a 11egot1able instru.1ne.nt, tbe defenda11t contends that the instrument was obt,�111ed_ by duress. If the court sustains the conte 11tion and eaters judgn1ent for the defendant, �t \.VIII not re_turn _tl1e docu to ·file h�s try1ng _ _ ment to the plaintiff, si11ce the clocun1ent is not enforceable. Tb1s prevents a suit on the instrument elsewhere. On the return of a document ad1n1tted 10 evidence, the person receiving it must give a receipt. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 144(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 258(1). See the discussion of this point in S. Sarkar, The Lalv of Civil Procedure (4th Ed., l 963), vol. 1, p. 368. Civ. C., Art. 2001. See also Civ. C., Art. 2141.
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damages cla.imed, but co ntend tl1e d an ce an . r111 rfo -pe oo 11 his , · ed · . existen. ce of a coiltract e h . u 1e, wo Id Jet1 1na e the right 1 · ce hav for by d t1se exc s wa · · nce illa "or .0 · .f on the on 1Y 1sst1.e 10 the. case. tI1at h1s ·non-per1' oo pr of 1 e1 1rd bt · e · tl1 s ha lJe . ce beg1n, sin . e burden of _ proof. In a sense tl1 s o oll 1 gi1 be � to ht rig � tile t tlJa We see then y g art v1n tl1e if l1a 1ce s11 the '' 11 .tio ga bli burden of p '' an ls tai er1 o als ? _ this ''right'' de ce he ha s prese nted, the ev1 tl1e by e en def or 1111 � cl s }1 ish �lbl est to � . �. proof fails 7 t call1n g upon th _ ou th _ wi ne t11 t l1a t r at the o11 1 t ga I1t e � th party e _ 1 � 1at mi ter � can t ttr co _ t , con tl1e act 1 of acI bre i or f int pla t sui a ff fails to . 1n : If, ss ce. den evi t tlJa ut reb to re the 1s no ct, tra reason to proceed con a s wa re tl1e t tl1a g win sho e cas ina.l<e out a re the t tl1a w sho to iff i11t pla the _ was a contract, not on or1 is den bur fLirtller: tlle tlie defenda11t to sl10,v tl1at tl1ere was not a contract. Since the plaintiff has not satisfied }1is burden, tl1at is, l1e l1as 11ot introduced . st1fficient evidence, which, if believed would j11stify a finding i11 his favor 011 tl1at 1 ss11e, the co11rt will render a y led part tl1e entit s, Tl1u ti1n . at tl � jtidgn1e�t for tl1e defenda11t at ! _ _ . to begin 111ust state Jiis case and prodt1 ce 111s evidence 1n su1Jport of tl1e 1ss11e or 1ss11es ,vh.ich he is bound to prove. 59 Only after l1e l1as n1ade ot1t his case or defence by introduc ing sufficie11t evide11ce \vl1icl1, if believecI, wo11ld j11stify a finding i11 his favor on the isst1e or isst1es wl1icl1 l1e is bo1111d to prove, s·ho11ld tl1e otl1er party l1ave to produce I1is evide11ce. Ass11111i1 1g tl1at tl1e party l1avi11g t]1e rigl1t to begin has introduced st1fi1cie11t evidence, or, as it is s0111etimes said, l1as 1nade ottt a pri111a facie case or defe11ce, tl1e otl1er party states l1is case, procl11ces his e,,idence and addresses the co11rt generally on tl1e ,1vl10Ie case. 60 T11e J)arty beginning tl1en replies on the whole case. 61 To recapitt1late, if there is only one issue, the party l1aving tl1e burden of proof on tl1a t iss11e begins: l1e states l1is case and procl11ces all his evidence on tl1at isst1e. If lie l1as i11trodt1ced s11fficient evide1 1ce to satisfy his b11rden of proof on tl1at issue, tl1e otl1er party' states l1is case, prod11ces his evidence 011 tl1at iss11e and addresses the court. The p;1rty begi11ning tl1e11 replies. TI1e party wl10 l1as the bt1rden of proof is entitled to l1ave tl1e last word, since if tl1e cot1rt is not more persuaded_ by 11�s evidence thar1 by tl1 e evide11ce of J1is oppo 11ent, it will decide the 1ss11e against }11n1.62 Tl1ere will freq11ently be more tl1an one iss11e in the case, and wl1ere the plain. t�[ 11as tl1e ?11rden of IJroof 011 011e of those iss11es, as w e }Jave said, l1e l1as the right to begin. I-Ie must produce l1is evidence on the iss11es as to wl1ich l1e l1as the ?11rde1 1 of JJroo�. Ho,vever, 11e also l1as the O{)tion to prod11ce l1js evide11ce 011 the 1ss11es as to w11icl1 tl1e defendant l1as tl1e bt1rcte11 of proof. If l1e does 11ot wisl1 to do so, he may reserve the evide11ce 0 11 tl1e latter · iss11es l111til tl1e defe11da11t has
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58 · See the discussion of tJ1is poi11t in S. Sarkar, supra, note 56 at p. 370. 59 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 259(1). 60 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 259(2). 61. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 259(3). 62 . r� e are really t_WO aSJ)eCtS to the th d a n tion bur den pro }1e du eJl of proof' t :�e11 o f pe of burd c Cf · rsuasion T h e part.y l,a vi� · · fY h·1s burden ° 1e 1 b t sat1s urden 1nt1st of proof g . production by i tr d · in· su in .find.1 g by c e a t g j ence y evid ustif _wl1 ich, if believed, would . ffi ! u f l1is favo r on t h� fss�� The ar whose evidence he is 11 •ore . trier of fact . will resolve the isstie in favor of the edp b� t he . persuade d. Bu t it n1ay be that lie is no more persuad b ) den evidence of one part ti1an the otlier; h!s mi11d is in eqtiilibrium. Tl1e party J,aving th e u� is of proof has the 6ur� 11 0 persuad 111g the trier of fact tl1at is version of t e iact rs e more likely· to be trt t� b h t e ir , de n 1 1� opp�nen t's yersion, and if lie fails to so persua the issue will be re��I � \vord'. t ve ain e "�g Sl htni. Tl11s is wl1y lie is oridinarily g iven tb ]as See generally J. McB .o 3t, 1 o u d�n of Proof: Degrees of Belief," California 1:· Rev., d p. 242, in Associatio� Trial � �f merican an nce Law Scl1ools, Selected Readi,zgs 011 Ev1c/e 1957), p. 991.
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produced his evidence on tl1ose issues. 63 If the plaintiff does not reserve I1is evidence, the procedure is tl1e san1e as if the only issues were those as to which the plaintiff had the burden of proof. He wil] introduce his evidence on all the issues, and assuming that he ·has introduced sufficient evidence on the issues as to which he has the bt1rden of proof,64 tl1e defendant 11 1ust introduce his ·evidence on all tl1e isst1es and will address the COllft. on tl1e - whole case. Tl)e plaintiff will tl1en reply on the whole case. 65 If tl1e tJlaintiff J1as not reserved the option to produce evidence, he may not introduce rebuttal evidence after tl1e defendant has present · · ed l1is case. 66 ' If the plaintiff J1 as reserved l1is evidence, tl1e following proced·ure is employed. Tl1e plai11tiff prodt1ces J1is · evidence on the issues as to wl1ich he l1as tI1e bt1rden of proof. Assun1i11g tl1 at tl1e evidence is sufficient, the defendant 111t1st prod11ce his rebt1ttal evidence and tl1e evidence 011 the issues as to wl1icl1 l1e l1as tl1e bt1rde11 of proof. Assu111i11g that l1is evidence on tl1ose isst1es is st1fficient, l1e addresses tl1e court on all tl1e issL1es. If l1is evidence 011 those issues is not st1fficient, be \Vot1ld 011ly address tl1e court on tl1e issues as to ·wllich tl1e plaintiff l1as tl1e bt1rden of proof� since t11ose are the 011ly isst1es to be detern1ined. If he has introdt1ced s11ffi cient evidence on tl1e isst1es as to whicl1 l1e l1as the burden of proof, tl1e plaintiff mtist prod.t1ce l1is evidence on tl1ose jssues. Tl1e11 tl1 e d.efe11da11t replies specially on tl1e evidence produced by tl1e plai11tiff, and tl1e plaintiff replies on tl1e wl1ole case. 67 It is clearly to the plaintiff's advantage to reserve · evide11ce 011 tl1e iss11es as to wllich tl1e defendant l1as tl1e b11rden of proof. If the defendant does not JJrodt1ce s11fficie11t evidet1ce to jt1stify a finding in l1is favor on tl1ose issues, tl1 e plaintiff will 11ot have to intro.dt1ce any reb11ttal evidence. Moreo\1er, if tl1e plaintiff l1as not reserved evid ence,_ he will have introdt1cecl bis evide11ce on tl1ose iss11es ,vitl1out k:oowing precisely wl1at evide11ce the defendant wi]] introdtice. }le vvill be rebL1ltiog evider1ce before that evidence has bee11 _lJresented. I-Iowever, de1?e11ding on tl1e 11at11re of the issues and tl1e evide11ce it may be more conve1.1ient for t11e plai1rtiff to i1.1trodL1ce I1is evidence on all tl1e isst1es ,1t one tin1e, e.g., l1e 111ay seek to prove all t11e issues by tl1e san1e witnesses, and l1e may i11troduce llis evidence on cill tl1e isst1es at one tin1e.
2. Production of Evidence by the Parties . Tl1e primary respinsibility for the exan1i11ation o·f witnesses rests with tl1e pi:1rties, though, as we will see, tl1e co11rt is also give11 broad JJowers with res1Ject to tl1e exan1i11ation of ¥litnesses. TI1ere are tl1ree stages to tl1e exa111ination of witnesses: (I) tl1e exami11ation-i11-cl1ief; (2) tl1e cross-exan1ination; and (3 ) tl1e re-ex,11nination. 68 In order to trnderstancl tl1ese stages, it is necessary to review tl1e tl1eory bel1ind tl1e adversary systen1 of litigatio11, \Vl1icJ1 is followed in Etl1iopia. The witnesses are ordinarily called by eacl1 party, and as to the witnesses l1e calls the party is the proponent. He tries to bri11g ot1t tl1e evidence tl1at will st1:pport his versio11 of t]1e case and tJ1at evidence on]y. Tl1e opponent then tries to ''clestroy'' the testimo11y of 63. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 260(1). 64. I-Je does not l1ave to introduce such evide.oce on tbe otJ1er issues, since as to tl1em the 65. 66. 67. 68.
opponent has the burden of proof. Thus, the plaintiff l1as the last word 011 all t11e issues, �11clt1ciing tl,ose as to \.vbjcJ1 he does not have the burden of proof. It \vould not be feasible to !1ave each party add.ress the court separately o·n tl1e issues as to wl1icl1 l1e l1as the burden of proof. See the djscussion of this poi11t in S. Sarkar, supra, n.ote 56 at p. 370. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 260(2). There is obviously a printing error in the text of Art. 261 (1), which does 11ot appear in the corrigenda. There is an ornjssion of. ''arid �� ass-examined by the other party." See Crin1. Pro. C., Art. 136(3) which parallels this prov1s1on.
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• o . at im th st '' te te ny ta ili ab eh e ''r Th to . th s e ie tr y or t en on op pr is · e tli · d n a . , . ss e n it w e th en ted b y questions from the em p sup I e b y ma l1 luc ( w s ces pro · · that as a result Of the . . b b e ug h ro ·11 t se w ca e o the attentio n th t ou a? ! � s w 1!-o k ss e . tn wi . e th g in _ r pos1tlon to determin court), everytl1 . tte be e whether or a 1n be ll 1 w irt cot . the d ' . of th e· court' an es e 1 t t'fi d 11 10 narrative .form. 1n�re � 1e 1'f 1 a11 th t� tru e th g lin tel is . . not the witness p th� te�timony es lo t tri !o ve de e on op pr e th 1ef � ch n1 n1o at in ain ex Thus, during the 1 , du nn g _ cro�s-exa1D1 natio n the h�n to le ab or fav st mo l1t lig tl1e _ of tile witness in 1n � re-exam1nat1on the pr_oponent r d d an , ny no t11 tes � at 1 tl dit cre dis opponent tries to t us no w consider the Le n. t1o na m1 exa sscro the of ct e f ef t11e ize 1 nin mi tries to requireme11ts for eacl1 type of exan1ination. -c n-in atio min exa the �ief. I! should b� noted for s nes ":it his s call ent pon TI1e pro tl1at if a party wishes to testify, l1e 1nust do so before �all1ng69 bis other witnesses, Th e witn ess takes and for all practical purposes, he is dee1ned to be a witness. ceeds the oatl1 in tl1e forn1 provided in tl1e · Tl1ird Scl1edt1le to tl1e Code, and pro 70 The or his t . onen cate prop advo the by ded oun prop s tion qt1es tl1e to ans wer que stions put in the examination-in-chief mt1st relate only to facts that are relevant to tl1e isst1es to be clecided and only to sucl1 facts of w hicl1 the witness has direct or indirect lcno\vledge. 71 Tl1e Evide11ce Code '.¥ill set forth rules of relevancy and in all probablity, will define wr1at is 1nea11t by ''direct or indirect knowledge ." The point to remember is that tl1e oppo11ent is entitled to object on the ground. that tl1e evidence sougl1t to be addt1ced 1Jy tl1e question is irrelevant or that it is in con1petent, i.e., tl1e \Vitness cJoes not l1ave direct or indirect knowledge of the facts as to \:vl1icl1 I1e is testifying.
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Tl1e 1nost important point to note in regard to the examination-in-chief is that t11e proponent or l:1is advocate can11ot ordinarily ask \Vl1at are called leading ques tions .72 The Evidence Code no dot1bt ,,vill elaborate on what constitutes a leading qt1estion, but as a general IJrorJosition, we can saJ' that a leading question is one st1ggesti11g tl1e answer wl1icl1 tl1e person p11tting it wishes to receive. 73 The purpose of _the rule for�iddi11g Ieadi11g qt1estions on tl1e examination-in-cl1ief (and, by impli cat1on, on _re-direct exa11unation) is to preve nt a witness wl10 is quick to adopt tl1e st1ggest1o n of tl1e exau1iner fron1 saying son1etl1ing tl1at l1e would . not say _ . otl1er,v1se. The testimony 1nust be that of the witne ss and not the examiner; tl1e exa1111ner cannot ''put ,:vords in tl1e moutl1 of tl1e witness," so to speak. Ii1 other . words, the exa1n1ner cannot s11gges t tl1e ansvver l1e wants to r eceive and. try to get that ans,ver from the wit11ess. l'len1e111ber tl1a. t the witne ss is being called by the proponent? and that tl1e propone11t is tryi11g to prove l1is case through the testim ony of that v.:itness. It is tl1erefore, necessary to li1 nit tl1e propo11e11t in lus exa.roination ? of tl1e witness and ins ure tl1at tl1e testimony is ge 11uinely that of the witn ess. . · · s a - lay It i s no� possible to down l1ard and fast ·rt1les as to w l1at constitute . 1eading quest1011· Often this depends on d: ask e is tion the way i n w l1icl1 tl1e ques <l oes the f orn1 of the qtie stion and tl1e tone of voice of tl1e examine r suggest the · a�swer th� t tlie examiiier wishes to �he tha t s e l1o p rec r ei, ,e? exa Ob nu vio11s}\,J' tl1e ne • . witness w1ll answ er tl · · O with 1 e. qties t!0n d to in ng a part noth ict1l ar w ay. Tl1is has i . • d whether the qtleSlion 18 leading. The leading nattrre of tl1e qu estion is detennine 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.
C� v. Pro. C., Art. 26 1(2). C v. Pro. C., Art. 26 I (1). �
C�v. Pro. C., Art. 263(1). C1v. Pr . C., Art. 263(2). � See Indian Evidence Act ' Sec. 141.
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by the form of the question and the tone i n which it is asked - it is only where the qt1estion itself st1ggests the answer which the examiner wishes to receive that it is considered to be leading. Tl1e most common example of a leading question is one where the exanuner concludes with a positive suggestion s11ch as ''didn't yot1'' or ''weren't yot1." For example, a question, ''you were attacked by tl1e defendant, weren't you," is clearly leading. The ''weren't you'' s11ggests tl1at tl1e answer must be yes, or at least, tl1at this is the answer the examiner wisl1es to receive. The question sl1ould be expressed in tl1e ne11tral for1n, and if it is, tl1en it is not considered leadi11g, even though the answer will be either ''yes'' or ''no'' and eve11 tl1011gh the circumstances o.f tl1e examination n1igl1t indicate the answer tl1e examiner wishes to receive. In one case,7 " \Vl1ere the plai11tiff was trying to prove that tl1e defendant l1ad sexual relations \Vitl1 the plaintiff's wife, the following q11estion was objected to as leading: ''Did yot1 at any time see tl1e children, after you l1ad seen Mr. Micha11d go to tl1e l1011se, try to get in ?'' Tl1e co11rt l1eld tl1at tl1e q11estion - designed to show tl1at tl1e defendant was with the plaintiff's wife bel1ind a locked door - was not leading, since the form of the question did not suggest tl1e desired a11s\ver: from the forn1 of tl1e question, tl1e witness could not tell wl1etl1er tl1e exa1niner wanted l1i1n to answer ''yes'' or ''no''. If tl1e q11estion has bee11 so111etl1ing like ''yo11 saw that tl1e cl1ildre11 co11ld11't get get into tl1e ho11se, didn't you," the11 it would l1ave been leading. Tl1e co11rt must consider the form of tl1e question and the tone in wl1ich it is asl<ed a11d determine wl1etber the nature of the question is sucl1 as to st1ggest tl1e ans\.ver tl1e exan1iner wishes to receive. The court may at times permit tl1e asking of leading questions,75 and tl1ere are two situations where it sl1011ld do so. One is \vl1e11 the \vitness is being examin ed as to wl1at are called ''introductory 1natters." Tl1e evicience of each \Vi t11ess sl1all start witl1 Ii.is name, age, occu1Jation and address,76 and to save tirne, tl1e exarniner can simply state tl1at ''yo11r nan1e is . . . . . . , isn't it?'' OlJvio11sly, tl1is is not objectionable, since tl1e substance of tl1e \Vitness's testin1ouy is not involved. The other sit11ation is wl1ere the witness cannot reme1nber s0111e or all of the matters as to whicl1 l1is testimo11y is sol1gl1t. Tl1e Evidence Code no clot1bt will co11tain rules gover11ing refresl1ing memory, a11d tl1ey are likely to allow tl1e use of leadi11g questions as one metl1od of doi11g so. 77 Leading qt1estio11s ·may also be used to assist child ,vitnesses wl10 J1ave difficulty i11 testifying. Bt1t, except in tl1ese situations, leading questions 111ay 11ot be asked by tl1e proponent. The cross-exa111inatio11 of tl1e witness goes to tl1e l1eart of tl1e adversary syste1n of litigation. One a11tl1ority has called it ''tl1e greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of trt1tl1." 78 This n1ay be an extren1e state111ent, b11t tl1e spirit is clearly reflected in Art. 263(3) of tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code, which provides tl1at ''questions p11t in cross-exa1;1-1inat�on sl1all te�d t_o s�ow _ wl1� t is e�roneous, do11btf11l _ . , Leading qt1estto11s . or t1ntrt1e 1n tl1e answers given 1n tl1e exan11nat1on-1n-ch1ef. may be p11t in cross-exan1ination, and freq11ently, cross-exa1uination co·nsi_sts aln1ost ent�rely of leading questions. Every effort 1s n1ade to sl1ow tl1at the w1t11ess l1as omitted
74. 75. 76. 77. 78.
i\udibert v. Michaud (Sup. Ct., Maine, U.S., 1920), Atlantic Rep., vol. 11, p. 305, in C. McCorn1ick, Cases 011 Evic!e11ce (3rd Ed., 1956), p. 8. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 263(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 269(1). See the discussion of the use of leading questions to refresl1 n1en1ory in M. Monir, The Law of .Eviclence (4th Ed., 1958), p. 881. J. Wigmore, Treatise on Eviclence (1940), vol. 5, p. 1367.
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e are also recognized methods of 1er Tl . tly ec rr co s ct fa 1 e tl . facts or is not th. the g tru l1n tel These methods of be to e!y Jik t no is ss tne wi tlle that 1 · t 11b b do �et .forth in �he Evi no ll wi d, ll ca e ar � ey tl1 as y," ilit dib cre 1;:�hing � . ing ow sh that the witness is e (1) ar s od t] me ed niz og rec t11e of � me So dence Code. , (2) that he h.as made nt ne po op e th t ns a1 ag or t en on op pr _ the of _ biased in favor t, at (3) trr th co he 1n ny 11o t11 as tes a his o th o � p_ wi r t ten sis on inc ts en _ tem sta ior pr _ d cte 1v1 n of co1 be tain crurunal s cer ha l1e t tl1a (4) tl1, tr11 � the ing tell for n tio uta rep 79 se rpo ry pu 1na of cross-exam.in.a pr1 l1e . ess liin ort stw � tru Iiis on offences reflecting de tl1e co11rt tl1at it tion is to discredit the testin1ony of tl1e witness and persua sl1ould not believe sucl1 testimony. The re-exan1 i1 1ation is lirnited to ''clarifying tl1e matters wl1ich have been raised i11 cross-exa 11u11ation."so The proponent does 11ot exa1nine the witness all over again, but tries to ''rel1abilitate'' l1im i11 tl1e sense th,1t l1e tries to sl1ow that tl1e original testin10 11y is to be believed - to reb11t the 11nfavorable evidence bro11ght 011t on cross exan1i 11atio11. Tl1e co11rt n111st 1J1al(e s11re tl1at tl1e re-examination is l(ept \1/ithin proper bou11ds ,1nd is li1TLited to clarifying tl1e n1atters raised by the opponent in the cross-exa111i11ation. Duri11g tl1e presentatio11 of l1is case, the I)arty will pres11n1ably seek to introduce i 11to evidence tl1e docu1ne 11ts 011 wl1icl1 he is relying. Previo11sly \Ve sa\V tl1at each party l1ad to prese11t l1is docL1n1e 11ts to tl1e co11rt, a 1 1d tl1ere are no express provisions of tl1e Ci,1il Procedure Cl)de gover1 1i11g tl1e introc111ction of the docu.n1ents into evicle11ce. Tl1e court 1nay '',1t a11y stage of tl1e s11it reject any doct1n1ent ,vl1icl1 it so tl1e co11rt could reject tl1e co11siders irrelevant or otl1er,vise i11adn1issible," 81 docu111e11t ,v J1e 11 filec! ,vitl1 tl1e staten1e11t of clai111 or presented at the first l1earing. Tl1e cot1rt n1igl1t rule 011 tl1e ad111issibility of tl1e doc111nents at the first hearing, b11t it is 111ore Ii l<el)' tl1at it wi11 ,1/ait l111til tl1e trial. At tl1e trial tl1e proponent ,�ii� . see!< to i11trocl11ce l1is doc11 111ent i11to evidence, and any objection to tl1e admis s1b1l1t)1 of tl1e doc11n1ent can be considered at tl1at tiine. 82 Note tl1at tl1e court l1as tl1e d11ty to excl11de a11 i11admissible doc11111e 1 1t even if 110 objection is n1ade.83 \\/l1ere a ?oct1111e11t l1as been ad111itted, it for1 11s IJart of the record; if it is 110 _ adn11tted, 1 t does 11ot f or111 part of the record a11d is to be rett1rned to the person wl10 J)rod11ced it. 34 3. Po,,,ers of the Court TI1e court i � give 1 1 broad powers ,vitl1 respect to tl1e exan1i 11atio1 1 of witnesses and tl1e l)roduct1on of docu 1ne1 ts at tl1e trial. Altho11gh Etl1iopia is co111111jtte� t_o : _ _ tlle �dversary systen1 o _f l1t1gat1011 and tl1e J)rinci1)le of p:.:1rt)' J)rese 1 1tatio1 1, this 18 . 1!1?d1�ed by giv1,1g tl1e Jt1dge a potential cleoree of co11trol over tl1e conduct of the litigatro1�- We e::irlier discussecl tl1e power of tl1 e cot1rt witl1 res1)ect to tl1e a111e �1d _ ent of pleading s �nd the fra11li 1 1g of iss11es for trial, a11d it has tl1e sa111e ki �d �} .po1,ve� at tl1e tria l stage. Tl1e co11rt 111ay at a11y time p11t a qt1estion to a witness · ··85 rt may dO so ,vh"1le l1e 1s · being · exa 1 11ined by tl1e parties or at the conclus1011
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See generally 1ndiau Evidence Act, sectio1 k, rmi c Mc Co C. 1s 146, 155, a11cl tl1e discussion in E11icle11ce (1954), J)p. 62-1 J 1. 3o. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 263(4). 81. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 138. . v. habataran (Privy _Council, I clia, 1 . ol. 890), Indian L. Rep., Calci1tt a, v 17, p 1 73 �� � � � 19' l er v Madho Das (Privy Cou vol. bad, nc1l, India, 1896), I11clia11 L. Rep., Allaha p. 76. 84. Civ. Pro. C Art 142 is i it t If e tl e u o = · · , c urt considers it necessary to in1po1111d the do c m i ' not to be r�turn�d · civ . p · ro. C., Art. 143. . , 85. C1\. Pro. C., Art. 26 1(4).
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of his testimony or at both times. It 1nay call as a witness any person present in court, even though he has not been called by . tl1e parties and may order any such person to prod11ce any document that l1e l1as with him.86 As we have seen, where the cour� considers it necessary to examine any otl1er person who is not present at t �e trial . or to obtain a doc11ment, it may iss· ue a summons requiring tl1at person to give testimony or prod11ce tl1e docu111e11t. 87 If it considers tl1at s11ch person should ·have been called as a witness by a party, it may req11ire tl1at party to pay tl1e expenses of tl1e witness.88 For exa1nple, the plaintiff contends tl1at the defendant signed a partic11lar docL1111ent. It apJJears tl1at an en1ployee of tl1e plaintiff saw lun1 sign it, but the plaintiff did not call tl1at en1ployee as a witness. Since l1is testi1nony wo11ld be f avor,1ble to tl1e plaintiff and l1e is tl1e plai11tiff's en1ployee, the plaintiff should be req11ired to prod11ce l1im or be responsible for tl1e expenses attendant t1po11 s11111n1oning l1i111 if tl1e co11rt concludes tl1at J1is testi111ony is necessary. The co11rt 111ay provicle that tl1e evide11ce of a partic11lar \Vitness is to be taken immediately, even before the l1earing. 89 S11p1Jose tl1at Ato A is a key witness for tl1e plaintiff and I1e has been ordered to leave for military service. Upon applica ti011 by either Ato A or tl1e plaintiff, tl1e court 1nay take tl1e evidence, that is, tl1e plaintiff will exa1ni11e l1i1n and the defendant \Vill be able to cross-exami11e l1im in tl1e prese11ce of the court. Tl1e evidence will tl1en be read at the trial. Tl1e cot1rt 111ay also recall any witness wl10 l1as been exa.111ined a11d may put to hin1 st1cl1 questions as it tl1i11ks fit. 90 Note tl1at under tl1is last provision only tl1e court exa111ines tl1e witness and the parties do 11ot have a ft1rtl1er oppo1it1ruty to qt1estion him altl1011gl1 tl1ey n1ay reqt1est tl1at he be called.91 Wl1ere a party, \vitl1ot1t lavvftil excuse, 92 ref11ses to give evide11ce or prod11ce a doct1n1e11t in l1is povver \vl1e11 requir ed to do so by the cot1rt, tl1e court may IJro11011ncc jt1dginent against l1im. 93 I-Iov.1ever, the co11rt n1ay decide 11ot to tal<e st1ch a step a11d 111ay issue the san1e ki11d of order as it wo11ld agai11st a11y recalcitrant v,itness. 94 If a witness can11ot spcalc A111l1aric, l1is testin1ony mtist be interpreted by tl1e official inter1Jreter or by st1cl1 other JJerson as tl1e co11rt n1ay appoi11t for tl1at ptirpose. 95 Tl1e i11ter1Jreter tak.es an oatl1 as providecl i11 tl1e Third Scl1edule and swears to interpret tl1e evide11ce truthftilly. It is in1porta11t to defi11e ''i11terpret." The interpreter m11st repeat tl1e q11estions a11d answers exactly as tl1ey l1ave been given and cannot s11nunarize. I-Ie is b11t a ''cond11it tl1ro11gl1 wllich tl1e witness speaks.'' Where tl1e interpreter is 11nable to repeat tl1e questions anc� answers exact ly, the evidence sl1011ld 11ot be considerecl. 96 To allow sucl1 test1n1011y wo11ld be
86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.
93. 94. 95. 96.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 264(1). Altl1 ougl1 this is 11ot specifically provided, it would seem tl1at the parties shoulcl also be permitted to exan1ine the \vitness. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 264(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 264(3). It n1ay make any other order regarding costs as it thinks fit. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 265. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 266. See Mad}1t1bai v. An1thalal (fJigh Ct., Bon1bay, 1946), 1947 All-India Rep., p. 156. r as to wl1icl1 n1alte In certain circuoistances a witness is privileged to refuse to . disclose the _ he is examined. Tl1e grounds of privilege will be set forlh 1n the Ev1det1ce Code. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 267. Tl1is is also true if l1e fails to do so at the first heari.ng. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 256. See Cjv. Pro. C., Art. 268, and the discussio11, supra, notes 17-19 and accon1pa11ying text. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 262. See 'Rex v. Irnrie (Ct. Crim. App., E11g., l 917,) Crin1. ,1PP· Rep., _vol 12, 1 p. 282, i11 E. .tvlorgan, J. McGuire and J. Weinstein, Cases ancl lv.fater1als 011 Evidence (4th Ed., 1957), p. 196.
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-e ht s s hi rig to os cr ed ni de xa is ho w at in , . nt ne o ion. P_ ?P � e th _ to ir fa un particularly is th If e 1s no t po�sible, the us be ?. d ou sh � ter re ter in l cia offi p an Wlierever possible, in bo th langua�es; 1t should nt flu 1s � ter re rp te in e th at th d fie court n1 ust be satis o t wh n ur ca co in t erpret, with en int :es e on n1e so is re P the 1er etl wh k as not simply , a.b1l1ty. out satisfying itself as to that person s th i?g and _tak e of enc vid e _ � o� objections. ng or� rec the r side con v1 00 We may 97 1ng s1d the ge. pre y b Jud g 1t1n wr It shall 10 The evidence is to be taken down d n, an ati atio min min exa reexa sscro on, with f, hie n-c n-i atio min exa tl1e be divided into 9B ion nat . in mi beg exa reand and ion end nat mi exa sscro tl1e ere wl1 to a note as Ordinarily, tl1e jl1dge takes down the evidence i11 narrative _form, tha t is, he records miner, but the st1bstance of tl1e witness' testimony without the question of the exa 99 . wer n and ans stio que 1lar tic1 par a However, n dow e be 1nay, in lus discretion, tak where tl1ere l1as been an objection to a question, which is overruled, the court 111irst record the questio11, the ans\'\1er, tl1e objectio11, tl1e name of tl1e person n.1aking it and tl1e cot1rt's rt1ling. 100 Tl1is is to enable the appellate court to determine \vl1etl1er tl1e objectio11 vvas properly o\1errt1led. Even thot1gl1 it is not required by tl1e Code, tl1e cot1rt shol1ld follov1 the sa1ne procedl1re wl1ere an objection is sustain ed, agai11 so tl1at the appellate cot1rt ca11 determine wl1etl1er the sustaining of the objection was proper. 101 It sl1ot1ld also be noted that if a party does not object to a particular qt1estion at tl1e trial, he ca11not contend on appeal that the court sl1ol1ld 11ot l1ave co11sidered tl1e e,;idence give11 in answer to the qliestion.102 Where, after e,1ide11ce l1as been recordecl, tl1ere is a cl1a.nge in tl1e con1position of the court, e.g., one of tl1e judges is replaced, tl1e st1it contint1es on the basis of the evidence that l1as been recorded, and it is 11ot necessary to l1ear that evidence over again. 103
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It is llnfortunate tl1at ti1ere is no provision for taking the testimony of the witness verbati,n, i.e., eacl1 c1t1estion and ans'.ver would be recorded. Some tl1i11g is lost when tl1e exact questions and answers are not recorded, and the record tl1at is produced depends on !1ow t!1e evidence l1as been recorded by the
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98. 99. 100. 101. 102.
Ci:'. Pro.. C., Art. 269(2). If, for some reaso11, the presiding judge is unable to record the evidence, 1t shall be recorded by anotl1er judge or clerk under the direction and supervision of the presiding judge. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 269(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 269(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 270. See tile discussio11 of tl1is point in S. Sark ar, Tl1e Lalv of Civil Procedure (4th Ed., 1963), vol. 1, p. 373. Except \Vhe�e the court desires to take additional evidence, it is provided that tl1e appella nt may not raise an� "fact" whicl1 was 1 1ot in evidence iL1 tl1e court ,vhicl1 gave the judgi ne�� appea�ed . from. Civ. Pro. C., Art.. 329(1 ). TJ1e same pri1 1cipl e would apJJly to "argu�ien_ts �r obJecti�os that \ver� not talc_en 1n the court below. TJ1e ge11eral rule is that if an obJection is not take11 to the 1ntroduct1ou of evidence i11 tl1e court of· first instance, it canno t _be oa,e:ipea!. See Chukwura Akunne v. Mattl1ias Ekwuno et al. (Ct. App., West Af rica A�· Ct. App. Rep., vol. 14, p. 59. I-lo\vever it has been heJd that a .n appellate c. our t' is · . boun to exclude irrelevat1t evide11ce ade to the n1 was eve1 obie 1 tl1�t ctio1 1gl1 1 no J '· · JO t ro duct1on of that .evide11 . · ce at tria . l· S ee Marneed1 Sat),an1 ,,. Masin1t1kk.a Venk'atas\Vanu (High Ct l\1a�ras, 1949), 1949 All-India Rep. p. 689 i11 M. MoOlf discu ssion nd tl1e a , ' ' t .1.r, e La,v ·,o.r he ,.,.,,1 'I ·v1 d ence (4th Ed 1958), .PP· 21-22. Tl1e h 1 E e � w that is point stressed to be , e appellate cour· t sIioulei �ot enc evid · base on · tts . . dec1s1on as to the sttfficieocy of the evidence · con l·t cons·d 1 ers 1rrelevant 1t cann t. b� contended that !l1e . trial jud_ge comn1itted error . in �idering such evidenc� if ion uss . O ��ection was ta ken to · no disc the also its 1nlroduct1on. See 1 n note 124, infra. Civ. Pro. C., Art 271(1) Th . · ·t that su e s me 1� trt1e where evidence has . been taken 10 � � suit J1as been tratlsferr�d tind�r � e t r A t · ,vl11ch 1: Ctv. to Pro. court C. , Art. 271 (2). T�e has been transferred accepts the evidence tl1at has been recorded 1n the former court.
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jt1dge .. Clearly a verbatim record is .more desirable, since. it is more co·mplete, and �here _ ts no danger_ that the record will be affected by the judge's subjectivity. Perl1aps 1t might be possible to employ tap. e recorders in some of tl1e courts. The clerk would operate tl1e machine and at the end of the proceedings, a stenographer wo11ld play the tape back at a slow sped and record tl1e testimony. This metl1od should be considered and perhaps tried on an experimental basis. The court is at1thorized to inspect any property or thing concerning which a question arises in the suit. 104 This is called a ''view," and it may be very helpful. For example, if there is a . question of whetl1er an iuj11ry to an en1ployee was caused by a n1achine or was due to tl1e fault of tl1e employee, the court may inspect tl1e macl1ine to ascertain wl1at probably happened. 105 It is as if the machine itself were brougl1t into cot1rt and i11troduced as real evidence. The court n1ay also appoint a commissioner to make a local investigation for the purpose of elucidating any matter in. disp11te or ascertaining the market value of property, or the a1nou11t of n1esne J)ro:fits or damages or annt1al net profits.106 This avoids tl1e necessity of taking tin1e at trial to determine sucl1 matters, and is particularly important where con1plicated financial qt1estions are involved. TI1e coin missioner makes such inspectio11 as l1e dee111s necessary an.d takes evidence, which he mt1st reduce to writing. He then returns tl1e evidence together with a \.Vritten report to the cottrt. 107 Tl1e report of tl1e commissioner and tl1e evidence take11 by him constitute evidence in the suit a11d for1n part of the record . 108 The court may examine tl1e co1nmissioner 011 oatl1, as 1nay either party, witl1 tl1e cot1rt's permission. The exan1ination may be as to the 1uatters covered in the report and the manner in which he made the investigation. 109 The cot1rt n1ay also appoint a con1missioner to examine or adjt1st accot111ts. 11° Finally, tl1e cot1rt 1nay isst1e a commission to one or more experts to verify facts i n disp t1te.111 For exa1nple, if there is a disp·ute over a boundary, tl1e court co11ld isst1e a commission to a sur veyor and have J1im 1neasure the land i11 q11estion. A word sho11ld be said abo11t the kind of evidence tl1at the cotirt 111ay consid er in arriving at its decision. \Vitnesses 1n11st give their evidence in open co11rt, unless the court otherwise directs, for good ca11se to be recorded. 112 Wl1ere the evidence is not to be given in open court, it 111ay only be heard ;n ca111era, tl1a.t is, the judge will take the evidence in cl1ambers in tl1e presence of the parties or their advocates.11 3 The point to be stressed is tl1at tl1e cot1rt may only base its 104. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 272. Tl1e court sl1all draw up a proces-verbal of st1cl1 proceedings, wbicl1 shall form part of the record. 105. See Buckingbao1 v. Daily News Ltd. (Ct. App., Eng., 1956), 1956 All-Eng. L. Rep., vol. 2, p. 904.
106. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 132. 107. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 133(1). 108. Civ. Pro. C., Art. .133(2). 109. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 133(3). 110. Civ. Pro. c., Art. J 34. If the co11rt is dissatis? ed V:ith. tl1e report of a con1missioner tinder Art. 132 or Art. 134, it may direct a further rnvest1gat1on. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 135. 111. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 136. 112. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 26.1 (3). 113. See Rev Const. Art. 113. Evidence is to be take11 i,z ca,nera wl1ere tl1e reception of the evidence· in ope� court wo11ld endanger public safety or public_ n1orals. '�Good. cause," as used in Art. 261 (3) of the Civil Procedure Cod �, 111ust be read 1n conn�ct-100 \V1th Art. 113 of the Revised Constitution. /11 camera means. 1n �he cha.n1bers of_ tl1e Judge, and tbe pre sence of the parties or their advocates is required 1n sucl1 proceed1ogs.
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n ted i n op en court or ir1 camera and e es . · pr en be s ha at th · ' . · . . · · dec1s1o .n on the evi'dence · t h l 1e t o w� ce 1s1 an ov rd pr co ns of the ac 1n 1on 1ss m m co n o d te n e es the evi-'dence pr · '' · d 1 n e '' that h as not been e ev e. t cr se on n o s1 1 �c d s it e . as b � Code. The court may n ot 1 es or tl1e1r adv�cates. It _w ou ld no t be proper rt p� e tl� of ce en es pr presented in the e neighborhood and base th 1n se ca e th t ou ab e 11r q1 1n to e, pl am ex for the judge, for 14 . se ne da a , se Su In ca d 1o � etl m at tl1 where by ed in . his decision 0 11 evidence obta 1_s�er of tl1 e plaintiff, had s e_ th nt, da fen de tl1e er eth wh to as te . tllere was a dispu n o n _the fac! that it 1s1o dec its sed ba 1rt co1 the t, n e eem agr d signed the ptirporte en gaged 1n deceitful con d ha and ter �ac cl1a d ba of s wa tiff 1 i1 pla the t tha . believed 1 11s brotl1er. He concluded that since ng sui s wa e 1 l 1 icl wl1 in t sui r tl1e ano in dtlct 1 11 �ga in�t hi_ s bro�l1er, he n:ust have i, cla e fals a �lie to 1g 1 i try was ff inti pla the _ . t ins tl1e suit aga l11s !1� sister, and ing rely v1as be_ 1 cl wl1i 1 1 0 1e11t een agr e 1 tl ed forg d erse rev n tl1e ground o 11 was 1sio dec Tl1e er. sist the for ent gm jud e gav re, refo t11e t11at tl1e plaintiff did not receive a fair trial. Tl1e appellate court observed that ''a party fails or s11cceeds on tl1e evide11ce tJ1at he lays �efore tl1e co11rt, and the court ca1111ot, by irnporting otl1er sta11dards tl1an those which the law allows, avoid its duty to l1ear, test a11d weigl1 sucl1 e\1idence. '' In otl1er words, tl1e court 111t1st base its decision 011 tl1e evidence prese 11ted i11 tl1e ca.se - evidence which the other party l1as l1ad a cl1ance to rebt1t - and cannot base it 0 11 otl1er evidence that the j11clges tl1e1nselves l1ave obtained. Of col1rse, if tl1e judge believes tl1at tl1ere is other evidence, eitl1er oral or doc11111entt1ry, that sl1o·uld be beard, he l1as tl1e power to bring tl1at evidence before tl1e co·urt. 115 Bt1t be n111st l1ear in co11rt, wl1ere the otl1er 1Jarty will l1ave tl1e opportl1n.ity to reb11t it.
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Secondly, tl1e j11dge 1 11ay 011ly base l1is decision 011 evidence tl1at l1e believes to be con1petent and relevant. As we saw, he has a dttty to reject any document tl1at l1e considers to be irrelevant or otl1er\vise inadn1issible, and the same is true witl1 respect to oral e\ride1 1ce. If l1e believes tl1at certain oral evidence is irrelevant or incon1petent, l1e sho11ld disregard tl1at evide11ce, even tl1 011gh . tl1e opponent 11as 111ade_ 110 obje�tio_n to its i11trod11ctio11. 116 Note, however, as _pointed ol1t previo11sly, that 1f no obJect,on was n1ade, tl1e opponent ca1111ot conte nd that tl1e judge con111litted error b)1 consicJeri 11g tl1 at evide11ce. C. Judgment and Decree After all the evide11ce l1 as bee11 prese11ted a 1 1d tl1e parties l1 ave prese11ted their final arg\11nents, tl1e court gives j11dgn1ent. 1 17 Tl1e judg111ent sl1ottld be given eitl1er at the_ trial or _as soon after tl1e trial as possible, wl1ile tl1e events of the trial are fresl1 1n tl1e m1_nds .of tl1e judges. 118 If tl1e co11rt is not goi 11 g to pro11ounce judg �nent at tl1e trial, it m11st fix th� date _whe11 it vvill prono11 11ce judgment.119 Tl1e . . Jt1dgn1ent s11all be reduced to ,vr1t1ng, s1gried by tl1e mein ber or 1 nembers of tl1e COLlrt, and pr�not11 1�;d by tl1e j11dge or, wl1ere there is n1ore tl1an 01 1e judge , ?Y t]!e presiding Jt1dge. -0 WI1ere tl1e case l1as been l1eard by a collegiate bench, z.e., 10 all cotir�s exce1Jt tl1e W oreda G11ezat Co11rt, tl1e decision of tl1e majority . shall be tlie decis,o11 of tl1 e court; l1owever, tl1e clissenting jt1dge n 111 st file a dissent-
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114. A� i Basaeed v. El Surra Basaeed (Ct. App., Sudan, 1957) ' 19 57 S11da11 L. J., p. 6. 115. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 264(2). 116. See Dwijsh Chao<lra Roy v. Naresh All· 194 5 194 Cl1 5) . ai1 dra Gu lcu pta tta Ca· , Ct (ll ' ., igh India Rep., p. 492. 1 I 7. Civ. ·rro. C., Art. 273. 118. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 180. 119. Ibicl. 120. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 18l(l).
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ing opinion, stating in writing the decision wl1ich l1e thinks sl1 ot1ld have been given togetl1er witl1 his reasons.121 The jt1dgn1ent sl1all contain a co11cise state111ent of tl1e facts, the !Joints for determination, the decision and tl1e reasons for that decision.122 Where tl1ere are several issues, tl1e col1rt shall state its decision on eacl1 separate isst 1e unless tl1e decision on one or n1ore issues is strfficient for tl1e decisio11 of tl1e case.1 2., For example, if tl1ere is a11 issue as to tl1 e existe11ce of a contract and an issue as to \vhether perforn1ance was prevented by force 1naje11re, and tl1e co11 rt finds that there was 11ot a valid co11tract, it is not 11ecessary to render a decision on tl1 e iss11e of force 111ajet1 re. Tl1e decisio11 on tl1e isst1e of tl1 e existence of tl1 e co11tract disposes of tl1e case. Altl1ot1gl1 tl1is is 11ot reqt1ired, it \vould be desirable if tl1e cot 1rt ,vo11ld state its fi11 di11gs of facts separately, including tl1 e evidence wJ1icl1 per st1 aded it to make tl1ose fi11di11gs. Tl1 e a1Jpellate co11rt is tl1e 1 1 i11 a better JJosition to deter111i11 e \v}1etl1er tl1 e fi11 dings were based on releva1 1t and con1pete11 t evide 1 1ce.124 Tl1e co11rt 111ay only give a judg 1 11e 11 t on a n1atter tl1at 11as bee11 raised by tl1e parties and tl111s pt1t in issue. 115 It 1 11 ay 11ot give a judg111ent 011 the basis of an issl1 e tl1at has 11ot been raised. For exa111ple, if botl1 sides ad111itted that a doct1111ent i11volved i11 tl1e suit was ge11 uine, tl1e cotirt 111 ay not decide tl1at tl1e docu 11 1e11t was a forgery and give jt1dg111ent accordi 11gly. 176 Note, 110\vever, tl1 at tl1e court l1 as the JJo,:ver to fran1e additional isst1es, 127 and if it believes that tl1ere is an isst1e that l1a.s not bee11 raised a1 1cl sl1 011ld l1ave, it 111 ay fra111 e tl1at isst1e, reqtiire tl1 e parties to give evidence on it, and re11der jt1 dgn1e11t in light of its decisio11 0 1 1 tl1e • lSSllC.
Tl1 e j11dg 1 11e11t itself ca11 11 ot be exect 1ted. It is 11 ecessary tl1at the cot1rt, after delivering tl1e j11dg 111ent, redt1ce tl1e operative part of tl1e jt1c!gn1e 11t, tl1at [Jart vvl1icl1 involves tl1 e relief to be given, to a decree. 128 Tl1e decree .n1 t1st co11t,ti11 tl1 e fol!o,v ing: (1) tl1 e 11 11n1ber of tl1e stiit; (2) the 11an1es a11d descri1Jtio11 of tl1 e JJarties; (3) tl1e partict1lars of tl1e clain1; (4) a clear that tl1e party do or abstair1 fron1 doi 11 g so 111etl1 ing, J)ay a definite st1111 of 1nooey or deliver a 1Jarticular tl1ing or CJ 12 (5) the a1J1ount of costs incurrecl, and surre 11 der or restore i11111 10,,able proJJerty; by \:Vl1on1 or out of ,vl1at property tl1ey are to be JJaici; (6) st1cl1 JJartic11lars as :ire .. . ·necessary to render tl1e decree st1sce 1Jtible of exect1tio11; a11cl (7) ,vl1 ere tl1e d. ecree cen l1e executecl by tl1e jJersonal obedie11 ce of tl1e judg111ei1t debtor, the ti111e v1itl1in ,vl1icl1 it sl1all be exec11ted. 130 If tl1e jt1clg111 e11 t \vas for tl1e defenda11 t, it wot1ld seen1 tl1at tl1 e decree sl1011ld state 111atters (I) (2) (3) .ancl (5) a11d tl1 at tl1e judg1ne1 1t Civ. Pro. C., Art. 181(2). 122. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(1). 123. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(3). 124. Vvhere tJ1ere is stifficient releva11t and con1petent evidence to support the findings, as a gener al rule, they \.Vill 11ot be set aside becaus � the cot�rt 1nay_ have considered some_ irrelev�11t or iocompete11t evide11ce. See Ahn1ed Alhad1 v. Ibrah1n1a Allie (Ct. App., \Vest Afnca, 19)1), West Afr. Ct., App. Rep., vol. 13, p. 323. 125. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(2). 126. See the discussion of this point i11 D. Mulla, T/1e Cocle of Civil Civil Proceclure (12tl1 Ed., by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 1, p. 726. 127. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 251(1). 128. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 183(1). 129. Where appropriate, the subject matter of the suit shall be identified in accordance \.vith the provisio11s of Civ. Pro. C., Art. 225. 130. Civ. Pro. C.. Art. J 83(1). 121.
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in the SLlit was _for the defendant. The decree mttst ·be signed and dated by the jtidge or j ttdges wl10 : passed it, exclt1sive of any disse11ting jttdge. 131 The Code provides tl1at specific directions are to be given in certain decrees. A dee.rec for the delivery �f 1n?vable property sl1all also state. the � ot1nt. of money Th1s. amotint to be paid as an alternative 1f tl1e property ca1111ot be del1ve�ed. st1ould be the valtie of tl1e property and dan1ages for the t1111e the plaintiff has been kept out of possession. 133 Note that the Code uses. the term, ''if delivery cannot be bad." TJ1e decree-holder does not l1a,,e the option to take the money instead of tl1e property; since l1 e sought possession of tl1 e property, that is the only relief to wl1icli be i.s e11titled. 13·1 It is only wl1ere tl1e prop:rty is not delivered tliat l1e can J)roceed to recover money da111ages, bt1t t�1e decree 111sures tl1at he can obtain exect1tio 11 for tl1at a111ount \Vithot1t l1avi11g to file a11other suit. 135 WI1ere tl1e decree is for the payment of 111oney, tl1e cot1rt may, for sufficient reason, postpone the pay 1 11e11t of the a1not111 t decreed or J)ermit payn1ent to ·be n1ade i11 i11stall1ne11ts, witl1 or witl1out interest. 1 36 Tl1is is a very salutary provision, ena.bU11g tl1e jt1dgo1ent- debtor to 111alce 1)aJ1n1e11t \Vitl1ot1t st1fferi11g execution. Suppose tl1at a judgn1e1Jt i11 tl1 e a111ot1nt of Etl1. $ 500 is e11tered against a defenda 11 t who is a. farmer. I-Ie will be selli11g l1is crop i11 tl1ree 111011ths a11d will be able to pa,y the st1 1 11 dt1e at tl1at time. At tl1e prese11t ti111e l1e does not have any casl1 by which 11e can satisfy tl1e decree. By 1)ost1)011i11g pay1ne11 t, tl1e decree-holder \\1ill get his 1110 1 1eJ', a11d it will 11 ot be 11ecessary to exect1te on tl1 e land of the judgn1ent-debtor. By tl1e sa1ne tolce11, if tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor is a \Vage-earner, arrangements can be n1 ade for l1i111 to pay a J )art of tl1e a.n1011nt eacl1 111onth, and again it will not be 11ecessary to exectrte on l1is prOJ)erty . I-Iov.1ever, tl1e jt1dgn1ent-debtor n1t1st satisfy tl1e co11rt tl1at l1e ca1111ot 111ake full pay111e11t at tl1e tin1e of the decree; he is not e11titlecl to st1cl1 a11 order as of rigl1t. 137
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Wl1ere tl1e suit is for the recovery of i1n1novable property togetl1er \vitl1 rent or 111es 1 1e �profits,. tl1e decree sl1 ot1ld be for possession tooetl 1 er witl1 the rent or 0 n:esne pronts \Vl11cl1 l1ave accrt1ed l )rior to the st1it a11d tr11til tl1e delivery of _possession t� tl1e decree-holder. 138 Tl1e decree will set a date on wl1icl1 poss ession is !o be del1,,ered, and tl1e a1nou11t sl1ot 1ld be for the rent or n1es11e profits wl1ich ,vtll have accr11 ed as of tl1at date. In certain st1its, ,1n accounti 1 1g or divisio11 o.f property is 11ecessary. In s11cl1 cases tl1ere sl1011ld be a preli111i11ary order a11d a final decree. I n a st1it i11 �,·I1icl1 an �c�o1inting is i11vol,1eci, st1cl1 ,1s a suit for a11 accot1nt of property that l1as bee11 adn�inist�red, or an accot111t of p�ct1 niary transactio11s bet,:vee11 a pri 11ci1Jal and agent, . or tl1e. dis�olLit1on of. a part11ersl11p or tl1e ta1<ing of partt1ersl1i1) accot111ts, tl1e coust, following Jtidgme11t, 1s to order tl1e tak.ing of tl1e accot111ts t:tnd give the necessary 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136.
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Ci�. Pro. C., Art. 183(2). Where a judge is t1nable to sign the decree due to death transf er, · · . rendered the 'JU ret1re1nent or the like, 1·t niay be s1g11e ·· · dgn,eot · d y b any Judge tl1e of wh1cl1 cot1rt . C1v. Pro. C., Art. 185. e 85 �e �e discussion in S. Sarkar, The La11 of Civil Procedure (4tl1 Ed., 1963), vol. 1, P· 3 · ee al Makuucta v. B.N. Ry. (I-Iigl1 Ct., Cal cutta, 1927) 1927 All-India Rep., P· 652· Sc�:. F tel, Nandlal (ffigl1 Ct., Rajasthat1, 1961) 1961 All-Ind ia Rep., p. 241 . ;o � . r . ·, A rt. 186(1 ) . Tl,e order may als o b 111 a e 1 d of t1 ec ee e de after the JJassing � c., .A rt. 186(2). Civ· pro. See Jagdisll v. Brajet,dra (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1949), 1949 All-Inclia Rep., p. 427. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 18 7 . 1
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directio11s. 139 After the accot1nting has been. n1ade, it will issue a :final decree, stating the amount of money tl1at is to be pajd to tl1e decree-l1older. Wl1ere the st1it is for tl1e dissolution ?f a partnersl1ip or the takjng of partnersl1ip acco11nts, . the court shall, before passing tl1e final decree, declare tl1e proportionate sl1ares of tl1e partners and fix tl1e day 011 wl1 icl1 . tl1e part11ersl1jp sl1all stand disso]ved. 140 F ollo\ving the taki11g of accot1nts, it will isst1e a decree stating tl1e amo11nt of n1oney or property to · which e::1c]1 J)artner .is e11titled and what is owed by one part11er to another. In ::1 suit for J)artition or separate possession of property, tl1 e court migl1t fi11d tl1at fL1rtl1er inqL1iry is necessary to 1nake tl1e fina.l partition or separatio11. I11 st1ch a case, it j.ssties a preli111i11ary order declaring tl1e rights of the several parties i11terested in tl1e property a11d givi11g directions for tl1e ft1rtl1er inqui ry.1�1 After tl1at inq11iry l1as been n1 acle, it issu.es a fi11al decree directing partition or separation. Wl1ere a set-off is allovved, tl1e decree states wh.at an1ot1i:!t is d11e to each party and orders tl1e recovery of any SLim wl1ich appears to be dt1e to either p,lrty. 142 The san1 e procedtire sho11ld be followed witl1 respect to counterclai1ns. As we have seen, tl1e co11rt 111ay give a jL1dg111e11t for tl1e defendant for the balance if tl1e an101111t to wl1icl1 J1e is found to be entitled exceeds tl1e a111ot1nt to wl1icl1 the plaintiff_ is f. ot1nd to be entitled. After tl1e decree l1as been passed, certified copies of tl1e j udg111ent or decree or boti1 sl1all be ft1rnisl1ed to the parties 011 applicatio11 to tl1e refistry of tl1e court whicl1 J)assed it, and tl1e date wl1e11 s11cl1 COJJY was ft1rnished sl1a]I be 111e11tioned tl1ereon. 143 Tl1e case has tl1t1s been disposed of in the co11rt of first instance. Tl1e issues l1a ve bee11 deterouned, a j11dgn1ent l1as bee11 renderecl, and a decree basecl on tl1at jt1dgment l1as been iss11ed. If 110 fL1rtl1er action is taken, tl1e case is considerecl closed. I-Iowever, tl1e Josi11g party 111ay seelc a revie\V of tl1e jt1dg111e11t. Or, the jL1dg111e11t-debtor n1.ay not satisfy tl1e decree. In the. next two cl1apter vve will consid er l10,v tl1 e losing party 1nay obtai11 revie\v of tl1e j11dg-111cnt arid I1ow the s11ccess ful party n1ay J1ave tl1e decree e11forceci. '
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139. Civ. Pro. C,. Art. 188. 140. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 189. -141. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 190. 142. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 191. 143. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 184(1 ).
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ClIAPTER IX REVIE\V OF JU_DGI",,1ENTS Review may be s011gl1t before the c?urt w!1ich, re11�ered the j�dg1nent, before an appellate court �tnd before His I1111J�r1al MaJesty s cl11lot. We will now proceed to co11sider tl1ese tl1ree aspects of rev1e,v. ;.\.. Revie'\-Y in the Court of Rendition 1. Procedural Irregtilarities The cot1rt whicl1 rendered tl1e jt1dgme11t 111,1y set it aside beca11se of tJrocedural irregt1l�rities, i.e., 11or1-co1111Jlia11ce witl1 tl1e provisio11s of the Code, ,:vl1ere such irregt1l,1rities l1ave st1bsta11tially affected tl1e dis1Josition of the case to tl1e detrin1ent of 011e of the JJarties. V-/l1ere an irreg11larity l1as occt1rred prior to tl1e taking of tl1e prelin1inary objectio11s or dL1ri11g the cot1rse of the _proceedings, tl1e party affect ed 111ust raise l1is objectio11 at tl1at ti111e. 1 Wl1ere it l1as occ11rred s11bseq11ently, tbe cot1rt 111ay reft1se to give jt1dg111e11t, or if it l1as already rendered judginent, it may set it aside. Tl1erefore, we vvill consider tl1e rl1les relating to irregularities in tl1.is context.
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Wl1ere irregularities arise fro111 11011-corr1pliai1ce \\1ith proced11ral r11les, tlJe court 111ay, on its O\v11 111otio11 or 011 n1otion of eitl1er part)', ''set aside tl1e proceedings in ,vl1ole or i11 part as irregt1lar, a1ne11d tl1e1n, or 111,1ke st1cl1 otl1er order as n1a.x be a1 Jpro1)riate." 2 A JJrocedt1ral irregt1larity n1t1st be distingl1isl1ed from v1hat is called a ''rnistak.e." rfl1e col1rt 111,1�,1 , agai11 011 its O\v11 111otion or 111otion of tl1e parties, correct ai1y clerical or arith1netical 111istal(es i11 the su111n1ons, j11dgn1ent, decree or order or any errors arisir1g i11 tl1ose docu1nents fro111 a11y accide11tal slip or on1ission, a11d st1cl1 111istakes or errors do 11ot constittite irregtilarities. 3 Perl1a1Js tl1e decree as renderecl 111.ay not be in accorda11ce witl1 tl1e jt1dgme11t, e.g., tl1e j11dgn1ent stated tl1at tl1e defendant ,vas liable for Etl1.$ l 000, a11d tl1e decree reads Etl1.$ 100.4 Or, the Ian� i11volved i11 tl1e case 1nay 11ot l1a\1e been described correctly.5 St1cl1 errors ca11 easily be corrected a11d do not affect the validity of tl1e proceedi11gs . 6 I r- o,vever, tl1ere n1ay l1ave bee11 ,111 irregularity whicl1 st1bsta11tially a11·ected the restilt of .tl1e case. Stippose that tl1e cot1rt erro11eot1sly fc1iled to grant a request for a11 adJot1rr1me11t, a11d tl1c 111ovi11g party \Vas t111able to J)rese11t liis ca.se properly. V./1,ere tl1at party_ l1as protested tl1e f,1ilt1re to gra11t tl1e adjo11rnn1e11t, ::111d the court 511 ?seqtiently realt�es that its decision 011 tl1e qt1estio11 was erro11eo11s, it ca11 _set _ aside tl1e proceedings, adJot1r11 the l1eari11g, and re11der its jL1dg1ne11t after l1old1r1 g the new l1earing.7 1. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 209(3). 2, Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 207, 209(1). 3. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 208. 4· arsem v. Jag�ndra (I-li gh Ct., Punjab, 1958), 1959 AII-J11clia Rep., p. 88. This_ wo�ld ��� uJ con1pron11se decree re11dered t1t1der Art. 277. See Ramn1ayya v. Ratnaswan11 (l-l1gb Ct·, !\� a�ras, 1958), 1959 All-lnclia Rep., p. 194. 5. See Kbudu v. Bhim (H' g1 Ct· patna, 19 9) 195 All-I11c/ia Rep., p. 183. 4 6. In correcting tl1e i rreg LI;·ari � 1 v b d" a Satya 1_ty, ;I1e court sl 1ould g1ve See parties. the t1otice to Karlliei (Hi 11 Ct pa a, 1943 ,:1-ll-lnclia Rep., 1), 72. 4 , 1) 1� � . �� 7 . S.ince the i;regul ity 1as a ected 1· ant p a t _ u . the o 1sst1e_ to decided to tl1e prejt1dice f he p JCthe a11d he li as c· protes ted' tll e court 18 aut11or1zed be o se becau f · a 1gs h proceed . i J to set e s i de t · y ' irregular1t · iv. p ro. C ., Art. 210 (.l).
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-----However, where the error is su.ch that, although it does not constitute a ''nlis take,'' as we have defi �ed that tern1, �t does not substa11tially aJfect tbe decision of t�e case on t !1e m �r1ts, the proceed1n �s may not be set aside. St1ppose tl1at in a suit for t �e dlssolut1on o � a partnership, tl1e cot1rt did. not iss11e a preliminary decree decla:1ng tl1e p �oport1onate sl1ares of the partners, as req11ired by Art. 189. _ Instead, 1t 1ss·ued a srng!e _decree, _declari11g tl1e sl1ares and stating ho\v mtich is due to each partner. Tl11s 1rreg11larrty does 11ot affect tl1e co11rt's decisio11 on tl1e merits, and tl1e proceedings will 11ot be set aside. Eve11 if the irregt1larity 1night _ _ have affected tl1e JLlclgment tl1at \¥as given, tl1e proceedinos will not be set asicle if 0 the irregt1larity can · be corrected. 8 For exa111ple, iL1 a case wl1ere tl1e defendant raised a c]ai11! of �et-off, tl1e court, after ii11ding tl1at tl1e plaintiff was entitled to recover 011 his cl�111n and tl1e defenda11t was e11titlecl to recover 011 tl1e clai111 of set-off, failed to enter ,1 judgme11t .for tl1e balance. The proceedings sbo11ld n.ot be set aside, since tl1e error ca11 be correctecl, a11d a jt1dg1nent entered for tl1e balance. Also , \vhere the _proceedi11gs are set aside in part, any step take11 prior to tl1e occt1rrence of tl1e irregt1larity shall 11ot be affected. So, jf a11 irregularity occt1rred at the trial, tl1e proceedi11gs of tl1e trial wot1ld be set aside, but 11ot tl1ose wl1icl1 took place at tl1e first l1eari11g. U11less a11 a._pplicatio11 to set aside tl1e 1Jroceedi11gs on grot111ds of irregt1larity has bee11 made to tl1e trial court, the occurre11ce of tl1e irregt1larity 111ay not be taken as a gro11nd of aLJIJeal; the only exceJJtion \Vot1ld be a .n irregL1larity arisi11g fro1n a11 alleged lack of material j11risdictio11 or one alleged to exist in tl1e jt1dg n1ent or decree.9 Any irregularity is deen1ed to have been validated wl1ere no appeal is taken fro1n tl1e j11dgn1ent or wl1ere the j11dgn1ent is co11fir111ed by the appellate court. 10 A procedural irregularity can11ot st1bject tl1e jt1dg111ent to collateral attacl<.11 2. Ne,vly Discovered Evide11ce The more com111on proceeding in tl1e lower court \Vill be 011e to obtajn review of the judgine11t on the ground of ne\vly discovered evide11ce. A party 111ay apply for review of tl1e jt1dgn1ent i11 the cot1rt of rendition 011 tl1is ground wl1ere: (1) no appeal l1as been t,tken. fro111 tl1e judg1ne11t or no appeal lies; and (2) subseqt1ent to the issuance of tl1e j11dgn1e11t, he disco,,ers 11e\¥ and i111_portaot n1atter s11cl1 as forgery, pe1jL1ry or briber)', wl1icl1 despite the exercise of dt1e dil.igence, was not witl1in l1is knowledge at tl1e time of t11e givit1g of tl1e jL1dgn1ent; and (3) l1ad st1cl1 matter been known at tl1e ti111e of tl1e giving of tl1e jL1dg1nent, it vvot1ld have materially affected the substa11ce of tl1e decree or order tl1e review of \vl1icl1 js sot1gl1t.1 2 It should be noted tl1at revie\¥ is riot a11tl1orized 011 tl1e grol1ncl ·�l1at tl1e _ � applicat1t has discovered new eviden · ce wl1icl1 coulcl l1ave affectecl the �ec1s10!1 of the case. The evidence n1t1st be s11ch as to st1ggest i.111proper co11dt1ct, wl11cl1 ta111ted the jt1dgment \.vitl1 fra11d. Tl1e evidence 11111st be that of forgery, perjt1ry, bribery or the like.1 J 8. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 210 (l). 9. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 211(1). Tl1e powers of the appellate cot1rt wl1ere irregularities have occurr ed will be discussed, infra. 1 0. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 21 2. 11. Of course wllere tile court Jacked judicial jt1.risdjctioa over tl1e defe11dant or ll1e defe11dant · did not r�ceive legally sufficient notice, the decree is subject to coUatera 1 attac 12. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 6(1). . . · d. rize ho aut 1s w vie Re . 1-9 es rul 47 der Or ure ced Pro il 13 . c ompare ' · . ' ti1e In a·1an c od e of Civ . · �� is also R ev1 r a 1 a 11c ]'fi qu ut ho v,1t r" tte n1a nt rta 1)o i111 � and ew ? ; upon the discovery of ''n . for _o� her a11d d o1_ rec of t!1e e fac the 011 nt are app or err authorized for "a mistake or s 1on d1t con t11e d 1be scr cum c1r lly efu car e cod ian iop Eth sufficient reason." Tlle drafters of the under which review would be allowed.
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1 ere �e�- no witnesses to th e transacti tl at 1 tl d me s�1 as tiff on � Suppose that the pl,lin _ n_dant. Tlie court 1 ff. ru 1d tl1 fe nt de a1 pl e th re we al tri e th at s se eS � aild the only wittl t en r l11m. S_ubsequent g1n fo �d J ed er nd re d an nt da fen de e th of iy _ wl1ose believed tlle testinJor ess of tn wi e existenc e the s an ey wa re the t tl1a rs ve co dis iff irit pla l the g e j t t1 th �n of on t_his ground, iew _ rev a ain t ob ot 1111 � ca He . e. ar aw un � ;e i�rties we t ec 1 11g tl1e JUdg 1nent. t uc aff nd co r .pe 1 ro mp y an ow 1 sl If 0t 11 since tile evidence does asked by tl1 e court if Ile en wh �s tne w1 t�e of ty nti ide e 1 tl ed eal nc co t 1 the defendai 1 0�, rev1e� wot1ld ?e proper due to the ct nsa tra the to es ess 11 ,vit knew of any 1 f tl1e w 1 tne_ss testi:fied o , Or t. an end def the of ct dtl con � bel1alf of t11 e fraudtilent � s wa 11es bed w1t bri t t�� to com mit tha ers cov dis er lat ifl' int pla tl1e and defendant, 1 ons for review 111ay. be further dit c�n e Th . per pro be o als t1ld wo iew perjtiry, rev ary ent t1m d ere doc cov ev1den .ce. Let d1s ly new of les n1p exa 1g 1 ri side con illustrated by 11 t, and l1e sot1ght to produce tis say that the plaintiff's claim was based on a doc11 111e 14 The court was satisfied lost. was al 1 1 origi tliat tl1e a coi)Y on tl1e gro11nd that tl1 e origi 11al ,vas lost and l)ernutted l1i111 to i 11trodt1ce tl1e copy. Jt1dgment was for tl1e l )laintiff i11 accorda1 1ce witl1 tl1e ter1 11s of tl1e co1)y. St1bsequently, tl1 e defendant discovers tl1e original doct1n1ent, tl1 e tern1s of \vlucl1 wo11Id support the defendant's positio 11. Review ca1111 ot be gra11ted, since tl1e fail11re to produce tl1 e original was ·11ot d1 1e to a11y im1JrO_I)er co 11dt1ct 011 tl1e part of tl1e l)lai11tiff. If tl1e plaintiff had s1 1pr)ressed tl1e origit1 al or l1 ad. falsified t 11e CO})Y, l1owever, review sbou]d be granted, si11 ce the 11ew evidence of tl1 e defenda 1 1t sl1ows tl1at i111proper cor1dt1ct occ11rred. In otl1er worcls, review is 11ot a11tl1orized 011 the grot1 11 d tl1at tl1e losi 11g party 11as discovered 11ew evidence. It is 011ly wl1 ere l1 e 11as discovered evidence of improper co 1 1clt1ct 011 tl1e part of l1 is OJ)po 1 1ent or a wit 11ess tl1at s11ch review 11 1ay be had. Tl1e tl1 eory is tl1at litigation n1t1st at s0111e poi 11t co1ne to an e11 d.15 ] t wot1.ld not be sou11 cl to 01)en 11p a case agai11, becat1se new evidence, even tl1at which \.Vas 11ot ,,.,itl1i11 tl1e party's l<:nowledge at tl1e ti 111 e o·f trial, l1as come to Iigl1t. Even tl1ot1 gl1 tl1is 111igl1t 3J)pear to V11ork: injustice in s0111 e cases, in.ore injt1stice ,votild probably rest1lt if tl1e finality of decrees ,vas re11 dercd uncertain. To prevent such t111certainty, review 011 tl1 e basis of 1 1ewly discovered evide 11 ce is severely restricted jn EthioJ)ia.
It sl1ould also be stressed tl1at tl1 e evide11 ce 11111st 11ot have been \-Vitl1in the k 11 0\\1l�dge of _tl1� aJ)plicant at tl1e ti111 e tl1 e j11dg111 e11t was give 11 . StlJ)IJose tl1at at tl1e trial Ato B 1s a l<ey witness for tl1 e plaintiff. The defendant l1as evidence to tl1e effect tl1at t!1 e plaintiff l1as bribed Ato B to testify 11ntrt1tl1.ft1lly. He does not P:O?ttce s11cl1 e,,1de11ce at trial, anticiJ)ati11g tl1at tl1 e cot1rt \Vi]I not belie,,e Ato B's testiin°?Y· . 1-Iowe,,er, tl1e co11rt does believe tl1at testi 111011y and renders jt1dg 111e1 1t for d he plain tiff. groun Tl1e cle�en dant can1� ot the obtai 1 1 a 1 1 1ent revie 0 \v 1 of e judg tl 1 i � _ tl1_at Ato B was b�1 bed _to perJttre l1 i111s_ elf. A party ca 1 111ot witl1l1old. evidence �t trial and tl1en obtain review of tl1e jt1clg1ne11t on tl1e basis of tl1at ev·idence. It 18 o�ly wl1ere tJ1 e evide 1 1ce l1as co 111e to ligl1t after t]1e close of tl1 e trial that revie w ,v1Il be granted. Moreo:';r, the evidence 111t1st be s11cl1 as to '' 111 aterially affect tl1e substance of tile decree. Ooe co11rt has s,1id t]1at .i 1 1 order to jt1stify a review tl1 e evide nce e tl 6 f 1 11 111�t . be ''sucli_ tliat, if belie,,ed, it would be conclt1sive on the isst1e." i I the plaintiff llad bribed a wit 11ess to testify falsely, bttt otl1er witnesses testified to As a �eneral proposition, wl1en a doc d uce pro d be um e 1ust n t is relied upon, the original n un less its l oss can satisfactorily b e e xJJ lain ed. _ _ 15 · This is tl1e basis fo r t l1e · . 5. Revie\V rul e O r �es Jttcli Art. cata C., e. Pro. m bodi ed in Civ. under Art. 6 is co (Hns·1ctered a n exce ption to the gene ral, rule of Art. 5. 16. Brown v · Dea n ouse O f L ords, E ng., 1910), 1910 App. Cases, pp. 373, 374.
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san1e _effect as the bribed wit!less, the e �ideoce of bribery would not jtistify review, since 1t w?t1ld not be conclt1s�ve_ on the 1ssue.17 T1 1e co11rt could still have decided the issue 1n favor of the pla1nt1ff on the basis of the other evidence. Finally, note that an applicatio � for review on this ground cannot be filed if an appeal l1as been t �1ken. Such ev1dence cot11d be brought to tl1e attention of _ the appellate court, wh1�h wot1ld co11s1der it in deciding tl1e appeal. An application co11ld not be filed eve11 if tl1e ap.pe::11 were filed too late and were tllllS dismissed. 1s This is because tl1e P . arty l1as tl1e 01)tion of raising the qt1estio11 before tl1e trial co·urt or before . tl1e . �ppellate court, and l1aving cl1osen tl1e latter option, 11e is bo11nd by tl1e �1sp?s1t1on n1ade by tl1e appellate col1rt, wl1icl1 here will refuse to consider tl1e obJect1on beca11se tl1e appeal was filed out of ti111e. However if an appeal :v_ere taken a1?d ?is1nissed on _ the grot1nd tl1at an aJ)J)eal diet not li� from the dec1s1on, an ,1ppl1cat1on for rev1e\V cotild be filed, since st1ch an application is a11thorized whenever a11 appeal can11ot be take11. 1 9 The application for review n1t1st contain tl1e same partic11lars as a memora11du1n of appeaJ,20 and be st1.pportecl by a11 affidavit contai11ing strict proof tl1at tl1e new evide11ce relates to forgery, pe1jury, bribery and tl1e like, and that the evidence was not, by the exercise of dt1e diligence, witl1in tl1e k11owledge of tl1e applica11t ::1t tl1e time of judga1ent. 21 It mt1st be filed witbjn 011e mo11tl1 from tl1e ti111e the evide11ce ,vl1jcl1 was the basis of the applicatio11 was discovered.22 There is no l)eriod of lin1itation relating to tl1e discovery of tl1e evidence, and an application for review can be filed ,vl1enever the evidence is discovered. This is 11ot 1111fair to tl1e otl1er party, sjnce the evide11ce \Vill t1s11ally be tl1at of i111pro1?er co11dt1ct on his part, ancl he is not entitled to asst11ne that a judgment obtai11ed on t]1at basis ,vill be free from collateral attack. If tl1e co11rt finds tl1at tl1e application for revievv sl1ot1ld be granted, that is, tl1at tl1e applicant bas eviclence whicl1 satisfies tl1e require1nents for review, it gives notice to tL1e opposite ]?arty so that lie can appear and be ]1earcl in supJ)ort of the decree. After l1ea. ring 11.im, tl1e co11rt will make such order i11 regard to tl1e rel1eari11g of tl1e case as it tl1inks fit. 23 No appeal lies fro111 tl1e order of the co11rt gra11ting or rejecting an aJJplication for review.24 The new evidence n1ay affect only one iss11e in tl1e case, a11d the co11rt's dis position of tl1e application n1ay depend on wl1at iss11e tl1is is. Suppose that in a suit on a contract tl1e defendant contends tl1at the parties did 11ot e11ter i11to a . y event, ·perfor1nance was prevented by force 1naje11re. vaJid contract a11d tl1at, in an The co11rt fi11ds in I1is favor 011 botl1 iss11es. Tl1e plaintiff st1bseq11ently discovers that the letters s11bn1itted by tl1e defe11dant to s11 bstantiate his co11tention tl1at the parties did not enter into a valid contract vvere forged. This \Vot1ld affect the iss11e as to the existence of tl1e contract but since tl1e j11dgment for the defe11dant wot1ld still stand on the basis of tl1e co11'rt's finding of force n1aje11re, tl1e application for revie,v s]Jould not be grat1ted; the jt1dgment would still be in favor of tl1e defend.
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
l discuss wil We " ed. iev bel be to y abl tm1 res "p is as h suc Moreover, the evidence shottld be this principle whe·n considering the adn1ission of new evidence 011 appeal. . . 40 p. p., Re flra l-ln Al 5 194 4), 194 ay, mb Bo , Ct. igh See Jankiram Co. v. Chuni1al Sl1ivram (H ia nfl 1-l A/ 48 19 ), 47 19 , ad ab lah Al ., Ct 1 igl (H ar nw See R.am Baksh v. Mt. Rajesb.iwari Ku Rep., p. 2.13. Se� Civ. Pro. C., Art. 327 a.ad. tl1e discussion, infra. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 6(2). Ibid. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 6(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 6(4).
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e nd �f liability, on 1 01 ou gr n sio ci de e th ed lv vo in ce en id ev e aot.25 If, llowever, th c ?urt m ay decide . that it ti d, 111 ot gr r l1e ot � an on d te � or pp stl and liability cotild be 1� did_ no t fully consider the e us ca be ., e. , se ca le 1o wl l[ e tl1 wotlld be better to retry 26 n t1o r to re de sc d1 or e 1 a tl s J re ha 1t a s tri se . ca ot1ler grotind of liability, and in st1cl1 es i�1 �hich revi�w on 11c sta n1 cu cir ted ui li1 e tb e siz )]1 1 e11 to _ nt rta po � . 1 It is very in1 at Jt tl1 o an 1s. , ly ed r1z ? tho u n a. de evi 1s e ce nc � 1de ev red ve co dis ly ew 1 1 of sis the ba t ss tha e es a tn. tifi w1 or Jus rty pa the a fur of r rt pa tl1e 1 1 0 t tic 11d co r i)e pro im ng sllo•\vi review. 3. Opposition ion dit is ren of 1rt opposition by 1iew ava ilab le in tl1 e co1 re\ of e typ l fina 1�11e 1 e j11dgme1;1, t. A11y person who tl ?Y d cte affe is ty, par a 11ot 1 l oug 1 tl , wl10 a person sl1ot1Id or cot1ld have been made a par ty to a suit a11d \.v}1ose 111terests are affected by a jt1dg111e11t in tl1e st1it 1uaJ', if l1e was 11ot 27a par ty to t11 e suit, file. opposition Tl1e conditions for filing opposi to tl1e judg111e11t before the j11dg:i11e11t is exec11ted. tion tl1e11 are: (1) tl1e ap1)licant ''sl1ould or co·uld have been 111ade a party;'' and (2) }1is i11terests are affected by tl1 e j11dgn1ent; a11d (3) tl1e application is filed prior to exect1tion of tl1e decree - oppositio11 cannot be filed after tl1 e decree l1as been executed. It ,:vould see111 tl1at tl1ree classes of persons wo11ld be able to file opposi tio11: i11dispensable parties, perso11s ,vl10 are tl1e real l )arties i11 interest, and persons. vvl10, as a rest1lt of tl1e decree, ,:vill be lia.ble for co11trib11tion or inden1nity to the t111st1ccessft1l IJart)'. Tl1e ter111, ''sl1ould l1ave been ma.de a l)arty," m.11st be read in ligl1t of Art. 4-0, wl1icl1 refers to ''tl1e rigl1t J)laintiff'' a11d ''1Jerson wl10 ought to l1ave bee.n joined as plai11tiff or defe11da11t or wl1ose presence is 1Jecessary for the determinatio11 of all tl1e q11estior1s i11,1olvecl in tl1e s11it." The interests of st1cl1 perso n. s will 11ecessarily be affected by tl1e j11dg111ent; the clai111 of tl1e real party i11 interest ,viii l1a.ve bee11 adjt1dicated, and, by defj11itio11, tl1 e i11terest of tl1e indispens f 1 1 able party ,viii l1a, e bee11 i11vol, ed i11 tl1e s11it a11d af ected by t11e j11dg111ent. Wl1ere a JJarty to a st1it is e11titled to co11tribt1tio11 or i11de111nity from s0111e perso11, tl1e jt1dg111ent ,vill affect tl1at perso11's interests, since if tl1e party so entitled is fo1Lnd liable, tl1at person ,viii, as a resL1]t of the j11clgn1 e11 t, I1ave to 1nake co11tribt1tion or inde11111ity to l1i1n. T11is asst1111es t]1 at lie is not contesting J1is liability to tl1e party, �ince if lie is, it is q11estio11able ,vl1etl1 er J1e wot1ld be s11fficiently ,tffected by the JUdgn1e11t so as to l1ave standing to o_p1)ose it. 28 OpJJosition cot1ld 11ot be 111ade by J)ersons wl10 cot1ld l1ave joi11ed as plaintiffs or cotild I1a.,,e beer1 joi11ed as defe 11d ants, btit \11_!10 are i1ot i11dis1Jensable J)arties. Si11 ce tl1ese persons \.vould b�1ve iode pe11dent. cla1t11s or be st1bject to i11deJJende11 t liability, they v\'Otild. 11ot be aflected _ by. tl1e Jttd� 111e1�t, a11d tl1 ey cao 1 1ot file 01)positio11 for tl1e :p1 1 rpose of l1aving tl1e1r _ _ clain1 s or l1ab1l1ty deter111111ed. Perso11s entitled to intervene t111der Art. 41 \11ould n?t necessarily be e11titled to file OJ )l)Ositio11. E . ve11 tl1011gl1 · tl1e intervenor \\1ould be ''int �rested in tl1e st1it," as this ter111 is t1sed i 11 Art. 41� J1e ,vould not satisfy tl�e _ require111ent of be1ng 011e vvl10 ''sl1011ld or cot1]d l1ave beet1 111 ade a party." It ts only ,vl1ere a J)erso11 wl10 is et1titled to i11terverie t111der Art. 41 cot1 ld also liave beei1. 111ade a part�,. e.g., a J)erson liable to 1nalce co11tribution or inde111nity, that l1e 1nay file 01 )pos1t1 011. 25. W � ere t}1er are t,vo grounds for appl i the one , deci � sion onlv a11d the 11ew evidence affects 1 ��1 14 0)n' ls l do� d not be granted. See Mahabir v. Collector of Alla.l1abad (Hjg h Ct., AllaJ1abad, n ,an L. Rep. vo l . 36 ' P . ?7 7. 26. c�: s . . ���ga ju v. Venkata (High Ct., Madras, 942), Madras L. J., vol , 16. . 2 p. 1 �. 7 27. · , Ar t. 358. 28. Tl�e indelllllitor contesting · ·n the 1 d e est h I S Ia ''mte 1 . t· b'I' Ity to tl1e defe11dant would not be r suit ,, so as to enable him , 10 . note , to supra intervene. See the djscussio11 in Chapter IV, a.11d accon1panying text.
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Tl1e purpose of the rule _permitting the filing of oppositio11 is to enable a person wl10 1s a�ecte _ d by tl1e Jt1dg1nent, but wl10 was J)robably unaware of it at tl1e time of ren<:lltion, to prevent the interference witl1 I-1is interests tl1at will result if _the jt1dgn1 ent _ is execut�d. St1ppos: tl1at despite the assignn1ent, the assignor bri n gs stu� on the cl� 1 m, and Judg1nen� i s_ for tl1e defendan t. A st1bseqt1ent suit by tl1 e assignee, wl10 1s the real party 1n interest, wot1 ld be barred by res judicata.29 I-le shot1ld l1ave been made a party tinder Art. 40, his interests are affected by the judgment, and, tl1erefore, l1e 1 11ay file opposition ,1nd l1ave l1is claim heard. TI1e sa111e is tr�1e with res1)ect to a 1 1 i11dispe11sable party. Once l1is existence is kno\vn, J1e n111st be made a ])arty, a 1 1d by enabli1 1g l1i1n to file opposition, this can be acco111plisl1ed. If a person liable to 1nake contrib11tion or indemnity was a\vare of tl1e st1it, l1e cot1ld l1,1ve interve11ed t111der Art. 41. If l1e was 11 ot aware of the st1it, tl1is provisio n e1 1ables ]1i n1 to c.0 111e i11 after judg1 nent, since l1e cot1ld l1ave bee n made a party a11d l1is i11terests \Viii be affected by tl1 e jt1dgment. As l1as been pointed ot1t, tl1e privilege to file opposition does 11ot extend to persons affected by tl1e decree wl10 could not l1ave bee11 n1ade parties to the origi nal st1it. In disc11ssiog i11tervention, we gave tl1e exan1 ple of tl1e case i11 \1olvi 1 1g a st1it to enjoin tl1e defenda1 1t from carryi 11g 0 11 certai 11 activities wl1ere, if tl1e i njt111 c tion were granted, tl1e defe 1 1dant cotild not perform l1is co ntract witl1 a notl1er perso1 1.30 The st1it was 11ot to enjoi11 hi111 from perfor 1 11ing that co 11 tract, a 1 1d l1is i 1 1ability to do so ,vot1lcl 011ly result fro111 tl1e natt1re of tl1 e relief so11ght. The person witl1 wl1om l1e had tl1e co11tract was ·per 1 11itted to interve11e, si1 1ce l1is interests v.·ot1ld be affected by the st1it, altl1ot1gl1 lie ,vot1ld 11 ot be co11siderec\ a 1 1 i 11dis1Jens able party. However, tl1at perso11 wot1ld not be per1nitted to file oppositio11 to tl1e jt1dgn1 ent 011 ce it \Vas re11dered. I-Te cot1lcl 1 1ot l1ave bee11 n1ade a party to tl1e st1it, since no clain1 was 1nade agai1 1st him, a 1 1d tl1e suit was 1 1ot clirected agai11st his contract \yitl1 tl1e defe11da1 1t. Therefore, 1111der tl1e rt1le, l1e wot1ld not be at1tl10rized to file opposition. Altl1ougl1 tl1ere is no reqt1ire1ne 11t to tl1is effect i11 the Code, it is s11bn1itted tl1at, except for indispe11sable l)arties, tl1e a1Jt)licatio11 to file o_p[)OSitio1 1 sl1 otdd be rejected if the applica n t was aware of the s11it prior to jt1dg 1 nent. A n. i11dis1Je11sable party 1nust be able to file Ol )l Josition so that l1e can be 0 1 1 tl1e record and a Jt1dgment. re11 dered i11 tl1 e case. I-Iowever, any otl1er perso11 seekin g to file o_ppositio11 sbot1ld not be able to do so if l1e cot1ld l1a,1e e 1 1tered into the st1it earlier. St1cl1 opposition delays tl1 e case, a11d an i11 terested perso11 sl1ot1lcl not be JJer n1itt�d to sit back, see tl1e case dis1Josed of, a11d if tl1e disposition is t1nsatisfactory to 1 111n, l1ave it re-opened. Tl1e cot1rt ,vot1ld be jt1stified in l1o!di1 1g �l1at_ a person wl10 c?� 1ld have become a party or interve11 ed earlier l1as ,va1ved l11s right to file oppos1t1on by failin g to take action at the earlier time. Tl1e opposition is 1nade by a petition addresse_d_ to tl1e cot1rt_ wl1icl1 rendered judgnient.11 In addition to formal matters, tl1e pet1t10 11 !Ilt1st specLfy tl1 e na1ne of the cot1rt wl1 1cl1 rendered the jt1dg1 11e 11 t, tl1e date of tl1 e JU��1nent and tl1e n 11 111ber of tl1e st1it in wl1icl1 it was give11, tL1e grot1 nds of OJJpos1t�o n and the nattire of the relief sotight. 32 It n1ust be acco 1 npa11iecl by a11 affidavrt of . tl1e truth of tl1 e facts alleged tllerein,33 aild an application for a stay of exect1t1on 111ay also be 29. I-le would be clain1ing tl1rot1gl1 the assignor. See Civ. Pro. C., Ast. 5(1). 30. Chapter IV, supra, note 214. 31 . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 359(1). 32. Civ. ·Pro. C., A.rt. 359(2). 33. Civ. ·rro. c., Art. 359(3).
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filed, \Vhere appropriate.34 Wlien tl1e petitio11 is re�e! ved, the court fixe� a day for llearing tile opposition and serves a copy of the pet1t1on on all the parties together witl1 a st1m111ons directi11g them to appear at tl1e l1earing. 35 The proceedi1 1gs upo_n th� filing �f. the o �po�� tion .are . s11bject to the same provisio115 as tl1e procecd1 11gs 111 tl1e or1g1nal act: _ 1on. Tl1!s s111;1ply I"?ea?s that tlie perso11 nU 1 1g the opposition has !L1e 01)1Jort1�1uty to raise hi s obJect1ons to the judginent a1 1d may, jf he so desires, 111trod11ce evidence. Tl1e co11rt__may . then confirm, vary or set aside tl1e judg1nent. 37 Tl1e procedt1�e for opl?os1t1on . insures !bat a JJerso11 wl1ose interest s will be af!ected by the Jt1dg1n�11t 1n a suit to wl11cb he cot1Id J1ave bee11 made a party will l1ave tl1e OJJport11n1ty to be heard before the judgn1ent is executed. Revie,v by Appeal to a I-Iigher Court Tl1c 111ost co111111on n1etl1od of obtaining revie1vv of a j11dgn1ent is by way of an aJJJJCcLl. A11 a1J1Jeal 111ay be defined as an ap1)licatio11 by a party· to a l1igher, or as iL is called, an ,1p1Jellate cot1rt, aski11g tl1at cot1rt to set aside or revise a decisio11 of a st1bordi11ate cotirt. 38 Wl1en an aJJpeal l1as been taken, the a_ppellate cot1rt reviews tl1e decisio11 of the st1bordi11ate co11rt to detern1ine whetl1er th.at court co111111itted sucl1 errors i11 its I1eari11g ancl disposition of tl1e case as to require the a1)_1Jellate court to reverse tl1e decisio11. If s11cl1 errors \Vere not con1mitted, the decisio11 of tl1e subordi11ate cot1rt \viii be co11}ir111ecl. In s01ne cases, tl1e error is st1cl1 tl1at it ca11 be corrected by varying tl1e jt1dg1nent, and the appellate court l1as tl1e IJOvver to do so. 1 1 1 Etl1io1)ia, as \Ve \Vill see, the appel.late court will 11st1a lly 111al(e a fi11al clispositio 11 of tl1e case, altl1ot1gl1 in certain circ11mstances it 111ay re111and tl1e case to the s11bordi11ate cot1rt for re-trial. B.
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A11 a tJJ)eal, tl1e11, n1ea11s a re\rie\,, of the case c111cl not a retrial of t/1e case by t/1e ctpJJe/lc1te court. Freqt1e11tly, tl1e grot111ds for aJJpeaJ will involve errors of law allegecl ly co11:1:1itted by tl1e st1bordi 11ate cot1rt. As a rt1le, the aJJpellate court does 1101 I1car adc l 1L1011al e\1ide11ce 011 tl1e appeal, and where tl1e introductio11 of additional evid�nce is pern1itted, it is Jinuted to a partict1lar q11estio11. Too often in the past, JJa�t1c�tlarly a111on� the lo\\'er cot1rts, an api)eal \VclS a retrial of tl1e entire case. Tl11s . 1s 11ot per111ttted 1111der tl1e Code, ,1 11d it is in1p . orta11t to caref11lly consider IJ\ecrsely wJ1at an a1JJJellate cot1rt does and l1ow a11 apJJeal iliflers from tl1e original trial of tl1e case .
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Eitl1e� party n1ay, in accorda11ce \Vitl1 tl1e l)fO\risions of tl1e Code, aJ)peal ,1gaio5t l �ny fiiial Jtidg11 appea 1e11t re11d erecl the in the s 11bor tak.i11 dinat g e co11r party t.39 TI1e _ � s callecl the ap1Jella11t, a11d the !)arty it1 wl1ose f,1vor tl1e j11dg111e11t \vas rende red �s . called . �l1e_ res1Jondent. On appeal, they are referred to by these desigi1ations, ,iltllotigl1 it is not 1111co1nn1on to refer to tl1e pl,1intjff-a,1Jpellant or plaintiff-respondent an�l . tl1e defei1dant�res�o 11de11t or clefendant-appellant. It is al so possible tl1at both �or parties n1ay be di ssati sfied witl1 the decision and if so, both n1ay appeal. exaniple, the cotirt may have fou 1 1d for the plaintiff, b11t n1ay J1ave award ed 11101 34. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 359(4). 35· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 360(1). 36 · Civ. Pro. C ., Art. 360(2). 37. Ibid. 38 · See Nageodra v· Stiresb (P rivy Council, India, 1932), 1932 All-India Rep., p. l 6S. 39. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 320(l).
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a lesser a111o �n_t of da�ag�s tha11 cl�m e_ ?· In su.ch a case,. t �e defenda11t 01ay appeal fro1;11 the dec1s1on on t �e issue �f_ liabiltty,40 and . the pla1nt1:ff 1nay appeal from tlie _ dec1s1�n on da�ages. Since the Judgment 011 the 1ss�1e of liability \Vas for the plain tiff, his appeal 1s caJled a cross-appeaJ; as to that 1sst1e, tl1e plaintiff would be t]1e cross-appellant and the defendant tl1e cross-respondent. However, if oi1ly tJ1e plaintiff appealed, he would be the appellant and the defendant wottlci be the respondent. The party seeki1�g to appeal 1nust l1ave bee11 adversely affected by tl1e judgment _ _ which he 1s challeng111g. ]list as a party cannot bri11g a suit to have son1e abstract qt1estion determined, l1e n1,1y not seek review of a decision. 11n1ess he has been injt1red by tl1at decision. Tl1t1s, wl1ere tl1e plai11tiff proceeded on alternative theories of liability, �11d the co11rt f ?11nd i n 11.is favor on one t11eory, but not on tJ1e other, and gave b1n1 all tl1e relief s011gl1t, he cannot a_ppeal on the ground that one isst1e \Vas decided against l1i111.41 So too, if tl1e defendant contended tl1at tl1ere ,vas no co11tract and aJternativel)', that perforn1ance was preve11ted by force n1ajeure, and a contract, but 11pl1eld the defe11dant's contentio11 tl1e co11rt fo11nd tl1at tl1ere ,vas : as to force 1najet1re and entered a jt1dg111ent for l1in1, l1e co11Jcl not ap1Jeal tl1e court's decision as to tl1e existence of the co11tract.42 A party may 011ly appeal \vl1ere l1e l1as been adversely affected by tl1e jt1dg1nent ,vl1ich J1e is cl1alle11ging. 111 n1l1lti-party litigatio11, a11y or all parties n1ay appeal if tl1ey are adversely affected by the decision. Tl1e parties aJJpeali11g 11eed not mal<e all the other parties respondents to the appeal. Sl1ppose tl1at the defe11dant joins a tl1ird party defe11dant. The court finds for tl1e plaintiff as against tl1e defendant and for tl1e tl1ird 1Jarty on tl1e defendant's claim against l1in1. Tl1e defendant n1ay apJJeal against the decision on third ·party liability, na1uing tl1e tl1ird party as resJJondent, \vitl1ot1t appeali11g against tl1e decisjon in favor of tl1e plai11tiff 011 his clai111. The tl1ird party could a.Iso appeal from a decision :holdi11g l1i.m liable to the defencla11t. Also, wl1ere one defendant l1as filed a cross-clai111 against the otl1er, eitl1er 111ay aJJpeal fro1n the decision on the cross-claim. 43 Wl1ere more tl1an one party has joi11ed or bee11 joined, tl1e appeal may be tal<e11 by or agai11st son1e of tl1e parties only, t1nless tJ1e other parties are inclispensable. For exa111ple, A ,111d B joi11 clain1s agait1st tl1e defendant arising fron.1 tl1e sa1ne tra11saction. J t1dgi11ent is for tl1e defe11clant ,tgainst botl1 plaintiffs. Eitl1er plain,tiff 111ay appeal. Tl1e same \VOltld. be trt1e wl1ere tl1e plaintiff bas joined clai1ns against t,vo de,fei1da11ts and jt1dg1ne11t is in favor of bot11 defendants. He n1ay a1)1Jeal tl1e decision aga.i11st one defenda11t only. I-Iowever, wl1ere an indispensable part)' bas not a1)peaJed as plaint�ff or been m� de a respo11de11t, the objection of absence of an i11dispe11sable party 1s eq11ally applicable. The a1 Jpel late cot1rt cannot proceed i11 t11e absence of an indispensable pa.rty, since it \Vol1ld _ the11 ]1ave no power to rend.er a jt1dgment 1n tl1e case. The judgn1ent apJ)ealed from is preslrmed to be correc_t, and the burden is on the appellant to sho\1l tl1at it sl1ot1ld be reversed or var1ecl. 44 Tl1us, wl1ere tl1ere
40. 41.
42. 43. 44.
b le tl1at the a; rend ;nt eiva conc s i . _It . ages dam of e issu The clefeiicla.nt 01ay also appeal on the f b o amaoes , w�y 1 Y n1u� too ot1ff pla1 the rded would appeal, contending tbat the court . awa . e littl too 1 d l11n rde a\va rt cou the t tha ing tend con and the plaintiff would appeal, , See Secretary of State v. Samiaatha (I�Iigl1 �t., M adras, 1914) , lfn(ldian L. R:p.,,v 11c1 h 3; p. 25. If the plaintiff proceeded on t,vo theories a11d the an1ou11t o . amages o 1nd fore appeal 1f the cottrt fot would be entitled wotdd differ under each tl1eory, l1e cottld _ mages. f da o nt him on the theory that ,vot1lcl resttlt in a lesser a1nou l-Ind1a Rep., 3 Al 194 2), s, 194 dra Ma , Ct. igh (1-I yar hay ant hw Vis v. eS e Ghularn Kadir Sahib p . 29 7 · a· r, 1953), tte Mi by R. ed. th (.12 re clu oce Pr vil Ci J o, de Co 1 e , rr, See th e 1scuss1on . .,_ " ·· . .1n D. Mtilla vol. 1, pp. 357-358. p., p. 5-) . Re ia nc/ l-J 1 Al 192 ), 21 19 ia, Ind , cil un Co ,y ri, _(P See Panlcrunissa v. Iza:tis
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en tl1e ve rd ha bu ld ou of 11t lla pe ap showing the al, pe ap sscro � a d an al pe ap was an . g was erron ous, and lc1n ac t�e cross � that tlle portion of tl1 e jL1dg111e11t l1e w�1s att on t rti of tha po to the t pec res l1 w1t Judgment n rde b11 1e san tl1e 1 ave J tild wo appellant wllich he was attacking. Wl1ere a 11 appeal lies, bt1t a. remedy is ava!lable i11 the coL1rt which gave the judg111ent or order, no appeal 111ay be loclged 111�t1l st1 ch ren1edy has been exl1austed. 4S _ w11ere prev1ously, disct1ssed procedural irregularities This woti]d include tl1e situation, 11 ave. occurred in tl1e subordinate cot1rt. Tl1e party must make his application to set aside the proceedings in that cot1rt, and if his a.iJplication is denied, he n1ay tlien ::1ppeal. Under Art. 211(1), it is provided that �1n error i11 the judgment or _ _ decree n1ay be made a grotrnd of appeal, eve11 tl1ot1gl1 a� appl1cat1on was not 1na.de to tl1e s11bordinate cot1rt. 1-Iowever, since a re111edy is available in the subordinate co11rt, it wot1ld see111 tl1at the ap1Jellate cot1rt cot1 ld 11ot l1ear the appeal until tl1at re1uedy was exl1at1stcd, so tl1at even ,vl1ere tl1e .irregt1larity occ11rs with respect to tl1e jt1dg1ne11t or decree, an application ,vot1ld l1ave to be 111ade to the subordinate cot1rt before the aJJJJeal cot1ld be taken. Wl1ere tl1e t111s11ccessfL1l party ]1as discovered ne,v 1natter tl1at would e11title him to revievv in tl1.e court tl1at re11dered tl1e jt1 dg111ent, as provided in Art. 6, he is not precll1dcd from appeali11g, ,1sst1111.i11g tl1at he has other gro·unds of appeal. Review t111cler Art. 6 is autl1orized only wl1ere an a1Jpea1 ]1as 11ot been taken, so wl1ere a JJarty l1as ta]<e11 a11 a_ppeaJ, l1e cot1ld ,,sk tl1e appellate cot 1rt to consider the new 111atter as additional evide11ce, wl1icl1 we \vill disct1ss s11bseqt1ently. However, l1e could 11ot aJJpeal solely 011 tl1e grot1nd tl1at l1e l1as discovered s11c]1 new n1atter. The existence of tl1at evidence does not rencler tl1e jt 1dg111e11t of the s11bordinate court st1bject to attack i11 tl1e a1JtJellate cottrt, and lie wot1ld l1ave to seek a review of tl1e jt1dg111e11t in tl1e st1bordi11ate cotirt. 46 Tl1ere is one appeal as of rigl1t. Wl1ere tl1e case was tried in tl1e Woreda Guezat Cot 1rt, a11 appeal lies to tl1e A,vradja Gtiezat Cot1rt in whose area of juris dictio11 tl1at Woreda Gt1ezat Court Iies; 47 where tl1e case was tried in the Awradja Guezat Cot1rt, an ap1Jeal lies to t11e I-Iigl1 Cot1rt ; 48 ,vl1ere the case was tried in . the H1gl1 Court, an appeal lies to the Supren1e lmJJerial Court. 49 Wl1ere, 011 appeal, tl1e appell�te cot1rt _co11fir� s tl1e j11dg111ent, a ft1rtl1er appeal does 11ot lie. If, ho,v e,,er, tl1e JLI ?gn1ent 1s v �r1ed or reversed, a seco11d appeal ]ies to the next higl1est cot1rt, e.g., 1f tl1e AwradJcl Gt1ezat Cot1rt varies tl1e jtrdg111e11t of tl1e Woreda Guezat Co11rt, an appe_a� lies t� th� tligl1 Cot1rt, a11d if on appeal to tl1e H'igl1 Co\1rt fro111 a case or1g111aJly tried 111 tl1e Awraclja Guezat Cot1rt, the rligl1 Cot1rt varies _ tl1e J�dgn1ent, a__ft1rtl1er ap1Jeal lies to tl1e St1pre111e I 1 nperial Cotirt. 50 N ote tl1at tliere _ 15 110 provis1011 for a tl1ird aJ)peal. St1p1Jose tl1at in tl1e Woreda Guezat Court, the Jlldgn1ent was for tl1e J)laintiff. 011 ,1ppeal, tl1e Alvradja Gt1ezat Court . . reverses and gives Jt1d g1ne11t for tl1e defe11da11t. Since tl1e decisio11 of tl1e Wored a Gtiezat Court was reverse� on 3JJ )eal, a second appeftl Ji�s to the I-Iigl1 Court. l Btit, no matter 110� tl1e I-I1gh Court disposes of tl1e case, i.e., w .hetl1er it confirn1.s _ or reverses tl1e decisio n of the Awradja Guezat Cot1 rt, a furtl1er appeal does not 45. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(2). 46. N o te that the decision of the court . . iv · · alab C le on th e ap pl ica appe t t1· o n 1s re,,1ew 1 ,:o r no .pro. C., Art. 6(4). 47. C� v. Pro. C., Art. 321(1) (a). 48. C 1v. Pro. C. Art 3?1(1) (b .. · ) of the p re u b a l · 1on the d1v1 tl1e al appe s by d l be wou eard 1 l s . Y, m ·. . · · High C ourt '' 81 ttLag ll1 the Taklay Guezat in which lo cated. was the Gu Aw ezat rad ja 49. c'iv. Pro. C., Art. 321(1) (c). 5o. C iv. Pro. C., Art. 321(2).
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lie to the Supreme I111perial Court .. Ju�is?ic!ion 011 appeal tinder tl1e Civil Procedttre Code thus d1 ffers f ron1 both t�e J t1r1sd1ct1on 1111der tl1e Criminal Procedtire Code w11ere two appeals are authorized as of right, 51 and the jurisdiction tinder tile prio� rules where only one a�pea.I was at1t l1 orized in civil cases.s2 Of cotirse, an appJ 1 ca-°:t who has ��bat1sted 111s r1 gl1ts of appeal 111 ay petitio11 His Imperial Majes 53 . on 1s1 rev for lot 1 Cb ty's
2. Interlocutory Appeals We . 1 11a.y now consider what are � ailed interlocutory appeals. An interloct1tory appeal 1s s11nply an appe�I. from an 111terloct1tory matter, a 1natter on which the court _ l1as re11 dere� a dec1s1011, bt1t 1\ l l1icli c/ecisioti cloes 11ot fi11a/ly clispose of t/1e case. .Exan1�l�s of 1nterlo.c11�ory 111at_ter� wo11ld be an order 011 a motion for adjot1rn, 111 ent, a de.c1.s1on 011 prel111u1?arY_ obJect1 ons, a rt1li11g on tl1e ad1nissibility of evidence and a dec1s1on 011 a11 appl1cat1011 to sue as a pat1per.5'1 Under tl1e prior rt1les,ss interloc11tory appeals to tl1 e St1pre1 11e In1perial Cottrt were per111itted. Tl1e suit was contin11ed in tl1e s11bordi11ate cot1rt, a11 d tl1e interloc11tory appeal was given preference on the docket of tl1e appellate cot1rt. Apparently, tl1is practice was also followed in tl1e otl1 er appellate cot1rts. Stich a practice was })rodt1ctive of delay, since tl1ere co11ld be a nu111ber of aJ)peals in a si11gle case. Moreover, it could rest1lt in un necessary appeals. Tl1e [),1rty \Vho was uns11ccessful in raisi11 g an interlocutory n1atter m.igl1 t t1ltirr1ately prevail, in wl1ic]1 case an ap1)eal on that matter wot1lcl be u11necess ary. Suppose that tl1e court per1nits the i11trod11ction of certain evidence over tl1 e plaintifl''s objection . However, in spite of that evidence, tl1e court finds for tl1e plaintiff. It will not now be necessary for 111111 to appeal fro111 tl1at ruli11g, since it has t11r11 ed ot1t that the ruling did 11ot affect tl1e decisio11 011 tl1e 11 1erits. In order to prevent delay and t1nnecessa.ry appeals, tl1e prior rule \Vas cl1a11 ged, and 11oder tl1e Civil Procedt1re Code, interloc11tory appeals are not pern1itted. No ap1)eal lies from any decision or order of any cour_ t on interlocutory n1atters, but any sucl1 decision or order 111ay be raised as a grot1nd of aJ)peal \vl1en an ap_peal is n1ade agai11st tl1e final jt1dg111e11t. 56 Th11s, tl1ere can be b11t one appeal, that from the finaJ jt1dg1ne11 t, and at sucl1 tirne all objectio11s, botl1 as to i11terlocutory matters and tl1 e final disposition, 1nay be raised. However, a person 111ay appe1:1l from any order directing l1 is arrest or dete11tion, or transferring property frorn 011e party to anotl1er or ref11si11 g to grant a11 apJ)lication for l1abeas corptis. 57 Altl1011gl1 s11cl1 orders ma.y ·be considered i11terloc11tory in natt1 re, tl1ey do involve restraint of a person or deprivatio11 of property, a 1 1d it \Vas decided tl1at a IJerson sl1 011ld be entitled to an immediate rt1ling 011 tl1e validity of the detention or tra11sfer. Tl1ese are the only exceptions per111itted, a11 d i11 ::111 otl1er cases tl1e cot1rt n111st reject any appeal taken on an interloc1 1 tory n1atter. It .is necessary, therefore, to disting11isl1 betvveen a r11ling on a� interloct1tory matter, wl1ich is not apJ)ealable, a11 d the final jt1dg1nent, from wl11ch, of cot1rse, 51 . Crim. Pro. C., Art. 182(2). 52. S ee Administra t ion of Justice Proc., 1942, Art . 17, Proc. No. 2, iVeg. Gaz., yea r 1, no. I. 53. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 322. As pointed out in Cl1apter I[, such a provision _i� decla ratort on�y, a so t 1e and a petition could be made to chilot, even i 11 the absence of such a prov1 s1on. Note ell te _co�r� to power of His Imperial Majesty tuider Rev. Co11st., Art. 35, to order an app k �Jur1sd1ct 1on. J1ear a case although ill tlle absence of sucI1 an order the court. vvould lac S ee the disc�1ssion in Chapter ll, supra, 11ot es 62-63 and accompanying text. 54. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(3). az., 55 · Sup reme I1nperia1 Court Procedure Rules, 1951, Arts. 7, 8, Leg. Not. No. 155·, Neg. G year 10, 110. 11. 56. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(3). 57. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(4)
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e, us , b ca in� on the ar nd pe pe ap de st t fi 7 �l1 mi as sy ea � as t no is lis Tl an appeal lies. ory 1n . nature may, 1n effect, 11t oc ter 1n ly ial nt � se es ter at 1n a on g lin rti a circunlstances, e os_ 1s es do of ing the case, it rul ? the e l1e W � e. cas tl1e of 11 ! o siti po dis ,il fin a be 1 sm1ss11�g the � tatement d of r tte 1na the r de 1 1s 1 Co e. bl ala pe ap d an t 1 . is a final jtidgn en _ 1. of 101 1se act cat a _ t is Th sta t no would s _ e do 1t t tl1a � d 1 111 gro t.I1e on im cla of ma y file a new statement of 1ff 1nt pla the ce s111 er, ord ' ory c11t rlo 1te 1 i an be rily ina ord 58 an d as \Ve saw, the c urt n, tio ac of may e 11s ? . clain1 witl1 respect to tl1e same ca 1 n tin der Art. 91 instead of 1 cla f o _ t e te1n sta ed end a1n an file � to iff int pla it tl1e n per 1 ot _ ose cho to s file a new doe 1ff 1nt pla the t tha e � pos sup er, wev I-io 9 it.s g sin disnus _ , 1s 1ch he 111g wl1 rely on ts and l1e fac tl1e all tl1 for set bas He i111. cla of ent statem al a ctic as pra ce, Sin matter, be on. acti of se cau a e stat do y tl1e t tl1a s tend con s ose n1 o. f the case, disp clai of t 11en 1 stat the of al 11iss dis1 the r, ove : d plea 1not 1 ca and tl1e order of dismissal constitt1tes a final Judgment. Or, suppose that the court rejected tl1e staten1ent of clai111 and tl1e plaintiff did not seek leave to amend. He tl1e11 filed a new state1ne 1 1t of clai1u after tl1e period of limitation J1ad expired, and followi1 1g objectio11 by tl1e defendant, tl1e strit \Vas dismissed. Again, as a practical n1atter, tl1e first order of dis1 11issal disposed of the case, and the plaintiff may aJJpeal fro1 11 tl1at order, assu1ni11g tl1e ti1 11e for appeal l1as not expired.
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As Vi'e l1ave said, ,t11 order denyi11g a req t1est for an adjo11rn1 nent would be an order on an ir1terloc11tory 111atter. Bt1t ,vl1at if, as a rest1lt of tl1e denial of the 111.otio11, tl1e JJarty did 11ot proceed f't1rtl1er a11d judgment ,vas e11tered against him. I-le cot1ld ap1)eal on tl1e gro11ncl tl1at tl1e co11rt i1nproperly denied l1is motion for an �tdjo11r 1 1111e11t. 60 I-le is appeali 1 1g fro1n tl1e final jt1dg 1 11ent e 1 1tered agajost him, altl1ougl1 tl1e grot1nd of l1is aJ)peal relates to an i.nterloc11tory n1atter, the denial of !1is 1 11otion for a11 adjo11rn111ent. We ma, y consider some further examples of tl1is r11le. At the first hearing tl1e plai11tiff contends tl1at the cot1rt sl1ot1Id st1n1 1 narily decide tl1e case in accordance \'\ itl1 tl1e JJrovisio 11s of Art. 255. Tl1e co11rt disagrees and sets tl1e case for trial. Tl1e J)lai11tiff can1 1ot appeal from tl1e cot1rt's ref11saJ to decide tl1e case st1m111arily.61 Tl1e decision does not dispose of tl1e case, bt1t n1erely reqt1ires a full-scale trial on tl1e merits. Tl1e plaintiff 1 11igl1t still prev,1il, wl1icl1 wo11ld render tl1e appeal t1nneces sary. Tl1e san1e would be trt1e wl1ere a n1otio11 for a peren1ptory findi11g Vi,as de11ied. Let tis say tl1at at the e11d of tl1e plaintiff's ca.se, tl1e defendant 111oves for a pere1111Jt_ory findi11g 0 1 1 tl1e grot1nd tl1at the pl,1i1 1tiff failed to sustain l1is b11rden of prodt1ct1on, a 1 1d tl1e 1notiot1 is denied. I-ie ca 1 111ot appeal from tl1e decision, si11ce the only effect of tl1e decision will be tl1at tl1e cle.fe 1 1dant \Vill l1�1ve to prese 1 1t his case, ancl l1e 111ay still prevail.62 J_,ikewise, where tl1e court sets aside a11 ex l)arte decree 011 tl1e _gro11nd tl1at tl1� defenda 1 1t clid not receive JJfOJJer 11otice or tl1at tl1ere was st1ffi.c1_ent ca11se for 111s 110 1 1-a1Jpearar1ce.63 The rtiling merely means tl1at tl1e �efer1dant w1_Ll l1ave a. cl1a11ce to prese11t liis case, a11d desJJite st1cl1 presentation, _ �he JLld,gn1ent m1gl1t be for tl1e plaintiff. Of cot1rse, if tl1e jtidg111ent on tl1e n1er1ts ts for tl1e defe11da 1 1t, t11e plai11tiff may ap1Jeal 0 11 the gro11nd tl1at tl1e court erred 1
58. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 232(2). 59. See the di scussion, st1pra, Cl1apter VI. 60 · ee Mullick v · Ganga (High Ct., Patna, 1924), 1925 All-I11dia Re p. 4. � p., 53 61. e M r genst�_rn Chemical Co. v . Schering Corp eral Fe 0) , d 195 Cir. , : . (Ct. 3rd App., U.S., � . R vol l8l, p. 160, 1n R. Field and B. Ka1Jlan, Materials 011 Civil Procedure , ���;�, n;, c1 3) 62. S ee Stewart v. Robe rts (Ct App , . , 54 . vol 1 ·. U , ies, S Ser · D . · · C . 2nd c 1r., · p., 6), l Re 194 era Fed . p. 697 in J Cb a db ourn and L. Levin , Cases 011 Civil Procedure (1961, p. 945.) 63 · See Su,'n d. ·ar ·v · N'Jgh aty · a (H..1gl1 Ct., Lahore, 1923), 192 All 5 -India Rep., p. 466.
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J·udgment is 1' i·n setting aside tl1e ex parte decree, b11t if·. the c-0r the p 1a1n · tr·rr, suc11 · ne �o c b ss e t a ·11 y ':1 S o too, where an order of dis111issal is an appeal se � t aside � � re , d �ns t tat � e stt ete 1t 11 da11t ca.nnot appeal.64 Even thotigll th and the e su it is Judgmen t m1gl 1 t .f i nal be for the defendant. reitistated, Ho\vever, in · all of tl1ese examples, ·if tl1e decision went the otlier wa.y, i·t \VOllld · · s1o d } 1e sin t ec1 ce · e, n_ wo11ld then �mo11nt to a final jtidgrnent in tlie bl ala be appe .1ly decided tl1e s1�. m t r co . m a1_ u the case 1n favor of one party, its judgment case. If . is just as final as �f 1 t decided tl1e case after a_ f:111-scale trial. A peren iptory finding in favor of the d�fendant at tl1� e11cl of tl1e plaintiff's ca.se mea11s tliat final jtidgnient is entered for ?-11u at tl1a� t:me. �11d where a motion to set aside an ex parte decree or to rei n state a s111t 1s deI11ecl, tl1 e original judgu1ent stands and is final. Tl1us, we_ s�e �l1 at tl1e ,vay in whicl1 tl1 e court disposes of tl1e 111atter 1nay deteri11ine wl1etl1er It IS interlocutory. I t must �e. str�ssed, l1oweve1> that a decision constit11tes a final j11dgment only where the dec1s1on itself finally disposes of tl1e case. Even tl1ough tl1e decision denies a party the relief reqt1ested, it 1nay 1101 finally dispose of the case, a nd, tl1erefore, it is not a.ppealable. Cot1sider this case. 65 Under tl1e ter111s of tl1e deceden t's last will, the residt1e of l1is estate was to be given to ai1 orphan age in I-I11ngary. Tl1e executor st1bi11itted th.e :fi11al acco11ot, and the court directed tl1at tl1e 1noney be turned over to the Acting Co11st1l General of Ht1n gary, wl10 ,vas represe11tin g tl1e orphanage narned in tl1e will. Tl1e exect1tor did not do so and appliecl to tl,e co11rt for ft1rtl1er directions. He contended that l1e doubted wl1ether tl1e orphanage existed and questioned tl1e propriety of paying tb.e n1oney to tl1 e Cons11l Ge11eral i11 light of ''existing political and economic conditions in I-Iungary." Tl1 e cot1rt clirected tl1at the exec11tor pay tl1e. r esidue of tl1e estate into co11rt until it co11ld be detern1i11 ed wl1ether the orpl1anage referred to in tl1e will still existed, i.e., wl1ether tl1e institt1tion claiming the legacy was the institt1tion tl1at the testator in ten ded to benefit in tl1e will. When tl1e Consul General appealed, tl1 e appeal \Vas l1eld to be i11terlocutory and was dismissed. The decisio11 111erely postponed tl1 e q11estion of vvl1 etl1er the institution was entitled to tl1e estate. It was a c11stodial order preservin g tl1e pro perty pending a final determination of that isst1e. It was still possible tl1 at tl1 e court would order tb.e property t11rnecl over to the Cons11l Gen eral, ::ind since tl1is was so, the decision was on a11 interloc11tory 1natter. Tl1e fact tl1at the effect of a decision is to deny to a party the rigl1t c1ai1ned cloes not make it a final j11dgn1e11t as long as there is the possibility tl1at the rigl1t will be r�cog1�zed st1bsequentl�. It is no grot1nd for con tending tl1at a decisio11 011 a q11estion IS fi?al beca11se . 1f tl1e q11estion I1ad bee11 decided diffe re11tly, a party wo11ld have received the relief l1e clain1ed . On tI1e otl1 er l1and, a j11dgi11ent n1 ay be final, even tl1?11gh so1netlling else remains to be done. In a suit for partition or separate possession o_f property, tl1e court may, if tl1e physical partition or separatio11 carmot c?nven�ently be .n1ade witl1out further inq11iry, declare tl1e rigl1ts of tl1e parties an� g1�e direct1ons. for th_e actual partition before passing tl1e final decree. 66 The question 1s wl1 ethe! tl1e deci sion declaring the rights of tl1e parties can be appealed befor� tl1e P8 �? 1 n � of the final decree. It is subntitted tha t the appeal sl1ot1ld be allowed. 7 Tl1e rigl1ts of the 64. See Venkata v. Nagoji (High Ct., Madras, 1945), .1946 rl1l-Jnclia Rep., . 344 US., 1950 e· 65. In th: matter of the_ Estate of Jol1n Ur!, deceas�d (Su _. Ct.�1:�wp so�: �ta1s a p. , 57) t_i9 : ;:� PP T, er, Jom C. 1n Atlantic Rep., 2nd Series, vol. 71, p. 665, 66. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 190. . vol. 144' 67 · See Kasishke v. Baker (Ct. App., U.S., lOtl1 Cir , 1944), _Feder�/ Rep., 211cl . Civil Pt ocer/u, e (l 961 ), p. 011 s se Ca P, 38 , in J. Chadbourn and L. Levin, 4
i:1es,
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t e ur ad co m e an erroneous tl1 If . ed in r111 te. de en be ve ha rsy ve ro nt co arties in tlle ed before the act_ual physical rs �e re be on isi ec e th at tl1 le ab � sir de _ �ecision, it is , 1t will not afef ct ne be do to 111s na re1 re mo 1ng th 111e s0 gl1 o11 th A1 . . partition is made al an d, pe ne ap n11 ter de ld be ou en sl1 be s ha ult res tl1e ce Sin se. 1 ca e tl in tilt tl,e res allowed. 68 ry is uto oc ion erl cis int de a or r he 1et wl final g 11in mi ter de in t tha n tl,e see We icate the rights of the jud ad to is ion cis de tl1e of ect eff tl1e r l1e 1;t wl a;k \Ve 111ust ut ion d stit cis con s the a , ect eff e tl1 final is tl1i If sy. � ver � tro co11 tl1e parties in � _ re s mo ng 1a1n th! ren 1 son to be tl1a ng nd1 �ta 1tl1 � 11ot e, _ abl eal � app is and judgme11t � y and non tor ocu 1s erl t 1 int , hts rig se tho te 1ca t1d adJ t no es do n isio dec tl1e If done. ren e f e t l�, ed dif id dec ealin g en app be � 1ad n stio � q11e the if 1 ugl tl1o � n eve e, appealabl _ _ n 1s1o 1s final and dec tl1e l, vai pre l stil l1t 1n1g l1e ce Si11 ed. vail pre e hav ld \vou l)arty cannot be a1)pealed. 3. Taking the appeal a. Men1ora11d11m of Appeal A party takes an appeal by fili11g i11 tl1e registry of tl1e appellate court a 111en1orandu1n of appeal sig11ed by l1i111 or l1is pleader. 69 Where tl1ere are several aJ)pellants, tl1ey 1na.y file 011e 111en1ora11dun1 sig11ed by all or by tl1eir pleader on bel1alf of all. 70 Every cot1rt 11111st keeJ) a Register of Appeals in wl1icl1 the parti culars of all appeals are e11tered and 11t11nberecl i11 order of reception. 71 Tl1e n1emo rand11111 of apJ)eal n1t1st contain, i11 addition to for111al n1atters, (1) tl1e name of tl1e cot1rt whicl1 gave tl1e j11dg1ne11t a1)J)ealed fro111, the date of tl1e j11dgment and tl1e nun1ber of tl1e s11it in wl1icl1 it was gi\1e11, (2) the. grounds of appeal, tl1at is, tl1e rcaso11s for ,vl1icl1 tl1e judg111e11t sl1ould be reversed or varied, and (3) the nature of tl1e relief sot1gl1t, e.g., that tl1e appellant wa11ts tl1e judg1nent to be reversed or tl1at he wa11ts it to be va.ried in certain respects. 72 A copy of the full record of tl1e case a11d tl1e judgn1ent are to be attacl1ed to tl1e memora11d111u. of ap1)eal. 73 N·ote tl1at it is 11ot necessary tl1at a copy of tl1e decree be filed with tl1e 111e111ora11d11n1, altl1ot1gl1 it would be goocl })ractice to do so. 74 As we ,viii see, in certain circ11msta11ces tl1e appellant 111ay be per111itted to prodt1ce additional e\ridence on appeal: Tl1erefore, the me111orand11111 n111st state \-Vl1etl1er tl1e appellant bases lus app��I ent1rel� 011 th� recor? of the original l1earing or wl1etl1er l1e desires to prod11ce add1t1onal ev1de11ce, 111 wl11ch case a11 aJ)plicc1tion to call additional evide11ce 1nt1st be _ attacl1ed to tl1e men1orand111n. Tl1e apJ)lication m11st sta.te tl1e natt1re of tl1e evidence, tl1e na111�s and addresses of tl1e witnesses to be called, if a11y, a11d tl1e reaso11 ,vl1y tl1e evidence \Vas not prodt1ced i11 tl1e stibordinate co1 1rt.7S Tl1e ,1ppella nt 76 t. n1ust st1b111it st1fficie11t copies of tl1e 1ne111orandt1m for service 00 ea.cl1 respo11den _ 6S · 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.
74· 75.
76.
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The s�me would be �rue of an at)J)eal fro1n a11 order issued t111der Civr Pro. C,. Art. 189, declaring the prOJ)ortionate shares of J)artners. TJ1e order detern1ines tl1e n1erits of the con� tro\1ersy and should be a.ppeaJable. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 323(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 323(3). Civ. J>ro. C., Art. 323(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 327(1). Civ fro · -, A.rt. 327(2), A party ,vould n1ake ap1) 184 (!), Art . C lica Pro tio1 Civ und 1 er � a ilc l Ln i ig t of Art. 327(1 ), tl1is ,vonld incl to lbe As . ;eco �d ude _ a11 the apJ) · lica for tion k eeptng o f tl1e record . . · Ch apter VIII' · p10• see Ci v ·, A c rt. 269 1n and tl1e d1scuss1on supra notes 97-l·Ol an'd accon1J)any . 1ng text. ' Uocter 0rder 41, rttle 1 of tbe I11dian a file st n1u Co de pel of lan . t _ ap Civ il Procedure, tl1e · copy of the Judg tnent and of tl1e de cree Civ. ·Pro. C., Art. 327(3). Civ. · Pro. C., Art. 327(4).
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Where the memorandum is no t in the p�oper form, it may be rejected or returned to the appellant for the purpose �f being amended within a specified time, or it The co11rse of action the court takes should may be amended then and there. depend on the nat11re of !h.e defects: if the memorand11n1 is completely inadequate, the appellant sho·uld be d!re_cted.. to . file a new one; if some amendments are neces sary �r docu?1ents are m1ss1ng, 1t 1s so11nd to fix a day for amendment; if the error 1s a minor one, tl1e memora11dt1m can be amended at tl1e time it is fi.led.78 b. Time for appeal The memorand11m must be filed witl1in 60 days fron1 the tin1e of tl1e delivery of jtidgrnent.79 Note tl1at tlus does not mean fron1 tl1e time tl1at the trial court prono11nced j11dgn1ent in accorda11ce witl1 tl1.e provisions of Art. 180. Wl1. ere an a_ppeal is filed after tl1e 60 day l?eri ?d, tl1e Registrar m11st refuse to accept the memorandum of .ap�eal, and l1e will 111form tl1e appellant that he may within 10 days file an appl1cat1011 .for leave to appeal out of tin1e.80 Tl1e tin1e limit n1ust be observed scr11p11lo11sly, since it is in tl1e 11ature of a period of limitation; the Regist rar wo111d not be justified i11 accepting a 1nemorand11m filed on tl1e 61st day after the delivery of the j11dgment. When a memorandum filed out of time is acco1npani ed by an a.pplication for leave to aJ)peal out of time, the Registrar n1ay only accept the application; if tl1e application is contained in tl1e memorand111n of apJ)eal, the Registrar must refuse to accept the 1nen1orandt1m and will inform the appellant that the application 0111st be :filed separately.81 Tl1e application for leave to appeal Ollt of ti1ne is to be in writing and 1n11st sho\V cause why the appella.nt did not apJ)eal \Vithi11 the prescribed period. 82 It must be accompanied by s11ch evidence as n1ay be necessary to e11able tl1e co11rt to decide whether tl1e appellant was prevented by good ca11se fron1 appealing withi11 the period.83 The co11rt 111ay l1ear tl1e appellant a11d. tl1e responde11t and n1ay take evidence, b11t it is not req11ired to do so. 84 If tl1e co11rt is satisfiecl tl1at the appel lant was prevented by good ca11se fron1 ,1ppea.ling in ti111e, it records an order granti11g the application, and the appellant sl1all file bis memorand11m of appeal witbi11 10 days of s11ch order. 85 It is provided that 110 appeal lies fro111 a decisio11 dis·n1issing an application for leave to aJJpeal out of time.86 T11is i111_plies tl1at a decision granting an application for leave to appeal ot1t of tin1e is appealable. However, tl1e decision granting the application is i11terloc11tory, since it is possible t� at even if the a_ppeal is heard, the respondent will prevail. TI1erefore, at tl1e t11:31� of tl1e granting of the application, the respondent cannot ap1)eal from t11e d� c1s10�. The appeal will be heard, and if the judgment in favor of the respondent 1s varied or reversed, he may take a second appeal (unless, of course, the first appeal was 77. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 330(1). 78. Where the court rejects the memorandum, it records the reasons f�r such rejection, and(2 a) · Art. 330
79. 80. 81. 82.
83. 84.
85. 86.
note of the rejection must be entered in the Register of Appeals. C1v. Pro. C., Civ. Pro. C., Art. 323(2) Civ. Pro. C., Art. 324(1). d e er be . l s hal m du ran mo me the ept acc to l usa ref a � of te � Civ. Pro. c., Art. 324(2). A no ( ) 4 rt. A C ., o. Pr . Civ l. usa 3 ref the of te da tl1e tl1 in the Register of Appeals together wi Civ. Pro. C., Art. 325(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 325(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 325(3). · entered m be st mu ion cis de e th d an n tio ca pli ap e th Civ. Pro. c., Art. 326(1). A note of the Register of Appeals. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 326(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 326(3).
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ise e ra th e tim at question of th at d an t) u Co al eri p Iin e _ em pr � Su e th . heard by t al ou pe of time. ap to ve lea g tin an gr 1n d re er t ur co te lla pe ap st 1 fLr whetller t1 e The sole q L1estion to· be considered on a11 applicatio� 1 for leave to appe�l out of tiinc is wJ1 etI1er tl1ere was good cause for the failure to appeal w1th1n the J)rescribed ti111e. TJ1 e 11 1erits of· tl1 e · appeal_ ar� irrelevant, and the court should not consider the111 in deciding upot1 tl1 e ::1ppl1 cat1on. Appare11tly, there was a tenden.cy to do tI1is in tl1 e past, and tl1e Code makes · it clear tl1 at sucl1 a practice is not proper. It is obviot1sly diffict1lt to defu1e wl1 at co.nstitutes ''good ca:use," acd �ach case 111 .ust be deter1nined on its O\v11 facts. However, tl1 e Code spec1fically provides that tl1 cre sl1all 11 ot be good cause where tl1e failure to aJ)peal in tin1e is .due to the default of tl1e a1)pellant's l)leader. 87 In otl1 er words, the a.ppellant bas the resJ1011 si bility to see to it tl1at tl1e appeal is taken witl1in the prescribed time; he ca11not say, ''l told 1ny J1leader to take tl1 e appeal, and l1 e failed to do so." This is 11ot a. su fficie11t excuse, and leave may 11 ot be granted on that ground. r1·11e coL1rt sl1 ould be very strict i11 interpreti11g good cat1se for tl1ese· purposes. ·1·11e 60 d[1y JJeriod is a 1011g one, and if a party desires to appeal, l1 e can easily clo so witl1i11 tl1 at ti11 1e. Unlil<.e t]1e case wl1ere l1as been a disn1issal for failure to apr)ear or wl1ere tl1 e cot1rt I1 as proceeded ex parte, a party's rigl1 ts are not aff€cted l)ecause of l1is abse11ce fron1 tl1e cot1rt at a partict1lar tin1 e. Moreover, the case ,viii have already bee11 decided on the n1erits, a11 d tl1e jt1dgi11 ent is presun1ed to be valicl. Extendi11 g tl1e tin1e for a11peal prolo11 gs litigation, and parties l1a,1e to be 111aclc to t1nclersta11d tl1at appeals 111L1st be filed witl1 in tl1 e reqt1ired. time..Further111orc, lhe periocl for tal<.i11g an appeal represents a period of limitation; after it l1as CX[Jired, tl1c succcssful litigant is e11 titled to asst11ne that tl1 e jt1dgn1ent in l1is favor ,viii be final. For tl1 ese reasons, tl1 e court sl10L1ld not find good cause unless the ap.1Jella 1 1t actecl witl1 tl1 e utn1ost good faitl1 at1cl tl1e failt1re to appeal i 11 time \vas clL1e to factors beyo11 d l1is power to control. "
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1·11e clearest exan1 ple of good ca.t1se is ·wl1ere tl1 e appellant was prevented fron1 :lJJJJealing by }Jl1ysical illness; in st1ch a ca.se lea,,e sl1 ot1ld be granted providing tl1 e :.lfJJ1ella11t filed tl1c applicatio11 for leave as soon as he was reasonably able to do so.88 Good cat1se n1igl1t also be fot1nd to exist wl1 ere tl1e aJ)pellant was called �1,vay 011 an c111erge11cy before l1 e I1 ad time to file an ap1Jeal, e.g., because of tl1e � ll11 ess of a 11ear relative or 1nilitary service. A qt1estion a1·ises as to wl1ether tl1e illness of tl1e JJleacler wl·1icl1 preventecl l1is filing t]1 e aJJpeal wotild constitt1te good cause. . It l1as bee11 so l1eld elsewl1 ere.89 I-Iowe,,er, tl1 e Code specifically provides tl1at tl1ere 1s 11 ot good cause wl1ere tl1e failt1re to a1)J )eal i 11 tin1 e is due to tl1e default of tl1e appellant's pleader. It 111 ay be asked ,vl1 etl1 er ''illness'' constitt1tes ''default'' ,v�. tl1ir1 �l1e 111 e�11ing of tl1 e r�le, b11t I do 11ot tl1i11 k the question sl1 ot1ld be ap _ �)1oach�d 11 1 tl11s w,ty. Tl1e pr1111 ary responsibility for fili11 g tl1 e appeal rests ttpon �11� party? a�d .l1 e sl:ot1Id 11 ot be able to avoid tl1 is res1)ot1 sibility on the groun d tl1c1t I1e 1 11st1t1ctecl 111s pleader to file tl1e a1)peal and tlle ple::ider was unable to cio so. .If_ tl1e appeal _cot1ld have been take11 witl1 in tl1e IJrescribed time despite the 87. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 326(2). · 88· 1:tl , �1 dia, tJ,e tiQie for appeal is governed by the 1908. Section 5 Ind i�.1 1 Lin of Ac lita t tio n c o_, eis go od cause. A 11uiuber of the exan1ples that follow are taken from Civil Courts ·· Manua1 l( O th ed., 1961) vol 5 · 0 s e, I 67 et , comp 97 · 6 8 ' J)l), Tl1e 14 case not are citations tl1i,1 h ve no_t bee�l included l1ere. Tl1e tex t gives the exan1ple of a case wl1ere the appellant � e�.. a mis�ar�!�ge and filed l1er application 9 days after the tin1 ir e ad app eal · fo e h xp • r IVI, C OU/ Is JY.1a1111ual, vo l. 5, p. 6806.. 89. S ;e Rtul1bold v. London Cotllllry Time s Co La u11 H' cil an 1 9 d 09) Sco , tt ( C Ap t. En p., . , g· J\.ep., vol. 100, p. 259.
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's illness, the fail11re to ·appeal in time was dtle to the , der lea PI.eader s defat1lt P · Tl1erefore, I wouId. suggest that Ill SllCh cases, tl1ere s 11ot1ld only be good c use 1 � _ circu i n m s ta.nces that · prevented tlle plea occu rred ss illne der fron1 co1nn1t1n1cat1ng the " h"1m to engage another advo · t·1me :.or the fact to the part Y In cate ' or proper 1Y file ' . lf e s im h l a e p p a e th
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. In consideri· ng wl1ether· a· par ty was prevented by good catise from appea11ng . . . . tt·me, the �1rcun1 s tances In w I11c · 1 1 h e act ed are very significant. We said that 10 s e exists wl1ere a party w,1 s prevented by ill11es s fron1 fl.lin cau ooo d o th e appea 1· . 0 Btit, sh? uld t 11ere b e g_ o�d cat1se wl,ere t!1e party waited until aJ111os t the end of the per1?d before beg1 n11111g_ to . ·prepare J1is ap1 Jeal, an� w�s t11en preveilted by a sudde� illness fro111 c? n1plet111 g tl1e 111 e11 1orand11m and filing 1 t? I do not think tl,at 90 The 60 SLtch In s ca11 a cas� � good . 1s day period is a lengthy one, and tl,ere a party sl1o_uld be�1n to �or� o� 111s aJJpeal in1mediately after the issuance of tl,e judgn1e11t with wh1cl1 l1 e I� d1ssat1sfied. If he waits until al111ost tl1e end of tI1e 60 day per�od - thereby del�y1n? tl1 e _ c �se, _possibily intentionally-and i s tl1en preventecl fro111 filing_ tl1e appeal 111 t1111e, it 1s difficult to feel syn11Jathetic toward J1 i1 n. tlis good fai_th in delayi11g 1nigl1t be q_t1estioned, and litigants n1ust be e.nco11raged to take tl1e1r ap_peals as · soo11 as possible. Therefore, wl1ere the appellant cl,1in1 s t11 at be was prevented by ill1 1ess o� a11 en:iergency fro1n filing tl1e appeal i 1 1 ti 111e, 11e sl1ould have to show tl1at the illnes s or e 111 ergency occurred soon after the delivery of the judgment or tl1e time wl1e11 hjs pleader advised hin1 to appeal, tl1at it did not abate i11 time for him to file tl1e appeal before tl1e period l1 ad expired, and that l1e filed the application as s oon tl1ereafter as was practicable. Suppose that tl1e party filed tl1e appeal i11 tl1 e wro11g co11rt, a11d by tl1 e tin1e tl1at the appeal wa? dismis sed for lack of jt1 risdiction, tl1e period l1ad ela1Jsed. Agai 11 , I do not tl1 ink tl1 ere is good ca11se. 91 The Code is very clear as to wl1ich coL1rt has appellate jurisdiction,. and eve11 a perso11 11 ot fa111 iliar ,vitl1 the law cou]ci asst1111 1., that l1e would take l1is appeal to tl1e cotLrt i11 tl1 e 11 ext acln1 i11istrative t1nit. 111 any event, he shot1ld make inqt1iry before filing the appeal. So too, tl1ere wot1ld not be good caus e on the grou11d tl1at the litigant could not p· ay tl1 e co11rt fee, si11ce l1e could file the appeal together ,v.itl1 a11 ap1Jlication for le,tve to a_ppeal as a JJauper. 92 Nor would the fact that l-;.e coL1 ld not get a copy of tl1 e record or j11 clgme11t before the expiration of tl1 e IJeriod constitt1te_ good ca11se. I-le will l1 ave l1 eard tl1e judgn 1ent i11 cot1rt, and based on tl1 at j11 dgn1e11t, l1 e co11lcl ascertain tl1e grot 1 nds 011 \Vllich he wo11ld be appeali11g. 93 In bis 111en1ora11 d1 1 m. of appeal he wo1ild i11dicate that l1e co11ld not obtain tl1e record or jt1dgn1ent, and tl1e Registra1· of tl1e appellate court could ass is t him in doi11g so. If, after seeing tl1e record and the jL1dg·n1ent, .be wished to amend the n1emorandu111 of appeal, the appellate co1Lrt, no cloubt, would allow such a1nen·dn1ents .94 Tl1e point is tl1at, if in do11bt, he s hot1 1d file the appeal within the prescribed time rather tl1a11 not flle it and tl1 en try to estab lish good caus e for his not doing s o. However, there are circuinstances where good ca11se n1ay be found t? exist, even thot1gh the appellant was not prevented · by pl1ys ical factors .fron1 fil1n� tl1e _ 1e appeal in time. One stlch circ11n1stance is ,vhere the appella11t was unaware of tl delivery of the judgment. If the cotirt neglected to advis e the appellant of the ' '
90. See Civil Courts Man11a l, si,pra, note 88 at p. 6807. 91. See id. at p. 6806. 92. See id. at p. 6807 and Civ. Pro. C., Art. 474(3). 93 · See Ayinla v. S.C.O.A. (Sup. C., Nigeria, 1953), Nigeria L. Rep., vol. lO, p. 154· 94. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 329(2).
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excu se d from filing the appeal be ld ou sh e h. 1t, e! m dg jt1 ce n ou on pr _ date on \VlJich it wotud e of ar e as aw th he n d u J_ he w 1e t1n t.9 e en th � j om fr d � se ap el . e av 1 1 ys da until 60 e e fil th ap to d eal 1 n time i n ile fa e 1 l e 1er w1 e us ca d . o go � be o s There should al s. ou ne ro be to er o pp t1t Su o d se tliat e rn tt1 h 11� w1 l, se n t1 c o . of e vic d a n o relian. ce n apJ)eal wo uld be fru1tle�s. }!e lat er a at !l1 m l11 s se vi ad . r de ea pl after the trial, J1 is t , al by bu pe is th ap an e fil to e, tim n1 lu the es s vi ad o \\'h , er d ea . J)l er 1 l ot an consults r s de 111 at ea e th pl os pp eo st1 o? err , Or usly . d_ re pi ex s ha al pe ap an g n ki ta period for at e tl? t� ader will take _ d ple . s an ay d 75 is al e p aJ) r f o e tim the t tha 1 ad vises 11in s , 1t 1 s �eJe�ted a� being filed y da 70 er aft en tak s i al pe ap tl1e n he W . the appeal. ime as a result of n t 1 al pe ap to e lt1r fa1 the 1er etl wh is ion est qu e Th out of tiine. s ple ader.'' In th e ' a rty pa of lt ati ef ''d the to e d11 is sel tin co of e ,,ic erro11eous ad ze ali a pen to ted party wl1ere ita l1es t no ve -l1a we far s tl1u and is, it tit�ral s ense in those cas es th e t r. Bu ade ple his by n _ ctio ina to d ue n e tal< 11ot s wa the aJ)peal party left tl1e taking of· tl1e a ppeal to 111s plead er, and w� have stressed that the party l1in1.self l1as tl1e respo11sibility to see that tl1 e apJ)eal is taken. In the present exa111ples tl1e p arty I1as not abdicated tl1 at responsibility. Rather he has made a and that mistake was 111.istake as to wl1etl1er or whe n l1 e sl1011ld take tl1e appeal, d11e to erro11eo11s ad,,ice of cou nsel. It is s11bn1itted that ''default of plead er'' should be Ii111ited to tl1e sit11ation wl1ere the JJleader failed to tal<e tl1e appeal and should 1 1ot i11clude tl1e sitt1atio11 w11ere tl1e pleader gave poor a d vice. If we wan t to en courage JJarties to rely on tl1e advice of tl1eir pleaders - as opposed to - turning the res1Jonsibility for taking tl1e a1Jpeal over to tl1em - we sho11ld not be quick to penalize tl1e parties ,vl1en tl1at advice t11r ns 011t to be incorrect. Perhaps ther e will be s0111e circt1111sta11ces ,vhere reliance on erro11eo11s ad vice of cou11sel sl1ould not j11stify tl1e failt1re to a1 Jpeal in tin1e, b11t 01 1 tl1e wl1ole, ass11mi ng tl1at tl1e ap pellant to s ee that tl1e appeal has acted i11 good faitl1 a11d l1as recog1lized his res po11sibility . ,vas talce11, relia11ce o n s 11ch ,1civice sho11ld con stit11te good ca11se. ' '
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It is not JJOssible to for11111late rigid r11les a.s to \Vl1at constitutes good cause i11 every case. Tl1e good faitl1 of tl1e appellant a11 d tl1e circ111nsta11ces s11rrou nding tl1e fail11re to take tl1e appeal in tin1e 111ust ·be considered. Bt1t, f or the most part, ,:ve ca11 say that good ca11se sl1ot1ld be fo11nd to exist only \Vl1 ere physical factors or_ an emergency preve11ted tl1e appella11t fro111 appealing i n time or where tl1e fa il11re to appeal wa.s d11e to tl1e erro neot1s advice of cot111s · el rendered wl1ile tl1e appellant was seeking to exercise l1is rigl1t to a.ppe,11. (c) Cross-objections
A� we I1 ave said, eithe: p arty 1nay appeal fro1n the d ecree. TI1e party in whose f�''? r Judgment on tl1e n1er�ts �1as entered 1 11ay have certai11 objections to the decree, � Jiich l1e 111a)' want to raise 111 tl1 e appellate cot1rt, a11d if so, J1e n1ay file w�iat is called a cross-a_pJJeal. II- owever, tl1e objections 111ay be s11ch that he is unwilling t o �e 311 ap.peal in order to raise tl1e1n; lie is relatively satis fied \¥ith the judgment as is. But., wl1en . the otl1er par ty appeals fron1 tl1e decree he 1na y decide that he ' · now .\¥ants to 1·,tJ ' i on�. It is, · tl1erefore, provid ed. tl1at tl1e respondent - se SlICl1 0b�ect . niaY, u P' 0n payment of tl1e prescr1becl co11rt fee take a11y cross-objection to the decree or order wl1icl1 l1e cOttId have ta · ' d1'd · en . k by appe�1 I o tw1tl1stand1 11g that he 11 not '.I a)peal fr� . nl any part of the ord er or d ecree 97 This is analogous to the . pro�isions relating to cou 1 1te rclaim not . 1� did . ff t E an n d set da -o n t def e ve i · n he ou t gh · . des1re t o pro · · secu te h· 18 cl a 1111, he may decide to d o so wl1en s ued by tl1e plainti'ff· ·
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95. See Civil Courts Manuc,l, supra, note 88 at p. 6808. 96. See id. at p. 68lO. 97. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 340(l).
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So too, even if the successful party_ did not wish to file an appeal to challenge certain aspects of the decree, once h1s opponent has appealed from tile decree 1 may d �cide that h e sho11 ld �ais� his objections as weU.. There is no substa�ti�: distinction betwee�1 a cross-obJect1on and a cr?ss _-ap_peal, and tlle same grounds of attack may be raised by both n1etl1 ods. The d1st1nct1on refers solely to whetl1er tl1e sticcessft1l p �rty filed an ap_peal to challei1ge certain aspects of the decree or wllether he 1nade 11 1s atta�k ?nly 1n response to an appeal filed by t11e other party, tllat is, by a cross-obJect 1 on. !he cross-objections m11s� be filed in tl1e forn1 of a men1orand 11m of appeal tl1e respondent is served witl1 the summons witlun orie 111 )ntl1 fron1 the t1n1e wl1en 98 A copy is to be served pp the al. defend on every party who 11d � � to app�ar f� may be af :cted b � tl1e obJection:99 _ Tl1e cross-objection may be l1eard and deter mined notw 1 thstand�ng that �l1e or1g1nal appeal is ''not proceeded with."100 So, even if the al?pe�lant decides to w 1 tl1 ?raw the appeal, tl1e co11rt will l1ear the respondent's cross-obJecbons anc1 . t.,av modify the decree as a res11lt. However, if the original appeal ,:vere not_ va.!1dly :filed, tl1ere \.Vould be 110 op1)ortt1nity for the respondent to present cross-obJect1ons. Suppose tl1at the appellant's memorandum of a1)peal was rejectecl as being filed ottt of time. It is as if no appeal l1ad been taken, and the respondent may not file cross-objections. tot As a practical matter, the respondent wot1 ld never l1ave be:!1 '-erved witl1 a su1 nn1ons. Tl1ere is a question as to whetl1er tl1e court will l1ear tl1e respondent's cross objections if tl1e original appeal abates due to the death of the appellant and the failure of his representative to be st1 bstitt1ted. In India, it l1as been held tl1at the court may not l1ear tl1e cross-objections.1° 2 However, the corresponding Indian rt1 le, Order 41, rttle 22(4), says that the cross-objections sl1all be l1eard ''notwithstanding that tl1e original appeal is witl1 drawn or dismissed for default." This was i11terpreted to mean tl1at if tl1e appeal abates, tl1e cross-objectio11 ca11 not be heard, since abate me 1 1t is not ''withdrawal'' or ''dismissal for defat1lt'' \.Vithin the 1neaning of tl1e rt1le. In Ethiopia, tl1e rule reads ''is not proceeded witl1," a 1n1 1cl1 broader tern1. Wl1ere an appeal abates, it is 11ot ''proceeded witl1." Tl1e obviot1s intentio11 of tl1e drafters was tl1at the cross-objections sl1ot1ld be l1eard even if tl1e cot1rt does 11ot l1ear the appeal, and since no li1 niting langt1age is en1 ployed in tl1e Code, the cot1rt should hear the cross-objections des1)ite tl1e abate 1 nent. Another question is wl1etl1er one co-respondent may file a cross-objection agai!lit another co-respondent. St1ppose tl1at A sues B and C, claiming Etl1. $ 5000, and a jt1dgment is rendered i11 his favor agai11st both defe11dants, but 01tly for Etl1.$ 500. B clain1ed that he ,vas entitled to inde11 1nity from C, but this claim was rejected. A appeals against B and C, wl10 do not appeal from that po�tion of tl1e decree holding eacl1 of tl1en1 liable for Etl1.$ 500. After A l1as taken h.1s appeal, B wants to review the qt1estion of his right to indemnity from C in tl1e �vent ·�hat tl1e appellate court I1olds tl1at A is entitled to recover a larger sum against 1111?. The question is whetl1er B may now file a cross-objectio11 to the d�cree � s against �, attacking tl1e findi 11g that l1e was not entitled to indemnity against lum. In India, there is a split of alitllority on this point, ioJ b11 t it- seems clear that he sl1011ld be 98. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 340(2). 99. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 340(3). 100. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 340(4). 101. See Jai Gopal v. Mtina Lal (I-:TigJ1 Ct., Lal1ore, 1923), 1924 All-India Rep., �- 43. 102. See Abdu]lanliya v. Mat1omednliya (J-JigJ1 Ct., Bo111bay, 194·8), 1949 All-111d1a Rep., p. 2?� · 103. See the discussioii and citation of conflicting at1tl1orities in D. Mulla, The Code of C1v1! Procec/ ure (12tl1 ed. by. R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 2, pp. 1207-1208.
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pernlitted to file· tl1e cross-objecti_on in �tl1iopia. Art. 340(l) rovides tl1at the respon � de.nt n1ay take any cross-objection wl11 ch �e � 00:l d l�ave tc.lken by way of appeal, and it does not prohibit taking a cross-obJect1on �1ga1n�t a co-respondent. � could ha,,e appealed against that portion of the decree J1old_1ng that l1e was entitled to indemnity fronl c. Since he could have done so and since the purpose of the rule authorizing cross-objections is to give tl1e respondent the s.am� benefits as he wo�Jd l1 ave l1ad if l1e cross-appealed from tl1e decree, su�h an obJection should be p�nn1tt ed. It n1 ay also be noted t11at Art. 340(3) provides tl1 at a copy .of .the obJection shall be served on ''the party who may be affected by such _obJ_ect1on." It does not say ''on tl1 e appe]lant," \\'l1icl1 wot1ld imply tl1at a cross-obJect1 on may be filed agai I1st another party to tl1e appeal, i.e., a co-respondent. Wl1ere tl1e responde11t has f11ed a cross-appeal, however, he may not, in addition, file cross-objections. 1-Ie will be limited to the grot1nds of attack raised in tl1e cross-appeat. 10-i In effect, cross-objections are _ a st1bstitt1t�. for a cross-appeal - as we ba,,e said, the only distinction refers to tl1e t1111e at which eac11 method of attack is en11)loyed - and a res1Jo11dent wl10 J1as filed a cross-appeal has no need. to raise cross-objections. By tl1e same tol<en, if the responde11t has filed an appeaJ, the appella11t cano.ot ra.ise additional grot1nds by the device of filing cross-objections to tl1e respoI1dent's cross-appeal. Tl1e opport11nity o:f raising cross-objections is given only to tl1e respondent wl10 11a.s not filed aI1 appeal, a11d the appellant must raise all grot1nds of attack it1 l1is ow11 appeal. Tl1t1s, wl1ere tl1e appellant l1as appealed and tl1e respondent l1as cross-appealed, tl1ere can be no cross-objections. We mt1st distingt1isl1 cross-objections to the decree fron1 attacks on some of the grot1nds of decision. Suppose tl1at in a st1it by A against B to recover da.mages for breacl1 of contract, B defe11ds 011 the grou11d that tl1e parties did not enter into a valid contract, and alternatively, contends that perfor 1 11ance ,vas prevented by force majeure. Tl1e cot1rt finds tl1at tl1ere was a valid contract, but also finds tl1at p�rforn1a11ce \vas prevented by force majeure. It enters a jt1dgment and decree in favor of B, from \Vl1icl1 A clppeals. On appeal B 111ay, in add.itio11 to supporting the cot1rt's decision 0 11 tl1e issL1e of force majet1re, attack its decision on the issue of tl1e existence of tl1e contract . It is not 11ecessary tl1at he file a cross-objection !o do. so. ics _A cross-objection refers to an objectio11 to tl1e (!ecree, and B obviously IS satisfied w1tl1. tl1e decree. I-lo\vever, the appellate court 111ay cor1.firm the decree on a grotind different from tl1at on whicl1 tl1e decision of the st1bo.rdi.nate court - 106 lf tl1e appe)late court co11�ltides \\1as ?ased in. t o e11ter tl1at tl1e 11ot djd parties . a. val1?. co11tract, I t . n1ay tl1en confir1n _ tl1e decree in favor of B irrespecti,,e of its d1_spos1t1on of tl1e . 1sst1e of torce n1ajet1re. Tl1erefore, B nla.)' argue tl1at the 'sub. 0.1 d111ate _ �ourt decided the But 1sst1e of ly. t11e exist inco e 11 rrect ce of a cont ract . since l1e 1s not attack�1 1g tl1e decree rendered by the subordiilate cotirt, he may make .that argt1n1ent ,:v1tl1 out fili 11g a cross-objection . It is i1 1portant to remember tl1 �t tl1e filing of a cross-objection is merely the . : d v1ce by \\,h1c l1 a respondent who did 110t file a. cross-appeal nlay attack tl1e decree . a ;ter tl 1e u11su�cessft1l pa1:ty has taken l1is appeal. 0 11 ce cross-objections have bee n fi led, tl1e practical effect 1s the san1e , 1·r } 1e I1ad. take11 a cross-appeal. as . Ad (d) ditional parties In Cliapter IV we considered the power of itl 1e tri al co ur t to bring i11 add tional parties. Tl1e appel.late cot1rt h as tI1e sa1ne kind of po\ver with resp ect t0 104. Se e Sttrjab Si,ngl1 v. Ram Si 11gh (1-I.igh Ct ·, pesl . r' 1936) ' 1936 All-India Rep., P· 2 14· · :iewa. · 105. See. the ct·iscussiou o f tl1is p oint in . D . Mu.JIa., si,p,a, . 11ote 103 at p. 1205. _ 106. See C1v. Pro. c., .. , d .tl1e . A rt. 342, an discussion, infra.
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persons· who were I?arties to tl1 e original suit bt1t wl10 were not made parties to the appeal.,, 'Yhe re It _ concludes that Sllch a person is ''interested in tli e result of the appeal, 1t . may direct that he be made a respondent.107 The question of wllo is ''i�terested In the resl1lt of tl1e . appeal'' . within the meaning of this · rule will xts , as . the follow�ng examples i11dicate. The Code gives � arise 1n a n�mber of cont _ _no f1rrtl1er �u1��nce, bt1t _ 1t 1s sub1rutted that ''interested in the reslilt of the appeal'' shot1ld ·ord.1nar1ly be Interpreted to mean a person whose interests will be affected by the decision on the appeal. _ If . suit were bro11ght against A and B as joint owners of property, and tl1e pla1ntrff appealed only against A, the co11rt sho11Id bring B in as a responcle11t; l1e is a11 indispensable party, and in his abse11ce the ·appea l cannot proceed. Thus� in a · partitio11 suit, the legal representative of a de ceased respondent as to wl10111 tl1e s11it l1ad abated, was bro11ght in under s11ch a r11le; the estate would be interested in tl1e res 11lt of the appeal, since tl1e appeal wo11ld affect property that wo11ld form part of tl1.e estate.1os •
Now suppose that the plaintiff s11ed A a11d B as joint obligors. J11dgn1 eot was for A and B, a11d tl1 e plaintiff only appeals against A. The question is wl1ether B can sl1bseq11e11tly be made a party to the suit on the ground that he is i11 terested in the · resttlt, since if tl1e j11dgment is reversed and A is con1pelled to pay tl1 e entire amo11nt, he will be entitled to claim contrib11tion against B. 109 B11t, inas much as tl1e j11dgn1ent in tl1 e subordi11ate court \Vas i n favor of B, he could contend that be wo11ld not be lia'ble to make co11trib11tion to A, since he was found not to be liable to tl1e obligor. And, if he is not 111ade a party to tl1 e ap_peal, l1e cannot be held liable to· the plai.ntiff, and tl1 e most l1e ,vould be liable f. or is <;ontribt1tion to A. The ql1estion is really w11etl1er a party w]10 was 11 ot originally 01 ade a respondent sho11ld be n1ade a respondent subseqt1e11 tly at tl1e i11stance of the appellant or tl1e named. res,pondent. At least wl1 ere tl1e time for appeal l1as not expired, it ca11not be said tl1at B l1 as a right n.ot to be n1ade a party to the appeal, and since the decision co11ld affect his liability to tl1e co-res1Jondent, tl1e court should be able to add hi.n1 as a party. A different questio11 is pres�nted wl1ere tl1e time for aJJpeal l1 as expireci. It 11�1s been .h.eld in India tl1at where the tin1e for appeal l1as expired, a successful litigant is no longer interested in the res11lt of tl1e appeal and. can11ot be made a resJJon. dent. 110 B11t if l1is ·rights wo11ld be affected by tl1 e j11dgment, e.g., he n1igl1 t �e liable to make contribution to the named respondent, l1e is eq11ally i11terested despite the running of the time IJeriod. I t,l1i11k tl1e point is that after tl1 e period l1as r11n, he should be entitled to avoid ft1rther proceedings and tl1 e risl< of a j11dgment's being entered against him. Therefore, t1nJess he �s a11 indispensa?le party,. the court should not add l1 im as a respondent after that t1111e. The sa1ne 1s trt1e with res,pect to a party as to whom an a.ppeal J1as been taken, b11t whicl1 l1 as abatecl. 111 The provision. authorizing the addition of a party, as a respondent sho11ld not be 11sed 107. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 40(5). 108. See Allabhai v. BhUia (,High Ct., Bombay, 1936): 1937 All-lr1dia Rep., P· 401. · 109. See Civ. C., Art. 1971(a). . _ llO. See Chokalingam v. Seetl1ai (Privy Cotmcil, Ind!a, _1927), 1927 All-India Rep., P· _2,_2, � oldtn� that a defendant agai 11st wliom the suit wa s d1sn11ssed and 110 appeal taken w1tl1'.n the per (I1igl1 Ct., Andl1ra; :,radesh, 1958), 1958 iod, could not be added; PalacJ1eral v. Mallipuqi _ e for appeal J1as expired, a deci:ee h� l�er t1n1 All-/nc/ia Rep., p. 743, 11olding that wI1ere tf1 e . . A con ary v1e w was taken 1n G1r1sb who was· not made a respondeilt cannot be added. � ,;· · : · ·Cb�nder v. · Sasi SekJ1areswar (tligh Ct., Calcutta, 1906), lncl,a11 L. Rep., vol 33, p. 329· See generally the discussion i11 :o. Molla., supra, note 103 at P· 1203. 111. See Kali Dayal v. Nagendra (Higt1 Ct., Calcutta, 1919), Calcutta fJ1eekly Notes, vol. 24, p. 44.
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an eal ap ng d fili an for e ti1n abatement. the to � ng ati rel es rul the t to circumven l against a party to the ea p _ ap of ht rig is l1 d ise erc ex t no s ha nt lla pe Where tlle ap _ ld t ou no sh he ve , ha ate ab a second ht rig t tl1a let s . ha or e tim in original suit chance to bring him in, so to speak. Moreover, it must be stressed tl1at a party can . b� added only if he is said to be interested in tl1e result of the appeal. If the pla1nt1 ff l1as fl!ed_ separate claims agai11st A and B, judgn1ent is in favor of A and. B, and tl1e pla1ntiff only appeals _ against A, B cannot be added as a respondent. The appeal 1s from the decree, and a party n1ay not take a further . appeal f�o?l tl1e same decree . for th.e purpose of ad.ding a party lie did not name 1n tl1e original appeal. There 1s . no procedure by whicl1 tl1e court is autb.orized simply to add another party. It IS only where such a party is interested in the res�lt of the appeal, as we _hav_e defined this, or tl1e appellate court wisl1es to add l11n1 for the pt1rpos� of 1 ssu11;1g a decree that _ _ sl1ould have been isst1ed by the subordinate co11rt, which we will discuss subse quently, that lie n1ay be brot1gl1t into tl1e appeal.
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(e) Stay of execution The fact that an appeal l1as been talcen does 1·1ot OJJerate to stay tl1e proceed ings or to prevent execution of tl1e decree. Exec11tion can be stayed only upon a showing tl1at st1bstantial loss \Vill result jf the stay is not granted and the appellant's ftirnjshing security for tl1e perfor1nance of tl1e decree. 113 A stay of execution m.ay be ordered by the appellate co11rt114 or by tl1e court which rendered the decree if an application is n1ade to tl1a,t cot1rt before the expiration of the time allowed for appeal.115 Si11ce both the appellate court a11d the subordinate court are authori zed to grant stays, it see111s i1nplicit that the subordinate court shot1ld onJy order a stay if a11 appeal l1a.s not been talcen; once an appeal has been ta.ken, any token, before an stay sl1ould be granted by tl1e appellate cotirt. 116 By tl1e same , a1Jpeal l1as been talce11, tl1e case is not within tl1e jt1risdiction of the appellate cot1rt, and it should not order a, stay, even if the unst1ccessft1l party assures the court tl1at he I)lans to talce an appeal.117 Moreover, tl1e r11les authorize only the granting of a stay of execution, and do not at1tl1orize tl1e setting asid.e of an execution tl1at l1as already taken place. It follows that after tl1e decree l1as been exect1ted, an application for a sta.y of exec11tion cannot be entertained.118 Where the case . is before the aJJpellate court, the president may grant a ten1porary stay for a period not to exceed 15 days, as may tl1e president of tl1e cot1rt \vllich passed the decree if an appeal l1as_ not yet been taken.119 B11t if the appeal is not deci�ed or a furtl1er stay order issued before tl1e exJJiration of tl1at time, the exect1t1on officer n1ust execute tl1e decree at tl1e end of tl1e period.120
'The court or presiding judge n1ay 011ly iss11e a stay if satisfied that (1) sub stantial loss . ma1 result to tl1e party applying for tlie stay unless the order is made, (2) tl1e application l1as been made witl1011t u11reasonable delay, and (3) money has 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 332. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 335(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 332. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 333. e � :: � discussion of this p�int in D . Mulla, supra, note 103 at p. 1188: ursl1otam v. Hargu (High Ct., Allahabad, 1920)' 1921 All-India Rer' n. p. 342. See Dharam s·ingh v. K ishen Singh , I 12 • vo Re (H p., igl1 Ct. , L. Ca lcu Ca tta lcu , 1883), tta p. 532. 119. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 334. 120. Ibid.
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been deposited, se curity given or a s11rety p _roduce d by tl1e applicant, guaranteeing due . perforn1anc e of the decre e a s . m�y 11lt1n1ately be binding tipon hin1.121 Tlie parties must be hea:d on the appl1cat1on, altl1011gl1 tl1e co11rt ma y, on application supporte d by affida vit, m a ke an ex parte order of stay p e nding the J1 eari11g of tI1 e applic ation.122 There must be strict con1pliance witl1 tl1 e conditi ons for gra11ti11g a stay. The applicant 111t1 st n1 ake tl1e a pplicati on as soon as I 1e is aware tl1at tl1e otl1er party is attempting to o btain exec11ti o 11 . As t o gt1a ra nteei11g tl1e performance of tlie decree tl1e �pplicant may . 11se any of tl1e above 111etl1ods - depositing 1noney, giving of sect1r1 ty, or procl11c1ng a s11rety - bt1t tl1e cot1rt n1ust be satisfied that the method en1ployed will guarantee perfor1nance. TJ1e more diflic11Jt qt1estion is when substantial loss will re s11 It to the party a pplying for tl1e sta y. If tl1e clecree is exect1ted and it is st1bseq11ently re ,,e rsed, tl1e party obtai11ing exec11tion will ]1ave to 111ake restitu tion.123 Tl1erefore , tl1e appe)Jaot will not ordi11arily stiffer substantial loss as a res11lt o f the exec utio11. For exa111ple, if tl1e re sponde11t exec11tes on a bank accot1 nt or the crop_ owned by tl1e a ppella11t, a11d the decree is reversed on appeal, he will be reqt1ired to rett1 r11 tl1e n1oney in tl1e a ccount or to pay the valtie of tl1e crop. The san1e \\1ould be true with r espect to sl1ares in a private limited con1pany, since the responden t could be req11ired to rett1r11 tl1e valt1e of tl1e sl1ares. On tl1e otl1er l1and, if tl1e responde11t ,vere to exect1te on tl 1e dwelli.ng l1ouse or land of the appella11t, substa11tial loss could result, sir1ce the appella11t 'vvould m eanwliile l 1ave to find an.other place to live or wo11lcl be t1nable to work l1is land. It has been l1eld. tl1at in cases relatir1g to i111 r11ovable property, tl1 e disturba11ce of the possessio11 o f tl 1e appella11t necessarily will res11lt in st1bstantial loss, and a stay is ordere d. 124 Tl1is sl1011Id be so in Ethiopia, i11 ligl1t of the attacl1me11t tl1at an individ11al f eels to l1is land. Son1 etin1es tl1e 11se tl1e aJ)JJlic,:int malces o. f the property n1ay deterniin e whether substantial loss will rest1lt. If tl1e applicant l1as an automobile th at lie uses for his business, st1l1stc111tial .loss \Vill rest1lt if l 1e is de prived of the vehicle . B11t if l1 e only 11ses tl1e at1t o mobile for personal travel, it does not ha ve ec o1101 nic utility, and l1e will not s11ffer substantial loss if de1Jrived of tl1e vehicle. Eacl1 case m11st be co11sidered se1Jarately, bt1t tl1e a1Jplica11t l1as tl1e burden of demo11strating to tl1e c ourt tl1at I1e will stiffer substantial loss if execu tion is pern1 jtted. A stay is 11ot to be gra11t e d as of cot1rse. ivioreover, \Vl1ere an appeal is p ending and an order for e xec11ti o 11 l1as been iss11ed, tl1e a1Jpellate cot1rt may, for s1rfficie11t ca11se, reqt1 ire tl1e responde11t to post security for tl1e restitt1ti o 11 of the property wl1ich 1 11 ay be ta ken in e xecution or for tl1 e pay111ent _of . tl1e valt1e of tl1e property. 125 If tl1e assets o f. the responde 11t are not s11cl1 tha.t 1t is clear he _ can make restitt1tion or rett1rn tl1e 1none y, such an order sl1011ld be issued. An applica nt whose applica tion for a stay l1a s bee11 denie d 111ay still ap1Jly for an order reqt1iring the respondent to post se curity. 126 It l1 as al�o been h eld tl1at where the respondent posts s ec1irity for restituti o11 or repayment 1n tl1e event the de cree is reversed the re is n o t s11bstantial ca11se j11stifying a stay of e xec11tion. 127 I-Iow ever, wher� 11njque p r operty such a s l and is involved, th � posti11g of se curity by tl1e respondent sl1011lcl not be strfficient to prevent tl1e granting of a stay. Apart from
121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 335(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 335(2). See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 349 and the discussion, infra. See Fateh v . DaiJn (Higl1 Ct., Lahore, 1926), 1927 All-J11clia Rep., p. 169. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 336. See the discussion of tl1is point in D. Mulla, supra, note 103 at P· 1192, 241. See Dhanjibhoy v. Lisboa (I-Iigh Ct., Bo111 bay, 1889), Jnclian L. Rep., vol. 13, p.
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tl1 at, as long as tl1e cotirt is sat�sfied that . the respondent will be able to make restitutioi1 and 11e }1 ,1s posted secur1ty, t11ere 1s no reason to order the stay. g of a star: _ granting a n nti gra he to 1es ac1 t pro ap o _ tw are _ In Stlmnlary, there 1n exept1onal cases. The C1v1l Proce dure ly on y sta a g tirJ 11 gra and rse stay as of cou 1 at an appeal has been taken does tl t c f� e Th cl1. roa app ter J;it _ the Code adopts ant demonstrates ell t app l1e ere y wl1 on� 1s 1t and , re� dec 1 tl e of ion ctit � . 11 01 prevent exe t stayed tl1at the appellate no 1s n t1o ct1 exe 1f ult res l wil s Jos al nti sta sub t tha . ee cr de e th of n io t1t ec ex e 1 tl tl1 wi e fer ter in ll wi t t1r co
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4. Grom1ds of Appeal In tl1e memorandt1m of appeal the appellant must set forth his grounds of appeal, tl1e grounds on v1l1 ich l1e obj�cts to the j_ udgment from which the appeal is taken. Tl1ey n1t1st be stated concisely and without argument; where there is 111ore tl1an one ground, eacl1 grot1nd sl1 all be set forth separately and numbered consecutively.12a It is very i111porta1.1t that tl1e appellant state all his objections to tl1 e decree in tI1e 1ne1norandt1m of appeal, since he may not, except with leave of cot1rt, urge or be l1 eard in st1pport of any grot1nd of objection not set forth in tl1e 1ne1nora11dt1m of appeal. 129 Wliile the co11rt may allow an amendment to the rnemorandun1 of appeal, 130 or may per111it the appellant to argue an objection not raised, it is not likely to do so ur1less it is convinced that tl1ere was good cause for 01nitting tl1at grot1nd in tl1e 1ne1norandum; tl1e appellant cannot obtain such per1nission as of rigl1t. 131 TI1 is rt1le is based on the consideration that if appea.ls are to JJroceed i11 a11 orderly man11er, tl1 e appellant mt1st be made to set forth all his objections in tl1e 1nen1 orandt1111 of appeal. If he does not do so, he n1ay be precluded fron1 raisi11 g tl1 e objection s11bsec1uently. For these purposes, it does not n1atter tl1at tl1 e objection was n1ade i11 tl1 e cot1rt below; to be raised on appeal, it m11st be made in the memorandt1m of appeal, which may be said to establish the issues to be detern1 ined on tl1 e appeal. Tl1 t1s, if in tl1e st1bordinate court, the respondent co11tended tl1at the cot1rt incorrectly r11led on the question of liability and also a\varded tl1e plaintiff more dan1 ages tl1 an l1e was entitled to receive, but i11 tl1e n1 en1orandum of ap1)eal only objects on tl1e grot1nd tl1at tl1e court incorrectly rL1led on tl1 e question of liability, l1e can only argue tl1 e question of liability and cannot contend tl1 at tl1e court erred in its award of damages. I-fo\vev er, !l1 e. appellate court, in deciding tl1e appeal, is not confined to the grot1nds of obJect1on �et fortl1 in tl1e n1emorandt1m of appeal or argued by leave of cot1rt. It may decide tl1e case on any gro11nd. tJ2 Thus, in ot1r exan1 ple, the · court cot1ld vary tl1 e decree on tl1e grot1nd that tl1 e lower court applied ru1 incorr ect 111 east1re of da�ages. Or, st1p1Jose tl1at i11 a st1it on a written contra.ct, tl1e court, . v ? er t�e obJec�1on of tl1 e defe11dant, 1)er1nitted tl1 e plaintiff to introdt1ce oral evidence _ tnco11s1ste_?t w1tl1 tl1e �ern1s of tl1 e written agree111 ent. Tbjs would be in violation of _ Ar�. �00:, of _the C1v1l Cocle. Even if the defendat1t does not file this ground of . .0bJe tion in his men1 orandt11n of aJ)J Jeal, tl1 e appellate cot1rt may reverse the judg � ment �ecause the lower cot1rt per1nitted the ter111 s of a written contract to be con!radicted by oral evidence. Bt1t tl1e respo11dent 111ust l1ave been given tl1e oppo� �r;�tr33 to con_te �t tlle grOlllld . of objectio11 011 w]1 icl1 the COllft is basing its decI. Providii1g he had tl11s opportunity in the st1bordinate court, no problem 128. C �v. Pro. C ., Art. 328(1). 129. C�v. Pro. C., Art. 328(2). 130. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 329(2 ). 131. S�e Bansidllar v. Sita Ra m (Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1891), [11dian L. Rep., vol. 13, p. 381· 132. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 328(3) 133. . Ibid. •
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arises, and since th� appellant l1as no t n1ade any furtl1 er arguinent on appeal, tllere is no need to p e!illt tl1e respon_dent to do so. On tl1e otl1 er I1and, tt1 e stibordinate cour t may have incorrectly �pplied tl1e law, and. no objection may }1 ave bee11 n,ade. The �ppellate � 011rt ma y decide tl1 e case on any _ rule of law it considers applicable, btit 1 t must give tl1e r�spondent the ?PPOrtun1ty to prese 11 t his arguments as to and sl1011 ld give the appellant ! In a reversal, the new rule of la� 'i}� 1 cl1 may rest1l _ _ t_ Th e poI11 t 1s tl1at wl11le tl1e co11rt n1ay decide tile case the same opportu _ n1 y. on any ground It tl1111k� proper, �l1 e _apJ)�llant may 11ot ordinarily present argtiments on a ground that l1 e did not raise 1n h1 s n1en1 ora11dum of appeal. By tl1 e sa111e token, except wl1ere tl1 e court per111 its tl1e introd 11 ction of 11e\v evidence, the appella11 t 111ay 11ot raise any fact wl1ich was not in evidence in the subordin �te co11rt. 135 ''Fact i ? evi �lence'' sl1 ould be constrt 1ed to incl11 de any objec tion or 1ss 11e tl1 at \Vas not raised 1 11 tl1e co11rt below. A 11 objection or issue cannot be raised for tl1 e first tiI11e on appeal, a1 1d an appeal sho11ld be limited to a revie\v of tl1e q11estions decided by tl1e lower co11rt. If a party can raise new objections a 11d issues on appeal, tl1 e appellate court is, to tl1at extent, turned into a co11rt of first instance, a.nd the reason for per1 nitting an appeal - that tl1e decision of tl1e st 1bordinate cot1rt n1ay be reviewed - is lost. Tl1 ere are, then, two aspects to the rule. Tl1 e first is tl1at the appella 1 1t 111ay not raise ne,v iss 11es for tl1e first ti 1 ne on aJ)J)eal. Tl1 e trial is limited to tl1 ose iss11 es fran1ed at tl1 e first l1earing or s11bseq1 1e11tly by ame11 dme1 1t, and the 011ly evidence introd11 ced at trial relates to tl1ose isst1 es. Once tl1 e isst1es are resolved, tl1e decision of tl1 e trial co11rt n1ay be reviewed by tl1 e appellate co 11rt, but it is too late to raise new iss11es witl1 11ew evidence before the appellate court. So, wl1 ere in a stut to recover an agent's commission, the principal defended on tl1 e ground that ther� was not a valid contract of age11cy, l1 e coL1 ld not 011 apJJeal contend that the judgi11ent in favor of the agent sl1011ld be reversed because tl1e co11tract of sale exec11ted by tl1 e agent was not a11thorized by tl1e agency co 11 tract. 136 Tl1ere was no issue as to I1on-confor11 1ity in tl1e trial co11 rt and tl1e issue co1 1ld 11.ot be ra.ised for tl1e first time 0 11 appeal. Also, w]1 ere a party abandons a11 issue at trial a1 1d does not introd11ce evidence to sttpJJOrt l1is side of tL1e isst1 e, l1e cannot revive the issue on appea]. 137 Wl1 ere a party at trial seeks to i 11 troduce evidence on a matter not in iss1 1 e and objection is 1 11ade on grot 1 nds of varia11 ce, l1e sl1011ld seek to amend I1 is pleading to include tl1e allegations tl1at are _tl1 e b� sis of tl1e. isst1e, and as we l1ave said, s1 1 ch an a111 end111 ent sl1011 ld be per111 1 tted; 1 f tl1 e 1not1on to amend was erroneously denied, the appellate court can pern1 it the amendment a11d hear the evidence on tl1 at iss11e. B11t, otl1 erwise, wl1ere an iss11e is not raisecl in the court below, it cannot be raised for the first time 0 11 appeal. The same is tn1 e with respect to objections. We saw that certain objections are waived if not raised prior to trial, i.e., at the first l�ear_ ing, 138 and, of co11rse, they cannot be raised on ap_peal. Moreover, where no obJect1on :was t,1ke11 to pro cedural errors committed at the trial, s1 1 ch errors ca11not be assigned as a gro11nd . 1 of appeal. J9 So too, as regards objections to the introd11 ction of evidence. If tl1e 134. See Ram v. Vengan1a (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1937), 1938 r1ll-lndia Rep., p. 357. 135. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 329(1). . . 136.
137.
138. 139.
.1 e11 est h1v ort 8), 194 S., U. "! ta, . See Lohman v. Edgewater J-Iolding Co. (Sup. Ct., Minneso . edure oc Pr v1l C1 on ses Ca , vin Le L. d an n ur bo ad Ch J. · voI . 33 , p. 842, ill Rep., 2 nd serzes, (1961), p. 897. p., p. 58. Re ia nd l-I Al 54 19 ), 53 19 , an tl1 (Ijas Ra g ., Ct 1 t See Sukhalal v. Deepcband Ii See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 244(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 211 (1).
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opponent does 11ot object to the introdt1ction of evi_dence at the tim� it is sought to be introduced, lie cannot contend that the subordinate . court comnutted error in considerino tl1e evidence. 140 Again, tl1e appellate co11rt 1s not bound to consider tl1at evide�ce in arriving at its decisio11, b11t tl1e judginent is not objectionable on tl1e grot1 11d that the st1 bordinate cot1rt considered sucl1 evidence. The point is that tl1e review on appeal is to be restricted t? tl1e questions tl1a_t have been decided _ in tl1e subordinate cot1rt; it is tl1 e dec1s1on of the st1bord 1 nate court on those questions tl1at is being reviewed 01 1 aJJpeal. Wl1ere is?t1es l�ave been resolved against a JJarty or l1is objectio 1 1s have been overrt1led, l1e 1s e 1 1t1t! ed to �ave those issues a 1 1d objectio1 1s reco11sidered on appeal. BL1t I1e cannot obtain a review of the entire case, tryi 1 1g to fi11 d new reasons \Vil)' tl1e jt1dgn1e11t should not l1ave been for llis opponent. He 111ay only obtain review of tl1e isst1es tl1at were resol\1ed against him a11d of J1is objections tl1at were overrL1led by the st1bordinate co1 1rt.
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Tl1ere are cert,1in exceptio1 1s to tl1e general rt1le. The clearest is the objection tl1at tJ1e court lacl<.ed 111 aterial jurisdiction. As \Ve l1ave repeatedly pointed out, the lack of 111aterial jt1risdiction, ,vl1icl1 goes to tl1e power of tl1e court to proceed at all, 1 11ay 1 1ever be waived, a11d it is specificall)' JJrovided tl1at tl1is objectio11 n1ay be rajsed 011 a1)peal, eve11 tl1011gl1 it \Vas 11ot raised i11 the cot1rt below. 141 The same reaso11i 1 1g is a1)plicable to tl1e failt1re to joi11 a 1 1 indispensable party; since the absence of sucl1 a party affects tl1e J)O\ver of tl1e cot1rt to l1ear the case, tl1e objection 111ay be tal(e11 at a 11y ti111e. 1�2 It is also s::1id tl1at the defe11dant can a1ways contend that the plai11tiff l1as failed to establish a11 essential elen1ent of l1is cat1 se of action or tl1at the co1 1tract 011 ,vl1icl1 tl1e plai11tiff sties is illegal or against p11blic policy. 143 In otl1er ,vords, eve11 tl1ougl1 tl1e defe 1 1dant did 11ot, a. t tl1e end of tl1e plaintiff's case, co11te11cl tl1at tl1e plai11tiff l1ad. failed to est,1blisl1 a cat1se of actio11, or, in l1is state111er1t of defe 1 1ce, did 11ot allege tl1 at tl1e co11tract was t1nenforceable as illegal or as against pt1blic policy, l1e ca1 1 raise tl1e argtiment or iss11e for the first tin1e on aJJpeal. So too, it is said tl1at tl1e plaintiff can contend tl1at tl1e defendant l1as failed to establisl1 tl1e existence of an affirn1ative defence tl1at be has set up. 144 It is submitted that tl1ese exceptions sl1ot1ld be recognized in Etl1iopia. Tl1e �J)pellate court sl1 ould 11ot per111it a jt1dgme11t to be entered for a pai·ty ,vl1ere it 1s clear fro111 tl1e record tl1at I1e J1as not made 011t l1is case or defence altl1ougl1 no specific objection \Vas tal(e11 on tl1at ground. Tl1is cloes 11ot involve a 11e,:v issue, but rner�ly tl1e q11estion of ,vl1ether a party l1as st1stained l1is b11 rde11 of prodt1ctio n on tl1e 1ssL1es tl1at were tried. WI1ere tl1e evidence 011 the record is not strfficient to st1stain the fi 1 1ding_ of tl1 e existence of a ca11se of action or defence, tl1e appellate cotirt _cannot pern11t tl1e jt1dg 1 11 e11t to st,111d, ,111d tl1e op1Jo11ent sl1ot1ld be per mitte d to raise tl1a� arg�n1e11t 01 1 � l)JJeal. As to tl1 e 11neoforceability of a contract on gro11nds of 1Jlegal1ty or p11bl1c policy, tl1is is tl1e ki 11 d of defe 1 1ce that tl1e court shotild not permit to be waived. I-Jere tl1e pt1blic i 11 terest is involved, perhaps 111ore 140. S �e the discussion of this IJOi11t in Cl1apter VIII, supra, 11ote 102 ru1d. accon1panying text.
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141. Civ. P_ro. C., Art. 2! 1(1). See al�o �i�. P _ r_o. Art. 9(2), tJrovidi11g that v.1} 1�never d!he court is aw�re that it lacks material Jur1sd1ct1on 1t must strike out tl1e suit notwithstan ing ' · · ' tl1a t an · 11 on t·I11s · 0b�ect to ground ,vas 11ot t alcen. 'fl1is ruJe is of universal appllcat1·on. Se:, e.g., R�ayya v. �ubbarayudtt (Higl1 Ct., Mad1·as, 1890), Jndia,1 L. Rep., ,, oI . 13, P· z:,, au<l Native Authority of Alcpabuyo v. Effion Enan (l-Jigl1 Ct ·, Nigeria' 1926)' Nigeria L. R ep., vol. 7, p. 92. 142. �e C _ ui1.ningban1 '!· Bre_wer, discussed in ChaJJter IV, Gbula.m and 141 , 11ote at s11pr a, ':1 dtr v. �ust Ki n (High Ct., Allahabad, 1896), ll1clian L. Rep vol p. 10 9. ., . � 18, � . cuss 1on 143. S the dis 111 Lol1ma11 v. Edge,vater Ho lding Co,, supra, note 136. ::/ 144. 1 .
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defendant. the of The defence· should be allowed to be raised interest the than so on appeal, and an isst1e on that point will be framed.1-is It has also �een held that a party may °:1ake a new legal a.rgtiment on �ppeal, even though this argllJ?ent was 11ot 1nade 1n the court below. This refers to a legal argt1ment on an issue tl1at was .decided there. For exan1ple, where tl1e case involved a doct1n1ent, a p,trt r was pern11tted to argt1e tl1at certain legal consequences followed fron1 ·�he constrl1ct1on pllt upon the doct1ment, altl1ougl1 lie did not make 146 It does . not seem objectionable to permit the beloW. court the 1n argt1n1ent th�� raising of ne� . leg·al argun1ents on . appeal, since, as we have said, the appellate court can dec1cle . tl1e case on tl1e. �as1s ?f any 1�t1le of law it considers applicable.t47 It can11 �t �e said tl1at t!1� case ts be.1 ng retr.1ed, _becat1se differe11 t legal argt1n1 ents , to. susta1n. ,t .party s pos1�1011 on an 1ssl1e are rrused on appeal. What cannot be raised ord1nar1Iy· a.re ne,v issues and new objectio11s to tl1 e action of the subordinate court. Apart fron1 tl1e exceptions noted, the grot1nds for appeal are to be limited to those isst1es resolved by tl1e subordi11ate cot1rt and the objections ra.ised at tl1e trial.
5. Procedure on Appeal (a) Hearing of parties As we have seen, tl1e memorandt11n of appeal is filed in tl1e appellate cot1rt, and it ser,,es as tl1e pleading tl1at originates the appellate proceedings. 148 Asst11ning that the appella11t bases 11.is appeal entirely on tl1e n1emorandt1m of appeal and for per1nissio11 to call additio11 al evidence, tl1e appellate court n1,ty does not apply . decide the case solely on the basis of tl1e grot1nds set forth in tl1 e men1orandum. of appeal. It fixes a day fo.r hearing the appellant or bis ple,1der, and follovviog tl1 e hearing, it may disrniss the appeal 111itl1oi1t calli11g on tl1e responclerit to appear, if it agrees ,vith the jt1dgn1ent of tl1 e st1bordinate cotirt. 149 This procedure is analogous to disn1issing a staten1ent of clain1 f. or f,tilt1re to state a cal1se of action. \V]1ere the appellate co11rt believes tl1at tl1e appeal is grot1ndless there is no reason to proceed further, and the cottrt is at1tborized to disn1 iss the aJ)peal. 150 If the appellant sets fortl1 n1ore tl1,111 one grou11d of appeal, and the court finds that so1ne grot1nds are n1eritoriol1s and other grot1ncls are 11ot, t11ere is the q11estion whether tl1e appellate cot1rt can dis111iss the ap�eal in J? a.rt, tl1at is,. as to the grounds it finds are witl1out 111erit. In India, there rs a split � f autl1or1�y . 011 tllis point. It has bee11 l1eld tl1at ,vhere tl1e appeal is s� verable, 1n that_ ?1st1nct grounds of objection l1ave been set forth, or tl1e aJ)peal 1s. f!om tl1 e dec1s1on on different issues, the appeal may be dism.issed as to the d1st1nct � rot1nd tl1 a_t tl1e court finds is non-1neritoriot1s or as to the iss11e tl1at tl1 e col1rt believes was r1gl1tly decided ; 1 5' however soine cottrts have taken tl1e position tl1at tl1e appellate cot1rt 1nust eitl1er djsnliss tl1e appeal or hear it in its entirety. 152 It seems to me tl1 at 145.
146. 147. 148.
149.
150. 151. 152.
As to tl1e po\ver of the appellate court to frame additional issues, see Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 342, 343. See Keshavlal v. Lalbhai (Sup. Ct., Ii1clia, 1958), 1958 All-/11dia Rep., p. 512. See Ram v. Vengana, supra, note 134. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 80(1). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 337. · · isct1ss1on o f d e tl1 e Se . on i11i op · at1 are ep pr . t o b e ld wou When doing so, the better practice this point. in D. Mulla, supra, note 103 at. pp. l 197 - 1198. . Rep., p. 207. ia nd l-I Al , . 34 19 ) , 33 19 y ba m Bo t See Kr.I C· , igh · 1s1naJ1 v. Mad usa (H . . 3. 48 p. p., Re dia l-In Al 0 194 0), 194 s, dra 1-'[a ., See Eswaria h v. Rameswarayya. (rligb Ct
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rt e of pa th a l �hat it an pe ar ap l1e to d re ui Y_ re be t no ld ou sl1 9 t tl1e appellate cour t ec to sp re th b ?th diffe rent wi u tr be d ul wo is Th � . us rio ito er m be does not believe to e th y rd1 ?ate court. b bo d su de ci de re we at tl1 s 11e iss nt re e ff di d _ an _ grounds of appeal tiously as di pe e bl ex ssi as po ted , uc nd co and if _ be 1ld ot sh al pe ap . on s ng di ee The proc 1 � that tl1 e Judgment appealed t11 ra 1st o1 1n de of en rd bu e 1 tl as 1 1 tlle appellant, who on as re to call upon the no 1s e er tl1 , en rd bu at th fy tis sa to ils fa , tis eo . on from is err n1 t1ch of . th� app t so 1n ad . Iy _ ea] as on ld ou sl1 t ur co e th _ � re, fo ere Th respondent. e. If 1t 1s �lea! that cre de the of n t1o r1a va or al ers _ rev a tify jus to bly appears possi d un r gro f ula tic par . a objection is t tha or tly rec cor � d ide dec s wa 1es iss1 one of the t t to tha pec issue or objec res th wi l pea ap 1 e tl ss mi dis uld sl1o it , nce without substa tion and proceed to l1 ear tl1e balance of tl1e appeal. Wl1ere tl1 e appeal is not entirely disn1issed, tl1 e appellate court is to cause the 111 emorandum of appeal to be served on the respondent, fix a day for the appeal and st1n1111on tl1e respondent to appear, 153 advising him that if he does not appear, the aJJIJeal will, nonetheless, be lieard. 154 The respondent must be allowed sufficient time to preJJare l1is reply a11d to appear and be heard. 155 Note tl1at the pro\1isio11s as to 11on-appearance, disct1ssed in Cl1apter VII, are equally applicable to appeals.
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On tl1e day of tl1e aJJpeal, tl1e appellant is to be heard first, 156 since he has tl1e burden of proof 011 tl1e appeal. If l1 e l1 as not made out a case justifying ft1rther argu111ent, tl1 e court 111ay dismiss tl1e appeal at that time. 157 If the co11rt does not dismiss tl1 e appea.I, the res1)ondent is then l1eard in rebuttal, and the a1)JJellant is entitled. to reply. 158 The court 111 ay, ho\vever, require the respondent to st1bniit a written reply to tl1 e 111en1 orandum of appeal and tl1e appellant to st1b111it a ,vritte11 cou11ter-reply. 159 There are no specific provisions governing the order of proceedi11 g wl1ere a cross-appeal or cross-objection has been filed. In such a case, it is st1b111itted that the court sl1011ld treat tl1 e appeal and cross-appeal or cross-objections separately, eve11 tl1011gl1 this means that tl1e parties will be a .rguing t,vice. Since evider1ce will not ordinarily be introduced, this is not objectionable. A.fter tl1 e appella11t's a1)_peal l1as been l1 eard, tl1e col1rt will hear tl1 e cross-appellant (or_ respo11dent, v.:11 ere only cross-objections l1ave been filed), tl1e cross-responde nt \VIII be l1 eard against tl1 e cross-appeal, and tl1e cross-appellant will reply. (b) Framing of issues . If, \,,hen it is l1earing the ap_peal, tl1e appellate court concludes that the st1b� ordinate c�urt _ has ornitted to fra1ne or try an iss11e or to deter111.i 11 e any questio n of fact wh1cl1 1s necessary for tl1e decision of tl1e suit on the merits tl1e appellate court may fra1:ne tl1ose iss11es and refer tl1e11 1 to tl1e sl1bordjnate c�t1rt, wl1ich is to take the ev1de11ce on tl1ose iss11es. It tl1en subn1its tl1 e evidence and its findings t � the appellate co11rt, and _tl1e_ evidence ancl finclings form part of the record. 1 1io Ei_ther party may file an obJect1on to tl1e :fi11di11 gs, aud after tl1ey l1ave been su� m1tted, the appellate court proceeds to detern1i 11e the appeaJ.161 By employing tb1s 153. 154.
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155. 156. 157. 158.
159. 160. 161.
TI1e notice is to be the sa.n1e as tl1at givet1 to tl1e defend filin g of the the foll a11t ow ing statement of claim. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 79(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 338(1). �iv. Pro. C., Art. 338(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 339(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 339(2). Ibid. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 339(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 343. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 344.
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te court avoids the ne �essity of taking such evidence itseJf. pell ap the re, . � cedu pro Note that th� subordinate cour� does not rev1e � its decision in the case; i t merely e e, makes findings, and subilllts the evidence and finding to the evid e h t s �� take The _ appell�te court �ay accept or reject those findings, and appellate . court. must review them not w1thstand1ng that nei ther party fil es objections.16J This procedure also ena�I es the appellate court to avoid requiring a retrial of the case �ecause of the failt1re of tl1e st1bordinate court to frame or decide a parti�t1lar 1sst1e. Perha.�s that �ot1rt was careless in framing tl1e issties, e.g., tJ1 e pleadings m�y �ave raised an 1ssue, bt1t tl1 e cot1rt did not see i t and tI1e parties did not see 1 t either. Or, althot1gh son1e evidence was introduced o.n an isstie tl1e co11rt did not make a finding. Ratl1er tl1a11 send tl1e case back for retrial o� try it itself, the appellate co11rt n1ay order the subordinate co11rt to take the evidence on that isst1e, an � the11 proceed _to l1ear tl1 e appeal, considering tl1e evidence that _ was taken. In th1s connection, 1 t does not matter that the failt1re to frame or decide the issue was not take11 as a grotrnd of appeal. 164 As we have seen, the appellate court is not limited to the objections set fortl1 in the n1emorandum of appeal; if it believes that tl1e correct decision of the case may depend on another isst1e that existed, but was not frru11ed or resolved, it may consider that isst1e after requiring the trial court to take the evidence on i t. Note, however, t]1at tl1e issue n1ust l1ave been involved i n tl1e case before tb.e s11bordinate cot1rt. Tllis power cannot be used to enable a party to raise 11ew issues on appeal. It is only where the .issue was, in effect, before tl1e s11bordinate court, bt1 t was not fran1ed or de cided there, that the court can be ordered to take evidence on it. Also, if the issue was before the court, bt1t was abandoned by a party, it mt1st be deemed to have been withdrawn, an.d tl1e appellate cour t canno t order a trial of tl1at issue. 165 The power to require th e st1bordinate cot1rt to take tl1e evicle11ce is discretionary, and the appellate court 1nay decide to try the isst1e itself if tlus ca11 be done conveniently. Assuming that substantial evidence mt1st be ta.ken, tl1e sounder procedt1re would be to have the evidence taken by the st1bordi11ate cot1rt.
(c) Additional evidence The mos t diffict1lt question relating to the procedure to be followed on aJJpeal is whetl1er the appellate cour t shot1ld allow additional eviclence to be �roduced. The general rule is that the parties are 1zot permitted to prodt1ce st1ch ev1den� e. 166 All issues mus t be raised at tl1e trial so that t]1 e court can render a fin,11 Jt1dg ment on the merits. By tl1 e sa1ne token, it 1nt1s t l1ave all tl1 e evidence on tl1 �se issues before it so tl1at it can resolve tl1 en1 properly. In order to force tl1e parties to present all their evidence at tl1a t tin1e, they must understand that they may not present additional evidence st1bseqt1ently. If the subordinate . court I�as not l1eard all tl1e evidence, its decision 1nay not conveniently be reviewed; 1 n e!fect, tl1e appellate court wo11ld have to try the issue again in light of the new e�1dence. In view of these considerations, additional evidence ordinarily may not be introduced on appeal. However, there are three si tuations where tl1e introduction of ne� evidence on appeal is authorized: (1) where the subordinate cour t reft1sed to admit evidence l62. See Habib v. Baldeo (High Ct., Allahabad, 1901), J11clian L. Rep., voJ. 23, p. 167· 163- See Kunhi v. Kutti (High Ct., Madras, 1897), J�dia1i L. .lfep., vol. 20, p. 496· Tl1e cour t's conlcusions as to tl1e evidence should be stated 1n the opinion. 1 64- See Chandulal v. La.khmi Chand (Higl1 Ct., Lahore, 1920), 1921 ,4/l-J,idia Rep., p. 256· 165 · See Sukh]al v. Deepchand, supra, note 137. 166 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 345(1).
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that otigllt to have been admitted? (2) where the appellate court req_uires any docu nient to be produced or any witness !o be ex�m�ne� �o enable 1t to . pronounce judgment; (3) wlie�e ther� is ''substantial ca�se, . Just1fy1ng the production of the evidence. t67 We will consider each of tl1ese s1tt1ations separately. e nc de is of evi n tio made at the uc rod int tl1e to n tio jec ob a11 en wh As we saw' t the evid�nce is in tha d�s c�u con it if d an n, tio jec ob the on e rul st n1u trial, tlie cotirt 1 on ma y be assigned as a ect obJ the on ing rt1l e TJ1 it. e lud exc st niu adin.issible it ing on the grotiiid. of appeal. However if tl1e appellate court finds th.at the rul 168 R n . isio dec e _t�e ers . rev y reb ather, it the not objection was erroneous, it 's11ould shot1ld I1ear tl1e evidence and consider wl1etl1er the decision n1ust be reversed in light of tl1e new evidence. . It would seem that th� party in �l1ose fav�r an _ issue was decided could also contend tl1at the court fa1led to consider certain evidenc e I1e produced on tl1e iss11e, since if tl1e opponent is cl1allenging the _court's finding on tl1e iss11e, tl1e party in wl1ose favor the issue \Vas resolved may wish to buttress tl1e fi 1 1ding by producing tl1e excluded evjdeoce. If the appellate cou.rt concludes that a11y evide1 1ce was erro11eously excl11ded, it should ordinarily permit the introduc tion of st1cl1 evidence unless it does not appear to be sigiiliicant. The second sit11atio11- where tl1e a1)pellate court reqt1ires a document to be produced or a ,vitness to be exa 1 nined i11 order to enable it to pronou.nce judgment occ11rs wl1ere, llJJOll an exan1i11atio11 of tl1e record, the COllft is persuaded that the record as it sta11ds is defective. Essential evide11ce is n1issing, as a result of which tl1e appellate co11rt ca1 1 11ot deternune if tl1e iss11es were correctly resolved. 169 For exan1ple, tl1e s11bordinate court failed to talce the evide11ce of an attesting witness, witl1011t wl1icl1 e,1idence tl1e validity of the doc11ment cannot be proved. 170 It is the appellate cot1rt's 11eed to consider tl1e evidence tl1at is significant in this context, not tl1e desire of a party to JJroduce additional evidence, although the need of the co11rt to consider the evide11ce n1ay be pointed 011t by the affected party. 171 The a1Jpellate co11rt must, if at all possible, decide the case witl1 reference only to tl1e evidence tl1at ,vas presented at the trial. The fact that it is difficult to decide on tl1e basis of tl1at evide11ce does not in itself jt1stify tl1e t,1king of additional evidence.172 Nor sho11ld tl1e court ever re-exa111ine a witness 011 tl1e sa111e matters as to wl1ich l1e was exan1i 11ed at tl1e trial, 173 or take new evidence to corroborate evidence disbelieved by the _trial court. 174 It is only where tl1ere is a ''gap' ' in the record, as a res11lt of which the appellate co11rt cannot deter111ine whether the issue was correctly resolved by the st1bordi 11ate co1 1rt, tl1at additional evidence shot1ld be permit ted 1111der tl1is r11le. V:e l1ave _ already given tl1e example of tl1e fail11re to take tb.e testi1nony of a.n attest111g witness. Anotl1er example would be tl1e ·fail11re of tl1e s11bordinate court to 167. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 345(1) (a) (b). 168. See Raja Joyt v. Jadu (High Ct., Calcutta, 1921.), 1921 All-l11d'1a R ep., p. 1?2 _ . 169. see Bank of Bengal v. L11cas (I-Iigl1 Ct., Calct1tta, 1923), 1924 AII-I11d Ren. p. 578. it1 ._,., , 170. Ibid. 171. A:t. 345 (1) (b) _says "the apl?ellate court requires any doc ed or · any prod uc b e to ume nt . enable 1t to pronot1nce j11dgn1en witness to be exa.r!uned to out such ing t." int po 's As to rty a pa need, �ee �arsotim v. Lal1noban (ll rivy Council, India, 193 143. P· ., 1), 1931 AII-Indi.a Rep · 172. See Prithwt v. Oranl1a (High Ct., Patna, 1948) 19 , 49 Al.l-l·d 11 1a · R ep., p. 338 . . 173. s e uhan,mad v. Mahmud- un-Nissa (High vol. 36, Ct. R , All 1t_ aha , bad 191 � Ind , 6), ia11 L. ep. P 19 174. SeeN asi·h m a v. . Hayat (High Ct., Madras, 1940), 1940 All-India e 911 . p. � Rep , Th . �s e involve t queSlion of whether there on duct i was intr o ''sub � stan the tial justi caus fy e'' to of n 1- ence on :lPPeal, bu t el p t1 1 e principle is equally applicable to the nee d o e �� �� . f th a p late u .h ave a witness examined.
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exan1ine an esse�tial doc1 1ment o � w �ich the case is based. For exa1nple, st1it is bro11gl1 t on a written co�t1·act, wl11 ch 1s not prodt1ced at tl1 e trial. No objection is made to the no11-prodt 1 ct101 1 of tl1 e cloct 1111e 1 1t, a 11 d tl1e · case is decided on tl1e basis of tl1e oral testin1ony of the parties. TJ1e apJJellate court can1 1ot know \vl1 etl1er tl1 e issues \Vere correctly deter 1nined, since tl1is 111 igl1 t depend 011 tl1e terms of tl1 e doc11n1ent, and tl1erefore, it 1n �y req11ire tl1e doct1111 e11 t to be prodt1 ced. Or, to take a11otl1er case, wl1 ere all tl1 e ev1de 11 ce is circ11n1 stantial, it 111 ay appear tl1at tl1 ere was a witness who co11Jd l1 ave given direct testirnony, b1 1 t ,vl1 0 was· not called by eitl1 er party or by tl1e court. Ratl1er tl1an review tl1 e decision solely on tl1e basis of tl1e circt1msta11tial eviclence i11 tl1e record, tl1e appellate co1 1rt 111ay decide to call tl1e witness ,vl10 can give direct testin101 1y. These examples i11dicate that it is tl1 e court's need to consider tl1e evide 11 ce tl1at is deter111i 11ative. If tl1 e co11rt desires to cal.I for additio11 al evidence, it is irreleva11t tl1at tl1e evide11ce could l1ave been produced by tl1 e party wl10111 tl1 e co11sideration of the evidence will benefit. 175 However, wl1en sucl1 evide 11 ce is called, tl1 e party ,vJ1 ose case will be a.dversely affected by tl1e new evide11 ce sl1 011ld be given tl1e opportunity to rebut it by 1Jroduci11g furtl1 er evide 1 1ce. 176 Tl1e more difficult q11estio1 1 will involve ,vl1 e11 aclditiooal eviclence may be produced ''for any otl1er s11bsta11 tial c,1t1se." Tl1 is provision ge 11erally l1 as been inter1Jreted els per 1 11itti11g a party \Vl10 failecl to prodt1ce evide11ce at tl1 e trial to produce sucl1 evidence 011 appeal wl1 en l1 e can sl10,v tl1 at tl1ere was ''st 1bsta 1 1tial cause'' for its 11 00-p . roduction earlier.1 77 In deter111 i11i1 1g wl1at co 11 stitt1tes substa11tial cause ,vithin tl1e n1eaning of tl1is rLtle, it is st1b 1nittecl tl1 at refere 11 ce sl1ot1 1cl be 111 ade to Art. 6, ,vl1icb pern1its tl1e i 11 trodt1ctio1 1 of 11 ew evide11ce on certai 11 1 11 atters i 11 order to obtain a re,1iew of tl1 e j11dgme11 t i 11 tl1e co1 1rt of re11 dition. I11 order for evidence to be introd11ced 11nder tl1at article, tl1 e evide 11 ce 1 11 t 1st 11 ot J1ave bee11 witl1in tl1e k .11 ow ledge of tl1e party at the ti111 e of juclg 1 nent, 11or available after tl1e exercise of due diligence, and it n1ust be st1cl1 tl1 at l1 ad it been l< 11 0,v11 at tl.1e ti 1 11e of judgn1 ent, it ,vo11ld l1ave 1naterially affected tl1e st1bsta 11 ce of the decree or order of which review is sot1ght. TI1ese are s11bsta 11 ti,:1lly tl1 e san1e co1 1ditior1 s recognized elsew]1ere as justifying tl1 e i11trod11ction of 11e,v evidence 011 appeal. 178 It J1 as ::1lso bee11 l1 eld that the evidence 1nust be s11cl1 as is J Jresu111 ably to be believec1, th::1t is, it fLP}Jears to be tl1e ki1 1d of evidence tl1at tl1e aJJJJellate cot1rt ,vould believe to be true. 179 Sucl1 a qualification is so1 1 nd, si11ce tl1 e co11rt sl,ould not waste tin,e heari11 g Ll1 e evidence if tl1e nat11re of tl1e evidence is st1cl1 tl1at tl1 e cot1 rt \Vottld not lil<ely believe it anyway. Ass111ning tl1at tl1 is approacl1 will be taken i11 Etl1io1Jia, tl1ere will be substantial cat1se justifyi11 g tl1e prod11ctio11 of additio11 al evide 11 ce only wl1ere the following conditio11s are satisfied: ( I) tl1e evidence sot 1gl1t to be introd t1ced was unk11own at the ti111e of trial or cottld not have been discovered at tl1 at ti1 11e by the exercise of reasonable dilige11ce; (2) tl1e evide11ce is st1 cl1 tl1at, if given, it \Vould probably l1 ave a significant effect 0 11 the decision; (3) the evidence is prest1mably to See Venkata v. V. (I-Iigl1 Ct., Madras, 1946), 1947 All-lncli� Rep., p. 111. See Hriday v. Rajani (High Ct., Calcutta, 1922), 1923 ,;.1/l-lnclia Rep., 300. For an interpretation of tl1e corresponding provi�ion . of the Indian Code as co? ferriog \vide discretion on the court see An1buja v. Appadurat (H1gl1 Ct., Madras, 1912), I11cba11 L. Rep., vol. 38, p. 414. Some courts, hov1ever, l1aye ta.ken the positi� n that "substantial cause'• _ refers only to the need of the court. 111 son1e Ind1at1 states_ the p�ov1s1011 has ?een a111ended to make it clear tf1at a party n1ay introduce sucl1 ev1de�ce 1f he ca11 satisfy th� court th� t _ • there was substantial cause for its non-production at tr1al. See generally the d.1sct1ss1on 1n S. Sarkar, The LaH' of Civil Proceclure (4tl1 ed., 1963), vol. 2, pp. 767-768. 178. See Corbett v. Corbett (House of Lords, Eng., 1953�, 1953 �Vee/(/y L. Rep., vol. p. 1124; Maeima Ismail v. Heirs of Mahmoud Moha1necl Gabll (Ct. A1Jp., Sudan, 1959), 1961 Sudan L. 1., p. 181. 179. See Ladd v. Marshall (Ct. AP . P·, Eng., 1954), 1954 All-Eng. L. Rep., vol 3, p. 745. 175. 176. 177.
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sub�tantial cause for no e s i · er th d, e fi � tis sa t no is 1 1 o iti nd co . y be believed. ,so If an t1on 1nvolv�s the con d1 on st e fir tl1 at tl1 e ot N � . ce en id ev _ e th allowing prodtictio11 o·f . e rs e tl1 he 11l ot e wl lv vo ce in en id ev e tl1 the e t1c od 1tr 1 1 to g in . dtlct of tile party seek . ed t1c od pr be to l1t t1g so is at th ce 11 e id ev e nat11re of tl1
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In view of tl1ese conditior1s, it will be only in exceptio�al circumstances that ne\v evide11ce 1nay be introd11 ced on tl1e gro11n.d of_ st1bstant1al cau�e, and this is as it sliotild be. A party mtist JJresent all of lus . ev1den�e at the trial.. He cannot witl1l1old some evidence for prodt1ctio11 on appeal 1f l1e 1� t1osucc�ssful 10 th� sub ordinate cot1rt. So, \vl1ere a JJarty fails to cross-examine a witness . at trial, he ca11not obtai11 pern1issio11 to exa111ine l1im bef?re the appe�ate cot1rt f. 1t. �urns o·ut tl1at it was the testi1nony of tl1at witness wl11cl1 was crt1c1al to tl1e d1ec1s 1 on of the case. 1 a 1 Or, wl1ere a party did 11ot introdt1ce a doct1ment at trial because he expected l1is oppo11ent to testify and wisl1ed to confro� 1t hi111 with the document, and tl1e oppo11e11t did not testify, tl1e JJarty cannot 1ntrodt1ce the document on appeal. 1 s2 .In tl1ese cases tl1e evidence was clearly available at the time of trial and sl1ot1ld l1ave bee 11 JJresented tl1ere. \Vl1ere tl1e JJarty is aware of tl1e evidence at tl1e ti111e of trial, bt1t tl1e witness \Vho ca.n give tl1e evidence is not present, he n1ust aslc tl1 at tl1e \Vit11ess be su11111101 1ed; l1e ca11 1 1ot peru1it tl1e case to be l1eard a11d tl1eL1 seelc to 1Jroclt 1 ce tl1e testi111ony of the witness before tl1e appellate cotirt. 183 N·or ca11 tl1e failt1re to JJrodt1ce the evidence at trial be jt1stified on the ground of ignora 11 ce of law. 184 As Io11g as tl1e evidence is available to tl1e party at the time of trial, it n1 t1st be JJrodt1ced tl1e11 if at all. It is 01 1ly wl1ere ne\V evidence, which could 1 1ot J1a.ve bee11 cliscovered at tl1e time of trial, apJJears subseqt1ently that it n1ay be J)rodt1ced before tl1e aJJJJellate cotirt. 185 Note also that tl1e evidence must be st1cl1 tl1at it co11ld not l1a.ve bee11 discovered by tl1e exercise of due diligence. A JJarty can11ot be allo,ved to i 1 1trodt1ce on appeal doct11ne1 1tary evidence tl1at was actually i11 l1is possessio11 or could. ]1a,,e been obtained by bi111 on the grot1nd tl1at he did not look for tl1at evidence before tl1e trial. And, a party who did not tl1orot1gl1ly i 1 1vestigate tl1e case and try to interview all possible witnesses cannot � 1 1trodt1ce _ _ the testi111ony of a witness wl1 0 was not produced at trial wl1ere an 1nvest1gat1on Vi1ot1ld l1 ave revealed the existe11ce of tl1at ,vitness. Where tl1e evidence ,vas not produced_ at trial, tl1e JJarty seeking to 1Jrod11ce it 01 1 appeal n1t1st demon strate tl1at tl1e evidence ''was 11navailable after the exercise of dt1e diligence." Seco11dly, tl1e_ �videnc � 111t1st be st1cl1 tl1at it ,vot1ld JJrobably l1ave a. sigiuficant effect_ on tl1e dec1s �on. Evidence tl1at is n1erely cu111t1lative ordi11arily sl1ot1ld not be p�r1rutted t 1 nder _ tl11s rt11e. Sttppose tl1at tl1e aJJJJellant JJresented t,vo witnesses at the trial wl10 testified on a partict1lar JJoi11t, a11d tl1is evicle11ce was 11ot believed by tl1e trial c?11rt. If he has discovered a· tl1ird wit11ess wl1 0 ,vill testify to tl1e san1e effe�t, tliere is no reason �or tl1e aJJpellate cot1rt to ta.ke tl1e testi 1 11011)', si11ce it will merely corroborate evidence tl1at l1as already been disbelieved and wot1ld not sub180. 181. 182. 183.
Tl1ese are tl1e criteria set fortl1 in Ladd v. Mars11 all, ibid. See Azim v. Ali (Cl1ief Ct., Sind, 1943), 1944 All-Indicz Rep., p. 7. 5 See Ran1 Pd. v. Manol1ar (High Ct., Bombay, 1957), 1959 All-I11dia Rep., p. 300. 398 See Isaacs v. �obhouse_ ( King's Beocl1, Eng., 1919), 1919 King's Benc/1 Rep., vol. 1, P· ls Seve!100 "· Witt &_ Btisch (Full Ct., Nigeria, 1912), Nigeria L. Rep., yol: 2, P· 77·· . d i��r: fhe evid�nce sougl1t to be introd woul e pr1nc1 pl uced the was 011 but a new issue, . be e qual· ly applicable wl1ere the eviden rt. cou te appell a ce was on an issue properly before the . 184. See p. Mangtbru· GuJabcl·1 ru1d v. Stiganchand (Privy Council, India, 1948), 1948 All- n i I d a Rep., 177. 185 ·
See. Durga v. Ramrati (Higl1 Ct., Patn
a, 1937), 1937 All-India Rep., p. 584.
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·------� stantially affect the decisi�n. 186 On the otl1er l1ad, if all tl1 e evidence · on wllicl1 the d�cisio11 was ?ased was circumstantial and the evidence sougl1t to be produced _ was direct, the evidence sho11ld be allo\\1e ?, since tl1e direct evidence 1nigl1 t be give11 _ . n1uch more weight thaJ1 tl1e c1rc11 11 1stant1a.l a 1 1d tl1ereby affect the decisio 11 of tlJ e case : In other word�, tl1e �vidence �0L1gl1 t to be introd11ced 1n11st have indeJ)ei1de11t _ signrficance which will be. likely to 1nf111ence tl1e decision of _the case. Tl1e requireme 1 1t that tl1e evidence mttst be s11cl1 as is presumably to be believ ed is demo11strated by tl1e case of Lc,cld v. Marshal1187 The plaintiff Slted to recover a st1 1u of money, wl1icl1 tl1e defe11 da11t denied tl1at I1e I1 ad received. T\vo witnesses for tl1e pl �i11tiff testified tl1at tl1ey saw l1 i111 give tl1e mo11 ey to tb.e defendant; _ the defendant, test1fy111g 011 J 1is o,v11 bel1 alf, de11ied l1avi11 g received tl1e 111011ey. The only otl1 er witness was tl1e defenda11t's wife called by tl1e plai11tiff. She did _ 11 ot want t o testify, bt1t wl1 en con1 1)elled to do so by tl1e cot1rt, testified that sl1e did not ren1e11 1ber whetl1er she saw tl1 e money pass. Tl1e cot1rt was 11ot perst1aded by tl1e testi111 011 y of tl1 e JJlai11tiff's \Vitnesses and gave jt1dgn1ent for tl1e defe 11 da11t. St1bsequently, tl1 e defe11da11t's wife obtained a divorce. When tl1 e case was api)ealed, the plai 11tiff sot1gl1t to l1ave l1er testify to tl1 e effect tl1at sl1 e was not telli11 g tl1e trutl1 wl1en sl1e said tl1at ''sl1 e did .not remen1ber," tl1at sl1e was afraid to testify for fear of the defendant, a11 d tl1at she l1 ad seen tl1e mo11ey pass. The cot1rt ref t1sed to l1ear the evide11ce. It said tl1at tl1 e eviclence was not st1ch as prest1111ably to t-,e believed, since a \vit 1 1ess wI1 0 hacl told a lie at tl1e trial witl1ot1t a11 y a_pJ)arent reaso11 cot1ld not be relied on to tell tl1e trt1tl1 subseq11en.tly. TJ1e cot1rt \Vas 11ot pers11aded tl1 at tl1e witness was ''coerced'' a1 1d co11seq11ently, did 11ot regard tl1e testin1ony witl1 mt1cl1 favor. It poio.ted out tl1at if a ,vit 11 ess l1ad bee11 bribed or coerced i 11 to telling a lie at tl1e trial or l1ad 111 ade a n1istake on a11 i1111Jortant matter, which l1e wisl1ed to correct, tl1e 11ew evide 11 ce sl1011ld be received. B11t tl1is \Va.s si1111Jly a case of a witness wl1 0 wisl1ed to cl1a11ge lier testi1110 1 1y. It was 11 ol demonstrated that tl1 ere was a good reaso1 1 for the \Vit11ess' telling a lie cit tl1e trial or for believi11 g tl1 at tl1 e wit11ess would tell tl1e tr11tl1 11 0w. TJ1 erefore, tl1e evidence - tl1e cl1anged testi111ony of tl1e witness - \Vas 11 ot s11ch as presu111a.bly to be believed a 1 1d cot1ld not be received 011 appeal. T11e same rest1lt sho11ld be reached i11 Etlliopia. Art. 6 does at1tl1orize a review of a jt1dgn1ent on the grot1nd tl1 at tl1e witness com111 itted perjury, a11 d we l1ave said that tl1e criteria of Art. 6 sl1ot1ld be applicable i11 deter111 ining wl1etl1 er tl1 ere is st1bstantial ca11se justifying tl1e prodt1ctio11 of additional evide11ce on appeal. B11t ''perj11ry'', as 11sed in the context of Art. 6, sl1 011ld 11 ot be eqt1ated \Vitl1 a \.vitness cl1anging ltis testin1ony. In order to j11stify tl1 e JJrod11ction of new evidence (or tl1 e granting of review 11nder Art. 6), tl1e co11rt 1n11st be satisfied that deliberate pe1jt1ry was comn1itted by tl1e witness as a result of bribery, coercion or tl1 e like, a11 d t]1at the witness can now be ex1Jected to tell the tr11tl1 . Tl1ere is a danger in permitti11g a witness to change his story after the trial. Tl1e 11nst1c�essfu! party _n1 ight try to bribe or intimidate a witness in an effort to make him c11 ange 11 1s story, a.nd refusing to allow such evidence wo11ld di�co11r� ge that kind �f effort: Wl1 ere tl1 e ne\v evidence is simply that of a witness changing his story, that evidence 1s not prest11nably See Narasiml1a v. Hayat, supra, note 174. The new evidence mi�l1t not be ''merely �un1ula tive" if it consisted of the testimony of a witness wl1ose test!n1ony would be. entitled lo special weight under tl1e circun1stru1ces. Suppose tl1at aU the witnesses ,vho testified at the trial would be expected to be biased in favor of one �r the other party, and the_ n� w ervei_. In evidence sought to be introduced. on appeal was the test1n1onr of a netitral obs ived, such a case the appellate court might conclude that the new evidence ot1gl1t to be rece since it con1es from an ttnbiased source. 187. Supra, note 179. 186.
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on for the change, that as e re tl1 to e nc re fe re by n, ow sh st fir be credible; it 01ust , a changed story is ily ar din Or e. on 1e tr1 e tl1 is ny no ti1 tes e 1 tl tlle new version of d, d ve an lie be be should not be to ly ab 1m es1 pr is at tl1 e nc ide ev of d kin not tile allowed. to 'be introduced on appeal. on cti du of pro new evidence tl1e i11g ow all for 1se ca1 ent fici suf re tlie is Wlien tlien 1 e evidence satisfies the requirements tl en ,vl1 is ion 1at sit1 st are cle � Tli ? eal app _ on can ot iew be rev had en, tak n bee befor e as 1 l l t � e�: aJ)p 1 1 a if , sa\v we As 6. . Art of to ce ks odu see intr ant )ell apJ e 1 evidence tl re whe re, refo The on. diti ren of t r . cou the ons diti con of Art. 6, the the s sfie sati and , ery brib or jury per , ery forg og sl1owi appellate co11rt sl1ould receive the eviden�e. In . otl1 er cases, the cou.rt . should only receive tl1e evidence if tl1e requirements Jtlst d1sct1ssed are clearly satisfied: (I) at tl1 e ti111 e of trial tl1e evidence was 11navailable tl1ro11gh tl1e exercise of due diligence, (2) it \Vo11ld be lil(ely to l1ave a substantial effect on the decision, and (3) it is prest1n1ably credible.
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Tl1e followi11g cases will demo11strate tl1 e sit11 ations wl1ere the introduction of new evide 1 1ce on a1)peal is !)roper. Tl1e case of 111.aei,na Is,nail v. Heirs of A-fa/11noi1d Mo/1a111ecl Cc,bil, 188 i11volved a Sliit against a widow to reco,,er p · roperty allegedly n1 isapprOJ)riatecl by lier l111sba11d. 0 11 appeal, the widow sought to introdt1ce plot files relati 1 1g to tl1 e dis1)osition of land by l1er l1l1sband, wl1ich wo11ld show th.at tl1e property l1acl not been 1 11 isaJ)J)ropria.ted. Tl1e plot files were sitt1ated in the gover11111 ent registry, but l1a.d not been prodt1ced at trial. Tl1 e trial court had reached its decisio11 0 11 tl1e basis of certified COJ)ies of lan.d registry certificates an· d oral testi111011y, and l1 ad 1 1ot itself exa111i11ed tl1 e JJlot files. The appellate court wa.s satisfied tl1at tl1e J)lot files would sho,v tl1at tl1 e testin1ony wa.s false, and thus, tl1e e,1idence ,votdd l1 ave ]1ad a s11bsta11tial effect t1po11 tl1e decision. As to the a,,ailability of tl1e evide11ce, tl1e co11rt observed tl1at evidence was not ''available'' unless it was in tl1e possessio 1 1 of tl1 e party or l1e l1ad reason to believe that it existed son1e,vl1ere. It said tl1 at tl1e defencla11t, an ordinary l1 011sewife, l1ad not l<110\v11 of tl1e l1t1sband's disposition of l1is J)roperty and could. not be expected to l1 ave bee11 a,vare of tl1e JJ! ot files. It stressed tl1 at tl1e ht1sband was the original defendant and died pending Sliit. I-Jere, i t was clear tl1at tl1 e defendant acted in good faith and ,vas not trying to witl1l1old evidence for 11se on appeal. She ,vas brought into tl1e �ase after the trial had started a.11 d \Vas not aware of tl1e h11sband's dispositions of 1 11s pr?pert_Y: Therefore, sl1e co11ld 1 1ot be expected to look for evidence s110,v�ng st1cl1 a cl1�pos1t1011. Note tl1 at if tl1e I111sband l1i11 1self were alive, tl1e non-prodt1ct1on of tl1e evidence ��t1ld not be exct1sed. Bt1t co11sideri 11 g all tl1e circ111nsta11 ces of the case _and tl1 e pos1t1on of tl1e defenda11 t, the co11rt was satisfied tl1at there was s11b sta 1 1t1al Calise for tl1 e �0D-J)rodt1ction of t11e evide11 ce at tl1 e trial and permitted tl1e defendant to produce 1t on a1)J)eal. An even _ clearer c� se is Cc1ltlJ,vel/ v. A1odern. �Voocl11ze11 of America, 189 w�ch . _ involved _a st1 1 t on a life 1ns1 1rance J)Olicy. Tl1 ere was no direct evidence sl1o\VI�g tl a� the 111 �11recl was dead; ·b11t because of l1is 11 11eXJ)lai 11 ed absence for a substantJal _ P � :1 0d of_ t1n 1e, I,e was presun1 ed dead, 190 a11d j11dg111 ent was entered for ·t11 e bene _ iary on tliat �asis. On appeal, tl1 e ins11 ·ance con1 )a11y sought to i11troduce _evidence : 1 ! tlle effect that st1bseq11e 11 t to tl1e Jt1d gment t]1 e insured was seen alive. The cotlrt 11eld tliat tl1 e evidence could be int rod.11�ed. It wo11ld obviot1sly aff ect tl,e 188. Supra, note 178 . 189. (SUJJ. �t., Kat1sa L. s, U.S.,' 1913) Pacific Rep vol 133 d an rn ou db ha C J n 3 · l . , ' p. 84 , L. Le �1n, Cases on Civil Procedt . ;re (1961), p. 928. 190. See C1v., C., Arts. 154 15 , 9.
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·---dec�sion of the c�se, since if . th_e ins11red were alive, tl1ere cotild be no recovery on til e policy. At th� trial, t�e plaintiff, wh o had the burden of proving the death, relied on the. prest1mpt1on o� death dt�e to the unexplai� ed absence, and there was notlling to ind1�ate that the 1ns11red might hav e been alive.· Therefore, the evidence could be received on appeal. It �s in cases_ .of tl1is . nattire that tl1ere is ''s11bstantial cause'' for allowing the prodt1ct1on �f add1tio1:al evidence_ on appeal. B11t, for tl1e niost part, the cotirt sl1011ld be very hesitant to find tl1e ex1ste1 1ce of st1 cl1 cat1se. All the evide11ce mtist ordi narily be presented at the trial, and only in exceptional circumstances sho11ld tl1 e appellate co11rt per111it tl1e introdt1 ctio11 of additional eviclence on appeal. Whenever additional e �idence _is . allowed to be prodt1ced, tl1e appellate cot1rt m11st record th � reason for its ad !11 1ss1on.. 191 If a second appeal is taken, the reason cot1�� be co�s1dered, and tl1e Jt1dg111ent set aside if tl1e i 1 11pro1Jer adn1ission of add1tio1 1al evidence caused the first appellate cotirt to reverse the decree of tl1e trial cot1rt. When s11cl1 evide11ce is to be taken, tl1e ap1Jellate co11rt may take it itself or may direct the trial co11rt or any otl1er subordinate court to take s11cl1 eviden7e and sen_d it to_ tl1e appellate co11rt.192 It 11111st also s_pecify the points as to wl11ch tl1e ev1de1 1ce ts to be co1 1fined and record i1 1 its proceedi 11 gs tl1e points so specified.193 (d) Review of findings of fact A related question concer11s the exte1 1t to wl1ich tl1e appellate cot1rt is bot111d in its decision by tl1e findings of fact 1uade by tl1e co11rt. Asst1111ing tl1at tl1e isst1e is one on wl1ich additional evidence is not taken, tl1e q11estion is whetl1er the appellate court sL1ould accept the findings of fact made by tl1e s11bordinate co11rt on tl1at isstre. In co1111tries sucl1 as tL1e United States or Great Britai11, 111 a11y cases are tried before a j11ry, and if the case is so tried, tL1e f111dings of fact made by the jt1ry are concl11sive. Tl1erefore, tl1e appellate cot1rts are bo1111d by tl1e tindi1 1gs of fact made by the jt1ry at tl1.e trial. They are not bo11nd by fi11dings of fact made by tl1e subordinate cot1rt it' tl1e case is tried vvitl1ot1t the j11ry. So too, in Ethiopia, tl1e appellate co11rt is not bound to accept all findi11gs of fact n1ade by the st1bordinate co11rt, and there are 110 express provisions of tl1e Code dealing witl1 the effect that is to be given to s11cl1 findi11gs. I-Iowever, if tl1e appeal is not to be a retrial of tl1 e case it follows tl1at to so111e exte11t, the appellate co11rt mt1st accept the st1bordi1 1ate �ot1rt's fi11dings of fact. Ordi1 1arily tl1e appellate co11rt will not have heard the witnesses and 1 11t1st base its decision on the record and any documentary evidence. This factor is a cr11cial 0 11 e in deter1 11ining the extent to which the appellate court sl1011 ld be bot1nd by tl1e finclings of fact made by tl1e subordjnate co11rt. Consider this case.194 In a s11it to recover cla1 nages for false representations, the defendant clai 1 ued tl1at he believed tl1e representations he n1ade to be trt1e. If this were so, he would not be liable. The trial cot1rt found tl1at wl1ile tl1e represe11t ations were in fact false, tl1 e defendant believed tl1em to be trt1e, and tbe_refore, entered jt1dg1 uent for 11in1. On appeal, the cot1rt l1eld that tl1e defe11dant d1d not 191. 192. 193. 194_
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 345(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 346(a). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 346(b). Arr. r. J ), 1 . 59 a, 19 ny , Ke cil un Co y riv (P are M de lf Ro v. Baron u110 Carl Sarnuel Akerhieltll L., vol. 3, p. 179 (I 959).
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believe tile representations to be tr1 1 e and reversed _ the deci5.ion in his favor. On a second appeal, tllis \Vas held to be error� and tl1e JUdgme11t of t�e first coui:: was reinstated. The second appellate co11 rt P? lnted 011t that tl1e resol1 1 t1on of the issue_ did tile defendant believe the representations to be t� 11 e - depended on an assessment of llis credibility, tl1 at is, on wl1ether l1 e 'r:'as telling the tr11 th when be _t�stified _ _ that 11e believed tI1em to be tr1 1 e. Tl1e trial J1 1 dge was 1n tl1 e best pos1t1on to deter 1ni11 e tl1 e q1 1 estion of credibility, since it was l1e w� o sa� and heard the wit _ ness testify. Tl1 e ap1 Jellate co11rt would l1ave to base its dec1 s1 0°: on the written record· it co1 1 ld 11ot observe 110\\' the witness appeared. on t11e witness stand and could '11ot eval1 1 ate his sincerity and otl1er i1 1tangible factors tl1at help determine wl1etl1er a witness is telling tl1 e trutl1. An aJJpellate co1 1 rt sho11Jd not substitute its fi 1 1ding on credibility for that of tl1e subordinate co1 1 rt. Tl1�r� �ore, wb� re the deci sion was based on the trial j11dge's opinion as to tl1e cred1b1lity of witnesses, i.e., where tl1ere was co 1 1flicting oral testi11101.1y as to tl1e existe11ce or non-existence of tl1 e poi 1 1t in iss1 1 e, the ap1Jellate co1 1 rt sl1ould be bo11 11d by the findings of the trial j11dge, since it did not see and l1ear the \Vit11esses testify.
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0 11 tl1e otl1er l1a11d, wl1ere tl1 e evide11ce is esse11tially und.isp11ted, or aU the evider1ce co11sists of doc11111ents, tl1e q1 1 estion is wl1at i11 ferences sho1 1 Jd be drawn f ro111 tl1at evidence, a11d tl1e a1)IJellate co1 1rt is i11 as good a position to draw tl1ose i 1 1ferences as tl1e s11bordi11ate co11rt. 111 011e case 195 tl1e iss11e was wl1 etl1 er trusts establisl1ed by a l1L1sba11d and wife were reciprocal in tl1 e se 1 1se that each agreed to establisl1 l1is tr11st in excl1a11ge for tl1e trust establishecl by tl1e other . Tl1e evidence consisted pri1narily of facts tl1at 11eitl1er side clisp11ted; tl111s, no q1 1 estion of credibility \Vas i 1 1volved. Tl1e appellate col1rt fou 1 1d tl1at in arriving at its decision, the sub ordi11 ate co11rt co1 111Jletely ig11 ored certai11 f,1cts and th11 s drew an incorrect inference fro111 all tl1e evide11ce talcen as a wl1ole. Tl1erefore, the decision was reversed. Tl1e approacl1 talcen in tl1ese cases is a s01 1nd 011e for tl1e appellate cou.rts in Etl1iopia to follo\v. Wl1ere tl1 e evide11ce is pri111arily oral, and tl1 e decision depends on tl1e col1rt's resollttion of co11flicti 11 g oral testin10 1 1y, the fi 1 1dings of fact 111ade by the subordi11ate co11rt sl101 1 ld not ordinarily be dist1 1rbed. B l1 t where tl1e findings rest on \vritte 11 evidence or ltndispl1ted ora.1 evidence a11d tl1 e q11estio11 is w.l1 a.t inferences shall be dra vvn . fro 1 11 tl1 e evide 1 1ce, tl1e apJJellate co1 1rt is in as good a position to draw tl1ose inferences a 1 1d sho11ld 11 ot be bo1111d b)' tlJe fi 11dings of tl1e s11bordi 1 1ate court. Tl1 e n1ore diffict1lt case is wl1ere tl1e finding depends 011 botl1 writte11 and oral evidence. Tl1e following guides n1ay be s1 1 ggested. 196 \Vl1ere tl1e evidence SlII)porting tl1e findii1 g (in tl1e opinion, the j11dges sl10111d i11dicate tl1e e,,idence on ,vi1icl1 tl1e findings were based), is prin1arily oral a 11d i 1 1,,olves tl1e resolt1tior1 of co 1 1flictiog oral testi1no11y, tl1e find.ing of the Sl1bordir1ate cot1rt sl1 ould ordinarily be accepted. \,VJ1ere tl1 e issue \-vas decidecl e11tirely on tl1e basis of \vritten evidence, tl1e decision may be �eviewed. fLtlly by tl1e ,lp_pellate co11rt. Where, altho11gl1 there was conilicti11g oral test1n1011y, 1t apJJears that the written evide 1 1ce or u 11dispttted oral evidence was s �ch as clearly �o 01 1 _twe �gl1 tl1e disp11ted oral e,,idence, the appellate court ca1:1 d1_sregarcl tl1e find1ngs in l1gl1t of tl1e ,vritten or t1 ndisptited oral evidence. Tlie point �s tl1at tl1 � appellate �011rt can 11ot retry t11 e case. Where, as happe11s so often, _ ther � !� cor1fl 1 ct1ng o�al test1n:011y, tI1 e finding will depend on an assess1nent of the cred1bil1ty of tl1e w1tn.esses. In s11 ch a case tl1e finding of the s1 1 bordinate �o_urt should be . accepted by tl1e appellate court, si11 ce tl1at court is in the best position to deternune matters of credibility. 195. 196.
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v g1� (Ct. App., U.S:, 2nd Cir., 1950), Federal Rep., 211d Series, vol. 180, P �t . r; 3 , in J· a ou�n and L. Levm, _ Cases o,z Civil Procedure (1961), p. 941. These are the cr_1ter1a set forth in Orvis v. H.iggins, ibicl. is
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•.-ii--6. Judgment on Appeal (a) Reversal for substantial error After the appellate court l1as heard the pa.rties or their pleaders and bas re ferred to such part of the proceedings, e.g., the record, as is considered necessary, it pronounces j udg1:1ent. 197 Tl1e j11d _gme11t may confirm, vary or reverse the decree or order fron1 which t �1e apJ)eal 1s taken. 198 In co11sidering wl1ether the decree should be reversed or varied as a res11lt o:f ai1 error committed by the trial cotirt, it is _ importa �t to determine �hetl1er tl1e error a111011nts to what is called a procedtiral irregt1lar1ty. If tl1 e error 1s s11cl1 as to an1011nt to a rnere ''jrregt1larity," tI1e Code directs the a p. JJellate cot1rt to correct it, but also l)rovides that tl1e decree 111ay 11ot be rev �rse � 011 tl1at gro_trnd. 199 It follo,vs that tl1e decree sl1011Id only be reversed or varied if the subord111ate co11rt co1nmittecl ''s11bstantial error," whicl1 affected its decision. For exa1u_ple, SllJJpose the state1ne11t of clai1n was not signed by the plain tiff, in violation of Art. 93. Despite tl1e objections of the defendant, the co11rt never required I1im to sig11 it. Obvio11sly, tl1is error does not necessitate a reversal of the decree,200 a11d tl1e a1Jpe]late co11rt may correct tl1e irreg11larity. Tl1 e sa111 e would be tr11e as regards an erro11eo11s r11lin.g on tl1e q11estion of joinder of parties. Suppose tl1 at the co11rt J)er111itted tvvo J)laintiffs \Vl1 ose clai111s did not arise fron1 the sa111e transaction to join, over tl1e objec.tio11s of tl1e defendant. Tl1e case proceeded to t1·ial, a11d it does not appear tl1at tl1e defendant was prejudiced by tl1e co11rt's having l1eard tl1 e two clai1ns togetl1 er. Even tl1011gh an error vvas co111mitted, it did not affect tl1e s11bstantial rigl1ts of tl1e defendant a11d does not req11ire a reversal. 201 Or, the co11rt pern1itted the defenda11t to begin and close whe11 it sl1 ould l1ave per mitted tl1e plaintiff do so. U11less specific prejudice can be sl1own to have resulted thereby, the decree sl1ould not be reversed. 202 Tl1e plaintifl� in st1cl1 a case wo1tld have to sl1ow tl1at somel1ow l1e was not able to introdt1ce all the evidence ]1e wanted to introduce, wl1icl1 is 11nlikely. A11otl1er example of \vl1 at is called ''harn1Iess error'' or a ''mere irreg11larity'' is wl1ere tl1e st1it \Vas i11stit11ted by a11 agent under a defective power of attor11ey. 203 The defenda11t is not prej11diced by tl1 is fact, and the appellate co11rt ca11 req11ire the execution of a proper J)ower. It l1as also been held tl1at tl1e consideratio11 of inco1npetent or irrelevant evidence by the subordinate co11rt does not require a reversal of its decisio11 vvhere t]1ere was st1ffi cient con1petent and relevant evidence to support the finding. 204 Errors will 11eces sarily occur, and every error cannot justify a reversal, or tl1e decision of the s11b ordinate court will never be able to stand. It is only wl1ere tl1e error s11bstantiall)' prejudiced tl1e u11successft1l party tl1at the judg1nent ,vill be reversed or va1·ied. Tl1e clearest example is wl1ere t11e SL1bordi n.ate court incorrect]y applied tl1e law. Tl1e appellate court will apply the law as 197. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 347. 198. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 348(1). Wh ere the parties agree as to tl1e form which tl1e decree in appeal shall take, or as to the order to be made on appeal, tl1e appeJlate court may pass a decree or make an order accorclingly. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 348(2). 199. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 211(2). 200. See Basdeo v. Smidt (High Ct., Allahabad, 1900), Indian L. Rep., vol. 22, p. 55. 201. See Ramdhan v. Lachmi (Privy Council, India, 1936), All-Indi� Rep., P· 42. ? 3, J. vo ...4. p., 8 Re P· n L. l,a Inc , 81) 18 , ad ab 202. See Makund v. Bahori Lal (Higl1 Ct., Allah 203, See Hirabi Gendala.l v. Bhagirath Ramchandra (Hjgb Ct., Bon1bay, 1945), 1946 All-India Rep., p. 174. p. 204. See Ahmed AJbadi v. Ibrahima Allie (Ct. App., West. Africa, 1951), _fVest Afr. Ct. rJp \vould be 1t e, nc de evi nt eva rel or nt ete n1p co d cle clu ex Rep., vol. 13, p. 323. If the court receiv ed by the appellate cou rt under Art. 345 (I) (a).
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t it l1a w on iders to be an d ns se co ba . 11 sio ci de e tl1 e . rs ve re · · . d an be o t t · 1 s e v 1e 1 e b tt � c e at 11 t p ur 1e l t -�e s that the 1 ve 1e os p 1 s1 r, O . w la e tl1 of l � . � . � fi � h incorrect applicatio11 t at �t l 1as dra wn an In ac o . ? in 10 t ec rr co in an e ad n1 dinate court l1as or 1b s1 sed above. It will then reverse 11s sc d1 ve l1a e w as . cts fa e tl1 ' · ' · 1f'.e1 rence fronl 101proper 111 pr er oc e ur r d Wh t aI errors ha ve u . co er . w . 1 o · e th f o � t a t� r fo ig ii substituting . its fmd 1less the errors were su ch ''as 111 ed rs ve re e b to t 1o 1 s 1 ee cr de ,20s I · . been co1n 1.111tted , the , su n I . e 1. � tl . e 1e en iv g g � ap e1 pellate b m o fr t en 11 �� ! gi d ju d li va . a t n ve re to p al. tri r a re de or d An a� e on s �rr n� �1 ee o? J)r s ou e tl1 . h 1as q1 to d cte re di is court nce of an indispe ns e se b th a_ or 1on !ct sd 1r1 1 J_ l r1a ate � as ch s11 . ion est ruling on a q11 1de o s cl1 als or �n ld err ou w _ _It t pre tha . ?n 1s1 ov pr �s. tl1 r de 1111 ll fa uld wo rty pa able e t_ 11�a rt. o�d cou the s11? 10 For example, al tri r fai a 1ng e1v rec n1 fro t lan l e app the veiited n, tl1e decree n1ay t1o d1c al r1s Jt1 loc s wa re the 1at l t ed cid de y l 11s eo on err 11rt if tl1e co 2c7 If " e. of e tic lur jus fai a ed us ca s l1a the ion cis not be invalidated u11less ''tl 1e de en y eni ver a onv �n se inc a c_ t foru 1n, l1is try to or err tl1e by lled 11pe co1 s wa defenda11t nd or ses atte nes the trial in wit 111s 1g bri1 to ble 11na \1/aS 1e l 1 l l 1ic w of as a result perso11, t l 1e decision 111igl1t req11ire a reversal. So too, if tl1e cot1rt erroneous ly 1ing \Vhic11 a part y was not able to \\ ollo f t, 11en 11r111 adjo an for 1est req1 a denied prese11t l 1is case, or if it did not let a party introdt1ce a]l his n1aterial evidence on a1 1 isst1e. Tl1e poi11t to stress is tl1,1t c:l decree sl1011Id be reversed because of proce er of tl1e cot1rt to hear the . d11ral errors onl y wl1ere tl 1ose errors affected tl1e Pow c ase or denied a party a fair trial . St1cl1 errors ''prevent a valid j11dgment from bei11g given," a nd t l1e judgn1ent m11st be q11asl1ed. B11t otl1er procedural errors sl1ot1ld not be coustr11ed. to l1ave this effect, a 1 1d eve11 tho11gl1 co111IDitted, should not resttlt in a revers a l. (b) Ren1ancl It n1ay be tl1at tl1e st1bordinate co11rt disposed of tl1e case on a preliminary poi�t_, and its decision ?n tl1at point is reversed by the ai)pellate court. Since the dec1s1on was on a JJrel1111inary JJoint, the st1bst,1ntive isst1es in the case J1 ave not been deter111ined. For exa1nple, s11ppose the st1bordinate cot1rt dis111issed tl 1e suit on tl1e. �ro11nd t l1at it was ba rred by Ji1mtation. Tl1e appel late cot1rt co11c]udes tl 1at the dec 1 s1on on tl1e q11estion of li111itatio11 was erroneo11s a11d reverses. fiTl1e 1nerits of tl1e case re111ain to be tried. Tl 1e appell ate co11rt may, if it thi 1 1ks t, ren1and the �ase ai�d n1a � direc� wl1icl1 iss11es sl1a]l b e tried 011 re111ai1d. 2os Or it n1ay tr)' tl1o se 1 ss11es itself, 1n wl 11cl1 case t11e pa.rties -vvill prese11t their evide11ce to tl1e appe.llate court. �or . these p11rp?ses ''preli 1 11i11ary point'' sl 1011ld be co11str11ed to 1ne.an. ?0t on ly obJect1011� ?,Ot go111g to the 1nerits, but any iss11e \V]1ic]1 re11dered a. decision _ on some rema1n111g iss1 1 e l1n11ecessary.200 St1ppose t11at in a st1it ot1 a contract, the 205.
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206. 207. 208. 209.
Civ. Pro. C., _ 17-rt. 211 (2). See tl1e discussion as to re,,ie,.v of JJrocedural ir regularities in the �Ott�� of ren�ition, supra, 11otes 1-11 and acco111pa11yi 1 1g text. Wbere the procedu ral irregula�: ity substantially affected the result of the case " the tJroceedings 111ay be set asi.d e. I-Io\\ uirreg ev��· once the case has been ap1Jealed, the juctgn1e11t 111,ty the if only be reversed g the l ar1ty was such as to "pr·event a .va t·d On· I a 1er 1 furt 1 · TJ1e t Jt1dgn1e11 fron1 bei11g given." . case i s, t h.e more seriou� the er ror n1ust be to justify aJteri11g the result. C ompare the ter p ce Cha d ure to b� in foil owed 111 sion the case of tJrelin1inary objections. See tJ1e discus YJ� ' supra, i1otes 80-95 and acco1n Ja11ying te xt 1 Ibid. �v. Pro. C., Art. 10(2). · Civ. Pro. C . Art 341(1)· \'Xrv'l·1ere the coPY . . d a s sen cot1rt · · · ' the appe]Jate su1·t· Of l ·ts JU · dgm ' ent · and orde · tO t·b e case 1s. so ren1a11ded the ·t 11 d subord1nate court ,vith directio11s to rea 0 c under its original numb er and proceecl to l1ear the case · c1·v Pro· C., Art. 341(2)..r. o te See She 6 .!'C . oambar v. Lallu (l-1·lgli bCt., Allahabad, 1887), lndiarz· L. Rep., vo 9, 2 _l. P· ess-�ry f or . tl1at wl,ere several issues h ne<: the decision of tl1e case Civ.ave een framed, the cou.rt need only resolve those ore_issu 5 has n� �· been reversed, the apPellate Pro. C., Art. 182(3). Where the decision on one or_1omg e 155tl court may remand the case for a decision on the rema
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.....-defendant denies the existence of tl1e. contract an d a]ternatively, contends that per formance was pr�vented by force n1aJeure. T]1e cot1rt finds tllctt there was no con tract and enters Judgment for tl1e de.fendant witl1out deciding the q1:iestion of force roajeure. On appeal, _ the appellate cot1rt finds that tl1ere \Vas a contract and reverses ie jt1d�ment. Tl1e i ssue as to_ force 1najel1re remains, and _tl1e appellate cot1.rt nlay, l _ ! _ . if i t thinks fit, remand tl1at .1ss11e for trial by the s11bord inate cotirt. It does not matter that the co11rt_ has a]rea.dr take� evidence on the isstle ;210 ho\vever, tl1 e evidence recorded d11r1ng the or1g1nal trial will be evidence dt1ring the trial after remand.'2 11 Before re111a11d�ng, tl1e appellate court m11st l1ave co11cl11ded tl,at tl1e decision 00 tI1e prelin1inary point sl1ol1ld be reversed. It is not a11tl1 orized to remand tl1e case for the subordi11ate court to take additional evidence 011 tl,at isstle.212 It mtlst also conclude that the clis1Josition of the case as a res11lt of the decisio11 on the preliminary point was erroneo11s. S11ppose tl1at tl1e st1bordinate co11rt erro11eously l1 eld that tl1e defenda11t had tl1e bt1rden of proof, and on tl1at basis f 011nd for the plaintiff. The a1Jpellate co11rt mt1st decide tl1at, witl1 tl1e b11rde11 of proof 011 the plai11 tiff, j11dgn1 ent sl1ot1ld I1 ave bee11 for tl1e defenda11t; it cot11 d find tl1at tl1e plaintiff sustained his b11rden of proof, and tl111s affirm tl1e fi1Jding in. his favor. 213 If a decisio11 has bee11 rendered following r11Iings on several preliminary poi11ts, tl1 e appellate co11rt 1uust find tl1at tl1e rulings on all the poi11ts were erroneo11s before reversi11g. 214 Note tl1 at tl1e decision of the appellate cot1rt on the preli1nin1:try point cannot be re-01Je11ed if tl1 e case is appealed to it again follo\ving the trial after re_mand.515 If the a1J1Jellate court concludes that the decision dismissing tl1 e case on gro11nds of lin1 itatio11 vvas erroneous and reverses and remands, tl1e defendant, a 1Jpe,1li11g fro111 a j11dgn1 e11t for the plaintiff on the remand, cannot co11 te11d that tl1e original decision of tl1e st1b ordinate cou.rt disniissing tl1e s11it 011 gro11nds of ]i111itation was correct. Tl1at qt1es tion has already been detern1ined on a J?1Jeal a11 d ca11 11ot be reli tigatecl. If tl1 e ciefe11dant wisl1ed to q11estio11 that decision, l1 e sl1 011lcl have appea.led tJ1 e reversal and ren1 and on tl1at ground to a higher co11rt at once.
(c) Powers of appellate court Tl1e appellate court is given broacl !Jowers witl1 respect to its dis1Jositio11 of the case. Where the evidence on tl1e record is slrfficient to e11 able the a1Jpellate cot1rt to pronounce judgn1er1t, it 111ay, after resettli11 g tl1e isst1es, if 11 ecessary, fi11ally determine the case notlvitl1stc1r1cli11g t/1at its clecision proceecls 011 ct clifferent basis t/1a1'l. the clecision of tl1e suborditzate co11rt. 216 For exan1 ple, in a case w J1ere there are isst1es as to the existence of a contract and as to force n1 ajel1re, the s11bord.inate cot1rt fmds tl1at there was a contract, bl1t that perforrn,lllce was : prevented by �o� ce 111aje11re. The plaintiff appeals from tl1e decree, assigning as e_rror tl1e . deci sion on tl� e question of force majel1re. TJ1e apJ Jellate co11rt 11pholcls h i s contentt?n. I-Iowe�er, r11 reviewing the record, it concl11des that the evidence does not establish the ex istence of a contract. It will the 11 confir1n the j11dgn1ent for the defenda·nt on the gro11nd 210. See Mata Dib v. Jamna Das (High Ct., Allal1abad, 1905), I11clian L. Rep., vol. 27, p. 691. 211. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 341(3). .• 21 2. See the discussion of this point in D. Mt1 1Ia, The Cocle of Ci11il Proceclure (12th ed. by R Mitter, 1953), vol. 2, p. 1209. 213. See I-Iabib-tillah v. Lala Prasad (High Ct., Alla11abad, 1912), lridiati L. Rep., vol. 34, p. 612· 214. See Bengal-Napur Ry. v. Behari Lal (I-IigJ1 Ct., Calcutta, 1925), 1925 All-India . Rep., p. 716 215 · See Ragbunath v. Ganesl1 (Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad, 1932), 1932 AII-Inrlia Rep., P· 603Zl 6. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 342.
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nt, o da wh fen de the did t tha te t take a No no ct. tra con lid ,,a a no s \Va e . on t l1e ex1·sten ce of the · 1on . the dec1s t11 at t·ber · contract· · t have cI1 aJlenged cross-appeaI, c Ould no o co n tract, 1t · can �onfirn1 on n s wa ere tl1 a tl1 es lud µc co � t tir co _ _ But if the appellate 1 e ?ec1s1on of th e subordinate c tl of sis ba e tl1 t tha ourt that basis not,vitbstanding e. 1r et aJ e m rc fo by d te 1 e1 ev pr as w ce an n1 was tl1at perfor t� c ot1rt reverses on a preli llc1: pe ap the ere wh ed y _ plo em b can ure ced J)ro Tliis _ _ � t nt to c1e le s 1ffi ab en 1s the appella te ord rec e 1 tl JD ce 11 de evi e 1 tl t btl nJinary point 21 d. 1an ren a t � S11ppose tl1 at the subordin ate court l1ou \Vit cotirt to disp;se of the case took evidence on both tl1e iss11es of tl1e existence of a c�ntract and on force t, and _rendered Judgment for the de 1naje11re. It fou11 d tl1at tl1ere was n_o contrac fe 1 1dant witl1 011t resolvi11 g the quest1 0 n. of force 111aJe11re. Now the appellate court reverses tl1e decisio11 as to tl1 e existence of the co1 1tract. Assunling tl1at the evidence on the issue of force 111aie11re is strfficient to enable tl1e appellate court to decide that issue, it can do so a11d re11der a final judg1ne11 t. If some additional evidence is necessary, the court can call for suc11 evidence a11 d tl1en render the decision. Or, suppose that altl1011gl1 tl1e pJeadi11 gs raised an iss11e of force 111aje11re, tl1at issue was not fran1ed as s11cl1. I-Iowe,1er, evide11ce on the iss11e was introci11ced b y botl1 sides. Tl1e appellate court 111ay now frame a11 issL1e as to force 111ajet1re and resolve it.218 Whenever J)ossible, tl1e apJ)ellate cot1rt sl1 011ld try to render tl1 e final decision and. avoid re 1 11 a11ding tl1e case. So too, tl1e apJ)ellate co11rt 1 nay pass any decree or order whicl1 ought to l1ave been 1 11ade by tl1e s11bordi11ate court and may n1 ake any order or decree that tl1e case 111aJ' req11ire.219 It does not 111atter tl1 at s11cl1 order was not requested by eitl1er party.220 In tl1is con11ection, reference should be n1 ade to the co11 rt's power tinder Art. 40(5) to join as a res1Jo11 dent any l)erson who was a party to the o�iginal proceedings, but_ ,vl10 ,1vas not a party to tl1e appeal. Tl1 e court may join h1n1 as respondent a11d 1ss11e a decree or order affecting l1i1n.
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V./e 111ay co11sider some exa1n1)les of tl1e exercise of tl1 js power. A sues B and C, clain1i11g tl1at one or the other is Ii,1ble to l1im. He obt,1ins a decree against B, btit not against C. B appec1ls, joining A a11 d C as respondents. Tl1e appellat e . _ co111-t finds tl1at B JS not liabl e to A, b11t C is. It will reverse tl1e decree as to B a11d can i�st1e a dec�·ee in favor of A against c.221 Or, A s11es B and _ C, _ _ _ cla1111 1ng contr1 bt1t1on aga111st the111. A obtains a decree against B, ·but not again5t C. B appeals fr�n1 the decree re11dered in favor of A, b11t A does not appeal �ron: the decree 1n favor of C. It has been held tl1at if tl1e cot1rt thi 1 1ks tl1at C 15 liable for contrib11tion, it ca11 adcl l1i 111 as a person interested in tl1e result of the ppeal and_ vary the decree to n1al<e C liabl t o n y a A.222 Altl1ougl1 m C to � e be , 111terest_ed in tlie result of tl1e appea.l," as we l1av e defined tl1at ter111 , since tlie appellate cotirt lias concl11decl tl1at tl1 e st1bord a ed ent er ave 1 l sl10 i ate co1 11ld 11 1rt _ decree against 111.11 1 and since it l1 as tl1 e J)OWer ate rdi n sub o e 1 tl to tha ent t dec er a1 1 ree y · · · · . co. 11rt sl1ould l1ave en · · nst 1 · te r ed 1 aga t .. · , 1 n�y Join . C for tl1e p11rpose of entering a decree . . : . him. A . s11111 �ar s1t11at1011 arose in a s111t by tl1e p11 rcl1aser of land a.gainst the occup1 �r to rec1tiire lits rem.oval and alternatively, to obtain con1pe 11 sation against tl1e vendor if
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218. 219. 220. 221. 222.
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See tl1e discussion of tl118 ), r 196 3 · poin ed ., · t m S. · Sa. kar, Tlze LaH, of Ci,1i/ Procedure (4th vol. 2, p. 762_ See Kalka v. Ha.risl1 (High Ct., A llala t bad, 1956), 1957 AII-I11dia Rep., p. 25. C.iv. pro. C., Art. 182(2). See tl1e d.iscussion in D . MulJa, supra, note 212 at p. 1225. lbicl. Major v. Nabin (H.igh ct.,
Calctitta, 1931.), CalcL1tta J-f/eekly Notes, vol. 35, p. l o79.
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-----the occupier had _a right to possession. Tl1e colttt fo11nd that tlie occtlpier was . to possession, and entered a · decree awardi11g tl1 e plaintiff conipensation entitled _ against the ve11dor. Tl1e vendor . appealed. T.he appellate co11rt concltided tliat tli e v�ndor was able to pass own �rsl11p free of occ11pants _and reversed th.e decree against hin1. It th.en n1ade .tl1 � occupier a �espo11dent for the ptirpose of entering a decree in favor of the pla1ntrff for poss_ess1011 and 111.esne pro·fits against him. 223 Tl1is power sl1ould be 11sed to preve11t the iss11ance of inconsistent decrees. A eacl1 is liable for part of tl1e damage he suffered.224 sues B an � C, claiming that _ Jt1dgn1ent 1s e11 tere� a �a111st botl1 defe11dants, b11t only B appeals. Tl1e appellate co11rt finds that B 1s liable for all tl1e damage. It ca11 issl1e an order to tl1e effect that B is liable for all tl1 e cla1nage and reverse tl1at JJart of tl1 e decree of the lower co11r� l1 oldi1�g C liable.225 In ligl1 t of its decision as to B;s liability, the decree holding C liable for part of tl1 e damage is inconsistent and cannot stand. �fhe only li111itation on tl1 e power of tl1 e appellate co11rt to iss11e a decree is tl1at it cannot take away from ,1 party relief whicl1 he was gra11ted by tl1e st1b ordinate co11rt a11d which is not cl1allenged 011 appeal nor inconsistent witl1 the f. inal decree to be rendered. S11ppose tl1at A sues B to recover Eth.$ 300, and tl1e col1rt renclers a decree in his favor for Etl1.$ I 00, fron1 \vl1ich he aJJpeals. B does not cross-appeal. It l1as bee11 l1 eld i11 I11dia tl1at the appellate court c,11mot find tl1at A is not entitled to recover Etl1.$ I 00.226 The 011ly isst1e on appeal is \Vl1 etl1er A is entitled to recover Etl1.$ 300. Vl11 etl1 er or not l1e is entitled to recover tl1e Etl1.$ 100 will not affect tl1 e decisio11 on that isst1e. Tl1erefore, since 110 objection vvas made to tl1e court's findi11g on tl1at poi11t, the case held that the aJ)IJellate court sl1011Jd not be able to set tl1at portion of tl1 e decree aside. Tl1is seems to be a sound apJ)roacl1, since wl1en a party fails to aJ)J)eal fro1n a JJortion of t1Je decree, he may be deemed to l1ave admitted tl1 e correctness of tl1e decisio11. It is 011ly where m11lti-parties ,are involvecl or wl1 ere a decisio11 011 an isst1e 1Jot raised 011 a.ppeal is necessary for tl1e final disposition of the case tl1at tl1e court shot1ld reverse a finding that was not cl1aIJ enged. Fi11ally, tl1e col1rt may reverse or vary tI1e decree i11 favor of cl persorJ wl1 0 is not a party to the appeal. Wl1ere tl1 ere is n1 ore tl1an 011e JJlai11 tiJT or defend ant a.ad tl1e decree appealed fro111 proceeds on a gro11nd con11n.011 to all plaintiffs or defendants, any one of tl1 e plai11tiffs or defenda11 ts n1ay apJJeal fro1n tl1 e \Vl1ole decree, and if tl1e appellate cot1rt finds that the decree shot1ld be reversed or varjed, it may do so in favor of all plai11 tiffs or defenda11ts, even tl1ot1gl1 s01ne were 11 ot pa.rties to the appeal. 227 Tl1e test is ,vl1 etl1 er tl1e decree ap1)e�1led fro1n proceeded on a ground con101011 to all. S11ppose tl1 at A s11es B, C and D to reco-ver land, claiming that 11e is the ovvner and that l1e ,vas dispossessed by all tl1 ree. B, C a11d D claim to hold separate parcels· of the land, granted to tl1 em by different persons. Tl1e court finds that A is the o,v11er of all tl1 e land and that l1 e l1as bee11 wro11g fully dispossessed by B, C and D. Only B appeals, and tl1e apJJellate col1rt finds tl1at A is not the owner. Since the lovver court's decree proceeded· on tl1e gro11nd 223. Charu Bala v. Nihar Kt1111ari (High Ct., Calcutta, .1926), 1927 A.ll-Jnclia Rep., P· 831. 224. See Civ. c., Art. 2160. WJ1ere several perso�s · have contribt1ted to the san1e damage, the l1 of the persons eac by rne bo be to ally fin 1s t deb the of n rtio rt po cou is to fix what l)ro liable. 225. S�e Jawahar Bano v. Sllujaat I-Iussain (High Ct., Allahabad, 1920), 1921 All-Jnclia Rep., p. 367. 226. See Ranga.m Lal v. JJ1andLL (.E-IigJ1 Ct., Allahabad, 1912), Inc/ian L. Rep., vol. 34, p. 32. 227. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 331 .
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that A \vas the owner, it proceeded on a ground co�on �o all defendants, and tlle decree will be reversed as to C a1 1? D notw1ths�an2�;ng that they did not . aJ)peal · and tl1at each set 11p a separate cla1n1 of ownersl11p. On tlle other 11and, it is n.ot proper to �everse tl1e decree in favor of the non-appealing parties if tl1e s11bordinate court did not procee� on a ground co m . reversal 1s co1nm of gro11nds tl1e of one t11ot1gh even all, mon to ?n to a 11,229 SuJ)pose that in 011r exa1nple it was B, C an_d D wl10 brought suit to recover tbe lai1 d agai11st A. Tl1e court found that ne1tl1er �' C or D was granted his portion of tl1e land by the person lln.der wl1om h_ e claimed. OnJ� B appealed. The a.i)pellate co11rt found tl1at B was granted tl1e portion _tha.t be claimed, a�d that A did not l1ave a better clain1 to tl1e la11d. Tl1e decree 1n favor of A against C and D \Vill 11ot be re,,ersed. A grol1nd of reversal is co1 11mon to B, C and D in the sense tl1at tbe rigl1t of a .I I of tl1en1 to reco,,er deJ)ended on a finding that A. was not entitled to tl1e la11d. But tl1e decision of tl1e Sltbordinate col1rt proceeded on a gro11nd separate to eacl1 plaintiff, that n.eitl1er \Vas granted l1is portio1 1 by the person under wl1on1 l1e clain1ed. Tl1e appellate cot1rt did not pass on the question of wJ1etl1er C or D was gra11ted lus J)Ortion. It did not l1ave to do so in order to deter111i11e B's clai1n. Tl1erefore, tl1ere is no reason to reverse tl1e decree as to C and D. B will l1ave tl1e portion that l1e claimed, and A will have tl1e portion clain1ed by C and D. J -Iowever, it is 011ly necess,1ry tl1at tl1e decree l1ave proceeded on one common gro1111d. S11ppose tl1at A s11es B to reco,,er dan1ages for breach of contract, and C to recover cla111ages for cat1sing B's brea.ch. The col1rt finds against botl1 defendants. Only B aJ)I)eals, a11d tl1e a1)J)ellate cot1rt finds tl1at B did not breacl1 the contract. Tl1e j11dg111ent sho11ld be reversed against C as vvell, since the decree of tbe sub ordi11ate cot1rt proceeded 11pon a co111111on grol1nd to both, that B breached the co11tract. B11t l1ad C ,1ppealed on tl1e grot1nd that the co1 1rt erred in finding that he caused tl1e brea.cl1, a11d l1ad tl1e court reversed the decree as to C, it would not l1a,,e reversed tl1e decree as to B. Tl1is is becal1se tl1e decision of tl1e appellate co11rt as to C l1as 11otl1i11g to do with ,vl1etl1er B breacl1ed tl1e co11tract, and the grot1nd talcen in C's aJ)peal was not tl1e ground on w11icl1 tl1e s11bordinate court proceeded in rendering tl1e decree ,1gainst B. Tl1is po\ver ca11 be exercisecl i11 favor of a defendant against vvhom an ex parte decree ':as passed. 230 Tl1ere is a split of al1thority in India as to \Vl1etl1er it can �e exercised \vhere a J)arty ,vl10 l1as taken an apJ)eal dies and tl1e legal representa tive does not beco1ne a party, res11lting in. tl1e abatement of tl1e appeal. 231 It co�1ld be coote11ded that tl1e rt1le only at1tl1orizes reversal in favor of a 11on-appeal1ng party and does not a11thoriz: reversal ,vl1ere an aJ)peal l1as i 1 1 fact been taken, but has abated. I·Iowever, tl1e pr1111ary I)llfJ)OSe of the rt1le "''011ld see1 n to be to enable tl1e aJ)p llate cot1rt to pre�ent it1co11siste 11t decrees. Wl1ere tl1e ,1ppeal has abated, tlle deci�ee 0�. tl1e subord111ate col1rt stands ancl i 11co11sistent decrees n1ay res ult. . Therefore, It 1s submitted tl1at wl1ere tl1e decree entered against tl1e deceased party ,vl1ose appeal has abated would be inco11sistent with tl1e decree entered in favor of the sticcessftil appellant, tl1e court sl1ould reverse tl1e f 01·me1· decree as ,veil. 228. 229.
See Ra�i Kamal v. Ahinad Ali (Higl1 Ct., CaJctitta, 429, 1903), J11dia,1 L. Rep., vol. 30, P· . e ritun . toy Rep Das v. a Sn1. -Ind Sabi tritn oni A Dasi 0 (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 194 9)., J9 5 �� r i ll 230. ee5 Ram Tahal v. Sukeswar (High Ct., Patna, 1916) I11dian Cases vol. 35, p. 54 7. � 231. 1npa re Dhondo Khando v. Wa�man B alwa1 1t (Hjgh Ct., B on1b ay, 19'14), 1945 All-India � R ower can be exercised) \Vitl1 Ra.mpha.l v. Satdeo (Higl1 Ct., Patna, 1940), � 19fo' lit-J���a ep., p. 346 (powe r can11ot be exercised).
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----he broad powers of the appellate c ?urt sl1ouJd always be kept in mind. Th e ! . decision of tl1e appellate court should . ?Is�ose of the case in all its aspects, and the final d�cree sl1o �ld con�l11de the l1t1gat1on once and for all. This is trlte even where multiple part1�s are 1nv�lv:�, . and tl1e Code gives tl1e appellate court the po\ver to settle tl1e r1gl1ts and liab1J1t1es of all parties to the controversy.
(d) Pronouncing of judgment Tl1e provjsions re�arding tl1e prono11ncing of j11dgment, discussed i n Chapter VIII, are equ�.ly app!1cable to tl1e j11dgn1e11t of tl1e appellate court; in addition, there are special requ1reme�ts for tl1e giving of a j11dgn1ent of appeal. We may disc11ss these togetl1er. Tl1e Jt1dgme11t of tl1e appellate col1rt m11st be pro11ot1nced in co11rt either at 011ce, or wl1at is 111ore likely, at a future day to be fixed by the court.232 Th_e . jud�me11t 1nus t_ be i n writing, signed by all members and prono11nced by tl1e presiding Jttdge. 233 S111ce a11 ap1)ellate co11rt will always be co1nposed of a collegiate bencl1, it is important to note again tl1at tl1e decision is by 1najority vote, and t11at a j11dge clissentin.g 0111st state i11 \Vriting tl1e decision wl1ich l1e thinks should be n1ade together ,vitl1 tl1e reasons tl1erefor. 234 Tl1e dissenting opinions are in1portant, p,1rtic11larly wl1ere tl1e disse11t i11volves a disagreement over the la,v to be applied or tl1e interJ)retation of a provision of law. The reasons given by the dissenting j11dge n1ay be very significa11t if tl1ere is a second a1)peal, and these reasons l1elp to foc11s sl1arply the precise legal question involved. Experience in other co11ntries has indicated tl1at, 11ot i11freq11e11tly, the view expressed by tl1e dis senti11g judges becomes tl1e majority view in tl1e f11t11re. Tl1e dissenting j11dge sl1ould 235 prepare rus opinion as care.f11lly as tl1e j11dge '.\1riting tl1e 111ajority opinion. . TI1e j11dgment n111st contain the points for detern1ination, i.e. the grounds of ap1)eal as set forth in tl1e memorand11m of appeal and tl1e f11rther q11estions, if any, de veloped by the appellate co11rt, the decision, and tl1e reaso11s for tl1e decision. Tl1e appellate co11rt sho11ld give its O\VD reasons for cleciding as it has evet1 where it is confirming tl1e j11dgment of the sl1bordi11ate co11rt. It is poor practice to con firm ''on tl1e basis of tl1e reasot1s set fortl1 in tl1e j11dgn1e11t from ,vl1icl1 tl1e a1)peal is taken," 236 11nless tl1ey are disc11ssed in tl1e 01)inion of tl1e appellate co11rt. Wl1� re the decree is va.ried or reversed, the j11dgn1e11t of tl1e appellate cot1rt 1nust specify the relief to wl1icl1 tl1e appella11t is entitled. 237 Wl1ere tl1ere are several iss11es, the court n1ust state its decision on eacl1 iss11e unless the decisio11 on a11y one or 1nore issues is sufficient for the decisio11 of the case. 238 It 1nay be tl1at one of tl1e grot1nds of appeal justifies a reversal and j11dgn1ent for tl1e appellant, and if this is so, it will not be necessary to consider tl1e otl1er grounds. As witl1 tl1e j11dgn1ent of tl1e subordinate court, tl1e operative part of tl1e jt1dgn1ent 11111s_ t be red11ced to a decree. 239 _ _ T'he � ecree may specify . by ,vl1on1 and how �l1e costs. 1_ncurre� 1n tl1e s111t are . be paid, and tl11s wo11ld 111clude botl1 the costs 1n the �r1g1naJ suit and on appe� l. . With respect to execution, the appellate co11rt may e1tl1er give the necessary d1rec-
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Civ. Pro. C., Art. 180. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 181 (1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 181(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(1). P· 12· See Sitatama v. Surya (High Ct., Madras, 1899), Indian L. Rep., vol. 22, Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 182(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 183(1). 240. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 183(1) (e). 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239.
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e o t th di on or uti sub ec ex e te tJ1 na . ate leg 2�1 de co y ma urt or lf tse · 1 • 0 IO t· u c e x e tions 1or · to e ar b e b b ot . f · or e sh . ee n1 cr ur de d or to the . Certified copies of tI1e jtidgine11t d gm en t an d decree also are Ju e th of . py co d fie rti ce A . to n parties on applicatio . m e d fro 1er ale Tl pe ap e cre y e e . d. tb e tl1 d st sse mu pa I1 1ic wJ t be uI co · ti e . . 1 t o t sen . . . be d . �n e�tr � o f t he Judgment of an , u1t 1 tie tn � g din cee � pro al gin ori 42 filed with t}1e . l its v1 su c1 of er st gi re 1e tl 1n e ad 1n be ill w t 11r tl1e appellate co 7. The Second Appeal Tlle Code does not contain any specific JJrovisions reg11lating the second appeal, and the provisions applicable to tl1e frrst app eal are, �s a general proposition, app l icable to t l1e second app eal. 1-Iowever,_ certain observ� t1_ons sl1ould be made with respect to the second appeal. The appeal 1s fron1 the dec1s1on of the first appellate court wl1icl1 varied or reversed tl1e decree appeale d fron1. If tl1e decree was con firn1ed, altl1ougl1 011 a different gro11nd, a secon.d appeal does not lie. Suppose that tl1e lo\ver court entered j11dg 1 11ent for tl1e defendant on the gro11nd that a. contract \Vas not sl1own to exist, but tl1e appellate co11rt confirms on the grot1nds that tl1ere was a contract bt1t its perfor111ance wc1s preve11ted by force 1uajeure. The plaintiff is 11ot e 1 1titled to ,L second appeal, since the decision does not vary tl1e judgn1ent; tl1e judgi11e11t is still for tl1e d.efenda11t, altl1ougl1 for a differe.n t reason. It is only ,vhere tl1e resJ)onde11t is adverse!:,, affected by tl1e decisio11 on appeal tl1at he can take a seco1 1d appeal. ]f, for exan1ple, tl1e jt1dg111ent of tl1e lower court was that the res1 Jonde11t recover Etl1.$ I 000, and on a1Jpeal, it was reduced to Etl1.$ 500, he cot 1ld tal(e a second appeal, si11 ce tl1e j11dg1ne 1 1t was va.ried to 11is detriment. On tl1e otl1er l1and, if tl1e responclent filed a cross-appeal or cross-objection, cl.aiming tl1at tl1e court sl1ould l1ave awarded hin1 Etl1.$ 1500, and tl1e decree is varied to grant l1in1 tl1at amou 11 t, tl1 e original appellant (\vl10 for these purposes is considered tl1e cross-respo11dent), ca11 appeal, since the jt1dg111e11t \Vas varied to his detrin1eat. On tl1e seco11d appeal, t l1e party appealing is considered tl1e appellant and the party in ,vl1ose favor tl1e previo11s j11dg 1 nent was varied or reversed is considered the responcle11t. Tl1e second appeal is to be a review of tl1e decision of the first appellate court varyi11g t l1e jt1dgme11t ap1Jealed from and 11ot a revie\,, of tl1e deci sion _of tl1e . trial court. TI1 e q11estio11 is whetl1er tl1e appellate court con1mitted . error In \'ary111g or reversing tl1e jt1dg111ent fro111 wl1 icl1 tl1e a1Jpea1 was taken. The second ap peal sl1ot1Id ?e lirnited to tl1at asJJect of the decision of t11e appellate cotirt vary1 11g or revers�11g the jt1dgment of tl1e first co11rt. Suppose tl1at tl1e first _ COllrt �OlIDd ror t}1e pla1nt1ff, cllld t]1e defenda11t apJJea{ecf, COt1tending tl1at t.}1e COltrt e! red 1n find111g tl1at tl1ere was a co11tract and i 1 1 rejecti 1J g tl1e de.fendant's conten t1011 tl1a� perfor1nance was preve11tecl by force n1aje11re. The apJJellate co11rt co11fu111s tlie finding tliat there was a contract, b11 t s11stc1ins the defe11da.nt's co11tention tl1at perf� r111 . :nce w_as preve 1 1t�d b_y force 1naJet1re. TJ1e JJlai11tiff appeals from the decisi_on reversino tl1e JU d g111ent 111 11 1s favor. S1 11ce tl1e decision. as to tl1e existence of the contract was confu:ined by tl1e appellate co11rt tl1e defenda11t sl1ould not be able to cross-appeal, conter1ding tl1at tl1e 8]Jpe]la.te co�1rt e rred . ion dec is tha t i n confir111ing So too, it wotild see111 tl1at tl1e seco11cl ,tppe1Iatt co11rt co11ld not join as a ��rou<lent a per�on wl10 wa.s a party to tl1e original proceedings, but �h? wa.s a party to the first a1J_peal. Art. 40(5) refers tlle n i suit tl1e to to a party court from whose decree tl1e aJJpeal is prefe ecoo<l s the rre tha d, t wh 1ne icl1 would an ap�ellate court could not add a person ap na l or igi _ wh o tl1 wa e s no t a party to pe.:1l, smce the second appeal 1s: prefe rred fro1n that decree· and no t from the decree 241. Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 183(1) (f). 242. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 184.
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of the trial co�rt. Also, in the case of a ren1and tinder Art. 341 or t]1 e framing of iss11es for trial 11nd.er Art. 343, the ren1and or reference s]1ould be made to the court which heard the first appeal and not to the trial court, since botl1 articles speak of ''tl1e co11rt from whos� decree tl1e appeal is !)referred." It is important to re n1en1ber that tl1e second appeal 1s not an appeal from the j·udgment rendered at tl1e trial. 8 . Restitution As we saw, tl1 e taking of an appeal does not prevent exec11tion of tl1 e decree unless a stay is orde.re ? for s11fficient cause. It n1ay be, then, that the judgment in favor of one pa.rty will l1ave been exec11ted, and, on appeal, that judgment will have been reversed. In s11cl1 a case the s11ccessful appella 1 1t is entitled to restitution and l1e n1 11st n1ake 11.is application for restit11tio11 in tlze coi,rt of first instance. Tl1at co1rrt n111st ca11se s11ch restit11tion to be made, as will, so far as possible, place the parties in the san1 e position as tl1ey would have occupied but for the decree or part of tl1e decree tl1at l1as been varied or reversed.243 In order to effect s11cl1 restit11tion, the court may mak.e any order, including one for the ref 11 od of costs and for the payn1 ent of interest, dan1ages, compensation · and mesne pro.fits, wl1icl1 a party is entitled to as a result of tl1e variation or reversal. 244 However, ,vl1ere the appellate co11rt l1as req11ired tl1 e responde11t to post security for restit1 1 tion, 245 it \VOttld seem that tl1 e application for restitution sl101 1ld be n1ade to tl1 e appellate co11rt. In all other cases, it is to be made to the court of first instance. It J1as been held elsewl1 ere that the decision of tl1e court on the application for restit11tion is appealable, 246 and since the Code contains nothing to tl1 e contrary, we may assun1e tl1at it will be appealable in Ethiopia as well. Restitution may be ordered i n favor of any party wl1 0 is entitled to sucl1 restitution as a res11lt of tl1e reversal or variation of tl1e decree. So, \Vhere A obtains a decree against B and C, wl1 ich proceeds on a com 1 non ground, ancl only B appeals, if the decree against C is reversed as well, C can obtain restit11tio 1 1, even thougl1 l1e was not a party to the aJ)peal. 247 Restitutio11 n1ay also be obtained against other persons wl1 0 l1ave acquired ownersl1ip or possessio11 of tl1e l )roperty. Where A exec11ted a decree for the possession of i1n111ovable property against B, and then leased the property, 11pon reversal of the decree B may aJ)ply for a11 order of ren1oval against the te11ant. 248 I-Iowever, wl1ere a person otl1 er tl1an tl1e decree-l1older l1as p11rchasecl tL1e J)roperty purs11ant to exec11tion proceedings order ed by. the court, l1 e will not be ordered to restore it. 249 TJ1e decree holder wl10 pu· rchased the property obvio11sly will be ordered to ret11rn it. 250 The court is to try, i11sofar as is possible, to restore tl1e parties to tl1e exact position they wo11ld have bee11 in had it not been for tl1 e decree. If tl1 e proJ)erty cannot be returned, e.g., beca11se it was sold at exec11tio1 1, tl1e decree l1older wo11l_d have to ref11nd the amo11nt he recei,1ed from the sale. The successf11l appellant 1s also entitled to interest by way of restit11tion: wl1ere A obtains a decree _for � tl1.$ 5000 against B and recovers tl1at arno11nt in exec11tio 1 1, 11pon reversal, � is entitled to receive the Eth.$ 5000 witl1 interest to the date of repayment, even if tl1 e decree Civ. Pro. C., Art. 349(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 349(2). • See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 336. . Cases, vol. 26, p. 890. l1an /11c See Dino NatI1 v. Jogondra (I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, 1914), See t11e discussion of tl1is point in D. MLLlla, supra, note 212 at PP· 455-456. p. 34 0. 21, l. vo p., L. Re 1 lia1 !11c , 4 189 , tta lcu Ca , Ct. � 1 igl (I-I See Robili Sin gh v. 1-:lodding _ . c/ta l-In Al 1 0), 195 See Biswakesa.n Ramanju Dass v. Krish 11a Cl1andra (I-I1gh Ct., Or1ssa, 195 Rep., p. 148. ? , 43 l. vo p., P· - 35 Re L. n lia lnc ), 19 19 , ay 250. See Shivbai v. Yesoo (Higl1 Ct., Bomb
243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249.
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25 1 o A r d n er f o r restitution m b t. s e r te in to s a t n e il s is rt ti o c t a 1 1 e pe ap e th f of d. the �fu ere ord r ree dec 1 bee I ot 1 1 holde in st te l1as 1 f io11 ct1t exe re e 1 d prope1: even ,v a stay _ by ed lh ain u obt e ting pos s c 1 e appellant tl · rity and gs n d1 e e e c pro 1s , 2s2 · exe.cution . Y t r1 R es 1 u t·t . c · s se ut1on a d te s can o p y e n be o m le ti ordered r fo st re te . n . · ent1t1ed to i 1ng th' y n1e ma s? 1 l st1 1g 11 1ot I 1 · t a be d, rie va owed to the en be s ha e cre de tile er . . whenev r $ 1000 and pu h fo t ns a l1. ag B Et e cre de i a ns tai ob A rc ases respondent. For exa' inple , 1 1 i·s red treed to E th .$ 100. Tl1e a11 · c 1 1 1e t 1 a' pe ap On . ion court B's property in exect1t ent ym on pa of t1p B .$ to Eth ty per pro 100 253 HoWthe e tor res . to . A · . . er d or . · y ma o as go d 1n t a pt1 . e b po s1t1on as he was o t_ ed titl en ly on is t lan J)el ap ever, the ose e. pp on r St1 tte 1 at A obtain s be �l a 111 t no , ree dec the of B's ion before execut k 1t, ed bac re1 ow ich wh ant ten B e !h m clai . sed lea ed was n bee 11ad ich wh , erty rop ts lec rty A pe col pro .$ 500 from the the Eth of on ssi sse po g nin tai ob ter Af 0. 100 ttll.$ 1titled to recover on ly Eth. $ 500 from A and n ot the e1 is al, B ers rev on Up tenant. Etl1.$ 1000 he claimed from tl1e tenant. 1t�on 111ay not_ be instituted; restitution may only �t1 rest for st1it t den pen inde Ail . u e 1on to 1 mad tl 1tt1t e rest for co 1 101 rt of first l1cat app a11 of be claimed by way t g instarice.2s-1 In tl1is regard, an interestin q 1estion is whether the appella nt must present l1is e11tir� claim in a si11 gle ap�li�ation ?r wl1 ether 11 e ca� flle �ultiple 11ded tl1 at every sL11t shall include 1s pro 1t (2), 216 Art. der 1 U1 1. t1t101 restit clai1 11s for , tl1e whole of tl1 e clain1 ,vI1icI1 tl1 e 1 )lai11 tiff is entitled to 111 ake - the plaintiff may not ''split l1is cat1se of action." I n I11 dia, it l1as been l1eld that an application for restitt1tion is 11ot a st1it witlu11 the meaning of tl1 e corresponding Indian rule and that, therefore, a J)arty wl10 a1)IJlied for restittrtio11 of l1 is property may subsequently ap1Jly for an order awardi11g l1 i111 11 1es11e profits. 255 St1cl1 an interpretation seems Tl1 e rationale bel1i11d prol1ibiting tl1 e splitting of tl1e cause of action ,1ery t1 11sot111d. is equally applicable to an a1)1)lication for restitt1tion, and a party sbou.Id be re quired to include tl1e entirety of l1is clain1 for restitution in his application or be barred fro111 applying for tl1e remainder.
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C. ReYision in Clillot . In Cl1apter II we disct1ssecl at lengtl1 tl1 e institt1tion of His In1perial 1vfajesty's cl1ilot, and den1onstrated 110w revision in cl1 ilot differed fro111 an appeal to an app�llate c?t!rt. !he �ivil Procedt1re Code atten11 )ts to regt 1late the proce�ure _for seeking rev1s1on 1n cl11lot, and as a resltlt of st1cl1 regulations proceedings 1n cl�ilot sl10u!d b� mucl1 n1 ore orderly tl1 an in tl1e past. Tl1e Code refers to tl1e Cl1 ilot, tr_eating. it as a t1nit, and no atten1pt is made to regt1late tl1 e ft1nctio11s of the e F1rd. M1r111.era a1:<l Sebre Se1ni as SL1cl1. As we tlies I, I ,1pter 1 pointed ot1t in Cl b_odies ar� agenc1e? establisl1ed by 11is I111 perial Majesty to assist Him in tl1� exer erp ise of His sovereign prerogative, a11d I le will they - n 1t1st decide tl1e functions �ornl and tl1 e extent to wl1icl1 tl1ey will provide tltls assista11 ce. has A party may inake au apJ)lication for ie l after 011ly revisio1 · 1 in cl1ilot ex,1,c1i1stecl all his rigbts 0f a. )pea 256 an tak e . O t d I . 1 Tl 1 1s · . . t . means tl 1 at if he l1as fa.·1le 1 appeal or a s.�coild a_ ppeal w!1 ere cl in n z revi , sio h can1 1 t at1tl 1ori . for o ed ap_ p ly . u0 e and ·Iiis petition will be reJected. It would be 110 justification that tl1e time
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251. See Rodger . 1 L. Rep-� 1 v Con1 toi d'Escon1pte de Paris (P r y 87 1) 1 iv Council, En g., 87 , Privy Council, vol. 3� � P� 465 252. See Shanmt1gsund . 33, . ar� v. Rati1avelu (High . . Ct., Mad ras, 1931), 1933 All-India R�p , p . 157, 253. See Maung San G YI v . Ma Ng we Bon p., p 1929 All-India h n n Re ?9 (Hig 19 254. Civ Pro c C goo Ra r ' - ' t ., A t·. 349(3) · · ., 255. See . St1rendra 206. . Lal · v. Sultan Al1 p med (High Ct., Calcutta, 1934), 1935 All-I11dia Rep., 256. Civ. Pro· c , . Art. 322.
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; _ a party _ cannot wait until an appeal is barred and tl1en petition appeal � �s expired _ for rev1s1on 1n . chilot. It IS only where he bas taken an a1)peal and tl1e decision appealed fron1 IS con·firn1ed that st1cl1 revisio11 may be available. Tl1e petiti?n for revision -?J:USt be n1ade witlun one n1ontl1 of the pronot1nce roent of the Jttdgment or dec1s1on as a result of wluch the petitioner's rights of appeal have been exl1austed.257 The petition sl1 ould be s11bmitted to the Fird Mir mer�, si�ce this is tl1e ag�ncy _ or the cl1ilot a11thorized by His I1nperial Majesty to receive 1t. WJ1e7e tl1e pet1 !1?11 1_s n1ade beyond tl1is date, tl1e provisions of Arts. 324-326 ap_ply, 1.e., tl1e pet1t1011 1s to be barred 11n]ess the petitio11er can sl1ow that l1e was prevented by good cat1se fro1n petitio11 ing \Vitl1 in tl1 e prescribed tin1 e.2ss The previo11s disct1ssio11 as to good cause is equally releve11t l1 ere. Tl1 e petition is to be accompanied by a COJ)Y of tl1 e jt1dgme11t or juclgme11ts witl1 wl1icl1 tl1e petitioner is dissatisfied a11cl a written n1 en1orandum setting fortl1 clearly and concisely the reasons for tl1e petitio11.259 Upo11 receipt of the petitio11, the cl1ilot shall serve notice on tl1 e o_pposite _party, directing hi1n to show cat1se wl1y tl1e petition should not be granted. 260 Tl1e notice sl1all be given by aflixi11 g it in so1ne conspicuot1s place i11 tl1e cot1rt in wl1icl1 tl1 e st1it was origi11ally brot1ght and by publication in sucl1 newspapers as tl1e chilot sl1a]l direct. 261 Th.tis, for a montl1 after judgment, tl1 e success.ft1l party 111ust inqt1ire and read tl1e newspapers to see if a petition for revision in cl1 ilot l1as bee11 filed. Althot1gl1 tl1e Code does not so specify, presumably there is a l1earing on the petition, a11d tl1is bearing wo11ld be l1 eld before the Fird Mirn1era. As pointed ot1t earlier, if the Fird Mirmera belie,1es tl1at the petitio11 is witl1 ot1t n1erit, it will dis n1iss it. If it believes tl1at it sJ1ould be gra11ted, it \Viii advise l-Iis Imperial Majesty to this effect. Upon tl1e granti11 g of tl1 e petition, tl1e petitioner 111 t1st, ,vitl1in 60 days, furnisl1 sec11rity for the costs of tl1e resJ)On.dent a11d cleJ )Osit st1cl1 amount as may be required to defray tl1 e expenses of sendi11g for or copyi11g tl1e record i11 tl1e case. 262 After st1cl1 security a11 cl deposit l1 ave been fur11 is]1ed, tl1 e cl1ilot declares the petition admitted, gives notice to t11e responde11 t by tl1e 111etl1od J)reviottsly discttssed, and gives tl1e parties a11tl1enticated copies of any of the papers i11 the st1it t1pon application and tl1e payment of tl1e expenses of preparation. 263 Tl1e cl1ilot ]1as been given extensive J)owers to reqt1ire tl1 e ft1rnisl1ing of adclitional security. Tl1e clear i1nport of tl1 ese J)rovisio11s is tl1 at the otl1er party is not to be prejudiced by the granting of tl1 e application for revision. TI1 e revision proceeding may not be 11sed as a delaying device, and tl1 e party seeking it 1nt1st be prepared to furnisl1 s11:fficient security throt1gl1011t tl1e proceedings. At any time before the petition is adn1itted, tl1e c11ilot may, upon ca·use sl1own, revoke its acce.1)tance of the security and make ft1rtl1er directions. 264 After the petition J1 as been ad1nitted, it
257. 258. 259. 260. 261.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 361(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 361(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 361(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 361(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 364(1). Notice need not be serve� on the legal representat !ve of the de app ear ceased opposite party or responde11t wl1er� the op�os1te party or respondent did notceed . ings ent pro sequ sub any at or of 1ned 1pla con 1s ree dec se wl1o rt cou at the hearing in the before tl1e Civ. Pro. c., Art. 364(2). Any order in �l1ilot is deen1ed �� h�ve been ?1acle . 369 . C., Art . P10 . C1, e. a cas l1 suc 1n t den pon res or ty par te osi opp th 1 dea of tJ e 262. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 362. 263. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 363. 264. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 365(1).
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. , ity if ur sec 1al it finds that th io1 dit ad ish rn fu to er ion tit pe e the req also ay r the q ent fur ym t pa tha m . is or re te ua deq ina :�:i ed uir is . hed . t nis fur o . y . . 265 . security prev1 W . rd h eco r ere th ng � . t 1 e py h co or . r titioner fo pe 1g d11 . sen . of ses 1 1 pe ex _ n1eet the t will be stayed, d 1n 1lo s cb ng d1 �e � o_ p1 e . tb r, d� or 1 ai i cl an fails to conlply \Vitl·l su 6 26 s t te us la ee m re on oc t1 pr t1 pe d. 1e tl ch lu w · · to the execut.100 of tlle decree si vi r :e fo th e decre e must be n . io tit pe . e tl! of g tin an gr e th �� 7 Notwitllstanding s. ct re st di ise Ju rw as the taking l1e ot t ilo ch e th s les un ly · al · · on iti iid co execu ted Un a g f 1on n o t1_ t1t an pe gr for revision in e t h y, sta a as te era op t no es do of an appeal , fo r good cause, take t ay 1lo m cl1 e tl1 r? ve \ve Ho . ion 11t ec ex t ec aff cllilot does not y an ay _do n1 of e th _It . 1on wi ut llo ec fo e� cl1 su ng; to ct pe res tl1 wi n tio ac 1 certai1 te; pu (2) allow execution dis the 1n d e_ olv 1nv ty rer pro e abl nov 1 any d oun (1) imp t en nd po for the res by for ty per uri sec of mance g hin nis f11r 1 e tl on up ree of tl1e dec 268 tay ) n the cu it exe � pet e 1 (3 tl tion of ; �� on ke ma y ma lot cl1i the . er of any ord ; ose (4) ner imp 1t1o certain condi pet tl1e by ty 11r1 sec of ting pos e 1 tl n upo the decree tions on the petitioner or give otI1er directions respecting the subject matter of tl1e petition . 269 Wl1ere at any time duri11g tl1e pe11dency of the petition the security furnisl1ed by either party a1)1)ears to be inadeq11ate,270the cl1ilot may, on the appljca W .bere s11ch security is not tio11 of tl1e otl1er party, req11ire furt11er security. f L1rnisl1ed, it 111ay do tl1e follo\vi11g: if it was tl1e J)etitioner who was required to furnisl1 sect1rity, it 1nay, on application of t11e respondent, order the decree to be exect 1ted; if it \Vas tl1e responde11t \Vl10 was required to f11rnisb security, it m.ay stay the f11rtl1er execution of tl1e decree and restore tl1e parties to the position they ,vere wl1e 1 1 tl1e original sect1rity was furnisl1ed or give other directions respecting the subject n1 atter of tl1e s11it. 271 Tl1e Civil Proced11re Code does not govern tl1e l1ea.ring of the case by the cl1ilot. As ,ve l1 ave see11 , 1-Iis l1nperial Majesty possesses broad powers witl1 respect to tl1e l1earing and disposition of tl1e cases before the chilot, and it was not consiclered feasible to regL1late sucl1 111a.tters. Once the case bas been beard, a deci sion \\1 ill be re11dered, ancl tl1is ,vill conclL1de the litigation. Wl1ere the decree or order of the cbilot involves exec11tion, e.g., wl1ere one party is ordered to pay mo11�y _or to do an act, tl1 e party desiring to obtain execution mt1st 1nake an aJ)�licat1on to tl1e coL1rt from wl1ose decree tl1e petition to the cl1jlot was preferred, which mea11s the court t�at heard tl1e last ap:pea1.212 Tl1at court will ex ecute tl1e decree or order as tho11gl1 1 t 11ad passed it itself 273 and its order is appealable to tJ1e same extent as tho11gl1 it l1ad been issued witl1 r;spect to a decree fro1n tl1at court. 2i4
e th of 'Yit� the end discussi on of the rev.isio1 1 in cl1ilot we l1 ave con1 e to . ad udicative �spect of the litigation. Tl1e case 'I1as been deter111.i 11 ed on tl1e merits, an� s11cl1 revi�w of tl1e j11dgine11t as is available 11nder tl1e la\V has taken place. Wh�re !11e party against wl1om a decree l1as bee11 l)assed l1as 11ot volt1ntarily complied Vv1th . its requireii1ents, enforce1nent is available, cess pro tl1is r and \Ve will no\V co11side 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273, 274.
C �v. Pro. C., Art. 365(2). C1v. Pro. C., Art. 366 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 367(1). 'th If the chilot does 11ot n1a w, uted ke any order requiri11g security, tl1e decree will be exec _ out secu.r1ty. C�v. Pro. C., Art. 367(2). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 368(1). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 368(2). C1�. Pro. C., Art. 370(1) · lb1cl. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 370(3).
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CHAPTER X
EXECUTION OF DECREES 'Execution may b� defined as the �roc �ss by which a decree is enforced against a person who has fruled to co111ply w1tl1 1ts terms. We must distinguish the decree from the judgment of the cot1rt. Tl1e jt1dgment represe11ts the decision of the court on tl1e issues before it and tl1e reasons for sucl1 decision. 1 The jt1dgme11t itself i s not susceptible of enforce111ent. Tl1e operative part of tl1e judgment - the part deal ing witl1 the relief to be awarded - shall be redt1ced to a decree, which is to contain such partict1lars as are necessary to make i t susceptible of execution.2 Tl1e decree will incl11de a cleetr order that the party against whom it is rendered sl1all do or refrain from doing son1etl1ing or sl1all pay a definite st1n1 of money or shall deliver a partict1lar thi11g or sl1all st1rrender or restore in1movable property.3 It is tl1e order which is enforced in the exect1tio11 proceedings. The discussion in tl1is chapter will be divided into tl1ree parts: (1) jurisdiction in execution; (2) procedure in execution; (3) attac11ment a11d sale of property. '
Jurisdiction in Execution The decree will be exect1ted by tl1e co11rt which passed it; 110\vever, i11 certain circt1mstances, it 111ay be transferred for exec11tion to another court.4 Wl1ere a decree is issued by an appellate court, that cot1rt n1ay itself give directions for executio11 or it may delegate tl1e exect1tion to the cot1rt wl1icl1 first l1eard tl1e case. 5 If tl1e decree of tl1e appellate court so delegates executio11, tl1e JJarty seeking to exect1te it n1t1st tl1e11 apply to the court of fi1·st instance. Wl1en tl1.e decree is re11derecl by tl1e chilot, the party seeking execution 1n11st apply to tl1e cot1rt fro1n wl1ose decree tl1e petition to chilot was preferred, and that court is directed to execute tl1e decree or order as though it were its own.6 A.
1. Transfer for Execution Ordinarily, tl1e court wl1icL1 rendered tl1e decree or to whon1 execution \Vas delegated by the appellate cot1rt or referred by tl1e cl1ilot will execl1te it. Bl1t if execution by that cot1rt is not feasible, the col1rt 111ay, upon its own motio11 or application of the decree-l1older, send the decree to anotl1er co11rt for exect1tio11. 7 Such transfer is authorized where: (1) tl1e judgn1ent-debtor resides, carries 011 b11siness or personally works for gain witl1i11 the local limits of the j11risdiction of a.notl1er court, to which the decree is sent for exect1tion (tl1e transferee court); (2) the jt1dg•
1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
S ee C.1v. pro. c ., Art . 18?-, and the discussion in Chapter Vlll, supra, notes 122-124 and accompanying text. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 183(1) (f). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 183(1) (d). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 371 (1). The procedt1re it1 execution is not _applicable to the arrest, detention and sale of ships in accordance \Vith the Maritime Code. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 371(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. J 83(1) (f). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 370. The orders n1ade by . the court executing the decree of the chjlot are appeaJable in the sam e manner and subJect to t11e same rules as orders by the court executing its own decrees. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 372(1) Where �l1 � decree-J1? lder seeks a transfer, he must fiJe an apphc� tion in accordan.ce witJ1 tt1e prov1s100s of Ctv. Pro. C., Art. 378. The order of transfer 1s set forth in the Fourtf1 Scl1edule.
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e within the local lim its cre de e th fy tis sa to y ert op pr . · 0f , · b 1· · ment-deb,tor 1 1as s·ufficient 1n sueh 1m 1ts o f the transfer wit not bt1t rt, cou . ee sfer · rin tran . the of c 0 10 t , IC d" S g . · . . rl tl1e JU v e bl , 11o rty m1 pe 1 · pro f ry ua ve s1t �ed within Li de o e sal � h s ·ec � di ! � � e cre de � , � . ansferee co t1r t, (4) the court cot.1 rt; (3) tlie tr ch e hi w tl1 of p 11 t10 1c sd 1 assed 1· Jt1 e th of ts ni lii tile local r , co ed at the decre e should re th be to � on as re r l1e ot y a11 r fo s, er the decree consid 8 Su cl1 a transfer 1s no t 1nandatory, and t t1r co ee the · . · · · be exeCuted by the transfer 1 n tl 1e circumstances en lf e,, , e rts 1t e t1t ec ex ay n1 e just cre de e tli . court wlucll passed e n t ut ca ur c ec r a, ex eth on wh e bl 11 e op t1 pr ue � be rty � y � ma it � r, � ve q . we Ho d.9 sse cu dis 1 n l 11d1 a, 1t ha s been held that a d an n, t1o d1c r1s JU its of 1its Iin al otitside the loc 10 The san 1e result sh ou ld be reacl1ed in . rty pe Ethi pro h court cannot execute on suc c�t1rt 1nay cli�ec� the attach the t tl1a ed vid pro is It ty. per pro le vab mo ini to as opia 1 s !ocated w1tl11n the limits t par a y onl ere wh ty per pro ble ova 11m 1 i of sale or _ ment ire ble ent ova tl1e 1 1 imm ere is outside wl1 t tl1a ly imp uld wo is Th . tion dic L1ris of its j 12 r e d h sal an of e t suc cl1m tta pe pro tl1e er ord ty. 11ot can � 1rt cot � tl1e on, icti isd of its jur Tl1us, wl1ere tl1e decree directs tl1e sale or delivery of 1mn1ovable property, and the imn1ovable is situated \Vitl1in tl1e jt1risdiction of a11other court, the decree should be , st1its for the recovery tra11sferred for execution to tl1at court. As we l1ave seen 13 a.nd the same reasoning , suits tl1e at 1gl1t brot of imn1ovable property 111t1st be \voulcl reqt1ire tl1at proceedings i11 exect1tio11 of i111111ovable property be brought there as well. Tl1ere is 110 comparable reqt1irem.ent respecting movable property, and it is st1bn1 itted tl1at tl1e cot1rt sl1ot1ld not be required to transfer a decree involving execL1tio11 on n10\1able property situated outside the local li1nits of its jurisdiction. 1-Io\vever, tl1e cot1rt would JJrobably direct st1cl1 a transfer if the n1ovable property were situated i11 a distant place.
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Tl1e court transferring a decree for exect1tio11 sl1all send a copy of tl1e decree, a certjficate stating that satisfactio11 of tl1e decree l1as not bee11 obtained by execu tion \Vitl1in its jt1risdiction, or the extent of partial satisfaction, if tl1is is tl1e case, and a copy of any order for exec11tio11 it may have made or if no such order l1as !llade, a certificate to tl1at effect. 14 Tl1e transfer n1ay be made without 11otice to the Judgment-debtor, 15 since he will be notified of tl1e exect1tion proceeclings by the transferee court. 16 Tl1ere is no JJrol1ibition against the transferring court sending the decre� to n1ore tl1a11 one court for execution, bt1t the better practice would be to_ send it to only one cot1rt at a time. If it is sent to n1ore tl1an 011e court, there 1s the dange� 7 tl1at both ot1rts ,viii si1nt1lta eot1sly exect1t tl1 e decree, necessitatin_g . _ � � � restitLttion. Tl1e transfer 111ay be recalled 1f tl1e transferr111g cot1rt concludes that it \1/as not necessary, e.g., tl1ere is su'fJicie11t property witl1 tl1e jt1risdiction of tl1e trans _ ferring court to satisfy tl1e decree. 1 8
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8 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 372(1). 9· �1 v. K ish?ri (I-Iig h Ct., Lal1ore,_ 1941 ), 1942 AII-J11dia Rep., p. 123. lO. �:: . �·�ri as v. N atio11al I11surance Co. (f-l1g l1 · 3 21 · , Rep. P AllIndi a Ct. ' Calcutta ' 1931 · ) ' 1932 ll. Civ Pro C., Art .373(2)· c here . ,v that ompare provides Civ. Pro. · wl1ich Art C. 26(1) . im�olva· bie prop�rtr is s1tuated within the jurisdict ion' of dlfferen t 'courts' local jurisdi· cti on hes in ei·t 1er court ,v1tl11n the lo · tuated. · . . . si ca l ' s r 1 Iffil ·t s · O f ,roperty w 1 1ose Jur1sd1ct1011 any portion of the 1 . 1?- · s·Ince im t movable propert. y niay be executed men the P for u pon in a suit ,vhere a decree .1ct1�Y of of money is �·s u� d' .I� does 11ot matter tJ1at the im1novable is not within the jurisd on the court wbic� issue the de cree. It m ay still order execution on su cl1 property. 1 3 · Civ· pro. C., Art. 25 (1) (a). . 14. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 3 73(1). 15. See N ehar v. Anatl1 (Hi h Ct., Patna, 1956), 1956 All-J11dia Rep., p. 269. 16. See Civ. Pro. c., Art. is6(l) · 1 7 · See the djscu 8 · R 0r t is by ed., 11t in D. Mulla, Tl1e Code of Civil Procedure (12tl1 Mitter, 1953)� ���- 1, � � 7. 18. See Saralabala v. Shyan; (Hig 1 1 Ct., Calcutta , 1953), 1953 All-India Rep., p. 765.
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-----The trafl:sfer is effective when made, even tho11gl1 a copy of the decree or tile required cert1�cates have not been filed. 19 Tl1e transferee court is directed to execute the decree wr�hout f Lirther ��oof . 11nl �ss the court! for any special reason to be recorded, requires such proof. Th1s ra1s �s the 911 �st1on of tl1e scope of inqtiiry tI1at can be made _by tl1 : tr �nsferee court. Obv1011sly, 1t 1.s to be very limited, as tI1e ''special reason'' prov1s1on 1nd1cates. !t l1as been he!d i11 India that the transferee co11rt n1ay refuse to exec11te tl1e decree 1f the transferring court lacked j11risdiction to render it 21 a11d tl1e same should be tr11e in Ethiopia, since tbe transferee court sbot1ld n'ot execute a dec ree rendered in a case tl1at tl1e transferri11g court l,ad. no power to _ hear. Th11s, 1f tl1e case sh.ot1ld l1ave been brot1gl1t before the I-Iigh Cot1rt, the transferee court may reft1se to exec11te a decree transferred by an Awradja Guezat Cotirt on the grouncl tl1at the transferring court lacked material j11risdiction. The san1e wot1ld ·be true if it were clear tl1at tl1e transferri11g court lacked j11dicial jurisdiction. However, sit1ce tl1e lack of local jurisdiction is waived if not raisecl and does not constitt1te grounds for reversal on appeal unless it has ca11sed injus tice,22 the transferee co11rt sl1011ld not refuse to exec11te tl1e decree on that grot1nd. So too, if the decree is clearly illegal, e.g., it enforces an agreement to obtai11 a divorce,23 it wo11ld seen1 tl1at tl1e transferee court sl1011ld be able to reft1se to e.xect1te it.�4 Except in these circ11n1stances, tl1e transferee co11rt sl1ould exect1te tl1e decree without ft1rther inq11iry. It is clear that the transferee cot1rt cannot alter, vary or add to tl1e terms of the decree.25 However, where tl1e decree is a1nbigt1011s, tl1e transferee court cai1 resolve tl1e a1nbiguity. So, ,vhere tl1e confirmi11g decree of tl1e appellate court failed . to mention the costs of tl1e original proceeding, tl1e transferee cot1rt co11ld refer to tl1e decree of the lower co11rt to detern1ine wl1at costs ,vere a,varded. 26 Also, if tl1e decree 11as been· appealed and n1odified by the a1Jpellate cot1rt, the tra11sferee co11rt can execute it as n1odified.27 The transferee co11rt is directed to exec11te tl1e decree, and in doing so, it l1as the same powers as if it l1ad passed the decree itself. 28 It retains tl1e IJower to execute the decree notwithstanding that an appeal l1as bee11 take11 fro1n t11e juclg ment i11 the suit. 29 However, it is only a11thorizecl to exect1te the decree, and, tbere fore, it may not transfer tl1e decree for executio11 to still anotl1er cot1rt. 30 Wl1ere it executes the decree, it shall certify tlus fact to the transferring cot1rt; if it fails to execute, it sl1all advise that co11rt of the circu1nstances attendi11g s11ch failure. 31
19. 20. 21. 22. 23 .
24.
25. 26. 27 . 28. 29. 30. 31.
See Perumal v. Kottaya (Higl1 Ct., :tv!adras, 1945), 1946 A_ll-Jndia Rep., p. 16?. The transferee court must see to it that the reqt1ired copies and certificates are filed. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 373(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 373(2). See Janendra v. Rabindra (Privy Council, India, 1932), 1933 All-India Rep., p. 61; Kiran Singh v. Chaman (St1p. Ct., India, 1954), 1954 All-India Rep., p. 340. Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 10(2). See Civ. C., Art. 17(2). See the discussion in S. Sarkar, The La1v of Civil Proceclure (4th ed.! 1963), vol. 1, P· 65, and Mee11ak.shi v. Chidambram (High Ct., Madras, 1946), 1947 All-India Rep., P· 341. See Prannath v. Mahadayal (H.igl1 Ct., Lal1ore, 1932), 1932 All-India Rep., P· 601 . See Babulal v. Ganpat (High Ct. , Patna, 1958), 1958 All-India Rep., p. �06. . See Bangar v. Kalidindi (H.igli Ct., A.ndhra Praclesl1, 1956), 1957 All-Ind1a Rep., p. 403 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 374(1). te era op t 11o es do eal an app of ing tak the t tha te No . See Bangar v. Kalidindi, sr,pra, note 27 as a stay of execution. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 332. . . Rep., vol. 3, p. 512. L. /1an /11c 8), 187 See Shib Narain v. Bepin Behary (I-ligl1 Ct., Calcutta, Civ. Pro. C., Art. 374(2).
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prive the court which tra t de no es do n io ut e ex r fo ee cr de � nsThe transfer of the o ay t m als ur co der exec utio n 0 at or Th . 1gs d11 ee oc pr e tl1 er ov f .: d 1·t 0f control 1erre .: e t m d n e · 3'- S o, 1· f the J· udg bt or h as so r. 1e ns tra me e th o pr g i11 nd sta itb tw no ee cr de e th ty d er an op pr at th transfer the decree on e ut ec ex ay m it , on cti di ris ju perty within its cree fo r the balance . As we ha ve e de tl1 e ut ec ex to ns io ct re di tl1 wi t0 another Court s ��' 1t oe fi 33 an d 1·r 1t · d · , er y ns ma tra e tl1 entertain all rec n ca t ur co . g rin fer ns tra e tll _ seen . . ed rn tu 1s ee re cr y de An e th before application en ev n io ut ec ex . r fo n tio ca pli ap an t which passed the decree.3s The ur co e th to e ad m be st mu on uti ec ex for a stay of le s a ab e rea r on tim fo ee to c de th le ab of en n _ tio ecu ex � the y sta y ma urt co ; e transfere 3 bu t 1s no t authorized t grant a stay itself. y, sta a h � suc for ply ap to tor eb _ t-d en judgm s _ to question the validity of ire des tor deb t 1en g1: jud the ere wh en, tok e : sam By tl1e 1ng co err s rt, ugh an ho alt t he In � he ion est qu may ! the ? � se rai st n1u he tile transfer, . to se e _ the rai t1m l11m quest�on.3 7 Any e giv to y st a r rt f cou ee sfer tran � ? apply to the . order of tl1e transferring court ID relation to the execution _of the decree 1s binding on tl1e transferee court. 38 I-1owever where a court has seized the property of the _ erty or the debtor or directed l1is arrest, it 1nay order tl1e restitution of the prop discharge of the judgment-debtor pe11ding tl1e result of the execution, and the trans feree court l1as sucl1 power wl1ere it l1as seized property or directed the arrest of the judgment-debtor. 39 Note tl1at tl1e fact tl1at such an order has been issued does not prevent the property from bei11g seized subsequently or tl1e judgment-debtor from being re-arrested in execution of tl1e decree.40 In summary, tl1e C.ode provides a convenient procedure by which the decree may be execl1ted by another court. The court to whicl1 tl1e decree is transferred for execution must exect1te the decree as passed and cannot vary or alter it. It can only reft1se to execute the decree if it conclt1des tl1at tl1e transferring court la.eked jurisdiction to render it or that the decree is clearly illegal. It cannot stay execution except to grant a ten1porary' stay so that an application for a stay can b_e made to tl1e trans�erri11g court. It is bot1nd by any order passed by tl1e transfer ring col1rt, althot1gl1 1t may deal witl1 property as to which it has issued an order of exect1tion. 2. Po,vers of the Court upon Execution It is important to ren1ember that execution is essentially a separate proceeding. A decree is 11ot execl1ted automatically, bt1t only 11pon application by tl1e decree holder to tl1e court whicl1 issued tl1e decree. 41 However, 011ce an application is ma.de tl1e c_ourt ��e?uting tl1e decree l1as co1nplete control over the proceedi11gs, and all queSlto�s arising between tl1e parties i11 tl1e s11it in wl1ich tl1e decree was pas sed d once rning mine the exec ution , deter discl 1arge be or satis n1us facti t o11 decr of tl1e ee �Y tl1at court and not by a separate suit. 42 Tl1e theory is tl1at tl1e execution 32· See Darsan v. Baldeo (I-Iigl1 Ct., Patn a' 1946) ' 1946 All-L,,d',a Rep., p. 365. 33 . See Sara1abaIa v. Sl1yam, supra, ,1o te 18. 34· S e Walchau<l v. Yeshwant (High � Ct., Bombay ' 1948) ' 1949 All-India Rep., p. 379, 35 · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 376(1). 36.
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37. S� the discussion of this p oint in S . Sarkar, supra, note 24 at p. 432. 38. C v . Pro. c., Art. _37 6(4)_ � 39. C1 . Pro. C., Art. 376(2). . : 40. Ibid.. Before orderin of . e g a r s ta h O s f e Y xecution _or the restitution of property or the d i. c a g ose the Judgment-debtor � co tt r� m�y requ1re security from the judgment-deb tor ao d imp such conditions upo� th him a s it tl1inks fit. Civ 41. . Pro . C ., Art · 376(3.)· C1.'v . Pro· c , Art. 42. C1v. Pro. C.,. Art. 378(1). 375(1).
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------pr�ceeding must have the �ame finality as the origi �al suit, and that all questions regarding · the execution must be raised before the \Vlitch could have been raised 4� The decision of the court on decree. the execution is sttbject to ecutin ¥ cotirt � appeal, but 1f !lo appeal 1s ta�en, the pr?ceedings are final, and what happened in those p�oceedrngs ca ?not furrush the ba�1s for a separate suit between the part ies. We will now examine the effect of this rule. The rt1le covers the p�rties to tl1e suit .and their representatives. Any question as to wq.e�h �r any· p�rson 1s the repr�sentat1ve of a party to the suit for tl1e pur pose of ra1srng q11est1cns as to execution sl1all be determined by the court executing the decree.45 For these p11rposes ''representative'' not only includes the legal repre sentative of a party, b11t a representative in interest sucl1 as the transferee of the interest of the de.cree-l1older or judgn �ent-debtor.46 If tl1ere is a question as to whether a person 1s tl1e transferee of either party, tl1at question is to be determin ed in the exec11tion proceedings so long as tl1e rigl1ts of the transferee are affected by the execution.47 ''Representative'' \vould tht1s include a purchaser, lessee or mortgagee of tl1e property of the jt1dgment-debtor, which has been attacl1ed.48 A party to the original suit who i s affected by the execution proceedings n1ust raise any questions regarding tl1e executio.n before the court exec11ting the decree not'vvitl1standing tl1e fact that the original suit against l1im was dismissed.49 Any q11estion involving tl1e purchaser of the property in the execution sale would also have to be raised under this rt1le. 50 ''Any question concerning the executio11, discharge or satisfaction of tl1e decree'' must 'be broadly construed in order to effectuate the purpose of the r11le. A con1promise intended to govern the liability of tl1e judgment-debtor tinder the decree and to affect tl1e ti111e and manner of e11forcen1ent can be recorded and enforced under this rule,51 and a· separate suit cannot be bro11ght on tl1e compromise agree ment. Any question as to tl1e existence of such an agreement can be determined by t11e court executing the decree. 52 If the legal representative of a deceased j udg rnent-debtor contends that property attached belo11gs to l1im a11d not to the debtor, l1e n1ust raise tl1e question before tl1e co11rt exect1ting tl1e decree. 53 ·upon the death of the debtor, tl1e representative ·became a party to tl1e s11it, and it does not 1natter that anotl1er person whose property was wrongft1lly attached could bring a separate 43. See the disct1ssion of tJ1is point is S. Sarkar, supra, 11ote 24 at p. 76. See also Civ. �ro. C., Art. 5 as to "questions \Yhicl1 could l1ave been raised." The effect_ is that 110 quest10!1 _ regarding execution, discharge or satisfaction can be raised by t?e parties 1_ n a separate suit whether or not that question \Vas explicitly raised in the execution proceedings. 44. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 374(1), 320(1). The order of the court �n the exec�1tio� proceedings constitutes a final judgn1ent \Vithin the meaning of Art. 3�0(1). S,n�e execution 1s a separate proceecling, an a.ppeal can be taken from tl1e final order 1n execution as well as from the judgment of the court on tl1e merits of the case. 45. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 375(2). 46. See Isban Chu.oder v. Beni Madbub (1-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, 1897) Indian L. Rep., vol. 24, P· 62. 47. See Ademma v. Subbamma (High Ct., Madras, 1942), 1942 All-lnclia Rep., p. 714 (question as to the validity of tl1e purported assignment). 48. See the discussion in S. Sarkar, supra, note 24 at p. 79. 49. See Kalu v. Thandavan (High Ct., Madras, 1932), 1933 All-India Rep., p. 340. 50. See Ganapatby v. Krishnamachariar (Privy Council, l11dia, 1917), 1917 All-India Rep., p. 121. 51. See Seghal Bros. v. Bharat Bank (I-ligh Ct., Punjab, 1961), 1961 All-lnclia Rep., p. 439. 52. See Muhan1mad K.asim v. Rukia Begam (High Ct., Allahabad, 1919), . ludian L. Rep., vol. p. 443. As t o the po,¥ers of the cot1rt with respect to compromise decrees see genera Y Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 274-277. 53. See Harbhagwao v. Rughnath (Chief Ct., Sind, 1940 ), 1941 All-India Rep., p. 142.
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suit witli respect to the property.s4 Followin� are some o�her exa!J?ple of questions th t ust be raised before the court executing the decree. (I) � ]aim of compensa ti:n ��r damage caused by tl1e judgment-debtor to property .prior to sur!endering possession ;ss (2) cl� im by t�e judgn1ent-debto: tl1at the decree-holder � ook 1n execu tion property not included _ in tl1e de� ree or 1n excess of the decree,_ 5 (3) clai_ m for refund or deficie11cy follow1ng execution on mortgaged property where an error in the amount of n1ortgage is subsequently discovered. 57 In all of these cases a separate suit by the affected party would be barred. So too wl1ere a decree is passed for the possession of property conditional upon the de�ree-l1older's IJaying a sum of n1oney, wliicl1 is paid·, . but possession is not delivered tl1e decree-l1older must apply to the court executing the decree for an order of' possession and cannot bring a separate suit. 58 Or, wl1ere the judgment debtor contends tl1at the exectition sale sl1ould be set aside dt1e to the fraud of the decree-l1older, l1e 111ust apply under this section and cannot bring a suit to set aside the sale. 59 In India, tl1ere is a split of at1thority as to whether the purchaser of property at tl1e execution sale n1ay bring a separate suit for possession or whe ther l1e 1nay only a1Jply to tl1e court exect1ting tl1e decree for an order putting him into possession.Tl1e disagreement exists as to both decree-l1older purchasers and otl1er purcl1asers. S0111e courts hold tl1at tl1e pt1rcl1aser is a representative of the decree-l1older and assu1ni11g tl1at tl1e decree-l1older may not bring a separate suit, tl1e pt1rcl1aser may not do so ejther. 60 l t seems to n1e tl1at botl1 the decree-holder purcl1aser and otl1er pt1rcl1aser sl1ould be reqt1ired to proceed before the court execu ting the decree a11d shot1ld not be able to bring a separate st1it. Since that court has tl1e po\ver to IJUt tl1e purcl1aser i11to possessio11, there is no reason for him to bri11g a separate suit, and in view of tl1e desirability of having all questions relating to exectition deter1nined by tl1e court executing tl1e decree, a sepa.rate suit should be barred. TI1e rule also prol1ibits the asserti11g of defences tl1at involve matters which co11ld have been raised before the co11rt executing the decree. St1ppose tl1at the decree-11older obtains in1111ovable property in satisfaction of tl1e decree. Subsequently there is ,1 suit for possession against tl1e jt1dg1nent-debtor.6 1 The judg1nent-debtor conte11ds tl1at I1e has satisfied tl1e decree a11d tl1at, tl1erefore, tl1e sale of the pro perty _to the decree-holder is void. Since tliis question relates to the execution proceed ings, �t sl1�uld l1ave been raised before the cot1rt executing the decree and cannot be raised 1n the st1bsequent suit.62 H _o\vev �r, tl1e rule only applies to questions concerning the exect1tion, discharge e decre tl1e r sat1sfact1on the decree. It co11cerrung of does not apply to qt1estions ? itself or n1atters 11nrelated to exect1tion. S·uppose tl1a.t tl1e legal representative of the 54 A sujt by such a person 'Yo�ld be authorized under Civ. Pro. c., Art. 421. It is imm ater}al · that any_ other perso11 cl�1m111g th�t the property of tl1e judgn1ent-debtor belongs to biol could _bring � separate suit. See. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 421 Si.nee the representative is a party to the suit, l1e 1s bound by tl1e J)rovisio11s of Art. 375. 55. See L lbu Bai v. Mol1an (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1925), 1925 All-India Rep., p. 385. � 56. rru Mahata v. Sl1yama Churn (1-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, 1895), Indian L. Re p., vol. 22, ���S�.
57. See Harnam v. Muhammad (High Ct., Allahabad, 1905), [11dia11 L. Rep., vol. 27, P· 48S. 58. See R man v. Jai Ram (I-Iigl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1920), 1921 All-India Rep., p. 369. � 59. See Ctv. Pro. C., Art. 445 a11d tl1e discussion, infra note 470 and accompanying text. 60. See the a·iscussion · · D. Mulla, supra, note 17, at 'pp. 195-196 and the cases cited ther ein. m 61. In th· JS cas� the cou�t apparently held that a separate suit could be brought by the decreeholder aga111St tl1e Judgment-debtor. 6-? . See Lakshman Chandra v. Ramdas Mo dal (High Ct., Calcutta, 1929), 1929 All-I11dia Rep., P· 3 74·
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deceased mortgagor claims that _the J?fO J?erty · allegedly mortgaged belonged to him rather tha� to the deceased._ This obJec_t1on goes to tl1 e validity of tlie decree and does not involve the_ ex�cut10 � proceed1ngs as stich.. Conseqtieiitly, even thotlgh lle is a party_ to . tl1� stut, ��s claim_ need not �e presented t ? tl1e _cot1rt executing the decree, since 1t ts not a qtiest1on concern1ng tl1 e execution d isclJ arge or satisfac tion o� the decree.".63 Or, a dispt1t � ru-ises bet:"�en the decree�l1older and a purport ed ass1 �nee of_ the decree �oncer111ng tl1e val1d1ty of tl1e assignment. Assttnling that the assignee 1s not at�empti11 g to �xecute on tl1e decree,64 e.g., he n1 erely seeks to rec?''er the proceeds of tl1 � exect1t1on fro111 tl1e decree�holder, the qt1estion of tl1 e ass1gnn1ent need 11ot be .raised before tl1e co11rt executing tl1 e decree.Gs It involves an assignment of tl1e decree and not its exect1tion, discl1 arge or satisfaction. It is very inlJ)Ortant to ren1e111ber tl1 at tl1e J)roceedings in execution are analo go11s to a suit on tl1e origi11al clai111. J1ist as all q11estions relating to a st1it 1n11st be raised at tl1at tin1e, 66 all qttestions co11cerning th.e exec11tion, discharge or satis faction of the decree n1ust be raised before tl1 e court executing tl1e decree and not by a separate suit. Finally, where a s11it by tl1e jt1dgment-debtor against tl1e decree-holder is pend ing in any court, tl1 e cot1rt whicl1 iss11ed the decree n1 ay, on sucl1 ter1ns as to security or otherwise a.s it tl1 inl<s fit, stay the exect1tion of the decree until the pending siiit has beet1 decided. 67 Tl1 e tl1 eory is that if tl1e jtidgn1 ent-debtor is suc cessf11l in the suit, tl1 ere \.Vill be cross-decrees, wl1icl1 may cancel ot1t or 111 ay reqture execution of a lesser a1not1nt. 68 Therefore, tl1 e court is given tl1e discretion to stay exect1tion until the pending suit has been decided. Note tl1at the otl1er st1it � may be pending in a11y court and need not be 1)e11di11 g it1 tl1 e cot1rt ,vJ1icl1 issued the decree. Howe,,er, only the cot1rt which isst1ed the decree 111 ay stay execu tion; execution n1ay not be stayed by the co11rt in which tl1 e other suit was filed. B.
Proceedings in Execution In this section we will consider how tl1 e decree-l1 older institutes exec11tion pro ceedings and tl1 e procedure to be followed i11 s11cl1 J)roceedings. We \.Vill 11 ot at .this time be concerned witl1 the act11al attacluuent and sale of property in satisfaction of tl1e decree, wl1ich will be discussed in tl1 e next section. 1 . Application for Execution (a) General provisions It may be tl1at the jt1dg1nent-debtor will satisfy the de� ree v� It1ntarily, e.g., I? ay the a1nount dt1e tinder tl1e decree to tl1e decree-l1older, 1n wl11cl1 case execution proceedings are tinnecessary. 69 However, if the decree is ·not satisfied by tl1e j t1dg63.
64. 65. 66. 66. 67. 68 . 69.
See Ramaswamy v. u Tun T11a (Higl1 Ct., R�goon, 1��9), 1940 All-I11dia Rep., p. 161. . .between tl1e deceased The representative would not be bound by the Judgment 1n the suit and the decree-holder, sin.ce ]1e is not claiming through th� deceased. See C1v. Pro. C., Art. 5(1). As to the power of the assignee to execute tl1e ?ecree, see Civ. . Pro. C., Art. 38 �. Wl!ere the assignee is trying to execute the decree, be 1s bound by tl11s rule. See the d 1scuss1on, supra, note 46 a.nd accompanying text. See Sarab Sukh v . Prem Dutt (l-ligh Ct., Lal1ore, 1936), 1937 All-India Rep., p. 465. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(2). See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 377. Tl1e posting of security is not ma.ndatory. See _Nars1df� vb . Mand e goo harsingh (High Ct., Bombay, 1930), 1931 All-India Rep., p. 247. Ho\.vever, 1t wou practice to require it in most cases. See Civ. Pro. c., Art. 397 and tlie discussion, i11fra, notes 195-196 and _acco� pan�ing text. As to payment out of court, see Civ. Pro. C., Art. 396 and the d1scuss1on, 111/ra, notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
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n io in s ut ec ng di ex ee by applying to oc pr te itu st in ay m r de ol -h ee cr . de e th . ment-debtor ' c· 10 . t n 1 t1o r s cu 1o xe s es oc pr ue iss te to No � ee cr de e th that d . sse pa h iic wl . t ur co the o 1s1 ov l pr s b era ca pli ge ap e tl1 t le to the tha d n � a. . it st1 ? te ara sep a file t no es do he t1on. In a sense the 1 ecu ex 1 gs din ee oc pr to ble ca . ! pli ap t no are ts sui _ institution of al s g1n 1t, d on an tl1e the of e 11 11a tin con original � � a are ion cttt exe in . gs din . cee pro _ pl1 e ap ation . may be made Th ed. 1sfi sa 1s ree dec the � � t1l 11n sed clo y l a.l fin t no is suit s been given tune to satisfy ha he 1f lt: au def in is or ebt t-d 1e11 gn jud the as n soo _ as 71 the application may be made wl1en tl1e time has passed without the , ree dec the n upo the de ma be y passing of the ma it ise, erw otl1 d; sfie sati n bee ng avi h decree's decree. 72
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The application must contain tl1e following information: (I) tl1e number of the suit; (2) tl1e names of tl1e parties; (3) tl1e date of th� decree; .(4) whether an appeal 11as been preferred ; 73 (5) \Vl1 at payment or other. adJustment, . 1f any, has been made subsequently to tl1e decree; (6) whether any previous appl1_ � at1?ns for execution have been n1ade, a11d if so, the dates a11d res11lts of the a.ppl1cat1ons; 74 (7) the amount d11e UJJOU tl1e decree, witl1 i11terest, if any, or otl1er relief granted, together with tl1e partic11lars of a.ny cross-decree, whetl1er passed before or after the date of the decree sougl1t to be execL1ted ;75 (8) the an1ount of costs awarded, if· any; (9) the nan1e of tl1e person against who1n exec11tion is so11gl1t; and (10) the mode76 in ,vl1icl1 tl1e assistance of tl1e court is req11ired. 77 The application sl1all be in writing a11cl sigi1ed and verified in tl1e sa111e 111anner as a pleading, and a certified copy of tl1e decree so11ght to be exec11ted sl1all be annexed. 78 WI1ere tl1e application seeks tl1 e attacl11ne11t of n10,1able l)roperty belonging to tl1e. judgment-debtor, it shall be accompa11ied by a11 in,1e11 tory of tl1 e property co11taining a reasonable description of tl1e same. 79 Where the applicatio11 seeks tl1e attacl1n1ent of immovable property, it sl1all contain a descriptio11 of tl1e JJroperty in accordance with Civ. Pro. C., Art. 225(2), 80 and a s1Jecifi.catio11 of tl1e j11dgment-debtor's interest in such property to tl1e extent believed or ascertained by the applica11t. 81 If s11ch a description is lackng, the application sl1o·uld. be returned to the applicant witl1 directions to furnish tl1e description witl1in ,1 prescribed 1Jeriod of time.s 2 70.
71 72.
7 3. 74· 75 ·
76.
C_iv. Pro. C.,. Art. 378(_1). If tl1e decree-l1older is dead, the application may be made by his representative. See C1v. Pro. C., Art. 381(1) and Bl1ag\\,an v. Hiraji (I-ligh Ct., Bombay, 1932), 1932 All-lnclia Rep., p. 516. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 186. I-!e may also be pern1itted to n1a.ke pay111ent in instalments. Civ. Pro. C:, Art. 378(�). !t :"ould be good J)ractice for tl1e decree-l1older to \vait for a reasonable t1n1e before 1nst1tut1ng proceedings. \�here an appea_l I1as been l)referrecl, the aJ)pellatc court n1ay gra11t a stay of execution and t 1e c� urt e�ecuting the decree sl1ould be a\vare of this IJOssibility. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 332· _ . TI11 s 15 signif_ icant in l_ight of tl1e fact that a fresl1 application 111ay not be made after ten yea_rs fol�O\Vlng the ·fihng of the ftrst afJp}jcation. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 384. _ _ _ 115 101 T � _is I)Or�ant in light of the special provisions ap1)lica ble to the execut ion of cro ss d ecrees. 8 ee C1v. Pro. C., Arts. 397, 398. TI at i�, wl,ethe_r by the delivery of tl1e pro or sale 1 decreed a. n d nt Jert) � atta cl1111e by tl1e 1 e f 1t u t at as hrn e1�t o se JJrOJJ erty, b?' er . �:�1 ; �f � �:f f tl1e ap1Jointrne11t' 'of a receiver, or oth wi h r t 1e 1e g1 :a11ted may requtre. . C1v. Pro. C., Art. 378(3).
77· 78. lbicl. 79. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 379( 1). 80. Where tl1e property is en . . . UI·re re te re d �� th e registers of 11n111ovable property, tl1e court rnaY q the applicant to prodttc . e a cert1 fied extract fro111 th e register s· 81. Civ· Pro· C , Ar t. 379(2). · 82. See Na111bud irpad v. Koodalu r (l-Iigh Ct., Madras, 1 9 45), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 241.
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-----(a) Application by holders. of joint decrees Where a decree bas bee� passed jointly �n favor of several persons, any one _ de tl1e cre nle im e ss po ses a cond1t1on to the contrary, may apply for of them, � tl1e execution of tl1e who]� decree for tl1e benefit of all, or wl,ere one has diecl for tl1e benefit of tl1� st1rv1vors and tl1e legal representative of tl1e deceased. w11er� tl,e cot1 rt sees st1ffi.c1 e nt _ cat 1 se for allowi �g the dcc:·ce to be so exectited, it sllall make st1cl1 ord�r. as 1� clee 1 11s nc� ess�1ry for r:ru� ccli11g tl1e i 11 terests of the persons \Vllo ha\1e 1 1ot JOI_ned 111 ll1 e a.pJ)l1 ci1t1011.83 This 1s a rule designed for tile conveni ence of tl1e parties, a11 d tl1e cot1rt sl1ould grant pern1ission witJ1 a view toward achieving st1 cl1 conv �ni�nce. If tl1ere. are several parties so tJ1at a representative class st1it n1ay l1ave bee n Jt1st1fied t111de� C�v. Pro. C., Art. 38, one l1older of tl1 e joint decree shot1ld be able to file tl1 e appl1cat 1 0 11 0 1 1 bel1alf of tl1 e otl1ers. Or, if one of the decree-l1olders is outside of tl1e jurisdictio1J, tl1e other sl1 ould be able to apply for execution. ''Joint decree'' l1 as been interpreted to mean a decree passed in favor of two or n1ore persons, althot1gl1 tl1eir share or interest in the decretal an1 ount 111 ay be different.84 Suppose that C issues a negotiable instrl1rnent to A and B jointly i11 tl1e aroot1 nt of Etl1 . $ 5,000, and that tl1 e court enters judg111ent in favor of A and B against C in the an1ount of Eth. $ 5,000, directing tl1 at A receive Eth. $ 2,000 and B receive Eth. $ 3,000. Tl1is is a joint decree, since it is passed in favor of two persons, altl1 ot 1 gl1. tl1 e decretal a111 ounts are different.85 Ho\\1ever, if A and B join clain1.s againsst C arising fro1n tl1 e same transa.ction and involving a comn1 0 11 questio11 of law or fact, 86 and tl,e co11rt iss11es a decree .in favor of A in tl1 e an1ot1nt of Etl1 . $ 2,000 a.11d a. decree in favor of B in tl1 e amount of Etl1 . $ 3,000, tl1 ere is not a joint decree. Altl1ougl1 tl1e claim 111 ,l)' be joined, eacl1 party is su ing on l1is separate clain1, and separate decrees are passed. The corres1)onding provision of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 21, r11le 15, has bee 11 interpreted to inclt1 de tl1 e situatio11 wl1 ere a decree l1as become joi11 t by transfer or by operation of Ia,v. So, where tl1e decree-l1 older dies, leaving several l,eirs, 011 e l1eir ·may exect1 te the decree 011 bel1alf of tl1e others, 87 or wl1ere t]1e decree J1 as been assigned to two or n1ore perso11s jointly, 011 e joint assignee may exect1te on bel1alf of tl1e otbers. 88 Tl1 ere is no reaso11 wl1y sucl1 a11 i11 terpretation sl1011ld not be followed in Etl1iopia, si11 ce tl1 e i 11 terests of the several parties l1ave become joint. Where tl1e joi11 t decree specifies tl1 e i11 terest of each decree-l1older, eacl1 n1ay execute lus 1)ortio11 of tl1e decree. I11 tl1 e case wl1ere A and B obtained a joint decree agai 1 1st C for Eth. $ 5,000, and tl1e decree directed that A receive Etl1 . $ 2,000 and B receive Etl1. $ 3,000, A may exect1te tl,e decree for Etl1. $ 2,000 and B may execute it for Etl1. $ 3,000. 89 Or, if i11 a s�it_ for posses_sion of land by A and B against C tl1 e co11rt declared tl1at eacl1 pla1nt11f was entitled to a certain part of tl1e land, 'eacl1 n1ay execute as to tl1at . part. 90 However, if _ tl1 e decree were simply tl1at A and B were entitled to possession of tl1e land aga111 st 83.
84. 85. 86. 87. 88. · 89. 90.
Civ. Pro. c., Art. 380. It n,ay decide to require _ the posting_ of_ security· in order to protect _ 111 tl1e application. See Valchand v. Manek the interests of the perso11s 'vvl10 have not Joined bai (High Ct., Bombay, 1952), 1953 All-Jnclia Rep., p. 137. See Yusuf v. Sallel1 (Chief Ct., Sind, 1927), 1928 All-India Rep., p. 37. Se.e the ·disct1ssion in D. Mulla, supra, note 17 at p. 770. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35. See Khadin, v. Abdur (l-Jjgh Ct., Allahabad, 1956), 1956 All-India Rep., p. 575. See Sbanka.r Hari v. Dainodar Vyankaji (Higl1 Ct., Bon1bay, 1944), 1945 All-/11clic1 Rep., p. 380. See the discussion in D. Mu Ila, srrpra, 11ote 85 at p. 770. P· 4. 10, . vol p., Ap ian Ind 3), 188 ia, Ind il, unc Co ivy (Pr ri See Hurris1, Cl,under v. Kalisunde
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to ve e ha fil ul wo an e on i pl � or ap , in jo ti ca to ve on l1a d til wo B d an A tl1 bo C to eb t-d r l1as paid one en m e dg th Ju re 1e wl , ly se er nv Co . tl1 bo of _ t� execute on behalf le e l1o e th w e ut cr ec de ex t e, no t ay bu m r l1e ot ay e m tl1 e, 1 ar s1 1 is 1 r de ol -ll ee cr de joint 91 . re 1a sl is h to execute only a s
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(c) Application by transferees ng iti or by operation wr in t en 11m sig as by red fer ns tra is e cre de Where tl1e 92 011ce th tion is granted ca pli ap n. tio ecu ex for � ply ap y 111a ee fer ns tra of la\\', tl1e ct to t bje he d su s an e me condi n ma me sa tl1e in � ted � c11 ex be )' � the decree ma _ . 3 9 . � r. de ol T -h l decree his includes na igi or e th by de ma re we 11 t10 1ca pl ap e th if as ns tio e ere nsf the y tra ma er; old ply e-h ap cre de nt for joi a of st ere int tlie of er nsf tra tI1e execution of l1is interest wl1ere ascertained or n1ay apply as a joint decree-holder.94 es. cre de of fer ns tra of r tte ma tl1e r de nsi co w no ll wi e W Where tl1e decree l1as been transferred by assignment and the assignee applies for execution, notice of tl1e application sl1all be given to the original decree-holder and tl1e judgn1ent-debtor; the decree sl1all not be exect1ted until the court has heard a11y objection eitl1er may l1ave to its execution. 95 Tl1e purpose of such notice is to perniit tl1e raisi11g of defe11ces to execution by the assignee, e.g., the assignee did not satisfy l1is agree111ent witl1 tl1e assignor or tl1e judgment-debtor to pay the assig nor.96 Note tl1at such notice is n. o t necessary wl1ere the transfer has been by opera tion of lav1. In India, tl1e assignee of a portion of the decree has been permitted to apply under this rule provided tl1e a.pplication is for execution of tl1e whole decree. 97 Also, in India, tl1e requirement of assig11n1ent of the decree has been strictly constrL1ed. Wl1ere a IJerson transferred by deed tl1e property in respect to \Vl1icl1 lie l1ad obtained a decree bt1t did not transfer tl1e decree, it was l1eld that tl1e transferee of tl1e JJroperty n1ight not apply for exect1tion under tl1is rule. 98 Tl1is interpretation is correct, since the r11le only a11th.orizes application by a trans feree of tl1e c!ecree and not by a tra11sferee of the interest of the decree-holder. liowever, it l1as also been l1eld tl1at tl1e transfer n1ust l1ave been made after the passing of the decree. Wl1ere A a.greed with C to transfer to l1im any decree th.at n1igbt be issued in his favor in a suit against B, and such a decree was subse quently passed, it was l1eld tl1at C might not c:1JJply for executjo11 under tl1is rule.99 �he co11rt reas ?ned tl1at C was not a transferee within tl1e 1neaning of tl1e rule, since at the tlme of the transfer, A \Vas not a decree-l1older; at that time no
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See :rarruk v. Divendrao (I-Iigl1 Ct., Calctitta, 1883), India,, L. Rep., vol. 9, p. 831. This is ontm�ent on th: fact that pay1nent be certified, since otl1erwise tl1e payn1ent cannot � �ecogru�ed. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 396. By the san1e toke11 \vl1ere tl1e judg111ent-de btor paid the entire amount to one joint decree-bolder, but the J)ay�1ent was not certifie d, the other decree-holder . could. execute on the an1ou11t due l1im. See Sl1ital Prasad Singh v. Sureudra Natl1 Cl1atterJee (I-I1gl1 Ct., Patna, 1949), 1950 All-l11dia Rep., p. 253. 92. C1_ v. Pr o. C., Art. 381(1). 93. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 381(2). 94. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 381(1). 95· Civ. Pro. c., t. 381(3). Tl1e form of notice is pre scribed in the Fourth Schedule. � _ 96. not tl1e d!scuss1on of_ t�is point in D. Mulla, supra, may t cour The note 1'7 at p. 778. e hav � 1der the v_al1 d1 ty of the assignment y ma ebtor but any objection the judgment-d to �x��� . 100· See Btlasrai v. Dt1rgadutt (High Ct. Bombay 1956) 1956 All-India Rep., P · 526· ' ' ' . l1ore V 97. See Kis · G" b & Co. (.Hi gh _ Ct , Calcutta, 1890), Indian L. Rep., v�l. 1 � 341 Note that this wa: :ifea case f 7, e ecre� _. tl o smce ap pl1cat1on by a holder of a joint decree, � was n o t issued in favor of _ a gned assi the assign ee. was There was but one decree, and he portion. 98. See Ram Piara v . su · (H. 65 r . aJ · ig h C · t. , Ja nu ., n e P u R an ia p d nd K -I ll as A hm . ) 0 ir 96 59 1 19 99. See Mahanaodi Reddi v. Venkatap pa (H igh Ct., Madras: 41): 1942 All-India Rep., p. 21· 19
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decree h �d been pas �ed in his favor. Such an interpretation is questionable. C had been .ass1 �ed the _ right to enforce a decree A migl1t obtain against B, and h .is situation 1s no different from that of the assignee �1110 obtained lus rigl1ts after tl1e de�ree_ was passed. . A will receive notice and may raise any q·uestions as to tl1e val1d1ty of .tl1e asstgnment. Therefore, it is submitted that the prior assignee should b e pernutted to apply under this rule. A transfer of tl1e decree by operation of law may arise in any of the follow ing ways: .(1) tl1e decree-holder l1as died, and tl1e decree l1as passed by devolt1tion or succession, 100 (2) tl1e decree-l1older has becon1e insolvent, and the decree has passed to the assig11ee or receiver; (3) a judgn1ent l1as been entered against the decree-holder in a.11other st1it, and· tl1e decree has been transferred i11 execution proceedings against him.1°1 Note tl1at tl1e provisions of the Code applicable to substitutio11 t1pon tl1e death or insolvency of a party to a st1it do not apply to proceedings in exect1tio11.102 The legal reJJresentative or the assignee or receiver sin1ply applies to execute tl1e decree 11nder this rule. However, the transfer of the proJJerty which is the st1bject matter of a suit does not operate as a transfer by operation of law of tl1e decree rendered in t11e st1it. Wl1ere A files a suit against C regarding certai11 property and wl1ile tl1e suit is pending transfers tl1e property to B, the transfer does riot operate to transfer a decree passed in the st1it to B, and B n1ay 11ot apply for execution under tl1is rule.1° 3 Wl1ere a decree for tl1e payment of 111oney against t\vo or n1ore persons l1as been transferred to one of them, either by assig111neL1t or operation of law, the transferee jt1dgn1et1t-debtor ca11not execute t]1e decree against tl1e otl1er judg111e11t debtor.104 The purpose of this rt1le is to force the transferee jt1dgn1e11t-debtor to proceed against his co-debtors by way of a su.it for contribt1tion, wl1ich is co11sicler ed a more appropriate proced11re.105 Theoretica]ly, \.Vl1e11 the decree-l1older's rigl1t and th.e judgment-debtor's liability becotne 1111ited in the sa1ue persot1, tl1e decree is satisfied.106 St1ppose tl1at A obtains a decree against B and C, and A dies, leav ing B as bis I1eir. B cannot exect1te the decree against C.107 Si11ce 1111cler st1b stantive Ja\v B and. C are botl1 liable to A, 108 B has no rigl1t of recovery against C unless lie bas paid n1ore than half of tl1e debt, 109 ancl he bas 11ot done so. Under the substantive law of contribt1tio11, l1e l1as no rigl1t to recover from C. In a sense l1is statt1s as co-debtor conflicts with I1is status as l1eir of A. Tl1is provision reflects a j11dgment tl1at in such a case I1is statt1s as co-debtor controls l1is rigl1ts and tl1at those rigl1ts sl1011ld be governed by tl1e st1bstantive law of contribl1tio11. No\v suppose tl1at A obtai11s a decree against B and C for Etl1.$ 5000; B _pays A Eth.$ 5000, and A �1ssigns the decree to lum. B cannot exec11te tl1e decree against C for Eth.$ 5000. but must instit11te a separate sttit against l1i111 in v1hicl1 l1e can 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.
See tl1e discussion in D. Mulla, The Code of Civil Proceclure (12th ed. by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 1, }). 775. See the discussion in S. Sarkar, The La1v of Civil Proceclure (4th ed., 1963), vol. 1, p. 416. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 49(3), 54(3). See Cl1imanlal !Iargovindas v. Gulamali (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1945), 1946 All-lnclia Rep., p. 272. The clecree itself must be transferred. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 381(4). See the discuission as to the purpose of the corresponding Indian rule in D. Mt1lla, supra, note 100 at p. 780. See also Anant v. Nagappa (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1908), lnclian L. Rep., vol. 32. p. 195. See the discussion of this view in S. Sarkar, supra, note 101 at p. 418. See Banarsi v. Maharani (High Ct., Allahabad, 1883), Indian L. Rep., vol. 5, p. 27. See Civ. C., Arts. 1908, 1971. See Civ. C., Art. 1897.
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ce sin se, s ca hi ht r rig are cle a to execute en ev is is Th O SO , 2 h$ Et · ' I · . recover on Y ree- ho Id er, and l�· is_ · this . kind d ec e th · _ ud pr s ha he e us ca be ly tl1e decree exists on l o n aw f h e t co t n b f o n 1? �t 1on er ut op e . These th . to . e ris es giv at tl1 n tio ua sit of u ec t t ex ns i. on where the dec ree ai ag n 1o 1ct str re e _th r fo 1:s oi as re e tl1 te . exanlples indica r. to eb d ten gm d Ju t in Jo a to ed er 11as been transf e the rul ere of w� the io� cat pli ap tl1e decree is s ate 1str ill1 e cas g vin lo\ fol Tile e st cre de ain � ag C tl taJ ob d B _an cl an D for A . . l,tw of n ltio er, op b)' transferred . g C as h. is heir. The vin lea s, die A 00 2,0 .$ Eth is re sha A's 1 icl1 wl of Etl1.$ 5,000, 000 , and B can execute the 2, 1.$ Etl of e11t ext tl1e to l1ed 11is ing ext en 1 tl decree is 1 1ot ble is li�a 1 r, �pp ev� 1 how wl1ere the n, itio hib pro e Tl1 0 o. 3,0o .$ Eth decree for decree was rendered against one j11dgment-debtor 1 n a capacity different than the capacity in v,1bicl1 tl1e decree wa_s transferred to l�im. A obtains a joint decree against B as tl1e legal representative of X and against C as the legal representative of Y. Tl1e decree is to be paid 011t of the estates of X and Y. A dies, leaving ve tati esen repr his capacity a.nd he in is B inst aga ee decr tl1e e Sinc . l1eir l1is as B st1cceeds to A's interest in l1is perso11al capa.city, l1e is not precluded from execut 11 Nor is tl1e prol1ibition applicable where 1 Y . of te esta the ing tl1e decree agai11st tl1e decree is not passed against defendants's jointly. A joins B an.d C as defend ants on tl1e gro11nd tl1at tl1ere is a con1mon question of law or fact in both st1its112 a11d obtains a decree against B for Et11.$ 1,0 00 and a decree against C for Etl1. $ 500. A assigns l1is decree against B to C. Since the decree has not been passed against B and C jointly, C may execute the decree against B for Etl1.$ 1,000.113 (d) Application against sureties and representatives A decree 1nay be exect1ted against a person who l1as become surety for the perforn1a11ce of tl1e decree or for a n1atter related to such performance. We must distingt1isl1 between tl1e person who I1as become surety for performance of the decree and the one vvl10 \Vas st1rety for perfor111ance of the original obligation. If A guaran teed B's debt to C, and C s11ed B, bt1t not A, C cannot obtain executron of his decree against B by n1aking A a party to the execution proceedings. The decree ra11 only against B and not against A. However, wl1ere- a person has become surety for tl1e l )erformance of all or part of a decree114 or for the restitution of property t�ken. i n exect1tio11 115 or for tl1e payn1ent of mo11ey or the fulfiln1ent of any cond.i t1on 1n1posed on a party pt1rs11ant to co11rt order the decree or order n1ay be exe�uted against him to the exte11t tl1at l1e l1as n1�de hi111self persot1ally liable, a11d J1e 1s deerned to be a !)arty to tl1e execution proceedings .116 WI1ere the j11dgn1ent-debtor dies before the decree bas been ft1.lly satisfied , tl1e decree-holder m�y apply to the co11rt wl1ich passed it for execution against tl1 e legal representative of tl1e deceased j11dgn1ent-debtor.111 Although the failure to add 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.
See Banarsi v. Maharani, supra, no te ] 07. See Panachand v. Sundrabai ( IIig - h Ct., Bombay, 1907),' l11. d'1an L• Rep., vol . 31 , P· 308· _ S ee C1v. Pro. C., Art.' 36(1). · · See Anant v Nagappa ' supra, no t e 8"-· w · t 1e 1·iab'lit 1 y w1tl1 e are l not at concerned tiJis point . · f o fhe l�iaebil�?-defenda11t to make contribtttion to anotl1er. This would dep end on the nature of ity of eacl1 to tl1e plaintiff. S ee Civ. Pro. c., Art. 33S(l) (c). S e e Civ. Pro. C., Art. 336 . to Civ. Pro. c:, Art. 382 Ti .15 . . . . tl1at he would l1ave to raise all que�t1ons relating • • } . !11eans execution, discharg Art. e Or satis action before the court ., C Pro . executing the decree. C1v. 375. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 38 3_
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tL1e legal representative within a one year period does not cat1se the sttit to abate t ts the proceedings ca.nnot continue until the legal representative has been brought o� record as. a party.1 19 In India, the �e is a split of authority as to whether failttre to bring 1n the legal representative renders void fu.rther proceedings, includ ing an execution sale. 120 In my opinion, the sounder view . is to hold that bis absence renders �oid any further proceedings. The court should not proceed where a named party 1s not on tl1e record. A stLit abates if the representative is not br?t1ght. in, wluch reflects . a policy reqt1iring tl1e presence of a named party, and this policy s]lot1ld be applicable to execution proceedings as well. While it is requir ed tl1at th_e a �plication be n1ade to the court wl1ich issued tl1e decree, if tl1e rep representative 1s n1ade a party by order of the court to which the decree was transferred, this should not affect the validity of tl1e proceedings.121 The point is that the proceedings should not contint1e t1nless tl1e representative is made a party. 2. Limitation We may now consider the matter of limitation. Tl1e Civil Procedure Code does not specify a period in wl1icl1 the first application to execute tl1e decree must be filed. Since the decree creates a11 obligation for the benefit of the decree-l1older, tl1e ordinary period of limitation for the enforcement of obligations, \vl1ich is ten years, 122 should be applicable, and if tl1e application is filed n1ore than ten years after tl1e date of the decree sougl1t to be exect1ted, it should be barred by limitation. The Code does provide a period o·f limitation for a second application, and all matters relating to a second applicatiot1 are gover11ed by the Code. 011ce an applicatio11 to execute a decree, otl1er tl1an one granting an i11junction, has been made, no fresh application may be entertained after tl1e expiratio11 of ten years from (I) the date of tl1e decree sougl1t to be executed, or (2) wl1ere tl1e decree or any subseqt1ent order directs the payment of money or the delivery of property to be made at a certain date or at rect1rring IJeriods, the date of tl1e defatilt.123 There is no restriction on tl1e nt1mber of applicatio11s that tl1e decree-l1older may make within tl1e ten year period. 124 Elowever, where one application l1as been rejected and a subseqt1e11t application raises the sa1ne qt1estio11s as did tl1e rejected one, e.g., tl1e decree-l1older seeks to execute on property that \Vas declared to be exempt from exect1tio11, 125 tl1e co11rt n1ay reject the application on tl1e grot1nd that the qt1estions raised in tl1e application have been decided previously. 126 Since tl1e restriction is only as to fresl1 applications, it is necessary to dis tinguisl1 a fresh application from one tl1at is a11cillary to an existing application 118.
Tbe provisions as to abatement do not apply to proceedings in execution. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 50(4). 119. See Rajlakshmi v. Bariamali (High Ct., Calcutta, 1954), 1955 All-India Rep., P. 573. 120. See the discussion and citation of cases in S. Sarkar, supra, note 101 at p. 92. The more recent tTe11d is to hold that further proceedings are void if the legal represe11tative lJas not been added. See Pashupati v. Usbapati (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta·, 1948), 1949 All-India Rep., p. 299. 121. See Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India (Privy Cot1ncil, India, 1928), 1928 All-ln.dia Rep., p. 162. 122. See Civ. C., Art. 1845. Altl1ough that articl� r�fers to co�tractual obligations, it represents the general period of Jim.itation as to all obligat1011s. See C1v. C., Art. 1677(1). 123. Civ. Pro. C., Art.. 38�. 124. A withdrawal of an application for execution should not be considered a witl1drawal of the suit within the meaning of Civ. Pro. C., Art. 278. -125. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 404. 126. See the discussio11 in D. Mulla, supra, note 100 at p. 203.
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e cr tl , l de ed ho ch eta at er . en be � s ! � may apply ha ty er op pr If g. in nd pe ill st that is e i , tim iod the per of ng ce sin n run he is still the er aft ty per pro t•·e f u O e l sa f or the too , 1·r th o e ' al appl1· �at1·on. 1"7 S urt co d ordered ha gin ori tl1e . on e cut exe trying to r n car bee , ied t ot1t no a ·subsequent l1as 1t t bu r bto -de ent 1. oin J'ud ' · • · · the of t o tt1e arres 1 1n t he meaning of t I · n wi t1o 1ca 1p ap sl1 fre a be t no . uld wo the · •or arrest app11ca. t10n 1· .·1on, r. · n 1· t1o 1ca 1or c11t p exe a ki d see file l? as 1 l a11 ng th.e _ rule.12s However, if the decree-holder 1e period ha s exp1r�d, _files an applica tl er aft d an y ert op pr n tai cer attachment of 1e la�ter a�pl1�at1on constitutes a tl ty, per P 1er otl of ent cl1m atta e f� . tion seeking tl1 t a_ppl!cat1on he sought the firs t�e In ._ red bar be 11ld wo and 1 1 tio lica app fresh g ow l(1n see the 1s l1e e attachment of sinc and ty, per pro c � cifi spe of ent m attach. to y tl1e r . t 1lla firs anc not and is barred is tion lica app ond sec the ty, per pro t differen 1 d, wh ere a n11mber of proper t 1 h er oth the n O . _ iod per 1 e tl � of ion irat exp _ the n.fter ies were attacl1ed 11r1der an appl1cat1on for exec11t1on, and only some were sold, an ication for execution, since application for tl1e sale of the otl1ers is not a fresh appl 130 Neitl1er is an application l1ed. attac beet1 dy alrea l1ave it involves properties that 131 , nor one to bring in the aside set is sale first for a re-sale made a.fter tl1e 132 It is 011l_y where the decree-l1older, . ebtor 11ent-d jt1dgi sed decea the of ve representati is trying to attacl1 property whicl1 ,vas not attacl1ed prev1011sly tl1.at tl1e application is considered a fresh one witl1i11 tl1e meaning of the rt1le. Thjs ,vo11ld include property as to ,vhicl1 attacl1111ent ,vas not so11ght previo11sly and property as to wl1icl1 attacl1111ent was s011gl1t, but not n1 ade. Also, where the decree-holder filed a.n application seel<ing deli\1ery of s_pecific property, b11t aba11doned it, he ca.nnot file a11otl1er applicatio11, seeking deli,,ery of tl1e san1e property after tl1e expiration of the period. Stated sin1ply, the decree-l1older cannot file a second application to attach or obtain any property after the expiration of tl1e period. In deter1nining wl1etl1er tl1e period l1as expired, tl1e following points sbot1ld be noted. Tl1e ''date of tl1e decree s011gl1t to be exec11ted'' means tl1e date when the partict1lar decree as to wl1icl1 enforcement is sought was iss11ed. So, where tl1e decree-l1older seelcs execution of the decree issued by the appellate court, tl1e date of the decree is the date ,vhe11 the decree was iss11ed by tl1at court, even tl1ough the appeal was only from a part of tl1e original decree.133 Where both a prelimi nary and a final decree are iss11ed, the date of the decree is that of tl1e final decree.134 Where tl1e decree is for the l)ayment in installn1 ents, tl1 e period ru11s from tl1e date of default as to each installnient. 135 If tl1e debtor were to make one pay111ent on May 1, 1956, and a second payme11t on June 1 1956 a fresl1 app)jcation as regards executio11 of the an1 ou11t of tl1e first pay1nent �ot1ld 'be barred on l\1ay 1, 1966, and a fresh a1)plication as regards tl1e executio11 of tl1e amot1nt of tl1e second payment would be barred on J11ne 1, 1966. Wl1ere there has been a sub sequent order, tl1e period r11ns from the date of tl1 e order rather than from the 127. See �howdl1rY Paroosl1 Ra m v. Kali (High Ct., Ca lcL1tta, 1890), Indian L. Rep., vol. 17, P· 53 128. See Jit Mal v. Jwala Prasad (Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad 155. . 21, P· vol , 189 . 9), Rep Jnd L. ia11 ., _ 129. a pa 1:�.��� �;r Shiddappa v. Ningappa Rangappa (Higl1 Ct., Bon1bay, 1946), 1948 All-I11d10 130. ��e21��nkata Lingan1ma v. Rajago1Jala Venkata (Higl1 Ct. , Madras, 1946), 1947 All-India Rep ., 131. See Shaukhi v. Thakur (II- igl1 Ct. ' Patna, 1936), 1937 All-1nd'1a Rep., p. 43. . 132. See Chinnan v. Manager (H. ig l1 Ct., Madras, 1947), 1949 All-India Rep., p. 348. 133. See Kr" nanla v. Mangamm al (Higl1 Ct., Mad.ras, 1903), J11dian L. Rep., vol. 26, P· 91 ��; • . 134. See3 W 9. l1an d Ram chan d v. Yesbant Daorao (High Ct., Bombay, 1948), 1949 All-India Rep , p. 7 . 135. See Laksluni Narayan Khatni v. dia All-In 1943 Gopa l Lal Pathak (High Ct., Patna, 194 2), Rep., p. 33.
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-------·-date of the .de_cree. A co11:pro�ise recorded by the co�rt1J6 constitutes a subsequ ent order w1�h1n the meaning of the �ule, and the period runs from the date that 1 the compromis e decree was recorded. 3 However, where the decree directs that in default of payment the mortgaged property is to be sold \Vitllin a fixed time, the period _runs_ fron1 the date of tl1e d �c �ee rather tl1 an fro111 tl1e date of tlie sale, since, decr ee nd tl1ere is no subsequent order everything 1s covered by tl1e or1g1nal � _ _ 138 Also, tl1e :11le only prol1 1bits tl1e filing of a fresh application after the stich. as expiration_ of the period. If a fresh application has been filed before tl1 e period has ex.I?1red, the court may n1ake an order on that application after the period 139 exp1red. has 3. Process of Execution (a) Receipt of application and examination of the judgment-debtor Upon receiving the ap1)lication, tl1e court n1ust first detern1ine wl1etl1 er there has been compliance with all tl1e conditions we 11 ave just disc11ssed. If tl1ese conditions l1ave not been compliecl wit11, tl1 e co11rt m11st reject the ap1Jlication, or if tl1 e defect can be re1nedied, it 11111st allow the aJJplicant to do so on suc]1 terms as it sl1 all fix.140 Any ame11dn1e11t so made sl1all. be dated a11d sign ed or initialled by the presid.ing judge.141 TJ1e application is tl1en deemed to be one in accorclance witl1 the la"', and tl1e a1uendn1ent relates back to tl1e time \Vhen tl1e ctpplication was originally fiJed.142 Where tl1e application for execution is adn1 itted, a copy is served on tl1e judgment-debtor together \\1itl1 a sumn1ons reqt1iring l1 in1 to a: p1)ear before tl1e court on a day fixed in tl1e st1m1no11s to s.how ca11se why tJ1e decree should not be executed. 143 If the judgment-debtor does 11ot appear, tl1e court orders tl1e decree to be executed and issues process for s11ch exec11tio11. 144 In addition, \Vl1ere tl1e aJJplicatio11 is made for exect1tion of a decree for t11e payn1ent of n1011ey, tl1e cot1rt 111t1st order the judgment-debtor to be an·ested a11 d bro11ght before tI1 e co11rt for the p11rpose of being exaniined as to 11is 111ea11 s. Note tl1 at tl1e j11clgn1ent-clebtor ,vl10 is brou.gl1t before the court in this manner will 11 ot l1 ave t11e opportt1nity to raise any objec tions to the exec11tion. 145 If tl1e cot1rt is. satisfied, by afficlavit or othervvise, tl1 at the judgment-debtor is a.bo11t to leave tl1e local l!1nits of its jt1risdiction or to dispose of his property or ren1ove it fro1n those limits, witl1 tl1e purpose of delayir1g or obstructing execution, it 111ay dispense with the i11 itial service of s111ru11ons and order t11e immediate arrest of the jt1dgn1ent-debtor.146 St1cl1 a11 order 111 ay be made J Jend ing the filing of an application for execution. 147 The jt1dgment-debtor brought before 136. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 277. 137. See Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Heramba Chandra Roy Cl1owdhury (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1945), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 154. 138. See K.hulna Loan Co. v. Jnanendranath (Privy Council, India, 1917), 1917 All-India Rep., p. 85. 139. See Marulasiddappa v. Lakshn1ipathi (Higl1 Ct., Mysore, 1950), 1950 All-India Rep., p. 64. 140. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 385(1). 141. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 383(3). 142. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 385(2). The principle is the same as that of relation back of amendments to pleadings. 143. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 386(1). 144. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 386(4). . or him on ved ser er nev s _ wa ns mo sum tl1e t tha w· sho ld 145. l-Iowever, it would seem tbat be cou .t. 78(2). "1 Ar C , o. Pr v. Ci re pa �o : n. that he was prevented fron1 appearing fo� good c�use. � tio such cases, he should ha ve the opporturuty to raise obJect1ons to the execu 146. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 387(1). 147. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 387(2).
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the co11rt in this manner would not be . pr� �lttded ��om ra�sing objections to the execution, since he has been arrested 10 1eu of .. � �ervtce of summons. . Any warrant for arrest 11111st direct tl1e officer entrt1st�d w1 h its execution bring the t? judgment-debtor before the court unless he satisfies the decree by his personal obedience, e.g., by paying the money owed under tl1e decree to the d ecree-holder.148 Wllere tlie decree is satisfied in tl1is way, the order of arrest shall not be issued.149 on ecti to obj �e �na the execution y 1:11a he s,_ ear app r bto -de ent gm jud When tlle n ke and t1? ma c e_ obJ an !us er rop sid app con l wil riate rt cou the and , ree dec . tile of 1t s the 1f find e decr e has been on 1cat1 appl tl1e 1 iss dism ld wou T1 t so cour 1e order. is n ise or tio erw ita otl1 lim by red bar objection is n tio lica app tl1e t tl1a or satisfied h l1 ns suc oat stio on que \ver as may be ans to nd bou is r bto -de ent gm jud The able. 1 51_ For purposes of the examina er. 1old ee-l decr tl1e and rt cou pttt to l1im by the . tion tl1e co11rt may s111n111on any person or require the production of any book or r�cord_ 1s2 Tl1e object of this proceeding is to determine wl1ether the judgment-debtor is able to satisfy the decree, since a decree can only be exect1ted against a judgment debtor wl10 is able to satisfy it. Tl1ere is no diffict1lty in this respect where the decree directs tl1e delivery of specific property or the perforn1ance of an act which the judgment-debtor is able to perform. However, n1ost decrees will be for the pay·ment of money, and the co11rt n1ust deter1nine \Vhether tl1e judgment-debtor has the means to JJay tl1e an1ount d11e under tl1e decree or any installment as to whicl1 execution is so11gl1t.153 W/1ere tl1e co Ltrt consiclers t/1at t/1e j1,1dg1nent-debtor does not lzave the 111ea11s to JJay tl1e a111ou11t di,e, it 111ctJJ 11ot issi,e ctny process for executio11. The burd.en sl1ot1ld be on tl1e decree-l1older to J)ers11ade tl1e cot1rt that tl1e judg1nent-debtor l1as s11fficie11t 111ea11s. 154 If tl1e co11rt ca11not iss11e process becat1se it considers that tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor ca11not pa.y tl1e a111011nt dt1e, it sl1011ld 11ot dis1niss the applica tio11, beca11se it 111ay iss11e process at any s11bseqt1ent ti1ne on being satisfied that tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor l1as become able to pay s11cl1 a111ount.155 It sl1011ld treat the aJJplica.tion as pendi11g 11ntil s11cl1 ti111e as tl1e clecree is satisfied or tl1e judgn1ent ?ebtor dies and his estate is settled. In deter111ining wl1ether tl1e judgment-debtor 1s able to JJay tl1e an1ot111t d11e, tl1e co11rt sl1011ld 11ot consider l1is property or inc�111e tl1at is exe111pt fro111 attacl1111ent. As we will see, certain p· roperty is not SLtbJect to attacl1n1ent, and tl1at pro1Jerty and i11co111e ca.1mot be considered in deter mining l1is _ability to pay, since it can11ot be 11sed to satisfy a decree. Tl1e court should 11ot 1sst1e process for exec11tio11 11nless it is satisfied tl1at tl1e jt1dgn1ent-debtor possesses 1nore than tl1at a111ou11t �1nd l1as property or inco1ne which l1e could s11rrender or }Jay to tl1e decree-l1older.1s6 In the event tl1at tl1e j11dgn1ent-debtor l1as not show n ca11se wl1)' tl1e decr �e sliotild not be exec11tecl, tl1e co11rt \Vill iss11e process for execution of tl1e decree in s11ch manner as the nature of tl1e relief granted n1ay reqt1ire.157 As ,1ve will see, 148. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 388(1). 149 . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 388(2). 150. t v. Pro. C. A t. i 38 , 6(2). � er Not e tl1at a all obj ections n1t1st be raised in this 1n n n an d no . f a Y separate suit. C1v. Pro. c., Art. 375· 151. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 386(2). 152. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 386(5). 153. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 392(2) . 154. S�e Jaswalla v. Amulya (High Ct. Allahabad 1940), 1940 AII-J11dia Rep., p. 4 94. 155. Civ. Pro. C. Art 39 t . wil l o 3 n (2 T ) b e tion 'r c apJ? · 1cat1on will' be pending, and a fresh appli a · . . be necessary'· Th'· · 84 3 15 18 part·icularly Art. of imp orta nt in view of tl1e limitation period 156. see Satyanarayana v S eetlla (Higl1 Ct., 1938), 1938 All-India Rep.,. p . 477. 157. Civ. Pro. c. , .Art. ; _ 3 2(1). See also C1v. Pro. C., Art . 386(3).
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the Code specific�lly directs ho" : various kinds ?f decrees are to be executed, and t'he co11rt must 1s �ue process 1n accordance with s11ch directions. Tile order of on wl1ich it was .issued arid shall be signed by a d. a te the process shall contam . 1 ss e seal of the and delivered COltrt , with to the t� execution oflicer. sealed judge The order must specify a day on or before whicl1 it shall be executed . 1 59 In addition to issuing process for execution, tl1e court is authorized to order the detention of t�e judgn1e11t-debtor �s a me�os _of forcing I1im to comply with tbe decree, It 111ay issue Sl1cl1 an order 111 t\vo s1t11at1ons: (I) if the co11rt concludes that prior to_ the tiin t: . wl1en the _applicatio11 for execution was filed, the jtidgment debtor . was 1n a pos1t1on . to sat1s�y tl1e decree and wiJf11lly failed to do so, i.e., or the abil.ity to be l1ad tl1 e n1 ea11s to satisfy tl1e Jltdgn1 t required JJerforn1 the �� _ act, and there was 110 excuse for l11s f a.il1ng to do so; (2) if, after tl1e co11rt bas examined tl1 e jt1dg111ent-debtor a11d ordered llim to co111 ply witl1 the decree, I1e refuses withot1t good ca11se to c1o so. 160 In either case tl1e cot1rt may order his arrest (if be is not already u11der arrest) and l1is detention in a ci\ 1il prison for a period not to exceed six mo11tl1s.161 The sole purpose of this provision is to detain a recalcitant j11dgme11t-debtor so as to force l1i1n to comply witl1 the decree. No punisl11nent is i111posed. I-Ie can al\vays avoid arrest by satisfyi11g tl1e decree prior to tl1e time the w,:1rrant for arrest is isstied.162 It \Vo11ld also seem tl1at J1e co11ld show that he now lacked tl1e n1eans to comply. Once detai11 ed, l1e rnay be released U}Jon paying tl1e a.n101111t dtte 11nder tl1e decree into court or tl1 e officer · e in charge of tl1 e priso11 or by otl1erwise satisfyi11g tl1 e decree. 163 It shoulcl b stressed tl1at whether to order s11cl1 detentio11 is in the discretion of tl1e cotirt. The court should do so only \-Vhen persuaded tl1 a.t the j t1dgment-debtor is failing to comply with the decree des1Jite tl1e fact tl1at he is able to do so. Not\vitl1standing an order of a.rrest and detention· , tl1e court is still to iss11e JJrocess for exect1tion, and tl1e arrest or release of the jl1dgme11t-debtor does not operate i11 a11y way to discharge hin1 fro111 the debt or obligation. 164 As we have seen, the execution order is delivered to tl1e exect1tion officer. }1e is to exec11te it in accordance witl1 the provisions of tl1e Code, to be discussed stibsequently, and is to endorse on tl1e order tl1e day and ma1111er in wh.ich it was executed. If l1e exec11ted it after the latest day specified in tl1 e process, l1e is to include tl1e reason for tl1e dela.y, and if it was not executed, the reason wl1y it was n.ot. TJ1e order witl1 s11cl1 endorse.ments is to be retur11ed to tl1e co11rt. 165 (b) Execution of decrees for the payment of money •
Tl1 e Code specifically directs how vario11s kinds of decrees are to be exec11ted: A decree for the payment of money, includi11g a decree for the payment of money 158. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 392(3). 159. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 392(4). • 160. Civ. Pro. C.• Art. 389(1). 161 . Ibid. 162. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 389(2). This refers to Art. 388(2), much authorizes satisfaction by the judgment-debtor to prevent arrest. ree-holder. 163. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 390(1) (a). He may also be released upon t11e request ofd,thebe dec y not be ma ase n rele bee l1as r bto -de ent gm jud a ce On . (b) (1) 390 _ . Art Civ. Pro. c., . re-arrested in execution of the same decree. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 390(2) 164. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 391. , the e tl1� process cut ex to ble una is cer offi ion _ cut exe � the ere Wh 165. c· . p (1). 393 _ e ,-,,1tnesses m this regard c At min exa y ma and c���t ;��II e;amf.a"e hi,n as to the alleged inability, It shall then record th e result . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 393(2).
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166 1nay be executed by the attachment n , ef li re r 1e tl o a d .as an alternative to son1e 161 a ac pr e d h tt t y op m er ay be movable 1e Tl ty er p ro p s r' to eb d ten 1n g 1d jt : sale of tl1e d ol e -h th ee cr at de er th t en m st ire fir qu re no proc eed is e er tl1 d ,tn or immovable, h attac rty s prope must, 16 tl1e as nearly as of value Tl1e � y. er p � ro p le b va � o m against . ee e cr r tl1 de de Th� decree -holder un te dt t 1n ot am e th 1 itl w nd po es rr _ co may be, rty pe to satisfy the decr ee pro ble lt1a va of e sal tl1e e t11r req d an e ti\' dic vin be cannot s t ha tha a A ose pp Su re dec ce. e against suffi t1ld wo ty per pro le tiab val s where les , rth Eth $ e _wo . l1ou 000 10, 's e 1 Th acl att to � court ks � see He . 500 $ l. Etl for . B t B es tl1a do ed isfi no t have other sat 1s it less 11n nt 1n1e acl att the mit sI1 ould no t per _ property tl1at more closely correspo11ds_ 10 �alue to Eth. $ 500. Of cours�, if the , tl1e ent chm rt to atta cou Ject st1b w1ll attach 1s t tl1a B of ty per pro )' onl tl1e is se hoti e t abl less tha valu ded sua per is property is it ess unl so do not uld sl1o it B11t it. not available. The mo11ey payable under tl1e decree may be paid i11to court whose dt1ty it is r out of court or otherwise as the to exec11te the decree 170 or to the decree-l1olde 171 A payn1ent of a portion of the t. direc n1ay ee decr the ed pass co11rt wl1icl1 172 ent, although the decree paym st1cl1 of nt exte the to valid is decretal amo1111t holder can still obtain execution for tl1e balance. If tl1e payment is 1nade into court 173 however, the co11rt's failure to give r; -holde decree tl1e to notice 111ust be given s11cl1 notice does not prevent tl1e payn1ent frorn constitt1ting satisfaction of the decree. 1· 7 4 Wl1ere tl1e mo11ey is paid 011t of cot1rt, or the decree is otherlvise ad ji,sted i12 lvl1ole or i11 JJC1rt to tlze sc1tisfactio11 of t/1e clecree-/10/der, l1e must certify such pay111ent adj11stn1e11t to tl1e co11rt whose d11ty it is to execute the decree, and tl1e co11rt n111st record tl1e same. 175 Tl1is shot1ld i11clt1de an adj11stment of any kind of decree, eve11 tl1011gl1 it is not 011e for the payment of money, since such adjust ment affects tbe q11estion of \\1l1ether tl1e decree can be executed. Under such an inter1)retatio11, an adj11stn1er1t in a decree of partition m11st be certified.176 Tl1ere is no req11ire1nent tl1at tl1e adjt1st1nent be in writi11g so an oral adjustment 111ust also be certified to tl1e co11rt.177 The following are exa1111Jles of a.dj11stment tl1at would l1a,, � to be certified to tl1e co11rt 1111der tl1is r11le: (1) an agreement to accept a portion of tl1e decretal am.011nt to be IJaid in i11stall1uents as ft1ll satis.faction,178 (2) a discl1arge by tl1e decree-holder of one joint jt1dg1nent-debtor, 179and (3) an 166. Where the decree orders the payn1ent of n1oney as an alternative to otl1er relief, it must first be sl1own that tl1e otl1er relief was unavailable. See note 221, i1ifra. 167. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 394(1). 168. Tl1i� is contrary to the prior rules under \vhicl1 tl1e execL11ion officer bad to first proce ed
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169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179.
against_ inovable proJJerty. 011ly if that was insufficie11t to satisfy tl1e an1ount of the decree uld 1n1 rnovable property be attached. Executio11 of Judgn1ent l{ules, 1953, Art. 21, Leg. �ot. No. 1 ?6, Neg. Gaz., year 12, no. 12. I-Iowever, under tl1e Code there are dilfe �ent _ rules goveriung the sale of n1ovable and 1rn111o vable pro1Jerty, a11d it will be more converuent fo_r tl1e decree-l1older to proceed against movable propert y. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 394(2). Wllere,, tile decree l1 as been transferred for executio11, it is to execute tbe dt1ty ''co \Vl1o urt se d�cree would m ean the transferee court. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 395(1). 8<:e Gopalji ''· San1rit (fligl1 Ct., Patna , 1932) ' 1933 ,411-l"d",a R.ep., p. 89. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 395(2). See the disc uss1·on in · D . Mulla, s11pra, note, 100 at p. 749. Civ · Pro· C., Art. 396(1). See Gharry v Gowrya (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1921), 1922 All-India Rep., p. 380. .. . See Ananda ;. a v BiJo� (Hi_gh Ct., Calcutta, 1925), 1926 All-India Rep., p. 643. See Kalyan·f �. D harams1 (H1gl1 Ct., Bombay, 1934), 1935 All-India Rep., p. 303. See Mal1o�ed Kl1 . d al Rep., vol. 31, p. ��7� ladur v. Mal1on1ed Muna war (High Ct., Madras, 1903), I11 iaTl L
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where tl1 e decree directs a division.•so If there agreen1ent to hold propetry_ jointly _ are joi?t decree-holders, sat1sfact1?n s11o�ld be certified by all or by one authorized to give a discharge; otherwise, the certification will not to certify by the others and be binding on tl1e otl1ers, 181 who can still execute on their portion of tl1e decree.1s2 The judgment-debtor n1ay also _ inform !l1e court of st1ch payment or adjust111ent and apply to tl1e cot1rt to issue a notice to tl1 e decree-l1older to show cause' on a day fixed . by the cot1rt, ,vl1y such payment or adj11stn1ent sl1ot1ld not be recorded as certified.183 If after service of notice, tl1e decree-holder fails to sl1 ow s11cl1 cause, tl1e court records the payn1ent or adjtistment. 184 If tl1e decree-holder fails to appear, tl1e cot1rt sl1 011Id still require proof of the payn1ent or adjustment before recording it. 185 Tht1s, tl1e j11dgment-debtor is protected against tl1 e decree l1older's fail11re to certify tl1e pay111ent or adj11stment. Sucl1 protection is very im portant, since a pay111ent or adjust1nent whicl1 has 11ot bee11 certified or recorded cannot be recognized by tl1e court executi11 g t11e decree. 186 Tl1is means that if the j11dg:inent-debtor has paid the arnou11 t of tl1e decree bt1t this l1as not been certified or recorded, l1e cannot object to exect1tio11 on tl1e ground tl1at 11 e has made pay ment. Perhaps he 111.igl1t obtain a stay so as to apply to the court for certification, but tl1e objection as sucl1 can11ot be entcrtain.ed. Tl1e rule applies even tl1ough tl1e judgment-debtor contends that he ,vas 1nisled by tl1e decree-holder and therefore, failed to apply for certification hiinself. 187 Tl1 e proble1n will arise most freqt1ently witl1 respect to a11 adjust1nent. St1ppose that A obtains a decree against B for Eth. $ 2,000 and s11bsequently agrees to accept Etl1 $ 1,000 in ft1ll satisfaction. Tl1is adjust1ne11t is 11ot certified or recorded, altl1ot1gl1 tl1e a.mount is paid. A n1 ay obtain exect1tion for Eth. $ 2,000. 188 B could not l1ave tl1e execution sale set aside on this ground: all q11estions relating to exect1tion m11st be deter111ined by tL1 e cot1rt exec11ti11g tl1e decree, 189 a11d tl1at court cannot recognjze the adjustment - tl1e gro11nd for setting aside tl1 e sale - since it \Vas not certifi ed. 190 Tl1e sa111e wot1ld be trt1e witl1 respect to a s11it by B to enjoin A fro1n applying for exec11tion: since tl1e qt1estion involves execution, it must be raised before tl1e court wl1ich is exec11ting the decree a11d tl1at cot1rt 1nay not recognize tl1 e ad j11strnent, which wo11ld be the grot111d for the gra11ting of tl1e injt111ction. 191 However, after A exect1tes tl1e decree for Etl1 .$ 2,000, B may bring stiit to recover drunages of EtL1.$ 2,000 for breacl1 of the contract. Tl1at st1it does 11ot i11volve a question relating to the exect1tion, since tl1 e prjncipal q11estion is tl1e breacl1 of the co11tract, wh.icl1 need not be raised before the court exec11ting the decree; tl1e co11rt l1 earing 180. See Sethuran1a v. Chota (High Ct., Madras, 1917), 1917 J\llaclras Wee!,ly Notes, p. 327. 181. See Karam v. Tailor (Higl1 Ct., Lahore, 1929), 1929 ,1-J/l-I11clia Rep., p. 462. 182. See Sl1ital Prasad Su1gh v. Sttrendra Natl1 Chaterjee (High Ct., Patna, l 949), 1950 All-India Rep., p. 253. 183. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 396(2). 184. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 396(3). 185. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 100 at p. 756. The _proceedings may be. likened to tbe cot1rt's hearing the case ex parte wl1en the defendan_t �ails t? appear. See C1v. Pro. C., Art. 70(a). Tl1e court should not certify payn1ent u1tless 1t 1s satisfied that such payment has been n1ade. 186. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 396(4). 187. See Mehbunnissa v. Mehtiiedunnissa (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1924), 1925 All-India Rep., p. 309. 188. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 100 at p. 751. 189. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 375. 190. See Chowduri Abllaul Subhan v. Kanti Ran1anna (l-ligl1 Ct., Madras, 1945), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 161. 191. See Azizan v. Matuk Lal (l-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, 1894), /11clial'1 L. Rep., vol. 21, p. 437.
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g d n 1e e ti tl u c r rt ec e u x e co , and it can e th � s, se o rp 11 p e es th r fo t, o n the case is e co to ed th u ifi rt rt ce t ex o n ec u as ti w nbo the it h 11g o th al t, en 1 yn pa e th recogn1ze decree. 192 g th� decree is prohibited from tin cu exe urt co the ly on at 1 tl ed ess str It must be ns a tai e ob cre A de at tl1 ain e ag os pp st B for Su t. en ym pa d e fi rti c un an _ es to sell th e � _tl1en ag1e recognizing e op pr He rt� t? B. y. ert op pr le a ov mm 1 of ? on ssi sse po the ss, B n1ay mainta .1n a ele rth ve t, ne b11 , urt co e th to ed tifi cer t no is Tile agreement e e Th t. cre s en de ha eem agr y ead the alr on sed ba been rty pe pro e 1 tl er ov rec to suit nt to sell the property, which me ree ag t]1e is im cla B's of sis ba e 1 tl d an ed exectit 193 So too, wl1ere . ngs edi A c pro obtains a ion cut exe tl1e l1 wit do to � ing 1 'i not 11 ad $ 200 and A accepts a bond for the 1. Etl s pay B , 300 1. Etl $ for B t ins aga decree n b nd, the eve on though the pay sue ay A e, dat r late ? a at e abl pay I? balance 194 Tl1e court 1s not asked to recogniz . ified cert n bee e not n1ent and adj11st1nents have a payn1ent or adjustment. It is me�ely asked to enf�rce a bo?d as it would any otl1er contractual obligation. To avoid a11 y such q11est1ons, the Judgment-debtor who has paid tl1e money 011t of court or e 1 1tered into an out-of-court adjustment should al\vays apply to tl1e co11rt for certification unless he is certain that the decree-holder (or all of tl1em, in case of a joint decree) has done so.
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(c) Execution of cross-decrees It may be tl1at an application is made by a decree-]1older against the judg ment-debtor for executio11 of a decree for the payment of money at the same time tl1at the judgment-debtor has applied for exec11tion of a decree for the payment of money against tl1e decree-l1older, wl1icl1 was obtained in a separate suit. Where botl1 parties have made sucl1 a1)plicatio11s, their decrees are called cross-decrees, and the executio11 of s11cl1 decrees is gover11 ed by special rules. In order for the rules relating to cross-decrees to apply, tl1e fallowing conditions m11st be satisfied: (I) botl1 decree-l1olders n111st have n1 ade application to the san1 e court for executio11 of tl1eir decrees; (2) tl1e decrees 1nust have bee11 obtained in separate s11its; (3) both decrees m11st be for tl1e payn1ent of definite s11ms of n1oney; (4) tl1e parties n111st be the same i11 tl1e sense tl1at tl1 e decree-l1older in one of tl1e suits \Vas �l1e jt1dgn1 ent-debtor in tl1e other s11it and the parties were involved i11 both suits 1� tl1e same capacities; and (5) botl1 decrees are capable of execution at tl1e same time by tl1e court. 195 Tl1e l1 older of a decree passed agai11st several persons jointly and severally may also treat it as a cross-decree in relation to a decree passed against l1im singly i n favor of one or more o·f sucl1 persons. 196 The clearest example of cross-decrees wo11ld be wl1ere A has a j11dg111ent against B �or Eth.$ 1,000 obtained on a debt owed by B to him a11d B l1as a judg n1ent �gainst A for Etl1. $ 2,000 on a debt owed to hi111 by A and both apply for execu tion. Tl1e . court 11�11st treat tl1e decrees as cross-decrees and apply tl1e special rules a� to th.eir exec11t1on. Or, A obtai11 s a decree against B and i11 executio1 1 purcltases B s property. On appeal, tl1e decree is reversed and A is directed to retu rn the 192. � 4 39 anm an v. Sub bab hat · . P· (I· l igl1 23, vol. Ct., Bo111bay, J 899) Indian L. Rep., �ou� � er ex ecu l�g tl1e decree'' n,eans the court e11tertaioin� tl1e exect1tion {Jroceedings ratl;i gh than an par�cular court. If the procee ding in x th or e s e ect1tion were originally b f e e Hithe Court' tte High Court could still for hear th e suit for breacl1 of tl, e contract ' since purposes o f a s eparate su·t 1 , 1·t 1s · n o I onger the court executing the decree. 193. 8 e 25' ar Chaodra v. Haris Chandra (I-Iigl1 Ct. vol . , Rep . L. , Calcutta, 1898), Indian p � 7��� 194. S e Swamirao v. K 419 ashinath (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1891), India,, L. Rep � ., vol. 15, P· 195. C1v. Pro. C., Art. • 397(1) (3). 196. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 397(4).
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property, which _he does, and pay_ B Eth. $ 700 i11 mesne profits, whicl1 he does not. A has obtained a decree against B for Eth. $ 500 in anotlier suit before the same court. Wh.en B aJ?plies for execution of his decree for Eth. $ 700, A may apply for ex�cut1on of l11s decree for_ Etl1. $ 500: tl1ese are cross-decrees, since they are for definite stt �� of money obtaine ? by tl1e same partjes in separate suits.1 91 Or, A and � are Jointly and severally liable to C for Eth. $ 1,000, and he obtains a decree against them for �hat �mot1nt. Since they are jointly and severally liable, C can enforce the decree against e1tl1er or both of tl1em.198 A s11es C in the same cot1rt and obtains a j11dg�ent of Eth.$ 100, \vluch l1e seeks to exect1te. C may elect to treat the decree against A and B as a cross-decree and apply for execution of his decree against A. 199 However, if A and B as joint obligors obtain a decree for Eth.$ 1,000 against C, and C in a suit before tl1e same cot1rt obtains a decree for Eth. $ 1,000 against B, the decrees are not cross-decrees, since the parties are not the same: the decree in the first suit was in favor of A and B against C, and the decree in the second suit is in favor of C against B.200 If A lJad obtained a decree against C for Eth. $ 1,000 and B, as co-plaintiff, J1ad obtained a decree against him for tl1at amo11nt, C could treat a decree obtained against B in that court as a cross-decree, since as to tl1ose decrees the parties wot1ld be the same. Or, A obtains a decree against B for Eth.$ 1,000. obtains C, B's trustee, in a s11it before the same co11rt, obtains a decree against A on B's bel1alf for Eth.$ 1,000.201 B can.not treat C's decree as a cross-decree, since he was not a party to tl1e st1it in \vhich it was passed.202 Also, the parties m11st ''occupy tl1e san1e character in both s11its'', tl1at is they must have sued or l1ave been stied i11 tl1e sa111e capacity. If, in our previot1s example, A had obtained a decree against C in l1is individL1al capacity, C co11ld not treat the other decree as a cross-decree, since i t was not rendered in l1is favor as an individual bt1t as tr11stee for B. If, on tl1e other l1and, A had obtained a decree against C as tr11stee for B, and C, as trL1stee for B, had obtai11ed a decree against A, A or C co11ld treat the decrees as cross-decrees, si11ce tl1ey were rendered in separate suits between tl1e sa111e parties in tl1e same capacity. Finally, consider this exa.mple. A l1olds a n1oney decree against B. B l1olcls a decree, issued by tl1e same court in a suit brot1ght by him as mortgagee against C, the 111ortgagor of tl1e property and A, tl1e purchaser of a portion of tl1e property from C. The decree directs that if the mortgage is not paid, tl1e property will be sold in satisfaction of the mortgage. A cannot treat the decrees as cross-decrees, si11ce l1e does not ''occt1py the san1e chara.cter i11 botl1 suits." The decree held by A is in bis favor personally. The decree l1eld by B does not impose any personal obligation against A: he is not ordered to pay a sun1 of money to B, though he l1as the option to pay a sum of n1oney in order to save the mortgaged property. 203 Of course, if C were the holder of the decree against B, he could treat it as a cross-decree, since that decree imposes on B the obligation to pay the mortgage debt personally.204
197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203.
204.
See Adwaita v. The Chittagong Co., Ltd. (High Ct., Calcutta, 1923), 1925 All-India Rep., P. 102. See Civ. C., Art. 1897. See Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1, Rule 18, .illustration (d). See .Indian Code of Civil Procedtire, Order 1, Rule 18, illustration (b). As to suits by a trustee, see Civ. Pro. C., Art 34(5). See Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1, Rule 18, illustration (c). See Sheo Shankar v. Chunni Lal (lligl1 Ct., Allal1abad, 1916), Indian L. Rep., vol. 38, p. 669. See Nagar Mal v. Ram Cl1and ( High Ct., Allahabad, 1911), J11dian L. Rep., ".Ol. 33, p. 240.
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e ere tl1 ne w sig s as ee cr e of a decree de ss� cr as ed at tre ? be o als y ma Decrees r bto -de ent tl1e gn1 to Jud or or ign ass the er wh e tile by e du s ebt • t-d nen dgi · ti J' d . assume 1. 20s s e. ne e u sig os 1e as pp t at st tl1 run ag e cre de A holds a lds I1o � elf 11s 1 11i . r o judgn,erlt-debt d sse 1n pa a separate suit in st A a1 ag e cre de a lds l1o � B d an B st ain ag . a decree n l1e W . C C seeks to enforce to B t s atn ag cre de his s _ ign � ass A rt. . cou the same dered a cross-decree, since c ns1 ot n · 1s A st a1n a e cre � de s B' � B, st ain ag that decree ed if C , urn s obligations ver ass A' we Ho C. t ins aga t no 1d 1 a A t ins aga ly on it runs c e es . r a cre s-decrees, since, in de tl1 ros bo A, st ain ag B by ld J1e ree dec _ the tinder st e cre ain C ag de . a s No ha B d an B t ins ag e _ cre de a s 11a w no . � . _w suppose effect, c ign the ass not t1o 1ga did obl b11t C, ns under to B t ins aga ree dec liis ed _ ign that A ass t has B tl1a a decree agai. nst ose p _ sup er rtl1 Ft1 . }um t ins aga d l1el t B tl1a the decree e t. r Th e com dec sam es tl1e are re bef s11it cross te : ara sep � . a in sed ? pas \Vas 1 at tl c decrees. Finally suppose tl1at A l1as obtained a d.ecree aga111st B and 1n satisfaction for lies n app utio A exec en Wh C. of that inst aga B by d aine obt ee decr a cl1es atta of C against A would be r favo i11 rt cot1 1e sa11 the by ed iss11 ee decr a11y ee decr 206 e of . gne the assi B's red side ee co11 decr be n1ay A es pos l)llr e tl1es for : cree �-de cros a W11ere tl1e decrees co11stit11te cross-decrees, as we have defined this concept, the following rules gover11 execution. If tl1e slims due unde r both decrees are equal, 207 In effect, one decree cancels out es. decre botl1 11po11 action tl1e co11rt enters satisf the otl1er, a11d both are dee111ed to· be satisfied. Wl1ere the sun1s are unequal, exec11tion 111ay be taken . 011t only by tl1 e holder of tl1e decree for the larger sum and for only so n1 11cl1 as ren1ai11s after ded11cting the s111aller s1 1 m.208 Suppose that A l1as a decree for Etl1. $ 1,000, B l1 a.s decree for Etl1. $ 2,000, and the decrees are considered cross-decrees. So long as botl1 applications for execution are pending before tl1e san1e court, A ca1111ot exec11te on l1is decree.209 B can execute his decree only for Etl1. $ 1,000. Satisfaction is tl1en entered 11pon bot/1 decrees.210 Note that in order for tl1ese r11les to apply, botl1 decree-l1olders must l1ave made applications for executio11 to tl1e san1e co11rt. If, i11 011r example, only A. I1ad applied for exceution B co111d not resist exec11tion on tl1e gro11nd tl1at l1e had a decree against A for a. la.rger a111011nt.211 :He 11111st n1ake an application to execute his decree, and no doubt, tl1e court wot1ld stay execution of A's decree so that he. co11ld n1al<e sucl1 applicatio1 1s. Note that tl1e provisions for execution of cross decrees are necessarily limited to the sit11 ation wl1ere both decrees ,:vere issued by tl1e same co11rt. Si11ce a11 application for exec11tion 11111st be 111ade to tl1e court whicl1 issued it, a court ,vo11ld not be capa.ble of execution a. decree tl1at had been passed by another court a11d, tl1erefore, could not apply those provisio11s. Cross-decrees m11st be disting11isl1ed fron1 cross-claims under tl1e san1e decree. �s we have seen, tl1e defendant 111ay flle a co1 1 nterclai1n or clain1 of set-of,f 212 and if the court finds in favor of t!1e IJlaintiff 011 the principal clai111 and i11 favor �f the defendant on tl1e co11ntercla1111 or set-off, the decree shall state wl1at amount ts due to each party and sl1all be ·for tl1e recovery of the balance due either partY-213 205, 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 397(2). See Adwaita v. Tl1e Chittagong Co. Ltd., supr a, note 197. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 397(1) (a). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 397(1) (b). ��e Spinnu v. Santl1oji (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1903), Indian L. Rep .' vol. 26, p. 428, iv. ro. C., Art. 397(1) (b). . See Cl1ajmpal Lal v · Db aram (Higll Ct., Allahabad, 1902), Indian L. Rep., vol. 24, P· 481• See Civ. 58-63 C notes 3 4 (f), 236, supra, ancl tl1e discussion in Chapter VI" and acco���nyi�g�!�t� (t) 213. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 19l(l).
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If the plaintiff su.es to recover Eth. $ 1,000, the defendent cou11 terclaims for Eth. $ 1,500, and the court finds i11 favor of tl�e plaintiff on the principal clajm and in favor of the defendant on tl1e cot111terclajm, tl1 e decree sh.ot1ld read as follows: the plaintiff is entitled to Etl1. $ 1,000, tl1e defendant is entitled to Eth. $ 1,500, tl1e defendant shall recover Et]1. $ 500. 111 s11cl1 a case, tl1 e plaintiff is not entitled to execution, and the defenda11t can exect1te for Eth. $ 500; satisfaction will tl1en be entered upon tl1e decree. 214 Wl1ere tl1 e sun1s are equal, satisfaction for both will �e entere� upo11 tl1e decree.115 TI1 e rt1les are, i1� effect, the same as those applicable to execution of cross-decrees except that here there is but one decree. (d) Execution of other decrees
A decree for recovery of specific 11 1ovable property or a share of s11cl1 property is to be exec11ted by tl1 e seizt1re of tl1e property or sl1 are thereof and tl1 e delivery to tl1 e decree-l1 older or st1ch person as J1 e appoints to receive delivery on l1is bel1alf. 2 16 Tl1is r11Ie is apJJlicable only to property in. tl1e possession of the judg ment-debtor ; 217 if tl1e JJroperty is in tl1 e possession of someone else, tl1 e decree-l1 older must proceed to attacl1 that JJroperty. 218 Tl1 is is so tl1 at the person i11 possession 111 ay have the opportun.ity to raise an objection to tl1 e attacl1111ent, e.g., that tl1 e l)roperty belongs to l1 i111 ratl1er than to tl1e j11dgn1ent-debtor. 219 Also, tl1e r11le refers only to specific movable J)roperty or a sl1 are in property that is capable of being delivered. If tl1e jt1dgment-debtor has 100 b11sl1 els of grain and tl1 e decree directs tl1 at I1 e and tl1e 50 busl1els \Viii deliver 50 b11shels to tl1 e decree-l1olcler, this rl1le applies, . be seized. However, if tl1e decree awards tl1e decree-I1 older an t111 divided sl1 are in movable property, e. g., a l1alf-interest in a l1orse, the 1novable property cannot be seized, and tl1e decreel1 older m11st proceed by ,vay of attacl1 n1 ent. 220 Note also that wl1 ere tl1 e decree directs tl1 at tl1 e decree-l1older recover specific 111ovable J)ro1J erty and tl1at l1 e receive the value of the property if not clelivered, tl1 e decree holder m11st first apply for recovery of tl1e movable under tl1 is rt1le a11 d ca11 not elect to enforce the mo11ey portion of tl1e decree. 221 In the case of a decree for tl1e deljvery of in1n1 ovable JJroperty, possession is to be delivered by the execution officer to tl1e decree-l1older or st1ch perso11 as he 111ay appoint to receive delivery on l1is behalf. 222 Tl1e execl1tion officer may, if necessary, remove any person bo1111 d by tl1e decree who reft1ses to vacate the property,223 \Vl1ere possessio11 of a b11ildi11 g or enclost1re is to be delivered and tl1 e person wl10 is in possessio11 and wl1 0 is bol1nd b)' tl1e decree, does not afford free access, tl1 e execution officer n1ay remove or ope11 any lock or bolt or break open a11y door or clo any other act necessary for p11tting tl1e decree-l1 older in .possession. 224 Remen1ber tl1at i11 a suit to recover possession of in1movable property all occt1pants m11st be macle '
214. Civ. Pro. C., Art. · 398(b). 215. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 398(a). 216. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 399. 217. Thus, it \vould not be applicable wl1ere tl1e · property is in the custody of a bank. See Pudn1anund v. Chundi Dat (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1896), Calcutta Weekly Notes, vol: 1; p. 70. 218. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. · 409. · 219. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 418-421. 220. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 410. 221. See Balmakunda v. Bengal-Napur Ry. Co., (I1igh Ct., Calcutta, 1927)_, 1927 ·A/I-India Rep., pert}'.. or a p. 652. Th e decree could direct that I1e migl1t elect \Vhether to receive the pro sum of money, bu t ordinarily· this will not be the case. ·. 222. Civ.. Pro. C., Art. 402(1). • ' 223. Ibid. 224. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 402(3).
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, he ree dec by d 11n and bo t be x the y arl cle e 11ld wo ecu : ,22s so stich persons. . · part1es · · p 2?6 a1 n c l s rso pos e sess1on through . m 1e tl t ns ru ag on ti ac e k ta ;�� d til co r \h u � ree. tion office s ec , h w t e � b y e d r 1 e C was 111 bo be so al 1ld . o1 w r to eb t-d en m dg ju tile t s bt1 C , wa on let ss1 sse o posses JJo int er v o_ rec to B st ain ag t s11i tl1e to rty pa . a t no 11 ca be A ced for of en or fav 111 in aga on ssi st B sse po for e cre de the B, by sion tinder tl1is rt1le. 228 Where tl1e decree is for the joint possession of inlillovable property, physical possession is not delivered. Instead, a copy of tl1e decree is affix_ e d in so_me cons pictLous part of the pro1Jerty and tl1e s11bstance of the decree 1s proclaimed by beat of drL1111 of some other c11sto1nary mode. 229 Pres11mably, the judgment-debtor \vill tl1en permit tl1e decree-l1older to enter into possession peaceably. If the judg111ent-debtor resists tl1e possession of tl1e decree-l1older, tl1e decree-holder may obtain tl1e assistance of the co11rt against s11ch resista.nce. 230
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Tl1e decree may direct tl1at tl1e j11dg1ne11t-debtor specifically perform a contract2J1 or n1ay co11tain an injunction directing tl1at l1e do or refrain from doing a specific act. 232 Wl1ere tl1e j11dg111ent-debtor l1as had an opportt1nity to comply with tl1e decree and l1as wilf11llJ' failed to d.o so, the decree 1nay be executed by the attachment aod sale of llis 1JropertJ, and the cot1rt may 011t of tl1e proceeds, award to the decree-l1older sttcl1 co1J1pensatiot1 as it tl1inlcs fit. 233 As long as the party has l1ad the opportt111itJ' to satisfy tl1e decree, there is no req11ire1nent that l1e be given notice before tl1e pro1Jerty is attacl1ed. 234 St1cl1 relief is s11bstitutionary, that is, tl1e coL1rt awards 111onet,1ry co1n1Jensation as a s11bstitL1te for the perfor111ance ordered in tl1e origi11al decree. Ho\Ve\1er, 011ce SLich co111pensation is paid, the decree is satisfied, and tl1e decree-l1older cannot enforce it ft1rther. Tl1e co11rt, instead of ordering st1ch atta.cl11nent and sale, may order the arrest and detention of the jt1dgn1ent-debtor, and he \Vill 11ot be released u11til he sees to it that tl1e contract or reqL1ired act is performed. 235 It 111ay also direct that tl1e act req11ired to be done sl1all be done, as far as practicable, by the decree-l1older or son1e otl1er person appointed by tl1e court, at tl1e expense of tl1e jL1dgment-deb tor; wl1en the act is done, the costs inc11rred will be determined by the court and may be recovered as thougl1 tl1ey were incl11ded in tl1e decree. 236 S11ppose that tl1e ?efendant l1as erecte� a strL1cture wl1icl1 renders tl1e plaintiff's villa 11ninl1abitable a� d 1s ord��ed to de11;10I1sl1 tl1e strL1cture. I·f l1e fails to do so, tl1e co11rt ma.y orde� 1�s deniolition, cl1arg1ng the defenda11t, since monetary co111pensation \vould not ebnu-
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225. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 36(4). 226. There is _not a requireme11t to tl1is effect i11 India, so provisio11 is .n1ade for attacl1in g proper ty o�c.upie� by tl1e tena 11t. See I11dian Code of Civil Procec\ure Order 21, Rt1le 36. Such a ' prov1s1on 1s unnecessary in EthiOJ)ia. 227. Se e Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(1). 228. See Pathak v. Renuka (I-ligh Ct., Calct1tta, 19 59), 1959 AII-Jrzclia Rep., p. 613 . 229. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 402(2). 230. �e� . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 450, 451 and tl1e discussion, infra, notes 513-518 and accom pan ying
231. See Civ. C., Art. 1776. 232. See Civ. C., Art. 2121. 233. Civ. Pro. C Art 400(1 · tacbment ) Th·e �u at d · tl1e gment-debtor avoid , in sucl1 a case, ma y or sale by p�ying · the money. C1v. Pro. C ., Arts · 415 ' 427 234. See Durga Das · · De wraJ_· <I:J1gl 1 Ct ., Calcutta, 1906), J11dian L. Rep., vol. 33, p. 30 6: 235. Art. 400(1) is wi:bout · preJudice to tl1e provisions of Art. 389 authorizing suc h detention. . ' 236. Civ. pro. C., Art. 400( 2).
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nate the injt1ry to the plaintiff. 237 In otl1er words, wl1ere n1onetary compensation wou� d n�t �e adeq1:1ate, the court sl1? t1ld try to obtain perforn1a11ce of tl1e reciuired act 1f this 1s practicable. rlowever, 1_t ca11 award the plaintiff compe11sation iii lieu of perfo!n:iance, and sho1ild do so _rf sucl1 compensation will be adeqt1ate redress for tl1e 1_nJ11ry._ Note tl1at the co11rt 1s only authorizecl to direct perfoi1na11ce of tl1e act s�ec1fied 1n tl1e _decree. Where tl1e defendant, for exa1111Jle was directed to den1ol1sh a wall and did so, bt1t s11b� equently erected a ne\v wall in a different place, }1e n1ay �ot be ord�red to den10I1_sl1 �l1e new wall in the execution proeeedings; _ the pla1nt1Jf 111ust bring another suit w1tl1 respect to the new wall. Where the decree orders the judgn1ent-debtor to exect1te a docu111ent or to endorse a negotiable instrun1e11t, and l1e neglects or refuses to do so, tl1e decree bolder may prepare a clraft of tl1e doct1ment or endorsement in accordance with the terms of tl1e decree and deliver it to tl1e court. 238 Tl1e cot1rt then serves tl1e draft on the jt1dgment-debtor togetl1er with a notice reqt1iring hi1n to file any objections witl1in a specified period. 239 Upon receiving the written objections, tl1e cot1rt shall approve or alter tl1e draft as it sees fit,240 and the draft in final form shall be executed by the exectttion officer.241 This provision is applicable to any decree for the execution of a document or the endorsen1ent of a negotiable instru ment, including a consent decree.242 It insures tl1at the docun1ent vvill be executecl or tl1e instrument endorsed despite the failure of the jt1dgment-debtor to clo so and avoids tl1e necessity for coercive action against him. 4. Rateable Distribution If assets are held by or under the autl1ority of tl1e cot1rt, and more than one applica tion for execution of money decree is pending before tl1e cot1rt, tl1e Code I)rovides tl1at tl1e assets may be shared by tl1e various decree-l1olders. 243 Suc]1 a procedt1re is called a rateable distribt1tion, and tl1e object is to provide an inexpensive and expeditiot1s remedy for the execution of money decrees held a.gainst tl1e san1e jtldgn1e11t-debtor witl1out tl1e necessity of separate proceedings. 244 In order for rateable distrib11tion to take place, the following conditions mt1st be satisfied: (1) assets must be held by or under tl1e authority of tl1e co11rt; (2) prior to tl1e receipt of st1cl1 assets more tl1a.n one person n1ust have applied for exect1tion; (3) the applications n111st be for the execu . tion of decrees for tl1e payme11t of money rendered against tl1e same jttdgment debtor; (4) the decrees 1n11st be t1nsatisfied. If tl1ese conditions are satisfied, the assets, after deduction of tl1e costs of realization, sl1all be distribt1ted an1ong all persons ''in tl1e prescribed n1anner."245 Tl1is sl1ould be construed to mean ''accord ing to tl1e amount tl1at eacl1 is entitled to receive at tl1e tin1e of distribtttion," 246 and eacl1 decree-holder should receive what is calJed a prorata sl1are of the proceeds, that is, the proportion of the proceeds that his decree bears to tl1e other
237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 24 5. 246.
See Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 21, Rule 32, illustration. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 401(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 401(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 401(3). th se l cau s hal t c �ur the , law by d uire req is n atio istr reg ere Wh } Civ. Pro. c., Art. 401(4). o es ens e t h exp Log d ar reg docttment to be registered and make such order as it thinks fit registration. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 401(5). . 767 p. p., Re dia -In All 8 193 7), 193 , tta lcu Ca , Ct. igh (H and See Birendra Nath v. Purna Ch Civ. Pro. C., Art. 403. 4, p. 29. . vol p., Re L. ian Ind 7), 189 , tta lcu Ca , Ct. igh (H a iss nn See Hasoon Arra v. Jawadoo Civ. Pro. C., Art. 403. ., Nagpur, 1935), Ct igh (H at np Ga v. r pu rya Da k, n . Ba al ntr Ce See Co-operative Society, 1935 All-India Rep., p. 214.
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tor fo r Eth.$ I 000 eb -d nt ne g1 ud j e th t ns ai ag ee cr de a s J1a ' ' · · decree S. Suppose that A ec a re d as e against him for b c d an 0, 00 2, $ . th E r fo im 11 t ns ai B 1138 a decree ag to t :ua U: eq e ha ar of ts se as e th e Th _. 00 total 3,0 $ h. Et l ta to s set as e Th Eth.$ 3,000. led to tit 1ve en ce r� be d lf ul ha wo of nt ica pl ap e th ch ea so s, nt ou arn l eta cr de e th of e d iv ul ce wo re $ B h. Et 0, 50 $ 1,000, h. Et ive ce re d t1l wo A : ee cr de s hi amount of s a a l re �h st1 � in th e �r ed ing oc ply pr ap � 1is � Tl 0. 50 I l1. Et $ e iv ce re d ul ,vo c and n irrespective t1o bt1 r tr1 fo le d1s ab ail av s set as e tl1 i11 lly ua eq are sh ll wi decree-11olders 247 st. r fi n io ut ec ex r fo y pl of wl1icl1 one happened to ap 11ey rt. the Mo cou ore paid into bef ets ass be re tl1e t tha is ion dit con t firs TI1e 248 e 011 by ld he ree nt dec lica app tl1e of on cti isfa sat in or court by tl1e j11dgn1ent-debt 250 It rt. 249 the cou ore does not bef ets ass ute stit con t1ld \l/O or to avoid attacl1ment matter tl1at tl1e payment involved a particul�.r decree. Since all the decree-holders l1ave filed applications, tl1ey would share i11 tl1e money on a pror�ta basis. How ever, if tl1e decree-holder wl10 attached the property purchases it by private agree n1ent witl1 tl1e debtor in satisfaction of tl1e decree prior to tl1e execution sale, there are not assets before the court.251 Tl1e decree l)ursuant to which the attachment \Vas isst1ed l1as been satisfied, the attacl1n1ent is deemed to be withdrawn, and tl1e property is 110 longer before tl1e cot1rt.252
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Tl1e !)arty seelcing reteable distribt1tion n1t1st l1ave applied prior to tl1e time tl1e assets \Vere received by tl1e cot1rt. Tl1is ,vot1ld. 111ean tl1e tin1e wl1en were physicall)' brot1gl1t l111der tl1e cot1rt's control in satisfaction of tl1e decree. So, one who applied before tl1e l)t1rcl1aser of tl1e l )roperty at tl1e exect1tio11 sale paid the entire amount sl1ot1ld be e11titled to sl1are, altl1ot1gh l1e apJ)lied after the pt1rcbaser l1ad n1ade a deposit, bt1t one wl10 applied after tl1e e11tire a111ot111t bad bee11 paid sl1ould not be e11titlecl to sl1are 11ot\vithsta11ding tl1at at the ti111e tl1e application was made, tl1e sale I1acl 11ot been confirn1ed. 253 .
The applicatio11s n1t1st be for exec11tion of 1noney decrees against tl1e sale judgn1ent ?ebtor. Tl1t1s, assets obtained i11 exect1tion fro111 a s11rety on one decree against the �11dg111ent-debtor cannot be rateably distribt1ted to tl1e holder of anotl1er decree against tl1e Jt1dgme11t-debtor, since tl1e s11rety did 11ot gt1arantee tl1e latter decree.254 However ,:vl1ere one decree-l1older_ l1a_s _a decree agai11st a partnersl1i1) firm and anotl1er l1as decree against all tl1e partners_ 1nd1v1dt1ally, rateable distrib11tion may take place, since in effect, tl1e decrees are aga111st the sa111c jt1dgn1e11t-debtors 255 So too a decree entered a0ainst a p�rson dtiri.ng 11is lifeti111e_ and a decree e11ter�cl against 'his legal representati�e after his death are de�rees aga111st tl1� sa111e jl1dgment-debtor for pt1rposes of tl1e rt1le. 256 \X/li�re a decree 1s re11dered against persons jointly, and anotl1er decree is rendered against one of the1n, rateable distribtrtion 111ay also take J)lace to tl1e extent of the 247.
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248. 249. 250. 251. 252 . 253.
254. 255. 256.
· · La · · Tl1ere is no requirement tl1at no tice · 1 · Cl1unn b e See given to tl1e first attaching creditor. . v. Jug l Ki. shore (H1gl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1905), /11clia11 L. Rep., vol. 27, p. 132. � See C1v. Pro. C., Art. 395(1). See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 415. See Sadasheoappa v. Punjabrao (I-I.igh Ct., Nagpu r, 1932) ' 1932 AII-I11clia Re'P., p. 156. See K edar wa t·1 v. Radl1ey Lal (High Ct., 609. . Pat na, Rep_ 193 ., 7), 193 AII p 7 -I11d ia · See civ. p ro. C., Art. 415. t�� � i sc����n in D. Mulla, Tl1e Code of Civil Procedure (12th ed. by R. Mitter,. 1953), . See Sakharam v Mahad eo (Hig ' h Ct., Nagpur, 1939), 1940 All-Ir1dia Rep., p . 79. · See Comm C , A Ct., h (Hjg 25 5 a d Pannaji De vichand Firn1 v. Lakkaji Dalaji Fir1n Bombay' ·1942).' 19�� A 11-1n d�ia Rep. ' p· 156· .. See Dundappa .v AnnaJi · igh Ct., Bo mbay, 1952), 1953 All-India Rep., p. 65. (H'
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st whom both decrees have been rendered. Suppose tlJat interest� of the person again _ aga dec inst A! B a. n d C and _ attaches property belonging to them ree a s obt alll x _ dec ree aga a hol rns t ds A. Y 1s entitled to a proportionate sl1are of the jointly. Y assets realized by tl1e sale of the joint property insofar as they represent tile share 257 If X's clain1 against A, pr pert y. that in · A B and C is Eth.$ 5,000, Y's ? . of _ claim agrunst A ts Eth. $ �, 000, . a�d t�e assets realized fron1 the sale of the property are · Eth. $ 6,000 , tl1e following d1str1bt1t1on wo11ld take place. Since A's interest in tl1e propert y is one-third, two-tl1irds of tl1e property are not st1bject to rateable distribt1tion · on that basis X would receive Etl1. $ 4,000 . Etl1 . $ 2,000 remains to be distributed: X's claim against the assets is now Eth. $ 1,000, tl1e unsatisfied an1ount of his decree: Y's claim against tl1e assets, tl1e amount of his decree against A, is Eth.$ 5,000. I-le is, tl1erefore, entitled to 8 0% of the Eth. $ 2,000 or Etl1. $ J ,600, and X is entitled to 20%, or Eth. $ 400. Th11s, X will receive Eth. $ 4,400 and Y will receive Eth.$ 1,600. By the same token, a party who l1olds a joint decree against two persons can apply for rateable distribution witl1 respect to assets 4,eld from the sale of tl1e property of one of them. X obtai11s a decree against A and attacl1es A's property. Y l1olds a decree agai11st A and B. Si11 ce he may proceed against either joint obligor,258 l1e may apply for exect1tion against A's property ,1nd is entitled to share in the rateable distribt1tion of tl1 e assets. Note also tl1 at since tl1e transferee may apply for execution, he may also apply for rateable distribution.259 Every effort is made to insure that all decree-holders against tl1e san1e jt1dgment-debtor vvill receive a fair sl1are of the assets.
C. Attachment and Sale The most important part of the exect1tion process is tl1e attachment and sale of tl1e property of tl1e jt1dg111ent-debtor to satisfy tl1e decree. The property of tl1e judgment-debtor is brot1gl1t 11nder the co11trol of the cot1rt by a process called ''attaclID1ent." It is tl1 en tra11 sferred to tl1e decree-l1olcler, if tl1is is ¥1hat tl1e decree directs, or sold, and the proceeds are paid over to the decree-l1 older. Most decrees are for the payment of money, a11d tl1 is is the primary 111 etl1od by \vl1icl1 st1ch decrees are exec11ted. 260 Altho11gl1. coercive n1 etl1ods against tl1 e j11dg1nent-clebtor n1ay be e111ployed, 26 1 it is only by attacl1111ent and sale tl1at the co11rt can g11arantee satisfaction to the decree-holder. Attacl1n1ent n1 t1st also be 11sed to effect delivery of 1novable property not in the possession of tl1e jt1dgment-debtor262 an.d to obtain an 1111 divid� d share in movable property for tl1e decree-holder. 263 Moreover, where the decree d1rect_ s an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits or a.ny other n1 atter, tl1 e property of the Judg1nent-debtor may be attacl1ed as in the case of a decree for the payment of 1noney before the exact amount dt1e l1 as been ascertained. 264 However, for tl1 e most part, attachment and sale will involve the satisfaction of a decree for the payment of . . money.
257. See the discussion in D. Malla, supra, note 253 at p. 296. 258. See Civ. C., Art. 1897. 259. See Venkatachella .m v. Subrahmaniam (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1940), 1941 All-Inclia Rep., p. 795. 260. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 394(1). 261. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 389, 390. 262. See the discussion, supra, no te 218 at1d accompa�ying text,. . ying text-. 263. See the discussion, supra, note 220 and accompan 264. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 405.
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t. Attachment (a) Methods of attachment n tio s ca his file pli ap er for execution old e-h cre de e tl1 en wh t tl1a all rec ll wi You ed ut ec by be ex to the e cre de h ac att tl1e es sl1 wi l1e ment r be . iet ,vl te . ica he mtist ind fo a at1on ap1)lic ent tachm tl1e s 26 does, � n1ust l1e � if be and , ty er p ro p f o le sa and 266 1on cat the pl1 t ap tha f o r als att te No e chm _ rs. � 11la nt rtic pa � n tai cer by d nie pa accom de Co d ns tl1e an tai con ty, per pro i ect c dir crfi spe of ons nt me ach att tl1e for be must . ed ch ta at be to e ar ty er op pr of s pe ty as to ho\V vario11s st not e that certain we mu ed, ach att be to is ty per pro 110w o erin sid con ore b Bef • • . nt un1 o11 n1m am of Illl pro no 1s ere Th nt. me ac att 1n fro � t mp exe is property _perty that _ t de so tha ma a e th� Judgment ns t1o exe t b11 , ain ret � can �� r bto -de ent the judg111 y tl1e rut d a11 rtu life po op of s 1t1e to earn ess nec tl1e of ed riv dep be 1ot 1 debtor ,vill a livelil1ood. The follo\ving property is exe1npt: (1) the necessary wearing-apparel, cookina vessels, bed and bedding of tl1e j11dgn1ent-debtor and his family; (2) tools instru;ents of in1ple1nents of any kind 11sed by tl1e judgment-debtor in his profess ion, art or trade; (3) \vl1ere the jL1dgn1ent-debtor is an agricult11ralist, such cattle and seed-grain as 111a;', in tl1e opi11ion of tl1e cot1rt, be necessary to enable him to earn l1is livelil1ood; (4) st1cl1 a1110L111t of food and mo11ey as may in the opinion of the court, be necessary to sustain tl1e judgi11ent-debtor and l1is family for a period of 268 ( 6) two-thirds of the judgment-debtor's 267 es 1oni ; alin and s sion pen tl1ree 1no11tl1s ; (5) salary, 269 or \Vl1ere tl1e salary does not exceed Etl1.$ 2 per day, and the judg ment-debtor l1as no otl1er inco1ne, tl1e entire salary; (7) any other property declared b)' la\V to be exen11)t fro111 attacl1ment or sale. 270 It is clear tl1at the exeo1ptions represent a11 atte1npt to leave. tl1e judg1nent-debtor witl1 the minimum amount of property tl1at l1e 11eeds to s11bsist a11d to ec1r11 a. livelil1ood. On the whole, rela.tively little property is exen1pt fron1 attacl11ne11t, a11d it is likely that the decree-holder will receive some satisfaction despite the exe1nptio11s. We will now consider tl1e specific directions for the attachment of variot1s kinds of propert)'. De1)e11di11g on tl1e nat11re of tl1e property and the person wl10 l1as control over it, different 111etl1ods are to be e1nployed. In tl1e case of movable property in tl1e possessio11 of tl1e j11dgn1e11t-debtor, otl1er tl1a11 agric11ltt1ral prod11ce, the attach n1ent is n1ade by pl1ysical seiz11re of tl1e property; the exec11tion officer n1ust keep tl1e property in a safe place and be reSJ)Onsible for its ct1stody.272 Since there is a different 111etl1od_ f�r tl1e attach111ent of prOJ)erty not in the possession of tl1e judg n1ent-debtor, 271 1t 1s not proper for tl1e co11rt to 111a.ke an order that attacl1n1ent shall be effected ''wherever the property 1nay be fot111d.. "273 TI1e order should direct 265. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 378(3) (j) (ii). See tl1e discussiot1 supra notes, 76-81 and accon1panying text. 266. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 379. 267. Tl,e In�ia� Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 60, exempts ''in1plements of l1usbandry" which the Ethiopian Code does not. However, even t1nder tl1e broader exen1ption, a n1otor tractor . was held to be subJec t to exect1tion. See Dwarka ,,. Municipal Board (l-Iigl1 Ct., AJlababad, 1958), 1958 All-India Rep., p. 561. 268. In Iudia only governn,ent pensions are exen1pt · See the disct1ssion in D · Mulla , supra, note · · all pension 253 at p 247· In Etl11op · s, wl1atever tl1e1· r source, are exempt. · 1a . ·. . is 00 269. This that Wt th0 ut prejudice to the provisio11S eff e ct to the of 121 C Marit Art i1ne more than one-quarter of a seaman's wages can dings. proc ee · ecu ti�n ex be ta. in k · · e. n _ . Pro. 270. C1v C., Art. 404. 271. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 406(1 ). 272. This is covered by Ci p v. ro. C., Art. 409, to be discussed st1bsequently. . 273. See Har1 prasad v B India 941 A//. a li ft' e S · , n,a11 · Cause Court (Higl1 Court, Rangoon, 1941), 1 R p., p. 347. 0
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g it is in the· possession of the judgment the executio n to seize the property providin _ debtor. Where the goods are stored 10 a warel1ot1se or si1nilar place and it is in convenient to remove them, an attachment can be effected by affixing the warrant of attachment to tl1e ot1ter door of the building. 27 4 However, the exec11tion officer should ordinarily take tl1e goods into pl1ysical custody. If tl1e l)roperty is stibject to speedy _ and natt1ral decay,. or the expense of . keeping it in c11stody is likely to exceed its value, tl1e exect1t1on officer 111ay sell 1t at once.275 T11e proceeds of the sale are then bro11ght before the court for distrib11tion. Where the property to be attacl1ed is agcic11lt11ral prod11ce, attacl1n1ent is made by the affixi11g of \.Varrant ratl1er tl1an by physical seiz11re. Wl1ere the produce is a growi11g crop, tl1e warra11t of ,1ttach111ent is to be atfi.xed on tl1e land on which the crop is growi11g ;276 wl1ere tl1e 1)rod11ce l1as bee11 c11t or gathered, tl1e warrant · is affixed on tl1e tl1resl1ing-floor or place for treading out grain or tl1e like or fodder-stack in wllicl1 it is deposited. 27 7 At1otl1er CO})Y of the warrant 1n11st be affix ed on the outer door or s0111e otl1er conspicuo11s part of the l1ot1se in whicl1 the judgn1ent-debtor ordinarily resides, or witl1 leave of co11rt, 011 tl1e place in whicl1 l1e carries on bt1siness or personally \:Yorks for gain, or in whicl1 l1e is know11 to have last resided or carried 011 bt1siness or personally worked for gain. 278 Once tl1e warrant is so affixed, tl1e produce is dee1ned to l1ave passed into possessio11 of tl1e co11rt, a.nd it is as if tl1e J)roperty were physically taken into custody by tl1e exec11tion offi.cer. 279 Thus, tl1e debtor 1nay not legally re111ove tl1e produce. 280 Tl1e co11rt tl1en makes st1ch arrangen1ents for c11stody as it deems necessary, and the decree-l1older must, in his application for attaclm1ent of a growing crop, speci.fy tl1e tin1e at which it is likely to be cut or gathered. 281 The co11rt n1ay direct or authorize the judgment-debtor to tend, c1Lt, gatl1er and store the prodt1ce or do a11y otl1er act necessary for mat11ring or preserving it. 282 If l1e fails to do so wl1en orderecl, tl1e decree-holder may obtain tl1e per1nission of tl1e co11rt to perforn1 s11cl1 acts, a11d the costs incurred by tl1e decree-l1older in doing so s11all be recovered from tl1e judgn1e11t-debtor as if incl11ded in tl1e decree. 283 Wl1ere the order for attacl1n1e11t of a growing crop has been made a considerable tin1e before tl1e crop is likely to be cut or gathered, tl1e court may suspend executio11 for s11cl1 tin1e as it tl1i11ks fit and may also make an order J)ro]1jbiting tl1e re1noval of the crop pe11ding execu tion. 284 A growing crop that does not adnlit to being stored 1nay not be attacl1ed at any time less than 20 days before the time at wl1icl1 it is fit to be c11t or gathered. 285 Finally, agrict1ltural prod11ce attacl1ed as a growing crop remains 11nder the same attacl1ment, altl1011gl1 it n1ay have been severed. 286 274. See Multan Chand v. Bank of Madras (tligh Ct., Madras, 1904), Indian L. Rep. , vol 27, p. 346. 275. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 406(2). 276. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 407(1) (a). 277. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 407(1) (b). 278. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 407(2). 279. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 407(3). 280. See Mahabir v. R. (High Ct., Patna, 1940), 1941 All-India Rep., p. 136. 281. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 408(1). 282. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 408(2). 283. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 408(3). 284. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 408(5). 285. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 408(6). 286. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 408(4).
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y, ian. nom uop Etl eco tl1e of cu exe ure nat tion al ltur icu agr of tile of . . w · In vie . o e pr �c ra d I . I 1s. tu u y er i r1c vf �g f o _ le sa po im d an n rta nt 11e clu ta t. at of y wa by s decree n e ca e t1s re sa ec d d. l 1e �e t h 11c wl �he Code _ by y wa ly on e th . be y 01a . is tll Often al t1� rd ac 1de pr wa ns to co \V v1e rat1ons. The a tl1 w1 t 1en hn �c att cl1 su tes ula reg y careftill e�tly _be attache? and e� n ca nv y co ert op pr e th t tha e t1� 1ns to d ne sig de provisions are at 1t tl1 ll so wi y _ t perish or sar no ces ne as of sed po dis d an d rve ese pr be ll wi that it interests of the decree-holder and e Tl1 t. en 1n1 acl att e 1 tl of use 1 c,: be ue val in decline jt1dgment-debtor are fully protected.
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r, bto -de ent the gm of j11d the method . n sio ses pos tl1e in not is ty per pro the Wl1ere of attachment depends on tl1e natu re of the property s011gl1t to be attached. \Vhere 281 ble a otia by red neg secu rum inst not t deb ent a is d cl1e atta be to the property or is a debt owed to tl1 e j11dgi11ent-debtor 11nder anotl1er decree, the attachmen t is r ebto from recovering the nt-d gn1e j11d tl1e ting l1ibi pro er ord ten writ a by e 111ad 288 A rt. the of er cou ord her f11rt il unt 1 debt l1i11 ing pay 11 fro1 debt and l1is debtor so attacl1ed is said to be ''gar11isl1ed'', and tl1e person owing the debt to the judg n1 ent-debtor is said to be the ''gar11isl1 ee''. A COJ)Y of the order is to be affixed on s0111 e co11SJ)icuo11s place of tl1e co11rtl1 011se a11d another CO.l)Y is to be sent to the garnishee. 289 Tl1e garnisl1 ee 111 ay pay tl1e a1no11nt of tl1e debt into court, and such pay ment discl1arges tl1e debt. 290 ''Debt'' sho11ld be co11str11ed as it l1as in India, to include a 1 29 a t ion. of presen obligat virt11e by fut11re tl1e i11 yable 1 p:: or t presen at e debt payabl Tl1ere is no req11iren1e11t tl1at tl1e debt be for a11 ascertained s11m. So, if the garni sl1 ee is required to pa1, tl1e 1Jroceeds fron1 tl1e sale of certain goods to the judg1nent-debtor, tl1e l )roceeds 1naJ' be ::1ttacl1 ed eve11 prior to the ti1ne wl1en l1e n1akes tl1e sale. 292 Tl1is r11Ie does 11ot inclt1de debts sec11red b y a negotiable intr1rment, \Vl1ich are treated seJ)arately; l1 owever, a debt sec11red by 111 ortgage ca.n be attacl1 ed tinder tl1is r111e. 293 TI1e debt n1t1st be owed to the j11dgme11t-debtor at the tin1 e tl1e attacl1111e11t is sougl1t. WI1ere tl1 e gra 1 1isl1 ee l1as given the j11dgment-debtor a cl1eque in satisfaction of tl1e debt, tl1 ere is no Jo11ger a debt owed by tl1e garnishee to tl1 e j11dg1 11ent-debtor, even tl1ougl1 tl1e j11dgment-debtor has not· yet presented the cl1 eque for J)ayme11t,294 and tl1e decree-l1older 1n11st proceed to attacl1 tl1 e cl1eque in the possession of tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor. It l1as also been l1eld tl1at n1 oney deposited by tl1 e juclg111ent-debtor witl1 anoth.er for perfor11 1a11ce of a contract in t]1 e future �annot_ be attacl1 ed, since, if tl1e j1 1dgment-debtor does 11ot perforn1, the other party 1s ent1tlecl to retai11 tl1e 111oney; tl1erefore, it cannot be said tl1at he O\Ves that 1non�y to tl1 e j11dgn1ent-debtor at tl1e ti1ne attacl1 1nent is sot1gl1t. 295 Fioall>', note tl1at tl1e garnisl11n�nt ?rder only _JJrol1ibits tl.1e judgi11e11t-debtor from actt1ally recovering tl1e de�t. He may 1 nst�tt1te a s_t11t for recovery or co11ti11t1e a11 existi11 g s11it, b11t cannot receiv e pay111e11t 11nt1l he satisfies tl1e decree against l1im ;296 I1e n111st t11rn tl1e proceeds lie l1as recovered over to tl1 e co11rt exec11ti11 g tl1e decree passed against him . 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295.
Attachn1ent of negotiable instrt1n1ents is governed by Civ. Pro. ·C., Art. 412. · Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(1). ·· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(5). ee Lachman v. Jarbt1ndan· (High 'Ct., Allahabad, 1928), 1928 All-l11dia Rep., p. 193. · ! ee Madho Das v. Ramji (I-Iigl1 Ct., All al1abad' 1894)' J,idian L. Rep. ' vol. 16, P· 286· ·· . See the discuss1o · D. Mt11la, supr · · .n 1n a, note 253, vol. 2, p. 822. · · See Bhagavao<las v. Abdul Husein (Higl1 Ct., Bo1nbay, 1897), I11dian· L. Rep.,· vol. 3, P· 49; e �� 3f aghavayya v. Cliamaria (Higl1 Ct., Andhra Pradesl1, 1957), 1958 All-J,z'dia !,;· Rep., 296. See Shig Singh v. Sita Ram (Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad 1890) f11dian L. ,R ep., voi: 13, p.?f,.
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WI1 ere the .property to be attac _ hed is a share in tl1e ca1Jital of a corporation by a written order prol1ibiting tl1 e person in w11 ose name t11e attacl1n1 ent 1s made _ _ the share may be; 1.e., . the Judgn1 et1 t-debtor or the person l1 oldiog tl1 e share on J1is behalf, fro111 t1:ansferr1ng tl1e sl1are or receiving any dividend, and tl1 e corpora tion fro1n reg ster1ng �ny transfer of tl1 e share.297 A copy of tlJ e order mtist be aflixed on some co�sp1ct1ot1 s part of the co�rtl1 ouse, and anotl1 er copy sl1 all be sent to tJ1e approp.r1at� officer of tl1_e cor1Jorat1on. 298 Wl1ere otl1er movable property or a st1n1 of n1oney 111 t11 e posse �s1on of someone otl1 er tl1an tJ1 e jt1dgment-debtor is to be �ttacJ1 ed, tJ1 � �ttac_l1 1ne11 t 1s n1 ade ?Y a writte11 order prollibiting tl1 e person in possession fro111 g1 v11 1g 1t over to tL1e Jttdg1ne11 t-debtor. 299 Again, a copy of the order mt1st be affixed on son1e conspict1ot1s part of tl1e cot1rtl1 ot1se, and anotL1er copy sent to the perso11 i11 possession. 3oo Whenever an order is 11 1acle tinder tl1 ese provisio11 s, it 1nt1 st be accompanied by a notice i11for1ning tl1 e gar11isl1 ee or officer or person i11 possession tl1 at l1 e may appear before tl1 e cot1rt on a day to be fixed in the notice to shovv ca11se why he should not comply witl1 tl1 e order.301 Tl1 is gives tl1 at person tl1e opportt1nity to to contest t11 e judg1ne11 t-debtor's rigl1t to tl1 e pro1Jerty, and the provisions of tl1e Code relating to the flling of objections, whicl1 will be discussed s11 bseqt1 ently, apply.3 :i2 At tl1at ti1ne the gar11ishee, cot1ld co11tend for exan1ple, tl1 at l1e is 11 ot indebtecl to the jt1dgment-debtor, becat1se tl1 e jt1 dgn1 ent-debtor is also indebted to l1 i 111 , a11 d botl1 debts operate as a set-off.303 Any otl1 er objection relating to tl1 e rigl1 t of tl1 e jt1dg ment-debtor to receive tl1 e pro1Jerty n1ay be raised at t]1 at ti111 e. Wl1 ere tl1 e property to be attacl1 ed co11 sists of t]1e sl1 are or i1 1terest of tl1e judgment-debtor in 111ovable property l1elo11 gi11 g to hi111 and anotl1er as co-o,vners, tl1e attachment is made by a 11 otice to tl1e judg111ent-debtor prohibiting l1 i1n fron1 transferring the share or interest or cl1arging it in any vvay. 304 For exa1n1)le, if tl1 e judgn1 ent-debtor and· a11 otl1 er are joint o,v11ers of an al1to111 obile, tl1 e interest of tl1e judgn1 ent-debtor in tl1e at1tomobile can be attacl1ed in th.is 1nanner. Note that tl1 ere is no order against the co-owner a11 d tl1.at no actio11 is tal<en vvitl1 res1Ject to tl1 e property. Tl1 e judg1nent-debtor is sin1ply restricted fro111 deali11g witl1 J1 is interest in tl1 e property. AttacJune11t of salary is to be 111ade by an order to tl1e e1n1Jloyer, ciirecti1 1g that the amount be wit11l1 eld eitl1 er on one pay111 eot or by n1 011 tl1 Iy installme11 ts. 305 Upon the receipt of st1 cl1 an order, tl1e en1 ployer n1 ust d� dt1ct tl1 e a11101rnt �s directed and re1n.it it to tl1 e cot1rt. 306 Reme.n1 ber tl1at tvvo-tl11rcls of tl1 e salary 1s exempt from attachme11 t, a11d tl1 at in certain c,1ses tl1e entire s�Jary is exempt. 307 If the an1ot1 nt directed to l1e witl1l1 eld exceeds tl1e ao1 ouot subJect to attacl1111 ent, the employer or judg111 ent-clebtor sl1 ot1ld bring this fact to tl1 e attention of tl1e cot1rt,308 297. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(2). 298. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(4). 299. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(3). 300. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(4). 301. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(6). 302. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 409(7). 303. See Satya v. Venkata (1-Tigt1 Ct., Madras, 1937), 1936 All-Jnclia Rep., p. 848. As to the nature and effect of set-off, see Civ. C., Arts. 1831-1841. 304. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 410. 305. Cifv. Pro. C., Art. 411(1). 306. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 411(2). 307. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 404(f). 1944 308. See Superintendent, R. M.S. v. Co-operative Credit Society (I-ligh Ct., CaI cu tt a, 1944), All-India Rep., p. 135.
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. d s i ea ry alr ala s re ing he be W . th wi _ held 1 e order accordingly tl � d en am ii \Vi t ur co the and _ 1 fica.lly directed to retur n ec sp 1s er o 1pl e 1 tl nt, me ach att of er ord � or � pri � ptirsuant to a . _ _ of ent all the particulars 1 rt togetl1er w1tl1 a full sta�em co1 the to er ord t uen seq sub tlie 309 Tl1e co1 1 rt 11111st be certain that the total amo unt nt. me ach _ att g stin exi . of tlle bto -de the ent of gm s Jud 1rd -tb r's salary. t,vo eed exc not s doe s ree dec all er tind attached The decree-holder 111ay also attacl1 a negotiable instrun1ent payable to the judg ment-debtor or endorsed over to l1 im. In order to prevent furtl1er negotiation of the instru111 ent the instr t1 ment itself mt 1st be seized by the exec·ution officer and brotigl1 t into c�urt. 310 Since tl1 e person obligated to pay �ill insist on the surrender of tlie instr11ment, 311 tl1is proced11re also prevents tl1e J tidgment-debtor or anyone else fro 111 receiving pay1ne 11 t. \VJ1erc tl1e property to be attached is in tl1e c1 1 stody of any court or public officer, tl1e attacl1 1 11 ent is 111ade by a notice to s11cl1 co11rt or officer reqt1esting tl1at tl1e property and a11y i11terest or dividend becoming payable thereon be held subject to ft1 rther orders of tl1 e co11rt from wl1 ich the 11otice is issued. 312 This would be a1)I)licable to pro1)erty tl1 at tl1 e judginent-debtor ca11 sed to be attached for satisfaction of a decree l1 e held a.gainst a11otl1er person or property claimed by tl1e judg 1 ne11 t-debtor and deposited Vt1itl1 a court or pt 1blic officer. If a person other tl1an tl1e jt1clg111e11t-debtor clain1s tl1e property, tl1 e question of title or priority be twee11 tl1at l)erson and the dec.ree-l1older sl1all be determi11ed by the court ]1aving custody of tl1 e JJro1Jerty and 11ot by tl1e co11rt tl1at sougl1t to attach it.313 Wl1ere tl1 e 1)ro1)erty is in tl1 e c11stody of a public officer ratl1 er tl1 a11 a co11rt, the question aJJJ)arently \Vo11]d l1ave to be deter1 11 ined by tl1e cottrt issuing exectttion. This provi sion ,vo11ld e11able a 1)erso11 c]ai1ni11 g to be tl1e assignee of th.e judgment-debtor r)rior to attacl1n1 e11t to litiga.te tl1e claim before tl1e cot1rt l1 aving c11stody. 314 A problem 1nay arise vvl1ere reqt1ests for attacl1ment of property i n the c11stody of a cot1rt l1ave been st1bn1itted by several otl1er co11rts. It seen1 s tl1 at in s11cl1 a case tl1e co11rt ha,,ing c11stody should treat the property as attacl1 ed by the co11rt wl1ose req t1est was first received ; 315 l1owever, tl1e otl1er decree-l1olders sho11ld be permitted to a.J)ply to tl1e a.ttacl1ing co11rt for r[1teable distribt1tion 11nder Art. 403. j! 6 Tl1is JJroced11re avoids conflicting attachn1ents, b t1t e11ables all tl1 e decree-holders to sl1 are in the assets. In t!1e case of at �acl1111ent of in11novable property a 11 11 mber of actions n1ust be tal<en. F1�st tl1 e court 1sst1es a11 order prol1ibiting tl1 e j1 1 dg1nent-debtor from transferring or charg1?g the property witl1 a.ny rigl1 t any iri re111. (tl1 at is, all)' right against tl1e property itself, such as a 1n.ortgage,) and })rol1ibiti 11 g all perso 11s fro1n taking any benefit fr?m a transfer or cl1arge.317 Tl1e11 tl1e order is proclai1ned at some place on or adJacent to tl1e property by beat of drt11n 01· other c t1ston1 ary 111ode, and a copy of . the order is affixed on a co11s1)ict1011s part of the property a11 d then 11po11 a conspicuotis part of the co11rt-l1011se.318 Tl1is J)roced t1 re �tpparently is applica.ble 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 411(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 412. See Cornn1. C., Art. 375(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art . 413.
lbic/. See Haricharan v. Kedarnatl1 35, vo l. (H No igh tes , Ct ., Ca We lct ek 1tt Ca ly a, 19 lcu 31 tta ), p. 517. 315. See Visvanadban v. Ar . · tina h c 21 g· 1 e am (H1 gl1 Ct. , Ma 192 e : dra a 0) s 192 1 All -Ind i . R . p., P ' · ' 316. Se e the d1scuss1on in ' 468 s · sar ·kar, .1.,.,..rze P· 1, Law vol. , of Civil Proced1,re (4th ed.' 1963), 317. c· v. pro. C., Art. 414(1). � 318. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 414(2).
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both where the j11dgme11t-debtor is tl1 e sole owt1 er of tl1 e property a,1d wll ere he is the co-owner. Tl1e order wo11ld not operate against any co-owner. I-Iowever, since the judgm�nt-debtor co11ld not cl1arge tl1e p�operty ,vitl1 a rigl1t ;11 re,1,1, he could not autl1or1ze. tl1e co-owner to do so, and since tl1e co11sent of all joint owners is req11ired to . dispose of or mortgage tl1e �roperty,319 tl1ere is no possibility tI1at the _ property will b � cl1arged ,v1 �l1 s11 cl1 a r1gl1 t after it is attacl,ed. Once the order has been procla1n1ed as provided above, a tl1ird party ca1111ot :tcq uire :liJY riglit i 11 the property.320 But . the order 11111st be proclain1ed, and if tl1e property is trans ferred or cl1arged prior to tl1e procla1na !ion, tl1 e rigl1ts of the tl1ird party are not _ are involved, tl1ese forn1alities 1 nust be followed effected.321 Wl1ere several properties 322 0 11 ce tl1e order I1as been proclaimed, tl1e property property. eacl1 to pect res witl1 _ is effectively attacl1ed. \Ve may no,v consider tl1e procedure to be followed after tl1e property l1as been attached. The attacl1n1ent is to be withdraw 11 0 11ly tinder one of tl1e follo,vi1 1g circ11n1stances: (1) wl1en tl1 e a111011 11t decreed witl1 costs and all cl1arges and expenses res11lti11g fron1 tl1e attacl1me11t of tl1e property l1ave been paid into cot1rt; or (2) wJ,en satisfactio1 1 of tl1e decree is otl1erwise n1ade tl1rougl1 the court or certified to tJ1e court; or (3) ,vl1 en decree whicl1 i s the s11bject of tl1 e attacl1ment is set aside or reversed. 323 In case of in1n1ovable property, tl1 e witl1dra\val m11st be JJroclain1 ed, if the j11clg111ent-debtor so desires and at l1is expense, in the sa111.e manner as \Vas the attach11 1ent. 314 Note that tl1 e attachment is witl1draw11 011ly \Vl1 ere tl1 e a11101 1 nt paid into coLtrt satisfies the an1ot111t of tl1e decree. If tl1at a11101111t is subject to rateable c1istrib11tio11 , the attacl1 ment sl1ould not be witl1dra,v11. 325 Also, the Code says that tl1e attacl11nent ''sl1all be deen1ed to be withdrawn.'' Upon tl1e satisfactio11 of any of tl1e three condi tions mentioned above, tl1e attachn1ent is automatically \Vitl1dravvn, and no furtl1er action on tl1e part of tl1 e court is necessary. A11y property in the custody of t]1e court sl1011ld tl1en be retL1rned to tl1e jt1dgme11t-debtor or tl1e person fro1n wl1om it \Vas taken. Where the property attacl1 ed is current coin or c11rre11cy notes, tl1e court 1nay at any ti1ne d11ri11g tl1e continua11ce of tl1e attac]111 1ent, direct that tl1 e coin or notes, or a part tl1ereof s11 fficie 1 1t to satisfy tl1e decree, be paicl over to tl1e party entitled under tl1e decree to receive it. 326 This does 11 ot 1nean that execL1tion l1as been had on st1cl1 property, but only that it l1as been turned over to tl1e decree l1older pending tl1e deter111inatio11 of tbe attacl11nent. The decree-l1older may be re qt1 ired to rett1rt1 tl1 e coi1 1 or currency if tl1e decree is satisfied or exec11tion otl1er wise does not talce place. If due to tl1 e default of tl1 e decree-holder, the court is 11nable to proceed · een _attacl1 ed, it may furthe; with the application for execution after P:operty has b dismiss the application or, for sufficie11t cause, adJourn tl1 e procee_d1ngs to a furtl1 er date. 327 If the application is dismissed, the attacl1ment at1tomat 1 cally ceases to be
319. Civ. C., Art. 1266. 320. Since the order would be fixed on the property, the third p�rty v,�uld be a\vare t�at the. law h wit e anc ord acc 1n ed 1ssu be ld cou d dee title no and ed err property could not be transf See Civ. C., Arts. 1195, 1196. 321. See 0110 Mg v. Ma Mya (Higl1 Ct., Rangoon, 1933), 1933 All-lnclia Rep., p. 198. 322. See Rukminamma v. Ramaya (I-ligh Ct., Madras, 1943), 1943 All-India Rep., p. 712. 323. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 415. 324. lbicl. 325. See Satnarain v. Mahabir Prasad (High Ct., Patna, 1939), 1939 All-India Rep., p. 392. 326. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 416. 327. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 417(1).
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or m in�ludes any act rf pe to e 1r ilt fa e tl1 r'' de ol -h ee cr de e tl1 effective.J2s ''Default of 29 r g 3 1n s! as 1 po cl , cu su rt se co e th u . ity by do to ed ct re di . is r de ol -11 ee cr de . e tll at tll d an 1� he fails to �o so, the t, ur co e tl1 1 1tl w lly fti e at er op co The decree-holder 1 n11st y 1s eb nt er 1e tl1 111 gu cl tin ta ex at e tl1 d ed an ish d, . se us s11 di be ll wi 11 io ut ec ex r fo n tio ica appl b) Objections to attach111e11t at th is g � n i· t1r at e? rel oc pr to t en hm the ac att e tl1 of rt pa t tan or np 1 i st Tlie mo ns de to t1o ma Jec the ob d an y ert attach op pr d l1e ac att e tl1 to s i1 cla of n n tio investioa 0 e us is it p ca be em r ex he eit t t from en l1m ac att to ct bje st1 be t no y ma rty . ment. Prope to eb t-d 1en r. The judggn JUd the of y ert op pr e tl1 t no is it 1se ca1 be or nt me ach att d t the property un tha gro the on nt me ach att tl1e to 11 tio jec ob 1 1 a file y 11a 1 tor deb nt1ne ty per the t. J?ro s tha ong bel ing i1n to cla 1 so1 per the and 11t, 11ne acl att 111 fro t n1p is exe 330 So too, to it. im cla a fer where pre y 1na r l1i 111 ratl1er tl1an to tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debto a debt allegedly owing to tl1e jt1dgn1ent-debt9r, a share i n the capital of a corpora tion or property i11 the possession of a tlurd party has been attached, the garnishee, ion 111ay file an objection to the officer of tl1e cor1Joratio11 or party in possess 331 . Jerty proi Obviously, only the judgment-deb the attacl11ne11t or prefer a claim to tor can raise tl1e objection tl1at tl1e property is exempt from attacl1ment, since the sl1ould not exe111ptio 11 is for his benefit. By the sa111e token, the judgment-debtor 2 33 . He should party t11ird a of lf bel1a 011 be able to prefer a clai1n to tl1e property notify tl1e tl1ird party, \¥110 can tl1en file l1is own clai1n. However, the judgment debtor 111ay contend that l1e is tl1e trt1stee of the pro1)erty and prefer a claim to tl1e pro1Jerty on bel1alf of the be11eficiaries. 333 Tl1is wot1ld be tr11e in any case where l1e l1olds tl1e }Jroperty in a re1Jresentative capacity. A person wl10 l1as made a prior attacl1111ent of tl1e propert>' sl1ol1ld not be able to file an objection to a st1bsequent attacl1111e11t. 334 He n 1a>1 a1Jply for rateable distribution, and botl1 l1e and the subsequent attaching decree-l1olcler are entitled to sl1are in tl1e proceeds, since at tl1e time of the s11b seq uent attacl1ment tl1e assets 11ave not yet been realized. 335 Tl1e objection procedt1re is apJJlicable or1ly ,vl1ere JJroperty l1as bee11 attacl1ed, tl1at is, seized i11 execution of a decree. Wl1ere a decree directed tl1at property be sold in satisfaction of a mortgage, a. clai111a11t could not prefer a clai1n t1nder tl1is r11le. 336 Tl1e mortgaged property was not att�cl1ed as sucl1, b11t was si1nply dis1)osed of in the suit on the n1ortgage. Tbe cla1n1ant would not be bot1nd by tl1e res11lt of tl1at s11it and could bring a se1Jarate s1�it to establish l1is rigl1t to tl1e property in qt1estion. The proced11re is designed �o deal with case� st1ch as tl1e fol_lowing. A consigned goods by railway to B, and B l_ 1ad n1ade_ spe�1 fic adva_nces against tl1e goods. Tl1e goods were attached at the railway station 1n exec11t1011 of a decree agai1 1st A. Althotigh A ,vas technically the o,vner of tl1e goods at tl1e ti1 11e they were attacl1ed, B was tl1e person enti�led to tl1e goods, and they co11ld not be attacl1ed in exec11tion of tl1e decree against A. B could prefer a claim to tl1e goods 11nder tl1is 1Jrocedt1re ' and tl1e court would release the goods from attacl1 111ent. 337 328.
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Civ. Pro. . C., Art. 417(2). \VL1ei1 tl1_e executio11 proceeding is finally disn1issed, any attachment at 1 tl1on1a//t1call7 ceases to be effective. See U1u1a1nalai v. Bagl1ya (Higl1 Ct. Madras , 1940), ' l 94 0 A - J nc.1a / Rep., l), 763. -329. S �e Ar<lesl1ir v. Usn1an (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 192 9), 1929 All-I11dia Rep. ' p. 455. 330. C �v. Pro. C., Art. 418(1). 331. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 40 9(7). 332. See Bhagwan v. Dwarka ( Chief Ct. ' Sind ' 1946)' 1948 All-111d",a R ep., p. 24· · · 33 3. See tl1e· a·iscu�sion Ln S. Sark ar, supra, note 316 at p. 480. 334. See Sundarba1 v Ganpat (Hi g11 Ct ·, Nagpur, 1934), 193 5 All-Irzdill Rep., p. 171. . · 335. See the ·d'isctission, supr a, notes 248-253 an d accompanying text · 336. · See n. n:.m 1 atram v. Khushal (l-Iigh Ct B 98· b on 1 ay, 1894), India,, L. Rep., vol. 18, p. ·, 337. See Velji v. Bllarmal (H igi l Ct., Bombay, 1897), Indian L. Rep., vol. 21, p. 287 .
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on is made . by presentit1 g a written application to tile court A claim or objecti 338 U o ree. de on, tl1e court proceeds to in the g p � receipt of tl1 e applicati � executin _ vestigate !l�e cla1� or obJect1on; wl1 ere the claimant or objector \Vas not a party beco mes he arty t, to tl�e proceedings for the purpose of the st1 al ong1 � � the � � to . cotirt's hearing his cl� 1m . or obJect1on, . and 1s st1bject to tl1e power of tlie court witll respect to e�aD1Jnat10� a.�d the like . as if l1e were a party.JJ9 If tlle court finds that tl1e �la1m . or . obJection was d�s1g�edl� or unnecessarily delayed, it will not make the 1nvest1gat1on, and the claim 1s, 1n effect, rejected.J"o The claimant date of tl1e attachment I1e I1 ad some interest or objector must sho'vV that at t l1e 341 As we have said, following an attacl1IDent in, or was posses_sed ?f th� property. no one can acqwre rights 1n the property. Wl1ere tl1 e property to wl1ich the claim or objection . ap�lie� has . alr�ady been advertised tl1e sale, for postpone 1uay court _ _ 342 After the 1nvest1gation, if the court is satisfied that the sale pe11 d1ng its 1nvestigat1on. for the reason stated in tl1 e aJ)plication or for a11y otl1er reason, the property is 11ot st1bject to attacl1 mei1t, it is to release the property, wl1olly or to tl1e extent it tl1inks fit, from the attacl1n1 e11 t. 343 If it is satisfied that tl1e property is st1bject to attachment, it will disallow the clai111 or objectio11. 3 '1 4 TI1e cot1rt is not required to prepare an opinion with tl1e order, bt1t it would be good practice to do so. If tl1e cot1rt finds tl1 at tl1 e property is st1bject to a mortgage or right in rein in favor of some person not in possession, it l1as tl1e discretion to continue the attachme11t subject to st1ch 111 ortgage or rigl1t in re,rz. 3-ts When tl1e property is advertised for sale, tL1e fact tl1at i t is st1bject to sucl1 mortgage or rigl1t i11 re,11 will be included in tl1e JJroclamation, 346 and tl1e i11terest of tl1e person having tl1e right will be fully protected. It has been l1eld in India tl1at tl1e purcl1aser at tl1e sale may not later challenge the existence of st1ch a rigl1t, 347 a11d if tl1is approacl1 is taken in Etl1 iopia, as I th.ink it sl1ot1ld be, there is 110 reaso11 \vl1y the court should not contint1e the attacl1 111e11t in st1cl1 cases. Tl1e pt1rchaser ,vill be aware of tl1e right, and presr1n1ably this fact will i11flt1ence the an1ot1nt bid. The objection procedt1re proves an expeditiot1s remedy for a claimant to assert his right to the attacl1ed property. I-Iowever, tl1e procedt1re involves an investigation and not a full-scale st1it. There are no pleadings, the cot1rt does not fra1ne iss11es, and it does not ]1ear all tl1e evide11ce tl1at co11ld be prese11ted by both sides in adver sary proceedings. Any review of the exect1tion proceedings by tl1e aJJpeJJate co11rt would 1nerely determine whether tl1e lower cot1rt properly condt1cted the investiga tion and whether its decision co11Id be st1pJ)orted. TJ1e rigl1ts of the claimants l1ave not been litigated as they wot1ld l1 ave been in an orclinary st1it over tl1e p�operty. It is therefore, provided. that wl1 ere a clai111 or objection is preferred, tl1e party against \v]1om an order is made may instit1.1te a s11it to establish tl1e right wl1icl1 he clai111s to the property in dispute, b·ut subject to the rest1lt of tl1e st1it, if any, tl1 e order shall be concl11sive. 348 Tl1 e 338. 339. 340. ?41. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 418(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 418(1). Ibid. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 418(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 418(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 41?(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 419(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 420. . as, a dr M ., Ct l igl (1-I a yy ra ga Su v. ma m va Civ. Pro. C., Art. 423(2) (b). See also Venkataragl1a 1931), 1932 All-India Rep., p. 119. 347. See Gailu v. Lakha Singh (Chief Ct., Oudb, 1934), 1935 All-lnclia Rep., P· 23· 348. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 421.
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s ish bl hi ht ta rig es to t to a11 im cla the attached e tl1 le ab en to is on isi ov pr is tll of purpose ed eas e11 be rel s t ba m attachment tha fro rty pe pro er ov rec to r de lol e-l cre de the . property Or t d no t. h in..k 1t . !s intended to d. I s. 111g e c pro l icia jt1d ry ina � ord � the h wit in accordance abl1sl1 th at certain property is est t it su a ing br to � tor eb t-d en gm jtld enable the eal m pp fro t 1n e th. h1 for be ision of uld dec wo ure � � ced pro er tnd sot tl1e exempt; _ t 1 t included exempt tha d un property in _ tlle coLirt execLiting tl1e decree on th e gro e nt a av l 1n1 the cla tl1e t tha opportunity to ary ess nec is _ _ � it , ver we Ho . 1 ent n the attac11 y 1s rut en rtu giv po to the decree op e sam the and t, sui r t1la reg a in im assert his cla holder if tI1e orcler goes against l1im. So too, if tl1e _cot1rt rules in favor of the claimant, and the judg111ent-debtor has asserted that �1e 1s tl1e owner_ of the proper ty, I1e sl1ot1ld be able to bring a st1it against the cla11nant to estab�1sb sucl1 owner ship. If he is not pern1itted to do so, he \V?uld have n o opporturuty to adjudicate the question of ownersl1ip in a full-scale trial.
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Tl1ere is a questio11 as to who must be parties to such a suit. In India, it l1as been held tl1at tl1e jt1dg1neot-debtor is 11ot an indispensable party in eitl1er tl1e decree-holder's suit 349 however, der e-bol ; decre the st again s11it ant's some claim tl1e in against tl1e clai111ant or courts l1ave l1eld tl1at tl1e jt1dg1nent-debtor is an indispensable party in the latter case. 350 It seen1s to 1ne tl1at wl1ile the judg1nent-debtor's interest is affected in the sense that if the property is fou11d to be st1bject to attacl1111ent, it will be used to satisfy his debt, l1e \Vill not be directly affected by the j11.dgment in the sL1it a11d is, tl1erefore, not an indispensable party, as vve l1ave defi11ed tl1at term.351 The suit i11volves a claim to specific pro1)erty, wl1icl1, irrrespective of tl1e result of the st1it, will be lost to him. If l1 e vvisl1es to see tl1at tl1e property is attached by the decree-l1older so that it can be ttsed to satisfy tl1e decree, l1e shot1ld be l)ermitted to bring a suit against tl1e claima11t, as we have said. He sl1ould also be pern1itted to intervene in any s11it bet\veen tl1 e clai11 1ant a11d tl1e decree-l1older, a11d s11ch intervention would appear to be autl1orized 11nder Art. 41 on tl1e ground tl1at he is interested in the result of tl1 e sL1it. 352 I-Iowever, \Vl1ere tl1e judgment-debtor is not actively pursui11g his claim of 0\\1nersl1ip, tl1ere is 110 reason to require that he be a party to the suit. There is no li111itation as to tl1e perso11s against wl1on1 st1it may be brougl1t, and prest1ma?l)1, tl1e clai111ant 111ay also bring st1it against tl1e p11rcl1aser at the auction sale .. Tl11s l1as bee� permitted in India. 353 The Code does not expressly prol1ibit such a su1t, and tl1ere 1s no reason wl1y it sho11ld not be pern1itted in Etl1iopia. Where _ a claim l1as bee11 preferred and rejected, tl1e proclamation of sale sl1011ld include a . advised of the possi s�aten1ent to tl is e ff e ct, and prospe ctive p11rcha be sho11ld sers � _ _ b1l1ty that a suit will be brot1gl1t against them by tl1e clai111ant. Js 4 A pt1rchaser ,vould tl1en take tl1e property subject to sucl1 risk and cannot complain if it turns out tl1at he pt1rchased property tl1at b�lo11ged to anotl1er. If this interpretation is fol! o� _ ed, the success of tl1e cla1111 ant 1n tl1e s11bseq11e11t st1it will 11ot affect the validity of tl1e sale. Th�refore, there is no reason wl1y tl1e decree-holder need be n1ade a party to the st11t by tl1e clai111ant agai·nst t11e pt1rcl1aser.Jss 349· See Hashim Ali Khan v. I-Iamidi Begum (High Calcutta, 1941), 1942 All-India Rep., Ct., p. 180. 35o. See Ghasi Ram v. Mangal Cl1and (Higl1 28' vol . , Rep . L. I11d Ct. ian , Allal1abad, 1906), p. 41. 351. See the ct·iscuss·ion 1n · Chapter IV, s11pra, notes 138-148 and accompanying text. 352. Tl1e resu·lt may affect the sat· • 1s1a c. ct1on of the decree held against him. 353. Se� Ram Chandra v. Raghupati (Hjgh Ct., Patna, 1944) ' 1945 All-India Rep., P· 189· 354. This would constitute ,,a tl · know t ser 11ng w h ich purcha · the cou. r t considers material for a in order to judge t h e nat u r e and value of the property." See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 42�(Z) (e), 355. See Bhola v. Madho (H lt trar)' res u ig h C t con was reached in Ram Chand ·, Nagpu.r, 1�27), 1928 All-I11dia Rep., p. 65; a ra v. Ra.ghupat1, supra, note 353.
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If a suit is not bro11ght to establish the claim to the property, the order of tL1 e court upon the objection in the execution proceedings is conclusive. So, if the decision is in favor of the clai.mant, and the decree-L1older does not bring st1cL1 a st1it L1e cannot attacl1 the saine property st1bseqt1ently.3 56 Or, if tl1 e decision is against tl1e claima.nt and he fails to bring a suit, he will be preclt1ded from asserting his claim in a s11it against him by tl1e a11ction-pt1rcl1 aser to recover the property.357 1-Iowever, the barring of a s11b seq11ent s11it is only as to claims m . ad.e agai11st property attacl1ed in execution of tl1 e sa1ne decree. Suppose tl1 at A attacl1es certai11 property i11 exec11tion of a decree against B. C clain1s the property, tl1e clai111 is allowecl, a11d A does not bring st1it agai11st C. The decree is satisfied by the attacl1 n1ent a11 cl sale of otl1 er property of B. A tl1en recovers anotl1er decree agai11st B. I-le is 11ot precl11ded from attacl1i 11 g tl1 e san1e previously clai111 ed by C, since tl1e order in tl1e first attacl1me11t was con property . cl t1sive only as regards that attacl1 1ne11t. 358 C 1nt1st again prefer an objection as be wo11ld if another decree-l1 older tried to attach the property. Moreover, wl1ere tl1 e co11rt ref11sed to 1nake an i 1 1vestigation beca11se of the clai1nant's delay i n 1naking his claim, lie is 11 ot precludecl fron1 bringi11 g a st1bseque11t st1it to recover tl1e property. 359 2. Sale Once property l1as been attacl1ed and, in case of objection, found to be st1bect to attach111e11t, the cot1 rt proceeds to order the sale of tl1e property, or of st1ch portion as 111 ay be necessary to satisfy tl1e amo11nt of tl1e decree, and the proceeds of the sale or a s11:fficie11t portion tl1ereof, will be paid to tl1 e decree L1 older.360 Wl1ile there are general r11les governi 11 g all sales, tl1ere are son1e specially applicable to tl1e sale of movable property and otl1ers specially applicable to tl1 e sale of i 1ru11 ovable property. We \viii first consider the rt1les applicable to all sales, then tl1 ose applicable to the sale of 1no,1able property ancl finally t11ose aJJplicable to the sale of i 1 nmovable property. (a) General rules Unless otherwise directed, all sales n111st be cond11cted by an officer of the co11rt or a perso11 appointed for t]1is ptirpose (tl1e perso11 co11ducti11g tl1e sale is referred to as tl1e a11ctioneer) ancl n1ade by pt1b]ic atiction. 3 61 I-Iowever, tl1e co11rt, after bearing tl1 e decree-l1older, 111ay a11tl1 orize a sale by private co11tract at tl1e request of or witl1 the co11 se11t of tl1 e jt1dgn1 e11t-debtor. 362 Note t11at a sale by private contract ca11 11 ot be at1thorized over tl1e objection of the judgn1e11t-clebtor, who has a11 interest i11 seeing that tl1 e l1igl1 est sale price be realized and applied in satisfaction of the decree. The decree-l1older is to make an application for an order of sale, 363 wliicl1 must be accompanied by a statement signed and verified in the n1 anner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadi11gs364 and containing, insofar as tl1ey are 356. See Premsukh Das v. Satyanarain Singh (tligh Ct., Patna, 1945), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 485, 357. See tl1e discussion in D. Mulla, The Cocle of Civil Procedure (4th ed. by R. Mitter, 1953). vol, 2, pp. 859-860. 358. See Kandadai v. Ragbava (High Ct., Madras, 1943), 1943 All-J11clia Rep., p. 33. 359. See Gobardban v. M.akundi (Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1928), 1928 All-I11clia Rep., p. 435. 360. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 422(1). 361. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 422(2). 362. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 422(3). 363. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 422(1). Note that an application for sale is separate fron1 an application for attach1nent and must be filed io addition. In the absence of an application for sale, tl1e court will not order the sale of the property. 364. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 92, 93.
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knowil or can be ascertained, the matters . r� qt1ired to be spe�ified in the proclama tion of sale. 365 For the pt1rpose of d_eterm11ung such matters, th� court 1ay s m mo ? u · n o supply ble such it thinks 1 wl10 person nforn1at any and exaroiile � 1on and may � . _ 1n 111s possess 1 docu111e11t 011 or any power; 1t may also reqtiire him to produce . appoii1t a 11 expert to esti111a_te the valt1e of tl1e property to be s�ld. 366 W here th e sale is to be by public auction, tl1e co11rt n111st ca11se a p�oclam� t1on of sale to be made. TI1e provision is 111andatory, and it l1a_s been h�ld _ 1n India tha� the absence of st1ch a proclamation re11ders tl1e sale void. 367 Tl11s �s a _ sound 1 n_terpretation, since tl1e very idea of a p11blic sale asst1roes that tl1e p1�bl1� will b� advised and will have an op_portt1nity to bid. Tl1e absence of _ any pu1?J 1c� t1on, �hie� shoul� render t11e sale void, m11st be disti11g11isl1ed fro111 an 1 rreg11lar1ty 1 n publ1cat1on, which does not have that effect. Tl1e effect of an irregularity in tl1e p11blisl1ing or conducting of tl1e sal� will be disc11ssed s11bseq11ently
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Tl1e 1)rocla1nation of sale may be drawn 11p only after 11otice to the decree-holder and tl1e j11dg1nent-debtor n111st state tl1e ti1ne and place of sale and 0111st specify as fairly and acc11rately as possible tl1e following inforn1ation: (I) the propert)' to be sold and tl1e esti111ated val11e tl1ereof; (2) any i11c111nbrance to \\'hicl1 tl1e property is liable; (3) tl1e a11101111t for tl1e recovery of wl1icl1 tl1e sale is ordered; (4) the terms and conditio11s of tl1e sale and tl1e 111anner ju wl1icl1 and time within tl1e pL1rcl1ase price sl1all be paid ; 368 (5) all other infor1 11ation wh.icl1 tl1e court con siders n1aterial for a JJL1rcl1aser to l<:11ow i11 order to j11dge the nat11re and value of tl1e l )roperty. 369 It l1as bee11 held in India tl1at tl1e sale must be held at tl1e tin1e and. place s1:iecified i11 the procla1n,1tion and tl1at the failure to do so renders tl1e sale void. 370 In n1y opi 11io11, tl1e I1oldi11g of tl1e sale at a different time and place, 1111lik.e tl1e absence of ail)' J)rocla1nation, sl1ould not render the sale ,,oid. Tl1e sale 111igl1t still be ''p11blic'' if there are s11fficient bidders. As we will see, where the l1igl1est bid does not reach tl1e s11n1 eq11al to the valL1e of the property as specified in tl1e proclan1ation, a second sale 11111st be l1eld,371 so there is no danger that tl1e pro1Jerty will be sold at a11 i11adequate JJrice as a res11lt of the variation. Tl111s, tl1e l1olding of the sale at a different place or tin1e sho11ld be considered an irregularity (and st1bject to the provisions of tl1e Code applicable to irregularities) ratl1er tl1an as voiding tl1e sale. I-Iowever, tl1e co11rt sl1ot1Id be ver)' careft1l to see that the proclamation contains the necessary details, since tl1e details in tl1e proclamation may s11bsta11tially affect the am?11nt that will be realized fro111 tl1e sale. Tl1e cot1rt l1as a duty to deter 1n!ne the est1_mated valt1� o� tl1e property a11d sl1ould 11ot n1erely accept tl1e valuation stated 10 tl1e appl1cat1on.372 It sl1ould list all i 11formation tl1at n1igl1t aftect tl1e 365. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 424(1). 366. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 424(2). 367. See Vei1kateswar� v. Ayyan1mal (I-Iigl1 Ct., Madras, 1949), 1950 All-lt1dia Rep., p. 367. . 368. In the case of 1n1n1_ovable property, tl1e JJrocla.mation is to draw attention to the requi�e ments for tl1e deposit fo]lowi1.1g pt1rchase ancl the effect of failt1re to pay tl1e bala nce. Civ. ro. C., Art. 423(3). p 369. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 423(2). 370. See the discussion in S. Sarkar, The Law of Civil Proced11re (4th ed., 1 963) , vol. 1 , P· 491 · 371. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 428(1). 372. e Ban Behar� v. Bhukan Lal (Hig re The l . 5 p. h Rep. , 1 Ct., Calcutta, 1932), 1933 All-India � �o e aulbority to �be �ontrary in India. See D. Mulla, sl1pra, note 357 at p. 869. How ever � preferable �iew is clearly that tb t Note on. the court make an independent valuati the 'co�� a�{?Oint an expert to estimate the value of the property. Civ. Pr?· C., r� 424(2). ThF ·s ay provision may demonstrate that the court I1as tl1e duty to make an mdepenfent valuation.
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amount bid, st1ch as the fact tl1at a third party has 1 11ade a clai 1n wl1ich Jias been rejected and tl1at he has filed or might file suit to establisl1 l1is claim.373 If tl1e cotirt makes sure that an acctirate proclamation of sale is issued, a second atiction is · le'', this fact will be less Iikel-y to be necessary, or if tl1 e property is not ''saleab come evident, and tl �e decree-holder will try to attach otl1er property. Tl1 e procla mation mt1st be pt1bl1sl1 ed at son1e place on or adjacent to tl1 e _property to be sold by beat of drttm or other custo111 ary mode, a11d a copy 111ust be afli'Xed on a con spict1ot1s part of the property and tl1e1 1 t11Jon a conspict1ot1s part of tl1 e courtl1ot1se.374 The court may a.lso direct tl1 a.t tl1e procla.mation be pt1blished in a newspaper circt1lating at the place of the sale, 375 a11 d tl1is is a desirable practice to ,.follow. Wl1ere the property is divided into lots for tl1e pt1r1Jose of bei1 1g sold separately, it is not necessary to 1nake a separate proclan1ation for each lot t1o1ess, in the opi11ion of tl1 e cot1rt, proJJer notice cannot otl1 erwise be given.376 If 110 pt1blica tion l1as been made, the sale sl1ot1ld be considered void. The absence of publica tion will n1e�1n tl1 at few, if any bidders, will come, and the sale will in no sense be ''public." 377 B11t if so1ne pt1blication was n1 ade, altl1ot1gh not in the prescribed ma11ner, the defect sl1 ot1ld amot1nt to a11 irregt1larity ra.tl1 er tl1an voicl tlJe sale. It is still possible that a st1fficient nt11nber of persons will k11 0\v of tl1e sale aL1 d will bid. 378
No sale 111 ay take place, withot1t tl1 e co11 sent in writing of tl1e jt1dg1nent-debtor, t111til at least 30 days after publication of the procla111ation, in tl1e case of i111movable property, and 15 days after pt1blicatioo, i n tl1e case of n1ovable property. Tl1 e only excepti.011 is wl1 ere tl1e property is subject to decay or is of a ki11 d tl1at n1 ust be stored at a cost in excess of its valt1e. In such cases the pro1Je.rty 111 ,ty be sold i11unedjately after attacJ1 1nent. 379 The date is calct1.lated from tl1e tin1 e wl,en tl1 e copy of tl1e proclamation is affixed on tl1 e cot1rtl1ot1se door or the date of JJroclan1atio11 in tl1e newspaper, if tl1is is done, whicl1ever is later. 380 The pt1rpose of this reqt1j1·e111ent is to give drospective biclders sttfficient ti111 e to be advised of tl1e sale and to decide to bid. Therefore, tl1e judg 1 nent-debtor n1 ay waive tl1 e reqt1ire1uent. l'.Jowever, a sale J1elcl before the time is not rendered void, bt1t is treated as an irregtilarity. 381 As long as tl1ere l1as been a proclan1ation wl1 icl1 l1as been J.Jt1blisl1ecl, tl1e sale is 1 1ot void. The decree-J 1older 1 nay not bid at tl1e sale witbot1t tl1 e writte11 1 Jer111jssio11 of the court, and a copy of the order gra11ting per 1 nission n1 t1st be given by tl1e cot1rt to the auctioneer. Js 2 Tl1 e pt1rpose of tl1is restrictjo11 is to e11 able tl1 e cot1rt to im pose conditions 011 the decree-holder if it thinks fit. For exa1nple, tl1e cot1rt n1 ay require that be bid for the a1nount of the decree. 383 Or, there 1nig'ht be several decree-l1olders entitled to rateable distribt1tion, a11d tl1 e co111i migl1t \Vant to regt1late 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381: 382. 383.
See Venkataragl1avan1ma v. Sugqarayya, supra, note 346. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 425(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 425(2). The costs of such publication are deemed to be costs of the saJe. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 425(3). See Srikakula v. Pannapati (High Ct., Madras, 1953), 1954 All-India Rep., p. 1024. See Nana Kt1 mar v. Golan1 CI1under (High Ct., Calc11tta, 1891), Indian L. Rep., vol. 18, p. 422. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 406(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 426. See Ashalata Basti v. Monindra Nath Basu (High Ct., Calcutta, 1941), 1942 All--India Rep., p. 275. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 430(1). See Sylhet Co-operative Tov,n Bank v. Rasik Chandra (High Ct., Calcutta, 1936), Indian L. Rep., vol. 63, p. 85.
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on to ssi rm bid pe ile wh t ld � tha ou sh is int po 1e not Tl m. the g on am g the biddin d a f me 1n or be rt o e to tl1 at at t wh ry ssa ce 3 ne � � the l!� is it 8-1 , ed us ref be ordinarily t be obtained. Where a us n 1n s1o .1s rm pe ior pr re, fo ere tl1 d, an , ing do is decree-holder , rty the pe s pro the ase ch 1ir p _ bid to purchase ion iss rm pe e11 giv is io wl decree-J1older d tl1e an f, rt -of cou set be l wil y ma ee dec enter tl1e on e dt1 nt ou a1u � tl1e and ney mo 385 So , eve n where the decree-holder t. par 1n or ole wl1 satisfaction on the decree in l wil be ing t ow o11n am an t unless th.e tl1a le sib pos l stil is it ty, per pro the purchases her . ree re dec mo tl1e of ,n one tha t1nt o � am tl1e for � bid to him es t1ir req cot1rt _ _ on, ut1 tr1b le d1s eab the amou nt rat to d itle ent are all �nd lied app J1as r decree-l1olde dt1e for purposes of set-off is the amount to wbicl1 tl1e decree-holder would be 386 Moreover, the fact that the decree-holder has . tion ribu dist 1 sucl e 11titled upon been allo\ved to set-off does not affect tl1e rigl1ts of otl1er applicants to rateable distribution, a11d l1e 111ay be reqt1ired to reft1nd money if the amount of the purchase price is greater tl1an tl1e amot1nt to wl1icl1 l1e is entitled 11pon rateable distribution.387 Wl1ere tl1e decree-l1older 1J11rchases \Vitl1011t per1nission, or has another person purcl1ase tl1e property for lum, the co11rt 1nay, upon application of the judgment debtor or any otl1er perso11 vvhose i11terests are affected by the sale, set the sale aside and direct a resale. 388 This sho11lcl also i11clt1de the sit11ation where the decree holder obtained leave to bid by misreprese11tations. 389 Even tho11gh tl1ere has been in11Jro1)er biddi 11g by tl1e decree-holder, tl1e cot1rt is not required to set the sale aside, and if tl1e J)roperty I1as been realized to its best advantage, it should not do so. 390 Note that tl1e j11dgment-debtor mt1st proceed to have the sale set aside t111der tl1is rt1le, si1 1ce tl1e ql1estio11 relates to exect1tion, and cannot bring a sepa rate s11it for tl1at l)llrpose. 391 It is also lJrovided tl1at the a11ctioneer or otl1er person l1aving any duty to perform in con11ectio11 witl1 tl1e sale cannot, directly or indirectly, bid for, acq11ire or atten11Jt to acq11ire any interest in the pro1Jerty sold.392 He m11st perforn1 his dt1ties i111partially and sl1ot1ld not l1a.ve a.n interest in tl1e ol1tcon1e of the auction. If a takes JJlace in saIe tl1is rt1le, it may be set aside in co11trave11tion of accordance _ w1tl1 the rt1les go,,erning the setting aside o·f a sale vvhere the decree-holder bid ,vitl1ot1t per11ussion. 393 Tl1ere is a split of a11tl1ority in India as to whether a pleader of a party is prol1ibited fro1n bidding t1nder tl1is r11le. 394 It is st1bn1itted that a p �ead�r does 11ave a dt1ty in co1111ection with tl1e sale, namely to see tl1at rigl1ts of his client are not violated dt1ring the co11rse of tl1e sale ' and' tl1erefore, sl1ould be precl11ded fron1 biddi11g. At any time before tl1e property is l<nockecl down, tl1at is, before tl1e auctioneer hammers tl1e sale to a close and declares the l1igl1est bid, tl1e sale must be stopped 384. 385. 386. 387. 388.
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392. 393. 394.
S�e Motilal v. Ft1lcl1a11 d (1-Iigh Ct., Bombay, 1924), 1924 AII-Ir1cli<, Rep., p . 515. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 430(2). See Sorabji v. Govind (I-Iigl1 Ct., Bombay, 1892), Indian L. Rep., vol . 16, p. 91. S�e Ram Chan dra v. Digambar (fligl1 Ct., Bo1nbay, 1959 ), 1960 All-I11dia Rep., p. 230. Civ. P_ro. C.,. A rt. 430(3). Tl1e decree-l1older is tl1en subject to the provisions of Art. 429 an d will be liable for any deficiency on resale. ep. e ia l-I11 sammat , R A d Jankabati v. 1922 Maharajadbiraj l (Higl1 Ct., Patna., 1921), �� 5�� ., i adha ia Krishn R a v. R Bisl1e sl1ar d ( Sal1ay 1922 India, � 1922), Privy Cou.ncil, All In ep 3 � T hi s follows from c·v . pro. c , Art · 1898)' ombay, . Ct., 375. See i B · (High Genu v. Sak.haram Jndia,z L' Rep., VO1· 22, p. 271. . C �v. Pro. C., Art. 431(1). C1v. Pro. C., Art. 431(2). See the d is cussion a11d citat1'o n of cases in S. Sarkar, s11pra, note 370 at p. 500 .
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if the debt and costs, including the costs of the sale, are tendered to the auctjoneer, or proof is given to his satisfaction tl1at tl1is · amount bas been paid into the cot1rt which ordered· tl1e sale.395 Thus, before the sale is complete, the judgment debtor can still save tl1e property by paying tl1e amo11nt of tl1e debt and tl1e costs. If there is a q·uestion as to whetl1er tl1e a1nount l1as been paid into court, the auctioneer should sto_p tl1e bidding u 1 1til l1e l1as an opportu1 1ity to determine whe ther it has been so paid. Where the higl1est bid does not reacl1 a sun1 equal to the value specified in tl1e proclamation of sale, the property is not to be sold. Instead a secon. d sale by a1 1 ction n1t1st be held after the issuance of a fresl1 proclan1ation in accorda11ce with the prescribed rules. At tl1 e second sale, tl1e l1jgl1est bid, whatever its a1 not1nt, mt1st be accepted and tl1e property sold. 396 111 otl1er words, there is to be a second sale before tl1e property is sold at less tl1an its estimated valt1e. Perl1aps not enot1gb people \Vere aware of tl1 e first sale. It can be asstimed that the bidders at the fu�st sale, if tl1ey are still i1 1terested, \Vill bid 'at tl1e second saJe a11d 1nay be willi 11g to increase tl1eir bids. Also, additio1 1al bidders may a1)pear at the seco.11d sale. In any event, it seerns desirable tl1at a second sale shot1lcl take place. But the 1 11atter n1t1st come to a 1 1 end, and. tl1e l1igl1est price realized at the second sale must be take11 to be the ''saleable value'' of the property. If tl1 ere is 11 0 bidder at tl1e seco1 1d sale, the co11rt n1ay a1 1 tl1orize the decree-l1older to take tl1e property i 11 ft1ll or partial satisfaction of. t11e clecree, as tl1 e court detern1 i11es. 397 The proclamation of sale m11st specify 110w 1Jayn1ent is to be n1ade. 398 Upon payment of the p11.rcl1ase money, tl1e auctio1 1eer is to isst1e a receipt and tl1e sale becomes absoltite. 399 If the p11rcl1aser does not p,ty the p11rcl1ase p _ rice or deposit according to tlJe !)rovjsions of law or tern1s of tl1e sale, tl1e sale is a11to111 �1tically cancelled, and a resale 1nay be ordered by tl1e cot1rt after tl1e isst1a11ce of a fresl1 proclamation in accordance witl1 the prescribed r11les. 10° For p11rposes of bidding, a resale ordered after tl1e cancellation of tl1 e sale d11e to tl1e f,1ilt1re of the IJL1r chaser to pay tl1e price of deposit is considered a f1rst sale:101 So, if tl1e price at the resale does not eq11al tl1 e esti1 nated value of tl1e J)roperty, a 1 1otl1er sale n1ay be ordered. Any deficiet1cy of price on tl1e resale mt1st be certified to tl1e co11rt by the a11ctioneer, a11d at tl1 e i11stance of eitl1er the decree-holder or the jt1dginent d.ebtor, is recoverable fro1 11 the purchaser as a clecree for tl1e payment of money.402 If tl1e resale bri11gs i11 tl1e sa 1 ne price as the origi11al sale, or more, no liability is in1posed. in tl1 e def,1t1lting pt1rcl1aser. If it brings in less, l1e n1ay be J1eld. . 403 liable at the insta11ce of tl1e decree-l1older or tl1 e j11dg 1 11e11t-de btor. Separate J)roceed ings need not be institt1ted, and the certificate from tl1e at1ctioneer is treated. as a decree 11pon whicl1 execution 1nay be bad.�04 It bas bee11 l1eld that tl1e defat1lt395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403.
404.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 427. WJ1ere the decree bas been transferred for execution, tl1is n1eans tl1e transferee court. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 428(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 428(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 423(2) (d). In sales of immovable property, the purchaser rnt1st be re quired, as a minimum, to pay a 25% deposit. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 440(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 429(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 429(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 429(4). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 429(2). It has been held in India that the assignee of the decree-holder may apply under this rule, and there is no reason why l1e should not be permitted to do so. See Kannatl1al Acbi v. Vaduganathan Cl1ettiar (High Ct., Madras, 1944), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 349. However, even if st1ch a certificate has not been issued, the deficiency sbould be recoverable. See Ta.pesril Lal. V. Deoki (High Ct., AJJababad, 1897), I11dia1z L. Rep., vol. 19, p. 22.
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1e tl e at ic cond sale was pr se er w lo e th at th w 1o sl to le ab ina0 purchaser sliotild be e first.· So, where the th at t no t bu le sa at tl1 at t en es pr e d e to fac tors whicli wer tr e er th as op w at pr th ct bject to fa su � tl1 e t1d cl in t no _ d di le sa of �st proclan1ation t d 11r di e co not hold the th d, di n 1o at n1 la oc pr nd co se e th t an j 11ctin1brance, b11 405 . ce n re fe if d 1e defaulting purcl1aser liable for tl (b) Sale of movable property e le tl1 sa e of to bl ica pl ble ap va mo y all c ifi ec sp les r11 l1e t er id ns co \v no ll We wi 1�ltt1ral produce, tl1e sale is to be ric ag l� is so be to ty er . property. Where the prop e sale 1s to be held p, th cro ing ow gr a 1s e uc od pr e tl1 If s. ce })la in l1eld in certa 406 If tl1 e crop has been cut or 11. ow gr s l1a p cro e th h on or near tl1e land 011 wl1ic ce r ing fo pla ad or tre or out flo g l1in res tl1 the ar ne or at ld l1e be 1st 1111 t i , red 1e oatl 407 . si ed t i)o de However, the is it h 1ic irain or tl1e lil<e or fodder stacl< on or in wl of it if is ort c res the bli pu of ce pla a at ld he be e sal 1 e tl t tl1a ect dir y n1a co11rt 408 Insofar as possi . ere tl1 ld l1e if ice }Jr r he opi11ion that tl 1e sale will bring in a hig 409 Tl1ese directions are designed to y. da t rke 111a a on ble, tl1e sale shall be he ld t e bes sibl ce pos the d11 pro to ely lik 1e tin and ce pla a at d l1el is sale tl1e insure tl1at price.
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Wl1ere tl1e pro1)erty to be sold is a. gro\vi11g cro}J \1/l1icl1 ad1nits of being stored, bt1t \Vl1icl1 l1 as 11ot yet bee11 stored, tl1e day of tl1e sale m11st be fixed so that the cro1) can be stored prior to tl1e sale, and tl1e sale 1nay not be held until the crop l1as been ct1t or gatl,ered a11d is re::1dy for storing. 410 Wl1ere the property does not fro111 its 11att1re ad111it of bei11g stored, it 111ay be sold before it is ct1t a11d gathered, ancl tl1e J)L1rcl1 a.ser is e 1 1titled to enter on tl1e land ,111d do all tl1at is necessary to te11d and ct1t or gatl1er tl1e crop. 411 In tl1e case of a sale of a 11egotiable instrt1111e11t or sl1are in a corJ)Oratio11, tl1e cot1rt n1ay at1tl1orize a sale tl1rougl1 a broker ratl1er tl1an by p11blic at1ctio11. 412 A brol<er 111ay be n1ore fa111iliar "''ith the value of tl1e J)roperty and may be able to obtain a better price tl1an wo11ld result from a sale by at1ction. Tl1e follo,1/ing rt1les govern the delivery a11d transfer of the property to the pu�cl1aser. Wl1ere the 1novable pro1)erty l1as ?.ctt1ally been seized, 413 it is sin1pl)1 delivered to the J)t1rcl1a�er after tl1e sale. 414 Wl1ere i t is in tl1e J)ossession of some person otl1er tl1an_ �h_e Jt1d�111ent-debtor, tl1e delivery is made by giving notice to tl1a t person 1)rol11b1t111g 111111 fro 1 11 deliveri11g possessio11 of tl1e property to anyo11e except �I1e p11rcl1�ser. 415 As we l1ave seen, wl1e1 1 s11ch property is att�tcl1ed tl1e pe�so11 1n possess1on m.ay raise an objection to tl1e attacl1n1ent; 416 ,1 st1bseq11ent s111t n1ay be brougl1 t by tl1e perso11 against whon1 tl 1e object.io11 is decided See Baij11ath v. Mol1eep (I�Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1889), I11clia11 L. Rep., vol. 16, p. 535. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 432(1) (a). Civ. Pro. c., Art. c., Art. 432(1) (b). • Civ. Pro. c., Art. 432(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 432(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 433(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 433(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 434. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 406. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 436(1). • Civ. Pro. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 436(2). Compare t 1en ttacl1n a Ill the corres1)011ding procedure c., Art. 409. 416. See tl1e discussion, supra, 11ote s 301-302 and accon1panying text.
405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. I
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to establish l1is rigl1t to tl1e property in dispt1te, bt1t if no suit is brought, the decision on the objection is conclusive.417 I-Iowever, it may be that no objection was filed by the party in possession, but lie reft1ses to deliver tl1e property to the purchaser. The Code does not provide a1Jy st1111m,:1ry procedt1re by wl1ich tl1e pt1rchaser of n1ovable pro_perty at exect1tion ca11 obtain delivery from tl1e possessor. Note that tl1e order only directs tl1e possessor not to transfer the property to a11y other person (if l1e clid tra11sfer tl1e property to a11other person, l1e cot1ld be l1elcl in contempt for violating an order of tl1e cotirt).418 Tl1erefore, the pt1rcl1aser \.VOtlld .have to i11stitt1te a11 ordinary Sllit for tl1e recovery of tl1e property.419
In tl1e case of a sale of a sl1are in corporation, delivery is effected by a \Vritten. order of tl1e cot1rt 1Jrol1ibiti11g tl1e person in wl1ose 11an1e tl1e share n1ay be standi11g fron1 111aki11g any transfer of tl1e share to a11yone except tl1e pt1rchaser, or receivi11g pay111ent of any divide11d or i11terest; tl1.e order will also prohibit tl1e n1anager, secretary or otl1er pro_per officer fro1n permitti11g st1cl1 tra11sfer or 1naking sucl1 payn1e11t to anyo11e except tl1e purcl1aser. 42 c Corporations 1nay l1a,1e rules restricti11g tl1e free tra11sfer of sl1ares, tl1at is, tl1e corporation or sharel1olders n1ay have wl1at is called a pre-e111JJtive rigl1t to pt1rchase the sl1ares of a prese11t share l10Ider.421 111 India, tl1e correspo11ding provision of tl1e Civil Proced11re Code has been constrt1ed as prohibiting tl1e cor1Joration fro111 exercisi11g its pre-e1n1)tive rigl1ts as to sl1ares sold in exect1tion; tl1e tl1eory is tl1at a provisio11 as to pre-e111ptive rights only affects tl1e volt111tary transfer of sl1ares a11d 11ot transfer by order of tl1e co11rt in execution. 422 S11cl1 an interpretation is not 11ecessary. So 1011g as tl1e corporatjo11 p11rcJ1ases tl1e sl1a.re at tl1e fixed price of _pre-e1111Jtio11'123 or tl1e price paid by the execution pt1rcl1aser, wl1icl1ever is l1igl1er, tl1ere is no l1ar111 i11 per111itt iog the corporatio11 to exercise its 1Jre-en1ptive rig11ts. In st1cl1 a case it sl1ot1ld a.pply to the cottrt for pern1ission to pay tl1at a1nount i11to co11rt and ask: tl1e co11rt to dissolve tl1e order. \Vbere tl1e exect1tion of a doc111nent or tl1e endorse111e11t of tl1e party i11 wl1ose 11aine a negotiable i11strt1ment or a sl1are i11 a cor1Joratio11 sta11ds is req11.ired to tra11sfer sucl1 i11strt11nent or share, tl1e e11dorse111ent n1ay be 111ade by tl1e exect1tio11 officer or other officer appoi11ted by the court i11 accordance witl1 tl1e provisio11s of Art. 401 (4):12·1 Until tl1e transfer is effected, tl1e co11rt n1ay ap_point some perso11 to receive any it1terest or divide11cl tbat is d11e ancl to sign a receipt for the saJe, wbicl1 is as valid as if signecl by tl1e party i11 \.Vl1ose 11a1ne tl1e i11s trument or share stands. 425 In tl1e case of a11y 1uovable property not otl1erwise provided for, tl1e co11rt is to n1ake an orcler vesti11g tl1e J)roperty i11 the pt1rchaser. .J 26 Tl1e p11rcl1aser is tl1en considered tl1e o\v11er, and tl1e order operates as proof of owoersllip, enabling l1io1 to bring a st1it to recover the property ancl to resist a s11it by anotl1er to obtain the property fro1n l1i111. 417. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 421. 418. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 480. 419. See Civ. C., Art. 1 206. 420. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 436(3). 421. See Comm. C., Art. 333. 422. See Mohideen v. TionevelJy Co. Ltd. (I-Iigl1 Ct., l\1adras, 1927), 1928 All-India Rep., p. 571. 423. TJ1 e price at wh.icJ1 the corporation will repurchase the shares must be fixed. Con1m. C., Art. 333(2) (b). 424. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 437(1). 425. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 437(2). 426. Civ. Pro. C., Art. -438.
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y ert is that any irregularity in op pr le ab 1 n of e sal a of ect asp ?y t can nifi sig The 111ost e �; e th tl1 sal e sal 1at v1t ai t rem no es do ns valid e � sal the g tin uc nd co . or publislling _ _ ed 1n sta y 1nJury by reason s 1s an h, o wh n so pe a r, � ve _ ow . ity : ar til eg irr � e � despite tll 1 011 against tl1e person at ens 111p c for t 1 su a 1te t1tt 1ns ? ay 1 n res ity lar egu of stich irr r, ase rch pu r tl1 the recov�ry of 1s on r pe at 1 tl if or � , 11ry � inj � tI1e for � ble nsi po . _ _ 7 As . rY, of ve t co fa re 1J de 10 we n 1 at ns pe will 1n co r � _ fo d �tn see, ty er ? op pr . ific spec _ . y ult ma res 10 1es the ar1t gt1l 1rre setting aside tain cer ty, per pro ble ova imm of s in sale the sale ty, is per d pro vali able 11ov 1 despite the of case tl1e in But . sale of the _ irregularity. Sttppose tha t the decree-l1 older, �hen �pply1ng for . tl1e sale of the _ s11bJect to �n 1ncun1brance. TI1e property, fails to specify that . tl1� property is : rance, and. sub proclaination of sale does not 1nd1cate tl1e existence of tl1e 1ocun1b seq11e1 1tly the purcl1aser seelcs_ to set tl1e sale aside on tl1is ground. H� may not do so, but must IJroceed against the decree-l1 older to recover compensat1 on for the redt1ced val11e of the pro_perty d11e to tl1 e inc11111brance. Or, suppose that the sale was not l1 eld at tl1e appointed ti1 11e a.nd place d11e to tl1e fa11lt of the executio n officer. The jt1dg1nent-debtor or decree-l1older may not have the sale set aside, but 428 wot1ld d tely realize 11ltima 1 tha1 price have been igl1er 1 l a tl1at sl1own be can if it obtained if tl1e sale l1ad been l1eld at tl1e proper time and place, the judgment debtor or decree-holder (if tl1e proceeds did not satisfy the decree) may institute an actio11 for co1111Jensation against tl1 e officer. If tl1 e p11rchaser is respo11sible for the irregL1larity, e.g., if l1e preventecl pro1Jer publication of tl1e proclaination of sale, the stJecif:ic property n1ay be recovered fro111 hin1. Tl1e point to be stressed is that despite any irreg11larity, tl1e sale re1 nains valid. Any inj1 1 1�y res11lti11g from the in1pro1Jer sale of n1ovable pro1Jerty ca11 11st1ally be redressed by compensation. It is considered undesirable to set tl1e sale aside, beca11se to do so wo11ld open as such all sales to JJote11 tial cl1allenge and tl1 ereby disco11ra.ge p11rcl1asers. Therefore, it is JJrovided tl1at no irreg11larity in pt1blisl1ing or co11dt1cting the sale of movable property vitiates tl1e sale. As \Ve pointed 011t earlier, an irregt1larity i11 tl1e p11blisl1ing or conducting of the sale 1nust be disti11gL1ished fro1n action or inaction wl1ich renders tl1e sale ,,oid. Wl1ere no procla11 1ation of sale l1as been iss11ed (as opposed to a 1 1 irregularity in sucl1 publication), tl1e sale is void,429 and a party a.dversely affected by a void sale i.e., tl1e jt1dginent-debtor or decree-l1older, may l1ave it set aside. So too, if the s�le has not b �en J?roclaimed (as opposed to a defect i11 tl1e 1node of procla1:11a t1on), the sale 1s void and may be set aside. 430 In tl1is connection, a question arises �s to wl1etl1er tl1e purchaser may l1ave tl1e sale set aside 011 the gro11.11d that tl1e Jtidgme11t-debtor was not tl1e o,v1 1er of tl1e property. l11 India, it l1as l1eld tJ1at the absence of a saleable i 11 terest or fail11re of title is 1 nore tl1a 11 a 1nere ''irregularity'' so �I1e P11rcl1 as�r n�ay l1ave tl1.e sale set aside 011 tl1at gro11nd. 4 J1 Ho\vever, it is specifi �all� prov1ded 1n tl1e Code that tl1e p11rcl1aser of i111n1ovable property 1nay have the sale set as1 de on tl1e ground tl1at tl1e jt1dg1ne11 t-debtor l1ad 110 saleable interest in the ? 43 pro1Jerty sold. - Tl1e absenc� o� a corresponding provisio11 regarding the p11rchaser of movable IJroperty wo11ld 1nd1 cate tl1at it was the i 1 1te11tio11 of tl1e drafters tl1at a ptirchaser of such property could not l1ave tl1e sale set aside 011 this gro11nd. As 427. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 435. 428. This_ wo�ld mean at tl1e. second sale if tl1e price at t h e first sale did not r each the value l pecifi in tlle proclan,ation of sale. If it reacl1ed tl1is price at the first sale, o h ar n m cou d t e sai1 to h ave resulted from th e irregularity. 429. See note 367, supra. 430. See note 377, supra. 431. S�e Framji v. Horinasji (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1878) J11dian L. Rep., vol. 2, p. 258. 432. C1v. Pro. c., Art. 446 .
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a prac�ical matter, diSJ?llted ?wnership of movable property is less likely to occtir than disputed ow �ersh1_p of immovable property, and the purchaser is not taking very much of a risk. 1-Ie could always go against the decree-l1older, wl10 attacl1ed property that was not owned by the jt1dgn1ent-debtor. Since tl1e Code does not sp�cifically provide tl1at tl1e pt1rc�aser may have the sale of movable property set aside becat1se �f lack of saleable 111 �er �st, and since it does so provide with respect _ to the saJe of 1mn1ovable J)roperty, 1t 1s st1bnutted tl1at the cot1rt sl1ot1ld not permit a sale of 1n?vable pr?p _ e�·ty to be set aside on tl1at grot1nd. In st1rnn1ary, as long as the sale 1s not void 1n tl1e sense tl1at tl1ere l1as been no procla111ation of sale or the proclaination l1as not bee11 pttblished at all, tl1e sale is valid despite any irregt1larity in pt1blisl1ing or conducting it. (c) Sale of imn1ovable property Tl1e importance of in1 111ovable IJroperty i11 Etl1iopia is well-known, and there fore, detailed rules govern its sale in execution. Tl1ese r11les are designed to achieve the following pt1rposes: (1 ) to enable tl1e jt1dg111ent-debtor to ''save'' tl1e property if at all possible; (2) to protect tl1e interests of all persons having a claim to the property; (3 ) to JJrotect perso11s who wo11ld be adversely affected by a fraudt1lent or improper sale of tl1e property; (4) to establisl1 the ownershi 1J of tl1e property in the purchaser; (5) to enable tl1e p11rcbaser to gain possession of the property witl1out the necessity of a sepa.rate s11it; (6) to determi11e all clai1ns to possession of tl1e property expeditiously. (1) Special provisions as to the sale First, tl1ere is tl1e n1atter of postponement of tl1e sale i11 order to e11able tl1e judgment-debtor to raise tl1e amount of the decree and tl1us prevent the sale of the property in execution. As soon as an order for the sale l1as been n1ade, tl1e judgment-debtor 111ay apply for a postpone111ent; if tl1e cot1rt is satisfied tl1at tl1ere is reason to believe that tl1e an1ot1nt of tl1e decree 111ay be raised by tl1e 111 ortgage, lease or private sale of tl1e property or so1ne part thereof or of otl1er im1novable IJro perty, it may, after heari11g tl1e decree-holder, postpone tl1e sale of the pro1Jerty on such ten11s and for sucl1 tin1e as it thinks fit i11 order to enable tl1e jt1dgn1e11t debtor to raise the a1nou11t of tl1e decree. 433 The ql1estion is sin1ply wbet]1er tl1e cot1rt l1as reason to believe tl1at l1e 1nay raise the reqt1ired a1not111t. Si11ce l1e \viii lose llis land if the sale is carried ot1t, and since any order rnerely postpones tl1e sale for a specified periocl, tl1e court sbot1ld resolve any doubts in his favor and not hesitate to postpone tl1e sale. However, the cot1rt 1n11st ·be satisfied tl1at the entire amount of tl1e decree can be raised; 434 otl1erwise, tl1e 1 Jostponement woulcl not be of any bene-fit, since tl1e decree-holder cot1ld insist on tl1e sale of tl1e property to satisfy the remainder of tl1e decree. Where the co11rt orders a postponement, i t issues a certificate to tl1e judgn1ent-debtor authorizing him, \vithi11 a specified time, to n1ake tl1e proposed mortgage, lease or sale. 435 Any n1onies payable 11nder the mortgage, lease or sale n1t1st be paid into the co11rt ratl1er than to tl1� jtidgment debtor, 436 and the n1ortgage, lease or sale does not become absolt1te t111t1l co11fir1ned by the court. 437 433. 434. 435.
436. 437.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 439(1). . Rep L. an Indi ), , vol. 1.891 ras, Mad Ct., h (Hig a sapp oba Cha v. i usam Gur i sam See Venkata 14, p. 277. t cot1r er of the an offic by d ucte cond not is it , sale a is e ther If . 2). 439( Art. Civ. Pro. c., _ ble. lica app not 1s rt. 422 and is not public. Once a postponemei1t l1as been granted, A. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 439(2). If the decree- l10Ider is the purchaser, the n1oney n1ay be set-off in accordance with Art. 439(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 439(3).
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lied app e for hav s c�1ment of the ?er atta bol ree dec of ber nt1m � a t tl1a be _ y pla It 111 st1ch c�se any de �l1ng with the n. utto tr1b d1s le eab rat in re sI1a . property or to ct effe es ve om be sale inst aga � or � e all claims leas ge, rtga mo of way by property 438 and the 1nor11es paya ble into co·urt are su t, 1en 1n bject cl ta at e enforceable u11der th 4 39 Postponement ma y not be ordered wl1ere the prop n. erty utio trib dis to rateable is to be sold in executio11 of a decree for the sale and enforcement of a mortgage against the IJroperty. 440 In tl1at case tl1ere has not441been a separate proceeding in Tl1e p�·operty was mortgaged exectition; tl1e original decree has directed the sale. as sect1rity for the debt, and wl1en tl1e d�bt �as not paid, the n1ortgagee was entitled to receive tl1e proceeds of tl1e sect1r1ty. Since the mortgagor has defaulted and tl1e court has so held, he is not entitled to additio11al time to try to raise the mo11ey. It is only where tl1e property has been attached in execution of a decree otl1er tl1an one for tl1e enforcement of a 1nortgage tl1at postpo11ement is at1tl1orized. Note tl1at there is no provision at1tl1orizing tl1e cot1rt to postpone the sale of n1ovable property. However, 11ote also tl1at any sale, whether of n1ovable or immov able property, will be stopped if, before tl1e .lot is knoclced down, tl1e debt and 442 Tl1e point is that a sale court. i11to paid or eer at1ction tl1e costs are tendered to of inm1ovable IJroperty 1nay be postponed so as to enable tl1e jt1dgn1ent-debtor to raise the a.1not1nt of the decree. .. ./I J
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A11otl1er provision aJJplicable only to tl1e sale of i1n 111ovable property is that regarding bids by co-sl1arers. \\111ere tl1e JJroperty sold is a sl1are of undivided immo vable pro1)erty, ai1d one of tl1e bidders is a. co-sl1arer, lus bid for the property or for a11y lot ta.kes precedence over tl1e bid of anotl1er person for the same amount. 443 Suppose that A and B 0\1/n t1ndivided sl1ares of imn1ovable property, and C seeks to sell A's sl1are in satisfaction of a. decree a.gainst A. C bids Eth. $ 1,000 for the sl1are and B bids Etl1. $ 1,000. Since B is a co-sl1arer and tl1e bids are for the san1e amot1nt, tl1e bid of :Etl1. $ 1,000 is deen1.ed tl1at of B. C can purcl1ase tl1e property 011ly by bidding a l1igl1er a 111ount tl1an B, the theory being tl1at tl1e co-sharer sl1ould l1ave tl1e pro1Jerty i11 JJrefere11ce to a stranger unless tl1e stranger is prepared to bid l1igl1er. If tl1e stranger pt1rchases tl1e sl1are, it is n1ore .likely tl1at tl1e property will be partitioned, and to prevent this, tl1e co-sharer is given ·preference in tl1e bidding. Upo11 the sale of i111n1ovable property, tl1e person declared to be tl1e purcl1aser n1us� deposit 25% of tl1e JJ11rchase price witl1 tl1e at1ctio 11eer. "44 Tl1e sale is not considered complete t1ntil tl1e cleposit is 111ade, 44 s so that if tl1e pt1rcl1aser fails to make tl1e deposit, 446 it would be proper for tl1e court to reopen tl1e bidding. Wl1ere tl1e decree-l1older is tl1e IJt1rcl1aser and entitled to set-off the 1noney, the 438. 4 39.
440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446.
See Shivlingappa v. Cl1anbasappa (I-Iigh Ct., Bo111ba)', 1906), l11,lia11 L. Rep., vol. 30, P· 337 See Ramanath Panda v. D n1odar Sahu (l�ligl1 Ct., Orissa., 1949), 1950 All-I11dia Rep., P· 23o. . e the � A decree-liolder \Vl10 ppl1ed t1�1 the after the to order prior 1,ostp but of onen1 ent � p�oceeds_ ll�d been realiz ed woul d be entitled to rateable distribution, si11ce at the ti.me of l11s application the assets were 11ot yet before the cot1rt. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 4 39(4). , See tlie discussion in D. Mt1lla, Tl1e Code of Ci11if Pro 195 3) Mit ter, R. by ed. cedr,re (12th vol. 2, p. 885. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 427. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 443. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 440(1). Jai ahadur v. Matukdhari (High Ct., Patna, 1923), 1923 All-/11dia Rep., p. 525. ;;� �een a 1eld that 'Yhere tl1e pt1 i a un der ro rch �as er pe rst1ades th e court that he bi d � pre lla: osi 19 3 ) 1��5 ,Ae lml ay. w ithdraw bis bid. See Radbey Lal v. Mt:. Ja 11ki (High Ct., Al laha a ' 4, l - nCiia , Rep., p. 204.
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447 Tl1e full amount with this req11iren1ent. nse sp d 1nust be paid to tbe 1 ay n t � cour _ � at1ct1011eer w1th1n 15 �ays from tl1e _sale of the property.44s Since i inmovable pro perty, on th � whole, 1s 1:11ore e �_pens1ve t11a11 movable property, the purcl1 aser may need son1 e time to obtrun add1t1011al 111oney, partict1larly if he bid n1ore tl1 an l1e tl1e balance is originally a �ticipate tl1e · If not paid witl1in the 15 day period, ? _ cot1rt . may, 1f 1t tl11�ks fit a11d after defraying tl1e expenses of tl1e sale, order tl1e deposit to be forfeited to tl1e govern111e11 t. It 1nt1st then order a resale, and the defat1lti11g purcl1aser forfeits all clain1 to tl1e property or to any part of tl1e s11n1 for which it may s11bsegt1e11 tly be sold. 449 It wo11ld also see111 tl,at in accorda11ce witl1 Art. 429 (2), the defat1lting p11rcl1aser wo11ld be liable to tl1 e decree-holder or j11dg1nent-debtor for any deficie11cy i11 price. 450 Tl1e article is applicable to botl1 sales of movable a11cl in1111ovable property, and tl1e fact tl,at tl1 e pt1rcl1aser forfeited the• deposi.t wo11ld 11ot be inco11siste11t witl1 l1olding l1in1 liable for a deficie11cy in price.
(2) Setting aside the sale The n1ost significant difference betwee11 a sale of i1nn1ovable property and a sale of n1ovable property is tl1at in certai11 circ111nstances a sale of i1n1novable property ca.n be set aside. 1�here are basically three sitt1ations ,vl1ere tl1is can be do11e: (I) where tl1 e j11dgn1 ent-debtor l1as 11 0 saleable i11terest i11 tl1 e property ;(2) \vl1ere ano ther person l1 as an interest in the property; (3) wl1ere there \.vas 1naterial irregttla rity or frat1d in the cond11ct of tl1e sale, rest1lting in s11bsta11tial injt1ry to tl1e applicant. We will co11 sider eacl1 sitt1atio11 separately. The pt1rcl1aser may apply to l1ave tl1e sale set aside on the grot111d tl1 at tl1 e jt1dgn1 ent-debtor had no saleable interest in the IJroperty . 451 Note tl1at tl1e jt1dg n1ent-debtor or decree-l1older 1nay 11ot a1Jply on tl1is grou11d. IIo\vever, if tl1e decree holder pt1rcl1ased witl1 JJer111ission, l1e is in tl1e position of a IJt1rcl1aser a11d n1ay apply. Therefore, it l1as been l1eld tl1at where the decree-l1older JJt1rc]1aser discovers tl1at tl1e j11dg111ent-debtor l1ad no saleable interest in tl1e property, l1e 11111st n1ove to set tl1e sale aside before proceeding to attacl1 otl1er property. 452 Tl1 e application is authorized only wl1 ere tl1e j11dgn1 ent-debtor l1ad no saleable interest in tl1e JJro perty, and the corresponding provision of tl1e l11dia11 Code of Civil Proceci11re, Orcler 21, rule 91, ha. s bee11 constrt1ed to 111 ean tl1 at wl1ere the jt1clgn1 ent-debtor l1ad an interest, l1owever sn1all, -tl1e sale sl1ot1ld not be set aside. 453 While tl1is follo,vs fron1 a literal ioterpretatio11 of tl1 e Code, s11cl1 a result is 11nfair. Tl1e JJt1rchaser sl1ot1ld be able to obtai11 a prorata reft1nd of tl1e purcl1ase price, at least where tl1e jt1dg ment-debtor l1ad less tha11 a half-interest in tl1e pro1Jerty and tl1e court concl11des tl1 at tl1 e purcl1aser will l1ave paid far i11 excess of the valt1e of tl1 e interest trans ferred to l1im. The court should be able to order a prorata reft1nd of tl1e pt1r chase price ,vhere, i11 ligl1t of tl1 e interest of tl1e judgn1ent-debtor, it wo11ld be unfair to require the pt1rcl1aser to pay tl1e fttll price.
447. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 440(2). The purcl1ase money is set-off in accordance witl1 tl1e provisions of Art. 430(2). must be given 448. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 441. Io calculating tl1e amount to. be paid, the purchaser ( 430 2). . er Art und d t1tle n e. be may l1e cl1 \Vhi y to off the aclvantage of an set449. Civ. .Pro. C., Art. 442. 450. Art. 429(2) is applicable to all sales1 and Art. 442 n1ust be read in conjunction witl1 that Article. 451. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 446. 9 452. See Muthu Kun1arasami v. Motht1sami (High Ct., Madras, 1926), 1927 A/1-lnclia Rep., p. 3 4 . 453. See Chowclli ury Abdul Subhan v. Kanti Ran1anna (I·ligl1 Ct., Madras, 1945) 1945 All-lnclia Rep., p. 161.
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11 by a _person wl10 ha_ s an interest in the 1 clai a lves invo n atio situ nd seco The any . _person, . either owning such at_ d h t . de_ ovi _pr is It d. sol n bee �s 1 J 1 at tl property . e acq111red before the sale, _titl � of t1e v1rt by e1n the� rest inte an ing 11old or property ons as the court may deter dtt1 con h s11c on 1 � as1d set sale the ave 1 to ly app ina.y 5.J Tliis provision enables tl1e r1ghtf11l owner or a . pers on who has an interest 4 ie. i nli r prio to . ed tl1� sale) to protect t _ �rea e a11s (b�c aser 1 cl pL1r e 1 tl of t tha to sl.1perior that property or interest witl1011t l1av1ng to . 1nst1tute a s111t against the purchaser. re the sale, 4ss the So a tra1 1sferee of tl1e property fron1 tl1e Jt1dgn1.ent-debtor befo 456 or a · n sale 11tio exec tl1e to r prior mort prio e 1nad holder of a contract for sale oage"'1 1nay have tl1e sale set aside tinder tl1is rule. Presu1nably, if the judgment debtor \Vere 11ot tl1e owner, tl1e person wl10 was wo11ld assert his claim when the attacl1111eut ,vas inade,458 bL1t if he did 11 ot, l1e 111ay l1 ave the sale set aside under this rule.
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111 India, it l1as been l1eld. that the j11dg111e11t-debtor n1ay apply to have the sale set aside on tl1e gro11nd tl1at he is a perso11 ''owi11g s11cl1 property. " 459 However, tl1e correspo11di11g provision of tl1e India11 Code of Civil Procedure, Order 21 , Rule 89, req11ires tl1at the applica11 t must de1)osit for J)ayment to tl1e decree-holder the amo1111 t for tl1e recovery of ,:vl1icl1 the sale was ordered, i.e., tl1e 1111satisfied portion of tl1e decree. One co11rt l1as said tl1at tl1e p11rpose of allowing the j11dgment-debtor to J1ave tl1e sale set aside upon deposit of tl1e money \Vas to prevent the land fro111 bei11g sold at an i11adequate price. 460 The drafters of the Ethiopia11 Code have carefully on1itted tl1e l)rovision for J)ay1nent of tl1e amo11nt of tl1e decree to the decree-l1older. Certainly, a stranger or 011e wl1 0 l1as obtai11ed an interest \.Vould not be co1111)elled to _pay tl1e an101111t to tl1e decree-11older as a condition for setting aside tl1e decree. Si11ce the drafters of tl1e Etl1io1)ian Code 11sed the ter111 ''have the sale set aside 011 st1cl1 co11ditio11s as tl1e co11rt may determine'' and they did not provide for pay1ne11t of tl1e a111 011nt d11e to tl1e decree-l1older, tl1e so11nder i11terpretation in Ethiopia wotild be to l1old tl1at tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor 111ay 11ot aJ)ply 11nder tl1is rl1le. Note tl1 at l1e co11]d ha, 1e paid tl1e amo11nt d11e before the sale was completed461 or obtai11ed J)Ostpone1nent before tl1e sale i11 order to raise tl1e money.462 Tl1ere is no reaso11 to de1)rive tl1e pt1rcl1aser of tl1e pro1)erty after tl1e sale l1as been con1pleted. Tl1e rt1le sl1ou]d be co11strL1ed only as autl1orizi11 g a11 application by one other than tl1e jt1clgn1 ent-debtor who is the o,vner of the property or has a11 interest therein. Tl1ere is also tl1e q11estio11 of ,vl1etl1er a J)ltrchaser of the property fro111 tl1e . J11dg111ent-debtor after tl1e sa.le is e11titled to apply on the grou11d tl1at lie is the ''owner _o_f the propert)1." Tl1ere is a s1)lit of a11thority on tl1is point in India, but the dec1s1ons revolve aro11nd tl1e fact tl1 at tl1e j11dg11 1e11t-debtor is co11sidered the ''owner'' of tl1 e pr?perty and, tl1 erefore, entitled to a1)ply. -163 If the i11 terpret�tion we have Sl1gges!ed 1s followed and the j11dg11 1e11t-clebtor 1nay not apply, tl1ere 1s no reas�n to per1111t tl1e J)t1rcl1aser fro111 l1i111 to do so. After tl1e sale l1as been 1nade, th� Judgn1ent-debtor l1as 1;10 interest ,v11icl1 l1 e could validly tra11sfer, and tl1e trans feree shotild not be p11t 111 a better positio11 than tl1e judg1nent-debtor. 454. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 444(1), 455. S e e the djscussion in D. Mulla, supra, 11ote 441 at p. 891. 456. See M drika Singh v. Na11dlal Sigl1 (Higl1 Ct., Patna., 1940) 1941 All-India Rep., P· 204. �� , 457. See SrmLvasa v. Ayyatborai (Hig]1 Ct., Madras, 189 P· 416. 21, vol. Rep 8) ., [11d L. ian , _ . 458. See C1v Pro. c., Art. 4l8. 459. eS e tlle d.iscussion and citation of cases in D. Mui.la' supra' note 441 at p. 89 0. 460. Pandu.ran·g v· Govin · d (Ii'igh Ct., Bomvay, 1916), I11dia11 L. Rep., vol. 40, p. 557. . 461. eS e C1v. Pro. C., Art. 4 27. 462. See Civ. Pro. c., Art. 439_ 463. eS e the d'isc·ussion and citation of cases in D. Mulla, supra, note 441 at p p. 891-89Z.
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Even !l1 ougl1 the sale may be set aside, tJ1e judg111ent-debtor re1nains liable for cost � and interest _not covered by tl1e procla111 ation of sale.464 Also, \vhere a person applt �s to _set aside . the . sale 011 the grot1nd of fra11d or irregularity, tl1 e third sit11at1on whicl1 ,ve will d1sc11ss, he n1ay not apply t111der tlus rule unless he witl1 draws the otl1 er application.465 In s11cl1 a case, the co11rt sl1 011ld order tl1at .l1e make an electio11 , but sl1011ld not dis111iss the apJJlication until l1 e has I1 ad that opport11nity.�66 Before a sale is set aside 11nder tl1is r11le, 11otice sho11Icl be given to the a11ct1on p11rcJ1 aser a11d decree-holder.467 The tl1ird situation is tl1e 011e tl1 at will create tl1e 111ost diffi.c11lty. A sale may be set aside_ on tl1 e gro11ncl of a n1aterial irregularity or fra11d in tl1 e publisl1iog or cond11ct1ng of tl1e sale proviclecl tl1 at tl1 e applica11t satisfies the cot1rt tl1at l1 e ]1 as sustai11ed st1bsta1ztial ir{jt1ry by reason of s11ch irreg11Iarity or fra11d. 468 Tl1e application to set aside 011 tl1is gro11ncl 11 1ay be made by tl1 e decree-holder, a11 y person entitled to sl1are in a rateable distribt1tion of assets, or by any person wl1ose interests are affectecl by tl1e sale:169 Tl1e j11dgment-debtor ,vo11ld be ''a person whose interests as affected by the sale,"470 si11 ce if tl1e proceeds of tl1e sale are insufficie11 t to satisfy tl1 e a.1nount of tl1e decree, he remai11s l.iable. A tra11 sferee of tl1e interest of tl1e j11dgi1 1ent-debtor prior to the sale would not be st1cl1 a perso11, since his interests can in no way be affected by tl1e sale.471 I-Ie co11ld apply to l1 ave tl1e sale set aside as 011 e ''o\vning or l1 oldi11 g an i11terest i11 tl1e JJroperty," sit1ce l1 e acq11ired l1is interest prior to tl1e sale. Ho\vever, a tra11 sferec fron1 tl1e j11dgn1ent-debtor followi11 g tl1 e sale wl10, as we said, sl1 011ld not be able to ap1Jly as one ''o,vning or l1 olding a11 i11terest in tl1 e property," sl101ild be able to a1Jply as a ''person ,vl1ose i11 terests are affectecl by tl1 e sale."� 72 If tl1e sale is set aside, ]1e will be entitled to tl1 e property, so l1 is i11 terests are affected ancl l1 e sl1 ould be able to raise a clai111 of n1aterial irregularity or frat1d. Tl1 ere is a split of autl1ority in India as to whetl1 er tl1 e at1ction p11rcl1aser 11 1ay apply u11 der this rule:' 73 111 111 y opinion, he sl1011ld be able to do so. As a res11lt of tl1 e sale l1e l1as received JJro perty for wl1icl1 be l1 as JJaid, a11 cl to tl1 a.t exte11 t his interests ]1ave been affected by tl1e sale. As a. res11lt of tl1e material irreg11larity or fra·ud, l1e 111ay l1ave IJaid n1ore tl1an he otl1 erwise wo11ld l1ave done. The term, ''interests affected by tl1e sale," sho11ld be broadly co11 strued, since it is only i11 exceptio11al circt1111stances tl1at tl1e sale will actt1ally be set aside. But where tl1 ose circ111nstances exist, any perso11 wl1ose interests can reasonably be said to have been affected sl1011lcl be able to apply to have it set aside. Tl1 e only gro1111ds 011 whicl1 a sale 111 a.y be set aside are n1 aterial irreg11larity or fra11d. Tl1 e fact tl1 at tl1 e property realized only half of tl1 e val11e stated in tl1e proclamation of sale, witho11t more, does not jt1stify setting the sale aside:' 74 Tl1 e •
464 . 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 47 0. 471. 472. 473 . 474.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 444(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 444(2). See Got1rchand Mullick v. Pradytnnma Kumar Mullick (High Ct., Calcutta, 1943), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 6. See Raj Chandra v. Kali (I-Iigh, Ct., Ca.lcutta, 1922), 1923 All-/11c/ia Rep., p. 394. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 445. Thiel. See Harindra Nath v. Bl1ola Natl1 (l:ligh Ct., Allahabad, 1936), 1937 All-India Rep., p. 407. /See Official Receiver of Rarnnad v. Veerappa Cbettiar (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1942), 1943 Al India Rep., p. 199. See Naranappier v. Cl1eclan1baram (l-ligh Ct., Madras, 1932), 1933 All-India Rep., p. 96. See the discussion a.ncl citation of cases i11 D. Mulla. supra, note 441 at pp. 899-900. 550. ., p. Rep ia J11d All2 192 1), 192 na, Pat , Ct. gh (fli n ara Ask s n v. ba. See Raj
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n A ow sh ly ive material irregularity 1at firn af be ust m . ud fra or ity : lar egu irr nlaterial e . to c�mply with the a fa1lur e11 be s ha re tl1e ere wh d rre cu oc ve ha to d _ sai nlay be ice 1s st ed pr b liz the rea an e 11r � ins upon the to � ned sig de de Co the provisions of 1 e 1nforn:1at1on nec� ss�ry to 11:l �ke a pro tl all e hav s yer bu e ctiv spe pro 1 at tl and sale 1al 1rreguia1:1t1es: failure e ter u 111a stit con to d l1el n be ve a 1 l � ing low � fol e 1 tl ia, Ind In . bid per 475 ; n of sale atio clam pro fa1lt1re to list the 111 to enter the value of the propert)' 476 failt1re to affi x a t ; jec sub s \Va ty copy of an inc11111brance to wluch tl1e pro1)er 477 l1olding the sale before the expirati ; rty ope p the on on � t11e procla.n1ation of sale _ 478 1n1proper valu t1on of tl1e property resulting in ; od peri day 30 � of tl1e req11ired . place of 179 the sale · without cl1 ang111 g the a sale at mucl1 less tl1an real val11e ; iss11ance of a fresh procla111atio11 ; 480 failing to req11ire th� pt1rcl1a� er to give the 25 % deposit.481 In. all of these examples the nature of tl1e 1rregularrty was such as to affect tl1e a111ot1nt of tl1e bid and tl1e a1not111t realized from tl1e sale. We mt1st in tl1is co11nection disting11isl1 between actions wlJich render the sale void. a11d actions \Vl1icl1 constit11te 111aterial irreg11larities. Wl1ere tl1e sale is void, it si111ply is 11ot recognized and can be attacked at any tin1e. There is no require n1e11t tl1at tl1e !)arty seek:ing s11cl1 a declaration n1 11st l1ave s11tfered substantial injury. It is a void action, wl1ich ca11not affect l)roperty interests. As \Ve have said, where tl1ere l1as bee11 110 1)rocla111atio11 of s�tle, tl1e sale is void. 482 However, if there was a procla1natio11, b11t req Liired infor111atio11 was 11ot incl11ded, tl1ere has been a 1n.aterial irregularity; i11 s11cl1 a case, tl1e affected party m.11st 111ove to have the sale set aside \\1itl1in a s1Jecified J)eriod of ti111e, and tl1e sale will be set aside only if l1e ca11 den1011strate tl1at l1e s11ffered st1bstantial i11jt1ry as a rest1lt of the irregularity .
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Moreo\1er, tl1e irreg11larity m11st be n1aterial. S11_ppose that tl1e procla111ation of sale failed to i11clt1cle tl1e a111011nt for the recovery - of wl1icl1 tl1e sale is ordered. Altl1011gl1 this is i1111Jro1Jer,483 it wo11ld 11ot be ]il<ely to affect tl1e bidding. Tl1e bidders \vill bid in light of \V]1at tl1ey tlli11l< tl1e property is worth and are not co11cerned \\1ith \Vl1etl1er tl1e decree-l1older realizes tl1e f11ll amo·unt of his decree. Tl1erefore, altl1ot1gl1 tl1e fail11re to i11clude this an1ot1nt is an irregt1larity, it sl1ot1ld not be considered a 111aterial one. Or, tl1e decree-l1older fails to sign and verify th � staten1e11t setti11g fortl1 tl1e matters to be specified in the proclan1ation. 484 Assu nung that the information is acct1rate, the abse11ce of signat11re and verification will l1av� 110 eff �ct . a11d sl1ould not cor1stitute a 111ateric1l irreg11larity. It is 011ly where the 1rregt1lar1ty 1s sucl1 as to probably affect tl1e amot111t bid or the a1nount realized fro111 tl1e sale that it can be considered to be 11 1aterial. 475. See Krishna v. Nripendra (High Ct., Calcutta, 1933), 1933 All-Jrzdia Rep., p. 662. 476. See Moti Laul v. Bhawan..i (1-ligh Ct., Calcutta, 1902), Calcutta Weekly 1Votes, vol. 6, p. 836. 477. ��e ii, na Kun1ar v. Golam Cht1nder (I-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1891), Indian L. Rep, vol. lB, 4 � 478. See Tassadu.k ''· Ahrnacl (Privy Council, India, 1894,) J11clia11 L. Rep., Calc11tta, vol. 21, P· 66. 479. See Maru?anaya�n v. Ma11ikav?sakan1 (Privy Cot1ncil, India, 1944), 1945 All-India Ref., p. 67· It is tile improper valuation tJ1at is the n1aterial irregularity, not tl1e fact that the _ perty was sold pro for a lo\.v sun1. Con1pare Rajba11a v. Askaran, supra, note 474. 480. See Fa�ahat v. Board of Reve11ue (I-Iigl1 Ct., Allahaba 1957 1957 All-I11dia Rep., p. 449. d, ), 481. B� lln "· S�.rwan (Higl, S:t., Calcutta, 1889), lr1clia11. L. Rep., vol. 16, p. 33. The mod�rn . in 1.ndia is that tl1e failure of the pt1rcl1aser to pay the deposit renders the sale . v�id. , . S�� a i i al v. op Sarad�r (Sup. Ct., e AII-J11d ndia, 349. 1954), In 1nr in on 1954 ia R p., p. � _ . t · � :ul d be an irregularity, tbe for bid since 1t does not directly an1ou. n t tl1e · · affect 1,roperty.
ef:w
482.
See note 367, sL1pra. 483 . See C� v. Pro. C., Art. 423 (2) (c). 484, See Civ. · Pro. C., Art. 424(1 ).
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An interesting questio11 involves the valiclity of a sale witl1ot1t attachment. Suppose tl1at tl1 e pr�perty sold has not been properly attached or l1as not been attached at all. Bt1t it has bee11 sold and tl1ere has been ft1ll co1npliance with tl1e provisi?ns of the Code relating to sale. One vie,v is that since the court is onJy authorized to order tl1e sale of property tl1at l1as been attacl1ed, tl1e abse11ce of attachme11t re11ders the sale void; another view holds tl1at t11e absence of attach1nent constitt1tes a_ 111 �terial irregt1larity� a tl1ird view is tl1 at as regards the jt1dgment debtor, at least, it .1s 1Jot even an 1rregt1larity. 485 It see1ns to me that since the pri1nary pt1rpose of attach111ent is to bring the property before the court in order to satisfy tl1e decree, attachn1ent beco111es irreleva11t once the sale l1as been made. To say tl1at the absence of attacl11ne11t renders tl1 e sale void denotes an overly co11ceptt1al approach; the property has been solcl, a11d if the provisio11 s relating to sale }1ave witl1, the abse11 ce of attacl1ment sl1ot1ld l1 ave no effect. I also fail been con1p]ied _ to see l1ow the abse11ce of attacl1111ent as such will l1ave anytl1ing to do witl1 tl1e an1ot1nt bid or tl1e ai11ou11t realized. Tl1 erefore, it is subn1itted tl1 at tl1e absence of attacb111ent shot1ld not re11der tl1 e sale void nor constitt1te a 111 aterial irregularity. It will be very rare and 011ly where a 111istake is made that tl1e cot1rt \viii iss11e an order of sale witl1 ot1t l1 aving attacl1ed tl1e property, and tl1 ere is no need to void or set aside tl1e sale i11 st1cl1 a case. We niay now consider fra11d. It l1as been pointed out tl1at in tl1e 111ajority of I11 dian cases where tl1 e co11rt fo1111 d frattcl, tl1e applica11 t \-Vas the judgi11 ent-debtor and tl1 e fraltd alleged ,vas tl1at tl1 e decree-l1older clid not serve hi111 witl1 a ,vrit of attaclun.e11t a11d no copy of the J)rocla111 atio11 of sale v1as a£f1Xed to tl1 e IJroperty. As a rest1lt, tl1e J)roperty was sold \Vithol1t tl1 e knowledge of tl1e jt1dgn1 e11t-debtor, and he first kne,v abot1t tl1 e sale wl1 en tl1e pt1rcl1aser i11 stitt1ted proceedings to obtain possession. 486 Th11s, fraud l1as ordinarily involved deliberate co11 clt1ct 011 the part of the decree-holder to prevent tl1e jt1dg1ne11t-debtor fron1 receiving 11otice of the proceed ings, so that l1 e will be l1nable to protect ltls J)roperty by satisfyi11g tl1e a1nol111 t of the clecree or taki11 g otl1er actio11 . Or, tl1e decree-l1older agrees witl1 tl1e j11dg ment-debtor that be will not l1old tl1 e sale if payn1 ent is 1nade \-Vitl1i11 a specified time. While tL1e j t1dgn1ent-debtor is tryi11 g to raise the 11 1011ey - a11d l1 as take11 110 action to obtain J)ostpone111e11t of tl1e sale - the decree-l1older sells the property. St1cl1 condt1ct constitt1tes fra11cl, beca11se it ca11sed tl1e judgn1e11t-debtor to fail to exercise l1is rigl1ts witL1 respect to tl1e [Jroperty:187 I-Iowever, it has been l1eld that a.n agreeme11t by wl1icl1 a bidder enters into an arrange111 e11t witl1 another bidder to sell tl1e property to l1in1 if lie d.oes not bid, does 11ot co11 stit11te fra11d. 488 Wl1ile the agreen1ent may l1ave discot1raged competition at tl1e a11ction, it is not illegal as sucl1. It only affects one bidder, a11 d otl1 ers may still bid. Nor does it prevent tl1e judgment-debtor from action witl1 respect to tl1 e property. Therefore, it sho11ld 11 ot constitt1te fraud so as to j11stif)' setting aside the sale. Even though a 1naterial irreg11larity or fra11d 1nay l1 ave occurred, the sale will not be set aside 11nless the applicant can prove that l1e suffered s11bstantial inj11ry as a rest1lt of sL1cl1 irreg11la1·ity or frat1d. Tl1e injury 1nust be proved independently, and it is not prest1med fron1 the existence of the irr�gularity or fra11d. 489 . The natt1re of the irregi.1lar.ity or frat1d, l1owever, may determine whetl1er tl1e applicant cot1ld 48 '5. See the discussion a.nd citation of cases it1 D. Mulla, supra, note 441 at pp. 903-904. 486. lei. at 905. 487. See Sheik ·Mau la Bux v. Raghubar (High, Ct., Patna, 1918), Patna L. J., vol. 3, p. 645. 488. See Mabomed rv1ira Ravutber v. Savasi Vijaya Raghunatba (Privy Council, India, 1900), l1ldia11 L. Rep,. Madras; vol. 23, p. 227. 489. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 441 at p. 906.
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e re sal t he we i not properly publiciz le, · 1np exa or F � . 1ry injt al nti st,i sub d _ have suffere _ tl1e , ry eby but . since the ainount ed, tile p·urcl1aser wotild 11ot l1ave suffered any inJu _ � b tor or realized may 11ave been affected �y . the lack of publi�at1_on,. the Judgment-de _ decree-bolder could hav e strffered 111Jury tl1ereby. Or, 1f 111 tl1e proclamation of sale been e ha d cot1l cted e r aff l1ase purc the adversely, but , al11ed overv � were erty prop tile . not tile decree-I1older nor jt1dgn1ent-debtor. Tl1e point 1s that a party may not have tile sale set aside 011 t11e grot1nds of 1naterial irregularity . or _ fr_at1d unless he ca.n show that fi e-and not so111eone else - l1as st1ffered st1bstant1al InJury as a result. If tl1e applicant is the pt1rcl1aser, ]1e_ n1u_st sl1ow that _ l1e has bee11 improp�rly induc ed If the appl1cant is the to J)t1rcl1ase the property at a price 10 excess of its value : _ 1f 1t ]Jad not been f. or th. e tl1at decree-holder or judgn1ent-debtor, be n1t1st sl1ow 4 9c ould l1 ve price been l1igl1er . tially realized substan a fraud, or arity In irreg11l � � certain circt1n1stances tl1e nat11re of tl1e frat1d or 1rregular1t)' may create a strong inference that tl1e price realized was less than it otherwise wot1ld l1ave been. Sup pose tl1at B's sl1are in tl1e attacl1ed 1Jro1)erty is sold for Eth. $ 200. It is sold at an adjo11rned sale, for \Vl1icl1 no l1ot1r \Vas fixecl and tl1ere are only three bidders. A sn1aller sl1are in tl1e sa111e property is sold at a properly conducted sale for Etl1. $ 4,000. It ca11 be i11ferred that tl1e irreg11larity was tl1e cause of the low price, a11d tl1e sale 111ay be set aside. 491
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Tl1e following case f11rnishes a good exa111ple of ,vl1e11 a sale sl1ould be set aside. Tl1e judg111ent-debtor died, leavi11g a widow a11d mi11or son. No notice of tl1e attacl1n1e11t was served on tl1e representative of tl1e minor. Althougl1 the pro perty consisted of a number of parcels, tl1e procla111ation of sale was read out, witl1out beat of dru1n, 011 only one parcel and affixed to a tree in the village. The procla1natio11 111erely stated the profit inco1ne and val11e of the land. The land Tl1e co11rt fo11nd tl1at the n1aterial irregt1larities \\1 as sold at a gross 11nderval11ation. \Vere tl1e cause of tl1e land's bei11g sold for 1nuch less tl1an it was worth a11d ordered tl1e sale to be set aside:192 Tl1e J)Oint to stress is that botl1 conditions n1ust be satisfied: tl1ere 1nust have been material irreg11larity or fratid a11d suc11 irregular ity or frat1d n111st l1ave ca11sed s11bsta11tial injt1ry to the particular person wl10 is making tl1e application. Note tl1at tl1ere is no reqt1ire1nent tl1at tl1e p11rcl1aser be aware of tl1e fraud or irregularity. Even tl1ougl1 l1e acted in good faitl1, the sale will be set aside where tl1e material irreg11Iarity of frat1d res11ltecl i11 s11bstantiaJ i1Jj11ry to tl1e ,lj)plicant.493 Ho\vever, if tl1e aJ)}Jlicant \Vas aware of tl1e fra11d or irregularit)' at tl1e ti111e of the sale a11d did not tl1en object, it l1as been l1eld tl1at l1e is estopped fro111 d�io� so st1bseqt1ently, a11d ca11not 111ove to set tl1e sale aside on tl1at ground.494 This 1s a s011n� approa.ch, since if he had objectecl, tl1e irregt1larity migl1t l1ave bee11 corrected a11d it \\'Ottlcl not be 11ecessary to set tl1e sale ctside. l:;-inall)'. 11ote again tl1at a party may not join a11 applicatio11 to set tl1e sale aside on tlus 0oround with an application to set it aside 011 tl1e gro1111d tl1at J1e is tl1e owner of the property or has a previo11sly-acq11ired interest i11 it. -19 s '
490. Ibid. 491. See Surno Moyee v. Dakl1i11a (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1897), J11dia1z L. Rep., vol. 24, P· 291· 492. See Krishna Pershad v. Mot icl1at1d (Privy Council ' India ' 1913) ' Indian L. Rep., Calc utta , vol. 40. p. 635. 493. See Bireswar v. Panch Kot1ri (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1922), 1923 All-I11dia Rep., p. 5JS. 494. �e Arunachellam v. Arunacbellam (Privy Council, India, 1889), [11dian App., vol. 15 , P· 171' � 495. 1v. Pro. C., Art. 444(2).
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(3) Confirmation, delivery of possession and resistance a. Confirmation Finally, w � will consider confirn1 �tio� of tl1e sale, delivery of possession and the proble1n of resistance. vVhere 110 a_ppl1cat1on to set aside is 1nade within two n1ontl1s from tl1e date of tl1e sale, tl1e sale become absoltite.496 It is not necessary for the purchaser to n1�ke .an application to tl1is effect.4"7 By the same toke11, if an appli catio11 to set ,:1s1de 1s n1,1de a11d tl1e application is disallowed tl1e court will make 498 tl1e confirmin. g sale, a11d absolute. llJ)Oil co11firmation, tl1e saie becon1es order an Where a sale of i11101ovable propert)' l1as becon1es absolt1te, tl1at is. ,vl1ere no application to set aside l1as been made witl1in the two 1nontl1 period or a .n application has been n1ade, but disallowed, the cot1rt 1nt1st iss11e a certificate specifying the proi)erty sold, tl1e nan1e of tl1e J)t1rchaser a11d tI1e date on wl1icl1 the sale be came absol11te."99 In I11dia, it bas bee.n l1elcl tl1at if the p11rchaser has died, the certificate 1n.ay be issued i11 tl1e name of l1is re1)rese11tative ;500 l1owever, tl1ere is a split of autl1ority as to whetl1er it can be issued i11 tl1e nan1e of an assignee. 501 In n1y opinio11, tl1e certi·ficate sl1011ld always be iss11ed in tl1e na111e of the actt1al p · urcl1aser so tl1at it will be clear, if tl1e qt1estio11 arises in tl1e ft1t11re, wl10 p11r chased the property origi11ally. But, if ]1e l1as died or transferred the property, is no reaso11 \vl1y this cannot be i11dicated on the certificate as \veil. Tl1e is tl1at the 11ame of tl1e at1ction purcl1aser sl1ould always be Where an applicatio11 to set aside the sale is gra11ted, tl1e cot1rt must 111ake a·o order to that effett. 502 Sucl1 an order is not to be n1ade, i.e., tl1e sale is not to be set asicle, t1nless notjce of tl1e applicatio11 to set asid.e l1as been given to all persons affected tl1ereby. 5c3 ''Perso11s affected tl1ereby'' sl1011ld be co11strued to 111ea11 the at1ction pt1rcl1aser, tl1e j11dg1nent-debtor, tl1e clecree-bolder and any perso11 entit led to rateable distrib11tion. A tra11sferee fron1 the purcl1aser sl1ot1ld not be deen1ed ''a perso11 affected tl1ereby," since freq11ently tl1e transfer will 11ot be know11, and the interests of the tra11sferee can be ·protected by giving notice to tl1e pt1rcbaser. Tbe rule as to 11otice is 1nandatory, and it l1as been helcl tha.t ,vl1ere tl1e sale was set aside witl1011t notice to the pt1rcl1aser, l1e was entitled to ap·ply for con1ir1natio11. 50'1 However, so 1011g as tl1e a1Jplication to set aside was macle ,vitl1i11 tl1e two 1nontl1 period, tl1e co11rt sh.ould not confir1n tl1e sale, b11t reconsider tl1e a1)plicatio11 to set a.side after giving pro_per notice to tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor. Finally, ·note tl1at where the application is not made ,vitliin tl1e two month period, tl1e sale beco1nes abso lute and cannot s11bseq11ently be cl1alle11ged: tl111s, where tl1e judg·ment-debtor did not make a.11 application to set tl1e sale aside, he co11ld not challenge the sale in a suit brought against him for possession of the property. scs
496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 447(1). See Satya v. Narnayya (J-ljgh Ct., Madras, 1937), 1938 All-India Rep., p. 307. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 447(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 447(3). See In re Vinayak Narayan (Higl1 Ct., Bon1bay, 1900), Indian L. Rep., vol. 24, p. 120. ; See Ganapati v. Subraya (I-iigh Ct., Bombay, 1935), 1936 All-lnclia Rep., p. J 37 (pe.,rmitted) _ 471 p. Rep /1a -Inc All 8 193 8), 193 , Makhan Lal v. Baldeo Prasacl (High Ct., Allal1abad (not permitted). 502. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 447(4). 503. Ibid. 504. See Gulab Singh v. KisI1an Singh (f-Iigh Ct., Labore, 1934), 1934 All-Jnclia Rep., p. 508. 505. See Chowdhury Abdul Subhan v. Kanti Ramanna (High Ct., Madras, 1 945), 1945 All-India Rep., p. 161.
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asid , the set p n bee has ty per pro ble 1ova 1 � �rchaser is entit 1 in 1 of sale a Where or y, n with -mo wt aser h c. pur t hou the of interest as nt � � yme repa for r orde an to led 506 I f all s l1a it en be o1n id. wh pa to n rso pe y an st ain ag , ect dir the the cotirt n1ay 1 e o�de� W?uld only run against him, tl r, olde 1 -l cree d e 1 tl to paid e wer � proceeds 1 b �t 1 on, the r d1st order would run le a rate to tled enti ? ers otl1 e wer e ther btit if against a11 to tl1e extent of the 11 1oney received. And if tl1ere were a11 excess, i.e. , if tl1e purchase price exceeded tl1 e an1ount of the decree or decrees, the order would rtin aoainst the jt1 dg 1nent-debtor for tl1e excess. The purchaser must be placed in a.s go;d a 1)osition as 11e \Vas before tl1_e sale, and in appropriate cases, tl1 e court n1ay order tl1e payment of interest to 111.01. b. Delivery of possession.
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Since i 1 nmovable property ca11not be seized pl1 ysically, it is necessary to provide for delivery of the property to tl1e purchaser. A.lso, it is possible that resistance will be made by tl1 e person in l)ossession. Rather tl1an req11 ire tl1e purchaser to institute a separate st1 it to recover possessio11 tl1e Code provides a method by wlucl1 l1e 111ay be IJLit i11 possession as part of tl1e exect1 tion proceedings. We n1ust distingt1isl1 betwee11 tl1 e sitt1ation wl1ere tl1e possessor is tl1e jt 1dgment-debtor or a perso11 l1olding on I1is bel1alf or clain1ing thro11 gl1 l1i1 11 and tlJe situation wl1ere the JJossessor is a stra11ger to tl1e j t1dg 11 1e 11 t-debtor and is asserting 1Jis ow11 claim to tl1e property agai11st tl1e JJt1rcl1aser. Wl1ere tl1e property is i11 the possession of the judgn1e11t-debtor or son1e perso11 0 11 his bel1alf, e.g., an agent, or a person claim ing t1nder tl1e title created by the jttdgn1 ent-debtor st:ibseq11e11tly to the attacllillent of tl1e pro1Jerty, e.g., a transferee fron1 l1irn, tl1e following procedt1re is to be follow ed: after tl1 e certificate iudicati11g tl1at tl1e sale l1as beco1ne absolute has been isst1ed, tl1 e JJL1rc J1aser 111a)1 mal<.e applicatio11 for delivery, and tl1e court will order delivery by pL1tting tl1e JJt1rcl1aser or l1is apJ)Ointee into possession, and · if necessary, b:,1 ren1oving any 1Jerso11 who refuses to vacate the property. 507 It has bee11 held in India tl1at tl1e purcl1aser is not reqt1ired to l)roceed tinder tlJis rule, b11t n1ay institute an ordina.ry st1it for J)ossession. 508 However, it is clear tl1at tl1 e decree l1older pt1 rcl1aser n111st lJroceed 11ncler tl1is sectio 11 . 509 Tl1is is becat1 se l1 e is a party to the st1it, and t1 11der Art. 375 any qt1estion co11cerning exect 1 tion, discl1arge or satisfactio11 of tl1e decree arising between parties to the s11it 111ust be deter1nined by tl1e court exect1ti11 g tl1e decree and not by a separate s11 it. Therefore, l1e 1nust employ tl1 is re1nedy to obtain JJOssessio11 and 1 11ay 11ot i11stitt1 te a separate suit. Tl1e pt 1rcl1aser is n1ore lil<ely to make t1se of tl1is re111edy, ·bt 1 t if l1e does file a. separate �t1 it, it shot1lcl 11ot be barred, si11 ce I1e is not a ·party to tl1e suit \Vit �in tl1e �nea111ng of Art. 375. It l1as also been l1 eld tl1at if the purcl1aser agreed w 1tl1 the JUdgt11e11t-debt?r tl1at tl1 e latter cot 1lcl re111ai 11 in possession of tl1e property or a part thereof, the Jt1dgment-debtor 111ay call tl1is to tl1 e attentio11 of tl1e cot1rt aiid the co11rt \viii 11ot direct l1is re111ova1.s10
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If . the pr�perty . is in tl1e possessio 1 1 of a te 11ant or otl1 er person entitled to possession, del1very 1s effected in the followi 11g 1na 1 1ner. After tl1e certificate has been granted and o� applicatio11 of tl1 e JJ11rcl1aser, the co11rt ,viii order delivery t o be made by affix111g a co:py of the certific::1te in so111e co11spicuous place on the .
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506. 507. 508. 509. 510.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 447(5). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 448. See Kisl1ore v. Chunder (Higl1 Ct. Calcu tta , 1887), lnd"1an L . Rep., voI. 14, p . 644. ' . See D eb.I Pr�sad v. Satiscl1andra (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1943), 1944 All-India Rep., P· 382· . See Cl1ockal1ngam Chettiar v. Lakshn ndia AllI ) 1a. 194 n a 5 d Che ttia ras r 194 (Hi 4, Rep., p. 1. . gh Ct. ' Ma '
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proper �y and proclaiming by beat of drum or other customary n1 ode, at so1ne _ convenient place that the 1nterest of tl1e judg1nent-debtor has been transferred to the ptirchaser.511 As of time, the tenant is advised tl1at tl1e purchaser i. s tl1e o\vner of the property and entitled to receive tl1e rents. Tl1e certificate of sale placed on _ some consp1cuot1s place on tl1e property constitutes notice to all that tl1e p11rchaser is tbe new owner and that tl1e jt1dg 111ent-debtor ca11not deal witl1 tl1e property further. c. Putting into possession.
It 1nay_ be that tl1e delivery of 1Jossession to tl1e pt1rchaser or 11.is appointee will be resisted. As ,ve saw, the cot1rt ofl1cial is autl1 orized to remove a _perso1 1 \Vl1 0 refuses to vacate tl1e san1e511 (ass1111 1j 1 1g tl1at person is tl1 e judgn1ent-debtor or an occt1pant on 11is belJal.f or one claiming throt1gl1 }um), bt1t tl1is may 1 1ot be possible, e.g., \Vl1 ere tl1 e occttJJant 11ses ar111ed force to repel the cot1rt ofllcial or purcl1aser. Whenever possession is resisted or obstrt1cted, t]1e l10Ider of a decree for the pos sessio1 1 of immovable property or tl1e at1ctio11 purcl1aser may make an ap_plication to t]1 e co11.rt con1_p]aining of st1cl1 resistance or obstrt1ctio1 1. 5 13 T11 e cot1rt shall fi x a day for investigati11g tl1 e 1natter and sl1 all summon the person against wl1om tl1e application has been n1ade to appear and a11 swe.r tl1e charge.514 Note tl1at tl1is refers to an;y perso1 1 wl1 0 is resisting or obstructing possessio11, altl1 ougl1 , as we vvill see, the action to be taken depends on the statt1s of the person wl10 is so resisti11g or obstr11cting. Note also tl1at tl1 is procedure is only autl1orized wl1ere tl1 e decree-l10Ider or purchaser has never been pt1t i11to possession. Once he l1 as been put i11to pos session and is St.{bseqi1e11t/;, dispossessed, he can 1 1ot a1Jply 11nder tl1is rule, bt1t n1L1st bring an ordinary st1it to recover possessio11. 515 Tl1 e co11rt proceeds to investigate the clai111 of resist,1 11 ce or obstruction a1 1d tl1 e status of the person who is caL1sing it. If :it is satisfied tl1at tl1e resistance or obstrt1ction vvas occasioned witl1 out good ca11se by tl1 e jL1dg111 ent-debtor or s0111e otl1er person at his i 11stigation, it will direct tl1 at tl1e applicant be p11t in possession of the property ; 516 if the applicant is still resisted or obstrt1cted in obtai11 i11g JJOS session, it may, at l1is insta11ce, also order tl1 at the jt1dg1nent-debtor or person acti11g at l1 is instigation be detained in a civil prison for a period not exceeding tl1irty days. 517 Tl1is procedt1re sl1 ould also be follovvecl in tl1e case of a pt1rcl1aser frot11 the jt1dg,ment-debtor followi11 g tl1e attacl1 1nent. 518 For pt1rposes of tl1is rule, tl1e provisions of Art. 448, referring to ''a perso1 1 .in possessio11 on bel1 alf of tl1e jt 1dg1ne 1 1t debtor or a perso 11 clai1 11 ing 1111der a title created by t1Je j11dg1nent-debtor s11bseqt1e11tly to tl1e attaclu11 eot'' sl1 ot1ld be applica.ble, a11d any s11ch person sl1 ould be st1bject to this proced t1re. Moreo,,er, tl1e ter111, ''witl1 011t good ca11se'' ca11 o.11ly be constrL1ed to 1nea 11 that tl1e occt 1pant l1as a legal rigl1t to possession. Perhaps l1 e is tl1e ten.int of tl1e judg ment-debtor, in which case be can1 1 ot be re111 oved fro1n possession, and delivery 111ust be effected in accordance witl1 tl1e provisions of Art. 449. Or, perhaps tl1.e pt1rchaser entered into an arrangement givi11 g the jt1dgn1ent-debtor or occ11pier tl1e right to possession. 511. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 449. 512. The applicant should first apply to be put into possession under Art. 448. lf this is unsuc cessful, he may apply under the present rule. See the discussion in S. Sarkar, The Lalv of Civil Proceclure (4th ed., 1963), vol. 1, p. 535. 513. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 450(1). 514. Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 450(2). 515. See Mg Ba v. u Tok ('fligh Ct., Rangoon, I 937), 1937 All-India Rep., p. 449. As to a su.it for possession, see Ci,1 C., Art. 1149. .. . v1s1 516. The appHcant would be put into possession in accordance w1tl1 the pro 00s of Art. 448. 517. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 451. . 518. See Ktippana v. Kurnara (f[igh Ct., Mad.ras, 1911), Indian .L. Rep., vol. 34, p. 450 •
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e of tl1e sal ty or �xec·ution proceed idi val the h wit do to ng tlii 11o s ha se'' cau ''Good te. olu ise, abs erw e Oth om bec no certificate l1as sale the e tin1 is 1 tI at . e, ings sinc , ate a ific of cert no e enc abs application for the i11 and ed, issu n bee e \VOt;ld hav possession may be n1ade. o� o ucti or bstr \Vas :ce sta1 resi occasioned by tl1e that sfied sati is rt cou t11e . If . 1 m1ng 10 goo d faith to be i � possess cla r, bto -de 1ent dgn 1 j1 the r1 tha er oth son a per . the Judgment ioii on bis own account or on account of so111e person other than519 Note that debtor the court shall make an order disniissing tl1e application. tl1e cd11rt does 11ot determine tl1e clai1n of that perso11. As we will see, a separate s1tit n1t1st be instit11ted by the decree-holder or p11rcl1aser in such a case. As long as tl1e co11rt is satisfied tl1at tl1e claimant is asserting a bo11a fide claim to possess ion i 11dependent of the claim of the judg111ent-debtor, it may not put the decree holder or p11rcl1aser into possession. For 1Jurposes of tl1is ru.le, a tenant, from 520 He l1is on own ssion nt. posse accou in be to claim ot ca1111 r debto 11e11tjt1dg1 tl1e 111t1st proceed to establisl1 l1is tenancy, and if tl1e co11rt fmds that the tenancy exists, it \Vill l1olcl tl1at the resistance or obstr11ction ,vas occasioned by good cause a.nd ,viii not re111ove him fro111 possessio11. Tl1erefore, tl1e cr11cial questions are tl1e status of tl1e person who is resisting or obstrt1cti11 g possession and tl1e reaso11 \Vl1y l1e is doing so. If the person is the judgment-debtor or one l1olding for lun1 or claiming tlrro11gh him, the co11rt must deter111ine \Vl1etl1er there is good cause for his resisting or obstructing possession. If tl1ere is not good cat1se, i.e., if tl1e person does not l1ave a legal right to possession, tl1e cot1rt will direct tl1at the decree-l1older or pt1rcl1aser be put into possession, and if tl1at orcler is still resisted, tl1e perso11 resisti1 1g 111ay be impriso11ed. But if the person is 11ot tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debtor and not l1oldi11g or clain1ing possession through l1in1, tl1e court 1 1111st dis111iss tl1e application. No\v sttppose tl1,1t tl1e perso11 in possession has been dis_possessed, that is, he d.id not resist tl1e decree-l1older or pt1rchaser or co1 1rt official wl1en that person tried to obtain possession, and the pro1Jerty is no,v in tl1e possession of the decree holder or pt1rchaser. Any dispossessed claimant otlzer t/1c111 the juclgn1e11t-clebtor 1n.ay n1ake an application to tl1e court co111plaining of s11cl1 dispossession, 521 The court must fix a day for investigating tl1e 1 natter and s11n1mon the party against wl1om the application is made to appear a11d answer tl1e sa111e.s22 Wl1ere tl1e co1ut is satisfied tl1at tl1e ap1Jlica11t was in possession of tl1e property on l1is own account or on �ccot111t of some JJerson otl1er tl1a11 the jt1dginent-debtor, it will direct tl1at the applica11t be put back into possession.523 Note again tl1at tl1e court does not deter1nioe t�e . n1erits of tl1e clai111.. It n1erely deterrnines tl1at the person dispossess�d is _ . not cla1m1ng poss�ss1011 on behalf of or tl1rot1gl1 tl1e jt1dg1ne11t-debto1·. Tl1is prov1s �on . parallels tl1e one Jt1st d1sc11ssed, wl1ere the lJerson resisting or obstrt1ctir1g possession _ does not cla1n� on bel1alf of or tl1rougl1 tl1e jt1dg111e11t-debto.r . In sucl1 ,1 case . the cotirt orders 1111n p11t back into possession, and tl1e 111 atter of wl10 has the right to possession or . ow11ership n1t1st be deter 111i1 1ed by a separate s11it. Thus, a ptlr chaser from tl1e Jt1dgment-debtor IJrior to tl1e attacl1111ent wl10 was dispossessed by the purchaser at tl1e a11ctioo sa.le n1ay apply 11nder tl1is r11le.s24 He is claiming on 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524.
Civ. Pro.- C., Art. 452. See Jairam v. Nowroji (Higl1 Ct., Bon1bay , 1921), 1922 All-India Rep., p. 449. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 453(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 453(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 453(3). erson p l a v. Ra n 1 dayal Such (H gl1 ! Ct., Patna, 1951), 1952 Al/-I,ulia Rep., p. 152. h _ 452· Art. !e;u! :i be entitled to resist t e possession r unde lder of tl1e purchaser or decree-bo h
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his own ac'?ount by virtue of t !1e prior purchase of tl1e property. It is irreleva11t that the clatm arose thro11gh action of tl1e j11dg1nent-debtor i.e. tl1e transfer since the basis . of his clain1 �o possession is tl1e prior purcl1as� and 1 1ot any prese11t rig.ht or 1!1terest of tl1e Jt1dgn1ent-debtor. It has been l1eld i11 India that a person in possession througl1 a tenant 111ay apply 11nder tl1is r11le. 525 It may be said tl1at he is claimi_ng th_ro�gh tl1e te�ant a11d not tl1rougl1 tl1e jt1dgn1ent-debtor. I-Iowever, the tenant 1s cla1ID1ng possess1011 tl1rougl1 tl1e j11dgn1ent-debtor, as we l1ave seen, 526 and since the st1b-tenan . t is clai111ing directly throt1gl1 tl1e tenant ' lie is ' in effect' clain1i11g t I1rol1g h tl1e Jt1dgment-debtor and not asserti11g an independent claim to possession. Tl1erefore, it is sub1nitted that J1e sl1ol1ld 11ot be able to apply 1111der tl1is rt1le. 527 Yot1 will recall tl1a.t \vl1e11 property is attacl1ed, a perso11 c]ai111i11g tl1at 11e is entitled to tl1e Property instead of tl1e judgment-debtor may file a11 objection to tl1e . attach�n1ent. 528 If tl1e court concl11des tl1at tl1e property is not tl1e property of tl1e judgn1ent-debtor, it 111akes an order disn1issi11g tl1e attacl1n1ent. 529 If tl1e claim is rejected, tl1e party wl10 filed tl1e objectio11 111ay institt1te a separate st1it. 530 Now s11ppose that wl1e11 i111111ovable property allegeclly belonging to A was attacl1ed by B, C filed a11 objection to the attacl1n1ent, claiming tl1at l1e was entitled to tl1e property. The objection was rejected, and tl1e property was sold to : o in exectttion. D l1as dispossessed C, a11d C seeks an order p11tting l1im into possession 1111der tl1is rule. 531 It has been l1eld by the Privy Council that l1e is not entitlecl to s11cl1 an order.532 He l1as had tl1e op1)ortt1nity to establisl1 l1is clai111, a11d l1is clai1n vvas rejected. He may bring a s11it t o deter111ine l1is clai111 a11d should be requirecl to do so. Failing the bringi11g of a separate suit, tl1e original order rejecting tl1e clai111 is conclusive, 533 a11d tl1ere is no reaso11 to p11t l1i111 into J)ossessio11 110w. It is only wl1ere tl1e applicant l1as not previol1sly asserted l1is clain1 to the property tl1at lie shot1ld be entitled to an orcler tinder tl1is rt1le. Also, tl1e clai1na11t sl1011ld l1ave tl1e burden of persl1adi11g tl1e court of the existe11ce of l1is clai111 to possessio11 011 ]1is own acco11nt and not on tl1e acco1111t of tl1e judgn1ent-debtor, since such an order will interfere wit!1 tl1e ordinary process of execlttion. 534 Note fi11ally tl1at tl1e 011ly qt1estion ,vitl1 wl1ich tl1e cou.rt is concer11ed is tl1e rigl1t of tl1e clain1aot to 1)ossess io11; as long as he sl1ows s11cl1 a rigl1t, l1e need 11ot establisl1 tl1at l1e is tl1e ow11er of tl1e property. s3s The provisions jt1st discussed are applicable to botl1 tl1e sitt1atio11 \Vl1ere the decree passed \Vas for tl1e possessio11 of i1n111ovable property, e.g., a s11it to reco,,er possession of imn1ovable property, a11d tl1e sitt1atio11 wl1ere in1movable property l1as 525. See Barajabala v. Gurudas (I-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1906), Jnclian L. Rep., vol. 33, p. 487. 526. See note 519, supra. 527. It seems clear that the represe11tative is claimin� througl1 the Judgn�ent-�lebtor. I·Iowever, in India, there is a split of authority on tl1is qt1est1on. See tl1e d1scuss1on 1n S. Sarkar, supra, note 512 at p. 539. 528. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 418. 529. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 419. 530. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 421. 531. Or he is resisting such possession, clain1i11g to be in possession on l1is own account within the n1eaning of Art. 452. 532. See Bholanatll v. I-Iara (Privy Council, India, 1932), 1933 App. Cases, p. 233. 533. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 421. 534. See Appa v. Venkappa O·Iigh Ct., Madras, 1930), 1931 /Jll-!11dia Rep., p. 534. 535. See Kangasabhai v. Poornatham11?al (Higl1 Ct., . Madras, 1947),_ J 947 111-!ndia Rep., p. 4 �8. Of course, he may be clain1ing a right to possession based on his ownership of the property See Civ. C., Art. 1206.
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o . r, H ney eve mo ere the dec ree of wh nt me pay the for � _ ree dec a isfy sat to . d sol . beetl cla 1 nung rights with resp s on per a ty 1Jer pro e abl nov inu of n ect sio ses . ! is for the pos _ 1 ts prior to_ �l1e t1m� � he suit restilt r1gl 11c d 11ire acq ave � 1 11st 111 J tJ' � per pro to that ns pro 1tl1 1s1o e ent Tl1 g . ted 1tt1 a claimant nst 1 s wa io11 y ses pos � for ree dec � iiig in tlie _ 1 on after haVJng been dis s ses 1n JJOs pt1t e b to or n sio ses pos ct trt1 obs or to resist possessed (Arts. 452, 453 (a) ) are not appli_cable in the case of a decree for �ossession to om w one , the . Jttdgment e11,t en ,. lite ee sfer � tran a 1 to erty � prop le f ovab in1m of 536 This tl e 1 . of suit on tt1t1 1 nst 1 tl1e r afte includes y pert pro e 1 tl red debtor I1as transfer he has a person to wl1 0111 he I1as tra11sferr�d possessio11 _a� �ell �s _ on� to whom _ 537 Tl1 e theory IS tl1at 011ce l1t1gat1on IS 1nst1tuted with respect p. i ersl1 ow11 ed transferr to i111111ovable propertJ', a transferee of ow11 ersJ1jp or possession takes the property su.bject to tl1e rest1lt of tl1e litigation. His JJosition witl1 respect to tl1e property is tl1 e same as tl1at of tl1 e jt1dgment-debtor. Therefore, he cannot resist delivery of possessio11 to tl1e decree-l1older and once dispossessed, cannot be p11t back into possession. Tl1is restrictio11 only applies to a decree for possession of im111ovable property and not to tl1e sitt1ation where i111n1 ovable property l1 as been attached in exectition of a decree for tl1e pay111e11 t of n1oney. So, a person to wl101 n immova ble pro1)erty l1as been tra11sferred follo,:ving the insti.tt1tion of a suit in which a decree for tl1e pay1nent l1 as bee11 iss11ecl .could still resist possession or be put back i11to 1)ossessio11. :Bt1t l1 e col1ld do so only if tl1 e transfer were 1nade prior to the attacl1 ment. 011 ce tl1e attacl1n1 ent l1 as been made, the property cannot be transferred,538 a11d a transferee after tl1 at ti 111 e, wl10 was 11ot J)ermjtted to receive tl1e property, can11 ot clain1 tl1at l1e 1 s i11 l )Ossession in good faith. Tl111s, he cannot resist the possession of tl1e decree-l1older or pt1rcl1aser and is 11 ot entitled to be pt1t back i11to possessio11.
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d. Subsequent suit. Tl1 is far we have bee11 considering tl1 e su111mary proced11re e1nployed to pt1t the decree-l1older or pt1rcl1aser into possession. The procedure is sumn1 ary only, and as we l1ave seen, tl1 e cot1rt n1ay 1 1ot actt1,1lly be determi11ing who is entitled to tl1 e l )roperty. It is, provided tl1erefore, tl1at any person other than the judg me11t-debtor against wl1 om a11 order regardi11g possession of im1 novable property is made n1ay institt1te a st1it to estab]isl1 tl1 e rigl1 t which he clai1ns to tl1 e present p_ossession of tl1e propert)r. 539 IIowever, if no st1it is bro11gl1t, tl1e order is concll1s1ve. We n1ay first consider ,vl1 0 ca11 bring a s11it 1111der tlus rule. If tl1e decree l1older or purcl1 aser sougl1t an order of 1Jossession, b11t the order was denied on tl1e grot111d tl1at tl1e resistance of tl1 e JJerso11 i11 possession was occasio11 ed by good cause, e.g., because l1e was a te11 ant l111der tl1 e jt1dg1ne11t-clebtor, ,111d the applica11t contends tl1at _ tl1at person was not tl1 e te11ant, tl1e a.J)IJlicai1t cot1ld Slle to obtain possession against tl1e tenant. I � tl1at stiit the qt1estio11 of the te11a11cy would be litigated. 011 tl1e otl1 er l1a�d, if. the applicatio11 l1ad been gra11ted and the tenant dispossessed, I1e could br111g suit to establisl1 11is right to possession based on tl1 e tenancy. �r, 1rocla was he tippose 1 at tl1at tl 1 tl e person resisti11 g 1Jossession s,1tisfied the cot1rt � 111 � possession on l1 is o,vn acco11nt, a.s a result of w11ich the application was dis _ m.1ssed._ Tl1 e applica11t cot1ld �nstitt1te s11it agai11st tl1 e clai 1ua11t, and the matt �r of _ , the claimant s right to �ossess1on wot1ld tl1e11 be litigated. If tl1e claim were reJected and tile appl 1_ cant p11t into possession, the clai111a11t could bring sucl1 a suit. The 536. 537. 538. 539.
Civ. Pro. c., Art. 454. See Kangasabl1ai v. Poornatl1an1mal su ' pra, note 534. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 414. Civ. Pro. C. , Art. 455. The pro to an filed cedt j 1re is is tl1e ecti san1 on ob e as an whe n attacl1111e.nt. See Civ. Pro. C ., Art. 421.
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� -----------third sittiation is wl1ere one who l1as been dispossessed applies to be put into possessio� . If t l1 e co11rt fmds � hat l1 e l1 elcl_ tl1e property on l1is own accotint and orders l111n_ t? be . pt1t back 1 �to pos�ession, tl1e decree-holder or pt1 rcl1aser can bring a suit 1� wl1icl1 tl1e �pp l�cant s right �o possession will be litigated. Conversely if th_e co1ut reJects the appl1c�t1011,. tl1� aJJpl1 ca11t can bring s11it agaist tl1 e decree1 1oJder or p�rchaser to e�tabl1 sl1 11 1s r1ght t? possession. In all cases tl1e rigl1t to . will be_ deter1111 ned fio�lly by an independent st1it and f11ll-scale proceed ssion Posse . n1 ent-debtor 1s 1Jrecl11ded fro1 11 bringi1 1g a separate st1it. The ings. Onl� tl1e Jt1dg _ prin1ar � d1 s;pute 1 s bet,vee11 tl1e cl�cree-l1 older or purcl1 aser a11 d tl1 e perso1 1 claiming possession_ 111 clepe11dently of_ tl1e Jt1dg111ent-debtor. Irrespective of tl1e result of tl1e sttit, tl1e Judgment-debtor will lose tl1e property, ,1nd l1is i11 terest540 is not considered sufficie1 1t to jt1stify his bringi11 g a st1it. An i1 1terestir1g I11dian case involved a dispute betvveen two p11rcl1 asers of tl1 e same i111n1ovable property. A held a decree for tl1e pay1nent of 1noney agai11st B. I-le attacl1ed imn1ovable property i11 exect1tion of tl1 e decree a11d witl1 tl1 e per1nission of tl1e co11rt, ,vas per111 itted to JJt1 rcl1 ase th.e property. Tl1 e property l1ad bee11 11 1ort gaged and in a s11it by tl1e 111 ortgagee to enforce tl1e 1 11ortgage, t11 e property was purcl1ased by C. C s11bseq11 e11 tly dispossessed A, a 1 1d A's a1Jplication to be p11t back into possessio11 was rejected. It was l1 eld tl1 at A l1ad to bring a suit against C to establish l1is rigl1t to i111 mediate 1Jossession of tl1 e pro1Jerty; if not, tl1e order of the court dismissing A's a.pplicatio11 to be p11t back i11 to IJossession \vo11ld be concltisive. 541 By the sa1ne t o .ken, tl1e decree-l1 older or 1J11rchaser \vl10 f,1ils to bring suit after l1e has bee1 1 denied IJossession is precl11 ded fro1 n s11 bseq11e1 1tly asserti11g his right to possessio11. For exan1ple, tl1 e perso11 wl10 \Vas dispossessed by tl1e decree holder obtained an order putting hin1 back into possession. Tl1e decree-l1older did not bring a s11it within t11e JJeriod of Ii1 nitation to establisl1 l1 is rigl1 t to possessio1 1, but dispossessed tl1 e occ111Ja1 1t. I:Ie l1i1nse]f wa.s later clispossessed a1 1d bro11gl1 t suit to recover possession. It was I1eld tl1 at l1is suit was barred. 542 Wl1en the court n1 ade an order putti11 g tl1 e orginal occ11pant bac k. into possession, tl1at order \Vas co11clusive unless a s11 bseq11 ent s11it was bro11gl1 t. Since it was not bro11gl1t witl1in tl1e limitation period, the decree-holder co11ld not a later tin1 e q11estio11 tl1e occ11 1Jant's right to possession. As against tl1 e decree-l1older tl1 e 1natter vvas settled by tl1e co11rt's order p11tting the occ11pa11 t back into possessio11. In tl1 e st1bseq11ent s11it tl1e plai11 tiff l1as to show l1is right to IJresent JJossessio11 of tl1e property. 543 It does 11ot n1atter wl1at JJosition he originally occtlJJied, �.e., wl1etl1er l1 e \vas tl1e decree-l1older or a11ctio11 -1J1 1rchaser or whether l1e was a claim ant. He is asserti1 1g tl1e IJrese11 t rigl1t to possession and is asking tl1 at an orcler of the court denying hi111 tl1at rigl1t be, i11 effect, set aside. I-le sho11ld 1 1ot be considered a dispossessed possessor; ratl1er l1 e is asserti11g a right tl1at is in clispt1te and sl1011ld be s11 bject to tl1 e ordinary provisions of la,v relating to tl1e b11 rde11 of proof. 544 It 540. He may have some interest in seeing that the decree-J1older or purcha ser _prev�ils, since if _ the decree-holder, at least, is unsuccessful, lie n1ay institute further proceedings 1 n execution against the judgment-debtor, 541. See Baiju v. Thakur (High Ct., Patna, 1938), 1939 All-J11dia Rep., p. 7. 542. See Mahadeo v. Brij (CJ,ief Ct., Oudh, 1946), 1948 All-Jnclia .Rep., p. 22. 543. See Kaleswar Mills Ltd. v. A.P. Govindaswami Naicker (I-ligh Ct., Madras, 1945), 1946 All-Jnclia Rep., p. 76; Amar v. Sardarni (I-Iigl1 Ct., Pun� ab, 1959), 1960 All-I11dia Re_p., p. 141. 544. Wl1ere suit is brought by a dispossessed posse sso�, I,e 1s to � e restored to _poss�ss10 � LmJess . of a �1ght 1n l11s favor the defendant can prove forthwitl1 and cooclus1vely the . ex1stence justifying such conduct. Civ. c., Art. 1149(3). Tl1e theory ts that the question of owne�sh1_ p, if any, sl,ould be litigated in a separate actio11. But _ here an order of the court has mter . burden of proof vened; the parties are on equal fo?ting, a_od the orcl1 nary rules as to th � . _ e should have tl,e should apply. Since the plaintiff_ is s eeking to upset a court orde1 , � . _ burden of proving that 1,e is entitled to pos session. See C1v. C., Arts. _QOl(l), 2141.
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nds that he is the owner of the prop conte should be noted that if the claimant · ertY 1s, t I1e court WI·11 dec1"d � t he question of bas that on on possessi asserts nd a. owner_ ship. The point is tl1at _where a claim l1as been made to 1 111n:iovab!e prope rty which is tile subject of exec11t1on, the n1atter n1ay be_ finailr detern11ned 1n a separate suit. It sliottld also be noted that the proced11res JllSt discussed are only applicable to in1n1ovable propert)'. 011�e n1ovable p_ roperty l1as be�n sold, the sale is final, and no one may n1ake a cla11n to po� sess1on or ownership of that property. Any such clai1n may be n1ade only at the t11ne of attacl11nent. 545 In tllis chapter we l1ave reviewed tl1e process by which decrees are enforced and exec11ted. Following execution, tl1e ca.se is over and the process of litigation has come to an end. In one sense exec11tion may be said to be the most important part of tl1e proceedi11gs, since it involves tl1e actual satisfaction of tl1e clai111, which in 1nost cases \vill be tl1e reason ,vhy the s11it was instit11ted. We have now come' full cycle. A party l1as sought relief, and if l1e bas been fo1111d to be entitled to the relief, it will have been given a11d enforced in accordance witl1 the law.
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CI-IAPTER XI RES JUDICATA AND SPLITTING OF CLAIMS Althougl1 res �l1dicata and splitting of claims are treated separately in tl1e Code, they are related 11! . th� sense tl1at. botl1 !ltles stern from a common 1Jurpose _ to bring a11 end to l1t1gat1on. To acl11eve tl11s JJttrpose, it is provided tI1at a matter once l}�gated _between tl1e s_an1e p�rti �s or persons l1nder whom parties clain1 cannot be rel.1t1gated 111 _anoth�r st11� (res Jl1d1cata) and that a plaintiff who fails to incl11de the whole of hts cla�1n w1tl1 res_pec� to a ca11se of action in one suit 1nay not st1bsequently file a suit for the re1na1nder of his clai1n (splitting of claims). There are a n11mber of aspects to each r11le, and we will discuss both r11les in detail in this cl1apter. Althol1gh eacl1 rule will be discussed separately, it is important to see the relationship between tl1en1.
l\. Res Jodicata 1. General Principles Res Jt1dicata means literally i n Latin ''the n1atter having been litigated." The principle is that once a matter has been litigated, it n1ay not be relitigated, and issues that l1ave been detern1ined once may not be determined again in a st1bseqr1e11t su.it. A party to a suit 1nay seek review of the jr1dgn1ent in accordance \Vitl1 the law, but i n the absence of s11ch review, tl1e judgn1ent and tl1e decision on tt1e issues in the sl1it is final. We must also disting11ish the principle of res judica ta fron1 the princiJJle of pendency. No col1rt i11 Ethio1Jia may try a11y sr1it in \vl1ich the matter in iss11e is also directly and st1bstantial1y in issr1e in a previor1sly i11stitut ed civil s11it in Etl1iopia betwee11 tl1e san1e parties or parties 11nder whoo1 t11ey claim. 1 In such cases the court in which tl1e st1it is s11bseqt1e11tly bror1gl1t rnr1st dismiss the case, because it is then pending in another court. 2 A qr1estio11 of res judicata arises only after one Sltit has bee11 decided and, in ci si1bseqi1e11t si,it, it is asserted that a11 issue or all iss11es i11volved in the su.it have already been deterrnined in the prior si1it. The general conditions for tl1e application of tl1e r11le of res judicata, as set fortl1 in Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5, are as follows: (1) there is a subseq11ent suit or issue arising in such a suit in whicl1 the n1atter directly and s11bstaotially in iss11e was directly and s11bstantially in issue in a former suit; (2) the former suit was bet_ween (a) tl1e same parties o r (b) parties �1nder w�o_rn t_ hey or any of tl1em c_la1m ; 3 (3) the parties in the s11bseq11ent suit are l1t1gat1ng 11ncl_er th� �ame ! ttle as in the former s11it; (4) tl1e matter directly and s11bst�11! 1ally 1n _1�s11e In both suits was 11eard and finally decided in the former suit. In add1t1on, defenc� or o� 111d gror a.ny matter which might and 011gbt a e mad been have to . _ issue attack in the former suit is deemed to hav e been directly a.nd s11bstant1ally In 1. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 8(1). In such cases tJ1e court in which the statement of claim was first filed has jurisdiction. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 7. 2· See tl1e discussion i n Chapter ID, supra, notes 131-132 and accompanying text. 3 · For these purposes, persons claiming a right in comn1on are deemed to claim under persons who litigated that right in a prior suit. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(4). 4· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(1).
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6 wb ich t er sui r ll? f� th in bas not been ef claim ed . i rel � y an d an ex, in that suit,s 1 d e e t to d em 1s 11 st t have ed 1 n t 1a ss been refused.? a p e re ec d e l tl b d te an Y gr pressly r� not only �ubs equent ?a a icat jud res of r11le !11e suits with We see tllen tllat n of an y issue that was t1o 1na rm e t _ de rea. o als t b11 , in1 cla e 1 1 sa1 deter respect to tlle r be em ed that tl1e rule rem 1?e st mu rt r, e v we I-Io t. sui of res or . inined in tile pri • n w?ose f�v?r the previo us suit or son pe� tl1e for e erzc def a as s rate ope judicata _ 01 . de �enda nt 1n the subse quent 1ff 1nt 1)la b e be er eth \wh d ide suit). issue was dec st ata n1u ?1c s Jll do e r so of a ple by way of a a ert ass to es sh wi o 1 wl rty pa Either 8 If he fails to do so, the defenc g. r1n I1�a e will be t firs tl1e at . preliniinary objection 9 It 1s not the typ e of n1atter which p revents a . ved wai 11 bee valid e hav deemed to jtidginent fron1 being given, as i� does not r elate to t�e po�er of the court to etry a s111t or issue that has been r to ver po\ its to 011ly but all, at case e 1 tl 11ear previotisly deter111ined. Since it is 11ot j11 risdiction·al in 1�ature,_ it is waived if not raised. 10 Once tl1e plea l1as been asserted a11d the cot1rt 1s satisfied that it is well founded, it is to dis1niss tl1e suit. II TJ1e only ground for avoiding the bar would seem to be tl1at tl1e cot1rt wl1ich rendered tl1e first j11dg111ent lacked judicial or n1aterial jt1risdiction to l1ear tl1e case, a11d tl1e !)arty against whon1 the plea is n1ade 12 Also, tl1ere is no requirement that the prior t. 1 poi1 tl1is rajse to able be d sl1ot1l sttit 111ust l1ave bee11 institt1ted before an Etl1iopian co11rt, so a decision of a foreign 13 at,1. jt1dic res of t effec tl1e l1as cot1rt also ••
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''For1n�r st1it'' i11clL1des a st1it in w11icl1 an ex parte14 or consent decree was 16 15 , instituted been a l1as st1it pr ferred, e been has rendered. Once a sta.ten1e11t of claim and a.n ex parte or co11sent decree operates as a decisio.n in tl1at su.it. A suit that l1as been \Vitl1drawn \Vitl1 leave does 11ot constitt1te a. suit in whicl1 tl1e matter \vas decided; to l1old tl1at sucl1 a st1it operates as res j11dicata would obviously negate tl1e pt1r1 Jose in per1nitting a fresl1 s11it to be filed. I7 Ho\vever, it bas been l1eld tl1at vv1here lea,,e to gra11t a fresh st1it is erroneously gra11ted, a subsequent s11.it is 5. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(2). 6. As we will see, the plaintiff n1ust sue for all tl1e relief to which l1e is e.ntitled ,,�th respect to the cause of actior1 011 wl1ich he sties. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(4). 7. Civ Pro. C., Art. 5(3). 8 · Civ. Pr?. C.,. Art. 244(2) (b). The reference is to tl1e subject-n1atter of tl1e suit, ,vbich �1ea� tl1 e_ eiit_i re �u1t _or any issue involved i1 1 tl1e st1it. Tl1e contet1tion that tl1e plai11tiff spht !us cl�in,, 1n v1olat1on of Art. 216, n1ust also be raised as a preliminary objection. 9. Crv. Pro. C., Art. 244 (3). lO. See the discussion of this poi11t i11 D. Mt1lla, Tl1e Code of Civil Procedure (12tll ed. by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. 1, p. 94. 11 . Civ . Pro. C., Art. 245(2). 12· Se� �eli�n, v. Chaudl1ri _(Privy Council, India, 1948), 1948 All-/11dia Rep., p. 168. 13. l11s is in accorda11ce w1tl1 general IJrinciples of Jaw recognized by n1ost nat1__ons. It sh uId �0es Je noted, however, urt c gn !ha_t under Art. 8(2), tl1e JJe11dency of a suit i11 a forei o a - n. ot ecltid the Etl11 ?�1an courts fron1 l1earing rst cause of c��ve the fi on found ed suit a not ft f)f s t�1a_t a d�cision of a for�ign d coul n situatio �ou.rt ret1dered i11 sucl1 a . . tile �ff�; of res Judrc text. ata. Sec tl1e d1sct1ss1011' infra note ?8 nying accom pa and ' 860· The 14. See Hara Cl1a dra v. Bep ·n , · vol. · , (I·ligh . Ct., Calct1tta, 1911), J1·1dia,1 Cases, 6 P "issues'' . uc f 'l cas wou ld be tl1e isst1es decided in tl1e court's judgment. . 172 15_ See Bigg: � �; g ee (� up. c • 1 p vo1 , Rep. t., Massacl1usetts US 11 Nortl1easter · . , 1930)' 336 • -in R· p··reId· an ' · ·· cl B · Kapla11, iv.1.a 1" ter1a · ls 011 C1v1l · Proceclure (1953), p. 941 · 16 . s-ee c·iv. Pro. C., Art. 213 . (1). . 17 · Wl1ere a suit l1as b . ute a fresh suit · l1draw11 . een 1t inst1t the without leave, the _plaintiff may not er with respect to ti e su � wev 0 H . ��c t 279 nia tter (1) Art of . tbey'were tl1e claim. Civ . Pro. C., issues raised in suc� use not "l1ea.rd and de�i�e��;�t would not be res judicata against the plaintiff , beca
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barr ed. ts Tl1is being so, any matters detern1i1 1ed in tl1e first stlit would Ilave tile effect of res jt1dicata. A decision on an interlocutory . 111 atter operates as res jtidicata as to tile issue involved.19 So, wl1ere 011e party obJected tl1 at tl1 e court did no t 11ave tile power to order tl1e dispt1te to be referred to arbitration a11 d tl1e cot1rt J1eld tl1 at i t had . sticll power, tl_ 1� de�ision as _to tl1e cot1r_t's po\ver was res jt1dicata.20 TI1e sa1 11e is trtie \Vitll decisions 10 exect1t10 11 JJroceed111 gs, st1cl1 as a decision on ,vl,ether a stibseqtient 21 ed n. by barr tatio is li111i n o icati appl
On tl1 e otl1er l1ancl, a crin1i11al proceecli11g is not a ''former suit'' witI1 i1 1 tl1e nieaning of A.rt. 5(1). Art. 2149 of. tl1e Civil Code ex1Jressly provides tl1at in deciding
wl1etl1 er an o.ffence l1 as b�e1 1 com1111ttecl for tl1e ·purpose of cieter111 ini 11g extra-co11 tract tial Jiability, _ . tl�e cot1rt 1s 11ot . bot111d by a1 1 acquittal or discl1arge by a criniinal cot1rt. Tl1 1s 1 s 1n accorda 11 ce w1tl1 tl1e general rulc.22 1-Io,vever, it n1ust be rem e1nbered that in Etl1iopia an i 1 1jt1red party 1 11::1y join a clai11 1 for da1nages i 11 tl1e cri111 i 1 1al proceedi11 g.23 Wl1 e11 l1 e does so, tl1 e cot1rt will deter111 ine tl1 c clai n1 for dan1ages at the sa1ne ti111e that it deter11 1ines tl1e guilt of tl1 e acct1sed, ancl asst1mino tl1at tl1e same bt1rdet1 of proof is applied in civil and cri 11 1inal �ases, 24 tl1e res�tlt in tl1e clain1 for da1 11 ages and tl1e cri1ni 11 al 1Jrosect1tio11 will be tl1e same. Bt1t if the injt1red party fails to file a claim for da11 1ages in tl1e cri111i11 al prosect1tior1, tl1e result in the criminal prosect1tio11 will b e irrelevant in tl1e st1bseqt1ent civil st1it. 1�o illustrate, A comn1its a pl1 ysical assat1lt aga.inst B, and following tl1e fili 11 g of ,1 con11Jlai11t by B, a crin1 inal prosectition is i 1 1itiated. B n1ay joi11 l1is clait11 for dan1ages for the violation of Civil Code, Art. 2038, i 1 1 tl1e cri1ni1 1al JJrocecdi11 g. If he cloes so, and the court fu1 ds A gt11lty of tl1e cri1ni11al offe11ce, it vvill l1old tl1at A 111t1 st respond to B in dan1 ages. If B does not joi11 l1is clain1, bt1t i11 stead files a st1bsequent civil suit agai1 1st A, tl1 e court i 1 1 tl1e civil case will deter111i 1 1e tl1e issue agai11 a11d cotild find tl1at A was 11ot liable for tl1e assat1lt. Conversel:y, even if tl1e court i11 tl1e crin1inal prosect1tio 11 acquitted A, tl1e cot1rt l1earing tl1e civil suit could fi11cl A liable for tl1e assat1]t t111 der Art. 2038. It sl10Lllcl also be 1 1oted that if the accused in tl1e cri1 11inal 1Jrosect1tio 11 pleadecl gt1ilty to tl1e offe11ce, l1is JJle,1 of gt1ilty cotild be i11 troducecl as evic/e11ce in tl1 e st1bseque1 1t ci,1 il case, si 11 ce oridinarily any ''state ment'' made by a party to a st1it ca11 be i11troclt1cecl agai11st l1im by tl1e opposing JJarty.25 18. See Malaya v. Fakir (l-Iigl1 Ct., Calcut ta, 19��7), 1947 /1/I-Inclia Rep., p. 393. 19. The san,e is true \.vi th respect t o any issue not going to the n1erils. The issue may not be reliligated in a subsequent suit a11y rnore than an issue going to the n,crit s n,ay be. 20 . See Asa v. Gan esh (fligl1 Ct., Lahore, 1930), 1930 /J/l-!11clia Rep., p. 836. 21. See Venkappa v. Lakashn1ikant (I-.Iigl1 Ct., I-Iyderabad, 1954), 1956 AII-Jncfia Rep., p. 7. As t o the effect of res judicat a in executio11 proceedings, see ge11eral ly S. Sarkar, The Laiv of Civil Proceclure (4th ed., 1963), vol 1, pp. 36-37. 22. See e.g., Ram Lal v. Tula Ran, ( IIigh Ct., Alla.habad, 1882), l11clian L. Rep., vol 4, p. 97, Keshab v. Manirudin (High Ct., Calcut ta, l 908), J11c/ian Cases, vol. 4, p. 523. 23. See Pen. C., Art. 100 and Crin,. Pro. C., Art s. 154-159. 24. In civil cases it is generally accept ed that the JJlaintiff n!u�t prove hi� case: "�y _a prepond erance of the credible evidence." 1�10\vev er, i11 son1e cr1n11nal cases 1n Eth1op1a, 1t has bee ?, h eld that the JJros ecution n,ust prove the guilt of the accused "beyond a reasonab le ci? u ?t , a higher burden of proof. The n,atter is not expressly resol ve�! by. tl:e Code o� Cr1n11nal Procedure. If the courts sl1ould l1old that the burden of proof 1!1 criminal cases is that of "r easonable doubt" it is conceivable that in a case where the evidence \Vas ne� rl_y b alanced, the court could. �cqt1it tl1e accused, but hold hin1 liable in dan,ag es to the inJured party. In practice, I imagine such a situation \.vould be rare. . . . . 25· It has b een l1eld elsewhere tha t the pica of guilty is conclusive 111 the civil .�ase , at leaSt · rr See U1u ted Sta tes v. on \Vr e th for "'' s age ·\VI1ere 1t d · · 1g an,, · cIa1mu ·1s the governn1e11t \.VJ11c · l1 1s , 1 9.5, p. 19, Bo\.ver (LT.S. 'District Ct., E.D., Ten11essee, 195 1), Fee/era/ Supp/enient Rc/J., �v.o_. in J. Chadbourn and L. Levin, Cases 011 Civil Proceclure (1961), p. 847· In Etb,opia, sucl, a result would be prohibited by Art. 2149 .
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judicata i n tl1e case of t wo su·1t res of n tio era op tl1e to as ses ari A quest.ion s l1t re ug we ts bro sui in o tw io tl1e Eth e 1er Wl pia and · O1 \,·ID 00 tile saine qtiestion. · lOV . . . s d eterm1n�d first must wa . h at t e cas tl1e 1n n 2 1s1o dec the 6 , ted lida lso cot were not r tte has ma n the be� ce on ed of, a . pos �1s e at1s bec s i is Tl1 ta ica jtid res operate as . proper. Tl1e res . be ta 1c� Jud 11?� obJection second decisio11 on tl1e saine matter would ded n. han dow 1s 11 1.s10 dec Which suit was t firs tl1e as n soo as ed rais be sllould 27 Once a qtrestion has bee n decided, it should not I. eria i1at i1ru is be t firs instittlted decided by a11other cot1rt, and tl1e firs� ?�cisio°: sho11I_d ?perate as res judicata. But tliis is only so ,vhere botl1 suits were 1111t1at�d 1n �tl1:op1a: The :pendency. of a suit in a foreign court does not preclt1de a co11rt 1n Eth1op1a from . trying a .suit founded on tl1e sa111e cause of action.28 It, therefore, follo,vs that while a foreign judgment ordinarily would be entitled to res judicata, it cannot be give11 that effect when the sa1ne cause of action is being litigated in Ethiopia, even if the decision in the foreign st1it were rendered prior to the decision in the Ethiopian one. 2. Persons Bound (a) Parties to suit 111 order for a decisio11 to l1ave res judicata effect, the former suit must have involved tl1e sarne l)arties or parties; t1nder wl10111 the parties i n the subsequent suit clai111. In botl1 instances all parties 111t1st be litigating under the san1e title.29 For these ptlrJJoses, ,vl1ere })ersons litigate in good faitl1 in res_pect to public or private rigl1ts cla1111ed i11 co111n1on for tl1e111selves and otl1ers� all persons interested i n the rigl1t are dee111ed to clai111 t111der tl1e persons litigating in tl1e original suit.30 To illt1strate tl1e reqt1iren1ent of ';sa1ne parties," suppose tl1at A and B are injured allegedly dt1e to tl1e fat1lt of C. Tl1e cl,1i11:s aro::.e f'rom the same transaction a.nd involve tl1e sa111e factt1al and legal qt1estio11s. A and B are entitled to join a.s plaintiffs,31 but 011ly A files st1it. Jt1dgn1ent is for C. S11bseq11entiy, B files suit against C. TJ1e decisio11 in A's st1it is 11ot res jt1dicata in the st1it brougrt by B. B \Vas not a party to tl1e first s11it: l1e 1s assertinQ: l1is own claim and is not clain1ing tl1rot1gl1 A. It does not 111c1tter tl1at tl1e issue3 i n both suits v.-ill be the san1e, 32 si11ce B was not a party to tl1e first suit nor clainung through a11y party to tl1at st1it. We see tl1en tl1at \Vl1en a clai1n of res jt1dicata is asserted, the first qt1estion tc be deter111i11ed is wl1ether tl1e }Jarty against wl1om the clain1 is made is bound by 1 l1e j t1dgrnent in tl1e forn1er st1it. ''Parties'' n1ea11 perso11s wl1ose na111es \\·ere 011 tl1e record, i.e., plaintiffs, defend ants, third-party defendants and intervenors.33 A party wl1o witl1draws34 or whose
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26. Where the mat_ter in issue is also i11 isst1e in a st1it pending in a·nother court, tl1e �as:5 n1ay. be consol1?ated or one suit 111ay be struck out. Civ. Proc. , Art. 8(3). However, 1t 1s possible that neitl1er court ,:vas avvare of tl1e otl1er stiit. 27. S�e Ist1P Ali v. Cour Cl1andra (fligh Ct., Calct1tta, 1922), 1923 All-I11dia Rep., p . 496. 28. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 8(2). 29. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(1). 30. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(4). 31. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35. 32. \Ve muSt _diSlinguish res_ ju icata of cipl e prin fron 1 tl1e tl1e prin cipl � e . Und of star er dec e isis. stat_e c�c1s1s, a court ordinanly follo,vs a prior t que n se sub a decision on a QL1estion of law in be 0• even tllougll a. decision a on it a I1 , qt1e ����we stio jud icat of law is not res a . 111:ired Y to �. n de� the .Pr1nc1�le of stare decisis. Tl1e courts in Etl1iopia are not requ � follow heir prior decisions In subseque nt' cases, but frequently do so. _ 33. See Gob1nd v. Tar . · uck (H'igh C t·, Calcutta, 1878), l11d1a1 . 14 5 p. L. Re 1 vo 3 . p. l ' ' 34. Remember that a party wl10 . w1th h it su WI 't b s d raws fre with out leave may not �nstitute 3: respect to the sub'ect matt r . be not 0f tile claim . How ever, th _ · woul � d e issues 1.n tl1e suit res judicata. See tl�e ct1scuss . 1on m note 17, siipra.
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name is st�uck off � ceases to be a par�y, and is not bot1nd by tl1e judgment.3:, The same 1s true a:s to a party wl1 0 dLes a11d as to wl1om the suit abates even thougl1 l1is nan1e erro�eo11s1y r�m�ins on the record.36 By tl1e same token, a person wl1o was not na111ed 1n tl1e st11t 1s not a party, altl1ot1gl1 J1is rights 111ay have been asser�ed. St1ppose tl1at A _ sties B for rent, and B prevails on tl1e ground that tl1e rent is owed to C, ,vl1 0 1s .found to be tl1� owner. Later A sties C for a declaration tl1at he is the owner. C is not entitled to tl1e defe11ce of res iudicata 011 tl1e grot1nd that the qt1estio11 of o\-v11ersl1ip \\'as decided i11 tl1e st1it bet;_,ee11 A and B, sine� . he \Vas not a party to tl1at st1il'.. 37 We will subseqt1e11tly clisct1ss tl1e ques�on of wl1etl1er? on otl1 er gr?t111ds, A 111ay be preve11ted from relitigati11g tl1e quest1011 ?f ownership. �t1� tl1 e 1)01nt to. re1ne1nber is tl1at C, who was not a J)arty to the st11t (a.od not cla11111ng tl1rougl1 ll!S te11a11t, obviot1sly) is 11ot entitled to treat tl1e st1it as res .itidicata tinder A.rt. 5(1 ). Tl1ere is a q11est:011 as to \Vl1etl1er ,L defe11dant who l1as bee11 joined on wl1at is callecl pro .for111a basis, e.g., an indis pensable party. sucl1 as a11 occu _ pa11t of i11t111oval,le property 11ndcr Art. 36(4), is bot1nd by tl1e Judg111ent. A, cla1m111g as the tenant of X, sties B for posses-:;io11. X, who is not i11terested in tl1e dis1)t1te belvveen A and B. is joined as defendant, bt1t no relief is sougl1l against ]1in1. 111 a st1bseqt1ent st1it by X against B for possession, it ,vas l1eld in lndia tl1at tl1e decisio11 i11 the for111er st1it on tl1e qt1estion of J)ossessio11 was not res judicata. 38 Tl1e reasoning \Vas that i11 tl1e for111er st1it tl1e qt1estio11 ,vas merely tl1at of l )ossession between A and B a11d tl1at X \Vas only a pro Jor111c1 defendant. Tl1e opposite view is tl1at a11y named parly is bou11d by tl1e decisio11, e,,en tl1ough no relief was asked against hi1n, so long as l1e l1ad a rigl1t to be heard in tl1e s11it. 39 It is subn1itted tl1at tl1e latter view is preferable. Tl1e IJarty is on the record and l1ac; tl1e op1)ortt1nity to present l1is side of tl1e case. 011e reason that indispensable parties, for example, 111 11st be joined is tl1at a clecree cannot be passed affecting tl1eir rigl1ts i n tl1eir abse11ce. If tl1is is so, tl1ey sl1ould be bound by tl1e decision in the case. Any party wl10 is 011 tl1e record will have had tl1e opportunity to raise any qt1estio11s regarding l1is rigl1ts I-laving l1ad s11cl1 opportu11ity, he should be bound by the rest1lt of tl1e litigation . 40 An interesting Ai11 erican case41 i11volved tl1e res j11dicata effect of a decision on a co-defendant as to wl1om tl1 e I Jlaintiff's s11it l1ad erroneot1sly been dismissed. The plaintiff sued the driver of a vel1icie, tl1e owner, and a contractor wl10 was perforniing work for tl1e owner. TI1e contractor contended tl1at he was not liable for tl1e acts of tl1e driver. At tl1 e end of tl1e plai11tiff's case tl1e cot1rt 1nade a peremptory finding tl1a.t the co11 tractor was not iiable for the acts of tl1e driver and dismissed the clain1 against Iiin1. The case conti11ued, and tl1e cot1rt entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff againrt tl1 e driver and tl1e o\-vner. The plaintiff appeaJed on tl1e grot111d that the co11rt erred in l1olding that tl1e contractor was not liable, and the appellate court reversec.l. �he decision on th�t poi11t. It als_o hel? _ . that the contractor was bot1nd by tl1e dec1s1on as to tl1e liab1l1ty of tl1 e driver (if 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
See the discussio11 in D. MuIla, supra note 10 at pp. 62-63. Ibid. See Dwarkanath v. Ran1chand (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1899), l11cliaTZ L. Rep., vol. 26, p. 428. See Joy Chand v. Dolegobinda (I-Iigb Ct., Calcutta, 1944), 1944 ,1-1/1-lnclia Rep., p. 272. See Ram Gita v. Prithvi (High Ct., Punjab, 1955), 1956 All-l1iclia Rep., p. 129 _ We may draw an analogy to Art. 5(2), which provides th_at any matter whicl1 nugh� and ougl1t to have been made a groutld of defence or attack 1s deen1�d to J1ave b cen directly _ forn1a or and substa.ntia]ly in issue. By the san1e token, any party to the suit,. wl1ether p10 not, should be bound to raise ru1y claim or objection he may have rn tl1e stiit. . 4 1. Keitz v. National Paving and Contracting Co., (Ct. App., M�ryland, U.S., 19g 7), Atta;��c Rep., 2n,l Series, vol. 136, p. 229, in J. Chadbourn at1d L. Lev1n, supra, note 2 · at p.
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e d be vicariously liable). Th Jl · · wo ont rac cor c r to ac 1tr 1 co e th . . ttit a . J:'. . . at , J, re c we • t 1 1e d r1ver d I 1 ve 's I1ab! 1 ty was d�t�r r e_ t1 of L1e !s� e tl1 1 icl wh mined. in it � h d1 � was a party to the sLi e t participate in 1 0�1g 1 no t 1 1 e ev 11, 10 c1s d� e th by d t1n bo . s wa _ Tllerefore, 11 e 1s to ld ew h? vi _ e1 at n d th all d , t l1e ,5?11 1 sa ,,� parties l1a we As t . iit s e th of rt that pa . 1 ss11es 1n the case without reference to _ all on 11 s10 1 c cle e 1 tl by of recor d are botind s. ue r ': IS e os tl1 to t ec sp re 1 l it w se ca e th tl1eir role in 42 tl1e e es e, 11 pr tiv re ta a by ed d fen de or decision w11 ere the SLiit I1 as be en filed it h�s been held d , e.g., a 111inor. However, te 1 e1 res rep so 1 1 so JJer tl1e is bind ing on ed ent t res �o. 1n accorda nce rep s wa I1e t tl1a ,v sl10 to or n n1i 1 e tl n to ope is it t tl1a 1n n tl1e 1s1o dec mer the for , 1eld upl suit will is 1 1 J tio te11 . co11 e 1 tl if 1d 1 a aw, e 1 tl \Vitli 43 dica. t a m�y also �pp ly as between co-defendants. j� Res a. icat j11d res as te Jera 11 0t o1 Tl1is ,vill be so wl1 ere (1) f'l1 ere 1s a conflict of 111terest between them, (2) it is 11ecessary to resolve tl1 at conflict in order to give tl1e IJJain tiff appropriate reljef, ::111d (3) tl1ere is actt1ally a decision of tl1e qttestion as between the co- d efend ants.44 S t1ppose tl1 at A st1es B a11d C, adjoini1Jg land owners, to recover d amages for injury to l1is JJroperty. B co11te11 cls that tl1 e l1 ar111 , if any, ,vas cal1sed by C, wl1 ile C co11le11ds tl1at a11y I1 ar111 was cat1sed by B. Tl1 e co11rt co1 1clt1des that each is respons ible for tl1e f11ll a111ot1nt of tl1 e l1ar1n c1.nd e11ters j11d g111ent in ·favor of A for the ft1ll a11101111t agai11 st botl1. B pays tl1e e11 tire a111011n t. I n a s11bsequent st1it against C for co11 tribt 1tio11 , C cannot conte11cl tl1at l1e ,vas not liable for the harm. There was a co11f1ict of interest in tl1at eacl1 co11tended tl1at the other was liable. The court l1ad to resolve tl1 at conflict i11 or der to deter1ni11e tl1 e plaintiff's rights against both and clid so. Tl1erefore, tl1e decision 011 tl1 e qtiestion of responsibility for harm to A's JJfOJJerl)' is res j t1clicata. Or, A a1 1d B clai1n a l1ot1se. A claims through his deceased fatl1er. A creditor of tl1e fatl1er SL1es A and B to established his right to sell tl1 e l1 ouse as tl1e JJroperty of the fatl1er. Tl1 e co1 1 rt finds tl1at the l1ouse belo11gecl to tl1e fatl1 er an d allo,vs tl1e creditor's st1it. B pays tl1e creditor and takes JJossessio11 of tl1 e l1 ot1se. I11 a st1it by A agai11st B, tl1e q11estion of wl1 etl1er A's f�1tl1 er owned t11 e 11ot1se is res j11dicata. 45 1 n tl1e st1it by the cred itor, it was neces sary to resolve tl1 e co11flict betwee11 A and B in ord er to d etern1 ine the creditor's rigl1t. B ,vas a party to tl1 e st1it and is bot1n d by tl1e decision tl1at the l1ouse belonged to A's father. (b) Persons clain1ing under C parties to 11rior suits TI1e 1nost trot1b!es?n1e qt1estio11s ,vill revolve arot1nd \vl1at persons are bou11d �eca1:se tl1ey a_re cla11�111 g 1111der JJarties wl10 litigated the q11estion tu1der tl1e san1e title ID a �Jrev1�us s111t. One ,vay of cle:fi11i11g ''clai111 ing under and litigati11g under the san1 e title'' 1s to say tl1at tl1e JJarty clai1ni11 g tl1 e benefit of tl1e prior jud g1uent or_ s011gl1t to be bot1nd by i t rn11st be ''in privity'' with a party to tl1e forn1er �li�t. In _ord er for � person to be bo1111 cl as a '' rivy'' he 111t1 st !Jave acquired an JJ interest 111 tl1 e SLibJect n1atter of tl1 e st1it by i 11heritance st1ccession or p11rcl3ase �ubseq�len�ly to tl1_e for�er s t1it or m11st l1 old tl1 e it1 terest s�bordinately i n the sens e tl1 at l11s_ 11 1terest 1s entirely d epe11clent on tI1 e interest of tlle superior l1older an_d �titom atically coines !� a11_ end. _after that interest is exting11ished .46 Thus, the herr 0�1nd by any d �cisio n involving the _ es an _ e c � tl 1 p_ t r op rty aga ins 1 in a s1 it by or ��r ' the � ptircliaser 1 s botrnd by an y dec1s1on involving the property in a suit by or 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.
See Civ. Pro. c., Art. 34. See Ebrahim v Ch eriy · an (H"igh Ct., Travan-Core, 1955), 1956 All-India Rep., p. 70. . . : _ See the d1scuss1on in D. Mulla, supra note 10 at p. 63 . ' · See Munni B"b 1 •·1 v. T'irlokt Natll (Privy l, India, 1931), 193 1 Al/-l11dia Rep ., P· 11 4•. Cou nci " See the . discuss1on .in D. Mulla, supra, note 10 at p. 62.
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agaii1st the .s �ller . prior. to tl1e time of p11rchase ;47 a 11 d tl1e lessee of land is bound b y atl)'. d�c1s101 1 1 �volvtng tl1e property rendered in a st1it by or against tile lessor, sirice 111s 1 11te�est 1 s depende �1 t on tl1e _1 !1terest of tl1e lessor, e.g., wJ1ere A sued B for a decla,ratton of ow?ersh1p a 1 1cl obtained a decree a11d then st1ed C, clai111 ing as B's tenant, for_. possesstoo, C _1s bot1t1d by tl1e decisio11 tl1at A is tl1e o,vner.48 It1 order to d�ter11 1111e wl1etl1er 0�1 e party is cl�i 111i11 g u11 der a 1 1otl1 er and litigating tinder _ tlie san1e title, we n1t1st consider the prov1s10 11 s of tl1e substantive Iaw.49 Th.e lessee clai 111 s througl1 tl1 e lessor, bltt tl1e lessor obviously does not claim tl1rot1ol1 the lessee, si11ce tl1e Jessee created no rigl1t i11 l1i 111 . Tl1 erefore, tl1 e dis111 issal �f tl1 e lessee's suit against �1n alleged trespasser does 11ot prevent a st1 it against tl1e sa111e person by the lesc;or. 50 Tl1e interest of 011e perso.11 111 ay be dependent 0 11 tl1e i11terest of anotl1 er person in the sense tl1 at the for 111 er is 11 ot e11titled to recover or n1 ay not be liable 11 11less the latter is so entitled or is so liable. In tl1e case of s11brogatio 11 , tl1 e rigl1 ts of the s11brogee are entirely deJ)endent 0 11 tl1e rigl1ts of the person 111al<ing tl1 e s11broga tion. St1ppose tl1at tl1e victi.111 of a 11 accide 11 t is paid Etl1.$ 1,000 by an i11 st1ra11 ce con1pany for dan1age to l1is a11to111obile. I-le sties tl1e driver of tl1 e other vel1icle to recover for personal i11jt1ries a 1 1d property da111 age, but tl1e s11it is dismissecl on tl1e grotLnd tl1 at lie is entirely at fat1lt. Tl1 e i 11 st1rance co111 1Jany then sues tl1e driver of the otl1er vehicle to recover tl1e Etl1 .$ 1,000 paicl to tl1e i11 s11red, to ,vl1ich clai111 it has bee 1 1 s11brogated. Tl1 e decisio11 tl1 at tl1e ins11red was ei1tirely at fa11lt is bi 1 1di11g on tl1 e i 11 st1rance co111pa11y, si11ce its rigl1 ts, if a.ny, are depende11t 011 tl1 e rights of the U1st1red against tl1e otl1 er driver, and tl1at q11estion l1as bee11 litigated i 11 a JJrior suit. By tl1 e same token, si11 ce tl1e st1rety is 11ot liable t1r1less tl1e princi1)al is, an exo 1 1eratio 11 of tl1 e }Jri11ci1Jal in a st1it bro11gl1t agai 1 1st ]1i1n by tl1e creditor is res judicata in tl1e creditor's s11it against tl1e s11rety. 51 Or, s11it is bro11gl1t agai11st a11 agent a11 d lie is fo11nd not . to be liable. A subseq11er1t s11it agai11st the principal based on l1is liability for tl1 e acts of tl1e age 1 1t is barrecl. 52 A 11 exa1npJe of tl1 e latter sitL1ation occt1rred ,:vl1 ere tl1 e princi tJal was so11gl1t to be joi 11 ed as a tl1ird party defe11da11 t in tl1e st1bseq11e11 t s11it. Tl1 at st1it was bro11ght by a passenger against tl1e driver of tl1e at1to1nobile i11 wl1icl1 sl1e \Vas ridi 11 g to recover cla111ages for inj11ries st 1 stait1ed ,vl1en tl1at a11ton1obile coJlidecl witl1 a taxicab, a11d tl1e clefe 11 d ant sot1ght to join tl1 e taxic�1b con1pany as a. tl1ircl party defencla 11 t. 111 a prior s11it the driver of tl1e taxicab s11ed tl1 e defe 1 1dant, �t11d tl1 e 1Jasse 11gers i11 tl1 e taxicab stied tl1e defe11daot and tl1 e taxicab co111pany. Tl1e suits were consolidated, a11cl the COll[t ruled in favor of tl1e taxicab driver a11 d tl1 e passengers against tl1e defendant. TJ1e �axicab cornpany was exorieratecl. 111 tl1e for11 1er s11it tl1 e issue of the_ . taxicab driver�s _ fault was litigated, and l1e was fot111 d 11 ot to be at fat1lt. Tl1 e l1ab1l1 �y of tl1 e t� xi _ S111ce tl1e driver cab con1pany was entirely de1Jeodent on tl1e liability of the driver. was l1 eld to be free fro111 fat1lt i 1 1 a s11it between l1in1 and tl1 e defencla 1 1t, tl1 e defendant was not entitled to recover against tl1e taxicab con1pa11y, and it cot1lcl not '-'
47. Following the purchase t11e seller would l1ave no interest in the property, and the purchaser in in the subsequent suit would not be litigating t111der the title under whicl1 the seller \vas litigating in tl1e former suit. See tl1e discussion in D. MuIla, supra, note 10 at P· 66. 48. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 10 at p. 65. 49. Ibicl. 50. See Ran1brohmo v. Bunsi (l-Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1882), Calcutta L. Rep., vol. 1 1, p. 122. 51. See Gil v. Morris (Sup. Ct., Tennessee, U.S., 1872), Tennessee Rep., vol. 58, p. 614, in R. Field and B. Kaplan, supra, note 15 at p. 963. . s, 52 · See Bruszewski v. United States (Ct. App., U.S., 3rd Cir., 1950), Fed�! R_e1;, ., 2ndpfe� � vol. 181, p. 419, in c. Brown, A. Vestal and M. Ladd, Cases and 1 ater,a s on ea ,ng and Procedure (1953), p. 419.
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this rt1le, .a decision in a . . d as a- third party defe11. dant. 53 . U1. 1 der case . , . . be Jo 1ne 4 e to t h as d a 1� at t d n1 �c em l Jl s . r� or ly r1 11a � dt or s 1 Where. _ involving the indemnitiee h t e� e d su er t riv e? d c1 �c who is insured· ile ob m to a�1 an of 1 tin . vic e th for exa1nple, a d s �t c :e J� 1_ as to t�e ins uranc; is 1·, ive dr e t�1 st ain ag or r fo r he let . wl the decision, 1ty b1I to its l1a 111g est the 11t co u 1s ins y an . mp red co the se The po sttp . t Bti y. ' an 111p co . 5 o 1e b I If f tl e 1� on d, � ur� cas I�s 1e t · 1 d fen 5 bec ause de d 1 �1 111 1 e 11 co t no can , . y . an illp co . , st,_ 1 ere wl � int ov.i 1c? . 1t? 1s tecting pro lai disc n1 fro 1t 1t ming ve1 pre uld ,vo so do to 1� th e s111t against the ins ured 1 101 ci� d� tl1e e, cas a cl1 st1 In y. lic po liability 011 tl1e 56 1 n . g e tl 1n pa lv m vo co 1.n 1t y. st1 1 t 1 t1e eq bs s11 a shottld not be res j11dicata i11 1 e title in both suits. Suppose that 1 sa1 the er und g atin litig be t nt1s 1 Tl1e parties le accident. The suit 1er da111ages for an obi on1 a11t o, rec to B s sue 11al ivid ind an as A lt. a C, fau ge y at sen irel pas e11t r in A's \VilS A t tl1a 11nd gro the on ed niss is dis1 ted oin app was adn1inistrator of C's A and t, de11 acci tl1e in d kille was ile, a11to1nob estate. I-le is not barred fro111 bringing st1it 011 bel1 alf of the estate to recover dan1ages for C's deatl1 . Tl1e latter suit is filed in a representative capacity, and A is litigating 11nder C's title ratl1er tl1 a11 l1is o,vn. But tl1e fact tl1at a party is involv ed in tl1e tv10 suits in differe11t ca pacities does 11ot necessarily n1ean tl1at he is not litigati11g 1111der tl1 e sa111e title in botl1 s11its. Tl1e heir of a deceased mortgagor sues tl1e n1 ortgagee to recover tl1e 1Jroperty a11d obtains a decree on tl1e · gro11nd that the n1ortgagee l1as been paid tl1e a.111011nt of tl1e debt. S11bseq11ently, the mortgagee brings sL1it against l1i111 as exec11tor of tl1e est,:1te of tl1 e decedent to obtain tl1e sale of the 57 . res is by judicata s11it e 1 barred T.l owing. still is 111oney tl1at gro1111d e 1 tl on property Even tl1ougl1 in tl1e first s11it tl1e s11ccessf11l party had tl1e capacity of l1eir and in the second suit l1ad tl1e capacit:y of exect1tor, in both cases l1e is litigating under tl1e title of tl1 e san1 e decedent, si11ce vvhatever clai1n he n1ay have is based on the rigl1ts of tl1e decede11t. Consider this case. 58 In a s11it by A agai11st B to recover property, B claims tl1at tl1e property belo11gs to C a11d tl1at he l1olds as tenant under C. The court rejects tl1e clai1n and awards tl1e property to A. C dies, leaving B as his heir. B tl1en s11es A to recover tl1e pro1Jerty as l1eir of C. Tl1 e col1rt held that tl1e decision i� tl1 e forn:er case was not res jt1dicata, since B was now claiming under a new title, as he1r of C. Since C would not l1ave been bot1nd by tl1 e decision in the case betwee1 1 A and B, B as C's l1 eir was 11ot barred. It is submitted tl1at the res11It is u11 so11nd. In botl1 cases B was clai1ning 11nder C, even thougl1 in t�e second case l1e wa� clain1ing in a different capacity. His rigl1ts, if any, were still been sly previou e_ p endent on the r1gl1ts of C, l1ad a1 1 d tl 1 e rights question of C's � lit�gated. Even tl10�1?l1 � 1nigl1 t not have bee11 bo11nd by tl1e result in the former s111t, B, wl10 was l1t1gat1ng u 1 1der tl1e sa1ne title i11 both st1its, sl1ot1ld be. 53 ·
n v. Gis� (U.S. District Ct., E.D., 1>e11nsylvania, 1958), Fed eral Supplement Re�., ��f Sulliva 196 9 p 928 1
�f , . p. 9 ·
, 11. M llose11berg and J. Weiostei11, Ele111e11ts of Civil Procedur e <
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eral 54. See Farm Bu��au Mutual l11surance_ Co v I-Ia1111ner (Ct. pp fed , 1949) A ·., U.S., 4t11 Cir., . . 965 Rep., 2nd Ser ,es, vol 177, p. 793, u1 ll. ·Field and B. Kapian supra, note 15 at , P· ongt : . 55 · N �e that uoder C:0 n1m, C., 687(1), tl1e ca_se civil a direc insu rer t � may to enti be tled f rom � cla!m. ?rougl1t wer p ing this e o by tl1e injured party. But I1e would not exercis �� 1ere he den1ed l1ab1l1ty on tl1e policy . 56 · Se e Farn1 Bureat1 Mutual Ins ·11 eca11 that ce ran WI u Yo o. 54. n . ant. .. c; v. Hammer, s11pra, ote r tr - · g l1abtl tl1e insur.er deny1n claun . 1ty on �l1e policy n1ay not intervene in a suit betw een tl1e and the 1 s �red, �V�L1 wl1ere l1e 1s ed are consi:ie cot1t h insu t endi ng � � the t a r and tl1e claim ant ing to o in a Ju �me11t for tl1e ra, n sup IV, er clai n1ant. See the discussion · in Chapt 210 and accompa.ny1ng text. 57 · See Radl1a MoI1a n 147 p . . . . Rep., E v. l 1Za J ane HI1t (Higl1 Ct. Allal1abad 1946) 1947 All-I 11dia ' , , • o-rr· nAA.. 58 · Jagannadham y k v · · en atasubl1a Rao (Higl1 Ct., p. Madra�, 1927), 1927 All - India Rep.,
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It sh ould . be no ted that a .party does not claim under a different title be cause of t he res11/t 1n t �e former st11t. A executes a usufructory mortgage to B, and B ssion. . A tenders Etl1 .$ 500 a d asks to be restored to possession. enters into posse � B contends t ha.t more 1s due . and re.fuses to deliver possession to h in1. A Slles B to recover posse ssion and depos1ts the Eth.$ 500 in court. Tl1e court finds tl1 at no more was due and rest�r� s A_ to possession. In a st1bseql1ent suit invo l vii1g the same property59 t h e de_c1s1on. 111 tl1e first st1it is res judicata: tl1e parties are litigating unde� tl1e s�me title as re gar�s t�1at property - tl1 at of n1ortgagor and mortgagee notw1th stand1 ng t?e fact that, ·tn l1gl1 t of t he c ourt's decision, after tl1e tender was made B _ l1a.d no right . t? occupy th e prop� rty. This does not mean tl1at for purposes of res JUd1cata, l1 e l1t 1gated the first st11t ::1s ft mortgagee and any subseqltent suit 60 trespasser. a as
(c) Other situations The next question we ma. y co11side r is wl1ether a person should be bot1nd by a judgment in a prior suit where t h e party in tl1 e subsequent suit was not a party to the former stiit and i s _not claiming under a party to th at st1it.We l1ave discussed the case wl1ere A sued B for rent a11d the co11rt found that C was tl1e o\vner rat h er t han A. We pointed out that in a stiit by A against C for a declaration of ownership, the former decision did 11ot operate as res jt1dicata. C was not a party and in tl1e st1bsequent Sliit is not claiming th rol1g l1 B. The question of wl1ether A should be bound is not one of res judicata, since th e ot l1er party to tl1 e second suit was not a party to tl1e first s11it and is not claiming tl1rot1gh 011 e w l10 \1/as. The question is wl1ether a party ·wl10 has raised a n1atter 011ce may rel itigate tl1e same matter in a st1bseql1ent suit involving a different party. Son1e col1rts else wl1ere h ave l1 eld t l1at, at le ast in civjl sl1its, l1e 111 ay not do so. So, \Vl1ere tl1e consu1ner s11ed th e man·ufactt1rer, c lai111i11g damages for injt1ries cal 1sed by an allegedly defective product, and i n a prior st1it by l1 i1n against tl1e retai ler, t l1e court fot1nd that t h e product was not t l1e cat1se of his i11juries, l1e was 11ot per1nitted to sue th e man11facturer. 61 The court held tl1at a party \v}10 l1as litigated a questio11 once shot1l d not be a bl e to litigate tt1e same qt1 estio11 again in a subse c11 1ent suit even. against a different party and one not e ntitle cl to tl1e defe11ce of res judi cata. This is a desirable solt1tion, si11.ce it prevents religation of a qt1estion once clecided. However, st1 c h a rest1lt is c learly 11ot a11thorized by Art. 5, a11d it is q11estio11f1ble whether the cot1rts wi ll apply t l1is expanded co11cept of res jt1dicata. PerhaJJS an amendment to this effect cot1 l d l)e 1 nade by th e Minist er of Jt1stice in tl1e exercise of l1 is powers tinder Art. 483. 62 At present, the n1atter 1nt1st remain l1nresolved.
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Finally, we may co11sider the e ffect of res judicata in suits \ Vl1ere . P. erso� s have litigated rights claimed in co1 n111 on for tl1 emselve s a. n d others. Th e dec1s1on 1n st1? h a case is binding on al l persons interested in th at rigl1t,. who are deen1ed to . claim under the persons who litigate d tl1 e original suit. 63 T h is rule would be app licable 59. '
60. 61. 62. 63.
In the subsequent suit B had sued to recover 1nesne profits. If tl1e first suit ,ve�e res judi cata the se cond suit wottld be barred on the ground that he could have cla1n1ed mesne profits in the fi rst suit. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(4). Theref?re, it was nece�s �ry . to de ter mine whetl1er he was litigating under the same title in both suits. _ If he were l1t1gat1n� unde r a different title in the second stiit, 11 e would be suing under a d1ffere11t cause of actlon, and the rule against splitting of cla.in1s would not be applicable. See Rukb111Jt1ibhai v. Venkatesh (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1901), lnclian L. Rep., vol. 31, P· 527. See Eisel v. Co]umbia Packjng Co. (U.S. District Ct., D., !vfassachusetts, .1960), Fecleral 861. Supplement Rep., vol. 181, p. 298, in J. Cbadbourn and L. Levin, supra, note 25 at p. Under that article the Minister is authorized to make rules that amend or add to the Code. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(4).
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. . .1y t o the situation where a representative suit ha s be en filed under . Art. 38, pr1mar1 e b d n d ar ou e . b 1 t e1 y es udgmeIll. pr e re tl1 e b to ed re ag J ve 11a ' S o OD wh . . . .. . . and a11 pers d e 1 to · p:esent interested ar e ent1t s _re ie rt pa e er wh n 1o ,1t 1g J1t 1y a1 It shotild also include e e er er th 1s, wh s, 1n fact a ri·ght rd wo r l1e ot In s. lve se 1 en th ' an · . rsons other th . . pe .. . ·I o · 1s b' d' t h. 1n · g on all pers ons t r10 1n 1 t g 1n lv vo 1n � 11 10 at 1g l1t y an 1, claimed itl commo1 m sto by ? ct1 by 11e e a11 th c e ag b 1r ha � stt in pa of n ita l1t rig a ts e, pl ain ex r Fo it. _ claiming r te ke ta wa to t om l fr r1g e tl1 a ?r ll n we � Ia of � t or ac tr a er ov e lag vil of a ?ean1ng of the_ rttle, and any litigation 1e tl 1n l1 1t w 1t 1 gl ri te va ri J) a . spring64 wotild be _ 65 g lla . v1 e ver, ''rights th of s we 11t I-Io ta b1 l1a 1n all � nd bi d t1l wo l1t rig at th to _ _ \Vitll respect �11 th e :u1t," as tl1at term is st ere int 1e an ''s ' an 111e t no do ' 11 110 1111 co claimed i n e st th 1n t ere sui int ne sa1 tl1e hin wit ve l1a o ,vh the ns rso pe d an 38. t. Ar in us ed i a cis by de 1d n in . a suit in u1 d bo r ide ns co be t � no ld ou sl1 � e icl art t tl1a of . n1eaoing 66 It 1s only wl1ere t ?e r1ght 1s held ed. e11t res in rep be to ee \vl 1icl1 tliey did 11ot agr up that a ar cul a rti of pa gro ers 1nb n1e all to gs lon be it t tl1a se sen tl1e co 1 11111on i 11 decision in a st1it i 1 1volvi11g tl1at rigl1t bi11ds otl1er clai111ants. L
1 in Issue llJ tia an bst Si1 d an tly 3 . Nlatter Direc Tl1e IJri 11ci1Jle of res jt1dicata is aJ)plicable only \Vl1ere tl1e matter directly and st1bsta 11tially in isst1e i 11 tl1e Sltbseq11e11t st1it ,vas also directly and s11bstantial.ly in iss·ue i11 tl1e for111er st1it. Ho'01e,1er, as we will see, 111atters wl1ich ot1ght to have been raised i 1 1 tl1e first st1it are dcen1ed to l1ave been raised, and consequently can 1 1ot be raised i 1 1 tl1e sl 1bseqt 1e1 1t Sliit. AJ Jart from tl1is req11ire111ent, tbe question will ordi11arily re\1olve arot 111d \Vl1at isst1es c1ctt1ally were raised i11 the first suit. 111 order to detern1ine this qt1estio11, \Ve 1111 1 st asl( \Vl1at isst1es were raised by the pleadings, \Vere fra 11 1ed for tri,1! at tl1e first Ji earing a11d were incl11ded in the judg b y denied 1 a11d party 011e by 1 st a.lleged be 111t an issL1e to me11t.67 Facts gi\ i11g rise tl1e otl1er. V,1 11 ere 0 11ly 011e JJarty alleges facts wl·ticl1 tt1r11 011 t 11ot to be necessary 68 Also, facts. those o t 1 respect to tl1e decisio11 of tl e c,1se, 1 10 issL1e is created �1itl1 tl1e isst1 es and tl1e court's fi 1 1di 1 1g on then1 n1t1st be disti.ngt1 isl1ed fron1 r11lings as to evide1 1ce. 111 a st 1 it by A agai11st B for re 1 1t, tl1e cot1rt .l1eld tl1at a rent note i11 wl1icl1 certc1i11 la11d was 11ot i11clt1ded was ge11t1i11e. B tl1 en stied A for a declaration tl1 at . tl1e land 1 1ot incltided in tl1e re11t 11ote ,,vas not part of l1 is holding. The ge!1t1 1ne 11 ess of tl1 e re11t note was not res jt1 dic,:1ta , l,ecat1se the ·fi. 1 1ding i11 tl1e first suit \Vas only as to tl1 e ad 1 11issibility of tl1e evide11ce. Tl1ere \Vas 110 iss 11e as t o tl1e a 111 ot 1 11t of la1 1d owned by A, bL1t only as to wl1etl1er B ovved tl1e re 1 1t as agreed. T l1e re11t note ,vas 111 erely 11sed as evide 1 1ce to dete ,r 1 11i 1 1e vvhether the rent res 9 So too, a not 1 a is so owed. issue i11 fi11cli11g 0 1 a \Vas 1 1 ot � }Joint tl1a.t � � case. tl1e of JUdicata, ever, if tl1e fi11ding on tl1 e poi11t vvas .i 1 1vo1,,ed 1 1 decisio 1 11 tl 1e . A suecl � for rent. B clain1ed tl1 at tl1 e area l1e actt1ally ocCLIJJied was less tl1an tl1 at entered in the lease a 1 1d sot 1gl1 t abate111e 1 1t of tl1e rer1t. Tl1e cot1rt found tl1at the _ l area o�ct pied was greet/er tl1 a11 tl1e area entered i 1 1 tl1e lease. Tl1at findi11g is not _ . res Jtidicata, srnce tl1e 011ly isst 1e was w11etl1er tl1.e J a11d was less tl1 ::1n or eq1ial to
64. See Civ. C., Art. 1371. 49 • 65. See Kalishatlkur v. Go1Jal Chttnder (l-Iigh Ct., Cal p. 6, vol . ct1tta ' 1881)' [11dia11 L. Rep ., the · . · 66. Under . A. rt · 38 • a re JJresen tati've suit avi s · on h · g pers n .may be instituted only wl1ere the same i11terest agree to be so represe11ted. 67. See the discttssion of tl)IS · po·1nt· 1n · D. Mulla' supra ' note 10 at p. 42. . . 68. See Sheo Ratan v Sheo Sah . 6 p 358 �1 (H1gl1 Ct.,_ Allal1abad, 1884), J11clian L. Rep., vo l. 'ti �t the As to what co11st·t I u te s a_n issue, see Ctv. Pro. C., Art. 247(1). Note l 1ow ever, 1 . a failure to.de t rele a al legatiori n °Y would � constitu ad. n 1ission mig 1t an be ich v l.D te l ' wh future suit · 8ee �iv. p ro., C., Art. 235 (2) 69. See Ram·charitar v· B awan (H · igh ' Ct., Patna, 1945), 1946 All-India Re p., p. 225.
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entered.10 Sine � tl1ere was no . isst1e as to wl1etl1er tl1e land was greater unt an1o the on that point is not res jt!clicata. find.1ng the a1not1nt, tI1at than Becat1se res judicata operates 011Iy as to tl1e iss11es decided in tile first suit, it follows that w�1ere a suit is disn1is�ed 011 a grot111d 110 1 goirzg to tli e 111 erits of the JJlaintiff's c/a1t11, a st1bseqt1e_nt st11t 0_11 �l1e sa11 1e clai111 is 110t barred by res judicata.11 Exa1np!es _of .non-111er1ts . detern1111at1ons that do 110t prevent a stibseqtient suit wot1ld be _ a d1s1n1ssal of tl1e s111t for �a11t of jt1risdictio11, for defati]t of appear ance,12 for fa1lur_ e to state a cat1se of action,73 and for faili11g to post sectirity for 74 By tl1e sa1ne t reqt d. 11r 1 e11 wl costs � ? ke�, ,vl1ere tl1e jt1dgine11t-clebtor's application to set a sale as1 �e cl11e to non -p�1bl1c_ at1on was dis111 issed becatise t11e period of Jimitati?� for n1ak1ng �t1cl1 a� a1)p�1cat10 !1 l1ad rt1n, he could raise tl1e qt1estio11 of . l, 11t 1n 1 sale a 1 e aga11 tl of st st l11n1 val1d by 1ty tl1e JJurchaser to recover the Ia.nd.1s t e Tl1e JJrecise isst1es i11 tl1e case will de1Jend 011 wl1at relief is so11gl1 t by tl1e JJlai11tiff and wl1at defences are asserted by tl1e defe11dant. Wl1ere A s11es B for a declaration that l1e is tl1e owner of certai11 lands and for tl1e rent clue for tl1 ose la11ds a11d B de11 ies tl1at A is tl1e o\.v11er and also denies tl1at a11y re11t is dt1e, there are necessa.ril)' two issues, becat1se A is clai111ing relief \.Vitl1 respect to t\vo 1natters, l1 is o,vnersl1ip of the Ia11d a11d l1 is rigl1t to tl1e re11 t fro111 B.76 On tl1e otl1er tl1at A st1es B to recover Etl1.$ 500 i n rent due for tl1e )'ear a11d l1and, s11 ppose . obtains judg111e11t for tl1at an1ott11t. He does 11ot pray for a declaratio11 tl1at the re11t is so 11111cl1 per 111 eter, eve11 tl1ot1gl1 tl1is is 110,v lie co111p11ted tl1at Etl1.$ 500 ,vas d11e. TI1e issue ,vas what a1nount of rent was dt1e for tl1e year. Therefore, in a suit for the rent for tl1e fo]Jo,,1ing year, B 11 1ay cl1allege the rate at ,vl1icl1 tl1e rent was co111pt1ted, since tl1e rate at wl1icl1 tl1e re11t was co1npt1ted \.Vas 11ot directly and st1bstantially i11 isstte in tl1 e for111 er stiit.77 T.l1e sa111 e JJri11 ciple is a1Jplicable to issues created by the defe11ces tl1at J1ave been asserted. St1ppose tl1::1t A sties B for the re11t for tl1e year, and tl1 e defence is that tl1e la11d is re11t-free. The issue is decid.ed agai11st B. I11 a s11it for tl1e rent for tl1 e follo1vving year, tl1e issue of wl1ether the land is rent-free is res j11dicata, beca11se it \Vas decided i11 the former suit.78 Bl1t if in tl1e first st1it tl1e issL1e ,vas n1erely 11 0\.v 1nt1cl1 produce was real.ized on the .land, in a st1bsqt1ent s11it the lessee 111ight be able to co11te11d that tJ1e la11 d is rent-free. Tl1e first st1it 1nerely acljl1dged l1ow n1 t1cl1 re11t was cl11e for that year, beca11se that was tl1e only point on wl1icl1 the parties were at issue. 79 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78 .
79.
See Ekran1 v. Ho lodhur (I-ligl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1873), /11(/ian L. Rep., vol. 3, p. 271. Of course, the no11-n1erits groLmd 111ay be such as to prevent any suit on the clain1, e.g., one t11at the c lain1 is barred by lin1itation. Note that a subsequent suit on tl1e c lain1 n1ay be barred. See Civ. Pro. C., Art 74. But it is not barred on grounds of res judicata. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 232(2), w l1ere this is express ly provided. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 10 at p. 81. See Srikaku la v. Pannapati (Higl 1 Ct., Madras, 19 53), 1954 All-Inclia Rep., p. 1024· See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 10 at p. 42. See Madht1st1du n v. Brae (l-Jjgl1 Ct., Ca lcutta, 1889), Indian L. Rep., vo l . 16, P· 300. See Venkatacba lapati v. Krishna (Hig l1 Ct., Madras, 1890), lnclian_ L. Rep.,. vo l .13, P· .287· con1p_r1s�d 1n _a s111gl_e ties per pro two of one So too ' where A sued B for pos of n sio ses · · JI ·d., t·Lle 1· cI·ec·1s1·00 ,;;vas res JLid1cata 1n a suit deed and the court found tl 1at tl 1e deed ,vas u1va to recover possession of the second property. See Kedar Nath v. Sheo Shankar (H .10o-h Ct ., Alla11abad, 1923), 1923 All-India Rep., p. 613. See Vishnu v· Ram liag (High Ct., Bombay, 1902), Inclian L. Rep., vol 26, p. 2 5. It n1ay _ble1 11c ,v l e '" nc e1e d f · er o att n1 is a d l an e tl1 f 0. e�· t quer1ed, however, whet · �er· t l 1e rent-f·ree c I 1arac t t1r co tl1e tly ren pa Ap ). 5(2 < t Ar ·, c' Pro. · ought to l1ave been raised by the Jessee. See Civ. assumed that it was not, possibly becat1se the suit was ?nl y for the rerlt �or a· Particular year.
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n m of e t lt nd st1 re ou gr a as of u iss _ i in cla be a d Moreover, a inatter inay ; 1gh_ lt w o uld n_o� n ecessar1.Iy ot _ t be _ en ev in s, ie rt pa issu e e tl1 by d rte se as defences f r e o e1 h h t a e b a ce o t _ �e g d 1n _ se Il1 a1 _cl , A rs . pe l1t t1g so , . f on lie re . e th o.f . ht . lig i11 . ed as ce d de tl1 ,in o 1s � 1r e l1e ad n1 e tl1 1s a �e at th rty pa 1s 111 cla . � c . nt re r fo B es su t. h ren e C b t su 1 1111 1 uently sues A s seq ard aw d an ir he t11e is A t tha . s . . nd fi · . . The cou r·t d b e arr res b Y 1s t Ju d s11i ta, 1e 1 ica T r. hei tl1e becau se is e 1 1 t tl1a . . n . r.i or. a dec . lar'atio e _ h d t. 1n st e r fi 1111 it, rn d su ete s n wa �ve C d a11 though A een tw be ip sh eir 1 1 of ue the iss 80 In st1c.l1 c�ses often _th e que�t1on B. will be st ain ag . . that was a stiit for rent 1n 1sst1e. A �1es, leaving a widow y all nt1 s�a _ b st1 d a11 ly ect dir s wa r tte na 1 \Vhetller the n tai of t cer t� ren pe� e pro _tl1 1�g irn cla ong bel s B, stie ing ow wid e Th r. the bro a ,lnd ty the per t pro s tl1a wa ng o inu tlycla Jo1n 1es, 1 e erv int wned r tl1e bro e Tl1 ed. eas dec tlie to to him by sed pas erty p _ _pro survi�e�ship. tl1e t tl1a and self lum a11d ed eas dec by tlie m fro the property Jo1otly. ts ren tl1e ived rece r tl1e bro tl1e and l1e tl1at I-Ie alleaes Tl1e iss:es are wl1etl1er l1e received tl1e rent jointly witl1 tl1e deceased and how much re 11t is o\ved b)' B. Tl1e co11rt :finds tl1at the deceased alone received the rents. A s11bseqt1e11t suit by tl1e brotl1er for a declaratio1181tl1at he and the deceased owned tl1e property jointly is not barred by res jt1dicata. The primary issue in the first suit \Vas wl1etl1er tl1e re11ts ,vere received joi11tly, and the q11estion of joint owner sl1ip of tl1e property was 011ly involved collaterally. Tl1e court considered the question only i11sofar as it related to tl1e receipt of tl1e rents. There was not a clear-cut isst1e as to ow11ersl1ip and tl1e matter \Vas not considered f11lly i n all its aspects. Tl111s, tl1e n1atter ,vas 11ot directly a11d s11bstantially in issue, and the decision would not be res j 11dicata. Son1etin1es the q11estion of wl1at n1atters are directly and substantially in issue is tied up witl1 tl1e q11estion of cot1nterclai111 and set-off. Tl1 e defendant l1as the option of asserting an:)' clai111 he 1nay l1a.ve agai11st tl1e plaintiff by way of counter clai111 or set-off, b11t is not req11ired to do so. Therefore, as we will see, his failure to assert tl1e clain1 in tl1e s11it against l1im does not bar a subsequent suit on tl1e clai 1 11. 82 B 11t, if l1e l1as asserted tl1 e facts givi11 g rise to the claim as a 1natter of defence, an issue l1as been createcl, a11d the decision on that iss11e operates as res jt1dicata. The seller sties tl1e bt1yer to recover tl1 e price of tl1e goods, and tl1e buyer �efends on tl1e grot1r1d that he is not Iiab]e becat1se the goods were defectiv�, 1.e., because the seller breached l1is warranty to supply proper goods. Judgment is for tl1e seller. Tl1e buyer 1nay not st1bseqt1ently st1e to recover damages for breach of _\varranty. 33 Tl1e isst1e of tl1e qtrality of tl1e ooods wa.s detern1ined in tl1e seller's action for tl1e price; since tl1e san1e .isst1e is 11 ec�ssarily i 11volved i 11 the buyer's actio n fo� breach of warra11ty. Tl1at action is barred. So too, wl1ere in a suit for t�e price, the . bti�er _cot! 1 1terclai111s for da111ages d 11e to a defect in tl1e goods, but lits cotintercla1111 is d1sm1ssed dt1e to the i11s1tfficie11cy of }1is pleading and l1e dec!ines to plead ftirthe_r, he 1nay not subseqt1ently st1e for breacl1 of warra11ty. 84 The 1ssue as to_ the quality of tl1e goods was raised in the prior s11it and, in effect, was dete r mined adversely to tl1e b11yer. On the . otl:er 11 and, w 11 ere the fa.cts giving rise to the defendant's claim were not necessarily involved .10 the prior st1it (and ue) , iss any cre ate therefore, did no t 80. ee opo dihee v. Sreeputty (H 832 · P· S, igh Ct vol ., . Ca lcu tta , , � 188 L. Re 0), I11dia1z p. 81. ee � tin � alla ur v. Lucho Ko 23 . er (Pr vo ivy l � Council, India, 1885) ' J11dian App., . lZ, p ' 82. S ee t 11e d1sct1ss1o n. ' in ,'1, r..a, no tes 138-140 and accompa·nying . text · 83. S ee Maine Lumber Produ cts c °i� v. J.W. St�pl1ens Ltd. (U.S. istrict Ct., D. M ·ne 1952), , �d Federal Supplement Re'fl., vo D ra ' su p ? a 1· -, P, 931, 1n C. B rown, A. Vestal and M. L ' note 52 at p. 716_ 84. See Roberts v. Green vo l. es, Se . ri (Ct p A p. 2n , Ke11tucky, U.S., 1949), Soz1tl1�vestern Rep., d 220, p. 390, in R. Field an · d B · Kaplan, supra, note 15 at p. 932.
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may be 1:1aintained. Tl1 e plaintiff stied a contracto sui t qu _ e nt sub s the r for breacl1 � J contract, al eg1ng tl1at there wer� defects resulting ng b1. i ild 1 a of fronl improper _ construction, that h� Jost rent� Lo order to _reJ?atr tl1 em a.nd that tl1 e contractor elo ng1_ng t tl1e pla1�t1ff. In defence, tl1 e contra ma ter ial s aw ? ay ed carri ctor alleged � _ _ �ga st11 ins t bro t tl1e pla1nt1ff to recover pay111e11 t for work t1gh t ad 1 J 1 e 1 at tll and a red Jttd men reco t; tl :er efore, l1e contended tliat tile issues as to ve and als ¥ ater i 1 0 _ _t . nd 1111sa ship JJpro a1 JJr1a 1011 ?f 1naterials were res judicata. Tile defectiv_e workm ? � _ ved tl1at tl The te?. cot1 rt eJe o se1 _ w as on 1 ? r content f tlle worknlaiisllip :e c�aract � � � ? . _ . opr1aL1on of tl1 e 111ater1als were not 1111 pl1c1tl)' 10 issue ir1 tl1e fornler and tlie n11sapp1 suit. Tl1e clai111 st1bsisted 11otwi�l1standing tl1at tl1e co11tractor was paid for llis work. Conc eivably l1e wot1lcl be e11 t1tled to tl1e price, bt1t wot1ld still be liable to tlle pJai11tiff for the o� her· ite111 s. 111 _tl1e first s1.1it, tl1 ere was no iss1.1e as to the contrac tor's rigl1 t to _ rece1,1e payn1 e11t. lt 111ay l1av� bee11 tl1 at tl1e defects and misapproiJria tio11 were cliscovered st1bseq1.1e11tly. Or, 1t 111 ay have been tl1 at t11 e plaintiff \-Vas willing to admit the contr,1ctor's clain1 to tbe 111 011ey owed tinder the contract and assert 11.is cot1nterclai111 st1bseqt1e11tly. Tl1e point is tl1 a.t tl1 ere ,vas no isst1e as to tl1e qt1ality of tl1e work111ansl1ip or tbe 111isaJJproJJriatio11 , so a st1bseqt1ent st1it raising those isst1es ,vot1ld not be barred by res jt1dicata. Where tl1 e decision 011 tl1 e isst1es i 11 tl1e first suit disposes of tl1e controverS)', the t1nsuccessfu] party 1 11 ay not re-open tl1 e co11troversy by tryi11 g to i11trod1.1ce 11 e,,, evidence on tl1 e iss1.1es or alter tl1 eir 11 att1re. The plaintiff contracted ,vitl1 tl1e defe11d aot to la.y a tile floor. TI1e plaintiff stied for tl1 e co11tract price, a11 d tl1 e defe11 dant defended on the grot1nd tl1 a.t the plaintiff did 11 ot st1bstantially perfor111 tl1e co11tract in that tl1 e floor was left i11 a stai11 ed a11 d discolored conclitio11 , vvl1icl1 tl1e j)lai11 tiff reft1sed to re1nedy. Jt1dg111ent was for tl1 e defencla11 t. St1bseqt1ently, tl1e plaintiff offered to re1nedy tl1e defect, bt1t tllis was not acce1Jted. He agai11 brougl1 t a suit for tl1e price, alleging tl1 at I1 e offered to ren1 edy tl1 e defect and t]1at tl1 e defe11 dant succeeded in havi11g so1neone else remove tl1 e defect at a sn1all cost. Tl1e second sttit was ba.rred by res j11dicata. 86 The isst1e was tl1 e sa11 1e in botl1 s1.1its - l1 ad tl1 e tJlaintiff substantially perfor111 ed tl1e co11tract? 111 tl1 e seco11 d st1it l1e was simJJly allegi11 g 11 e,v facts to sl1ow tl1at be had st1bsta11tially 1Jerfor111 ecl. Tl1e iss11e of st1bsta11 tial perfor mance bad been determined and cot11d 11ot be re-opened in a st1bseqt1e11 t s11it. Finally, it sl1 ot1ld be noted tl1at tl1e decision 011 certain kinds of issues n1 ay not operate as res j11dicata becat1se of tl1 e natt1re of tl1 e iss1.1e. A good exa1npl� is _ 1te11a11 ce. Since 1 to supply 1na11 an issue as to tl1e an101.111t dt1e t1nder an obligatio1 the exte11 t of tl1e obligation deJJends 011 variot1s conditions, whic11 n1ay cl1 ange, 87 a decision on tl1at question in a st1it for 111aintena11 ce cot� ld 11 ot operate as res judicata in a st1bseqt1ent st1it, beca.11se tl1e conditions at tl1 e t1111.e of tl1e st1bsec1uent st1it may have cl1anged. 88 4.
Matter Which I-las Been Heard and Finally Decided (a) Issues decided by tl1e court A nt1mber of isst1es may have been raised in tl1 e . ca?e, bt1t n� t all of tl1 em may have been decided. 89 As one cot1rt l1 as stated, ''Res Jud1cata, by its very words, 85 · See Thibault v. Lambert (Sup. Ct., New rlan1pshire, U.S., 1934), Atlantic Rep., vol. 174, . p. 46, in R. Field and B. Kaplan, supra, 11ote 15 at P· 928, ,c · ), pac,ri · ·, 1912 86. See T11ornpson v. Washington National Bank (Sup. Ct., \\'aslungtoo, US Rep., vol 122, p. 606, in R. Field and B. Kaplan, supra, note 15 at p. 896 87 · See Civ. C., Art,-_ 807. 88 · See Banguru v. V1Jayamacl1..1 (Hi. gh Ct., Madras, 1889), lncb.an �-. Re'P. ' vol. ?? p. 175 --,ues t1nles·s 1- 15 89 · See_ �iv. Pro. C., Art. 182(3) . The c urt must re 11d�r. a deci�\�0 011 all iss <? case. . _ dec1s1on on one or more issues 1s sufficient for tbe_ decision of •
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al ici nd its j11d mi sed rci d exe an s l1a er 1It aft co1 the icli wh argu� on er att . · n1" a roea11s test .ed . m atter. . ,,90 Ther efore 1·cn co a 1 01 on s1 c1 de a to e n1 co n io at er id i . d cons ment an ' t at e d issu h e , 1s ·ct ec1 d · not n bee not res l1as btit J ed udicata rais · tl bee has · ,.1e ' . 91 an 1ss\. · I · t, gs c sui b r111 1ng · A . a1m ose pp S11 . t: owners�p of s111 tl1e in til res the of � irresiJective . ds o 1ten als co1 d �n l1�t !he suit is t . 11e1 ow �he 1s A t tha 1es 11 de B B. . lst i i aga land . ds L1n 011 of gro t st11 1 1tat tl1 l1m ses m1s on d1s 1rt co1 e � Tl1 The re . ion barred by lii11itat 11gh n tl10 re eve the so p, sh1 was an issu e 11�r o:" of e issu the on g din n fi 110 n has bee 92 It does not m att r that ta. 1�a JUd res the judg 11ot is e issu � . as to ow11ersl1iJJ, tl1at . n1ent was for B ' since tl1e iss11e of ownerslup was ·not. dec . ided So, if A dispossesses B, a11d B s11es A, clai1ning tl1�t l1e is tl1e O\Vner, 1 t 1s open to .A to contest B's o\v11ersl1i tJ in tl1e subseq t1ent suit. Or, A sties B to recover the price of goods sold. Tl1 e st1it is dis111issed 011 tl1e grou11d tl1at tl1e goods were sold against a credit tbat B l1ad "''i tl1 A, and tl1at tl1e credit l1as 11ot yet expired. Even if tl1ere \.Vas an iss11e as to payn1e11t, tl1e case was 11ot decided on that grotind, and after the credit 93 However, it is price. the for action sufficient if an bring cot1ld I1ad expired, A tl1e decree 11ecessarily i11volves a fi11ding 011 tl1e isst1e, e.g., ,vl1ere tl1e judgn1ent of tl1e ap1Jellate cot1rt s11ows tl1at the issl1e is n1ateria], even if tl1e decree con.firms the decree of tl1e lower court, ,vl1icl1 did not explicitly deal with the iss11e. 94 Wl1ere tl1e case l1as bee11 appealed, tl1e decree of tl1e appellate col1rt must be co11sidered in order to deter111i11e vvl1at iss11es l1ave bee11 decided. 95 The jt1dgment of tl1e aJJJJellate cot1rt will OJJerate as res jt1dicata as regards all the findings of the lo,ver cot1rt 11ecessar)' to tl1e decisio11 of tl1e appellate cot1rt even if they are not referred to i11 tl1e j11dgn1ent of the appellate colirt. 96 In tl1is connection it sl1ould be observed tl1at tl1e ap1Jellate col1rt n1ay decide tl1e case 011 a ground different from tl1e grot111d 011 ,,,J1icl1 tl1e lower cot1rt decided it, 97 a11d if it does so, only its decision 011 tl1at gro1111d is res jt1dicata. S11ppose tl1at in a s1ut on a contract, tl1e lo\ver cot1rt dis1Tlisses 011 tl1e gro11nd tl1at tl1.e clai111 is barred by limitation. The appellate cot1rt concludes tl1at tl1e clain1 is not barred by Ii111itation, but also co11cludes tl1at tl1ere is no contract a11d confirn1s the j11dg111ent for tl1e defend.ant on that grot1nd. Tl1e decision on tl1e existence of tl1e contract is res j11dicata. Tl1e decision 011 a11 issue 11111st be one tl1at is necessary for the decision of the case.. I� tl�e lo,ver co11rt, ii� the IJrevio11s exa111ple, decided that tl1e suit was barred by l1m1tat1011, b11t also decided tl1at tl1ere ,vas no contract, and tl1e appellate co1rrt confir111ed the decisio11 as to li11.1itation, tl1e decision on the existence of tl1e co11tract, eve11 if confirmed by tl1e appellate cot1rt, ,vould not operate as res judicata. 98 Tl1e: lower cot1rt 111ay l1ave decided tl1at iss11e in order to avoid a possible re111and 1f tl1e appella�e co\1rt reversed its finding 011 tl1e ql1estio11 of Iin1itation. But once tl1e . matter of l1n11tat1on was decided, tl1ere was 110 11eed for a decisio11 on tl1.e existence : of tl1 e co11tract. The existence of tl1e contract tl1en ceased. to be in isst1e, and any
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9 0 · Gur Prasad v. Gt1r Prasad (I-lig11 Ct., Orissa, 1944), 1944 All�J11d Rep., p. 321. ia . 91 · Civ. Pro. C., Ar�. 5(1) req�ires tl1at tl1e suit or isst1e See ." decide d fi11ally be a11d "J1ear d . also Mahalakslun1 v. Pam.1111 (I�I1gl1 Ct., Orissa, 1958), 1958 All-l11dic, Rep., p. 139. 92. See l-Iar Swarup v. An and Swart1p (E-ligl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1942), 194 2 All-India Rep., P· 410· 93. See at�rhottse . v. Levu.1e (Sup. Ct., Massac Rep., vol 65• l'l l1us ;;7 etts Nor , thea U.S ster 190 ., 3), p. 8--, 1n R. Field. and B. Kapla11, supra, 11o . te 15 at p. 923. 94 · Midn:p�r Zan,indary Co., Ltcl. v. Naresl1 Naray 11 Roy (Priv Council, nd a 9 4 y a I i , 1 z ), -4 A / /-.1.nc.l.1a Rep., p. 144. 95. See Sbeosagar v. Sitara.1n (Privy Council, l11dia ' 1897) ' J11dia11 App., vol. 24, p. 50. 96. See tl1e d·isc uss1o · D . Mulla, supra, · n 1n note 1O at p. 85. . 97. See C1v. Pro. c., Art. 342_ 98. See Pitcl1 i v. Bl1arata (High C t., l\1adras, 19?_.4), 1924 All-I11dia Rep., p. 893
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stion do�s no t operate �s res jt1dicata.99 So qt1 e the 011 too, wllere A stie s B isio n dec s for . ct1tt1ng and re1nov1ng trees, judg111ent is for B botll on tile dam age ver reco to orotind tl1at the land did no t belong t o A and on the grot111d that B did not cut d_ �l1e appellate c o t1�t confirm s 011 tl 1e gro11nd that B d id no an , s tre e t cut tlle the trees, tlJe dec1s1on on tl1 e qt1est1on_ of ow11ersllip is not res jtidicata. 100 Once tl,e case has bee11 appealed , _tl1e 011ly 1sst1es tl1at are res j11dicata are tl1ose tt1 at 11ave been decided by the appel late c o�rt, and tl1e appellate cot1rt only decided the issue of the ct1tting of the tree s and did not resolve tl1e isst1e of ownersllip. Tlie problen1 of _ wl1 at isst1es are res judicata wil l arise whenever t,vo or 1nore 1 tl 1e cot1rt. The qt1estion b) decid ed been l1ave will be whetl1 er tl1e decision on es issu both issues is re s jt1dicata. Whe re aJl tl1e isst1es ba, 1e been decided by tl1e lower cotirt, tl1e answer 111ay depe11d 011 wl1ether t l1 e party agai11 st wl1 01n one of tl1e fr o1n that decisio11. St1ppo se tl1at A sties B to recover issties wa s decidecl 111 ay appeal . certain property_ belo11gi11g t o X. A alleges two grot111ds e11titli11 g hin1 to tl1 at proper ty, 101 tl1at he 1s the adopted s o11 of X ancl tl1at X co11veyed tl1 e property to l1im by deed. The cot1r t ·finds tl1at J1 e is 11ot X's aclopted son, bt1t tl1at t l1e propert:>1 was conveyed to him by deed, a11d enters jt1dgment in l1 is favor. It l1as been l 1eld in India tl1 at tl1e finding on tl1 e isst1e of adoption is not res judicata. 102 T,vo reaso11s were given for tl1e l1oldi11g: (I) tl1e finding on tl1 e issue of adoption \Vas not 11ecessary for tl1 e decisi on of tl1e case, once tl1e cot1rt fot111 d tl1 at l1e ,vas entitled to tl1 e property ltnder t�e conveya11ce; (2) l1 e cot1ld not l 1ave appeal ed tl 1e decision as t o tl1 e adoption, beca11se tl1e jt1dg111e11t was in l1is favor. By tl1e san1 e token, ·wl1ere in a st1it by A again st B to recover possessio11 of la11d, B co11 tended that the st1it col1ld not be 1nai11 tained becat1se notice to qt1it had not been give11 and alter11 atively, that l1e was e11titled t o possession ag,1inst A, and the cot1rt l 1eld that l1e was not entitled to possession, but dis111issed tl1 e st1it 011 tl1 e grot1nd tha t notice to quit l1 ad n ot been give11, tl1 e fi11ding as to possessio11 was not res jt1dicata. 103 Tl1is \Vas beca·use he co11l d not aJ)peal f. ron1 tl1 e finding as to po ssession, si11 ce tl1e suit \vas dis1nissed a11d the judgi11 ent, therefor e, was in l1is f:1vor. We may tl1 t1s take it as a general principle tl1a t a finding by tl1 e lo wer cot1rt vvill 11ot operate as res j11dicata against a party wl10 could not ]1ave apJ)ea l ed fron1 tl1a t findi11g, because the judgme11t of the lower cot1rt was in l1is favor.
Now suppose that tl1e case has been aJ)l)ealecl. 111 ot1r l ast exa.n1 ple, no p roble1n would arise, becau se the appellate cot1rt wot1lcl firs t co11sider tl 1e non-1nerits iss11e, that is, wl1ether tl1e suit was J)remat11re, becat1se notice to qt1it l1 ad not bee11 given. If it coo:firmed the decision of tl1 e lower cot1r t on tl1 a t isst1e, it wo11ld 11ot decide the qt1estion of po ssession. If it reversed tl1 e decision 011 tl1 at isst1e, it wot1l d tl1en proceed to decide the q11estion of possession. In otl1er ':'ords, tl1 e appell ate cot11: t wot1ld only consider the merits iss11e if it cot1ld 11ot decide tl1e case on tl1 e basis of the non-merits issue. In ol1r earlier exa1nple rega.rding the ''a.dopted son'' a problem ·need not arise either pr oviding the appellate cot�r! first conside�s the _q11estion of conveyance by deed, becat1se if it confir111s tl1at d ec1s1on ot1 t l1� t issue, it � ould �ot have to decide tl1e 111at ter of adoption. If it reverses tl1e �nd tng on . that 1?s. t1e, 1t would have to consider and decid e tl1e n1 atter o f tl1e adoJ)t1on, and its dec1s1on would be re s jt1dicata. TJ1e appellate court should first decide tl1 e isst1e \v]ucb, 99. Compare Ekram v. 1-IolodJltlr, supra note 70, wl1ere the decision as to the excess an1ount of the land was not necessary to the decision of the case. lOO. S ee the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 10 at P· 85. IOI. Note that l1e m11st al1ege all grounds entitling l1im to relief. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(2)102. See Rango v. Mudiyeppa (I-ligh Ct., Bombay, 1889), [11clian L. Rep., vol 23, p. 296. 17· 13, vol. P· ., Rep L. ian Ind . 6), 188 a, e cutt Cal gh do S oo n (fli b . Nu. Ct., Bid v. e lOJ
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t e11 d. gm an j11d de the ren of r on ati rm a decisio nfi co e tli n i ttlt res ll wi ·r confirmed s t 4m ur 1 �6: co co the ate ell pp a din fin the if g , So y. sar . of th� ces ne 1111 s ue is; er oth �n n 1s1o y dec an d, e on the matter of de_ by ce yan 1ve co1 of 1e iss1 the 011 lrt cot . er low ry essa not nec for 1s tl1e 1t e a11s bec a, decision of icat j11d res e b · not tild sllo n ptio ado the ca.se. es issu two l1ave been decid ed re wl1e is r side con st m11 we n atio situ t Tile nex by the lower cotirt, and tl1e party a.gai11st wl10111 tl1ey were decided does not appeal. t. of trac co1 cl1 brea B contends that for es nag da ver reco � to B sues A that ! pose Stip . tlie parties did not e11ter i1�to a valid contract and alter11a�1vely, �bat ,performance was prevented by force 1naJet1re. Tl1e court reso_l�es botl1 1ssL1e� in B s favor and disi11isses tl1e suit. A does not a1)1)eal. Is tl1e decision on botl1 issues res judicata? In 111y opi 11ion, it sl1011Id be. 104 Botl1 iss11es go to tl1e merits of tl1e case. In tl1at se11se, botl1 were 11ecessary to tl1e decision of tl1e case. While the co11rt could l1ave decided 011 one grot111d, it was not improper for it to decide on both grot1nds, as botl1 went to tl1e rnerits. A co11ld l1ave ap_pealed, and depending on tl1e disposi tio11 of tl1e case, by tl1e a1)pellate court, one isst1e or botl1 wot1ld have been finally decided. Si11ce tl1e case was 11ot appealed and si11ce both iss11es went to tl1e merits, tl1e decision 0 11 both sl1ot1ld be res judicata. I{owever, w]1ere tl1e lower cot1rt decides botl1 a 111erits a 1 1d a non-111erits issue, and 110 appeal is take11, only tl1e decision on tl1e 110 1 1- 1 nerits isst1e sl1ot1ld be res jt1dicata. Wl1e11 the case is disposed of on a no11-merits grot1nd, tl1e suit v,1ill be dis 1 11issed, a11d a decision on the merits cannot be said. to be 11ecessar)' to tl1e decisio11 of tl1e case. So, where i11 a s11it for a declaratio11 tl1at a lease was st1rrendered, tl1e cot1rt dis111issed on tl1e grot1nd that the suit coL1ld 11ot be 111aintained, bt1t also fou11d tl1at a s11rrender bad been effected, tl1e decisio 1 1 on tl1e n1atter of st1rre11de.r \vo11ld not be res j11dicata. 105 Tl1e final sitt1atio11 to consider is where botlz parties l1ave attacked a decision in wllich a 111erits a1 1d a no11-1nerits iss11e were decided. A s11es B for possessio 1 1 of land, co1 1te 1 1ding tl1at B's lease l1as expired. B defends on tl1e groun.d ·that lie 11as a rigl1t of occt1pation 1:111d tl1at tl1e stiit is })re111at11re, si11ce l1e also ]1as a right to re11ew tl1e lease, w]1icl1 l1e 1nigl1t still exercise. The co11rt fi11ds tl1at l1e did n.ot l1ave a right of occL1pation, bt1t tl1at he did have a rigl1t to re11e,v and, tl1erefore, disn1isses tl1e st1it as pren1ature. A appe,Lls, co11te11di11g that the co11rt erred in l1olding tl1at tl1e suit was J)re111att1re. B files a cross-objectio11 106 to tl1e finding on liis occ11pancy rigl1t. Tl1e appellate co11rt co11fir1ns tl1e decision of tl1e lower court jn all respects. Tl1e qL1estio11 is wbet11er tl1e findi11g on tl1e isst1e of the occupancy right is �es jL1dicata, a11� I do not tl1inlc it sl1011ld be.101 0 11ce the a1Jpella.te_ co11rt decided the 11011-111er1 ts ground, tl1ere was no reason for it to decide tl1e qt1estion of tl1e occ11pancy rigl1t. Tl1t1 s, tl1e decisio11 on that iss11e was not necessary to t11e decision of the case and sl1011ld 11ot be res j11dicata. In su!nn1ary, it is s11b111itt�d tl1at the following rt1les sl1ottld apply whenever two or _more 1sst1es l1ave been decided. Wl1ere two grotinds were clsserted to support the claim or defence, and only 011e of tl1en1 was decided i n favor of the successf111 party, tl1 e decision on tl1e otl1er gro1111d sl1ot1ld not operate as res judicata against (res 900 P· 24, �o�pare P_eary v_. Ambica (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1897), [1zclia11 L. Rep., vol. 7• 1 vol. Rep., L. Judicata) with S111 '? C:haran v. Raghu ( Iligh Ct., Allal1abad, 1895), J11clia11 p. 174 (not res Jltd1cata). , 105. i i atal Muraka v. Maogtulal Bajoria (High Ct ., Calcutta , 1944), 1947 All-Ind a Rep. e 1� �� 2 � 106. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 340. 107. See Midoa zamin · dar ·i Co., Ltd._ v. Naresh Narayan Roy (Privy Cou.ncil, Indi·a, 19'1) ,... ' 1922 All-J,id�! Rep., p. 241, wl1ere 1t was l1eld no t to be res judicata.
104.
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e could not h a ve appea led fro111 �l1at decision. Wllere the h ce sin case h as been , liiin e _appellate court sl1�uld on}y dec.1de as 111a?y issues as are iie cess th ed, ppe al ary for a ev e rsal of th.e Jt1dgme11t, and its de r or on_ rma ti con fi cision on an isst1e not the necessary �or this purpose should not ope�a te as r es j·udicata notwitl1 standing tl1at the party 1.n wl1ose fa:or the case wa s ult101ately decided raised tllat isstl e . Where two isst1es were decide d a�d . tl1e case was not appealed, the decision on both issues sbot1ld operate a� res Jt1d1cata 0_11 ly if both issues i11volved the merits; if one issue involved the n1er1ts _ a n� 011e did not, only tl1e decision 011 t he non-merits issue sl1 ot1ld op�rat e as r_es Jt1d1c:rta . Isst1es tl1at l1ave been ''lleard aild finally decided'' ref er to those 1sst1es \vl 11cl1 \.V�re necessa�y for tl1e decision of the case, as we ba,,e defined that ter1n, and \Vere 111 fact dec1ded by the co11rt which rende red the final jt1dgn1ent. (b) Res j11dicata and issues of law Anotl1er aspect of tl 1e proble 1n of ''1 1eard and finally decided'' concerns tl1e res judicata effect of a decision 011 a11 issue of law where the r11Je of l avv 011 \Vhich tl1e decision ,vas based l 1as s11bseqt1ently been cl1anged. Tl1e cl1a11ge 111ay occur as a resul t of n ewl y-enacted legislatio11 or a later decision of a biober co11rt contrary to the _prior decisio11 of a lower court or a later decision of tl1e co11rt that decided tl 1e case, wl1icl1 overrt1les its prior decision. Tl 1e qL1estiot1 .is wl1etl1er tJ1e former decision o .n tl1e q11estio11 of law is res jt1dicata in a st1bseque11t st1it. The general principl e is t]1at 011ce an isst1e l1as bee11 decided, it can11ot be relitigated. in a st1bsequ ent s11it by p arties bot1nd by tl1e prior decisio11 notwitl1standi11 g tl1at tl1e law is changed or t he prior decisio11 is fo11nd to be erro11eot1s. \.Vhe t1 t l1e Ia,:v is ch.a11ged by subseqttent legislation, the former decision operates as res j11dicata, because legal sit 11ations and rigl1ts existi11g JJrior to tl1e enactn1en t of the new legislation a.re not ge11erally a ffected by s11cl1 enact111e11t. 108 Tl1is pri11ciple co11pled with the general principle of res jt1dicata preve1 1t s tl1e relitigation of a legal isst1e decided under repealed l aw. How ev er, tl1e prior decision is not res j11dicata \Vl1ere at the tin.1e of the s11bseqt1e11t s11it otl1er facts l1ave occurred wl1 icl1 bring tl1e subject matter of tl1e s·uit under the new legislatio11. A good exan1ple of tl1 is is a c l1ange in the law of lin1itatio11. A sues B i11 1960 to recover 1noney tl1at was clue ju 1956. At tl1a t time tl1e p eriocl of lin1itation is tl1ree years, and the clain1 is barred. In 1961 A loans B additional 1noney, for \.VhicI1 J1e Sl1es i11 1966. Under legislatio11 enacted in 1960, t11e period of Ii1nitatio11 is 110\V ten years. The decision in t l1e 1960 · u t, the c l ai.m suit as regards the n1011ey dt1e i11 1956 is, of cot1rse, res judicata. 109 B arising ir1 1961 n1ust be decided. tinder tl1e 1960 law, since it is a 11evv c]ai111 . Tl1e 1960 suit did 11ot litiga te the qt1estio11 of Ii1nitation forever, bl1t 011ly tl1e q11est�on of limitation for the de bts dt1e in 1956. Since tl1e 1966 sl1it i11volves a new claim, the new period of lin1itatio11 is to be applied eve11 if tl1e circ111nstances giving rise to the 1961 clai1n were si111ilar to tl1 ose giving rise to the 1956 clain1. t jt1dicial 11en seq st1b a of ct_ e T eff the he l1nd aro re es mo olv ct1lt 11 e .rev q11 stio diffi . int:rpretation contra ry to t11e interpretation in the prior s111t. X sells propert� to A, wh1cl1 was in the pos se ssion of B. In A's st1it against B to recover possess1?n,. tl1e court holds tha t a person out of possession may not transfer property and cl1sn11sses t�e st1it. Later, a l 1igher court l1o lds in anotl1er case tha t the owne_r otit of po?se� s100 may transfer the land. A ag,1in s11es B to recover poss�ss1on. �J1e suit 1s barred on the ground tha t tl1e iss11e of A's rigl1t !o . possession a�ainst B ,has a lready been Iitjga ted.1 10 It is trtie that the forn1er suit involved an 1sst1e of law ,
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108. See Civ. C., A rt. 3348. 109 • This is required by Civ. C., Art. 3350 (1). 1087· p. lO, l. vo 110. See Govvri p., Re L. ian Ind 4), 188 , tta lcu Koer v. Audb Koer (Higl1 Ct., Ca
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1 correctly. But _the correctness of the decision i1 d ide dec 1 1 e be e hav . has wliicll nJay e �n 1sst1e ha s been decided, it may c . on d an ta, ica jt1d res li \Vit _ not notlling to do 1 do es no t operate as a rule of 1 1s10 dec tl1e at 1 tl , ver we ho te, No d. e t la\v be relitiga s sue A . to B . lots r ecover posse two A sold X at 1 tl e pos Sup B. and ssion A eii twe be e? on the �rot1nd that X cot1ld not transfer iss dism is st1it tlie and I, No. lot of e L11gl1 er cot1rt later l1olds i11 anot Tl1 . ion sess pos of ot1t le wl1i A to ty per her pro tlie 1 d. A tl1 en sues B tl1e la1 sfer tran 1nay er own ion sess pos -ot--.. ot1t e 1 tl 1 at to case tI recover possessio11 of lot No. 2. The cot1rt 1nay consi�er tl1e legal isst1e . of whether tl1 e land . In tl1e for1ner st11t the court sfer tran 111ay er ow11 on sessi f-pos out-o the to lot No. I. There was no issue only decided tl1e isst1e of possession ,vith res1Ject _ does not 11 � atter that tl1e issue of as to possessio11 witl1 res1Ject to lot No. 2. It law is tl1e san1e in botl1 cases, si11 ce tl1 e first case only 111volved lot No. I. In otl1er ,vords, tl1e cot1rt in the :first st1it decided � specific . isstie -. wl10 had the right to possession of lot No. 1 . In order to decide that 1sst1e, 1t l1ad to resolve a qt1estio11 of law - 111 ay tl1e ot1t-of-possession ow11 er tra.11sfer tl1e land. But the decision 1 i11 tl1 e first st1it a1Jplies 011ly to lot No. , becat1se the first st1it involved tl1at lot and 11ot lot No. 2. Tl1erefore, while tl1e decisio11 in tl1e :fi1·st s11it is not affected by tl1e new decisio11, tl1e cot1rt 11 1ay ta.l<e accot1nt of tl1e ne,v decision in determin.ing vvl10 is e11 titled to 1Jossession of lot No. 2.
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Tl1e JJrinciple 11 1ay be stated in anotl1 er way. Tl1e de cision on a question of Ia,v litigated betwee11 t\VO parties is res j 11dicata in a11y s11bseqt1ent suit involving tl1e sa111 e cat1se of actio11, but is not res jt1dicata i11 a suit involving a different cat1se of action. 111 Sltppose tl1at A enters i11to two separate oral co11 tracts witl1 B. I�e Slles on 011 e, a.11 d the cotirt dis111isses tl1e st1it 011 tl1e grot1nd tl1 at s 11cl1 contracts n1 L1st be i11 writi11g. 111 a st1bseqt1e11t st1it 011 the seco11d contract tl1 e question of ,vl1etl1er tl1e co11tract n1L1st be i11 writing is not res jt1dicata. Tl1e first st1.it in,1 olved tl1e cause of action \Vitl1 respect to tl1e one contract \-Vl1ile the second suit involved tl1e cat1se of action with respect to tl1e otl1 er. In tl1 e fu·st s11it· the cot1rt did not decide tl1e validity of tl1e second contract, a11d it is imn1aterial tl1at tl1e same legal isst1e is i11,1olved i11 botl1 cases, si11 ce tl1e validity of the seco11d contract was not ''l1 eard and decided'' in tl1e st1it on tl1e first co11tract. Bt1t Sll_ppose tl1at tl1e first contract \Vas to be 1Jerfor1ned i11 i11stalments. When tl1 e first i11staln1ent is dt1e, A Slies, a11d tl1e cot1rt l1olds for tl1e defe11 da11t on tl1e orou11d tl1 at tl1e contract n1ust be in writing. A st1it on the co11tract wl1 e11 tl1e second i11 sta.l111e11t is dt1e is barred. In order to s11cceed in tl1at st1it A 111t1st IJrove t]1e existe11ce of a ,,alid co11tract, and tl1e cot1rt l1 as already l1eld tl1at tl1e contra ct is i11valid. 111 other \\1ords, tl1e fact tl1at the decisio11 ,vas on a qt1estio11 of law (a11cl tl1e i11 ter1Jretation of t11e la\v may �ave cl1anged) does 11ot JJreve11 t tl1e OJJeration of tl1e princi1Jle of res jt1dicata. Tl1e 1ss11e l1 as been det�r:11ined a11 d 1nay 11ot be relitigated in a st1bsec1t1ent st1it. B �t the _ �ac� tl1 at the dec1s1on was 011 a qt1estio11 of law does not n1 ean tl1at it 15 r�s Jtidicata in a st1it i11 volvi11g a cliffe re11t cal1se of actio11 even if tl1 e legal isSLle 15 the same. The disti�ction bet�een a s 11bseqt1e11t st1it on tl1e sa11 1e ca,11se of action 311d a �ubseqtien� stiit 011 a d1ffere11 t cat1se of actio11 inso.far as it relates to cl1anges of interpretation of tl1e law is well-ill11strated by a co11 sideration of two An1erican case s. In one a fornier 11aval officer s 11ed tl1 e gover11 111 ent to recove r retire111 ent pay. !f }le was an ''officer of tl1 e Navy'' a.t a certain tiI11e I ·\ 111 g her a to 1 e vot1ld be entitled et rate. At the time in qt1estion, 11e wa s a cad a tha t held co1 1rt cad et the an d , t . ' was an ''offi e ' to h · ·cer· of the Navy d e tl 1 t en . , wit · 11 1n · the 11 1ean1ng of the statute, and 11 I
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3 ), See the disctission in D. Mulla., 195 r, Mj tte y T/1e Cocle of Civil Proced11re (12tl1 ed. b R. vol. 1, p. 60.
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higher pay. In a later case i11 ,1ol\1 ing a11other officer, tlie cotirt helcl tl,at a cadet \.vas not ''an officer of tl1e 1:f a�y'' . withi11 tl1e n1 ea11 i11 g of tl1 e stattite. The govertl ment then reft1sed to pay tl1 e pla111_tJff 111 tl1e for111er case tl1e higher rate wJ1en another instalment was d t te. In a su1t to recover tl1e l1igl1er rate f. or tl1at instaln1e11t tl1e decision in tl1 e for111er s11 it to tl1e effect tl1 at l1e w,1s ''an officer of tile N,lvy'' was 112 Tl1 ere was bL1t one ca11se of action, l1 is clai111 for tl1 e retire11 1 e11 t a. judica t res pay, a11d it d�d 11 ot 111atter tl1 at it �vas pa.yable it1 i11stal1 11 e11 ts. I-le was J1eld to be entitled to ret1 re111 ent _pay at a certain rate, and tl1e q11 estion of tl1 e rate cot1ld 110t be reljtigated in a s t1it to recover otl1er i11stal111 e11ts. I11 tl1e otl1 er case an in1porter so11ght to i1 111Jort_ certa!11 goods a11� obtainecl a declaratio11 tl1 at tl1 ey were d11ty-free. In a later case 111voI-v1ng . a1 1otl1 er 1111 porter tl1e co11rt l1eld tl1 at tl1is class of goods was not d t1ty-.free. Tl1e 1111 porter wl1 0 was s11ccessful i11 tl1e first case so11 ght to i1nport additio11 al goods, a1 1d tl1 e gover11 1ne11t, relying on tl1e decisio11 in tl1e later case, irnposed ,l duty. I11 l1is suit for a declaratio11 tl1at tl1e goods \.Vere d t1ty-free, tl1e decision in tl1e first ca.se was l1eld 11ot to be res judicata. 113 I-le was sui11 g for a decla1·atiot1 witl1 respect to rliffere11t goods a11 d, tl1erefore, n1ay be said to I1 ave been s11 j1 1g on a differe11t cat1se of action. 114 Tl1e SJJecific isst1e i11 tl1e first case was \vl1ether tl1ose goods ,vere d11ty free, and it was in1n1 aterial tl1at the basis of tl1 e decision involved a11 i11terpretatio1 1 of tl1 e law to tl1e effect tl1 at a categor)' of goods \Vas duty-free. We ma)' concl11de by saying that 011 ce a11 iss11 e of law l1as been clecided, the decision operates as res j11dicata \Vitl1 respect to tl1 e ca11se of actio11 involved i11 tl1e st1 it in wl1icl1 it was re11derecl. It is 11 ot res j11dicata in a st1bbseqt1ent st1it between the same parties i11 ,1olvi11g a different cat1se of action. Tl1e i1111Jorta1 1 t {Joint to reme1 nber is tl1at a cl1a1 1ge in tl1 e law or tl1e interpretation of tl1 e law 011 wlucl1 a decisio1 1 on an iss11 e was based does 11ot affect tl1 e operatio11 of tl1e rttle of res judicata.
5. Scope of Res J udicata The drafters of tl1 e Civil Procedtire Code l1ave made it clear tl1at tl1 e scope of res judicata is to be very broad. There are two as1Jects of tl1 is broa.d scope. First, any n1atter whicl1 111igl1t a11cl oirgl1t to lzave bee11 n1ade a groLtncl of clefe11ce or attack in the suit shall be cleemed to ]1ave bee1 1 s11 bstantially a11 d 1naterially in iss11e. 115 Secondly, any relief claimed in the s11it wl1 ich l1as 11ot been exJJressly gra,zterl by the decree JJassed in tl1e suit sl1 all be dee111 ed to ]1 ave been refused.' 16 We \.Viii discuss both aspects separate})'. (a) Matters to be raised As we will see, a plaintiff may not split l1 is claim in the sense of s11ing for part of the clai1 n at one time and part of the clai1n at another time; l1e must inclt1de the wl1ole of his clai1 n in tl1e st1 it. 117 By the san1e token, when a suit l1as See United States v. Moser (Su p. Ct., U.S., 1924), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep., Lawyers' Ed., vol. 69, p. 262. 113. See United States v. Sto11e & Downer Co. (Sup. Ct., U.S., 1927), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep., Lawyers' Ed., vol. 71, p. 1013. 114. This was no t the grotmd of the court's decision. The court stresse� that a �ontrary result ter �ou ld por e im <;>n ,. ,.e. s v, 1a'v tom cus the of n tio tra nis mi ad uld wo . cause inequality in t11e import the goods duty-free while another cou]d not. H�\.Vever, 10 my opnu�n, tl,e r�ult ln,ar. o be reached on the ground tha t in. tL,e second case a different cause of action \Vas 111v vec 115. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(2). 116. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(3). 117. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216. 112.
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all tl1e grou11os that woul d su pp ort his claim,
been filed, the ce he ay fen m . de ve of ha s 1nd r ot Fo gr all purposes rt se as t us ni nt da fen de and the er ted all st1ch . grounds which ass ve /1a to 1ed en de are s tie J Jar e 1 t _ _ ta, J ica of res jud ta tca Ud res es �, pli for ap ere Th J t ed. no ert �ss y n onl bee ve }Ja to t to gh ou d an nligllt . t 1es tha 1ssL vvoi1/cl have been decid ecl t11e !o t bu d, ide dec sly res exp re "''e t tha . les isst the 1 ch grot1nds 10 a forn1er suit mean s1 se rai to 11re fail e Th . ties par s tl1e by if raised ct, e eff y . In th� 011e t are deemed to 11en seq sub any in sed rai be not can . . that tt1ey have been decided ad,,ersely to the party seek1�g to raise the1� 1n the subsequent to ty e par rais a a ut pern new claim or to ed pen re-o be not 1nay case a and suit def�nce that l1e sl1011ld l1 ave raised in tl1e first s11it. Tl1 e q11estion of failt1re to include a gro11nd of attack or defence arises in a 11 t1 1nber of co11texts. 011e is where tl1e plaintiff bri11 gs s11it on a claim and fails to assert certai11 grou11ds tl1at would entitle 1111n to relief. On tl1e basis of the ground l1 e asserts, j11dg111e11 t is for the defendant. Tl1e plaintiff bri11gs a subsequent suit allegi11g a different grot111d. Si11 ce l1 e is st1i11 g on tl1e same cat1se of action and failed to allege tl1 e grot111d i11 tl1e first s11it, tl1e st1bseqt1ent suit is barred by res jt1dicata. For exa1111Jle, A sties B and C, charging tl1at B negligently pern1itted C to c.on1 e t1po11 B's pre1nises to 11se a meat trolley a11 d tl1at as a result of the negljgent t1se by C, A ,vas i11jt1red. Judg11 1ent is in favor of B and C. S11bsequently, A sues B, co11 te11 di11 g tl1at l1e ,v,1s injt1red as a res11lt of tl1 e neglige11t operation of the trolley by B. Tl1e seco11d s11it is barred by res j11 dicata. 118 There was a single cat1se of action against B, 11 a111 ely tl1 at A st1:ffered injt1ries as a rest1lt of B's neglig ence. 111 tl1e first st1it A l)roceeded 011 tl1 e tl1 eory tl1at B was negligent in permitting C to t1se tl1e trolley. In tI1 e seco1 1d s11it, l1e is seeki11g to recover for the same injury, a11d is 111erely allegi11g a different tl1eory of liability, tl1at B negligently o_perat ed tl1 e trolley l1i111 self. 119 Si11 ce l1 e co11ld have alleged tlus ground of liability in the first st1it, 120 it is dee111 ed to l1ave been directly and s11bstantially in isst1e and for pt1rposes of res j11dicata, resolved against A. Or, tl1 e plaintiff sues for possession, clai11 1ing tl1at l1e is tl1e ow11er of certain land, and jt1dgn1 ent is for tl1 e defendant. The plaintiff subseqt1e11tly sues again, now clain1 ing tl1at l1 e is the mortgagee and entitled to enter into possessio11 u11der tl1 e m ortgage. Assu111ing tl1at tl1e mortgage r barred is was isst1ed prior to the institt1tion of tl1 e first s11it, the second . suit b) res jt1dicata. 121 If he had !)roved tl1at l1 e was entitled to possession t1t1der the n1ortgage in tl1e first st1it, l1e wo11ld J1ave bee11 s11ccessf11 l since l1e sougl1t to be p11t into possession and cot1ld have been p11t i 11 possession' as 1J1ortgagee. He fajled to assert tl1at gro1111d of attacl< i11 the forn1er s11it and 1nay not do so in the stibsequent 011e. Likewise, if A st1es B for an acco11nting allegedly due tinder a co11 tract of. agency a11d tl1 e jt1dg111 e11t is for B, A n1ay not subseq11ently s11e B for an acco11nt1ng allegedly due u11 der a11 agree1ne11 t of partnersl1ip. 122 TI1e existence of
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See Pan�s v. Great \Vestern Pacl<ing Co. (St1p. Ct., California, U.S., 1943), P ac ific {ep. cl ·,es, vol. 134, p. 242, i11 C. Brow11, A. Vestal a11d M. Ladd, supra, note 5- at �� 7g g� f 119. �0� _ w ill rec�ll our dis�ussio11 to tl1e effect tl1at � ry tli�o e th \.Vl1e11 tl1e plaintiff is changing ltabih_ty, 11e IS not statmg a new cat1se of action so as to be precluded from ameu<ling bts pleading after the statute of limitations l1as run. See tbe discussion in Cl1apter VI, s upra, 11otes 138-141 and accompa11ying text. 120. arty nlay _allege any nt1n�ber ?f gro11nds of claim or defence, including those tl? at exiSt xt. t t�le alternative. See the d1scuss1on in ng e panyi Chapter VJ' supra' note 28 and accom 121. See Gosh wara.11· . v · Adl1iklal (H igh Ct., Patna, 1947), 1948 All-I11dian Rep., P· 30Z. If the 01 . age wer� 1s5ued sttbsequ�ntly e c b d, arr . fi � e au�i t b� a w���· be c]ainlJ ng under a differ to the rst suit, l1e wottld 11ot be b did not e ent title in tl1e second suit a title that xS ' the t itne O f the forn1er suit. 122. See Beliari v. Ran1 (Hig h Ct., Allahabad, 1948), 1949 All-I11dia Rep., p. 265.
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the partnership . would have �ntitl_ed_ hi1n to the relief so11 gL1t in the first Sliit, and he may not b _ nng another _su_1 t c 1 arm1�g the_ sa1ne relief from the same defendant 00 tile basis of a different pre-existing relat1onsh1p between tl1 e111. The principle is also applicable to a second s11it on tl1e san1e contract wllere tlle first s11 it was decided again�t tl1e plai11tiff, and i 1 1 tl1e second suit be seeks to raise a new iss11e o� ask for different relief witl1 res1)ect to the same contract. A written contract provided �l1at tl1 e defe 11dant ,vol1ld purchase lip to 600 -tons of the plaintiff' s product. In a st11t 011 tl1e co11tract, tl1 e plai11 tifr co11tended tI1 at the defend ant agreed to p11rchase cit least 600 tons an? by a subseq11ent oral agreenient agreed to p11rchase at least 800 tons. Tl1e co11rt interpreted the co11 tract as not reqtiiring t11e defendant to tJurcl1ase at least 600 to11s a.nd l1 eld that tl1 e plaintifl' cotild not 123 J11 do1nent was entered for the j11troduce proof of tl1e st1bseq11 e11 t oral agree111ent. defenda nt. Tl1e pl�i11tiif st1bseque1 1tly bro11ght anotl1er s11it� now contendi11 g that the \.Vritten contract did not represent tl1e tr11e agree1nent of the parties and asked tI1 at s11cl1 agree1nent and er1forced as reforn1ed. It the contract be ''refor111ed'' to express . was l1eld that the second s11it was barred. 124 The plai11tiff cotild l1 ave raised tl1is isst1e in the first s11it, but failed to do so. Tl1erefore, it was dee11 1ed to have been directly and substantially i 1 1 iss11e i11 tl1 at s11 it a11 d could not be p11t in issue i11 a subseque11t st1it. By the san1e toke 1 1, a defendant who co11ld I1ave asserted a defe11ce a11 cl fails to
do so 111ay not assert tl1e defence \Vl1e.n a subsequent s11it is broltght 011 the san1 e ca11se of action. A s11es B, C, D ar1 d E for re11t as joi11 t tenants. None ap1Jears and an ex parte decree is ren.dered against all of tl1 e1n jointly. I11 a st1it agai11 st all fot1r for tl1e rent d11e in a s11bseq11e11 t period, B ap1Jears, clai111ing tl1 at l1e is not a joint tenant and is liable only for 011 e-fot1rtl1 of tl1 e rent. He could I1ave asserted this defence in tl1e first s11 it and failecl to do so. Tl1 e basis of tl1 e decision was that the fo11r defenda11ts were liable for tl1e re11 t jointly. Tl1 at decision is res judicata, and B, who could have raised his clefence in tl1 e for1ner st1it, n1ay 11ot do so in the subsequent one. 125 Or, wl1ere A sues B for breacl1 of co11 tract a11cl obtains a judgment, B may not st1bseq11e11tly s11e for recession on the gro11nd tl1at t 1 1e contract is invalid, since tl1e defe11ce of invalidity co11Id l1ave bee 1 1 raised in the first suit. 126 Also, where a perso11 wl1 0 paid off a prior 111 ortgagee was st1brogated to the latter's rights and failed to plead l1is right of s11brogation in a suit by a later mortgagee, to wl1icl1 l1e was made a party, he co11ld not i11 stitl1te a st1bseque11t suit to enforce J1 is rigl1 ts in tl1e property. 127 Jt1st as tl1 e JJlaintiff m11st assert all the grounds entitling l1i1n to relief, tl1e defenda11t who is asserting a col1nterclai1n or set-off, 1nust assert all the grot1 nds s11pporting sucl1 claim. A 1nortgagee, wl1 0 also holds tl1e mortgaged property as lessee, sues the 1nortgagor to recover Etl1.$ 3, 000 on the mortgage debt. Tl1e n1ortgagor seeks to set-off Etl1.$ 4,000 alle¥edl� dl1e ltnder a contract of lease. Tl1e contract is not proved and the set-off is_ d1sallo:Ved. A decree is entered in favor of the n1ortgagee for Eth.$ 3,000, and he 1s pernutted to purchase the property in satisfaction of tl1 e decree. The n1 ortgagor_ tl1 en_ s11�s to l1ave the sale set aside for a declaration that the mortgage debt 1 s ext1ngl11shed and for an accounting 'as to the amol1nt owed for rent, asking that tl1 e amount 123. See Civ. C., Art. 2005. 124. See Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Pap�r Co. (Ct. App., U.S., 7t _I� Cir., on s ial te, Ma n, pla Ka B. d an ld Fie R. in , 822 . p 1946), Federal Rep., 2nd Series, vo l. 153 . Civil Procedure (1953), p. 906. . 125. See Saroji11 i v . Lak.hi Priya (HigI1 Ct., Calcutta, 1924), 1925 All-Incba Rep:, p. 427. 126. Se e C.J. Phillips v. A.B. Mitcl1ell (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1931), 1932 All-l11d'a Rep., p. 889· 127. See Suwabi v. Krishna (High Ct., Nagpur, 1946), 1948 All-lnclia Rep., p. 256.
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,2a is it . r st1 e bt ba Th de e d_ a re tg or 1n e th t � n In ai ag � ff t-o se the be nt re r fo ed ow
1 1der an �xpr s co�tra�t. He 1 1 nt re e tl1 1ed 111 cla or ag could J tg �� t . foriller sl:iit, t 1e 111or 1 accoLlnt 1n . a suit, 1.e., he could ra ne ge a r de un 1t 1 re r fo iin cla his have asserted t ac s 11tr res co n exp and a�tern atively, 1· 1�e 1 u e � du s wa t ren tl1e t tha d lle i i cla have to 1nake the claim at that led fai 1g v11 Ha nt. o11 acc al 1er 1 ge a r de ltn e dti s wa tllat it tin1e, l1e n1ay not do so sl1bseql1ently. Anotl1er sitt1ation is wl1ere a party clai111s property on one gro11nd and in a did l1e 11ot icl1 wl1 raise in tl1e fi rst nd, ro11 er tl ano � on it � 111s clai st1it t stibsequen . suit. X dies, leaving property to 111s w1do\V, wl10 1nal(eS a gift of the propert y to B, X's brotl1er. Tl1e wido\v dies. A, allegi11g tl1at _he a 1?d X owned the property 1ay of s11rv1v?rsh1p, �ues B to recover the \\ by it to led. entit is J1e jointly and that property. Tl1e st1it is dismissed. f-. Ie. files a ne\V suit, alleging that following the \vidow's deatl1, l1e beca111 e tl1e heir of X and that129 the tra11sfer of the property by At tl1e time of tl1e first suit, tl1e widow is void. 1"11e seco11d st1it is barred. tl1e widow \Vas dead and if he was tl1e l1eir o.f X, 11e was so tl1en. Therefore, be cot1ld l1ave raised tl1e clai111 of l1eirsl1ip in tl1e first st1it jn addition to the claim of st1rvivorsl1i1J, a11d l1aving failed to do so, he 111,1y not raise it st1bsequently. Converse ly, \Vl1ere i11 a sl1it for possessio11 tl1e defe1 1dant defended on tl1e gro11nd that he took tl1e IJroperty by s11rvivorsl1 ip and the isst1e was decided against hin1, he may not, in a s11bseq11ent sl1it against l1i1n for possession of tl1e sa1ne property, defend on tl1e gro11nd tl1at l1e received tl1e property 11nde.r tl1e \Vill of tl1e forn1er owner. 130 I-lis clai111 as be1Jeficiary t11 1der tl1e will col1 ld l1 ave been ra.ised alternatively in the first s11jt a11d si11ce it was not, it is clee111ed to ]1ave bee11 decided against him. As \Ve l1ave see11, i11 order for parties to be bol1nd by tl1e jl1dg111 ent in a for1 11er st1it, tl1e)' 11111st be litig,1ti11 g u11der the sa111e title in the st1bsequent suit. 131 So, a decision re11clered agai11st a JJerso11 in l1is individl1 al capacity does not bar a st1it by l1i111 in llis represe11tative capacity, si11ce in tl1e second Sltit he is s11ing on bel1alf of tl1e person \Vl1 0111 l1e represents. By analogy, \Vhen a person is s11ed in one ca1Jacity, l1e is not expected to assert a clai1n to tl1e st1bject-matter in dispute based on anotl1er capacity. A s11es B to obtain property a s tl1e representative of Y, a11d jt1dgment is for B. A is 11 ot barred fro.n1 s11ing B on a clain1 that tl1e J)fOJJerty belo11gs to lun1 i11 l1is individl1al ca1Jacity, becat1se wl1e11 l1e is st1ing as a representative, l1e ''ot1gl1 t not'' to prefer a clai1n to tl1e property in his i 1 1dividual _ 132 ca �ac1ty. However, so111e I11clia11 co11rts l1ave also take11 tl1e JJosition tl1at ''matter �h1cl1 ot1gl1t to l1ave bee11 macle a grot1nd of attack or defe11ce'' 111t1st be re.id in light of ''litigating 11nder tl1e san1e title." As a rest1lt they ]1ave l1eld tl1at wl1en _a person l1�s litigated a sl1it v1itl1 res1Ject to property, clai 11 1ing t111der one title, l1e 15 not reql11:ed to assert grot111ds of a.ttack or defence tl1at 111ay exist on the basis of a11other t1tle. 133 TJ1e fo]lowi11g tl1ree cases illt1strate tl1e J11 dia11 position. WJ1ere A . Slted B for a decla_ratio n that he was tl1e owner of lt1nd and jt1dgn1ent \Vas for B, A w�s not barred 1n a Sl1bseq11ent st1it for possessio11 brot1oht by B against A fron1 pleading that he was i 1 1 possession as a te1 1ant. 134 111 tl1e fi�st st1it l1e was litigating
128. See 'Mahabir Pershad v. Mac11gl1ten (Privy Cout1cil, I 1dia, 1889 J1 1dia11 App., vol. 16, P· lO? i ), 129. See Guddappa v. TirkapJJa (1-Iigh Ct. Bombay, 1901), ]11dia11 L. Rep., vol. 25, p. 1s9. 130. See Doorga Persad v. Doorga Konwari (Pri 5, vol. App ., J11di a11 vy Council' India' 187 . 9)' p. 149. 131. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 5(1 ). 132. S� Kanhiya Lal v. Ashraf Kl1an (Higl1 Ct., Allahabad ' 1924) ' 1924 All-India Rep., P· 355· 133. Tb1s wo Id not pply wher e tl1e party asserted tl1at l1e was entitled to receive prop �rty h:eId � by anotl�e r on different groui1ds, on, ussi disc e.g., the survivorship and testate st1ccession. See . , note 130 and accompa sup,a nying text. 134. See Msst· Afzaltlrutlssa v. Fayazuddit1 (Higl1 Ct., Lahore, 1931), 1931 All-J11dia Rep., P· 61 0·
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1 e land, and in the second suit he was 1 1·t i·gati·. tl of ng as a te11at1 t. er own the as 1 er : A sue d B for recovery of Jand, alleging tl1at B held tinder wl was ca�e . Another the lease was �1 ot proved, and the stiit was dismissed. expired, had 1 whic! e, a leas on tlle grotitld that lJ e 1tte 5 to st1e to recov� � �ossessi?n of �he land perm � was . A In tl1e first s11it the basis of l1 1s claim was that Ile was the r. owne _ e J tl was recover fro111 tl1e lessee to while in tl1e second Stlit he was entitled and or less and l1 e11ce .1,e was 11ot clain1i11g 1111der tl1e same title. SimiJarly owner, as miiig clai Etl1.$ 500 for . 11se and occttpation of J,is land by B, recover to stied A re \.Vlle alleging tl1at tl1 e lease l1eld by B l �ad exp1recl, and the s11it was disnlissed on t]ie 1 ad not expirecl lie was 11ot barred from st1bsequently sui oo 1 lease the tl1at nd '. grou . to recover rent d11e u11der the lease. 136 I11 tl1e first s11it, tl1e basis of tJ1 e claim wa� that B was a trespasser, a11d B litigatecl tl1e s11it i11 tl1at ca1)acity wliile tl,e stibse quent suit is against B as a te11a11t.
It see1ns to 111e that to approacl1 ''ougl1t to have been made a gro11ncl of attack or defence'' in ligl1t of '']itigati11 g 1111der tl1e sa1ne title'' is not sot1nd. Even though tl1e party 1nay be clai111 ing 11nder clifferent titles in both st1its, tl1e clai111 s may be related. It l1as bee11 J 1 eld, as we l1 ave seen, tl1at in a s11it for possession as absolute owner, failt1re to assert a clai111 to possession as 111ortgagee bars its assertion in a st1bseqt1ent stiit. 137 Tl1is decision has been explained on the ground that 1l1e clai111s are not so clissi111ilar as to caitse co11fi1sio11 c1ncl, t/1erej'ore, tl1ey oz1g/1t to /1ave bee11 ,nacle. If we approach tl1 e 1natter in tllis ,vay and not 011 the basis of "san1e title'', we will not necessarily reacl1 tl1 e sa1ne res11lts as \Vere reacl1ed by the Iod.ian co11rts in tl1 e tl1ree cases j11st discussed. U11 der tl1 e sL1ggested approacl1 tl1 e court would look at the natt1re of the gro1111 d asserted a11d ask \vl1etl1er tl1 e grot111d omitted is st1f i1ciently related to tl1e 011 e asserted so that, in view of tl1 e p11rpose i11 reqt1iring all grot1nds of attack or defe11ce to be asserted in a single s11it, it 011gl1t to l1ave beeu raised i11 tl1 e for111er suit. In the first case, wl1 ere A s11ecl for a declaration. tl1at lie was tl1e ow11er of land, l1e \Vas only seel<.i11g declaratory relief to establish ow11ersl1ip. I-le was not tryi11 g to defe11d l1is l)Ossession or to oust any one else fron1 J)ossession. Si11ce l1 e ,vas seel<.i11 g a declaration of ownersl1ip, l1e 011gl1t 11ot to be expected to assert 111atters wl1icl1 wot1lcl establisl1 a right to ·possessio11 ar1 d, therefore, sbo11ld be able to assert tl1ose matters i11 a sL1bseq11e11t st1it. So, I wo11ld agree \vitl1 tl1e res11lt in tl1 e :first case, altl1 ot1gl1 for a differe11t reaso11. I-Iowever, suppose tl1at B were i n possessio11 ancl A s11ecl to recover possession from 1 1im, alleging that l1 e was the ow11er of tl1e land. J11dgment was for B. In a subseq11e11t suit against B for possessio11, A alleges tl1 at l1e is entitled to possession . as a te11 ant. Even thot1gl1 l1e is litigating the second s11it under a differe11 t title, 1t sl101ild be barred. In tl1e first st1it ]1e sot1ol1t to recover possession ancl sl1ot1ld l1ave alleged all grot1nds that wot1ld l1 ave s11p�orted llis claim. He co11ld have asserted lus rigl1 t to possession as owner and as tenant alter11atively. Having failed to do so, l1e g possession °11 a s�1ot1ld not be permitted to instit11te a s11bseq11ent s11it, claini.in__ f ot gro11nd. In other words, the title 1111der wl1ich a J Jart� litigates _sl1ot1ld be ?rfere irrelevant to tl1e questio11 of v1hat 1natters l1e 011ght to ?e req111red to raise. If tl1e a11t ? matter could have enabled the plai11tiff to obtain tl1e relief sot�gl1t or the defen . to successft1]Jy defend the action, it 011ght to l1ave bee� . rai s�d, . and tl1 e frultire of the party to do so sl1 011ld precl11de hi1n from ra1s1ng it 1n a Sllbseqtient suit. 135. See Zamo rio of Calicut v. Narayanan (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1899), lnclian L. Rep., vol. 22• p. 323. 136. See Watson v. Dhonendra (High Ct., Calcutta, 1878), lnclian L. Rep., vol 3, p. 6· 137. See note 121, si,pra .
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nd tl1e seco in case, which held tha 1lt rest tl1e e rov app ld wou J is, bas that On t . the se t lea a und th. gro tl1e on 1d 1 la � ad expir ed and tl1e r ove rec to d B sue wllere A tly uen m seq fro sub ing red try bar ot was I1e , ved pro not �o recover s wa � e leas the . cerned with tern.unating the con only was l e , st11t first tl1e 1 J1 er. own ! as land tlie 1 tl1e te fron . Ian ant the ng His ownership veri reco � d n a. sl1ip tion rela � ant -ten lord land was not in isst1 e nor threatened. In tl1e second suit he was trying to establis]1 his 0,vnersl1ip, and tl1ere was 110 reason for_ l1i111 to l1ave tried t� do so �o the first stlit. I-Iowever, if tl1e approacl1 s11ggested ts followed, tl1e rest1lt 1n tl1e third case we liave discussed. is 11ot correct. In tl1at case the landlord wl10 u1 1successfu]]y broug ht a suit to recover n1011ey for wrongft1l t1se a11d occt1patio11 was not barred from subse q11e i1 tly st1i 11g to recover tl1e re1 1t d11 e tinder tl1e lease. In both suits the landlord v,1as seeki11 g tl1e sa1 11e relief, tl1e recover)' of 111011ey for t1se of tl1e land. In the first suit l1e clai1ned tl1at tl1e defe11da.nt owed tl1e money, because he was wrongf ully occt1pyir1g the ]a11d. 111 tl1e seco11d s11it l1e claimed tl1at the defendant owed the 1 11oney u11der tl1e lease. I11 tl1e seco11d suit 11.e was 1 nerely cl1anging the theory of tl1e defe11da11t's liability. I11 tl1e first s11it, l1e co11ld l1ave clain1ed alternatively against tl1e defenda.nt as a wro11gful occ11 pier a 1 1d as a lessee. Ordi11arily a party 1 nay not clai1 11 tl1e sa111e relief 011 different tl1eories in s11bseq11ent st1its, and tbe res11lt shot1ld 1 1ot be differe11t 111erely beca11se tl1e otl1er !)arty 1 11ay 11ot be litigating under the sa 1 ne title in tl1e subseq11e11t st1it. TI1e claim t i nder tl1e lease co11ld have bee11 asserted co11venie11tly i11 tl1e first st1it, and si11ce it was not made a grot1nd of attack at tl1at ti111e, it sl1ot1ld 11ot be 1 11ade i11 a s11 bseqt1e11t st1it. Therefore, it is submitted tl1at tl1e co11rts sl1011Id n.ot i11terpret ''ol1gl1t to l1ave been n1ade a ground of defence or attaclc'' in ligl1t of ''litigating 1111der the same title." If, under the criteria we l1ave disc11ssed, tl1e 1 11atter 01rgl1t to l1ave bee 1 1 11 1ade a gro1111d of attack or defence, it sl1011Id be res j11dicata irrespective of tl1e title 1 1 nder wl1icl1 tl1e parties are litigating i11 tl1e st1bsequent s11it. Finally, it si1011Id be observed tl1at the failt1re to assert a clai1n of co1111terclaim or set-off b)' tl1e defe11da11t does 11ot bar l1is doing so i n a st1bsequent suit. B)7 definition, tl1e defe11da11t l1as a11 option in tl1 is regard: he n1ay assert tl1e clai1n or n1ay raise it i11 an indepe11de 1 1t suit. 138 Si11ce l1e has tl1is option, a claim of cot1nter clai1n or set-off does not co11stit11te a ''111atter ,:vluch 011g]1t to l1ave been 1nade a gro11nd of defence'' ,:vitl1in tl1e 111eani1 1g of the rt1le.139 N'ote, however, tl1 at wl1ere tl1e defendant l1as assertecl tl1e facts givi11g rise to tl1e cot1nterclal111 or set-off as a defe11ce to tl1e plai11tiff 's clai1n and tl1e isst1e created by tl1e facts is resolved agai11st tl1e defe 11dant, l1 e 1 11ay not subseq11ently bri1Jg a s11it 011 the clai 111 , e.g., ,vi1ere i11 a suit for tl1e price of tl1e goods, tl1e defe1 1dant conte 1 1ds tl1at tl1e goods were defective and the co11rt fincls tl1at tl1e goods were 1 1ot defective the defe11da11t n1a)' 11ot st1bsequently bri 11 g a s11it to recover da.111ages fo1· breacl1 of warranty. 140 (b) Relief not gra11ted Tl� e se �ond aspect of the scope of res j t1 dicata is that any relief clain1e� i 11 _ the s11 1t whicl1 l1as not been expressly granted by tl1e decree passed in tl1e suit 15 deeined _ to_ have beefl: ref11sed. 141 Tl1is 11111st be disting11isl1 ed fro1 11 the situation where . tlie plaintiff s1)l1ts his cal1se of: actio11, tl1at is, wl1ere he seeks recovery for only a part of the �amage s11fferec1, and fro1n tl1e situation where the pla i1 1tiff fails to a.s� for some relief to wl1 1_ cl1 l1e was entitled. Where tl1 e plai11tiff s11 es for only a par t 138. See Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 234(1) (f), 236. 139. See Draksharam v. Gunda (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1926), 1926 All-India Rep., p. 1020. 140. S�e the discussion, supra, note 84 an d accompanying text. 141. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 5(3).
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damage, as we will see, .he may � ot st1e for the re1nainder. ?42 By the same does not se:k _reli�f to wh1cl1 . 11� was entitled, he 111ay not claim the he if en, tok this too I��olves sp � 1tt1ng a cat1se of action. The p resent rtile r f , uen t1 bseq � � 511 f e reli .el1ef was 1 n fact _ wl 1 ere 1 s1t11 at1o n asked for, btit was not expressly deals with the _ expressly refusecl. !n ? tl1er words, the decree is sileiit as to tll e reli or n d e t ef gran tl1e _ relief 1s clee111ed to have case s such 11 been reftised notwitllstanditlg 1 d. e n claii _ r ess r11l1ng to this effect. So, w11 ere the plaintiff stied exp an of e nc abse to recover e th poss ession of land a11d n1e�ne proJi�s __for tl1e tin1e tl1e defe11d�11t was irl occltpation red to possess1011, tl1e plaintiff could and tI1e decree ordered that t.he l )la111t1ff be resto 143 TI1e decree was silent as to n1esiie recov er to 111es11e s11e profi t s. que11tl y e sttbs not pro·fits, and tl111s, the req11est for n1esne p r ofits was deemed to }1av e been reftised. Or, the n1ortgagee s11es to recover tl1e amo1111 t of tl1e debt a11d in defa11Jt of sttcl1 tl1e 111ortgaged property. TI1e court grants a decree for tl1e recovery, for tl1e sale of amo11nt of _tl1e debt. A _ s11b_seq11e11t s11it by tl1e n1 ortgagee to have tl1e property sold is barred, since s11ch rel1ef 1s deen1ed to l1ave been refused in the for1ner suit.144 of the
However, i n India it l1as be en l1eld tl1at wl1ere relief clai111ed b11t not granted was only a11xiliary to the principal relief tl1at was so11gl1t, tl1e fail11re to grant sucl1 relief does not mean it was reft1sed, and a s11bseq11e11t s11it to obtain sucl1 relief is not ba rred. A sues B to recover l1er sl1are in tl1e estate of D, whicl1 B l1olds. She clai111s to be D's widow, wl1icl1 B denies, so sl1e also seel<s a de claration tl1at sl1e "vas ma rried to D. There is a conse11t decree which a\vards l1er a su111 of money fro1n the estate of D in B's possessio11. Tl1ere is 110 declaration as to the validity of her 1narriage to D. She 1nay s11bseq11ently s11e B, clai1ning as D's \vidow, to recover lier sl1are in tl1e estate of a de ceased relative of D.145 I11 the for111er suit tl1e J)rincipal relief cl.aimed was l1er sl1are i11 tl1e estate of D. 111 o rder to substantiate t l1is clain1, sl1e sougl1t a dec]aratio1.1 tl1at sl1e was D's widovv, b11t 011ce a consent agree1nent \Vas reacl1ed, s11cl1 a declaration was 11ot 11ecessary. Tl1erefo re, tl1e cour t held quite JJr operly tl1at tl1e failt1re to iss11e s11ch a declaration sl1011ld not operate to foreclose tl1e qt1estion i11 f11tu re litigation. B11t except fo r cases st1ch as tl1is, failure to expressly gra11t r elief n1ea11s tl1at the r elief \Vas de11ied, and it cannot be claimed in a s11bseq11e11t s11it. In this section we l1 ave explored at le11gtl1 tl1e provisions of tl1e Code relating to res judicata. These provisions are broad and design ed to i11s11re that matters whicl1 were litigated or cot1ld I1ave been litigated bet\veen parties to a s t1i� or p� rsons claiming tinder s11cl1 parties will no t be litigated again. Tl1e p11rpo� e 1s to_ 1_ nst1re finality of litigation. A. related p11rpose 1.11ay be fo1111d in the rule against spl1tt1ng a clain1 to whicl1 we will now tttr n.
B. Splitting of Claims 1. General Principles to as so d n1e fra be ble ica act r p as r fa It is provided tl1 at every st1it sl1all as revent fur �L1er p to d an 11t sp i cts bje su ord � �� _ ground fo r frnal decision t1p on tl1 e � � . ht1gat1on concernino tI1ein. 146 Tlle principles of res Jt1d1cata JlISt d1sct1ssed are clesign ed to implement this pt1rpose, pa rtic11larly tl1at req11iring a party to assert all the 142. 143. 144. 145. 146.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216. · 252 P· 21, l. vo p., Re L. lian Inc 4), See Jiban v. Durga (High Ct., Calcutta, 189 849. p. 33, l. vo p., Re L. lian lnc 6), 190 See Sbibu v. Chandra Mohan (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 342· See Fatmabai v. Aishabai (l-Iigl1 Ct., Bombay, 1889), fnclian L. Rep., vol. 13, p. Civ. Pro. C ., Art. 216(1).
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t ril of no pe e ing tl1 be at ve I1a le ab ay m ]1e to ice fei de as rt or k ac att f o d s grouii . b� s , i 1l ed 11t 1ne e by ple tl1 r m l1e 1rt f rt is i e L os e rp p11 pro le 11 1t· 1 1n a, su,bs,eqtleilt stiit. Tl tl1en 47 E, e1. . s111t u . 1 1nust 111c e d · . th. e ·. · . •vh n o • · tt . ac f o �e 11 ca a f o ig i i tt li ? le of the sp � iilg tlie . 1 res1Ject to tlie cai,se of action. 148 ,11/ J 1 1lce 111c , to l lec t1t e11 s 1 (f tiA 1 i, pla . 11,J11·cfi r/1e , /111 • !JJ CtG 11, c e _1n y no afterwards a11 h J. fhi o s . 1 por an ?! t 1)ec res !u st1e to . its o1n � �� s1m_ply, a pla1nt�� � If the plai11tiff � 9 ff Sta ted . 1na y ._ ed tt 111 not split 01 so n io rt Jo e tl 1 to t ec sp re ll l it Stle \V 1on gives occasion for of act 1se ca1 l1e ''T 1t, t p11 1rt cot e on As . ion act of lse his cat les ab 1 1se e:r t a ca1 n tl1a n1a if d to ask for an t, s11i tl1e of on ati ind fot tl1e and for1115 l1is its im, lim cla he cannot after 11e icl1 vvl1 to t tl1a n tl1a ef reli ler wic a laroer a11d 150 Tl1e r·ule is desi ." gs din ee oc JJr nt cle en ep ind by ce im ward; seek to recover tl1e balan s s11it on ]e ltip t 1nu wha by is essential ed de11 b11r 1g bei1 11 fro1 rts co11 tl1e ent JJrev ed to .1s1 t 11en ass1 l1ar d u by 11 eate rep fro1 ut 11da s defe tl1e 8 it tect JJro to and ng ,vro ly 011e It is not diffi.cL1lt to pictL1re a ,1i11dictive J)lai11tiff bri11ging a nt11nber of suits agains t Tl1e p11rpose of civil litigation a defe11dant wl10 l1as co1ru11itted a wrong agai11st l1i111. 152 a11cl it ·is reasonable and is to JJrovide cornpensatio11 for tl1e i11jt1recl party, proper to reqttire l1i111 to claiu1 all tl1e co111pe11satio11 to wl1icl1 l1e is entitled in a single· suit. Ft1rtl1er111ore, a JJarty entitled to n1ore than one relief ,vitl1 respect to tl1e san1e catise of action must sue for all tl1ose reliefs in one s11it, and if be fa.ils to do so, l1e 111a>' not afterwards do so for tl1e relief 0111itted.153 However, in certain cases, tl1e co11rt n1a�l gi,,e l1in1 leave to s11e for the additio11al relief at anotl1er ti111e.154 Tl1L1s, tl1ere are two aspects to tl1e rt1le agai11st splitting a cause of action: (1) tl1e J)lai11tiff 11111st i11clt1de the wl10Ie of l1is clain1 with respect to tl1e cause of actio11 on ,vl1icl1 l1e sues, a.11d (2) tl1e JJlai11tiff 111t1st seek all the relief to wl1icl1 he js entitled t111cler tl1at ca11se of action. It' he 0111its to st1e for part of the clain1 or 0111its, except \,1itl1 lea,1e of co11rt, to s11e for all of tl1e relief to wllich l1e is e11titled, l1e 111ay not st1bseq11e11tly st1e for tl1e part of tl1e clai111 or relief he has 0111itted. Note tl1at if it ,vere 11ot for tl1e rt1le prol1ibiting Sj)]itting of clain1s, tl1e q11estio11 of the defendant's liability i11 tl1e s11bsequent st1it wot1ld be res judicata, 1
147.
148. 149. 150.
151. 152. 153. 154.
Civ. Pro. c;., Art. 5(2). The relationshi1J between tl1e two pri11ciples is den1onstrated by_ ti}� case of Wright v. Ben11ett (Ct. App., Eng. 1948), All-Eng. Rep., vol. 1, p. 227. Tl1e pla1ot1ft broL�ght suit against the defe11da11t to recover dan1ages for frat1dt1lent n1isrepreseotation and negh�ence. Judgn1ent was for the defenclant. I-le brougl1t a seco11d su.it on the san1e facts, alleg1ng a fraudule11t co11spiracy by tl1e defendant and others. Tl1e cot1rt I1eld that \\1 hether or not the second suit ,vas barred by res judicata, successive st1its cot1lci not be brought on tl1e same f ac�s. There was one cause of actio11 for any l1ar111 allegedly caused by the defendant, ,vh1ch could not be S[Jlit. Sor"!let_imes a s�1it 111ay be ba�red botl1 on grot111ds of res judicata and splitting of clainis. to ge dan1a and 1 15 11volve? an tn iojt1ries 1ob1le n auto_ accide11t witJ1 B a11d st1frers IJersonal A_ his automobile. _I-Ie SL!es B to recover for the personal injt1ries, a11cl judgn1e11t is for B. �o s B of s�1?seq !ssue �ient sui_ t a�a1n st to B the , rec?v er for tl1e da111age to tl1e at1tor11obile � lia�ili�y is res Judicata, because it_ was �eter111it1e� in . the prior suit. Assuming that th.� plaintiff l1ad only 011e cat1se of act1011, \v}11cl1 we will d1sct1ss subseqt1e11tly, the second SUI f cause 15 _barred also� ?ec use the JJ!aintiff has split l1is clain1 same ? the to respect with � actio�. The d1�t1n �1on would be significa11t if the plai11tiff J1ad prevailed i11 the firSt sui�. � Tlle issue of ltabihty would be res jt1dicata in favor of tl1e plaintiff, but the secon d SUit would be barred, because tl1e JJlaiotiff l1ad split l1is claim. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(3). Mulianunad Hafiz v. Muha1n111ad Zakariya (Privy Cot1ncil, India, 1921), I 922 All-I,rdia Rep., p. 23. 235 See the discussion in S. Sarkar, Tl1e Lau, of Civil Pro 1, o . 3), ceclure (4th ed. ' 19 6 v l P· · · pter I, • · Cha · n in See the c1·iscussio sttpra, notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(4). Ibid.
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since tl1at qt1estion was detertnined in tl1 e IJrior st1it, a 1 1d t11is migl1t encourage the plaintiff to bring . s�ch . a suit . i11 order to l1 arass the defendant. To J Jrevent sttcl1 a sitt1ation, the pla1nt1ff 1s required to assert tl1 e \Vhole of tl1 e clai 111 i 1 1 one sitit. There is one sitt1atio11 wl1ere tl1e wl10Je of tl1 e clain1 11eed not be i 11cluded. The plai1Jtiff m,1y i 11tentionally reJinqt 1isl1 a portio11 of J1is clain1 so as to bring it \vitl1 i 11 the jurisdiction of a partic11lar co11rt. 155 B11t if he does so, he 111ay ,1 ot subsequently sue· witl � respect to tl1 � ·portion of tl1e clai111 that was relinqt1isl1 ed. 156 Suppose that A J1as issued a pron1 1ssory 11 ote to B for Eth.$ 5,200. Suit sl1ot1Id be brot1ght in 157 b11t B does riot V11a11t to travel to tl1e provincial capital and Co11rt, 1 l-figl e 1 tl v.;ants to file the st1it i11 the Awradja G11ez,1t Cot1rt. J 1e is per11 1itted to do so by relinqt1isl1i11 g Etl1 .$ 200 and s1 1 ing for Etl1.$ 5,000 instead of Eth.$ 5,200, but l1 e n1ay 11ot later stte A i11 tl1e Woreda Guezat Cot1rt to recover tl1 e re1nai11i11g Eth.$ 200.158 H· e l1 as aba11doned tl1 e rigl1t to recover tJ1at s111n. I-Iovvever, if tl1 e case sl1ot1ld be tra 1 1sferred to tl1 e High Cot1rt, 159 it wot1ld be proper for B to a1nend I1is statement of clain1 to add tl1e re 111ai 1 1i11 g Eth.$ 200.160 Note also tl1 at a ·plaintiff 1 1 aving a ot 1111.ber of ca11ses of action against a defe11d ant is not req11ired to joi11 · tl1e111 in a si11gle s11it. A plai1 1tiff 111ay 11nite several causes of actio.11 against a single defencla11t, 161 b11t he is not required to clo so. Tl1 e r11le o·nly prol1 ibits the splitti 1 1g of a si11 gle ca11se of action. As \VC will see, ma11 y cases revolve aro11 1 1d tl1e qr1estion of ,vl1etl1er tl1 e plaintiff had a si11gle cause of action a.gai11 st tl1 e sa1ne defe11 d,111t or ,vl1etl1er lie had, i11 fact, two c,1L1ses of action agai 11 st l1in1. Tl1e rule refers to ''01nitti11g a l)Ortion of his claim." So 1011g as tl1 e J)lai11tifl' was a,vare of tl1 e claim, tl1 e on1 issio 11 of a portion, even if 11ni11tentional, bars a subseq11ent su.it witl1 respect to tl1 at .J)Ortio11 .162 By tl1e sa111e tol<en, tl1e Code says tl1e plaintiff sl1all 11ot ''afterwards sue." TJ1e qt1estio.11 arises as to \vl1at is tl1 e effect of the plai 11tiff's SJ Jlitti11 g h. is c]ai111 by filing sii1111lta11 eot1s stiits, ;,e., .he files se[)arate suits at tl1e san1 e tj111 e eitl1er before tl1 e same court or before different cot1rts. One vie,v is to hold tl1at tl1 e s11its sho11ld be consolid.ated, 163 a11 d tl1 is 111 ay be done in Ethiopia w11 etl1er the s11its are pending before tl1 e sa1 11 e cotirt or . before differe11 t co11rts.164 Anotl1 er view is to l1olcl tl1at one n1ust be dismissecl, and tl1e 0 11e bearing the later nun1 ber is deen 1 ed to be :filed after\vards. 165 A. tl1ird view is to l1old tl1at the plaintiff 111 ay elect \\1l1.icl1 s11it he war1ts to J Jrosecute; 166 J Jres11mably l1 e co11ld amend his state111 e11 t of clai 1 11 to add the a11101111t 0111itted. 167 The latter procedure '155. .156. 157. 158. 159. I 60. 161. 162.
163. 164. 165. 166. 167.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 216(2). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 216(3). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 15(1) (a). See Ramlall v. Bhajabari (High Ct., Calcutta, 1896), Calcutta Weel,ly Notes, vol. 1, p. 32. As it migl1t be under Civ. Pro. C., Art. 31. See Ran1lall v. Bhajahari, supra, note 158. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 217. See Ram Prasad v. Rad11a Panday (High Ct., Patna, 1_940), 19� 1 All� Inclia Rep.,. p. 37. As we will see, wJ1 ere the plaintiff was not aware of _a po: t1on_ of his claim at the tune of the first suit, a seco.od suit is not barred. See the d1scuss1on, 111/ra, notes 212-214 a11cl accon1pany ing text. See Ganesh Rarnchaodra v. Gopal Lakshn1an (lligh Ct., Bombay, 1942) 1943 All-Inclia Rep., p. 12. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11. See Murti v. Bhola Ram (Higl1 Ct., Allal1abad, 1894), Jnclial'z L. Rep., vol. 16, p. 165. See Rayalu Ayyar v. Rarnudu Ayyar (}Iigh Ct., Madras, 1926), lnclian L. Rep., vol. 49, p. 869. See Upendra v. Janaki (I:-Jigh Ct., Calcutt.a., 1918), Indian L. Rep., vol. 45, p. 305.
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iff of int e a th pla ve o pr rti de po to n n � so ·ea of his 110 is ere Th st. ! de un so seenis r, ld ve he ou we sh . Ho 1ts s11 be made to ate ar sep ed fil s l1a e 1 I e us ca be ly np i si claim 1 1d any �mendn1 �nt �l1ould be conditional a n, aw l1dr wit l1as he t sui t11e of ts cos _ pay tlle .l1e has ct d _111 on at1 1ol of the rule, the h t1g l1o AJt ts. � cos se � tl1o � ing pay . ltpon 11 is ng ned by JJJ1 bei sc1 ''d e ha t1ld l1o � He . ied ned � � re1 �ged with be ily eas � can m liar ere , ls wl1 a t sui 11n. cla 111s 1s of n � tio ug por bro a of s ? ht los tl1e by not and costs _ ff t1Id be 111t1 sho pla tl1e 111, cla1 permitted to a of tio11 por a to ect resp l1 wit only 168 . on rti po ed itt 01n the d amend to ad TI1e prohibitio11 is agai11st the bringing of a st1bseq11ent suit with respect to the on1itted JJortion. It does not prol1ibit tl1e plai11tiff fro111 asserting an omitted portion of a clain1 as a clefe11ce i11 a s11bseqt1e11t st1it. Suppose that tl1e n1ortgagee 01nits to i11clude a 1Jortio11 of tl1e 111ortgaged property in l1is st1it to obtain possession 11nder tl1e 111ortgage. However, he does obtain possessio11 of the whole, and the 111ortgagor bri11gs s11it aga.inst l1i111 to recover possession of tl1at part of the property not i11cl11ded in the decree in tl1e prior suit. The mortgagee is not precluded from asserting l1is rigl1t of sect1rity in tl1at portio11 by way of defence to the suit.169 I-Iovvever, a IJarty wl10 on1itted to incltide a portio11 of the claim in a prior suit sl1ot1ld not be able to recover that amot111t by way of co11nterclai1n or set-off in a s11bseqt1e11t st1it against l1i1n. A defe11dant asserting a co11 11terclaim or set-off is in tl1e position of a plai11tiff as regards tl1at co11nterclai1n or set-off, 170 and shottld be st1bject to tl1e sa111e rt1le 1 Jrobibitii1g tl1e splitting of claims. Also, tl1e prohibition of s1Jlittir1g of clai111s a1Jplies to a11y clai111 tl1at 11as been asserted by way of counter clai1n or set-off. So, ,v11ere A sties B for Eth.$ 200 and B, who bas a claim of Etl1.$ 1,200, seel<s to set-off Et11.$ 200 of l1is clai1n and does so, l1e is p reclt1ded fron1 s11 bseq11ently s11i11g for the re1naini11g Etl1.$ I ,000. 171
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Likewise, w11ere the n1ortgagee sued for a deficiency after foreclosure, a11d tl1e 111ortgagor defended 011 tl1e grot1ncl that tl1e n1ortgagee l1ad in1properly conducted tl1e foreclost1re, tl1e 1nortgagor could 11ot st1bseq11ently s11e to recover d.amages res11lt ing fron1 the impro1)er sale. 172 TJ1e n1ortgagor's defence in tl1e forn1er suit was analogot1s to set-off i11 tl1at I1e was contending tl1at as ,l rest1lt of tl1e sale, not only· did the 111ortgagee not realize tl1e a11101111t of tl1e debt, b11t l1e, as n1ortgagor, \Vas deprived of a st1rp]us. Tl1e total an1011nt of tl1e n101·toaoor's loss l1ad been incurred at tl1e time of tl1e first s11it. I-le l1ad a ca11se of acti;ne as a res11Jt of tl1e improJJer sale, wl1icl1 l1e elected to em1JlO)' as a defence to tl1e 1nortgagee's suit for the deficiency. Since he failed to assert a clai111 for additional da111ages at tl1at tin1e, l1e could 11ot do so i11 a st1bseq11e11t s11it. . . Tl1e r11le against splitting of clai111s is not applica.ble to proceedi11gs in exec�t�on 1 � tl1e se11se _tl1at the decree-l1older may JJresent s11ccessive applicatio11s for reaJ1z1n.g different portions o� tl1e sa111e decree. So, tl1e decree-l1older 111ay file a11 applicati?n t� recover possession of the property a11d. a subseqt1ent application to realize his costs.173 Bt1t the rt1le shot1ld be applicable to the execution of n1oney decrees, 168. Ibid. 169. e �� 1! �.njab National Bank v. Official Receiver (Higl1 Ct., Lahore, 1939), 1940 All-India Rep., 170. ee e.g., tl1e provisio11s of Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 234(1) (f), 236(2), 238(2), 239(1). ! 171. ee Katl1er a Rowther v . Abdul Rahim (High 80 · · 5 ., P Rep Ct., II-J1 Ma 1dia dra s, 1942), 1942 A � 172. � r <le rian v. Un�on Market Nat th , iona Ban l k 19 up. � 50 Ct., Mas (S ::,e � sach ts, U.S., ) Nor . 930 Rep., 2nd Series, vol. 95, p. 552, in R. Field and B Kaplanusetsupr ote 124, P· · a n ' · ' 173. See Radha Kishen v. Radha Prasad (High Ct., Calcutta, 1891), Jndia11 L. Rep., vol. 10, P· 51 5·
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n1ay be exect1ted t1pon as a t111it. If tl1e decree-I1older 011Iy decrees sucl1 since of part of a n1oney-decree, l1e may not later apply for exectition applies for exec11tion 174 e. balanc the of 2.
"'hole of the Claim with Res11ect to tl1e Cause of Action (a) What constitutes the whole of the claim
As \Ve l1ave said, tl1e rule only prol1ibits tl1 e splitting of a si11gle ca11se of actio11 and does not require tl1e plai11tiff to st1e 011 all tl1e cat1ses of action he l1as agai11st tl1e defendant. Tl1 e qt1estion is wl1etl1cr tl1e plaintiff l1as ''split l1is claim \vitl1 respect to tl1e cat1se of actio11." Jn order to a11swer tl1is qt1estion, the cottrt n111st deter111ine (1) ,vl1at ,vas tl1 e cat1sc of action i11 respect of \vhicl1 the claim ,vas made in tl1e for11 1er st1it, (2) \Vl1at is tl1e clai111 111ade in tl1e st1bseq11ent st1it, a11d (3) \Vl1etl1er tl1e clai111 11 1ade i11 tl1 e st1bseqt1e11t st1it cotlld have bee11 111ade i11 .,,,,}1ole or in part in respect of tl1e cat1se of action in tl1e prior stiit. 175 As ,ve l1a,,e said, tl1e cause of actio11 111ay be defi11ed as ''that ,vl1icl1 gives occasion for and forn1s the foundation of the Sttit." 176 It is tl1e facts wl1icl1 give rise to tl1e liability of tl1e defendant a11d tl1e relief clai111 ed by tl1e plaintiff. Wl1 ere the facts could give rise to only 011e catise of action, if tl1e plai11tiff l1as 11ot included tl1e wl1ole of l1is clai111 in the {Jrior suit, l1e 111ay not s11bseq11ently sue on tl1e rest of ]1is clairn. Tl1e follo\ving cases will illt1strate tl1 e application of tl1is rttle. A lets a l1ot1se to B at a >'early rent of .Etl1.$ 1,200. The rent ,vas 11ot paicl in 1960, 1961 and 1962. 1.n 1963 A s11ed to recover tl1e re11t due for 1961 a11c! ,vas st1ccessful. He n1ay 11ot afterwards st1e 13 for tl1e re11t for 1960 or 1962. 177 At the ti,ne of tl1e stiit i11 1963, he l1ad a clai.111 against B for tl1ree years' rent 1111cler the lease. Tl1e lease created l1 is cat1se of actio11, a11d vvhen l1e stied l1e h�1cl to c!ai111 all he \1/aS e1Jtitled to t111der tl1e lease. Since l1 e only stied. for a tJart of tl1e rent, lie cotild not st1bseqt1ently s11e for tl1e re111ai11der. Or, the plai11 tiff's I1usband l1 aci a11 accide11tal death inst1ra11ce JJolicy. Part A JJrovideci tl1at l1is vvidovv sl1otI!d receive Etl1.$ 2,000 UJJOn l1 is accidental deatl1. Part .B provided that tl1e co1n 1Jaoy ,vould pay an additional Eth.$ 200 for eacl1 year that tl1e policy l1acl bee11 rene\.ved. At tl1e tin1e the htisband suffered tl1e accide11tal deatl1, tl1e 1 Jolicy !1ad bee11 rene,vecl 11 ine times. Tl1e plaintiff \Vas, tl1erefore, e11titled to recover Etl1.$ 3,800 under the JJolicy. She stied to recover tl1 e Etl1.$ 2,000 clue 1111der Part A. She 1nay riot n1aintain st1it to reco,,er tl1e Etl1.$ I ,800 due 1111der Part B. Tl1e policy gave her a rigl1t to recover Etl1.$ 3,800, and sl1e ,vas reqtiired to seek recovery of tl1e e11tire a.n1ot1nt. i11 one st1it. So too, wl1ere the plaintiff in an a11to111obile �1ccide11t s11ffered botl1 personal to l1is at1tomobile, and l1e sued only to recover for tl1e da111age injt1ries and da1naae b . . to tl1e at1to111obile, l1e 111ay 11ot st1bseqt1e11tly st1e to recover for tl1 e perso11al InJtiries.178 TI1ere ,vas one act of tl1e defe11dant, wl1ich cat1sed l1arm to tl1e plaintiff, and it is in1material tl1at st1cl1 act cat1sed two lci11ds of l1ar1n, one to tl1e plai11tiff's person a11d one to his property. The plaintiff l1as a single cat1se of action. against 1 7 4. 175. 176. 177. 178.
See Panji v. Ratancband (High Ct., Bombay, 1933), 1933 A ll-Inclia Rep., p. 364. See the discussion in S. Sark:ar, supra, note 151 at p. 235. See Muhammad Hafiz v. Muhamo,ad Zakariya, supra, note 150. See Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 2, rule 2, Illustration. See Piscus v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Sup. Ct., Kansas, U.S., l 941), Pacific..Rep., 2ncl Series, vol. 112, p. 83, in C. Brown, A. Vestal and :rvr. Ladd, Ca ses _ �ncl .A1at�r1als on the contrar7 po�1l1on, holding that . Pleading and Proceclure (1953), p. 705. Some courts take _ 1s the English v1e\V. lei. at p. 708. this tly aren app two causes of action are created and Since there was but one act cat1�ing two injuries, it is difficult to see ho\.V two causes of action are created.
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ult of the res a il as ob ges tom n1a au d e accident r ove rec to 11t rig � _ t11e _ ant . end def the o 1 11 tl1 at cause of action. fr g 1n 1s ar s n1 ai cl s hi lit sp t 10 1 and he 111 ay 1 1ot afte�te� by the fact tha t the claim is i111s cla of ng itti spl _ i11st aga rtile TI1e 1 nstalments and two or inor n 1 e abl pay 1s t deb a ere 1 wl So, ts. uen 1 l sta e is dtie in i 11 1 111st sue to recover tl1e amot111 t due 1 ntiff plai the , s1tit of e 11 ti1 tl1e at dtte are 179 Nor doe s it 1natter tl1 at tl1e obligation is to be satisf ts. 1 1e1 ied aln inst l1 bot 11nder in t,vo ,vays. B owes A Etl1.$ 1,300 for servic�s rendered. I1e_ issues a p�onlissory 11 ote for Etl1.$ 700 a1 1d agrees to J)erform services for A, which the parties agree ,ire wortl1 Eth.$ 600. I-le dies witl1ot1t perfor1 I1i11g ti1e services. A s11es his representa ti,,e 011 tl1e 11ote and obtai11s a j11dg111 ent. I-le later s11es the representative to recover Etl1.$ 600, the vc:tl11e of tl1e services B failed to perform. The second suit is ba.rred. t8o B I1ad an obligatio1 1 to A in t]1e a1no11nt of Etl1.$ 1,300, and at the ti111e of tl1e first sL1it, tl1at ,11I1 01111t \vas d t1e. It is i1 111 11 aterial tl1 at tl1 e obligation was to be satisfied i11 two ways a1 1d tl1at tl1 e tl1 eory of liability was different for each: there was a single obligation to JJay Eth.$ 1,300, and it l1ad to be enforced in i ts entiret)'. However, if at tl1e ti111e of tl1e sL1.it on tl1e note, B was still alive and l1ad not reft1sed to 1 Jerfor1 11 tl1e services, a st1bseq11ent sui t to 1·ecover the Eth.$ 600 as tl1e valt1e of tl1 e u11perfor1ned services \Vo11Id not be barred. At tl1e time of the s t1it, tl1e 011 ly part of tl1 e obligatio11 tl1at wa.s owi1 1g was tl1e amot1nt of tl1 e note, a11 d tl1at 1 J,1rt of tl1e obligation reqL1iri11g tl1e perfor11 1ance of services could not l1ave beer1 e11forced. If B l1ad reft1sed or ,vas clearly 1111able to perfor1u the services, the suit ,,,ould l1ave l1ad to be broL1ght for tl1e Etl1.$ 1,300. Likewise, where at the time of ,1 sL1it 011 a 111ortgage debt, botl1 pri11cipal a11d interest are d11e, and the n1 ortgagee s ties 011ly to recover tl1e interest, a s t1bseq11e11t s11 it for tl1e principal is barred. 181
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(b) Single or multiple causes of actio11 TI1e 111ore difficL1]t cases are those \Vl1ere it may be disp11ted wl1 ether the facts of the transactio1 1 ga,,e rise to one cat1se of actior1 or to two. It t here are t\\1 0 ca t1ses of action, tl1en tl1e fail11re to clai111. tl1 e relief to vvl1 ich the party wo11Jd be 1e seco11d ca11se of action does not a1 no t1nt �o a splitting of his tl Linder entitled . _ claim, s111ce he \11as 11ot n1 al<ing a clai1n \'·litl1 res 1Ject to t]1e second cause of action. SL1ppose that A, clai11 1ing c:1S tl1 e 11 eir of l1is fatl1er, s11es B to recover possession of la ?d oc �t1�ied by B. He SL1bseq t1e1 1tly st1es C to recover possession of otl1er land, still cla11n1ng as tl1e l1 eir of l1is fatl1er. Tl1e seco1 1d s11it is not barred (it \\'011ld also not be .barre� agai11st B).182 Sii1ce these are sepa1·ate properties, J1e l1as a c �tt �e of �ct1011 \V1tl1 res1Jec t to eacl1 a11 d eacl1 ca11se of action gives rise to a d1st1nct cla1n1. Or, A, clai111ing tl1 a.t l1 e I1ad inl1erited property X fro111 his father and tl1a! B cast do11bt 011 l1is title to tl1at _1Jro1Jerty, s11es :B for a declaratio11 of ovvnersl11p 1 1ation of 1)ossessio11. S t1bseq t1e11tly l1e s11es B to recover posses" confir1 a11d _ s1on of property Y, again conte11cling tl1at I1e l1ad i11 l1erited the property froro 183 _ ed. 111s f�t her and that B l1as ca.st clo11bt 011 l1 is title. Tl1e second st1it is not barr By his actions, B cas� do11bt 011 A's title to two pieces of _propert)'· A ,vrong was _ thereby con11n1tted \V1tl1 respect to eacl1 piece of property, a1 1d tl1e two wrongs created two cat1ses of action. · 179. So to o' where a ny .0bl. iga " t·ion 1s pay a ble a t successive periods, and at the tin1e of sut·t more t 11 an o ne pa yment 1s 1n a rrear s. See note 177 supra. 180. ee Pr onath v. Bisnat 1 (High Ct., l AllaJ1abad, 1907), India,1 L. Rep., vol, 29, P · 256� � 181. ee Hikmatulla v. Iman1 Ali (1-ligb Ct., Allahaba d, 1890), J11dia11 L. Rep., vol. 12, P· 203· 182. Ss:: amp ana bo yina v. Add la a (Higl1 Ct., Ma dr as, 1902), India,, L. Rep., vo l. 25, P· 736· � 183. 410· a.r Swa rup v. Anand Swa rup (High Ct., P· Rep., a Allahabad, 1942), 1942 All-I1zdi
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However, tl1 e fact that separate rroJ)erties are involved does not 11ecessarily n1ean tl1at tl1ere �re two ca11ses of action_. If botl1 properties were injtired by a single act, there 1s b11t 011e ca11se of_ act1011. Tl1e plaintiff o,v11ed two I1 ouses, 011e in lot No. 1 of a _plot and one 1n lot No. 2. Tl1 e defendant constructecl a railroad track, and as a restilt of a cttt and fill 11 1ade in tl1e track the l1ot1ses ,vere dan1 aged. Tl1e P!ai11tiff �tied to recover dan1ages for the i11jt1ry to tl1e I1ot1se - later s11ed to recover dan1ages for tl1 e in lot No. 1 a11d ob �a111ed a Jttdg1 ne11 t. 1 Ie 184 1n lot No. hot1se Tl1e seco11d suit barred. 2. was l1eld to be the to injt1ry Tl1e caL1se of actio11 arose fro111 the constrt1ctio11 of tl1e railway track by tl1 e defe11 d ant, a11d l1e l1acl to st1e to recover da111 ages for all tl1e l1arm cat1sed to hin1 by st1ch const�t1cti�11 ._ It die! 11ot 111atter that tl1 e l1arn1 ,vas caused to two I)ieces of property, since 1t 1s tl1e nt1111ber of \.vrongs con1n1itted that determi11e the number of cat1ses of action and 11 ot tl1e 11L1111 ber of properties injt1red tl1ereby. Suppose tl1at an automobile drives i11to a l1 erd of cattle, killi11g five cows. Tl1e o\.\1ner 111 ust st1e to recover dan1ages for tl1 e loss of all of tl1e cows, becat1se tl1ere is only one cause of action, tl1 e clriving i11 to the l1 erd of cattle. Another example of the pri11ciple that it is the \.Vrong ratl1er tl.1.an. the i11jt1ry tl1 at deter.111 ines tl1 e nt1mber of cal1ses of action is tl1e followi11 g. A, alleging tl1at lie is entitled to a portio11 of the land a11d B to anotl1er f)Ortio11 , conte11ds that B dispossessed l1in1 of his l)Ortion and de1nolisl1 ed structt1res 011 it. He sues B to recover damages for tl1 e destrt1ction of the strt1ctt1res and obtai11 s a decree. He tl1 e11 sties B for a declaratio11 tl1at he is tl1e o,v11er of a portion and for an order of possession. Tl1e seconcl st1it is barred. 185 B co111n1itted one \1/rong, tl1 e act of dispossession. Tl1at wro11g cat1sed harn1 to 1\ .i11 two res1)ects: l1e was dispossessed, and l1is strt1ctt1res ,vere cle1n.olisbed. He n1t1st recover for all the ha.rm stiffered fro111 that wro11 g i11 a si11 gle st1it. The qt1estion of tl1 e nun1ber of cat1ses of action 111ay arise vvl1 ere a si11gle i11strument involves 111t1ltiple tra11sactions. SupJ)ose th,1t the 111ortgagor isst1es a n1 ort gage covering three l)lots of la11d to sect1re a clebt. Tl1e debt is paid, bt1t tl1e n1ortgagee refuses to release tl1e plots. The 111ortgagor sues to obtai11 the release of two of tl1 e plots. A later suit to obtain the release of the third plot was l1eld to be barred. 186 Tl1e wro11g co111mitted by tl1e n1ortgagee \.vas his failure to release tl1e property after tl1e debt .had been I Jaid. There \vas 011e clebt ancl one 1nortgage notwitl1standing tl1at it covered cliffere11t properties. Tl111s, tl1ere vvas only 011 e cause of action, and ti1 e clain1 arisi11g under it could 11ot be split. Sin1 jlarly, tl1ere is tl1 e qL1estio11 of \Vhetl1er all clain1s arising t1ocler a single contract 111 ust be joi 11 ed in one st1it, or to put. it in anotl1 er w,1y, do different breacl1es of tl1e same contract give rise to n1ore tl1an one cause of action? A agrees to purchase ten bales of cotto11 fro111 B. He takes delivery of seven, b11t does 11 ot pay tl1e price. I-Ie refuses to take delivery of the otl,er tl1ree. A sues to recover tl1e price for tl1e seve11 bales of \.Vl1 ich B took delivery. May l1e later sue to recover damages for B's reft1sal to tal<e delivery of the re111ai11ing three bale� ? 011e view _ would allow tl1 e sttit 011 tl1e ground that there were t\vo breacl1es, g1v111g rise to different catises of action. Tl1 e contrary view l1 olds that since botl1 claims arose 11nder tl1e san1e co11 tract, there was onJy one cause of action - tl1 e brea� l1 ? f tl1e particular contract by B. 1s1 T11 e latter view seems preferable..B l1ad an obl1gat1on to
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See Beronio v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct., Califo�n_ia, U.S., 1890), Pacific Rep., vol. 24, p. 1093, in J. Chadbourn and L. Levin, Cases on C1v1l Procedure (I 96 l), p. 580. 185. See Khardah CointJaoy Ltd. v. Durga Charan (High Ct., Calcutta, 19 19), Inc/ia11 L. Rep., vol. 46, p. 640. 186. See Bbau Daji v. Patlu (l-Jigh Ct., Bombay, 1922),_ 1923 A //- 111 d",a_ Rep., p. 63 187. Compare Anderson v. J(alagarla (I-fig11 Ct., Calcutta, 1886), Jnd1a11 L. Rep., vol_. 12, p. 339 p., (two causes of action) with Duncan v. Jeetmull (High Ct., Calcutta, 1892), Indian L. Re vol. 19, p. 372 (one cause of action). 184.
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1 e fac t that �� breacl1ed the Tl ce. pri ct 1tra co1 tl1e pay to and cont� ds take the goo f 1d by 1ng a1l a ds to pay the price goo tl1e e ta to g lin fai � � by ts, pec res two iil ract . ndent wrongs.. He simply epe two ind of n s1 m1s com the as d w vie be not s11ould � � . . _ . c 1ere tra at V/l con the time of the one e1 11nd s tion iga � obl 1 J 1s n1 for per failed to . stiit the contract l1as been defi111tely breacl1ed, that 1s, where tl1 e defendant has e ct, c tl1er ntra tl1e er 11nd sl1ould be only 1s tio1 ig ob s iou var his ? 1 � ori1 perf to � �d fail _ . 1 d 1de to t11re req r1cl1 be d all 011l 1 sl his clain:is one catise of action, and tl,e plrunt1ff tinder tl1e co11tract in t�rat s11it. Of cot1rse, if J)erforn1ance of so11,e of the obliga tions �.as not dt1e at tl1e tin1e of the fu·st st1it, e.g., if B was not yet required to pav tl1e 1)11rcbase price, a st1bseq11ent sLLit f �r 11011-1)ert'orm�nce of tl1�se_ ob'igetions would the pla1nttff was entilted to 11 ot be barred. I11 that case, at tl1 :: t11ne of tl1e st111', 1nake on!y one clai111 \Vitl1 respect to tl1e cause of action:, and l1e 1r1a.y make a second clai1n witl1 respect to the san1e ca11se of action wl1en entitled to do so. Also, it is J)ossible tl1at separate co11tracts n1ay be created by the �ame instrument. Wl1ere it was provided in 1l1e instr111nent signed by tl1e parties t11at eacl1 1nonthly sl1i1)mer1t of goods sl1ot1ld be treated as a disti11 ct co11tract, the plaintiff cotild bring a separate stiit ,'rith respect to eacl1 sl1ip1nent. 188 Since eacl1 sl1ip1nent constittited a distir1ct co11tract, a11y breacl1 connected ,vitl:1 tl,at sl1ipment give rises to a separate cause of action. Agai11, tl1c qt1estion is not tl1e 11 t11uber of i11slr11ments, bt1t the L1t11nber of contracts created b�l tl1e i11strL111 1e11t. If tl1e instrt1ment creatrd only one contract. tl1ere is 011ly one cat1se of actiou irrespective of tl1e 11t11nber of breaches of tl1e c011tract tl1at n1ay l1ave r:ee11 co111n1 itted. Wl1at was origi11ally a single caLISe of actio11 111ay be converted i11to t\vo er.uses of action by tl�e l)arties. A owes B Etl1.$ 1,000. 111 satisfaction of tl1e debt be issues two pro111i-:;sory 11otes to B i11 tl1,,. a111ot1nt of Eth.$ 500. Prior to the giving of tl1e notes, B col1ld not st1e for Eth. $500 at 011e ti111e and iater st1e for the l1ala11cc>. Tl1ere wa.s one cal1se of action for the Etl1. $1,000. Bt1t ,vhen A issued the notes, B acquired a rigl1t to enforce eacl1 note, and each note ga,,e rise to a seJ)arate cat1se of action. Tl-;ereforc, B is 11ot reqt1ired to sue on both notes in a si11gle st1it, 189 altl1ot1gl1 I1e n1ay do so. 190 A11y tin1e a prornissory note or any negotiable i11s{rL1n1ent is issL1ed, a ne\V obligarion is created, and tl1e i11stTu111ent itself giv'es rise to tl1e cause of action. So. wl1ere a suit is brot1ght on tl1e ir1stru111e11t, a st1bseqt1ent suit on t]1e t111derlying obligatio11 is not barred 011 tl1e ground tl1at tl1e JJlai11tiff l1as split l1is clai111 \Vitl1 respect to tl1e same cat1se of action. 191 I-le has t\VO cat1ses of ::iction, one oi1 tl1e instrt1111e11t a·ncl one on tl1e underlying ?bl�gation. Howe,,e�, it js })Ossible tl1at tl1e seco11 d st1it 111ay be barred by res Jt1d1cata. If tl1e deience in tl1e first st1it ,v,1s to tl1e effect tl1at the defenda nt l1ad inct1rred no liability to 1'l1e J)lai11t1ff at1d tl1at defe11ce \VdS st1stained tl1e isst1e of liability WOlild be res jt1dicata as regards tl1e i1uderlyino- obligation a; well. But if tl1e first s11it onl� involved tl1 e liability of tl1e defendant 0°n the 11egotiable in�trun 1ent, a subseqt1ent SL11t oa tl1e t1nderlyi11 g obligation 1n2.y be n1ai11ta1ned . the or 11 . Tlie obljgatio act a tl1at party 1 ctt1 as l to option an part enforce of � . . entire obl1gat1on may create t_wo causes of action witl1 respect to that obligation. W!1er� �oods are to be delivered on tl1e condition that tl1e buyer will pay tlle of ent paym price . rn instalments, tl1e parties 1nay provide tl1at i 11 case of default of one instalment, the entire an1011nt sl1aU becoine due.192 TJ1 e buyer defaults on one
188. 189. 190. 191. 192.
See Volkart v. Sabju (Higl1 Ct., Madras, 1896) , I11dian L. Rep., vol. 19, p. 304 . See �anta.narayana v. Savithri (Higl1 Ct., Ma dras, 1913), I11dian L. Rep., vol. 36, P· 151 · See Ctv. Pro. c., Art. 217_ S�e Payan.na v. Pana Lana (Privy Council, India ' 1914) ' Indian App.' vol. 41, P· 142· Ctv. C., Art. 2386(1).
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in�talroent, and tl1e s7ller sues only for tha t instalment. May he subseqtlently sue to recover3 tl1e otl1er instalments whe n tl1ey becon1e dt1e? Tl1e ans\ver s11011Jd be tl1at 19 beca11se at . tl1e ti111e of defa11lt he l1ad two causes of actio11 agai11st ay, 01 lie tile bt1yer, one for the 1n�taln1e11t tl1at ,va� d11e and one for tl1e remaini11g insta1n1ents.194 He ha.d the option to treat all 111stal111ents as d11e and cot1ld have sued on that cat1se of �ctio11. I-le also l1ad a ca11se of actio11 \vitl1 respect to the i11stal n1ent in defat1lt. Since l1e l1ad two causes of actio11, l1e co11ld elect to sue only on 5 1 9 one. the Tl1ere is a c111estion as to wl1etl1er i11 tl1e case of \Vro11gful possession, tl1e rigl1tf t1l possessor l1as a _separate ca11se of action for tl1e recovery of possession and for n1esne profits. B 1s ,vro11gft1ll)1 occ11pying A's land, and A sues to recover possession. He obtains a clecree and st1bseqt1e11tly s11es to recover 111es11e profits for the ti111e B \Vas i11 possessio11. Tl1ere is tl1e view that tl1e s11bsequent suit is not barred, because A I1as t\VO causes of action, one to be restorecl to possessio11 a11d one to recover profits for tl1e 11se of tl1e Ia11d. 196 The result wot1ld be tl1e sa111e if he first sued to recover mes11e profits. Tl1e co11trary vie\v is tl1at there is one ca11se of action for tl1e dispossession, and tl1at tl1e a\varding of n1es11e JJrofits is a claim tl1at arises fron1 th8.t cause of action. 197 Tl1e latter view is clearly preferable. Tl1ere l1as been 011e act of dispossession, a11d profits were realized by tl1e defendant only because of the clisJJossession.198 There was a co11tinuing cot1rse of co11d 11ct, tl1e use of tl1e land followi11g tl1e dispossessio11. Tl1erefore, the plai11tiff sl1ot1\cl be required to claim botl1 possessio11 and 1nes11e profits i11 tl1e san1e sui.t. Also, \Vl1ere beneficiaries sued to obtain a co11veyance of property fro111 tl1e trt1stee, vvl1icl1 ]1e had p11rcl1ased ,vitl1 tr11st fu11ds, b11t did 11ot clain1 111esne profits that l1e n1ade fron1 tl1e 11se of tl1e property, a st1bseq11ent st1it to reco\ 1er st1ch IJrofits ,vas l1eld to be barred. 199 The nature of tl1e asserted relationsl1ip betwee11 the parties i11 tl1e two s11its and tl1e relief so11gl1t n1ay also ]1e]p to deter111i11e wl1etl1er the }Jlai11tifl. is suing on the sa111e cat1se of action i11 tl1e seco11d st1it. Tl1e plai11tiff sties the defe11clant to req11ire his re111oval fro111 tl,e land, clai111i11g t}1at tl1e lease tinder \vl1icl1 he ]1eld J1ad expired. S11bsequently, tl1e plaintiff sties to reco\1er tl1e la11d, clai111ing tl1at tl1e defencl ant is a trespasser. Tl1e seco11d suit is not barrecl. 200 When the defe11cla11t ]1eld
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193. See Lasa Din v. Guiab Kunwar (Privy Council, I11dia, 1932), I 932 All-!11rlia Rep., p. 207, 194.
195.
196. 197.
198. 199. 200.
where tl1i s result \Vas reacl1ed. Note that the seller n1ay not a vail hin1self of the accele ration pro vision unless the buyer is in arrears for two consecutive JJayment s represcnti11g together not less than one- tenth of the sale price, a nd any stipulation in1pos ing a n1ore onerous oblig_ation on the buyer is void. Civ. C. Art. 2386. This ,vould indicate that the cause of action for the arrears and the cause of action for the an1ount dt1e under the acceleration provision are distinct. Note that having made an election not to sue for ren1aining instalments at tha t tin1e, l1e could only sue for tl1em ,vhen they becan1e due. He could not sue under the acccl�ration clau se unles s it again beca1ne ope rative by subsequen t e vents, e.g., the buyer ':as again two ins taJme11ts in arr ears and the amount totaled not less than one-tenth of the price of sale. See the discussion and citation of cases in D. Mul la, The Code of Civil Procedure (l 2tl1 ed by R. Mitte r, 1953), vol. 1 , p. 534. Ibid. Of cours e, a suit for means profits that accrued subsequently to tl1e suit for possession would not be barred. Note that a claini for tl1e recovery of mesne profits may be joi�ed -:Vith a suit to rcc?ver possession. Civ. Pro. c., Ar t. 218(a). This demonstrates the relat1onsh1p be_t"".' een th_ e cla1�s , since ordinarily claims for the recovery of imn1ovable property may not be Joined ,v1th claims of an unrelated nature. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 218. . 229 p. p., Re dia 1 -In 193 All 1), 193 , a i Ind il, unc Co ivy (Pr m See Naba Kumar v. Rad11ashya See Ram Lakshman Janki Ji v. Mukund Lal (I-ligl1 Ct., Patna, 1948), 1949 All-India Rep., p. 358.
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over a.fter tlle expiratio11 of tl1e lease, tl1e J)l,1i�tiff l1ad a ca1�se . of action against llinl under tl1e lease. WJ1en tl1e defeoda� t cont1n·ued to ren1� 1 n_ 1n possession., the plaintiff 11ad a cause of action agaj nst 111 111 11nder general pr1 nc1_ples of law , as he ,vould 11ave aoainst any trespasser. There were two causes of act100, eacl1 of which tlle plaintiff 11�.gl1t assert . at. tl1e a� )propriate time. 1':f ote that tl1e decision i? � he first suit wotild 11ot be res Jt1d1cata 1 0 tl1e seco11d s111t, because tl1e first su1t 111volved the lease and tl1e seco11d s11it involved tl1e q11estio11 of wl1etl1er the defendant vias a trespasser. Also, si11ce tl1e JJlai11tiff was trying to ter111i11a.te tl1e lease, l1e would not be expected to raise a cl� i111 of tres1Jass, and tl1e trespass_ 'vvo,�ld not constitute a , 01 i l1ave bee11 ra sed. to a 1 1d ougl1t tl1at 1111gl1t lt l1as also been of attack ''gro11nd l1eld tl1at a s11it to eject a tena11t tinder a. lease does not bar a s11 bseq11ent suit to reco,,er rent due 1111der tl1at lease. 202 Tl1is is a closer case. I11 both suits the relationslup is tl1e sa1ne, and botl1 the rigl1t to eject the tena11t and tl1e right to recover tl1e re11t arose fro111 tl1e lease. \Vl1ere tl1e .rei1t ,vas d11e at tl1e time of the suit (if it were 11ot, tl1en, of cot1rse, it cot1 ld 11ot l1ave been clai111ed), it \Vas possible for tl1e J)laintiff to seel( tl1e rent a.s alter11ative relief. Ho�1ever, tlJe tenant committed two distinct wrongs, faili11g to pay tl1e re11t ar1d l1oldi11gf over. TI1e wrongs \Vere not related, since tL11der tl1e lease l1e l1ad two q11ite dif erent obligations: to pay tl1e rent wl1e11 due and to vacate tl1e la11d wl1en the lease l1ad expired. This case <lifters fro111 tl1e case disc11ssed previot1sly203 where, ,vitl1 respect to one shipment of goods, tl1e l,t1yer toolc so111e, b11t ref11sed to pay tl1e .Price and refused to take the ren1ai11der. Tl1ere �1as 011ly 011e sl1ip1 11e11t, and l1is obligation ,vas to take all the goods and 1Ja11 tl1e price. B11t l1ere tl1e obligations are con1pletely unrelated, and it is reasonable to l1old tl1at tl1ey give rise to t\VO ca11ses of actio11. Or, A sl1es B to recover re11t for tl1e J)roperty. Tl1e st1it is disn1issed on tl1e gro11nd tl1at A and B hold tl1e J)roperty jointly. A 111a.y s11bseq11e11tly s11e to obtain partition of the J)roperty. 20 4 In tl1e first Sltit l1e clain1ed tl1at l1e \Vas tl1e sole owner, and on that basis alleged a ca11se of actio11 to recover re1Jt. Tl1e co11rt found tl1at a different relatio11sl1i1J existed bet\veer1 tl1e J)arties, and once tl1at relationship was established, A l1ad a cause of action for partition. We 111ay 110w co11sider the 111atter of a si11gle cause of action wl1ere multiple parties are invol\1ed. Tl1e fact tl1at 111l1ltiJJle parties are in,,olved n1ay give rise to t\vo ca11ses of action, bt1t tl1is is not always tl1e case. A and l1is adoptive n1otl1er, B, execute a deed to JJroperty X in fa.vor of C. A, co11te.nding tl1at tl1e deed is invalid, sues B to recover tl1is and otl1er property, vvl1icl1 l1elo11ged to A's adoptiv e fatl1er, B's husba11d. B l1ad also transferred propert)r Y to C, \Vl1icl1 tra11sfer A also contends is invalid. C is joi11ed as a defendant, A a11d B enter i1 1to a conse11t decree ?Y wl1icl1 � ad111its A's clai111 to all tl1e prOJJerty. C co.11tests A's clai111, and a decree 1s entered 1n . favor o� A agai11st C witl1 respect to pro1Jerty. A 0111its to ask for a decr �e a.ga1nst C w1tl1 reSJJect to property X. A s1 1bsequently sues C to recover possess101 1 of property X. Tl1e s11it is barred.205 I 1 1 tl1e first suit l1e l1ad 111ade a claim for all the property transferred by B to C, bt1t 0 111itted to clain1 relief again�t _ C w1tl1 respect to property X. Tl1e fact tl1at l1e clain1ed tl1e relief against B 15 201. T�erefore, tl1e !ssue _would not be deen1ed to I1a,:e been decided against him in the form er suit. See the d1scuss1oi1, supra, 11otes 134-137 and accompanying text. 202. See Subraya v. RatJ1navelt1 (High Ct., Madras, 1909), I1zdian L. Rep., vol. 32, P·. �JO. If we_ conc! ude tl1at tl1ere are two causes of action, there is also no problem of sp11tting of reliefs w1tl1 respect to the same cause of action. 203. Supra, note 187. 204. See Timappa v. Manjamya (High Ct., Bombay, 1923), 1923 All-India Rep., p. 440. 205. See Anant v. Mal1leshwar (H1'gh Ct., Bombay, 193 0), 1931 All-India Rep., p. 114
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immaterial. A s to C, he l1as failed to inclt1de the wl1ole of tl1e claim made, a11 d a subsequent suit is barred. As a 1natter �f substantive law, the prese11 ce of two parties 111ay give rise to two cat1ses of _action. A lets a l1ouse to B and C at a rent of Etl1.$ 1 ,200 J)er year. The rent is dt1e for 1960, 1961 and 1962. In 1963 A sues B to recover tl1e rent due for 1960. I-Ie may not st1bseque11tly sue B to recover the rent d11e for 1961 and 1962.206 Howe:�r, l1 e n1 a.y s11e C to recover tl1e rent due for those years.207 Wl1 ere debtors are Jointly an d s �verally liable,208 the creditor may req11ire any one _ _ to disc harg e tl1e obl1gat1011 , and eacl1 remains liable 11ntil the oblieoation is of then.1 · . ftl11y d1 �c l1arged.-"09 A l1ad two ca11ses of actio n for tl1e rent, one against B and one against C. Tl1e fact tl1at l1e s11ed B does not affect the existence of l1is cause of _action agai?st_ <?, and \Vl1en l1e is st1ing C, l1 e is suing on a separate cat1se of action. Or, A 1s InJured tl1rougl1 tl1e 11 egligence of B. He is treated by C� a doctor, and sucl1 treatment aggra,,ates tl1 e injt1ries. He sues B to recover damages for tl1e injuries ca11sed by l1is negligence, and st1bseq11ently sues C to recover for tl1e addi tional injuries. Tl1e st1it against C is not barred.210 Independent acts by B and C produced separate inj11ries, and each gave rise to a cause of action. It is i111n1aterial that A could l1ave reco,1ered for tl1e entire a1no11nt of tl1e l1arn1 against B.211 Since there \Vere two cat1ses of action, }1e cot1ld proceed against C witl1 respect to l1is cause of action against l1i1n, and l1e has not split any claim arisi11g fron1 tl1at cause of action. Finally, a party is not considered to split l1is claim with res1)ect to the cause or action where he st1bseq·uently sues to recover for injury or loss \Vhicl1 die! not exist or of which l1e was not aware at the tin1e of the first st1it. There is an automobile accident in ,vhicl1 tl1 e plai11tiff suffers dar11age to l1is a11to111obile. I-le sues the driver of tl1 e otl1er at1tomobile a11d obtains jt1dgme11t. At the time of the suit, l1e did not appear to have suffered any l)ersonal injuries i11 tl1e accident. Later, ill-effects from tl1 e accide11t are discovered to exist. He is not precl11dcd from suing to recover damages for tl1e personal injt1ries. 212 \.Vl1ile I1e l1as split l1is clai111 arising from the cause of action, l1e did not do so knov1ingly. At the time or tl1 e first suit l1 e included tl1e whole of the claim tl1at he thought lie had against tl1e defendant, and it is not fair to preclude him fron1 st1ing for ir1juries discovered after the time of the s11it. S11cl1 a situatio11 will not occt1r often, and an exception to the rule against splitting of c]ai1ns is proper l1 ere. So too, \vl1er� . tl1 � employee settled a suit agai 11st l1 is employer for tl1e loss of a leg and l1ead 111Jur1es, a11d at that time ,vas ass11red by tl1 e en1ployer's pl1ysician that the injury to l1is eyes was temporary and \vould disappear upon b.is recovery from nervot1s shock, l1e was not 206. See note 177, supra. 207. See Pl1ani Bhusen v. Rajendra (High Ct., Calcutta, 1946), 1947 All-India Rep., p. 11. 208. If the obligation \Vere strictly joint, both d_ebtors \.vould be indispensable . I?artics to any suit. I-Iov;ever, unless otl1erwise agreed or provided by law, co-debtors are Jointly a11d severally liable. Civ. C., Art. 1896. 209. Civ. C., Art. 1897. It is specifically provided that I?roce�di�gs institu�ed against one of tl1e debtors shall be no bar to sin1ilar proceedings being 1nst1tuted against the other debtors. Civ. C., Art. 1898. 210. See Ash v. Mortensen (Sup. Ct., California, U.S., 1944), Pacifi_c Rep., 211cl _Series, vol. 150, p. 875, in c. Brown, A. Vestal and M. Ladd, Cases and Materials on Plead1nr1 and Procedure (1953), p. 732. " . ,, ," " . . ,, . omitted between may and relieve 211. See C.I\., c. , Art. ?08 - 6 . No te that the word "not 1s in the English version. 212. See Boos v. Claude (Sup. Ct., Soutll Dakota, U.S., 1943), Nortlnvestern Rep., 2nd Series, 210 at p. 714. te no ra, sup , dd . La M d an l sta Ve A. wn ro ·B c v0I , 9, p. 26?-, 10 · , ,
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2 13 d ne o tur int y e t1r ey inj b the en wh e dn it �n su nt ue ss. eq bs su a recluded fro m bringing e the for sal of �t tra co? a of imm nce ma for ovable per ific pec s n tai ob to B s stie _ A . �r 1 s seized b y tl1e e�ecut1on officer, t� per pro tl1e 1e11 Wl . ree dec a ns tai property and ob nt ue t seq sui by sub A 1t. of A against on rti po a Jy 011 ned ow t tha B d ere cov it is dis 214 t d, is no rre ba ice e pr 1as rcl pt1 au e tl1 bec of rt pa se te na tio or op pr a er ov rec to B all ned of ow B t the tl1a 1ed t111 ass land in ties par l1 bot t sui t firs the of e tim tlie at ole as wl1 tl1e n tl1a kn�wn to A less ne o B t tl1a � t fac the if r, eve ow I I11. '; stio que � . . se cna the pur to ect price would resp l1 11 w1t t st t uen seq sub a , st11t tl1e of e tim at tl1e be barred. If A were aware of the deficie11cy, he would be entitled to specific perfor1na11ce \\'i.tl1 abatement of tl1e pt1rchase price, and the wl1ole of the claim wou ld l1ave }1ad to be macle in tl1at s11it. 1'Tote that in all tl1ese cases, the question of liability is res judicata, becat1se it was determined in the former st1it bet\1/een the san1e JJarties.
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To review, tl1e crt1cial q11estion i11 the subseq11ent suit is wl1etl1er the plaintiff is suing on tl1e same cat1se of action as we l1ave defined tl1at term. If the court concludes tl1at l1e is st1i11g on a differe11t cause of action, the subsequent su.it is not barred, because the rt1le only prohibits tl1e splitting of a claim \vhich the plaintiff is entitled to n1al<e witl1 respect to a single ca11se of action. 3. 01nitting of Relief A party may be entitled to 111ore tl1an one relief with respect to the same cause of action. I-Ie is not reqt1ired to st1e for all the reliefs, but if he omits to stie for all reliefs, except ,vith leave of court, l1e 111ay not afterwards sue for the relief so on1itted.215 Tl1e cot1rt l1as no discretion to pern1it a plai11tiff to om.it part of l1is cla.i111, but n1ay, in a1JJJropriate cases, IJermit a plaintiff to omit to sue for some of tl1e relief to ,vl1icl1 l1e is entitled. Witl1 tl1at exception, the rule prolubiting tl1e splitti11g of relief is tl1e san1e as the r11le JJrohibiting the splitting of claim.s, and so111e cases may involve botl1 q11estions. Tl1e co11rt mt1st deter1nine whether the relief sot1gl1t ir1 tl1e st1bseqt1ent st1it existed ,vitl1 respect to tl1e cat1se of action on which the plaintiff sued previously. If it did, and tl1e plaintiff failed to ask for it at that time, l1e rnay not do so in tl1e s11bseqt1e11t st1it. Moreover, a party n1ay be entitled to certain relief at one tin1e and to otl1er relief at a11other time. If l1e was only entitled to certain relief at tl1e tin1e of the for1ner st1it, he is not barred from seeking tl1e relief to wl1.icI1 l1e l1as s11bseqt1ently becon1e e11titled in tl1e later s11it. The basic question is wl1ether at tl1e tin1e of the first st1it tl1e plai11tifl' vvas e11titled to more than one relief vvitl1 respect to the sa1ne cause of action, for wl1ich he failed to st1e.
. St1ppose that A leases his la11d to :s for five years on tlJe co11dition that if B fails to pay the rent at tl1e e11d of each year, tl1e lease is voided. At tl1e end of the second year, B fails to pay. At that tin1e, A is entitled to two reliefs 11nder the lease: (I) recovery of tl1e rent for t11e seco11d year, and (2) possessio11 of the pr�perty 11nder the !ease. He s11e� to recover tl1e re11t for tl1e second year and do es not. ask for possession nor obtain leave of co11rt to 0 1uit tl1a.t relief. He may not dtlring the third year sue for possession, si11ce he failed to i 11cJude that relief in the first suit.216 Conversely, if he s11ed to recover possession and not to recover
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213.
e Vi11eseck v. Great _Northern Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct., Minnesota, U.S., 1919), NorthH1es tern i:'P, vol. 161, P, 494, 1n C. Brown, A. Vestal a11d M. Ladd, supra, note 210 at p. 714. 214. S�e Vetlkataran1a v. Venkatta (High Ct., Ma dras, 1901), Jndia11 L. Rep., vol. 24, p . 27. 215. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 216(4). 216. See Subbaraya v. Krisl1na (High Ct., Madras, 1883), In.dia11 L. Rep., vol. 6, p . 159.
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the rent, a subseq�ent suit to rec�ver �he rent is barred.217 Now stlppose that at the en� of the tlu�d ye�r, B again fails to pay the rent. A may sue to recove: possess1�n at that . time since at tl1_e en� �f tl1e �bird year, that rigl1t to possession . 1n nd tl1at sens revi e A ved, 1s cla11 1 11ng relief with respect to a new cause of was � action, the f� lure_ of B to pay tl1e . re_nt for the tl1ird year. This principle is applic able to_ any s1tt1at1on_ wl1ere tl1e_ plai:ntiff has an optior1 with respect to several reliefs. Tl1e f�1lure to exercise tl1 e optio11 10 tl1 e first suit 111 eans tl1at it may not be exer cised 1n a st1?s�qt1e11t 011 e, b�1t �l1en facts again give rise to tl1e option at a later time, tl1 e plaintiff 111ay exercise 1t tl1en notwitl1standing tl1at he did not exercise it earlier. The 11 1ortgage provides tl1at ,vl1 ere tl1e mortgagor fa.ils to pay tl1e interest on the debt sectirecl by tl1e 111 ortgage, tl1e mortgagee may obtain possession of the property. Tl1e n1ortgagor fails to pay interest, and the rnortoaoee sues to recover sucl1 interest. He 1J1ay not st1e for ·{Jossession, but where the::,�ortoa c1gai11 fails o eoor to pay tl1e interest \Vl1 en dt1e, a st1it for possessio11 is not barred.218 Ho,vever, consider tl1 is case. A 111 ortgage exect1ted in 1960 provided tl1 at tl1 e interest sl1 ould be paid n1011tlily a11 cl tl1at if it ,vas not paid for six montl1s, the mortgagee cot1ld interest or botl1 the principal and interest eve11 as to realize ei.ther the t1npaid . principal n.ot dt1e at that tin1e. It was also provided that if tbe principal and interest were not paid \vitl1in tl1 ree years, all principal wot1]d becon1e dt1e. In I964, tl1e n1ortgagee st1ed to recover tl1e t11J paid i11 terest. In 1965 he stied to recover tl1 e entire an1 ot1nt of principal. That suit was barred.219 I-Ie was entitled to recover tl1 e entire an1ot1nt of principal in 1964, since principal was in arrears for 111 ore tl1a11 three years. I-laving s11ed for interest at that tin1e and having failed to ask for tl1e entire principal, l1 e co11ld 11 ot sue for st1ch re]ief s11bseqt1ently. Moreover, if a party has a si11 gle option, tl1 e failt1re to exercise it in tl1e first st1it will prevent l1 im from doing so subseqt1e11 tly. St1ppose tl1 at the mortgage provides that wl1en tl1 e mortgagor fails to pay tl1 e prodttce, tl1 e mortgagee 11 1ay take posses sion. In 1964 tl1 e mortgagor fails to pay tl1e prodt1ce. !11 I 965 tl1e 111 ortgagee st1es to recover tl1e prodt1ce for 1964, b1.1t does not ask for possessio11. If tl1e n1 ortgage is constrt1ed as giving tl1 e n1 ortgagee tl1 e rigl1 t to take possession tl1 e first tin1e tl1e produce is not paid, bt1t not giving bi1n the option to take possession if tl1e prodt1ce is not paid at tl1e end of each year, a subseq11e11 t st1it to obtain possessio11 wot1ld be barred notwithstandi1Jg tl1at the 1nortgagor failed to l )ay the produce in ft1tt1re years.220 The 111ortgagee had tl1 e rigl1 t to take possession wl1 en he brot1ght the suit in 1965. He did 11ot st1e for sucl1 relief at that time a11d 111ay n.ot do so st1bsequently. Tl1 e more diffict1lt qt1estion revoI,,es arot1nd tl1e relief to wllicl1 tl1 e plaintiff was entitled at the time of the first st1it. Suppose A sues B to obtain specific perfor mance of a contract to sell land. I-Ie obtains a decree ordering specific perfor1nance, but does not obtai 11 possession. Is a subseqt1ent suit to obtain possession barred? Tl1 ere is a split of autl1 ority on tliis point in India; t�ose cot1rts tl1� t l1old . tl1 e suit is not barred take the position that there is no right to possession until a deed of conveyance has been issued, and, therefore, at the time of tl1 e_ first suit, A could not l1ave obtained possession.221 Hov1ever, the cot1rt may direct that tl1e 217. 218. 219.
See Kashinath v. Nathoo (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1914), I11dia11 L. Rep., vol. 38, p. 444. See Parmesbri Das v. Fakiria (High Ct., Lahore, 1920), Indian Cases, vol. 59, p. 71. See Muhan1mad Jlafiz v. Muhammad Zakariya (Privy Council, India, 1921), 1922 All-Inclia Rep., p. 23.
220. See ChhabiJ Da s v. Masst1 (Higl1 Ct., Patna"' 1914), Indian Cases. vol. 19, p. 981. 221. See the discussion and citation of cases in D. Mulla, supra, note 196 at p. 538.
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on ssi o sse int po as iff int pla t par the t ptl h of y ma · t d an . e e t u c e x e e b e c n � a y e v n o c · · t'ff . . 223 TllUS , in the fir st suit t .he p 1a1n 1act, could hav 1 ·, in . . e . execu. tion p. 1 oceed· 1ngs. .· nst . t.he defendant •'"o · ai ag n tio ac f o e us ca gle sin a d 1r obta.ined possession. He lia t1t as 1 en e w d e h to 1er t 1 .. he w . s po d an se ct ra nt o · co ss1 ' e tl1 n of ce an ' m r O · . f er p fi C speCI1 1evant. s·1nce be co uld h av e 1rr be 1ld 1 1 0 . sl d ue iss s wa ' e c ·re o r after the deed .for1ner sw· t, he . . be1o ld not be 1e ou tl sh 1n n tio ac of e us ca s hi r de tin obtained possession . ly nt ue eq bs su it r fo 1e s1 to able in in ta rta ce ob to f, lie it re s11 a gs in t br bu iff t n ai pl is e 1 tl at 1 t1 e os pp su Now t ve ha d no en 11l be wo ly ab s ob ce pr ne it 1I, sary sf1 es cc su 1 en be 1 J ad 1e If tl l. unstlccessf tld t�e subs�q uent suit ot sh , se ca _a cl1 s11 In . ief rel r l1e ot ain t ob to for lli iu to sue 1s at tl1 _A ing rs nn ve pla co ?1s to B B. to sell y ert op pr l sel to s ree ag A d? rre be ba rying 011t the sale. The car m fro 11 hiI n j?i en to s s11e d an C to ty i)er pro e tl1e sam 11bseque�tly sue A to obtain s y Ma lie. t no es do it 1 s1 1 a � 1cl 1 1 s at l t s co11rt l1 old e t11n the of the fi.r�t suit, at If , u�e cot Of ct? tra con 1 e tl of ce 1 11 1aI specific perfor y be arl er, _cle rop p _ 11ld wo t s111 since at ?11d sec tl1e , due yet not s \Va nce ina for per A's of cific spe ef he reli t performance. to led t i ent not was A suit t 1 firs tl e of e tim tl1e But let us ass111ne tl1 at l 1e was e11titled to s1Jecific performance at that time. I f B l1ad s11cceeded in e11joini11g A fro111 carryi11 g · out tl1e sale to C, a later suit for specific J)erfor 1 na11ce l)robably ,1vo11ld 11 ot l1 ave been necessary, since if A wanted to sell tl1e land, as he ap1Jare11tly did, he wo11ld l1 ave 11 0 cl1oic e b 11t to sell it to B. In a sense, B 1 nisco11ceived l1is re111edy. TJ1e for1ner Sllit is not res judicata, because it ,vas not decided on tl1e merits and did 11ot deter111ine the q 11estion of whetl1er A was bo111 1d to 1Jerfor1n. his contract ,vitl1 B. Rat11er tl1a11 omitting to ask for some of tl1e relief to ,vl1icl1 he '.vas e11titled, B asked for tl1 e wrong relief. Since, if he l1 ad bee 11 s11ccessful in tl1e forrr1er sl1it, a second st1it probably wot11d not have been necessary, tl1e fact that l1e \Vas not st1ccessful sl1 0L1lcl not bar a second suit in wl1icl1 l1e is seeking tl1e appropriate relief.224 d,222
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It l1as been l1eld in I11dia that tl1e dis111issal of cl s11it for specific performance by the pL1rchaser does not bar a s11bsequent s11it to recover the down payinent.225 TJ1ere 1 11ay be said to be two ca1 1ses of actio11, one b,1sed on tl1e contract (or p11rported contract, if tl1e co11rt disn1 isses 011 the gro1111d that there was no contract) at1d one based on the th.eory of 1111j1 1 st enricl1 n1e 1 1t which would result jf the seller retains tl1e pa)1111e11t. Tl1 is n1ay be tr11e, b1 1t th�re was a si 11gle transaction - the contract or purported co11tract - a11d tl1e down pay111ent was made 1,nder the co11tract. �here are two. ca11ses of action only in the 1nost tecl1 .nical sense. Since tl1ere ,vas a single transactio°:, tl1� plai11tiff sbot1ld be req 11ired to assert all clai111s witl1 res pect to that tra 11 sact1on 111 one SL1it. It has also been l1eld in India t l1at a s11it to d_eclare a sale of prope�ty i11valid does no t bar a s11bseq11e11t s11it to recover posse� sion of tl1e pr_o1)er�y, since t_he plai11tiff co11ld no t l1ave unt.Il ion po sse ss for ask ed . 26 e sal e_ 2 \Va s in�altd�ted. It is di·�c11lt to see wl1y 11 e co11ld no t l1ave ask ed to t� - �lt in possession 111 1 he forn� r s111t. Tl1e co11r e t� in� 1 n de t_ ter wo 11ld to ha fir st ve � . d val 1 �ty of_ the_ sale, btlt_ after It� I1a done so, It could l1ave ordered the plaintiff 1 sl1011ld no t be tl1e tin1e at \Vbich tl1e plaintiff bec an1_ e ��t�tl�� ��ssess1on .. Tl1e test tlle relief� bu t_ whetl1er the relief wa it t. su I s av f1r ail st ab le in tl1e i f \Vas, a s 1 1bsequent Suit to obtain s11ch relief sl1011ld be barred.· Finally, it has be en 222. See Civ. Pro. c., A rt. 400(2). 223. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 448. 224. See Sardari Mal v
e . Hirde wbe N r ath . (Hi 459 gh , Ct. , Lah ore , 1925), 1925 All-l11dia Rep., p. this result was r�ched. 225. See Munni Babu . 11 · v. Kunwar K 1:1ta (I-iigb 3 C t., Allahabad, 1923), 1923 All-I,1dia Rep., P · .,. 226. See Kesl1a vlal v. � Amarcl1 and ( igh Ct., Bon1b ay, 1933), 1933 All-India Rep., p. 3 9B.
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for accounts may be sui a bro11ght by one partner against another that � there d liel . 227 In Ethiopia, dissolution a.nd winding of the p tnership. d1ssolut1on the � following up are governed by . the C ?�merc1al Code, and it is clear that any distribution of between the partners are to be detern1ined as part assets and all questions ar1smg 228 Tl1erefore, a subsequent suit for an accounting of the dissoluti�n proceedings. n,ay not be ma1nta1ned. Finally, a word_ should be said abo11t the power of the court to grant the· plaintiff l �ave to OIIllt to sue _for part of the c]aim. The co11rt n1ay do so even if the pec11n1ary value of the relief allowed to be omitted exceeds its pecuniary juris diction.229 Ho,vever, before tl1e co11rt does so, it should. be convinced that there are very valid reasons for granting s11cl1 leave and sl1ould not permit the plajntiff to avoid tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Code relating to relinqt1isl11nent of tl1e claim in order to bring the case within the jurisdiction of a particular court. Leave sl1ould be given only in sit11ations wl1ere tl1e plaintiff is entitled to alternative reliefs and roay legitimately wish to exercise one s11ch relief first. For example, tl1e plaintiff sues to obtain specific perforn1a11ce of a contract. He is not i11terested in damages at tl1at time, but if specific performance is not available, be m.igl1t wisl1 to clai1n them later. Or, lie may not have yet ascertained wl1etl1er be can recover damages, because \1/hat he wants is specific performance. The granting of leave to sue for omitted relief sbo11ld be done sparingly so as not to defeat tl1e p11rpose of tl1e rule requiring all reliefs to wl1icl1 the plaintiff is entitled to be sougl1t in a single suit. we l1ave disc11ssed the JJrovisions of the Code designecl to insure In this chapter . finality of litigation. Tl1e drafters have derno11strated a clear inte11tion tl1at all n1atters in d.ispute between tl1e parties tl1at relate to the sa111e transaction sho11ld be disposed of in the san1e s11it. 23° CarefLtl enforce1nent of these provisions will red t1ce tl1e volume of litigation and prevent harassment of one party by anotl1er.
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227. See Ihandu v. Rulia (High Ct., Bombay, 1937), 1937 All-India Rep., P· 633. 228. See Comm. C., Arts. 258-270. . . 229. See Mu.hammad Fayaz v. Kallu Singh (Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1911), Indian Cases, vol. 8, p. 689. un o. d v. M h an i Ch ra Sa in re atu isl leg ian d . In e th of n tio 230. See the disctission as to tJJe inten Bibi (lligh Ct., Calcutta, l 898), Indian Rep., vol. 25, P· 371.
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CHAPTER XII S R E T T A M L A R U D E C O R P R E OTI-I r be of 111 h ot nu er procedu a ly ief br y irl fa s us sc di ll wi ral e In tliis chapter w d r an fo e, th ur e most part ed oc pr of '' 11s le1 ob pr r ajo ''m the t no e ar 111atters. They e w are mo r e complex and are f . A res d11 e oc pr al eci s1J or les ru l consist of tec11nica se rs tl1e tte f ma all e ve sin ha , ver ,ve Ho e. been � t11r na in � l ura ced pro lly tia 11 e 110t ess . ble On th e whole , this ira des 1s m the to e 11c ere ref e som de, Co t}1e in iricluded e xtent of co�erage _ of the tl1e o 11r ict a r � de r e tl1 e giv to � ed p ign cl1apter is des �� _ Civil Proced11re Code and to fam11iar1ze h1n1. w1tl1 its contents. The d1scuss1on will ed with varying degree s s cus dis be l wil cts e j st1b the and ts, par lve twe into d ide div be of con1pleteness.
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A. Agents and Pleaders Ordi11arily any appeara11ce, application or act in co11rt may be done by the party or l1is legal representativ e, ag ent or pleader. The only reqt1irement is that the represe11tative, agent or plea.der be able to ansvver all material questions relating to 1 er. Tl1is is particularly answ to able so n perso a b)' d panie accom be or s11it tl1e i1nporta11t for a foreig11 1Jarty or one wl10 is residi11g 011tside of Ethiopia, since l1e 111ay prosect1te a clai111 or defend a suit \\ritl1out being present l1ere. The court l1as tl1e JJower to req11ire a JJarty to ap1Jear in person, b11t it sl1ould not requ.ire tl1is unless it is essential for tl1e proper determi11ation of tl1e suit.2 Unless expressly di1·ected by tl1e cot1rt, tl1e party is not expected to appear in person. 3 Tl1e position of a11 age11t or legal repr . esentative n1 t1st be distinguished fron1 of a pleader. An agent is one wl10 is autl1orized to act on behalf tl1e positio11 . of a party to tl1e st1it and to do all tl1ings that a party is required to do. He is not tl1e part�)''s a.dvocate and does not appea.r in that role. Tl1e same is true \vith respect to tl1e legal representative, who is a person reqttired by law to act on bel1alf of a party to a st1it, e.g., the g11ardian of a minor and tl1e requ.ire111ents rela �ive to his ap1Jointment are defined by the law reqt1iring hi111 to act. � pleader 1s. a person \vl10 l10Ids an advocate's license, a11d no person n1ay appear 111 tl1e capac1t� of a pleader 11nless he l1olds s11cb a Iicense,4 The party or l1is agent or representative 111ay entrust the co11d11ct of tl1 e case to a IJleader' a11d obvio11sly he is well ad,1ised to do so. In an ordinary s11it the age11t 111ay be tl1e spo11se, brotl1er, son, fatl1�r 0� grand -father of � party, �nd s11cl1 pe rso11s are to appear witho11t co1upensatton; \�l1 �re a 110n-resid7nt carri e s on b11siness witl1in tl1e local li 11iits of a court 's jt1.ris . d1ct!on and t�e s111t 111volves tl1 e bt1siness, tl1e perso·n w110 is carrying on t�ie business on his behalf may appear as agent. 6 Tll is only r efe rs to tl1e pers on in
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1. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 57. 2. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 65_(1). See the discussion of notes a, supr Vil .' appearances -in Chapter 2 - 13 and accompanying text. 3· tf sc 00 iii D. MLilla, Tl,e Code of Civil Procedure (12t h ed. b y R. Nitter, 195 3), � ;� �JJ� ' 4 · Registration of Advocates Rules 1952 "Ple ader ' A ,. is the term used in tli·e Civil C0' d e, b'u r 2 , L eg. ,�<;>t. No. 166, Neg. Gaz., ye� 11t1on. des1gna advocate t 1s tl1e more common · 5 · c·iv. pro. C., Art. 58(a). 6 · This assumes that h e has n Ot h · w ic h . po · fi tnted an ag�nt speci cally to receive pr ocess, m (l) case s ervice is to be made On t:ep agent so appointed. Se e Ci v. Pro. C., Arts. 64, 96
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licarge . of t�e business and not, a minor e1nployee s�ch_ as a clerk� so,_ a st�tement the party s clerk mus t be d1s1111 ssed.7 In st11 ts 1nvolv1ng tl1e by signe d claim of 1 ed defen�ant �oy person authorized to act for the gover�ment governn1ent as � n a1_1 _ \.Vith respect t? Jt�d1c1al proceedings 1s deem.ed to be the agent by whon1 appearances, acts and appl1 cat1ons may be n1 ape or done on bel1alf of tl1e government.s WI,ere the government undertakes tl1e defence of a suit against a public servant, the aovernn1ent pleader n. 1t1st appear a.nd present to tl1e court l1is authority to answer 9 I he doe fence. d of ent s not so appear, the suit proceeds as a st1it 1 � staten � fhe 10 es. i te rt. 1 va pa pri e1 \.ve bet entirely A n1 ember of the Ar1ned Forces wl10 cannot obtain leave for the purpose of prosect1 ting or defe11ding tl1 e st1it i n person may at1 tl1orize a11y person to sue or defend jn his stead.11 Tl1 e a11 tl1ority must be i11 writing and sig ned by tl1 e party in the presence of l1is co1111 nandi11 g officer, or if l1e is tl1 e commanding officer, the next subordinate officer; wl1 ere tl1 e _party is servi11g in 1 nilitary staff ernployn1 ent, it is to be signed in tl1e presence of tl1 e l1 ead or otl1er superior officer of tl1e office in wlucl1 l1e is employed. 12 Tl1 e at1tl1ori ty n111 st also be countersigned by tl1e con1 ma11 di11 g officer or otl1 er officer and filed i11 cot1rt so as to constitute proof of tl1 e autl1ority and proof that the party cot1 ld 11ot obtain leave. 13 Tl1 e agent may eitl1 er prosect1te or defe11 d t l1 e suit i11 perso11 or appoint a pleader to do so.14 A prisoner \V}10 cannot obtain leave may also autl1orize an y person to prosect1te or defend tl1 e s11it i n l1is stead. 15 The a11thority 111t1st be in writing and sigt1ed by tl1 e prisoner i n the presence of tl1 e s11peri11 tendent, ,:vho must cot1nter sign, and tl1e a11tl1 ority is tl1 en filed i n co11 rt. 16 TI1e otl1er provision ap1)licable to suits i11 volving men1bers of tl1e Armed Forces are also applicable to suits i11volvi11g orisoners. 17 As ,ve l1 ave said, the a1)poirunent of an age11t 1n11st be distingt1isl1 ed fro111 tl,e appointn1 ent of a JJleader. In order to appoint a pleader, tl1 e party 1nust exect1te a po\-ve.r of attor11ey signed by l1 jn1 or l1is a11 tl1orized agent or by s0111e otl1er person autl1orized to 1 nake sucl1 appoi11tn1e11t.1 8 Tl1e power of atto.r11ey must be filed in court togetl1 er witl1 tl1 e pleading.19 It is dee1ned to be in force unt! l revoked, witl1 leave of court, by a writin g sig11ed by tl1 e client or plead�r, or unt !l tl1e death of ei tl1 er tl1 e client or th.e pleader or 1111til all 1Jroceedi11gs 1n tl1e st11t are ended so far as regards tl,e client.20 Since the a11 tl1ority re1nai n s i11 effect 7. See Uttan1ram v. Thakordas (High Ct., Bon1bay, 1922), 1922 All-/11(/ia Rep., p. 113. 8. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 59. As to service of IJrocess in suits against the government. see Civ. Pro. C., Art. 96(3). As to verification of pleadings, see Civ. Pro. C., Art. 92(3). 9. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 60(1). 10. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 60(2). 11. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 61(1). 12. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 61(2). 13. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 61(3). 14. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 61(4). 15. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 62(1). 16. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 62(2). 17. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 62(3). 18. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 63(1). 19. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 63(2). . an appli�� t. 6, er nd u ew i rev r fo n tio ca pli ap an . e lud 20. lbicl Proceedings for this purpose i11c �-1� t . un der f r . _ r u 100 res or . n _ g Lion· for correction of nlistakes under Art. 208 a�d � n applicatio the purpose of obta1. n1n act for ·y application or · 349· They a1 so me · 1u de an appeal an d an · ing a refund of 111011ies .t rJaid into · m ta b o or ts ea n1 cu do of copies of documents or the retur11 courts. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 63(3).
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ed iss is it su ism e tl1 r r te fo � af lid va is fa de it d, de en ult or e ar . . s ng di ee oc pr l al until e e id t th �s se to d1 y pl ap uss al or ex n ay m r de ea _ pl � e th at th so , rte pa ex heard ized to .appoint a plead or th au IS rty pa a at th 2 t c . fa tile at th te _._ e. 1 No er . parte dec·re 2 2 . e. a ve 1 1a 1 en t 1c no s d s oe ho w e on t in po ap ay m does not mean that he n as his age nt tio dic ris tl1e ju in ng idi res rso pe a int po ap l so a � y to _ A party ma de by ma an b 1st tr mt t Ins 11e nt1 . e po um ap � ch Su nt in s.23 ces !-1 pro of � e vic ser accept _ 24 r e of tl1 ry t. u ist co reg e tl1 n 1 ed s1t po de writi11g signed by the party and B. Arrest and Attachment before J11dgn1ent The provisions about to be discussed mt1st be _disti�gt1ished trom those provid . ton ci,t 1n exe gs din These proceed cee pro e 1 tl of t par as nt me 1 cl atta and est arr for inoin�s invo lve arrest and attachment prior to tl1 e time � j_11dgine?t has been render ed. They are desig11ed to prevent a defendant or � JJla1nt1ff aga111st whom a counter c lain1 l1as been lodged fron 1 defeating tl1e execution of a decree that may be passed sing of his against hi1n by leaving tl 1e Jin1 its of tl1e court's jtuisdiction or dispo 26 or wh 25 , t dan. defen the of t arres tl1e at is ider cons first property.. We will called. sec11rity for aJJpearance, and tl1 en co11sider security for tl1e production of property.
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1. Arrest before Judg111ent TI1ese r11les are a1Jp licable 011ly to st1its not involving unmovable property. If tl1e s11it i11volves im111ovab le prOJJerty, tl1e defend,111t's interest in such property ma.y be co11sidered s11fficient security for 11is appearance. A warrant of arrest may be isssued against the defendant \v11.ere tl1e cot1rt is satisfied that tl1e defendant: (I) \vitl 1 intent to clelay tl1e case or avoid tl1e process of tl1e cot1rt or obstruct or delay exec11tio11 of any j11dgn1ent t l1at may be entered against l1 in1, has left or is about to leave tl1e l ocal Ii111its of tl1e co11rt's j11risdictio11 or has disposed of or re1noved property fro1n s11cl1 li111its; or (2) is about to leave Etl1iopia t1nder circumstances affording a reaso11abl e probability that tl1e plaintiff may be obstructed or delayed i11 tl1e exec11tion of a11y decree t11at may be passed against tl1e defendant.27 W11ere the contention is that tl1 e defe11dant is abo11t to leave or l1as left tl1e lin1its of the court's jurisdiction, a cl ear intent m11st be s110\vn. B11t where tl1e contention is �I1at I1e . is about to lea,,e Et l 1iopia, a \.Var.rant 1nay be issued irrespective of a sl10\v1ng of intent so lo11g as tl1 e circ11111sta11ces t1nder whicl1 l1e is abo11t to leave afford or 11cted obs a reason able pro that ty ab i a11y ree de be J a passed will im gainst 1 � ? t ? j _ . d�la yed 1n exec11t1011.- For example, 1t may be sl1ow11 tl1at tl1e de·fenda11t 1s pla11rung to stay abroad indefinitely. 21. See Abdul Aziz v. P�1nl1ab �ational Bank, Ltd. (I-Iigt1 Ct., Lall tre, 1929), 1929 All-lndia o Rep., p. 96. Jwala Devi v. Bhr1gunapl1 (Higl1 Ct., Allahabad, 1944), 1944 ,;-1/llndia Rep., P· 23 s. 22. See Voerappa v. S_u�daresa (I-figl1 Ct., Madras, 1922) 192 Rep., p. 1201. Note 2 AllI11d ia tllat 23. 24. 25.
26.
27. 28.
a person qu�lifying as an agent witbi11 tl1e meani11g act s of A.rt. 58 may do all the that a pleader migl1t do, but to qualify as a ple a 63, rt. A of ad er n1e wit ani hin ng tl1e er on mus�, hold. a�, �dvocate's lice t?�e, but advocate 1s tl1e mor nse. "Pleader'' is tl1e term used in the Civil Procedure e common designatiotl. Civ..�ro . C., A.rt. 64(l). Service may be tbe ma de on suc l1 ordance with acc age an in nt · prov1s1 ons o f Art. 96(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 64(2). See the �i�cussion in D. Mulla, s11pr a, n ote 3, vol. 2, p. 1141. 1:,1;.��,s��sA':t ;'J o p licable to a pla�\iff against �hom a count';"'!3im h:'5 been filed� ;( l � � n reference to m who st again defe ndan t'' plain inclu tiff des a cot1nterclaim has been 1.led. y Civ. Pro. C. , Art. 147(1). See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 3, vol. 2 , p. 1141.
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The applicati?n may be 1nade . at a11y stage of the suit, i.e., before or. after it �as con1e to trial, so long as . a Jt1?gment has not_ been rendered, and tJ1 e appli cation may be st1pported by affidavit or otl1er evidence on oatli.29 TI,e court in addition to tl1e . con?itions ciisct 1ssed above, tl�e plaintiff should be satisfied t hat _ has a colorable claim and that t1nless 30act1011 1s taken, tl1e defendant will ren1ove himself from the powers of tl1e co t1rt. Wl1ere tlJe co11rt is so satisfied, it iss11es a warrant to arrest t]1 e defendant a11d bring l1im before tl1e court to sho,v cause \Vl1y he shoul?. not _fLLrnisl1 se �L1rity for l1is appearance. 31 N·ote tl1at tl1e purpose of these prov1s1011s 1s to reqt11 re tl1e defe11dant to furnisl1 security ratl1er tl1an to detain him. Tl1e defe11clant 111ay avoid arrest by paying tl1e officer entr11sted \Vitl1 the exect1tion of tl1e ,varrant tl1 e su111 specified in the \Varrant, s1i:fficiet1t to satisfy the pJainti!f's cla_i1n, whicl1 s11m will _be held by tl1e cot1rt t1ntil tl1e s t1 it is disposed of or until ft1rther orcler.32 By posting that su1n the defe11da11t has given sufficient security for his appeara11ce. Asstu11ing tl1at tl1e defendant is arrested, he n1ay show cause \vl1y at1 order requjring tl1e _posting of sect1rity sl1 o·uld not be entered. Tl1e cot1rt 1nay find tl1at he l1as no intent to act in1properly or tl1at 11e is not abot1t to leave tl1e co11rt's jurisdiction or leave Etl1iopia, as tl1 e case 1na)' be. If he has not sl10\\111 good cat1se the cottrt mt1st order hi 1 11 to eitl1er deposit in co11rt 1noney or otl1er property s11ffici ent to ans\ver tl1e clai1n against bi1n or to furnisl1 sec11rity for his apiJeara11ce by way of a surety. 33 Tl1e security m11st be for 11.is appearance at a11y ti111e wl1 en called upon ,vl1ile tl1 e st1it is pei1ding ancl 11ntil satisfaction of a11y decree tl1at 1nay be passed against l1ii11.34 The surety 1n11st bind l1i111self to pay, i11 defat1lt of tl1 e party's appearance, s11cl1 s t1n1 of 1noney as tl1e party 1nay be ordered to pay in the stiit.35 Money deposited 11nder tl1is rt1le wo11ld only be for the be11efit of the claimants in the s11it; it would 11ot be st1bject to attachme11t by other liecree-l1old ers.• since it is not realized in satisfactio11 of a clecree.36 If the defendant ref11ses to con1ply, tl1e court may order l1i1n to be detai.11ed in prison un.til he does co1n1 )ly or u11 til tl1 e decision .in tl1e suit l1as been given or any decree passed against l1i111 l1as bee11 satisfied. 37 I-Io\vever, it is also J)rovid ed tl1at be n1ay not be detai11ed for more tl1an six n1ontl1s followi11g tl1e granti1 1g of the order - a necessary conti11ge11cy in the event th. at the litigatio11 becomes protracted. He is only to be detained if be fails to ft1rnish sect1rity, si11ce as we have said, tJ1 e pt1rpose of tl1e r11le is to reqt1ire sec11rity and not to cause the defendant's dete11tion. A s t1rety for appeara11ce 111 ay at any ti1 11e a_pply to be discl� arged. 38 He has an absolt1te rigl1 t to be discl1arged upon reqt1est, a11d whe11 11e 1s, tl1 e defendant m11st find another st1rety. 39 If tl1e defendant is 11nable to find another s t1rety, tl1e 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 147(1). See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 3, vol. 2, p. 114L Civ. Pro . C., Art. 147(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 147(2). t to money pa.id Civ. Pro. c., Art. 148(.1). The court may also n1ake an order \-Vith respec in by the defendant t o avoid arrest under Art. 147(2). Civ. Pro.· C., Art. 148(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art-. 148(2). , p. 1053. 41 l. vo p., Re L. lian Inc ), 18 19 , ras ad M ., Ct See Ramiall v. Gopalier (High Civ. Pro. C., Art. 150. court must summon the the , de ma is n io. cat pli ap h suc en 1 1 w Civ. Pro. c A t 149(1) .Pro. C., Art. 149(2) v. Ci t. res ar defendant or;' if ft · thinks fit, issue a warrant for his Civ. Pro. C., Art. 149(3).
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er er op ot pr or ty sufficien t to ey o m � t 1 t co in sit � po de � to in hi _ court \Vill order . to le ab clo is he if , m 111 t .4 ns so 1 a. ag 0. Once ed ss pa be ay 11 1 at tll . ee cr de satisfy any 1 arged, he 1s only required l sc d1 en be as h ty re s11 1 at t.l to _ Il e lias foltiid a. stirety and 1 er� he !1as �een orde red to l W n. ca be 1f y ert op pr sit JJo de or find anotller stirety d 1n n, ne so tai pn de be as y n1a e 1 l disc uss, so do to led fai as 1 1 d an rty pe pro deposit ed 1Jreviot1sl)1• 41 2. Attachment before J11dgment TI1 e .rt1les relatino to secttrity for prodt1ction of property are designed to prev e11t tl1e defendant fr�on1 disposing of or removing llis property so as to preven t execution. U11der this proced t1re tl1 e action is taken entirely against the property, and it is aJJplicable to all s t1its, including tl1ose i11volving immovable p_roperty. Such action is to be taken vvhere t he cot1rt is satisfied that tl1e d.efendant, w1tl1 the intent to obstr t1ct or delay' t l1e exect1tion of any decree tl1 at may be passed against him, is abot1t to dispose of tl1 e vvhole or a11 y JJart of his JJroperty or is abot1t to remove st1cl1 property from tl1e local Jim.its of tl1 e court's jt1risdiction.42 I-Iere, the crucial question is tl1e defendant's intent. Tl1e cot1rt must be satisfied that the defendant l1as tl1 e i11tent to obstruct or delay exec11tion of t]1e decree, a11d tl1 e decision will depe11d on tl1e state of 11und of tl1e partict1Jar defendant. However, this state of 1ni11d n1ay be i11ferred fron1 l1is acts witl1 respect to tl1e property. TI1e fact that tl1 e defe11dant atten1pted t o sell a s111 all portion of a large estate wot1ld not warrant tl1e i11fere11ce tl1at l1e inte11ded to dela)' or obstrt1ct exect1tion.43 But \Vhere in a st1it 011 a 1nortgage debt, tl1e defenda.nt 11ad effectecl frat1dulent sales or mortgages on otl1er pro1Jerties, it was proper for tl1 e cot1rt to infer that he was trying to defeat a11y personal decree tl1 e plaintiff nligl1 t l1ave obtained. 44 Note tl1 at on.ly the prese11t cond t1ct of tl1 e defenclant is relevant. The fact tl1at s01netime in the past lie n1ortgaged or disposed of pro1Jerty wo t1ld not i11 and of itself constitt1te suffici ent gro t1nd for attaching l1is other property.45 A present attempt to dispose or ren1ove of property n1 t1st be sl1 own.
The a1Jpljcation n1 ay be 1nade at any state of the suits, and the allegation s may be proved by' affidavit or otl1 erwise.46 Tl1e plaintiff 111t1st 11nless tl1e cot1rt other\vise �irects, seek tl1e attacl1men t of specific IJroperty, and' in his applic:1tion _ he n1 ust 1nd1cate tl1at pro1Jerty and its estin1atecl value.47 Where tl1e court is satisfied tl1at tl1 e �roperty 1 :1 igl1t be disposed of or re1noved, it 111 ay eitl1er direct the ?efend a11t to furn1sl� sect1r1ty of a specified a1not1nt, or to prod t1ce tl1e property or its valt1e or a portion as 1nay be st1fficient to satisfy the decree, or it n1ay' order _that he appe ar an� show ca� se \Vl1y l1e s11011ld not ft1rnisl1 security.48 Thus, the _ c?t� rt m� y order 11 11n to_ ft1r111sh sect1r1ty or prod t1ce tl1 e property directly without giving h1111 the opport11n1ty to sl1ow cat1se. It wo11ld see1n l1 owever tl1 at where the . co tirt 1 sst1ed an order req1�i:ing l1im to JJost secttrity or 'prod11ce 'the property, lie could show tl1at tl1 e co11d1t1ons for tl1e applicatio11 ot· tlle rule were no t present, .
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40. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 149(4). 41. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 150. 42. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 151(1). 43· w i v. J?0ccan Bank (High Ct., Bombay, 1921 9. 6 p. �: ), : Al Re 19 l-I p., 21 nd � �� ia ; 44· P as Hiralal v. Mahadu Dagdu (Hi gl1 Ct., Bombay, 1943), 194 3 All�Jndia Rep ., p. 24_ 45. See Durga Das v Nab Cba d . (H 4· n 9 ra · · · Ct., n . igh 6 Calcutt a, 1933) 1934 Rep., All-Ind ia _p ' 46. civ. pro. C., Art. 151(1). 47. C�v. Pro. C., Art. 151(2). 48. C1v. Pro. c., Art. 15 l(l) . '
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i.e., he was not about _to dis_pose of: or remove tl1e property witt1 the intetJt to abstract or delay ex :�t1t1on, and tl1e co11rt wot1ld set �tside tlie order. Tlle court may also order conditional attachment of property.49 If the d�fenda11t fails_ to sho\�, ca11�e vvl1y l1e shoL1ld not furnis]1 sectirity, or ·1ty when reqt11recl, the co11rt is to order tl1at the pro1)erty fails to f�1r.n1sh tl1e secu � _ specified 1n tl1e appl1cat1on,. or s11cl1 JJortion of jt as appears necessary to satisfy 50 any decree, be attacl·�ed. Tl1e attacl11nent is ordinarj]y 1nade in tl1e manner provid ed for tl1e attacl1n1ent of pro_perty in exec11tion. 51 If tl1e defendant sl1ows cause \Vl1y l1e sbot1ld not be reqt1irecl to ft1rnisl1 security or does ft1rnisl1 security after the property l1as bee11 attached, tl1e cot1rt will order the ,1ttacl1 111 ent to be vvitl1dra,vn or 1nake s11cl1 otl1er order as it tl1i1lks fit. 52 In any eve11t, tl1e co11rt \\1ill order the attach111e11t to be witl1clrawn wl1enever tl1e defendant fL1rnisl1es tl1 e sec t1rity required, togetl1er witl1 security for the costs of tl1e attacl1ment, or vvhe11 th.e suit is distnissed. 53 TJ1e correspo11ding provision of tl1e Indian Code of Civil Proce. dure, Order 38, rt1le 9, l1 as been .i11terpreted to mean tl1at tl1e attach1nent e11ds auto111atically wl1en tl1e sec11rity is ft1rnisl1ed or tl1e suit dis11ussed.54 TI1ere is a split of autl1 orit)1 as to ,vl1 ether an attacl1111e11t witl1dra\vn after tl1 e suit is dis111 issed revives if tl1 e order of dis1niss;1l is set aside on a_ppeal.55 In 1ny OtJinion no revival sbould t,11<.e place. Tl1e court is reqt1ired to n1 ake an order ending tl1e attacl1111 e11t ,vl1en tl1 e st1it is dis111.issed, a11d whetl1er it does so or not, tl1e attacl1 111ent sl1ould coo1e to an end at tl1at ti111e. Once it l1as con1 e to an end, tl1e property is releas ed, and I do not see l1ow the result on appeal \Vitl1 respect to tl1e disn1 iss:1l of the s11it can effect tl1 at fact. It is provided, moreover, that wl1ere property l1as bee11 attac.hecl JJrior to jt1dg n1ent and a decree is su.bseq11e11tly _passed i11 favor of tl1e plaintiff, it is 11ot nece ssary for l1 im . to ap1Jly for reattacl1111ent of the property. 56 Bt1t note tl1at an ap_plication for exect1tion m t1st still be 11 1ade, and if the ap1Jlication for e>�ect1tio11 is not made witlun. the li1nitation }Jeriod, tl1e attacl1111ent is i11efJective. 57 Also, vvl1en exect1tion is sot1gl1 t \Vitl1 respect to 1Jroperty tl1at l1as been attacl1 ed J)rior to jt1dg ment, the ordi11ary rules governi11g exect1tiou apply, so tl1at tl1e fact tl1 at tl1e property 11eed ·not be .reattacl1ed d.oes not prevent it fro1u ·bei11g subject to rateable distribL1tion.58 As we saw wl1en we considered exec11tion, objections to tl1e attacl1 rne11t of the property may be preferred by a tlurd party on tl1e grou11d tl1at tl1e property belo11 gs Civ. Pro. c., Art. 151(3 ). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 152(1). ( Civ. Pro. c., Art. 153 1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 152(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 153(4). ' Tte e � 5 ., 1clia All 0 193 ), 1930 s, dra Ma , Ct. igh (H ny mo sila ju v. Ma See Balara HarCl1an�ra (H igh ·., �a\ cut a, i same is true w]1ere tl1e su t abates. See Joyotisb Chandra v. 1928 ), 1928 All-Inclia Rep., p. 234. . . 1�1 Ct CH in. v. Am an hm _Ra l du A1? see , ive rev not s doe t sui the t 55. For a case I1olding tha s11e view 8;Dd po op I ,e t o n s1o cus d1s a f for . 780 p. , 45 vol p., Re Calcutta, 1918), Indian L. . p. , 711 2 . , vol 3) 196 ., ed 4th e ( clur oce Pr il Civ of ll' La e Th citation of cas es see s. Sarkar, 56 . Civ. Pro. C., Art. 153( 5 ). . the pres c r1·be d per10 . . · d' t)1m 57. Ibid. A s to the effect of the failure to n1ake th e appl1. cat1on \.VJ Rep., p. 8 O . ·T=gt1 Ct., Madras, 1945)' 1945 A l/ -l n d ,a I n (I::u see S. ahu· 1 v. A. runacb a.at . 9 . 3 l p , ., vo p 33 Re L. 11 clia J11 ), 06 , 19 tta lcu Ca . ., Ct 58 . See Sewdat Ro y v Sree Canto (Higl1 . s1?on , us e t d 1sc h . ee ce an ar pe ap s r fo in to court as security . p,ai·d ..... Thus, ·1t d'Al · money 111ers fr · om panying text . supra, note 36 and accom . 49. 50. 5 1. 52. 53. 54.
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ty ro is e er h p e at ex th 11d ou pt gr m � � 1e t1 om fr on or bt de ten m dg ju _ e th by to him or t r en to 1o m p d dg Ju be , ta e at th en be ir � s th ha d � ty er op pr e 1 er l w . o, to So _ . nt le ln cl atta e sa m�. manner as a th In ed at t1g es nv be ill w it d � an n, party n1ay prefer his claii . exect1t1on of a decree fo r tl1 e payment of . claim made to property attached In ed ch r ta io y at pr rt op to pr e tl1 at dg th ju m � ai cl ay m so al t an _ nd fe de e Th money.59 e at th tim at m ai ho cl e tl1 ld rt se as t to no � 1re � ilt fa is 1 l 1 gh ot th al t, np i e ex is t etl m an d t an 1ca ed pl te ap e11 1 11 be n s ]1a for ee cr de : ? a � ter af so g in do m . fro n1 lu bar ry until th.at ssa ce t ne no 1s n t1o Jec ob e th r, tte ma al 6 tic ac pr a exectltion filed. 0 As ti1ne. the ect aff t hts no rig es do nt me exist dg jt1 e for be t 1en l111 ac ,1tt y, ntl ca nifi sig t os M r does it bar any no it, su e tl1 to es rti pa t no ns rso pe of t e11 l1m ac att the e i 110 befor the for e ng sal lyi pp a of the 1n fro 11t da fen de 1 e tl t ins aga e cre de a s : pe�son holding 61 Under nt. da e fen tl1 de st ain ag e cre de l1is of 11 1 tio property 1111der attachn1e11t in exect prior to the rendering of the decree, tllis rt1le, if tl1e defendant becomes insolva11t 1er.62 Also, if A obt ain s attach1nent of B's ei, rec tl1e to s tl1e property wot1ld JJas C may have the B, inst aga ree dec s a ain obt C and ent 1 gi1 jt1d r to prio ty JJfOJJer 63 A questio11 does a_ r ise as to whether ree. dec .11.is of tion sfac sati in JJroperty sold tl1e passir1g of tl1e decree prevents JJersons fron1 acq11iring rigl1ts with respect to tl1e attacl1ed property. St1ppose A and B own property jointly. C sues A and prior to judgment, obtains the attacl1ment of A's interest in the property. C then obtains a decree, bt1t bei�ore l1e applies for exect1tion, A dies. Tl1e question is whe tl1er A's interest passed to B by st1rvivorsl1ip, a11d in India, there is a split of a.11tl1ority on tl1is poiI1t. 64 011 011e l1a11d, tl1e j11dgn1 e11t l1as been rendered, and it is not necessary to tal<e out a new atta.cl1111ent. 011 tl1e otl1er hand, an application for exec11tion ]1as 11ot been filed. If the property l1ad not been attached prior to j11dg1nent, the decree wo11ld 11ot preve11t B from ta.l<i11g tl1 e property by survivor ship, since exect1tion }Jroceedings l1ad n.ot been instit11ted. The res11lt sl1ot1ld be no differe11t beca11se tl1e property l1ad been ,1ttacl1ed. Tl1e clear in1port of these provi sions is tl1c1t tl1e attacl1111e11t is to operate as security for t.l1 e exec11tion of the decree and not as a substitute for exect1tio11 proceedings. Ti1e plaintiff wl10 obtained attac,h ment ? f property JJrior to the decree sl1011Id not be in a better position as regards to refers Code tl1e tl1at fact Tl1e plaintiff. otl1er any exec11t10� tl1an of rights tl1e _ tl1e parties 1n a11 attach111e11t ''before j11dgment'' sl1011ld not 111ean tl1at a_fter judg ment, tl1e attachment gi,,es tl1 e plai11tiff greater tl1an otl1 er decree-bolders.65 Tl1ere r ore, until proceedings in exec11tion }1ave been i11stituted, prior rights of third partie -S 10 tl1e attached propertJ, sl1ot1ld not be affected.
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Civ. Pro. C., �t. 153(3). Tl1e proceclt1re for investigating a clain1 to attached prope · rty is governed by C1v. Pro. C., Arts. 418 421. . 60. See Basiran1 v. Katt-yayao.i (fiigl1 Ct.' Calcutta ' 1911) p. 8 3 l . vo J 1· . ' ep., . R . L ,a,, ' ,1c. 8 44 . . Property exen1pt from execution 1s governed by Civ. })ro . C. ' Art. 404. . 61. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 153(2). 62· ��e 9�f�i��!P if �· �1� Official_ Assignee (I�Iigh_ Ct:, Madras, 1916), /11dia11 L. Re p., vol. 39, gh h e creditors would ord1nartly have con1e into existence prior to the attacl101ent. 59 ·
63 ·
See Bisl1eshar Das v. Ambika (Higl1 Ct AH h . , P· 57 5 37 vol. , abad_ � Rep., L. l11d1a1i 1915), ."'. . A would. no t be entitled t0· rat ea ble d1 stribtt e decre held t1on, smce have l1e would not yet against B. · 64 . Compare Subrao v. Mahadevi (H" JOS t ig , 'a) J ct., B ombay, 1�14), !11dian L. Rep., · 38 ol. P (attac�ent and decree d oe s . � a rigl 1 t o_f surv1vorsl11p), _ and Sankar�l1oga . v. o:��d R e ce1�er (High Ct., Madras l��) r ;�� ea de ' sl11p ' All-Ind,a surv1vor Rep., p. of (r1gl1t 2 following decree). 7 65. Even after h e obtains a dec ' 5 te re e 8 ' tl no 1 e property is subject to rat eable distributio n. See supra.
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c. Temporary Injunction, Interlocutory Orders and Appointment of Receiver Since litigatio11 may and . f �equently does take_ some ti1ne to be finally decided it is necessary to make _pro_�1s1on for t?e protectton of tl1e parties a11d the nJain tenance of tl1e p_roperty 1n d1sp�te pending the final determination of the case. Tile court bas extens!ve powers to insure_ tl1 at the purpose of bringing suit will not be defeated by action that occurs dur111g the pendency of tlie case and that tile property in dis_pute will be preserved. The three remedies, to be disc11ssed i n this section, should be employed. as necessary it1 order to accomplish this restilt. 1. Temporary Injunctions An. i_nj11nc�ion is an order restrainit1g a J)arty from doing a partic11lar act or requiring him to do s11ch an act, and tl1e plaintiff may ask for injunctive relief as part o� the final decree. � teri �porary inj11nction is isst1ed during tl1e pendency of the s111t to preven � cert:110 action fro1�1 tal<ing . place that wo11ld prej11 dice tl1e other party to the s111t. Tl1 e Cocle a11tl1 or1zes the issuance of a ten1porary i 1 1junc tion i 11 two kinds of sit11ations: (1) where action taken witl1 respect to property will prejudice the other !)arty; (2) wl1 ere, in a s11it to restrain the breach of a contract or tl1e con1Jl1.ission of an act, tl1e defe11dant is tl1reate ni 11g to breach the contract or do the act pending litigation. We will first consider the iss11a11ce of a temporary inj11nction to preve.nt dealing with _property. An inj11nction may be gra 1 1ted if the court is satisfied tl1at (1) the J)roperty i n disp11te is in danger of being \.Vast ed, dan1aged or alienated by a party to the s11it, (2) the property in dispt1te is in da11ger of being wrongf1 1 lly sold i n exec11tion of a . decree, or (3) the defenda 1 1t threate ns or intends to remove or dispose of l1is property witl1 a vievv to defraud bis creditors. In such cases, tl1e co11rt may gra11t a te1n_porary injunction to restrai.n the act or n1ay make a11y otl1er order as it thinks fit,66 a1 1d the order is effective until the disposal of tl1e s11it or f t1rther order. 67 Tl1e cot1rt shot1ld determine tl1at the applicant l1as a pri111 a facie case, that protection is necessary so that tl1e applicant will not s11ffer irreparable injury before l1is rigl1t can be establisl1ed, ancl tl1at tl1e inconvenie11ce or harn1 likely to res11lt to the applica11t if tl1e inj11nction is not gra11 ted is greater tl1an that likely to arise to tl1e otl1er party if the i11junction is granted. 68 In view of tl1e natt1re of in11novable pro1)erty an d its impor tance in Etl1iopia, an inju11 ctio11 sl1 ould ordinarily be granted \vl1ere tl1e cot1rt is satisfied that there is a d,1nger to tl1e property pending tl1 e sttit. In case of mov able property, t11 e co11rt sl1011ld consider ,vhetl1er any injury to tl1e property can adequately be com1)ensated for by way of da1 11 ages. If it can, there is no reason to isst1e the i11junction.69
While a party may apply for a temporary inj11nction, altho11gl1 tl1e st1it was not brought to obtain inj11nctive relief, tl1e fact tl1at the s1ut was orginally bro11�l1 t to obtain s11ch relief 1nay be significant in deter1 nining whetl1er a te1nporary �n junction should l1e gra11ted. Tl1 is is because tl1e failt1re to grant a te111 porary i n junction may mean tl1at the plaintiff will be 11nable to obtain the relief l1e so11gl1t.70 66. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 154. 67. Ibid. 68. See Daily Gazette Press, Ltd. v. Karacl1i Mun (Higl1 Ct., Saurasbtra, 1930), 1930 All-lnclia Rep., p. 287, and Stibodhll Gopal Bode v. Province of Bil1ar (High Ct., Patna, 1950), 1950 All-lnclia Rep., p. 222. . . . . 66. See Civ. c., Art. 2121. That article governs the c�nditions under w�1�h a . final tnJunction t. may be granted and is also applicable to tlie granting of temporary. _inJunctions unde �11gArof 155. There is no reason why it should not be employed as a guide for the granti temporary injunctions under Art. 154 as well. 70. See Nanabhai v. Janardhao (High Ct., Bombay, 1888), Indian L. Rep., vol. 12, p. llO.
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1 1ction prohibiting the defe u inj an n tai ob to s sue iff int pla 1 . ·ror ex. amp e, the . . land to demol1sh . re. \l\rv'l11·1e t he suit. . nd ant . tu ,a struc is s ff' lti air pl pe nde . tli · g 1n . t er 1 . e1 m fro rt s h. o � Id ISS · ou e L1e Th Jt. h 1is a n10 de te to s ten mp orary rea th nt � da fen . de e th ' ing, . 1ff 1nt he s g t pla er1 a nd deniolis hing ent !. 111 fro _ ant end def ? tlie g inin tra res . ion injunct _ will be _ d �f the rig ive 1ff pr 11t de la1 e t]1 , so do t no _ es J? do it if ce sin re, ht the structu his and e ct pos nta pur 11re 11ct str 10 bringing the 1) kee to _ � t sui the cJainled in � _the status quo sl1ould be the suit wotlld be defeated. TJ1e broad test 1 s whetJ1er t it t is of the rt tl1e cou if n h nio and opi of, d ose disp a is t sui e 1 tI il u11t ed Preserv • • • 7I . on ct1 Jun 1n ry ra po tem a should be , it will grant
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Where tl1ere is tl1e danger tl1at tl1e propert)' may be wrongfully sold in execu tion of a decree, the injunction may be issued against tl1e decree-holder, even thougl1 I1e is not a party to tl1e s11it. S111JJJose tl1at � atta�hes prope: tY_ allegedly belongi11g to B in execLLtion of a decree 11.e holds aga1D:st l111n. C, cla�llling to be tl1e owner of tl1e property, s11es A and B for a decl� 1·at1on of ovv11er�h.1p. He may obtai11 a te111porary ioj1111ction restraining A fro1u sell111g the property 111 satisfaction of tl1e decree, since if C is fo1111d to be tl1e o,vner, tl1e property will have been wrongft1lly sold in exect1tion of tl1e decree.72 It wot1ld also seem that tl1e injunc tion could be issued against A even if l1e were 11ot a party to C's suit; tl1e Code simply says ''\vrongf11lly sold. in exec11tio11 of a decree." There is tl1e possibility that the attacl1ment will l1ave been levied after tl1e instit11tio11 of tl1e s11it involving the property, a11d a ten1porary i11jL111ction sho11ld be iss11ed in s11cl1 a case. .
Tl1e JJrovision authorizing tl1e iss11a11 ce of a tem1)orary inj11nction where defenda.nt inte11ds to ren1ove or dis1Jose of l1is pro1Jerty in fra11d of l1is creditors should be co11strt1ed to be applicable 011]y wl1ere a creditor on a pre-existing obligation is st1ing to JJre,1e11t s11cl1 co11duct from taking 1:>lace, ancl the t11reatened removal or disposal might ta.ke place before tl1e claim is litigated. Where tl1e plaintiff is s11i11g to recover on. an 11nascertained clai111, l1e sho11lcl proceed by way of attach me11t, si11ce tl1at ,viii insttre tl1at property is available to satisfy any decree tl1at may be rendered in his favor. Wl1ere tl1e contention is tl1at the property is in da11 ger of being \vasted, daroag � d or alie�ated, tl1e inj11nction may b e issl1ed only agai11st a party to tl1e suit wl10 1s tl1reaten1ng to do s11cl1 an act.73 I-Iowever, for tliese purposes, ''party'' sl1ould _ be co11strt1ed to 111clude a11yo11e w110 wo11ld be bot111d by tl1e jl1dg111ent, for exan1ple_ a JJerson wl10 has acq11ired his title to tl1e property :fro.1n a. pi1rty after tl1e suit 11 as beg111: or tl1e representative of a party.74 It l1a.s bee11 I1eld in India tl1at if the pa �·ty ag �1nst wl1om tl1e i11jL111ction rL1n.s alienates tl1e property, the transfe r is not void against tl1e transferee.75 B11t if tl1e transferee h::td. notice of tl1e injL111ction, he co11ld 11ot l1ave received tl1e property in good faith a11d as to bi111 the transfer ' sl1ould ·be void.76 Where the plaintiff l1as bro11gl1t suit to restrain tl1 e defendant from comn1itting a breacl1 of contract or 0th.er act prejt1dicial to 11in1, a temporary i 11jL1nction to 71. A See lFi-d �m R a1n Kishun Sl1ah lt\vari Sahu 1 5 J m v. Pat na, a una Prasad (H·igh Ct ., 19 1), 195 -l -/ n tan R ep., p. 469. · 72. �e: the di �cus�ion in D. Molla, e hav d cou l si1p 1 d an o bJection to the attacl1n1ent ra, note 3, vo l. 2, p. 1153. Note that he i n tl1e execution proceedings under Art. 418. . 73. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 154. 74. See the discussion in S . Sarkar , supra' note 55 at p • 715• 75 · See the di sc uss1·on in · D . Mulla, supra, note 3 vol. 2 p 11 . 53 • ' ' · 76. Th1s assum ·· es that the 1n · J·unc t1. on was registereq. Se e Civ. C., Art. 1643.
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restrain tl1e b�each or tl1e collll:1ission of tl1e act may be granted.11 The defendant will b� re?tra1ned .from b�ea�h,1 ng t �e ;ontract or con!n1itting t?,e act pending the 8 Of th plai e ntilI of s n cl�IJ?l · 11na t1o co11rs�, 1f the s111t were brot1gl1 t to r1 dete � restrain the defenda�t from con1ffil�t1ng a_n act witl1 respect to property and the threatened to commit t!1� act pending s111t, a temporary inj11nction wo11ld be a11thorjzed under tl1e prov1s1ons of Art. 154, previously discussed.19 The Code 111 akes it cle,lf, however, tl1 at a temporary injunction may be isst1ed even where the threatened act does necessarily involve property wltich is the subject matter of the suit. In determi11ing wbetl1er a ten1porary injunction against the breach of a contract or the co1n111issio11 of an act sl1 ot1ld be granted, tl1e cot1rt n1 11st co11 sider wl1ether, assun1ing tl1at the plai11t(ff's clai,11 i,vill be provecl l1e wo1tld be entitled to an in junctio11 as fi11al reli�f in the s11it.so S11ppose tl1e plai11 tiff ceases to restrain tl1e defendant from breaclung the contract, or to pt1t it in another way, to obtain specific perforn1ance of tl1e contract. SJJecific performance may not be ordered in Ethiopia unless it is of special interest to tl1e party seeking it, i.e., 11nless tl1 e breacl1 of the contractt1al obligation cannot adeq11ately be redressed by an a\vard of cla1nages; moreover, specific perfor1nance can only be ordered if tl1e co11tract can be enforced witl1out affecting the personal liberty of the debtor. 81 If tl1 ese co11ditions wo11ld not be satisfied, tl1e co11rt could not grant a temporary i11j11nction restraini11g tl1e breacl1. So, if A s11ed B to req11ire ltim to perfor111 l1is contract of employ111ent with A and sought a ten1porary i11junctio11 reguiri11g hi111 to perfor1u pending s11it, the temporary ioju11ction could not be granted. Even assuming the tr11th of A's allegations, l1e wo11ld not be e11titled to a fu1al decree of specific perforina11 ce, beca11se tltis co11ld 11ot be ordered witl1011t affecting B's personal liberty. Tl1is being so, A is not entitled to a ten1 porary injt1nction. By the sa111e token, vvl1ere tl1e plaintiff sues to restrai11 tl1e defe11dant from con11nitti11g an act prejudicial to him, he is not entitled to an inj11nction as part of the fi11 al decree 1111less he ca.n sl1 ovv that tl1e inj11ry is not sucl1 that it can adeq11ately be redressed by an awarcl of damages.82 For exa1nple, A s11es B to enjoi11 B from 11si11 g fL1nds tl1at he holds in trust for A for llis own p11rposes. If B l1 as s1rfficient property of l1is ow11 to satisfy a judgn1e11 t ordering llim to ret11rn tl1e amo11nt claimed by A, A wo11ld 11ot be entitled to an injunctio11 as part of the final decree: he will not s11ffer a11 inj11ry by the expenditt1re of the funds that cannot be redressed by an award of damages. Therefore since A would not be entitled to a final inj1111ction 11nder the law, he not entitl�d to a temporary ioj11nction to restrain B fro111 using tl1e f u11ds ·pending suit. Of co11rse not all cases will be as clear as these. There may be cases wl1ere, at the time the teinporary injt1nction is so11ght, it is not clear whetl,er tl1e IJlaintiff will be entitled to specific perforn1ance or an inj11nction �s part of the fi�1 al �ecre�. As long as it appears that tl1e plaintiff 111ay be . e�t1tled . to . s11� l1 relief if bis allegations are found to be tr11e, the co11rt would be Jt1st1fied 1n 1ssu1ng a temporary 77. A suit to restrain a breach of contract is n1ore cornn1only referred to as a suit to obtain specific performance of the contract. Compare Civ. Pro. C., Art. 400. . . . 78. An injunction granted as part of the final decree would supersede the ten1porary 1nJunction. 79. As a practical matter, it would make no difference wl1ether the court proceeded under Art. 154 or Art. 155. 8 0. See Nusserwanji v. Gordon (l-ligh Ct., Bombay, 1882), Indian L. Rep.il��l. 6, p. 266· For a discussion of other views, see D. Molla, supra, note 3, vol. 2, P· 81. Civ. C., Art. 1776. 82. Civ. C., Art. 2121(2).
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g , en in at ev m th st1 ar as cle is e - . th it ere wh e all 8 at th is t gat·tons in po e Th 3 . n Lo t· c n . 1nJu . spec1_.6 ? perform a e 1 t1ed to t en e b t no d ul wo l1e 1e, trt nc or of the plaintiff to be ld . 1 t t ot no ur sh o ue c_ iss e tl1 , ee cr a de al fin ll_l e t_ e tl1 of t ar porary a on i t nc an inju � p . fro1n breaching the c�11!ract or com p:1itttng the . itljtinctioil restraining the defendant _ y un rar 1nJ on 1I?o ct1 ten a tl1e court do s r fo n tio mo a 011 t tha te No t. ac _ ed ten ea tllr � I 1 ait m1 aw t?e �t s . Tlu i1 l. cla tria s 11 iff' int pla t tl1e of ts eri 1 _ re me n not determine the s at tr �al,_ he might wefi on ati eg all lus e ov pr n ca iff int pla e 1 tl if r, he 1et ,,,J s ne determ i cre t . d If al n e fi th of rt ? .1s 1s so, and the pa as on � cti � 11n inj an _ to be entitied . nt1 ff 1s seelc1n to reve 1 pla tl1e ich wh _p nt, the � defendant is tl1reatening to do the act _ m 1 fro 11111 ing t do ven pre so until the to 11 tio 11nc inj ary por te1n a 1e iss1 l ,vil colirt plaintiff's claim is finally l1eard and decided. Tl1e party seeki ng a temporary inj11nction 0111st make a n1 otion 84to the court and tl1e facts necessitating the inj11nction 1nay be proved by affidavit. Where th; an act, the injunction is to restrai11 tl1e breach of a contract of the co1nmission of 85 ered. been rend l1as e11t 1 i1 jt1dg Ordinarily, al n fi after e n1ad 1notion 111ay also be n otice of tl1e apJJlication sl1ol1ld be given to the opposite party b11t if the object of the injunctio11 \1/0lild be defeated by tl1e delay in giving notice, i. e, there is the 86 the in s ined, t1nles restra junction act tl1e do will party the that r im111ediate dange may be issued ex parte. 87 Tl1.e JJarty against wl1on1 it l1as been isst1ed may then appl); to J1 a ve tl1e inj1111ction set asi de on tl1 e grot1nd tl1at it \Vas i1nproperly granted .BB The injL1nction, if 11ot dissolved, sl1bsi sts t1ntil tl1e s11i t is disposed of. 89 However, at any ti111e the party affected 111ay n1ove tl1e co11rt to discharge, var)' or set aside fl1e injunction.90 \V'l1ere the st1it l1as bee11 disposed of and the case appealed, only the a1Jpellate court n1a)1 grant a temporary inj1111ctio11.91 Wl1ere tl1e i11jl1nction has bee11 gra11ted agai11st a body corporate, it is binding 01 1 tl1e cor1Joratio11 as well as the 1nen1bers and officers whose personal act ion it seeks to restrain.92 T1 1is 111 ea11s tl1at i11 case of disobedience, tl1e property of the corJJOration 111a)1 be attacl1ed. Violation of a11 injt111ction 1nay be p111 1isl1ed in two ways: by tl1e attachn1ent of tl1e property of tl1e }Jerson or by conte111pt proceedi11gs 1111der Penal Code, Art. 443. 93 Where property l1as been attacl1ed, the attacl1 111ent remains in effect for a !11axin1t11n of one year, and if the disobedience or breacl1 contin11es, tl1e property is sold, a� d o _L1 t of tl1e proceeds tl1e cot1rt awru:ds s11cl1 co111pe11 sation to the other party as it tl111Jks fit. 94 The co11rt 111ay en1 ploy eitl1er attac]1 n1ent or conten 1pt and 83 84 · 85. 86_. 87 · 88 · 89 · 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.
S�e the discussion of tl1is ,,iew in D. MuIla, si,pra, 11 ote 72. �i_v. P_ro. C., Art. 154. TJ1is sl1ould be eqLtally applicable to a. 01otion for a temporary 1n3unction under Art. 155. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 155(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 157. ! See Bevis & S:0· Ra : (Higl1 Ct., lla!1abad, 1951), 1951 AII-I11dia Rep., p. 8. On ce '? � t party received notic e ?f the application, J1e coul d not dispose of the property, and 1·r . 11 e 1 so, he would be punished for contenipt. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 158. • ' See the discussion in D· Mul·l a, ,.,. ) 1953 r, .i ,ze , Co,,e Mitte ..1 of Civil • • Procedttre (12th ed. by R. vol. 2' p. · 115?-· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 15 8. See Gossain Money v. GLtru persliad 1 1' · J vo , Rep. (High Ct., Calcutta, 1885), /11dia11 L. p.. 146. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 159_ Civ. Pro. c., Art. 156(!). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 156(2). The bal ance is paid to the party entitled to the property.
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---95 Also, attac hme orde nt r first. to boun d bot� pt1ni�hments m,ty be iillposed.96 is not Finally, a11 y person wb� has knowledge of the IDJltnct1on and wl1o J1imself does or assists the restrained t)arty in doing so sl1ot1ld be subiect to tlle prohibited act · J 97 . sancti ons tlle san,e 2. Jnterloct1tory Orders
An i11terloct1tory order may be broadly defi11ed as any order tl,at tl1e cotirt considers necessary or expedient to be n1ade pe11 ding tl1e deterrnination of the stiit.98 The �ot1rt 111 ay at any _ti1 1:e 111 ake s11ch orders t1pon application by o11e JJarty a11d notice to . tl1 e ?tl1 er; tl11s 111 �l �1des orders for tl1 e ct1stody of a n1inor a11 d the payme11t ?f al �t11on1es.9� 111 add1t1011, tl1e Cocle co11 siders certain provisions regarding specific k111ds of 111terloct1tory orders, wl1icl1 vie will 11ovv co11 sider. Wl1ere 1novable J)fO})erty wl1icl1 is i11 volved i n the stiit or whicl1 l1 as bee11 attacl1ed before jt1dgn1e11 t is subject to speedy or natural decay or otl1erwise sl1ould be sold at once, tl1e court 111 ay order tl1 e sale of tl1e JJroperty, in such n1anner 100 tl1i1 1 as it 1 ks · fi t. Tl1e suit is tl1 en over tl1 e proceeds realizecl 1s 1 ter1 s11ch 01 and from tl1e sale. Under this rt1le, tl1 e cot1rt may order tl1e sale of sect1rities vvl1 ere n1arket conditio11 s i11 dicate that a drop i11 val11e is likely .101 Tl1 e co11rt n1ay also n1ake a11 order for tl1e dete11 tio11, preservation or inspection of any property ,:vl1ich is tl1e subject matter of tl1e suit or as to ,vl1icl1 any questiot1 may arise in tl1e suit.102 For example, i11 a st1it by A against B for dan1ages rest1lting fro111 a11 injury allegedly ca11sed to A's l1ouse by tl1 e erectio11 of B . 's l1011se, tl1e court n1ay require tl1.e i11spection of A's l1 011se on applicatio11 by B, since P... 's l1ouse is the subject 1natter of the suit. 103 Note tl1at tl1 e Code 011ly refers to JJroperty that is the subject matter of the st1it a11 d does not a11tl1 orize tl1e cot1rt to pass an order for tl1e inspectio11 or dete11tion of doc111ne11ts 011 tl1 e grot111 d tl1 at a question i11 volv ing tl1e documents 1nay arise d11ring tl1e s11it. 104 A party \-Visl1 ing to obtain a docu n1ent m11st do so i11 accordance witl1 tl1 e provisio11 s of Art. 137 or 240. Wl1ere tl1e court isst1es an order for tl1 e detention, 1Jreservation or inspection of proJJerty, it may authorize any person to e11 ter 11po11 or into any land or b11ildi11 g or san1ples to be ta.ken, observations n1ade or experi1nents tried so tl1 at full i11formation or evidence n1ay be obtained. 105 An application for an order of sale or for tl1e dete1Jtion, }Jreservatio11 or i11s pection of · prOJ)erty may be n1 ade by tl1e plai11tiff, after notice to the defendant, at any tin1e after tl1e st1it l1as bee11 i11stit11ted. 106 The defendant may n1al<e apJJlica tion, after notice to tl1e J)laintiff, at any ti1ne after he I1 as n1ade an a1)peara11 ce. 107 95. See Mawazzam v. Shebasl1 (I-Ugh Ct., Calcutta, 1927), 1927 All-Inclia Rep., p. 598. 96. This is specifically provided in Civ. Pro. C., Art. 156(1). 97. See K.L. & S. Co. v. Secretary of State (Higl1 Ct., ·Patna, 1937), 1937 All-Inclia Rep., p. 65. 98. See Civ. Pro. c., A.rt. 165. Note that tl1e decision on an interlocutory m tter is not �eneral � ly appeala ble. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 320(3). I11ter locuto ry o rder, as used 1n Art. 165, 1s only one type of interlocutory m atter as regards the question of· appe als. 99. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 165. 100. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 160. 101 . See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 89 at p. 1161. 102. Civ. P.ro. C., Art. 161 (1) (a ). 103. See Dhe roney v. Radha (High Ct., Calcutt a, 1897), Inclia1i L. Rep., vol. 24, p. 11?. 104 . See Rarnswarup v. Kesa v (lligl1 Ct., Rajasthan, 1958), 195 8 All-Inclia Rep., p. 218. 105. Civ. Pro . c., Art:· :161(1) (b). TIJe pr�visions as_ to execution of process a p_ ply by analo� to t. 4o_(3). persons authorized to enter unde r tl11s rule. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 161 (2). See, e.g., Ar 106. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 162(1). 107. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 162(2).
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1 1d an d th e p ar ty in p osse la in e 1r n1 te or d 11 la io ss es lv ,,o n 11 i it su 1e tl Wl1ere or ss e le to th of e e du th nt re or n te t en e n1 ur rn ve go a. e 1 t1 le dt s xe ta y pa to f::1iJs , the otl1er p arty, claim� ld so be to d re de or is e 1r n1 te or a result of wl1icb the ]and t en m on ay 11p p of y 11a e th e, nu te v re or nd ]a u en e tl1 � e in st . r� � te in an ve lla ing to d en to sp t stt 11r co e th e th to le sa y })l ap le sa e th ' and to . r io pr . d · . . or re11t dlle, an 108 T fi k 1n t h 1t s t. a� 1s 1n te 1 l; he co urt 1c s1 on 1 01 1 t a. 1c i)l ap e tl1 t an gr ay m tile cotirt t 1n e o1 th n am 1� es s id po pa 111 y rt pa by the e tl1 1st � 1 ai � ag rd ¥a a\ ee . �r de ,. its in _the cot11t t�11nks fit, or may charg . may as te e ra the cl1 s11 . at t es ter in tl1 ,vi rty pa otlJer 109 U i e. e cre th de d cte 1n re 1 er s nd d_ s t un co th ac of 1t 1 1e t11 jus ad y an in id pa ainotlnt . d ul ee ply co cr ap de a to ? 11e ta1 ob protect � l1a 10 wl e, 1pl a11 ex r fo , ee ag rtg rtile, a 111o e the sale wa s t for bu e, be cre de his of 11 1t10 ec1 ex i11 ld so s wa it er aft t 11 e property confir1ned. 110 ty er or per oth y pro ne mo is t s11i capable tl1e of r tte 11a t-1 jec Stib tl1e ere wl1 Fi1 1ally, ty or per pro ney as trustee mo tl1e lds ho he t tl1a s 11.it 1 ad ty par a a11d of delivery, r ty, the par ano to the due is rt cou or s ong bel it t tha nits ad1 or t�l l)ar r tl1e a11o for ed 1rt or iver co1 del to the in ited )os de1 be to y )ert pro or 11ey 1 mo tl1e er ord 11ay 1 . $ 5000, and B ad1ni ts owing Etl1. $ 4000, 111 Etl1 ver reco to B s s11e . A if So, ty tJar otl1er 112 Thus, 0 400 .$ Eth the osit dep B t tl1a er ord . an A 1nay apply to the co11rt for tl1e IJarty to wl10111 the n1011ey or property is ad1 11.ittedly due 111ay have possession wl1ile tl1e otl1er q11estions i 1 1volvecl in tl1e s11it are being litigated.
3. Appointment of a Receiver In order to preserve tl1e s11bject 111atter of tl1e st1it pending a determination of tl1e rigl1ts of tl1e parties, the co11rt 111ay appoi11t a receiver to deal with property ver it d11ring tl1e JJendency of tl1e s11it. 113 The co11rt 1 nay apJ)oint a receiver ''\vl1ene 114 In con decree. appears to be just and convenient'' botl1 before and after tl1e sidering \Vl1etl1er a receiver sl1ould be a.p1)oi1 1ted after an apJJlication to tl1at effect is 111ade, tl1e court is directed to l1ave regard to (I) tl1e a1nou 11t of the debt clain1ed by tl1e ap1Jlicant, (2) tl1e an101111t vvl1ich 1 11ay J)Ossibly be obtained by the receiver whe1 1 deali11g witl1 the property a11d (3) tl1e J)robable cost of lus appointment. 115 Tl1e cot1rt has a good deal of cliscretion l1ere, b11t m11st exercise it i 1 1 ligl1t of the ,1bove criteria. Tl1e re111oval by tl1e defenda11t of a s11bsta11tial ai1101Lnt of property tinder suspiciot1s circ11mstances d11ri11g tl1e pendency of a s11it .involving ownership of that property ,vo11ld be good grou 1 1ds for the ap1)ointment of a receiver. 116 Also , \vl1ere the mortgagee, e11titled to e11ter in possession on clefa11lt of payment, sues to recov�r on. tl1e -111ortgage, it wo11ld be possible to aJ).point a receiver to pre :e �� 1 _ t su any �ealinoO w1tl1 the property _by tl1e mortgagor d11r111g . tl1e of i tl1e IJendency Wliei e tl1e decree a\\'ards 111a111tenance a11d i1 11poses a cl1aro-e 0 11 specific property to sectire payment of t11e allowa11ce, tl1e aJJJJoi11 t111e11t of a rec�iver for that property 108. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 163(1). 109. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 163(2). 723, 110. See the discussion in S· Sark·r, . Proce p -, · . -, a vo 1 ,.,.,'h . L .1.,e a1v .r 01 1963) C1v1/ c/11re (4tl1 ed.' ' . 111. C1v . Pro. C.' Ar . . . t. 164· The COllrt ay requ1r · e security 1t1 st1cl1 a case. . ?1 .· 437 112. See Haribatis v. National Sugar Mills (Hi t gh L C . ' ahore ' J·933) ' 1933 All-India R ep., P· · · 113. S ee Satyanarayan BanerJee v. Ka1yan Rep., i Higl Pras , , 1 1945 ad All-/11d ( ia 945), 1 Ct. Ca lcutta p. 387. .1"1,·dual or 114. Civ. Pro. C., Art · 166(1) (a) 1nd
p · · n a. t reSLltnably either he court appoint may or corp ate receiver.· · fit. 115. Civ. Pro. C., Art 166(2) · tb'nk s · . . · 1 · · It it a · · ·n,ay irect inquiries on these and other matters as . 116. See AmodeIaI Burwa ses, ca an n v. GiriJa liidi · Sanlcar Cl1audbury (High Ct., Calcutta, 1942), vol. 213, p. 234.' 117. See Jaikisondas v. Zenabai (High Ct., Bombay, 1890), India,, L. ep., vol. 14, P· 431 · R
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----1 , since if tl1 e allo\vance is not paid, tl1 e receiver \vill sell til e exect1tio1 facilitate n1ay 11 8 I-Iowever l of 1 1ce ot1t the proceeds. lo\Va a tl1 e cottrt sllotilcl tl1e pay property �nd 1 nent J 1as 111ade otit a not appoint a receiver ltnless the party seeking tl1 e appoit1t 1 l<J entitling l1in1 to tl1e property case i 11 1. qt1estio 1 facie priina
Althot1gl1 n1 ost cases ,viii invoI,,e tl1e situatio11 vvhere tl1e property as to ,vJ1icI1 tlle apJ)ointn1e11 t of a .receiver is . sot1 ght is t11e st1bject n1attcr of tl1e st1it' tl1e· cot1rt is a 11tl1or�zed to a!)po11 1t ct �ece1 ver of ''a11 y JJroperty," and in a1Jpropriate circt1n1 stances 1111 gl1t appo111t a receiver of !)roperty 11ot involved in the s11it.120 Suppose tl1at tl1e defe11dant o,vned bt1t one piece of property, wh.icl1 l1 e ,vas wasting, and if he continuecl to do so, tl1e properly wot1ld be wortl1less. Si11ce tl1 e JJlai11tiff , 1ot1 ld not be able to realize a11ytl1i1 1g on l1is decree if s11cl1 \Vaste co11tin11ed, tl1e cot1rt n1ig11t co11clude tl1at it was proper to appoi11t a receiver for the property. 121 1
Tl1e receiver 111 ay be give11 broad J)O\vers. Tl1e cot1rt by its order 111a)' atttl\o rize tl1e receiver to ren10, 1e any person fro111 tl1 e possessio11 or custody of t\1e p roperty a11d to take over tl1e J)Ossessio11, c11stody or 11 1anagen1e1 1t of tl1e property hin1self. 122 It 1nay also a11tl1orize l1 i1n to exercise co11 trol over tl1e l)roperty to tl1e extent of bringing and defe11 di11g sL1it, realizi11 g, 111anaging, protecting, preserving and improving tl1e l)roperty, collecti11g tl1e rents and profits a11d disposi11g of tl1en1, a1 1cl exec11ting doc111 nents as ow11 er. 123 I-lis powers ,viii be specifiecl in tl1e order of ap.pointment, and J1e sho1 1ld be dee111ed to possess those po,vers u11til clischarged by the court, eve11 after the decree l1 as been isstted. 124 Si11ce tl1 e receiver is an offic�r of tl1e cotrrt, J)roperty i11 l1is l1 a11 ds 1 nay not be attacl1ed ,vitl10L1t leave of the co11rt tl1at ap.poi11tecl l1i111 . 125 So too, l1e 1nay 11ot st1e or be stied ,vith reSJ?ect to that property ,vitl1ot1t leave of cot1rt u11less tl1 e order of a1)point111c11t specifically provided for st1c]1 suit. 126 J\Iote, 110,vever, tl1,1t tl1 e cot1 rt is 11ot rec1uired to give the receiver all of tl1 e J)O\Vers disct1ssed above, and vvl1ere tl1ere is a qt1estio11 as to tl1e receiver's power, t]1e order of ,1ppoii1tn1e11t 11111 st be co11sulted. Where £t receiver was 011 \y at1 thorized to collect and preserve tl1e assets of ,1 firn1, it ,vas l1eld tl1at 11 e did 11ot l1 ave tl1e l )ower to n1ortgage tl1 e fir11 1's proiJerty. 127 Tl1e a11 1ot111 t of re111t1neratio11 l)aid to tl1e receiver is to be fixed by the court, 128 a.11d ordi11 arily he shot1Id be co1npensated. After a receiver l1as bee11 ('.1ppoi11 tecl, l1e n1t1st ft1rnisl1 st1cl1 sect1rity as tl1e co11 rt 111 ay direct, accot111 t for vvl1 at be receives
118. See Hemanginee v. Kun1ode Cha11der (High Ct., Calcutta, 1899), /11(/ian L. Rep., vol. 26, p. 441. 119. See Chandiclat v. Padn1a11and (I-Iigh Ct., Calcutta, 1895), /11(/ian L. Rep., vol. 22, p. 459. 120. Civ. P ro. C., Art. 166(.l). 121. See Rajlakshmi v. Mt1tl1us\va111i (High Ct., Madras, 1958), 1958 All-India Rep., p. 411 and the discussiot1 in S. Sarkar, supra, note 110 at p. 725. 122. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 166(1) (b) (c). 123. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 166(1) (d). 124. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 89 at p. 1174. See also I-liralel v. Loonkaran (Sup. Ct., India, 1962), 1962 All-lnc/ia Rep., p. 21. 125. See the discussion j 11 D. Mulla, supra, note 89 at p. 1165. I-Iov,ever, _note that property subject to a mortgage need not be attached in execution. So, \vl1�re a receiver \Vas appointed een n1? rtgaged to C, b usly vio pre had n stio que in ty per pro in a suit between A and B, and the C was able to obtain the sale of the property tinde r the mort�age decree ,v1thout leave of· 127 court. See Jogendra v. Debendra (High Ct., Calcutta, 1899), l11cha11 L. Rep., vol. 26, P· 126. See the discussion in D. Mulla, supr{1, note 89 at p. 1166. 127. See Subran1anian. v. Lutcl1man (Privy Council, India, 1923), l11clian App., vol. 50, P· 77. 128. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 167.
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130 n t, ur e y co th b d te ec ir d a as d ay the s 1t u1 co ac 9 s 12 hi it m b . 1 s from tl1e pro_perty ' t 11 1·t directs.131 Also, tl1e receiver is Jiable for any �o ss or o c e tl J s a . e 2 u 1J d ce en . . c: . t 1g · · n s 11 · o os r o g gr lt ne am 1· wrl ful de1 au 1s 11 by . ty er N op pr ote l tl e o t d e s u a _c s e g 1a e pl e m dan ig y si gl b ne d e. se u nc ca ge If 11a a1 d · he or b ss o l r· fo as e bl 1a 1· . t 0 11 that he is r h rt o u _ as caused loss or co l 1e t by d te ec ir d as ts n 11 c failed t o s11bmit llis acco m , ce e en th ig gl t ne ur s co os gr or ay t 11l fa de re di wilftil t by ty er op pr 0 e . th o t a d e k 1a � s i1 to ed od ce go o pr y an 1e tl y pl ap o am d unt an ed ch ta at be ty er op pr s h� ; tl�; 133 TJ1e �a ct that th e receiver has e, ag 1n da de or alt ss lo y an . or n i }Ji m o fr due e r th he s ot ?f l1t r1g e es t]1 rti �a t ec aff in t no a th es do t ty er op pr e 1 . tI l itl \V ly imi)roper y o� 11t fr 111 �1 rt an n prop e�ie s, ce an id �a be t� s a w y rt pa a_ re property . S o, whe �� the .receiver ffilsappropr iated a ll, s� to d te in po ap part of wliich a receiver was 1 . ed 1n 1a n re y rt pe ro }J e th n o e rg 1a cl e th s, ed ce o r p the
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Consolidations of Suit ing e olv s tl1 se inv ca e t sam en fer dif cl1 ques l1i w by ess oc pr e tl1 is Coi1solidatio11 1 er. Consolidation is authoriz ed etl tog d an ed tri d an ard i1e are tions of fact or law wo or more suits t ere Wh es. rti pa e sam the en ,ve bet are ts sui o tw the where only e rt, in wruch the sa1n cou tl1e in ties par e sam tl1e een w bet g di11 1Jen a re or ap1Jeals sa111e or sin1ilar q11estions of law or fac t are involved, the co11rt ma y , on its own n1otion or on the aj)plicatio11 of either par ty , order the suits or appeals to be consolidated. 135 Tj1is sit11ation n1 11st be disting11isl1ed fron1 the one in whicl1 tl1e n1atter in issue is also directly a11d s11bsta11tially in iss11e in a previously i nstituted 136 S11ppose A sues B for . issed dis111 be 1ust 1 suit d eco11 tl1e s se a c 1 l 1 ,vl1ic st1it, i11 a declaration tl1at l1e is tl1e owner of l )roperty X, and B subsequently sues A for a declaration tl1at J1e is tl1e owner of property X. The second suit n1.ust be dis111issed becaus e tl1e n1a11 ner dircetly a11d Sll bstan tially i11 issue in the first sujt- the X-is also directly and st1bstantially in issue in tl1e second o ,voersl1ip of property st1it. But s11ppose tl1at A has e11tered i11to two separate contracts w ith B, one to b_e perfor111ed i n January a11d 011e to be perforrned in Febr 11ary . B fails to perfom1 e1tl1er contract. A n1ay join botl1 claims in a single stlit, 137 but he is not required to clo so. Le� 11s say that i n botl1 s11its B contends that perforn1ance was prevented ?Y force maJet1re, and tl1e facts givi11g rise to f orce 111ajeure in January continued i nto Febrt1ary . In both s 11its, tl1e q11estio11s of fact and law are identical - \Vas performance_ prevented by force 1naje11re. Since tl1 e q11estions are ide11tical, there is no r�ason to litigate them twice (1)artic11lc1rly , since differe11t panels n1a)' resolve tlieni differently), and the ca ses sl10 11ld be consolida ted for trial. N?w s111Jpose tl1at A and B have e11tered into tw o separate contracts of sale, on _wllich A. files separate suits If tl1 e co11rt co11cludes tl1at botl1 suits will invol�e . sim1lar q11est1ons of sales law, it 111ay also order consolidation. J38 Both case s will
D.
129. 130. 131. 132 . 133. 134. 135. 136 . 137. 138.
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cial Civ. Pro. C., Art. l 6 8 (a ) The co rt s1 . . . spe r v ess u _ ioti11 e y. dar c require 111111 to post sect1r1ty unl circumstances exist und · h"IC 11 securit 1n Jai v. y Indar �eed not be required. See Brij (Privy Council ' Indian ��3;) 1932 A II-J11c/1a Rep. ' p · 191· c·iv. p ro. C., Art. 168(b). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 168(c). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 168(d). C1v. Pro C Art 169 An . alance 1· s to be pa.i·ct to the receiver. Y b • • ·, • See Br1J· · Indar v. J. Indar, . supra, note 129. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 11 (1). See c·iv. Pro. C., Arts. 8(3 ), 7 . . C �v. Pro. C., Art. 217. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 11(1).
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legal questio?s, and tl1 e court may conclude that tlley can si1!1ilar around olve rev conveniently be tried together. It will the 1 1 consolidate tl1em for trial. The power to consolid _ �te also e_xists wl1en the s·uits betwee 1 1 tl1e saine parties in which the same or s11111lar ques�1ons of _ la\V or fact are involved are pending in different courts, or wl1 ere two s111ts pencl1 ng between tl1e same parties in different courts are so closely co1111 ected t_I1at. they cannot be properly tried separately_ t 39 In sticl1 �ases, l1_owever, t!1e a_ppl1cat1 �n 140to consolidate 1nust be made by a party Tl1e application n111st be 1 11ade to the before evidence 1s taken 1n e1tl1 er s 11 1 t. High Court if tl1e s 11its are pe 11 din� in tl1e Woreda Guezat or Awradja Guezat Courts, and to tl1e S11preme Cot1rt, if any of tl1e s 11its is pending before a divi sion of the l-ligl1 Co11rt on circ 11it. 141 ·upon tl1e granting of the applicatio1 1 tl1e court to ,vhich the application was 111ade \Viii direct \Vl1icl1 of tl1e subordi1 1ate dot1rts is to try tl1e case.142 Tl1is procedure is also to be followed where two or more appea.ls, in which tl1e sa 1 ne or sin1ilar questions of law or fact are involved, are pending bet,veen the same parties in different courts of tl1e san1e grade. 143
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Note that co11 solidatio11 n1 ay only tak:e place \Vhere tl1e suits so11gl1 t to be con solidated are between the sa111e pa.rties. Tl1ere is no proced11re by ,vl1i.ch s11its i 1 1volv ing different parties n1 ay be consolidated.144 But if the suits are between tl1e san1 e parties, \.Vl1ether pe11ding before the same co Ltrt or before different co11rts, they 1uay be co 11solidated wl1ere tl1ey involve the san1e or sin1 ilar qt1estions of la\v or fact, or they are so closely connected tl1at tl1 ey can11 ot properly be tried separately. It sl1ould be pointed 011t that tl1e cot1rt is 11ot req11ired to co 11 solidate suits for trial, b11t 1nay refuse to do so wl1e11 the s11its ca11not conveniently be tried to getl1er. Its power to refuse to consolidate is analogot1s to its povver to order sepa rate trials where 1nultiple causes of actio11 l1 ave bee11 joi11ed i11 a single suit, and the consideratio11 s applicable to the orderi11g of separ,1te trials, disct1ssed in Cl1a1)ter IV, 145 are eq11ally applicable in tl1.e prese11t context. Wl1e 11ever a motion for co11so lidation is made or the co11rt, on its 1notio11, is consideri11g consolidatio11, 11otice should be given to all interested parties, a11d tl1e cot1rt shot1ld hold a l1 earing 0 1 1 the question of consolidation. E. Habeas Corpus Habeas Corpt1s (literally, in Latin, ''yo11 l1 ave tl1e body'') is the p�oced�tre_ by wh.ich a person illegally detai11 ed may obtain release fro111 sucl1 dete11 t1on. It 1s . a civil ren1edy, a]tl1 ough in n1ost cases tl1 e person seeking release fro1 11 � usto�y will have been detained on a charge of comn1 itting a crin1inal offence. A d1sc11ss1on of gra1 1ti11 g the applicatio1 1 of habeas corpus, tl1at is, of what con tl1e grounds for '"' stitutes an illegal detention, is beyond the scope of tl1is book. We \Vill merely be concerned witl1 the proced11re for filing tl1e application. However, it may be obser� ed that in Engla11d and Un.ited States, tl1 is procedure has proved very valuable 1n 139. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11(2). If the suits are not consolidated, the court in \vhich the subsequent sujt was filed should dismiss. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(3). 140. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11(2). 141. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11 (3). 142. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11(4). 143. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 11(5). . . 144. Unless the parties in one suit ar e claiming under tl1e san1e title as the parties 11:1 the othert ts n1ay no stu the t tha ed ect nn co y sel clo so are its su 'suit and th e nla tte r in issue in both properly be tried separately. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 8(3). 145. See the discussion, supra, Chapter IV, 11otes 79-80 and accon1panyrng text.
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11 t · b y government officials. There i ra st re ry ra it u·b r . E i. • • was l)rotecting individt1 als fr o m tt 11 .. e o 10 p 1a av a bl 1 · , a1 an s a d w e 1 1 th e e Civil c ro p 1e tl ? r 1e � tl e h w to s a t b u o son1e d . 1s 1t t 1a t1 r ea cl it es l<. 1a 11 e Procedure Cod ive cJ us e ex th r ju i11 i tl1 ict wi isd es m on co 11s rp co of the as be ha r fo n tio _ ica pl ap An 1 w�o bas p�e 11 restrained ot herwis 1 rso pe y an by e . d na 1 be . e 1ay 11 _ High Cotlrt.146 It l e v1 oc e C1 tl1 Pr d ure Code er nd 1 1 le ac ,n tly clL r de or an or of 1 ce 11 a t tllatl i n ptlrs r de e or th s t wa th 47 r tte n1a made tinder t no s oe d � It 1 e. d Co ure d e oc Pr · l ina Crirn 1e re�tra�11t �r th e 1neans by which it tl of re t11 na e tl1 ct, fa in legal atitI1ority; if, 1 011 1 s pr?per. Tl1e application _ cat 1 1)l ap tl1e w, l tl1e of 1 io1 lat � was j 111posed is in vio g tt11 t sta the can pl1 �.1) name of the the of it av d affi an by d 11ie pa o1n mtist be acc 1 re a 1 1d !)lace of the restraint and the t1 na �he is, e h y od c11t ose _ perso11 111 1der wl1 _ t48 d the l ?e 1� aJ)p �lle ts 1 fac tl1e . ion to cat tify tes 1 1 ca o ¥1h s 11a111es of ai1y person 1e aJJI?l1ca t1o n �11mself, e.g., if J1e is tl ke 111a to le 1ab 1 11 is d ine tra res son l)er If tl1e restrained i11 a re1note area or is preve11ted b�l lus c11stod1rtn fron1 making the application, tl1e application 1na.y be 111ad e by any per son on l1is beha]f; in such cases, tl1e ap1)licatio11 111t1st state tl1e 11 an1e of tl1e person 149restrained a1 1d that I1e is l1nable to 111al<e tl1e aJJl)]ication and / or affi d avit l1imself.
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On receiving tl1e app.Iication, tl1e Higl1 Co11rt i111111ed.iately isst1es a sumn1ons directing tl1e person havi11g c11 stody over the restrai11ed l)erson to appear before the court togetl1er witl1 tl1e perso11 restrai11ed on day to be fixed in tl1e sumn1ons and to sl1ow ca11 se \vl1y tl1e restrained perso11 sl1011l d not be released . 150 Tl1e court will also isst1e a s11111111ons for tl1e appeara.nce of any perso11 v1ho 1nay be ab]e to testify to tl1e facts alleged in tl1e a1JJ)lication. 151 On tl1e day of the hearing the cot1rt investigates tl1e tr11 tl1 of tl1e allegations and 111ay ma1ce s11 ch orders with regard to evidence as it tl1i 1 1l<s fit. 152 The sole q11 estion before the court is whether the restrai11t is 11nla\vft1!. If it concludes that tl1e restraint is i 1nlawf1tl, it must order the imn1ediate release of the perso11 i11 c11sto d y, a 1 1d tl1e ct1 sto dian 11111st i 1n 111ediately release l1i1 n not\Vit11sta11ding a.ny orders or instr11ctions t o tl1e co11trary. 153 Suppose tL1at tl1e applicant was arrested a 1 1cl detained in the prison on a charge of l1on1i cide and tl1e l )rison d irector was instr1 1 cted by tl1e Minister of the I11terior 1 1ot to release l1i111 11nder any circt1mstances. If t11e co11rt fincls that tl1e detentior1 is 11 nlaw �tll, 154 tl �e d irector 1n11st release I1i1n despite tl1e instrt1 ctions of the Nli11ister, and if he fails �o . do so, l1e will be l1eld i11 co1 1tempt. On tl1e other hand, it may be tl1_at co11rt 1s _ 1n do11bt as to t11e trt1tl1 of tl1e facts alleged in tl1e application and \VIs1ies to adJourn tl1e case 11ntil a later d ate, wl1en n1ore e·vidence can be present ed. It 1:lay tl1e� order tl1e_ release of tl1e perso11 restrai 11ed upon his executi11g a bo �d , ,v !tl1 or w1tl1011t si1ret1es, tl1at l1e will ar,pear i 11 co1 1 rt 0 11 any future d ay 011 �vl,icli 111 s appea_rai1ce 1nay be reqt1irecl ancl will co1n1Jly witl1 s11 cl1 otl1er orders155that tlie COllrt order1 11g the release n1ay tl1i11l< fit to mal<e i11 the circ11111stt1nces. It 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 15 2. 153. 154.
Civ. Pro. C., Arts. 15(2) (i), 177(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 177(1). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 177(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 177(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 178(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 178(2). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 179(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 179(2). , For exan1p]e l1e was n t pr d Rev of n o uced before a court following bis arrest, in violatio ? Const., Art. '5 1 and Cri m. p ro. C ., Art. 29. . 155. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 179(3).
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cot1rt is not r_e9u.ired to order 11is release on boi1 d, but if it the that seem ld \vou 1ld make a dec1s1on 011 the application as soon as sl1ot it so, do to pra.cticable fails t11ereafter. This brief clisct 1ssion of the. procedt 1r� �o . �e followed tipon an application for 11ld 11 ot be �aken as 11 1 1n1111 1 z. 1ng the im1)ortance of tlus remedy. sho corptts eas ·h I tabis avail_ab_le to test !h� legality of any detention, eitl1er pt1rs11ant to a charge of the coin 1u1ss1on of a cr11u 1nal o�e 11ce or for any other reason. It operates to IJrotect the liberty of all persons froin illegal governn1 eI1tal and private action. Tl1e inclusion of this reme�y in !he_ Civil P!ocedure Cocle 111 akes it clear tl1at tl1is ren1edy is to be available 10 Etl1 1op1a, ancl It 1nay prove to be a Iuost i111 porta.11 t one. F.
Time Provisions and Adjour111nent The rt 1les abot1t to be disct1ssed n111st be applied very caref11lly so as to prevent delays in the disposition o.f a case. Since JJrotracted litigation l1as been common in the past, tl1 e drafters of the Code l1ave set fortl1 a 11t1n1ber of rules desig 11ed to prevent sucl1 dela.y fron1 being a featt1re of litigation in tl1 e futt1re.
When an act is to be do11e in relation to proceedings in cot1rt, tl1e cot1rt rot1st, if the time is not fixed by la\.v, fix a time for tl1e doing of tl1 e act, l1 aving regard to all tl1e circ11 111.stances of the case.156 Suppose tl1at a IJa.rty is given leave to amend ]us pleading. TL1e court 11111st set a time in which the amend111eot is to be Inade, and if a party fails to amend his pleading \.Vitl1in tl1e required ti1ne, l1e may not do so later t1 11less the ti1ne is extended by tl1 e colirt. 157 A ti1ne Iin1 it fixed by .law may not, unless otl1erwise provided, be sl1ortened or extended. 1 sa Si 11 ce, for exa111 ple, a 1notion to set aside a11 ex parte decree 11111st be n1 ade \vitl1 in one montl1 fron1 tl1e day the defendant was a\.vare of tl1e decree, 1 59 the court n1 ay not at 1tl1orize the defe11dant to file s11ch a 111otion at a later tin1 e. Ti1ne li 1 11 its, \.Vbether fued by law or by tl1e court, 1nt1st be calc11lated in accorda 1 1ce ,vith the provisions of Art. 1848 of the Civil Code 160 T.l1 e period does not i 11 cl11de tl1 e day from whicl1 it began to run, e.g. if tl1e act l1ad to be done v-1itl1in ten days and the order were iss11ed on June 1, 1966, it ,voltld l1ave to be done by J1111e 11.1 61 The period expires on tl1e last clay, e.g., the act co11ld be do11 e 0 11 June 11; 162 where the last day is a l1oliday, the act n1 ay be done on the 11ext worki11g day, e.g., if June 11 were a l1 oliday, and Jt1ne 12 were not, it wol1ld l1ave to be done on J tine 12.163 The tin1 e li1nit is deen1ed to be observed where tl1 e purpose for wl1 ich it was fixed is f11lfilled before it expires. 1 64 If the plaintiff is granted ten days in whlcl1 to an1end l1 is pleading a11d does so after five days, the IJleading _is dee_1n�d to l1 ave been properly amended. If tl1ere is a dispute as to \vl1 etl1 er a t1n1e l1m1t l1 as bee? observed, tl1 e bt1rden of proving observance is on tl1e_ party _:Vho alleges tl1at It has been observed. 1 6s For tJ1 at purpose, official entries, receipts and stan1ps are 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165.
Civ. Pro. c., Art. 192(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 91(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 192(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 78(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 192(3) Civ. c., Art. 1848(1). Civ. c., Art. 1848(2). Civ. c., Art. 1848(3). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 193(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 193(2)
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. , 66 t � d e rge �r . o _ t ra cct1 !na Th � e b to cou d e v rt ro p re a ma y y 1e tl ss le n u e iv 1s lt c con 1 ca t1 011 to tl1at effect l p _ ap an ng 1d1 ov pr 1it 1 Ji1 is e tim ma. de a d ten ex e us ca d oo fo · v 7 It m ay no t be m ad e after wards. t d re Sa e 1 n b e1�, °1�e tl1e ti1 11e limit l1as expi • . 6 e n e ex · b t d d re y ma t 1 twice.t 68 ha t · n 11 1!1° · . 1 e � tim _ 10 1 .. ?s, c stan ex ceptio11al circun1 7 1 on of tl1e tim e l1m1t may not be do t ra 1 p ex e th to . ior pr ile ne Anyti11· 11g not do • . . er:- .. 169 . ct t.e e1 no of s 1 , ds ar rw te af ne do 1f d after\1/ards a11 n ed tI1e tl1i l1ir wi t req ac tl1e e tim �o t no and did did rty pa a ere \Vll , ver we Ho rt cou to e _ h t to_ fix )�Y � fresh time apJ l stil y ma J1e , ion ens ext an not obtain 1 n 1 t wl1ere the applicant satis fie li me 1 fresl tr a fix ' onlJ 11ay 1 t t cotir s 110 it the B liinit. 1 1ces beJ1o�d his control from observ ta 111s 1 c1 cir by ted ven pre s wa 11e tlie court tl1at 1 11sta11ces . amol1ot1 ng to _force n1ajeure: mere t1 circ ans n1e s Tl1i 1 t.11 Jinu e tirn tI e 1 ing . g not amounting to force majeure niistalce forgetft1l11ess, 1Jress of b11s1ness or anythin 172 Moreover, tl1e application it. li111 e tin1 l1 fres must be a will 1 1ot jt1stify tl1e fixing of filed \Vitl1i1 1 flftee1 1 days fron1 tl1e ti1ne of the disappearance of the circumsta nces.113 S11cl1 strict pro\risions are 11ecessary so tl1at acts ,vill be don e within the prescrjbe d time and litigatio11 will 11ot be delayed ttnnecessarily. Tl1e sa111e lci1 1d of aJ)IJroacl1 111ust be take11 to the granting of adjourn 1nents. If tl1e cot1rt gra11ts adjo11rnn1ents as of co11rse of beca11se tl1 e pleaders have failed to apJ)ear, cases will not be disposed of expeditiol1sly. Therefore, an adjoumn1ent 111ay be gra11ted 01 1ly if s11fficie11t ca11se is sl1ow1 1 and tl1en only for such time as is necessary to e11able tl1e J)tlrJJose for wl1icl1 tl1e adjol1r11ment is granted to be carriecl ot1t. 174 Tl1e fact tl1at botl1 parties req11est an adjoltrnment does not mean tl1at tl1e co11rt 1n11st gra11t tl1e reqtiest. 175 Tl1e co11rt has a responsibility to all litigants and sl1011ld not dela.y tl1 e trial of a case (and thereby delay the trial of otl1er cases), n1erely because the parties do not wisl1 to try it at the appointed tin1e. It is also specifically provided tl1at 110 adjo11rnme 1 1t 1nay be granted on the gro11nd tl1at tl1e pleaders of tl1e parties ]1 ave failed to appear. 176 Delays may be caused by pleaders wl10 l1ave a 1 1t1111ber of cases pending and who simply fail to appear whe11 one is scl1eduled to be l1eard. If a party is going to conduct a case by a pleader, he n1ust see to it tl1at tl1e pleader is present at tl1e time his case · is to be l1ea.rd. Tl1e 01 1ly tin1e when a hearing 111i1st be adjo11r11ed is where the decision is depende11t upon tl1e con1pletio11 of other proceedi 11 gs, civil or criminal. 177 Suppose that A l1as be_come surety for a debt owed by B to C. He sties B to recov er th_e am?unt for wluch l1e has become s11rety. At tl1e ti1 11e of tl1e suit against B, C's su.�t against A for tl1e an1011nt of tl1e debt is still J)ending. 11s If A prevails in the suit 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 193(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 194(1) Civ. Pro. C., Art. 194(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 195. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 196(1). Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 196(2) (n1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 196(3). C�v. Pro. C., Art. 196(2) (b) Civ. Pro. C., Art. 197(1). See tl1e discussion in S . Sarka 64 3 p 1 . o r·' T lie Laiv of Civil Proced11re (4th ed., 1963) , v l , · · C�v. Pro. C., Art. 197(4). C,v. Pro. C., Art. 197(2). Note tl1at A could 11 v . . and b" Jill e 6 en ome d � as a third party defendant in the suit betwe C. See Civ. c. ' Art · � 4 9 an d C1v. Pro. C., Art. 43(1).
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1 ot ?e entitled to recover agai11st will 1 he C, by 1 hi nst B. U11til the result ? agai an 1� know�1, th e cot1rt cat1 not decide n A C be tw �e sui t � the whet11er B is in liable to A, and 1t must adJourn its l1ear1ng of tl1e case t1ntil tl1 at ti111e.
Upon granting an adjol1r11 11 1e11t, the cot1rt n1ust fix a day for tl1 e furtl1.er J1ear ing of th� case and n1a.� 111 ake s��� I1 order as it tl1inlcs fit \\'itl1 . respect to the costs occasioned by tl1e adJ011rnn1 ent. Tl1ese woL1 ld be tl1e exJ)enses inctirred by the 11 tl1e case would l1a ve otl1erwise been Iieard, incl t1 ding a ot}Jer party on . tl1e day v1l1e 180 T11 e cou r. de rt 1�1ay refuse tl1e adjo11rnment 11nless the party ea s pl l11 1 en l w .fee for pays the costs or 1nakes an order tl1at_ .1f costs are not paid, tl1e st1.it will be beard 181 Costs sl1ot1l parte. � be _ta.x�d aga1J1st tl1e party \.vl1ose cond1 1ct \\'as responsible ex _ for th� adJournn:ent, 1[ tl11s 1s tl1e case, and n?t necessarily agai 1 1st tl1 e JJarty requesting the adJournn1 e11 t. S1 1 ppose tl1at at the trial tl1e plaintiff seeks to amend his statement of clain1 to iocl11de a ne,v a.llegation. Tl1 e defendant is not prepared to n1 eet the issue created by tl1e new allegatio 11 and requests an adjourn1 11 ent. 1s2 It is tl1e plaintjff's fault tl1at tl1 e adjo11r11n1ent is necessary - if l1e l1 ad included tl1e allegation in tl1 e origi1Jal pleading, tl1 e defendant wo11ld not J1 ave needed tl1e adjour11n1 ent - and l1 e sl101 1ld be taxed witl1 tl1e costs. Tl1e cot1rt m11st also 1nake such order as is necessary to enst1re tl1at the P . t1r1Jose for vvl1 ich the adjoL1rn1nen.t was granted is carried 011t. 183 If, for exa1uple, tl1e plaintiff obtains an adjo1 1rnn1 ent so tl1 at a witness wl10 ca11 give cr11cial evidence n1ay appear, the court sl1ould issue a s u· mn1ons for tl1 e attenda11 ce of tl1at ,vitness. 184 W'here the purpose for ,vhicl1 tl1e adjo11rn111ent \Vas granted l1 as not bee11 carried out for a reason attributable to tl1e defat1lt of eitl1er party, tl1e court vvill : proceed to decide tl1 e suit in1n1 ediately when the proceecli11 gs 11 ave bee 11 resu1ned on tl1e ne,v date. 185 Suppose tl1 at the co1 1rt grants the J)lai11tiff a11 adjo11rnn1 ent to an1 e11d J1is staten1ent of claim, bltt l1e does 11ot do so. 011 tl1e day set for tl1e case to be rest1n1 ed, the co11rt shoL1ld decide tl1 e case on tl1e basis of tl1 e issues JJrevio1 1 sly raised and tried; note tl1at i t does 11ot render a defa11lt j11dg 111ent against tl1e party ,vho was responsible for tl1e J)t1rpose of tl1 e adjoL1r11111e11t not being carried 011t. 186 But suppose tl1 e plai11tiff fails to aJ)pear at tl1e adjo11 rned l1 earing. Sl1ould tl1e court proceed to hear the case e.x: JJarte or sl1ould it dis11 1iss tl1e st1it Linder Art. 73? The approacl1 taJ<en i11 I11 dia, wl1 icl1 see1ns to be a sot111d one, is tl1at the court slJould dismiss l111 less all tl1e evidence is in, which case it s1Jotild decide 011 tl1e basis of tl1 at evidence. 187 If a decision is possible, tl1 e case s11o·ulcl be disp. osed of once a11d for all ratl1 er tha. n dismissed. Where the p t1rpose for wl1 icl1 the adjour11179. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 197(3). Where the l1earing of evidence has begun, the hearing of the _suit is to be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attend�ce have_ bee� exam1n�d so far as tl1is is possible. Ibid. WI1ere the bearing has been adJourned sine_ die, that 1s, without a date being fixed for a new J1eariog, new summonses must be issued to the parties and witnesses. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 197(5). 180. See Chettiar v. C. (High Ct., Madras, 1938), 1938 All-India Rep., p. 711. 181. See The disct1ssion in D. Mulla, Tlze Cocle of Civil Procedure (12th ed. by R. Mitter, 1953), vol. J, p. 711. l 82. Such an adjournment is ordinarily referred to as a continuance. 183. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 198(1). 184. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 111. 185. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 185(1). 186. See Shaikl1 Muhammead v. Cbul11ai lv[atbo (High Ct., Patna, 1919), Indian Cases, vol. 51, p. 189. l.87 · See the discussion in D. Mulla, supra, note 181 at P· 715,
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f a reason no t attributable to or t ot1 d rie car en be . t no s ha tl ie 8 �1ent w'as graii 18 . ted . e m rn . t u er n th adjo 1r ft a t 11 a · g1 l il w rt 11 co e th f y , t · ar p ·· t l1e1 1 ault o e·t , ded e pen are ti1n st1s s its lin1 di11 cee pro e 1 tl g prescribe d icl1 vvb itl iod . · e,o- the per D ltrln . 189 S_ 11ppos� tl. 1a t execution 1. r111 t no ceedings pro do 1rt cot t11e . by d fixe or law by 11 s t10 wa ica pl st ed ap fil fi1 � Th on . l1s 11t 1110 . e re January th r fo ed rn jou ad etl be have d ary on rre nu ba Ja be 1, y l r1_ 1?a ord !966.I9o In 11ld vi10 ion cat pli ap sh fre A I, 1956. d be rre ttld �a \Vo on ril 1on Ap c�t pl1 ap I_, 1966. sh fre a 1t, 1 ne 1 irn jot ad . the of ht lig y ntl t ige s n� dil l1a d sue t pur an im cla tl1e his case, at 1 tl t fac the to e du if , ver we Ho gs d are me din dee cee pro the not to have rs, yea two for nt ma dor s ain rein e the cas been sus1)ended. 191 \1/e m11st stress tl1at adjo11r11111ents sl1011ld be granted sparingly so that litiga tio11 will not be delayed except for very g ood ca11se.
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G. Seci1rity for Costs In certai11 circ11mstances tl1e co11rt ma)' order tl1e plaintiff to post securjty for tl1e defe11dant's costs, eitl1er on its ovvn 1notion or on application by the defendant. This n1ay be done at a11y stage of the s11it; tl1e reasons n1 ust be recorded, and tl1e plai 11tiff is reqt1ired to post tl1e sec11rity \Vithin a time fixed by the court. 192 Ho\ ever, tl1e cot1rt 111ay not order st1cl1 sec11rity wl1ere the plaintiff could not be liable for tl1e defe11dant's costs, irres1)ective of the fi11al disposition of the issues, e.g., wl1ere tl1e defe11da11t has ad111itted liability, a11d the sole issue relates to da111ages. 193 Tl1e co11rt 111ay also reqt1ire security for costs fro1n a defendant who l1as filed a cou11terclain1, sir1ce as \Ve I1ave l)Ointed 011t, vvitl1 respect to that counter clai111 l1 e is i11 tl1e position of a l)laintiff.194 i�ote that the cot1rt may 11ot require sec11rity for costs fro111 a plai11tiff v1l10 has been given leave to s11.e as a pauper, since to do so wo11ld defeat tl1e p11rpose of tl1e rt1le per11tltting hin1 to sue on tl1 at basis. 195
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Sect1rity for costs 111ay only be ordered agai11st a non-1·esident plaintiff who 196 security. as does not possess stiilicient in1n1 ovable pro1)erty in Etl1iop.ia to serve So, wl1ere tl1ere are several plaintiffs, sec11rity 111ay 11ot be ordered 110Iess all are non-residents a11d 11one l1as sufficie11t in1111ovable property in Ethiopia. 197 By the ?ame to�e1 1, if t�e onl_y i 111111ovable pro1Jerty tl1e non-resident possesses is that in,,olved 10 tl1e suit,_ sect1r1ty \V1ll be ordered, si11ce if be is 11ns11ccessft1l, he has no property ot1t of w_l11c!1 the costs 1nay be realized. 1 98 For these purposes, a perso·n abot1t to Ie�ve E l11op1a und�r sucl! c!rc11n1.st,111 ces as to afford reaso11 a·b1e probabiljty that he wil� not� be back 1n Etl11op1a \Vl1en orclered to pay costs is deen1ed to be a non resident. 199 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.
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Civ. Pro. C., Art. 199(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 198(2). See Civ. Pro. C., A.rt. 384. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 198(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 200(1). See the discussion in D, Mulla, si,p ra, note 181, vol. 2, p. 997. Id. a t p. 999. ½�ss ;�!� �a fizan v. Abdul Kari1n (I--Iigl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1908), Calcutta Weekly Notes, 3 196. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 2 00(2). 197. Ibid. 198. Ibid. 199. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 200(3).
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1 e ,vl1 �t�er the defencl ��t is a no11-residei1t, refereiice Jntist In order to deter1ni1 1 ! p�ov1s1ons of tl1e C1v1l Co?c. :ioo A person llas liis resi eva1 rel l1e to ! . : this 1s be made 1 �re l1e nor1nally resides, i.e., lives and ,vork:s.201 a 1f c :v1 Eth1op1 in e den 1 0 ca1�e to Ethiopia for the s ?lc pt1rpose ?f i11stittiting proceedi il gs \1/1 plaintiff A 1 ot1gl1 11e n1 1gl1t be pl1ys1cally present ll ere at tlie even tl ent, non-resid a be wolild 202 stiit. the tinie of WI1ere a11 order reqt1iri11g tl1 e posting of security I1 as been n1ade and tI1e plaintiff has not ft1r11ish �d . the_ sect1rit� witl1in tl�e time fixed, the cot1rt m't1st dis111 iss tile stiit t111less �l1e pla111t1ff is_ per1111tted to \:V1tl1draw.203 A plai11tiff as to \¥}lorn the stiit is dis1n1ssed tinder tl11s rule n1ay apply, vvitl1in one month fr0111 tlie date of dis111issal, for an order setti11g it aside, a11d if it is proved to tl1e satisfactio11 of tile court that l1e was preve11ted by sufficient cause from furnishing tl1 e security in time, tl1e orcler of dis1T1issal n1t1st be set aside 011 s11cl1 ter111s as to security, costs . or otl1erwise as tl1e court tl11n l<s fit, a11d tl1e co11rt will appoint a day for proceed 204 Notice of tl1e aJ)plication m.t1st be given to the defenda11t.205 g s11it. the ,vith n i It l1as been l1eld in India tl1at \Vl1 ere a st1it has been dis111issed t111der tl1is rule, the plaintiff is 11ot barred fro111 instit11ting a fresl1 suit 011 tl1e san1e cause of ac tion. 206 I11 n1 y OJJinion, s11cl1 an i11terpretatio11 is unso11nd. There is provision for the plaj11tiff to witl1dra\V witl1 leave a11d to have an order of ciisr11issal set aside. If l1e is u11 able to ft1rnisl1 sec11rity, l1 e sl1011ld be given per1nission to ,vill1clra\v \Vitl1 leave to file a fresl1 suit. 207 If lie l1as not obtained sucl1 lea\1e failed to J)OSt security althougl1 able to do so, there is n<> reason to pern1it l1i111 to file a fresh s11it.
An appellate co11rt n1ay req11ire sucl1 security fro111 tl1 e appella11t, in its 0\\111
motion before tl1e respondei1 t is called 11po11 to a1Jpear a11cl a11s\ver, 208 or after sucl1 appearance, 011 tl1e application of tl1 e respo11dent. 209 Security n1ust be ordered where the appellant is residing ot1t of Etl1iOJJia a11d does not l1ave st1fficie11t i111n1 0vable property in Ethio1Jia otl1 er tl1an tl1e {)ro_perty, if any, to wl1ich tl1e aJJ!)eal relates.210 If I,e fails to ft1roisl1 sec11rity wl1 e11 orderecl, the JJrovisions jt1st discussed are applicable.211 H.
Payment into Court Tl1e l)rovisio11 s relating to 1Jay111 ent into court e11able a defenclant \.vl10 acl1:1it:, ovving a st1m of money to pay tl1 at st1111 i11 to co11rt and avoicl further proceed111g5 or avoid liability for costs if tl1e proceeclings conti11ue. In a suit to rec?ver a debt or dan1ages, i.e., a s11it wl1ere tl1e JJlai11 tiff seek:s 1noney by \vay of relief, the 200. See Civ. C., Arts. 174 182. 201. Civ. C., Art. 174. Note tl1at security for costs may be required from an Ethiopian national 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209.
210.
211.
or don1iciliary w110 is a no11-resident at the tim e of suit. See I-Janif v. Ku]san1 (I-ligl1 Ct., Bombay, 1922), 1922 All-lnclia Rep., p. 299. tl�is should ty, uri sec h njs fur to . e abl un is. iff int pla e 1 t1 ere . Civ. Pro. c., Art. 201(1) Wh (6). (-) 278 t. Ar C., . Pro . C1v e Se t. sui sh fre a file to constitute good cause e11titliog l1im Civ. Pro. C., Art. 201(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 201(3). 1· -?6, p. 637 vo p., Re L. n lia lnc ), 02 19 ay, n1b Bo ., See Hariram v. Lalbai (Higl1 Ct See note 203, supra. g upon the llin ca t ou th ,vi al pe ap e th ss n1i dis y n1a t You \.Vill recall that th e appellate cour respondent to answer. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 337. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 202(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 202(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 202(3).
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u s po t i in de 1gs t ur dit co ee oc pr . s , 11 e 1 tl h c of s ge sta . ' m of ' ' at any . c .. 1 e11dant n,ay dec . 1 ff s c Ia1.m.212 nt p 1e a1 tl I f o on t1 a s1 1 t sa 1ll ft ?e This is � _ .. money as be considers t? y, ne of en v mo e_ y ug 'er o': l1o t _ 1ec the h the debt lcs see iff int pla e . til er ev en wh proper an as cl1 1o ct s11 un f lie I0J re n r ay l1e m ot 1 1 1gl o1 th o 11 als e ev d an b 3 e 2 ed ttr sec · ' be · Y n ta · e d 1e b t] en fi d t a11 Y en to giv 1 1 e the t · b 1s 1t Jos i de pla . tlie 1 ot of e · · · · i · tic No tr 214 1 ed 1 n c a1· 1 �t o f tI1� d pos1t 1s. paid to 1 mo a e 1 t d a11 t, 11r co e tl1 of the 11 . tio _ ; _ � ttnder tlte di!:ec _ . . 21 s. �t � 1e 1s It �1 rw ld l1e o �ou t r co e see m that th ss le t1n 1, �1 1 t ca _ i pl ap � s 111 on � plaintiff ly 1s 1ff on 1nt ed pla titl the en t tha to e l11d nc co recover to n tio cre dis the s lia urt co tlle 2 6 ce lan to ba 1 the d the un ref a end def t1ld . wo so, nt if d a11 nt, ou ain a part of this WJien tl1e plaintiff receives s11cl1 noti�e, . he 111ay ei!her _accept tl1e an1ount in full satisfaction of tl1e claim or accept 1 t 1 n part sat1sfact1on and contend that still 1 11ore is d11e. If l1e only acceJJts the a111ount in partial satisfaction, be may prosec11te the s11it for tl1e balance. 217 How�ver, �f l1e elects to prosecute the suit for tl1e balat1ce a11d tl1e co11rt finds that he 1 s e11t1tled to recover no more than the an1ount deposited, tl1e J )lait1tiff is liable for all costs incurred after tl1e deposit and tl1e 1Jrevio11s costs it1sofar as tl1ey were cat1sed by tl1e excess amount of tl1e plain tiff's clai111 218 In otl1er words, wl1ere the defendant is \Villing to pay son1e money, . and tl1e plaintiff clai111s 1nore, he prosect1tes that clai1 n at tl1e risk of be.ing liable for costs. Tl1e defe11dant who ad,nits owi11g a certain amount shouJd not have to continue tl1e case ,vl1ere l1e pays that a111ount into cot1rt. If the plaintiff still con tests tl1e a111011t1t due, l1e sl1ol1ld prosect1te the s11it at his own risk, since it is the excess of l1is clai111 tl1at re11ders ft1rtl1er proceedings 11ecessary. If it turns out that lie was 11ot entitled to recover 1nore, l1 e is tl1e one responsible for tl1e fl1rther litigation, and sl1011Id bear tl1e costs 11ecessitated by tl1e ft 1 rther litigation and the excess of l1is clai111. If tl1e IJlai11tiff elects to accept tl1e a.mot1 1 1t deposited in f11ll satisfaction, he !)resents tl1e cot1rt with a staten1ent to tl1at eftect, a 11 d tl1e court enters jt1dgn1ent c.1ccordi11gly . 219 Ordinarily, tl1e s11ccessf1 1l party is entitled to costs.220 Ho,vever, ,vl1ere tl1e case has, i11 effect, been settled b)' a deposit into co11rt, the court awards costs i11 ligl1t of wl1icl1 party is 111ost to bla111e for tl1 e litigation . 221 Suppose th at A . o,ves B Etl1. $ 100. B 111 a]ces no de1nancl for pay111ent and has 110 reaso ·n to believe tl1at s11c]1 a de111a11d ,vo11ld pt1t l1i111 at any disadvantage. He i 1ru11ediately files suit. When A is sued, l1e deposits Etl1.$ 100 in co11rt, whic.h B accepts. B �l1oulcl not be e11titled to J1is costs a11d sl1011ld be liable for any costs A may l1a,,e 111c·urred.222 The st1it was co1111)letely ll11necessary a 1 1d cot1ld l1ave been a,,oided if � had inade a dema11d, or at least ,ve 111ay ass11111e it \VOttld l1ave been avoided �Ince 110 ?einand was n1ade a11d paid im111ediately after l1e "''as stied. Of course, if the . cla111 1 had beei1 disp11ted or A l1ad i 1 1dicated tl1 at l1e wo11 ld not pay unless sued, it was 11ecessary for B to :file s11it, a11d e,,e1 1 tl1011gl1 A paid tl1e 111one)' into 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222.
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Civ. Pro. C., Art. 281(1). See Brij �opal v. Masuda (.High Ct. , Orissa, 1935 ), 1935 All-I11clia Rep., p. 93. See tl1e d1scuss1. on in D. MuJJa, stinra 11ote 18 ? p. 89 4. 1, VOJ • -, J , .iv. C Pro. C., Art. 281(2). 1 See Gray v. Bartl10Iomew (Queen,s Bencl1 v ' ol · Rep., Bench Eng. , , 1895), 1895 Q1,ee11's p. 209. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 282(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 282(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 283(1). Se_e tl1e discussion, in rra '.I' , note 349 and accompanying text. ctv. Pro. C., Art. 283(2). See Indian Code of Civil proce dure, Order 24, rt1le 4, illt1stration (a). J
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cha rge against him.223 Now suppose that A is be sl1o u1d ? cost s o urt, willi c ng cla rm bu s tl1a B t t Etl1.$ 150 is owed. He sues A who . ay B Eth.$ 100, . t11 Pdeposits Eth.$ 100, wl11ch B accepts. The fact that B readily accepted t' hat , an1ot1nt . 1. . accept.e d It · bef· ore - It was 11e who stied to rec Id have · e St10U. iuclicatecl that h over 224 liab be le for costs. If A paid Eth.$ ISO i i,to cot1rt, he n,ore _ and he shot1ld · . · . should be_ J_1· ab1e for costs,. since 1t was 111� reft1sal to pay that anlotint, whlch l,e is no,v �1L11ng to pay, _wlu�l1 made the st1It n_ecessary. Note tl1at tl,e procedure is situ at1on wl1ere tl1e parties have entered into a con,promise tl1e . �o cab le 1 o app l t n . . such In s111t . a s1t11at1on tl1e costs would be covered by the agre ement pend111g . t.•125 agreeroen
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Summary and Accelerated Procedures s 111nn1ar_y proced11re refe�s to a . pr?ce�11re by wl1icl1 tl1e plaintiff may prosect1te bis clai111 w1tho11t _ the n_ecess1ty ?f 1nst1tt1t1ng_ a f11ll-scale suit. Accelerated procedtire provides for t�e 11n111ed1ate l1 ear111g of certain kinds of cases speedily and witho11t a full-scale s111t, because the 11at11re of tl1e case req11ires and renders s11itable an immediate disposition. Altl1ougl1 the proced11res are different and applicable to differ ent ki11ds of cases, tl1ey are related i11 tl1e sense tl1at the questions involved in both kinds of cases 111ay be deter111ined \.vitl1out f11ll-scale s11it.
I.
1. Summary Procedure Where su111mary proced11re is available, tl1e plaintiff l1as tl1e option to en1ploy it, but is 11ot required to do so. I-lo\.vever, si11ce by definition tl1e procedt1re is expeditious, and a full-scale s11it may be avoided, tl1e plai11tiff vvill 11sually do so. In Ethiopia, s11n1ID.ary procedure is available wl1ere tl1e plai11 tiff seeks only to recov er a debt or liquidated den1and in 1no11ey payable by tl1e defendant and arisi11g {l) upon a contract, express or in1plied s11cl1 as 011 a bill of excha11ge, pro1nissory note or otl1er sin1ple contract debt, or (2) on a bo11d or co11tract writter1 for _pay ment of a liq11idated a1nount of 111011ey, or (3) on a g11arantee where tl1e clai1n against tl1e principal is i n respect of a debt or liq11iclated a11101111t.226 As a prac tical n1atter, i n most of these cases, tl1e plai11tiff is e11titled to recover: the defe11dant has simply ref11sed to pay the debt owed and is forcing tl1e JJlaintiff to instit11te suit. Therefore, a proced11re is provided by wbicl1 tl1e plaintiff n1ay recover tl1e claim without tl1e expense atte11da11t upon bringing an ordinary s11it. The crt1cial question is tl1e liquidated a1no1111t of tl1e debt. Tl1e plaintiff 1n11st be entitled to recover a specific s11m of mo11ey ascertained at tl1e tin1e of s11it. If tl1e defendant accepted goods under a contract, b11t ref11sed to pay tl1e price, a sumn1ary s11it for the price would be proper, since tl1e a11 101111t claimed is liquidat�d-�27 011 tl1 e otl1er hand, if the defenda11t refused to accept tl1e goods, tl1e pla1nt1ff wo11ld have to sue to recover dan1ages for breacl1 of contract, and the amount of su�h da111ages wo11ld have to be determined at trial. The plaintiff co11ld not state a specific a1notint which l1e is necessarily entitled to recover by the 11at11re of his clai1n. Tl1erefore, the plaintiff's clain1 is not liquidated, and. he is not entitled t_o employ su_m1nary procedure. Now suppose that A exec11tes an instru1nent by wl11cl1 l1e pron11ses to 223. 224. 225. 226.
Se e Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 24, rul e 4, illustration(b). See Indian Code of Civil Procedure, Order 24, rule 4, illustration (c). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 276(2). · . . t a sui e 10 bl aila av ly on is ure ed c pro ry ma sum dia I . Civ Pro • c., fi.l n A -t • 284 • Note tha · t in · · on a n egotiable instrument. S ee Indian Code of C1v1l Procedure, Orde· r 37, rule 1 227. Any defect in the goods would give ris e to a cot�nterclaim by t� e ?efe� d�nt to reco v ;J di 5 lmct froin a is ice pr e tt1 for 1n1 cla 's iff damag es for breach of warranty. Th e plaint claim the defe11dant n1ay l1ave.
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s witl1io si� months, od go n tai cer er liv de t no es do . e Th a Y B Eth.$ 5000 if he ' , te or ue no eq ch y ce or sin iss om pr the obliga. , ge an c}1 ex of l bil · Pinstrt1111e.nt 1s not a . 22s . . d o , o ut b· g t ·h . r the e 1v 1 e d to case re l1 � 1l fa sho 's A � . n o p uld l1 l a 11 io it _ d n co is . 11 tio d te da a r u1 fo l1q . m bt su de ct ra nt If co e cone th pl sim a e lv . vo . in . to d re e 'd 1 11s co be B o d 1s go 1e l s, t led 1 er tit 1v en e 1 c to to 1re ill fa rec s A' by over ed cI1 ea br · n 1 ee b 1as tract e d ur ul ed wo oc pr be y ar 111 o n1 th st1 au d an e riz bt de d on ct ra nt co le niJ i si a , 00 50 Etll.$ 229 . d 11 11 ro g t 1a tl dt1�e, he endor ses h.is ary 1 1_ oce m1 pr su tl1e oy 1pl e11 to s she wi iff int IJla WIIere the , v1! an s da ut a afli bn rep s11 d �11 ed . r e'' ur ed by llim oc p Pr y ar 1111 un ''S i111 cla of . stateinent ts! 111 . fac 1fy tl1e ver to ely bis t1v s po se cau ear sw � can of 1o � w1 n rso pe . 1er otl y an or ,. l be re h1s ier tl1e 1n t 1s tl1a no i ng t sta d an defence , ed in1 cla nt o11 am tlie d an 1 actio1 11ed sig e for is d. the 11re ced pro cases where y 1a1: 1111 su1 d, sai e 11av \Ve As 0 t.23 sui to tile im, cla tl1e and to e before institut enc def any e l1av to ely : lil-: t 11o is tl1e def e11dant i110 stiit under tlus JJroced11re, the JJlaintiff sl1ot1ld be req11ired to swear that }1e ed not se1·v on tl1e is 1n clai of defendant. e11t e1n stat Tl1e so. be to this s eve beli th set rµ for i11 the Second for tl1e in 11s 1J110 st1n cial s1Je a es serv 1rt cot tl1e Instead 232 TL1e sum mon s advises him. that 231 ed. crib 1Jres he be to n for1 Scbedt1le or in sttcl1 othet has bee11 stied for a s11111 of 111oney on a specified oblig,ttion and that be must obtain leave to cle_fe11cl tli e si,it. I-le n1ay not appear and defend t111less lie applies and obtains sucl1 leave fro111 tl1e cot1rt.233 If tl1e defendant or 011e of several defenda11ts fails to make 234 tl1e plaintiff is entitled to a ons, s11n1m the by :fixed ti111e such a11 applicatio11 ,vitl1i11 tl1e decree for a11 ctmot1nt not exceeding tl1e su1n cla.imed i11 the staten1ent of claim together ,vitl1 i11terest if any, and costs against tl1e defe11dant or st1ch of the defendants as have failed to apply for leave to defe11d.235 I n otl1er words, \Vl1ere summary procedure is en1ployed, tl1e def e11da.11t 111ay 11ot apJ?ear and defend except witl1 lea, 1e of court. If l1e does not aJ)ply for s11cl1 leave, jt1dgn1e11t will be entered against him, since l1is failure to a1J})ly demonstrates tl1at l1e does 11ot have a valid defence. It has bee11 l1eld i11 I11dia, however, tl1at tl1e defe11da11t may, a·fter judgn1ent has been e11tered, aslc tl1e court to pass a decree tl1at tl1e a1not1nt be payable in instalments,236 �nd tl1ere wot1ld see111 to be no objection to tl1is. Tl1e JJllrpose of the procedt1re 1s to enable tl1e plaintiff to avoicl a full-scale s11it, and tl1is J1as been accon1pli sl1ed. Once tl1e j11dg111e11t l1as been entered i11 favor of tl1e plaintiff, tl1e court sl1011ld be able to pass the same kind of decree as i11 any other case. an by d st1pporte A1:1 )p a ication for be leave to to a. p pear and defend is 1 � � affidavit, \vl!1cl1 states wl1ether the defence alleged goes to the wl1ole or to part 011Jy and_, if s�, to wl1at par_t, ?f the pla�ntiff's clain1.237 T11e plaintiff !11us� served w1tl1 notice of. tl1e appl1cat1011 and w1tl1 a co1) of tl1e defenda11t's affidavit. Y
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228. See Con1m. C., Arts, 735(b), 823(6), 827 (a). 229. ! 11 1ndia sum i:nary procedure W?t1lcl 11ot be available in sucl1 a case, si11ce the inS trllment _ ts not a primissory note. See S11no11 v. I-Ialcim Mal1on1ed (I-I.igl1 Ct.' Madras, 1896), 1ndi011 L. Rep., vol. 19, p. 368. 230. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 284. 231. See No · 17 - "Su1nmons 1s· sum1nary Suit 011 Negotiable Instrument.'' 232. C1.v. Pro. C. , Art. 284(1). 233. Ibid. 234. U�der Form No. 17 tl1e tin1e is fixed at summons. the ten of day ser s tl1e vic fro e m 235. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 285(2). 236. ��3CA�i�;�8 M. Cl ya Firm 9 g v. 0.A._P.K.C.J. Cl1ettyar Firm (Higl1 Ct., Ra� ��g 1 �: "X; ;�1 f 1 \. ..J sdJ P P 1 e Jame 1 contrary v. view Pestonji was taken in . 11 Rep Bombay 1926) , 1926 ·All-111·d1a ., p. 250. 237. C �•v. Pro. C., Art. 286(1). 238. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 286(3). L
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l1old a l1eari11g, a t wl1 jcl1 ti111e - Tbe co1trt will · tl1e defen 111 ay · dant , , be· exan1111e · d . produ to qt11red �e relev�nt deeds, boolcs doct1111ents ai1 d the like. 239 re l and on oatl be !;rved with 11ot1ce of tl1 e applicatio11 Llnd a copy of tll e · 1st m tiff � plai The . � 2 t1on. appl1ca s 1t defeodai Tile cotirt . 111a� do. one of �l1ree tl1i !1gs. It 111ay reject tl1e aJJplicatio11 a 11 ct refuse the �eave, ':"l11cl1 !t \Vtll do It co11v111�ed tl1at .tl1e defe11dant establis1_ 1 _a legally _ sufficient defe11ce. 24 In. s �1:l1 a case, tl1e � udgn1e11t IS e11 tered for tI1e plaintiff.242 It roay grar 1t leave _t1nco11d1t1011ally,243 o�· . 1t I11 ay grant leave co11ditional tipor1 pa)' n1ent of n1 011e)1 into cot1rt of tl1e g1v111 g or sec11rity for tl1e satisfactio11 of 1J 1 e ff' 11, a11d it 111ay i1�1 1Jose co11 ditio11s as �o tl1e tin1e or n1a11ner of trial.244 clai1 s lainti p Thus, wl1ere tl1e cot1rt decides to grant leave, 1t I11 t1st also decide wl1ether the leave is to be conditional or u11conditional. lf tl1e defence is tl1at JJay111ent l1as already bee11 111 ade, tl1 e cot1rt sl1ot1ld gra11t tl1e leave, bt1t require tl1e clefendant to 245 If the court is pcrst1aded tl1at there is a 1 e c)aiin. satisfy tl to sect1rity ftiroisl1 bona fide dispt1te as to tl1e existe11 ce of tl1e debt a11d that tl1e defe11da11t has assets sufficient to satisfy any decree passed against l1in1, it sl1ould gra11t tl1e leave t111conditionally. If the colt.rt is in doubt \¥l1 etl1er tl1e defence is bona fide, bt1t is 11ot convi11ced 246 If tl1e al. 1 1 conditio al<e it 1 n sho11ld ]eave, bt1t tl1e t 1 gra1 sho11ld it not, is it that defence applies only to part of tl1 e claim or part of tl1e clain1 is ad111iltcd, tl1e court e11ters a jt1dg111e11t for the plaintiff i11 the a111ou11t of tl1e ad111itted clain1 on such tern1s as to s11spe11 ding exec11tion or tl1e 1Jay.11 1e11t of a11y a1nou11t realized by 247 The defe11da11t is tl1e11 give11 fit. think ay 1 11 it as costs of ion taxat or attacl1n1ent, 2·18 In the case of 1. clai11 tl1e of ce balan to tl1e s a. d defen and ar apJJe to leave multiple defe11da11ts, wl1 ere not all are er1titled to leave to appear a11d clefend� the co t1rt is to gra11 t leave 011ly to a defe11da11 t \vl1 0 n1ay ]1ave a good defence. As to tl1e otl1 ers, tl1e JJlai1.1tiff is e11titled to a decree o.n wl1icl1 l1e 111ay obtain exectition withot1t prejt1dice to l1is rigl1t to JJrocced \Vitl1 tl1e suit 249 11cl. clefe a11cl ear app to e leav 1 1 against the defendant or defe11da11ts give WI1ere leave, ,vl1etl1er conditio11al or unconditio11 al, is given, tl1e cot1rt 1nay n1 al<e orders with res1Ject to tl1e filing of ple,1dings, fra1ni11 g of isst1es and tl1e _ like, or 0 111ay order tl1e case to be l1eard i111n1ediately.25 If tl1e issues are clear, it sl1ot1ld order an im111ediate ]1 eari 1 1g, since tl1e pt1rpose of tl1e sun1mary I?rocedt1�e is t_o if , ally F1n e. ;ibl s po as n soo as 1ed ni1 er1 � det i1n cla enable the pla.intiff to l1ave l1is 1 tly c!1scovcrs � hat tl1e uc1 the cot1rt l1as e11tered judgn1 ent for tl1e plaintiff, b11t subseq _ so, service of tl1e st1n1n1ons wa s no t effective or that tl1ere 1s good cat1se for clo1ng
239. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 286(2). 240. See MutJ1ttkart1pan v. I-Iabib (I-ligl1 Ct., Madras, 1955), 1955 All-J11clia Rep., P· 43. 241. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 287. 242. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 290. 243. Jbicl. p. 476• p., Re ia nd l-I Al 33 19 ), 33 19 , 244. See Surput v. Mal1araj (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta _ 7 71 , 18 l. P· vo 245. See Roul et v. Fetterle ( Ilig - h Ct., Bombay, 18 94 ), Jnclian L. Rep., 246. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 288(1 ). 247. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 288(2). 248. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 289. 249. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 291. 250. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 292.
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. . and iff e int giv pla tl1e the defendant 1 of or fav in ree dec e 1 tl ea ve it may set· as�de do . so to 1e Tl ur co ble t y 1s reasona ma 11 see it als stay , if d fen de an r appea 2s1 to fit . s l e e s s a 1 ·t s rm te se o 1 1J 1 i1 d n or set aside execution a
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Accelerated Proced11re
ari11g_ of . certain l�in�s of applic e. J1e tl1 �· fo le ab ail av s i _ e _ �r ed oc pr aAccelerated 1 on of var10L1s appl1cat1on s. s1t po d1s . e th r fo s ion ect dir First \Ve . . d there are tions , an . . r h d ea se un 1 d er �a 1e t r ele 1ng acc 1av 1 . r fo d ate 1on cat 1 pl ap procean w 110 ss cu dis shall rs of tte d ma kin y . at ma wh be er �id con 1 dealt with 1 tl1e d an de ma be st dure n1u e ca? . e rd_ hrs l1av be� er to und d itle ent accelerated ty par A . tire ced pro . under this 11 t10 1 t�11n �he period fixed w l1ca app ned sig d n ed dat , tten wri a file � . procedure n,ust 1 011s, or w_ l1ere 110 per1 ?d �s fi�ed, within t l1ca app h suc of g kii1 ma tI1e for by law 11ch the appl1cat1on 1s basect.2s2 on s act l \V. tl1e of � e enc urr . occ e 1 tl n1 fro s fiftee11 day Tlle application 111ust specify tl1e capacity . 1n . wl: 1cl1 the �ppl1cant acts and must cl1 1t I� n1ad�; 1t m11st a!so be support indicate; tl1e provisio 1 1 of the law under �hi.253 It 1s to 1ncl1 1de required documen ts ed by a1 1 affidavit stating tl1e reaso11s of it 2 . es 1 to nt wisl lica it app tl1e s11bm as ce 1 54 The e1 evid y and s11cl1 other docume11tar proceedings at tl1is point are ex parte, a11d the defendant is not served with notice. Tl1e ap1Jlication will be dis111issed if tl1e applica11t is not qualified to act in the proceedings or if it is not in the proper forn1 or not filed within the prescribed ti111e, or if tl1e court co 1 1siders tl1at the subject n1atter of the application cannot be 255 A dismissal of the applica11re. proced rated accele tl1e tinder of ed properly dispos tion does not operate as res judicata as to tl1e st1bject n1atter of the application, but a fresl1 application n1ay not be 111acle 01 1 tl1e sa1ne grot1nds. 256 In other words, the applica 11t 1 11a1 , 11 ot file anotl1er application asl<ing to have the matter determined under tl1e accelerated procedt1re. 2.
Where tl1e a1Jplication is allowed, the court 111l1st make a decision under the accelerated procedure in the form of a jt1dgn1ent or written order, as the nature of the case 1nay require. 257 Ordinarily, tl1e court will 1nal<e its decision 011 the basis of tl1e application, b11t it may req11ire additio 1 1al evidence if it thinks this is necessary.258 The decisio11 on the applic,:1tion 111ay be given on such tern1s as to costs or otherwise a.s tl1e GOllrt tl1inks fit.2 s9 It \Vill be noted that in a nun1ber of cases tl1ere is no provisio 11 by wl1icl1 an i 11terested party has tl1e opportunity to �ppea� and opJ)ose tl1e granting of tl1 e applicatio 11. However, a n11111ber of tl1e cases in wl11ch an appl_ication is a11thorized i11volve only one pa1iy, a11d ,�1l1ere a_notb_ei party \Votil? be interested, l1e could move tl1e co11rt to n1odify or set aside its 0rder granting the applicatio1.1. It is specifically provided that the court n1ay al\vays la\V make a �urther orde� �hen 11 ecessary. 260 Unless otl1erw the by ed · ise provid . un<ler whicl1 the appl1cat1 on 1s n1ade, tl1e decision is 11ot appea.lable.261 Where an
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251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 301(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 301(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 301(3). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 302(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 302(2). Civ. Pro; C., Art. 303(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 303(2 ). C� v. Pro. C., Art. 304(1). C v. Pro. C., Art. � 304(2). ed uss C1v. Pro. C., Art 1 sc . d' . be subseqtiently ' are· 306(1) · However, appl1cat1ons made under Arts' 309-311, to appealab le. 261. c·iv. Pro. C., Art. 306(2).
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taken witl1in ten days fro1n tl1 e giving of tl,e J·uctori ,ent' anc1 it be 11st m lies ' 0 apPeal · · · �6? en io "' rced 1111 t1 · ·1 t 1,e t1n1 e for a1Jpeal l1as expired or th e \VI 11 n?t b ent 1 udgn the j decided.· been Iias appeal \Ve 111ay no,v co11sicler the kind of 111atters tl1 at may be dealt ,vitl, under accelerated proced11re. _ 1�J,e Co?e r��ers to specific ap1Jlicati011s and contains direc tioiis to be follov.1ed Ill tl1e d 1spos1t1011 of su�J1 applicatio11 5 _263 1-Iowever, applica tior,s otl,er tl1a11 tl1o�e exJJressly referred to 111 tl1e Code 1nay be 1,eard tinder tl1e co11rt concludes tl1at tl1ey 111ay properly be disposed of if re Jroced11 1 erated accel ' · 264 . 1anner 11 in this In tl1e following cases tl1e co11rt, 11po11 1naking its decision in favor of tl,e applicar1 !, m11st_, at l1is request, provide l1i111 . �itl1 ,, � dated a11 d sig11ed certificate, stating, Ill concise forn1 tl1 e conte11 ts of tl1e dec 1 s1011 :-6:> cl1a11ge of 11an1 e ;266 refusal to prepare a record of civil stat11tes ;2 67 ref11sal to register an associatio11 ; 268 refusal to celebrate a 1narriage ; 269 reft1sal to 1Jer1nit an interdicted person to co11tract 270 ; 1 to sue regarding declaratio11 s of status; 271 \vitl1drawal of pern1issio1 narriage 1 273 ; 27 2 1 to n1arriage dispensation frorn observance of the oppositio1 ; tion interdic period of \Vido,vl1ood before contracti11 g anotl1 er 1narriage ; 274 applications to const1lt or to be granted po\vers of doc11111 e11 ts or to be a11tl1orized to depart fro111 i11strt1c tion.27s Tl1e s11 ccessf11l applica11t can tl1 e11 present tl1e certificate to tl1e appro1Jriate official, wl10 will pres11mably 111ake tl1e required entry or 1Jer111it tl1e applicant to perfor1n tl1 e desired act. If tl1e official wisl1 es to contest tl1e n1atter, l1e rnay 111ove tl1e court to set aside or 111odify its order.
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In the case of tl1e follo,ving applicatio11 s tl1 e cot1rt 111ay, \Vitl1out furtl1er proceed
ings, but after i11vestigatio11 if necessary, give directio11s or iss11e a certificate 2of 76 1 , 111ent doc1 1t 1 a relev tl1e 1 01 f,1ct approval, registratio11 or certificatio11 or e11 dorse sucl1 277 ; ters regis es in e11tri or cls recor of ion ellat applicatio11s for tl1e correctio11 or canc applicatio11s for registratio11 or applications for approval or co11fir111atioll ;278 certificatio11. Tl1e follo,villg applicatio11 s are to be disposed of i o accordance ,vitl1 specific directions given in tl1 e code. Wl1ere, 011 receiving an apr,lication for tl1e calling. of a meeti 11g, incl11ding one of tl1e fa111 ily cot1ncil, tl1e co11 rt fi11 cls tl1at a meeting should be called it ap1 Joints a perso11 to call tl1 e n1eeti11g 011 st1ch ter1 11 s as the 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267.
268.
269. 270.
271. 272. 273.
274. 275.
276. 277.
278.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 300(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 300(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 305(1). Civ. c., Arts. 42, 43. Civ. c., Art. 139. Civ. c., Art. 470. Civ. C., Art. 601. Civ. c., Art. 369. Civ. C., Arts. 773, 779, 786. Civ. c., Art. 377. Civ. c., Art. 592. Civ. C., Art. 596. Civ. C., Arts. 129, 209, 239 , 287, 523, 528, 535, 630. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 305(3). See Civ. C., Arts. 121, 127, 1623, 1630. 1· 44 . rt A ., C . m 1 n Co d an 4, See Civ. C., Arts. 146, 628, 633, 74 9, 763, 766, 767, 80 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 307.
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g e tin tJ1 to ee m the duties laid d rd ga re . tl1 \Vi it ot rry ca to O\Vn coltL t "''1 11 fix and 279 ion s for app oin to at t ic ec pl sp ap re ith vV t. tir co e 1 tl by tm_ent � ed ct re di 0 w y t b t ur e s co if th d. fio r te da at t1i tl1 li , or he q . e te us tr ap . , or poin tct re di l : �a a o isi • pro . . . fo a :i re 1 _1e r w c op pr an ap , on te 1s ia pe 1e 1 t fixes re.mune ts in po ap 1t e ad 1 n be . d lil llo 111eot S 1 f u o en 111 t t ap , e o a tb . or f 1J tt1t o n 1 11s _ t10 co 1ca 1· p t ap to tor or . ration.2so Witll respect 1 cil 1 un Y e a1n f co tl1 e t f h · t o ur co er 1b · e11 is to sum111 al ion dit ad a11 or oc 1 . 1 . ad . t titor fi d d ay, n and a o r the ea JJ . p a ? x t_ appoi �· 0 11 11 11 1e ntme tl f o es � \' nt ti la re ll a n 2s1 1no . rd n ea h ee b e av l1 es 1v at el 1e tl 1 r te llf is to be 111ade 011.ly n tio olu a h _as tha t passed res suc de asi ; -�o io� cat pli ap an f o_ e cas In tlle �; . or tl1e sl1areholders 1neet1ng of , 100 1at a oc ass com an of ng et1 1ne 1 1 er, gen by a 111ed by a copy ?f tl1e resolution and the ropa a�c� be t 2s3 n1t1s tion , lica app tJ1e 11y pa 28 on at1 ed n1z ga ern e 01· nc tl1 co of . 1on 4 1at oc If the 111emora11dtin1 and articles of ass n, tio ca it causes a copy to e pli tl1 ap of sis ba e tl1 011 ion cis de a r de ren t 11o can court tl1e ors s, ect day dir een r fift and l1i11 wit ito aud and s , ion zat ani org tl1e 011 ed be serv on tl1e y lt1ti wl1 reso 1se cat g win should not sl1o ly rep tten wri a file to d are reqt1ire y n ur wn, the sho not se is co cat1 285 or t l a 1 filec not is ly rep tl1e If be set aside. 2 86 . ide as set be to n order tl1e resolt1tio 287 or the of ner a part ion puls e tl1e for filed been x Wl1ere an a1Jplicatio11 l1as 289 288 tl1e cot1rt cat1ses a copy to be served on , trtistee or er dis1nissal of a 111a11ag 11i 111, and l1e m11st, witl1i11 fiftee1.1 days, file a written reply sl1owing cause why he 290 If the reply is not filed or cat1 se is not . issed dis111 or lled exJJe be 1 not sl1ot ld 291 Note that in tl1e cases issal. or dism lsion exp11 order 111ay cot1rt show11, tl1e invol\ring setti11g aside of resolutions or ex1J11lsion or dis111issal the court 1nust find tl1at tl1e application is n1eritoriot1s ancl vvill order the resol11tion to be set aside or tl1e party exJJelled or disn1issed only if it is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to st1cl1 relief. Tl1e procedure 0L1tli11ed above is also to be followed in the case of applications for tl1e dissolt1tio11 of a partnersl1ip or for the terminatio11 of an endo\V ment or trt1st, to tl1e extent aJ)propriate.292 279. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 308(1). 280. �iv. �ro. C., �rt. 308(2). These 11rovisions are apJJlicable by analogy to all applicatio ns involv1ng guardians a11d tutors. Civ. Pro. C.' Art. 308(3). See Civ. C., Arts. 211, 319, 220, -- , 238, 383. ??9 281. See_ Civ. C., �rt. 448. An ap 1)eal is aL1tl1 orized against decisio11s of general 111eetin�s to ,vhicl1 tile applicant l1as not adhered \vl1ere tl1e contention is tl1at the decision ,vas contrary to la,v or the 111en1orandun1 of association or statt1tes. 282. See Conlm. C., Art. 416. The resolutio11 111ay be cl1aUe11ged on tl1e ground that it is contrary to law or to the n1e111orandum or articles of associatio11 283. �iv. �ro. C., Ar:t. 309(1). '"fhese provisions a. )ply by· a.nalogy to applications concerning ies lutions expelling a n1e111ber, decisions 111acl1e by tl1e con1 111ittee of n1anagen1ent of e �1 Jo_w in�nt or revocation of autl1orization or a1)J)roval t1nder Civ C , Art. 49( 1), scbeni � 0 d· 1tors ·. · . ere d1str1but1on of tJro4' ts, 11 the · b )' 1 r, na 1 b a1a11ce s 11eets a11d generally to obJect1ons n1ade . . of a trade1. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 309(,�). . 284. C1v . Pro. C., Art. 309(2). 306(l). 285. C iv. Pro. C., Art. 3o 9(3). Note Art. C., Pro. tbat d Civ. tl1e appea court er lable. 's is or 286. See Comm. C., Art. 261. 287. See Conun. C., Art. 29 3. of 288. See Civ C Art 5?2 oval . rem Tl1e provisio11s a 1Jply. by analogy to applications for tl1e · · gt1ardia� 0�' tutor. iv . Pro. C ., Art. 310(3). 289. c· v. Pro. C., A. rt. 310(1). � 290. C1v. Pro. C., Art. 310(2). The order is appealable. i, Pro. C., Art. 306(1). _ C ,. 291. cIV. Pro. C., Art. 311. 292. See Civ. C., Art. 505.
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· the for a1nalgamatiou ation of two applic or mor·e e . ndowme 11t·s 1s Where a11 r �e a copy se 1s f . tl1e applicatio11 on the 11iilistry of tll e cou � rt 11:1 e th � J � ,29 . ade n1 _ ay, if 1t de �1r es ? . file w1tl11n :fifiee-11 days, a \v ritten reply conc ern 1 1ch wh ;11 _ . Interior, or unders1rab�l1ty of tl1 e p_ro1Jos �ct an1algan1ation.294 TJJe amal 1l1ty des1rab tlle ing rde r ed ot1ly 1f tl1e court 1s satisfied that it is desir able and iii o be may tl .rnatio oa 295 tl1e case of an application for the witI1drawal of an In . es r inte n � eral . ge the 1 tl1e �PtJl cant a 1 1d oppo11 ent n1t1st be sum11 1oned to a botl 1age 1narr to sitior1 � oppo hearing, a.nd tl1e cotirt may 011ly g!ve Jt1dg1nent after both pa.rties J1ave bee11 lleard.296 1-[o wever , if the perso11 01Jpos1 11g tl1e297111arriage does not appear withotit good be o�·dered. . On r ec eivi11 g an application to set 111ust al \Vithdra,v the e, caus aside a refusal to make a11 entry 111 a pt1bl1c record or regi ster or to celebrate a n1arriage, a cop� of tl1e ap_pli <:at�o 11 111t1st be served 0 11 tl1e JJerson wl1o so refused, and t1e is reqt11red to file, w1tl1 1n fifteen . clays, a written reply sl1owing cat1se why tl1e reftisal sl1ould no� be se t aside.298 Wl1ere the reply is not received or in the reply good cause 1s not sl1ow 11 , t11 e col1rt mt1st or der tl1e refusal to be set aside .299 Note tl1at i11 this case, if tl1 e reply is not received the refusal rultst �e set aside a11d the burde11 sl1owing good cause is 011 the p�rso11 n1aking tl1e reft1sal. Tl1e provisions disct1ssed in this sectio11 a re designecl to facilitate tl1e disposi tion of cases where tl1e clai111 is not likely to be dispt1ted or where the natt1re of the cla.in1 is such tl1at an i1nrt 1ediate de cisio11 is r eqt1ired and feasible. They provide an expeditious remedy i11 approp riate cases and avoid ft1ll-scale proceeclings wh ere sucl1 p roceedings are unnecessary and JJerl1aps undesirable. J. Procedure in Arbitration Arbitration is the p rocess wl1ereby tl1 e J)arties to a dispute e 11 trust its solution to a third party, the arbitrator, wl1 0 l111 dertakes to settle tl1e dispt1te i11 accorda11ce with the principles of law. 300 Arbitratio11 is governed by tl1e Civil Code, Arts. 3325 - 3346, but it is provided tl1erein that tl1 e proc edt1re to be followed by the arbitration tribttnal and exe ct1tion and appeals shall be gover11ed by the Civil Procedure Code. 301 Accordingly, tl1e Code co 11tai11s a 11t1n1be r of provisio11s witl1 respect to st1cl1 111 atters, ,vhicl1 we \.Vill no\v consider. Tl1ese provisions are app]icab]e where arbitration is r equired by law or tl1e parties have entered i11to a written agree111 ent to sub1nit present or futt1re differe11ces to arbitration. 302 Ho\vever, i t is also provided tl1at no arbitration n1ay take JJlace in relation to administrative contracts. 303 Ad1ninistrative contracts 1nay generally be defined as those connected with an activity of the public se rvice, implying a p erma11 ent participation of tl1e contracting party with tl1e admi11istrative authorities in tl1e 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 312(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 312(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 313.
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Civ. Pro. C., Art. 314(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 314(2). ' Civ. C., A.rt. 3325(1). the of s on isi ov pr e iv nt ta bs su e th ct e f af Civ. C., Art. 3345. However, th e procedure may not Civil Code. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 315(4). 301. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 315(1). 30?-· Civ. Pro. C., Art. 315(2). 303. See Civ. C., Art. 3132(2).
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. e go.vernment woul tl1 tl1 wi s act 11tr co 3 ost :tv1 · . d 04 1ca11 tn e vic ser · cli u s . f o · .· on . 1 ct1t e ex 3 s o e 1 h'b e pr d 1t 1 e 1 by w !' _. w ce la �a p e k ta � 11 10 or a� tr bi �r ay ni where r o · N . ry tlus catego t pab le of doing so und 1s no ca n 1o at 1tr b ar to l1t r1g a t 111 b1 st1 er a party see king to tl1e la,v.3c6 g �a1nily arbitrators, must, inc din l, 11a ?t! tri o11 at� itr ,Lrb an !�; e for be e Tlle procedtir T h . d is rt o tt _ es not m e an th l co v1 c1 a . 1n �s e 1 11 sa 1e tl at e b . , le ib ss o insofar as p 11tl1 al l tl1e rt1les contain e d 111 the Code. The V1 ce ian pl 1n co in ict str tllere 111t1st be es e rve : �ne of tl1e reaso o t_ P: �t rta po in1 is :gs di1 e �e pro ns on ati itr for111 ality of arb 1 trat1011 1s to av?1d the . expense and arb t� e c,1s 1r e �l1 1 1 t 1 1 sLtb to ])arties 111 ay decide e n e ga ted if p le ad111gs and the b t1ld \Vo s thi d an , 1gs d11 e ce pro 1rt co1 ii1 ti 111e involved ns cer tl1e ion con :is pro s g tl1i rin l1ea of of the ce a11 c i nif sig e Tl1 ed. tiir c e r re i like �,e w m allo a�d tl1e t1es l)ar to present tl1e . r . l1ea st mu It i l. t1na trib 1e t case by . ing to tl1e law unless by the tl1eir evide11ce, and it 1nL1st decide all qt1est1ons accord 303 y n1a It 1 e sun1mon s for isst so. 11g doi 11 1 fro d e t n1p e ex 1 bee 1 l1as it ion izat hor at1t gl1 er e a witness fails to 1ot1 wl1 altl rn, svvo be y 111a wl10 ses nes wit of 1ce 1 . t11e atte11da appear i11 answer to a sL11 11111ons, a 09co11rt 111l1st isst1e a s111nmons in accordance And wl1ere a par ty \Vho l1as been given \vith tl1e pro\risions of Arts. 1 11-121.3 tl1e 01)portt1nity to be l1eard a11d prodL1ce l1is e vidence fails to do so, the tribunal 310 Tl1e poi11t is that the arbitral proceedings must ult. defa in rd awa its e 1 gi\, 11 ay be fair to botl1 parties, a.nd, tl1erefore, tl1ere 1nust be cornpliance with tl1e provi sions of tl1e Code designed to i11st1re st1cl1 fairn ess and give botl1 parties the opppor tunity to J)rese11t tl1eir sides of tl1e case . Otherwise, tl1e provisions of the Code sl1ot1ld be en1ploye d as a gt1ide , but sl1ot1ld 11ot be 11se d where tl1ey would disrupt ti1e i 11 for111 ality of tl1e arbitral proceedings, rest1lti1 1g i n i11cre ased costs and delay in disposition of tl1 e case. It n1ay beco111e 11ecessary for the cot1rt to appoint an arbitrator, e.g., where an arbitrator is disqt1alifie d or re111oved. 311 Tl1e a1)poi11t1 nent 1nay b e n1ade by a11y court to whicl1 tl1e a1)1)lication for appoint1ne11t is addresse d. 31 2 The a1 11ount of n1 oney in dispute, even if in excess of tl1e cot1rt's j11risdiction, does not affect its . l)owe_r to appoint an arbitrator t1po11 applicatio11 Wl1ere an arbitrator l1as b�en appo11�ted, �� 1nt1st witl1ot1t delay sig11ify l1is acceptance or r eft1sal to tl1 e appornt111ent 1n \Vr1 t1ng. 313 . Jt1dges are 11ot eligible for a.ppoint111 ent as arbitrators, altl1ougl1 they 1nay be appointed as f,1111ily arbitrators. 314 wllich the av;,ard 1n11st be 111ade, wl1icl1 . TI1 e parties n1t1st fix a period witl1in ti�e 1 11ay be extended by tl1e parti es. 315 Tbe award is to b e i11 th.e same forn1 as a Jtidgme11 t and 1 nt1st deal witl1 the qt1estio11 of costs.3 1 6 If there is n1ore tl1an 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316.
Civ. Pro. c., Art. 315(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 315(3). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 317(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 317(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 317(3). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 317(4). Civ. see See Civ. c ., Art. 3336(2). With res tors arbitra y pec il t m to fa tl1e f appointn1ent o c., Arts. 733(2). 734. Civ. Pro. c ., Art. 316(1). Civ. Pro. c ., Art. 316(3). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 316(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 318(1). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 318(2). Civ. Pro. c., Art. 318(3).
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---·----.llnllilthe award is to be tl1e decision. of the 1 naJ·ority ·311 A COJ)Y of· the ator arbitr ' dated and. s1gne one , b y the arbitrators a11d served on botl1 parties.318 d · be _ to . is . avva rd 1 e arbitrator has not bee11 fixed, lie n1ust fi1 tl paid be to fee x a 1easonaIf the . . . Tlie st1ccessft1l party sl1 ot1ld obtain ho1nologatio11 of tl1 e awa1·d. Jl9 e tl1 111 _ fee . . ble 1 ,1ve tl1e awa1 d co11firn1ed by tl1e court \Vitl,in w110 se J · L1 fl·sd·lCt·1 011 l 1s, at 1 tl . . aWard' 320 comes, ·d d f an . ollow11 1 1 aw g ho1 1 1ologat1on, �I1e a,vard 111ay be tl1e a1nou11t of th� _ � .Jt1dg111 e11 t.32, \.Vhe11 tl1e y cot 1 rt l1on1.ologations tl,e a\vard it 1?1na1 _0 an as tited exec be exect1t�d, a _11d tl1e party wl10 !1as obtaitled Jioinologation to_ 1s 1t that _ direct \\,ill L1 t1on . as l1e wot1l ? 111 the case of a jtidicial exec for l1cat1on a an l?� file nJay Code relat111 g to execution are also applicable to tl,e tl1e of s1ons prov1 l1e T _ e. decre exec11tion of arb1tral a,varcls . awarcls and applications to set aside st1cl1 a,vards are Appeals fro1n arbitral 57 322 3 . 3 T'l1 � appeal 1n�y be st1bject to tl1e ter111s of tl1e A ts. go, ,erned by _ � 32350 a11d. tl1e parties 1nay waive tl1eir rigl1t of appeal, provided arbitral st1b1!uss1� 11, 324 Tl1is \vould 1 f11ll k1 1 ow]edge n1ade \V1tl of tl1e circumstances. 1s waiver tl1e that indicate tl1 at tl1e parties n1a.y 1Jot waive tl1eir rigl1t to appeal i11 tl1e arbitral sub mission, since at tl1e tin1e tl1e sttb1nissio11 was prepared tl1ey co11ld 1Jot l1ave l1ad full kno,:vledge of tl1e circt1111sta11ces. TI1e provisio11s of the Code regarding the tak ing and l1 earing of a11 appeal fro1n a j11dgm.ent apply by analogy to appeals fro1n arbitral awards. 325 Tl1e appeal is to be tal<en to the court wl1icl1 \VOttlcl I,ave had appellate jurisdiction l1ad tl1e dispt 1te i n whicl1 tl1e a\vards ,vas given not been referred to arbitratio11. 326 To deter111 ine vvhicl1 co11rt tllis is, \Ve 1nust first determine ,vhicl1 court wot1ld l1 ave l1ad origi11al jt1r.isdictio11 to l1ear tl1e case if a s11it had been bro11gl1 t. S11ppose tl1at tl1e claim referred to arbitration does 11ot involve in1n1ovable property and is va.l1 1ed at Etl1 . $ 3000. S11it \Vot1ld l1ave l1ad to be bro11gl1t in tl1e Awradja Gt1ezat Court. 327 Si11ce a jL1dg111e11t of tl1e A,vradja G1 1ezat Court may be a1)pealed to tl1e I-Iigl1 Cotirt, 328 tl1e appeal fro1n tl1e arbitral award ,vould ]1 ave to be take11 to tl1e tligl1 Cot1rt.
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Tl1ere are basically tl1ree gro11 11ds on ,vl1ich an appeal 111ay be taken: (1) tl1e a\vard is inconsiste11t, 11ncertain or a111bigt 1ous, or, on its jc1ce, wro1Jg in law or fact; 329 (2) tl1 e arbitrator on1itted to decide n1atters referred to l1i1n ; 330 (3) certain irreg11la.rities or i1npro1)er cond1 1ct on the party of tl1e arbitrator l1ave occtirrecl. 331 An 317. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 318(.l). 318. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 318(5). e Civ. Se n. tio dic ris ju ne mi ter de ld ou sh rs to ra bit ar 319. By analogy, the amount clain1ed before the Pro. C., Art. 16. 320. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 319(2). the rth fo . t� se ich wb , de Co vil Ci e th of 321. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 319(1). Subject to Art. 736 1 ! ons ab - t ov pr e. th d, ale pe ap be ay m � 1� • � grounds on which a decision of t he family arbitrators rs. ito ar the fan1ily by e ad n1 s rd va a\ 1 on fr s al pe ap to e to be discussed are applicabl Pro. C., Art. 350(4). 322. Civ. Pro. C., Art . 350(1). 323. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 350(2). 324. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 350(3). 325. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 352. 326. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 14(a). 327. See Civ. Pro. C., Art. 321(1) (b). 328. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35l(a). 329. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 351(b). 330. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35l(c). 331. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 35l(c) (i).
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e s, es 1 nd th 01 ou d gr ze ri d 1o 1tl an a1 ly e on th is a d ar aw Wa al tr bi ar rd , an n 1 o f r I a e p p · a. d en t . Jll a gm Th e as t · 11 ion of the te cis ex de e m sa e 1 t1 ew vi re . . to . i s 110 t subJi iect a bl f as . .I t 1S only r e d ew vt h SUC. t re 110 IS Ct ia or \V Ja f he 0. W n re jo st 1e q1 a. Oil or at tr bi ar e o . rc 1 al an e or ie e r er nt co l w , ac g. e. , � , c r wl1jcJ1 or 11c � i _ ! ly nt � te pa _ � _ is _ on si ci de tl1e v. to t e, ec v1 bJ re e su 1s Th 1t t bi at ar tl1 g, l 1n ra r1t w 10 subbe to es iir qt re . tile la'rV e ed rr er w fe rs to re te 1e arbit rato ,1t t 111 t ha w e 11n r11 � te de t? d te r ul ns co be t tis nl tl io iss 111 e e d, th d rr f ar re aw so rs 1s te at 1n e bj of su e on � ct e cid _ de to to . led ai _ f s 11a he jf _ atld y review o�y wher� they t1f us J o r at tr b1 ar e tl1 y t 1c dt 1 o isc � m or � _ appeal. Irregularities _ . the arbitrator did at tl1 te ra 1st 0 ?1 de ?� g 1n ar l1e not � _ are stich as to .IJrevei1t a fair fy1ng an appe�l from th e award s�1 Jt1 s t1e lar gu rre t. 1 en 11 dg ju ! � render rui 11nbiased es e rti tl1 pa or rm e fo on in to of d ile fa m r the to tra bi ar 1 e tl at tl1 t fac e 1 tl e ltid inc would 332 . the f t d di no ly 11e t mp co l1 � ac th wi . g, the in � ar l1e � e 1 tl of ce pla . or . e tim of tile 333 e, nc f o 1de 1 ty ev b1I or ss1 m1 ad the ing rd fact ga re ion iss b1n s11 l ra bit ar tl1e tern1 s of 11aterial witness or too k evidence in the 1 a of e nc ide ev e th r ea 1 l to d tliat t1e reft1se 334 Misconduct on tl1e pa rt of the arbitrator . 11 1 tl1e f o e on abse11 ce of tl1e parties or 3 t d tl1e no a11 es er, rti oth pa tl1e Js of the e 011 d ear . 11 l1e t tl1a t fac the e tid l inc would s bes by bri rtie or pa tl1e other of e 011 by ed enc f111 1 i1 uly 1nd . 1 s ,va 1 e l 1 fact tl at wjse,336 or tl1at he acq1.1ired an interest in. tl1e st1bject matter of tJ1e disptite referred to hi 111,337 i11 wl1icl1 case 11.e obviously could not render an 1111biased judg fy revie\v and it js iu1portant to ti j11s ich wh t sor this of s tter n1a y l on. is It 1 n e11t. re111e111ber tl1at tl1e an arbitral a.ward 1nay not be revie\ved on the same ground as a j11dg1ne11t. Tl1e appellate cou1·t 1nay co11fi.r1n, vary or reverse tl1 e award and may thereby u r 338 nd g o the on is eal p ap_ tl1e 1 ere wl cept e , ever I{ow t. 1 x me1 render a final judg tl1at irregt1larities .l1 ave occurred i11 t11 e proceedi11gs, the apJJellate court n1ay, instea339d of varyi11 g or reversing, ren1it tl1e award to tl1e arbitrator for reconsideration. It should al1l1ost al,vays re111 it wl1ere tl1e arbitrator failed to decide a matter referr ed to l1im, ,v J1 ere an a\vard is re111itted, tl1e arbitrator n111st, t1nJess otL1erwise directed i11 tl1 e order of re111ission, 111ake I1 is seco11d a \Vard witl1in t]1 ree rn.onths fron1 the date of tl1 e order. 340 If only a portion of the a\vard is renutted, tl1e ren1 ai11der 1ard.341 a n1ay be e11 forced if capable of exec11tio11, pendi11g tl1e n1 aking of tl1e second '1. A related procedL1re is an application to l1 ave tl1 e award set aside.342 Here the conten�io11 is t11at tl1 e award is com_pletely invalid, beca11se the arbitrator l1as ab11sed his authority. The application is to be 111ade to tl1 e cot1rt l1 aving j11risdiction to hear an appeal 43 3 a. w a from tl1 e �:"ard and mt1st be 111ade witl1 i11 tl1irty days fro1n giving of tl1e �� Tl1e provisions of tl1e Code regarding the 111aking a11d l1earj 11g of an opposition, A�ts. 359-360, a1)ply by analogy to tl1 e 1nal<ing and I1earing of a11 appljcation to set aside.344 The gro11nds for s11cl1 a motio1.1 are tl1 at (1) tl1e arbitrator decided m atters i:
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33 2. Ibid. 333 . Civ. Pro. c., Art. 351(c) (ii). 334. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 35l(d) (i). 335. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 351(e) (ii). 336. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 351(d) (iii). 337. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 353. 338. Civ. Pro. C ., Arts. 353, 354(1). 339. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 354(2). 340. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 354 . 354(3). 341 . Civ. Pro. c., Art. 355(1). 342. Civ. Pro. c., Art. 355(2). 343 . Civ. Pro. c., A rt. 355(3). 344. Civ. Pro. c., A rt. 356.
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or 111ade a11 ·awa rd pt1rs11a11t to a stibtllission tha . Iiim to rred refe t vvas ' · inva 00t 1 I'd a n e t the reti e ee r b e1· i1g to tvvo or 111ore arbitrators, ('J) - tl1' ' d elapse . J1ad tl1ey did 11ot or that the arbitrator delegated a11y part of bi·s atit . (3) or her tog ' et l ' lOrl-1 y to . el ther act , · . , � · 34 par or ties a coa 1e t r f . l bitrator. ::, These are the oiily o one crer ran ' . grot111 s 1n . a St ' .::, d . . awar d 111ay b e set as1·a e. If tl1 e appl1catJon to set Whj.ch·.an 1an ted, the . . . asid ' . e 1·s g. . deemed to b e llll·JI and vo1'd346 . If tl1e appl1cat1011 JS d1s1nissed the award . a,vard JS . d e11 forcea ble. 347 an lid va be to 1ed en de is The procedt1re for arbitration is designed to i11 s11re tl1 at til e proceedi·ogs are · · 011 of the arbitrators will be over(." ·1rI y, a11d t l1e dec1s1 · · ol1sl� an d _1a conducted exp. e d1tJ ttirned 011ly Jn except1011a� c1rcl1n1sta11ces wl1 ere tl1 e arbitrators ma,1ifestly made an incorrect avvard or acted 1111 properly so as to de11 y a fair l1eariog or exceeded tlleir authorit)'· K. Costs Following tl1e dis1Jositio11 of tl1e st1it, tl1e cot1rt may n1ake a11 award as to tl1e costs j11c11rred in tl1e st1it, a11d it l1as ft1ll power to decide by whon1 or ot1t of 1 a � extent st1cl1 �osts are to be paicl.348 \.Vhat property _a11d t o wl Tl 1 e pt1rpose of _ allowjng costs 1s to 1ndemn1fy a party aga1nst tl1e expense of vindicating h.is riahts in cotirt. 349 ·rJ1is bei11g so, tl1 e general rt1le is tl1 at costs follow tl1e event, that is, costs are to be awarded to the s11ccessft1l party 11nless l1e l1 as bee11 g11ilty of 111is conduct or tl1ere is some otl1er good reaso1 1 for 11 ot awarding costs to l1 i111. 350 The s11ccessft1l }Jlaintiff sl1011ld ordinarily be a\varded costs, even thougl1 l1e recovers a lesser amount than clai111 ed. 351 I-Iowever, tl1e an1ot111t tl1e }Jlai1 1tiff recovers 1nay be relevant. If he Sltcceeds on part of l1is clai1n, bt1t fails 011 the n1ost important and 11 1onetarily sigrnficant part, he n1ay be l1eld liable for costs . 352 Wl1 ere l1e recovers less tl1an c]ai111ed, tl1e court may apportion l1is costs to tl1e amot1nt recovered. 353 lJ.1 the case of n1 t1lliple parties, the co11rt sl1 ot1ld be careful 11 ot to allo\.V t111 nece ssary costs. Where tvvo or 111ore defe11clants l1ave a co11 1mon defe11ce, and are successful, only one set of costs sl1ot1ld be awarded, althot1gl1 if their interests are antago1 1istic, t]1ey are e11titled to appear separately, a11d eacl1 sboulcl be able to recover l1is f11ll costs. 354 Wl1ere two or 111ore plaintiffs join, only one of whon1 is successful, tl,e s11ccessft1l JJlai11 tiff sl1ould recover l1is costs against the defenda11t, a11d the defendant shot1ld reco.ver fron1 tl1e unsuccessft1l plaintiff l1 is costs inc11rrecl by tl,e fact that plaintiff also joi11ed his clai1n i11 tl1e stiit. 355 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350.
Civ. Pro. C., Art. 357(2). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 357(1). Civ. Pro. C., Art. 462. See Ma1tlnclra v. As,vini (Higl1 Ct., Calcutta, 1920), Inclian L. Rep., vol. 48, P- 427. 4 See G11at1shan1 v. Morobs (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1894), Indian L. Rep., vol. 18, P· 47 1 n 31 · P., Rep clia -Jn AII 9 194 8), 194 s, dra Ma , !� � a�� See Ademma v. Varadareddi (I-ligl1 Ct. c of y r ove re� that action by the defendant under Art. 281 o r 465 n1ay prevent the result in c osts being imposed on tl1e plaintiff wl10 recovers less than claimed. . . 53), 351. See the discussion i 11 D. Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure (12th ed. by R. Mitte r, 19 vol. 1, p. 152. 352. Ibid. _353. lbicl. v. Rep., vol. Di /z nc Be n's ee Qu ), 86 18 , g. 3 En . 54 See Viscount Gort v. Row11ey (Queen's Bench, 1 7 , p. 625. Rep., lia . nc -J II A 8 2 19 ) 28 19 e or · ' 355. See Ganga Bishao v· Murree Brewery C o. (HJg11 Ct ., Lah '. , y pa st 1u n ns o n 1 1 n su e th g in st ue q re ty ar p · 1e . , ti P- 800. Where the court sumnions a wt'tness h e could , ul s[ es . cc su e er w ·t pa Y i t tha the expenses of the witness. Ci v. Pro. C., Art. 112. If recover tbis amount as costs.
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d a a11 ees ng fili �easonable atto rney's tl1e [ of st nsi co y all Jer gei fee _ Costs would rney s . fee be included: other\l1is e att an t tha ? nt rta po in1 th� · larly It is particu ed,. and th .e sticc.essful pta· .111fi e1n 1nd be ly tr11 not tild \Vo . int'Iff ' successf. LI l. decl'endant . c . 11s im I T . l1e a . . f I rt o cou nt 1ou a11 y l ma f11l e 1 tl also all ow er ov rec . ,., ly tial act . t . . . . . . \VOU Id no to co11rt, even thoug h they 1n � se es t11 w1 s hi g o1n in · br of were es 0 ns pe ex e tll , t y . r pa . . • _ a _ . 6 1 11st be st1essed tl1 at t11e court has a g It 0 5 t.3 ur co e tll . oo d . . 011 ed by not st1mn1 e1 1 1 ar ld cu ou rt1 sh a pa be r l1e 1et wl � ow all � g nin mi ed and ter de 11 j ii tio cre dis deal of 1ff 1nt e h tl1 pla e as 1er d wl e . su t . tl1a o d.efend be tw 3 y n1a It s7 1. sun at _ _ \vh for so. if l aw rcl wil him 11rt c the tl1e , ts one cos t ins � aga incurred � l sft1 ces stic y onl is _ nd a ' aiJts 8 35 d. se 1s as sm 1t w d1 s11 1e tl 1 b)' adding the defendant as to ,:vl om The Code also provi?es for the a�ardi11g of what_ 1nay be call�d compe nsatory ole 1n e, wl1 or enc de 1n or 1111 cla � pa.rt, on the a to s ect obJ ty par a · ere 1 Wi costs. grotind tl1at it is 1<now11 �o be false or v� xat1ous by the party putt�ng if forth, ned ndo ed, aba llow or disa ,v1thdra�'n, in tly 11en seq s11b 1s nce defe or m clai t!1e and y tl1e part 011 alty pe11 n1aking the claim a ose i1111J n1ay rt co11 tl1e , part i1 i or \Vhole or defence. It n1t1st record its reasons for finding tl1at tl1e clain1 or defence is false 1ment of con1 r pa) for orde tl1e an e 111ak 111ay so, e don ng 11avi and , or vexatiot1s 359 1 .$ Etl 500. g S11ppose that the edi11 exce 11ot 11nt a1no an to pensatory costs 11p plaintiff s11es on a 11ote, \vl1icl1 t11e court finds tl1at l1e kno\vingly forged. It ,vould be at1tl1orized to award tl1e defenda11t compensatory costs, and it sbouJd do so.360 Tl1e perso11 \�,1l1 0 l1as 111 ,1de a false clai111 or defence and who is req1ured thereby to pay com1Jeosatory costs 111ay still be st1bject to a criminal prosect1tion under Art. 446 of tl1e Penal Code for 1naking false statements.361 But if there is a s11bsequent st1it for da111ages a.rising 011t of t . h e assertion of tl1e claim or defence l1 eld to be false or vexatious, the an101111t a,varded in con1pensatory costs may be take11 into account.362 Wl1ere tl1e cot1rt l1as ordered the pay111ent of costs, tl1e party in whose favor costs l1ave been decreecl, 11111st prepare an ite1nized bill of the expenses he l1as inct1rred in tl1e s11it. 361 Tl1e bill is filed witl1 the court, and a. copy is served on the party liable for costs.364 The co11rt st1n1111ons tl1e parties,365 and after hearing them, n1ay red11ce a11y item in tl1e bill whicl1 it finds to be excessive and may disallo,v sucl1 costs, cl1 arges a11d expe11ses as it fi11ds were not necessary or proper for tl1e party to incur.366 If the party entitled to costs has failed to file the bill, the cot1rt, after recording sucl1 failt1re, n1ust certify tl1e costs of tbe otl1er parties or n1ay allow tl1e defaulting party a 110111i11,1l or other s11111 so as to prevent any otl1er party from being prejt1diced by s11ch defat1lt.367 Costs carry interest at the
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356. See Kameshwar v. Nebi (I-Iigl1 Ct., Patna, 1945), 1945 All-l11clia Rep., p . 184. 357. S�e Ramgopal v. Secretary of State (Higl1 Ct., Bombay, 1933), 1933 All-/1azdia Rep., P · 106· 358. Ctv. Pro. C., Art. 465(1). 11dia 359. All-I V k 1957 t amin ·v. 1957), Laksl11ninarayan a (I-Iigl1 Ct., Andhra pradesl1, �:� �� � ;J� ., 360. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 465(2) 361. Civ. Pr p. C., Art. 465(3): 362. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 463(1). 363. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 463(2 ). 364. Civ. Pro. C. Art 464(1) T · · b' ll and bear · h · 1 tl1e Regtstrar to consider the · e court may requtre · . .1s10 ; n. the sub.mi ss ·1on ' s of the dec . parties a make and to then will report to which tl1e court p · ' Civ . · ro. c ., Art. 464(5). 365. Ctv. Pro. C., Art. 464(2). 366. Civ. p ro. c ., Art. 6464(3). 367 Civ. Pro. C., Art. 464(4).
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day of judgment until they are paid.368 ·Finally a the from rate par tY may 1 ga1 cost to s notwithstanding that be does no't decision as . a from e eal appea 1 from app . ec1s f o 1on d t be appellate court on the question of cos h e t d an men t, jud g ts is the final.369 L. Foreign Matters Ordinarily, foreign matters are governed by tl1e body of law, referred to as oweve . I L 310 II aw. r, �erta1n matters are dealt ,vith in the Civil rnat1o na Jnte . te Priva referen brief ce will a and be made to the relevant provisions. Code, e edur Proc 1. Evidence on Commission at Instance of a Foreign Court Evidence on co1nission refers to the process by wlucl1 tl1e evidence of a witness 371 ttse in for �ourt co�rt_ of pi�oc:ed ings. outside In addition to providing n is take for evidence ?n comm.1ss1on �or use_ 1n Et_hlo_p1a, tl1e Code provides a device by evidence of a witness 10 EthIOJ)Ia· may be taken for tise in a civil which the · · 312 Note that _it n1ay not be taken for use r · n u� t . 1g co re 1o _ a 1n ng in a di . procee criminal proceeding. An appl1cat1on for the taking of sucl1 evidence must be n1ade to the High Court, and it may be made by either a party to tl1e foreign proceed ing or by the Advocate General acting under instructions fron1 tl1e Ministry of Justice.373 The I-Iigl1 Court must be satisfied that the foreign coi,rt wisl1es to obtai11 the evidence. This may be demonstrated by (I) a certificate signed by tl1e di J).lo matic representative of the foreign country in Etl1iopia and transmitted to tl1e court through the Ministry of Justice, (2) by a letter of request issued by the foreign court and transmitted to the court through tl1e Ministry of Justice, or (3) by a letter of request issued by the foreign court and produced before tl1e High Court by a party to the proceeding.374 The High Court may tl1en examine the witness itself or issue a con1mission for his examination.375 Tl1e commission .is executed in the ordinary \vay, 376 and it is to be returned together with the evidence tal<en 11nder it to tl1e I-Iigl1 Court, which then forwards it to the Min.istry of Justice along with the letter of request. The Ministry forwards it to the foreign co11rt.377
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2. Execution of Foreign Judgments A judgment rendered by a foreign cot1rt 1nay only be executed after an applica 378 �nee the app�ica ted. gran and e mad tion to execute such a judgment has been tion is granted, however, the judgment will be executed as though 1t had been given by an Ethiopian court,379 i.e., in accordance with the provisions of tl1e Code govern368. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 466. 369. Such provisions have not yet been enacted in Ethiopia. 370. See the discussion in Chapter Vlli., supra, notes 20-28 and accompanying text. 371. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 129. 372. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 130 373. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 129. 374. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 129(1). 375. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 131. Sec Arts. 123-126, 127(4). 376. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 131. or ·ct f e J oV pr ay m te sta r he ot an ith n 377. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 456(1) (2). A n international- conventio w . d. a different method of execution, but as yet none have been establishe 378. Civ. Pro. C., Art. 460(3). . . l c Morris d 1 379. � excellent discussion with reference t o the English rules w il �� f,��� � Dl�H � d ·both r;_ nc T n tscu l Dicey's Conflict of Laws (7th ed., 1958), pp. 981-1075. le cognition of foreign judgment s and forei gn arbitral awards.
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ment may be exe cuted judg ign fore a ch wlu er 11nd ns o i ndit o c are , cu. t'� on. Tlie . g. ;xe to f ' A --t- 45g of tile Civil Pro cedure Code. A discussion of recogn i tion 1n 0 • n...t . set 1ortl1 · . 380 k ' b o b e ut ·h' we i t. f o e p o will sc e ! . d n o enu1:1erate . � : . . fo. reign j11dg111ent is far bey on tl1em. First, tl1e re must be reciprocity 1y 1efl br 1t 1 e 1 inn o c and n 1 .·ons t11e. cond'ti · te ut t 1n d l1 ts rn ts e co untry in which pe en m dg Ju 1 a1 1)1 10 tb E f o n io 11t ec ex t a. th tlle sense tl1e If . o urts . o f that cou c re� d� ren s wa ed c11t exe be o t t 1gl1 501 ntry . the jtidgnlent rt 1�n u co_ 1op must, 1n turn, refus e to Eth tl1e s, ent gn1 Jt1d ian iop Eth e cut exe to reftise oun trie s will �xecute the judgment c st mo as 1 11cl sm I11a . ent gm jtid of ir the execute ot1n try will execute an Ethio pian c any t tha ned s111 pre be 11ld sho it . otller countries, o ved. Second_ly, the Jt1_dgment must have been pr is . y trar con the ss unle it jtidgmei . d rendered by a court duly establ1sl1ed and c onstitute This means a - court as we 11ave defined tl1 e tern1 - a tribunal establisl1ed by the law to adjudicate case s in t l1ave had judicial jurisdic mus t cour tl1e tl1at ns mea o als It law. ,:vith ce rdan o acc tion over tl1e defendant, that is, its contracts with bis person or the transaction were sucl1 tl1at it was reaso11able for tl1at c ourt to subject him t o its processes. 381 Tl1e judon1ent-debtor 111ust have also been given the opportt1nity t o appear and present his defet1ce. N ote tl1at tl1ere is no req11irement that l1e actually appeared. 382 a11d the opportunity to appear, notice, nable o reas given the was l1e as long So j11dg111ent will be recognized. Fourtl1ly, the j11dgment n111st be final and enforceable. If tl1e jL1dg1ne11t is only reflected in a preli111inary decree and m o re re.mains to be done, it obvio11sly can11ot be exec11ted. Finally, the execution of the judgment must not be contrary to public order or 111orals. For exan1ple, if tl1e court ordered the defendant to pay da111ages fo r breach of a c ontract to sell a slave in a country where slavery is legal, that j11dg111ent would not be enforced in Ethi opia. The entire area is a ,,ery con1plex 011e, a11d on other c o u11tries a body o f law has developed ,vitl1 respect to eac11 of tl1ese conditions. As 1nore f oreign judgments· are sought to be executed in Etl1iopia, tl1e 1neaning of these provisions will be clarified here as well. For tl1e present, it is sufficient tl1at the reader be aware of the conditions under ,vllicl1 foreign judgn1.ents 111ay be exec11ted. The application for exec11tion of a foreig n judgment is . t o be made to the division of tl1e I-Iigh Court on circuit in tl1e Taklay G11ezat where execution is to tak� place . 333 The application n1ust be in vvriting and must be accompanied by� certified copy of the j11dginent to be exect1ted and a certificate signed by the Pres1?ent or R_egistrar of the co11rt wlucl1 rendered the j11dgment to the effect that tl_ 1 e Judgment 1s final and enforceable. 384 Tl1e j11dgment-debt or is given the opportunity to present observatio11s to tl1e co11rt \vitl1in a fixed tin1e . 385 In other ,v ords, he may n ot file an answer t o tl1e applicatio11 , an. d tl1ere are n ot adversary proceepings as s�ch: he !11erely presents l1is o bservations t o the court. I-I owever, tl1e court n1�Y �e qwre pleading� to_ be s11b1nitted, 386 and in case of d oubt n1a y suspend its �e�is ion on tl1e appl1cat1on 11ntil all doubtful p oints l1ave been resolved. 387 Tl1e decision G
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. 380 · Judicial for tl1�se purp?ses is not necessarily co-extensive ;ith judicial .jurisdicti on for internal t, purposes, as �lSCUSSed lil Cl1apter III. Tl1e men jud g n fore ig en tl1?ttgl1 it would have not exercised Etl1iopian COllrt n1ay recog11ize along as it was not jurisdiction on tl1ose · facts· so .:�e for�ign court to have exercised jurisdiction in tl1 e parti · · · cular cas�. 381. on, ll ecall_ tl1a� the absence of legally dicti juris d cour t's the Sllffi cient notice estroys t�; d�· cusSion in Cl1apter III., ·supra, notes 114-119 and accompanying text. · . Pro. C 382 · c�v ., Art. 456(3). · 3�3. · C1v . Pro. C. Art 4 · . . . h·e questi on 5 7 s · uc h _a t certifi cate on . ve would ·not necessarily · be conclusi · of finalit 'b u ·. 384. C�v. Pro :' c ., �: · :fJ·(l) ss1st the court in determining that question. . . 385., . C1v.. .Pro. , C . . . ... . A r t . 459(2)· 386 . · Civ._. . p��: c .,'· . Art. 459(3). . . .. 387 . · Civ. PllQ. C., • ·· . Art. 460(1). . . : . ... '-
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---. the of basis appli catio the n on 11n1es s for made sonle . to be special reason to i s record ed the court .decides to bold a l1earing. 388 The co11r t may a] so award . ' be . granted, tl1e judgment is d' w here the �PP.1·1cat1on ts 1 s� e av b e w s A 9 execut� costs.38 390 n by an E th1op1an court. ve gi n bee d ba i it f ed as 3. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards · equa11y o nt s 1s What we have said witl1 respect to execution of foreign J. udcrme orcement of f ore1g · n arb1t� . al a�ards. An applicatioi1 mtist be en f t�e to e icabl appl made to tl1e High_ �otirt, and the pr?c�dt1r� Just discussed is to be fol lowed. 391 �ore restr1ct1 are ve_ in_ that the award 1nay not be enforced ns cond1t1o the ever, How ,vb1ch u11der Etl11op1a11 law cot1ld not be submitted to matters to s relate .i t if be of such mt1st a awarcl natt1re as to be enforceable on tlJe the and ration arbit . 9 t 11op1an a\.v. E 3 2 In other words, tl1e co11rt \viii execute a I I . . 10 conditions lru.d down . foreign ju�gn1ent even 1f the la�v ?r procedttre 11nder whicl1 tl1at jtidgn1e11t was rend ered differs fron1 tl1at of Etb1op1a (so long as the la,v is not so different t11at to recognise_ the judgment wotild offend _Etl1iopian pt1blic policy or tl1e procedure denies the JUdg1nent-debtor tl1e opport11n1ty to be }1eard). However, \vben there is a question of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, tl1e provisions of tl1e Civil Code relating to arbitra.tion n111st be considered. TI1e n1atter must l1ave been sus ceptible of arbitration 11nder Ethiopian law, e.g., an award based 011 an ad1ninistra tive contract may not be enforced in Ethio1Jia. Secondly, it must be s11cl1 as to be enforceable were it rendered in Ethiopia. Otherwise, the conditio11s are ge11erally similar to tl1ose for execution of a foreign judgn1ent. Reciprocity m11st be ensured so tl1at an Ethiopian arbitral award would be recognized in that country tl1e award n1ust have bee11 n1ade followirJg a regular arbitration agreement or otl1er legal act in the country wl1ere made, the pa.rties must have l1ad equal rights in appointing arbitrators and been sun1mo11ed to attend the proceedings, tl1e arbitration tribt111al rnt1st have been regl1larly constituted, and the award is not contrary to p11blic order or 1norals. As with execution of foreign juclgments, tl1e matter of e1Jforce1J1ent of foreign arbitral awards is much n1ore co1nplex tl1a·n \VOl1ld apJJear fro1n tl1is brief disc11ssion. In this c)1apter we have discussed a nt1111ber of other procedt1ral matters and have tried to give a picture of tl1e scope of tl1e Civil Proced11re Code. Tl1e Code is well-suited to the needs of Ethiopia and if pro1Jerly applied, will ena_ble. tl1e courts to perform the function for ,vl1ich tl1ey have been created - to adJud1cate disputes fairly and expeditiously in accordance \.vitl1 the law.
388. 389. 390. 391. 392.
Civ. Civ. Civ. Civ. Civ.
Pro. c., Art. 460(2). Pro. c., Art. 460(3). Pro. c., Art. 461 (2). Pro. c., Art. 461(1) (e) (f). Pro. c., Art. 461(1) (a)-(d).
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Index ACCELERATED PROCEDURE page Application for, 384 Defined, 381 When available, 385 - 387 ADJOURNMENT Discretion in granting, 376 Mandatory w·here decision is dependent upon completion of other proceedjngs, 376 - 377 Order for further hearing of adjourned case, 377 - 378 . .\GENT Defined, 358 En1powered to accept service, 112-113 May enter appearance, 358 Of member of Armed Forces, 359 Persons qualified, 358-359 AMENDMENT OF ISSUES, 179 -359 AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS: See also PLEADING AND PLEADINGS By appellate court, 146 Compulsory amendment of improper pleadings, 158 - 160 Continuance following allowance of, 148 Liberally allowed, 147 - 149 Sub�titution of parties by, 154 - 156 To allege new claim, 1,15 146 - 157 Upon failure to state a cause of action, When an1end.ment is not necessary to determine the real questions in djspute, 149- 150 149-150 When amendment will introduce a different cause of action, 150-157 When tl1e statute of li111itations has run, 150-154 Amendment by plaintiff, 156 - 157 Amendment by defendant, 154- 156 Substitution of parties, APPEAL 239-245 Additional evidence on, 241- 245 ''for any other substantial cause'', 240 ''where appellate court requires," 240- 241 ''Where subordinate court erroneously excludes," 230 - 232 Additional parties on, 249- 251 Affirmance of decision by appellate court on different grounds, 228 - 230 Cross-objections to decree 237- 238 Dismissal without calling 'upon respondent to appear, 220 Exhau stion of other remedies as condition precedent to, 220 First appeal, 238 - 239 Framing of issues by appellate court, 218 Function of appellate court,
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Grounds of objection, Hearing of, How taken, Interlocutory appeals, Judgment, Me1norandu111 of, Multiple parties: right of_ appeal, New issues cannot be raised on, Objections, Must not have been waived, Exceptions to rule of non-waiver, Powers of appellate court, Remand to subordinate court, Restitution upon reversal of decree, Reversal or variation i11 favor of one not a party to, Review of findings of fact by appellate court, Second appeal Nature of, Rigl1t to, Stay of execution, Substa11tial error doctri11e, Time for taking,
APPEARANCE
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Arrest of defendant to secure, At1thority to enter, By age11 t or pleader, Defined, Failure to appear, Court must take action in the eve11t of non-appearance, Dismissal of suit, Ex parte proceeding, ''Good cause'' for non-appearance, Multiple parties, Where defendant appears and plaintiff does not appear, Where neither party appears, Where plai11tiff appears and defendant does not appear, Where third party defendant does not appea.r, Striking of suit, Subsequent appeara.nce at adjourned hearing after initial non-appearance, ''Sufficient cau.se'' fo r non-appearance ' " r non-appearance, ''Su.ffic1e . 1;1t �ause'' 1o Personal ordmar1ly not required, Power of court to compel, Surety for,
ARBITRATION Appeals from arbitral awards Defn i ed, Foreign arbitral awards Nature of proceedings ' Powers of court Procedure in , g�verned b Y c1v · 1· 1 procedure Code,
2:t4· - 235 238 224 221- 224 253- 254 224- 225 219 235 235- 237 235- 236 236- 237 2 4 9- 253 2 4 8- 249 2 5 5- 2 5 6 2 5 1- 252 245- 246 254- 255 220- 221 232- 234 247- 248 255 - 258 360 - 361 161 358 I 61 161- 171 162- 163 166 163, 166- 167 171 167- 168 162- 163 162 163 - 164
164
165
164- 165 168 168- 171 161 162 361 - 362 389- 391 387
395
388
388- 389 387
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S DA A NI I TB A A Appointment, 11 Local Jt1dgments under Proclamatio n of 1947, Establ ished 10 , rs e w J11risdiction and po 11 ATTACHMENT: See also EXECUTION OF DECREES Before judg1ne11t Conditio.ns for, 362 Procedure, 362 - 363 Rights of third parties, 363 - 364 In execution proceedings Exemptio11s, 286 Of agricultural prod11ce, 287 - 288 O f corporate sl1ares, 289 Of iffi.lnovable property, 290 - 291 Of movable property and interest i11, 286 - 287, 289 Of property i11 custody of court, 290 Of property not in possession of judgment-debtor, 288 Of salary, 289 - 290 Taking of objections to, 292 - 295 Withdrawal of, 291 - 292 AWRADJA GUEZAT COURT Establisl1ed und.er authority of Admi11istration of Justice Procla111ation of 1942, 9 28 Material jurisdiction, 10 Organization, 1 CIVIL PROCEDURE: defi.11ed, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF 1965 258 Does not gover11 11eari11g of case by cl1ilot, .4 Forms, 4-6 Interpretation, 4 Organizatio11 and structure, 4 Power of Minister of Justice to 1nal<e n1les 1111der, 3 Preparation by Codificatio11 Departme.nt, 3 Promulgation as decree, 3 Repeal of prior law, CLASS SUIT 62 - 63 Conditions for 1naintaining, 62 Defined, 65- 66 Res judicata effect, - 66 65 class, Rights of other Inembers of 66 65 • ''Same interest," COMPROMISE . 187 Agreement, 18 19 9 0 Invalidation, I 88 - 189 Powers of court with respect to, 186 - 187 Prior to litigation, 187 -188 Procedure for recording, , 372 373 CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS: Authorization and· procedure, COSTS 392 ' ' �· Co mpensatory, - 19.9 -
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Ordinary, Procedure for claiming, COUNTERCLAIM OR SET-OFF Decree, when counterclaim or set-off has ?een filed, it, su nt ue eq bs su g in rr ba as rt se as to re Failu , rsy ve ro nt in co nt ou am g nin mi ter de of es os rp For pu Limitations on filing set-off, Procedure for hearing, Unrelated claims, Whether claim is one of ''counterclaim'' or ''set-off'',
391- 392 392- 393 211 342 130- 131 131 130- 131 130 130- 132
COURTS Defined, Established by and under authority of Administration of Justice Proclamation of 1942, Jurisdiction: See JURISDICTION Particular courts: See AWP�DJA GUEZAT COURT, HIGH COURT, etc.
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DECREES Contents., Specific directions for certain decrees, Wl1en prelin1inaf)1 order is required, .EVIDENCE: See also TRIAL; WI fNESSES Additional evidence on appeal, By affidavit, Documentary Action b)' court upon receipt of, Effect of failure to produce a.t First Hearing, Introduction at trial, Power of court to compel production of, Examination of witnesses, Local investigation by commissioner 0 Newly-discovered, Objections to, On commission, Recording of, To be heard in open court or in ca,nera ' View of property,
EXECUTION OF DECREES: See also ATTACHMENT Application for Generally, Against sureties and representatives By holders of joint decrees, ' By transferees, Attachment Exempted property Objections to, ' Of agricultural produce Of Corporate shares ' Of immovable prop;rty, Of movable property and inte re st in O f property attached prior to su it , Of property in custody o f court, '
8 8
209- 210 210 210 239- 245 197 198 197- 198 204 198 - 199 201- 206 207 213- 216 206 196- 197 206- 207 207- 208 207 265- 266 270- 27 1 267- 268 268- 270 286 292- 295 287 289
290- 291
28 6- 287, 289 363 290
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Of property not in possession of judgment-debtor, 288 Of salary, 289-290 Withdraw al, 291 - 292 rs upon sale of co-sl1a.r e immovable by property, Biddiilg 304 of ble ova sale iI11m of ty per pro tion ma , Confir 211 es, s-decre Cros 278-281 Defin ed, 359 Delivery of property following sale Mo,,able property, 300 - 301 1able property, Jmn10, 312-313 r, to Detention of judgme11t-deb 275, 282 Effect Of irregularity upon sale of 111ovable property, 302 - 303 Of payn1e.nt or acljt1st1ne11t, 277 -278 Of revision in cl1ilot, 258 Exa111inatio11 of judgn1ent-debtor, 273 - 274 Finality of proceedings, 262 - 265 Fo.reigi1 jt1dginents, 393 - 394 "Fraud'' i11 sale of i111n1ovable IJro_pert:y, 309 Jt1riscliction of courts to order, 259 ''Material irregLtlarity'' in sale of u. 11n1ovable pro1Jerty, 307 - 309 Objections b) jt1dg1ne11t-debtor, 274 Partict1la.r decrees Decree for delivery of im.n10, able property, 281 - 282 Decree for pay1ne11t of 111011ey, 275 - 276 Decree for performance of act, 282 - 283 Decree for recovery of s_pecific 111ovable property, 281 Decree for specific performa11ce, 282 Postponement of sale of i1nmovable property, 303 Powers .... 16·.)Of court to stay proceedi11gs because of pende11cy of other suit, 261 Of court to whicl1 decree l1as bee11 tra11sferrecl for exect1tio11, 262 Of court v.1bich l1as transferrecl decree for executuio11, 274 Process for, 296 - 297 Proclamation of sale, 271 - 273 Prohibition t1po11 filing of second applicatio11 after lapse of ti1ne, 313 - 318 Pt1tting purchaser of im1novable property i11to possessio11, 283 - 285 Rateable distribution, Sale 295 - 296 Applicatio11 for, 295, 297 - 299 Conduct of, 300 - 305 Of agricultural property, 303-305 Of immovable property, 300 - 303 Of n1ovable property, 299-300 Resale, where first sale ineffective, 305 - 311 Setti11g aside sale of immovable property, 232-234 Stay on appeal, 309 - 310 ''�ubstantial injury due to irregt1larity or fraud '' 271 Time for filing application, 259 - 2 6 2 Transfer of decree for' FIRST HEARING: See also APPEARANCE 172 -1 73 Admissions b y parties, 171 - .172 Exami11ation o f parties ' 180 176 Framing of isst1es , 1
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t Hearing oo1ent at . firs Jude . d On a m1ss1ons, 173 . . 181 - 182 When parties are not at_ issue, n ca s ue iss t bu be determined without , ue iss at be ay m es rti pa n he W 183-186 further evidence, , es ns fe e de iv at rm affi to d on sp re to d ire qu re iff 172 Plaint 173 -176 Preliminary objections, 197 Production of documentary evidence, 161 Relation to other stages of litigation, HABEAS CORPUS, writ of 374 Application for, 373 Defined, 374 -375 Procedure and l1earing, HIGH COURT 8 Established by Ad1ninistration of Jt1stice Proclamation of 1942, 28-29 Material jurisdiction, 10 Orga11ization, I-ITS IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S CJ-J rr,OT 12-13 Compared with court, 256-257 Conditio11s for obtaining revision in, 16 Exercise of jurisdictio11 discretionary, 18 Fird Mirmera, 258 Hearing of case in chilot not gover11ed by Civil Procedu,re Code, 13 -14 I-Iistorical backgro11nd, l)owers of I-Iis In1perial Majesty 17 To ''do justice," 1 7 -18 To gra11t relief ,.vithout regard to formal law, 18 Sebre Se1ni, 257 Sec11rity, power of chilot to require, 14 Sovereig11 prerogative as legal basis, 15 Stat11s under Revised Constitution ' INDISPENSABLE PAR'l'IES: See also JOINDER; PARTIES Addition of, 8 1 , 85-86 82 Defined, Distinguished 85 Fro1n con�itionally necessary parties, - 84 F on1 83 part ies wl10 cou ld hav e join join ed ed, or been hav e � . 85 ObJect1on to absence of 236 May be raised on appeal, 82-83 ''Pers?ns wl1ose rights will necessarily be affected," 81 �e!at1�n of rule to requirements of substantive law, 82 Suits involving specific property, INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS: Power of court to issue, 369 -370 INTERPLEADER D�finition and purpose, 92-93 4 Different sources of claims 9 ' Procedure ' 95-96 4 W h e n -9 a v a il a b le 93 ' 1 .1r vv 11en prohibited, 94-95 INTERVENTION By public prosecutor 9 9 - 100 ' - 402 '
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u Defin ed, Distinguished from permissive joinder, " party, d tereste ''In Procedure for, T HEARING S IR F o ls a ee S : S E U ISS Agreem ent for decision on single issue, Amendment of, Disposition of, at. First H�aring , framing of, at First Hearing, Of fact and law, Relation to material propositions, When issue arises,
96 96 - 97 96-99 99
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JOINDER: See also INDISPENSABLE PAR'l'IES; PAR'l'IES Generally Joinder of causes of action and joinder of parties: comparison and relation Misjoinder of parites, Permissive and mandatory joinder compared, Cause of action By single plaintiff or plaintiffs with joint i11terest, Multiple causes of action involving multiple parties, Power of court to order separate trials, When prohibited Claim for recovery of immovable property and llnrelated claim, Claim in representative capacity and claim in personal capacity, Of defendants Common question of law or fact defi11ed, Distinguished from joinder of plaintiffs, General rule, Parties jointly or severally liable on the same contract, Where plaintiff is in doubt as to the person fro1n v1l1om be is entitled to redress, Where plaintiff seeks alternative relief, Of plaintiffs General rule, Not affected by number of plaintiffs nor type of relief claimed, Insurer and insured, Interests antagonistic: effect, Power of court to order separate trials, ''Same transaction or series of transactions," Of third party defendant Definition and pu.rpose of third party practice, Entitled to contribution or indemnity, Relation to substantive law, Insurer as third party defendant, Procedure, Rights of plaintiff unaffected, Third party's relationship to original defendant, JUDGMENT Contents ' Foreign enforcement of, -- 403 -
180 - 181 179- 180 183- I 86 176-179 178-179 177 178
66, 78 80- 81 81 66- 67 78 -80 66 67-68 68 -79 74 73 73 75-76 76-77 77 -78 70 72- 73 72- 73 73 72-73 70- 72 87 88-92 88 89-90 87 87 92 209 393 - 394
Lin1ited to issues presented, Must be reduced to decree, 011 appeal, Pronounce111ent by co11rt,
209 259
247 - 254 208 - 209, 253
JURISDICTION Conflicts of, Defined, Ele1ne11ts of, In executio11, Matters outside j11risdictio11 of courts, Notice as affecting, Objections to I-low raised, Effect of failure to raise, Pende11cy of anotl1er suit as affecting, Pleadi.11g of, Priority of \vl1ere plaintiff bas filed s11it in different courts,
48- 50
19 19 259 31 - 32 45-46
46-47 47 49-50 139 -140 49
JURISDICTION, JUDICIAL 20 Applicable lav1 i11 Ethiopia, 24-25 Conse11t as basis, 43 Defined, 47 Dismissal of state1nent of clain1 for failing to disclose, 22- 23 Doing of a11 act a.s basis i�or exercise, 20 Domicile or natio11ality of plaintiff; ins11fficient basis for exercise of, 20-21 Domicile or nationality of defenda11t as basis, 47 Effect of failure to object, 20 In personan1, 20, 25- 26 In ren1, 25 Loss of, by co11sent of parties, 21 Over legal persons, 19 Recognitio11 of judgme11ts by otl1er states on basis of, 24 Special appearance as not constitution consent to,
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JURISDICTION, LOCAL Basic place of, Contracts generally, of carriage, of insura11ce, of pledge, deposit or bailment ' Definition and purpose , Effect of failure to object to Government as defendant ' Imn1ovable property general rule, exception, ''right to, or in�erest in_ immovable proper ty ,' ' . where property situate within th , co ur ts e ju ris di di ffe ct re of io nt n J o1nt defendants ' Legal persons, Non-residents ' ''Place where person resides , ,,
33
36
37 - 38 38
38 33 48
36
39 40 40-42 42 34 3 5-36 3 4- 35 33-34
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Special cases, 36 Suits upon several causes of action arisi11g in different places, 42 Transfer of suits to different area of local jurisdiction, 43 -4 5 y, ble ert va op pr mo to Wrongs 38 s, on rs pe to s 11g Wro 38 - 39 JURISDICTION, MATERIAL Amot111t in controversy dependent t1pon whether suit involves nlovable or immovable property, 27 Changes under Civil Procedure Code, 27 Definition and purpose, 27 Determination of an1ount in controversy, 29-31 Effect of change in amount in controversy, 29 Effect of failure to object to, 47, 236 Mt1ltiple clain1s, 29 Of Awradja Guezat Court, 28 Of High Court, 27- 28 Of Woreda Guezat Court, 28 Where subject matter of suit cat1not be expressed in money, 28 MEKTL \VOREDA COURT Establishment under authority of Administration of Justice Proclamation of 1942, 9 Withdrawal of jurisdiction, 9 MOHAMMEDAN COURTS Appointme11t of judges, II 11 Establishment under Proclamation of 1944, 11 Jurisdiction, 11-12 Status f ollo\vin·g enactn1ent of Civil Code, NOTICE: See also SERVICE OF PROCCESS As affecting jurisdiction, .Effect of lack of proper notice, Lack of proper notice and legally insufficient notice compared, Legally sufficient, what constitt1tes, Sufficiency of actual 11otice,
45 -46, 117 117-119 119 46 118
PARTIES: See also INDISPENSABLE PARTIES; JOINDER; REAL PAR'fY IN INTEREST 230 - 232 Additional parties on appeal, 85 Conditionally necessary, 104-107 Death of, 108 - 109 I 11solvency of, 294 Suit to establish right in attached property, 322- 323 Who are bound by decision in for mer suit, 379-381 PAYMENT INTO COURT: Provisions, PLEADERS 359-360 Appointment and power of attorney, 358 Defined, 358 May enter appearance PLEADING AN D PLEADINGS: See also AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS; ISSUES; STATEMENT OF CL AI M; STATEMENT OF DEFENSE 125 - 126 Alternative, - 405 -
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S G IN D A E L F P O NT E M D Amendment of: See AMEN , se o rp u p d n a n io it n fi e D . . Development of issues by, , ts h g ri e v t1 n a st b su g n ti ec ff a Errors in a s , se en ef r d o m ai cl f o t en em at st er Further �nd bett Inconsistent allegations, d, de ea pl ly al c i if ec sp be t us m ch hi w rs Matte Model forms, Pleading conclusions, s ng di in ea ed pl itt by m ad ct fa of f oo pr re ui req to t ur co of r we Po opposing party, Rejection of, AIM CL F O T N IE ElV AT ST e Se : aim Cl of t 1en en at St E NS FE DE OF T EN EM AT ST e Se se: fen De of t en tem Sta Staten1ent of material facts, Variance, Verification, PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Defined, Dismissal and stril<.ing out of suit followi11g decision on, Lack of jurisdiction, Limitatio11, Waiver by failure to raise, PROCEDURE: See also CIVIL P·ROCEDURE; CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF 1965 Defined, Major problems of, P11rpose, Stages of litigation, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: See also INDISPENSABLE PARTIES; PARTIES Addition and substitution of' Assignee as, Defendant, claim must be made against, Insurer and insured as, Purpose of requirement, Receipt of benefits as determ.ining,
f
RECEIVERS Appointment, Powers, Remuneration and security,
f
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120 - 121 121 - 122 121 158-159 127 124- 125 122- 123 124 135 139 122 132-135 123 173 176 174 174 175-176 1 6-7 ,,
120
57 - 59 53- 54 59- 60 54- 56 52 54
370 371 371- 372
REPRESENTATIVE SUITS
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Defined, Person und�r disability, Representative class suits: See CLASS SUIT S Suit by fiduciary, RES JUDICATA �s �et �een co-defendants, Cla1m1ng under part1·es 1·n prev . ious suit'''
60 60- 61
62 324 324 .. 326
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Counterclaim an d set-off, 330 331 , se o rp d u p an n Definitio 319 Dismissal of prior suit not on merits, 329 Effect of decision in criminal proceeding, 321 s, le p ci n ri p General 320 319 , rs te at J11terlocutory m 321 Issues of law, 335 - 337 raised in prior suit, 328 - 330 raised but not decided i n prior suit, 331- 332 where more tl1an one issue has been decided, 332- 335 which ought to have been raised, 338 - 341 ''Litigating under same title," 326 - 327, 340 - 342 Parties bound, 322 - 324 Prior decision in foreign suit, 322 Relief claimed but not granted, 342- 343 Representative suits, 327 - 328 Waiver of defense, 320 REVIEW BY COURT WHICH ISSUED DECREE Grounds for review Newly discovered evidence, 213 - 216 Procedural irregularities, 212- 213 Opposition, 216-218 SECURITY FOR COSTS: Requu·ement of furnishing, 378-379 SERVICE OF PROCESS: See also NOTICE 1.18 - 119 Actual notice notwithstanding improper service, 112 - 113 Assimilated personal service, 115 At place of employment, 111 By post, 111, 113 - 115 Constructive service, 117 - 119 Failure to make service in accorclauce with orovisions of Code: effect, .. 111 - 112 Hierarchy of 1nethods of service, 116 - 117 On resident of Ethiopia who is outside jurisdiction of court, 111 - 112 Personal service, Procedure to be f ollo\ved when personal or constructive service 115 - 116 impossible, 111 , 116- 117 Substituted service, Suits 113 against body corporate, 113 against partners, 114 involving business of non-resident, 114 involving in1movable property, 111 Summons: how served, SPLI'l"I'ING OF CLAIMS 347 - 348 ''Cause of action;'' wl1at constitutes, 349 - 350 Claims arising under single instrument or contract, 348 Claim due in instalments, 5-346 34 Effect of simultaneous suits, - 357 4 35 5, 34 4 34 , le e11tit is ?, y part Failure to sue for all reliefs to which 7 34 6 34 , suit t uen Omitted portion of claim a.s defense to st1bseq 3 - 344 34 Purpose of rule, 345 Relinquishment of portion of claim,
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11 io ct a f o s se u ca le ip lt 1u n r o ! Single , m ai of g cl 11 ti lit sp g in ct fe af a ss lo o � Subsequent injury � , ed lv o v in e ar es ti ar p le p ti ul m e er l1 W G N D DI N A G EA S N PL DI EA PL so al e Se : IM A CL F O T STATEMEN Annexes, Designation of parties, Effect of pleadi11g facts negati11g the clain1, Identificatio11 of subject n1atter of suit, Pleading an1ount of clain1, cat1se of action, co11clt1sions, facts entitling tl1e plaintiff to relief, jurisdictio11, Rejectio11 of, Reqt1iren1ents,
348 - 352 353 - 354 352- 353 129 12 7 - 128 143 - 144 128 128 - 129 140 - 144 142 140- 144 13 9 - 140
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STATEMENT OF DEFENSE: See also PLEADING AND PLEADINGS Denial of allegations of state1nent of clain1, 129, I 35 - 138 Evasive de11ial prol1ibited, 130 Ge11eral de11ial prol1ibited except for da111ages, 129 Matters tl1at n1ust be raised b)', 136 - 137 Pleading 144 legally sufficie11t defe11se, 138 li111itatio11, 130 Raising of defe11ses, 135 Refusal to ad111it, 139 Rejectio11 by cot1rt,
SUITS By or against associations a11d bt1siness organizati.011s, By or agai11st partners and partnerships, By pau1Jers, Institt1 tio11 of, \rVithdrawal, SUMMARY PROCEDURE Action by court, Authorized i11 certai11 cases Defined, Plaintiff's optio11 to employ, SUPREME IMPERIAL COURT Appoi?tment of judges, Established by Revised Constitution Lirnited to exercise of appellate ju;isdictio11, . _ Organ1zat1011, TAKLAY GUEZAT COURT Es�ablished under administration of Just ice Proclamation of 1942, Withdrawal of jurisdictio11 TEMPORARY INJUNC TIONS: T o . . b e i·ssued 1n . certain circumstances, TIME For doing of act, to be fixed by court, '
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WOREDA GUEZAT COURT
Constituted by single judge, Establisl1ed under authority of Admi11istration of Justice Proclamation of 1942, Material jurisdictio11,
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