Nagarjuna

Nagarjuna's Critique of Pramaanas In philosophical circle, he questions or raises doubt about the validity of the 'knowledge claims' made by others. If we bear in mind this general characterization when we read Nagarjuna's philosophical treatises like Vigraha-vyavartani andMulamadhyamaka Karika, we would be convinced that there is no logical or psychological obstruction or hardship to make an extension of the applicability of the term 'cognitive sceptic' to Nagarjuna. In his philosophical works Nagarjuna subjects the 'knowledge-claims' made by the Naiyayikas and others to severe dialectical criticism and shows that these claims are not supported by sufficient justification.

In his engagement with the critics of his shunyavaada thesis, Nagarjuna briefly dealt with the notion of Pramaana, or reflected on the question of the grounding of Pramaanaas in a rather praasangika style. Given this critique one may try to ask how Nagarjuna can envisage the possibility of knowledge of the empirical world. Nagarjuna's takes on his opponents reveal his conception of what can be characterised as an onto-methodologically enclosed nature of knowledge of the world.

As an ontological preliminary to Nagarjuna’s thinking we need to understand his uses of the terms such as bhava, bhaava, svabhaava, suunyata. These concepts together set the limit and scope of not only his ontology but his epistemological position as well. Nagarjuna obviously does not mean, when he says that everything is void, that the world is void in this sense. He also does not deny that whatever exists exists in some manner, i.e., each has a bhaava. The word 'expression' is perhaps the nearest in meaning.

Bhaava therefore means being–thus, i.e. specific determination of being. What he denies to each bhava, or being, is that its being-thus is not something it owns, i.e. being-thus is not an intrinsic being-thus (svabhaava) of something. This absence of intrinsic being-thus is called voidness (Suunyata). So suunyata is to be strictly understood as the non-intrinsic being-thus ( bhaavaa nihsvabhaavaa iti).

If one understands Nagarjuna correctly, bhaava is predicated on bhava, and svabhaava is predicated on bhaava. He only denies the latter. His reason for denying svabhaava to any thing is that its being-thus is relatively arisen together (with that of other things). The term he used is pratiityasamutpaada.

Epistemology Nagarjuna’s reflections bearing on epistemological questions appear primarily in his reply to the objections of an imagined opponent who discredits him of his suunyavaada thesis if he is consistent or leave him at his own risk of being inconsistent. The argument briefly is as follows: If Nagarjuna denies any given thing intrinsic ness with respect to its being-thus, and therefore holding them to be void, then Nagarjuna’s own thesis of suunyata itself suffering from the absence of intrinsic being-thus, will be void. A thesis that is void, asserts nothing. Besides other things, the opponent drags him to lock horns with him on epistemological issues. If Nagarjuna arrives at the theory of suunyata through any of the pramaanaas, then that pramaana, pratyaksha e.g., is itself void because like other things it is also being-thus and therefore void.2

This applies also to anumaana ( inference ) aagama (verbal testimony) or upamaana (comparison).3 For the same reason objects recognized through anumaana, aagama and upamaana are also suunya.4 By the same logic, Nagarjuna cannot negate anything, as he appears to be doing, for negation will not have svabhaava for accomplishing what it supposeas to accomplish, because negator and negated are equally void. Similarly for Nagarjuna the reasons he advances for accepting his thesis should be void, having no inherent force, therefore, his thesis will not hold.5 Though in his reply Nagarjuna has shown that the objections of the opponents are misplaced since the latter has misunderstood the meaning of the suunyataa, he takes up the problem of pramaana. N’s rebuttal is in praasangika style, that he has not apprehended any object with the help of any of the four pramaanaas.6 So the objections of the opponent do not apply. For the sake of completeness we may summarize Nagarjuna’s remaining arguments against exempting pramaanaas from the predicament of being covered by the relational structure of existence (pratiityasamutpaada). If we look askance at the pramaanaas it means we are not prepared to treat them as more privileged than prameya. Pramaana then moves to the place marked for prameya.

The philosophical opponent of the sceptic to coin a word from Matilal, may be called 'cognitivists'. (2) In Indian Philosophy they are mostly Naiyayikas who claim that with the help of justificatory grounds as casual instruments (pramanas) we can have the cognition of the objects of the knowledge (prameyas). In Akaspada Goutama's 'Nyayasutra' knowledge is considered as something that leads to attainment of the highest good ( tattvajnanannihsreyasadhigamah ). In Nyaya system of philosophy knowledge is taken as something which always points beyond itself.

All the furniture of the world are classified under several sets of objects of knowledge ( prameyas ). A piece of cognition is valid if it can give us an indubitably true awareness of an object of knowledge. Nagarjuna devoted 20 verses from 31st 51st in Vigrahavyavartani in order to refute the Nyaya concept of pramana. Nagarjuna's main concern here is not to say that what we know about the world is false; rather he maintains that the knowledge claims made by the cognitivists ( Naiyayikas and others ) are not supported by adequate logical grounds. The main contention of Nagarjunian scepticism is to set a limit to cognitive claim of the Naiyayikas. In other words, it is rather a critique to the soteriological claims on the basis of empirical foundation of cognitivists' theory of knowledge. It is a scepticism about the justification of knowing or pramana.

1 : No Criterion Argument The pramanavadins (cognitivists) claim that it is possible to have indubitablely true presentational cognition or (prama) on the basis of pramanas. A pramana is usually defined as the instrumental cause of an indubitable and unerring piece of presentational knowledge.

A Nyaya cognitivist Vatsyayana further argues that in philosophical debate, one is supposed to defend or reject certain thesis. Even for the rejection one would require this or that pramana. In other words, even the very denial of a certain pramana is possible only on the acceptance of certain other pramana and this precisely establishes the validity of pramana as such. And if once it is admitted that the validity of pramana as a variety of knowable (prakara), one is logically compelled to recognise three other varities of knowables (prakara)-the agent of knowledge (pramata), object of knowledge (prameya) and knowledge par excellence (pramiti). It is here a Nagarjunian philosopher would object that your very programme is defective. If you say that prameyas or knowables are justified because of pramanas (ground) and pramanas are not

questionable, then you are acting as a dogmatic in philosophising. If you accept the reality of pramanas without any justification, your very acceptance is an exercise of dogmatism. All the accounts of the cognitivists may be broadly classified under two heads: (a) the pramanas are self-validating (svatah prasiddhih) that is to say they are intrinsically valid. (b) their validity is established on the basis of some other pramanas (paratah prasiddhih). Both these possible alternatives have been examined by Nagarjuna. The charge of no criterion centres the question: How is a congitivist going to validate his standard or criterion (pramana) itself ? It is said that pramana is valid on its own ground in terms of itself, that is no more than just begging the question and is a case of dogmatic enterprise. If it is said that pramana is validated in terms of another, that would immediately leave room for the charge of infinite regress. Now either way, according to a Nagarjunian sceptic, a cognitivist can not have adequate means to support the established status or truth-criterionship of pramanas which lies at the foundation of cognitivist's truth-claims.

1.1 Charge of Inner-inconsistency and Dogmatism Explained The point Nagarjuna elaborates is this that dogmatism and inconsistency of arguments would be automatic outcome if we admit pramanas as self-validating. Nagarjuna further argues that if we admit that pramanas are required for the justificatory grounds as well as intrumental cause for establishing the knowables (prameyas) but the pramanas themselves belong to a self-validating class, then we also accept that pramanas are placed in a 'privilezed sacrosanct class'-that is to say, a clear-cut dichotomy is introduced between pramanas and prameyas. But a philosopher must explain, the justificatory grounds for such preferential treatment; he should not merely state the dichotomy but must explain the reason behind such dichotomy. This is what exactly Nagarjuna demands. 'If without assigning any reason pramanas are claimed to be self-validating then a sense of arbitrariness would be introduced and this acceptance of this without any justificatory certification is a clear case of dogmatic enterprise.' This is also a case of internal inconsistency and disaccord in congnitivists' arguments.

1.2 The Charge of Infinite Regress Revisited Now if in order to aviod the charge of non-accordance and dogmatism, the cognitivist adopts the second alternative that is a pramana may derive its validity or authority from another pramana of the same type or dierent type this would, according to Nagarjuna, instead of giving any justification for the acceptance ofpramana simply invite the blemish of infinite regress (anavasthadosa). For example, of the first alternative we may say that a perception say P1 is established through another perception say P2 and for the second, a perception say P, is established through an inference say F. But in either case of the theory of extrinsic validity, the blemish of 'infinite regress' would be inevitable. These are the techniques about which the congnitivists themselves highly speak of, that is, if something is to be acceptable, there must be inner logical consistency between the justification and the claim and a justification must not be vitiated by the blemishes of circularity and infinite regress. The sceptic here is just reminding the cognitivists that claiming pramanas as self certified, you are committing logical inconsistency and claiming them as established by others you are either inviting the blemish of circularity or the blemish of infinite regress.

1.3 Analogical Arguments Refuted

However, Goutama in the Nyayasutra also employs the analogy of a lamp (pradipa) to meet possible charge of infinite regress. He says that as a lamp reveals objects as well as itself, so the pramana (supportive grounds) reveal prameyas (knowables) as well as themselves. It is here Nagarjuna tries to point out faults and in 'Vigrahavyavartani' he devotes six verses in order to show that the analogy of light or fire is quite incapable of serving as a 'sapaksa' in the cognitivists' arguments.In 'Vigrahavyavartani' verse 35, Nagarjuna argues that ifpramanas were like light or fire which reveals itself as well as the presence of other subjects simultaneously then there would be no logical as well as practical difficulty in claiming that fire would also burn itself as it can burn other things. But this is a contradiction in thinking as well as in the actual happenings. In view of this, the cognitivists' assumption that fire reveals itself as well as other objects' becomes doubtful and remains unestablished. It is further contended that if 'fire reveals itself as well as other object is true, then the proposition that 'darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as other things' would also be true. It is an admitted fact that although darkness conceals the presence of other things, it does not conceals the presence of itself. (Na caitad drstam tatra yaduktam / Svaparatmanau prakasayatyagnirititanna). What is evident here is that in contrast with the cognitivists 'light analogy, Nagarjuna constructs just contrary analogical argument to disprove the cognitivists' claim.

1.4 Blemishes of Interdependence and Circularity Detected Nagarjuna further argues that if for the sake of argument we admit that pramanas are selfestablished, then it would imply that they are established even independent of prameyas (knowables). But if a kind of pramana were established without reference to prameyas, then this particular type of pramana ceases to be worthy of the name pramana. If it is argued that pramanas are independent of prameyas, then these pramanas become pramanas of nothing. As pramana has always a relational character with prameya in cognitive situation, the thesis that 'pramanas are independently established' becomes refuted. If it is said that pramanas are established through prameyas and prameyas through pramanas, then a Nagarjunian sceptic would at once point out that neither of them have a self-nature (svabhava) of their own and therefore, should be treated assunya (vacous). Again, it would be a case of proving what is already proved (siddhasadhana), because the tacit assumption is this, that prameyas are already established.

If prameyas were regarded as already established, the necessity of pramana itself for the establishment of prameyas becomes superfluous. If it is said that the validity of pramanas are prameyas dependent and the validity or establishment of prameya is pramana dependent then it amounts to committing the blemishes of interdependence and circularity. Nagarjuna laughs at the cognitivis because his view almost amounts to say that "the son is produced by the father and that father is produced by that son.

But in this case who is that gives birth and who is that is born". Therefore the criterion of mutual dependence rather shows that both pramanas and prameyas are devoid of any essence of their own (sunya). Since there is neither established pramana nor established prameya the so called 'knowledge-claim' of the cognitivists becomes unwarranted. All views (drsti) about the world, for Nagarjuna, becomes systematically misleading and therefore, they are to be rejected.

{Extra reading for understanding} nagarjuna Pramāṇa Pramāṇa (wellsprings of information," "measure" Sanskrit) is an epistemological alluding to the methods by which a man gets precise and legitimate learning (pramā, pramīti) of the world. In getting pramā, or right knowledge the relationship of following places a crucial role: 1.

Pramāta, the subject, the knower

2.

Pramāṇa, the method for getting the information

3.

Prameya, the item, the comprehensible

Un-doubtable and un-mistaken information is for the most part seen to be the causal after effect of pramāṇas, which takes four unique structures observation (pratyakśa), derivation (anumāna), examination (upamāna), or word (śabda). The pramana of "recognition" alludes to tactile contact with articles, which the Nyāya school of Indian Philosophy, accepted to be unerring. When we talk of derivation (anumāna) we mean inference which portrays the development from specific to specific through simplification, and, if done effectively, is seen as a reliable wellspring of learning. Examination (upamāna), points out to comparison that communicates the relationship between some article and a word portraying that question. It was felt that if there is a word, there must be an article which that word is portraying. Accordingly word (śabda) envelops truths which are conveyed through the hallowed writings. These truths were additionally held to be faultless.

Nāgārjuna’s approach to Pramāṇas Nāgārjuna’s approach to pramāṇas is clearly visible in his literary work called Vigrahavyāvartanī (The Dispeller of Disputes). Here in this text Nāgārjuna sets out to respond to certain specific objections that are raised against his system. These objections were raised by both Buddhists and non-Buddhist opponents of Nāgārjuna. Pointing to the positionlessness of Mādhyamika, which he terms to be a kind of absolute, T.R.V. Murti states that, the ever-vigilant dialectical consciousness of all philosophy is another kind of absolute. For, it rises above all positions, transcending the duality of the thesis and anti-thesis which eminently contain the whole universe.

Nāgārjuna systematized them. He exposed the confusing implications of such alternative and brought the antinomies of reason to light and showed the impossibility of reaching a sound Metaphysics on the basis of Dogmatism or Rationalism.

In the 2nd aphorism of Vaidalyasūtra Nāgārjuna begins his refutation with the criticism of pramāņa and prameya as independent reals. According to Nāgārjuna, this claim of the Nyāya philosopher is unjustified.

The so-called differentiating marks between the two are confusing. Neither the first nor the second can be established as existing something independent of others. The so-called causal instrument of knowing is worthy of name pramāņa only when there exists a knowable, prameya.

This means that without the knowable, the pramāņa stands as the causal instrument of nothing.

Again, a knowable (prameya) as the object of knowing is worthy of name only when there exists an instrument of knowing which causally justifies it. A pramāņa is the causal proof for a

knowable being existing. This shows that one is claimed to be established as existing depending on the other and vice-versa. In other words, the defining features of the one becomes applicable to the other and vice versa and this amounts to say that any one of them would function both as the causal instrument of knowing and as the knowable which may create a very confusing situation. This proves that neither of them as existing is established in the sense in which the Nyāya philosopher holds.

In the 3rdaphorismNāgārjuna develops a fresh argument against the claim of independent existence of pramāņa and prameya. What is dependently existent is devoid of its own nature and what is devoid of any nature of its own cannot be established as an independent category. It is a mistake, according to Nāgārjuna to classify in absolute sense the furniture of the world into sixteen categories. Neither pramāņa nor prameya can be classified either as existent or norexistent or both because of their own nature.

The pramāņa-theorist may object here that the pramāņa is required to establish the prameya, the knowable. The pramāņa functions like a weighing instrument and just as the weighing instrument measures other objects, pramāņa establishes prameya. In response to such an explanation in favour of the independent existence of pramāņa Nāgārjuna advances subtler implication of this and derives absurdity from it. He argues that if we admit that pramāņa is required as the causal instrument in order to establish prameya but pramāņa itself belongs to a ‘self-establishing, privileged and sacrosanct’ class then the pramaņa-theorist would be introducing arbitrariness and dogmatism. And without sufficient logical ground the admission of the distinction between pramāņa and prameya is same as admitting ‘inconsistency and discord’.

Again, another implication of admitting pramāņa as self-established may amount to say that pramāņa is established independent of prameya. In fact in such a situation it would cease to be a pramāņa, because it would be the pramāņa of nothing. If one is established, however, through the other and vice versa, then none of them would have an independent nature. It would further because of proving what is already proved (siddhasādhana), because of the assumption that prameya is already established. In that case the necessity of pramāņa itself for establishing prameya becomes superfluous. And when the independent nature of both pramāņa and prameya remains un-established, the so-called ‘knowledge-claim’ by the Nyāya-cognitivism becomes unwarranted.

The 4th aphorism also contains the examination of the Nyāya cognitivist’s arguments in favour of the existence of pramāņa as an independent category. The pramāņa-theorist here introduces the analogy of weighing scale. But Nāgārjuna refutes the justifiability of the analogy of the weighing scale or a lamp-light. What itself is not established cannot be the causal instrument for establishing others. If in order to avoid the arising of the aforesaid question it is said that a pramāņa is established by another pramāņa then the so-called first instance of pramāņa would turn out to be a prameya. In that case how can we distinguish between a pramāņa and a prameya?

But the pramāņa-theorist may, however, argue here that a pramāņa is just like a lamplight which illuminates others as well as itself and when a pramāņa is established through other pramāņa, that other one is also a pramāņa. But Nāgārjuna at this juncture brings the charge of infinite regress against the pramāņa-theorist. If in order to avoid the charges of non-accordance and of dogmatism, the pramāņa-theorist adopts that a pramāņa is established by another pramāņa of the same type or of different type, this would instead of providing any justification for

establishing pramāņa as existing simply invite infinite regress. To cite an example of the first alternative, we may say that a perception, say P1 is established through another perception, say P2 and P2 by P3 and so on, and for the second alternative, a perception, say P is established through an inference say F and so on. But in either case, the blemish of infinite regress would be inevitable. The net outcome, according to Nāgārjuna, is that the existence of pramāņa is not established.

The 5th and the sixth aphorisms contain a possible counter-argument by the cognitivist Nyāya philosopher and the refutation of that counter-argument by Nāgārjuna. We see in the Nyāyasūtra 2.2.19 that there is a comparison of pramāņa to a lamp-light (pradīpa). Light is the revealer of objects. But we do not require any other thing for revealing the existence of light itself. Pramāņa, according to Gautama, functions in this manner in order to establish the existence of prameya. But Nāgārjuna however, shows the unfitness of the afore-said analogy in the 6th aphorism. Darkness is opposite / contrary to light and there is no generally admitted connecting tie between the two. As there is no established connecting tie between the two, the light cannot be said to reveal objects being in connection with darkness. Now if light is in no way in connection with darkness, how can it destroy darkness? In a similar way it is absurd to say that prameya is established by pramāņa. To strengthen his refutation, Nāgārjuna in the 7thaphorism introduces a possible analogy in favour of the opponent and refutes it subsequently. The opponent may argue that though light is not outwardly in connection with darkness, yet it can illuminate the object destroying darkness as it is seen in case of the hurtful influences of planets upon human beings despite there is no contact between the two. Similarly light can destroy darkness, though there is no direct contact between light and darkness. This shows that for influencing the cessation of darkness by light no direct contact is necessary between the two.

But Nāgārjuna refutes this possibility and considers the new analogy given by the opponent not only unfit but also contradictory to the example. In the given analogy, planets and individual human beings who are said to be affected by the inferences of the planets, both have bodies.

But it is not fit for the case of light. In case of an individual, say Devadatta or Brahmadatta, it has a body to be affected by the evil influences of the plants. But this is not the case with darkness.

Now if it is argued that even in the absence of any contact light destroys darkness then it must also be admitted that a lamplight in a particular room is also able to destroy the darkness that prevails in the interior of the caves of the mountain or a distant dark place is illuminated by the lamp-light of this room.

In the 9thaphorismNāgārjuna continues his refutation of pramāņa. He says that darkness is considered as the absence of light. And both the common people as well as the scholars admit that darkness being the absence of light does not have any independent nature, that is to say, it does not exist independently. Now if lamplight is compared to pramāņa and darkness to prameya, then in the absence of prameya, (i.e. darkness) the role of pramāņa (i.e. light) becomes irrelevant. So light cannot be claimed to be established as the illuminator of darkness. And this proves that the example of light and darkness is not a suitable one. Moreover, this 9thaphorism elaborates another dimension of the same argument. It is logically arguable that light can illuminate itself if and only if there is darkness. But light and darkness are mutually exclusive and therefore are contradictory and on account of this the claim that the presence of darkness is to be eliminated by the presence of lamplight remains un-established.

In the 10th aphorism Nāgārjuna has constructed a counter-argument, we would like to call it‘darkness-analogy’ in contrast to the Nyāya-cognitivist’s argument what we have titled as ‘light analogy’. The Nyāya cognitivists argue that light illuminates other things as well as itself.

Analogous to this, we may say, according to Nāgārjuna, that ‘darkness conceals the existence of itself as well as of other things.’

But as a matter of fact, though darkness conceals the presence of other things, it does not conceal the presence of itself. What is evident here is that the claim of the pramāņavādin’s is not justified.

Next Nāgārjuna tries to show that neither pramāņa nor prameya can be established as existing in any of the three times. The 11th aphorism thus continues the refutation of pramāņa in a broad sense introducing the temporal consideration of pramāņa and prameya. Nāgārjuna argues that if pramāņa is meant to establish prameya (as existing), then it must exist either ‘before or after’prameya or it must be admitted that pramāņa and prameya are simultaneous. According to Nāgārjuna, none of the afore-said alternatives are tenable. If pramāņa is temporally ‘before’ prameya, then it must be admitted that ‘pramāņa exists when prameya does not exist. But in that case pramāņa itself cannot be worthy of its name; because without prameya, it is pramāņa of nothing. The cognitivists themselves defined pramāņa as the causal instrument of knowing and prameya as the object of knowing. So in the absence of the knowable how can the causal instrument of knowing be worthy of its name? Again, if it is argued that pramāņa exists after the knowable, prameya, then it must also be admitted that even in the absence of the causal instrument of knowing, the object of knowing, the knowable (prameya) is already established (as existing), and in that case, there would not be any necessity for the role of pramāņa. We cannot logically any more say that pramāņa is required to establish prameya. But it is absurd to admit something as the causal instrument which comes into being after the very object whose existence is already established. And something being a causal instrument of knowing must be temporally prior to the object of knowing. This shows that something existent and something non-existent may be seen at the same time. But our practical experiences show that even the simultaneous existence of pramāņa and prameya cannot establish pramāņa as the causal instrument of establishing prameya just as the fact of simultaneity in existence of two horns of a bull cannot prove that the left horn causes the right horn.

In the 12thaphorismNāgārjuna apprehends another counter-argument from the pramānatheorists like a Naiyāyika. The objection is that if you deny the existence of pramāna in three times, the denial is not established as existing in any of the three times. If you deny everything, then you cannot deny the fact that ‘you are denying’. If you do not deny the fact that ‘you are denying’ then you are not denying everything.

But Nāgārjuna in the 13thaphorism eliminates the possibility of the afore-said counter-argument as non-sensical. It is an admitted position to all that if something is negated earlier, then from that negation the existence of that thing cannot be followed. When something, say, pramāna is negated as existing, it is non-sensical to argue that here ‘negation’ itself is established as something existing. In the 14th and 15thaphorismsNāgārguna simply continues the implication of his refutation of pramāņa and prameya as existing. His main contention is that once the claim for the independent existence of pramāņa and prameya has been shown unjustified, there remains no further scope or necessity for debate.