AFRICAN DEFENSE April 2015

African Defense

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April/May 2015

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Combating Piracy in Gulf of Guinea

Botswana Defence Force

Tow a Co ards mm on Afri Spac can e Po licy

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www.african-defense.com OMM COVER: During an international training exercise in the Gulf of Guinea, a boarding party gains access to a ship. Photo by DoD

Keep the Wheels Turning Runflat inserts and non-pneumatic tires can minimize mobility kills and keep vehicles moving.

Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Fast-tracking multinational efforts that coordinate maritime security for the region.

By Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo

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The African Standardization Challenge

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Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa West Africa is a complex mix of factors that impact politics,

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South African Defense Budget 2015...and Beyond

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By Dev Mehta

Can the Botswana Defence Force Attain its Effectiveness Posture A critical look at the military effectiveness levels the BDF has established for itself. What will it take to get there?

By Colonel Sianang Mokuedi

Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Fast-tracking multinational efforts that coordinate maritime security for the region.

The 5,000 nautical mile (nmi) coastline of the wider Gulf of Guinea offers seemingly idyllic conditions for shipping. It is host to numerous natural harbors and is largely devoid of chokepoints and extreme weather conditions.

By Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo 4

It is also rich in hydrocarbons, fish and other resources. These attributes provide immense potential for maritime commerce, resource extraction, shipping and development. Indeed, container traffic in West African ports has grown 14 percent annually since 1995, the fastest of any region in SubSaharan Africa.

The wider Gulf of Guinea, stretching from Cape Verde to Angola, is the main transit hub and facilitator to the region’s rapid economic growth which has averaged 7 percent since 2012. The Gulf of Guinea has also become a hub for global energy supplies with significant quantities of all petroleum products consumed in Europe, North America and Asia transiting this waterway.

This economic boom, however, is threatened. In 2012, the Gulf of Guinea surpassed that of the Gulf of Aden (infamous for high-seas hijackings) as the region with the highest number of reported piracy attacks in the world. These attacks also tended to be more violent. Given the limited maritime security presence off the West African coast, South American narcotics traffickers have found the region an attractive transit route to Europe. Oil theft and illegal bunkering plague the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria alone loses between 40,000 and 100,000 barrels a day due to theft. With 40 percent of the region’s annual catch estimated to be illegal, unregulated, or unreported, West Africa’s waters also endure the highest level of illegal fishing in the world.

Trade partners have taken note. In 2013, almost all of the estimated $10.2 billion worth of regional trade with the United Kingdom moving through the Gulf of Guinea was declared at risk of theft.

With the increase in risk to ships, cargo and seafarers, insurance premiums have soared and companies have taken on additional burdens to secure their ships.

Insufficient state presence in the Gulf of Guinea makes the economic losses incurred

by the region difficult to estimate with precision. These are certainly substantial, however. Estimates of the annual cost of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea range from $565 million to $2 billion. The strategic development plans of many countries in the region rely on 60 percent of their revenues coming from hydrocarbon resources either sourced from or transiting through the Gulf.

Governments in the region have been late to realize how their absence in the maritime domain not only costs them untold revenue but also undermines security on land, as criminal activities on the sea start and end onshore. To the extent that the global economy relies on increasingly interdependent shipping and energy supply networks, the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea constitute a collective challenge to all stakeholders in the region and internationally. zxxxx The Unique Nature of the Gulf of Guinea’s Maritime Insecurity

Piracy attacks (and armed robbery at ses) in the Gulf of Guinea comprised a fifth of all recorded maritime incidents globally in 2013. These figures represent only a fraction of the actual attacks in the region as ship owners and governments downplay incidents to avoid increased shipping costs or a reputation for insecurity. Incidents reported to the International Maritime Bureau indicate that the affected area is substantial.

Anchorages and approaches to the ports of Bonny and Lagos (Nigeria), Cotonou (Benin), Lomé (Togo), Tema (Ghana), and Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) are particularly vulnerable with large numbers of merchant ships often loitering in these areas.

In the busy port of Lagos, hundreds of vessels loiter for days along the roadsteads (calm areas of water near harbors where ships can anchor) due to the limited capacity of West and Central African ports for offloading. Control measures in the ap-

African Defense/April/May 2015

proaches to these ports remain weak. The beaching of 25 ships on the Lagos coast following a rough, two-hour storm in 2010 revealed that many vessels in harbors are unmanned and unmonitored.

The then director-general of the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) suggested that such boats may also serve as hideouts and blinds for pirates and robbers.

When a vessel is boarded by pirates, equipment and cargo are often stolen.

Occasionally members of the crew are kidnapped for ransom. Ships may be hijacked and sailed to distant locations across maritime borders where cargo is transferred to other vessels. Recent attacks in the Gulf of Guinea indicate a preference for ships laden with crude oil and oil products. Such attacks are known to have occurred along the Ghana-to-Angola and Nigeria-to-Côte d’Ivoire axes. For example the MT Kerala was found in waters near Ghana’s Tema Port on January 28, 2014, with a sizable amount of her oil cargo missing after being seized near Luanda eight days earlier.

In other cases, support vessels to offshore installations are attacked, sometimes with such speed and precision as to raise suspicion of complicity of the offshore crews in the theft and illicit sale of oil. Gulf of Guinea piracy is increasingly characterized by violent assaults against vessels and hostage takings—1,871 seafarers were victims of attacks and 279 were taken hostage in 2013. Incidents of fierce resistance to naval patrols have also increased. Pirates aboard a passenger boat opened fire on a Nigerian Navy (NN) craft during a routine patrol along the Cameroonian border in August 2013. Six pirates were killed in the

African Defense/April/May 2015

exchange.

In another incident just weeks prior, pirates tried to flee the gasoline tanker MT Notre after eight NN vessels surrounded it. Twelve of the 16 pirates were killed and their boat sank during the 30-minute gun battle. In April 2013, two crew members were killed after pirates boarded the SP Brussels off Nigeria’s coast. Just 18 months earlier, five crew were taken hostage when pirates robbed the same vessel while it was 40 miles off the coast of the Niger Delta.

Oil theft is often the result of collusion among local gangs, compromised elements in the oil industry and security agencies, and organized criminal networks from Eastern Europe and Asia. While Nigerian nationals have been most involved in the region’s piracy, other Africans, Eastern Europeans and Filipinos have been arrested in Gulf waters for crude-oil theft, illegal bunkering and attacks on shipping. In March 2014, two Britons, employees of a UK-based maritime security firm, were arrested with 12 Nigerians for attempting to offload crude from a vessel that itself had been seized for stealing oil.

zxxxx Building a Collective Maritime Security Response

Attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea have exposed the vulnerability of the region’s maritime space. This has precipitated various countermeasures. In 2010, improvements in operational collaboration between the NN and NIMASA resulted in substantial reductions in attacks around Lagos Harbor. Under the collaboration, jointly manned vessels conduct law enforcement

and antipiracy patrols backed with electronic surveillance assets, particularly within the territorial seas and harbor approaches.

Unfortunately, the gains in Nigeria led to increased attacks off the coast of neighboring Benin. After reporting no attacks in 2009 and only 1 in 2010, Benin experienced a surge of more than 20 incidents in 2011.

As a result, tonnage at Cotonou Port fell by more than 15 percent resulting in a loss of $81 million in customs revenue. The development compelled Benin’s President Boni Yayi to request assistance from Nigeria.

In September 2011, NN-NIMASA vessels began jointly patrolling waters with Beninese security forces. The number of actual and attempted attacks on ships around Cotonou Port dropped from 20 in 2011 to 2 in 2012 and 0 in 2013. Consequently, shipping activities resurged.

Reflecting the interconnected nature of this threat, enhanced patrolling around Cotonou led to a sharp increase in attacks in 2012 on shipping and hostage taking off the neighboring coasts of Togo (attacks–15, hostages–79) and again Nigeria (attacks–27, hostages–61). Over 80 percent of the attacks recorded in Nigeria occurred in waters off the Niger Delta, where the NN-NIMASA collaboration was less robust. Notably, Togo and Nigeria accounted for over 70 percent of the attacks and hostage taking in West Africa in 2012-2014.

In May 2013, two private maritime security firms collaborated with the NN to launch the Secure Anchorage Area (SAA), which provides security to vessels in a designated area off Lagos Port. The SAA offers armed protection for vessels wishing to either anchor or conduct ship-to-

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ship transfer operations offshore. In 2014, NIMASA, in collaboration with the NN and the Nigerian Air Force, unveiled their Satellite Surveillance Centre (SSC). The SSC tracks all vessels in Nigerian waters and can identify each vessel’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) number. This initiative complements the existing array of sensors installed along Nigeria’s coastline under the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability program supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. Various other regional and international partners also adopted supportive resolutions and programs, including the African Union, United Nations, European Union, IMO and G8.

In the meantime, drawing on lessons learned from the Gulf of Aden, the shipping industry created the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GOG). With the goal of becoming a dedicated focal point for incident reporting, information sharing, and the latest

maritime security guidance, the MTISCGOG was tested in 2013 and 2014 during the regional maritime exercise Obangame Express. The MTISC-GOG is headquartered at the Regional Maritime University in Accra, Ghana, and provides participating vessels with 24-hour-per-day security reportage. It can also provide information to national maritime operational centers in the region and Interpol.

In response to the growing maritime threat, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) developed an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS) in 2008, which called for a common regional framework for regulating maritime activities off Central Africa. In 2009, it activated the Regional Coordination Center for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe-Noire, Republic of Congo.

Under the ISMS, CRESMAC is responsible for commanding three centers for multinational coordination (CMCs), one for each

Benin 65 7 7 Cabo Verde 530 2 3 1 2 4

Côte d’Ivoire 281 3 The Gambia 43 10 Ghana 292 8 9 1 6 4 Guinea 173 4 3 Guinea-Bissau 189 2 Liberia 360 2 2 Nigeria 459 2 10 15 4 7 25

Senegal 286 3 8 3 1 9 Sierra Leone 217 4 4 Togo 30 4 2 6

Source of Acquisition

Small Craft Acquisition in 10 years

Large Craft Acquisition in 15 years

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Landing Craft

Small Patrol Craft (IPC/SDB)

Large Patrol Boats

Corvette

Frigate

Coastline (nmil)

Country

Platform Profile of West African Navies and Coast Guards

China, France China, Germany, US France US, UK US, Germany US Portugal US France, Germany, US, Italy, UK, Singapore, China, Israel, Nigeria, Netherlands France, Spain China, US France, US

zone of Central African waters: Zones A, B and D. The primary value of this initiative is to bridge information sharing and authorization protocols required in the pursuit of suspect vessels across maritime boundaries.

The CMC for Zone D, operational since 2009, coordinates antipiracy efforts by the navies of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. This collaboration has resulted in a reduction in maritime crime and hostage taking as well as over 17 citations for illegal fishing that resulted in hefty fines in Cameroon alone.

There is an ongoing effort to consummate an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) modeled after the ECCAS effort, including creating a regional coordination center for maritime security in West Africa and three zones (E, F and G) overseen by multinational maritime coordination centers (MMCCs). The pilot for these is ECOWAS’ Zone E (the waters off Benin, Nigeria and Togo).

The reality of a constantly shifting threat informed the Yaoundé Declaration of June 2013 in which the heads of government from ECOWAS and ECCAS agreed to establish a Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Center (MICC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon. A “Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa” was adopted to further promote collective efforts on information sharing, interdiction, prosecution, and support to victims. Implementation of the nonbinding code of conduct has been slow going, however. In particular, the delayed operationalization of the MICC highlights the need for greater political will. zxxxx Continuing Challenges

The highly adaptive nature of piracy networks in the Gulf of Guinea mirrors the situation in the Gulf of Aden whereby the gains of the multinational antipiracy effort off the coast of Somalia mutated into expanded threats elsewhere in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. While single-state solutions may achieve short-term gains, they are insufficient to curtail the fluid strategies adopted by piracy networks. Accordingly, a strategy of concentrating only on transit vulnerabilities is insufficient as pirates will constantly adapt to circumvent naval countermeasures. The more fundamental issues of how to manage maritime space

African Defense/April/May 2015

and to counter what motivates pirates and their support structures on land must also be addressed.

Continental causalities. Man lives on land and not at sea. While the Gulf of Guinea provides an ideal shipping and fishing venue, the ease with which robbers can disappear along the coastline after an attack exposes another, less favorable aspect about the region—limitations of surveillance, intelligence, and community policing in the coastal areas. In particular, political and socioeconomic conditions onshore, especially the growing army of jobless youth, are drivers of piracy in the region. In the Niger Delta, for instance, the government’s amnesty program for ex-militants in 2009 caused an immediate abatement in attacks on shipping. The resurgence in 2013 has been attributed partly to challenges in sustaining gainful employment opportunities to growing numbers of youth in the area.

Governments are equally obligated to pursue more effective enforcement ac-

2015

tions against piracy networks on land. For example, the illicit markets where pirated goods (especially oil) are sold around the world remain largely unimpeded.

Capacity. Operationalizing political, interagency, and interstate commitments to combat piracy and related crimes in waters of the Gulf of Guinea will depend on establishing robust capacity for surveillance, response and enforcement.

• Surveillance. Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal have improved their coastal surveillance assets with the assistance of partners such as the United States and the EU. Unfortunately, the ability to detect vessels without active automatic independent surveillance (AIS) beyond radar range (30-40 nmi) remains a challenge for many states in the region.

Similarly, access to affordable broadband and local maintenance capacity to facilitate communication and patrols presents a problem for many states.

• Response. Central and West African

navies and coast guards have limited patrol capacity. Even if the entire current inventory of platforms were deployed, there still would not be enough vessels to provide for a sustained patrol of one craft for every 250 nmi of coastline. The variety of equipment suppliers poses additional challenges of interoperability and sustainability of fleet vessels, the majority of which are over 25 years old.

Nonetheless, maintaining the availability of these vessels is vital. At the beginning of 2014, the Nigerian government announced a 60 percent drop in crudeoil theft (from 100,000 to about 40,000 barrels a day) due to, among other things, the deployment of newly acquired patrol boats at strategic access routes in the waters of the Niger Delta. Additions such as fast inshore patrol craft and seaward defense boats (SDBs), including ex-US Coast Guard cutters, were notable in this regard. Sustaining such modest success requires significant bolstering of patrol in-

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ventory with more offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and coastal patrol boats. • Enforcement. Frustration over the lack of effective prosecution of pirates and maritime criminals is prevalent in many Central and West African states.

This stems from an absence of requisite domestic laws for prosecuting piracy and, in other instances, weak penalties and judicial processes. In many states, navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies lack prosecution powers and rely on the police and other agencies for such a vital element of the enforcement cycle. In the restive Niger Delta, for example, trial for many suspects of oil theft and piracy comes several months after arrest due to insufficient availability of judicial officers. During that time, challenges in the preservation of evidence and limitations of detention periods often weigh in favor of the suspects who regain freedom soon after arrest.

Commercialization of antipiracy efforts. The increase in attacks to shipping in the Gulf of Guinea has prompted various commercial countermeasures. In Nigeria, oil companies have hired private military and security contractors (PMSCs) to provide protected transit in the waters off the Niger Delta. The exponential rise in the number of PMSCs in recent years demonstrates the lucrativeness of such ventures. The engagement of PMSCs by NIMASA and the government of Togo to guard ports, moreover, underscores the expanding opportunities for PMSCs in the region.

The profit-oriented focus of PMSCs, however, introduces fundamental questions over sovereignty, equity, and governance imperatives. What happens to such profitoriented ventures when the piracy threat abates? Will such outfits direct sufficient

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attention to the onshore networks and drivers of piracy, including tracking the products and proceeds of such criminal activities? A scenario whereby PMSCs own more patrol vessels than navies or coast guards raises questions over roles and responsibilities for national security. A concerted effort among the IMO, the regional bodies, and national governments must address these questions before inevitable conflicts of interest and conspiracy theories build up. zxxxx Way Forward

Combating piracy and armed attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea requires more effective measures across the piracy cycle from shore-based causes and offshore transit vulnerabilities to shore-based markets for piracy proceeds. Stemming the tide of attacks equally demands more deliberate cross-cutting efforts that incorporate preventive, deterrent, and collaborative measures among national and regional stakeholders.

Maritime space management. Improving security is more about the strategic management of maritime space than it is about naval fleets and patrol craft. Central and West African states must define clearer transit corridors and anchorage sites for protection of merchant vessels in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, which extend 200 nmi from a country’s coast. This would be akin to the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor that has functioned well in the Gulf of Aden and has been replicated as a voluntary reporting area in the Gulf of Guinea by the MTISC-GOG.

Such arrangements require a combination of regional and national collaboration that the proposed MICC could facilitate.

Further to the protected secured anchorage area in Lagos harbor, similar concepts

should be established around approaches to all ports in the region, including enforcement and sanction processes for vessel violations. Such procedures will improve vessel safety as well as simplify the patrol and surveillance demands on maritime authorities.

Estimates are that effective maritime domain awareness capability in the area can be realized and sustained at a reasonable cost.

To advance regional maritime space management, there is a need to fast-track the activation process of the MICC and the pilot Zone E mechanisms. This will facilitate information sharing among law enforcement agencies, maritime commerce stakeholders, and international partners.

In particular, the establishment of national maritime operation centers (MOCs) could resolve some difficulties in interagency cooperation among navies and port and flagstate control authorities.

Enforcement harmonization. The limited number of piracy-related trials underscores the need for greater harmonization of legal efforts in the region as stated in the memorandum of understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. To do so, a review of each country’s legal framework should be undertaken to enable each to effectively prosecute piracy. Efforts to fast-track extraditions and to synchronize penalties for crimes at sea across jurisdictions would prevent pirates from finding more lenient treatment across coastal boundaries. Members of the judicial system should be trained in coordination with maritime enforcement agencies in order to speed up and standardize the process of evidence collection and preservation to facilitate efficient and fair trials. Creating courts dedicated to handling piracy and sea robbery prosecutions may help minimize these delays.

African Defense/April/May 2015

Internavy cooperation. Authorization of a standing forum for Zone E heads of navies by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) could provide much-needed synergy for coordination efforts of the region’s navies. This protocol needs to be replicated among other zones under ECOWAS. The Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of ECOWAS has the responsibility in this regard to encourage the activation of the zonal coordination mechanisms for all member states, including common understandings and prosecutions of cross-border and extraterritorial crimes. Consummation and implementation of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy, therefore, deserves the urgent attention and commitment of all stakeholders, including the affected coastal communities.

Asset Requirements. A layered deterrent mechanism characterized by maritime air patrols, ship-borne patrols (made up of OPVs and SDBs), and terrestrial- and satellite-based surveillance assets will be needed to monitor and secure the Gulf of Guinea. A theoretical 100-nmi radar coverage and patrol radius should be assumed for each patrol vessel.

For every vessel at sea one should be on standby while another would be undergoing routine maintenance. Based on these assumptions and West Africa’s approximately 3,000 nmi coast, the aggregated minimum OPV requirement for effective deterrence and response amounts to 90 craft. Compared to the current inventory of 32 OPVs/equivalent assets (frigates, corvettes and large patrol craft as categorized in governments should consider the 58-OPV deficit as a working guide on future capitalization efforts. In the relatively calm and open waters of the region, OPVs of under 1,000-ton displacement with minimal weaponry would suffice. SDB requirements would enable effective presence in the approaches to all ports in the region with a similar provision that two additional SDBs be available for each one deployed. States with long coastlines or piracy hotspots should consider acquisition of fixed and rotary wing maritime patrol aircraft. These projections, though ambitious, provide a planning guide for governments, navies, foreign partners and investors.

Profiling piracy networks. Breaking the cyclical chain of attacks on shipping in a cost-effective manner requires a robust capacity for profiling maritime crime and sharing information among stakeholders in

African Defense/April/May 2015

the region. Such a capacity would involve monitoring transiting vessels, their crews, and their ownership with a view to profiling suspicious vessels and individuals, including activities in coastal communities.

A watch list for suspect vessels as well as human accomplices should be developed, updated, and shared.

An international campaign to close off markets and financial centers to stolen oil and its proceeds would raise the cost of stealing from the Gulf of Guinea. This would require more concerted efforts between Central and West African states and their global partners to identify and sanction criminal networks involved in the laundering of proceeds from piracy and related crimes. Sanctioning vessel owners and organizations known to be the beneficiaries of proceeds from attacks and oil theft would be extremely useful and yet is a significant gap in the collaboration between the EU, Asian and African states.

Partnership Engagement. More collaboration is needed among international partners and African governments in the international waters around the Gulf of Guinea. Operations Atalanta, Ocean Shield and Combined Task Force 150/151 in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean provide an adaptable template. There would also be value in the US, European and Asian partners strengthening naval and coast guard capacity in the region through effective collaboration with the evolving MICC, MMCC/ CMC and MOCs.

Targeted economic development on the coast. The situation in the Niger Delta and widespread poverty in the region underscore the need for more concerted infrastructural development, youth employment generation, and coastal environmental protections. Given that the waters off the Niger Delta account for over half of the piracy attacks recorded in recent years, there is a need to improve economic opportunities for coastal communities there.

Likewise, given the socioeconomic impacts of illegal fishing, pollution, and environmental degradation, state and local governments across the region must focus on maritime-related policy matters that directly impact coastal residents. This includes enforcing laws governing foreign companies’ intrastate shipping, proper application of environmental laws, and expanding shipbuilding, fishing, and other industries where significant production deficiencies still exist. Such advancements would reduce

the incentives that drive youth into piracy and create shared interests among communities, the state, and the private sector in a secure and vibrant maritime economy.

Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill, which incorporates measures aimed at deepening responsible exploitation, improving local community participation, and benefitting host communities with economic, social, and infrastructural development could also emphasize enhanced economic opportunities in coastal areas. At the very least, multinational oil companies should rethink their current community development strategies. zxxxx Conclusion

As countries in the Gulf of Guinea increasingly rely on the seas for economic prosperity, the evolving violent attacks on shipping with transnational dimensions call for multilateral remedies. Fast-tracking initiatives such as the MICC, the Zone E MMCC, and other operational models already underway across the region offers a cost-effective and quick-impact approach toward enhancing security in the short term.

While acknowledging the necessity of PMSCs as a stopgap measure, there is a need for caution on the part of vessel owners, governments, and regional bodies against the over-commercialization of maritime security. Governments must also uproot the drivers of piracy as well as expand the resources and shared interests in a secure maritime domain.

None of these recommendations will gain enough traction to be self-sustaining, however, until the discussion of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is raised from the operational to the ministerial level where the purse strings are held. Until there is political will in each Central and West African country to protect the region’s waters, the Gulf of Guinea will remain a challenged security space.

Rear Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo is an officer in the Nigeria Navy. His three decades of experience include participation in operations and sea exercises in the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. He served as an expert in the development of the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. This article was published as an Africa Security Brief by the African Center for Strategic Studies. The original version of the article, complete with endnotes can be found at www.africacenter.org.

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Keep the Wheels Turning

Runflat inserts and non-pneumatic tires can minimize mobility kills and keep vehicles moving.

Militaries large and small have also turned to wheeled vehicles. They offer a great deal of flexibility in road and off-road travel as well as having lower operating and maintenance costs and, in general are simpler to take care of when compared to a tracked vehicle. Make no mistake that in some cases it’s hard to beat what a heavier tracked vehicle has to offer, but in many cases, wheeled vehicles get the job done.

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Any system—or vehicle—is only a strong as its weakest part, and in many cases rubber tires can be the chink in the armor. They are susceptible to bullet holes, shrapnel, fire— and even just sharp rocks and other terrain features.

Runflats, the insertion of a device within a tire that keeps it from going completely flat when penetrated, have long ben a solution. A number of companies have

developed solutions, each taking a somewhat different approach in design and/or materials. zxxxx Preserving Mobility

In 1977 Tyron invented its first special aluminum wheel and safety band.

In the early 1980s, at the request of the British Ministry of Defence, Tyron produces

African Defense/April/May 2015

a range of runflats from the light weight low cost Tyron Multiband which is perfect for vehicles that have a spare wheel, as the Multiband allows the driver to continue with one or more tires deflated to a place of safety, to the unique range of All Terrain Rubber (ATR) runflats for off road and military applications which gives 50 km plus and up to 150km

Since then, the company has continued to develop new wheel and tire systems that have served government, security and military customers.

Tyron has taken the advantages of rubber and the advantages of composite and developed a unique runflat for off road applications which does not require any special tools to change the tires. “Our design has been patented and undergone

African Defense/April/May 2015

significant testing including ballistic testing against small arms,” said Tony Glazebrook, Tyron’s technical director.

Tyron’s ATR Runflats are multipart rubber systems designed to be easy to fit, even at the side of the road without any special tools. The use of rubber makes the runflats particularly suitable for off road situations as the rubber absorbs much of the impact from crossing rough ground.

The for confidentiality reasons, the company is reluctant to name any specific customers. “Our runflats have been selected

by African customers and are under evaluation by a number of others,” said Glazebrook. “ We have recently introduced Friction Shield, which is designed to further improve the performance of the world’s only multipiece rubber run flat,” said Glazebrook.

“At the heart of Friction Shield is a sealed lubrication system that bursts following tire deflation. This provides the right amount of lubricant to ensure that the tire is not damaged further by reducing the heat generated by friction between the insert and the inside of the tire itself, this enables the vehicle to keep functioning effectively over longer distances and higher speeds.”

Friction Shield’s lubrication system is in sealed sachets to stop it drying out, or becoming contaminated and is permanently attached to the run flat itself, which also makes it impossible to forget when changing tires.

The ability to keep moving is the purpose of a runflat and how far is always a question. “The ATR runflats, unlike composite, comes with a performance guarantee, giving a maximum performance is of no interest to anyone as they will claim 50km or 75km or 100km, in English, this means that they cannot do these figures, because doing 5km is up to 100 km,” said Glazebrook.

“For these reasons, we give a minimum performance guarantee which is 50km plus, on the heavy 4x4, 6x6 and 8x8 vehicles on 20-inch wheels. We also have TuV approval for 100km at 50km/h with two flat tires on a Toyota Fortuner and then carried on for a further 50km at 30km/h with all four tires deflated.”

Tyron’s All Terrain Rubber (ATR) runflat is described as the world’s first bulletproof two and three-piece steel reinforced rubber (rubber runflat with steel backbone) runflat system for a variety of combat vehicles. “Its unique, flexible characteristics outperform the alternatives in both distance and dura-

bility,” according to the company.

The companies produce special heavy duty alloy and steel wheels in 16-inch, 17-inch and 18-inch for 4x4 Toyotas etc. zxxxx Resilient Technologies

Founded in 2005, Resilient Technologies, a wholly owned subsidiary of Polaris Industries, is a developer of advanced mobility products, including its patented non-pneumatic (airless) tire—TerrainArmor—for their all terrain vehicles (ATVs) and off road vehciles (ORVs). According to the company, TerrainArmor is the “industry’s first non-pneumatic tire built to sustain damage without compromising functionality or mobility.” Originally designed for military environments, this polymeric web design can withstand harsh terrain that would typically destroy a pneumatic tire.

It has been tested on their ATVs and ORVs with millions of miles on off-road trails and road wheel verification. In the harshest environment the tires will last for more than 5,000 miles with a full combat load, the wheels have gone 1,000 miles with railroad spikes driven directly through the tire, and 350 miles after being hit with .50 caliber rounds.

“A runflat allows a user to continue to operate the vehicle system at a degraded performance and slower speeds,” said Paul Dutch, site manager for Resilient. “The TerrainArmor tire acts like a runflat in that you can continue to operate the vehicle, but you lose very little speed and performance.

While road conditions have improved in Africa over recent years, maintenance and lack of paved roadways are a constant issue both in urban and rural areas, creating issues for air filled tires. Holes, rocks, debris and rough surfaces can take the air from your pneumatic tire.”

“Our tires have been validated and continue to test off road to ensure they can handle most off- and on-road obstacles,” explained Dutch. “We have had quite a bit of interest in our technology from African organizations looking to reduce flats and tire replacement.”

“We produce two different tires, one for our MV850 ATV (or civilian variant WV850) and one for our Ranger ORVs,” said Dutch.

“Currently we have an 8-inch wide 26-inch diameter tire for the Ranger, and are validating a 9-inch wide 26-inch diameter tire for heavier loads, which will be available in the fall of 2015.” The company is also working

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on several different platforms both inside and outside of the Polaris ATV/ORV family.

For real world testing, Resilient has put 36 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition through this tire, shot it with a .50 cal round and had a railroad spike completely embedded in through the tread band. “In each case we were able to reach top speed (80kmph) on the vehicle and didn’t notice any degradation in performance,” said Dutch.

The Polaris Rangers use nearly the same tire. The weight and speeds of the Ranger vary from the MV850, under similar test conditions they were able to reach maximum allowable speeds without performance loss. A damaged tire will eventually degrade over time and distance, but even with significant damage the tire can go hundreds if not thousands of miles.

“Depending on the terrain, these tires will last well over 8,000 km, that’s in the worst conditions” said Dutch. “They have exceeded 16,000 km in test on trails and gone over 32,000 km on a road wheel. The tire has reached speeds of 120kmph on both trail and pavement.”

The pneumatic tire has been around for a long time and it works very well. “I don’t believe pneumatics will ever be replaced completely, but airless tire technology will continue to grow and be adopted all over the world,” said Dutch.

“We see Africa as a tremendous market for the TerrainArmor tires, whether the tires are on an off-road Polaris product or eventually being used in the light and medium truck/SUV market,” said Dutch. “The

abundance of parkland, long stretches of rural highways and urban obstacles in Africa are the perfect environment for our tire. You don’t have to worry being stranded by a flat or carry spares which adds to a vehicle’s logistic footprint.” zxxxx Hutchinson Industries

Hutchinson Industries a manufacturer of mobility components for wheeled vehicles since 1926, with a full line of products including runflats for various levels of security.

“With an expertise and experience of several decades, Hutchinson covers a complete range of runflats, for any type of application, civilian and militaries, with or without rubber, for various kind of wheels and tires,” said Alexis Bart, Hutchinson’s Defense & Industry – Export Manager.

The Hutchinson family of runflats with their VFI (variable function insert) and VPPV have become, according to the company, “the gold standard” in military runflat applications. Hutchinson’s Countermine VFI is specially designed to increase protection and survivability from mine blast. The tires are the primary target to immobilize a wheeled vehicle. It is vital to the crew that a vehicle can escape at high speed or complete its mission with one or all of the tires flat.

“The VFI has withstood some of the harshest wartime conditions, and has proven to be priceless to the protection of the crew and its vehicle,” according to the Resilient Technologies’ non-pneumatic tire.

company.

Hutchinson’s portfolio includes a variety of runflat technologies and solutions. Many of these solutions are currently providing protection on military applications worldwide and can be manufactured to meet known standards such as FINABEL or the US Army specifications. Hutchinson can also provide a custom runflat solution tailored to specific customer needs.

The rubber material and reinforcements that the Hutchinson VFI is composed of permit it to absorb a substantial amount of energy from the mine blast. In combination with the Hutchinson aluminum wheel the VFI has shown to significantly reduce the acceleration from a blast.

Rarely does one solution fits all customer needs. “The question of performance is closely discussed with our customers and we make sure to offer them the adapted system, that is usually a compromise in terms of price, performance, weight, etc.,” said Bart. “Performance also highly varies depending on external parameters— Hutchinson know how and experience is a key factor to accompany our customers at the best and not propose theoretical performance only.”

Hutchinson offers a wide range of systems to fit most vehicles. “We offer more than one hundred sizes and for different performance requirements in composite, rubber, mix of rubber and composite,” said Bart. “We are a specialist in runflat and offers custom made solutions, perfectly adapted for each application.”

“Export is very important for Hutchinson and Africa is part of a challenging but interesting area to develop,” explained Bart.

“Runflats can be very useful and even necessary for several applications that are not always explored—ambulance, cash in transit, people movers, for example. Hutchinson is already there, however, there is still room to improve and discover new potential.” zxxxx M-Safe

M-Safe of India was established with a strong determination to become India’s top most manufacturer of safety equipment for Army, Police and VVIPs. To date they have built a client base that includes government agencies and organizations (civil, law enforcement, military), private security companies and protection.

According to the company, “We have the capability to customize and adapt to

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African Defense/April/May 2015

the ever-changing need for multi-purpose armored vehicles by our clients. We remain highly focused on the needs of our clients and our goal is to always exceed their expectations, by producing the highest quality run flat systems for armored vehicles from luxury cars to heavy-duty truck.

“Our mobility and survivability products are designed to keep you moving from dangerous situations. We offer a variety of products for security, military, and commercial wheeled vehicle applications. Runflat systems provide the capability to continue journey for some extended distance, while experiencing one or more deflated or damaged.”

Their design uses a runner-roller design that provides “excellent performance and heat resistance.” The roller is securely attached to the wheel which is allowed to move or rotate about the wheel at the same speed as the tire, thus reducing friction and heat build up.

The company believes that their inserts give the driver superior handling and control compared to other static type runflat systems. Their insert is made from a specially formulated lightweight, high strength compound designed to resist crack propagation from ballistic attack and severe road hazards. zxxxx RunFlat International

RunFlat International was established in 2001 as a spin off from its parent company Westley Plastics using its polymer technology to develop run-flat tire insert systems According to the company, “Our composite material has been developed and is processed specifically for run-flat applications while our products are subject to multiple patents.” Their designs are useful for both single-piece and split rim wheels.

For single piece wheels, their design consists of two or three antiballistic composite segments bolted around the wheel rim which remain fixed on the rim when the tire is fully inflated but slip anticlockwise to the forward rotation of the tire and wheel when the tire is deflated, compensating for the difference in diameters between the tires (inflated and deflated) on each side of the axle. These Dynamic Runflats are particularly easy to fit thanks to their patented locking device which also does not require the fitter to insert their fingers inside the tire when installing the runflat. These systems also offer a particularly smooth and safe ride

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in run flat mode since no grease is required inside the tire (only on the inner profile of the runflat which is in contact with the rim.

Runflat International’s Static Runflat system for multiple piece demountable (split) rims is primarily designed for military applications on and off-road. The Static System is made of three antiballistic composite segments bolted tightly around the wheel rim which remain fixed and keep the tire in place whether inflated or not. Its beadlock function is particularly strong in run flat mode due its patented shape (the base of the runflat spreads under the vehicle load, thus applying further pressure on the tire beads), so even deflated tires do not rotate on the rim, keeping the vehicle in motion at all times.

For shorter distances, Runflat International offer the Ty-Lok series, the most economical solution in their range. For run flat distances longer than 5km and to protect the rim from damage, it is however recommended to use RunFlat Dynamic Systems.

It is known that Egypt has recently tested RunFlat’s tire inserts on one of their 6x6 armored personnel carriers which drove about 50 kms with three of six tires flat. zxxxx Rodgard

Rodgard, a division of Hutchinson Industries, designs and manufactures tire mobility inserts for the wheeled vehicle industry. “We provide products for security, military and commercial applications,” said the company.

Rodgard pneumatic tire inserts are designed to provide extended mobility when one or more tires are deflated, and are made from a specially formulated lightweight, high strength compound designed to resist crack propagation from ballistic attack and severe road hazards. The proprietary material compound is strong enough to support the load of a fully armored vehicle.

Their runflat design is comprised of two components, a roller and a runner. The runner is securely attached to the wheel in the drop center, and provides a track or channel in which the roller is allowed to move or “rotate” about the wheel at the same speed as the tire, thus reducing friction and heat build up.

“Rodgard Runflats have been used and proven for over 25 years of service on armored vehicles, police vehicles, riot control vehicles, and cash-in-transit vehicles.” Said the company. “The Rodgard Runflat pro-

vides excellent handling and performance after a tire deflation compared to other static type runflat systems.”

The company’s runflat products have been designed to US Army, NATO/ FINABEL speed and distance standards of 50km@50km/hr. zxxxx RunFlat Tire Systems

RFTS is another producer and manufacturer of run flat tire systems, composite runflat inserts, polymer tire bands and inserts, security and military wheels, and custom mobility and security solutions.

“As a global leader in runflat technology since the 1970s, our company protects some of the most important vehicles in the world–troop carriers, armored vehicles, presidential convoys, bulletproof cars, and custom limousines, and security and off road vehicles use our products to keep moving even during the most difficult situations and life-threatening attack scenarios,” said the company.

Safesure Runflat Systems Safesure in an Indian company offering customized vehicle mobility solutions for armored and up-armored vehicles used by police, military, border security forces, special protection forces and VIP’s.

“Our in house research and development and design team consists of qualified and experienced professionals with international reputations,” said the company.

Safesure runflat systems are designed to provide vehicle capability to continue movement for extended distance, while experiencing one or more deflated or damaged tires hit by an rifle or automatic weapon fire or tire blast. “We can custom manufacture runflat systems for 4x4, 6x6, and 8x8 wheeled armored vehicles,” said the company. And they promote that can develop solutions with short notice.

They can also customize the runflat systems for vehicles using tire pressure monitoring systems.

Safesure runflats comply with NATO and FINABEL (20.A.5) standards and are approved by the Ordnance Factory Board, Indian Ministry of Defence and major original equipment manufacturers. “Our products have successfully passed tests against armorpiercing rounds B32 by HP White Laboratory,” said the company.

13

The African Standardization Challenge

Considering the advantages and synergies of focused acquisition.

By Paul Pryce

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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional grouping of 15 West African countries, has become an increasingly important security actor and a potential partner for NATO. Following troubled interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia earlier in the 21st century, ECOWAS brokered peace in Guinea-Bissau and provided the bulk of troops deployed on the African-led International Support Mission in

Mali (AFISMA). Of Africa’s various regional and sub-regional groupings, ECOWAS is regarded as enjoying the greatest prospects for security integration.

Yet there is one significant challenge to the interoperability of West African forces, holding ECOWAS back from mounting successful interventions independent of powers like the US or France. Namely, there is a lack of standardization in small arms and

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light weapons used by member state ground forces. Among the infantry fielded by ECOWAS members, there is an eclectic mix of weapons in which the AK-47 and its Chinese knock-offs figure prominently but also popular are the American-made M16A2, Belgium’s FN FAL, and Germany’s Heckler & Koch G3A3. Many of these firearms employ different forms of ammunition, creating a logistical nightmare for any intervention in which forces of multiple ECOWAS members may engage in combat against insurgents, as was the case in Mali in 2013.

This supply issue is experienced even within the armed forces of individual member states. For example, the Nigerian Army has traditionally equipped its units with the AK-47 and the FN FAL, which fire the 7.62x39mm Warsaw Pact round and the 7.62x51mm NATO round respectively.

This situation will be further complicated as Nigeria accepts delivery of as much as 6,000 Polish-made Beryl M762 assault

rifles, which are chambered for the same ammunition as the AK-47. As a result, platoon-level units engaged in firefights against Boko Haram elements may find that they are unable to share ammunition among themselves as squadmates are equipped with entirely different weapons. Currently, only a few ECOWAS member states have standard-issue assault rifles. Liberian units are almost uniformly equipped with M16A2 assault rifles, while Senegal has adopted South Korea’s Daewoo K-2 as the standard infantry weapon. But these small states are the exception to the rule.

It is vital to the future success of ECOWAS that members standardize ammunition. The standardization of ammunition by NATO members since the 1950s has ensured Alliance forces enjoy a good level of cohesion and interoperability when embarking on such missions as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. On the one hand, it may seem intuitive

that ECOWAS should adopt the 7.62x39mm round as its standard, given that the AK-47 is so prevalent among the armed forces of the region. But adopting this round as the standard would undermine modernization efforts by regional militaries, many of which are tied to important security sector reforms, such as anti-corruption measures and increased civilian oversight of the military.

The suspension of one aspect of ongoing defence reforms would be an all too convenient excuse to suspend all defence reforms and revert to old, less constructive practices. As an example of modernization efforts, even prior to the ouster of President Blaise Compaore, Burkina Faso was adopting Swiss-made SIG SG 540 assault rifles as a standard. Like Senegal’s Daewoo K-2 and the M-16s that remain in service among Ghanaian, Liberian, and Cape Verdean units, the SIG SG 540 is chambered for the NATO standard 5.56x45mm round.

Adopting this as the ECOWAS standard would ensure that NATO member states are better able to provide logistical support to ECOWAS missions and would also allow, for example, French and Togolese forces to freely operate alongside one another, sharing equipment and ammunition as necessary.

ECOWAS has the potential to lead the rest of the continent on security integration, setting a continent-wide standard. After all, this issue was seen during AFISMA when other major African powers also suffered profound logistical problems. Chad, which contributed considerably to the Malian intervention despite being a member not of ECOWAS but of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), equips its own forces with the same eclectic mix as Nigeria: AK-47s, FN FALs, and M16s. Demonstrated leadership in this area by ECOWAS could serve as a model for institutions elsewhere in Africa, raising West Africa’s profile and ensuring that other powers like Chad will need to rely on ECOWAS’ guidance rather than vice versa.

Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests are diverse and include maritime security, NATO affairs, and African regional integration.

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15

African Space Policy and Strategy

Building on existing frameworks and new initiatives, Africa moves towards a common strategy.

Recently, African states started to look at the value and prosperity in intraAfrica relationships; this led the 54 African members in Africa to realize the role that space technology and its application can play to enhance African life and contribute to resource mobilization.

A process started at the African leadership conference in Kenya 2011 with the Mombasa declaration on space and African development. In 2012 the African Ministerial Council of Science and Technology (AMCOST) asked the African Union to formulate a space-working group that aims at developing an integrated African space policy and strategy. The working group has been chaired by South Africa and membership from Algeria, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya Namibia, Nigeria and Tanzania.

The African Union space working group worked hard for two years to integrate African efforts and initiatives in the space arena and survey the already existing infrastructure for resources usage optimization. Additional inputs have been continuously received from many African states, experts and councils to formulate the targeted documents.

The drafted policy document reflects how space science and technology can play a significant role in the international, regional, and national economic and social development efforts. It identifies the main goal of using space science and technology for the benefit of African people; where optimal socio-economic benefits can be achieved. On the other hand, it points to the important issue of building infrastructure in African states and how space can be integral and beneficial as value cost.

The policy addresses some main

By Ayman Ahmed (PhD, MBA) National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Science Egyptian Space Program 16

objectives such as user needs, international cooperation, coordination between African states and market prospective issues. This African Space Policy identifies the key policy drivers (goals) that will inform the agenda for any formal space initiatives on the continent. The policy drivers are supported by a set of objectives that emulate the critical factors that need to be addressed in maintaining a viable and sustainable space program. In addition, the objectives are underpinned by a set of guiding principles that form the basis of all decisions and actions and, in turn, inform the core building blocks of the African space agenda.

The African Space Policy is thus a guiding framework for the formalization of the African space agenda, but will need to be complemented by an African Space Strategy and an implementation plan to give effect to the policy.

For each of these policy objectives there are a policy principles that will help achieve these goals in an appropriate and efficient way.

On the other hand, the African Space strategy reflected the ideas stated in the policy; African experts drawn from fields of earth observation, astronomy, space physics, metrology, and navigation and positioning; and communication, strategy top lines. The strategy enables Africa to benefit from its abundant and untapped space resources.

The focus of a space strategy is on four highlevel themes emphasizing the following:

For Earth observation it targets the establishment of user needs that address Africa’s socio-economic opportunities and challenges. With visionary emphases on being well capacitated in the development of integrated earth observations towards improving quality of life and economic growth in African contentment. In this context, its aims at developing critical mass of capacity of human capital in earth observation applications and usage, developing and improve earth observation institutions in Africa, foster knowledge sharing among African experts, users and stakeholders, developing space and in-situ

infrastructure that helps achieve the user needs and societal benefits. This includes, but not limited to, space-based and in-situ infrastructures, ground segment and ICT infrastructures, generating services and products throughout earth observation applications via web-based and appropriate technologies that meet the user needs.

Fostering the stakeholder’s engagement to ensure the generation of the relevant services and products and maximize the benefits of earth observation applications.

Raising awareness among the public, users, policy and decision makers, develop strategy and mechanism for data access and sharing, data integrity and dissemination, data accuracy and validity, data standardization and harmonization, metadata, data archiving and repository.

Some critical issues can be raised such as human and institutional capacity, technological disparity, data sharing policy, products and services sharing policy, political will, coordination challenges, resources mobilization and governance.

To achieve this objectives the strategy focuses on creating an inventory of earth observation activities and capabilities, gap analysis, human and institutional development, infrastructures development and maintenance, research development, strategic partnerships, outreach and awareness, continuous products and services development, establish networks and communities of practice (user forums, conferences, workshops), and small medium enterprise development.

For navigation and satellite communication the strategy addresses user needs such as education (including E-learning), telemedicine, emergency communication, security, universal access includes, telecommunication and broadcasting, indigenous industry and export of space technologies and services, operational services, and investment in research and development. With visionary emphases on universal affordability and sustainability—including the sharing under a partnership model to federate demand—

African Defense/April/May 2015

and taking into account short, medium and long term returns on investment with a focus on high value services that will drive further infrastructure.

Some challenges strategy has identified to achieve these goals such as cost, government, subsidies for deprived communities, funding model, sustainability, government capacity to make use of benefits, ground segment, space segment, human capacity development, industry

development, conflict of interest and cyber security.

One of the foundation elements of the African Space Policy is the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM) Initiative.

More recently, based on recommendations from meetings held in Abuja, Nigeria 2010 and at the African Union’s 4th ministerial conference in Khartoum, Sudan in 2012—given that not

Regional African Satellite Communications Organization

Regardless of the indicator considered (telephone density, telecommunication penetration rate in rural areas, availability and efficiency of telecommunications services), Africa, viewed globally, appears to be in every respect, the least developed continent in the area of telecommunications. Moreover, the virtual non-existence of direct links between African countries compel them, in order to communicate among themselves, to transit through Europe or the United States, entailing charges that amount to several millions of dollars annually.

Increasingly aware of the role of telecommunications as the engine of economic development and recognizing that investment in telecommunications can considerably increase the level of productivity and effectiveness of all the other sectors and improve the quality of life and, furthermore, constitute an element of motivation for any investor, African leaders decided, following several consultations, to combine their efforts in providing the continent with telecommunications infrastructure capable of ensuring the sustainable development of telecommunications in the continent and in each African country, with special emphasis on service to rural areas.

In order to respond to this concern the African leaders decided to undertake a feasibility study. The study, which was conducted from 1987 to 1990, involved 50 African countries and 600 African experts in addition to support from international organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union, the United Nations Development Program and the African Development Bank. Indeed, this was the most comprehensive study ever carried out in the area of telecommunications in Africa.

The findings of the study were adopted by African states in February 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria. The highlights of the study were the following: A telecommunications satellite tailored to well-defined specifications is the best technological choice for satisfying Africa’s telecommunications needs, globally and optimally.

This system can only be economically and financially viable provided it is designed on a continental scale.

In order to implement the findings of the study, African States meeting in Abidjan in May 1992, decided to create the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization—RASCOM.

RASCOM took two decades to become fully operational, which offers a realistic time frame for future Pan-African space initiatives. This period was primarily a result of delays in intergovernmental negotiations and in implementing long-promised commitments. Further delay arose from technical failures: its first satellite, RASCOM QAF 1, launched in 2007, soon failed, with the replacement RASCOM-QAF1R launched only in 2010. RASCOM’s success (from its 20 transponders) has linked 150,000 villages to telecommunications services.

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all African administrations are signatories of the RASCOM convention—the placing under RASCOM of the orbit/spectrum resources required to accommodate continental satellites is seen as unnecessary but they will be within the vision of the African space organizational framework. As a way forward, the African space strategy considers a systems approach in the development of the satellite communication network wherein the whole value chain is broken down into subprograms to be worked on in an overall pre-allocated timeframe.

Indeed, space science and technology presents a unique opportunity for users from African states as it contributes towards a better proactive management of disease outbreaks, natural resources, environment, natural hazards and disasters, weather forecasting, climate change mitigation and adaptation, agriculture and food security, peacekeeping missions and conflicts, and maritime activities, among others.

The strategy, on the other hand, focuses attention on space science and astronomy with emphases on the already existing national and international partnerships and entities such as; Square Kilometre Array (SKA), African VLBI Network (AVN), Hartebeesthoek Radio Astronomy Observatory (HartRAO), South African Astronomical Observatory (SAAO), Southern African Large Telescope (SALT), Multifrequency Interferometric Telescope for Radio Astronomy (MITRA), National institute for astronomy and geophysics-Egypt, South Africa National Space Agency (SANSA), Nigeria’s National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), Algerian Space Agency (ASAL), National Remote Sensing Station (CNT - Algeria), Research Center of Astronomy and Astrophysics(CRAAG - Algeria), Royal Center for Space research (CRERS Morocco), and Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMD Kenya).

The African Space Policy and Strategy is thus a guiding framework for the formalization of the African Space Agenda. It will be complemented by a plan of action with the goal of addressing user needs, ensuring the access to space services, developing the regional market, coordinating the African space arena, enhancing space governance, and promoting international cooperation.

17

Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa

West Africa is a complex mix of factors that impact politics, security and personal relationships.

Over the past decade, West Africa has gained considerable ground in consolidating peace and democratic governance after having been ravaged by deadly/long years of conflicts, widespread human rights violations, and political instability. These hard-won gains have generally brought stability to the region and enabled positive economic growth and development with a promise/potential to reverse the trend of widespread poverty, youth unemployment and to promote sustainable livelihoods, good governance and democratic practice.

As we all know, West Africa region is home to almost 340 million people repre-

By Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)

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senting a rich cultural diversity and human capital. It stretches from Mauritania to Nigeria and covers the disparate climatic zones from arid Sahel desert to its north to the fertile land and rain forests to its south. Despite the slowing down of the global economy, the West Africa region has in recent years been the fastest growing economy in Africa, with well above an average of 6 percent (2012) and 5.6 percent (2013) growth rate.

However, there continues to be a growing disparity within the countries on human development, compounded by governance and security challenges including transnational crime such as arms, drug and human trafficking and terrorism. The challenges faced throughout the West African region are complex and diverse.

In the Sahel for instance, the fallout of the 2011 Libyan crisis and the subsequent spillover of the conflict continue to have a devastating impact on neighboring countries. The case of Mali is fresh in our mind.

Even after the massive support and engagement of the international community, which lead to the stabilization of the situation in Mali, the country today remains fragile in the face of numerous security challenges. In the northern part of Mali, extremist terrorist groups have not only continued their brutal attacks against Malian forces and civilians as well as UN peacekeepers and international aid workers, but have also kept the political peace process hostage. Just this weekend, two civilian colleagues were killed near Gao.

The aftermath of the Libyan crisis as well as the insecurity caused by terrorist groups and organized criminal groups in the Sahel have also affected Niger; a resiliencefragile country also pressed on its southern border by the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group.

Meanwhile, the structural problems faced by Sahelian countries in the area of economic development and democratic

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governance can also cause political disruptions, especially where an ever-growing youth population is frustrated by the lack of opportunities and outlook for the future.

This problem was undoubtedly a contributing factor last year when Burkina Faso nearly plunged into a crisis following a popular uprising that saw the expulsion of the country’s President of 27 years in just two days.

Indeed, the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria can also be traced in parts to the Sahel bred security threats and their consequences in the region. While the ongoing joint efforts are achieving concrete result, the long-term solution lies in substantially in comprehensively addressing the root causes of the fragility in the Sahel region. I should mention, in this regard, the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel developed to help achieve this objective. The UN has a dedicated Office tasked with the primary responsibility to implement the strategy in close collaboration with all UN offices and agencies as well as the countries of the region. The Office is headed by a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General.

Over the past year, three of the four countries of the Mano River Union have been ravaged by the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease. This unprecedented public health disaster, which prompted the establishment of a first-ever UN emergency health mission – UNMEER – has isolated Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in the region and left their economies badly affected. The crisis has also exposed fault lines and weaknesses at national and regional levels, particularly regarding health care structure and delivery system. Social fabric was affected and public trust on public institution was further eroded. Most worrisome was that the EVD outbreak slowed down the progress that was being made in the post conflict peace-building efforts in the affected countries. For instance, efforts in the implementation of the trans-border security strategy in the Mano River Union were almost completely stopped owing to the outbreak of the disease.

The Gulf of Guinea is another area of instability in West Africa, which also straddles countries in the Central African region. Many West African countries have joined the club of petroleum oil producing countries, including Ghana. While this is welcome as an economic blessing, experience from other countries, especially our

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‘big brother’ – Nigeria - has shown that if not well managed, mineral resources like oil (as was the case with diamonds in Sierra Leone) could be a source of potential tension, or what others have termed a curse. The petro dollars from oil have also attracted the attention of pirates and other interest groups who have embarked on the phenomenon of oil bunkering at high sea, causing a great toll on security of oil and commercial vessels. Therefore, the issue of maritime insecurity has become a serious threat in the Gulf of Guinea, attracting attention from ECOWAS, ECCAS and the AU to meet in Yaoundé in June 2013 to seek a collective solution to the menace. Affected countries from both regions have shown commitment and made progress in the adoption and the operationalization of maritime security mechanism. UN support and encouragement to this endeavor was provided and will continue to be provided by UNOWA and UNOCA.

2015 and 2016 are the years of another cycle of elections in West Africa. As the year 2014 was coming to an end, the Burkinabe experience came to underline the volatility of electoral processes and contests in our region. The move to amend the constitution and the ensuing popular insurgency and its consequences sent echoes throughout the continent and was received as a warning signal in countries where long-time political leaders were suspected of nursing plans and/or ambition to amend the constitution and extend their rule.

Nearer home in West Africa, inclusive dialogue on political participation and transparent electoral processes is gaining currency in Togo, Guinea and Benin Republic. The main issues revolve around electoral time table, polling/voting system; biometric voters’ card; the establishment of constitutional bodies and general the work of the electoral commissions. I must hasten to mention that in almost all the countries affected, political actors both sides of the divide (presidential majority and the opposition) have demonstrated commitment and responsibility to peaceful settlement in a consensual way. While the results of such efforts vary from country to country, little efforts would be needed from the international community to help stakeholders to bridge their differences and to conduct credible and violence free elections.

In this regard, Nigeria has set a positive pace. The region’s natural leader silenced all sceptics after it successfully conducted

two rounds of elections that displayed an unprecedented level of credibility and fairness. The peaceful execution of the general elections in this country of 175 million people underlines how political leadership and commitment to non-violence and noninstigation by party leaders can serve as a key factor in avoiding electoral violence.

Nigerians acknowledged as critical the role played by the international community in ensuring transparency and non-violence before, during and after the elections.

I am just back from Nigeria where our preventive and behind the screens diplomacy and the great resolve of Nigerians and relevant institutions, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) have just successfully concluded the 2015 general elections in which a former military leader, H.E. General Muhammadu Buhari defeated the incumbent President Jonathan.

The historic congratulatory phone call from President Jonathan to General Buhari at a moment the collation was still ongoing completely doused tension in the country.

Throughout the campaign, the presidential candidates denounced violence as a means to retaining or ascending to power at all cost, through what has now come to be known as the Abuja Peace Accords (I &II).

Here, I must pay tribute to Kofi Annan for his role in the signing of the Abuja I Accord on January 14, 2015. Working with the Office of the Inter-Party Affairs, civil society organizations such as the Situation Room (a platform of Nigerian organizations working in areas of elections, peace and security), the Kukah Centre, and the Savannah Centre, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Kofi Annan played a significant role in dousing tension and ensuring the peaceful elections in Nigeria. I recall President Jonathan harping that his political ambition is not worth the blood of a single Nigerian. His exemplary and statesmanlike manner in conceding defeat is a great message sent to all African countries embarking on elections this year and subsequently. I will therefore wish to relay this message to the rest of West Africa to say that Nigeria has shown the way. The specific message for Ghana as it prepares for the 2016 elections is that having a head of electoral commission who is a person of high integrity, professionally competent, independent-minded and mindful of their personal dignity and legacy is important in Continued on page 30

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South Africa’s Defense Budget 2015.....and Beyond

According to the South African Defence Review, it could take five years or more to recover from the dismal state of the SANDF’s funding problem.

South African defense spending has been under much scrutiny of late with defense experts calling for a radical transformation of the procurement process followed by a robust increase in the defense budgets for the coming years. SDI’s Dev Mehta takes a closer look at this year’s defense budget and the dynamics expected to be played out over the next decade.

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ing of $68 million in 2017-2018, up from

The current dismal state of the South African defense industry is the result of years $54 million in 2014. Other highlights of the of neglect and abuse. A defense review con- budget include immediate procurements of a medium and light transport aircraft and ducted by the government in March 2014 land based and airborne C4ISR systems. highlights the country’s capability gaps in

Common services have received the the areas of ammunition, critical infrastruchighest allocation of $1.8 billion, folture, skilled personnel, combat vehicles, lowed by the Army—$1.43 billion, Air transport aircraft and the overall structuring Force—$0.71 billion of the procurement and the Navy—$0.35 process. The South ‘Even with an immediate billion. According African National intervention, it could take to SDI estimates, Defence Force Army allocations (SANDF) is deemed at least five years to arrest are expected to to be in a ‘critical the decline and another five increase from an state of decline’, estimated $1.46 with the current years to develop a limited billion in 2016, budget allocations, and sustainable defense to $2.13 billion in both capital and 2020 at a CAGR of revenue, not consid- capability.’ ered to be adequate – 2014 South Africa Defence Review 9.91 percent, with the increases for the to meet the ever Air Force. Navy and growing needs of restoring the country’s military effectiveness. Common Services pegged at 11.2 percent, 6.7 percent and 9.3 percent respectively.

In fact according to the findings of the review, “even with an immediate intervention, The budget for the Ministry of Interior has also increased in terms of local currency it could take at least five years to arrest the but has dipped in terms of buying power, to decline and another five years to develop a value $10.5 billion in 2015 (2014—$10.7 limited and sustainable defense capability.”

The general consensus on South Africa’s billion). defense budget for 2015 is that it is too low for any radical transformation to begin. Even zxxxx Is South Africa Spending Enough on Defense? though this year’s budget marks a 4 percent increase over 2014, it continues to shrink in

South Africa’s defense industry is still real terms owing to inflation and currency reeling from the policies of suppression of fluctuations. South Africa’s commitment to its armed forces during the apartheid era. border safeguarding and regional security The undermining of black resistance during has resulted in $225 million and $363 milwhite rule, wars in Namibia and Angola and lion being allocated for related missions till the support of the regime in Zimbabwe, all 2017. However, budget constraints have contributed to divide public opinion, which resulted in only 13 army companies being along with the increased focus on economic deployed for border security, as opposed to development, has contributed to the military the proposed 22. Another area to benefit is ‘special operations’ which will receive fund- being neglected.

African Defense/April/May 2015

According to a recent report released

by SDI, South Africa’s defense spending declined from $4.8 billion in 2011 to $4.3 billion in 2015 and all this in spite of the industry facing critical shortages in many areas. The 2014 defense review however is expected to catalyze the South African defense market over the next few years, with budget allocations expected to increase to US$6.9 billion by 2020. Even though this increase is substantial when compared to the inertia the market experienced over the last decade and more, it is not considered to be enough to galvanize the country’s armed forces into a powerful regional force.

One of the main reasons this is so is that the country harbors military ambitions beyond just its own territory as is evident from its strong military contingents in Congo and Darfur. The armed forces also lend support to anti-piracy operations off the Mozambique coast, while positioning itself as the leader in all of Southern Africa. In the words of Helmoed Heitman, a South African military expert who was involved in making the 2014 defense review, “of the 25 countries involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa, we are the ninth largest in terms of troop contributions.”

Developing countries usually spend about 2 percent of their GDP on defense and more if the country is in need of urgent military modernization, with India being a good example. SDI estimates Indian defense spending to average about 2.1 percent of their GDP during the period 2015-2019

African Defense/April/May 2015

and this is in spite of having to combat the perennial problems of a third world nation.

South Africa however, has been consistently spending below this figure, with the numbers totaling an average of only 1.19 percent over the last five years; similar to countries such as New Zealand which faces virtually no external threats nor has any serious military ambitions. The country also ranks below Algeria, Angola, Libya, Kenya, Morocco and Egypt in terms of defense budget allotments as a percentage of GDP. Further, if guidance is sought from comparisons with other countries in the region, South Africa fares poorly with other major

countries such as Angola and Algeria having spent a total of $24.2 billion and $45.1 billion respectively during the period 20102014, as compared to South Africa’s $22.2 billion.

These numbers assume far greater meaning when looked at in light of South Africa’s desire to establish itself as the major African power in the region and the world.

Further with regional powers now expected to possess stronger defense capabilities than others, South Africa needs to take another look at the strategic direction of its defense spending over the next decade. According to the findings of the defense review, “even

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if South Africa were to double its defense budget overnight, it would not be able to plug the African military capacity gap that results in French, US and other interventions on the continent.”

There is also a severe disconnect between the missions given to the SANDF and the resources available to carry them out.

For example in March 2013, the rebels carried out an attack on a contingent of South African soldiers in Central African Republic (known now as the Battle of Bangui), and almost took over their positions, due to shortages in ammunition and support services. zxxxx Market Opportunities

Land Based C4ISR: South Africa’s military C4ISR assets have found increased usage over the last five years, with the country’s renewed focus on executing reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

The country’s spending on groundbased systems can be attributed to the investments in upgrades and replacement of the communications infrastructure.

Cyber security is one of the primary areas of investment, as the DoD’s budget aims to dispel fears about recent reports released by expert analysts from the consulting firm Wolfpack Information Risk, stating that it would not be hard to shut down major South African governmental websites and information networks, considering the minimal cybersecurity measures in place.

Expenditure on this segment is expected to increase at a strong CAGR of 7.4 percent till 2025.

Naval Vessels: South Africa is expected to play an increasingly significant role in maintaining regional stability in the African Union, with a growing need to address a number of maritime issues such as illegal fishing, piracy, and an increasingly active drug trafficking cartel. These countermeasure operations are expected to entail the use of amphibious platforms in order to rapidly insert troops at flashpoints. In addition to such regional security operations, the Navy is also involved in a number of peace-

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keeping operations that require amphibious ships to land infantry troops in troubled regions. As per SDI estimates, spending on this sector is expected to increase at a robust CAGR of 14.3 percent till 2025.

Transport Aircraft: With the need to replace its fleet of Douglas C-47 Dakotas, South Africa is actively looking for maritime surveillance aircraft options. However, SDI predicts the eventual purchase of multimission aircraft, such as the Airbus C-295, which is a light transport aircraft with maritime patrolling capabilities. With the country’s defense budget currently under scrutiny, such procurement will provide a more suitable alternative, to address multiple requirements at affordable costs.

The SAAF also continues to operate its fleet of C-130BZ Hercules as its primary airlift and transport aircraft. With an average age of over 50 years, these aircraft are now approaching the end of their serviceable lives.

Options to replace this fleet of transport aircraft include Airbus’s A400 and Lockheed Martin’s C-130BZ Hercules.

UAVs: The next decade is expected to witness significant spending on UAV platforms for use in a wide variety of roles within the South African military, as well as civilian areas. Most of the UAVs being inducted are expected to be surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, with the Bataleur and Seeker 400 being the most likely choice. These platforms will be used for will be used for peacekeeping missions and non-military applications, such as crime prevention, border patrol, disaster management, election monitoring, as well as search and rescue.

African Defense/April/May 2015

Can the Botswana Defence Force Attain its Effectiveness Posture

A critical look at the military effectiveness levels the BDF has established for itself. What will it take to get there.

In pursuit of effectiveness, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has set itself a decent vision of “a professional prompt and decisive force.”

The debate is whether the BDF can attain the level of military effectiveness espoused in its model vision.

By Colonel Sianang Mokuedi Botswana Defence Force African Defense/April/May 2015

A capability appearing lethally effective in parade will not translate into an effective military or a cure for national security.

Strategists such as Allen Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, define military effectiveness as a process by which armed forces transform resources into fighting power.

A fully effective military is one deriving maximum combat power from available resources physically and politically. Defense acquisition or procurement, as it’s otherwise known, plays a central role in military effectiveness. Linda S. Brant and Francis W. A. Hearn describe it as “a process whereby the military avail itself capabilities through expenditure of national treasure.”

The BDF is not disposed to transform its resources proficiently enough to realize its envisioned effectiveness. Specifically, attainment of their vision is undermined by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities, deficient policies and a defense management framework and procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military.

The BDF’s vision of a light highly mobile force resonates well with missions dominated by action against non-state actors; poachers, border security, and peace enforcements operations.

However, this has not been matched with the requisite capabilities (they tended to be heavy weapon platforms suited for interstate conflicts). Additionally, the BDF’s rapid development meant there wasn’t a corresponding growth in defense policies and strategies to define its roles, force levels, and sustainment. Consequently, Botswana has no defense acquisition management system; the current procurement process is too rudimentary to address the peculiarities of the military and lacks the focus to deliver appropriate capabilities.

zxxxx Assignments and Capabilities Mismatch

The BDF is hard to read; its capabilities barely match current missions, regional security environs, or the versatility of its vision. Its order of battle, as captured in Defense Web, is an anti-thesis of the service’s vision statement. Its inventory consists of heavy weapons platforms; these are obsolete cold-war era capabilities drawn from all corners of the world. Poor choices for the missions the BDF has been engaged in over the past two decades. For the most part, these have been actions against internal non-state actors and aid to civil authorities; assignments calling for the light mobile forces correctly advocated by the vision. A review highlights this equipment and assignments mismatch and offers something to consider in preparing for the future.

The BDF’s origins portray a military formed more as a beacon to sovereignty rather than a potent force to counter powerful adversaries. The creation of the BDF, though an important first step in the building of a defense system, did not halt the acts of aggression from Rhodesia and South Africa. In fact, the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia continued to destabilize Botswana until the cease-fire after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, leading to Zimbabwe independence in 1980. The violation of Botswana’s territorial integrity was not only confined to the Rhodesian border, some incursions were also perpetrated by South Africa.

During wars of liberation, history attributes the country’s survival to the diplomatic genius of the polity, particularly the country’s first president Sir Seretse Khama, than to the effectiveness of the military.

When the wars ended in the 1990s, telling events in international security were taking place: the end of the Cold War, a rise in

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non-state actor threats, and a commensurate increase in peace and stability operations in Africa.

As a result, the BDF increasingly resembled a gendarmerie, engaging more in homeland security than conventional military missions. In response to the nation’s Wildlife Anti-poaching Unit’s failure to cope with increasingly violent poaching activities, the government brought in the BDF (they would eventually take primary responsibility). In addition, the BDF began a losing battle to secure borders against illegal immigrants and accompanying criminal elements. Indeed, the 1990s saw a rise in such activity (particularly armed robberies) and this increase threatened to undermine business confidence in Botswana.

Concurrently, the BDF was heavily engaged in many regional peace-keeping missions; from the 1992 “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia, through United Nation’s UNOMOZ in Mozambique to the 1998 “Operation Boleas” in Lesotho. Surprisingly, while Botswana committed to providing a battalion to the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade in 2007, it has not participated in any of the current and more robust peace-enforcement missions.

The closest BDF can claim to having participated in such missions is when it went into Lesotho with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (more than two decades ago). Concurrently poaching in Botswana has escalated and border security has not improved. Maybe this is because it lacks the requisite light and highly mobile forces; a consequence of its acquisition processes failing to procure the proper capabilities.

Given the nature of its assigned missions (to act against non-state actors in poachers and peace enforcements operations), it could be assumed the BDF would opt for matched capabilities: helicopter gunships, armored personnel carriers, communication equipment, and Special Forces.

Instead, in the 1990s, Botswana embarked on ambitious arms programs of heavy and slow Cold War relics (tanks, fighter aircraft, and drawn-artillery). This led Martin Rupiya and Daniel Henk to retort, African militaries lack the planning required for a realistic assessment of their security environment and a serious effort to match means, ends and ways to procurement decisions.

Thus, the BDF’s order of battle is dominated by obsolete 1960-70s technol-

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ogy most countries retired at the end of the Cold War, opting for modern lighter and faster technologies. Two security writers, Peter Batchelor and Susan Willet, explained why the BDF made such a move: years of economic growth enabled Botswana’s leaders to purchase prestige symbols, going against the current trend of disarmament and security cooperation of the region.

There was no clear connection between capabilities acquired and challenges the country faced against poachers, border security, and aid to civil society and escalating demands for peacekeeping in the continent. This mismatch naturally invites questions about the focus and influences associated with force development. For a force structure and acquisition process not based on the security realities and expectations of the nation may render the BDF irrelevant as the country becomes frugal. zxxxx Deficient Policies and Strategic Defense Management Framework

The rapid development of the BDF from a single rifle company to the current force did not have corresponding formulation of defense policies and strategies to define its roles, force levels, and ways of sustainment.

Policy makers neither kept abreast of the BDF’s growth nor changing world events. Consequently, they failed to promulgate requisite defense legislation and policies beyond creating a founding act.

The BDF was formed out of and around the logical imperative of the time. It came out of a police branch; hence, it lacked a military history or strategic leadership experience.

Thus, it adopted a culture of expediency and tactical solutions at the expense of long term strategic planning.

The Botswana Defence Force Act of 1977, as observed by R. Dale, does very little to define the construction and role of the military. Apart from force employment privileges of the President and the Commander, the BDF Act provides little guidance on the regulation of force size, equipment, and organization.

Under the section for the establishment and maintenance of the defense force, the act merely states “There shall be established and maintained in Botswana a force to be known as, ‘The Botswana Defence Force,’ which shall consist of the Regular Force of the Defence Force; and the Defence Force Reserve.” It suggests the broad employment of the BDF as “defence of Botswana and

with such other duties as may from time to time be determined by the President.” Apart from referring to a Navy (in a landlocked Botswana), Air Force and Army in explanation of “disciplined forces,” the constitution is silent on the construct of the military. This ambiguity and lack of strategic guidance led University of Botswana academic Dr Molomo to observe, “The reality of Botswana’s defence policy is that there is no formalized structure by which it is formulated.” The polity has a minute comprehension of the BDF’s business, capabilities, and formations (or lack thereof), save for a few individuals in legislature and executive who served in the military before joining politics.

Consequently, development of the BDF has been an evolution from within; the rest of the government and the nation had insignificant input.

Published in 2013, Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, Glen Segell, described it this way, “Parliament, through its committee, under the broad framework of separation of powers, is constitutionally mandated to oversee the military. However, as we indicated earlier, a characteristic feature of Botswana’s political system is the fusion of power.

Invariably, this state of affairs compromises parliament’s effectiveness to perform its oversight function.”

In the absence of specific defense management policies, the BDF largely depend on civil service legislation and general orders. This lack of specific guidance forces it to functions as a regular civilian governmental department. This is unlike in other nations. For instance, in the U.S. legislative articles (such as Title 10, United States Code) provide authority to determine size, organization, and directs civilian leadership to provide written policy guidance for military planning. Moreover, in Botswana (as is the case in most of Africa) legislative debates and policy developments are muted by the over classification of information on military activities. According to Molomo, “On occasion, the legislature has not been allowed to review the defense budget in its presentation in the National Assembly due to national security concerns.”

This has not only stifled military legislation and policy development, but has perpetuated ignorance among legislators and festered misguided hostility to the military’s funding requirements.

In the 36 years of the BDF’s existence, Botswana has not carried out a defense review, despite the dramatic end of the Cold

African Defense/April/May 2015

War as well as a shift in regional political and security circumstances. Development of the BDF has largely been an evolutionary internal patch-up process rather than through broader strategic guidance from the polity. The current move within the BDF to introduce brigade groupings is yet another self-induced change by the military without any legislative, policy, or doctrinal guidance.

Like previous changes, it is largely a copy-paste structure from the US (without appreciating the methods, environment, scale, and experiences that informed brigade combat teams decision in the US), with no study to demonstrate its appropriateness to the country’s defense needs, military effectiveness, or affordability.

In the US every new administration has to produce a security strategy within the first two years of office and any resulting transformation will be managed by their Department of Defense (DoD). Indeed, other countries periodical carry out defense reviews to keep their militaries relevant; both South Africa and the United Kingdom completed theirs in the past two years, specifically in response to the end of the Cold War and an increase in non-state conflicts.

Similarly, Botswana needs a review of its

African Defense/April/May 2015

military to achieve its existing missions or those defined by the review. This re-organization should not be an internal BDF process; it must be a national project, because the people procure the military’s capabilities through their elected representatives.

As Clausewitz aptly states, “neither experts in politics or policy making nor experts in fighting need necessarily be experts in strategy.” Major strategic decisions concerning force development and employment are supposed to be a robust engagement between the polity and the military, producing strategic guidance for the nation.

Consequently, policy makers should consider priorities and equities to shape not only military strategy, but the development of a broader national security strategy to guide all national security agencies. The Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) has to provide strategic guidance to coordinate and facilitate the multiplicity of the country’s security actors, such as the police Special Support Group (SSG) and the Directorate of Intelligence Services (DIS) who, like the BDF, also possess substantial kinetic capabilities and coercive force. The ministry is aware of these shortcomings.

In the opinion of the Minister of Defense Justice and Security this guidance “will ef-

fectively reduce the discrepancies, redundancies and deficiencies in our national security policy implementation process. To this end, the security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilities required.”

However, it seems the MDJS is hamstrung by human capital to carry on this task; normally the BDF has no more than two middle ranking officers at the ministry.

In the US, the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense (with a complement of over 3,000 civilian and military staff) are a platform for engagement between the military and polity to define policy and sustain the armed forces. The South Africans and the British have similar arrangements; an integrated civilian/military effort converts national resources into military capabilities with due regard to political, military, and economic dimensions.

Botswana is not yet there in this top down approach to building military capabilities; the MDJS does not have a robust defense management structure to inform policy, plan force development, and execute defense acquisition. Deficient of this type legislative and bureaucratic guidance, the BDF’s vision becomes an unrealistic internal exercise; another part of a futile bottom

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up, stove-piped approach to the country’s security challenges, lacking coordination and synergy with other national sources of power. Because of this practice, the BDF’s inventory has become a perfunctory capability to address every security challenge of a landlocked country surrounded by war tested, dominant, and more populous neighbors. zxxxx Acquisition System Unsuited To Address Military Peculiarities

Furthermore, the current procurement system does not address the needs of the military. It lacks the requisite focus, making it vulnerable to competing interests of involved parties. Individuals within the military constitute one such interest party.

Likewise, in the absence of strategic focus, commercial interests become a major influence. Many of the weapons systems within the BDF are classic examples of an acquisition system improperly poised to deliver effective and sustainable capabilities of a professional, prompt, and decisive force.

The current acquisition system contrasts sharply with international best practices, where defense ministries provide management architecture and policies to convert military requirements into capabilities.

Within the US, the DoD has an expansive defense acquisition structure (with policy documents such as Directive No. 5000.01).

The UK Ministry of Defence has a Capabilities Working Group (CWG) headed by the Chief of Logistics to produce a user requirements document and guidance.

In South Africa, their acquisition requirements are developed from the different services and approval of each program is done by the Armament Acquisition Council, the Secretary for Defence, or other authority as required by relevant legislation. In fact, the South Africans have a parastatal company with a mandated function to meet the needs of their security services for material as well as all aspects of defense technology research. In Botswana, acquisition funded through monies obtained from the Botswana Consolidated Fund (including defense acquisition) must conform to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) (Cap. 42:8). The PPADA is the equivalent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (1984) in the US, it provides uniform policies and procedures for procurement of all goods and services by executive agencies within

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the federal government.

Unlike in the US, where additional guidance for defense acquisition programs is provided in the DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Botswana has not promulgated any additional legislation or regulations to addresses the peculiarities of military acquisition. The MDJS has no management framework to guide the translation of military needs into sustainable capabilities. The military depends on guidance from the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) procedures (the mechanics of procurement), without validating and prioritizing requirements. The Botswana Defense Force acquires military capabilities in the same manner schools acquire books. No additional regulations or processes ensure acquisitions secure freedom of action for the military, future sustainability, or forge strategic partnerships and alliances.

Consequently, it comes as no surprise when the inventory of the BDF is a medley of equipment from all over the world.

Interestingly, no major capabilities come from our weapons exporting neighbor South Africa, the economic lifeline of our country through the South African Customs Union (SACU), and our combat partner within the SADC standby brigade. In the absence of specific government policies to address defense acquisition, the BDF is prone to influences not necessarily aimed at providing appropriate and sustainable capabilities to its warfighters.

As previously suggested, a major influence is the military. The military is a tribe, which in the absence of regulation, procures to fit its own culture. To a tank commander, only a tank can kill by another tank, while a military aviator will intuitively opt for fighter jets, irrespective of real national security needs, to preserve their culture.

As Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett opined, “organizational cultures are particularly strong and stark in military organizations, where training and acculturation practices are pronounced, individuals in tightly knit social groups are called upon to override even their instincts, and organizational symbols are literally worn on one’s sleeves.” These cultural desires often take priority over military effectiveness, sustainability, and strategic logic.

Consequently, the BDF has put little emphasis on forming strategic partnerships with the countries who provide their equipment, conceding sustainability and

freedom of action. Because their equipment comes from all corners of the globe; it’s purchased from obscure defense contractors who are not original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and who can’t secure a long term support commitment. Additionally, the country’s limited industrial base and lack of technical knowledge leaves the BDF at the mercy of these unscrupulous suppliers. Having accumulated unsuitable inventories, the military’s flexibility is lost as funding goes towards maintaining out dated equipment.

The country’s weak defense acquisition system is also susceptible to manipulation and influence by business interests. Industry representatives can be anything from relatives of serving members, retired military members, to legislators. Parliament has repeatedly sought to know how BDF conducts its business (particularly how it identifies major equipment suppliers).

However, successive defense ministers have declined to go into details citing security reasons. Nor has the BDF explained its relationship with industry’s middlemen. The code of conduct for these representatives is as elusive; they apparently get rewarded based on how close they are to influence acquisition decisions, or how much inside information they acquire for their companies. In the absence of strategic guidance, standards (technical specifications), or a robust acquisition process, the BDF is easily swayed. These defects of defense acquisition can best be illustrated by the procurement of 14 Canadian-built CF-5 aircraft from representatives of the Canadian government in the 1990s.

Like most weapon platforms the BDF acquired at the time, the CF-5 was bought second hand. The strategic calculus of its purchase is neither apparent nor documented in the public domain. These CF-5A/B models had far too many operational limitations to be employed as a modern tactical fighter.

Consequently, it remains an ineffective air superiority fighter; it is equally ineffective as a ground attack aircraft, and lacks operational range when carrying a weapons load. Insightfully Royal Canadian Air Force pilots stated the CF-5 lacked all-weather navigation and attack capabilities. Specifically, it could not compete with the MiG-19 Farmer when the standard fighter equipment of the Warsaw Pact was the more advanced MiG-21 Fishbed. Bought at a time when all Botswana’s neighbors possessed aircraft superior to the MiG-19 Farmer, the

African Defense/April/May 2015

CF-5 was an inapt answer to most of the BDF’s missions. The operational radius of the aircraft limits its support to our troops, so it can’t reliably provide fire support to a BDF peace-enforcement mission abroad.

The CF-5, like other Cold-War era aircraft, has a large logistical footprint; it uses liquid oxygen, an independent ground-power unit, supplemental air for starting, as well as other ground support equipment.

Additionally, the aircraft has serious sustainment challenges. The OEM, Canadair, no longer maintains configuration control for the CF-5; similarly Canadian Forces have no interest in its future. This has left the BDF at the mercy of unreliable private suppliers.

Subsequently, maintenance is proving to be particularly debilitating for a landlocked, low industrial base country with an extraordinarily demanding operational environment.

Similar challenges are found across most major weapon platforms in the BDF inventory; reduced effectiveness leads to low operational availability, difficulties in integrating hardware from different sources leads to inadequate logistics support. This is compounded by the country’s low industrial base and inherent inability to maintain complex military equipment. A proper defense acquisition system would have rejected these weapon platforms before the BDF acquired them; especially at a time when the proponents of these systems were retiring them for lighter and faster capabilities.

Botswana needs a sensitive defense acquisition system, where operational requirements can dictate the capabilities acquired and a ministry of defense that can provide an appropriate defense acquisition management platform. zxxxx Recommendations

Clearly the BDF has outgrown the BDF Act; reliance on civil service General Orders is reason enough to promulgate legislation and regulations that will cover more of BDF mandate and activities. There is need to have separate and distinct military statutes to address among other things authority on size, organization, and written policy guidance for military planning.

Parliament to should be led on more into the development of the military, as much as the President is responsible for its employment, parliament should play a more active role in appropriating for and resourcing the military to ensure the country’s secu-

African Defense/April/May 2015

rity. This can only be realized if the military opens up more and is accountable to the legislators.

A comprehensive security review is overdue for Botswana. Primarily, to inform the role and equipment of the BDF in the current security climate of southern Africa and its missions relative to other security organs within the country. As the minister observed, this will effectively reduce the discrepancies, redundancies and deficiencies in our national security policy and security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilities required

The establishment of Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) did not bring about expected level of involvement in defense management, commensurate with world best practice for similar institutions. The ministry should consider beefing up its staff with individuals knowledgeable of defense management. The ministry should take to both the executive and legislature proposals to stimulate defense policy formulation. To this end the ministry should have the structure and staff for developing defense policy and then translating approved policy into a long term plans and an acquisition and branch to address defense business.

There is a need to take a further look into the current procurement system to accommodate and address the peculiarities of military acquisition, as well as restore public confidence in the processes. Acquisition strategies should be put in place to emphasize standards, as well as partnerships to ensure the weapon systems acquired are operationally and logistically sustainable.

Policies should strengthen smart partnerships to pool resources and capabilities Botswana cannot afford on her own, particularly with well-resourced South Africa; shunning South Africa when our country’s economy is tied to it is wasteful. An arrangement similar to what the Canadians have with the Americans can go a long way in complementing and saving costs for both countries.

There is need to for the nation to have confidence on how defense spending is done. The relationship the BDF has with industry should be as transparent as security allows. Equipment choices should be a product of sound security assessment; neither the military desires nor the industry influences should prevail over strategic imperatives. Middlemen and companies in the security business need specific regulations;

perceptions of undue influence are not only hurtful to the BDF image, but undermine its effectiveness as well.

Action should be taken to dispose of obsolete systems and their inordinate maintenance costs. Inventory which can’t be brought to the fight, no matter how impressive on parade, will not make the BDF’s vision of “a prompt professional and decisive force.”

Conclusion

The Botswana Defence Force’s vision cannot be realized under the current arrangement. There is lack of strategic focus and a defense management framework for matching its policies and resources to deliver appropriate capabilities.

Botswana has been slow to promulgate legislation and develop policies to further define the military’s purpose, guide the acquisition of its equipment, and explain the role the BDF must to play in the country’s security enterprise. The military has largely relied on civil service policies and regulations, with the unintended consequence of it becoming molded into a regular government department. This has been compounded by the continued assignment of the military to perform functions normally assigned to civil authorities.

Consequently, the BDF has continued to carry out internal restructuring and acquire capabilities without improving its operational effectiveness; while it is consistently assigned to act against non-state actors, it has acquired the capabilities predominantly required for traditional, state-to-state Cold War era combat. This is also due to its vulnerability to competing interests, not all of which are aimed at delivering appropriate capabilities to the BDF.

Regardless, the next big ticket purchases will not address the country’s security concerns.

A defense review is needed to establish the proper relationships between the people, institutions, and the military. Otherwise the BDF’s vision statement shall remain an inconsequential sound bite confined to the military barracks.

To read an expanded version of this article complete with citations and notations, send an email request to jeffm@african-defense. com

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Rosoboronexport State Corporation 27 Stromynka Street Moscow, 107076 Russia www.rosoboronexport.ru 7 495 534 61 83 7 495 534 61 53 Fax MODULAR ARGUMENTS

It’s no secret that today the use of remote controlled weapon stations or weapons platforms in combat vehicles is a global trend based on commanders’ desire to protect the crew from enemy weapon effects, improve battlefield surveillance and increase the killing capabilities against a wide range of ground and air targets.

Such means have become particularly relevant through the emergence of remote weapon control technologies and lessons learned from the tactics used by ground forces in today’s armed conflicts.

For example, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, in 2005-2006 alone, their armed forces lost about 350 soldiers in exposed firing positions (who operated

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open turret mounts) in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In fact, remote controlled weapon stations (RCWS) with light cannons came to be seen as a mandatory element ensuring the required firepower for most of existing armored vehicles, from trucks to tanks.

The reason is simple: using the fire control system and without exposing himself to enemy fire or the risk of injury in vehicle rollovers, the gunner can effectively provide fire support to reconnaissance, escort and patrol units while remaining safely inside the vehicle.

In recent years, many arms manufacturers have been working on remote controlled weapon platforms. But it is precisely in Russia that truly effective RCWS have been developed capable of becoming a mainstay for significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of armored vehicles in service with armies of many countries in the world.

By the way, before remote weapon stations were developed, weapons were housed inside the manned turret. However, with such a layout, achieving the required level of crew protection entails a significant increase in weight and moves the center of gravity upward, which affects mobility of vehicles. At the same time, the

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RCWS is free from this drawback, which can be effectively used to improve protection of the hull, where the crew is housed, or carry additional equipment and ammunition.

Modular design solutions implemented in Russian RCWS enable the use of 7.62 mm PKTM type and 12.7 mm Kord type machine guns, as well as 30 mm 2A42 type automatic cannons as weapons.

Cocking of weapons is remote, electromechanical, multiple. The weapon elevation and traverse angles are -10 to + 75 deg and 360 deg.

African Defense/June 2014

Capability Profiles

The automated gunner workstation is equipped with a plasma or LCD control panel with an integrated ballistic computer and a two-handed control console (or a one-handed joystick). The RCWS is equipped with a sight having television, thermal imaging and distance measuring channels. Enhanced accuracy of a heavy machine gun, achieved through two-plane weapon stabilization, provides assured target kill with the first burst, while an improved image display system enables target reconnaissance, acquisition and tracking before opening fire. Communication between the fire control system and the vehicle’s information and control system can be provided via RS-485, Ethernet and CAN channels, while video transmission—via the HD-SDI (SMPTE 292) and Ethernet channels.

In general, the Russian RCWS can be divided into three categories according to weight—light (up to 300 kg), medium (up to 650 kg) and heavy (up to 1,500 kg). They are self-contained platforms and every customer can simply select the required type of modules. The modular principle also makes it possible to quickly upgrade the RCWS.

Unarmored machine-gun RCWS weighing up to 300 kg are designed for installation on armored cars, command ve-

African Defense/April/May 2015

hicles, support vehicles or fixed facilities.

They offer the ammo box change capability without people leaving the vehicle.

For command vehicles and other automotive and tracked platforms, machinegun RCWS weighing up to 650 kg have been devised. They carry an additional remote surveillance TV camera to expand the observation capabilities.

Machine-gun and machine-gun/cannon RCWS weighing up to 1,500 kg are designed to be mounted on lightly armored wheeled and tracked vehicles. Their armor protection complies with NATO STANAG 4569 Level 2 or 3. The modules can carry smoke screening and other systems. The capability to control fire from two stations is their major advantage.

The module’s armament includes a 30mm automatic cannon and a 7.62 mm machine gun with 300 30 mm rounds and 1,000 7.62 mm rounds, respectively.

The sighting and observation system used in the new Russian weapon module meets all modern requirements imposed not only in Russia, but in other countries as well. The system includes observation and sighting TV cameras, a thermal sight and a laser rangefinder. In addition to all the basic functions related to preparation for fire and fire, a fire control system installed in the RCWS ensures opera-

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tion in automatic target tracking mode.

This greatly increases the likelihood of engaging a moving when the vehicle moves over rough terrain. Moreover, the dependence of target accuracy of the proficiency of a gunner operating the RCWS decreases.

Unlike most of foreign counterparts having no or insufficient ballistic protection, Russian RCWS offer ballistic protection matching that of the platform on which the module is installed.

Rosoboronexport, Russia’s sole state special exporter of the whole range of defense and dual-use products, services and technologies, is proud to offer its partners high-performance and versatile Russian remote controlled weapon stations. Arms market experts recognize that these modules, consisting of 100 percent Russian components, are very attractive today not only because they have a better price, but also due to the fact that there is no dependence on suppliers from other countries if they are ordered. This is also an argument.

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Growing Challenges of Peace and Security in Africa Continued from page 19 consolidating Ghana’s rich experiences in the conduct of elections.

I am happy to say that West Africa now counts very successful elections that make us to hope for a better democratic future.

Ghana, Sierra Leone, Benin, Cape Verde, Senegal have all been cited as success stories in free, fair and transparent democratic elections, with power alternating from one party to another. I salute the maturity of the electorate in these countries, and the men and women who have handled the electoral institutions, including the electoral commissions. Permit me to pay tribute to these courageous and professional officers who have continued to write the name of Africa in golden prints. The ECOWAS electoral unit and the team of observers, civil society and other partners and stakeholders have contributed, in no less manner, in successful elections in West Africa.

Meanwhile, in the northeastern part of the country, the brutal conflict with Boko Haram has been on for five years and has had a devastating impact on the lives of civilians, thousands of which have been murdered or displaced inside and outside the country. The crisis quickly spread to neighboring with devastating consequences in some of them.

While discussions over a multinational military force are still ongoing, Nigeria has been joining forces with its neighbors since the beginning of February and mobilized a long-needed military offensive to stop the insurgency from committing atrocities against local populations.

For now, Boko Haram has been pushed out of their strongholds but attacks still occur and a regional humanitarian crisis with over a million displaced people is still left largely unaddressed with no current perspectives for a return. As we strive to address the security deficiencies that have given rise to Boko Haram and similar terrorist groups and alleviate their humanitarian consequences, we must remain mindful that they do not exist in a vacuum but nourished by weak state institutions, ungoverned spaces, political neglect and the rampant poverty that drives people into desperation.

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I have just completed a tour of the Boko Haram affected countries plus Benin with my colleague SRSG for Central Africa, which took us to Yaounde, N’Djamena, Cotonou, Abuja and Niamey. Countries assessed that defeating Boko Haram is within their reach. Boko Haram attacks have reduced significantly following the vigorous action taken by Nigeria and its neighbors during the past few weeks but we are not yet out of the woods. Challenges remain to be addressed properly and urgently with regard to coordination of their fight and the funding required. Nigeria is expected to live up to its responsibility and put in more efforts under the new government. But other governments need to understand the huge stakes involved in the fight against Boko Haram by standing together to face this menace and especially allowing hot pursuit across common borders. The marginalization, underdevelopment and humanitarian crisis brought about need to be tackled. Already, reflection on what needs to be done for the post-Boko Haram era is underway.

In this connection, I would like to underscore the somehow related phenomenon of migration and say that it has always been disheartening watching television images of Africans drowning in boats in the Mediterranean waters or jumping barbwires to reach Europe at all cost. Only this week we have been reminded of the dangers faced by thousands of youth risking their lives to cross the Sahara and the Mediterranean to enter Europe.

West Africa faces a multitude of peace and security challenges. It will require full attention and combined efforts to prevent violence and political instability in this region. Let me also state here that peace and security are attained by collective effort, even if we all have the understanding that the responsibility for global peace and security lies with the United Nations, while at the level of member states, it is the government’s role to protect its citizens. In this regard, it is worth noting that Africa took a major step with the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in 2000, which provides a normative framework for an intervention of the continental body in case of grave violation of human rights for instance, thus bridging the gap between “non-interference” and “non-indifference.” The subsequent African Architecture for Peace and Security, which stretches from prevention of conflict to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding as well as the Charter on democ-

racy, elections and governance, are equally noticeable.

At regional level, ECOWAS has had a vanguard role as indeed it put in place a normative set up, starting with the declaration of political principles as early as in 1991. This was followed, less than a decade later, by the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security of 1999. The two instruments were further enhanced by the protocol on democracy and good governance of 2001.

Learning from past experience of interventions to bring peace and security to countries in West Africa, ECOWAS realized the need for a paradigm shift towards conflict prevention. Based on existing protocols, particularly the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999 (also known as the Mechanism) and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, ECOWAS and its partners have deployed efforts aimed at operationalizing the early warning system in accordance with Chapter IV of the Mechanism. Emphasis on early warning and early response was intended to underscore the importance of prevention of violent conflicts both at the structural and operational levels, and the adoption of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in January 2008 is proof of the determination of West African leaders to work proactively to avert or prevent violent conflicts. Efforts at establishing the ECOWAS Standby Force that draws from the famous ECOMOG experience is an indicator of a strong resolve and collective political will.

Nevertheless, the UN should continue to help build their capacity and consolidate the close political integration in West Africa.

We must also do more to engage with the living voices in these societies and help build and improve civil society-driven conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms throughout the region.

To prevent a backslide into conflict and disorder in countries that are still in fragile recovery, we as a region must not lose sight of providing the necessary support to diplomatic and political mediation, ensuring free and fair elections, and implementing security sector reform and efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime.

We cannot allow ourselves to forget that prevention of conflict remains a pressing priority in West Africa.

African Defense/April/May 2015

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African Defense/April/May 2015