AFRICAN DEFENSE December 2015

African Defense

Promoting strength and security through professionalism and partnership

December 2015

Namibian Special Forces

Dedicated to the African Military Professional

Brig. Gen. Chris Gildenhuys on African Capacity of Immediate Response to Crisis Interview with ARMSCOR’s CEO Kevin Wakeford

Gen. Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda Chief of General Staff Angolan Armed Forces

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EXHIBITION

THE LAND & AIRLAND SOLUTION

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African Defense November 2015

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Driving the Continental Imperative

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Future Soldier Programs

Cover photo courtesy of the European Union Naval Force Atalanta.

The mission of EU NAVFOR is to: protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other vulnerable shipping; deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea; monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia; and support other EU missions and international organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.

What’s Inside

ARMSCOR has struggled past issues and is positioning itself to help shape a new way of dealing with Africa and how things are done in Africa.

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With about 40 programs worldwide, Africa is off to a slow start both in numbers and progress.

By Andrew W. Hull and David R. Markov

13 Land Forces Interoperability in SADC Joint and Combined Operations

It is unrealistic in today’s complex and integrated security environment, for most countires to ignore what can be gained by partnering.

General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda Chief of General Staff, Angolan Armed Forces

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17 African Capacity of Immediate Response to Crisis

Steady progress towards a standardized African response force and South Africa organizes its participation

By Brigadier General Chris Gildenhuys Director Operations, Joint Operations Division South African National Defence Force

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20 Namibian Defence Forces Methodically Building Special Forces Capabilities

Focus on candidate selection, training, the right equipment and adequate funding, Namibia is building an elite fighting force.

By Oscar Nkala

22 The Algerian Defense Market

Algeria surpassed South Africa as the largest defense market in Africa in 2009.

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24 Evading the Endgame in an Insurgency The case of the Lord’s Resistance Army and beyond.

By Major David O. Munyua Uganda People’s Defence Force

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African Defense Emerging Defense Technologies Military Training International Special Operations International

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Driving the Continental Imperative

ARMSCOR has struggled with past issues and is positioning itself to help shape a new way of dealing with Africa and how things are done in Africa.

African Defense had the chance to sit and talk with ARMSCOR’s chief executive officer Kevin Wakeford about the status of the organization, its primary challenges, how they are being address and what is the plan forward.

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African Defense: let’s start with the general state of affairs at ARMSCOR in 2015.

Wakeford: Having come onboard as CEO a few months ago, I missed the wave of instability that plagued the previous board of directors. That board found itself at an absolute impasse between itself and the Ministry of Defence which resulted in a number of negative consequences.

Our new board, which came in a year before I did, has done a marvelous job in restoring relations with the Ministry of Defence and the rest of our stakeholders.

It’s safe to say the new board, under retired South African Navy Admiral RJ Mudimu, being a former member of the armed services, understands the client. The admiral is taking a very sensitive approach, he is able to read the tea leaves and understand the marketplace what the client wants.

The admiral has established of credo of on time, in time, all the time and is calling

for ARMSCOR to be a responsive institution.

The amount of work he’s done over the last year has made my job much easier in terms of stakeholder management relationships are intact with the Ministry of Defence—the client—and with the defense industry itself.

So, to answer your question, ARMSCOR is currently a stable institution with good relationships. However, to understand the way forward we have to look at and understand our marketplace which is changing dramatically.

The changes are driven by the African imperative and the need to secure our borders.

African Defense: And the challenges to this?

Wakeford: The South African Ministry of Defence—our client—like all government departments, suffers from growing human

African Defense/December 2015

resources costs and a diminishing budget allocation. Like our client, we to have had our budgets cut, but our mandates have remained the same.

In my view, we have some of the best intellectual giants in the world. Our defense sector scientists, engineers, business analysts, to name a few, are world class. You name it we have them, but we need to make sure we retain those people and their skills.

We are expecting changes for us in 2016. Not change for the sake of change, but change to meet the changing environments.

We need to change our style of acquisition which needs to become more holistic and systemtic in its approach. I don’t think we will look at acquisition on a project-by-project basis anymore.

We will be taking a look across our entire portfolio and re-prioritizing our approach to acquisition by better knowing the needs of our client and what we need to do to meet those needs.

For example, we may need to understand what is needed to deploy a brigade somewhere in Africa as part of an African response force. Some of those needs we might have available on our own, but it also might be better to collaborate with alliance partners for what we don’t have or where it might be more cost effective to acquire things locally.

Another example might be about what are our coastal requirements are. Is piracy

African Defense/December 2015

still a major issue and if so what kind of boats do we need: do we need frigates or smaller, faster lighter vessels and what are the operational imperatives surrounding piracy so that, together with the client we can go in the right direction.

Through this process of admission that the market has changed and we realized can’t give or have everything our hearts desire. We need to get what we need and at times we need to get it quickly African Defense: And examples of the collaboration you have in mind?

Wakeford: One example might be on a multinational operation. One country might say it will bring in road transportation— trucks and other vehicles, another might say it will bring in the catering systems.

By doing this it could shift the patterns of acquisition.

When an operation is sponsored by the UN, the African Union, European Union of other large umbrella organizations, the acquisition requirements follow very specific processes and policies. We can be a very important partner with those organizations. ARMSCOR can work very well in those multinational environments whether we have the solution ourselves or can help find intra-African solutions that take into account the local flavor and nuances.

ARMSCOR may not have all of

the solutions so it is very important for us to have our business radar be as all encompassing as possible. A solution best suited for the Great Lakes region, might not be as successful in southern Africa or in North Africa.

This is an example of changes within ARMSCOR. We understand that we have to show a willingness to listen to the client— and in this case the client is larger than just the SANDF. Our client is driven by the continental imperative so we can‘t have a narrow focus.

In a sense we are lucky in that the dogma and doctrine have disappeared and we have this great opportunity to be part of shaping a very new way of dealing with Africa and changing the way things are done in Africa.

African Defense: Could you identify the top few acquisition programs that are most important right now?

Wakeford: Very shortly we will be going through a review of our programs with a goal of re-prioritization. Through this, we will be looking at all of our programs and evaluating them.

With some there may be contractual obligations that will dictate how they are handled. For hose that have involved substantial industry investment or commitment by the private sector, any changes may be more difficult.

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The result of this review could mean some projects are shelved, some may have the investment spread out over a longer period of time, while still others may see other actions.

For now, it is too early to go into more detail.

African Defense: Cyber security is a global issue. What’s ARMSCOR’s relationship with the Ministry of Defence, the rest of government and the international community in finding the right solutions?

Wakeford: Cyber security has been identified has an area that needs to be looked into carefully. From the client perspective we would have to team up with the Director of Defense Intelligence to see what their views are. My CIO (chief information officer) is engaging with the client on this matter as we speak.

I would say we are still in the phase of understanding what the dynamics are internationally at what needs to be done going forward so that we don’t compromise the level of security that’s required.

African Defense: what can you tell me about the surplus material disposition program?

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Wakeford: We have a disposal unit that is fairly active.

They are always looking for ways to dispose of excess material, which can, in some cases, mean destroying it, selling it as scrap or selling/transferring it to other entities where it can continue to see service.

Just recently, I signed off on one of those sales for scrap. It was a massive amount of destroyed material which was sold into the private sector for scrap.

African Defense: What is the strategy for ARMSCOR and for the South African defense industry to communicate with the rest of the world both as potential partners for business or as potential customers for African-made equipment and systems?

Wakeford: I think before we spread the word we need to look at some of the major constraints we have. One is that our financial services sector is not all that bullish on the defense industry for many reasons. I think those reasons are linked to two things in our past. One goes back 30 or so years to the former regime, conflicts, sanctions and sanctions busting. In more recent times, there was the controversy of the arms deals under the new democratic order and regime. These issues created a

huge mess and confusion.

In many other countries the defense industry is viewed as an engine for growth, and cutting edge technologies and innovation. Not so in South Africa.

Many products in the civilian/ commercial world were the direct result of research and development turbined by defense requirements.

It is my view that this industry needs to be built up and built up with global trade in a big way. We need a lot more governmentto-government contracts to streamline and fast track the process.

This is a focus area for helping our industry and to become an income generator for us, our client and the government.

A specific area of concern is with our small and medium-sized companies. These companies are key innovation drivers and the backbone of our industrial base.

But this sector is starved for capital for two reasons.

One of the major limiters are performance guarantees. In business, if one of our companies were to receive a substantial export order from overseas, it is routine for that buyer to demand a performance guarantee. In South Africa, there is just no money available for those purposes to our small and medium-sized companies. This speaks volumes to the financial support available to our defense sector.

ARMSCOR needs to look at how it can encourage the establishment of the financial support necessary to allow our companies to grow. We need some sort of defense industry investment fund that would be the foundation for the growth and expansion of our industrial base.

We need to help shape decisions that convince the financial institutions that investing in the defense sector is worthwhile and safe.

Another option for this kind of defense industry investment fund would start with an initial fund using government seed money and perhaps through capital guarantees or even straight forward debt/equity financing.

African Defense: And is there a current need for marketing of ARMSCOR? Wakeford: Absolutely, but it needs to be more than just flag waving.

We need to build relationships with all of our potential clients. We need to be

African Defense/December 2015

much closer to the Defence Forces and the rest of industry.

We need to identify the low-hanging fruit as it were, in areas where we can grow quickly and seize those opportunities whether they be in land, maritime or aerospace.

We also need to look at linking our acquisition style to participation. We should not be looking to just tick the boxes but to better be an active participant in the process.

For example, if we decide we need to acquire aircraft for a specific mission, we should look at producing certain parts of that aircraft here in South Africa. Or, we should look at establishing an academy for technicians so we have the local capacity to service those aircraft instead of having to order parts and have outside people perform the work. This will make us more responsive to our internal requirements and needs.

As we have in the past with some contracts, we should look at the ability to locally manufacture either directly or under license. At the very least we should have the ability to hold and maintain inventory locally, and to be a part of the life cycle management of the system or significant

elements of the equipment.

We need to make sure that we do not fall victim always doing business a certain way because that’s the way it was done in the past. At some point the market will pass you by. We need to be one with the market.

The marketplace is our compelling reference point. As it moves, so must we.

For our organization to be relevant in the future, we must be able to understand all of the variable within the marketplace and with our clients to we never lose touch with their needs and requirements.

This is the only way we can remain revelant in this space.

African Defense: Anything you’d like to add about the business of ARMSCOR and the men and women of ARMSCOR? Wakeford: I think we have some of the best brands in the world.

I’ll say it again and again but the issue may be how do we optimize those brands.

We’re going to have to shift more people into business development to build up our industry—and marketing is key.

We need more collaborative marketing efforts with joint planning that will allow us

to expand international trade. By doing so, we can approach international trade in a far more robust manner.

As our acquisition process becomes more seamless, more holistic and less project-based then we can migrate some of those best practices from R&D to business development. This is not to sacrifice acquisition and R&D but just place more emphasis on business development so we can be more responsive and increase the revenue opportunities.

Once there, this will help finance some of our own costs and allow us to start building up the special defense accounts for our clients.

We have huge challenges and we must find ways to face those challenges and not back away from them. We must solve those challenges as the socioeconomic imperatives are too great for this country. We, we as Defence Force and as ARMSCOR, can assist in finding solutions and assist our nation and continent in growing a sector that should be at the cutting edge of the economy.

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SIGHTS 7

Future Soldier Programs

With about 40 programs worldwide, Africa is off to a slow start both in numbers and progress.

Today there are approximately 40 ongoing future soldier programs worldwide.

Two of them are in Africa and those appear to be slow in starting.

The longest on-going program is the African Warrior Integrated Soldier System Program (African Warrior Program) which started in 1999 to support the South African National Defense Force (SANDF).

The other is the Sudanese Integrated Soldier Combat System (SICS or KOMBO) which publicly debuted at the International Defense Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) 2013 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and again at IDEX 2015.

Although these two program efforts meet the generally accepted criteria for future soldier programs, there are many significant differences between them, including scope, acquisition strategy and degree of interest in exporting.

Interest in future soldier systems has not been confined to just South Africa and Sudan. About a decade ago, there was a brief public reference to the Egyptian Integrated Soldier System (EISS). No details of the program appeared at the time and there has been only one other mention of the program since. The lack of detail suggests EISS was a preliminary planning effort that did not go beyond the initially conceptualization stage.

Africans have also seen the French FÉLIN (Fantassin à Équipement et Liaisons Intégrés in French and Integrated Infantryman Equipment and Communications in English) future soldier system in action. The French 2nd Marine Infantry Regiment was equipped with FELIN when it participated in Operation Serval in Mali in 2013 and again during Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic in 2014. Unfortunately, there are no published

By Andrew W. Hull and David R. Markov 8

assessments about how FELIN capabilities were used or its performance during those operations. zxxxx Defining the Future Soldier and/or Soldier Modernization Construct

South Africa and Sudan have never stated publicly their motivations for embarking on future soldier programs.

But presumably they mirror those of other nations which have instituted future soldier programs. Future soldier programs in part involve adapting to the digital battlefield, controlling intelligence, information and communications across the entire battlefield.

Future soldier or soldier modernization programs seek to provide systems for dismounted soldiers and small units that permit them to carryout missions during day or night, in any weather conditions and in all environments. Other characteristics of future soldier/soldier modernization programs included increased lethality and survivability for infantrymen and squads. Some countries choose to acquire capabilities in all of these areas whereas others focus selectively on only one or a few of the capabilities (e.g., load carrying, body armor).

Generic categories of capabilities generally associated with future soldier/ soldier modernization programs are: Lethality Capabilities include improved accuracy for the dismounted soldier’s personal weapon, night sighting capability, high rate of fire and presence of multiple capabilities (e.g., small arms rounds and grenades).

Command, Control and Communications This includes the ability to direct, coordinate and control personnel, weapons, equipment, and procedures required to complete missions. Often

African Defense/December 2015

this is achieved via a small hand-held personal computer or personal data assistant (PDA).

Survivability/Endurance Protecting the individual soldier against environmental elements and small arms weapons effects. Efforts in this category include improved field rations, better clothing, body armor and medical equipment.

Mobility This category focuses on the capability of dismounted soldiers to move about the battlefield while carry heavy loads.

Efforts in this area involve ways of lighten the weight of loads and/or developing mechanical assists like exoskeletons and frames for carrying backpacks.

Power Supply Because future soldier/soldier modernization equipment consumes large amounts of electrical power, considerable effort in future soldier/soldier modernization programs has gone into decreasing power demands of devices, increasing the operating efficiency/life of batteries, and/or finding alternative power sources to batteries (e.g., fuel cells). zxxxx Acquisition Strategies

There are three basic acquisition strategies associated with future soldier/ soldier modernization systems: Self-reliance All equipment is designed and produced from the domestic industrial base of the country seeking to acquire a future soldier system. South Africa exemplifies this approach. Given the breadth of domestic defense industrial capabilities, a tradition of self-reliance and pressure from South African defense firms on the SANDF to buy locally, this is hardly surprising.

Build and buy Some equipment is designed and manufactured domestically but other elements are acquired from foreign vendors. The Sudanese exemplify this approach, producing some equipment domestically but purchasing other pieces from foreign sources, for example,

African Defense/December 2015

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buying a Chinese assault rifle to meet lethality requirements.

Buy entirely from foreign sources This approach as the name implies involves either purchasing the entire future soldier systems from foreign sources or procuring sets of future soldier systems in a particular area (e.g., lethality, load-carrying, or C4ISR) when domestic requirements do not extend to the full spectrum of future soldier capabilities. Many African nations will probably be forced to employ this acquisition strategy given their modest defense industrial capabilities should they choose to acquire future soldier capabilities. zxxxx African Warrior Integrated Soldier System (South Africa)

The African Warrior Program took a “human centric approach” as its starting point, according to the program manager in 2010. He amplified on that point by saying: “The human is the customer-furnished

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equipment and the most important part of the whole system.” Other members of the program team reiterated his view. They emphasized the system “literally starts with the naked human as the basic subsystem adding first the basics like clothing and protection and eventually integrating that with electronic aids and advanced optical and weapons systems.”

The African Warrior Program is being optimized for the African battlespace and for the SANDF. This means taking into account a wide range of terrain (e.g., dense bush, forests, mountains, riverine areas, swamps, deserts and urban areas) as well as varying climatic conditions. It also involves planning for widely differing types of potential opponents: (1) conflicts with other states, (2) peacekeeping, (3) rebels armed with improvised weapons, (4) mercenaries, and (5) civilian rioters. The African battlespace also encompasses the possibility of using both lethal and less-than-lethal force options.

Given the breadth of challenges faced, the program takes “a real systems approach within which equipment and armaments

will optimally enhance the impressive capacity of the human being in the complex modern-day battlespace,” according to ARMSCOR.

The program seeks to upgrade the capabilities of individual soldiers to deal with a wide variety of issues. Equipment must protect soldiers from the full spectrum of natural hazards (e.g., disease and animals) as well as battlefield threats ranging from shrapnel to chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, the system emphasizes force projection capabilities through accurate targeting and precise engagement of the enemy while at the same time minimizing collateral damage among non-combatants.

The program began in 1999 with the approval of the requirement operational capability (ROC) followed by staff target endorsement (STE) in 2000. The functional user requirement statement and logistic user requirement (FURSLUR) were completed by 2003. After 2003, the sequence of programmatic activities becomes a little confused. According to one study, after the project study report (SR) was released, the

African Defense/December 2015

SANDF selection process began in 2004.

Another paper, however, claims that the project study phase focused on milestones and the programmatic way forward was not completed until 2006.

The final acquisition strategy envisioned an evolutionary multi-stage effort and differed from the development sequence originally stated publicly by program managers. As noted above, managers stated their intention to develop individual pieces of soldier “kit” (e.g., body armor, clothing) first and then move onto electrical and advanced optical aids.

The proved acquisition strategy, however, switched the order of development of personal “kit” and electrical/optical devices. In the final acquisition plan, Phase one (called Future Project 1) was to run from 2007 and 2011 and concentrate on near-term command and control equipment.

Phase two (Future Project 2) was scheduled to go from 2011 to 2014 and focus on soldier items (e.g., body armor, helmet, load carriage, sleeping system, clothing).

The final phase (Future Project 3) would concentrate on lethality aspects in the post2014 timeframe.

Implementation of the acquisition strategy’s timeline has not gone according to the original plan because of cross-theboard funding difficulties of the South African Department of Defense. In some cases, procurement has been delayed while in others interim, less-capable stopgap solutions have been implemented until the more robust capability can be afforded.

Nevertheless, modernization of the land forces remains a priority according to the Department’s Annual Report 2011/12.

Unfortunately, there is little detailed information available regarding the capabilities of particular pieces of “kit” developed under the African Warrior Program except in the areas of load configuration and lethality. The program planned on developing four load carriage configurations. However only three of them have been discussed publicly: (1) a 6-hour combat configuration including combat jacket, weapon, and 3 liters of water, (2) a 24-hour patrol configuration that added an overnight bag and additional water to the 6-hour configuration, and (3) a six-month configuration about which no details have been revealed. To improve lethality capabilities of the program, the South African military has taken a two-track approach: (1) upgrading the capabilities

African Defense/December 2015

of the existing 5.56 mm R4 assault rifle in the near-term to allow investment in other areas of future soldier capability, and (2) ultimate aim, is to design an entirely new replacement weapon to be fielded in the farterm.

In 2010, the program manager for the African Warrior Program envisioned a number of improvements for the interim upgrade to the existing R4 assault rifle design. He noted a number of upgrades to include mounting new tactical sights for improved target effects (e.g., tactical reflex sight configuration, image magnification sight) as well as providing some type of lessthan-lethal capability.

The SANDF’s corporate communication director Brigadier General M.M. Visser told the press in August 2012 that the SANDF was “investigating options” to replace the existing version of R4 assault rifles “in the future.” A year later, Stephen Burger, chief executive officer (CEO) of Denel Land Systems told the media that his company had received orders for “several hundred” of upgrade R4s for the SANDF to evaluate as a component of the African Warrior program.

It appears that Denel’s proffered improved R4 assault rifle was likely the near-term option envisioned by the African Warrior Program. Denel’s lethality improvements included laser and infrared sights, red dot sights, a Milkor underbarrel 40mm grenade launchers and other unspecified add-ons. The upgrade also included something described as “shock

prodders” presumably to meet the less-thanlethal requirement.

So far budgetary constraints have blocked introduction of Denel’s improved R4 rifle into military service. Nevertheless, Denel executives remain optimistic that it’s just a matter of time. Denel’s CEO told reporters in July 2014 that he hoped orders for the upgraded R4s would “come soon.”

The Vektor division of Denel Land Systems has also designed a completely new rifle called the Compact Rifle for the 21st Century (CR-21). It’s possibly in response the long-term (post-2014) lethality requirement of the African Warrior Program.

Vektor’s CR-21 is a gas-operate selective fire 5.56mm assault rifle with a bullpup configuration. Key technical characteristics include: (1) 20 or 35 shot magazines, (2) 1x magnification reflex sight, (3) ambidextrous fire-control lever, (4) downward-deflected ejection to accommodate left-handed shooters, and (5) 40mm under-barrel grenade launcher. zxxxx Sudanese Integrated Soldier Combat System (SICS or KOMBO)

Sudan was slow in beginning its future soldier program compared to South Africa and much of the rest of the world.

But once undertaken, it took on many of characteristics commonly associated with future soldier programs worldwide. The Military Industry Corporation (MIC) of Sudan describes KOMBO as being a group

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of digitized systems designed to enhance the capabilities of individual infantrymen as well as to integrate the combat capabilities of infantry squads.

The program starts by regarding the individual soldier as a platform and the system as a vehicle for integrating advanced technologies in the areas of firepower lethality, day/night surveillance technology, computer technology, self-organizing information network technology and ballistic protection.

The MIC of Sudan goes onto stress a number of attributes of the system including: Improved day/night vision Secure communication with small infantry units Improved front/back ballistic protection against small caliber ammunition and shrapnel from bullet-proof jackets and helmets Improved accuracy and intensity of fire (a rifle mounted with a grenade launcher) Geo-location for both the individual soldier and his unit by means of GPS and personal data assistance (PDA) devices.

One of the elements of KOMBO is the domestically manufactured SARY SMZ03 night vision goggle which was featured along with KOMBO at IDEX 2013 and 2015. This lightweight monocular device is described as a being head-mounted, but MIC of Sudan marketing literature pictures the device as helmet mounted. It uses ambient star and moon light illumination to aid soldiers while walking, driving, firing weapons, vehicle maintenance, map reading, and providing medical assistance.

Technical characteristics of the SARY SMZ03 include: (1) magnification of 1x, (2) 40 degree field of view, (3) resolution power of 0.68 cycles per mode, (4) system gain of 2,000 (f1/f1) and (5) weight with head mount of 680 grams.

The Sudanese-produced DABAKA SSZ09 STR-2100 VHF transceiver appears to be the personal soldier radio system and was on display with KOMBO at IDEX 2013 and 2015. DABAKA SSZ09 is a handheld VHF transceiver operating in the 30 to 87.975 MHz frequency range and is compatible with STR-2200 and STR-

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2300 radios. The transceiver is capable of supporting 128 networks and 100 terminals per network. Operating modes include: (1) fixed frequency analog clear voice, (2) fixed-frequency digital secure voice, (3) frequency hopping digital clear/ secure voice, (4) fixed frequency data transmission and (5) frequency hopping data transmission. The MIC of Sudan also claims anti-jamming and anti-listening capabilities because of 500 hops per second frequency hopping and a digital encryption algorithm.

Additionally, DABAKA allows the user to edit, send and display short message service (SMS) communications without using a computer.

Firepower for KOMBO is provided by the Chinese 5.56 mm bullpup QBZ-97 assault rifle. This rifle is identical to the QBZ-95 in domestic service in China in all but two respects. Those difference are as follows: (1) QBZ-97 uses the NATO standard 5.56 mm round instead of the 5.8 mm Chinese round of the QBZ-95, and (2) Sudanese version has a deeper magazine well to accept NATO standard magazines.

It does not appear that the MIC of Sudan

is currently manufacturing the QBZ-97 assault rifle, but does produce the “TERAB” MAM01 5.56 x 46mm cartridge. This brass jacket, steel core, lead post cartridge produces muzzle velocity of approximately 965 meters per second. The QBZ-97 is a curious choice since the stated requirements for KOMBO include a rifle mounted grenade launcher whereas the QBZ-97 shown in MIC of Sudan’s advertising literature for the assault rifle shows it with no under-barrel grenade launcher. zxxxx The Future

It is unclear at present which other African nations will seek to acquire future soldier/soldier modernization capabilities or in what areas or timeframes. Nevertheless it seems virtually inevitable given the global defense market’s push toward future soldier programs and the extensive marketing of them in whole and in part to African nations that they too will follow this trend.

Indeed, MarketWatch has forecast that the soldier modernization market in Africa from 2014 to 2024 is expected to increase.

African Defense/December 2015

Land Forces Interoperability in SADC Joint and Combined Operations

It is unrealistic in today’s complex and integrated security environment, for most countries to ignore what can be gained by partnering.

By General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda Chief of General Staff Angolan Armed Forces

African Defense/December 2015

As I see them, today’s world features the coexistence of old and new threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, nationalism, which generate separatism (denial of state supervision by national groups on portions of their territory) or irredentism (the will of the state to expand borders as a way to aggregate national groups deployed in neighboring states), pandemics, competition for raw materials and resources, especially natural or border tensions between states, migratory pressures, ethno-religious radicalism, organized crime, resulting from a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, the existence of pressure groups, and the existence of various and multiple power centers.

It is also common for there to be the simultaneous existence of regular wars, operating according to the Clausewitzian model and irregular wars, in which states go to war against a terrorist network, an ethnic militia, an independence movement, a rebel army or organized crime. Irregular wars can also be fought between two or more organized groups, not involving any state.

There are mounds of information and increasingly complex systems, embedded in traditional combat disciplines such as logistics, mobility, command, control and communications, computer systems and information (C4I). These could create spectacle wars, based on the use of new information technologies. The access to widespread use of information systems and increased combat capability, induce dependency, which in turn creates vulnerabilities.

The developed world favors collective security and the reduction of confrontation odds, with a system of forces that favors the great technological and scientific development applied to military purposes, including a greater capacity in ordnance—treasured so for its cleanliness and surgical preci-

sion—and for an accepted higher technical training.

However, for most of the world the situation is different. Most of the world’s unstable countries have military forces that while perhaps numerous, are of reduced quality, serving on the border or to ensure internal order and hinder the fragmentation of the state.

For centuries, the main feature of armed conflict has been its symmetry, wars between states, with clearly defined borders, or civil/internal wars fought within a country’s known borders.

Nowadays, we have seen asymmetric wars, transnational wars in which boundaries set by the states no longer play any role, being ignored by violence between non-state groups. Acts of war and criminal acts tend to be undifferentiated, without prospect of a definitive outcome, in time and space.

A clear example is the Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa region, with roots in Somalia, but they perpetrate their actions in neighboring countries. On the opposite coast, Boko Haram in West Africa, which incubated in Nigeria two years ago, today conducts violent actions in Cameroon, Niger and Chad. zxxxx Growing Asymmetries Call for Greater Unity

The world today is driven by adverse situations with increasingly accentuated asymmetries, which in one way or another concern all societies, therefore, there´s a need for greater unity among different political, economic, social and administrative actors, to provide a peaceful and secure environment for the populations.

One should consider interoperability as a feature that refers to the ability of different

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during the joint exercises conducted both at regional (SADC and ECCAS), and the AU level. zxxxx Feasibility of Regional Collective Defense Mechanisms

Land forces (LF) are the policy instrument of state armed forces, which include all the organized, equipped and trained elements prepared for extended ground operations. The LF can be used in joint, combined or allied combined operations, according to the mission at the strategic, operational or tactical level. zxxxx Land Forces Challenges

A brief analysis of LF in the SADC region on the doctrinal point of view, allows us to understand that those forces have been trained for conventional warfare, despite some experience in guerrilla wars, gained over of colonial liberation struggles and civil wars, faced by some states.

However, the current context, marked by the development of evolving information and communication technologies, the emergence of new conflicts—usually asymmetric—and the constant environmental changes in which they develop, pose new

Photo courtesy of United Nations

systems and organizations to work together in order to ensure the exchange of information among individuals, organizations and computer systems in an effective and efficient manner.

When it comes to defending the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional space, interoperability is the ability of various doctrines of member states armed forces to act together for a common cause.

The scenarios of war in the 21st century are characterized by high complexity, with sudden changes of the situation, which sometimes paralyzes the institutions and organizations that do not have the flexibility and ability to adapt to those constantly changing scenarios.

In this vein, it is of paramount importance to exchange experiences among regional partner forces during the joint exercises and cross-training events.

The creation of centers of excellence should be an ongoing process, for example as is present with SADC special forces, and is one of the prerequisites to achieve the desired interoperability.

This intervention is aimed at contributing, highlighting some relevant aspects towards the accomplishment of joint missions, based on the experiences acquired

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challenges to land forces.

Until the 1990s, and considering the doctrine of conventional warfare, the risks and threats were evaluated based on the potential threats represented by neighboring countries, as well as from external threats arising from the geopolitical agendas of the great powers.

In that light, state defense and security mechanisms were structured to meet the bellicose tendencies of those countries.

This situation has completely changed with the establishment of regional organizations, whose charters provide for mutual defense, with concepts ranging from singular defense to collective defense and hence the emergence of a set of risks and threats affecting them, in particular: • • • •

Armed conflicts within states; Terrorism; Response to external aggression; Reintegration of ex-combatants and rehabilitation (child soldiers); • Proliferation and illicit in human beings trafficking, drugs, small arms and light weapons; • Illegal immigration; and • Maritime piracy.

Valerio Stumpf wrote in Trinity: “the end of the Cold War made obsolete simplistic generalization arising from ideological and military bipolarity, in force until then. A multipolar strategic environment, troubled, uncertain and volatile, characterizes the current situation. No country is free from threats, although often manifest in a diffuse manner.”

It is at this juncture that the land forces are called upon to develop their strategies and tactics, which requires changing the conventional paradigm for full spectrum operations, or forces with a holistic view of military operations, meaning to look at conflicts in their entirety including the participation of non-military actors, namely: governmental and non-governmental.

The operations are usually carried out in three phases: 1 INTERVENTION: (period of armed conflict) 2 STABILIZATION: (reconstruction effort to ensure the safety of the land forces) 3 NORMALIZATION: (marked by the creation of political system bases and transition

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of power, allowing withdrawal of the force)

These courses of action are developed by land forces, which require specific training to act in a complex environment, where the situation changes abruptly, under the eyes of the population, the media and cooperation with members of the civilian component which were traditionally regarded as foreign to the theater of military operations. zxxxx Interoperability: Concept, Advantages and Dimensions

Interoperability can be understood as the ability of different systems and organizations to work together, in order to ensure that individuals, organizations and computer systems interact to exchange information in an effective and efficient manner.

On the other hand, interoperability can be seen as the ability to have multiple heterogeneous systems, to deal with the information and interpret it in the same way.

One of the advantages of interoperability is to generate a number of variants and proposals that allow decision makers to make better decisions on the coordination of programs and services, at low cost, using

an integrated vision of the use of technological solutions. zxxxx Land Forces Interoperability in SADC Space

The big issues that are raised in the interoperability of the land forces towards the defense in the regional space are: • Member states geopolitical and geo strategic objectives; • Defense and security structures; • Member state military doctrine; • Socio-cultural and economic aspects. zxxxx Legal framework for interoperability • SADC Charter; • SADC protocol on politics, defense and security cooperation affairs; • Mutual defense pact.

After considering the preliminary questions, we can state that the land forces interoperability necessarily occurs from the standardization of doctrine intelligence systems, multilateral provisioning system, command and control,

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and legal considerations.

Doctrine

It is very important for land forces doctrine to be defined to guide the creation of integrated forces, their training, their equipment and the flexibility to conduct broad-spectrum operations.

To this end it is necessary to ensure: • A flexible command structure, with reduced hierarchical echelons that enables timely decision; • Training and initial instruction programs (before integrating the mission, performed in the origin country) and continuously (during the mission). The training package should include, besides the basic instruction, issues related to guerrilla war, counter terrorism, peace operations, languages, history of Africa and the region countries, related to the means of communication and with civilians; • Defining individual battle equipment requirements (that assures the individual protection), armament and combat technique; • Land forces employment mode.

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Intelligence System

These systems should work in close cooperation with member states military intelligence and civilian organizations. The collection, processing, analysis, dissemination (sharing) and cataloging (registration) information in a timely manner to understand and prevent risks and threats to regional security; The creation of a center of cyber warfare, considering the fact that the institutions management is dependent on ICT, as the quickest way to communicate and disseminate information; Creation of a database of elements and groups that constitutes a threat to regional security.

Multilateral Provisioning System

This system must ensure the ground, air and sea transportation of land forces, regardless of the scenario and distance, to where operations are being conducted. To this end, they should include the medical and medicine assistance, as well as the evacuation of members of the force who need specialized assistance.

Command and Control

The command and control structure must be implemented with the creation: • From the force command headquarters at the level of motorized brigade level unit (multinational), in its organic composition; • Joint operations center in each member state to enable the information circulation and follow up of the force headquarters activities.

Legal Package • The legal package aims to regulate the life of the multinational force, in the following aspects: • Internal service rules in the units; • Rules and military discipline; • Rules of engagement; • Service duration in the mission headquarters, rotation of command and personnel. zxxxx Interoperability at the Tactical Level

Focusing on the situation at the tactical level gives us the advantage of observing, from a practical point of view, all the shortcomings resulting from the application of operational interoperability designed at a strategic level.

At the tactical level it is possible to

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evaluate all material tactics and techniques that can lead to the efficiency of interoperability and/or evaluate the accomplishments of the planned operation. From there, things can be identified allowing corrections in those tactics and techniques to be adopted in pursuit of success in joint actions.

The viability of the regional collective defense mechanism, is based on the following tactical elements: • The training areas (specialized centers of excellence), that meet the requirements for the deployment of forces in different operating theaters (desert, jungle, river, sea and others); • Exchange of skills and /or experience among member states in the field of language; • Exchange of instructors in various areas of knowledge; • Creation of rapid response capabilities in the region, in crisis situations (up to 14 days maximum); • To organize and to exercise the mult national-joint or joint-combined commands and staffs in order to standardize procedures and achieve interoperability; • To create working groups with the objective to harmonize common concepts and tactical procedures.

The items listed above are some of the major challenges for the implementation of the regional collective defense mechanism in the different regions of our continent, particularly in SADC, so we suggest them to appear on African leaders agendas. We point out the defense and security organs will be the responsible actors to undertake the preliminary tasks in order to implement their desired goal. zxxxx Relevancy for SADC Members

When referring to interoperability in any context, be it regional or wider, we must not forget the great challenges that exist. It is above all, at the execution and/ or tactical level where the main barriers appear, embodied in language, doctrine and communication challenges. Because of this, the main efforts should be focused on mitigating or overcoming those challenges.

This will make the adoption of those mechanisms more effective at the political, strategic, operational and even tactical levels.

From this perspective, field exercises

play an important role, including drills, maneuvers and joint forums, as key elements for achieving the standardization of concepts and uniformity of tactical procedures, which are prerequisites for the emergence of a common doctrine for SADC members

At the regional, tactical level (SADC, ECCAS and others) huge challenges are present, related to training (different training and maintenance programs of the forces), these multinational joint exercises are critical to integrate forces and allow the development of a capability to perform international missions

It cannot be overstated that language, telecommunications, weaponry, tactical concepts and procedures used in different countries and armed forces, are challenges ahead towards interoperability.

There are many examples of these joint training efforts within the SADC framework, SADC Special Forces Welwitchia 2013, Vale do Keve 2014, to name a few where these elements constituted challenges to the implementation of the planned missions.

Without a doubt, interoperability is key to the implementation of collective defense mechanism in the region, adopted under the common security and defense policy. zxxxx Conclusions • The geopolitical and geostrategic objectives, the security and defense organs structures, member states military doctrines and the sociocultural and economic aspects are factors contributing to the interope ability towards the implementation of the collective defense mechanism regional, at common policy of security and defense level; • Its realization requires unconditional compliance with legal framework from member states, such as: the SADC Charter, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs and the Mutual Defence Pact.

• Therefore, you should develop a set of common concepts and procedures for training and deployment of forces to the level of the different theaters of operations.

• A working group has been proposed to study the implementation of the Land Forces Committee at the Inter- State Defence and Security Committee Level as the air force, navy, health and somw components.

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African Capacity of Immediate Response to Crisis

Steady progress towards a standardized African response force and South Africa organizes its participation

By Brigadier General Chris Gildenhuys Director Operations Joint Operations Division South African National Defence Force

Since the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the subsequent launch of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, Africa expressed the desire to face and address its own challenges and not to rely solely on ‘foreigners’ from Europe or elsewhere to intervene on its behalf in conflict zones or hotspot-areas.

There are various examples spanning several decades where forces from outside the continent intervened (on behalf of the host country) in various types of conflict.

The recent intervention of the French in Mali is but one example. zxxxx African Standby Force

The AU decided more than a decade ago to form an African Standby Force (ASF) comprising brigades in the North, in the West, in Central Africa, in East Africa as well as one in Southern Africa (SADC ), the so-called regional economic communities (RECs). Until now this force(s) has not come to fruition while several hotspots, for example those in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the South Sudan, cause serious havoc and instability in the region.

The East African force, through one of its members states Rwanda, did however report readiness towards the end of 2014. The AU expects regions to have their respective brigades ready by December 2015. zxxxx ACIRC

In May 2013 the AU, prompted by a number of heads of state (HOS), decided to form, as an interim measure in transition to the ASF, a so-called African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)-type force. It was decided that the force should comprise five motorized battalion groups with fully fledged combat service and com-

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bat service support capabilities. This force should be able to intervene in a robust way and should be able to sustain operations for at least 90 days. Thereafter, it is said, a United Nations or AU force will take over to bring about sustainable peace and stability.

South Africa is one of the volunteering nations (VNs) since its Commander-in-Chief, President Jacob Zuma, was one of the first to commit forces. Behind the scenes he is also playing a key role in getting more HOS to buy in to the idea of ACIRC.

At the seventh meeting of the AU specialized technical committee on defence, safety and security (January 2014 in Addis Ababa), AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, said that, although much solidarity and support was given to ECOWAS and Chad, the AU response to the situation in Mali could have been much more effective. Therefore the decision by some African HOS to establish ACIRC to ensure Africa is in a better position to respond to peace and security challenges facing the continent.

Altogether nine VNs, a relative small number given the total number of member states comprising the AU, initially bought in to the idea, with prospects of more countries expected to join soon thereafter.

The countries were Algeria, Angola, Chad, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Since the establishment of ACIRC, Egypt, Burkina Faso and Rwanda have also joined the endeavor.

An ACIRC Cell (planning element) was stationed in Addis Ababa in March 2014 and started with its work to operationalize this capability. This team is responsible for the development of the modalities towards the operationalization of ACIRC and also the harmonization with the ASF in making.

A very optimistic original view was that this force, capable of intervening in hotspot

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areas, would have been ready by late September 2014 and then be kept on standby until late 2015/early 2016 when the ASF is expected to be operational.

Exercise Amani Africa II, originally scheduled to take place in Lesotho in late 2014 was re-scheduled for October/November 2015 with South Africa as the host nation. It aims at exercising and confirming readiness of some of these ASF elements, especially the so-called rapid deployment capability (RDC).

ACIRC (as is the case for the ASF) experience several challenges still to be addressed. Some of these are strategic lift capabilities (especially air lift for rapid response), time for preparation as well as budget short falls. The ACIRC Cell undertook verification visits to VNs during May and June 2014 with the aim to verify and assess the pledged capabilities, to establish the readiness of ACIRC and to identify capability gaps. They have reported back to the VNs’ chiefs of defence in mid-July 2014 on matters such as their assessment of the pledged capabilities, identified gaps, budgets and common costs, deployment schedules, roles and responsibilities of the framework nations (FN), decision making and planning processes, MOUs as well as command post exercises (CPX) and force training exercises (FTX).

These were the main conclusions: • ACIRC will attain initial operational capability by October 2014 (an objective that was partially achieved by SA’s ACIRC element); • A CPX was planned for end-October 2014 to be followed by a FTX by endDecember 2014. Both exercises were to test and evaluate ACIRC against the attainment of its full operational capability (both these objectives, despite several shortcomings, were also achieved by the end of 2014); • ACIRC will be ready to intervene in any crises on the African continent by December 2014.

With neither a requirement for an ACIRC deployment during 2014, nor any during the first half of 2015, time has moved on. South Africa has been the FN from the 1st of July and will continue to fulfil this role until 31 December 2015. The SA National Defence Force (SANDF) is preparing itself to fulfil this obligation as best as it can. The South African Army’s 43 Brigade has been

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designated to be the headquarters for the SA contingent, comprising land, air and maritime capabilities, while the general officer commanding (GOC) 431 Joint Task Force has the dual responsibility of commanding the SA contingent for ACIRC as well as being the overall force commander during this standby period. zxxxx Dawn of Democracy

South Africa’s involvement with ACIRC has coincided with the 20th anniversary of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) in April 2014.

Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in April 1994, the military, as for the rest of society, has gone through major transformations. Defense spending, among others, were cut to the bone. This, as well as a number of other factors, caused a severe deterioration of defence capabilities over the past two decades. This situation is obviously posing several challenges in SA’s endeavor to continue to prepare and maintain its contribution to ACIRC.

Shortly after the formation of the new SANDF (1994), the adoption of a White Paper on Defence (1996) and a subsequent Defence Review (1998), it was decided to maintain most of the defence capabilities at a so-called core growth capacity. It was believed at the time that such capacity could be developed and grown into full war-fighting capabilities should there be a threat or requirement to do so.

In retrospect, however, the ‘core growth’ approach, even if it was the most affordable approach, has proven to be one of the main reasons why most capabilities, especially the more conventional warfare type capabilities, slowly and steadily deteriorated to levels of non-sustainable deployability.

It is mainly in the support domain that capacity is lacking which directly leads to capabilities being non-sustainable. zxxxx Defence Review

There is, however, light at the end of the tunnel since a new Defence Review was approved by the cabinet in early 2014 and recently by the South African Parliament. This review spells out what the nation requires from SA’s military and the expectation is thus that National Treasury will gradually allot adequate resources.

In her budget speech in Parliament on 23 July 2014, the Minister of Defence and

Military Veterans, Hon Nosiswe MapisaNqacula, said: “The question crucially posed by the Review is: what is it that we want the defence force to do at home, in the region and the rest of the continent. Once that question is definitively answered, adequate resources must be allocated to enable the DoD [SANDF] to execute its mandate with the requisite effectiveness and efficiency…

The Defence Review recognizes and states unambiguously that the SANDF is in a state of decline characterised by force imbalance between capabilities; ageing technology and un-affordability of many of its main operating systems. We do not have a choice, but to respond with urgency to put plans to arrest the decline within the current five years, starting immediately during this financial year.

Five years is averagely the amount of time it will take us to develop a limited and sustainable defence capability.

The longer the neglect is perpetuated, the greater the effort, time and cost it will take to arrest the decline. Although the SANDF is still able to maintain operational presence, if we do not start now, the decline will get worse. Our mandate in the next five years is to act fast to restore the minimum capabilities required to safeguard South Africa, protect its maritime resources and trade routes, conduct peace missions and humanitarian interventions.…”

In her 2015 budget vote in Parliament on May 19, the Defence Minister said: “The Defence Force will be sufficiently equipped and skilled to successfully execute operations across the full spectrum of conflict. It must have the capacity to defend and safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of South Africa, keep and enforce peace beyond our borders and have an offensive capability to deter potential aggressors.”

The SANDF is certainly due for and in the process of a major revamp. Only then will the Defence Force be able to effectively deal with demands posed by situations at home, in the region and on the continent— typically scenarios that will require an ACIRC-type intervention.

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Namibian Defence Forces Methodically Building Special Forces Capabilities Focus on candidate selection, training, the right equipment and adequate funding, Namibia is building

By Oscar Nkala an elite fighting force.

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) Special Forces School has graduated its fourth special forces regiment after 70 recruits concluded a rigorous 18-month long advanced military training course at the main garrison town of Grootfontein in August.

From an initial intake of 300 volunteers, only 70 soldiers completed the program while the rest dropped out after failing to cope with the rigorous training curriculum.

Defense Minister Penda ya Ndakolo officiated at the pass-out parade of the special force of paratroopers and commandos drawn from the army, navy and air force saying the new recruits will help form the nucleus of the army’s expanding special operations command.

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Minister ya Ndakolo said Namibia will, in the next few years, intensify its drive to expand, train and equip the NDF in order to meet evolving security threats which include armed insurgency, terrorism, piracy, money-laundering and kidnapping for ransom—problems which are already firmly rooted in East, West, Central and North Africa.

Following a display of tactical air and ground operations capabilities by the graduates, ya Ndakolo expressed satisfaction that the special force has the capability to counter both internal and external threats:

“I am very proud of what I saw. As we in the ministry and in the Namibian Defence Force constantly advocate for mobility and agility of the defence force, we should recognize that the role of our special forces will be crucial in nearly all operations of the NDF,” said ya Ndakolo.

“In a vast and semi-desert country like this, role of special forces needs to be given prominence and considered central in the defense force design and deployment procedures,” he said.

He said the special forces are a forcemultiplier which can be deployed in small teams to serve as commando units in the Parachute Regiment, Special Air Service and special boat groups in support of the navy.

The units can also be deployed on counterterrorism operations which include urban, desert, mountain and forest warfare.

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Minister ya Ndakolo said the graduates can also operate all heavy artillery systems and light infantry weapons in addition to competence in intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence and sabotage operations aimed at destroying enemy weaponry, communications and logistical supplies systems.

Ya Ndakolo implored the acting NDF Chief of Staff Vice-Marshal Martin Pinehas to recruit only the ‘best and brightest soldiers’ to form future elite units of the special forces and challenged the graduates to be exemplary. “They should be trained at a higher intensity to prepare them properly for their missions as a rapid deployment force. To those of you who are graduating today, remember that you were chosen for this special training because you are the finest Namibians who have been given this excellent opportunity to become members of the special forces and to obtain the best military training available in the world. Therefore you are expected to be exceptional soldiers in both your performance and behavior,” he said.

The NDF Special Forces are being trained by US defense and security specialist company Chute Systems Specialists. The company has been training Namibian Special Forces since 2009 in terms of a package that includes a skills transfer process through which it is training Namibians to become instructors at the special forces school.

A representative of Chute Systems Specialist hailed the resilience of the graduates saying the comprehensive special forces training curriculum offered to the

NDF is ‘almost like torture.’

“It’s almost like torture and the drill sergeants know no other way than the contents prescribed in training manuals.

Personnel admitted to the unit specialize in mountain warfare operations at high altitude terrains where they are exposed to the tough skills of climbing and cold weather survival. Other than mountain warfare, they are also drilled in vehicle insertion techniques, motor vehicle maintenance and mechanics,” said Waldo Krahenbuhl, one of Chute Systems’ owners.

He said the potential recruits are subjected to extreme physical and mental tests before they are admitted and can withdraw at anytime during training. This year, Namibia allocated a defense budget of N$7.23 billion (about $537.14 million), of which a substantial amount will be used to train and equip the special forces among other high priority force modernization programs.

The budget will also fund the procurement of modern military equipment, the construction and refurbishment of infrastructure at several army bases. A high proportion of the budget will also be used on military research and development projects which include evaluation, research and re-stocking or upgrading of military equipment.

In terms of Namibia’s Medium Term Expenditure Framework Plan for 2015/16 and 2017/18, the N$7.23 billion will be used for the construction of a new army battle school at Oshivelol and the training of 3,500 new army recruits. New military bases will be constructed in the town of

Mpacha, Oluno, Keetmanshoop, Gobabis, Walvis Bay (navy base) and Karibib (air base).

Three existing military bases—Osona, Luiperdsvallei, Leopards Valley (Windhoek) and Otjiwarongo—will be upgraded while a new military hospital will be built at at a cost of N$800 million during the lifespan of the currenct defense budget. Namibian defense and security experts have expressed support for the country’s surging annual defense spending saying the absence of war in the region does not mean that security threats have ceased to exist.

Despite the successful suppression of an armed secessionist rebel movements which briefly seized Katima Mulilo, the capital of the Caprivi Strip (now called Zambezi Province), the Namibian government is worried about the possibility of future revolts arising from the simmering secessionist demands.

The country’s defense spending is also informed by the country raging border disputes with Botswana over an island on the Chobe river known as Kasikilili in Namibia and Sedudu in Botswana.

In 1992, the two countries fought a brief war over the island and the conflict has simmered on since. Namibia also has border and water rights disputes with South Africa and Lesotho over the Orange River which originates in the Lesotho Highlands and forms the frontier with South Africa.

Newly discovered off-shore hydro-cardon and mineral resources have also led to calls for the development of a robust navy to protect the 1,300 kilometer-long coast and sea-borne resources.

SADC special forces on exercise. Photo courtesy of the Namibian Defence Forces (Photo courtesy of NDF)

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The Algerian Defense Market

Algeria surpassed South Africa as the largest defense market in Africa in 2009.

SDI estimates the cumulative African defense market to be worth more than US$270 billion over the next five years out of which over US$75 billion is expected to be earmarked for capital expenditure.

Defense companies around the world have been forced to sit up and take notice of the robust opportunities offered by the countries in this region. One of the main causes for this is the lack of indigenous manufacturing capabilities and the resulting dependence on established manufacturers in the west.

SDI predicts a strong demand for all types of military hardware as governments prepare for a phase of intense conflict with terrorists and Islamic militants.

Algeria surpassed South Africa in 2009 as the largest defense market in Africa with a total spending of US$51.5 billion over the last five years. This is expected to increase to US$92 billion over the next five, with US$28 billion being allocated only for capital procurements. When compared to Angola (US$45.4 billion), South Africa (US$26.7 billion) and Nigeria (US$11.5 billion), the other big spenders in the region, Algeria is clearly poised to offer the maximum opportunities for global defense suppliers in the years to come. The country’s economic prosperity fuelled primarily by robust hydrocarbon exports has contributed majorly to such robust spending.

However, with a view of further strengthening its economy, Algeria is now shaping its policies to diversify its revenue streams to other areas of industrial output.

In an interview with the country’s leading daily El Watan, Major General Rashid Chouaki said that the government was seeking to increase the country’s defense industrial output from about 5 to 6 percent of GDP up to 10 percent as part of efforts to reduce the country’s economic reliance on hydrocarbons and tackle the wider informal economy that makes up much of Algeria’s economic output. He further said that the policy aims to add 25,000 workers to the defense sector in addition to 20,000 positions in adjacent and complimentary sectors as the military looks

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to outsource roles such as equipment MRO.

Even though most of the contracts for spending in areas such as armored vehicles, border security and military aircraft have already been awarded, SDI takes a look at the sub contracting opportunities that are expected to arise as a direct result of this spending.

Armored Personnel Carriers The Algerian government in 2014 signed a deal with Rheinmetall to procure 1200 Fuchs armored patrol vehicles over the next decade. The German company will also

By Dev Mehta simulation contracts being doled out by the Algerian government. One way the government could go is equipping the new assembly plant with sufficient MRO capabilities as part of the technology transfer agreement with Germany and making subsequent efforts to ensure that the work is carried out by local companies such as Entreprise Nationale des Véhicules Industriels and NIMR-Algerie Joint Stock Company, as much as possible. However, in case this is not deemed feasible, global companies are expected to receive contracts for simulators and training services including in-service support.

Replacement Parts and Logistics: This is expected to be a major area of opportunity for both domestic and foreign suppliers. The procurement of 1200 vehicles is anticipated to result in the need for new OEM parts, surplus parts, re-manufactured parts and reverse engineering facilities.

build an armored vehicle assembly plant in Algeria at a cost over US$32 million to manufacture a minimum of 980 of these vehicles in the country. This rather large procurement is expected to result in sub contracts in areas such as: Maintenance and Training: The areas of related MRO and training are expected to witness large investment considering the number of vehicles that are being procured.

Algeria has learnt well from mistakes made by South Africa which in spite of spending robustly on the acquisition of advanced military equipment, has faced many operational problems due to insufficient maintenance and training programs. Similarly Nigeria’s purchase of UAVs from Israel didn’t serve their desired purpose of tracking the Boko Haram due to the lack of spending on maintenance and training. Therefore the next few years are expected to result in maintenance and

Combat Engineering Equipment Parts: Modern combat engineering equipment and related personnel play a pivotal role in enhancing force mobility and as such the Fuchs procurement is expected to result in sub-contracts for equipment such as military fixed bridges, automation of bridge systems, mine clearing equipment, recovery vehicles, earthmovers, advanced materials and autonomous equipment.

Transport Aircraft

Transport aircraft are expected to account for a large percentage of Algeria’s capital defense expenditure during the forecast period, with SDI’s estimates valuing the market at US$2.9 billion over the next decade. The country has expressed strong interest in the procurement of either the Airbus Military A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transports (MRTTs) or the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III Strategic Airlifter and is currently evaluating both options in an

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In another notable development, Algeria is expected to manufacture supersonic drones in collaboration with South Africa with the first delivery scheduled for 2016.

effort to replace its aging Ilyushin Il-78 Midas tankers. The procurement of these aircraft is expected to create opportunities in the areas of: Maintenance and Support Functions: The rising cost and complexity of maintenance for transport aircraft such as the Boeing C-17 Globemaster and the Airbus Military A330 MRTT has resulted in the formation of partnerships in order to take some of the responsibilities away from the manufacturing company. An example of this is the 2011 C-17 Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP), which witnessed the USAF’s air cogistics complex at Warner Robins AFB, Ga., replacing Boeing as the C-17 Product Support Integrator lead. Boeing and the US Air Force also set up a collaborative initiative called PE/PI, which has resulted in sub-contracts of over US$2 billion being issued to various companies such as Northrop Grumman and Honeywell Technologies. The Algerian procurement of either the C-17 or the A330 MRTT is expected to result in contracts for suppliers/providers of systems engineering services, program management, field service support, installation & support, equipment management and logistics services, in the medium to long term.

Engines: Since this procurement is still in the RFP stage, major manufacturers of engines can expect to benefit from substantial contracts. Existing A330 MRTT operators have chosen either General Electric’s CF6-80E1A3 engine or the RollsRoyce Trent 772B engine. The Pratt and Whitney PW 4168A engine, however, seems to be the least likely to find favor with Algeria as it has yet to be selected by a customer in the international market.

Training: The area of training services is

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expected to benefit from this procurement program. Contracts will be doled out to one or multiple vendors for advanced simulation systems, courseware, computerbased training and classroom sessions.

Apart from Boeing, L-3 Link is one of the major companies involved in aircrew and maintenance training, providing maintenance technicians, initial, mission, continuation and upgrade qualification training and the supply of many variants of aircrew and maintenance training devices.

Border Security: With the ongoing civil unrest in Mali, the North African region is facing the challenge of increased international trafficking. The scenario has worsened due to the links between drug traffickers from different nationalities and armed Islamist groups, who are largely operating in the sub-region of the Sahel. As a result, the Algerian MoD has increased its focus on developing a consolidated security system which focuses on increased surveillance and monitoring. The government is also establishing an air unit within the Gendarmerie Nationale, which specializes in border surveillance and is expected to result in related procurements.

The next few years are expected to result in the procurement of: UAVs: Algeria is working towards enhancing its air platform to thwart attempts by the Maghreb-based terrorist groups operating in Mali and Libya and is thus expected to ramp up its spending on UAVs over the next few years. Although no procurement has been finalized yet, the country has expressed interest in procuring 30 E95 UAVs from Russia and an undisclosed number of Chinese CH-4 UAVs which can be armed with guided weapons. The US could also emerge as a supplier of non-offensive UAVs, after it refused to sell drones to Algeria due to legal restrictions on the export of similar weapons to other countries.

Electronic Surveillance Systems: With the Algerian Army actively participating in securing the borders by building a 50km-long electric fence and setting up 13 new bases for the Gendarmerie units in provinces bordering Mali, the next few years are expected to throw up major opportunities in the areas of electronic surveillance systems and other border management solutions. Dense surveillance systems, multi sensors, watchtowers, naval and ground based radars and AIS receivers and transponders are some of the equipment that are expected to be procured.

Methodology Strategic Defense Intelligence (SDI) has a database of forecasted defense spending across 70 countries worldwide. The country’s defense budget is first analyzed in isolation with information being sourced from budget documents provided by the various MoDs. SDI then factors in other variables such as the economic and political environment and internal and external threats, before making its budget forecasts.

SDI then correlates this data at the program level by capturing programs of record and stated modernization plans. Each program or weapon acquisition is then dissected even further to establish data at a more granular level. The capture of current and planned programs in this manner allows for an estimation of the weapons market by identifying gaps in capability and comparing them with a country’s modernization plans.

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Evading the Endgame in an Insurgency

The case of the Lord’s Resistance Army and beyond.

By Major David O. Munyua Uganda People’s Defence Force 24

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a Ugandan insurgent outfit that was cofounded in 1992 by the African warlord Joseph Kony. This occurred after its predecessor, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), and the government army—the National Resistance Army (NRA)—resolved their differences and agreed to dissolve the former. Since its founding, the LRA has continually fought the Ugandan government up until the present day (2015). The LRA claims to be fighting to establish a government in Uganda based on the biblical Ten Commandments, which later changed to fighting for freedom and equal political and economic opportunities for all Ugandans.

The LRA has not been the only Ugandan rebel group; there have been several others. Most have either been defeated or, like the UPDA, have resolved their grievances with the government. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), like the LRA, continues to fight the government.

One difference between the ADF and the LRA is the location of their respective sanctuaries: the ADF is located in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) while the LRA operates in northwestern DRC, southeastern Central African Republic (CAR), and parts of western South Sudan.

The LRA is the older of the two.

The LRA is led by a semi-illiterate man (Joseph Kony), and has poorly trained forces, no logistic base, and no high-tech equipment or firearms. But it has frustrated many with its ability to evade termination for close to a quarter of a century. It is therefore interesting to explore in depth the strategies that the LRA has used to prolong its longevity and elude elimination.

Identifying the LRA’s survival strategies may provide policy makers and scholars with ideas as to how to derive viable solutions to tenacious insurgencies.

Politicians, scholars, the local population in Uganda, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and, indeed, other

countries affected by the LRA insurgency all have their own theories to explain the LRA’s longevity. For example, a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), an NGO, accuses the Ugandan government of not having the political will to end the LRA insurgency. According to the ICG, because the LRA no longer operates within Uganda, Uganda is no longer (or less) motivated to end the insurgency.

Another NGO, the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), asserts that the LRA’s survival is due to other factors, such as the support it receives from Sudan, the weakness of the counterinsurgency forces, and the benefits of war to some individuals charged with the duty of ending the insurgency.

Unfortunately, such theories, which are based on subjective analysis, unless otherwise substantiated with empirical evidence, can divert us from the truth. It is therefore prudent to conduct a systematic analysis of the LRA insurgency so as to present an empirically supported theory of how and why the LRA has prolonged the longevity of their insurgency project. zxxxx How Have They Survived?

If you ask the Ugandan government or any of the states fighting the LRA in Africa how the LRA managed to evade termination for such a long duration, you are likely to get a variety of reasons. This is because there is no systematically researched evidence to support a given narrative as to why and how the LRA prolongs its longevity.

Globally, the LRA is not the only insurgent group that has managed to prolong its lifespan. There are other nonstate actors that have continued to project insecurity, not only to specific geographical locations but to the whole world, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab in East Africa, and Boko Haram in West Africa. Within East and Central Africa—a

African Defense/December 2015

conflict-prone region—there are several insurgent groups that continue to destabilize the region, among them, the Seleka rebels in the CAR that are fighting the CAR government, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) that is fighting the Rwandan government, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) that is fighting the Burundian government, and the recent breakaway faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the SPLA, which is fighting the SPLA government in Juba.

The list is long, and there may not be an end to it; other insurgent groups may emerge in the future as well.

Knowing the strategies that the LRA uses to evade termination would give state governments insights into formulating the best counterinsurgency strategies to use to deal with such myriad of insurgent groups, more especially in the East and Central African region. Each state affected by the LRA insurgency has its own explanation as to why the LRA keeps surviving, despite the fact that they have joined efforts under the African Union Regional Task Force (RTF) to fight the LRA. zxxxx The Onset of Civil Wars

The popular explanations for onset of civil wars are ethnic discrimination, wealth

African Defense/December 2015

inequalities, access to contrabands, and availability of safe havens. Contrary to this claim, studies have shown that territorial conflicts are more likely to occur in sparsely populated areas, near national borders, far from the capital cities, and in less rough terrain. These studies also suggest that civil wars aimed at capture of state power are more prone in densely populated areas and near natural resource mines, like diamond mines.

The argument that ethnic and wealth diversity have less effect on the onset of civil war is supported widely by other authors in support of this claim, arguing that ethnic groups, social classes, peoples, civilizations, religions and nations do not engage in conflict or strategic interactions, but organizations do. It is organizations, formed deliberately or ad hoc, that leverage ethnic or social agenda to attract its members and wage conflict in their name.

Furthermore, although ethnic divisions may exist and be used for mobilizing ethnic groups, such divisions are not static but, rather, more dynamic. Williams goes on to assert that language and religious differences can prove so flexible that they become central in fostering relationships that are more inclusive than ethnocentric among different ethnic groups. These arguments show that there is no conflict that is instigated purely by an ethnic or any other form of social groupings. It is organizations that organize and portray conflicts to be

based on social groupings.

Others have argued that no insurgency can survive without having safe havens outside the confines of the target state.

The National Resistance Army insurgency in Uganda (1981–1986) shows that the insurgents operated near the capital Kampala. The NRA’s intent was to capture state power. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency in Sudan (1983– 2005), however, shows that the insurgents operated far from the capital Khartoum.

Like the NRA, the SPLA’s intent was to capture state power; however, they did not operate near the state’s base. Neither the NRA nor the SPLA relied on extraterritorial haven to sustain their insurgency project, but instead they operated from within the borders of their respective countries.

This is contrary to the claim that all insurgents must have safe haven outside the target state’s boundaries to operate successfully. Therefore, there is need to conduct further investigations to ascertain the most sustainable argument. Currently, both the NRM (the political wing of the NRA) and the SPLA are in government. The NRA captured state power in 1986, while the SPLA used peace talks and a popular referendum to gain state power, officially, in 2011.

Some writers claim that insurgencies are caused by conditions like poverty, as marked by state’s weakness, thus favoring rebel recruitment; political instability;

25

rough terrain; and large population. Some empirical analysis has shown that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that ethnic or religious diversity, stronger political grievances, and the end of the cold war as the root causes of insurgencies.

Yoweri Museveni and Ondoga Ori Amaza, members of the NRA, participated in a protracted popular insurgency that was fought within the confines of Uganda’s borders, which are densely populated area, and are fairly rough terrain. The NRA declared war on President Obote’s government after the 1980 elections were reportedly rigged. The NRA claimed to be fighting to establish freedom and democracy in Uganda. Uganda, by then, was experiencing political instability and was more

26

of a failed state than not. This argument is also in line with those that say that wars aimed at capture of state power are fought near the base of the state (the capital city) and resource deposits, and in densely populated areas. However the NRA insurgency was not based in areas richly endowed with mineral deposits. Instead, it relied on the local population for its basic logistic supplies.

However, it must be noted that, much as state weakness has influence in determining the onset of civil conflicts show that economic shock in the form of a drop in external income affects only the

intensity and geography of conflicts within countries. It has less effect on the location of the onset of conflicts. Most conflicts start in remote areas that are not susceptible to economic shocks. zxxxx Genesis of the LRA Insurgency

On July 27, 1985, Tito Okello, Basilio Okello, and their cohort, then soldiers

African Defense/December 2015

of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), mutinied against the government of President Milton Obote and dislodged him from power in a coup d’état. Tito Okello was appointed President. This group was composed mostly of people from the Gulu and Kitgum districts, that is, members of the Acholi tribe who accused Obote of tribalism. Obote was from the Langi tribe, which neighbors the Acholis in northern Uganda.

During this chaotic situation, the National Resistance Army was busy fighting the Obote government from the outskirts of Kampala city. Tito Okello’s government, in a bid to coopt the NRA and stabilize the country, called on the NRA to talk peace.

Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi offered to mediate the talks in the Kenyan capital city of Nairobi, and a peace deal was reached in December 1985. The Okellos thus expected the NRA to join them in a new transitional umbrella government by 1986.

On January 25, 1986, to the astonishment of the Okellos, the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) marched on Kampala, dislodging the Okellos from power.

Probably, the NRA/M had little or no confidence in the transitional government to be established. The following day, January 26, the NRA/M officially announced the takeover of government. Tito Okello and his cohort fled the country, with many of them taking refuge in neighboring Sudan (currently South Sudan). By April 1986, the NRA had reached the northern border of Uganda, further displacing remnants of the UNLA into Sudan. In late 1986 and early 1987, the former UNLA soldiers and some members of the Acholi tribe displaced by the civil war regrouped as the UPDA and launched counter offensive against the NRA/M government in Uganda with the support of the Sudanese government.

In 1986, as the NRA/M was still trying to settle as a government, an Acholi priestess, Alice Auma, a traditional healer, formed a parallel rebel group to that of the UPDA. Auma claimed that she was possessed by a spirit called Lakwena, meaning the “messenger.” She accordingly proclaimed to be a mystical spiritual conduit for Lakwena to the Acholi and Uganda at large. Her Holy Spirit Movement/ Mobile Force (HSMF) fought against the NRA, capturing substantial part of northern and eastern Uganda. In 1987, however, the

African Defense/December 2015

HSMF suffered a defeat when it reached Jinja, about 80 kilometers from Kampala city, and Auma and some of her followers fled to Kenya where she eventually died from illness in 2007.

Joseph Kony, the current leader of the LRA, comes from a small village near Gulu call Odek. He was brought up in the Catholic faith but dropped out of school at an early age. By 1987, Kony was a soldier in the UPDA at the age of 26 years. One day, while at home on leave, he was reported to have been possessed by some spirits and could not speak for three days. Later, when some Christians (Balokole) joined hands in prayers and drove away the evil spirits, he opened his mouth. It is reported that from that time onwards, he became a conduit for ten different spirits, which he claimed were holy ones. Heike Behrend, partly quoting de Heusch, reported thus:

In his first speech, he [Kony] said he had been sent by God to liberate humanity from disease and suffering. But, he added, he had discovered that healing was senseless as long as those who were healed were killed. So he resolved to fight to destroy all those who wanted to fight.

The struggle would last until no one had the wish to fight any longer. He said he had not come to topple government, but to destroy the evil forces in the world as well as the abila (the shrines of the ancestors), amulets, and all forms of witchcraft and sorcery. He said he had come to teach people to follow God. His coming to Acholi [the territory] did not mean he was privileging the Acholi [the tribe], but that he wanted justice and righteousness to reign throughout the country [Uganda].

Immediately after acquiring the mediumship for the spirits, Kony embarked on mobilizing troops by mainly attacking other insurgent groups within Acholi region.

These included the UPDA, HSMF and other minor spirit-based resistance groups. His mission was to co-opt all of them under his command.

Those refusing to join Kony’s Holy Spirit soldiers, by then called the Lord’s Army, were imprisoned or ransomed for logistical supplies. The Lord’s Army operated like Alice Auma’s HSMF: it had Holy Spirit safety precautions as its rules and regulations, and the Holy Spirit tactics, which they used for fighting their enemy.

Meanwhile, the UPDA, under its commander Odong Latek, continued the fight against the NRA/M until 1988 when

its faction under Angelo Okello decided to sign a peace agreement with the Ugandan government. President Museveni had already announced an amnesty for any insurgent who wished to renounce rebellion and return home. The agreement between Angelo Okello and the NRA co-opted some of the UPDA’s forces, while others became members of the local defense units (LDUs), whose responsibility was to protect the villages from attacks by insurgents. This agreement also temporarily halted Sudanese support to the UPDA. However, the UPDA, under Odong Latek, did not agree with the terms of the agreement and thus decided to join hands with Joseph Kony, who was by this time the leader of his reformed Uganda People’s Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA). The UPDCA also recruited some members of Alice’s defeated forces to boost its strength. Odong Latek, a trained military officer, seemed to have had profound influence on Kony. By 1992, the UPDCA changed name to the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and changed from Holy Spirit tactics to classical guerrilla warfare. By this time, the LRA was the only Acholi-originated insurgency still fighting the government of Uganda. zxxxx The Beginning of the Quarter-CenturyLong Resistance

The LRA/M reactivated ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) so as to receive military supplies and special training from the Sudanese government.

The government of Sudan had also granted the LRA sanctuaries within its territory.

This facilitated the operations of the LRA greatly by giving the LRA the opportunity to rearm, train, farm and maneuver back to Uganda to conduct operations. President Museveni was a former classmate of Dr. John Garang (the leader of the Sudanese rebel movement, Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement—SPLA/M) while at Dar es Salaam University in Tanzania. The two leaders, naturally, cemented the ties between their armies. The SPLA operated from within the borders of Sudan, but it received supplies through the territory of Uganda. In essence, a proxy war situation was established: the LRA supported by SAF, fighting the Ugandan government, and SPLA supported by NRA, fighting the Sudanese government.

In 1994, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to mediate a peace agreement

27

between the governments of Uganda and that of the Sudan, but it never worked. The two countries continued to support the insurgents of each other, and so the proxy war situation continued.

On October 8, 1995, Uganda enacted a new constitution that transformed the NRA into a national military called Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF).

Nevertheless, the UPDF continued the fight against the LRA. It was just a change of name, but the operations and other routine activities of the UPDF continued unchanged.

Between 1994 and 2004, the NRA and the UPDF (after 1995), continued to fight not only the LRA in northern Uganda, but also other insurgent groups in West Nile and the Western regions of the country.

The LRA also kept making incursions from its base in Sudan to conduct operations in Uganda. The operations included mostly abductions, attacking weak UPDF detaches, raiding internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps, and ambushing both the UPDF and civilians. Several peace initiatives were organized by the local religious and political leaders to end the insurgency but to no avail. The fight between the LRA and the government of Uganda raged on.

In 2002, Uganda and Sudan negotiated a deal to allow the UPDF to cross the border into Sudan to conduct limited operations for three-month duration. As per the terms of the agreement, Uganda was given a red line south of Juba city that it could not cross while pursing the LRA. Uganda renewed the mandate over eight times. Meanwhile, the LRA relocated beyond the red line and kept bypassing the UPDF to conduct operations in Uganda.

The last serious incursion of the LRA into Uganda was in 2004. The LRA moved through northern to eastern Uganda. They were contained by locally mobilized militias called Amuka boys from the Lango tribe and Arrow boys from the Itesot tribe. These groups were armed with rifles to defend the IDP’s camps in northern Uganda and the villages in eastern Uganda respectively. The plan was that the locally organized militias would protect the rear territory (parts of northern and eastern Uganda) while the UPDF confronted the LRA at the front in southern Sudan. However, because the LRA operated with small covert groups, they managed to penetrate deep behind the UPDF lines. As the militias confronted them together with some UPDF rear units,

28

the LRA withdrew back to Sudan, leaving behind trails of massacres in their wake. zxxxx The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Ugandan Peace “Jokes”

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M in 2005 changed the proxy war status quo. According to the CPA, SPLA/M was granted authority to govern southern Sudan semi-autonomously, which meant that the whole of southern Sudan came under the control of SPLA/M. Because SPLA/M was an ally of Uganda, it meant that the LRA had lost its ally’s control of the sanctuary territory. The sanctuary that the LRA reverted to during all the previous years had by then shifted into the control of the SPLA/M—an enemy of the LRA by extension.

The LRA thus had four options: it could relocate to the countries in the west of Sudan (the DRC or the CAR); it could relocate eastwards to Ethiopia, Somalia or Kenya; it could talk peace with Uganda government; or it could stay within the vast territory of southern Sudan and use guerrilla tactics to survive.

The LRA chose two options: First, it relocated to the west, in Garamba National Park in the DRC. Probably, the leaders of LRA realized the richness of game parks in terms of food supplies and plenty of ground with favorable terrain to maneuver in case of counterinsurgent onslaught. The DRC also harbors a number of other insurgent groups, and the LRA probably hoped to link up with them or survive independently. Second, it accepted the offer of a peace negotiation by the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GOSS). Dr. Riek Machar, the GOSS vice president was selected to be the mediator. The Ugandan government also agreed to the talks, commonly referred to as the Juba peace accord. Given how events unfolded thereafter, one may also argue that the LRA could have used the peace talk option to achieve the relocation option.

In 2006, as peace-talks were being held in Juba, with the LRA represented by the so-called LRA external wing, the LRAproper relocated to Garamba National Park in the DRC. By late 2007, the peace-talks were through and the final signing of the agreement was to be held in Juba. However, to the astonishment of many, including the LRA negotiators, Kony decided to snub the agreement at the last minute. By this

time, the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant of arrest for Kony and his other top four commanders had been issued. This could have contributed to Kony’s refusal to sign the agreement. He wanted the charges against him and his commanders dropped before he would sign the agreement. There are also reports that Kony was actually not interested in the peace agreement.

Therefore, he had to find a reason to snub the agreement, and this was the best opportunity he had. zxxxx Things Fall Apart! Back to the Sword

In 2008, Uganda responded by launching a concerted attack on the LRA positions in the DRC in an operation dubbed Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT).

The LRA was dispersed, and some of its members fled to the CAR, Sudan’s Darfur Region, and parts of Chad. By the time of this writing, LRA members are suspected to be located in the countries mentioned above, including parts of the new country— the Republic of South Sudan (RSS).

Since then, the LRA has continued to abduct and terrorize the civilian population in the DRC, CAR, and RSS. In 2011, the African Union officially designated the LRA a terrorist group. Since October 14, 2011, the United States has also joined the African Union taskforce (AU RTF) deployed to track down the LRA. US special operations forces (SOF) serves as adviser to the AU RTF, which consists of forces from Uganda, the DRC, RSS and CAR.

Since 2008, the RTF has scored a number of successes. Several junior to medium LRA commanders have been eliminated, and other senior commanders like Opio Makasi, Caesar Acellam, and Dominic Ongwen surrendered. The use of force may not be very effective now, but the non-kinetic method seems to be yielding some good results of depleting the LRA senior command structure. Several defections have been recorded as a result radio communications encouraging LRA fighters to quit. zxxxx How?

The long story of the LRA clearly requires further investigations to ascertain exactly why this insurgent group managed to survive for so long. Could it be how the LRA is organized and the tactics it is using to fight that gives it such longevity? Is it

African Defense/December 2015

the wise selection of sanctuaries and areas of operation that actually favors the LRA’s survival? What role do the population and the regional politics play in the survival of the LRA? This brief history of the LRA only provides clues about some of the factors mentioned in the above questions.

It is therefore imperative that further investigation is conducted. It is hoped that such inquiry will give policy makers and scholars a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of insurgent survival. zxxxx Conclusion

In trying to draw a correlation between insurgent activities and geographic factors, a number of factors where reviewed and plotted on a map including elevation, distance to water, distance to minerals, distance to resources, distance to roads, distance to Kampala, population densities and the distance to the border.

In general, the results show that the LRA makes use of its surrounding environment, which includes the physical features such as the elevation, water sources and land cover, and the human geography factor such as the population density. The LRA also made use of the interstate politics and the weaknesses of the states in the region to gain some time for its insurgency project. Research further confirmed that the LRA modifies its organizational structure to adapt to the changing military and political situations so as to evade termination by the counterinsurgent forces. This, however, cannot be possible without the intuition of the LRA leadership, meaning that the LRA leadership plays important role in making decisions that contribute significantly to the longevity of its undertaking.

Counter to initial thinking, the research seems to suggest that the LRA does not depend on mineral deposits in the operation area to fund its insurgency project. The results also show that the LRA operates, in general, at the proximity of the state capital Kampala. The LRA further operates at the proximity of the roads in the region.

However, this could be due to the fact that the events recorded are mostly encounters with counterinsurgent forces and civilian population, which are, incidentally, nearby roads. Counterinsurgent forces prefer locating their defensive positions near access routes for the purpose of easy supplies. Civilians, as well, prefer to settle near roads for easy access and protection by

African Defense/December 2015

the counterinsurgent forces.

It is therefore inevitable that the records should show the insurgent activities near roads. However, this does not mean the insurgents exclusively rely on roads for their operations. zxxxx Moving Ahead

The Ugandan military (UPDF) has been battling the LRA since late 1980s up until this writing. The UPDF mostly depends on intelligence information and analysis to combat the LRA. Uganda, at large, also relies on intelligence information and analysis to assess the progress of the war against the LRA insurgency, and formulates strategic courses of action on that basis. This research gives another perspective on how to study the LRA insurgency based on readily available, open-source information, empirical analysis, and is supported by previous knowledge on similar insurgency projects.

It is therefore hoped that combining the findings and recommendations in this work with intelligence information will help Uganda and other affected African states to formulate better strategies to combat the LRA insurgency.

The LRA, according to the findings of this work, makes good use of its environment to keep surviving. This is not surprising because even wild animals, quite intuitively, use their surroundings to facilitate their survival. It is, however, important to note that not all humans are capable of surviving in the same environment for such a long duration without making concessions for peace talks to succeed. This means that the LRA has mastered how to adapt and live comfortably in harsh environments such as the thick and rough terrain in the DRC and CAR. The LRA has clearly demonstrated expertise in the selection of sanctuaries that guarantee its prolonged longevity.

Countering the LRA by denying it access to life-supporting environmental factors, however, may not be so feasible because it will be a daunting task to try, for instance, to deny the LRA access to water sources, wood supplies, and raised grounds.

This is because these geographical features are plentiful and spread throughout the region. It will require enormous human and other types of resources to accomplish such a task. This means that other measures should be opted for as a solution to the LRA

insurgency.

The LRA, according to the findings of this research, also takes opportunities presented to it by the prevailing political situations in the region. That is, it chooses sanctuaries based on the capability of the hosting state or host state’s relationship with Uganda. For example, as seen earlier in this work, from 1988 to 2005, the LRA had sanctuaries inside southern Sudan and parts of Uganda that are less populated or completely uninhabited. This was because Uganda and Sudan had competing interests, which played quite well for the LRA’s survival. After 2006, the LRA decided to relocate to the DRC and later to CAR because these two countries do not have the capability to police their borders effectively.

It should be noted that the LRA did not choose the DRC and CAR by coincidence.

It had the easy option of going eastwards to Kenya, Ethiopia, or Somalia, rather than crossing the Nile, an obstacle, to go westwards to the DRC and CAR. The most probable reasons are that, when compared to the countries in the western side, the countries on the eastern side are densely populated, with rougher terrain and stronger state power, and friendlier to the Ugandan government. Therefore, cordial interstate relationships and concerted efforts to combat insurgents in the region could be an agreeable solution to that effect. That is by denying havens to the insurgents.

Another strategy that the LRA uses to prolong its longevity is that of changing its organizational and leadership structures according to the prevailing military and political situations. For instance, as discussed earlier in this work, the LRA constructs its organization structure similar to that of a professional bureaucracy when it had gained strength and is able to face the counterinsurgent onslaught. However, it dismantles the same organization down to smaller units when it is faced with possible defeat and termination. This tactic affords the LRA survival because it is hard for the well-organized counterinsurgent forces to fight an insurgent that is disintegrated into smaller fighting groups.

The LRA seems to know very well that this tactic works and incapacitates the advanced force advantage that the counterinsurgency forces have over it. This could be one of the reasons why the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, preferred to maintain direct control over the core operatives when they reorganized into a more mechanistic

29

bureaucracy after 2006. After Operation Lightning Thunder, it was easy for the LRA to revert back to small groups, divisional style organization, which it still uses.

According to some, the best way to fight an organization that operates in small units is to self-divide into smaller units corresponding to the target organization.

Will this strategy work in the military setting? This is another research question altogether. The best way to control water in a flooded house, as an analogy, is first to shut the tap from which the water originates before mopping it; otherwise, it will be a waste of time and effort. In other words, when the insurgents are nowhere and everywhere, the best strategy is to go for the control center: high command manhunt.

Because much as the groups operates independently, they still report to and are controlled by the high command. zxxxx Policy Recommendations

This research has provided supporting evidence that the LRA uses its environment to facilitate the longevity of its insurgency project, meaning that, it relies, partly, on geography to survive. It is therefore recommended that the counterinsurgent forces consider deploying strategically in positions that have resources that provide livelihood to the insurgents, especially water sources. However, this means more manpower is needed to cover all the water sources in the region. Foot patrols may also be used to enhance domination of the territory. This will deny the insurgents access to those critical resources and thus pressure them to give up the insurgency.

The LRA is unlikely to relocate to another state other than where it is right now.

Further north is desert terrain, which the LRA is not used to. Further west is Cameroon, which is a formidable state, according to African standards, and it is likely to fight and deny the LRA sanctuary.

To the east and south there are the joint African Union forces, which means that the LRA can be defeated kinetically, if the CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda can work jointly and effectively under the African Union regional task force. It appears that the challenge right now is the lack of manpower to cover the vast territory in which the LRA is roaming.

This recommendation can be

30

implemented with good results if the strength of the counterinsurgent forces is boosted.

The LRA has decided to break up its organization structure. It operates in small divisional groups that report directly to the high command of the LRA.

The best way to defeat such an insurgency project is to identify the key players—the movers and shakers—of the insurgency and eliminate them from the equation. Eliminating the connection to the high command will most probably cause the organization to crumble because the groups won’t have the direction and purpose of fighting. The challenge with this recommendation is to find the apparently invisible high command members. A multifaceted approach may have to be used to locate and capture the leaders of the insurgency. This may include phone tracking, human intelligence, signal intelligence and drones, among other methods.

The most cost-effective method that the author thinks can end the LRA insurgency is the use of psychological operation methods to encourage mass defection from the LRA ranks. The LRA high command will have no one to command if the fighters defect, and the high command itself will have no choice but to give up the undertaking. This method will not only be, as Gordon McCormick would say, a “strong win,” but it would be a “complete win” as well, because the leadership of the LRA won’t have that motivation to continue to fight if there are no people to use as fighters. In short, we must capitalize on degrading Joseph Kony’s fighting strength—manpower—because that is what keeps him motivated, surviving, and busy running the insurgency project.

The data on the LRA is getting outdated. The LRA most probably is changing face in terms of new commanders taking the mantle of the LRA leadership.

Data collectors have to research more and update their data on the LRA to unveil the identities and biographies of the upcoming LRA leaders. The more we keep track of the LRA leadership, the easier it is to derive effective strategies to end the insurgency.

For an expanded version of this article, including statistical maps showing the relationship of various geographic factors to insurgent activities and endnotes, please send an email to African Defense at jeffm@african-defense.com

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MARKET LEADERSHIP IS ALWAYS A BATTLE. BUT CONDOR ACHIEVES THAT WITH A UNIQUE STRATEGY: PRESERVING LIVES. CONDOR. GLOBAL LEADER IN NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES In every mission, it is essential to know that the right partners are by your side.

Therefore, Condor is proud to provide the best and most complete portfolio of Non-Lethal Technologies to the Armed Forces around the world and continues developing and innovating solutions that ensure the preservation of life.

For maximum security, choose the largest and most complete line of Non-Lethal Technologies in the world.

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African Defense/December 2015