The Consul December Issue

T heC onsul A Publication of the International Affairs Association of the University of Pennsylvania

Fall 2013路 Volume I 路 Issue 2

Director of Publications:

Henry Chang

Head Layout Editor:

Andrea Yeh

Editors-in-Chief:

Sam Blumenthal

Jing Ran

Layout Editors:

Karen Chen

Iana Feliciano

Sally Kong

Business Staff:

Adino Luo

Louis Capozzi

Brian Kwok

Rami Saker

Managing Editor:

Michael Luo Content Editor:

Chloe Porter

Senior Columnists

Christine Du

Maxwell Hummel

Minsoo Kim

Julia Rossi Junior Columnists

Taylor Evensen

Michael Karam

The C onsul Europe France: the New Sick Man of Europe?..........................................................................4

Africa: Special Feature Rape as a Weapon of War in Congo..............................................................................6 All Roads Lead to Kigali: the Aftermath of Rwandan Genocide in Congo........................8 Beginning of An End? Exploring the Paradigmatic Shifts of South Africa’s AIDS Policy...10 The Other Horn of Africa...........................................................................................12

East Asia No More Feeling the Stones: Has China’s Third Party Plenum Laid Out a Sure Path For the Next Decade?...................................................................................................... 14

The Consul

Europe

France: the New Sick Man of Europe?

By Chloe Porter It’s no secret the French love their grands hommes. Charlemagne, François I, and Charles de Gaulle all come to mind. These are men who have inspired greatness, who have come to embody the qualities of the ideal Frenchman, who have been assigned almost God-like status. They are national heroes, promulgated to their mythic reputations in an effort to bring the French people together, to create a national identity. They serve as reminders of a France steeped in glory and power. That France seems all but gone these days. Perhaps the era of the grands hommes is over, or at least the political grand homme.

Maybe the world we live today in doesn’t lend itself as easily to the creation of these political idols. But the problem goes deeper than that.

Sadly, the French president, François Hollande, is the exact opposite of this grand homme ideal. He is a physically uninspiring figure with an equally lackluster presidential track record marked by misstep after misstep.

Faced with bleak economic realities and high unemployment, the morale among the French populace is dismal.

This is not the prideful France we all know and (sometimes) love.

While I was researching this article, I came across countless articles discussing Hollande and his policies, the French economy, and general discontent. It was more difficult to find,

however, accounts of the day-to-day experience of the average French citizen. The articles discussing France at the macro level paint a depressing picture, but they are rather removed.

Fortunately for me, my French mother just returned from visiting my grandmother in the Motherland, so I got to hear about the daily struggle first hand. What she told me was disheartening to a far greater extent than the objective facts about the French economy. In short, things are “not good.”

She told me she preferred spending time with those of my grandmother’s generation, who are less affected by economic troubles, particularly in a country where the elderly receive good benefits. The vast majority of her middle-aged friends, on the other

“They face money problems, particularly mounting taxes, and lack much hope for improvements in the near future.”

hand, appeared stressed out and sad.

They face money problems, particularly mounting taxes, and they lack much hope for improvements in the near future. They aren’t the only ones.

Students, too, are preoccupied with financial concerns and are being hit hard by unemployment. Furthermore, tales of suicide are becoming more prevalent, which does not serve to ease tensions. The result of all of this is air thick with discontent and ·4·

dreariness, and a frustrated and troubled population.

The irony of the situation, of course, is that Hollande was elected in large part because he appealed to a youth uninspired by the less idealistic former president Nicolas Sarkozy. Now, Sarkozy was certainly no grand homme, and he had his flaws. But I think most would agree he would have been better than the current president. A year and a half ago, though, many were ready for a change. I was in France myself shortly before the election in the spring of 2012. Though I’m a French citizen, I didn’t vote because I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough about French politics to make an informed decision. I had, however, read a little about Hollande in the Economist.

I remember seeing his proposal to levy a 75% tax on the highest earners as a giant red flag and wondering how someone suggesting something that seemed so preposterous to me could possibly succeed as president.

Wouldn’t that just discourage entrepreneurship and cause all the rich people to move out of France? That was the precise point I made to my 20year- old French friend who had announced he would vote for Hollande.

He lazily dismissed what I had said, saying he and his friends were sick of Sarkozy, who had a “stick up his ass,” and who they viewed as responsible for constantly siccing les flics (the cops) on the youth. The prospect of a socialist president was romantic, and

besides, Sarkozy had really not been a particularly noteworthy president.

Unfortunately, though, Hollande has been anything but a breath of fresh air.

The very unfortunate truth is that Hollande has the lowest approval ratings of any French president ever. He currently has the support of a dismal 20% of the population. This should not be altogether too surprising, considering he campaigned on a utopian program that he could never realistically carry out. He promised the French people that he would pull the country out of economic and financial crisis without asking significant sacrifices from its citizens and without huge reforms, especially with regards

“To add fuel to the fire, the unemployment rate is at a 16-year high at 10.9% as of May 2013.”

to public services, all thanks to growth supported by the state and financed by higher taxes on the rich. But that growth is nowhere to be found. Taxes have indeed rapidly mounted, but primarily for the middle class. The 75% top tax is still set to come into force, but the rich won’t be the only ones tightening the belt, thanks to €3 billion ($4 billion) of new taxes, on top of new policies that will bring more households into the income-tax system as well as a higher Value added tax rate. Economists warn that a tax strike may be forthcoming. Indeed, though it has been postponed, French

President François Hollande

football players were planning a strike at the end of the month protesting the 75% tax. To add fuel to the fire, the unemployment rate is at a 16-year high at 10.9% as of May 2013. And to make matters even worse, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) has slashed France’s credit rating to AA from AA+, just two years after it lost the top rating of AAA. It foresees government debt hitting 86% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015 and believes unemployment will remain above 10% until 2016. In its statement, S&P said: “We believe the French government’s reforms to taxation, as well as to product, services and labour markets, will not substantially raise France’s medium-term growth prospects and that ongoing high unemployment is weakening support for further significant fiscal and structural policy measures.” In other words, S&P is basically reiterating what my mother said: things are “not good.”

Needless to say, France is undergoing a period of considerable volatility. Revolt is without a doubt in the air.

Demonstrations occur almost daily, from groups who only share in common a deep hatred of their president’s policies. These groups do not belong to organized social movements, and the disarray could be potentially dangerous as tensions rise. Certainly, citizens have been forthright about their discontent.

On Remembrance Day, a national holiday in France on November 11th, protesters booed Hollande and demanded he step down. Furthermore, though the footballers have agreed to postpone theirs, strikes are on the rise. Primary school teachers recently went on strike in protest of the extension of their workweek from four days to four-anda-half days. Midwives, angry that they receive inferior pay to doctors, staged a go-slow.

Important to note is that France does not exist in a bubble. The widespread domestic anger will have ramifications for the European Union. Many in France perceive the EU as part of the problem, rather than as a savior. They claim the EU is too focused on austerity and trade and is too removed. According to the Economist, only 41% of the French support the EU, versus 60% in Germany and 43% in Britain. 77% believe that joining the EU weakened the French economy, and 33% would leave the EU. ·5·

These are not promising figures, and they pose a problem for Hollande. Germany leads the EU, but it needs French support to get things done. Hollande is happy to cooperate, but without public support, he may be pigeonholed.

Today, my French professor told me she is worried for her nieces in France.

She told me that the French exchange

“Needless to say, France is undergoing a period of considerable volatility.

Revolt is without a doubt in the air.”

students at Penn don’t want to return to France. Undoubtedly, France has fallen on hard times, and quite understandably, morale is low. But if the French can come together to access that glimmer of national pride that I am confident is still there, then perhaps the daily struggle will be just a little bit more bearable. C Sources:

h t t p : / / w w w. e c o n o m i s t . c o m / n e w s / europe/21589895-french-increasingly-thinkeurope-problem-not-solution-d-sillusion?zi d=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/francois-hollande/10450534/FrancoisHollande-in-crisis-as-France-engulfed-by-exasperation-and-anger.html h t t p : / / w w w. e c o n o m i s t . c o m / news/21589065-national-front-will-prospergrim-year-frances-surprise?zid=309&ah=80d cf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e h t t p : / / w w w. e c o n o m i s t . c o m / n e w s / europe/21588429-fran-ois-hollande-underfire-even-within-his-own-camp-mishandledmuddle?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f6 03b9fd9577f0e h t t p : / / w w w. e c o n o m i s t . c o m / n e w s / europe/21588118-french-president-battlingdismal-poll-ratings-local-election-defeatsand-government?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b856 1b012f603b9fd9577f0e http://www.courrierinternational.com/ article/2013/10/30/un-pays-au-bord-de-linsurrection http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10422881/Franceunites-against-Francois-Hollande.html http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/11/18/francois-hollande-a-til-vraiment-battu-un-record-d-impopularite_3515759_823448.html http://fressoz.blog.lemonde. fr/2013/11/08/face-a-la-crise-le-dilemmedu-president/

The Consul

Africa: Special Feature

Rape as a Weapon of War in Congo

By Taylor Evensen In 2008, the United Nations formally declared rape a weapon of war. Rape is not just an act against individual women or a “spoil of war;” it is systematically being used to destabilize communities and instill terror, even acting as a form of ethnic cleansing in certain cases. Especially, in Half The Sky, Nicholas Kristoff argues that rape is especially effective in conservative societies in which female chastity is honored. Communities ostracize victims because of codes of sexual honor while also undermining tribal structures because leaders lose their authority when they cannot protect the women.

The use of rape in wars is not rare.

After World War II, Russian soldiers raped thousands of East German women. In Bosnia, thousands of women were raped to give birth to Serbian babies, and 200,000 women were raped during the battle for Bangladeshi independence in 1971 in order to produce Punjabi children. It has also been used in East Timor, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Sudan, and Algeria; however, the world capital of rape is undeniably the eastern Congo.

John Holmes, the UN undersecre-

tary general for humanitarian affairs said: “The sexual violence in Congo is the worst in the world.” With combatants from about twenty armed factions fighting for control, militants assault civilians in order to gain control over areas without having to risk engaging directly with other armed groups. Over 250,000 accounts of rape were report-

“It has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in an armed conflict.” - former UN force commander Patrick Cammaert

ed in eastern Congo in 2009 alone. The Journal of American Medical Association concluded that 39.7% of women in the Eastern Region have been exposed to sexual violence during their lifetime.

The numbers may be even higher because limited access to conflict areas makes it is impossible to know the true extent of the violence.

A rape counselor in Goma explained: “All militias here rape women, to show their strength and to show your weak-

·6·

ness. In other places, there is rape because the soldiers want women. Here it’s that but also a viciousness, a mentality of hatred, and it’s women who pay the price.” The victims are not just adults; children as young as three are raped by militants.

Congolese militant groups use a particularly vicious type of rape. As reported in Amnesty International’s “Lives Blown Apart” Report: “Some women had a rifle, a knife, a sharpened piece of wood, glass or rusty nails, stones, sand or peppers inserted into their vaginas. Others have been shot during or after rape, sometimes in their genitals.”

These savage acts of violence cause women to suffer from injuries and diseases such as HIV, injuries to the reproductive system, broken pelvises, infertility, prolonged menstrual periods, uterine prolapses, fistulas, and psychological trauma. These women are also forced to care for the children they bear from the trauma.

The lack of access to basic healthcare exacerbates these medical problems.

Fewer than 30% of Congolese have access to healthcare, and there are only two hospitals in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that have the capacity to provide surgery for rape survivors. Moreover, there is not adequate prenatal care for pregnant women. 1 in

24 women face a lifetime risk of maternal death. War and the lack of running water and electricity have also caused the collapse of healthcare in many areas.

The fear of HIV/AIDS and codes of sexual honor causes many community members to stigmatize rape victims. These attitudes make it even more difficult for women to treat their injuries or rebuild their lives. Sagunia, a young Congolese woman, was repeatedly raped by two men in April 2003. Her reflection of the events is harrowing: “In the community, they made such fun of me that I had to leave the village and live in the forest. Today, the only thing that I can think about is that I want an abortion. I am hungry, I have no clothes and no soap. I don’t have any money to pay for medical care. It would be better if I died with the baby in my womb.”

In the DRC, rape has become normalized. Noel Rwabirinba, a sixteen-year-old militiaman, said, “If we see girls, it’s our right, we can violate them.” The legal system does not even support victims’ rights.

In the DRC Family Code, a married woman who wishes to take a case to court must first ask her husband’s permission, and many husbands discourage their wives from filing charges against rapists be-

cause it threatens their own honor. In the Penal Code, rape is also not adequately defined, and there is no law against spousal sexual assault.

The legacy of sexual violence and bloodshed began in the 1960s, when dictator Mobutu Sese Seko’s troops used sexual abuse as a method of torture. President Mobutu’s regime was rampantly corrupt and drove the Congo into severe debt. The Rwandan Genocide (1994) exacerbated the Congo’s internal problems.

Many of the refugees that fled into eastern Congo were Hutus that had massacred the Tutsis in the genocide. The Interahamwe, a Hutu extremist group, regrouped in the refugee camps and sent out raiding parties to terrorize villages and attack Congolese Tutsis. The Rwandan government supported rebel forces, led by Laurent Kabila, to stamp out the Interahamwe and overthrow Mobutu’s corrupt regime.

Kabila’s army defeated Mobutu in less than a year, and quickly proved himself to be an unstable leader. In 1998, Kabila turned on the Rwandans and implored the Congolese to eradicate the Rwandans and Ugandans living in the Congo. Rwanda and Uganda retaliated by seizing most of eastern Congo. Angola, Zimbabwe, and

Zambia supported Kabila in exchange for oil and mineral concessions. The Second Congo War was even more brutal than the first. Civilians suffered most, as various rebel groups destabilized communities to gain control over land and mines.

Local communities were forced to form resistance groups to defend themselves.

However, this well meaning resistance movement, called the Mai Mai, quickly degenerated into groups of marauding young men who raided villages, raped women, and financed themselves through mineral trade.

Although international and national peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 brought an official end to hostilities, the country continues to be ravaged by warfare. More than 5 million people have died in eastern Congo since the start of the First Congo War in 1996. The various related conflicts in the region over the past two decades comprise the most brutal war since World War II, and it has been fought on the backs of women. In former UN force commander Patrick Cammaert’s words: “It has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in an armed conflict.”

C

Half The Sky http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=186342 Amnesty International, “Lives Blown Apart” http://www.unfpa.org/sowmy/resources/docs/country_info/profile/en_DRC_SoWMy_Profile.pdf Kamemba, Claude (June 2001). “The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Independence to Africa’s First World War”. UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research. Paper No. 16/2000.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the.” The World Factbook. 2013. [accessed 18 February 2013].

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The Consul

Africa: Special Feature

All Roads Lead to Kigali:

The Aftermath of Rwandan Genocide in Congo

By Michael Luo

On November 7, the M23 militia, one of the many armed groups that have been ravaging eastern Congo over the last two decades, surrendered to the Ugandan government.

Peace talks with the rebels have since collapsed, as the government sees little use in negotiating a settlement with a defeated group when there are still countless other militias still operating within its borders. Furthermore, there is also the uncomfortable fact that the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, who, along with the Rwandan government, is widely believed to be covertly supporting the M23, is conducting the peace talks.

Though the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the UN mission in the Congo can briefly celebrate the defeat of a group that captured the Congolese city of Goma last year, it is clear that none of the causes of two decades of war in the region have been addressed. The reality is that all of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa can be traced back to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the

massive demographic and political shifts that resulted in its aftermath.

The Background of the Rwandan Genocide

The close alliance between Rwanda and Uganda stems from the Ugandan Bush War in the early 1980’s, in which current president Yoweri Museveni overthrew Milton Obote and took power. Uganda was home to a large Tutsi refugee population that had fled there after the 1959 Rwandan Revolution. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was born in the refugee camps and joined Museveni’s forces due to discrimination against refugees by the Obote government.

When Museveni took power in 1986, he rewarded his Rwandan supporters by granting them citizenship rights.

Rwanda’s current president, Paul Kagame, who lived in Uganda from the age of two and was an important leader during the Bush War, was given a high position in the Ugandan military. The RPF used Uganda as a base when it invaded Rwanda in 1990, a war that ended in the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993. This power ·8·

sharing agreement was destroyed by the death of Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana in a suspicious

This population of refugees and ex-genocidaires is the root cause of much of the subsequent violence in the region, the death toll from which is estimated to be as high as six million.

plane crash on April 6, 1994. Radical Hutus quickly seized control of the government and commenced the Rwandan Genocide.

Led by Kagame, the RPF invaded Rwanda again and fought its way to the capital of Kigali, but not before radical Hutus had killed 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. As the RPF advanced, hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled before them, fearing reprisal attacks. After refusing to intervene in the genocide, France pushed a chapter VII mandate through the UN Security Council and

http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/RWA.jpg set up the Turquoise Zone in the southwest of the country as an area for Hutu refugees.

This project was short-lived, however, and refugees soon started pouring out of Rwanda. Many went east into Tanzania, but the majority, including many members of the genocidal government and the Interahamwe militia moved east into the Kivu region of Congo. Though many refugees eventually returned, thousands still remain in Kivu, either forced to stay by militias or scared by propaganda into thinking they will face retribution if they return home to Rwanda. This population of refugees and ex-genocidaires is the root cause of much of the subsequent violence in the region, the death toll from which is estimated to be as high as six million.

The First and Second Congo Wars

Since 1994, both Hutu and Tutsi militias operating in Kivu have been major players in the First and Second Congo Wars. The first war started in 1996 when Rwanda started arming the Tutsi Banyamulenge people of Kivu to forestall an invasion attempt by the remnants of the Hutu militias.

Both the Ugandan and Rwandan governments were active supporters of Laurent Kabila’s rebellion against the

Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who was suspected of supporting the Hutu militia. However, once Kabila captured Kinshasa, Congo’s capital, he expelled the Rwandan and Ugandan military forces that had been supporting him, triggering the Second Congo War as the Rwandans and their allies launched a new rebellion against Kabila. This war lasted until the 2003 Pretoria Accords, one provision of which was a promise by the DRC government to quell Rwandan security fears by disarming remaining Hutu militias and protecting ethnic Tutsis living in the Kivu region.

Militia on both (or all) sides of the conflict have committed war crimes, massacred civilians, enlisted child soldiers, and used rape as a weapon of war.

Conflict in Kivu

Though the rest of the region has largely stabilized since 2003, the eastern Kivu region of the DRC has remained an anarchic mess, with various rebel groups fighting each other as well as government and UN forces, all while ·9·

plundering the region’s rich mineral resources. The specific groups and individuals involved are constantly changing as internal power struggles cause militias to splinter. The recent surrender of Bosco Ntaganda, who lost control of the M23 earlier this year, can be understood as a decision made out of fear of his fellow warlords – he would rather face the justice of the International Criminal Court in The Hague rather than the guns of his rivals in the Congo. Beneath this changing assortment of actors however, the issues remain the same. Rwanda refuses to allow the chaos on its western border to go unwatched, nor will it leave the Tutsi living in Kivu unprotected from the perpetrators of genocide twenty years ago. On this issue, all parties are somewhat in agreement. Kinshasa recognizes that disarming its Hutu militias would remove the main reason for Rwandan intervention. However, it still remains relatively powerless to govern huge swathes of its territory without international assistance, especially with a military that is often corrupt and poorly trained.

While the list of the millions of victims of war in the Great Lakes of Africa grows ever longer, the conflict remains underreported in the rest of the world. Opponents of intervention in countries such as Syria point to ethnic and political complications but the

The Consul

Africa: Special Feature mess in the eastern Congo is far more complex. Though on the surface each side may have reasonably admirable goals – Rwanda to bring genocidaires to justice and the DRC to bring stability to its war-ravaged people – no one’s hands are free of blood. Militia on both (or all) sides of the conflict have committed war crimes, massacred civilians, enlisted child soldiers, and used rape as a weapon of war. The leaders of the states involved have long used their prior good deeds and domestic accomplishments to hide their com-

plicity. The West is unwilling to denounce Kagame due to his status as the man who ended the genocide, in a way acknowledging its shame at standing aside and watching at the time. Museveni has long used his struggle against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army to distract from his own questionable actions.

But the people of the Great Lakes don’t care about the politics.

They just want an end to two decades of war. Surely the region’s leaders must agree – the conflict is sapping their countries of re-

sources they desperately need to put their own nations on a track toward growth. As one of the most important causes of the region’s woes is the ghost of the Rwandan genocide, the primary focus of the international community in the Congo must be a concerted effort to disarm the remaining radical Hutu militias, thus securing Rwanda’s border and removing justification for intervention and allowing Congolese and international forces to focus on establishing stability and security for the people of Kivu.C

Beginning of An End?

Exploring the paradigmatic shifts of South Africa’s AIDS policy

By Minsoo Kim Even into the 2000s, South Africa had a backwards approach to HIV/ AIDs treatment. In fact, the thenhealth minister, Manto TshabalalaMsimang, came under withering international criticism after she advocated an “alternate” treatment method consisting of a healthy diet of garlic and beer. The public policy

fiasco had dire consequences on the lives of many South Africans, resulting in approximately 300,000 AIDS related deaths. Since then, the South African government rejected its HIV/AID denialism and embraced an active AIDS/HIV program. What steps have been taken to curb the infection in the country with the highest number of HIVpositive individuals in the world?

· 10 ·

The public policy fiasco had dire consequences on the lives of many South Africans, resulting in approximately 300,000 AIDS related deaths.

According to South Africa’s “National Strategic Plan for HIV, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and TB 2012-2016”, the South African National AIDS Council has increased the number of antiretroviral treatment facilities to 2,552 and 250,000 males have undergone circumcision. Antiretroviral treatments are currently the only effective way of combating the symptoms of AIDS and male circumcision has been shown to lower the risk of contracting HIV. The key objectives outlined in the strategic plans are: addressing social and structural barriers that increase vulnerability to HIV, STI, and TB infection; preventing new HIV, TB, and STI infections; Sustaining health and wellness; and increasing protection of human rights and improving access to justice. Note that tuberculosis is linked to the prevention of HIV in South Africa because the weakened immune sys-

only 30% of the eligible HIV patients have access to antiretroviral treatment.

tem from AIDS causes people to contract tuberculosis. In fact, 80% of South Africans have tubercle bacilius living in their bodies, but the immune system and environmental conditions are preventing the bacteria from incubating into a full-blown infection.

The South African government plans to spend over R30 billion yearly by FY 2016-17 in order to meet the five year objective of reducing new HIV infections by 50%, initiate 80% of eligible patients on antiretroviral treatment, reduce the number of TB deaths by 50%, ensure access to legal framework for the patients, reduce self-reported stigma and discrimination related to HIV and TB by 50%.

How successful have these efforts been? The audacious attempt of the National Strategic Plan has been met with mixed results. One of the greatest successes of the NSP is that it has drastically reduced the vertical transmission, or mother-to-child transmission, of HIV. Between 2008 and 2010, the rate of vertical transmission has decreased by 50%.

In response, the revised NSP created new objective of completely eliminating vertical transmissions of HIV. Other efforts were not as successful. Even after the government successfully defended a lawsuit by transnational pharmaceutical companies regarding the domestic generic production of a key antiretroviral drug, Ne-

· 11 ·

pravine, most of the eligible HIV patients still do not have access to the critical antiretroviral drug. At the time of writing, only 30% of the eligible HIV patients have access to antiretroviral treatment.

This is modern understanding of dealing with an health pandemic is a radical departure from mid-2005 when even

Although the rate of infections and the number of infected South Africans remains high, the turnaround of public policy is finally pushing South Africa towards the right direction.

the current President Jacob Zuma testified in a hearing that he “showered after having sex with an HIV-positive woman to prevent contracting HIV.” Although the rate of infections and the number of infected South Africans remains high, the turnaround of public policy is finally pushing South Africa towards the right direction.

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The Consul

Africa: Special Feature

The Other Horn of Africa

By Maxwell Hummel

It was reported earlier this month that the Western black rhino is extinct. This wasn’t a pronouncement made based on specific information; no members of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) witnessed the death of the known last specimen. In fact, it was a tad delayed if anything; the IUCN declared it extinct two years ago, and even then it had been five years since any such rhino had been seen. The cause of this extinction is not subject to much debate: it was hunted to death. Now, there are two possible misconceptions regarding our understanding of the Western black rhino’s extinction.

The first is that the western black rhino is one of the major subspecies of rhino. It isn’t; it was one of five species of black rhino, which is in turn one of five species of rhino.

The second misconception is that

only the Western black rhino was on the edge of extinction. It certainly wasn’t; for the most part, the entire rhino species, along with several other animals, is in quite a dire situation.

There are two African species of rhino: the inaptly named white rhino and the black rhino.

Both have been poached for some number of years due to their most defining feature, their horn. The usage of rhino horn has been documented as far back as 1200 B.C, when Javan rhinos were killed and their horns used for cups. Of course, other parts of the rhino were made into various goods including armor, but the desire for their horns has remained constant over the years.

What has changed over relatively recent years is the type of rhino being hunted. This is perfectly illustrated by the amount of black and white rhinos in the Africa historically and currently. At · 12 ·

the beginning of the 20th century it was estimated that there were well more than one hundred thousand black rhinos in South and East Africa. At the same time, the south-

“As the population grew, these rhinos were introduced back into the areas they once inhabited. It is hard to say why this species seems to be uniquely resilient to the threat of poaching.” ern white rhino was thought to be extinct until a small breeding population was discovered in South Africa. Now the situation is nearly completely reversed. There are now twenty thousand white rhinos in South Africa and only five thousand black rhinos. These numbers are obviously smaller than the sev-

eral hundred thousand that could be found one hundred years ago, certainly, but the recovery of the white rhino is certainly proof that situations as ghastly as the current one aren’t quite hopeless.

At the same time, the white rhino is also representative of a situation that does seem without satisfactory resolution: much like the black rhino is comprised of five subspecies, the white rhino has two subspecies. There is the southern white rhino whose population makes up the vast majority of the white rhino’s numbers, and the northern white rhino. There are precisely four northern white rhinos, all in captivity. But at least hope can be found in one of conservation’s greatest success stories.

After the second population was found in 1895, great lengths were taken to ensure they were protected and could breed without interference. As the population grew, these rhinos were introduced back into the areas they once inhabited.

“...it should not be too much of a surprise that rhino horn can carry a per-ounce weight comparable to that of gold.”

It is hard to say why this species seems to be uniquely resilient to the threat of poaching.

Perhaps that will change in the years to come; poaching of rhinos may actually be worse than ever. In 2009, 122 rhinos were killed. In just two years that number jumped to more than six hundred. Why? Well, before I get into that, remember one thing: rhino horn is very expensive. As the number of rhinos dwindles and punishments for attempting to harvest the horns grow more severe, it should not be too much of a surprise that rhino horn can carry a per-ounce weight comparable to that of gold.

So who is willing to fork over that much money for what is ultimately nothing more than a hunk of keratin?

Simply put, the people who

A calf of the diceros bicornis, otherwise known as the black rhinoceros shell out the money think that these horns have more-or-less mystical powers. Rhino horns have special value in traditional Chinese medicine, and with the Asian rhinos in an even more dire state than the African species, adherents to that medical system have turned to African black markets to procure their desired horns. A weird permutation of these beliefs has also spread to Vietnam, where a rumor has spread in recent years that rhino horns can be used to cure for cancer. This kick-started the

“The only apparent solution seems to be to eliminate the market for these illegal goods.”

demand for a black-market for horns and may have even led to the extinction the Javan rhino in the region.

The horn’s reputed power evolved from being a cancer cure to a general cure all. It has become something of a status symbol; people buy rhino horn either to simply be able to show they can afford or give it away as an impressive gift. The recent economic upswing in Vietnam has produced a · 13 ·

social class affluent enough to purchase these products at a significant pace.

It may be easy enough for us to write the desire for rhino horn off as a product of antiquated superstition, but it really it seems to follow from the development of an upper class in nations like China and Vietnam. As those countries continue to join the first world, we understand and accept that such a process comes at the expense of things like air quality and the working class’ quality of life. Given that, it shouldn’t be too much of a surprise that Africa could also be affected, especially when one considers the increased level of interaction China has had with nations like Angola in recent years. Poaching has always threatened animals like the rhino. However, as the affluent classes of Vietnam and China grow in number, the threat becomes more and more serious. The only apparent solution seems to be to eliminate the market for these illegal goods.

And that’s simply something that no Western nation has the power to do.

C

The Consul

East Asia

No More Feeling the Strones:

Has China’s Third Party Plenum Laid Out a Sure Path For the Next Decade?

By Christine Du The Chinese Communist Party’s much anticipated Third Party Plenum ended recently, leaving scholars, journalists, analysts and essentially Chinawatchers around the world chewing up the slow trickle of information the party released to satiate the public’s curiosity. The party released a vague, party-rhetoric-infused communique at the end of the plenum that was torn apart and analyzed by China scholars and analysts, who were dissatisfied with the document’s lack of real content. Despite complaints over the lack of immediacy and relative transparency of the release of these broadscope reform blueprints consolidated during arguably the most important meeting in China of this decade, there have been floods of news reports, analyst opinions, blog posts—you name it—offering an array of opinions about the Plenum. And there is little consensus among these opinions.

There is praises, criticism, mixed feelings; optimism, pessimism. The one thing that most can agree upon is that the decisions reached at the Plenum

push for further reforms that have deep and monumental policy implications for China. And frankly, we don’t know how it will play out.

A 20 page document released by the party on Friday contained a comprehensive layout of essentially the party’s policy goals for the next decade. The document affirmed Xi Jinping’s early ambitions for furthering economic reform, and included policy reforms targeted at various challenges the Party has been facing with its reform policies, most notably those regarding corruption, income distribution and social issues. Some would even say that these proposals for sweeping policy-reform are wildly ambitious and a clear indication of the reformists’ consolidated power at the Party Center.

In the field of economic reforms, the document proposed a variety of experiments, including putting together markets for farmers to swap land, imposing property taxes more broadly as a way to restrain rapidly escalating property prices, creating an intellectual-property court and expanding carbon-trading exchanges to more cities. The government intends · 14 ·

to allow market mechanisms to determine the allocation of resources, including oil, gas and water.

To combat corruption, the party will push for institutional reforms in its the anti-corruption bureau, namely segregating the bureau from party monitoring (similar to the FBI), into an independent administrative body free from the control of local party cadres and political leaders.

In response to the emergent social and demographic issues facing China today, the party also put forward a series of reform plans. Most notable is its intention to ease up on its notorious one child policy, though specific policy changes were not expounded.

It also announced that it would abolish the labor camp systems that have been in place since 1957. Community correctional policies may now be expanded to replace labor camps, but it is not clear when the abolition will be achieved. Another key area of change is that of land reform. The restriction on transferring usage rights of rural land that is classified as “for construction” will be lifted.

There are many other areas of reform that Xi Jinping and his support-

ers are pushing for through the third party plenum, and it has sparked a huge wave of commentary. What does all of this mean for China? For the US? For the rest of the world?

We can definitively say that China is moving forward with opening up its economic, as the government has pledged to further loosen control on markets, which would increase the competitive power of private enterprises against state owned enterprises. Coupled with promise to reform tax policies and legal procedures regarding property rights, China is trying to assure foreign investors of a safe and fair trading environment.

Foreign capital inflow continues to fuel China’s miraculous economic growth, and it is imperative that the party instigates reforms to ensure the confidence of investors from abroad.

China’s export-based economy took a blow during the 2008 repression, but the repercussions of the global financial meltdown were buffered domestically because of the country’s high savings rate and control over its foreign exchange rates. However, China is now shifting its developmental focus from heavily export-dependent manufacturing sector to a more sustainable service-oriented light industry.

It is safe to say that the Communist Party has not wavered from its goal of economic growth, yet XiJinping and LiKeqiang (Premier) are well aware of the negative externalities put on China’s social sphere and environment. The 3rd plenum mentioned the intent to remedy some of these issues, but critics are skeptical of the government’s true conviction of behind these problems that overshadow its main objective for economic development.

For instance, the modifications on the one child policy—as in, families would now be allowed to have a second baby—are without their own problems. China is now getting a taste of its one child policy—namely, severe aging of society—needs to come up with a way to reshape its demographic. Studies have shown that even without the one-child policy, urban parents would only be having under two children on average. However, this is not the case in rural areas, where a typical families will have five or more children. Westerners liberal ideology

would insist that reproduction is a uni- tralization seemed to have encouraged versal human right, and merely easing corruption as local cadres were given the one child policy is not enough—it more power. In a fundamentally nonought to be completely abolished. How- democratic system, it is more producever, we need to respect the CCP’s res- tive and efficient to establish a central ervations about the risk in eradicating line of power. Xi’s commitment to anthe one child policy in its current demo- ti-corruption is also quite promising, graphic situation. Completely abolish- though as always doubts exist about ing the one-child policy may result in a how much these reforms will actually surge in rural population, while the ur- affect the “big fish.” Analysts are conban population growth will lag behind. cerned that the new anti-corruption Such a development would only exac- will pose a greater risk to corruption of erbate the problems of urbanization local leaders, but central party leaders and urban-rural inequality. Therefore, will still be untouched. even though critics attack this clause Nevertheless, Xi has made some as an empty promise with no immedi- ambitious moves in the third plenum ate deadline (they did not say when this resolution and officially consolidated would be done), we should be patient his power by pushing forth his politias the party needs time to find a way cal agenda. He made a bold claim that to balance urban and rural population unlike DengXiaoping, who initiated Chigrowth that would dampen the issues na’s era of reform, he will no longer be of societal aging and urbanization. “crossing the river feeling the stones.”

The greatest complaint about the Whether or not he’ll bring China to the third plenum resolution is about politi- other side, we’ll have to wait and see. cal reform. The resolution boasts rhetoC ric stressing party power over cadres, demonstrating that the new party leadership is still not in favor of further political democratization.

Many point to the establishment of the National Security Committee and the Central D e e p e n i n g - Re form Leading group and claim that Xi is centralizing his political power. This is a step back from political democratization, which is built upon decentralization of political power.

However, we need to keep in mind the political structure of the CCP and realize that decenJinping has been at the head of the CCP since November 2012 tralization does Xi as the General Secretary of the Central Commitee of CCP and the not necessarily Chaiman of CCP Central Military Commission. Since March 2013, improve policy Xi is also the President of the PRC and the Chairman of the PRC implementation. Central Miliary Commission.

Instead, decen· 15 ·

The Consul

Dear reader,

We are pleased to present to you our second issue of the year! Following our recent issue on North Korea, we at The Consul decided to switch regional focus for this issue to the African subcontinent. However, remaining constant is our emphasis on educating the Penn community on the human aspect of global conflicts as we write about some of the environmental and health issues present in or near conflict zones, as well as some of the worst atrocities currently being used as weapons of war in conflicts in Africa.

We hope that you will find this special feature as well as our coverage of the recent crisis in France and reformation in China enriching to your understanding of international issues. As always, please browse www.theconsul.org to see all of our articles, blog posts, and special content.

Best, Sam Blumenthal and Jing Ran Editors-in-Chief, The Consul

The International Affairs Association University of Pennsylvania