Journal of International Social Affairs Fall 2017

VOLUME 9 NO. 1

FALL 2017

The Journal of International Social Affairs A Patrick Henry College Publication

Issue No. 1 CONTENTS Maren Sekerak

Preventing Violent Extremism in Private Religious Schools (pg. 1)

Claire Atwood

Seclusion and Exclusion: Early Islamic Treatment of Women and Modern Implications (pg. 19)

Nathaniel Mullins

The Russian Symphonia: Harmony of Church and Melody of State (pg. 28)

Sarah Geesaman

Theorists, Tyrants, and Terrorists: The Rise of European Terrorist Ideology in the Narodnaya Volya (pg. 45)

From the Editor

Dear readers,

On behalf of the editors for the Journal of International Social Affairs, I am proud to present the Fall 2017 edition. International Affairs frequently pass people by in a blur of sporadic news stories. Because different nations and groups each try to present their different accounts of current events, the reality behind International Affairs is sometimes difficult to pinpoint. Throughout its history and in this issue, the ISA Journal seeks to uncover the underlying philosophies which motivate and explain modern social affairs. Our four articles fulfill this purpose admirably.

In his paper, “The Russian Symphonia: Harmony of Church and Melody of State,” Nathaniel Mullins examines the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Government with implications for modern Russian policy toward the nation of Iran.

In “Theorists, Tyrants, and Terrorists: The Rise of European Terrorist Ideology in the Narodnaya Volya,” Sarah Gessaman considers the origins of European terrorist ideology in the nihilistic philosophy of early Russian terror groups.

In “Seclusion and Exclusion: Early Islamic Treatment of Women and Implications for Modern Islam,” Claire Atwood examines the roots of the Islam’s treatment of women with implications for the compatibility of Islam with the modern west.

Finally, in “Preventing Violent Extremism in Private Religious Schools,” Maren Sekerak examines the justifications behind the censorship of extremist ideologies in private schools in the United Kingdom and the United States.

This journal would not be possible without the assistance of many. The editorial staff of David Thetford, Claire Atwood, Esther Katz, Danielle Fife, and Meg McEwen has worked tirelessly over the last few months to help prepare this journal. We are grateful for the guidance of our faculty supervisor Dr. Stephen Baskerville, for the assistance of the Journalism, Strategic Intelligence, International Politics and Policy, and Political Theory programs, and for the assistance of Dr. Frank Guliuzza and the Patrick Henry College Department of Academic Affairs for their assistance in producing the journal.

Most of all we are grateful for you, our readers. We hope you gain as much from reading this Issue as we did from preparing it.

Sincerely, David Slaughter, Editor-in-Chief

There are some things which cannot be learned quickly, and time, which is all we have, must be paid heavily for their acquiring.

Ernest Hemingway

STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Associate Editor: Research Editor: Copy Editors: Layout Editor: Faculty Supervisor:

David Slaughter David Thetford Claire Atwood Esther Katz Danielle Fife Megan McEwen Dr. Stephen Baskerville

PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 www.phc.edu ISSN 2572-9586

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P

Violent Extremism in Private Religious Schools

reventing

Maren Sekerak This paper will address the issue of violent extremism in youth and what steps, if any, the United States should take to address the problem within private schools. Radicalization of young people is a growing problem both as a whole and within the United States, and every effort must be made to stabilize, assist, and guide these at-risk youths. To combat this problem in the United Kingdom, the government has passed legislation mandating school teachers to report on any suspicious extremist activity of their students. This paper will discuss the United Kingdom’s solution to the problem of extremism in youth and evaluate its effectiveness for potential use in the United States. As a specific area of concern, this paper will highlight private religious schools and any current or potential legislation that might afford the US government jurisdiction to monitor the existence of extremist curriculum and teaching within these private schools.

Radicalization of Youth in the United States As evidenced by the average age of converts to the Islamic State, extremism in youth is a pertinent problem for the United States. The average age of a female convert to the Islamic State, or IS, is only 21, with one third of female converts being teenagers.1 According to an NBC article from May 2016, two thirds of the people known to have left the United States between 2013-2014 to fight for IS were under 25.2 Many of these radicalized youth traveled to Syria directly after high school. The United Nations recognized the serious threat of violent extremism in youth by hosting a seminar in June of 2016. During the seminar, global leaders discussed methods of radicalization, vulnerabilities of children, and preventative measures.3 Before discussing violent extremism, radicalization, and terrorism, these terms must be defined. The FBI’s definition of violent extremism is, “encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals.”4 This relatively simple definition captures the core of the idea and will be used for the duration of this paper. Additionally, the terms “violent extremist” and “radical” are almost always interchangeable throughout the paper. “Radicalization” in this context means the process of becoming a proponent of violent extremism. In this

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paper, “terrorism” is used in reference to the actual violent acts committed, and a “terrorist” is a person who physically commits the violent acts, as described above (not just condoning them).

Currently, the Islamic State is the largest and most pressing extremist group to combat, but regardless of religious identity, youth in general are most susceptible to radicalization.5 For second and third-generation Muslim immigrants living in the US, often the inability to integrate into society is the main cause for frustration and isolationist behavior. Traditional Muslim doctrine also fosters isolationist communities of like-minded believers.6 Of the disenfranchised youth that this system produces, some will turn to fundamentalist Islam as a way of gaining an identity. Radicalized Islamic youth often come from this demographic.7 United States Legal Precedent In the United States, the majority of laws regarding the investigation of terrorism come from the stipulations in the Patriot Act of 2001.8 Additional regulations come from Executive Orders 12333, 13354, 13388, 13584.9 Finally, the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide addresses the basics of what actions constitute an FBI investigation, whether it be an assessment, preliminary investigation, or full investigation.10 Any concrete terrorism activity within United States private schools would be prosecuted under these statutes. However, most of the laws referenced above are in regards to factually demonstrable terrorist activity, while extremist teaching in private schools is a more nuanced offense.

In a situation where a private school is suspected of teaching extremist material, the legal course of action would be for the FBI to open a threat assessment or preliminary investigation. Based on information collected during the preliminary investigation, the FBI would be able to determine whether there were “specific and articulable facts” which give grounds to bring the case to a full investigation.

Only in a full investigation does the FBI have authorization to apply for surveillance under FISA.11 The specific regulation of private schools is almost entirely left to the states.

No state or territory makes provisions for regulating private school curriculum on the basis of extremist beliefs.12 This means that there is almost no accountability for private religious schools. Accreditation bodies do review the curriculum for academic rigor, but not for extremist beliefs, and accreditation is entirely optional for private schools.13 This means that any information on extremist teaching in private schools would come from a tip or from constant threat assessments of various private schools by the FBI. Since the former is an irregular, unreliable option and the latter would be incredibly time consuming, the United States is left with a gap in their intelligence on violent extremism.

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At this time, there has been only one Supreme Court case directly related to extremist teaching in private schools. In Bob Jones University v. United States (1983), the university prohibited interracial couples on the basis of religious beliefs.14 In response, the IRS took away their tax-exempt status. The Supreme Court ruled against Bob Jones University, claiming that their discriminatory policies violated “fundamental national public policy.”15 In order to get their tax-exemption back, Bob Jones repealed its policy. This case suggests that in the event of a similar violation, the same tactic of removing the school’s tax-exemption would be considered Constitutional. However, in cases where a private school had enough funds to waive that right, this method might not work.

In the case of the Fairfax Islamic Saudi Academy (discussed in length in the following section), the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was tasked to investigate, as the school was a Saudi Arabian school operating in the US.16 The school was considered a branch of the Saudi embassy and offered diplomatic status.17 Even though radical Islamic teachings were found in the textbooks, the school was not prosecuted under any US law. The situation was handled by the US government’s personal research organization, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom. They communicated directly with Saudi Arabia and the school to update the textbooks. There is no clear precedent for prosecuting independent private schools that promote extremism.

United Kingdom Legal Precedent To combat violent extremism, the United Kingdom has enacted a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy called Contest, which was first established in 2003.18 Contest seeks to counter violent extremism in four categories, named: Pursue, Protect, Prepare, and Prevent. Pursue seeks to “stop terrorist attacks,” Prevent, “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism,” Protect, “to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack,” and Prepare, “to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.”19 Contest as a whole combines the efforts of many different agencies and government bodies. Preventing youth radicalization in schools falls under the Prevent category.

An additional, supporting piece of legislation governing counterterrorism efforts in the UK is the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.20 One of the most contentious directives of the act is dubbed Prevent Duty. Prevent Duty refers to the stipulation in Section 26 of the act, which orders authority figures to report on their students’ extremist or anti-British beliefs.21 Most often, Prevent Duty refers to school teachers reporting on their students. Many people are criticizing this act for marginalizing Muslims and violating the right to free speech.22 “Channel” is the title given to the United Kingdom’s system for aiding those

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identified to be at-risk of radicalization, whether they be adults or children.23 Channel fits under the Prevent category of Contest. When these people get reported for extremist beliefs, the Channel Panel will review their case and decide on the best course of action. Normally this involves cooperation with a trusted mentor, local social worker, school staff, or another authority figure to meet with them and address the issues they are facing.

Ofsted, or the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills, is the United Kingdom’s school inspection department.24 It is Ofsted’s role (or the role of a subsidiary body) to perform inspection of all public and private (also known as independent) schools. In the wake of Contest and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, Ofsted has incorporated these new duties and criteria into their inspections.

To supplement the current UK laws, the government is crafting a new Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, which is yet to be released.25 Initial discussions of the bill revealed that the government was planning on introducing three new civil orders, which constitute a criminal offense if disobeyed. In a review of the new bill, Parliament condemned this method of law enforcement.26 The new civil orders would ban extremist groups, give law enforcement more power to stop extremist behavior, and give power to local authorities to close down premises used in support of extremism. However, Parliament recently stated that it appears the government is backing down from their proposed civil orders. They also stated that the bill includes so many fundamental legal problems and sensitive issues that it requires a longer review period than standard bills.27 The bill has not been fully drafted yet, and there are no indications of when it will appear before Parliament.

The Fairfax Islamic Saudi Academy In the United States, the most recent issue involving religious extremism in a private school is the case of the Fairfax Islamic Saudi Academy. As stated above, the Islamic Saudi Academy was established by the Saudi Arabian government and operates under the umbrella of the Saudi embassy. The school opened in Fairfax, Virginia in 1984 and quickly grew as it filled a niche need.28 The school observes traditional Islamic practices while also offering rigorous academics.

The Islamic Saudi Academy first appeared in the news in connection to Mohammed Osman Idris, who was arrested for lying about his attempted suicide mission.29 The second time the school made headlines was following the arrest of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali in 2003. The valedictorian of the 1999 class at the Islamic Saudi Academy, Abu Ali was tried and convicted for conspiring to assassinate President Bush as well as aiding Al-Qaeda.30 In 2002, the Washington Post pub-

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lished an article on extremist teaching in Islamic schools, listing the Islamic Saudi Academy as a school that fostered distain of other religions.31 Following these cases, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) visited the school in 2007 to inspect the curriculum.32 They requested copies of the textbooks, but were denied. The USCIRF then asked the Saudi government directly for information, but again received no curriculum samples. Instead, the Islamic Saudi Academy stated to the Commission that the offending textbooks had been updated and that they would only provide the new material if the scholars reviewing the curriculum were agreed upon by both parties. As the Commission and the school could not agree, the matter was dropped, and no new information has emerged. However, the Islamic Saudi Academy has closed and reopened under a different name: King Abdullah Academy.33 The United Kingdom’s Treatment of Faith-Based Schools In the United Kingdom, the Prevent Strategy and Prevent Duty are being met with criticism for marginalizing Muslims, as well as having an overly broad definition of extremism which includes anything that subverts “British values.”34 Since the Prevent Strategy is designed to be holistic, negative consequences could be far-reaching.

Some private religious schools, called faith schools, are being heavily penalized during Ofsted inspections when they were previously marked as “outstanding.”35 Many think the new standards are too restricting on the right to free speech and freedom of religion, especially considering the fact that they were not penalized for the same behavior three years ago. Certain Ofsted inspectors have also been accused of being racist and insensitive when visiting faith schools for actions such as not removing their shoes in a place of worship.36 These reports continue to spur on the conflict between faith schools and Ofsted.

An additional concern for religious groups is the proposed inspection of outof-school religious classes, including Sunday school and summer camp.37 These inspections would only occur in places where the class met for an average of six or more hours per week, but many congregations offer classes that would meet that criteria.38 Orthodox Jewish schools are a minority heavily affected by the recent Prevent strategy. February 2016 reports by Ofsted claimed that certain Jewish, or Charedi, schools “removed images of women from textbooks, taught that a woman’s role was ‘to cook and clean,’ crossed out the word ‘Christmas,’ and even refused to allow boys to speak to female inspectors.”39 While these beliefs are considered extreme today, schools respond to these allegations by citing their right to freely practice their religion. Ofsted inspectors currently consider these

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practices to violate the British value of equality.40 Even though Christian faith schools make up the vast majority of private schools, they are facing scrutiny from Ofsted regarding traditional beliefs on marriage and family. Inspectors have asked young students leading questions about sexuality, marriage, and race, marking the entire school down for answers that were not tolerant enough.41 Sometimes certain inspectors are unforgiving or interpret the law more broadly than it was intended. According to Simon Calvert, Deputy Director for Public Affairs at The Christian Institute, the mandate to, “actively promote British values,” needs to be clarified in order to reduce confusion and frustration over increasingly condemning Ofsted reports.42 Perhaps more than any other type of faith school, Islamic schools are being penalized for traditional practices under Ofsted’s new standards. A comment that often appears in reports on Islamic schools is that the students are “poorly prepared for British life.”43 The most apparent cause for concern is the widespread gender segregation in Islamic schools, based on Islamic beliefs. Often the students are separated by gender by 5th or 6th grade, and any interaction between male and female teachers is separated by dividing screens.44 Ofsted has said on multiple occasions that this practice does not prepare students for life in modern British society.

In regards to Prevent Duty specifically, teachers are facing pressure to report on any extremist behavior they observe or risk breaking the law. Sometimes this pressure to obey the law fosters over-reporting or exaggeration.45 Some teachers have observed that Prevent Duty fosters a sense of suspicion in schools, while some families have stated they cannot discuss sensitive topics with their children for fear the kids might twist the parents’ words if they bring the subject up at school.46 Data from this past year shows that 70% of children referred to Channel, the counter-extremism program, were described as displaying radical Islamic beliefs, while 15% were reported for far-right extremism.47 Some have taken this data to show that Prevent Duty targets Muslims as a whole.

Implications for the United States The United Kingdom has clearly wrestled with the problem of extremism in private schools for longer than the United States. The UK’s experience affords the US an opportunity to gain insight into the oversight process of private religious schools before shaping its own counter-extremism laws. The United States’ relative inexperience with counter-extremism laws for private schools is mostly due to the fact that few situations have necessitated a response. However, the paucity of extremist teaching in private schools does not mean that the United States has a perfect system. It is possible that certain private schools promote these beliefs

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unbeknownst to the FBI. The United States should prepare a careful response to extremism in private schools so the nation is prepared in case such a situation arises.

The United States lacks a specific plan for addressing extremism in private schools. Should a situation arise, there is no pertinent department to address the situation. The investigation would most likely fall to the FBI, where the investigation of private schools is probably not standardized. If an allegation of extremism in a private school was made today, it would be addressed in a similar way to any other extremism case. The FBI would most likely perform some research, then send an agent to investigate the situation. The solution would be up to the interpretation of the FBI agents and supervisors assigned to the case. This sort of solution would be fairly subjective, when an objective standard for investigation of private schools would be more appropriate.

An objective approach to addressing extremism in private schools is necessary because subjectivity, especially in regards to a sensitive issue such as religious radicalism, could escalate the situation instead of solving the issue. The government’s response should not be left to the agents assigned to the case, but rather should be reasoned and prepared by many educated people prior to encountering the specific instance. A prepared response also lessens the chance of something unexpected occurring, such as an agent not being fully aware of the complexity of the issue, or acting out of an emotional response rather than following protocols. The agent or investigator should already know how to handle the situation based off of the guidelines that are in place prior to being assigned to the case. If an investigator knows their mission and their plan of attack, they are less likely to make a mistake, act on their emotions, or formulate a controversial report which could make the situation worse. Protocols also mitigate bureaucratic confusion, where individuals are unsure of who needs to handle the situation or what channels are proper to address the issue. With the correct protocols in place, the proper authorities know what is in their jurisdiction, and how to efficiently go about their work to ensure that the situation is handled correctly.

Benefits of United Kingdom Policy Fortunately for the United States, the nation does not need to go through the same trial and error period as the United Kingdom when it comes to counter-extremism laws. Instead, the United States can learn directly from the mistakes of the UK without committing them. Therefore, when forming policies, the United States should use the UK as a case study of the results of counter-extremism laws in effect. Using the information gleaned from these observations, United States policy makers can utilize the effective aspects of the law and avoid the unfavor-

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able ones.

Three positive things the United Kingdom accomplishes with their Contest Strategy are their holistic structure, the focus on reintegration, and the subsequent discovery of serious issues within certain private schools. The Contest Strategy combines all investigation of extremism under one platform, using a department that already existed, Ofsted, to investigate schools. This simplifies the structure, making the process streamlined. The UK also developed a detailed reintegration plan, Channel, designed to help both children and adults facing radicalization.

The mentors that partner with Channel address the root of the problem, instead of merely punishing the offender. Finally, the UK’s school inspection agency uncovered problems that had gone unnoticed previously, such as library books within an Islamic school stating that women are “‘commanded to obey their husbands and fulfil their domestic duties’” and also giving “tacit approval to a husband beating his wife.”48 Nearly all of the negative aspects of the UK’s Contest Strategy and Prevent Duty stem from poorly defined terms and overly broad mandates. Terms and phrases such as “intolerant,” “life in modern Britain,” and “British values” received backlash because they were poorly defined and broad and could be used to restrict harmless speech.49 Ofsted had an opportunity to precisely define what “actively supporting British values” means and does not mean, but they left it open to interpretation. By having such a broad mandate, they reported several innocent schools as intolerant.50, 51 Rather than clarify the terminology, Ofsted unintentionally created a larger problem by making several schools frustrated.

Secondly, the United Kingdom did not provide enough adjustment time or training in Prevent Duty for teachers, as evidenced by the fact that some teachers were unsure of exactly how the system worked or were over-reporting suspected radicalism.52 The mandate to the teachers to report any suspicion of radicalism created confusion and fear. Some teachers over-reported, as they were not sure exactly what they should be reporting, but they did not want to disobey the law.

Some teachers actively searched for any sign of what they believed to be radicalism, while others criticized the law for creating a community of distrust and suspicion.53 Barriers and Precautions The United States can most certainly implement some of what the UK has done regarding counter-extremism; however, the United States cannot implement all of what the United Kingdom has done. It is doubtful that Congress would pass a bill that permitted the amount of surveillance and oversight that the UK has allowed. This is because United States citizens, as a whole, fundamentally value

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their individual privacy and freedom of expression more than the average United Kingdom citizen.54 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution makes it very clear that we should not restrict speech. Obviously some precautionary measures must be taken, but for the most part free speech is entirely upheld. Conversely, UK law states that some restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society.�55 Hence, UK citizens have been conditioned to allow for restrictions, while US citizens hold free speech as the standard.

Additionally, the United States has not had a catalyst to drive Congress to pass an anti-extremism bill, such as the 2005 London bombing did for the UK.56 The United States should not wait for a situation large enough to force them to act. Instead, they should preemptively address the issue, rather than attempting to formulate a law while reeling from a surprise situation. One example of the United States creating a protocol after a large event is the Patriot Act, which many have argued was too broad.57 This act was written immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001, similar to the way in which the UK strengthened Contest in the wake of the July 7, 2005 bombing. Some have said that if the Patriot Act was written prior to the attacks, it would have been more narrowly defined and restricted in its scope.58 Furthermore, the United States should not wait to draft a protocol until after a situation arises because the valuable time in the aftermath of an event should be spent responding to the problem itself, not figuring out how to go about responding to the problem.

When forming its counter-extremism policy, the United States needs to be careful to narrowly define what constitutes an extremist belief. The two issues that must be addressed are violence and racism. Intolerance should not be included in the mandate, as in the Prevent Strategy, because the term is relatively open to interpretation. Restricting intolerant speech would probably not be considered Constitutional under the First Amendment. Additionally, traditional beliefs regarding marriage and gender identity might be construed as intolerant, when those subjects should be addressed in a different capacity. The two issues of violence and racism are almost universally held to be wrong, which would reduce possible contention over the law.

The United States needs to watch closely to make sure its counterterrorism materials and guidelines are not focused on Islamic extremism. Even if the highest percentage of radicals come from a form of Islam, the focus on Muslims being the highest percentage of radicals is, in fact, a factor encouraging the radicalization of some Muslims.59 Some Muslims take offense at this stereotype, and the anger they feel can drive them further into their Islamic communities, sometimes into radical teachings. To ensure that the United States does not contribute to the problem, we should take every effort to treat radical Islamists the same as other

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extremists. The FBI’s “Don’t Be a Puppet” webpage does an exceptional job at educating children about the dangers of all extremist groups, without singling out Muslims.60 Similarly diplomatic wording should be used in any new counter-extremism law.

While a comprehensive strategy like Contest would probably not get the support it would need to pass in the United States, the US should take small steps towards a more limited strategy of its own. The US should utilize the strengths of the UK’s Channel and Prevent Duty to aid in counter-extremism efforts and examine possible methods of private school inspection, keeping in mind the controversy surrounding Ofsted inspections. Based on the criticism surrounding the UK’s Prevent Strategy, the United States should be careful to define all terms as precisely as possible, as well as craft laws using the least restrictive means.

Recommendations To address the issue of extremist teaching in private religious schools, the United States should establish a protocol to follow when investigating private schools. This protocol needs to be limited in scope, extremely precise, and easy to implement. Instead of creating a new agency, the FBI should adopt the primary responsibility. Since the FBI already has jurisdiction over most terrorism cases within the United States, this protocol would not need a new law, but would fall under existing FBI manuals. The protocol should establish when an investigation is permitted and when it is necessary. It should also clearly define what the investigators will look for and what the punishment or resolution will be. To accomplish these goals, the FBI will need to partner with other agencies, making collaboration and communication necessary for success.

Even though the FBI specializes in counterterrorism, the United States Department of Education has more experience working with schools, which is necessary when dealing with private schools. Since the two organizations have entirely different mandates, they would approach the issue from two different viewpoints, which would increase the overall knowledge of the team. The FBI should assume the leadership role, as they have both legal authority and greater experience in matters of national security, but the Department of Education should be significantly involved in the process. To aid in this endeavor, the FBI should create a small unit under their counterterrorism branch, which would facilitate the partnership with the Department of Education, as well as provide training and counter-extremism materials for use in private schools. The formation of the unit should be supervised by FBI leadership, but once the unit was functional, it should only be comprised of 3-5 employees, functioning on an as-needed basis. If the demand for private school inspection increases, the unit should only expand as appropriate.

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Since this protocol should be in keeping with current FBI guidelines, it should not allow for random inspections. The FBI should follow the channels described in their Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, opening an assessment when someone offers a tip, a preliminary investigation when there is suspicion of extremism (or a known extremist employed by the school), and a full investigation when there are facts demonstrating extremism.61 In all matters, they should attempt to be as transparent with the school as possible. The school should be formally advised regarding the steps of the investigation, so as to limit any misunderstandings they may have. In this way, the FBI would continue to uphold the current standards of freedom of speech and privacy.

During any inspection of a private school, the FBI should bring a trained representative from the United States Department of Education. Working under the FBI’s special unit, this person would handle any negotiations regarding violent or racist materials discovered. Since the focus of the Department of Education is on helping schools better educate children, the focus of any negotiations should be centered around what is best for the children. If necessary, the FBI would be available to enforce the decisions made by the Department of Education. At first, this system should function under existing counterterrorism laws and not require additional mandates. However, if a situation arises where the FBI needs more authority to proceed in a matter, the laws surrounding the unit should be examined by the FBI’s legal department to judge if a new law should be formulated. This special task force might need to be given more power to enforce these rules.

When examining materials for extremist teaching, the Department of Education should look for materials encouraging unjust violence and racism. Each case should be handled individually, making sure the intent of the author was taken into account. Materials should only be banned when the intent of the author is clear beyond a reasonable doubt to ensure that only the most offensive books are being restricted. These books should be disposed of, by command of the FBI. To resolve an issue regarding extremist material in private schools, the protocol needs to clearly define what situations should be resolved quietly within the unit and what situations deserve a full investigation and possible court case. The protocol should also take precautions to shield any specific information about a case from the public in the interest of protecting the children involved. Only situations where the school is uncooperative should be taken to court, following the precedent found in Bob Jones University v. United States.62 Additionally, the FBI should set up a very limited, optional version of Prevent Duty, where school teachers have the option to report any radical beliefs to the FBI. The FBI’s special unit on extremism would provide them with materials and assist the teacher in helping the child. This should not be enforced or necessary,

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but simply a tool available for all teachers. The assistance and guidance of the child would fall directly on the teacher, since the US does not have an extensive program such as Channel to handle the matter. The teacher would need to discuss the issue with the child, under counsel from the FBI’s special unit. If the program becomes widely used, the special FBI unit might need to expand to address the need. The FBI should be extremely clear that this program is optional. Teachers should never feel pressured to report on a student.

To assist these students, teachers would need counterterrorism training. The FBI should produce several videos designed to educate teachers, instead of performing training at each school personally. These videos should start with basic information, but cover the issue in increasing depth. They should be unclassified and available to all teachers online. A streamlined way to combine all this information would be on a secure website which posts all educational materials publically. All licensed schools would receive an access code which would allow them entrance to a portal for reporting students. The reporting process should be detailed, but not overly complex. There should also be a function to track changes to the child’s behavior. The FBI would have access to all of this information. In severe cases of radicalization, where the child is making direct threats of terrorism, the FBI would need to assume direct control of the situation.

Finally, Congress should pass a bill mandating accreditation bodies to check for violent or racist teaching when inspecting the curriculum of private schools.

Since accreditation is optional for private schools, this should not be a terribly contentious bill. There does not need to be a special accreditation task force, only another category to check when reviewing the curriculum. Of course, the mandate should be clear, well defined, and have examples to follow. In case of confusion, accreditation bodies should have direct access to the US Department of Education to discuss any issue they face. If needed, the Department of Education would have direct access to the FBI, which would act as a final authority in the matter. If the accreditation body found violence or racist materials in a private school, they would again contact the Department of Education, who would contact the FBI if necessary to make sure the school gets inspected and the matter resolved.

Conclusion In conclusion, the United States is currently faced with the problem of its inability to effectively monitor violent extremism in private religious schools. The United Kingdom has enacted a large-scale counterterrorism program which offers some solutions that might be helpful to US efforts. Using the lessons learned in the United Kingdom regarding Contest, Channel, and Prevent Duty, the FBI should form a special unit to implement a counter-extremism protocol for pri-

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vate schools. Working with the FBI, the Department of Education should inspect material in private schools during the course of an investigation. The FBI should also create a standardized, completely optional system for teachers to report extremist beliefs of their students, with the focus on assisting the child. Using these methods, the United States can better protect its children from violent extremism.

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References 1. Danielle Paquette, “Why Young American Women are Joining ISIS,” The Washington Post, November 17, 2015, accessed December 8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ wp/2015/11/17/why-young-american-women-are-joining-isis/?utm_term=.ff7582820643.

2. Richard Engel et al., “The Americans: 15 Who Left the United States to Join ISIS,” NBC News, May 16, 2016, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/americans-15-who-left-united-states-join-isis-n573611.

3. “UN Urges Prevention Efforts to Address Threats of Violent Extremism to Children and Youth,” UN News Centre, June 3, 2016, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54133#.WEnh9PkrLIU. 4. “What is Violent Extremism?” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed December 9, 2016, https://cve.fbi.gov/whatis/.

5. Margarita Bizina, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 2014), accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.globalsecuritystudies.com/Bizina%20Youth-AG.pdf.

6. Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2009), 48.

7. Bizina.

8. “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001,” Public Law 107 –56. U.S. Statutes at Large 115 (2001), accessed December 9, 2016, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3162enr/pdf/ BILLS-107hr3162enr.pdf.

9. “Executive Orders on Privacy and Civil Liberties and the Information Sharing Environment,” Justice Information Sharing, US Department of Justice, August 10, 2013, accessed December 9, 2016, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/executive-orders.

10. “FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), 2013 Version,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013, accessed December 9, 2016, https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2013-version/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20 Guide%20%28DIOG%29%202013%20Version%20Part%2001%20of%2001/view.

11. Ibid.

12. “State Regulation of Private and Home Schools,” U.S. Department of Education, November 23, 2016, accessed December 9, 2016, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/regulation-map.html.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 13. Ibid.

14. Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Tech, “Bob Jones University v. United States,” Oyez, accessed December 8, 2016, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-3.

15. Ibid.

16. “Saudi Arabia: USCIRF Confirms Material Inciting Violence, Intolerance Remains in Textbooks Used at Saudi Government’s Islamic Saudi Academy,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, June 11, 2008, accessed December 6, 2016, http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/ press-releases/saudi-arabia-uscirf-confirms-material-inciting-violence-intolerance-remains.

17. “USCIRF Responds to Parents of Islamic Saudi Academy Students,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, December 21, 2007, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www. uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-responds-parents-islamic-saudi-academy-students.

18. Brian Auten, “The FAQs: Counter-Extremism Policy and Sunday School in the United Kingdom,” The Gospel Coalition, January 22, 2016, accessed August 31, 2016, https://www.thegospelcoalition. org/article/the-faqs-counter-extremism-policy-and-sunday-school-in-the-united-kingdom.

19. United Kingdom Parliament, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,”

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/con-

test-summary.pdf.

20. United Kingdom Department for Education, “The Prevent Duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers,” (Crown Copyright, June 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf.

21. Ibid.

22. Divya Talwar, “‘Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy Faces Legal Challenge,” BBC News, December 6, 2016, accessed December 13, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38209567.

23. United Kingdom Parliament, “Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism,” (Crown Copyright, 2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf.

24. Ofsted, “About Us,” United Kingdom Government, accessed December 13, 2016, https://www. gov.uk/government/organisations/ofsted.

25. “The Proposed Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill,” United Kingdom Parliament, July 21, 2016, accessed December 13, 2016, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/ jtrights/105/10507.htm#_idTextAnchor028.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 28. George Clifford, “Cultures Mix in Fairfax,” The Washington Post, December 21, 1984, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1984/12/21/cultures-mix-in-fairfax/d7d3e2f4-6a39-4ece-97bf-2beabbddaf2e/?utm_term=.daf1c3332a03.

29. John V. Wyman, “Criminal Complaint in U.S. v. Mohammed Osman Idris,” CNN Law Center, March 26, 2002, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/03/26/us.v.idris/.

30. Emily Belz, “Saudi Studies,” World, July 14, 2009, accessed December 15, 2016, https://world. wng.org/2009/07/saudi_studies.

31. Valerie Strauss and Emily Wax, “Where Two Worlds Collide,” The Washington Post, February 25, 2002, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/02/25/ where-two-worlds-collide/e04d18c3-e0ce-45d2-9b17-724ff67c88c2/?utm_term=.3dc25319a0e2.

32. “USCIRF Responds to Parents.”

33. “King Abdullah Academy,” King Abdullah Academy, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www. kaa-herndon.com/.

34. Divya Talwar.

35. Etan Smallman, “Is Ofsted Scrutinising Faith Schools Properly?” New Statesman, March 11, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/education/2016/03/ofsted-scrutinising-faith-schools-properly.

36. Mark Hodge, “Muslim School Slammed: Ofsted Inspection Finds Islamic Faith School had Leaflets Branding Music and Dancing as ‘Acts of the Devil,’” The Sun, June 17, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1298124/ofsted-inspection-finds-islamic-faith-school-hadleaflets-branding-music-and-dancing-as-acts-of-the-devil/.

37. Harry Farley, “Ofsted Will Still Inspect Sunday Schools, Warns Christian MP,” Christian Today, July 11, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.christiantoday.com/article/ofsted.will.still. inspect.sunday.schools.warns.christian.mp/90358.htm.

38. Ibid.

39. Smallman.

40. Ibid.

41. Heather Bellamy and Simon Calvert, “Christian Schools Challenged by Ofsted Over ‘British Values,’” Cross Rhythms, February 5, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.crossrhythms. co.uk/articles/life/Christian_Schools_Challenged_By_Ofsted_Over_British_Values/55406/p1/.

42. Ibid.

43. Talha Ahmad, “Ofsted on Muslim Faith Schools: Islamophobic? Ignorant? Or Both?” The Muslim News, December 24, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/com-

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S ment/ofsted-muslim-faith-schools-islamophobic-ignorant/.

44. Javier Espinoza, “Luton Muslim School Uses Dividing Screen Across Room to Separate Men and Women,” The Telegraph, April 28, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ education/2016/04/27/school-inspector-warns-of-segregation-in-independent-faith-schoo/.

45. Freddie Whittaker, “MPs and Peers Demand Review of Prevent Duty,” Schools Week, July 22, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://schoolsweek.co.uk/mps-and-peers-demand-review-of-prevent-duty/.

46. Whittaker.

47. “Thousands of Children Reported to UK’s Anti-Extremism Program,” Deccan Chronicle, September 12, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/world/europe/120916/ thousands-of-children-reported-to-uks-anti-extremism-program.html.

48. Richard Adams, “Ofsted Wrong to Penalise Islamic School Over Gender Segregation, Court Rules,” The Guardian, November 8, 2016, accessed December 14, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/nov/08/ofsted-wrong-to-penalise-islamic-school-over-gender-segregation-court-rules.

49. Ben Stanford and Yasmine Ahmed, “The Prevent Strategy: The Human Rights Implications of the United Kingdom’s Counter-Radicalisation Policy,” Questions of International Law, July 20, 2016, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-prevent-strategy-the-human-rights-implications/.

50. Bellamy.

51. Hodge.

52. Javier Espinoza, “Teachers ‘More Likely to Report Children as Potential Terrorists than Police,’” The Telegraph, March 25, 2016, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2016/03/26/teachers-more-likely-to-report-children-as-potential-terrorists/.

53. Whittaker.

54. Richard Wike and Katie Simmons, “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech,” Pew Research Center, November 18, 2015, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-butopposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/.

55. Ibid.

56. Josh Siegel, “How the British Government Tries to Stop Youth From Becoming Terrorists,” The Daily Signal, October 9, 2016, accessed December 18, 2016, http://dailysignal.com/2016/10/09/howthe-british-government-tries-to-stop-youth-from-becoming-terrorists/.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 57. Larry Abramson and Maria Godoy, “The Patriot Act: Key Controversies,” NPR, December 16, 2005, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/patriotactdeal.html.

58. Ibid.

59. Rami G. Khouri, “9/11 Then and Now: Terror, Militarism, War and Fear,” Al Jazeera, September 11, 2016, accessed December 18, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/911-terror-militarism-war-fear-160911055050615.html.

60. “What is Violent Extremism?”

61. “FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), 2013 Version.”

62. “Bob Jones University v. United States.”

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S

Exclusion: Early Islamic Treatment of Women and Modern Implications

eclusion and

Claire Atwood The study of early Islamic treatment of women is crucial in addressing the current state of Muslim women throughout the world today. Understanding why Muslim women in the Middle East are considered inferior to their male counterparts can be answered by reflecting on the Qur’an’s regulation of women and early Islam’s application of the religious text to gender roles. Evolving from pre-Islamic Arabia in the 600s, the new religion of Islam promoted the exclusion of women from the public eye, considering the fairer sex to be inferior politically, legally, and mentally.

The Arabian Woman’s Traditional Character and Sphere Islam grew out of the ancient Near East in 610. Although its fundamental beliefs were officially born with Muhammad’s divine revelations after an angelic visitation, the practical workings of Muslim life were heavily influenced by the Arabic customs of the day. Early Islam’s treatment of women significantly overlapped with the region’s mindset towards gender. The primary common characteristic was a patriarchal society inwardly focused on the tribe. In Arabic culture, the patriarchal family served as a long-term, durable social structure with an intense focus on extended familial ties. The significance of family was far more influential than a person’s class or profession.1 The nuclear family of three generations served as the basic unit in pastoral and village communities. 2 The power of men in the traditional patriarchal system was evidenced by various laws directing the rights of women. A woman was the property of her father or husband, married or divorced according to his will. Polygyny and female infanticide were both common practices.3 The basic responsibilities of the sexes were clearly divided, particularly in pastoral and village communities. Men were mainly responsible for looking after the land and livestock, while women cooked, cleaned, and reared the children. Men were formally responsible for dealing with the outside world.4 Although legally and politically women possessed minimal power, they did hold a large degree of authority in the domestic sphere. The primary role of a woman was wife and mother, confined to the household. As a woman grew older,

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she could acquire greater influence as a mother of male children or senior wife.

It was possible to gain authority over not only the younger women of the family but also over the men.5 During times of war, women could be found taking care of the wounded soldiers on the battlefield and encouraging soldiers onto victory as part of coteries.6 While women were regarded as important in society through these various roles, they were still considered property with full submission owed to the male figures in their lives.

Certain women served as exceptions in the military, religious, and political spheres. There were many cases of women who arose as proud, strong-willed, and loud participants in war efforts. Religiously, there are records of women holding significant religious roles as seers, soothsayers, judge-arbiters, and occasionally prophetesses.7 Politically and socially, women occasionally served as mediators, taking part in public events with some degree of influence.

Though a female holding a leadership position was rare, passivity was not a clear characteristic of women in pre-Islamic Arabia. Forced to live a hard life in primarily the desert with constant fear of war and plunder, women were strong and resilient. The conditions of survival help explain women’s courage and even enthusiasm for a good, victorious fight.8 Simply because females were largely housewives did not mean they were ignorantly sedate.

Unfortunately, there exists little information regarding women’s daily lives during this time. Several reasons account for this. One is that woman in general did not hold positions of social prominence and thus merited less recording of their lives. Also, many records are inaccurate or incomplete, skewing any thorough picture. Finally, historians demonstrated significant prejudice in their records. Compilations of reports by second and third-century Muslim recorders were subject to substantial anti-female prejudice, thus giving the modern historian a misrepresentation of the truth.9 Islam’s Legal Provisions Two distinctions arise in comparing pre-Islamic Arabian women with those following them in the first two centuries of Islam. Before Mohammad, there existed no unified codified law. This meant that the role of women could vary significantly based on the individual woman’s personality and the attitude of her family.

Once Islamic law was codified, it set legal and religious standards for women to follow, thereby narrowly defining their role in society. The second distinction was that women before Islam began did not suffer from prescribed seclusion. Although women were largely limited to being wives and mothers under the control of their husbands, they were not legally confined to certain parts of the household with only other females and close male relatives.10 Thus, in pre-Islamic Arabia,

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women were treated as subordinate to men, yet they were not legally resigned to seclusion and pre-established roles.

At the heart of the Islamic religion is the Qur’an, the divine revelations Mohammad received from Allah from 609 to 632. As the central religious text of Islam, the Qur’an is considered to be the ultimate authority. Mohammad’s revelations from Allah are both eternal and universal yet also directed at the specific problems facing Mohammad’s community. As the Qur’an was codified and the laws set into practice, the regulations were accepted and recognized as divine.

This caused Muslims to see the regulations as immutable, disallowing the possibility of alternative structures or modes of action.11 The Qur’an holds that men and women are spiritually equal. Mohammad addresses the revelations to both men and women and tells each gender that all will be morally responsible for their actions on the Day of Judgment.12 Surah Al-‘Ahzab, (The Confederates), explains, Muslim men and Muslim women, believing men and believing women, devout men and devout women, sincere men and sincere women, patient men and patient women, humble men and humble women, charitable men and charitable women, fasting men and fasting women, men who guard their chastity and women who guard their chastity, men who often remember God and women who often remember God, to all of them God has made a ready pardon and a glorious reward.13 Accompanying the spiritual equality of both genders were certain improvements in the legal status of Muslim women. Women were guaranteed rights of inheritance under the protection of their family, the woman’s husband was obligated to provide for her and their children, and polygyny was limited. While a man could marry more than one woman, he was limited to four wives and was required to treat them equally. Even before marriage, a woman had the right to choose her marriage partner. In direct contrast to pre-Islamic Arabia in which a man paid the required dowry to the future wife’s family, Islamic law mandated that the man pay the dowry directly to his bride. Further in the financial realm, the Qur’an specified that women were entitled to their own money and their husbands must support them financially during the marriage and potentially for a set amount of time after a divorce.14 Similar to most ancient cultures, however, early Islamic law maintained that the man ultimately had power over the woman. The Qur’an offers multiple oppressive verses that allow for male domination sexually, legally, and mentally.

Sexually, Surah Al-Baqarah (The Cow) 2:233 states, “Your women are your sowing field: approach your field whenever you please.”15 Male owners also hold sexual ownership of their slave girls. Legally, a woman is allotted half the share

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of inheritance available to men. Furthermore, for a woman to remarry her ex-husband, she must first marry another man, have sex with him, and then have the second husband divorce her. The Qur’an even makes several references to the mental superiority of the male. In legal proceedings, a woman’s testimony is worth only half of a man’s. Mohammad provides his reasoning for this in the Bukhari hadith, explaining, “This is because of the deficiency of a woman’s mind.”16 Perhaps due to their mental deficiency, in the Bukhari hadith, Mohammad states, “Evil omen is in three things: The horse, the woman, and the house.”17 This parallels with the similar reasoning that the majority of people in hell will be women. The Bukhari hadith explains, “The Prophet said, ‘I looked at Paradise and found poor people forming the majority of its inhabitants; and I looked at Hell and saw that the majority of its inhabitants were women.’”18 While the advent of Islam provided arguably better conditions for women for the first two centuries, the Qur’an and subsequent hadiths clearly placed women below men in multiple spheres.

Although particular verses regarding treatment of women read clearly, significant controversy and a host of interpretations have existed since the early beginnings of Islam. As Islamic law developed, it was heavily influenced by differing Middle Eastern customs. Various schools of law emerged, all holding differing views on women. One major controversy was temporary marriages, contracts entered into for definite periods of time. Temporary marriages were condoned by Mohammad yet were outlawed for Sunnis by the caliph Omar.19 Perhaps one of the most controversial traditions of Muslim society today, veiling has also experienced widely variant interpretations. Different verses speak of distinct areas of the body that must be covered, yet there is no clear unity between them. As well, required seclusion of women is debated, as it is not clear if it applies solely to Mohammad’s wives, upper-class women, or all females.

The occasional incongruence of the Islamic sacred text is visible even in the prescribed roles for each gender. In a major verse distinguishing gender roles, Surah Al-Nisa (Women) 4:34, the word “qawwamun” is used to describe the role of men. It can be interpreted as lord, master, ruler, governor, or manager. Some scholars depict this to mean man is the ruler and women are to be ruled. However, others interpret it solely economically - men ought to be the breadwinners and women are the child-bearers.20 As society has progressed, such varying interpretations have not only led to different orthodox schools of thought but also a clear divide between traditionalists and modernists. Traditionalists take the Qur’an at face value, supporting its direct regulations while believing that the rise of Islam greatly improved the situation of women. Modernists, seeking better treatment of women, argue the Qur’an was revealed at a specific time in a specific social context. They seek to reinterpret the spirit of the text’s regulations to meet modern

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realities.21 Amidst the divides between different sects’ schools of thought and between the traditionalist and modernists, how Mohammad’s commands ought to be interpreted becomes far too hazy for consistent application through the centuries.

The infiltration of Islamic regulations into Arabic society brought segregation, seclusion, degradation, and exclusion for women. Prescribed exclusion and seclusion of women contributed to the rapid decline of women outside the home.22 Although Mohammad intended for women to be a part of the religious process, women were quickly excluded from participating in any of Islam’s significant leadership roles. Women were also secluded from normal social intercourse with men outside the home, leading to a largely male society in the Middle East.

The contradictory application and interpretation of the Qur’an’s instructions on women were influenced by early Islamic leaders. Mohammad’s own interactions with women were self-contradictory. Some scholars believe that “the emancipation of women was a project dear to the Prophet’s heart.”23 He demonstrated clear respect for particular wives. Even though he lived in a polygonous society, Mohammad chose remain monogamous while he lived in Mecca.24 However, he married Aisha when she was only seven years old, waiting to consummate the marriage until she reached either nine or ten years old. Mohammad encouraged gender equality in numerous ways, yet his personal relationships demonstrated a contradiction in treatment. Omar, the second caliph, also represented a contradiction of Islamic treatment toward women. Though he has been accused of misogyny, his directives were a far cry from the disempowerment of women that developed in Islamic societies in later centuries. While he planted seeds that eventually led to the constriction of gender roles, he encouraged compulsory education for boys and girls, allowed for women to work alongside men, and appointed a woman to serve as head of the market in Medina.25 Though the Qur’an offers clear instructions on women, the application has historically been self-contradictory, evidenced directly by Islamic leaders.

Social Factors Significant in Application Understanding there to be no direct connection between the Qur’an’s commandments and certain Islamic practices, the early treatment of Muslim women was heavily influenced by outside social factors. Ignac Goldziher explains, “In order to observe historical justice, it must be admitted that degradation of women in Islam is the result of social influences for which the principles of Islam are unjustly made responsible, but which were in fact the outcome of the social relations of the peoples converted to Islam.”26 As Arab-Muslim armies conquered territory formerly belonging to the Byzantine and Persian Empires in the 600s, the Muslims gradually incorporated their values and customs, such as the practice of

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veiling a woman’s head, face, and body.27 Recognizing that Islamic law was more patriarchal than warranted for in the Qur’an, it becomes apparent that generally the Qur’an was followed when it was not too inconvenient for men or the patriarchal family, yet was ignored when it became a burden. Potential inconveniences were based on the living situation of the family. Great variance can be observed between Muslim women’s lives based on such factors as class, mode of production, time, and place.28 Certain rules on subjects including polygyny, divorce, and child custody were indeed widely followed across class and area boundaries. However, the practices of seclusion and veiling depended mostly on a woman’s class. The wealth, power, and respect of a family affected the treatment of the family’s female members, with the existence of a harim in the household being an indicator. Urban middle-class and upper-class women were the most likely to be veiled and secluded.29 Because they were not forced to work in the fields, these women were more easily secluded because contact with strangers was not necessary.

Separate from the Qur’an’s regulations, there was a central code of honor and shame observed by Muslims, similar to many ancient societies.30 The honor of a family was dependent on the purity of the female family members. Aspersions cast on this purity resulted in shame for the entire familial body. This need for purity helps explain the seclusion practices. Female purity did not solely equate to virginity for girls and fidelity for women. Rather, purity rested on no one saying or thinking the opposite of these virtues for women. This was best achieved by segregating women from outside men and thus shielding them from potentially dangerous or gossip-provoking situations.

Due to such practices as seclusion and the prevailing mindset that women were inferior mentally, women were excluded from possessing any leadership positions outside the home. Women could not hold political seats of power. As well, neither during the life of Mohammad nor immediately afterward did women hold strong positions of leadership in the religious sphere, regardless of their supposed spiritual equality. However, women did hold some control within the domestic sphere. Women controlled cooking and the attractiveness and cleanliness of the home, affecting the husband’s visitors’ experiences. Multiple Islamic rulers were heavily influenced by their wives and similar situations could be found in private homes. Evidence has been found that certain marriages had equal husband-wife relations.31 Although sufficient evidence exists to evaluate the general conditions of women in pre-Islamic Arabia and Muslim women in the early centuries of Islam, serious scholarly work is limited. Written sources utilized by historians are heavily male-oriented and must be restudied with women’s questions in mind. As well,

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gender studies in the Islamic world are heavily ideologically charged with strong prejudices from all sides.32 Implications for Modern Islam Islam has quickly become one of the world’s largest religions and is growing continually. Yet, in the Middle East and in other areas dominated by Muslims, women are regularly oppressed and considered less than men. The conditions of the female population represent a stark instance of the incompatibility between the West and the Islamic world.33 As the Western world deals with Islam, it must possess a proper understanding of Islam’s origin and traditions. For Christians to successfully reach Muslim women, we must understand their accepted role in society and the mindset they have existed under for centuries.

Although the Qur’an granted women spiritual equality and an improvement from pre-Islamic Arabia, the blended societies of Islam created an oppressive regime of men controlling women. Islamic law and tradition supported the exclusion and seclusion of women, holding that women were inferior legally and mentally. Although the Qur’an offered slightly improved promises for women, the daily life of Muslim women continued to contain degradation and hopelessness.

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References 1. Malise Ruthven, Islam: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 100.

2. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, 1991), 105.

3. “Women,” In The Islamic World: Past and Present, ed. by John L. Esposito, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed April 26, 2016, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e370.

4. Hourani, 105.

5. Ibid., 106 6. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Ellison Banks Findly, Women, Religion, and Social Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 22.

7. Ibid., 20.

8. Ibid., 22.

9. Ibid., 21.

10. Ibid., 23.

11. Ibid., 27.

12. Ruthven, 102.

13. Ibid., 102-103.

14. Oxford Islamic Studies Online.

15. James Arlandson, “Top Ten Rules in the Qur’an that Oppress Women,” American Thinker, November 13, 2005, accessed April 26, 2016, http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2005/11/top_ ten_rules_in_the_quran_tha.html.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Beth Baron and Nikki R. Keddie, Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 8.

20. Shannon Dunn and Rosemary B. Kellison, “At the Intersection of Scripture and Law: Qur’an 4:34 and Violence against Women,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 26, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 11-36.

21. Ruthven, 102-103.

22. Haddad, 27.

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24. Ibid., 15.

25. Tamim Ansary, Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 51.

26. Haddad, 33.

27. Oxford Islamic Studies Online.

28. Baron, 8.

29. Ibid., 6.

30. Ibid., 9.

31. Ibid., 10.

32. Ibid., 1.

33. Ansary, 354.

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T

Russian Symphonia: Harmony of Church and Melody of State he

Nathaniel Mullins Religion is as much a part of Russia as vodka or icy winters. The history of the Russian state is also a history of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). For centuries Russia has embraced the Orthodox concept of symphonia—harmony between church and state. This doctrine encourages close links between the ROC and the government. Religion has not only shaped Russia’s government, but it has also shaped its very civilization. President Vladimir Putin has claimed that “Orthodoxy … largely determined the character of Russian civilization.”1 He was not wrong. The ROC has played a significant part in the lives of Russians ever since the medieval period—the church even brought Cyrillic writing to Russia.2 However, despite Russia’s religious roots, this purported bastion of Christianity has not hesitated to work alongside Islamic Iran. Iran, even more so than Russia, has a state religion.3 Just as Russia claims to protect Christians, Iran claims to protect the Shia Muslims.4 How is Russia able to reconcile its alliance with Iran and its self-proclaimed status as protector of Christendom? In Russia, the symphonia is tilted in favor of the state, allowing the government’s pragmatic interest in a strategic alliance with Iran to overcome its obligations to the church.

The Doctrine of Symphonia Defined The doctrine of symphonia portrays the church and state as allies obligated to work together in order to advance Christendom. Symphonia denies that there should be a wall of separation between church and state. Those Christians who espouse this doctrine believe that these institutions ought to support one another as if playing a musical piece in harmony—playing the same tune but with slightly different, complementary parts. Byzantine Emperor Theodosius’s code from the 5th century bears testament to his belief in the symphonia. His code bans pagan temples and heretics while granting special privileges to Christian bishops. In essence, the Byzantine state was striving to assist the church in advancing and protecting Christendom. The codes claim that heretics should “be smitten first by divine vengeance and secondly by the retribution of our own initiative, which we shall assume in accordance with the divine judgment.”5 This indicates that the

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emperors saw themselves as working under the blessing of God himself—working to carry out divine judgment upon the enemies of the church.

The belief that the state ought to advance Christendom in harmony with the church has not died out in Eastern Orthodox theology. At the end of the 20th century, the Sacred Bishop’s Council of the Russian Orthodox Church agreed upon “The Basis of the Social Concept,” a document intended to govern church-state relations into the 21st century. The document states, “In implementing her social, charitable, educational and other socially significant projects, the Church may rely on the support and assistance of the state.”6 Thus, according to the Orthodox Church’s official, current position, it still does not view itself as operating apart from the state. The close interaction between church and state causes both entities to focus upon expanding Christendom. The state appreciates how the concept of Christendom gives it a religious motivation to expand its borders, and the concept of Christendom allows the church to enjoy significant public power. The symphonia urges the church and state to operate in different ways for the same end—the advancement of Christendom. In this effort, the role of the church is primarily spiritual while that of the state is primarily material. So significant is the interaction between church and state within Orthodox theology that the aforementioned document even describes how the church ought to interact with each specific branch of government.7 Thus, at least in theory, symphonia allows the church and state to support one another in creating a Christian nation.

The Historical Origins of the Symphonia The doctrine of symphonia cannot be truly understood apart from its origins.

The ROC did not invent the doctrine of symphonia—the roots of this doctrine stretch back to the early Eastern Orthodox Church. Although often forgotten by American Christians, Eastern Orthodoxy is one of the three primary branches of Christianity. It has approximately 260 million adherents, with nearly forty percent of these living in Russia.8 Although some may date the origin of Eastern Orthodoxy to its split with the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in 1054 A.D., it existed as a distinct entity long before that.9 Eastern Orthodoxy’s history goes back as far as that of the RCC—in fact, one may contend that Orthodoxy is the older of the two traditions. While the RCC developed in the Western Roman Empire, Orthodoxy grew in the Eastern Roman Empire. It never embraced the rule of the pope. Instead, it organized itself into autocephalous churches—patriarchs of certain cities held independent jurisdiction over the surrounding regions.10 Although the Orthodox Church viewed the patriarch of Constantinople as its leader, it held that he was merely the first among equals and could not exert the same level of power over the eastern church that the pope exerted over the church in the west.

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Furthermore, while the Roman emperors in the West grew steadily weaker, those in the East remained powerful for centuries after the empire became Christianized. Thus, although the popes had the power to struggle with the emperors in the west and assert the authority of the church over the state, the patriarchs of Constantinople were unable to resist the state. They could only exert influence over the powerful Byzantine Emperors by working alongside them. From the 4th century, the patriarch of Constantinople embraced the doctrine of symphonia.11 Thus, a weak church and a strong state gave birth to the doctrine, and from its earliest days the symphonia was tilted in the state’s favor.

The dominance of the state in the symphonia is particularly pronounced in Russia. The history of the ROC is the story of how the Russian government increasingly came to dominate the church. The origins of the Russian church may be traced to 988 AD, when Vladimir the Great of the Kievan Rus converted to Christianity.12 Vladimir forced his people to become baptized, and Christianity quickly became established throughout the region.13 Evidently, from the beginning, the state played a role in advancing Christianity throughout Russia. Even if Russia’s connection with the Kievan Rus is no more than part of its historical mythology, that connection still forms an integral part of its historical identity.14 Thus, the conversion of the Kievan Rus, as far as the ROC is concerned, was also the conversion of the Russians. The missionaries to the Slavs, Cyril and Methodius, brought far more than Orthodox Christianity with them—they also brought the Cyrillic alphabet. With a language and history defined by Orthodoxy, the civilization of Eastern Europe can hardly be separated from the Eastern church.15 The Orthodoxy of the Russians in particular was so extreme that historian Paul Bushkovitch would write in reference to this era, “The Rus people were not just Christians, they were Orthodox Christians.”16 Thus, the identity of Russia is rooted in Eastern Orthodoxy and the doctrine of symphonia which traveled with it.

From the moment Ivan the Great freed Muscovy from the Golden Horde in 1580, he was able to implement the concepts of symphonia in this early form of Russia.17 Since he was now a true ruler—no longer under the Golden Horde—he had the duty to protect Christendom. Naturally, he did this by executing heretics.18 He advanced his religious credentials by marrying a descendant of the Byzantine emperor.19 The result of this wedding was significant—Russia came to see itself as the political descendent of Rome. Moscow now thought of itself as the Third Rome and would never forget it. Furthermore, the loss of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire meant that Moscow was now among the most significant Orthodox autocephalies.20 By 1589, Moscow became one of the top five patriarchates.

Moscow now stood “fifth … in honour after the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.”21 Evidently, the Russian church had gained

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significant influence over Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodoxy contributed to the prestige of Russia and gave it the ability to project its power into nearby Orthodox regions. With a state which now saw itself as filling the vacuum left by the Byzantine Emperors and a church with increasing influence, Russia came to view itself as the protector of Christendom.

Preeminence of the State in the Symphonia Although the ROC continued to gain influence over Orthodox Christianity in surrounding regions, it began to lose power against the Russian government.

From the time of Ivan III, the state began to exert its influence over the church.

Ivan IV was even able to execute the Metropolitan of Moscow—the highest figure in the Russian church at the time—when the Metropolitan disagreed with him.22 Although the trend of growing state power over the church did have some moments of deviation—for example, Patriarch Nikon’s influence over Tsar Alexis—generally each successive tsar held more power over the church.23 One notable area of weakness for the church in its relationship with the state was that the Tsars essentially had the power to appoint the patriarch.24 This one-sided relationship could only harm the church, for inevitably a tsar was certain to exercise this power to the church’s detriment. That tsar was Peter the Great, who refused to appoint a new patriarch when the last died in 1700 and ultimately abolished the patriarchate.25 For more than two centuries, the ROC would have no patriarch. Peter the Great also confiscated land from the Orthodox Church—particularly from monasteries. He even set a precedent—if only briefly—of providing a stipend for the clergy, placing them firmly under the state’s thumb.26 Evidently, the church grew steadily weaker in what was supposed to be an equal relationship with the government. From nearly the beginning of the Russian state, the tsars were able to execute the head of the ROC with impunity, and later tsars were able to seize the church’s wealth with none able to stop them. The church could provide no significant brake upon the Russian government. Evidently, the Russian symphonia has one theme far more dominant than the other. With hard power at its back and the ability to appeal to Orthodox churches from foreign autocephalies, the state was able to overcome the soft and solitary power of the ROC. The church’s inevitable defeat was only made more certain by Russia’s well-known tendency to autocracy. Autocrats cannot stand the accusatory voice of the church and will exert all of their effort to bend a dissident church to their will. This is exactly what happened. While claiming the name of Orthodoxy and allowing it to shape Russian culture, the Russian government truly worked for its own desires. Already by the 18th century, the government placed its own pragmatic goals above religious ones. Instead of strengthening the church, the doctrine of

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symphonia had merely made the church susceptible to the state’s authority.

Even as it emphasized pragmatic policies at home, Russian tsars portrayed themselves as the protectors of Christendom abroad. In its protracted conflict with the Ottoman Empire, started by Peter the Great, Russia portrayed itself as the protector of the Christians under Muslim rule. Thus, the very tsar who most stripped the church of power portrayed himself abroad “as the Orthodox Defender of the Christian Faith.”27 Catherine the Great maintained this international image as a protector of Christendom as she continued the conflict with the Ottomans.28 In a similar vein, Tsar Alexander I created the Holy Alliance Treaty, signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which claimed “to publish, in the face of the whole world” that these nations would “take for their sole guide the precepts of [Christianity].”29 While little came out of this alliance, it indicated that the Russian state tried to portray itself as an international leader of Christendom. This portrayal was partly a symptom of Russia’s war with the Ottoman Empire—by claiming the name of Christendom, they could find ideological support for their fight. It allowed the Russians to hide their pragmatic motive of reaching the Black Sea with its warm-water ports. Thus, the tsars portrayed themselves as Christian leaders even while undermining the church’s authority. They only truly served the church when such service was in the pragmatic interests of the state.

Modern Symphonia Compromised: The Church at the Mercy of the State During the Communist era, the state followed the past precedent of emphasizing pragmatism above religion. As the tsar fell to the provisional government, which in turn fell to the Bolshevik revolution, the ROC held a months-long council which reestablished the patriarchate in 1917—just in time to suffer through the Soviet era.30 The church faced savage oppression under the Soviets except for those times when the government needed the church to stir up patriotism—such as World War II.31, 32 This serves as the final historical data point of how Russian pragmatism employs religion—Stalin allowed the ROC, but only when he needed it. History set a precedent for Russia: The state’s interests come first. Even when the Russian state advocated symphonia, it claimed a position of dominance instead of equality with the church.

At present, the Russian state once again advocates the symphonia and once again portrays itself as the defender of Christianity. However, Christianity has largely become a civil religion throughout Russia. While Orthodoxy is apparently widespread, it is largely nominal. A significant number of Russians—seventy-two percent—consider themselves Orthodox, but only seven percent attend church at least once a month. Disturbingly, the same poll which revealed that seventy-two percent of Russian’s view themselves as Orthodox mentioned that only fifty-six

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percent believe in God.33 This means many of those who labeled themselves as Orthodox would not even assert that they believed in God. This type of religion is little more than a formality.

Although nominal for many people, Russian Orthodoxy has great civic importance to the Russian people. Putin went so far as to call Orthodoxy the “unbending spiritual core of the entire people and state.”34 Because of this belief, in 1997 the Russian government gave preferential treatment to the ROC above all other Christian denominations.35 Furthermore, at Putin’s urging, the Russian government passed legislation forbidding evangelization outside of one’s church.

The ROC is not harmed by such legislation, because it can count all Russians as its members.36 In return for such support, the church helps to extend Russian influence into the Orthodox territories of Eastern Europe. It also offers general support to the Russian government.37 Orthodox priests have even blessed the guns and airplanes of the Russian army.38 The BBC reported on the closeness of Russian church-state relations, “Alexander Yakovlev, a top Communist Party ideologue and functionary for many decades, said that the KGB “directly ran” the Orthodox Church and controlled all religious activity in the USSR. Many believe that … the Federal Security Service … still has close links to top clerics.”39 Thus, the church is in many ways under the control of the Russian government. When the Russian government claims to be supporting Christianity, in actuality it is frequently merely advancing its own interests. The government is willing to support the church whenever doing so does not conflict with the state’s interests, but the state disregards the desires of the church when those desires come at odds with practical state policies. This demonstrates that the Russian government is willing to throw its support behind a lopsided echo of the historic symphonia—the church and state are in harmony as long as the state’s interests are dominant.

The Russian-Iranian Alliance This sheds light on the Russian-Iranian alliance. Iran’s explicitly Muslim credentials seem like they ought to place Iran and Russia in conflict. Ever since the Islamic revolution against the shah in 1979, Iran has loudly proclaimed its goal to expand Islam.40 The theocratic government claims to protect and extend Islam even more than Russia claims to protect and extend Christendom.41 Iran is a known sponsor of terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad.42 They are not merely content to have a state religion; they are determined to implement their ideology internationally. The relationship between mosque and state in Iran is not of primary importance to this paper, but it is clear that Iran views religion as central to its identity and is willing to project that image at least as much as Russia is willing to do with Orthodoxy. As practically neighboring states

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advancing religions which are directly at odds, it seems peculiar that the two countries would find so much room for agreement.

Despite their apparent ideological differences, Russia and Iran have created a diverse array of treaties. The best known of these is the nuclear agreement, with Russia developing Iran’s nuclear program by providing supplies and technology.43 Russia also sells Iran conventional armaments, reaching a ten billion dollar arms deal at the end of 2016.44 Furthermore, in their conflict with the Islamic State, Russia and Iran have begun to share intelligence.45 In 2016, the two nations engaged economically, signing trade deals worth forty billion dollars.46 The unexpected degree of mutual respect between Russia and Iran further cements this alliance. Iran respects Russia, seeing Russia in the same way that Russia sees itself—as a momentarily weakened superpower. Russia also sees Iran as a regional power—in essence also viewing Iran in the same way Iran views itself.47 Russian military leaders view Iran as the “Southern Threat,” implying that they have a certain degree of respect for Iranian power; Iran consistently feels threatened by the giant to their north.48 The very fact that the two powers fear one another means that they have similar understandings of the international scene, strengthening the united face which they show the rest of the world. This also means that they are not friendly partners, but merely pragmatic allies.

The Arab Spring has strengthened this unlikely alliance. Iran has long had an alliance with Ba’ath Syria, for Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafiz al-Assad, made Syria the third country to acknowledge Iran’s sovereignty after the revolution of 1979.49 Furthermore, as Iran tried to export its revolution into Iraq, it found an ally in Syria due to a split in the Ba’ath party between Iraq and Syria. Syria worked with Iran on the principle that the enemy of its enemy was its friend.50 Iran, interested in extending its regional power, naturally does not want its ally in Syria—Bashar al-Assad—to fall before the Islamic State or the rebellion which the Arab Spring started.

Russia also supports Ba’ath Syria. During the Soviet era, the USSR invested heavily in Syria.51 The Tartus naval base which Syria has leased to Russia is Russia’s only Mediterranean port.52 This base has grown even more important as Russia and Syria signed an agreement allowing the expansion of the Tartus base in January of 2017.53 If Assad’s government were to fall, Russia would almost certainly lose this base. Thus, Russia’s international power and prestige is linked to the survival of the Assad regime. Since Assad’s regime has fallen into increasing danger with the progression of the rebellion, Russia and Iran have drawn together to protect their mutual interests. The united face they have shown against Western involvement in Syria demonstrates their strengthening alliance.54 Thus, contrary to what the religious conflict of these two states might suggest, Iran and

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Russia are not only allies, but their alliance is strengthening.

Pragmatic Reasons for Russia’s Alliance with Iran Russia’s ability to reconcile this alliance with its religion is based on a simple pragmatic calculus—the Russian-Iranian alliance contributes to Russia’s internal peace and international power, so Iran’s religious views are irrelevant.

Russia’s alliance with Iran provides internal peace to Russia in two ways.

First, the alliance has long supported the Russian economy. Historically, Soviet trade with Iran brought in much needed foreign dollars. The Soviets traded steel mills for oil. Later they were able to bring in Iranian money by using nuclear technology and trained scientists.55 Their economic ties include the recent arms deals mentioned above.56 The Russian Military Industrial Complex is enormous, employing up to three million Russians.57 Such an enormous part of the workforce needs a foreign market to which it can export its goods. While the West has developed a growing antagonism toward Russia and its second-rate weaponry, Syria and Iran are glad to find a source of arms disconnected from the US, thereby maintaining part of the Russian economy.

The Russian-Iranian alliance also ensures internal peace in Russia by lessening tension in the Caucasus—particularly in Chechnya. The violence in Chechnya has been going on for decades, started by Yeltsin’s attempt to subdue the rebellious region.58 While Russia lost its first war against Chechnya in the mid 1990’s, it managed to conquer Chechnya in the second war. These wars were brutal, and the violence has not yet stopped.59 The Muslim Chechens are as brutal and violent in killing Russians in terrorist attacks today as the Russians were in suppressing the Chechens during the 1990’s.60 The violence in the region continues to be so extreme that it created concerns for the safety of the Sochi Olympics in 2014.61 The horrors in Chechnya could be worse, however. According to Harvard Research Director Brenca Shaffer, “Iran has helped to prevent a Muslim backlash against Russia’s actions in Chechnya.”62 By limiting its reaction to the violence in Chechnya to nothing more than rhetorical statements, Iran has protected Russia. As a neighbor of the Caucasus, Iran’s refusal to throw its weight behind the Chechens not only cuts them off from Iran’s support, it cuts them off from the support of others. Because Iran would be the natural protector of the Chechens but refuses to raise its voice, the international Muslim community is unable to provide support for these internal dissidents. Iran’s assistance with the Chechen problem is one of the primary reasons for Russia’s support of Iran.63 This demonstrates that Russia’s alliance with Iran creates a real practical benefit: internal peace.

The second great motivation for the Russia-Iranian alliance is each nation’s desire to assert itself internationally. This reveals itself as a desire to resist US

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hegemony. Understanding this issue requires understanding how Russia and Iran view themselves. Russia views itself as a world power in a moment of weakness, not as a declining nation shaken by economic chaos.64 Iran perceives itself as a major cultural and regional power.65 Both nations find their self-perceptions harmed by US hegemony. In the case of Russia, it cannot be a genuine superpower if the US maintains hegemonic rule. US expansion into Eurasia particularly threatens Russia’s aspirations.66 Thus, Russia will do whatever it can to limit US hegemony. Iran has a similar inclination. The revolution which brought the current Iranian government into power opposed a shah who was supported by the US. This alone would make the US appear malignant, but America’s consequent actions made US hegemony even more distasteful to Iran. The US spent years exerting its power to isolate and contain the new, radical government.67 Iran cannot fully function as a regional power if it is handicapped by a dominant US. By working together, Iran and Russia are able to reduce the power of US hegemony in the Middle East. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis notes how these allies thwart American interests: “In this relationship, Russia opposed the US attempts to contain Iran, and Iran played the loyal ally role in the region, in particular supporting the Russian desire to keep the ‘near abroad’ under its sphere of influence.”68 Thus, Russia allows Iran to realize its identity as a regional power, and Iran allows Russia to resist US hegemony in Eurasia.

Russia’s alliance with Iran allows each nation to do more than just resist US hegemony—it allows them to assert their power in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian lost the ability to project influence over the Middle East as it had before.69 Russia needed some significant new factor if it was to remain relevant in the region, and Iran serves as that factor. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two great regional powers of the Middle East, standing at odds with one another.70 By allying with Iran, Russia has access to the second of the two regional powers. In essence, Iran serves as the extension of Russian power into the Middle East. As long as Russia has Iran as an ally, the US will have to take it into consideration before taking any actions in the Middle East. Similarly, Russian support for Iran on the international stage, particularly in the UN, helps to defend Iran against international actions such as sanctions.71 This allows Iran to maintain its economic power and international standing. The effect of Russia’s alliance with Iran is not merely hypothetical.72 The present situation in Syria demonstrates how effective Russia and Iran can be when they work together. Iran has offered direct support to Assad, sending advisors, law-enforcement, and ground forces. Hezbollah, which receives support from Iran, also backs Assad.73 Together, these efforts have formed an “extensive, expensive, and integrated” effort to secure victory for the Syrian government.74

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Russia also offers help to Assad. In 2016, this assistance included multiple airstrikes against the rebels in Aleppo, killing roughly 450 civilians in a single month.75 This combined assistance served as a significant factor in the fall of Aleppo to the forces of the Syrian government in 2016.76 This defeat has perhaps dealt a terminal blow to the rebel remnants of the Arab Spring in Syria.77 Russia and Iran did not work independently to achieve this aim—together they managed to reach their goal of defeating the rebels, perhaps for good. The defeat of the rebels also spells a defeat for their Western allies—in particular the United States.

By allying together, Russia and Iran have succeeded in advancing their goal to extend their regional power.

Iran also provides Russia with a bargaining chip to use when dealing with a hostile international community. As long as Russia defends Iran on the international stage—in particular using its permanent position on the United Nations Security Council—Iran’s nuclear developments cannot be stopped.78 Russia is well aware that it is the only possible brake on Iranian nuclear power. Its influence over Iran’s nuclear program gives it yet another incentive to use when dealing with pressure from the West.

Russia’s alliance with Iran is driven by pragmatic considerations. All other reasons for their alliance dissolve upon a cursory examination. The states’ religions seem like a cause for disagreement, not alliance. The Russians are Orthodox. Iran, on the other hand, is practically 100 percent Muslim.79 Instead of debating the existence of a god, they are debating how theocratic they ought to be, and eighty-three percent favored the implementation of Sharia law in 2013.80 This devotion to Islam indicates that it should not be such a strong ally with Russia. Moreover, Russia and Iran are neither ethnically nor linguistically similar.

They even lack positive historical associations. As neighbors they have fought border wars, with Russia seizing parts of Iran throughout the 19th century.81 These conflicts continued into the 20th century when the Soviets tried to support a conflict between the Azeris and Iranians.82 Their ideological differences were so significant that not until the 1990’s were the two nations truly able to cooperate.83 This alliance has grown out of bad soil; both nations see each other as a threat.84 However, as seen above, there are multiple pragmatic reasons for Iran and Russia to work together. Such an unlikely alliance can only be motivated by practicality.

Conclusions: In maintaining its alliance with Iran, the Russian government weighs pragmatism against Orthodoxy. On one hand stands a relationship which offers a defense against US hegemony, the extension of Russian power into the Middle East, and a useful bargaining chip in international affairs. On the other hand stands

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Russia’s alleged role as the protector of Christendom. On this side of the equation is a religion which plays at least a role of nominal significance throughout Russia.

Russia in general and Putin in particular would never want to dismiss their Orthodox identity. Thus, there is an active conflict between Russia’s pragmatic foreign policy and the religion which stands at the nation’s core.

This apparent conflict dissolves when viewed through the historic lens of Russia’s church and state symphonia. While explicitly espousing a symphonia which would place both entities on an equal footing, as seen above, the state actually dominates the relationship between the two entities. Indeed, one may contend that the state only encourages the church insofar as it is useful to the state’s interests. When the church blesses the weapons of soldiers, when it provides an excuse for the expansion of the state, or when it creates a needed national fervor, then the state encourages it. Thus, the Russian state tends to value the church as a practical entity which is ultimately subservient to the state’s interests. When the state has other practical interests—such as those presented by an alliance with Iran—then the church must be put into its place. The alliance with Iran has many practical benefits, evidently important enough for Russia to discount its religious interests.

In essence, Russia’s alliance with Iran indicates that religion is not the primary determinant of Russia’s political decisions on the international stage. Thus, if the US desires to divide the Russian-Iranian alliance, it cannot rely on appeals to religious motivations. Instead, the US must appeal to Russia’s pragmatic interests.

While there are many ways for the US to provide pragmatic incentives for Russia to break off its alliance with Iran, the US is necessarily handicapped because Iran and Russia are specifically aligned against US hegemony.

The ROC will not help the US break the Russian Iranian alliance, for the symphonia in Russia does not truly involve two entities playing in harmony. Instead, the state plays the melody and the church must harmonize with the desires of the state. Whether or not the ROC will one day break free of its subservient role is a question that remains to be seen. For the time being, the US should not expect that it can influence Russia by appealing to the ROC. On the part of the ROC, it must strive to find a voice separate from the state if it wants to truly play a part in Russia. Already recent polling shows that the ROC has become largely nominal.

If such trends continue, even the pretense of symphonia will disappear, for there will be no church to play in harmony. Only the state’s driving melody will remain.

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References 1. John Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?” Journal Of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2007): 188, accessed May 1, 2017, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost.

2. Florin Curta, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500-1250 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 214-215.

3. Joel Rosenberg, Inside the Revolution (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009), xi.

4. Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The Rise of Iran as a Regional Power: Shia Empowerment and its Limits,” NATO Review, 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/iran-tehran-islamic/EN/index.htm.

5. Bryn Geffert and Theofanis Stavrou, Eastern Orthodox Christianity: Supplemental Texts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 189-191.

6. “The Basis of the Social Concept: Church and State,” The Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Relations, accessed May 1, 2017, https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/iii/.

7. “The Basis of the Social Concept: Church and State.”

8. Conrad Hacket and Brian Grim, “Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population,” Pew Research Center, December 2011, accessed May 1, 2017, http:// www.pewforum.org/files/2011/12/Christianity-fullreport-web.pdf, 31.

9. Elizabeth Prodromou, “The Ambivalent Orthodox,” in World Religions and Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Philip Costopoulos, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 133.

10. Lewis Patsavos, “Unity and Autocephaly: Mutually Exclusive?” Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2005, accessed May 1, 2017, http://web.archive.org/web/20060107201552/http://www. goarch.org:80/ en/ourfaith/articles/ article8131.asp.

11. Deno Geanakoplos, “Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of the Problem of Caesaropapism,” Church History 34, no. 4 (December 1965): 381, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3163118?seq=1# page_scan_tab_contents.

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13. Paul Bushkovitch, A Concise History of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 8.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 14. Yaroslav Dashkevych, “How Moscow Hijacked the History of Kyivan Rus’,” trans. Adrian Bryttan, Euromaidan Press, May 2014, accessed May 1, 2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/05/14/ how-moscow-hijacked-the-history-of-kyivan-rus/.

15. Imogen Bell, Central and South-Eastern Europe 2003 (New York: Europa Publications, 2002), 30.

16. Bushkovitch, 9.

17. Ibid., 43.

18. Ibid., 47.

19. Bushkovitch, 43.

20. Maureen Perrie and Andrei Pavlov, Ivan the Terrible: Profiles in Power (New York: Routledge, 2013), 16.

21. “Russian Orthodox Church: Early History and Art,” University of Toronto, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~ mes/russia/moscow/history.html.

22. Isabel de Madariaga, Ivan the Terrible: First Tsar of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Chapter 14.

23. “Patriarch Nikon and the Subjection of the Russian Church to the State,” Church History 10, (December 1941): 232-235, 244, distributed online at Stockton University, accessed May 1, 2017, http:// intraweb.stockton.edu

/eyos/arhu/content/docs/djc%20archive/Patriarch%20Nikon%20and%20

the%20Subjection%20of%20the%20Russian%20Church%20to%20the%20State.pdf.

24. James Cracraft, The Church Reform of Peter the Great (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 113-114.

25. Ibid., 119.

26. Cracraft, 117-118.

27. Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1977), 365.

28. Kinross, 400.

29. “The Holy Alliance Treaty,” Research Subjects: Government and Politics, The Napoleon Series, May 2000, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.napoleon-series.org/research /government/diplomatic/c_alliance.html.

30. Lev Regelson, Tragedy of the Russian Church: 1917-1953, (Society of Christian Culture Moscow, 1991), Chapter 2, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.apocalyptism.ru/Patriarchschip-and-Sobornost. htm.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 31. Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 288.

32. Alexandra Heywood, “God in the Gulag: Christianity’s Survival in Soviet Russia,” The Dartmouth Apologia 5, no. 1 (Winter 2011), accessed May 1, 2017, http://augustinecollective.org/god-in-the-gulag-christianitys-survival-in-soviet-russia/.

33. “Russians Return to Religion, but not to Church,” Pew Research Center, February 2014, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/.

34. “Putin Hopes Orthodox Christianity will Strengthen Russia,” Johnson’s Russia List, January 2000, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0001a.html.

35. “Nationalism, Anti-West Sentiment Threatens Religious Freedom in Russia,” Newsroom, January 2000, May 1, 2017, http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0001a.html.

36. Kate Shellnutt, “Russia’s Newest Law: No Evangelizing Out of Church,” Christianity Today, July 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/june/no-evangelizing-outside-of-church-russia-proposes.html.

37. Andrew Higgins, “In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower,” New York Times, September 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/ russia-orthodox-church.html.

38. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Russian Orthodox Church Lends Weight to Putin Patriotism,” BBC, August 2015, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33982267.

39. Shevchenko.

40. Rosenberg, xi-xiii.

41. Karagiannis.

42. Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362.

43. Thowhidul Islam, “The Nuclearization of Iran and the Policy of Russia,” Asia and African Studies 22, no. 2 (2013): 248-278, 253, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/112612414_Islam.pdf.

44. Roland Oliphant, “Russia May Sell Iran $10 Billion Worth of Tanks and Jets in New Arms Deal,” The Telegraph, November, 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/14/ russia-may-sell-iran-10-billion-worth-of-tanks-and-jets-in-new-a/.

45. J. Stuster, “Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria to Share Intelligence on Islamic State,” Foreign Policy, September 2015, accessed May 1, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/28/russia-iran-iraq-andsyria-to-share-intelligence-on-islamic-state/.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 46. Elie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik, “The New Power Couple: Russia and Iran in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/ publications/ summary/ira n_and_russia_middle_east_power_couple_7113.

47. Brenda Shaffer, Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), 17.

48. Ibid., 14.

49. Jbin Goodarzi, “The Iran Primer: Iran and Syria,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2015, accessed May 1, 2017, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-syria.

50. John Devlin, “Syria,” in Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power Strategies, ed. Samuel Wells, Jr. and Mark Bruzonsky, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 26.

51. “Soviet Relations with the Baathists in Iraq and Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, June 1969, declassified May 2002, accessed May 1, 2017,

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/

DOC_0000772106.pdf, 1.

52. Rod Nordland, “Russia Signs Deal for Syria Bases; Turkey Appears to Accept Assad,” New York Times, January 2017, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/world/middleeast/russia-turkey-syria-deal.html.

53. Ibid.

54. Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Suspends Cooperation with U.S. in Syria after Missile Strikes,” New York Times, April 2017, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/russia-iran-us-strikes-syria.html.

55. Abbas Milani, “Russia and Iran: An Anti-Western Alliance,” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, (October 2007): 329, accessed May 1, 2017, https://web.stanford.edu/~amilani/ downloads/ CurrentHistory1.pdf.

56. Tzvi Kahn, “Iran, Russia Pursue Illicit Arms Sales,” Foreign Policy Initiative, March 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/iran-russia-pursue-illicit-arms-sales.

57. “Russia Defense Industry Production up 2.5% in 1Q09,” Sputnik International, June 2009, accessed May 1, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/russia/20090602155148607/.

58. Simone Ispa-Landa, “Russian Preferred Self-Image and the Two Chechen Wars,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 11 (March 2003): 306, accessed May 1, 2017, https:// www2.gwu.edu/ ~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/11-2_Ispa-Landa.PDF. 59. Elizabeth Bagot, “US Ambivalence and the Russo-Chechen Wars: Behind the Silence,” Stanford Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 33, accessed May 1, 2017, https://web.stanford.edu/group/ sjir/pdf/Chechnya_11.1.pdf.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 60. Preeti Bhattacharji, “Chechen Terrorism (Russia, Chechnya, Separatist),” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2010, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/separatist-terrorism/chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist/p9181.

61. Ariel Cohen and Cassandra Lucaccioni, “Sochi: Security and Counterterrorism at the 2014 Winter Olympics,” Heritage Foundation, January 2014, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/ report/sochi-security-and-counterterrorism-the-2014-winter-olympics.

62. Shaffer, 2.

63. Ibid.

64. Shaffer, 17.

65. Ibid.

66. Bulent Aras and Fatih Ozbay, “The Limits of the Russian-Iranian Strategic Alliance: Its History and Geopolitics, and the Nuclear Issue,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, no. 1 (March 2008): 46, accessed May 1, 2017, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/pdfs/9.pdf.

67. Aras, 50.

68. Ibid.

69. “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 5, no. 1 (March 2001), accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.rubincenter.org/2001/03/antonenko-2001-03-03/.

70. Elsa Kania, “A Bipolar Gulf: The Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran,” Harvard Political Review, December 2011, accessed May 1, 2017, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/a-bipolar-gulf/.

71. Geranmayeh.

72. Aras, 52.

73. Will Fulton, Joseph Holiday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” AEI Critical Threats Project and Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/ sites/default/files/IranianStrategy inSyria-1MAY.pdf, 6.

74. Ibid., 9.

75. “Russia/Syria: War Crimes in Month of Bombing Aleppo,” Human Rights Watch, December 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-monthbombing-aleppo.

76. Martin Chulov, “Russia’s Influence has Risen but Iran is the Real Winner in Aleppo,” Guardian, December 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/17/aleppo-fall-syria-iran-winner-influence-analysis.

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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 77. Nabeel Khoury, “The Fall of Aleppo,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, December 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/the-fall-of-aleppo/.

78. “Current Members.” United Nations Security Council, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.un.org/ en/sc/ members/.

79. “Iran,” Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, 2016, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www. globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/iran#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010&region_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2014.

80. “Iranians Views Mixed on Political Role for Religious Figures,” Pew Research Center, June 2013, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/11/iranians-views-mixed-on-political-role-for-religious-figures/.

81. Shaffer, 5.

82. David Nissman, The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 2.

83. Aras, 48.

84. Shaffer, 13-17.

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T

heorists,

Tyrants, and Terrorists: The Rise of European Terrorist Ideology in the Narodnaya Volya Sarah Geesaman

“I am still always struck by how disturbingly ‘normal’ most terrorists seem when one actually sits down and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and then only after considerable reflection and debate.”1 In penning these words Bruce Hoffman, an American political terrorism analyst, characterizes one of the most mysterious paradoxes in the world of terrorism: those whose actions seem farthest from reason often arrived at their radical positions through reason. Although terror tactics have become an increasingly popular method of political expression in recent decades, a century and a half ago they were not nearly so common. While sporadic instances of terrorism had occurred throughout the years, it was not until August of 1879, with Russian Narodnaya Volya’s inception, that the world saw so complex an organizational apparatus formed solely around the purpose of accelerating political reformation through violence.2 Terrorism is inherently extreme and, to those not party to its politics, inherently unreasonable. It is difficult to imagine that the first professional terrorists could have been thinking rationally when they started Narodnaya Volya. Despite this, Hoffman’s analysis proves correct—for Narodnaya Volya’s founders, terrorism was a reluctant but entirely rational decision.

Given the intellectual milieu of the day—a distinctly Russian blend of nihilism, utilitarianism, radical feminism, and socialism—it is no small wonder that the first professional terrorist group took shape in nineteenth-century Russia. Though such developments were certainly not inevitable, the political atmosphere during Narodnaya Volya’s inception made Russia the perfect breeding ground for terrorist philosophy.

The Beginning of Nihilism in the Russian Psyche By the early 1860s, nihilist philosophy was a rapidly developing trend in the Russian national psyche.3 Ideas of natural scientists, philosophers and materialists like Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Henry Buckle, and Ludwig Feuerbach

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had impressed themselves upon Russian thinkers.4 Men like Chernyshevsky, Herzen, and Mikhailov digested their theories and repackaged them for a distinctly Russian audience.5 Though these Western-influenced ideas of materialism and physicalism quickly gained popularity in Russia, it was not until 1863, with Russian novelist Ivan Turgenev’s publication of Fathers and Sons, that the movement was given a name: nihilism, for the Latin word nihil—nothing.6 As Turgenev defined it, “A nihilist is a person who does not bow down to any authority, who does not accept any principle on faith, however much that principle may be revered.”7 Nihilists embraced utilitarianism, rationalism, and materialism, while rejecting tradition and aesthetics on principle and promoting the assertion and pursuit of reasonable self-interest through rational means.

Russians had long been frustrated by the apparent hypocrisy of their political regime. The reign of Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825-55) was marked by political repression, censorship, and tyranny, and the minor acquiesces that Alexander II made when he replaced his father did little to repay the debt many of the educated elite felt his office owed the public.89 Even Alexander II’s 1861 emancipation of the serfs failed to satisfy public hope for societal remediation, as the reforms did little to help the condition of the serfs, often leaving them worse off than they had been before, with little to no land and utterly unequipped to provide for themselves.10 Rather than assuaging public frustrations with the tsarist government, emancipation only served to exacerbate them.

Nihilist sentiment, which was rapidly gaining traction in some sectors of the educated Russian population, called for a rejection of all forms of authority: political, religious, traditional, or otherwise. Bazarov, the protagonist of Fathers and Sons and a committed nihilist, adopted a cynical view along with his colleagues. He found reform efforts to be utterly fruitless, morality to be completely lacking, and hypocrisy and self-interest to be abundant in all circles professing to pursue the public good. Given the impossibility of achieving the “public good,” each man’s efforts ought to be focused on pursuing a reasonable, realistic, and happy life for himself.11 The Russian nihilist focused on the exercise of his own individual liberty above all else, rejecting authority on principle. In the words of Russian revolutionary Sergei Stepniak, nihilism was “the negation, in the name of individual liberty, of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by family life, and by religion.”12 This wholesale rejection of authority had severe implications for a Russian society somewhat predisposed to accept it.

Before long, much of Russia’s educated class had rejected Christianity in favor of newer, materialistic philosophies which boasted the support of naturalistic scientists and the brightest Russian minds of the nineteenth century.13 This departure from Christianity, however nominal it may have previously been for

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some converts, opened the door for wholesale religious-like dedication to new philosophies. Some men fervently pursued nihilism, but many others found its “solution” of abandoning hope for political reformation and pursuing intellectual superiority and personal satisfaction just as dissatisfying a remedy to the plight of the Russian peasants—who at that time comprised something near ninety percent of the country’s population—as their emancipation had proven to be. In his book Underground Russia, an insider’s view of the development of Russia revolutionary thought, Stepniak wrote of a theoretical encounter between an older man who had cynically embraced nihilism and the young man who was once his pupil, drawing plainly the contrast between the philosophy of the nihilist and the similarly atheistic revolutionary: “Well, and what will happen afterwards?” asks a young man full of ardor, who has just arrived from some distant province, and come to visit his old master.

“I am happy,” replies the latter.

“Yes,” the young man will say to him, “you are happy, I see. But how can you be happy when in the country where you were born people are dying of hunger, where the Government takes from the people their last farthing and compels them to go forth and beg for a crust of bread? Perhaps you do not know this; and if you know it, what have you done for your brethren? Did you not tell me years ago that you wished to combat ‘for the happiness of human nature?’”

And the model Nihilist, the Nihilist of Turgenev, will be troubled by that look which knows nothing of compromise; for the enthusiasm and the faith that animated him in the early years of the struggle have vanished with victory.

He is nothing more than an intelligent and refine epicure, and his blood circulates languidly in his plump body.

And the young man will go away full of sadness, asking himself with an accent of despair the terrible question, “What are we to do?”14 From Christian Orthodoxy to Socialism The naturalistic philosophy which had given rise to nihilism was thought to have sufficiently debunked Christian beliefs, eliminating the need for religious foundations. Yet many well-educated Russian youth, righteously indignant at the squalor in which the peasantry dwelt, found the nihilists’ solemn resignation to “confine [themselves] to abuse,” as Turgenev put it, disturbing.15 These young men and women were passionate about bringing the serfs true liberation and did not believe that a world devoid of God had to be a world devoid of progress or sympathy.16 Although they had rejected God, they found the abandonment of what

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they saw as a defunct Greek-Orthodox Church freeing rather than hopeless.17 In that simple rejection, they opened their doors to a new faith: Russian socialism.

A wide array of factors contributed to the induction of socialism into elite Russia’s political conscience. In an effort to redeem his office from the transgressions of his predecessor, Alexander II had enacted a number of liberal reforms, not the least of which were the lessening of censorship requirements, the permission of foreign travel, the liberalizing of education, and the provision of scholarships which allowed more Russian youth to obtain an education than ever before.18 Even during the tyrannical years of Nicholas I’s reign, Western philosophy and political ideas had crept across Russia’s borders. Although Russian elite had been heavy consumers of French socialism as early as 1820, Alexander II’s liberalizing reforms increased the metropolitan Russian’s access to and consumption of Western philosophy considerably.19 The philosophical works of such westernized Russian thinkers as Alexander Herzen, Mikhail Bakunin, and Ogarev—all of whom were socialists—became more widely read as censorship officials struggled to keep up with the review of their productions.20 Additionally, as nihilistic philosophy had spurred on the breakdown of traditionally accepted social structures, many Russians began to preach the gospel of feminism. Men like Chernyshevsky wrote novels supporting female independence and equality in romantic relationships, while revolutionary socialists for years to come commented that the “one question in which Nihilism rendered great service to its country… was the important question of women.”21 Women were encouraged to pursue higher education and many answered that call, some under the auspices of liberation and others for the sake of better equipping themselves for motherhood. While Russian universities were receptive to their presence for a time, women’s close associations with the nihilist movement which first brought them into the schools became the impetus for their expulsion.22 In 1863, a new university statute disbarred women from all Russian universities for their associations with nihilists.23 As a result, women with particularly strong feminist inclinations had to travel outside the confines of Russian society in order to obtain an education.24 The quest for education pushed some Russian women into Zurich, Germany, where many of them found the nihilistic pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake unsatisfactory.

“What is all this knowledge,” the young girls asked themselves, “but a means of acquiring a more advantageous position among the privileged classes to which we already belong? Who except ourselves will derive any advantage from it; and if no one does, what is the difference between us and the swarm of blood-suckers who live by the sweat and tears of our poor fellow-countrymen?” 25 These girls became disciples of Marx, Bakunin and other socialist thinkers,

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attending study circles, meetings of the Marxist Internationale, and so forth.26 As news of Zurich as a hotbed for socialist thought began to spread, hundreds of men and women flocked to the city to participate in what had become more of a socialist club than a place of collegiate study.27 When the Russian government issued the Ukase of 1873 and economic agreement which subsequently required all Russians in Germany to return to Russia, the women who had spent years immersed in socialist thought brought it back to their home country.28 Young Russian socialists set out to labor side-by-side with the peasantry who had so aroused their sympathies. In fields and factories the youth worked, anxiously awaiting what they believed was an imminent socialist revolution.29 While Bakuninists decried the need for socialist proselytization among the peasantry, claiming that “if [the peasants were] summoned to an immediate revolution, it could not be other than a social revolution,” others argued that a revolution— even one to which the population was predisposed—could not succeed independent of a prolific propaganda apparatus.30 Tsarist censorship of Russian socialism prevented public propaganda, while the nature of small rural communities and the increasingly thorough work of Alexander II’s police made the spread of more secret propaganda risky to the point of ineffectiveness.31 Despite Tsarist attempts to slow the progression of socialist ideology in Russia, there was little Alexander II could do to stop the shifting undercurrent of political thought. An article contemporary with the Russian socialist movement and published in The North American Review aptly summarizes the revolutionary perspective: What Russian Socialism wants to destroy may be defined in two words— Russian tsardom, the chronic cancer on Russia’s body politic, with all the minor social diseases it has engendered…. They wage a merciless war against the state, such as the Tsar’s power has shaped it, with its lawlessness, corruption, and secret police. They deny religion, but what religion? That miserable organization of the Greek-Russian Church, the head of which is the Tsar—that religion which has long ago ceased to have any vitality, and would now fall to pieces if it were not protected by police regulation….32 The Russian people had long suffered under the oppressive air of political repression and moral decay. Socialists sought to completely undermine common cultural institutions which they considered nothing more than artifices, perpetuated only through continued societal hypocrisy, and they would stop at nothing to see the achievement of a socialist state which would make right the decades of Russian societal wrongs.

As Kropotkin, a revolutionary socialist, proudly asserted, “We … have declared war on the government.”33

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The Birth of the Zemlya I Volya Discouraged socialist youth slowly began to conclude that philosophy without action was dull and hollow and began to seek methods of public action through which they might inspire revolution. It was out of a desire to blend active propaganda with philosophy that Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty), a socialist revolutionary organization named in honor of Alexander Herzen’s expression of the needs of Russian peasantry, was born. 34 Mark Natanson, a socalled “apostle of the socialist movement,” founded Zemlya i Volya in 1876 with the express purpose of utilizing its organizational structure and political clout to organize a systematic incitement of an agrarian revolution.35 Though few socialists of the late 1870s disagreed that some sort of political action was necessary to inspire a peasant uprising, there was widespread disagreement over the sort of action which ought to be taken.36 Some members believed that conducting public demonstrations, printing and distributing socialist journals, and dwelling amongst the Russian peasantry would be sufficient, while others saw little benefit in the pursuit of such tactics. Members of Zemlya i Volya had predilections on both sides of this debate.

Though non-violence had been the reigning paradigm of Russian revolution, some began to deviate from the more popularly accepted methods of proselytization and advocate violent means of resistance. Nechaev’s “Catechism of a Revolutionary,” published in 1868, had famously declared that “those who are especially inimical to the Revolutionary organization must be destroyed; their violent and sudden deaths will produce the utmost panic in the government, depriving it of its will to action by removing the cleverest and most energetic supporters.”37 His philosophy substantially drew upon the ideas of Robespierre, who claimed that terror was an emanation of virtue because it was “nothing but justice, prompt, severe, and inflexible.”38 Nechaev trained a handful of dedicated followers in his philosophy, amongst the ranks of whom was Vera Zasulich, later to become one of the most prominent terrorists in Russia.39 By 1878, Nechaev’s philosophy had become the perspective of many of Zemlya i Volya’s most influential members.

Many who had previously hoped to incite agrarian revolution by bringing philosophy to the Russian peasants and conducting public demonstrations found their faith in previous strategies waning. “It was evident that by this path there could be no advance,” wrote Stepniak.40 Ironically, the circumstances which drove many socialist revolutionaries to choose terrorism were partially Alexander II’s own creation. His fear of nihilist and socialist philosophy had spearheaded efforts by state forces to shut down, arrest, or kill conspiratorial Russians wherever they might be found. Stepniak

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captured well the desperation he and his associates felt when he observed that the “merest suspicion led to arrest.”41 The conditions in which so many revolutionary socialists had found themselves—languishing behind bars, while all the passion of revolutionary fervor blazed within their hearts—was infuriating. Those imprisoned felt they were being held back from the fight, while many of those lucky enough to escape government detection or arrest felt they were standing by the sidelines, tolerating the abuses of the government, and watching their revolutionary movement fall apart while doing nothing to stop the collapse. 42 Confronted by the disproportionate power of the government against their forces and frustrated by the revolution’s failure to gain traction, two of Zemlya i Volya’s most influential members—Lev Tikhomirov and Nicholas Morozov—published an article in one of the organization’s periodicals which called political assassination “above all an act of revenge, the only means of defence [sic] in the existing situation, and at the same time one of the best weapons of agitation.”43 This disagreement over tactics might have remained nothing more than a topic of conversation amongst Zemlya i Volya members, with some choosing to pursue terrorism while others rejected it, but two assassination attempts permanently changed the face of this debate. The first was Vera Zasulich’s famous attempt to assassinate General Trepov, a Russian official who had ordered the flogging of a political prisoner, on January 24, 1878. The incident left Trepov seriously injured, and Vera was arrested and put on trial. Though evidence that she had fired the shot was readily available, the fundamental question of her case quickly became whether or not General Trepov deserved to be shot rather than whether or not Vera herself was guilty. Within two months she was acquitted of the crime. The implications of this verdict were not lost on the more radical members of Zemlya i Volya.

Zasulich was not a terrorist. She was the angel of vengeance, and not of terror. She was a victim who voluntarily threw herself into the jaws of the monster in order to cleanse the honour of the party from a mortal outrage….

This occurrence gave to Terrorism a most powerful impulse. It illuminated it with its divine aureloa, and gave to it the sanction of sacrifice and of public opinion. The acquittal of Zasulich was a solemn condemnation of the entire arbitrary system which had impelled her to raise her avenging hand against the bully.44 Upon hearing of her release, Alexander II ordered that she be rearrested and retried, but Vera had already escaped. The tsar’s feeble attempts to control the trial’s fallout were incredibly unsuccessful. The people had shown where their sentiment lay—not with the tsarist regime, but with those who were brave enough

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to oppose it—and their voices spoke louder than any of Alexander II’s attempts to silence them.45 The second assassination attempt took place on April 2, 1879. Alexander Konstantinovich Solovev, a long-standing member of Zemlya i Volya, attempted to assassinate Tsar Alexander II.46 Although there had been previous insular attempts to assassinate the tsar, Solovev’s was the first that found substantial backing within Zemlya i Volya. Such an attempt so soon after Tikhomirov and Morozov’s public affirmation of terror tactics signaled a new path for Russian socialism.47 As Solovev boldly proclaimed, “We revolutionary Socialists have declared war on the government.”48 Solovev’s assassination plot failed and he was convicted and hanged little more than a month later, but his actions served as the catalyst for a split in Zemlya i Volya which would culminate in the formation of Narodnaya Volya.

Despite Tikhomirov and Morozov’s strong endorsement of terror tactics, other Zemlya i Volya members were less certain they would be effective.49 Tikhomorov, Morozov, and their followers adamantly advocated for a campaign to assassinate the tsar, while their opponents—Georgi Plekhanov, Pavel Akselrod, and others—vehemently opposed it. It soon became clear that resolution between the two factions was not an option. Vera and Solovev’s assassination attempts had outlined a clear path for violent resistance and those who felt an urge to do more for the cause of socialism could not be dissuaded from following that path. In the same way, those who opposed the assassination of the tsar believed whole-heartedly that such an attempt would hinder the progression of the socialist agenda in Russia and were therefore equally unwilling to waver in their dedication to the path set before them. In 1879, Zemlya i Volya fractured into two independent organizations. Those opposing the tsar’s assassination took for themselves the name Chornyi Peredel, which means, “The Black Repartition.”50 Those in favor called themselves Narodnaya Volya, or “The Party of the People’s Will.”51 Formation of Narodnaya Volya’s Identity Membership in Narodnaya Volya was diverse. The newly-formed revolutionary group closely mirrored its parent organization’s internal structure. Like Zemlya i Volya, it had a “central nucleus [which exercised] a measure of control over local chapters, which functioned in the provinces, and over special units which confined their activities to occupational groups, such as workmen, students, and army officers.”52 This central nucleus was known as the Executive Committee, while its the surrounding support network—membership of which was estimated to lie somewhere between 500 and 2200—was known as narodnovoletz.53 Represented nationalities and ethnicities on the Executive Committee included Rus-

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sian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Polish, Greek, Norwegian, Georgian, and German.54 Ten of the twenty-nine Executive Committee members were women.55 Many of Zemlya i Volya’s most organized, commanding, and charismatic leaders joined Narodnaya Volya’s ranks and found themselves a place on its Executive Committee.56 Despite demographic and experiential differences, the Executive Committee members bore some similarity to one another.

These members believed their sole purpose was the assassination of the tsar and were willing to go to great lengths in order to achieve those ends. They did not fear death because to them nothing was worse than living in active violation of their convictions. In this boldness, they found their strength. As Alexander Mikhailov, another member of the Executive Committee, eloquently put it, “Who does not fear death is almost omnipotent.”57 Morozov remarked on the nature of the Executive Committee, stating: The Executive Committee was not a society of theorists, but a fighting squad. When we accepted new members, we never asked them, ‘What are you thinking about Social-Democracy, about anarchism, about constitutions, about the republics.’ We asked them only, ‘Are you ready to give up your life and personal freedom and all that you have for the liberation of your homeland?’ And if to the last question we received an affirmative answer, and it seem to us that the person was really capable of all this, we immediately accepted them. 58 It was here that Narodnaya Volya forged a new identity which stood independent from all other revolutionary groups of the time. Though Narodnaya Volya’s internal structure mirrored Zemlya i Volya’s, the composite function of Zemlya i Volya and other such groups had always been to theorize and to spread those theories to their target audiences. The formation of an organization dedicated to political resistance through terrorism was entirely unprecedented. This “fighting squad,” as Morozov put it, was the first of its kind.59 The Philosophy of Terrorism: Both Rational and Humane So it was that a series of small stepping stones led some of Russia’s brightest minds to adopt the philosophy of terrorism—to many of them it seemed the most reasonable conclusion. Nihilism had pounded the last nail in the coffin of the institutions of religion and family with which the Russian intelligentsia had long been dissatisfied. For those who found a nihilistic outlook equally unsatisfactory, socialism was one of few philosophies which offered a hope and purpose independent of the religious institutions in which these enlightened Russians had lost all faith. Socialist revolutionaries placed all their faith in agrarian revolution, but the longer they were forced to endure the tyranny of tsardom the more impatient

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they grew. Because socialism is an inherently atheistic political philosophy, its adherents have no hope for the achievement of their goals beyond themselves.

Thus, when the agrarian revolution was too slow in coming, the revolutionaries took it upon themselves to act. When they found that even public demonstrations and active proselytization failed to bring an end to tsarist abuse, they hardened themselves and trudged one step further for the sake of their socialist vision.

Narodnaya Volya temporarily discarded all other goals in order to focus on assassinating the tsar. Zemlya i Volya’s fragmentation had been relatively peaceful, and as Narondaya Volya threw itself headlong into plotting assassinations it made it clear that it still considered Chornyi Peredel an ally in its fight against despotism. Narodnaya Volya’s “Program,” which outlined its mission, short term goals, and tactics, explained that “all opposition elements, even those that do not join us, will find help and protection in us.” 60 Though Narodnaya Volya affirmed the use of terrorism against the tsar and his collaborators, it specifically condemned allowing unaffiliated civilians to become the target of political violence. As a postscript attached to the “Program” declared, “individuals and social groups that stand outside our struggle with the government are recognized as neutral; their identity and property are inviolable.” 61 While such blanket moral statements are easy to make and easier to ignore, history suggests that at least some narodnovoletz took that promise seriously. As Bruce Hoffman wrote in his book, Inside Terrorism: Their unswerving adherence to this principle is perhaps best illustrated by the failed attempt on the life of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, made by a successor organization to Narodnaya Volya in 1905. As the royal carriage came into view, the terrorist tasked with the assassination saw that the duke was unexpectedly accompanied by his children and therefore aborted his mission rather than risk harming the intended victim’s family.62 This refusal to target innocent civilians seems sympathetic to the twenty-first century mind, which is well accustomed to the story of the unsuspecting passerby sacrificed on the altar of an unknown radical’s political expression. Certainly, in some instances their refusal to kill unaffiliated civilians was merciful, as was the case when the terrorist called off his assassination attempt in order to preserve the life of his enemy’s child. However, self-interest may have also been heart in that decision. As it attempted to catalyze an agrarian revolution, there is little that causing random civilian casualties could have done to further Narodnaya Volya’s political goals. Modern terrorist organizations often target the civilian population as a method of inspiring fear which, in most democratic societies, translates into action of some sort. Narodnaya Volya, on the other hand, had no such motivation.

It solely participated in destructive activities which would pain and pressure the

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tsarist government, and needed the support and approval of the Russian people.

Narodnaya Volya’s assassinations were meant to make the government feel fear and the people feel hope.

On March 1, 1881, after six failed assassination attempts, Narodnaya Volya finally killed the tsar. 63 Alexander II was traveling by coach down the Catherine Canal toward his Winter Palace in St. Petersburg when revolutionaries Nikolai Rysakov and Ignati Grinevitsky lobbed two explosives in his direction. When the first explosive struck his coach, he demanded to disembark and inspect the damage. As he stood in the open air, the second explosive struck his legs and left him severely injured and rapidly losing blood. Guards and bystanders loaded him onto a sleigh and rushed him back to his personal doctor in the Winter Palace, but in their rush to take him home they neglected to bind his wounds. When he arrived at the Winter Palace, Tsar Alexander II had lost too much blood to be saved and he died shortly thereafter.

The Repercussions of the Narodnaya Volya Narodnaya Volya had believed that this assassination would bring about social revolution. They were met with a surprisingly anticlimactic response on the part of the peasantry.64 Those who hated the regime celebrated the tsars’ death, but nothing more. As one revolutionary history aptly put it, “The people were completely indifferent to the fact of regicide.”65 The terrorist’s pleas for freedom of the press, of speech, of peaceable assembly, and of free elections were entirely refused by Alexander II’s successor, Alexander III. As Stepniak commented, “The Government replied by fresh executions, by again exiling thousands to Siberia, by fresh rigors against the press, and against every liberal tendency.”66 It seemed Narodnaya Volya’s efforts had been a complete failure.

While it certainly failed to achieve its short-term goals, Narodnaya Volya made a lasting impact on the face of Russian politics and global political expression. The diverse ethnic makeup of its Executive Committee and surrounding narodnovoletz ensured that when the organization crumbled, its ideas still circulated throughout Eastern Europe. The prolific writings of Narodnaya Volya’s major theorists spread eastward by way of newspapers, books, and Russian exiles. 67 Socialist revolutionaries across the Western world quickly began modeling their resistance campaigns off the example laid out by Narodnaya Volya.

It is curious that so many revolutionists would seek to imitate a resistance which ostensibly failed to achieve its political goals. Yet, as Hoffman explains, “To the nascent anarchist movement, the ‘propaganda by deed’ strategy championed by the Narodnaya Volya provided a model to be emulated.”68 Shortly after the tsar’s assassination, anarchist and socialist movements extolling tyrannicide

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cropped up in London, Poland, and Serbia. These would be followed by others of their kind, and eventually even Lenin himself would take a page out of the terrorists’ book in order to secure his own power.69 To this day radical terrorists, even those whose political philosophies starkly differ from Russian socialists’, often mimic the structural and functional example that Narodnaya Volya set.

So it was that a seemingly defunct revolutionary movement, based upon a political philosophy which, on its surface seemed too extreme to be practically applied, came to change the face of European political resistance forever. Russia proved to be the prime location for the formulation and expansion of terrorism. Ideas of nihilism, of socialism, and of violent resistance—all of which had appeared in other forms across Europe—found within the vacuum of Russian morality a space to flourish. There they danced and fought and mixed together, producing a passionate expression of defiance that was both distinctly Russian and highly moldable to the revolutionary needs of other nations. The passion of the Russian revolutionary captured the hearts of foreign socialists and anarchists alike, as he held within himself the character of both the hero and the martyr.

They latched onto his dogmatic expression of socialist idealism. They emulated his practical self-sacrifice. They embodied his determination. They took up his oath to be free “in defiance of everything,” and Europe has never been the same.70

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References 1. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 2006), xv.

2. Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2015), 15.

3. “The Revolution in Russia,” The North American Review 129, no. 272 (July 1879): 23-36, accessed May 5, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25100774.pdf.

4. Brian Duignan, Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Nihilism,” Chicago: Encylopaedia Britannica, accessed May 9, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/nihilism.

5. Sergei Stepniak, Underground Russia: Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life (New York, NY: John W. Lovell Company, 1883), 14.

6. Stepniak, 3.

7. Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, trans. Richard Hare (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948), 19.

8. David Saunders, Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881 (New York: Longman Publishing, 1992), 98-99.

9. Clark R. McCauley and Sophia Moskalenk, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 6, 212.

10. Saunders, 239-248.

11. Stepniak, 12.

12. Stepniak, 4.

13. Ibid.

14. Stepniak, 9-10.

15. Turgenev, 45.

16. Stepniak, 12.

17. “The Revolution in Russia,” 30.

18. McCauley, 7-8.

19. S. G. Pushkarev, “Russia and the West: Ideological and Personal Contacts before 1917,” The Russian Review 24, no. 2 (April 1965): 146, accessed May 5, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ pdf/126753.pdf.

20. Andrzej Walicki, “Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Russia,” The Russian Review 36, no. 1 (January 1977): 18-25, accessed May 12, 2017,

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21. Stepniak, 8.

22. Cynthia H. Whittaker, “The Women’s Movement during the Reign of Alexander II: A Case Study in Russian Liberalism,” The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (June 1976): 40-42, accessed May 12, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1877817.pdf.

23. Whittaker, 42.

24. Stepniak, 18.

25. Ibid., 19.

26. Ibid., 19-20.

27. Ibid., 19.

28. Ibid., 20.

29. Ibid., 23-24.

30. Stepniak, 26.

31. Stepniak, 24-25.

32. “The Revolution in Russia,” 27-28.

33. Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960), 632.

34. David Saunders, Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform, 1801-1881 (New York: Longman Publishing, 1992), 241.

35. Venturi, 469-470, 225.

36. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. “Zemlya i Volya,” Chicago: Encylcopaedia Britannica, accessed May 12, 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zemlya-i-Volya.

37. Sergei Nechaev, “Catechism of a Revolutionist,” 1868.

38. Hoffman, 3.

39. Ana Siljak, Angel of Vengeance: The Girl Who Shot the Governor of St. Petersburg and Sparked the Age of Assassination (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 93.

40. Stepniak, 32.

41. Stepniak, 33.

42. Venturi, 620-624.

43. Ibid., 629-30.

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45. Ibid.

46. Venturi, 631.

47. Ibid., 630.

48. Ibid., 632.

49. Venturi, 622-626.

50. Yarmolinsky, 223.

51. Ibid., 226.

52. Ibid.

53. Yarmolinsky, 225-227.

54. Ibid., 228.

55. Anna Hillyar, Revolutionary Women in Russia, 1870-1917: A Study In Collective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 43-49.

56. Yarmolinsky, 223-225.

57. Yarmolinsky, 228.

58. Morozov, “Executive Committee,” accessed May 12, 2017, http://www.narovol.narod.ru/ispolkom.htm&prev=search.

59. Ibid.

60. “Program of the Executive Committee of ‘People’s Will’, 1879,” accessed May 12, 2017, http://apesni.org/zona/zemlaivola/progr1879.php.

61. Ibid.

62. Hoffman, 6.

63. Edvard Radzinsky, Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2005), 417.

64. Peter Julicher, Renegade, Rebels, and Rogues Under the Tsars (Jefferson, NC: McFaraland & Co., 2003), 214.

65. Ibid.

66. Stepniak, 265.

67. Steven G. Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 18.

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69. E.A. Rees, Political Thought From Machiavelli to Stalin: Revolutionary Machiavellism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 99-100.

70. Stepniak, 50.

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