The Journal of International Social Affairs: Spring 2018

VOLUME 9 NO. 2

SPRING 2018

The Journal of International Social Affairs A Patrick Henry College Publication

Issue No. 2 CONTENTS William Bock

21st Century Collective Security: Reforming NATO To Counter Major Power Aggression (pg. 1)

Ryan Kilhenny

The Crimean Crisis: Ukraine’s Survival within Russia’s Near Abroad (pg. 14)

Claire Atwood

Encryption: The Threat and Implications of Going Dark

Maren Sekerak

Mind-Controlled Technology: An Analysis Of BrainComputer Interface In The Context Of National Security

(pg. 27)

(pg. 45)

From the Editor

Dear readers, On behalf of the editors for the Journal of International Social Affairs, I am proud to present the Spring 2018 edition. International Affairs frequently pass people by in a blur of sporadic news stories. Throughout its history and in this issue, the ISA Journal seeks to uncover the underlying philosophies which motivate and explain modern social affairs.

In her paper, “Encryption: The Threat and Implications of Going Dark,” Claire Atwood examines the implications of new encryption technology—what it means for terrorists and the surveillance systems of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

In “21st Century Collective Security: Reforming NATO To Counter Major Power Aggression,” William Bock considers the position of NATO in the modern day, its continued usefulness, and suggestions for its continued relevance.

In “The Crimean Crisis: Ukraine’s Survival within Russia’s Near Abroad,” Ryan Kilhenny examines the historical significance behind Russian’s involvement in the Ukraine and uncovers what must be done to protect the stability and independence of the nation.

Finally, in “Mind-Controlled Technology: An Analysis Of Brain-Computer Interface In The Context Of National Security,” Maren Sekerak examines the impact that the development of brain-computer interface technology will have on the globe with implications for the security of different nations.

This journal would not be possible without the assistance of many. The editorial staff of David Thetford, Claire Atwood, Esther Katz, Danielle Fife, and Meg McEwen has worked hard over the last few months to help prepare this journal.

We are grateful for the guidance of our faculty supervisor Dr. Stephen Baskerville and for the assistance of the Journalism, Strategic Intelligence, International Politics and Policy, and Political Theory programs.

Most of all we are grateful for you, our readers. We hope you gain as much from reading this Issue as we did from preparing it.

David Slaughter Editor-in-Chief

There are some things which cannot be learned quickly, and time, which is all we have, must be paid heavily for their acquiring.

Ernest Hemingway

STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Associate Editor: Research Editor: Copy Editors: Layout Editor: Faculty Supervisor:

David Slaughter David Thetford Claire Atwood Esther Katz Danielle Fife Megan McEwen Dr. Stephen Baskerville

PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 www.phc.edu ISSN 2572-9586

2

1st Century Collective Security: Reforming NATO to Counter Major Power Aggression William Bock

A recent edition of the New Yorker featured an article entitled “What Does NATO Do Anyway?” with contributions by the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Douglas Lute.1 This simple title posing a simple question raises serious concerns about the role NATO plays in keeping Europe “whole and free and at peace.”2 While this mandate is considered questionable by some and often misunderstood, a visit into NATO’s past reveals its important role in maintaining the continued vitality of the West.

A quick review of the history of global conflict over the last hundred years is all it takes to understand the necessity of collective security in the 21st Century.

Such an explanation can be most easily understood in the simple Swiftian terms of Gulliver and Lilliputian power dynamics. In World War I, the West – mainly the United States – was lulled into a false sense of security by the idealistic notion that man’s sophistication would stop all wars. American isolationism and decreased U.S. military power left the West unprepared for what would be called “the Great War.” The Lilliputian powers – like Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia – were devastated by the German Gulliver during the conflict. It took many years and thousands of lives to rescue the Lilliputians from the giant Gulliver. This set back the whole world economically, politically, and socially.

After “the Great War,” the West was convinced that their fight was finished; consequently, Woodrow Wilson and other American allies turned to new, multilateral institutions such as the League of Nations and ignored the festering issues.

Then, while Japan attempted to take over weaker countries in Asia, Germany invaded France and Poland. These Lilliputians were once again subdued by the German Gulliver. It took the Allies years to mobilize and even more years and thousands more lives to rescue these smaller, Lilliputian countries. This set the world back economically by destroying Europe’s infrastructure and economic system and opened the door for Soviet expansion into the Lilliputian countries.

It was then that the West formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was successful, for the first time in the history of the modern nation state, in providing these Lilliputian countries protection. It certainly did not stop all the Lilliputian countries from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, but it

FALL 2017

1

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

stoped and provided a mechanism (Article V) for the rest of them to band together and tie down the Gulliver of the North. NATO’s expansion after the dissolution of the Soviet Union now allows for more Lilliputians to come together and bind the Russian bear even more securely.

But now, fueled by oil profits and emboldened by the power vacuum created by the American “pivot to Asia” and the Middle East, the Gulliver of the North has his strength back and his hand free. With the NATO expansion stalled and many NATO members failing to meet the 2% defense spending requirement, the ropes have loosened even further. The Lilliputian countries do not know where to look for protection or who they should ally with. The U.S. and the other major powers of Europe need to ensure that there is a safe place to go, and that place must be NATO. By 2025, NATO must be able to provide collective security to its members against the haunting spectre of hybrid war and must remain open to new members, all the while sustaining old alliances and containing the Russian expansion.

Current Issues: Russian Aggression and the Rise of the East Crafting NATO’s collective defense policy for the next decade requires consideration of three major geopolitical threats: (1) Russia’s hybrid war strategy, (2) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and (3) the turning of Turkey. The first two threats are the result of a major power competition returning to the international stage after multiple decades of a unipolar world order led by the United States. The last threat is an example of the kind of chaos that the awakening of the Russian Bear and the rise of the East can cause for NATO. Indeed, the confluence of the first two threats has the potential to destroy NATO’s internal cohesion.

Russia has already started devastating Lilliputian states and disillusioning even major powers such as the U.S. during the past decade with its hybrid warfare strategy. For example, Russia targeted Estonia with cyber-attacks in 2007, Georgia with military might in 2008, Ukraine with gas cut offs in 2009, Ukraine again in 2014 with Russia’s land grab in Crimea, Montenegro with a “plot to overthrow the pro-NATO government” in 2016, and the U.S. with political influence operations aided by cyber-attacks in 2016. 3 These actions should dispel any notion that Vladimir Putin wants peace in Europe and cooperation with the West. However, significantly, none of them have been found to come into conflict with Article V of the NATO charter by qualifying as an armed attack and thus meriting a significant response from the alliance.

It is clear that Russia has a broader definition of war than Article V currently protects NATO allies from. Russia’s usage of a broad range of active measures which exploit grey areas in international law allow Moscow to effectuate its inter-

2 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

ests by destabilizing U.S. and European security and undermining NATO members’ confidence in the sustainability of collective defense in the process. Unless and until NATO develops a new strategy that counters Moscow’s hybrid warfare, the collective security guarantee enshrined in Article V will be nothing more than a paper promise.

Russia is not the only threat which must be considered by NATO. “As tensions between Russia and NATO continue to percolate along Europe’s eastern periphery, another development has quietly emerged along the vast southern expanse of what was once the Kremlin’s Soviet empire.”4 Some experts call it “China’s NATO”5 others call it “a modern-day Warsaw Pact,”6 its official title is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its membership includes Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as well as observer states such as Iran, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Belarus.7 Since the beginning of the 21st century “the SCO has transformed itself from a glorified border-security framework into a regional counterterrorism entity into an alternative international bloc, with an important security component and significant economic and political potential.”8 Indeed, the SCO calls China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), “the most ambitious and all-encompassing economic development project in the history of humanity.”9 Conceived of as the Chinese version of the Marshall Plan, OBOR aims “to connect China and Europe in a web of roads, high-speed rail, power lines, ports, pipelines, fiber-optic lines and other infrastructure with the goal of stimulating growth in the scores of developing countries in between.” 10 Just as the Marshall Plan connected Europe to the U.S. and drove a wedge between Europe and the USSR, China’s OBOR initiative also has the potential to drive a wedge between Europe and the U.S. by changing the geopolitical landscape in favor of the East rather than the West.

The SCO provides a security guarantee for Lilliputian states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan who pivot toward China. In terms of raw military power, the SCO clearly rivals NATO. On paper, a combined China and Russia military force would field 3.1 million active-duty personnel, plus millions more in reserve, financed by a cumulative defense budget eclipsing $200 billion. Further, these two nations feature some of the world’s largest ballistic missile forces. When adding India and Pakistan to the mix, the SCO would present NATO with four nuclear-armed opponents, plus millions more manpower reserves and frontline troops. This all, of course, fails to account for Iran, which remains in observer status – for now.11 To just focus on the SCO’s military capabilities, however, misses the point.

The real threat to NATO that this Eastern bloc represents is its potential to serve “as a geopolitical counterweight to the U.S.”12 Tensions between the SCO and

SPRING 2018 3

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

the U.S. have already been high with the SCO unceremoniously rejecting U.S. requests for observer status in 2005.13 In 2005, the SCO also urged the U.S. to set a deadline for the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan.14 The organization made clear that it wants the U.S. out of Central Asia, running “peace missions” in Afghanistan to showcase its force projection and troop transportation capabilities.15 While the SCO still lacks many of the elements that would make it a true rival to NATO, the organization “is already a factor altering the Eurasian geopolitical calculus.”16 Lilliputian countries are already gravitating toward the East, and that is perhaps the greatest threat the SCO presents to NATO: it signifies a dramatic shift in the current geostrategic balance of power that normally favors Washington. Additionally, it signifies that “global dynamism is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific region” according to the National Intelligence Council report on Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.”17 To put it in the words of Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, “[f]or the first time in many years, a real competitive environment has emerged on the market of ideas” between different “value systems and development models.” The good news, from the Russian point of view, is that “the West is losing its monopoly on the globalization process.”18 The best example of how the SCO has changed Eurasian state’s economic and geopolitical calculus is Turkey. According to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey is now looking to join the SCO after relations between Turkey and the West soured following the Turkish repression of political dissidents.19 The fundamental problem in the relationship between Turkey and the West according to Prime Minister Erdogan is simply that he has “lost trust in the West since last year’s failed coup, which he has interpreted as a Western plot to oust him.”

And now, he is “determined to secure his own defense.”20 Because of this, Prime Minister Erdogan has pivoted toward Asia, publicly stating that “[i]f we get into the SCO, we will say good-bye to the European Union. The Shanghai Five [the former name of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization] is better – much more powerful.”21 Turkey has also begun rapprochement with Russia, purchasing a Russian surface-to-air missile system in September of 2017.22 Neither of these developments necessarily mean that Turkey will leave NATO or break off relations with the West, but they do signal that the SCO has caused division within NATO and that Turkish-Russian relations are warming, presenting a multitude of strategic difficulties for the alliance. If Turkey turns toward the East it could wreak havoc within NATO making concesus – which is required to act on all important issues – immensely difficult if not impossible.

Strategically, Turkey is the second-largest military power in NATO.23 The country houses U.S. tactical nuclear weapons,24 provides a launching pad for NATO counter-terror operations, and administers important oil pipelines that protect European energy security.25

4 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

Ultimately, NATO needs Turkey today for the same geopolitical reasons that it did during the Cold War and must continue to fully engage with Ankara. It is important to recognize that the relationship between Turkey and NATO has always been based on the philosophy of realpolitik. Indeed, throughout its history Turkey has shown a desire to seek security from the strongest superpower. For the past half century that superpower has clearly been the U.S., but now it is not so certain. To keep Turkey and other NATO members from turning toward alternative collective security structures, the U.S. must establish a new strategy to contain Russia and stop pivoting away from Europe as it has done twice since the turn of the century, “first under Bush, with the war on terror; then under Obama, with the pivot toward Asia.”26 Now, more than ever, NATO needs renewed American leadership to reinvigorate the alliance.

Recommendations for Reform: Three major recommendations for NATO reform will help the West contain Russia and stymie the SCO. They must (1) reinforce NATO’s deterrence capabilities, (2) rethink NATO’s strategic concept, and (3) reaffirm NATO’s open-door policy.

Reinforce NATO’s Deterrence Capabilities: Two major reforms should be undertaken by NATO to protect the alliance’s Eastern flank from Russian aggression: (1) troop deployments and (2) tactical nuclear weapons. In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are crystal clear: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics.27 Fortunately, the RAND analysis notes that “avoiding such a swift and catastrophic failure does not appear to require a Herculean effort.”28 The deployment of additional heavily armored brigades with proper support would go a long way toward deterring a Russian offensive even if they would not be sufficient to ul-

SPRING 2018 5

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

timately prevent the Russian takeover of the Baltic states in a prolonged war.29 NATO should deploy the seven brigades necessary to protect the Baltics from a Russian incursion and the U.S. should commit troops to this operation. This would strengthen NATO’s deterrence capabilities against Russia and show solidarity with NATO member states in deterring Russian aggression.

The second recommendation concerns placing tactical nuclear weapons in Poland or another strategic location in Western Europe. So long as Poland is willing, and there are indications that it would be,30 the U.S. should consider providing tactical nuclear weapons to Poland through NATO’s nuclear sharing program for five major reasons: (1) to provide an offset to Russia’s tactical nukes which currently outnumber NATO nukes 10 to 1 in Europe,31 (2) to provide an offset to the potential loss of Turkish support for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons being based at Incirlik air force base, (3) to provide nuclear protection to the Baltic region – aircraft armed with the B-61 in Poland’s strategic location would be able to encompass Kaliningrad and the Baltic States, (4) to show solidarity to NATO members who doubt that the U.S. will come to their aid if Russia invades, and (5) to send a clear message of strength to Russia that the sovereignty of NATO member states will not be compromised.

Rethink NATO’s Strategic Concept:

NATO’s Strategic Concept, the authoritative statement of how the alliance plans to address current security threats and challenges, has been updated about every ten years since the inception of the alliance almost seventy years ago.32 The last time NATO updated its Strategic Concept, however, was back in 2010. As detailed above in the current issues section, the security landscape across Europe has changed significantly since then with Russia’s resurgence as a major threat to European security through use of hybrid warfare and the rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not to mention threats like the rise of ISIS, and the fall of democracy in Turkey.

Most importantly, discussions surrounding NATO’s Strategic Concept should help member states clarify which situations should trigger Article Five “and seek to create a tiered response mechanism that could be used against adversaries that wage war without declaring it.”33 NATO strategy must also consider the meaning of “armed attack” in terms of cyberspace. A new NATO strategy must affirm, as NATO did in its Tallinn Manual 2.0, that proportional countermeasures taken by member states to enemy cyberattacks are fully justified under international law.

Of course, reconsidering NATO’s Strategic Concept could be fraught with disagreements between the member states. However, “the need to have NATO’s key strategic document reflect current reality should outweigh all other concerns.”34 A new Strategic Concept may not be too difficult to achieve considering

6 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

that it could draw on the substantive language of the agreements made by NATO members at the 2014 and 2016 summit declarations. Ultimately, “a renewed commitment to cooperative security would send a signal to those like-minded actors that feel anxious because of intensifying regional tensions and a highly unconventional U.S. president.”35 States such as Sweden, South Korea, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia would “be grateful for any indication that NATO remains a steady partner, still extending its hand in security cooperation.”36 Reaffirm NATO’s Open-Door Policy: Reinvigorating the NATO alliance requires a demonstration of the credibility of NATO’s open-door policy enshrined in Article 10 of the NATO charter.

Montenegro’s accession to NATO over the summer was an important step in this direction. But further action is needed to keep NATO’s door open. The following policy recommendations should be considered: (1) Open Door Declaration: the U.S. should ensure that NATO’s open-door policy is explicitly clear in every Summit declaration the organization issues.

“The open-door policy is a highly symbolic message that has encouraged many nations in the past to push for modernization and reform.”37 A routine open-door declaration will do much to incentivize such reform to create a Europe “whole and free” and a NATO that lives up to its founding principles of democracy, sovereignty, and the rule of law.

(2) Georgian Solidarity Declaration: NATO should file a separate declaration on its support for eventual Georgian membership in the Alliance and make it clear in subsequent Summit declarations that “Georgia’s successful completion of subsequent Annual National Programs, the close relationship through the NATO– Georgia Commission, and the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package are the true markers of progress that will bring Georgia closer to ultimate membership.”38 (3) Georgian Defense Support: The American Enterprise Insitute suggests that supporting the nation of Georgia with defensive weaponry would strengthen the position of NATO. “The U.S. and NATO allies should sell defensive anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry to Georgia. So long as the weapons are defensive in nature, there is no reason not to provide them to the Georgian military.”39 (4) Nordic Cooperation: NATO should invite Finland, Norway, and Sweden to participate in NATO exercises and Summit meetings to encourage NATO membership.

(5) Partner with Ukraine: there are three elements to this recommendation: (1) “NATO should encourage NATO’s Centers of Excellence (COE) to assist Ukraine in facing Russian aggression, especially in the areas of cyberspace, energy security, and countering propaganda. While only member states can be

SPRING 2018 7

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

COE-sponsoring nations, the alliance should consider inviting Ukraine to become a Contributing Participant.”40 (2) “NATO should continue to encourage Ukraine to participate in NATO-led exercises. In addition, NATO countries should continue robust participation in exercises in or near Ukraine, especially the Rapid Trident and Sea Breeze exercises.”41 (3) the “United States should begin providing defensive weapons that would help Ukraine defend its territory. Such weapons could include anti-tank weapons to defend against Russian-provided armored personnel carriers, ammunition, vehicles and secure communications equipment.”42 (6) Engage Turkey: while many NATO members have complicated relationships with Turkey, NATO should show solidarity by standing with Turkey against common threats such as terror organizations like the PKK through intelligence sharing between member states. NATO should also “provide Turkey with any help it might require to secure its airspace. This might include increased air patrols, more air defense batteries, and increasing the deployment of air surveillance capability.”43 Bolstering Turkish air defense will help reduce Turkey’s incentive to turn to Russia for airspace support.

(7) Encourage B9 and 3SI Enlargement: The U.S. should push Poland and Ukraine to include Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in its Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and Bucharest Nine (B9) group. These central European regional security and energy initiatives show great promise for increasing integration and preparing Central European states for NATO and the EU as Foreign Affairs noted: The 3SI and B9 could help to significantly support the development and security of those post-Soviet countries that are already close to the EU yet will, for the foreseeable future, remain within Europe’s gray zone and thus face especially high risks and demanding challenges. In both practical and symbolic terms, the two initiatives could become major drivers of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three Eastern Partnership participants, fill their association processes with political as well as economic substance, and help to prepare them for future membership in both the EU and NATO. They would signal to Moscow that the current 3SI and B9 members have common interests with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and that these postSoviet states’ stability, security, and prosperity are of importance to the entire eastern and central European region – whether covered by NATO and the EU or not.44 Conclusion: NATO in the 1960s In an article written in Foreign Affairs, Alastair Buchan, now head of Brexit strategy for the University of Oxford, described the problems NATO faces in glib terms. He wrote that “the great uncertainties and dangers that technological

8 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

progress has created dispose of any lingering Western hope of being able to deter a tactical move by a strategic threat.” Moreover, “NATO is in no sense a synonym for the ‘free world’ and can only very partially act as the focus of a cohesive community of nations.”45 These statements could easily describe NATO today but the most intriguing thing about them is that they were written in 1962.

Decades later, the Soviet Union has been relegated to the dustbin of history, NATO has twenty-nine as opposed to the fifteen members it had in 1962, many of those members are former Soviet states, and the West’s premier collective security organization is fast approaching its seventieth birthday. While many have criticized the effectiveness of NATO’s collective security, the mere fact that the organization still stands today as a bastion of stability and security in Europe is a testament to the triumph a community of nations united by what President Trump in his recent speech in Warsaw called “the spirit of Western civilization” can achieve.

Certainly, NATO’s future is uncertain, but it has always has been uncertain, and despite monumental changes in cyber and space technology and complex relationships with its own members over the years. There is no reason why the organization cannot return to the prominence and power it once enjoyed during the Cold War so long as the West has the will to reinvigorate its alliance. An American pivot toward Europe along with a reinforcement of NATO’s deterrence capabilities, a rethinking of NATO’s Strategic Concept, and a reaffirmation of NATO’s open-door policy will go a long way toward reestablishing a Europe that is “whole and free and at peace.”

SPRING 2018 9

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

References 1

Robin Wright, “What Does NATO Do, Anyway?,” The New Yorker (July 22, 2016). Accessed

November 26, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-does-nato-do-anyway.

2 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO’s Contribution to a Europe Whole and Free,” Carnegie Europe (May 6, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63522.

3 Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’ and What Can be Done About It,” RAND (March 22, 2017). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf.

4

Daniel Darling, “Is the SCO Emerging as Eastern Counterweight to NATO?,” RealClearDe-

fense (August 30, 2015). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/31/is_the_sco_emerging_as_eastern_counterweight_to_nato_108426.html.

5 Tyler Roney, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China’s NATO?” The Diplomat (September 11, 2013). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-chinas-nato-2/.

6

Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., “A New Bloc Emerges?” American Thinker (August 5, 2005). Ac-

cessed November 26, 2017. http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2005/08/a_new_bloc_emerges. html.

7

“About the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Ac-

cessed November 26, 2017. http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/.

8 J. Peter Pham, “NATO’s New Rival,” The National Interest (August 19, 2008). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/article/natos-new-rival-2825?page=2.

9 Gal Luft, “It Takes a Road: China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: An American Response To The New Silk Road,” Institute for Analysis of Global Security (November, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.iags.org/Luft_BRI.pdf.

10 Enda Curran, “China’s Marshall Plan,” Bloomberg (August 7, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-07/china-s-marshall-plan. Luft.

11 Darling.

12 Stakelbeck.

13 Dilip Hiro, “Shanghai Surprise,” The Guardian (June 16, 2006). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/jun/16/shanghaisurprise.

14 Lionel Beehner, “U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia,” The Council on Foreign Relations (July

10 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 26, 2005). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/asia-us-military-basescentral-asia.

15 Julie Boland, “Learning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s ‘Peace Mission-2010’ Exercise,” The Brookings Institute (October 29, 2010). Accessed November 26, 2017. https:// www.brookings.edu/opinions/learning-from-the-shanghai-cooperation-organizations-peace-mission-2010-exercise/.

16 Pham.

17 The National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” The United States Director of National Intelligence (November 2008). Accessed November 24, 2017. https:// www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.

18 Robert Kagan, “Ideology’s Rude Return,” The Washington Post (May 2, 2008). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/01/AR2008050102899. html.

19 Natasha Bertrand, “NATO’s Second-Largest Military Power is Threatening a Dramatic Pivot to Russia and China,” Business Insider (November 22, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http:// www.businessinsider.com/turkey-russia-china-shanghai-cooperation-organization-2016-11.

20 Carlotta Gall and Andrew Higgins, “Turkey Signs Russian Missile Deal, Pivoting From NATO,” The New York Times (September 12, 2017). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.nytimes. com/2017/09/12/world/europe/turkey-russia-missile-deal.html.

21 Lina Wang, “Will Turkey Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Instead of the EU?” The Diplomat (November 24, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/ will-turkey-join-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-instead-of-the-eu/.

22 Gall.

23 Bertrand.

24 Adam Cabot, “Out of Turkey and Into Poland,” RealClearDefense (August 14, 2017). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/14/poland_an_alternative_ tactical_nuclear_deployment_112036.html.

25 “Turkey’s Energy Profile And Strategy,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa, 2011, http://www. mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa.

26 Jeffrey Gedmin, “NATO Cannot be Strong if Democracy is Weak,” Politico (July 7, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-cannot-be-strong-if-democracy-isweak-kosovo-defense-viktor-oban/.

SPRING 2018 11

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 27 David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” RAND (2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www. rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Associated Press, “Poland Considering Asking for Access to Nuclear Weapons under NATO Program,” The Guardian (December 6, 2015). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2015/dec/06/poland-considering-asking-for-access-to-nuclear-weapons-under-nato-program.

31 Cabot.

32 Patrick Keller, “A New Strategic Concept for NATO?” The American Enterprise Institute (September, 2017). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.aei.org/publication/a-new-strategic-concept-for-nato/.

33 Phillip Lohaus, “Deterring Russia Requires Bolstered NATO ‘Shaping’ Capabilities,” The American Enterprise Institute (July 6, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.aei.org/publication/ deterring-russia-requires-bolstered-nato-shaping-capabilities/.

34 Keller.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Mykola Kapitonenko and Bruno Lété, “Six Recommendations to Strengthen the Ukraine-NATO Partnership,” The German Marshall Fund of the United States (May 22, 2015). Accessed November 24, 2017. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/six-recommendations-strengthen-ukraine-nato-partnership.

38 Luke Coffey, “NATO Summit 2016: Keeping Georgia on the Membership Track,” The Heritage Foundation (June 14, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.heritage.org/node/10589/ print-display.

39 Ibid.

40 Daniel Kochis and Luke Coffey, “NATO Summit 2016: The Alliance Must Deepen the NATO– Ukraine Partnership,” The Heritage Foundation (July 5, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http:// www.heritage.org/node/10552/print-display.

41 Ibid.

42 Carl Levin and James Inhofe, “Give Ukraine the Weapons it Needs for Self-Defense,” The Washington Post (October 19, 2014). Accessed November 26, 2017. https://www.washington-

12 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S post.com/opinions/carl-levin-james-inhofe-give-ukraine-the-weapons-it-needs-to-defend-itself/2014/10/16/06da647a-4fe2-11e4-babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html?utm_term=.3a5b706f8896.

43 Luke Coffey, “NATO Summit 2016: Why the Alliance Cannot Afford to Ignore Turkey,” The Heritage Foundation (July 24, 2016). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.heritage.org/trade/ report/nato-summit-2016-why-the-alliance-cannot-afford-ignore-turkey.

44 Andreas Umland, “How Romania and Poland Can Strengthen NATO and the EU,” The Majalla (November 18, 2017). Accessed November 26, 2017. http://eng.majalla.com/2017/11/article55254892/romania-poland-can-strengthen-nato-eu.

45 Alastair Buchan, “The Reform of NATO,” Foreign Affairs 40, no. 2 (January 1962), 165-182. Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029545?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

SPRING 2018 13

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

T

Crimean Crisis: Ukraine’s Survival within Russia’s Near Abroad

he

Ryan Killhenny Executive Summary Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation has moved aggressively to secure its position amongst its former imperial territories.

Throughout the near abroad – the former Soviet republics – pockets of ethnic Russian minorities have sought to rejoin their mother country by forming secessionist movements. Russia has supported these rebel groups with its armed forces in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and most recently in Ukraine, where it illegally annexed Crimea and supports the rebels of Donetsk and Luhansk. In order to understand Russia’s motivation and strategic benefit for supporting these groups, it is important to review the history of cultural development and geopolitics between Ukraine and Russia, as well as the animosity through their recent history.

Historical Background Ukraine traces its origin to the medieval state of Kievan Rus, allegedly founded by the Viking ruler Oleg in about 882 when he subjugated the local Slavic peoples. The Norse Rurik Dynasty of Kiev was thoroughly Slavonized by the time of Prince Volodymyr (Vladimir) I in 980 when the state had expanded to dominate the region from Poland to the northern Volga.1 Volodymyr I converted Kievan Rus from Slavic paganism to Eastern Orthodox Christianity in 988, strengthening the kingdom’s ties with Byzantium in the south and further distinguishing it from its Catholic Western neighbors especially after the Great Schism of 1054. The Slavic state of Kievan Rus collapsed in 1240 when the Mongols under Batu Khan invaded from the east at a time when Kiev was internally divided. The mongols razed Kiev to the ground and the state did not recover for over a century. The Metropolitan of Kiev fled to the city of Vladimir, which – along with Novgorod – became a new center of power in the region, albeit tributary to the Mongol Golden Horde.2 The city of Moskva began as a small fort in 1147 and grew into the leading Slavic principality when it defeated Tver’ in 1318. In 1328, Moskva secured the Vladimir throne from Khan Uzbek. The founding of modern Russia is dated

14 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

to Grand Prince Ivan III’s annexation of Novgorod to Moskva in 1478 which united the two ecclesiastical centers of Russia under one ruler.3 Over the next several centuries, the Principality of Muscovy grew into the Russian Empire as it overcame and absorbed its neighbors through conquest. By 1796, its domains stretched from Poland in the west to Kamchatka and the Bering Sea in the distant east.

Throughout its history, Russia’s lack of natural protective geographic barriers in the form of either mountains or coasts has encouraged the formation of militant authoritarianism. The vast Northern European Plain offers no more protection from invaders than the central steppes of Asia or the Siberian Taiga. In order to protect itself from its enemies, Russia was compelled to conquer and subjugate its neighbors, creating an ever expanding buffer zone of terrain around its home territory.4 Unfortunately, no matter how far the empire expanded, it was faced with the same dilemma of little to no natural protection. Moreover, it was forced to keep a watchful guard upon all of the non-Russian ethnic minorities whom it had conquered lest they should revolt against imperial rule.

In order to ensure strength and stability in the midst of a myriad of external and internal security threats, Russia turned to centralized authoritarianism, first under the tsars and later under the general secretaries of the Soviet Union. Grand Prince Ivan “Grozny” IV turned the aristocratic boyars into a service nobility subservient to himself in the early 1500s. It was he who first used the title of tsar, claiming parity with the ancient Caesars of Rome and the contemporary emperors of Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire, the greatest powers of that time.

In 1721, Peter the Great made himself the “protector” of the Russian Orthodox Church, abolished the Patriarchate of Moskva, and replaced it with a Holy Synod comprised of members chosen in practice by himself.5 Thus the Russian tsardom eliminated the two major potential checks upon its power and consolidated total authority under itself as head of both the church and the state. While the peasantry was in no position to resist such trends, most Russians – both then and now – consider such consolidation necessary to prevent a recurrence of the Time of Troubles: a chaotic episode from 1598-1613 when Russia had no clear heir to the throne and was invaded by Poland.6 Many consider the economic crisis of the 1990s following the dissolution of the USSR and preceding the rise of Vladimir Putin as a second “time of troubles.”

The Russian Orthodox Church has become an indispensable component of Russia’s national identity. Although initially under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, Russian bishops elected their first autocephalous (independent) patriarch in Moskva in 1453, after Byzantium fell to the Ottoman Turks.7 In the 15th Century under Ivan III, Russia perceived itself as a “new Israel,” chosen by God and ordained by providence to overcome all the unbelieving Catholic, Muslim, and

SPRING 2018 15

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

pagan enemies which beset it from all sides. Ivan III used state force to control the nature of the Russian church by executing heretics; starting in the 1660s, Patriarch Nikon would standardize church doctrine and persecute dissenting Old Believers.8 19th Century Slavophilism further defined Russian nationalism in terms of its distinctly Slavic Orthodox faith.

Russia uses this combination of church and state under tsarist caesaropapism (where the tsar is both “Caesar” and “pope”) to pragmatically further its political influence internationally. For example, in the 1700s and 1800s, Russia used its position as defender of the global Orthodox Church to oppose Muslim Ottoman persecution of Christians in the Middle East, declaring war on the Caliphate several times and conquering the northern Black Sea region. While Moskva may certainly have had the interests of Orthodox Christians at heart, it is quite certain that they also desired to conquer the Bosporus Straits and secure access to the Mediterranean. Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has depicted itself as a righteous bastion of Christendom against a morally decadent Western culture by extolling and elevating the Orthodox Church as a traditional religious symbol of the secular Russian nation, seeking to align its conservative Slavic neighbors towards itself and away from the liberal governments of the EU and NATO. The Russian legislator Milonov expressed this sentiment well: “This disease of anti-Christian activity will pass… let fake values live together with Barack Obama, with his same-sex marriages, with his drugs,… we are going to the true real values; family, church, and state.”9 While Russia developed its own national identity on the basis of its Muscovite empire, Ukraine remained a divided borderland with little distinction or identity apart from the surrounding eastern Slavic peoples. After the fall of Kievan Rus, western Ukraine was conquered by the Catholic Kingdom of Lithuania in the 1300s. From the 1500s to the late 1700s, Ukraine remained divided between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the west and the Orthodox Russian Empire in the east.10 By the time Russia annexed the whole in 1795 with the partitions of Poland, western Catholic Ukraine had developed a very different culture from eastern Orthodox Ukraine. Crimea and eastern Ukraine (which have historically been controlled by the Russian Empire) speak mostly Russian while central and western Ukraine (long part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) speak Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian portion is oriented westward toward Europe while the eastern part affiliates with Russia. For example, in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election, the Russified southern and eastern part of Ukraine voted mostly for pro-Russian Yanukovych while the central and western parts voted for pro-Western Tymoshenko.11 Ukrainian nationalism began with the Orthodox Cossacks in the mid-1600s,

16 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

but did not become significant until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were founded in 1922 as a response to oppressive Soviet policies under Stalin and others. Briefly following Russia’s defeat in World War I and Germany’s failure to implement the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Ukraine achieved a brief period of independence as one united country in 1919. During the Russian Civil War, however, the Bolshevik Red Army defeated the Ukrainians and conquered all of the country except for the western third which was reclaimed by Poland. With the founding of the USSR, Ukraine was reorganized as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922.

Like the tsars of the late Russian Empire, the Soviets sought to suppress and assimilate Ukraine.12 Starting in 1934, Soviet narrative championed the idea that the glory of Russia had created the world’s first socialist entity. Thus Soviet ideology became infused with a return of Russian nationalism under Stalin which had been discouraged under Lenin and Trotsky; ultimately, the Soviets were exploiting Russian national sentiment in order to bolster the Soviet Union’s still artificial and fragile socialist amalgam, but this still exemplifies the manner in which the central government in Moskva propagated loyalty towards itself – whether truly nationalist or socialist in content – and away from local ethnic identity.13 The Bolshevik policy of prodrazvyorstka, confiscation of grain and other agricultural produce from the peasants for a nominal fixed price, only angered the peasantry and caused severe food shortages. As a result of Stalin’s 5-Year Plans for rapid and forced industrialization, nearly 11 million Ukrainians are estimated to have died of starvation as grain was exported away from the state-owned sovkhoz farms to support the industrialization movement, while many others were shot or deported to the gulag. To this day, Ukrainians refer to this mass starvation as the Holodomar, a term reminiscent of the Holocaust. Rather than fuel patriotism for Mother Russia, these and other measures inspired many Ukrainians to greet the invading Nazi Germans as liberators during Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941.

Following the Allied victory over Germany and its satellite states in 1945, the Soviet Union claimed the remainder of Ukraine from Poland, uniting Ukraine for the first time since the reign of the Kievan Rus (other than the brief period of de facto independence in 1919).14 As such, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became the independent state of Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Ukraine-Russia Relations Since Independence

Following its independence, Ukraine fell far short of expectations that it would become a wealthy free market democracy. In 1991, the nation was even poorer than neighboring Moldova with merely $1,307 per capita. As in Russia,

SPRING 2018 17

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

the 1990s were economically devastating. While there was some minor improvement in the 2000s, Ukraine’s economy has ultimately suffered from its nationalism and inefficiency. Moreover, Ukraine faces one of the world’s sharpest demographic declines due to low birth rates well below replacement rate in addition to emigration to various EU member states. In spite of its great supply of natural resources, it must still import 70% of its natural gas, mostly from Russia.15 Through the 1990s, while the weak Ukrainian government sought relative neutrality between east and west, numerous tensions nevertheless arose between itself and the Russian Federation. Russia, following the loss of its Soviet satellite states and its socialist empire at the end of the Cold War, found itself at its weakest and smallest territorial extent since well before 1900 and was thus sensitive to any strong foreign power challenging it within its traditional sphere of influence.

Russia had always relied upon a deep buffer of territory in order to protect itself from invasion and wield power internationally. The first major contention was Ukraine’s nuclear weapons arsenal. On December 5, 1994, international negotiations produced the Budapest Memorandum: a document signed by Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom whereby Ukraine agreed to abandon its nuclear arsenal in return for assurances that its independence, sovereignty, and existing borders would be respected and not threatened with force.16 Russia was not about to tolerate the presence of a foreign power with its own nuclear arsenal residing within its traditional sphere of imperial control. In 1999, Russia became a signatory of the Charter for European Security, reaffirming the right of every state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements.

While Russia requested that the Charter prevent any state or group of states from having pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability within the Charter’s jurisdiction, the same provision “adds or can consider any part of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] area as its sphere of influence clearly an allusion to the Russian concept of the near abroad.”17 Another major controversy was caused by the status of Crimea, a region populated mostly by Russians and Tatars where Russia had always based its Black Sea fleet.

Following Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Russia was concerned that it would lose its strategic naval position in the region. Therefore, Ukraine agreed to grant Russia a lease to use Crimea for its navy.

On October 10, 1997, Ukraine joined with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova in forming GUUAM, a political, economic, and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union republics. Uzbekistan joined in 1999.18 Russia, however, saw this as a challenge to its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is also known as the Russian Commonwealth, especially because Azerbaijan and Moldova are also

18 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

CIS members and GUUAM (recently renamed GUAM) seeks to provide many of the same economic and security services as the Russia-led CIS. In Ukraine’s November 2004 run-off presidential election, the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was ousted by supporters of the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Yanukovych had won the election by 3% of the vote according to the incumbent President Kuchma, who favored Yanukovych in spite of the fact that Yushchenko was winning in the exit polls by over 11%. Nearly 1 million pro-Yushchenko protesters took to the Maidan, Kiev’s main square, as well as several other urban centers across the country, refusing to recognize the results of the election.

On November 28, a high-ranking member of Kuchma’s government ordered the military to crack down on the protesters, but the order was refused. On December 1, the Ukrainian parliament joined with the protesters, passing a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Yanukovych’s government. The Supreme Court ruled the election fraudulent on December 3. Finally, Yanukovych and Kuchma agreed to a new election which Yushchenko won by 52% to Yanukovych’s 44%. Because orange was the color of Yushchenko’s party, the incident became known as the Orange Revolution.19 Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the revolution as corrupt and unconstitutional, asserting that “One of the parties [Yanukovych’s] cannot be cornered by means of unconstitutional activities… corruption was blooming there and people round the new president [Yushchenko] have started to enrich themselves.” He continued that while Russia was not against change, it was opposed to the chaos and discord exemplified by the Orange Revolution.20 Following Yushchenko’s controversial victory over Yanukovych, tensions between Ukraine and Russia only became worse as Yushchenko steered Ukraine away from general neutrality and towards a distinctly pro-Western position.

Ukraine’s partnership with NATO had hitherto been loose although Ukraine had sent some troops to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 1990s.

While Kuchma had announced a goal of joining NATO in May 2002, Yushchenko visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and urged the alliance to take relations with Ukraine to a “qualitatively new level.” NATO and Ukraine then launched an “Intensified Dialogue” phase later in 2005.21 Russia was not happy. As Ukraine drew close to fulfilling its aspiration of joining NATO in 2008, Vladimir Putin warned Ukrainian president Yushchenko that “It is horrible to say and even horrible to think that, in response to the deployment of such [NATO missile defense] facilities in Ukrainian territory… Russia could target its missile systems at Ukraine. Imagine this just for a second.” Putin has issued similar threats against Poland and the Czech Republic over their affiliation with NATO. Yushchenko responded that Ukraine’s NATO affiliation should not be seen as a threat to Russia.

Nevertheless, Russia fears that the proposed antimissile system could be used by the West to spy upon their airspace and weaken their defenses.22

SPRING 2018 19

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

Ultimately, Ukraine’s bid to join NATO was rejected along with Georgia’s in a 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania. Although US President George Bush supported their membership, Germany and France both opposed it. French Prime Minister François Fillon explained that the proposed entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO was “not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.” In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election, having been ousted six years earlier, and began to pursue a foreign policy more amiable to Moskva. He saw no need for further integration with NATO, calling it an “unrealistic prospect.”23 Russia’s Annexation of Crimea

By November 2013, Ukraine was plagued with severe debt, endemic corruption, and in dire need of assistance. While the European Union (EU) offered Ukraine a trade deal, Russia offered a loan of $15 billion and encouraged Ukraine to join a “Eurasian Union,” Vladimir Putin’s alternative to the EU which includes Kazakhstan and Belarus. After much uncertainty, Ukrainian President Yanukovych accepted Russia’s loan on November 21. In response, crowds of pro-Western Ukrainian protesters occupied Kiev’s main square and named it the EuroMaidan. After numerous clashes between police and protesters with catapults and barricades, the Ukrainian parliament impeached Yanukovych in January 2014 and formed an interim government under Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Yanukovych had imprisoned for allegedly abusing her power.24 In March 2014, Tymoshenko signed the trade agreement with the EU, creating a free-trade area and expanding cooperation on foreign policy and crime-fighting although this was rejected by Dutch voters who did not want Ukraine to join the EU.25 The EU Association Agreement was not finalized until signed by Ukraine’s new President Peter Poroshenko on July 27.26 The second ouster of Yanukovych in the Euromaidan movement led directly to the outbreak of pro-Russian protests in southeastern Ukraine and in Crimea where the population is mostly Russian and where Russia already had significant military installations.27 With the imminent possibility of Ukraine joining the EU, Russia was not about to risk the loss of these critical military assets. Through the month of February 2014, Russia quietly deployed thousands of additional soldiers into its bases in Crimea.28 On February 28, Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) without insignia set up checkpoints on Crimea’s border with Ukraine and seized key government buildings in Sevastopol.29 In March, Russia held a popular referendum in Crimea, in which over 90% of Crimeans allegedly voted to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. However, Kiev asserts that the referendum was a sham conducted under coercion.

In April 2014, Ukraine deployed its military against pro-Russian rebels who

20 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

had seized government buildings throughout eastern Ukraine. Less than a month later, separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared their independence from Ukraine. In September, Russia sent convoys of trucks into the region along with military tanks, troops, and other weapons to arm and support the rebels. On February 12, 2015, Germany and France were able to negotiate a ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia after the United States threatened to supply lethal aid to Ukraine, but it was of no avail. Eight days later on February 20, Ukraine’s National Defense and Security Council reported 300 violations of the ceasefire with several more of its service members killed. From April 2014, to March 2016, nearly 9,500 people were killed in the violence and more than 22,100 were injured, including Ukrainian armed forces.30 The international community has resoundingly denounced Russia’s annexation of Crime and its militant intervention in eastern Ukraine. On March 16, 2017, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, declaring that it “again condemns the Russian occupation of Crimea and calls for its immediate end.”31 Poland has also voiced strong opposition to Russia’s actions and supported the sanctions implemented against it by the United States, European Union, and other countries, saying “Poland does not recognize the so-called annexation of Crimea and invariably supports the integrity of the Ukraine’s territories within borders that are recognized under international law.”32 When the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) classified Russia’s invasion of Crimea as an international armed conflict, Russian President Putin issued a decree withdrawing Russia from membership in the ICC (although Russia was technically never a member in the first place).

The UN General Assembly’s Human Rights Committee approved a resolution condemning Russia’s occupation of Crimea.33 Analysis Russia’s intervention into Ukraine’s instability is only part of a broader and more fundamental strategy of reestablishing its influence over the Near Abroad, the territory of the former USSR. In April 2005, Vladimir Putin declared that “the collapse of the Soviet union was the biggest geopolitical disaster of the century…

Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside of Russian territory.”34 Therefore, given the ethnic Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics surrounding Russia, these nations are arguably irredenta: former imperial holdings that need to be reunited with the rest of Russia. In order to reclaim these lands, Russia seeks to rely upon soft power sources to catalyze its influence on the sovereignty, foreign policy, and security approaches of the ex-Soviet states. When Russia first occupied Crimea, Putin claimed the right to rule any territory inhabited by Russians in all ex-Soviet possessions. This new

SPRING 2018 21

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

Russian nationalism allows Russia to simply occupy and annex any strategic territory as a “plan B” if there is no compliance from soft-power alternatives such as negotiations, economic leverage, or threats of force. Ultimately, the invasion of Crimea sent a clear message: if a Eurasian country does not clearly respect Russia’s interests, it will lose the territories inhabited by ethnic Russians.35 Modern Russian foreign policy operates on the basis of the Medvedev Doctrine. Its ideas are largely inspired by Alexander Dugin’s expansionist geopolitical theories. As implemented specifically in late 2016, the strategy calls for the reaffirmation of the Russian sphere of influence of the former USSR, specifically through promoting Russian nationalism and “consolidation of the Russian diaspora.” It also mandates “full effectiveness of the protection of rights and legal interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad.” While Moskva may certainly have the best intentions of sundered Russian compatriots living in the near abroad at heart, it quite certainly is willing to violate the sovereignty of its neighbors to do so, and in the process reclaim its lost empire.36 In essence, this strategy could be described as a Brezhnev 2 Doctrine: once Russian, always Russian.37 For example, Russia uses the leverage of frozen conflicts in Georgia to exercise a degree of de facto power over that nation. Within Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have both become secessionist entities recognized by Russia. Ossetia is controlled by the Communist Party of Ossetia, which in turn depends completely upon Russia for its continued existence. In April 2008, after NATO rejected Georgia’s application for a military action plan, Russia responded to Georgia’s actions by escalating its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. When Georgia deployed its military against South Ossetia, which had attacked Georgian villages, Russia allied with South Ossetia and rapidly repelled the Georgian forces, blitzing from the border to within 40km of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital.38 Due to Russian disorganization, Western powers had time to intervene and implement a ceasefire. Otherwise, Tbilisi would have fallen completely.39 Another example of Russia’s expansionist strategy is active in Moldova, where the region of Transnistria has been controlled by pro-Russian separatists since 1991. In June 2016, Moldova had to ask Moskva to stop recruiting its citizens into the Russian armed forces. Russia currently has about 1,500 troops stationed in eastern Moldova as a peacekeeping mission; should Moldova ever consider joining NATO, it can expect the situation to become much less peaceful.40 In addition to preserving and restoring its old imperial sphere of influence, Russia fears the establishment of NATO directly upon its border. Russia has been invaded four times from the West, by Poland, France, and Germany twice, in addition to being incessantly threatened by its neighbors in general for centuries.

In the past, it has relied upon large territorial buffers to compensate for its lack

22 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

of natural geographic barriers and inferior technology, but in 1991 it lost these.

Moreover, NATO is first and foremost an anti-Russia military alliance backed by the United States military.

Furthermore, Russia has a special interest in Ukraine given its acceptance of Alexander Dugin’s views. Dugin accepts Mackinder’s school of geography, which holds that control of the Ukraine and the northern Caucasus is the key to controlling Eurasia. By controlling this heartland, one can ultimately control the world. In Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, failure to control and stabilize the Ukraine leads to continental chaos and discord. Therefore, this secondary factor would make Ukraine’s persistent instability as evinced in the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan an additional cause for concern to Russia.

Upon careful evaluation of the history and strategic situation of the region, Russia’s foreign policy in its near abroad can be best understood as an attempt to reassert itself as an expansionist power and reclaim its old sphere of influence.

Nationalist influences call for the reunification of all ethnically Russian peoples into one nation and the annexation of all the irredenta. Security concerns sharpened by unfortunate historical precedent necessitate that Russia prevent NATO and other foreign powers from establishing themselves in Eastern Europe, where they could pose a threat to Moskva. Given its cultural background of militant authoritarianism, the denunciations, sanctions, and ultimatums of the West are of little concern to Russia in the cause of remaining a global superpower.

SPRING 2018 23

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

References 1

“Kievan Rus,” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed May 8, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/

topic/Kievan-Rus. 2

Paul Buskhovich, A Concise History of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013),

22-23.

3

Ibid., 37.

4 Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House Trade, 2013), 155-159.

5

Buskhovich, 83, 92.

6

Ibid., 53-58.

7

“Russian Orthodox Church,” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed May 5, 2017. https://www.

britannica.com/topic/Russian-Orthodox-church.

8

Buskhovich, 45-46, 70-71.

9

Ivan Watson, Maria Stromova and Antonia Mortensen, “The Rise of the Russian Orthodox

Church,” CNN (March 30, 2017). Accessed May 6, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/europe/ russian-orthodox-church-resurgence/.

10 Eugene Chausovsky, “Ukraine: Caught Between East and West,” Stratfor (December 29, 2015).

Accessed May 8, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ukraine-caught-between-east-and-west.

11 “A Divided Ukraine,” CNN (March 3, 2014). Accessed May 6, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/.

12 Serhy Yekelchyk, “The Ukrainian Crisis: In Russia’s Long Shadow,” Origins 7, no. 9, (June 2014). Accessed May 3, 2017. origins.osu.edu/print/2480.

13 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 235-236.

14 Chausovsky.

15 Pekka Sutela, “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 9, 2012). Accessed May 2, 2017. carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/ underachiever-ukraine-s-economy-since-1991-pub-47451.

16 “The Budapest Memorandum at 20: The United States, Ukraine and Security Assurances,” The Brookings Institution (December 9, 2014). Accessed May 4, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/events/ the-budapest-memorandum-at-20-the-united-states-ukraine-and-security-assurances/.

17 “The OSCEs Istanbul Charter for European Security,” NATO Review. Accessed May 7, 2017.

24 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/More-capable-balanced-alliance/OSCEs-Istanbul-Charter-European-Security/EN/index.htm.

18 “The OSCEs Istanbul Charter for European Security,” NATO Review. Accessed May 7, 2017. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/More-capable-balanced-alliance/OSCEs-Istanbul-Charter-European-Security/EN/index.htm.

19 Max Rennebohm, “Ukrainians Overthrow Dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004,” Swartmore College Global Nonviolent Action Database (September 9, 2011). Accessed May 7, 2017. http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ukrainians-overthrow-dictatorship-orange-revolution-2004.

20 Jonathan Steele, “Putin Still Bitter Over Orange Revolution,” The Guardian (September 5, 2005).

Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/06/russia.jonathansteele.

21 Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: Government Faces Uphill Battle In Achieving NATO Aspirations,” Radio Free Europe (November 15, 2005). Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/1062966. html.

22 Peter Finn, “Putin Threatens Ukraine On NATO,” The Washington Post (February 13, 2008).

Accessed

May

7,

2017.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/12/

AR2008021201658.html.

23 Adam Taylor, “That Time Ukraine Tried to Join NATO – and NATO Said No,” The Washington Post (September 4, 2014). Accessed May 7, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-and-nato-said-no/?utm_term=.0cd8516d6c93.

24 Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi, “Ukraine’s Revolution and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea: How We Got Here,” The Guardian (March 5, 2014). Accessed May 8, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-russia-explainer.

25 Jennifer Rankin, “EU Leaders Try to Salvage Ukraine Deal,” The Guardian (December 15, 2016).

Accessed May 8, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/ukraine-will-not-join-eudutch-are-promised-in-effort-to-save-treaty.

26 Nick Thompson, “Ukraine: Everything You Need to Know about How We Got Here,” CNN (February 3, 2017). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/10/europe/ukraine-warhow-we-got-here/.

27 Yuhas and Jalabi.

28 John Simpson, “Russia’s Crimea Plan Detailed, Secret and Successful,” BBC (March 19, 2014).

Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082.

29 Carl Schreck, “U.S. Denounces Russia’s Crimea Annexation On Referendum Anniversary,” Radio Free Europe (March 16, 2017). Accessed May 8, 2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/united-states-de-

SPRING 2018 25

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S nounces-crimea-annexation-referendum-anniversary/28373961.html.

30 Thompson.

31 Schreck.

32 “Poland Calls for End of Russian Occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea,” Radio Poland (March 20, 2017). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/298631,Poland-calls-for-end-ofRussian-occupation-of-Ukraines-Crimea.

33 “ICC Classifies Annexation Of Crimea As International Armed Conflict, UN Committee Condemns Occupation,” The Interpreter (November 16, 2016). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.interpretermag.com/day-1003/.

34 Anders Aslund, “The Kremlin’s New Policy in its Near Abroad,” The Moscow Times (July 27, 2010). Accessed May 8, 2017. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlins-new-policy-in-itsnear-abroad-173.

35 Iulian Chifu and Simona Tutuianu, eds., Torn Between East and West: Europe’s border states (London: Routledge, 2016). Accessed May 4, 2017. https://books.google.com/books?id=DdHLDAAAQBAJ&dq=russia+policy+on+ukrainian+sovereignty+brezhnev+doctrine&source=gbs_navlinks_s.

36 The Security Council of the Russian Federation, Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (November 30, 2016). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/international/document25/.

37 Chifu and Tutuianu.

38 George Friedman, “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power,” Stratfor (August 12, 2008). Accessed May 8, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_ power.

39 Gustav Gressel, “In the Shadow of Ukraine: Seven Years on from Russian-Georgian War,” European Council on Foreign Affairs (August 6, 2015). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_in_the_shadow_of_ukraine_seven_years_on_from_russian_3086.

40 Damien Sharkov, “Moldova Asks Russia’s Army To Stop Recruiting Its Citizens,” Newsweek (June 22, 2016). Accessed May 8, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/moldova-asks-russia-separatist-army-stop-recruiting-citizens-473155.

26 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

E

ncryption:

The Threat and Implications of Going Dark Claire Atwood

Introduction The tension between law enforcement and individual privacy continues to rage as the FBI seeks to increase its access to encrypted devices with the “Going Dark” program. As technology advances, encryption capabilities pose a problem to law enforcement. Technology companies such as Apple and Google have embraced encryption as a promise of privacy to their clients. However, criminals and particularly terrorists utilize encryption to escape detection. The government faces questions on how to modernize current laws on encryption to ensure that law enforcement agencies maintain this investigative ability while balancing Fifth Amendment rights and respecting the communications industry’s innovations.1 This paper seeks to cover the history of encryption and investigate the current utilization of encryption by criminals and terrorist groups. This paper is not a technical paper. Rather, it is an analysis of the current environment from a conceptual perspective, considering the evolution of encryption and case studies. Ultimately, the US government should not pressure communications providers to enhance their ability to facilitate the legal interception of information for counterterrorism purposes. Although encryption has improved, it will likely not significantly impact the government’s investigation and conviction of criminal activity. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies can still access a plethora of investigative tools without creating additional vulnerabilities in personal communication devices. Until law enforcement can produce more compelling case studies, the costs that accompany exceptional access outweigh the benefits.

Cryptography and Encryption Law enforcement has traditionally sought the cooperation of vendors and service providers when dealing with court-sanctioned targets utilizing encrypted products. The operating presumption has been that the vendors and providers would have built-in access methods to update products and assist with customer service. However, this presumption is irrelevant when mobile device manufacturers and vendors create encrypted communications applications without retaining a means of access. This presents the problem currently facing law enforcement.

Under current law, mobile device manufacturers are excluded from the obligation

SPRING 2018 27

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

to provide assistance to law enforcement interception of communications and data. Similarly, citizens are not required to provide their devices’ passcodes or stored data to law enforcement.

As defined by a report published by the Open Technology Institute and the Cybersecurity Initiative, cryptography “refers to the practice and study of theory and techniques for secure storage and communications,” while “encryption is the actual process of combining the contents of a message (‘plaintext’) with a secret value or password in such a way that scrambles the contents into a totally new form (‘ciphertext’) that is unintelligible to unauthorized users.”2 Encryption allows two parties to communicate securely. Two primary types of data are encrypted: stored data (data at rest) and communications data (data in transit). Data at rest is generally encrypted with a “root key.” The “root key” is generated and stored on a device owned either by the owner or the service provider.

Microsoft and Apple’s most advanced mobile devices or products have root keys or cover keys generated within the device itself. This means the owner of the mobile device is the only actor who can decrypt the stored data. This is not the case with remote and cloud storage which maintain the ability for service producers to access encryption keys. For law enforcement to access stored data on a physical device, it must gain access to either the root key or the cover key. The Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination limits the ability of law enforcement to compel owners to divulge their passcodes. Law enforcement’s primary problem, therefore, is accessing data stored exclusively on mobile devices.

Companies like Apple can generally still access remotely stored data. However, sophisticated criminals may be able to turn off a device’s back up function so that data is exclusively stored locally and thus unable to be accessed via other means.

Public-key cryptography is the most commonly used method for encrypting communications data. The method requires two separate but mathematically linked keys, one that is secret and one that is public. This translates to very strong security as the private key cannot be feasibly determined from its corresponding public key. Public-key cryptography is used not only for such communications as secure online financial transactions, but also peer-to-peer communications within applications like WhatsApp and Gmail. These applications allow for both legitimate and illegal exchanges of information.

The Crypto Wars The current encryption debate is not new. During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration faced a similar situation with the “Crypto Wars.” Law enforcement had to answer to a coalition of industry groups, privacy advocates, and technology advocates concerned over potential threats to online innovation and fundamental liberties. The government initially succeeded in imposing strict limits on

28 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

encryption. With concerns over digital and wireless technologies, the government favored legislation to assist law enforcement’s electronic surveillance practices in an evolving technological world. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) stood as the prominent piece of legislation from the Crypto Wars – its legacy endures in the current Going Dark debate. Passed in 1994, CALEA required telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing authorized electronic surveillance.3 For today’s debate, the notable caveats may be of more interest. First, law enforcement and officials are not authorized to require telecommunications providers, manufacturers of equipment, and providers of support services to adopt “specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations. Officials may also not prohibit ‘the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature’ by these entities.”4 Second, telecommunications carriers are not responsible for “decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”5 A decade after the passage of CALEA, this caveat was expanded. Because not all telecommunications providers had implemented the capabilities required by CALEA, the Department of Justice, FBI, and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) petitioned the Federal Communications Commission to extend CALEA provisions to a wider breadth of telecommunications providers, including broadband and VoIP providers.6 It is helpful to note that CALEA does not apply to email or data stored on mobile devices or include such providers as social networking companies.

Although CALEA required companies to assist in governmental surveillance efforts, the government later confirmed the growing strength of encryption.

During the late 1990s, a debate arose over US export controls and encryption technology. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption software became the most popular email encryption platform and was considered a milestone in the development of public cryptography.7 It was the first time that military-grade cryptography was available to the public. Philip Zimmerman, creator of PGP, became the subject of a federal investigation over whether he had illegally exported cryptographic software, considered a form of “munitions.” The Clinton Administration responded to the investigation by gradually liberalizing encryption expert controls and relaxing limits on the strength of encryption keys. By 1999, the Administration caved to pressure from industry and public interest groups. It accepted the role of encryption in the Internet and allowed the exporting of encryption without restrictions. Public cryptography was now accepted. In the years following, a consensus emerged that strong encryption was good for security, liberty, and economic growth.8

SPRING 2018 29

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

The Victory for Encryption and the Implications The past fifteen years have established encryption as the basis for the digital economy, a crucial part of cyber security, and the digital safeguard of personal liberties. The conclusion of the “Crypto Wars” marked the beginning of significant growth for the Internet. New Internet services emerged that were founded on secure communication. Companies like EBay, PayPal, and Amazon were dependent on privacy and security. The consumer had to be confident that he could conduct secure transactions online. Recognizing the need for such confidence, cyber security experts advocated full governmental support for encryption.

New protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) relied on encryption to secure connections and administer servers. They were necessary for the modern data-center.

The effects of these protocols included independent verification, consumer confidence, and the prevention of real attacks that would have been extremely easy to carry out.9 The protocols also led the Internet to expand to electronic banking, electronic medical records systems, online bill payment tools, home automation systems, and e-filing systems for taxes. SSL was also found in physical products like smart phones, home routers, and media streaming devices.10 Adding to its impact on the economy, encryption has become crucial for cyber security. Appointed by President Barack Obama, the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies commented on the necessity of full commercial encryption: “Encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet… In light of the massive increase in cyber-crime and intellectual property theft on-line, the use of encryption should be greatly expanded to protect not only data in transit, but also data at rest on networks, in storage, and in the cloud.”11 The Review Group also offered strong recommendations for the US government: the US government should “Promote security by (1) fully supporting and not undermining efforts to create encryption standards; (2) making clear that it will not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial encryption; and (3) supporting efforts to encourage the greater use of encryption technology for data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in storage.”12 As the foundation for cyber security, encryption prevents crime. Crimes such as identity theft and fraud are prevented or mitigated by strong encryption. Conversely, policies that inhibit encryption increase vulnerabilities and the potential for crime. Attacks including Logjam and FREAK (Factoring attack on RSA-EXPORT keys) created vulnerabilities resulting from the split of functionality into domestic and export-grade encryption.13 The persistent security concerns that result from these vulnerabilities are based on weakened encryption, not enhanced encryption.

Human rights groups have rallied alongside technology companies and cyber

30 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

security experts to support encryption as the digital protector of the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment. The American Civil Liberties Union argues, “encryption and anonymity are the modern safeguards for free expression.”14 The UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and Opinion similarly explained, “Encryption and anonymity provide individuals and groups with a zone of privacy online to hold opinions and exercise freedom of expression without arbitrary and unlawful interference or attacks.”15 The US government has endorsed efforts to maintain a hospitable environment for online free expression, providing funding to groups that utilize circumvention tools reliant on strong encryption.16 The Disputed Problems in the New Status Quo Recognizing the benefits of encryption, technology companies and communications providers have embraced end-to-end encryption. Although end-to-end encryption benefits cyber security, an increasing number of encrypted communications applications fall outside the scope of existing law and thus limit governmental access. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have responded by calling for backdoor access, arguing that such access is necessary in investigations and counterterrorism efforts.

The rise of digital communication has led to an advancement of encryption technology. Sixty-four percent of adult Americans own a smart phone.17 These devices have become targets for criminals due to the large amount of personal information they hold. To protect their customers, communication providers and manufacturers have begun regularly updating the devices’ security features.

Smart phones are locked with passcodes and the contents are encrypted. The advancements in encryption have been largely led and embraced by Apple and Google. In September 2014, Apple updated its major operating system, iOS 8.

In addition to protecting the stored personal data with a user-created passcode, Apple cannot bypass the passcode and therefore cannot access data. This makes it infeasible for Apple to respond to government warrants for the extraction of this data from devices in their possession running iOS 8.18 Additionally, Apple cannot comply with a wiretap order because it has no way to decrypt iMessage and FaceTime data when it’s in transit between devices.19 Google followed Apple’s lead with its Android 5.0 mobile operating system, launched in November 2014. The operating system has default privacy protections including automatic encryption of data protected by a passcode. Google does not keep a key to locked data on personal devices and thus is unable to unlock encrypted devices.

The general goal of recent moves toward greater encryption is end-to-end encryption. The prospect of a digital world whose contents are protected by endto-end encryption has brought about a strong reaction by law enforcement and intelligence agencies both within the United States and in countries like India

SPRING 2018 31

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

and China. Governments are concerned by the prospect of a digital ungovernable space. The advancements of encryption make the prospect of a worldwide communications infrastructure secure from all possible intruders, from hackers to the Chinese to the FBI, a potential reality.20 The government illustrates this reality as a place that should seem attractive only to techno-anarchists.21 It is concern over such a vast, ungovernable space that has brought about the FBI’s “Going Dark” program. The program derives its name from the FBI’s claim that “it is ‘in the dark’ by the loss of evidence, that [it] would be lawfully entitled to, due to advances in technology, antiquated ELSUR laws, and or lack of resources, training, [and] personnel.”22 First made public in 2009, the initiative is intended to increase the FBI’s authority in implementing wiretaps and trace orders in the new world of technology. It is accompanied by the desired expansion of existing surveillance laws such as CALEA and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).

The FBI explained that the Going Dark program is a “five-prong strategic approach to address the lawful ‘Intercept capability gap.’”23 The first prong modernizes or amends such existing surveillance laws. The second prong enhances the authorities’ ability to sensitively and lawfully intercept information, equipment, and techniques. Third, the program enhances cooperation between the FBI’s technical expertise and other law enforcement entities. The fourth prong enhances lawful intercept cooperation between the private communications industry and law enforcement agencies. Finally, the program seeks new federal funding to bolster the FBI’s intercept capabilities.24 Director James Comey has led a campaign advocating the Going Dark program for the past few years. Comey addresses the false notion that the FBI is omnipotent in its current capabilities. As Comey explained, the FBI “[can’t] access any information at any time. [We can’t] get what we want, when we want it, by flipping a switch.”25 He explains that the FBI is not looking to expand its intercept authorities. Rather, it is an attempt to keep up with changing technology and be able to actually collect the communications the FBI is authorized to collect. Such companies as Apple and Google are not subject to CALEA; the FBI argues that they should be required to build lawful intercept capabilities. Comey attributes the push toward greater encryption as a marketing strategy. This strategy fails to account for criminals. Comey asks the public to value the rule of law and recognize the implications of zones that could operate beyond the reach of that rule of law.26 The Limited Data for Accurate Threat Assessment One glaring problem in law enforcement leaders’ advocacy of the Going Dark

32 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

initiative is a lack of empirical evidence. The Going Dark debate is dominated by discussing how encryption has advanced past existing law and the principles at stake. Lacking in many conversations, however, is any discussion of why exactly encryption is a threat. The public safety threat of encryption and the inhibited capacity of law enforcement due to encryption protections appear to be largely grounded in assumptions. Any case studies where law enforcement or counterterrorism efforts were significantly hurt due to encryption are missing. The lack of data weakens the government’s argument that encryption has a significant impact on its law enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities.

A study of the investigative efforts negatively affected by encryption can be divided into two categories: domestic law enforcement investigations and counterterrorism efforts. First, agencies such as the FBI and DEA have presented past criminal activity that involved encryption. FBI Director James Comey offered five examples in a speech promoting the “Going Dark” initiative. In Louisiana, a known sex offender altered and deleted evidence on both his and his victim’s smart phones. Yet the evidence was recovered and helped sentence the suspect to death. In Los Angeles, there were witnesses to a young girl’s death. Text messages on her parents’ phones, though, proved that the mother caused the death and the father was aware. The parents were confronted with the evidence on the phone and both pled guilty. In Kansas City, the DEA obtained search warrants for the smart phones used by a drug trafficking organization discovered incriminating text messages. In Sacramento, a hit-and-run killed a young couple. After images from nearby red light cameras directed the police to the suspect, the police seized the suspect’s smart phone and found implicating stored GPS data. The suspect was convicted and is currently serving 25 years to a life term sentence. In Kansas, smart phones helped exonerate an individual when data from a smart phone proved the innocence of several teenagers accused of rape. Director Comey intended for the examples to demonstrate the prominent role that smart phones play in criminal investigations. He followed up the examples by saying that there are many times when the FBI “can’t crack the password.”27 Although encryption may have slowed investigation efforts, each of the example’s criminals were caught and successfully prosecuted.

FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni offered additional examples in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee.28 From 2007 to 2009, the DEA investigated the leader of a major international criminal organization smuggling cocaine and trafficking arms globally. With the help of a confidential human source, the DEA successfully dismantled the drug trafficking portion of the organization.

DEA was unable to prosecute the organization’s arms trafficking portion. Caproni explained this was because the communications provider lacked intercept capabilities and the government’s other investigative techniques were ineffective in

SPRING 2018 33

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

gathering the necessary evidence. Yet even if the communications provider had interception capabilities, there were several other factors entirely separate from encryption that inhibited the prosecutor’s case. Caproni always discussed a 2009 child prostitution case investigated by the FBI. The target used a social networking site that lacked a technical interceptor solution, resulting in the inability to intercept certain electronic communications. Though the FBI still built a successful case and secured a conviction with other investigative techniques, Caproni lamented over a supposedly weaker case and lighter sentence.29 Encryption has resulted in a few weaker cases. However, there exists no inverse relationship between the growth of encryption and failed investigations and prosecutions. Agencies like the FBI and DEA maintain a robust set of tools that mitigate the impact of encryption. The “Going Dark” discussion lacks quantitative precedent explaining the full impact of encryption on law enforcement efforts. Until such quantitative evidence is provided, encryption’s overall negative impact on law enforcement efforts appears to be exaggerated.

Counterterrorism efforts make up the second major category of examples presented in the encryption debate. Similarly, the debate lacks a robust sampling of counterterrorism cases that have been hindered by strong encryption. The examples that have been elaborated on have come from academic centers and journalists, rather than government agencies. In its anti-encryption campaign, the federal government has largely failed to demonstrate how encryption is impeding the government’s counterterrorism efforts, both in the United States and abroad.

The counterterrorism efforts surrounding 9/11 provide an example of the minimal role that encryption played. 9/11 occurred on the heels of the Crypto Wars.

One of the masterminds of the World Trade Center bombings, Ramzi Yousef was previously captured in the Far East. One search revealed a laptop containing information about a plot to blow up eleven US commercial aircraft in the region.

The FBI reported that some of the information on the computer was encrypted.

The FBI failed to publicly state whether it was able to decrypt the information or not. Either way, it is difficult to argue that 9/11 could have been prevented if there was no encrypted information on Ramzi Yousef’s laptop.30 Considering the intelligence community’s current fight with ISIL, the proliferation of social media and messaging apps for recruitment purposes have become a point of major concern. The Fordham Law School’s Center for National Security examined the demographics of would-be ISIL recruits in the US.31 It highlighted the digital means for radicalizing individuals. The Fordham study did not delve into the use of encrypted communications apps and services by ISIL with US recruits. Of the 56 cases examined, only two involved messaging services. One, Surespot, offers end-to-end encryption. Kik allows users to avoid exposing their mobile numbers to establish an identity. FBI used generic phrases

34 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

like “private online communications” in two other cases to indicate communication between conspirators. The majority of the cases employed unencrypted platforms like Twitter and Facebook.32 Analyzing the findings, The Hill noted that none of the prosecutions were inhibited by an encrypted or otherwise ostensibly more secure communications app or service. A recent plea agreement for 17 year-old Ali Shukri Amin put a co-conspirator in touch with an ISIL supporter outside of the US via Surespot. The use of Surespot inhibited neither the FBI’s monitoring abilities nor its ability to intercept communications technology.33 A federal court order may actually require Surespot to cooperate in counterterrorism investigations. Encryption has not impeded the government’s ability to monitor ISIL’s recruiting in the US. A report by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts similarly mitigated the government’s claim that criminals are going undetected thanks to encryption. The report stated, “Three federal wiretaps were reported as being encrypted in 2014, of which two could not be decrypted. Encryption was also reported for five federal wiretaps that were conducted in previous years, but reported to the [Administrative Office] for the first time in 2014. Officials were able to decipher the plain text of the communications in four of the five intercepts.”34 There was no evidence of encryption preventing prosecutions or derailing investigations. In 80% of cases prior to 2014 that involved encrypted communications, the FBI was able to decipher the messages. It is difficult to conceive that encryption jeopardizes law enforcement operations, particularly when remembering the large array of investigative tools the FBI has at its disposal, from physical surveillance, covert physical searches, cooperation from telecommunications companies, the use of informants, etc.35 The San Bernardino shooting provides the most recent example of a terrorist attack that involved encrypted devices. On December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, a married couple, killed fourteen people and injured twenty-one at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. Director Comey has stated that Farook and Malik were homegrown violent extremists inspired by foreign terrorist groups. The couple was radicalized at least two years ago.36 Although the investigation is ongoing, the FBI has indicated that the couple utilized encrypted messaging services to communicate their plans. Malik declared her allegiance to the Islamic State on Facebook, though it is still unclear whether she used encrypted messaging to contact anyone abroad.37 The attack has brought the encryption debate back into the spotlight. Government officials have utilized this example to demonstrate the need for exceptional access. However, it seems that such access would not have prevented the attack. Malik’s allegiance to the Islamic State was unencrypted. Rather, the poor screening process that Malik and Farook went through when coming to the Unit-

SPRING 2018 35

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

ed States ought to be cited as the primary failure on the part of law enforcement.

Senator Chuck Grassley noted, “Our government apparently didn’t catch the false address in Pakistan she listed on her application or other possible signs that she was radicalized or an operative.”38 A week after the attack, Director Comey cited the May 2015 assault in Garland, Texas as further proof of the problems with end-to-end encryption.39 Two ISIL-inspired attackers opened fire outside of an event hosting cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. On the morning of the attack, one of the shooters exchanged 109 messages with “an overseas terrorist.”40 Comey stated, “We have no idea what he said because those messages were encrypted.”41 While the content of the messages would have likely sent a strong alert, it seems that just the knowledge that a man had exchanged 109 messages with a known overseas terrorist would alert law enforcement. Neither the San Bernardino attack nor the Garland assault provide sufficient evidence that law enforcement knowing the content of particular encrypted messages would have prevented the attacks. Rather, they demonstrate an attempt by the government to present much needed evidence regarding the harms of encryption.

Security Costs of Exceptional Access Beyond the exaggeration of encryption’s consequences, exceptional access would result in severe security risks. A group of computer security experts issued a report that argued that the effort to build a system like the one proposed by the FBI “risks eroding cybersecurity in ways far more important than the problems it would solve.” Further, “any exceptional access system would ‘pose…grave security risks [and] imperil innovation.’”42 The report details three major security risks. One, “providing exceptional access to communications would force a U-turn from the best practices now being deployed to make the Internet more secure.” Second, “‘building in exceptional access would substantially increase system complexity’ and ‘complexity is the enemy of security’…By requiring a potentially complicated new system to be developed and implemented, we’d be effectively guaranteeing more vulnerabilities for malicious actors to hit.” Third, “exceptional access would create concentrate targets that could attract bad actors.”43 The issue of insecurity applies to communication devices. One of the experts in the report explained in a separate article that an insecure Internet already exists. End-to-end encryption is one of the major tools used to work around that insecurity, both securing communications and data at rest. Exceptional access endangers data.44 The same backdoor that would be used by the FBI could be similarly accessed by criminals, hackers, and spies.45 The security risks that result from exceptional access translate to increased crime, economic costs, loss of innovation, and threatened human rights. En-

36 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

cryption is largely used to prevent crime rather than hide it.46 It prevents theft and credit-card fraud, improves national security, and protects businesses from industrial espionage.47 The FBI’s initiative would also lead to “the erosion of confidence in the government resulting from an increased sense of ‘Big Brotherism.’”48 The negative consequences of exceptional access translate into severe economic costs. During the Crypto Wars, the Economic Strategy Institute estimated that continuing export controls on cryptographic products would cost the US economy more than $35 billion over five years.49 It is important to consider the global backdrop to this debate. The “least trusted country” problem applies here. The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review explains, “the level of trust placed in data traveling through the Internet becomes that of the country that we trust least…Internet security is only as strong as the weakest link.”50 A large problem with the FBI’s initiative is the vulnerabilities that all users suffer from due to increased exposure. National security communications software and systems must be as secure as possible. When deliberate backdoors are created, generally through hidden “lawful intercept” access features, systems become more vulnerable. This effect is not limited to wiretap targets.51 The government must consider the implications of creating an access point for law enforcement. Director Comey has protested the “misconception that building a lawful intercept solution into a system requires a so-called ‘back door’, one that foreign adversaries and hackers may try to exploit.” He argues for using “the front door, with clarity and transparency, and with clear guidance provided by law.”52 However, it is questionable what the difference is between the front and back doors.

When a lawful interception system is added to a communication service, the security of the service is fundamentally weakened.53 Alienation of Silicon Valley An unfortunate implication of law enforcement’s current positioning against encryption is the alienation of industry and the American public. Industry has responded in force to the FBI’s “Going Dark” initiative. Tech companies, privacy advocates, security experts, policy experts, human rights experts and a majority of the House of Representatives agree that government-mandated backdoors are more a problem than a solution. Reasons for this include an unavoidable weakening of the security of communication devices and data and an implicit encouragement of oppressive regimes to pursue similar backdoors.54 The FBI has repeatedly encouraged meaningful debate over the issue, reminiscent of the “Crypto Wars.”

The problem is, while the FBI continues to pursue its initiative, the majority of the country and industry has made their opinion clear in opposition to the program. Apple CEO Tim Cook described encryption as “a must in today’s world.”55 Until the government provides substantive data on how encryption impedes its

SPRING 2018 37

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

efforts, it should acquiesce to the industry and the people.

Alternatives Until A Resolution Is Reached Both sides have presented theoretical worlds that they believe will be the result of end-to-end encryption. The FBI creates a world consisting of a vast ungoverned space that could be exploited by criminals. It argues that there is nothing attractive about it being “technically impossible to intercept and read ISIS communications with followers or to follow child predators into chatrooms where they go after kids.”56 The opposition argues that the introduction and maintenance of exceptional access are not worth the security costs. These opposing worlds are now engaged in a “theological clash of absolutes” that lacks satisfactory quantitative support.57 Until substantially more research is done, it is unclear whether the FBI’s desired exceptional access will not create troubling security risks. The burden of such research falls on the government. The previously mentioned report by computer experts suggested, “absent a concrete technical proposal and without answers to the questions raised in this report, legislators should reject out of hand any proposal to return to the failed cryptography control policy of the 1990s…

Our recommendation is that anyone proposing regulations should first present concrete technical requirements, which industry, academics, and the public can analyze for technical weaknesses and for hidden costs.”58 Until such research is brought forth, there are various alternatives to exceptional access that should be considered. Learning to operate alongside end-to-end encryption, federal law enforcement must strengthen its capabilities, resources, and processes.59 The FBI and policymakers must work together to increase law enforcement’s ability to work around encryption. The FBI should have the capability to attack multiple points on an attack surface. Congress should create a legal framework that allows the FBI to exploit vulnerabilities and surreptitiously collect data. None of these capabilities require increased exceptional access.60 With such capabilities, the FBI must have the resources and manpower to successfully utilize them. This enhancement can appear both in increasing training for existing officers and hiring more personnel with strong technical expertise.61 FBI field offices must have their own encryption experts and tools.62 The increase of sources should be accompanied by an evaluation of existing resources like the National Domestic Communications Assistance Center (NDCAC). Intended to share technical knowledge between law enforcement agencies, the NDCAC must be there for local law enforcement when they encounter challenges with modern communications systems.63 Law enforcement agencies and policymakers should work to smooth the process of requesting access to data and communications. Friction can be eliminated

38 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

by reauthorizing roving wiretap authorities and reforming judicial processes so that the FBI does not have to constantly negotiate in a procedural maze.64 Processes can also be streamlined. More standardized request and response formats should be made so that the FBI can more quickly access data.65 The government must also decide what role it expects communications providers to play. Through a regulatory mandate, the government could continue pursuing full exceptional access and assume that technology companies will rush to maintain consumer security. This would require the presumption that the challenges are resolvable and that the companies’ innovation and expertise will deliver.66 The government could utilize civil liability as an incentive for access.

Liability might distribute the risk as to favorably slant the encryption debate toward the government.67 Sidestepping exceptional access on personal devices, the government could intervene in a previous step, by requiring communications providers to maintain a master key. If presented with a valid search warrant, a technology company would be required to provide this key to law enforcement to unlock the device.68 The government should also encourage major social sites’ existing efforts to combat online propaganda and recruitment by Islamic militants as a counterterrorism tool separate from government regulation.69 As the government considers the alternatives, it should appreciate the current “golden age of surveillance.” Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are enjoying more robust surveillance capabilities than ever before. The Congressional Research Service affirmed, “Police access to location data, information about individuals’ contacts, and a host of websites that collectively create ‘digital dossiers’ on a person all enhance law enforcement surveillance.”70 These opportunities for information access should continue to be harnessed.

Conclusion Encryption has made technological advances since the “Crypto Wars” of the 1990s. Its advancement has positively brought about electronic commerce, cyber security, and the protection of free speech online. As encryption expands beyond existing law, law enforcement, policymakers, civil liberty advocates, and technological companies will have to coordinate a response. The FBI may continue to advocate for exceptional access through the Going Dark program. However, in order for the program to be accepted, the government must present compelling data on the threat encryption poses to law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts.

Currently, no one has adequately proven that end-to-end encryption significantly increases crime or terrorist activity. Meanwhile, the security vulnerabilities resulting from increased exposure and the potential alienation of industry must be remembered as the encryption debate continues on. In this “golden age of surveillance,” the government ought to appreciate the large arsenal of investigative tools

SPRING 2018 39

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

at its disposal, unhampered by encryption.

40 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

References 1 House Committee on Judiciary, “Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies,” 112th Congress, 1st session, 2011, H. Hrg. 59, 1-79. Accessed September 27, 2015. http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-59_64581.PDF. 2

Kevin Bankston, Danielle Kehl, and Andi Wlson, “Doomed to Repeat History? Lessons From

The Crypto Wars of the 1990s,” New America (June 2015). Accessed September 27, 2015. https:// static.newamerica.org/attachments/3407-doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-ofthe-1990s/OTI_Crypto_Wars_History.abe6caa19cbc40de842e01c28a028418.pdf.

3

Kristin Finklea, “Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement

Investigations,” Congressional Research Service (September 8, 2015), 2. Accessed October 11, 2015. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44187.pdf.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., 3.

8

Bankston.

9

Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Finklea.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Benjamin Wittes, “Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits,” Lawfare (July 12, 2015). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-encryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits.

SPRING 2018 41

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 21 Ibid.

22 Jennifer Lynch, “Newly Released Documents Detail FBI’s Plan to Expand Federal Surveillance Laws,” Electronic Frontier Foundation (February 16, 2011). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://www. eff.org/deeplinks/2011/02/newly-released-documents-detail-fbi-s-plan-expand.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 James Comey, “Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?”

Brookings Institution (October 16, 2014). Accessed October 11, 2015. http://www.brookings. edu/~/media/events/2014/10/16-going-dark-technology-privacy-comey-fbi/10-16-14-directors-remarks-for-brookings-institution-as-given.pdf.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Valeria Caproni, “Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies,” House Committee on Judiciary, 112th Congress, 1st Session, 2011, H. Hrg. 59, 1-79. Accessed September 27, 2015. http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-59_64581.PDF. 29 Ibid.

30 Charles Barry Smith, “Current US Encryption Regulations: A Federal Law Enforcement Perspective,” New York University Journal of Law and Public Policy 3, no. 11 (1999-2000): 11-20. Accessed September 15, 2015. http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Charles-Barry-Smith-Current-U-S-Encryption-Regulations.pdf.

31 “By the Numbers: ISIS Cases in the United States,” Center on National Security at Fordham Law (June 25, 2015). Accessed September 27, 2015. http://www.scribd.com/doc/270005491/By-the-Numbers-Isis-Cases-in-the-Us. 32 Ibid.

33 Patrick G. Eddington, “Not ‘Going Dark’: The FBI’s Misguided War on Encryption,” The Hill (July 7, 2015). Accessed September 27, 2015. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/246796-not-going-dark-the-fbis-misguided-war-on-encryption.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Becca Stanek, “FBI: Alleged San Bernardino Shooters Were Radicalized At Least 2 Years Ago,” The Week (December 9, 2015). Accessed December 9, 2015. http://theweek.com/speedreads/593323/ fbi-alleged-san-bernardino-shooters-radicalized-least-2-years-ago.

42 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 37 David Francis and Elias Groll, “FBI: California Shooters Radicalized Years Ago, Encryption Is A ‘Business Model’ Question,” Foreign Policy (December 9, 2015). Accessed December 9, 2015. http:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/09/fbi-director-san-bernardino-shooters-were-radicalized-years-ago/.

38 Ibid.

39 Pierre Thomas, “Feds Challenged by Encrypted Devices of San Bernardino Attackers,” ABC News (December 9, 2015). Accessed December 9, 2015. http://abcnews.go.com/US/feds-challenged-encrypted-devices-san-bernardino-attackers/story?id=35680875.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Wittes.

43 Ibid.

44 Susan Landau, “Thoughts on Encryption and Going Dark: Counterpart,” Lawfare (July 15, 2015). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-encryption-and-going-dark-counterpart.

45 Ronald Rivest, “The Case Against Regulating Encryption Technology,” Scientific American (October 1998). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv98e.pdf.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Kenesa Ahmad and Peter Swire, “Encryption and Globalization,” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 13 (Spring 2012): 416-481. SSRN. Accessed October 11, 2015. http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1960602.

51 Steven Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, and Susan Landau, “Going Bright: Wiretapping Without Weakening Communications,” IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine (February 2013). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/GoingBright.pdf.

52 Lauren Walker, “FBI’s Comey Calls for Making Impenetrable Devices Unlawful,” Newsweek (October 18, 2014). Accessed October 11, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/going-not-so-bright-fbi-director-james-comey-calls-making-impenetrable-devices-278190.

53 Ibid.

54 Kevin Bankston, “It’s Time to End the “Debate” on Encryption Backdoors,” Just Security (July 7, 2015). Accessed September 27, 2015. https://www.justsecurity.org/24483/end-debate-encryp-

SPRING 2018 43

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S tion-backdoors/.

55 Francis.

56 Wittes.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Marshall Erwin, “The FBI’s Problem Isn’t ‘Going Dark.’ Its Problem is Going Slowly,” Just Security (July 16, 2015). Accessed October 11, 2015. https://www.justsecurity.org/24695/fbis-problemgoing-dark-slow/.

60 Ibid.

61 Finklea.

62 Erwin.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Wittes.

67 Ibid.

68 Finklea.

69 Froomkin.

70 Finklea.

44 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

M

ind-Controlled

Technology: An Analysis Of Brain-Computer Interface In The Context Of National Security Maren Sekerak

Executive Summary and Introduction Brain-Computer Interface is an emerging technology with incredible potential. During Brain-Computer Interface, users focus intently on what they want to happen, and finely-tuned processors translate those brain signals into machine commands. The result appears to be magical – humans controlling their environment by thoughts alone. However, with this capability comes great risk. The technology works by picking up brain signals, something that could be hijacked by planting a secret device onto someone else’s sensor. These signals could also be intercepted during the translation from the processors to the machine, and then warped so that the machine commands do not “follow orders.” For those involved in intelligence and national security, Brain-Computer Interface is an important technology to study because of the associated security risks. The correct balance must be found between encouraging this new technology and protecting its users from the associated risks.

After the introduction, this paper will begin with a summary description of Brain-Computer Interface. It will cover the fundamentals of the technology, the history of the technology, and descriptions of all the major terms and components that make-up the technology. The paper will then discuss the current boundaries of Brain-Computer Interface as well as the possibilities for the future of Brain-Computer Interface. In the Analysis section, the paper will describe the best and worst-case scenarios for the future of Brain-Computer Interface as well as moral and ethical issues for humans in the case of widespread use of this technology. The paper will close with an evaluation of Brain-Computer Interface, especially as it relates to national security.

Summary Description of Brain-Computer Interface Brain-Computer Interface is a blanket term used to describe the interaction between brain waves and technology.1 During Brain-Computer Interface, or BCI, electrodes pick up signals from the brain and translate them into readable com-

SPRING 2018 45

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

mands for computers and machines.

There are three types of Brain-Computer Interfaces: invasive, partially invasive, and non-invasive.2 In invasive BCI the skull is opened to expose the brain and the electrodes are implanted into the tissue of the brain. This method offers the strongest signal, but the electrodes will often develop scar tissue around them within months making the signal much weaker. In partially invasive BCI the skull is again opened but the electrodes rest on top of the brain, not inside the brain.

There is less scarring following this procedure but the brain signals are weaker than fully invasive BCI. Finally, non-invasive BCI refers to the practice of placing the electrodes on the outside of the skull by means of a helmet or headset. This method is the cheapest and most practical but offers the weakest signals.3 Brain-Computer Interface is a relatively new technology having only emerged around 20 years ago. However, the foundational principles necessary for BCI were discovered in the 1920s when German scientist Hans Berger began the research that led to modern-day EEG machines.4 Interestingly, what sparked his scientific endeavor was his belief in mental telepathy, not hard science. He was not a trained neuroscientist, but after his sister felt the need to see if he was safe directly after Berger was involved in a freak military accident he was convinced that brains emit communicative signals. When Berger first began research he was untrained and insecure, but managed to successfully record electric signals from human brains on his invention, the EEG machine. Berger was unsatisfied, however, and waited five years before publishing his work. He was immediately ridiculed and disregarded until a famous British physiologist confirmed his findings in 1934.5 After the initial discovery of electric brain waves, scientists created new machines to monitor these brain signals but made little progress in understanding the brain signals themselves. After the 1960’s, more emphasis was made on studying the sources of the signals and the relationships of the brain waves to stimuli, however, it was not until around 2000 that scientists began to decode the brain waves and turn them into readable data.6 Forming a functional Brain-Computer Interface requires multiple in-depth processes but can be broken down in to several main steps: signal acquisition, signal amplification, signal processing, and machine execution.7 Brain signals are acquired through the electrodes placed inside or on top of the brain, as outlined above. These electrodes are most often made of gold or silver. Next, the signals that were picked up by the electrodes need to be amplified enough to be read correctly. This is done in part by “active” electrodes included with the regular, or “passive” electrodes. These active electrodes work to amplify the brain waves initially while reducing noise and interference. Signals are further amplified by additional BCI hardware and filters layered upon the electrode. After the signals are amplified, they travel to the connected computer to be digitized, also called

46 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

preprocessing.8 Following digitization of the signals, they are processed by a system that determines the intentions of the brain signals and what needs to be done about them. Some of the brain signals are irrelevant to the BCI process and need to be filtered out. This is called feature extraction. Finally, these filtered signals are translated into readable commands and sent to the machine to be executed, normally by wireless connection.

EEG is frequently used in the context of neurology, but rarely understood.

EEG stands for either electroencephalography, which refers to the process, or it stands for electroencephalogram, which refers to the resulting graph of the data gathered. The etymology of the word breaks down into three parts: “electro,” “encephalo,” and “graphy/gram.” “Electro” denotes the involvement of electricity, “encephalo” is taken directly from the Latin word for head, and “graphy” and “gram” come from the Greek words “graphia” or “gramma” respectively, meaning “the process of writing or recording,” or “that which is written or drawn.”9 EEG is the process by which the gold or silver electrodes placed on the skull pick up the electric signals of the brain. An EEG test is often used to diagnose patients with disorders such as epilepsy that clearly manifest themselves in brain signals.

This collected data is translated to a graph showing the spikes of brain activity over time. By reading these graphs, neurologists can infer certain things about the health of the subject’s brain. During BCI an advanced form of EEG is used to not only collect the signals but to read exactly what they mean.10 EEG technology forms the basis for non-invasive BCI helmets and is the primary means of collecting brain signals for all BCI technology.

MRI stands for magnetic resonance imaging and was the precursor to fMRI, or functional magnetic resonance imaging.11 During an MRI scan the head is placed in a strong magnetic field which aligns the nuclei of hydrogen atoms in the brain. By applying a slight magnetic pulse to the brain the hydrogen nuclei produce a faint signal which is then detected and mapped. In MRI, the product is a static representation of the physical structure of the brain – a snapshot in time.

This process was the basis for fMRI which goes beyond MRI to map brain function and activity over time. During MRI testing scientists noticed that more blood flows to areas of the brain that are activated by stimuli. They used this concept to monitor blood flow in the brain by means of the magnetic principles of oxygenated blood. In an fMRI, the end product is a constantly evolving chart of where the brain is active.12 This technology is used in Brain-Computer Interface to collect information about what is happening inside the brain, and what areas are being stimulated when. Combined with EEG signals, this information is what is used in BCI to understand the specific commands or intentions of the brain signals.13

SPRING 2018 47

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

Application of Brain-Computer Interface BCI has the possibility to transform our understanding of what can be done to the human body. The most practical benefit of BCI being developed today is enhanced prosthetics. Prosthetics with BCI technology are able to function solely off of thoughts, just like a real appendage.14 These technologies connect wirelessly to the brain after a short amount of time spent learning the thought patterns of the owner. In the future, these prosthetics could even include pain sensors to replicate human nerves. With BCI technology people missing arms and legs can simply buy new ones which are almost as good as the real thing.

More advanced than BCI prosthetics, BCI technology is helping people who cannot communicate to express simple ideas.15 In these instances the person is given a headset and slowly taught to control their thoughts. The headset is linked to a visible computer screen and the person is instructed to imagine their hand moving the mouse and clicking on images or letters on the screen. After hours of practice, the person can “click” on letters to form words and express ideas – simply by guiding the cursor with their mind. Alternately, people can choose letters by watching for them in a sequence. When they see the letter they want, the recognition sparks a signal in the brain which is then recorded. Little work has been done in attempts to assist patients who are even further “locked-in” and unable to communicate at all but the possibilities are there.16 Development of exoskeletons is another area in which Brain-Computer Interface is being applied.17 Exoskeletons provide a frame for the body to help support people who are paralyzed. When combined with BCI technology exoskeletons can be easily connected to an EEG headset and controlled by brain power. A BCI exoskeleton was debuted at the 2014 World Cup where a paralyzed young man walked onto the field and kicked off the World Cup by controlling the exoskeleton with his mind.18 Many videogames and toys are being developed for BCI technology. There are flying robots controlled by the user, small games that require immense concentration, and emotion-sensing animal ears and tails to express yourself.19 In video game technology there are some products that let you control your character through BCI. These products are all used with a BCI headset so that the user does not need a surgical implant. The drawback to headsets is that the signals are not as clear meaning the user must concentrate very intensely on what they want to happen.20 The lack of precision is a major obstacle to overcome for the development of future BCI gaming technology.

The possible benefits that could result from BCI technology are incredibly wide-ranging. The most practical benefit would be replaceable body parts. In the future it will probably be possible to replace missing arms, legs, hands, and pos-

48 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

sibly even fingers and toes. These advanced prosthetics would be wirelessly connected to an implant in the brain and behave almost normally. They would look like normal appendages and even have built-in pain sensors. After these body parts we will probably be able to replicate eyes and seamlessly connect them to BCI technology as well. For soldiers it might be possible to create exoskeletons that function as physical enhancements and are connected to their thoughts for ease of use. Thinking bigger, a mind-controlled jetpack could allow for handsfree flight. For vehicles, BCI technology could communicate with self-driving cars to make a hybrid processor more capable of complex decisions. BCI technology could also be connected to virtual reality technology, making for a fully-immersive gaming system. The gaming system could send feedback to the brain to simulate the environment in which you are playing. For those with learning disabilities, BCI technology could help teach people how to focus or guide the brain’s thought patterns. All these applications of BCI technology are futuristic but not far-fetched.

Analysis Ramadan points to four main problems with BCI in his chapter titled “Basics of Brain Computer Interface.”21 First, the signals acquired by EEG electrodes are always very weak and require amplification to understand. This is a significant problem in EEG headsets and one of the main problems to solve before furthering the technology. Secondly, signals are often misunderstood and wrongly classified.

Many brain signals are not necessary to the BCI device and only serve as distractions. We must improve the signal filtering system to classify and use the signals correctly. Thirdly, the small amount of bandwidth that BCI currently allows for is simply not enough to support large-scale, quick commands. The processing power must be increased and the speed of data transfer must be increased if the technology is to progress. Lastly, there is still a high error rate when processing brain commands. This is due in part to low signal strength, signal interference, and slow data processing, but also because our processing capabilities are not as fine-tuned as they could be. When the user finally realizes that a mistake was made, the process of rethinking the command and making sure the machine is executing properly takes even more time. With more research we will be able to understand brain signals better to hopefully solve this high error rate.22 As Walter Glannon describes in his article, “Ethical Issues with Brain-Computer Interfaces,” we must be careful when considering the extent to which BCI technology can substitute for normal expression of thought.23 We should not expect too much of the technology before it has been tested over years of experience. Family members of “locked-in” people who use BCI technology to help communicate should not place blind faith in the technology. BCI can never be a

SPRING 2018 49

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

complete substitute for human functioning. Additionally, medical staff must address the issue of whether a patient communicating through BCI is able to make informed decisions about their own healthcare.24 This problem can be applied to all areas of life. Should people who can only communicate by means of BCI be treated differently than other people with disabilities? While the current results are promising, there is always a margin of error. The procedures for these scenarios should start to be addressed now so that professionals are familiar with the issues when the situation arises in reality.

Morality comes into play when considering the autonomy of the people receiving the technology. The long-term effects of BCI have not been studied because the technology is so recent, but even short-term studies have produced troubling effects. For example, scientists have done studies on people with BCI prosthetics to prove that the movement of the prosthetic itself sends back its own signals to the brain. Instead of questioning the random movement, the people justify it.25 This was illustrated as early as 1969 by neuroscientist Jose Delgado in his book Physical Control of the Mind.26 He was able to electrically stimulate a patient so that his head turned from side to side. He describes this disturbing phenomenon in his book, saying: The interesting fact was that the patient considered the evoked activity spontaneous and always offered a reasonable explanation for it. When asked, “What are you doing?” the answers were, “I am looking for my slippers,” “I heard a noise,” “I am restless,” and “I was looking under the bed.” In this case it was difficult to ascertain whether the stimulation had evoked a movement which the patient tried to justify, or if a hallucination had been elicited which subsequently induced the patient to move and to explore the surroundings.27 These observations are troubling when considering the implications of longterm BCI implants. Before the technology can progress, studies will need to be done to determine the extent to which a BCI implant becomes essentially part of the brain. If an implant needed to be removed after decades of use what would be the effect on the patient? These types of questions can only be answered with more time.

Best-Case and Worst-Case Future Scenarios When considering the future of Brain-Computer Interface, there is a bestcase scenario and a worst-case scenario. Looking at both future scenarios can help us determine what steps we need to take in the present to insure the future does not turn into a nightmare.

In the best-case scenario all people with bodily injuries can take advantage of this affordable and widespread technology. Insurance plans cover all prosthetics

50 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

but even when purchased outright they are affordable for the middle-class. The technology is completely customizable to your needs and will connect with optical implants, performance-exoskeletons, and all self-driving vehicles. For security purposes the BCI brain waves are individually encrypted for each device and unable to be hacked. To do this the BCI processors become intimately familiar with your brain during the training phase and only respond to commands from you. Without your permission they will not allow anyone other than you to operate the technology. However, you can share your thoughts and feelings directly with another person if you allow it. This helps ensure everyone can see the other side in an argument. If the technology needs a software update it will download directly from the internet while you sleep. If you have an optical implant the BCI technology knows when you want to access the internet or scroll through Facebook and it brings it up in your field of vision as a sidebar. You can download files of knowledge to save to your BCI hard-drive and program your limbs to be good at certain things. All people who have suffered from a communication disability are able to utilize BCI technology to function normally. Soldiers and Peacekeepers can use the technology to create strong exoskeletons which become personalized to their needs and desires. Intelligent robots can be connected to your BCI device and function as an extra set of hands when doing chores. On the legal side the laws have kept up with the technology and humans are protected both with this technology and without. Human dignity is not forgotten, but held up as the reason for all this technological advancement. Because of all this technology humans spend more time doing the most important things: cultivating relationships, creating art, discussing ideas, and becoming the best versions of themselves.

In the worst-case scenario, most humans have BCI implants and upgrades which can be accessed by the government and hacked by other malicious actors.

This means that people can be controlled like puppets without their knowledge.

Before the technology became so corrupted, people were fascinated with the ways in which it could help us automate more aspects of our lives. People wanted to use the technology to create perfect versions of themselves and customize their abilities at will. Because of this they pushed the technology faster than society could catch-up. Children were given BCI implants at birth. The legal system was ill-equipped to deal with the problem and the public outcry was not enough to stop the scientists from pushing forward. When the wealthy received their BCI implants and customized upgrades, enough middle-class people wanted them that the market was permanently established. At the first sign of any mental challenge or defect in their children parents utilized the BCI technology that was implanted at birth to aid the child’s thought and development. As a result, the children in this scenario do not need to overcome any significant difficulty. This translates into adults who are privileged, complacent, and spoiled. There is little use for higher

SPRING 2018 51

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

education because everything difficult can be automated. The hard work was already done in the previous era, the job of the present-day is to sit back and enjoy what has been created. As a result of this moral decline, people believe they can get away with almost anything. To combat this criminal attitude the government begins to access people’s implanted BCI devices and soon collects a database of all citizens. They can access the information stored in the BCI whenever they need. Initially, this was used as evidence to convict criminals in court, but it has been increasingly violated. Whenever the government needs to do something, they can manipulate the thoughts of the people. Only a select few know about this technology because the rest of the world has grown so complacent. Malicious actors have also discovered ways to access people’s BCI signals and are able to make people obey their commands as well. Underground societies exist where anti-government hackers try to “take back” the people that government has controlled. Distrust of authority increases until the government deploys Peacekeepers with advanced BCI exoskeleton technology which makes them nearly invincible.

The Peacekeepers can automatically track down people who are anti-government because they have access to BCI data that monitors thoughts. The use of the Peacekeepers spark riots which the government tries to put down. Society is locked in a downward spiral unable to give up the technology that is destroying it.

Evaluation When looking at the best and worst-case scenarios described above, it is easy to see certain pitfalls that need to be avoided. To avoid the pitfalls in the future a standard must be established early to allow for the objective judgment of the technology as it progresses. For the purposes of this paper, the long-term goal regarding BCI should be to utilize the technology in the most beneficial, practical way that does not encroach on human dignity or privacy. The technology should aid humans in pursuit of the “good life” while reducing the negative uses of the technology as appropriate. While this statement is broad and subjective, it provides a base-line philosophy that is necessary to guide the technology. The ideas of human dignity, privacy, and practicality are too foundational to skip over.

A different understanding of those foundational issues would drastically change someone’s perspective regarding the objectives for the technology. Building from these foundations, the remainder of this paper will analyze the future of BCI technology for both the intelligence community and the individual.

For the United States government and intelligence community, one of the main areas of concern is making sure that BCI signals cannot be hacked and manipulated. If there was a possibility for BCI implants to be accessed by an outside party, the risks might outweigh the benefits for the intelligence community. If soldiers and intelligence operatives could not trust the technology and the

52 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

agencies could not trust that the operatives were not being hacked and controlled remotely, there would be little practical use for the technology. Security concerns must be addressed before the intelligence community will likely implement BCI technology.

If, in the future, the United States employed BCI technology on a large scale, the results would be somewhat unpredictable. The outcome would depend heavily on what specific capabilities the United States decided to use and if the use was classified or public information. If they used BCI technology in a military capacity (enhanced exoskeletons, killer robots, and drones, etc.), it would probably be public information even if the specifics were classified. The military would probably not use the technology without the proper security checks and without the acceptance of our closest allies. They would also be very hesitant to use the technology if the public opinion was negative. Under these circumstances the application of BCI technology is completely justified because it would be used by consenting soldiers to aid in the fight against those who would do the United States harm. However, if the United States government forced military implants on those who did not want them that would be a violation of human rights.

For the intelligence community, the uses for BCI might be more subtle. In undercover operations having a way to relay real-time data to the center of operations without being wired would be a huge advantage. In stressful situations the technology could emit calming signals and, when needed, it could help the user focus deeply on a specific task.

Using BCI technology on the battlefield would seem to provide a huge advantage. If the United States were to forego development of this technology while other nations paved the way, it would put the United States at a serious disadvantage. This is not a position that the United States wants to be in so DARPA has committed 60 million dollars to funding BCI research between 2016-2020.28 In the event that an adversarial nation produces the technology before the United States, the United States would be completely thrown off-guard. DARPA would probably be given as much money as they needed to produce similar technology as soon as possible so that the United States would have equivalent capabilities.

That window of time without the technology would be incredibly tense as the nation would be more vulnerable to attacks than normal.

Because the technology is not advanced enough to entirely predict what the results will look like, it is almost impossible to plan ahead for specific defensive systems. However, there seems to be two ways to combat BCI systems. The first is physically. There will always be a way to physically take down a person with BCI capabilities because they are only human. The second, more complex, cunning way to combat these systems would be to hack into them and attempt to shut them down from the inside. While DARPA and NSA could no doubt find a

SPRING 2018 53

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

way, even creating the technology to do this produces its own security risk. If the technology fell into the wrong hands, no one with an implant would be safe. The capability for remote, malicious access would undermine all attempts at protection of privacy. Because this is an issue which the NSA regularly deals with, they would probably be heavily involved. In the present, DARPA might even be considering adding a secret back-door component to any BCI technology the United States produced. This would allow the government access into any BCI device that used the software they created and could protect against international theft of BCI technology. This would be extremely classified but not entirely impossible.

For the United States government as a whole the danger will probably lie in navigating the laws surrounding the technology. Law-makers should not limit BCI so much that the technology is forever stunted but they should not ignore the potential dangers. They should place the most importance on protection of privacy, as their initial decisions will set the tone for future decisions. It is easier for the government to assume more control later than to give control back. However, BCI technology for the intelligence community will no doubt be classified. This presents an added layer of complexity for law-makers as they attempt to understand an already complex issue. The intelligence community’s legal departments will need to be well-versed in this technology when it emerges so that they can assist Congress and other entities who need to know about the developments. However, the temptation for these agencies might be to downplay or misrepresent the current BCI capabilities in attempts to have greater legal boundaries. There is no clear or easy solution to this problem.

In regards to individual human beings, BCI technology seems to be very self-focused. The entire system revolves around human capabilities and the extent to which humans can utilize technology for their own desires. With this self-seeking, physical, temporal focus, it could become very easy to forget about the human spirit. The greatest things in this world are not being the smartest, the fastest, or the strongest – the best things always include relationships with others. To the extent that BCI increases or diminishes the capacity for relationships will determine how the technology ultimately effects society.

54 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

References 1

Rabie A. Ramadan, S. Refat, Marwa A. Elshahed, and Rasha A. Ali, “Chapter 2: Basics of Brain

Computer Interface,” in Brain-Computer Interfaces: Current Trends and Applications, ed. A. E. Hassanien and A. T. Azar (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 31-50. http://www. springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783319109770-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-045-1486025-p176925970.

2

Ramadan.

3

Ibid.

4 David Millet, “The Origins of EEG,” UCLA Brain Research Institute (June 3, 2002). http://www. bri.ucla.edu/nha/ishn/ab24-2002.htm.

5

Ibid.

6

Jordan Sorkin, “Getting into Brain Waves: History and Resources,” Stanford Neurosciences In-

stitute (April 18, 2016). https://neuroscience.stanford.edu/news/getting-brain-waves-history-and-resources.

7

Ramadan.

8

Ibid.

9 Douglas Harper, “Electroencephalogram,” Online Etymology Dictionary. http://www.etymonline. com/index.php?term=electroencephalogram.

10 Ramadan.

11 “What is fMRI?” UC San Diego Center for Functional MRI. http://fmri.ucsd.edu/Research/whatisfmri.html.

12 Ibid.

13 Ramadan.

14 Jianjun Meng, Shuying Zhang, Angeliki Bekyo, Jaron Olsoe, Bryan Baxter, and Bin He, “Noninvasive Electroencephalogram Based Control of a Robotic Arm for Reach and Grasp Tasks,” Nature (December 14, 2016). http://www.nature.com/articles/srep38565.

15 “From Brain to Computer: Helping ‘Locked-In’ Patient Get His Thoughts Out,” NPR (October 26, 2014). http://www.npr.org/2014/10/26/359081510/electrode-cap-helped-locked-in-patient-gethis-thoughts-out.

16 Walter Glannon, “Ethical Issues with Brain-Computer Interfaces,” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8 (2014): 136, PMC. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4115612/.

SPRING 2018 55

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S 17 Helen Thompson, “Mind-Controlled Technology Extends Beyond Exoskeletons,” Smithsonian (June 12, 2014). http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/mind-controlled-technology-beyond-exoskeletons-180951710/.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ramadan.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Glannon.

24 Ibid.

25 Paul R. Wolpe, “Ethical and Social Challenges of Brain-Computer Interfaces,” AMA Journal of Ethics 9, no. 2 (February 2007): 128-131. http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2007/02/msoc1-0702. html.

26 Adam Keiper, “The Age of Neuroelectronics,” The New Atlantis, no. 11 (Winter 2006): 4-41. http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-age-of-neuroelectronics.

27 Keiper.

28 Steven Max Patterson, “DARPA Researchers to Push the Limits of Reading and Writing Human Brain Neurons,” Network World (February 5, 2016). http://www.networkworld.com/article/3030652/ hardware/darpa-researchers-to-push-the-limits-of-reading-and-writing-human-brain-neurons.html.

56 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

SPRING 2018 57

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

58 SPRING 2018

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

SPRING 2018 59

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I A L A F FA I R S

60 SPRING 2018