The Journal of International Social Affairs: Fall 2018

VOLUME 10 NO. 1

FALL 2018

The Journal of International Social Affairs A Patrick Henry College Publication

Issue No. 1 Academic Articles Danielle Fife

One Decade at a Time: The Development of the Meaning of Human Rights Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (pg. 1)

Olivia Bowers

The Kurds, Turks, and Iraqis: How Religious and Ethnic Identities Inflence Regional Conflict (pg.

17)

Claire Atwood

Burma’s Rohingya Minority: An Opportunity to End Discrimination and Promote Ethnic Integration (pg. 36) Opinion Article

Samuel Bock

Justice for All: The Case to Remove Foreign Sovereign Immunity from State-Owned Enterprises (pg. 44)

From the Editor Dear readers,

The editors of the Journal of International Social Affairs are excited to present the Fall 2018

edition. As always, the ISA seeks to provide readers with informative and insightful research on how peoples and nations address critical issues while facing dynamic changes in their social, political, religious, and economic systems. The three articles and short opinion piece in this edition each provide a timely view into one of these current issues.

In the first of this edition’s three academic articles, Danielle Fife provides a historic look at

the breakdown of the term human rights in “One Decade at a Time: The Development of the Meaning of Human Rights Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

In “The Kurds, Turks, and Iraqis: How Religious and Ethnic Identities Influence Regional Con-

flict,” Olivia Bowers examines the religious undertones of the tension surrounding the Kurds in the Middle East.

Finally, in “Burma’s Rohingya Minority: An Opportunity to End Discrimination and Promote

Ethnic Integration,” Claire Atwood considers what can be done about the current human rights crisis in Myanmar.

To round out this edition with a short opinion piece, Samuel Bock provides a cogent argument

on how foreign sovereign immunity unfairly prevents individuals from seeking legal redress for wrongs committed against them in “Justice for All: The Case to Remove Foreign Sovereign Immunity from StateOwned Enterprises.”

The journal would not be possible without the many who provided assistance and support. The

editorial staff of Esther Katz, Kenneth Kisby, Elias Gavilan, Sarah Roberts, and Leo Briceno have spent months preparing the articles and journal for production. I would also like to thank Dr. Stephen Baskerville for his guidance and support as our faculty supervisor, along with Dr. Frank Guliuzza and the Patrick Henry College Department of Academic Affairs for their assistance in producing this journal.

Most of all we are thankful to you, our readers. We hope you will find the articles in this issue

insightful and informative.

Sincerely, David Thetford, Editor-in-Chief

We shall never be able to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international boundaries Harry S. Truman

STAFF Editor-in-Chief: Associate Editor: Research Editors: Copy Editors: Layout Editor: Faculty Supervisor:

David Thetford Kenneth Kisby Elias Gavilan Sarah Roberts Esther Katz Leo Briceno Dr. Stephen Baskerville

PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 www.phc.edu ISSN 2572-9586

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Decade at a time: The Development of the meaning of Human Rights Since the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights ne

Danielle Fife The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is internationally recognized as the premier authority on human rights. Presented to General Assembly in 1948, the UDHR was meant to codify human rights in an era of international healing and fear. While the UN sought to ensure that the world never went to war again, the UDHR sought to make sure that the people of the world were protected as well. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human rights reads, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world… The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard achievement of all peoples and all nations.”1 The UDHR remained the standard for human rights in the world for over twenty years after its passage. At that time, the focus of human rights work was to better protect the established human rights. Yet, human rights today entail positive rights such as the right to health care and, in some cases, the right to an abortion. A close examination of the progression of the definition of human rights over the past seventy years shows that a confusion of terms led to the expansion and breakdown of the meaning of human rights seen in the early twentieth century. Pivotal points such as the Carter administration and the year of human rights were essential to this fundamental shift in meanings.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) The year was 1947 and eighteen members of an elite commission met in San Francisco, California, to do the impossible: draft an International Bill of Rights.

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They sat down at the drafting table with the intention of defining the fundamental human rights of man. When their task was complete in September of 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt presented the Commission on Human Rights’ final draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. “We began with the somewhat naïve, albeit sincere, determination to work out an International Bill of Rights, and in the initial impulse of our inexperience we saw the completion of this task just around the corner.”2 At the end of this exercise, the members of the commission still intended to follow up with a series of covenants to provide the standards necessary to protect and preserve these fundamental human rights.3 The preamble to the UDHR, as introduced at the beginning of this paper, emphasized the importance of these fundamental and universal rights for all people in all places and at all times. The promotion of these rights and respect for their standards are seen as essential for the preservation of human rights for all. The specific articles of the declaration ensure human rights such as life and liberty and ban such trespasses on these rights, like slavery and torture. These human rights establish rights such as personhood, equal protection under the law, and the right to due process of law and a fair trial. The UDHR does include some less traditional but established rights, such as the right to work and right to education.

The declaration also seeks to ensure that states create an environment where these rights are possible to pursue.4 Moses Moskowitz, a premier human rights activist and member of the Economic and Social Council at the time of the writing of the UDHR, cites the UN Charter as the basis for and definition of Human Rights. “By the time World War II erupted, there existed both a tradition of international responsibility in the field of human rights and the rudiments of international definition of several of these rights and freedoms.”5 At the outbreak of the second World War, the leaders of the world felt a responsibility to keep the citizens of the world safe from the world and its atrocities. Moskowitz summarizes this saying, “There is no doubt that the Charter involves a commitment to the furtherance of human rights more extensive than any comparable international endeavor.”6 Ten Years after the UDHR (1950s) Moskowitz had the opportunity to follow the development of human rights before the UDHR and after. Moskowitz recalls, “Even before the outbreak of World War II, the desirability of defining international for the treatment of individuals was expressed by leaders of thought in the field of international law and

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relations.”7 As he recounts that ten years after the UDHR’s implementation, the UDHR remained the main standard for human rights in the international community. While the actual implementation of these human rights in states was still up for debate, what constituted human rights was generally considered to be the UDHR.8 They were known to be universal and to be political, economic, and social rights. Moskowitz says of these rights, “In their essentials, man’s interests are the same everywhere and they spring from the same inalienable sources. The preservation of their individual liberties and their participation in the distribution of their political, economic, and social rights and privileges, are goals shared by all men.”9 Human rights were seen as a common interest that provided a new and essential force to conduct international affairs and pursue international peace and security.

The humans of humanity were seen to be the focus of human rights. They were the immediate object of all international concerns and their needs must be pursued above all. Moskowitz commented, “International concern for human rights must be consciously directed towards making the human person the center of international attention and the overriding problems of man, the deliberate aim of international cooperation.”10 At this point, the focus of human rights and international relations was still people. The human was the focus, not the expansion or refining of their rights.

Twenty Years after the UDHR (1960s) While the UDHR remained the premier definition of what constituted human rights throughout the 1960s, human rights began their irreversible transition to what we know today. Traditionally, human rights constituted political and civil rights such as the right to life, liberty, and a fair trial. Maurice Cranston in Human Rights, Real and Supposed says of these rights, “What are now being put forward as universal human rights are social and economic rights, such as the right to unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, medical services, and holidays with pay.”11 This should come as no surprise when you consider the history of human rights at the United Nations. The UDHR was not the first human rights effort at the UN. In fact, the UN’s Economic and Social Council’s inaugural meeting was in May of 1946, over two years before the UDHR was drafted. The UN initially prioritized economic and social rights but then put these on the backburner to write the UDHR. A shift to less traditional economic and social rights was simply the next step after the UDHR was established in the international community.12

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At the drafting of the UDHR, the goal was to draft an “International Bill of Rights.” To modern American ears, that sounds patriotic and praiseworthy. After all, The Bill of Rights in America is consistently praised for protecting and preserving American’s fundamental human rights. According to Cranston, this meaning was not at all misunderstood. “English-speaking delegations not unnaturally interpreted the expression ‘Bill of Rights’ as meaning an instrument of positive law, and therefore understood the duty of the Commission to be that of finding a formula for making human rights positive rights by making them enforceable.”13 While the commission initially agreed to produce a manifesto or declaration of human rights, they worked with the goal of later creating something that would be more “legally binding” and enforceable. Of course, even in the 1960s this was yet to happen, but with the re-advent of economic and social rights, it is important to remember the initial goals of the commission.14 Legislation can readily secure traditional political and civil rights because these, for the most part, bar government interference in the lives of people rather than calling the government to take an action. This is no longer the case regarding the right to work or the right to social security.15 Human rights, which should be definable and defendable universal rights of men, were confused with ill-defined and unachievable ideals that can be pursued by governments. As Cranston says, “An ideal is something one can aim at, but cannot by definition immediately realize. A right, on the contrary, is something that can, and from the moral point of view must, be respected here and now.”16 Human rights, according to Cranston, are universal rights that each government can provide or protect its citizens from and are of paramount importance. These rights do not depend in any way on the station of the individual. They are rights for all people simply because they are human.17 Human rights at this time were often spoken of in terms of ‘justifiable claims’ or ‘moral titles’ and some have gone so far as to call them duties or obligations.

This language becomes interesting when realizing that, at the same time, human rights were spoken of as ideals, or goals to work towards but not to necessarily achieve. 18 Cranston comments on this saying, “All these words – ‘right’, ‘justice’, ‘duty’, ‘ought’, ‘obligation’ – are the key terms of what Kant called the ‘categorical imperative’. What out to be done, what is obligatory, what is right, what is duty, what is just, is not what it would be nice to see one day; it is what is demanded by the basic norms of morality or justice.”19 A duty cannot be confused with an ideal. An ideal is not something that can be measured or tangibly completed.

How do we measure justice or peace? These are ideals, not tangible obligations

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or duties that nations possess. Cranston continues, “Thus the effect of the Universal Declaration which is overloaded with affirmations of so-called human rights which are not human rights at all is to push all talk of human rights out of the clear realm of the morally compelling into the twilight world of utopian aspiration.”20 These so called economic and social rights, cannot actually be considered human rights at all. Instead they are a slippery slope, muddling the definition of human rights for future generations as we see in the next decade.

Thirty Years after the UDHR (1970s) 1977 was the Year of Human Rights, the year that “the new American president reaffirmed America’s dedication to the worldwide support of human freedom.”21 This was the crux of the human rights effort in the 1970s. President Jimmy Carter said in his inaugural address, “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.”22 With the inauguration of Carter, preservation of human rights became an important condition of aid to America’s friends and the heart of much of the opposition to its enemies. This coupling of the human rights initiative with foreign aid ushered in a new era for human rights. These efforts, however, were not fully realized because of their limited success in terms of foreign policy officials.23 Raymond Gastil summarized this phenomenon when he said, At the same time, lack of immediate successes that can be directly attributed to the policy, and the persistent criticism of the policy by highly placed officials and academics has already led to some back-pedaling, noticeably in regard to the Soviet Union… In the struggle for human rights, as in so much else, the question of morale is critical, and we must maintain our position to sustain the hopes of others.24 The Carter administration was selective in the rights and countries it chose to emphasize. The focus of the discussion on human rights tended to concentrate on political imprisonment and torture in noncommunist countries, suppression of intellectuals in some communist countries, and the denial of rights to black majorities in southern Africa.25 This selectivity was in part due to the fashion of the day, a fashion that favored blacks and East Asian communism. It was also, of course, due in part to political pressures, both internal and external, to forge and maintain alliances. This selectivity in human rights was and is dangerous in designing any sort of policy.

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It not only confuses Americans but also confuses any foreigners who would use American policy as a guideline in creating policy of their own. Perhaps this is the fatal flaw of the human rights agenda – perhaps it has always been her fatal flaw. The politics of the leading nations, the superpowers of the world, and the fashions of the day are the driving forces of what makes it on the docket. Rights and countries that are either unfashionable or inconvenient go unnoticed by those who can actually lead the change. 26 Yet, this selectivity may not be the most damaging mistake made during the Carter years. During this time, the term freedom began to be used synonymously with the term human rights. The idea of freedom soon acted as the driving force for America’s international relations and became the goal in every policy.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, the world was not quite ready for such a vigorous approach to human rights and strings attached foreign and development aid to our allies. Even still, the new approach was used wherever convenient and human rights was the banner of American foreign policy. No good American could argue with pursuing freedom and the universal rights of all men because he had an obligation to pursue the ideals of human rights.27 Human rights in this era fell into three categories, according to Niels Christian Nielsen. The first covered the integrity of persons, such as due process and a bar on torture. These were regarded as necessary for a decent human life. The second guaranteed citizens the freedom to participate in their governments. These included such rights as “liberty of thought, speech, and assembly, as well as democratic elections. It also includes freedom of religion and the right to unlimited movement within and without the country.”28 So far, none of these rights are new.

The third group of rights, however, had only recently found general acceptance.

This included such rights as a right to food, shelter, and healthcare. “Their defenders argue that political freedom can mean little when basic physical needs remain unsatisfied. Political guarantees are meaningless when a hungry man – tried by due process – is hanged for stealing bread.”29 These rights rest on a desire for moral decency, rather than specific civil or political rights. This third category, more than the rest, raises serious questions regarding implementation because they require the government to provide a specific service and call this a right. “In spite of the moral decency inherent in such rights, they are often seen as ideals or goals rather than civil liberties.”30 Fifty Years after the UDHR (1990s)

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As the twentieth century came to a close, human rights saw perhaps its most pivotal betrayal. As officials attempted to reinterpret human rights, they found their efforts ineffective as the meanings of the rights were perverted.31 Instead of asking what qualifies as a human right, the question became, one of which right should be held in higher esteem. The further humanity found itself from 1948, the further it seems to have found itself from the values and tradition of the UDHR. Habib Malik, son of Charles Malik, comments saying, “One disturbing phenomenon gaining ground today can best be described as the systematic hijacking of human rights to serve special interests and to promote dubious agendas of a political and generally secular nature.”32 The liberal fight for a new range of rights, such as homosexual rights and abortion rights, has undermined not only the integrity of rights but also the meaning of the term family. These pseudo-rights, according to Wagner, continue to launch human rights further and further from their more traditional origins. Habib Malik continues, “It is sad that under the guise of protecting human rights there should be launched – and through the United Nations specifically – a sustained attack on those very rights that were enshrined in the Universal Declaration.”33 Three main areas specifically led to the degradation of rights in the 1990s. The first was the inclusion of welfare in the definition of human rights, the second was the clash of rights, and the third was the assault on the definition of family.34 Tara Smith defines rights in the 1990s as, “the right to life, the right to property, and the right to welfare.”35 It is this third category of rights that signaled the biggest change in the definition of human rights. This change ushered in a new generation of positive rights. According to Smith, these rights are just ways that individuals are justified in expressing their new-found freedom of expression and action. Again, the confusion and new rights are all grounded in the confusion of terms between freedom and human rights. Schooyans says, “Without secure foundations for rights, we have been adrift without a compass to guide our determinations of which rights claims are and are not legitimate. Intuitions have swarmed forward to fill the void.”36 What qualifies as a human right has been reduced to what those who care feel strongly should be considered a human right.

“As rights have been called upon to accomplish an increasing number of tasks, they have been weakened by the burden.”37 Entire new classes of rights have been introduced – such as animal rights, abortion rights, and rights against discrimination – and with these new rights come a new range of demands for services. This shift in meaning has devalued the term human rights.

Much like inflation, this expansion of rights and their meaning has “eroded

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their purchasing power, devaluing their currency.”38 Appealing to rights no longer has the power and protection that it used to. “Just as bad money drives out good in an economy, so pseudo rights are driving authentic rights out of our moral economy.”39 And yet, because the appeal of the term rights has not diminished at the same rate as has its firing power, it maintains an appeal to all persons who care passionately about some end. Smith states, “The language of rights caries an aura of respectability that is difficult to deny in one’s cause, if that respectability seems at all attainable.”40 A right claim will immediately raise the stakes of the disagreement and cause one’s adversaries to freeze for at least a moment. This gives the rights “claimer” at least a momentary advantage. Everyone with a cause wants their cause to be a human right to maintain their advantage on anyone who might oppose them. While many have warned of the corrosiveness of a free-forall “rights binge,” special interest groups continue to claim more and more often incompatible rights. 41 This moral insanity does not offer a clear or coherent definition that could be held up in an individual argument of whose right should prevail, much less in an international court. Unfortunately, rights no longer offer a reliable moral protection. The advent of so many new rights has caused them to clash with each other, leading to a debate not of which is a fundamental human right, but of which right should be considered more highly. 42 Smith says, “Traditionally, rights were regarded as decisive moral arbiters. Invoking a bona fide right would definitively settle any controversy as to whether certain treatment of a person was permissible. Today, determinations of who holds which rights are not nearly so conclusive. Typically, invoking a right merely marks the opening round of escalating claims to rights and counter-rights.”43 The acceptance of ill-grounded rights has eroded the barrier to claiming that some freedom is a right and continues to make it easier and easier to miss-apply the term right. Often a solution in a disagreement between rights is to create a brand new right to help solve the confusion. An appeal to some higher right is a logical way to solve such disputes and leave the list of rights with one more added to the end without a thought. 44 “Once the gates have been opened for some right claims, it is difficult to deny others.”45 This continues to further break down the integrity of the meaning of human rights.

Human rights in recent years have come to be a means for humanity to pur-

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sue their individual selfish wants. Instead of human rights being universal for all, many of these so-called “rights” are specific to only certain people at certain times.46 Out of this new wave of rights came an assault on the definition of family through homosexual and reproductive rights, undermining the traditional definition the UDHR held so dear.47 This traditional meaning says that the family is the “natural and basic element of society and has the right to the protection of society and the State.”48 The family was also clearly defined as heterosexual and monogamous, elements that the “new rights” put forward failed to recognize. Family, as a term, has come to encompass homosexual unions and one parent families, undermining the traditional meaning. Schooyans says of the issue, “Henceforth the word [family] is equivocal; its significance fluctuates at the pleasure of the interests at work…. By means of the individualism embodied in the so-called ‘new rights of man,’ the UN booby-traps the traditional family institution.”49 These various new meanings of the term family are the direct consequences of the new conception of man’s rights: human rights as human freedom to pursue his own desires.

Unfortunately, since “family” as an umbrella term for a whole range of new rights, the meaning of the term and the universal rights ensured therein have been cheapened. It has turned the focus from the preservation of the institution to the pursuance of the desires of the members of the institution. “Thus the UN lends its support to the States that have already undertaken to weaken the familial institution by encouraging the unbridled freedom of individuals.”50 As can be expected, the shift in meaning of terms has led to confusion on the international stage. Freedom is treated as completely synonymous with universal human rights. The pursuance of an individual’s wants has been mistaken for the pursuance of his basic human rights; this next generation of rights has evolved from this shift in meaning. This opens up the possibility for gender fluidity, homosexuality, and abortion to all be considered fundamental human rights, exactly what we see happening.

The Past Sixteen Years and the “Progress” of Human Rights A quick Google search of “what are human rights” leads straight to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) at the United Nations.

Viewed by many as the authority on the standard for human rights, the OHCHR offers a full-page definition of human rights in 2016. “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.”51 These rights are universal to

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all people in all states. The OHCHR says that it is the responsibility of the States to ensure that these rights are protected. Additionally, the OHCHR calls these rights interdependent. “The improvement of one right facilitates advancement of the others. Likewise, the deprivation of one right adversely affects the others.”52 While the OHCHR paints this interconnection in a positive light, this is the same idea that encourages the rapid addition of new rights to the list. Next, the definition says that human rights are equal and nondiscriminatory. This categorizes nondiscrimination as a fundamental human right. “The principle applies to everyone in relation to all human rights and freedoms and it prohibits discrimination on the basis of a list of non-exhaustive categories such as sex, race, colour and so on.”53 There is no intention, in the definition of human rights offered by the High Commissioner, to limit the definition or the potential for “new” human rights. Unlike the language and purpose behind the UDHR, the OHCHR is purposefully looking for new rights to add to the unexhaustive list of fundamental human rights.

The constant need to pursue new rights and to accept all new rights as fundamental human rights has led to a dubious clash. While the right to life seems to be considered a fundamental human right, abortion is also considered a fundamental human right by the same activists.54 Human rights today are not the same life and liberty rights of the past. According to Habib Malik, “Today the emphasis has shifted. Economic, social and cultural rights have come to their own, and indeed with a vengeance. The paradigm today is ‘the adequate standard of living’.”55 Long gone are the days of civil and political rights. Instead has entered the era of the right to paid vacation, a living wage, and sexual expression. This is the right for a person to be anything he wants to be because human rights and freedom are interchangeable. The High Commissioner of Human Rights describes this phenomenon at the conclusion of its definition of human rights: Human rights entail both rights and obligations. States assume obligations and duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.56 The positive rights espoused by this definition equate fundamental human rights with state action and welfare. It is easy to say that anything is a human right

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or a human right abuse because the status quo allows no opportunity for redress.

Currently, no enforcement mechanism exists for punishing human rights offenders and thus, no consequences exist for misappropriating the term.57 “To say that something is a human right rings hollow if there is no effective means of redress for human rights abuses.”58 Conclusion Human rights today are a status symbol – they are the fashionable charity of the elite. Human rights lawyers have the same status and acclaim as a Hollywood celebrity. (Think of George Clooney’s wife Amal, a human rights lawyer and the apple of Hollywood’s eye.) The international community uses human rights as a way to “prove” that they are better than their enemies and to justify why they should be considered a better nation than their friends. It is the method of sorting out the social hierarchy of the international order.59 The importance of human rights and the connotation of the term lead every person who is passionate about an issue to want to call their pet issue a human right. This, combined with the mixing of terms between human right and freedom have been the most significant contributors to the degradation of the definition of human rights in the late twentieth century. This initial breakdown has created a free-for-all situation in the human rights agenda wherein there is no clear definition of what constitutes a human right. There seems to be no desire on the part of the United Nations or human rights activists to slow down the “progress” of human rights and reassess the definition.

While human rights today do not have any binding enforcement mechanism, they still have had a lasting impact on the world as we know it. Those very fundamental human rights espoused in the UDHR still ring true today, even if the integrity of the concept of human rights as a whole has been damaged. Habib Malik reflects, “Even the most hardened dictator in today’s interconnected world cannot continue to ignore indefinitely the alarms being sounded by the global human rights movement.”60 The call to protect human rights still holds the citizens of the world accountable to their people and a higher standard of life. Unfortunately, the human rights of today have strayed far from their original meanings and have been battered and bruised along the way. In order to move forward, it is essential to reclaim the meaning of the term human rights. Instead of being synonymous with freedom, or moral obligation, human rights must be considered a limited entity of its own.

Habib Malik reminds readers, “Whenever practice leads some astray, there stands the Universal Declaration as a beacon signaling the way back home.”61 Only future practice and treatment of human rights can remedy the errors of the decades.

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References

1. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,”, accessed December 18, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/ EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.

2. Charles Habib Malik, The Challenge of Human Rights: Charles Malik and the Universal Declaration, ed. Habib C. Malik (Oxford: Charles Malik Foundation, 2000), 214.

3. Charles Habib Malik, 214-215.

4. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

5. Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nations (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958), 17.

6. Moses Moskowitz, 14.

7. Moses Moskowitz, 17.

8. Moses Moskowitz, 25.

9. oses Moskowitz, 20.

10. Moses Moskowitz, 21.

11. D. D. Raphael, ed., Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London: Indiana University Press, 1967), 43.

12. D. D. Raphael, ed., 45.

13. Ibid.

14. D. D. Raphael, ed., 45-46.

15. D. D. Raphael, ed., 50.

16. D. D. Raphael, ed., 53.

17. D. D. Raphael, ed., 50-51.

18. D. D. Raphael, ed., 52.

19. D. D. Raphael, ed., 53.

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20. D. D. Raphael, ed., 52.

21. Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Boston: Freedom House, 1978), 64.

22. Jimmy Carter, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1977. The American Presideny Project. http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575.

23. Raymond D. Gastil, 64.

24. Raymond D. Gastil, 66-67.

25. Raymond D. Gastil, 67.

26. Raymond D. Gastil, 67-68.

27. Raymond D. Gastil, 68.

28. Niels Christian Nielsen, The Crisis of Human Rights (Nashville: T. Nelson, ©1978), 18-19.

29. Niels Christian Nielsen, 19.

30. Ibid.

31. Teresa Wagner and Leslie Carbone, Fifty Years After the Declaration: The United Nations’ Record On Human Rights (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), v-vi.

32. Teresa Wagner and Leslie Carbone, xvii.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Tara Smith, Moral Rights and Political Freedom, Studies in Social and Political Philosophy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 186.

36. Tara Smith, 4-5.

37. Tara Smith, 2.

38. Tara Smith, 2.

39. Tara Smith, 2-3.

40. Tara Smith, 3.

41. Ibid.

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42. Tara Smith, 2.

43. Tara Smith, 1-2.

44. Tara Smith, 4.

45. Ibid.

46. Teresa Wagner, v.

47. Michel Schooyans, The Hidden Face of the United Nations (St. Louis, Mo.: Central Bureau, CCVA, 2001), 128.

48. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

49. Michel Schooyans, 128-129.

50. Michel Schooyans, 129.

51. “What Are Human Rights?,” Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Angus J.L. Menuge, ed., Legitimizing Human Rights: Secular and Religious Perspectives (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2013), 1.

55. Charles Habib Malik, 231.

56. “What Are Human Rights?”

57. Angus J.L. Menuge, ed., 6.

58. Ibid.

59. Angus J.L. Menuge, ed., 1.

60. Teresa Wagner, xix.

61. Ibid.

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Kurds, Turks, and Iraqis: How Religious and Ethnic Identities Influence Regional Conlfict

he

Olivia Bowers Executive Summary & Introduction The growing tensions between Kurdistan, Iraq and Turkey present unique religious, cultural and ethnic considerations for U.S. national security and diplomatic policy. The historical and present conflict in Iraq bears great significance to the stability, geopolitics, and power allocation of the region. Nations such as Turkey, Syria and Iran are important stakeholders with many interests that are impacted by the religious and ethnic divisions in Iraq. Despite their efforts in combating ISIL, the Kurds are facing opposition on every side and are not above using aggressive means to obtain their objectives. The future of Kurdistan will inevitably influence the future of the region. Additionally, given the United States’ involvement in Iraq, Turkey’s movement away from secularism and the EU, and Iran’s determination to pursue nuclear energy, U.S. national security interests are at stake. Kurdistan has always been a democratic partner of the U.S. in the region.

The current political, territorial and religious climate, however, could shape a re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards the region.

A variety of drivers exist within the conflict. A significant contributor to the tensions surrounding the region is the ethnic differences between majority Arab countries and an ethnically distinct Kurdistan. Kurdistan has faced severe violence and opposition in the past, and still faces strong opposition today, due to underlying ethnic hostility.

Territorial interests are also at stake. The primary conflict surrounding Kurdistan is its bid for independence. Iraq, Turkey and Iran all have vested interests in barring Kurdish independence efforts.

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Politically, different active parties are vying for power in Iraq and Kurdistan.

Shia political parties and Iranian-backed militias are interested in filling the power vacuums left by ISIL. Baghdad is also fragmented, creating a unique opportunity for Iran to make additional power grabs.

Economic factors directly play into the tensions. Kurdistan and Iraq dispute territory which contains oil fields and pipelines. Additionally, the distribution of revenue is an issue. Turkey has a vested interest in maintaining a healthy trading relationship with Iraq.

Finally, the historic religious differences and persecution throughout the region cannot be underestimated. The Kurds identify themselves first ethnically, as Kurds. Kurdistan is home to several variations of Islam, largely nominal affiliations, Semitic religions, and indigenous faiths. The conflict is more complex than just “Sunni versus Shia” and the other religions are often incorrectly lumped together with sects of Islam rather than understood as distinct cultural and historic religious beliefs, antithetical to the Quran.

U.S. policy ignores some of the important ethnic and religious distinctions behind the conflict and focuses on short term stability, rather than long-term interests and advantages. This paper will address the national security issue through addressing demographics and geography, the history of the conflict, religious affiliations in Kurdistan, and the current climate.

Summary Description of the National Security Issue Demographics & Geography It is worth noting that the Kurds are not a religious sect in Islam. Instead, they are an ethnic group, comparable to other regional groups such as Turkmen or Assyrians.1 Iraq is a majority Shia country, with 62% of Muslims considering themselves Shia, 30% as Sunni and 6% as “just Muslim.”2 The Kurds and Sunni Muslims are closely tied, with nearly all Iraqi Kurds considering themselves Sunni Muslims. According to Pew Research Center, 98% of Kurds identify as Sunnis, while only 2% identify as Shia.3 There is a very small minority of Iraqi Kurds who are not Muslims, but Yezidis. However, being Kurdish does not necessitate aligning with a one of the Islamic sects. For example, in Iran, Kurds are split almost evenly between Shia and Sunni Islam.4

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The geography of Iraq and the dispersion of these groups is an important consideration. Iraqi Shiites occupy central and southern Iraq, from southern Baghdad to Basra. Sunni Muslims live in northern Baghdad along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The Kurds inhabit the mountainous region of northeastern Iraq, bordered on the east by Iran and the north by Turkey.5

Image courtesy of “Who are the Kurds?,” BBC, October 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-29702440 (accessed March 15, 2018).

As for other regions, Kurds comprise between 7% and 10% of Syria’s population. Prior to the revolts against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, Kurds could be found in Damascus, Aleppo, Kobane, Afrin and Qamishli.

History Despite the fact most Kurds adhere to Sunni Islam, they do not identify themselves by their religious identity. Instead, they just consider themselves “the Kurdish people.”6 The history of the Kurds is one of political, ethnic and religious violence and still influences ethnic conflict today. The Kurds descended from Indo-European tribes. Arabs conquered Kurdish territory in the seventh century and Islamized them. Twentieth century Iraq was known as a period of extreme persecution. Three main lines of conflict were pervasive: Shiite against Sunni, Sunni against Shiite and the Sunni Iraqi government against the Kurds.7 After World War I and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the 1920 treaty of Sevres promised a country for the Kurdish people. However, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), did

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not follow through on that promise. The largest ethnic group in the world without their own country, the Kurdish people have facilitated several uprisings in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey in attempts to gain independence.

Turkey: Uprisings were met with harsh repression, especially by the Turkish military. Throughout the 1980s, the Turkish constitution banned the use (speaking and writing) of the Kurdish language. Thousands of Kurdish villages were destroyed, similar to Saddam Hussein’s’ efforts to persecute the Kurds in Iraq.

Kurds were referred to as “worthless”, “animals”, and “microbes.” The Turkish government severely restricted political parties and imprisoned dissidents.8 Deep-seated hostility still exists between Turkey and the Kurds. A notable political development was the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which called for an independent Kurdish State within Turkey.

Syria: Kurds make up the second largest ethnic group in Syria. In 2005, Amnesty International found that Kurds were consistently discriminated against.

People of Kurdish descent were barred from certain professions, prevented from owning property and not allowed to study at the universities. Nothing could be published in Kurdish and those who protested discrimination faced unfair trials, arrest and torture.9 Iran: In 1945, the Kurds in Iran established the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan. But this independent nation was short-lived—the Iranian army defeated the Kurds in 1946. Kurdish revolts were met with suppression policies, including assassinations, arrests, and executions.10 Iraq: The Kurds once inhabited two-thirds of the oil reserves in Iraq. This has proved problematic for the Kurds since when the Iraqi government has feared losing its economic capital. The government has also feared that Kurdish independence would trigger Shiite independence movements. As a result, Kurds have experienced cultural, political and ethnic discrimination. These ultimately culminated in genocide attempts in the late 1980s at the hands of Saddam Hussein.

During the genocide, the Iraqi military invaded “rebel” villages with instructions to every living thing, both animals and humans. Utilizing chemical weaponry, Iraqi forces killed about twelve thousand Kurds within the span of three days.11 Religion in Kurdistan The Kurds are a multi-religious ethnic group. Inheritors of a blend of In-

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do-European culture, Kurds are primarily followers of Islam. Islam spread in the Kurdish culture during the seventh and eighth centuries. Pre-Islamization, Kurdish cults designated lakes, stones, graves, trees and fire as pirs or holy places.

Nomadic Kurds considered stone mounds sacred. These Kurds believed that the stones could save them from misfortune. Sedentary Kurds celebrated the graves of saints, often bringing offerings such as baked bread and sweets. Sedentary and nomadic Kurds both adopted cults of trees, stones and water.12 Islam- Sunni Sunni Islam constitutes an estimated 80% of the global Muslim population.13 Excluding Bahrain, Iran, Iraq and Yemen, most Muslim countries are predominately Sunni. “Sunna,” the traditional portion of Muslim law to which Sunni Muslims especially adhere, can be translated as “the way”, “trodden path” or “example”, referring to the habits and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.14 The term comes from the Arabic phrases “ahl al-sunna was al-jamaa”, the “people of the Prophet’s way and Community.”15 Sunni Islam developed during the 7th century C.E. Conflict arose over who was to choose the caliph to succeed Muhammad. The Sunni believed that the whole of the Muslim community should select the caliph. The Shi’a, however, maintained that Muhammad had awarded his son-in-law, Ali the position. This divide was particularly important because Muhammad did not have any living male heirs.16 Sunni believed that Muhammad had chosen his friend Abu Bakr because Bakr had been appointed to lead the Muslim community in prayer.17 This position is considered one of leadership, interpreted by the Sunnis as an indication that the correct successor was Abu Bakr.18 Generally, they agreed that the caliphs should be members of Muhammad’s tribe, Quraysh. After Muhammad died, supporters of Bakr gathered at Saqifah and appointed Bakr as their caliph instead of Ali.19 At the very outset, the Sunni still respected Ali, given his relation to Muhammad.20 However, following the murder of the third Sunni caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, the division was exacerbated between Sunni and Shi’a. A civil war broke out after the caliph was murdered in his home.21 Ali became the new caliph and Uthman’s advocates believed Ali had failed to avenge his predecessor. A series of revolts plagued Ali’s reign and, in 656 AD, Aisha, one of Muhammad’s widows defeated him in battle (The Battle of the Camel).22 Following the conflict, Muawiya became caliph and, when he died, designated his son Yazid as his successor.

The following chart explains the primary differences among Shi’a and Sunni that

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arose out of the conflict over succession.23

The Sunni sect of Islam tends to emphasize the power of Allah and his sovereignty more than its Shi’a counterpart. Sunni also typically purport a more liberal definition of what it means to be a Muslim. Additionally, a key aspect of Sunni tradition is the role of Islam in political and public spheres. Sunni place great emphasis on Sharia Law. Sharia serves as the legal standard for Muslims concerning commerce, inheritance, marriage, divorce and other aspects of everyday life.

Today, most Islamic countries have Sunni majorities. As the map details below, many counties not made up of the largest concentration of Sunni, still fall within the 21%-40% category. In only a handful of countries do Sunnis compose a minority of the population, namely, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Lebanon, Qatar and Bahrain.24

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The majority of Iraq’s Muslim Kurds identify as Sunni, at least nominally.

However, many Kurds embrace variations of orthodox Islam, adopting Sufi practices and the Cult of Angels rites and beliefs. While religion is an influential part of Kurdish culture, Kurds do not define themselves by their religious beliefs as much as by their ethnic background and differences with Arab culture. This is why Kurds are more likely to adopt unorthodox practices and may only be nominally Muslim in either sect, Sunni or Shia.

Islam- Sufism In Kurdish village life, the Sufi brotherhoods carry notable importance. Many Kurds belong to these Sufi brotherhoods and participate in traditional Sufi rituals, chants and dances. Many Muslim Kurds have stronger bonds to Sufi orders than to traditional Muslim practices. Some Sufi rituals in Kurdistan do not reflect orthodox Muslim rites. Non-Muslims and Cult of Angels followers have adopted some of their own Sufi orders.

Babism Kurdish adherents to Babism believe in the transmigration of the soul, similar to the followers of the Cult of Angels. They do not mourn the loved one who dies because the soul will enter the body of another Babi, typically a newborn, a few days after death. This transmigration of the soul supposedly started long ago, with the souls of religious leaders residing in the bodies of Shia saints. Historically, the involvement of the Kurds in Babism was strong. One of the early major Babi communities was Kurdish. Eventually, Babism evolved into the Universalist religion of Baha’ism. Some ideas carried over, including Universalism, the idea that all religions are extensions of the same idea of faith, the equality of women, and the belief that all holy figures are manifestations of the same supreme Spirit.26 Due to Baha’i’s focus on global religion, Kurdistan has hosted very few proselytization efforts. It is difficult to estimate how many Babis are left in Kurdistan but only a few thousand Kurdish Baha’is persist, mostly in southern and central Kurdistan.27 The Cult of Angels The majority of Kurds who do not follow Islam embrace one of the indigenous Kurdish religions. Each of these faiths are variations of the ancient religion loosely labeled the “Cult of Angels.” The Cult believes in angelic beings

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who protect the universe by balancing dark forces of matter. Another fundamental tenant of the Cult is the belief in the soul’s transmigration through reincarnations. Reincarnations are manifestations of deity in major and minor “avatars”.

The Cult’s deity has been described as a “boundless, all encompassing, yet fully detached ‘Universal Spirit’ (Haq).” The Spirit does not interfere in world events, except to contain and bind the universe. It has manifested itself in seven different epochs as archangels who administer creation. The Cult still believe in the appearance of minor avatars which represent the manifestation of the Spirit. No heaven or hell exists. Instead, the pleasures of heaven and the horrors of hell take place on earth and people experience them during reincarnations, depending on the quality of their reincarnated lives. At the end of the world, righteous and “complete” humans who pass the bridge of final judgment will join the eternity of the Spirit; failed souls will be eradicated alongside the material world. Overall, the Cult of Angels is a Universalist religion, considering all other religious legitimate interpretations of the original belief in the Spirit. This means the religion is not fundamentally opposed to the practice of other religions in Kurdistan such as Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrianism. Traditionally, the Kurds kept the beliefs and traditions of the Cult secret but today scholars are conducting much more research to understand this indigenous Kurdish religion.28 The advent of Islamization decreased the influence of the Cult. However, the Cult still impacts Kurdish culture. Popular Cult adherent Khidir is revered throughout Kurdistan, possessing shrines built along natural springs of water.29 In an attempt to absorb Shi’ite Islam, the Cult “high-jacked” Islamic figures Ali and Muhammad. It included these men in its belief system as prophets and saints who were manifestations of the Spirit. Specifically in Yarsanim and Alevism, the Cult considers Ali as the primary avatar of the Spirit. The Shi’ite belief in several saints and a messiah also closely aligns with the Cult’s tenants. As a result, today some branches of the Cult consider themselves bona fide Shi’ite Muslims.

This alignment appears despite the Quran’s anti-Universalist emphasis on Islam being the only true religion.30 Thus, it is a mischaracterization to label the Cult as a branch of Shia Islam. Today, many Muslims would say that Cult followers are Shia Muslims of a “peculiar” type.31 All branches of the Cult have fallen under accusations of rampant sexual promiscuity that claim as evidence the Cult’s notorious communal sex ceremonies called, “killing of the lights”. The legitimacy of these claims is not entirely supported and is sometimes used to discriminate against Cult adherents.32 Altogether, three primary branches of the cult have survived in Kurdistan: Yarasanism, Yezidism and Alevism.

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1.) Ahl-i-Haqq or Yarsanism The religion Ahl-i-Haqq or Yarsan, meaning “Devotees of Truth” exists within four regional areas of Kurdistan. The most populated area of Ald-i-Haqq people is west of Kirmanshah, close to the Iraqi border. Altogether, roughly half a million to a million Kurdish people espouse Ahl-i-Haqq. Gurani, an Iranian dialect unique to the Kurds, was used to document the history of the religion.

Ahl-i-Haqq’s primary tenant is that God and six or seven archangels, representing different parts of God’s essence, manifest themselves in human forms. A notable example of the human incarnation of God was Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad.33 Additionally, followers of Yarsanism take personal responsibility for their salvation and believe this to be an individual’s responsibility. The religious community has no duty to hell someone reach “humanity” or do right. Those who sin can be reincarnated as an animal. A soul can reincarnate 1,001 times are until the end of the universe, which is considered to be after 50,000 years.34 2.) Yezidi Yezidi descents from Zoroastrianism. Yezidis also have similar beliefs to the Alh-i-Haqq, namely that God created six or seven angles to exercise authority over the world. Many are illiterate due to Yezidi traditions that ban literacy. By other Muslim peoples, they are largely considered “poor and oppressed”, “devil worshippers” and have experienced discrimination.35 The Yezidis are located primarily in Northern Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has destroyed many Yezidi villages, killing and capturing thousands of Yezidis.

The Yezidis closely hold their beliefs. They believe in a good principle associated with the Spirit and that Malek-Tauz, represented by a peacock, embodies its primary manifestation. (Malek-Tauz appears as a bird standing on a brass or bronze pedestal.) The Yezidis have their own sacred books, including the Kitabe Jilva (Book of Revelation) and the Maskhafe Resh (Black Book) which details rites and customs.36 More than other branches, this one emphasizes the importance of angles. Yezidis include Lucifer as one of the angles, mantainingauthority and power over world events. They consider Malek-Tauz, not the Universal Spirit, as creator of the world.37

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3.) Alevism Followers of Alevism regard Ali as the most important avatar of the Spirit.

Additionally, they hold that Ali and Muhammad are actually a single avatar with double manifestations, called Alimuhammad. Interestingly, however, Alevism is still a non-Islamic religion. Similar to the other branches, Alevism contradicts the monotheism, letter and spirit of the Quran. Demographically, Alevi Arabs are a mixed bag of Arab converts and assimilated Kurdish people. Turkmen have also converted to Alevism, with almost as many Turkish converts as practicing Kurds. Due to the religion’s larger following, Alevi’s have experienced far less discrimination than have the Yezidis. Turkish Alevi’s are considered one of the most radical and extreme religious and political groups in Turkey.38 Christianity Christians compose one of the smallest religious groups in Kurdistan. This is due largely to the negative sentiment toward Christianity by other religious groups in the area. Additionally, involuntary and voluntary migration, massacres and conversions to Islam have reduced the number of Christians in Kurdistan.

Prior to the six century and before Islamization, many Kurds were Christian, given their historical identity as the Medes, a people group found in the Bible.39 In Western Syria, some tribes of Tor Abdin who espouse Christian beliefs have been subjected to harsh and discriminatory treatment, such as land and property seizure and kidnappings of daughters belonging to the tribes.40 Some Kurds even speak Aramaic, the language believed by many scholars to have been spoken by Jesus Christ.41 Examples exist of non-Christian Kurds of Anatolia and central Kurdistan who still bless their bread by pressing a cross in the dough while letting it rise.42 Judaism Jewish Kurds also reside in Kurdistan. While no distinct Jewish communities exist in Kurdistan anymore, there used to be. After World War II and Israel was declared a nation in 1948, Jewish Kurds left Kurdistan to return to their Jewish homeland. Stories have been maintained of Muslim neighbors weeping over the loss of their Jewish friends and maintaining synagogues for decades in honor of their Jewish friends.43 Many of the current Jewish descendants in Kurdistan have converted to Islam.

General Kurdish Values

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Two integral values within Kurdish culture are family and marriage. Marriage defines alliances and social hierarchies within a tribe.44 Often first cousins marry, and a man often marries the daughter of one of his father’s brothers. Married couples often live with family and it is rare for Kurds to marry non-Kurds.

Families are patriarchal, but and both men and women work in the fields. Women are not typically veiled and can freely associate with men. Additionally, if there was no suitable heir, a woman is able to become the leader of a tribe. Women even fight alongside men as Peshmerga.45 Religious Tolerance The Kurds have been lauded as one of few groups in the Middle East which practice religious tolerance. For example, in 2012, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) did not accept teachers sent by the Central Iraqi Government, declaring all Kurdish schools as religiously neutral.46

Current Situation Politically, remaining a unified Iraq has been met with several difficulties, namely Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds maintain different political goals. Shiite Arabs tend to vote for candidates of religious parties, desiring a theocratic or sectarian government (similar to Iran). Sunni Arabs, on the other hand, strongly oppose a sectarian government in Iraq. Kurds also prefer a secular government, but ultimately, they desire to establish their own independent state. For the most part, the constitution has protected the three groups from each other, but the groups have individually sought to achieve their political goals independently. Shiites autonomously created a sectarian-leaning region in Southern Iraq, while Sunni government leaders have used oil resources to finance development of Sunni regions, while simultaneously attempting to halt progress and growth in Kurdish or Shiite regions.47 A key area, the oil rich city of Kirkuk is still a flashpoint even today, because it is claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. The Turkmen are supported

by Turkey, who strongly opposes Kurdish independence efforts.48 In July 2015, violence between Turkey and the Kurdish independence party- the PKK- ignited again, in what Turkey has coined as a “synchronized war on terror.”49 Turkey also considers the YPG and PYD (Democratic Union Party) as extensions of the PKK and consider all three terrorist organizations.50

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Independence efforts today have been met with strong resistance from the central government in Iraq. In September 2017, the Kurds held a referendum on independence in the Kurdistan region and among the disputed areas seized by the Peshmerga in the conflict against the Islamic State. The central Iraqi government claimed the referendum was illegal and denied its legitimacy. The Kurds decisively supported independence, with more than 90% of the 3.3 million participants voting for secession. The results would typically initiate negotiations with Baghdad, but the central government required the referendums annulment.51 The fight against IS has stimulated both cooperation and greater hostility between the groups. Namely, Kurdish fighters, the Peshmerga and Shia militias united to fight against IS fighters where Iraqi central government forces were not sufficient. Now, there is growing conflict over territory Shia and Kurds have reclaimed from IS.52 Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland and an expert on Shia militias, told Business Insider, “If there was another major conflagration that did occur … then it would probably be the Shia militias versus Kurdish forces.”53 The Associated Press described the relationship between the Shia and Kurds as a “marriage of convenience.”54

This image depicts areas of Kurdish population since the beginning of conflict with the Islamic State.

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The three predominate ethnic and religious groups in Iraq—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Sunni Kurds—do share a few core religious doctrines. All groups believe in Allah and the role of the Prophet Muhammad. Nine in ten members participate in Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting. A few notable differences exist between Sunni and Shia Muslims, but differences between Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds are comparatively small. 98% of Shia Arabs believe in visiting the shrines of Muslim saints. Fewer (71%) Sunni Arabs and only 59% of Sunni Kurds agree with this practice.55 Sunnis are opposed to Shiites filling positions of power, because they see Sunni governance as their birthright.56

This image shows the ethnic and religious breakdown of Iraq’ population.

Courtesy of the Pew Research Center.

The historical and present conflict in Iraq bears great significance to the stability, geopolitics and power allocation of the region. Nations such as Turkey, Syria and Iran are important stakeholders with many interests that are impacted by the religious and ethnic divisions in Iraq. Despite their efforts in combating ISIL, the Kurds are facing opposition on every side and are not above using aggressive means to obtain their objectives. The future of Kurdistan will inevitably influence the future of the region. Additionally, given the United States’ involvement in Iraq, Turkey’s movement away from secularism and the EU, and Iran’s determination to pursue nuclear energy, U.S. national security interests are at stake. Kurdistan has always been a democratic partner of the U.S. in the region.

The current political, territorial and religious climate, however, could shape a re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards the region.

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References 1.

2.

Besheer Mohamed, “Who are the Iraqi Kurds?,” Pew Research Center, August 20, 2014, http:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/20/who-are-the-iraqi-kurds/ (accessed March 15, 2018).

Ibid.

3.

Ibid.

4.

Ibid.

5.

“Prejudice in Iraq: Shiites, Sunni, and Kurds.” Prejudice in the Modern World Reference Library. . Encyclopedia.com. (March 14, 2018). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/ news-wires-white-papers-and-books/prejudice-iraq-shiites-sunni-and-kurds

6.

Ibid.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Ibid.

12. “Kurds-Religion and Expressive Culture,” Every Culture, http://www.everyculture.com/ Russia-Eurasia-China/Kurds-Religion-and-Expressive-Culture.html (accessed April 5, 2018).

13. “Overview,” Patheos, http://www.patheos.com/library/sunni-islam (accessed February 17, 2018).

14. “Overview,” Patheos, http://www.patheos.com/library/sunni-islam (accessed February 17, 2018).

15. “Beginnings,” Patheos, http://www.patheos.com/library/sunni-islam/origins/ beginnings (accessed February 17, 2018).

16.

Ibid.

17.

Ibid.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Ibid.

20.

Ibid.

21.

Ibid.

22.

Ibid.

23.

Ibid.

24. “Sunnis and Shia in the Middle East,” BBC, December 19, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-25434060 (accessed February 17, 2018).

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25. Ibid.

26. “Religion in Kurdistan,” Kurdistanica, http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=book/export/ html/95 (accessed April 5, 2018).

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. “Kurdish Religion and Family Values,” Global Connections- Champlain College, April 22, 2016, http://globalconnections.champlain.edu/2016/04/22/kurdish-religion-familyvalues/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

34. “Religion in Kurdistan,” Kurdistanica, http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=book/export/ html/95 (accessed April 5, 2018).

35. “Kurdish Religion and Family Values,” Global Connections- Champlain College, April 22, 2016, http://globalconnections.champlain.edu/2016/04/22/kurdish-religion-familyvalues/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

36. “Kurds-Religion and Expressive Culture,” Every Culture, http://www.everyculture.com/ Russia-Eurasia-China/Kurds-Religion-and-Expressive-Culture.html (accessed April 5, 2018).

37. “Religion in Kurdistan,” Kurdistanica, http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=book/export/ html/95 (accessed April 5, 2018).

38. “Religion in Kurdistan,” Kurdistanica, http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=book/export/ html/95 (accessed April 5, 2018).

39. “Learn About Kurdish Religion,” The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/historyand-culture/kurdistan-religion/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

40. “Kurdish Religion and Family Values,” Global Connections- Champlain College, April 22, 2016, http://globalconnections.champlain.edu/2016/04/22/kurdish-religion-familyvalues/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

41. “Learn About Kurdish Religion,” The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/historyand-culture/kurdistan-religion/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

42. “Religion in Kurdistan,” Kurdistanica, http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=book/export/ html/95 (accessed April 5, 2018).

43. “Learn About Kurdish Religion,” The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/historyand-culture/kurdistan-religion/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

44. “Kurdish Religion and Family Values,” Global Connections- Champlain College, April 22, 2016, http://globalconnections.champlain.edu/2016/04/22/kurdish-religion-familyvalues/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

45. “Kurds-Religion and Expressive Culture,” Every Culture, http://www.everyculture.com/

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46. “Learn About Kurdish Religion,” The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/historyand-culture/kurdistan-religion/ (accessed April 5, 2018).

47. Besheer Mohamed, “Who are the Iraqi Kurds?,” Pew Research Center, August 20, 2014, http:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/20/who-are-the-iraqi-kurds/ (accessed March 15, 2018).

48. Tony Karon, “Understanding Iraq’s Ethnic and Religious Divisions,” TIME Magazine, February 24, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1167476,00. html (accessed March 15, 2018).

49. “Who are the Kurds?,” BBC, October 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-29702440 (accessed March 15, 2018).

50. Ibid.

51. “Who are the Kurds?,” BBC, October 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-29702440 (accessed March 15, 2018).

52. Pamela Engel, “There’s another conflict brewing in Iraq that ‘could get quite nasty’,” Business Insider, June 9, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/kurd-and-shia-tensions-iniraq-2015-6 (accessed March 15, 2018).

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Besheer Mohamed, “Who are the Iraqi Kurds?,” Pew Research Center, August 20, 2014, http:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/20/who-are-the-iraqi-kurds/ (accessed March 15, 2018).

56. Mohamed, Marwa. “Ethnic Conflict Briefing Report: Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds.” Prezi. February 8, 2015. https://prezi.com/2qhzce9k7mej/ethnic-conflict-briefing-report-sunnis-shiiteskurds/?webgl=0 (accessed March 15, 2018).

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B

urma’s

Rohingya Minority: An Opportunity To End Discrimination And Promote Ethnic Integration Claire Atwood

Summary As Burma’s civilian government strives for peaceful democracy and ethnic integration while maintaining popular support, its leadership will have to address the Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority based in the Rakhine State in western Burma. Rohingya have faced official discrimination by the government for decades and are refused citizenship and the right to self-identify. Intensified violence between Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and subsequent displacement of Rohingya has brought international attention to the Burmese government’s treatment of Rohingya. As the new civilian government enforces its separation from the former military junta, it is emphasizing the inclusivity of ethnic minority groups in a national peace dialogue. This public push towards inclusivity offers the opportunity to improve the living conditions of Rohingya and grant them long denied rights.

The Rohingya People A Muslim minority living in the north of the Rakhine State, the Rohingya are ethnically related to the Bengali people living in neighboring Bangladesh’s Chittagong District. Rohingya have been the target of state-sponsored persecution for decades. They are persecuted for both their religion and ethnicity, which distinguish them from the Buddhist majority in Burma. The Burmese government refuses to use the term “Rohingya” to describe their community. The Rakhine state government and Buddhist majority instead use the term “Bengali,” claiming their presence is the result of illegal immigration from Bangladesh.1

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Muslims have lived in the geographic area of the Rakhine State for centuries.

They have historically lived on both sides of the Naaf River which marks the current border between Burma and Bangladesh. The British government annexed the Rakhine State after the 1824-1826 Anglo-Burmese War. After the annexation, the British encouraged migration from India into the Rakhine State. Since independence in 1948, successive Burmese governments have considered this migration illegal.2 Under the Burmese government, Rohingya are deprived of the right to full citizenship. Burmese authorities consider Rohingya undocumented immigrants and do not recognize them as citizens or as an ethnic group. According to the 1982 Burmese Citizenship law, the Rohingya are de jure stateless.3 Without citizenship, Rohingya cannot legally leave the townships within the Rakhine State.

Since 1994, they must request special permits, often available only through bribes, to marry. They are restricted to having two children, a limitation other ethnic groups do not face. The government includes Rohingya in official family registries and gives them temporary registration cards. However, the documents do not mention place of birth and are not considered evidence of birth in Myanmar. Rohingya face additional requirements such as performing unpaid forced labor for security forces.4 The census reflects official Burmese discrimination against the Rohingya.

According to the 2014 census, Muslims make up just over two percent of Burma’s population. This undercuts Buddhist hardliner claims that Islam poses a threat to the dominance of the Buddhist faith. Buddhists make up 90% of the country’s population of 51.48 million. They are followed by Christians at 6.3% and Muslims at 2.3% or 1.1 million. However, the 2014 census does not include the one million strong Rohingya minority. Rohingya were banned from self-identifying during the census taking. When the Rohingya are added, Muslims make up 4% of the population.5 This number reflects estimates that have been circulating since the last census taken in 1983. The results of the census were withheld for almost a year to avoid stirring tensions ahead of the national election.

Recent Conflict in Burma The 2012 Rakhine State riots marked a high in sectarian violence between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. The riots began after weeks of sectarian disputes and occurrences including the gang rape and murder of a Rakhine woman by Rohingya and the killing of the ten Burmese Muslims by Rakhines.

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Rumors and energetic political speeches based on hatred and fear of Rohingya contributed to the intensity and length of the riots.6 Violence erupted in June 2012 and resurged in October 2012. The conflicts primarily occurred in northern Rakhine. Homes and places of worship were razed and casualties were inflicted. Over eighty people died and an estimated 90,000 people were displaced. The government imposed a night-time curfew and declared a state of emergency in six townships. In October 2012, the violence spread and displaced an additional 35,000. These displacement numbers are in addition to the more than 200,000 Rohingya who had fled earlier crackdowns and discrimination. Buddhist extremist violence flared up again in the summer of 2016. On 23 June 2016, a Buddhist mob destroyed a mosque in Bago Region.

On 1 July 2016, a separate Buddhist mob burned down a mosque in Kachin State.

The Rohingya IDP and Refugee Issue Approximately 635,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) are in Burma as a result of conflict and violence.7 IDP camps in Burma contain deplorable conditions. Humanitarian workers have stated that Rohingya IDP camps are among the worst they have ever seen.8 In IDP camps outside Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, Rohingya suffer from chronic malnutrition, minimal medical care, and are forbidden to travel freely outside the camps. Humanitarian groups have been blocked from traveling to the IDP camps. Aid workers reported not being able to get travel authorization to reach the camps outside Sittwe. Natural causes have also contributed to the camp conditions. Monsoon rains have interrupted humanitarian and development assistance, as UN offices and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have to stop and resume activities. To escape the IDPs, some have attempted illegally fleeing by boat to neighboring countries. Thousands have sought to journey to Malaysia via boat. Desperate Rohingya are willing to pay over US$1,500 for the passage. The journey across the Indian Ocean takes place in rickety, overcrowded boats. As sinking incidents gain international attention, it is estimated that as many as 50% of the boat refugees have died.9 Rohingya have sought refuge in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. While these countries have accepted Rohingya refugees, Burmese Muslims still face discrimination and limited rights. The conditions for Rohingya refugees in Hyderabad, India, demonstrate their lower status. Although Rohingya were initially accepted as Mazloom Musalmaan (“oppressed Muslims�) by the local Hyderabadis, prolonged interaction has exposed a gulf of culture, language,

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habits, and religious zeal. Cheap labor offered by Rohingya has stirred resentment among the affected poor locals. The locals express concern regarding potential terrorist leanings of Rohingya. Other countries reflect this local response to refugees. Many Rohingya arrive in new countries as undocumented migrants, lacking the ability to legally work. Rohingya refugees are able to make the initial move out of Burma, but it is difficult for them to find permanent homes. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, nearly 1,500 Rohingya arrivals were officially registered in 2015 yet only forty-six have been resettled by a third country.10 Tensions Between Key Actors in Rakhine Issue Conflicting positions between Buddhist extremists, the National League for Democracy, and foreign governments represent the tension that is preventing resolution on the Rohingya issue. Governmental officials including Aung San Suu Kyi struggle balancing the Buddhist majority’s extremist attitude toward Rohingya and the maintenance of external relationships predicated on the promotion of universal human rights.

Ma Ba Tha, a Buddhist nationalist organization, represents Buddhist extremist thought and violence. Ma Ba Th a is translated in English to the Patriotic Association of Myanmar. Ma Ba Tha thrust itself into political prominence in 2014.

A more open, anti-Muslim atmosphere allowed the organization to gain influence with a divisive, anti-Muslim platform. It has held stadium-sized rallies, organized protests, and pushed laws “defending race and religion” through the Burmese parliament with the blessing of the government. Ma Ba Tha has contributed to a culture of anti-Muslim fear, despite Islam’s clear minority status in the country.

Recently, Ma Ba Tha’s influence has been in decline. It has been denounced both

by Burma’s new civilian government and Burma’s primary Buddhist religious council. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the political party heading the civilian government, has stated that it would not take the group’s demands seriously. Ma Ba Tha has also lost recognition by the Sangha Maha Navaka Committee, the clerical council appointed by the government to oversee Buddhist religious life. The Committee declared that it does not recognize Ma Ba Tha in the official Buddhist order, though it has not called for the organization’s dissolution.

This loss of respect has decreased Ma Ba Tha’s influence. Its most prominent monk, Wirathu, has continued to lash out insults regarding the government, yet promised protests have failed to materialize.

The NLD has been hesitant to recognize and engage with Rohingya. The

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2011 transition from a military junta to a civilian government offered an opportunity for improving the lives of Rohingya. The new government has publicly demonstrated a desire to dialogue with ethnic minority groups, yet it has evaded the Rohingya plight to avoid stirring tension.

Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counsellor and leader of the NLD, has disappointed Burmese Muslims in her inaction regarding their cause. Suu Kyi has received numerous accolades for her long fight for democracy and human rights, including the Nobel Peace Prize and US Congressional Gold Medal. She is affectionately called “Amay Suu” or “Mother Suu” by her citizens, including Muslims. Based on Suu Kyi’s career-long fight for democracy and philosophy of non-violence, Rohingya hoped that her ascension to power would bring an end to their persecution. However, fearing the loss of popular support, Suu Kyi has remained largely silent on the divisive Rohingya issue. The government could face major public backlash if it unilaterally granted citizenship to Rohingya. Such backlash would be difficult for a government emerging from a half-century of military rule. In meetings with outside partners, including neighboring countries and the United States, Suu Kyi has asked for space to deal with Rohingya.

Suu Kyi even uses the term “Rohingya” sparingly to avoid backlash from the general public. She has said that emotive terms make the situation more difficult.11 The Burmese government has officially reflected this position by refusing to say “Rohingya” and by asking foreign governments to do the same. In a meeting with US Ambassador Marciel, Kyaw Zay Ya, a foreign ministry official, stated, “We won’t use the term Rohingya because Rohingya are not recognized as among the 135 official ethnic groups…Our position is that using the controversial term does not support the national reconciliation process and solving problems.”12 The United States responded to this request by supporting the Rohingya right to demonstrate and the ability to self-identify.13 Conclusions: Burma’s Minority Groups and Continued Transition The success of Burma’s new civilian government depends on successful engagement with its ethnic and religious minority groups. The government has wrapped the Rohingya crisis into this inclusivity effort. The 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference, beginning on 31 August 2016, is open to all armed ethnic groups. Groups are welcome regardless of whether or not they have signed a nationwide peace pact with the government. The conference emphasizes inclusivity as the civilian government seeks to reach local communities and tackle long-

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standing grievances. Topics will likely include land rights, ownership of natural resources, and security for the ethnic communities.14 The government’s push for full participation of civil society demonstrates its commitment to ending decades of government abuse and breaking from the military’s divide and rule tactics.

The new civilian government will likely prioritize the maintenance of popular support to prevent potential military interference. The need for popular support will limit the government’s ability to aid Rohingya and include them in the national dialogue. During discussions with foreign governments, the Burmese government will likely either avoid mentioning the Rohingya15 or ask for space.16 Both methods have been utilized by the government in recent interactions. Such calls for space indicate that, while the civilian government will condemn extremist violence, any reconciliation with Rohingya specifically will be procrastinated.

The government’s emphasis on peace negotiations with prominent armed ethnic groups will keep Rohingya in the shadows. Local clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya will likely continue, but large-scale protests are not anticipated. This assessment is based on the decline of Ma Ba Tha’s influence and the massive dispersal of Rohingya.

As the United States vies for influence in Southeast Asia, the Rohingya issue offers the opportunity for the US to work with Burma to promote development and human rights. The US has enthusiastically supported Burma’s transition to democracy. The US has the option to use this growing friendship to press for urgent support to Rohingya, prioritizing humanitarian aid groups’ ability to travel freely to affected areas to support displaced Rohingya. The US has strongly supported the right to self-identify. This right has been refused by the Burmese government. As Burma works toward peaceful inclusivity, the US can balance respect for Burma’s independent sovereignty and a moral desire to assist the persecuted Rohingya. The Burmese government’s efforts to dialogue with ethnic minorities show clear progress toward peaceful democracy. In this dialogue, the US has the opportunity to emphasize Rohingya, focusing on their right to self-identify, the discrimination against them, and the horrible conditions faced in IDP and refugee camps.

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1.

Min Thein Aung and Wai Mar Tun, “Myanmar Government Orders State Media Not To Use ‘Rohingya’”, Radio Free Asia, June 21, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www. rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-government-orders-state-media-not-to-userohingya-06212016155743.html.

2.

“Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” IRIN, November 16, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www. irinnews.org/report/96801/briefing-myanmars-rohingya-crisis.

3.

“Discrimination in Arakan,” Human Rights Watch, May 2000, accessed July 25, 2016, https:// www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm.

4.

Ibid

5.

Sam Yamin Aung, “Govt Publishes Data on Populations of Religious Groups,” The Irrawaddy, July 21, 2016, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govtpublishes-data-on-populations-of-religious-groups.html.

6.

Max Beauchamp, “Beyond Bigotry: Unravelling Ethnic Violence in Rakhine,” New Mandela, December 19, 2013, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.newmandala.org/beyond-bigotryunravelling-ethnic-violence-in-rakhine/.

7.

“Myanmar,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, December 2017, accessed October 16, 2018, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/myanmar.

8.

Sarah Margon, “Aung San Suu Kyi Must Focus on Ending Burma’s Civil War,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/11/aung-sansuu-kyi-must-focus-on-ending-burmas-civil-war/.

9.

“More Rohingya Boat People Set to Flee Violence,” IRIN, November 6, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2012/11/06/more-rohingya-boat-people-set-fleeviolence.

10. Chris Buckley, “After a Year, Rohingya Family Still Separated,” The New York Times, July 5, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/world/asia/rohingyamalaysia-myanmar.html?_r=0.

11.

Murray Hiebert, “Aung San Suu Kyi Sets Out to Find “Practical Solutions” in Rakhine Stat, and the World Should Help,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 10, 2016, accessed October 10, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/aung-san-suu-kyi-sets-out-find%E2%80%9Cpractical-solutions%E2%80%9D-rakhine-state-and-world-should-help.

12. Richard Paddock, “Aung San Suu Kyi Asks US Not to Refer to ‘Rohingya,’” The New York Times, May 6, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/ myanmar-rohingya-aung-san-suu-kyi.html?_r=0.

13. Antoni Slodkowski, “New US Ambassador to Myanmar Says He Will Keep Using Term ‘Rohingya,’” Reuters, May 10, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ukmyanmar-usa-rohingya-idUKKCN0Y10S5.

14.

Margon.

15. Oliver Holmes, “Aung San Suu Kyi to Discuss Burmese Workers’ Rights on Thailand Trip,” The Guardian, June 23, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/jun/23/aung-san-suu-kyi-to-discuss-burmese-workers-rights-on-thailand-trip.

16. Lesley Wroughton, “Suu Kyi Calls for ‘Space’ to Address Myanmar’s Rohingya Issue as Kerry Visits,” Reuters, May 22, 2016, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/usmyanmar-usa-kerry-idUSKCN0YD01E.

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J

ustice for all:

The Case to Remove Foreign Sovereign Immunity from StateOwned Enterprises Samuel Bock

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States.

It would become the costliest natural disaster in American history. Little did anyone know that, for thousands of those victims, the suffering had just begun. Over the next few years, 4,000 Americans affected by Katrina built new homes using drywall made by a subsidiary of the China National Building Materials Group (CNBM). This drywall released sulfur emissions that forced families to move out of their homes and caused extensive health issues, among other problems. The total damage amounted to anywhere between $15-25 billion.1 One might assume that this Chinese company was held accountable. One might think the American families harmed had the opportunity to make their cases in court. However, because CNBM is a state-owned enterprise, meaning it is a company owned by but legally separate from the Chinese government, it and its subsidiaries were granted immunity in U.S. courts and were therefore shielded from any liability. This story of injustice is not unique to companies from China, nor is this incident the first or only of its kind. It is merely the tip of the iceberg of a massive body of evidence demonstrating that foreign, state-owned enterprises are held above the law. In response, a growing number of scholars are recognizing the injustice of this unwarranted legal defense. Sovereign immunity afforded to state-owned enterprises in the U.S. should be revoked.

A relevant and troubling question exists as to how the United States, valuing justice, accountability, and the rule of law, has allowed for certain companies to be exempted from the law. The answer lies within the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) codified in Title 28 of the U.S. Code. The FSIA was originally intended to protect foreign governments, acting in their official roles as

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governments, from suit in the United States, not government-owned companies acting in their roles as businesses. The FSIA was intended to protect nations not nation-owned corporations.

Regardless of the FSIA’s purpose, because of its poor wording and ambiguous terminology, many foreign state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have construed the text to shield them from all liability in U.S. courts. As international law reporter Chris Clayton pointed out, “Federal court rulings as far back as 1995 show that Chinese corporations successfully got cases against them dropped under the FSIA.”2 Clayton goes on to note, “They’ve used FSIA to escape legal action on suits ranging from shipping damages to bad drywall to breach of contract and defective fireworks.”3 Immunity for SOEs is not an international requirement. In fact, aside from the U.S., no country gives immunity to state-owned enterprises. U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley put it perfectly: “...we must ensure that entities, whether owned by a more traditional foreign based company or a foreign government, all play by the same rules when it comes to U.S. laws ... [and] ... when state-owned enterprises are essentially using a ‘get-out-of-jail’ free card to avoid transparency and accountability through the courts, leaving U.S. companies and consumers holding the bag, changes need to be made.”4 Subsequently, in order to uphold justice and the rule of law, scholars are rightly asserting that the U.S. ought to remove sovereign immunity from foreign state-owned enterprises. In his article, Senator Grassley outlined the benefits of such a policy change. First, it would level the playing field between foreign stateowned and private companies by making both equally subject to suit in the U.S. as the FSIA intended.5 Second, it would uphold equality under the law, giving American companies and consumers the chance to make their cases against these companies just as against private companies.6 The U.S. has always stood for the principle that those who break the law should be held accountable under the law. Yet, under the FSIA’s current structure, this time-honored principle has been and is being circumvented, putting non-governmental companies on an unlevel playing field. While private companies have to be accountable to the law, their state-owned competitors are held above the law. The U.S.’s current policy is the antithesis of the American way, depriving thousands of Americans from obtaining justice.

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Hurricane Katrina was an unstoppable tragedy that led to a state-owned corporation taking advantage of U.S. citizens — this is something that could have been prevented. By removing immunity, it is possible to provide an avenue for thousands of Americans to finally receive the justice they have been denied. This nation should never have allowed for state-owned companies to be held above the law. It is well past time to give Americans a chance to prove their case: stateowned enterprises should no longer be granted sovereign immunity.

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1.

Greg Allen, “Toxic Chinese Drywall Creates A Housing Disaster.” National Public Radio, October 27, 2009, accessed October 3, 2018, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=114182073.

2.

Chris Clayton, “US Law and Chinese Immunity: State-Owned Companies Claim Exemption From Litigation,” The Progressive Farmer, May 17, 2016, 1, accessed September 8, 2017, https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/article/2016/05/17/state-owned-companiesclaim.

Ibid.

3.

4.

Charles Grassley, “Grassley Looks to Keep State-Owned Enterprises from Skirting U.S. Courts | Chuck Grassley,” September 15, 2016, accessed September 8, 2017, https://www.grassley. senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-looks-keep-state-owned-enterprises-skirting-us-courts.

5.

Grassley.

6.

Ibid.

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