12-05-02: Gonzaga Uni: Pres. McCullogh: ICC TRC Fraud Genocide Complaint Against Tutu by Andrea Muhrrteyn

02 May 2012 P O Box 5042 George East, 6539 South Africa President: Thayne M. McCulloh Gonzaga University 502 East Boone Avenue Spokane, WA 99258-0102 president@gonzaga.edu Honourable Transparency CC: Archbishop Desmond Tutu Honourable Transparency CC: Pope Benedict XVI Dear Pres. McCullogh, Radical Transparency Notification: Radical Honoursty EcoFeminist Charges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against, amongst others, Archbishop Desmond Tutu for his endorsement and concealment of Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) FRAUD, the consequences of which are genocide and crimes against humanity against Boer/Afrikaner white South Africans. I am an adult Problem Solving Radical Honoursty African Ecofeminist paralegal in George South Africa; where I run a small EcoFeminist pedal-powered wormery business (www.sqworms.co.nr). My Radical Honoursty EcoFeminist culture of Radical Transparency Principles: (A) A healthy ecological environment, with due regard for carrying capacity laws of sustainability is a sine qua non1 for all other constitutional rights; similarly a psychological integrity environment of philosophical courageous truth searching honesty and sincere forgiveness is a sine qua non2 for healthy, transparent relationships that result in the co-creation of a code of conduct that enables non-violent honest sincere resolutions to disagreements. 1

Opinion of Weeramantry J in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (1998) 37 International Legal Materials 162 206. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7383.pdf 2 Practicing Radical Honesty, by Brad Blanton http://jus-sanguinis-ror.blogspot.com/2012/01/practicing-radical-honesty-being.html

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;l Criminal Court

I am the only leader in South Africa focussed on Problem Solving3. All other political, media, corporate and religious leaders (sic) in South Africa practice Parasite Leeching4 Leadership (sic).5 I am 45 years old, have never been on welfare, have used an IUD as contraception since the age of 19, and hence have never been pregnant, nor had an abortion. I have lived an ecological small footprint life; to avoid aggravating overpopulation, resource wars; materialist consumerism and resource depletion.6 I am the only member of the Radical Honesty7 culture and religion, in South Africa. Our culture is founded on the principle of Radical Transparency. Radical Transparency is also practiced as the foundational principle of: (1) Delancey Street Foundation (www.delanceystreetfoundation.org): the worlds most successful rehabilitation program, where over 14,000 former drug addicts, murderers, felons, criminals and delinquents have rehabilitated themselves by means of Delancey Street Foundations radical transparency brutal honesty each-one-teach-one program; (2) Bridgewater Associates (www.bwater.com) is managed according to CEO Ray Dalio‟s Radical Transparency Principles (http://www.bwater.com/home/culture--principles.aspx): Bridgewater is indisputably the worlds weirdest largest and best- performing hedge fund: “Bridgewater‟s unique results are a product of its unique culture. Truth and excellence are valued above all else. In order to be excellent we need to know what‟s true, especially those things that we would rather not be true, so that we can decide how best to deal with them. We want logic and reason to be the basis for making decisions. It is through this striving to be excellent by being radically truthful and transparent that we build meaningful work and meaningful relationships”. As a Radical Honoursty Problem Solving Ecofeminist Activist I have supported the rule of law for all, and been involved in non-violent political necessity guerrilla larfare, or civil disobedience actions on behalf Radical Transparency Problem Solving, for my former husband8, Greenpeace9, Amnesty Int‟l, Pacific Inst. for Criminal Justice10, Jericho 9811, Crack the CIA12, The Disclosure Project13, New Abolitionist14, Justice for 3

Problem solving leadership only acts towards solving any problem to enable the problem to be clearly and succinctly defined. Fanclubs and followers are eschewed, advice and suggestions towards clearly defining the problem are accepted based purely on merit of the suggestions, irrespective of individuals social-standing. 4 Parasitical Leeching Leadership generally choose some kind of ideology whereby they vaguely and ambiguously pretend to solve vague and abstract problems; while the predominant motive is to grow themselves a fan club/following, for their own socio-political or economic benefit. Their Parasite Leadership „problem solving‟ deliberately avoids any focus on clearly defining any problem, or any investigation of the root cause of the problem. Their primary focus is to divert their fan clubs attention towards the symptoms of the problem, using emotional blame game language focussed on another Parasitical Leeching Leaders fan club. Such Parasitical Leeching leaders – like WWF Wrestlers – thereby entrench the Parasitical Leeching Leadership paradigm (Fake Left Wing v Right Wing Political Paradigm Explained 4). Put differently: The bath is overflowing, Parasitical Leeching Leaders focus their fan club on endlessly mopping up the floor; who is mopping, who isn‟t, etc. All attention towards defining the problem as the running tap is strictly avoided, including vilifying anyone who even mentions the possibility of a tap leaking being the source of the problem. The focus is to perpetuate the problem indefinitely while socio-politically exploiting the problem for personal gain, by means of manipulating the emotions of „followers‟, related to the symptoms of the problem. Ninety-Nine percent of the worlds so-called „leadership‟ is PARASITE LEECHING LEADERSHIP. 5 All SA Political Parties & Media Editors practice Parasite Leeching Leadership - Survey http://why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/2012/03/all-sa-political-parties-media-editors.html 6 The ecological footprint is a measure of human demand on the Earth's ecosystems. It compares human demand with planet Earth's ecological capacity to regenerate. It represents the amount of biologically productive land and sea area needed to regenerate the resources a human population consumes and to absorb and render harmless the corresponding waste. Using this assessment, it is possible to estimate how much of the Earth (or # of Earths) it would take to support humanity if everybody lived a given lifestyle. All we do, buy and breed has ecological consequences. Ecological Footprint, excluding „Child-Free‟ factor (www.myfootprint.org/en/) is 13.16 gha. 7 Founded by Dr. Brad Blanton, author, psychologist and „Honesty in Politics‟ Congressional Candidate: www.radicalhonesty.com 8 RSA OVERSEAS: South African on hunger strike in California, by Ilda Jacobs 9 In Easter 1993, I was arrested with a few dozen Greenpeace activists in a Save Our Seas anti-nuclear demonstration at Sellafield, Nuclear Power station, in Scotland, for trespassing. I was neither charged nor prosecuted. See: Greenpeace’s Campaign Against Ocean Dumping of Radio-Active Waste, 1978 – 1998 (www.greenpeace.org). 10 98-07-04 Miami Herald: Police action harms image as protectors [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/5503636] 11 Jericho 98 is the movement to Free America‟s Political Prisoners. I participated in Jericho 98, wrote to President Mandela to request his support for the many Anti-Apartheid Activists whom the ANC conveniently forgot, rotting away in America‟s prisons: Marilyn Buck, Jaan Laaman, Tom Manning, etc. I visited Marilyn Buck in prison a few times. 12 99-03-16: San Francisco Chronicle: CIA Class Action Suit For Not Reporting Drug Trade [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/28391760] 13 Presidential UFO: George W. Bush‟s UFO Mail: Are You Ready for the Revolution? [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/33838621] 14 New Abolitionist: Race Traitor: Zero Tolerance [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/5503955]

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intn’l Criminal Court

Timothy McVeigh15, Alliance for Democracy16, Boycott 2010 World Cup17, Right of Return for African White Refugees18, et al19. Complaint to International Criminal Court (ICC): The Complainants Request the ICC: Prosecutor‟s Office to: Initiate an investigation into the allegations that the respondents are to be held criminally culpable for their endorsement and concealment of TRC FRAUD, the consequences of which are genocide and crimes against humanity against white South Africans, and ethnocultural legal and political persecution of Afrikaner/Boer and Radical Honesty cultures. Complainants allege the Defendants cover up and censorship of the ANC and Anti-Apartheid Movements (i) Frantz Fanon/Black Consciousness („liberation by violence on the rotting corpse of the settlers‟) (ii) Black Liberation Theology („violent elimination of „whiteness‟); and (iii) Houari Boumediene/Black Power Breeding War (“The wombs of our women will give us victory”)20 inspired TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FRAUD (“TRC FRAUD”) perpetrated against citizens of South Africa, and predominantly against white Afrikaner/Boer/Settlers; is committed in the context of endorsing the ANC‟s institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by Africans over other racial groups, particularly Boer/Afrikaners and committed with the intention of maintaining the ANC regime. The genocide and crimes against humanity evidence submitted to the ICC: Prosecutors Office, in complaints against: (i) the SA Government and (ii) African National Congress, and (iii) Julius Malema, by an anonymous farmer (F & F van der Walt Attorneys; OTP-CR203/10) and the Verkenner Movement of SA on respectively June 2010 and 05 April 2011 is in the opinions of this Complainant a direct result of TRC FRAUD. Initially Radical Honesty SA believed the ANC TRC political, religious, academic and media elite‟s TRC FRAUD to have been negligent; and consequently in good faith approached them to provide them the evidence of their TRC FRAUD, for their impartial professional enquiry. Their responses of obstruction of justice to deliberately and intentionally suppress, obstruct and censor the TRC FRAUD evidence from any impartial enquiry and from any public discourse, for its root cause problem solving resolution, have proved however that if their original TRC FRAUD conduct was negligent; their cover-up of their TRC FRAUD negligence is deliberate, intentional and malicious; with real life genocide and crimes against humanity consequences. [..] 15

April 2001: New Abolitionist: Tim McVeigh and Me [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/5508338] In 2000, I was arrested & detained for 3 hours, with Brad Blanton, Ronny Dugger (founding editor of Texas Observer and Alliance for Democracy), & others in the Wash, DC, Capital of the Rotunda. Issue: Campaign Finance Reform. District Attorney declined to Prosecute. 17 09-12-17: IOL Tech.: Anti-SA Smear Campaign on Facebook [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/24312359] 18 10-04-23: Algemene Dagblad: Zuid Afrikanen Smeken Om Wilders Hulp [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31036819] ; 10-04-25: Sunday Argus: SA family seeks repatriation to Netherlands [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31036819]; 10-04-30: Mail & Guardian: Persecuted Afrikaners Talk of Returning Home [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31036798]; 10-05-17: Christian Science Monitor: White South Africans use Facebook in Campaign to Return to Holland [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/33839485] 19 On 17 Dec 1998, I was arrested at Oakland Federal Building, with anti-war protestors, who shut down the Federal Building for two hours. I was detained by Oakland Police for an hour, before being released. Alameda Co. District Attorney declined to prosecute. 1998-12-19 Beeld: SA `plaasmeisie' vas in VSA oor Golf-protes [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/5504269] 20 “One day, millions of men will leave the Southern Hemisphere to go to the Northern Hemisphere. And they will not go there as friends. Because they will go there to conquer it. And they will conquer it with their sons. The wombs of our women will give us victory.” -- Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria, at the United Nations, 1974 (Boumediene was an ardent supporter of the ANC and SWAPO) 16

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intn’l Criminal Court

Radical Honesty‟s TRC FRAUD information and evidence repeatedly submitted to Respondents clarified that Radical Honesty believed the TRC to have made grievous errors in its alleged enquiry into the origins of Apartheid and Apartheid violence; and its findings consequently erroneous and biased. Radical Honesty do not believe that the ANC had a „Just Cause‟ to initiate acts of aggression, i.e. to launch their violent liberation struggle, against the system of Apartheid, when among others: 1.

The ANC had an honourable non-violent option for liberating its own people by ending its poverty pimping breeding war;

The ANC had no right intention: Apartheid had raised black living standards to the highest in Africa; ANC true motives were, and continue to be, reasons of selfinterest, greed, corruption, abuse of power and personal aggrandizement; as well as Black Liberation Theology racial black power hegemony: and the elimination of „whiteness‟ on the rotting corpses of SA‟s white settlers;

The ANC had no proper authority: Black Africans did not want Black rule, nor did they voluntarily support the liberation struggle (Mandela‟s decision to launch the violent liberation struggle, was not because it was a tragic „last resort‟ of a peaceful non-violent campaign. The militarization of the struggle, was a result of the spectacular failure of the 1952 Defiance Campaign21 ability to mobilize the black masses to participate in the non-violent struggle: only 10 000 joined the protest, of which 8,500 were in prison);

The ANC had no reasonable chance of success in eliminating whiteness and white rule, for the majority of blacks favoured white rule, who were aware they were better off under white rule, than any of their black brethren in the rest of black Africa ruled by despotic black liberation movements. They consequently decided the African people would need to be terrorized to support the ANC;

The ANC did not use proportional force: It decided to adopt the People‟s War of necklacing, street committees, to terrorize its own people to support its fraudulent „liberation struggle‟; where any poor black Africans who even slightly objected to the ANC‟s agenda, and who insisted on being a law abiding citizen by paying their rent or electricity, was labelled as „an enemy conspirator‟; and worthy of the necklace;

The ANC did not use proportional force on its own soldiers at its Mbokodo Quatro Torture Camps (www.mbokodo-quatro-uncensored.co.nr);

Wikipedia: The Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws was launched by the ANC at a conference in Bloemfontein in December 1951. Demonstrations in support of the Defiance Principles were organized for April 6, 1952, the 300 th anniversary of white settlement in the Cape. Of approximately 10,000 people who protested in the Defiance Campaign, around 8,500 of them were imprisoned.

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intn’l Criminal Court

relationships to their families, parents and future, as individuals with no regard whatsoever for the concept of personal responsibility, integrity and honour; 8.

The ANC did not adopt violence as a last resort; but as a first resort to liberate the African‟s colonized mind of „whiteness‟, because in their Fanon/Black Liberation Theology worldview „violence was a cleansing liberating force to restore the Africans self-respect on the rotting corpse of the settler‟.

Just Post Bellum: Subsequent to the cessation of the Apartheid conflict as a result of the „TRC Ceasefire negotiations‟, the ANC did not choose to avoid imposing punishment on innocents and non-combatants. Instead 16 years later, individuals who had nothing to do with apartheid are still being punished for „apartheid‟, by means of Affirmative Action policies; and every single other problem under the sun is blamed on „apartheid‟. Neither have the ANC respected the rights or traditions of Boer-Afrikaner minority cultures. To the contrary, the ANC appear to be doing all in their power to facilitate the destruction of Boer-Afrikaner and other minority cultures, some of whom have absolutely no standing whatsoever in SA‟s alleged „multi-culti‟ courtrooms. Finally, the ANC reneged upon its promises of Political Amnesty in cases such as Eugene de Kock, Clive Derby-Lewis, Januzs Walus, and others, whose crimes were clearly politically motivated; while endorsing amnesty for their necklacing cadres; destroying any possible trust that could have been cultivated with minorities, by honouring their agreements. Radical Honesty believe if the TRC had been led by Impartial International individuals –such as for example Dr. Brad Blanton; Judge Jason Brent, and Pastor James Manning -committed to seriously enquiring into all the ecological, psychological, political, demographic, and spiritual causes of Apartheid violence, much of the information shared in the Radical Honesty Complaints Submitted to the Defendants before the SA Constitutional Court (CCT 23-10 and CCT 06-11) and Equality Court (07-2010 EQ JHB); and in the Boer Volkstaat 10/31/16 Theses Petition and Briefing Paper to EU Progenitor Nations and NATO22 (Audi Alteram Partem Notice to Defendants23); would have been revealed as part of the Truth and Reconciliation process; which would have resulted in more impartial rainbow perspectives balanced TRC report. Such a report would have accurately identified the demographic, political and spiritual causes of Apartheid violence, and hence provided guidelines for addressing those root cause problems, and holding all parties accountable for refraining from continuing such breeding war or Marxist spiritual „violence on the rotting corpse of the settlers‟ behaviour. Instead the TRC promulgated the ANC‟s truth, and nothing but the ANC‟s „Black Liberation Theology victimhood‟ truth, as the one and only absolute truth, and designated white Afrikaners as the scapegoat for the ANC‟s victimhood poverty pimping breeding war socio-economic problems.

Truth About the Truth Commission Report: Forward by John Kane-Berman, Chief Executive, South African Institute of Race Relations:

22 23

http://www.african-white-refugees.co.nr http://www.african-white-refugees.co.nr

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intn’l Criminal Court

“Although the TRC's founding legislation required it to generate a factual, comprehensive, and properly contextualised rendition of past conflict, the report it has produced is anything but. The commission claims that there can be no dispute about how 'strong on truth' it has been. Dr Jeffery's meticulous study refutes this claim. The commission also said that there could be no healing without truth, that halftruths and denial were no basis for building the new South Africa, that reconciliation based on falsehood would not last, and that selective recollection of past violence would easily provide the mobilisation for further conflict in the future. If these are its criteria for the role of truth in promoting reconciliation, it has failed to meet them. “ Respectfully, Lara Johnstone Radical Honoursty Encl: (1) Johnstone Lara: Radical Honesty EcoFeminist Genocide Complaint to International Criminal Court (ICC) (2) Jeffrey Anthea: The Truth About the Truth Commission

02/05/12 RT Notice to Gonzaga Uni: RH EcoFeminist Charges against Archbishop Tutu to Intn’l Criminal Court

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE HAGUE NOTICE OF COMPLAINT ITO ART.15 OF ROME STATUTE COMPLAINANTS: RADICAL HONESTY – SA

First Complainant

LARA JOHNSTONE

Second Complainant

POLITICAL TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS: DESMOND TUTU

First Defendant

ALEX BORAINE

Second Defendant

NELSON MANDELA

Third Defendant

NELSON MANDELA FOUNDATION

Fourth Defendant

F.W. DE KLERK

Fifth Defendant

F.W. DE KLERK FOUNDATION

Sixth Defendant

NORWEGIAN NOBEL COMMITTEE

Seventh Defendant

SANDILE NGCOBO

Eighth Defendant

DIKGANG MOSENEKE

Ninth Defendant

EDWIN CAMERON

Tenth Defendant

JOHAN FRONEMAN

Eleventh Defendant

CHRIS JAFTA

Twelfth Defendant

SISI KHAMPEPE

Thirteenth Defendant

MOGOENG MOGOENG

Fourteenth Defendant

BESS NKABINDE

Fifteenth Defendant

JOHANN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN

Sixteenth Defendant

ZAK JACOOB

Seventeenth Defendant

ZA MEDIA TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS ACCESSORIES: SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL EDITORS FORUM (SANEF)

First Accessory

MONDLI MAKHANYA

Second Accessory

JOE THLOLOE

Third Accessory

RALPH ZULMAN

Fourth Accessory

JOHAN RETIEF

Fifth Accessory

SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION (SAPA)

Sixth Accessory

MARK VAN DER VELDEN

Seventh Accessory

BUSINESS DAY

Eighth Accessory

PETER BRUCE

Ninth Accessory

BUSINESS REPORT

Tenth Accessory

JABULANI SIKHAKHANE

Eleventh Accessory

CAPE ARGUS

Twelfth Accessory

CHRIS WITFIELD

Thirteenth Accessory

CAPE TIMES

Fourteenth Accessory

ALIDE DASNOIS

Fifteenth Accessory

CITY PRESS

Sixteenth Accessory

FERIAL HAFFAJEE

Seventeenth Accessory

THE CITIZEN

Eighteenth Accessory

MARTIN WILLIAMS

Nineteenth Accessory

DAILY DISPATCH

Twentieth Accessory

ANDREW TRENCH

Twenty-First Accessory

DAILY MAVERICK

Twenty-Second Accessory

BRKIC BRANKO

Twenty-Third Accessory

DAILY NEWS

Twenty-Fourth Accessory

ALAN DUNN

Twenty-Fifth Accessory

EAST COAST RADIO

Twenty-Sixth Accessory

DIANE MACPHERSON

Twenty-Seventh Accessory

EYEWITNESS NEWS

Twenty-Eighth Accessory

KATY KATAPODIS

Twenty-Ninth Accessory

INDEPENDENT ONLINE

Thirtieth Accessory

ADRIAN EPHRAM

Thirty-First Accessory

MAIL AND GUARDIAN

Thirty-Second Accessory

NIC DAWES

Thirty-Third Accessory

THE MERCURY

Thirty-Fourth Accessory

ANGELA QUINTAL

Thirty-Fifth Accessory

NEWS 24

Thirty-Sixth Accessory

JANNIE MOMBERG

Thirty-Seventh Accessory

PRETORIA NEWS

Thirty-Eighth Accessory

ZINGISA MKHUMA

Thirty-Ninth Accessory

SA STAR

Fortieth Accessory

MOEGSIEN WILLIAMS

Forty-First Accessory

SUNDAY INDEPENDENT

Forty-Second Accessory

MAKHUDU SEFARA

Forty-Third Accessory

SUNDAY TRIBUNE

Forty-Fourth Accessory

PHILANI MGWABA

Forty-Fifth Accessory

TIMES LIVE

Forty-Sixth Accessory

RAY HARTLEY

Forty-Seventh Accessory

3rd DEGREE

Forty-Eighth Accessory

DEBORA PATTA

Forty-Ninth Accessory

BEELD

Fiftieth Accessory

TIM DU PLESSIS

Fifty-First Accessory

DAILY SUN

Fifty-Second Accessory

THEMBA KHUMALO

Fifty-Third Accessory

DIE BURGER

Fifty-Fourth Accessory

HENRY JEFFERY

Fifty-Fifth Accessory

BUN BOOYSEN

Fifty-Sixth Accessory

E-NEWS

Fifty-Seventh Accessory

PATRICK CONROY

Fifty-Eighth Accessory

FINANCIAL MAIL

Fifty-Ninth Accessory

BARNEY MTHOMBOTHI

Sixtieth Accessory

FINWEEK

Sixty-Fist Accessory

COLLEEN NAUDE

Sixty-Second Accessory

THE GEORGE HERALD

Sixty-Third Accessory

MANDI BOTHA

Sixty-Fourth Accessory

INDEPENDENT ON SATURDAY

Sixty-Fifth Accessory

TREVOR BRUCE

Sixty-Sixth Accessory

702 RADIO

Sixty-Seventh Accessory

PHELADI GWANGWA

Sixty-Eighth Accessory

RAPPORT

Sixty-Ninth Accessory

LISA ALBRECHT

Seventieth Accessory

THE SATURDAY STAR

Seventy-First Accessory

BRENDAN SEERY

Seventy-Second Accessory

SOWETAN

Seventy-Third Accessory

BONGANI KESWA

Seventy-Fourth Accessory

THE HERALD

Seventy-Fifth Accessory

JEREMY MCCABE

Seventy-Sixth Accessory

VOLKSBLAD

Seventy-Seventh Accessory

AINSLEY MOOS

Seventy-Eighth Accessory

ROD AMNER

Seventy-Ninth Accessory

ROBERT BRAND

Eightieth Accessory

GUY BERGER

Eighty-First Accessory

HARRY DUGMORE

Eighty-Second Accessory

HAROLD GESS

Eighty-Third Accessory

JANE DUNCAN

Eighty-Fourth Accessory

ANTON HARBER

Eighty-Fifth Accessory

FRANZ KRUGER

Eighty-Sixth Accessory

WILLIAM BIRD

Eighty-Seventh Accessory

PROJOURN STEERING COMMITTEE

Eighty-Eighth Accessory

INTNL MEDIA TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS ACCESSORIES: NEW YORK TIMES

Eighty-Eighth Accessory

CELIA DUGGER

Eighty-Ninth Accessory

ARTHUR BRISBANE

Ninetieth Accessory

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

Ninety-First Accessory

AINSLINN LAING

Ninety-Second Accessory

TONY GALLAGHER

Ninety-Third Accessory

ALGEMENE DAGBLAD

Ninety-Fourth Accessory

CASPER NABER

Ninety-Fifth Accessory

NOTICE OF COMPLAINT ITO ART. 15 OF ROME STATUTE PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Complainants hereby request the Office of Prosecutor (OTP): Luis Moreno – Ocampo, of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Hague to investigate the alleged Defendants and Accessories on charges of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in terms of Art 5(1)(a) & (b), 6(c) and 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The Complainants Request the ICC: Prosecutor’s Office to: Initiate an investigation into the allegations that the respondents are to be held criminally culpable for their endorsement and concealment of TRC FRAUD, the consequences of which are genocide and crimes against humanity against white South Africans, and ethno-cultural legal and political persecution of Afrikaner/Boer and Radical Honesty cultures. Complainants allege the Defendants cover up and censorship of the ANC and Anti-Apartheid Movements (i) Frantz Fanon/Black Consciousness (‘liberation by violence on the rotting corpse of the settlers’) (ii) Black Liberation Theology (‘violent elimination of ‘whiteness’); and (iii) Houari Boumediene/Black Power Breeding War (“The wombs of our women will give us victory”)1 inspired TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FRAUD (“TRC FRAUD”) 1 “One day, millions of men will leave the Southern Hemisphere to go to the Northern Hemisphere. And they will not go there as friends. Because they will go there to conquer it. And they will conquer it with their sons. The wombs of our women will give us victory.” -- Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria, at the United Nations, 1974 (Boumediene was an ardent supporter of the ANC and SWAPO)

perpetrated

against

citizens

South

Africa,

and

predominantly

against

white

Afrikaner/Boer/Settlers; is committed in the context of endorsing the ANC’s institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by Africans over other racial groups, particularly Boer/Afrikaners and committed with the intention of maintaining the ANC regime. The ICC Prosecutors Office Clerk is requested to submit this Correspondence -Communication and Complaint under Art.15 of the Rome Statute: Charges of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in terms of Art 5(1)(a) & (b), 6(c) and 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute -- into the Communications Register for the attention of the Prosecutors Office, for their appropriate consideration and investigation, in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Dated at George, Southern Cape, South Africa on this the 08th of May, 2011.

(SGD) L JOHNSTONE Litigant in Person Per: P O Box 5042, George East, 6539 Tel: (044) 870 7239 Cel: (071) 170 1954 Email: jmcswan@mweb.co.za

TO:

INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE

Delivered on:2

Information and Evidence Unit Office of the Prosecutor Post Office Box 19519 2500 CM The Hague The Netherlands Facsimile: +31 70 515 8555.

POLITICAL TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS: & TO: ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU (First Defendant) The Desmond Tutu Peace Center PO Box 8428, Roggebaai, 8012 Cape Town, South Africa Tel: +27 (21) 525 1980 2 3

Notified on: 3

Fax: +27 (21) 525 1990 Email: info@tutu.org RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Assistant Vivian; Desmond Tutu Peace Center: Dan, Toni Doman, Hudaa Croeser

& TO: REVEREND ALEX BORAINE

Notified on: 4

(Second Defendant) INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 Hanover Square. Floor 24 New York, NY USA 10004 Tel: +(917) 637 3800 | Fax: +1(917) 637 3900 P O Box 44329, Claremont, 7735 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: ICTJ: C Garvie, ICTJ – Capetown, ICTJ – Brussels, ICTJ – Geneva, ICTJ – Kenya, E. Gonzalez, Suliman Baldo, Comfort Ero, Mirna Adjami, Elizabeth Goodfriend, Marieka Wierda, Caitlin Reiger, Kelli Muddell, Javier Ciurlizza, Michael Reed, Eduardo Gonzalez, Lisa Magarrell, Cristian Correa, Patrick Burgess, Sari Kuovo, Ruben Carranza, Virginie Ladisch, Habib Nassar, Miranda Sissons, Roger Duthei, Mirna Adjami, Pablo de Greiff, Javier Ciurlizza

& TO: NELSON MANDELA

Notified on: 5

& TO: NELSON MANDELA FOUNDATION (Third and Fourth Defendant) Chairperson of the Board: Prof Jakes Gerwel Chief Executive Officer: Mr Achmat Dangor Spokesperson: Ms Zelda La Grange Nelson Mandela Foundation Private Bag X70000 Houghton, 2041, South Africa Telephone: +27 11 547 5600 Facsimile: +27 11 728 1111 Email: nmf@nelsonmandela.org RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Nelson Mandela Foundation: Verne Sheldon Harris, Spokesperson Sello Hatang; Sahm Venter; Razeh Seleh; Dr Mothomang Diaho

& TO: F.W. DE KLERK & TO: F.W. DE KLERK FOUNDATION (Fifth and Sixth Defendant) F.W. De Klerk Foundation P.O. Box 15785, Panorama, 7506, South Africa Tel: (021) 930 3622 Fax: (021) 930 3898 4 5 6

Notified on: 6

RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Nichola de Havilland; Shan Wolsky; Piet Le Roux; David Steward; Patricia Brand-Adams

& TO: NORWEGIAN NOBEL COMMITTEE

Notified on: 7

(Seventh Defendant) The Nobel Institute: Norwegian Nobel Committee: Thorbjørn Jagland (Chair); Kaci Kullmann Five (Deputy Chair) Sissel Marie Rønbeck; Inger-Marie Ytterhorn; & Ågot Valle Henrik Ibsens Gate 51, No-0255 Oslo, Norway Tel: (47) 22 12 93 00 | Fax: (47) 22 12 93 10 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Norwegian Nobel Comm; Nobel Committee Library

& TO: SANDILE NGCOBO

Notified on: 8

& TO: DIKGANG MOSENEKE & TO: EDWIN CAMERON & TO: JOHAN FRONEMAN & TO: CHRIS JAFFA & TO: SISI KHAMPEPE & TO: MOGOGENG MOGOENG & TO: BESS KNABINDE & TO: JOHANN VAN DER WESTHUIZEN & TO: ZAK YACOOB (Eighth to Seventeenth Defendants) The SA Constitutional Court Director of the Constitutional Court: Vic Misser Tel (011) 359 7459 Fax: (011) 339-5098 E-mail: director@concourt.org.za RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Magda Visagie; Martie Stander; Director: Vic Misser; Registrar.

ZA MEDIA TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS ACCESSORIES: & TO: SA NATIONAL EDITORS FORUM (SANEF) & TO: MR. MONDLI MAKHANYA (First & Second Accessory) Mr. Mondli Makhanya, Chairman 7 8 9

Notified on: 9

South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) 2nd Floor, 7 St David’s Office Park St David’s Place, Parktown Tel 011 484 3630 / 3617 | Fax 011 484 3593 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: SANEF Admin, SANEF Executive Director: Ms Femida Mehtar:, SANEF Chair: Mr. Mondli Makhanya, Ms. Makhubele.

& TO: SA PRESS COUNCIL: OMBUDSMAN THLOLOE

Notified on:10

Third Accessory Ombudsman Joe Thloloe SA PRESS COUNCIL 2nd Floor, 7 St. Davids's Park St Davids Place, Parktown, 2193 Tel: (011) 484 3612/8 | Fx: (011) 484 3619 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Press Ombudsman Thloloe; Khanyi Mndaweni

& TO: SA PRESS APPEALS PANEL JUDGE RALPH ZULMAN

Notified on:11

Fourth Accessory Judge Ralph Zulman SA PRESS APPEALS PANNEL 2nd Floor, 7 St. Davids's Park St Davids Place, Parktown, 2193 Tel: (011) 484 3612/8 | Fx: (011) 484 3619 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Judge Ralph Zulman

& TO: SA PRESS COUNCIL: DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN RETIEF

Notified on:12

Fifth Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Johan Retief SA PRESS COUNCIL 2nd Floor, 7 St. Davids's Park St Davids Place, Parktown, 2193 Tel: (011) 484 3612/8 | Fx: (011) 484 3619 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Deputy Ombudsman Johan Retief

& TO: SA PRESS ASSOCIATION (SAPA) & TO: MARK VAN DER VELDEN 10 11 12 13

Notified on:13

Sixth and Seventh Accessory Mark van der Velden, Editor SA Press Association (SAPA) P O Box 7766, Johannesburg, 2000 South Africa Tel: (011) 782 1600 | Fx: (011) 782 1587 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: News room, Editor Mark van der Velden, Sub Editor Hannes de Wet, CapeNews, Cape Editor Ben Maclennon, Russell Norton

& TO: BUSINESS DAY

Notified on:14

& TO: PETER BRUCE Eighth and Ninth Accessory Mr. Peter Bruce, Editor Business Day P O Box 1746, Saxonwold, 2132 Tel: (011) 280 3091 | Fx: (011) 280 5501 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Peter Bruce, News Desk, Editor Sam Mkokelis

& TO: BUSINESS REPORT

Notified on:15

& TO: JABULANI SIKHAKHANE Tenth and Eleventh Accessory Mr. Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor Business Report 47 Sauer Street, Johannesburg Tel: (011) 633 2484 | Fax: (011) 838 2693 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Jabulani Sikhakhane, Business Report:

& TO: CAPE ARGUS & TO: CHRIS WITFIELD Twelfth and Thirteenth Accessory Mr. Chris Witfield, Editor Cape Argus P O Box 56, Capetown, 8000 Tel: (021) 488 4911 | Fx: (021) 488 4156 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Chris Witfield, Lindiz Van Zilla, Lyntina Aimes, Gasant Abarder, Andisiwe Makinana, Sue Visser

14 15 16

Notified on:16

& TO: CAPE TIMES

Notified on:17

& TO: ALIDE DASNOIS Fourteenth and Fifteenth Accessory Ms. Alide Dasnois, Editor Cape Times Newspaper House, 4th Floor 122 St. Georges Mall, Capetown Tel: (021) 488 4911 | Fx: (021) 488 4717 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Alide Dasnois, Ella Smook, Di Caelers, Nina Talliard

& TO: CITY PRESS

Notified on:18

& TO: FERIAL HAFFAJEE Sixteenth and Seventeenth Accessory Ms. Ferial Haffajee, Editor City Press Media Park, 69 Kingsway Auckland Park, Jhb Tel: (011) 713 9001 | Fx: (011) 713 9966 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Ferial Haffajee, G. Edmunds, Liesl Pretorius, Trevor Neethling

& TO: THE CITIZEN

Notified on:19

& TO: MARTIN WILLIAMS Eighteenth and Nineteenth Accessory Mr. Martin Williams, Editor The Citizen P O Box 43069, Industria, Jhb, 2042 Tel: (011) 248 6000 | Fx: (011) 248 6213 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Martin Williams, Deputy Editor Michael Coetzee, Puleng M, Citizen News Bureau

& TO: DAILY DISPATCH & TO: ANDREW TRENCH Twentieth and Twenty-First Accessory Andrew Trench, Editor The Daily Dispatch P O Box 131, East London, 5200 17 18 19 20

Notified on:20

Tel: (043) 702 2000 | Fx: (043) 743 5155 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Ed. Coordinator - Samantha, Investigations Editor Mr. Eddie Botha, Robin Ross-Thompson, Theodore Jephta, Thanduxolo Jika

& TO: DAILY MAVERICK

Notified on:21

& TO: BRKIC BRANKO Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Accessory Brkic Branko, Editor The Daily Maverick 1st Floor, Building 3, Albury Park Corner Jan Smuts & Albury Rd, Hyde Park Cell: (084) 444 8700 | (083) 414 2983 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Brkic Branko, Deputy Editor Philip de Wet; Transparency Mandy de Waal; Brendah Nyakudya; Jacques Rosseau; Ivo Vegter; Stephen Grootes; Brooks Spector, Newsroom

& TO: DAILY NEWS

Notified on:22

& TO: ALAN DUNN Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Accessory Alan Dunn, Editor The Daily News Independent Newspapers 18 Osborne Street, Greyville, Dbn Tel: (031) 308 2911 | Fx: (031) 308 2111 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor Alan Dunn, Editor Secretary Debbie Yunnie

& TO: EAST COAST RADIO & TO: DIANE MACPHERSON Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Accessory Diane Macpherson, Editor East Coast Radio 313-315 Umhlanga Rocks Drive, Umhlanga Rocks, Durban Tel: (031) 570 9495 | Fx: (086) 679 4951 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: News Editor Diane Macpherson, Online Editor Charis Apelgren

21 22 23

Notified on:23

& TO: EYEWITNESS NEWS

Notified on:24

& TO KATY KATAPODIS Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Ninth Accessory Katy Katapodis, Editor Eyewitness News Primedia House, 2nd Floor 5 Gwen Lane (cnr Gwen Lane & Fredman Dr) Sandown Tel: (011) 506 3702 | Fx (086) 501 2014 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Eyewitness News Editor Katy Katapodis, , Eyewitness News, Webmaster

& TO: INDEPENDENT ONLINE

Notified on:25

& TO: ADRIAN EPHRAIM Thirtieth and Thirty-First Accessory Adrian Ephraim, Editor Independent Online The Star Building 47 Sauer Street, Jhb, 2001 Tel: (011) 633 9111 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor Adrian Ephraim, Aeysha Kassiem, Karen Breytenbach, Jason Warner, Anel Powell, Sharika Regchand

& TO: MAIL AND GUARDIAN

Notified on:26

& TO: NIC DAWES Thirty-Second and Thirty-Third Accessory Nic Dawes, Editor Mail and Guardian P O Box 91667, Auckland Park, Jhb 2006 Tel: (011) 250 7300 | Fx: (011) 250 7502 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor Matthew Burbidge, Editor Keith Nichols, Editor Nic Dawes, News Desk, Stefaans Brummer, Verashni Pillay, Newsdesk: Drew Forrest, Features: Tanya Pamplone, Dep. Editor: Rapule Tabane, Editor Pers. Asst. Wendy Mosetlhi

& TO: THE MERCURY

24 25 26 27

Notified on:27

& TO: ANGELA QUINTAL Thirty-Fourth and Thirty-Fifth Accessory Angela Quintal, Editor The Mercury Independent Newspapers, 18 Osborne St., Greyville, Durban Tel: (031) 308 2911 | Fx: (031) 308 2333 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Angela Quintal, Mercury News

& TO: NEWS 24

Notified on:28

& TO: JANNIE MOMBERG Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Accessory Jannie Momberg News 24 70 Prestwich St, Green Point, 8005 Tel: (021) 468 8000/8073 | Fx: (021) 468 8200 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Jannie Momberg, Media 24 Ondersoeke, Llewellyn Prince, Jannie Momberg Secretary Lameezah Hendricks

& TO: PRETORIA NEWS

Notified on:29

& TO: ZINGISA MKHUMA Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Accessory Zingisa Mkhuman, Editor Pretoria Newspapers Holdings Ltd 216 Vermeulen Street, Pretoria Tel: (012) 300 2000 | Fx: (012) 328 7166 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Zingisa Mkhuma, Graeme Hosken

& TO: SA STAR & TO: MOEGSIEN WILLIAMS Fortieth and Forty-First Accessory Moegsien Williams, Editor SA Star 47 Sauer Street, Johannesburg Tel: (011) 633 2410 / 9111 | Fax: (011) 836 6186 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: 28 29 30

Notified on:30

Moegsien Williams, Deputy Editor Jovial Rantao, Admin Vidette Aslett, StarNews

& TO: SUNDAY INDEPENDENT

Notified on:31

& TO: MAKHUDU SEFARA Forty-Second and Forty-Third Accessory Makhudu Sefara, Editor Sunday Independent 47 Sauer Street, Johannesburg Tel: (011) 633 9111 | Fx: (011) 834 7520 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Makhudu Sefara; Editor Makhudu Sefara Secretary Jennifer Johnson, Deputy Editor Andrew Walker, Tony Carnie, Venilla Yoganatha

& TO: SUNDAY TRIBUNE

Notified on:32

& TO: PHILANI MGWABA Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Accessory Philani Mgwaba, Editor Sunday Tribune P O Box 47549 Greyville, 4023 Tel: (031) 308 2771 | Fx: (031) 308 2357 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Philani Mgwaba, News Editor Liz Clarke, Tribune News

& TO: TIMES LIVE (SUNDAY TIMES)

Notified on:33

& TO: RAY HARTLEY Fourty-Sixth and Forty-Seventh Accessory Avusa House, 4 Bierman Avenue Rosebank, Johannesburg Tel: (011) 280 3000 | Fx: (011) 280 5150 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Editor: Ray Hartley, News Editor Jessica Bezuidenhout, News Editor Heather Robertson, Sunday Times, Justice Malala, Kim Hawkeye

& TO: 3RD DEGREE & TO: DEBORAH PATTA

31 32 33 34

Notified on:34

Forty-Eighth and Forty-Ninth Accessory Ms Debora Patta 3RD Degree: Executive Producer PO Box 12124, Mill Street Gardens, CAPE TOWN, 8010 Tel: (021) 481 4500 | Fax: (021) 481 4630 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: News Room, Ms. Deborah Patta, ETV, 3rd Degree, Kirsty Blackford, ETV News

& TO: BEELD

Notified on:35

& TO: TIM DU PLESSIS Fiftieth and Fifty-First Accessory Mr Tim Du Plessis Editor: Beeld PO Box 333, Auckland Park, 2006 Tel: (011) 713 9000 | Fax: (011) 713 9956 / 7 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Beeld Editor: Tim du Plessis, Nuus, Letters, Marietjie Louw, AA Pienaar, Daniela du Plooy, J. Prins, Pieter du Toit, Beeld Pta Ms. Nicoleze Mulder

& TO: DAILY SUN

Notified on:36

& TO: THEMBA KHUMALO Fifty-Second and Fifty-Third Accessory Mr Themba Khumalo Editor: Daily Sun PO Box 121, Auckland Park, 2006 Tel: (011) 877 6000 | Fax: (011) 877 6020 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Themba Khumalo, News Daily Sun, R. Devenish

& TO: DIE BURGER & TO: HENRY JEFFERY & TO: BUN BOOYSENS Fifty-Fourth, Fifty-Fifth & Fifty-Sixth Accessory Mr. Bun Booysens Editor: Die Burger 35 36 37

Notified on:37

PO Box 692, Capetown, 8000 Tel: (021) 406 2121 | Fax: (021) 406 3965 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Burger East, Willem Jordaan, Chantel Cox, De Waal Steyn, Redaksie, Redakteur Jo-Ann Floris, Ass. Redakteur Mariska Spoormaker, J Pienaar, Annemarie de Laura, Die Burger Journalists

& TO: E-NEWS

Notified on:38

& TO: PATRICK CONROY Fifty-Seventh and Fifty-Eight Accessory Mr. Patrick Conroy ETV: Head of E-News PO Box 12124, Mill Street Gardens, CAPE TOWN, 8010 Tel: (021) 481 4500 Fax: (021) 481 4630 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: News room: E-News, Patrick Conroy, Zanile Madikane, Bongi Potelwa, Gill Scholtz

& TO: FINANCIAL MAIL

Notified on:39

& TO: BARNEY MTHOMBOTHI Fifty-Ninth and Sixtieth Accessory Mr Barney Mthombothi Editor: Financial Mail P O Box 1744 Saxonwold, 2132 Tel: (011) 280 5808 Fax: (011) 280 5800 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Barney Mthombothi, David Furlonger, Financial Mail, FM Mad Focus, Rob Rose, Onica Buthelezi, Financial Mail

& TO: FINWEEK & TO: COLLEEN NAUDE Sixty-First and Sixty-Second Accessory Ms Colleen Naude Editor: Finweek PO Box 786466, Sandton, 2146 38 39 40

Notified on:40

Tel: (011) 263 4700 Fax: (011) 884 0851 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Rikus Delport, Colleen Naude, Tian Libenberg, Tony Koenderman, Sikonathi Mantshantsha

& TO: THE GEORGE HERALD

Notified on:41

& TO: MANDI BOTHA Sixty-Third and Sixty-Fourth Accessory Ms. Mandi Botha Editor: George Herald PO Box 806, George, 6539 Tel: (044) 874 2424 Fax: (044) 874 1393 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Mandi Botha, George News, Pauline Lourens, Lindie Joubert, Shirley Coetzee, Lo-An Nel Breytenbach, Suzette Herrer, Lucinda Viljoen, Melissa Hulls, Lizette da Silva, Michelle Pienaar, Ilse Schoonraad, Jannie Meyer, Anica Kruger, Yvonne Botha, Mr. Steyn

& TO: INDEPENDENT ON SATURDAY

Notified on:42

& TO: TREVOR BRUCE Sixty-Fifth and Sixty-Sixth Accessory Mr. Trevor Bruce News Editor: Independent on Saturday PO Box 47549, Greyville, 4023 Tel: (031) 308 2934 / 2381 Fax: (031) 308 2111 / 2185 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Trevor Bruce, Luvoyo Mjekula, Philani Mgwaba, Quinton Mtyala, Greg Arde

& TO: RADIO 702 & TO: PHELADI GWANGWA Sixty-Seventh and Sixty-Eighty Accessory Ms Pheladi Gwangwa Station Manager: 702 Radio PO Box 5572, Rivonia, 2128 Tel: (011) 506 3702 | Fax: (011) 506 3670 41 42 43

Notified on:43

RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Pheladi Gwangwa, News, 702 Eyewitness News, Bruce Whitfield, Kieno Kammies, Robin Clark, John Robbie, Lynne O’Connor, David O’Sullivan

& TO: RAPPORT

Notified on:44

& TO: LISA ALBRECHT Sixty-Ninth and Seventieth Accessory Ms. Liza Albrecht Editor: Rapport PO Box 8422, Johannesburg, 2000 Tel: (011) 713 9628 Fax: (011) 713 9977 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Liza Albrecht, Ombudsman, Letters, Rapport, Herman Jansen, Colin Hendricks, E. van Wyk, K Burger, M Malan, W. Pelser, C. Nel, Carien Kruger, Jamey Thomas, Henry Cloete, P Malan, Etricia Kraft, Jacob Rooi

& TO: SATURDAY STAR

Notified on:45

& TO: BRENDAN SEERY Seventy-First and Seventy-Second Accessory Mr. Brendan Seery Executive Editor: Saturday Star PO Box 1014, Johannesburg, 2000 Tel: (011) 633 2792 | Fax: (011) 633 2794 / 838 3019 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Star News, Brendan Seery, Thandi Mabuza, Anel Lewis, Quinton Mtyala, Mthunzi Mbatha

& TO: SOWETAN & TO: BONGANI KESWA Seventy-Third and Seventy-Fourth Accessory Mr. Bongani Keswa Editor In Chief: Sowetan PO Box 6663, Johannesburg, 2000 Tel: (011) 471 4000 | Fax: (011) 474 8834 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Bongani 44 45 46

Notified on:46

Keswa, Editor â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Sowetan, Lorraine Mofokeng, Thuli Zungu, Edward Tsumele

& TO: THE HERALD

Notified on:47

& TO: JEREMY MCCABE Seventy-Fifth and Seventy-Sixth Accessory Mr Jeremy McCabe Editor in Chief: The Herald Private Bag X 6071, Port Elizabeth, 6000 Tel: (041) 504 7911 Fax: (041) 585 4966 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Jeremy McCabe, The Herald, L Makungan, Avusa, Estelle Kerrane, Shawn M, Circulation Manager, Avusa Group Secretary Joanne

& TO: VOLKSBLAD

Notified on:48

& TO: AINSLEY MOOS Seventy-Seventh and Seventy-Eighth Accessory Mr. Ainsley Moos Editor: Volksblad PO Box 267, Bloemfontein, 9300 Tel: (051) 404 7600 Fax: (051) 430 6949 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Ainsley Moos, Nuus, Christo Van Staden, Hannetjie Van der Merwe, Adri Herbert, Tom de Wet

& TO: ROD AMNER Seventy-Ninth Accessory Prof. Rod Amner Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Rod Amner, Rhodes Journalism, Prof. Anthea Garman, Nicky Cocroft, Simon Pamphilon, Simwogerere Kyazze

47 48 49

Notified on:49

& TO: ROBERT BRAND

Notified on:50

Eightieth Accessory Prof. Robert Brand Pearson Chair of Economics Journalism Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Robert Brand, Rhodes Journalism, Prof. Herman Wasserman, Prof. Jeanne Prinsloo, Prof. Larry Strelitz

& TO: GUY BERGER

Notified on:51

Eighty-First Accessory Prof. Guy Berger Head of School Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Guy Berger, Rhodes Journalism, Dr. Lynette Steenveld, Reg Rumney

& TO: HARRY DUGMORE

Notified on:52

Eighty-Second Accessory Prof. Harry Dugmore MTN Chair of Media and Mobile Communication Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Harry Dugmore, Rhodes Journalism, Jude Mathurine, Khaya Thonjeni

& TO: HAROLD GESS

50 51 52 53

Notified on:53

Eighty-Third Accessory Lecturer Harold Gess Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Harold Gess, Rhodes Journalism, Jenny Gordon, Paul Greenway

& TO: JANE DUNCAN

Notified on:54

Eighty-Fourth Accessory Professor Jane Duncan Highway Africa Chair of Media and Information Society Rhodes School of Journalism and Media Studies Africa Media Matrix building Upper Prince Alfred Street Grahamstown, 6139 Tel: 046 603 7100 Fax: 046 603 7101 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Jane Duncan, Rhodes Journalism, Chris Kabwato, Nqobile Buthelezi, Sibusiso Mtshali

& TO: ANTON HARBER

Notified on:55

Eighty-Fifth Accessory Professor Anton Harber Professor - Journalism and Media Studies Wits Journalism University of the Witwatersrand 1 Jan Smuts Avenue Braamfontein 2000 Johannesburg Tel: (011) 717 4028 Fax: 011 717 4081 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Anton Harber, Big Media Sally, Wits Journalism

& TO: FRANZ KRUGER Eighty-Sixth Accessory Professor Franz Kruger Senior lecturer in Journalism 54 55 56

Notified on:56

Wits Journalism University of the Witwatersrand 1 Jan Smuts Avenue Braamfontein 2000 Johannesburg Tel: (011) 717 4028 Fax: 011 717 4081 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: Franz Kruger, Wits Editor, Wits Journo Info

& TO: WILLIAM BIRD

Notified on:57

Eighty-Seventh Accessory William Bird Director & Ashoka Fellow Media Monitoring Africa Suite no.2, 22 Art Centre 6th Street Parkhurst (Johannesburg) Tel: +27 (0) 11 788 1278 Fax: +27 (0) 11 788 1289 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Email: William Bird, MMA, Sandra Roberts, William Bird, George Kalu, Media Monitoring, Laura Fletcher, Prinola Govenden

& TO: PROJOURN STEERING COMMITTEE Eighty-Eighth Accessory PROJOURN Steering Committee c/o: Michael Schmidt Exec. Director: Institute for the Advancement of Journalism 9 Jubilee Road Parktown, Johannesburg, 2193 Tel: +27 11 484 1765/6/7 Fax: +27 11 484 2282 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Steering Committee General Secretary: Samantha Perry; Michael Schmidt: Steering Committee Admin Secretary; Beauregard Tromp; Michael Coetzee; Greg Gordon; Ray Joseph; Monica Laganparsad; Ebrahim Moolla; Sholain Govender-Bateman; Antoinette Lazarus; Mandy de Waal; Jan Hennop; Cobus Bester; Subry Govender; Justin Arenstein; Jedi Ramalapa; Anso Thom; Billings Siwila; Matuba Mahlatjie

INTNL MEDIA TRC FRAUD DEFENDANTS ACCESSORIES:

57 58

Notified on:58

& TO: NEW YORK TIMES

Notified on:59

& TO: CELIA DUGGER & TO: ARTHUR BRISBANE Eighty-Eighth, Ninth & Ninetieth Accessory Public Editor: Arthur Brisbane Tel: (212) 556-7652 Email: public@nytimes.com RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Public Editor: Arthur Brisbane; Co-Bureau Chief: Celia Dugger; NYT News; NYT News Tips; NYT Foreign Desk; New York Times Exec. Editor; New York Times Mng. Editor

& TO: DAILY TELEGRAPH

Notified on:60

& TO: AINSLINN LAING & TO: TONY GALLAGHER Ninety First, Second & Third Accessory 111 Buckingham Palace Road, London, SW1W 0DT Victory House, Meeting House Lane, Chatham, Kent, ME4 4TT Tel: 0044 1622 33 50 30 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: Daily Telegraph News; Sunday Telegraph; Telegraph Letters, Sunday Telegraph Letters; Aislin Laing; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard; Neil Tweedie; Neil Courtis; Neil Trainis; Neil McCormick; John Ley; Jon Swaine; Jean Vernon; Jane Archer; Jon Doust; John Winter; John Coates; Honest John; John Hiorns; John Allison; Nick Allen; Robert Mendick; Roger Highfield; Nigel Farndale; Philip Sherwell; Brendan O'Neill; Patrick Sawer; Martin Chilton; Rob Crilly; Barney Henderson; Andy Bloxham; Tom Chivers; Laura Roberts; Nick Collins; Peter Hutchison; Martin Beckford; Julian Ryall; Sally Williams; Garry White; Sebastian Berger; Graham Boynton; Bonnie Malkin; Murray Wardrop; Richard Adams;

& TO: ALGEMENE DAGBLAD & TO: CASPER NABER Ninety Fourth & Fifth Accessory Marten Meesweg 35, 3968 AV Rotterdam Postbus 8983, 3009 TC Rotterdam Tel.: +31 (0)10 4067403 Mobiel: +31 (0)6 46124087 Fax: +31 (0)10 4066969 RADICAL HONESTY ECOLAW TRANSPARENCY NOTICE: CasperNaber; AD Buitenland; AD Lezers

59 60 61

Notified on:61

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE HAGUE COMPLAINT ITO ART.15 OF ROME STATUTE TO:

International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor Information and Evidence Unit Office of the Prosecutor Post Office Box 19519 2500 CM The Hague The Netherlands Email: otp.informationdesk@icc-cpi.int , Facsimile: +31 70 515 8555.

FROM:

Lara Johnstone, Member of Radical Honesty culture & religion

RE:

Communication and Complaint under Art.15 of the Rome Statute: Charges of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in terms of Art 5(1)(a) & (b), 6(c) and 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.

COMPLAINT DETAILS: Name:

Lara Johnstone (Married: Johnson)

Date of Birth:

04 December 1966, Volksrust, Transvaal, South Africa

Nationality:

South African

Passport:

A00011592 (South African)

Identity Number:

661204 0012 086

Sex:

Female

Profession:

Vermicompost/Worm Farmer & Ecolaw Activist

Ethnicity:

European

Culture & Religion:

Radical Honesty (www.radicalhonesty.com)

Address:

P O Box 5042, George East, 6539, South Africa

Tel/Fax:

+27 – 44 – 870 7239

Cell:

+27 – 71 – 170 1954

Email:

jmcswan@mweb.co.za

USA Residency:

Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS): # A77 177 281

Husband (Separated):

Demian Emile Johnson

Husband Ethnicity:

African American

Husband Address:

Demian Emile Johnson, C-68641; High Desert State Prison; P O Box 750; Susanville, CA; 96127-0750

INTRODUCTION: [1]

Pursuant to Article 151 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court2 I, Lara Johnstone (married/separated: Johnson), member of the Radical Honesty culture and religion, hereby request the Office of Prosecutor (OTP): Luis Moreno – Ocampo, of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Hague to investigate the alleged Defendants violations of Article 5(1)(a) Crime of Genocide and (b) Crimes against Humanity; as defined by Article 6 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part; and Article 7(1)(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. Certain parties actions were/are also committed with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of SA’s population; committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.

[2]

The respondents are alleged to be criminally culpable for their endorsement and concealment of “TRC FRAUD”, the consequences of which are genocide and crimes against humanity against white South Africans, and ethno-cultural legal and political persecution of Afrikaner/Boer and Radical Honesty cultures.

OVERVIEW: OBSTRUCTION & CENSORSHIP OF TRC FRAUD:

[3]

The genocide and crimes against humanity evidence submitted to the ICC: Prosecutors Office, in complaints against: (i) the SA Government and (ii) African National Congress, and (iii) Julius Malema, by an anonymous farmer (F & F van der Walt Attorneys; OTP-CR-203/10) and the Verkenner Movement of SA on respectively June 2010 and 05 April 2011 is in the opinions of this Complainant a direct result of TRC FRAUD.

[4]

Initially Radical Honesty SA believed the ANC TRC political, religious, academic and media elite’s TRC FRAUD to have been negligent; and consequently in good faith

1 2

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm

approached them to provide them the evidence of their TRC FRAUD, for their impartial professional enquiry. [5]

Their responses of obstruction of justice to deliberately and intentionally suppress, obstruct and censor the TRC FRAUD evidence from any impartial enquiry and from any public discourse, for its root cause problem solving resolution, have proved however that if their original TRC FRAUD conduct was negligent; their cover-up of their TRC FRAUD negligence is deliberate, intentional and malicious; with real life genocide and crimes against humanity consequences.

THE COMPLAINANT: [6]

I am the daughter of a former Kwa-Zulu Natal farmer (Farm: Gerizim near Utrecht). On 11 October 1997, I married African-American Demian Emile Johnson in Folsom Prison, California, where he has been serving a sentence of 15 to life since 1982 (separated, filed for amicable divorce). My original commitment to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process may be found in my Submission to ‘Register of Reconciliation’ and donation to Presidents Fund for Reparations to assist victims of gross violations of human rights dated 18 January 1999; which detailed my willingness to donate my entire Inheritance to facilitate sincere Truth and Forgiveness.

[7]

I joined the Radical Honesty culture and religion in 1999, after reading Dr. Blanton’s book Radical Honesty: How To Transform Your Life By Telling the Truth, going to one of his workshops; and learning how to be specific about my anger, and to share it honourably face-to-face to the individual I was angry with; with the commitment of remaining in the conversation until sincere sensate forgiveness had occurred.

[8]

I am the only member of the Radical Honesty3 culture and religion, in South Africa. The Radical Honesty culture and religion are founded upon the Truth and Forgiveness Social Contract: Being Specific About Anger and Forgiveness4; as excerpted from: Practicing Radical Honesty5. Radical Honesty is a powerful process by which people can make corrections in the minds distorted and only partly conscious map of the world. Our maps of the world are distorted by our repressed anger and resentment; the greater the amount of repressed anger and resentment,

3 4 5

Founded by Dr. Brad Blanton, author, psychologist and ‘Honesty in Politics’ Congressional Candidate: www.radicalhonesty.com Chapter 9: Radical Honesty About Anger: Practicing Radical Honesty, by Brad Blanton, Ph.D.

the greater the distortion. The key to individuality, integrity, individual freedom, and free societies, lies in providing people with the skills and capabilities to get over their anger, and experience sincere forgiveness. It is the way the statistics from Stanley Milgram’s experiments on blind obedience to authority6 get changed.7 [9]

Radical Honesty culture and religion was founded by Dr. Brad Blanton, who is: (1) President and CEO of Radical Honesty Enterprises Sparrowhawk Book Publishing and The Center for Radical Honesty, both dedicated to promoting honesty in the world; (2) former candidate for Congress in 2004 and 2006, on the platform of ‘Honesty in Politics’8; (3) Pope of the Radical Honesty Futilitarian Church; i.e. “Dr. Truth”9; and (4) author of (a) Radical Honesty: How To Transform your Life by Telling the Truth; (b) Practicing Radical Honesty: How to Complete the Past, Stay in the Present and Build a Future with a Little Help from Your Friends, (c) Honest to God: A Change of Heart that Can Change the World, with Neale Donald Walsh (Conversations with God series); (d) Radical Parenting: Seven Steps to a Functional Family in a Dysfunctional World; (e) The Truthtellers: Stories of Success by Radically Honest People and (f) Beyond Good and Evil: The Eternal Split-Second-Sound-Light-Being; (g) Some New Kind of Trailer Trash.

[10]

In addition to Brad Blanton, Ph.D; founder of the Radical Honesty culture; I am also a former employee of (1) Ms. Peggy Noonan, former Speechwriter for President Reagan and G.W. Bush, Snr; at her home in New York City, NY; (2) HRH Princess Gloria Von Thurn & Taxis Family on their Private Yacht: S.Y. Aiglon; (3) Lord and Lady Glenapp, now Earl and Countess Inchcape, at their home in Swindon, Wiltshire. (PDF References10)

[11]

As a rule-of-law political activist, I endorse and have advocated for the rule-of-law for all, rich, poor, white, black, left and right, religious or atheist. I am separated (filed for divorce) from Demian Emile Johnson, who is, and has been, incarcerated in California Dept. of Corrections, for the entire duration of our marriage11. In addition to Radical Honesty I have been involved in non-violent civil disobedience actions on

6 Great World Trials; The Adolph Eichmann Trial, 1961. pages 332-337; 1997.: Eichmann, speaking in his own defense, said he did not dispute the Holocaust facts. During the whole trial, Eichmann insisted that he was only "following orders"—the same Nuremberg Defense used by some of the Nazi war criminals during the 1945–1946 Nuremberg Trials. He explicitly declared that he had abdicated his conscience in order to follow the Führerprinzip. Eichmann claimed that he was merely a "transmitter" with very little power. He testified that: "I never did anything, great or small, without obtaining in advance express instructions from Adolf Hitler or any of my superiors." 7 Ibid. Ch. 8: Community and Compassion: Work of Stanley Milgram; (p81) 8 See Video Documentaries at: www.why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/p/honesty-in-politics.html 9 See Center for Radical Honesty at: www.radicalhonesty.com 10 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/jl-references?mode=a_p 11 98-05-31: Sun Times: US convict wins love and support in SA town,; 98-09-24: YOU & Huisgenoot: Volkrust FarmGirl Doomed Love for Black Convict, by Frans Kemp

behalf of my former husband12, Greenpeace13, Amnesty Int’l, Pacific Inst. for Criminal Justice14, Jericho 9815, Crack the CIA16, The Disclosure Project17, New Abolitionist18, Justice for Timothy McVeigh19, Alliance for Democracy20, Boycott 2010 World Cup21, Right of Return for African White Refugees22, et al23. [12]

I am 44 years old. With the help of an IUD, inserted at age 19, Common Sense and a love for children, I have never been pregnant, nor had an abortion; nor brought any unwanted children onto the planet; nor contributed to local, national or international overpopulation or resource wars; nor advocated on behalf of population or economic growth; or materialist consumerism.

GENOCIDE: OBSTRUCTION & CENSORSHIP OF TRC FRAUD: [13]

Radical Honesty alleges the Defendants cover up and censorship of the ANC and AntiApartheid Movements (i) Frantz Fanon/Black Consciousness (‘liberation by violence on the rotting corpse of the settlers’) (ii) Black Liberation Theology (‘violent elimination of ‘whiteness’); and (iii) Houari Boumediene/Black Power Breeding War (“The wombs of our women will give us victory”)24 inspired TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FRAUD (“TRC FRAUD”) perpetrated against citizens of South Africa, and predominantly against white Afrikaner/Boer/Settlers; is committed in the context of endorsing the ANC’s institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by Africans over other racial groups, particularly Boer/Afrikaners and committed with the intention of maintaining the ANC regime.

[14]

Radical Honesty’s TRC FRAUD arguments in regard to Just War principles of honourable war are: (i) having just cause, (ii) being a last resort, (iii) being declared

RSA OVERSEAS: South African on hunger strike in California, by Ilda Jacobs In Easter 1993, she was arrested with a few dozen Greenpeace activists in a Save Our Seas anti-nuclear demonstration at Sellafield, Nuclear Power station, in Scotland, for trespassing. She was neither charged nor prosecuted. See: Greenpeace’s Campaign Against Ocean Dumping of Radio-Active Waste, 1978 – 1998 (www.greenpeace.org). 14 98-07-04 Miami Herald: Police action harms image as protectors 15 Jericho 98 is the movement to Free America’s Political Prisoners. She participated in Jericho 98, wrote to President Mandela to request his support for the many Anti-Apartheid Activists whom the ANC conveniently forgot, rotting away in America’s prisons: Marilyn Buck, Jaan Laaman, Tom Manning, etc. She visited Marilyn Buck in prison a few times, helped where she could. 16 99-03-16: San Francisco Chronicle: CIA Class Action Suit For Not Reporting Drug Trade 17 Presidential UFO: George W. Bush’s UFO Mail: Are You Ready for the Revolution? 18 New Abolitionist: Race Traitor: Zero Tolerance 19 April 2001: New Abolitionist: Tim McVeigh and Me 20 In 2000, she was arrested & detained for 3 hours, with Brad Blanton, Ronny Dugger (founding editor of Texas Observer and Alliance for Democracy), & others in the Wash, DC, Capital of the Rotunda. Issue: Campaign Finance Reform. District Attorney declined to Prosecute. 21 09-12-17: IOL Tech.: Anti-SA Smear Campaign on Facebook 22 10-04-23: Algemene Dagblad: Zuid Afrikanen Smeken Om Wilders Hulp ; 10-04-25: Sunday Argus: SA family seeks repatriation to Netherlands; 10-04-30: Mail & Guardian: Persecuted Afrikaners Talk of Returning Home; 10-05-17: Christian Science Monitor: White South Africans use Facebook in Campaign to Return to Holland 23 On 17 Dec 1998, she was arrested at Oakland Federal Building, with anti-war protestors, who shut down the Federal Building for two hours. She was detained by Oakland Police for an hour, before being released. Alameda Co. District Attorney declined to prosecute. 1998-12-19 Beeld: SA `plaasmeisie' vas in VSA oor Golf-protes 24 “One day, millions of men will leave the Southern Hemisphere to go to the Northern Hemisphere. And they will not go there as friends. Because they will go there to conquer it. And they will conquer it with their sons. The wombs of our women will give us victory.” -- Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria, at the United Nations, 1974 (Boumediene was an ardent supporter of the ANC and SWAPO) 13

by a proper authority, (iv) possessing right intention, (v) having a reasonable chance of success, and (vi) the end being proportional to the means used. [15]

Radical Honesty’s TRC FRAUD information and evidence repeatedly submitted to Respondents clarified that Radical Honesty believed the TRC to have made grievous errors in its alleged enquiry into the origins of Apartheid and Apartheid violence; and its findings consequently erroneous and biased. Radical Honesty do not believe that the ANC had a ‘Just Cause’ to initiate acts of aggression, i.e. to launch their violent liberation struggle, against the system of Apartheid, when among others: 1.

The ANC had an honourable non-violent option for liberating its own people by ending its poverty pimping breeding war;

The ANC had no right intention: Apartheid had raised black living standards to the highest in Africa; ANC true motives were, and continue to be, reasons of selfinterest, greed, corruption, abuse of power and personal aggrandizement; as well as Black Liberation Theology racial black power hegemony: and the elimination of ‘whiteness’ on the rotting corpses of SA’s white settlers;

The ANC had no proper authority: Black Africans did not want Black rule, nor did they voluntarily support the liberation struggle (Mandela’s decision to launch the violent liberation struggle, was not because it was a tragic ‘last resort’ of a peaceful non-violent campaign. The militarization of the struggle, was a result of the spectacular failure of the 1952 Defiance Campaign25 ability to mobilize the black masses to participate in the non-violent struggle: only 10 000 joined the protest, of which 8,500 were in prison);

The ANC did not use proportional force: It decided to adopt the People’s War of necklacing, street committees, to terrorize its own people to support its fraudulent ‘liberation struggle’; where any poor black Africans who even slightly objected to the ANC’s agenda, and who insisted on being a law abiding citizen by

25 Wikipedia: The Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws was launched by the ANC at a conference in Bloemfontein in December 1951. Demonstrations in support of the Defiance Principles were organized for April 6, 1952, the 300th anniversary of white settlement in the Cape. Of approximately 10,000 people who protested in the Defiance Campaign, around 8,500 of them were imprisoned.

paying their rent or electricity, was labelled as ‘an enemy conspirator’; and worthy of the necklace; 6.

The ANC did not use proportional force on its own soldiers at its Mbokodo Quatro Torture Camps;

The ANC did not use proportional force in its decision to target illegitimate targets: Its own people; by choosing to maximize not only the physical destruction of property, schools, libraries, community infrastructure, but additionally the psychological, intellectual and emotional destruction of children’s education, and relationships to their families, parents and future, as individuals with no regard whatsoever for the concept of personal responsibility, integrity and honour;

The ANC did not adopt violence as a last resort; but as a first resort to liberate the African’s colonized mind of ‘whiteness’, because in their Fanon/Black Liberation Theology worldview ‘violence was a cleansing liberating force to restore the Africans self-respect on the rotting corpse of the settler’.

[16]

Just Post Bellum: Subsequent to the cessation of the Apartheid conflict as a result of the ‘TRC Ceasefire negotiations’, the ANC did not choose to avoid imposing punishment on innocents and non-combatants. Instead 16 years later, individuals who had nothing to do with apartheid are still being punished for ‘apartheid’, by means of Affirmative Action policies; and every single other problem under the sun is blamed on ‘apartheid’. Neither have the ANC respected the rights or traditions of Boer-Afrikaner minority cultures. To the contrary, the ANC appear to be doing all in their power to facilitate the destruction of Boer-Afrikaner and other minority cultures, some of whom have absolutely no standing whatsoever in SA’s alleged ‘multi-culti’ courtrooms. Finally, the ANC reneged upon its promises of Political Amnesty in cases such as Eugene de Kock, Clive Derby-Lewis, Januzs Walus, and others, whose crimes were clearly politically motivated; while endorsing amnesty for their necklacing cadres; destroying any possible trust that could have been cultivated with minorities, by honouring their agreements.

[17]

Radical Honesty believe if the TRC had been led by Impartial International individuals –- such as for example Dr. Brad Blanton26; Judge Jason Brent27, and Pastor James Manning28 -- committed to seriously enquiring into all the ecological, psychological, political, demographic, and spiritual causes of Apartheid violence, much of the

26 27 28

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information shared in the Radical Honesty Complaints Submitted to the Defendants before the SA Constitutional Court (CCT 23-10 and CCT 06-11) and Equality Court (072010 EQ JHB); and in the Boer Volkstaat 10/31/16 Theses Petition and Briefing Paper to EU Progenitor Nations and NATO29 (Audi Alteram Partem Notice to Defendants30); would have been revealed as part of the Truth and Reconciliation process; which would have resulted in more impartial rainbow perspectives balanced TRC report. Such a report would have accurately identified the demographic, political and spiritual causes of Apartheid violence, and hence provided guidelines for addressing those root cause problems, and holding all parties accountable for refraining from continuing such breeding war or Marxist spiritual ‘violence on the rotting corpse of the settlers’ behaviour. Instead the TRC promulgated the ANC’s truth, and nothing but the ANC’s ‘Black Liberation Theology victimhood’ truth, as the one and only absolute truth, and designated white Afrikaners as the scapegoat for the ANC’s victimhood poverty pimping breeding war socio-economic problems. LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES: [18]

The Defendants endorsement, cover up and censorship of the legal and political persecution of the Radical Honesty culture; denying it any and all rights to honourably defend itself in the Public discourse.

BREEDING WAR AS ACTS OF WAR: [19]

Jason G. Brent, Former Judge East Kern Municipal Court, Mojave, California31; author: Humans: An Endangered Species32: 1.

“We must all understand that the most potent weapons of war are the penis and the womb. Therefore, if you cannot convince a group to control its population by discussion, debate, intelligent analysis etc., you must consider their action in using the penis and the womb to increase population an act of war”

“No one has the right to use his penis or her womb to destroy all of humanity. There is not a God given right to reproduce or to reproduce in a manner which results in the total and complete destruction of our species.” -- Humans: An Endangered Species

29 30 31 32

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MEDIA: ABOVE THE LAW WORLDVIEW GOLIATH OPINION FORMERS: “My former editor at the Sunday Times, the bibulous Mondli Makhanya, has frequently bragged over a long liquid lunch that his position as an opinion former puts him above the law. His theory is that a large newspaper is so mighty that nobody would dare mess with the editor. And to an extent he is right. When a newspaper such as the Sunday Times wants to put the boot in just for the hell of it you just have to accept it as an abuse of privilege disguised as freedom of speech.” -- David Bullard, Why A Media Tribunal is a Good Idea33 “The fact that the media doesn't answer to anyone is the epitome of fascism, the media has become the single most influential institution in the world, I feel very strongly that the media should be accountable to someone.” – Steve Hofmeyr34 (Pat Stevens, Fiefdom of the Press) “[T]he jealously guarded power of the media to regulate itself appears in some respects to enable it to transcend the law..[..] The fact that [Lord Wakeham] refers to the PCC’s historic decisions as ‘case law’ further reinforces the impression that the press maintain a transcendental position vis-à-vis the law, and that they view themselves as doing so. This transcendental role is not restricted to regulation; the media effectively plays judge and jury in people’s lives.” – Are the Media now Above the Law?, The Telegraph 35 “Mainstream media, of course, can't say Jack Diddly about this theater of the absurd, even though they’ve been cornered into asking a few pseudo-hardball questions. They are, after all, criminally culpable for the endorsement and concealment of something they damn well knew was a lie, murder, and high treason ten years ago.” – Michael C. Ruppert, The Ghosts of 9-1136; author of Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil “In the old days we used to schnarf cocaine in the Summit TV editing room because we didn’t want anyone to know. These days you can find traces of white powder on the toilet seats on the 4th Floor” (The Executive suite). – David Bullard, “Yes it's dirty linen but it’s OUR dirty linen”….AVUSA’s day of shame.37

MEDIA ROLE IN CENSORSHIP OF BREEDING WAR ACTS OF WAR: [20]

T. Michael Maher, Ph.D, Prof. & Head: Dept. of Communication, University of Louisiana38: 1.

How and Why Journalists Avoid the Population Environment Connection (PDF39)

Written Statement by Consent of T. Michael Maher, Ph.D, to testify as expert witness for How and Why Journalists Avoid the Population-Environment Connection and Media Framing and Salience of the Population Issue (PDF40)

33 34 35 36 37 38 39

http://www.newstime.co.za/rs_articles_contributors.asp?conid=9&recid=1970 http://www.patstevens.net/parables/fiefdom-of-the-press http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1427135/Are-the-media-now-above-the-law.html http://www.collapsenet.com/free-resources/collapsenet-public-access/item/828-ghosts-of-september-11th http://www.newstime.co.za/rs_articles_contributors.asp?conid=9&recid=3395 http://www.jussanguinis.com/BP/exp/Maher-Michael.htm http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/mahertm_journo-env-pop-connection?mode=a_p

“Population growth has been implicated in promoting water shortages, urban sprawl, global climate change, and most importantly for this court case, massive migration, social stress and resource scarcities that can lead to violence (cf Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence).” (-Written Statement of Consent by T. Michael Maher, to SA Concourt (PDF41))

“The evidence clearly suggests that population growth is bad policy. But in most countries pressure to change pronatalist or pro-immigration policies is light, which is explained by my next point. 2. In covering population-driven environmental problems, media seldom link the problem to its source in population growth.” (-- Written Statement of Consent by T. Michael Maher, to SA Concourt (PDF42))

THE COMPLAINT: BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF FACTS: [A] TRC FRAUD COMPLAINT TO NORWEGIAN NOBEL COMMITTEE: [21]

On 06 June 2009 Johnstone filed a complaint to The Nobel Institute: Norwegian Nobel Committee: Notice of Legal and Political Request to: (I) Withdraw Nobel Peace Prize’s from Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for (a) Intellectual Dishonesty & Hypocrisy; (b) Moral, Political and Religious Prostitution; and (c) ‘TRC-RSA’ Fraud and Betrayal; and (II) Accept Nobel Peace Prize Nominations for Dr. Albert Bartlett; Dr. Garret James Harden, and Dr. M. King Hubbert, for Intellectually Honest and Politically Honourable Ecologically Sustainable, Human Rights, Peace and Social Justice Advocacy (PDF43).

[22]

It included Notice’s to ‘TRC-RSA’ Nobel Peace Prize Recipients: Mandela, Tutu and De Klerk: Final Honourable Notice of Legal and Political Delivery: Elimination of ‘TRC-RSA’ Nobel Peace Prize Recipients Plausible Deniability, to allegations that your

Human Rights Advocacy is guilty of (i) Intellectual Dishonesty and

Hypocrisy; (ii) Moral,

Political and Religious Prostitution; and (iii) ‘TRC-RSA’

Fraud and Betrayal.

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[23]

09-06-06: TRC Fraud Complaint to Norwegian Nobel Committee (PDF44), includes among others Annexures: 1.

Proudly South African/TRC-RSA Afrikaner Genocide Report: Censorbug Bear Blog Reports: (i) Alphabetical Listing of Farm Murders: A – Z; (ii) 2008 Farm Murders in South Africa: Brief Summaries; and (iii) Genocide Watch 2002 Report on Boer Farm Murders (PDF45)

18 July 2006: PeakOilRSA Briefing Paper: Is Gross Mismanagement of the Nation’s Energy Policy an Impeachable Offense?46 (PDF47)

[24]

The Norwegian Nobel Committee, as well as Mandela, De Klerk and Tutu ignored the Complaint.

[B] HC-WC APPLICATION FOR REVIEW: HC-WC #19963-09: [25]

Application for Review #19963-09 was filed in the High Court, Western Cape on 23 September 2009; Respondents: (i) Hon. Patricia de Lille, MP, ID (3rd); (ii) Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Former President (4th); (iii) Mr. Bulelani Ngcuka, Former NPA Nat. Dir. (5th); (iv) Mr. J.S. Selebi, Former SAPS Comm.(6th); (v) Mr. BM Skosana, Former Min. Corrections (7th); (vi) Mr. Nelson Mandela, Former President (8th); (vii) The Nobel Institute: Norwegian Nobel Committee (10th).

[26]

The Application for Review objected to the Magistrate’s endorsement of the State and Complainant (De Lille’s) legal and political persecution of Defendant (Johnstone); by (i) the Magistrates refusal to enquire into the State’s irregularities and illegalities of unlawful arrest of Defendant without any valid Arrest warrant; and detention of Defendant for 33 days in Pollsmoor without any court appearance or bail hearing; (ii) the Complainant’s and State’s attempts to illegally in violation of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act; have the Defendant certified as insane; to attempt to coerce the Defendant into silence about her allegations of TRC FRAUD submitted to State and Complainant; (iii) the Magistrate’s refusal to abide by his agreement to allow the Defendant to invoke her Political Necessity Defense, thereby robbing her of her ability to defend herself.

[27]

The application noted for the record the state of South Africa’s criminal justice system as reflected in the case against the Defendant, as:

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“[10] For the Record: State of Effective Emergency: South Africa’s Unrepresented White Refugees: The Tyranny, Disorder, Crime and Corruption of the State, has effectively resulted in a state of anarchy, where fundamental rights of due process, natural law, administrative law, safety and security, etc have been effectively intentionally, deliberately and maliciously suspended, as a result of corruption, incompetence and indifference. South Africa is heading towards a socio-economic, political and military failed state of Zimbabwefication.” [10.g] While South African Legislative, Judicial and Executive authorities have, and continue to, refuse to confront, enquire into, or acknowledge the reality of the tyrannical Disorder, Crime and Corruption of the Failed State, and its effective nullification of the Truth and Reconciliation Social Contract, which has effectively resulted in a state of anarchy, where fundamental rights of due process, natural law, administrative law, safety and security, etc have been effectively intentionally, deliberately and maliciously suspended; a foreign court/tribunal has finally had the courage to impartially enquire into, and courageously confront, the reality of this evidence. In the State of Ontario, Canada, on 27 August 2009, Board Member William Davis of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (“RPD”), in file number MA8-04910, found white South African, Brandon Carl Huntley to be a Convention Refugee” [..] “[10j] The ZimbabweFication Future for Whites in South Africa: Since the Zimbabwe land seizures began a decade ago, some 4,000 owners (virtually all white) of Zimbabwe’s most productive farms have been forced out, along with their 320,000 workers (almost all black) and their families, amounting to 1m-2m people. Although around two-thirds of the land has been allocated to 140,000 poor black families, the rest has gone to Mr Mugabe’s relatives and comrades, most of whom have little or no interest in farming. Vast tracts of fertile farmland now lie fallow; agricultural output has slumped. One of Africa’s biggest food exporters is now one of its main recipients of food aid. Of 6,500 white commercial farmers in 1980, when Mr Mugabe came to power, only about 500 remain. ..[..] According to exiled Zimbabwean businessman, Mr. Mutumwa Mawere, former CEO of Shabanie Mashaba Mine Holdings (SMMH), Mugabe does not believe that a white person can own land in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, many leaders within the SADC, share Mugabes views that white persons cannot be African and do not have a right to African land. Of legal matters, before Mugabe Judge’s, which involve a white person or farmer: he says “the outcome would be known before trial.” Mr. Mawere states that the biggest mistake that African governments made at independence was the failure to resolve the citizenship issue regarding whites. Finally, Mr. Mawere states that African leaders who fought alongside Mugabe in the 1960s, such as President Jacob Zuma, are no different from Mugabe; “President Jacob Zuma you see today is not different from Zuma the freedom fighter you saw during the liberation struggle and therefore, you should not expect him to support [white farmers] cases at the SADC summit.” For a white person to “trust someone [in Africa], with state power to be good to [them], then you must be living in another world.”48

[28]

Annex B: Application for Review #19963-09 (PDF49) Enclosures include among others: 1.

[FF.01a] Why We Are White Refugees, Afrikaner Genocide Report, includes (a) Alphabetical Listing of Farm Murders: A – Z; (b) 2008 Farm Murders in South Africa: Brief Summaries; (c) Genocide Watch 2002 Report on Boer Farm

48 49

Speech in Rivonia, Johannesburg addressing guests at a meeting organised by the African Heritage Human Rights Forum, September 2009. http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/090922_19963-09_nom?mode=a_p

Murders (PDF50); [FF.01b] FF.01a was submitted to Respondent Eight in June 2009; c/o Respondent Ten, as an attachment to: Nobel Institute: Nobel Peace Prize Committee: Notice of Legal and Political Delivery (PDF51) 2.

[FF.05] The Great South African Land Scandal, by Dr. Phillip du Toit, which documents the Zimbabwefication of South Africa’s Food Security, and includes Ch. 16: Slaughter -- The Farm Murder Plague (PDF52): the murder rate of South African commercial farmers, is highest for a specific group in the world – 313 per 100 000.

[HH]: Affidavit of Dr. Brad Blanton, evidencing the legal, psychological, and socio-political competencies

‘citizens

privilege’,

of Individual

Nuremberg

Responsibility,

Principles

required for

skills

acts

and civil

disobedience to perceived illegitimate authority; and their application to the common law ‘reasonableness test’ (PDF53). 4.

[JJ]: Founding Affidavit of Lara Johnstone; in support of Notice of Intention: Application for Leave and for Judicial Review (PDF54).

[29]

The Magistrate and Prosecutor simply ignored the application. The media ignored the Magistrate and Prosecutor’s irregular conduct.

[C] RADICAL HONESTY AMICUS CURIAE: CCT 23-10: CITIZEN V. MCBRIDE [30]

On 23 March 2010 Radical Honesty filed an Application (PDF55) to proceed as Amicus Curiae in Citizen v. McBride before the Constitutional Court. It informed the court that: [20] Allegedly the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (“the Act”), was setup to among others: (a) provide for the investigation and establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed… emanating from the conflicts of the past, granting of amnesty to persons who made full disclosure…, affording victims opportunity to relate violations suffered; ….. rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of violations of human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations; the making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of future gross violations of human rights; (b) establish the truth in relation to past events as well as motives for and circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have occurred, to prevent a repetition of such acts in future; and because the Constitution stated that (c) the pursuit of national unity and the well-being of all South African

50 51 52 53 54 55

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citizens and peace required reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society; and (d) there was a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation not retaliation, a need for ubuntu not victimization. [21] All of the original Appellants, the Respondent, and all the Supreme Court of Appeal Justices, including those dissenting, all appear to assume that the Act meant what it said, and that those entrusted to implement the law applied the law in the Act, as if the law meant what it said. [22] The Applicant does not share their assumption that the Act meant what it said, nor that those entrusted to implement the Act even applied the law to the extent that the Acts law meant what it said. [..] [23] Consequently the Applicants In Forma Pauperis Amicus Curiae submission shall argue that: [24] The TRC was a fraudulent PR publicity stunt negligently conducted by SA’s political, academic, media and legal elite: Both Appellants and Respondents legal arguments are negligently or intentionally furthering the politically correct -- and financially and public relations convenient -– political, psychological and legal fraud conducted by South Africa’s political, academic and media elite, upon South African citizens. [25] TRC’s fraudulent representation to victimizers and citizens: TRC would provide ‘closure’: The TRC implied that alleged sincere and serious ‘closure’ was possible, and would occur, via the legal processes of what I shall refer to as the “TRC’s Religious Circus”56 of using victims and victimizers as a form of ‘Circus Monkeys’ on the world stage; to promote their fake two-faced hypocrisy Intellectual Forgiveness Rainbow Nation. [26] TRC’s fraudulent representation to victimizers, victims and citizens: TRC would make impartial enquiry to “establish the truth in relation to past events, as well as the motives for, and circumstances in which gross violations of human rights occurred, and to make the findings known, in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in the future.” The TRC’s enquiry can only be considered a ‘Flat Earth’ enquiry, which totally and perhaps intentionally and deliberately ignored population policy factors which contributed to the motives for implementing apartheid. Imagine if blacks had chosen to adopt a cultural trait of personal responsibility and concern for their children, whereby they refrained from procreation until they could provide for a stable and loving environment for their offspring in a small committed family environment. If so, South Africa would currently be populated by 10 million predominantly educated citizens, 50% white & 50% black and coloured, most of whom had grown up in loving small family homes, with responsible parents. [..] What role did population growth factors play in South Africa’s Apartheid violence? If understanding demographic roots is a prerequisite for understanding their subsequent symptomatic political violence, and hence preventing their future re-occurrence, why was this not a priority for the TRC to enquire into? What role did the ANC play in contributing to the Population Explosion of Cannon Fodder and Resource War Violence? Why was the ANC not required to take responsibility for their population production of poverty stricken cannon fodder? … 56

PDF: http://why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/2010/03/hegelian-clash-between-belief-unbelief.html

Why was the media silent about the role population growth demographic factors played in South Africa’s Apartheid violence? If the Media are serious about their commitment to ‘Reconciliation’ and prevention of future hostilities, why were they silent about how the TRC, and subsequently the ANC are deliberately indifferent to abiding by the laws of sustainability57? How are the ignorant masses suffering from the resource war consequences of overpopulation colliding with scarce resources ever going to wake up, if their media and political leaders are too gutless to start telling these truths, and educating people on these issues? Is Martin Luther King Jnr. the only black leader to have ever expressed a sincere concern for the plague of overpopulation, and the need to Educated to Liberate the poor from their cultural prison of ignorant poverty production procreation?

[31]

On 03 May 2010 the Concourt approved the Application. On 18 July 2010 Radical Honesty submitted Heads of Argument (PDF58), in support of Radical Honesty Population Policy Common Sense Interpretation of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995. It was supported by the expert witness statements of Dr. Brad Blanton (PDF59) and Dr. T. Michael Maher (PDF60).

[32]

The Amicus argued among others that: Mainstream Access-to-Discourse-Gatekeeper Editors censorship61 of nonviolent political grievances and problem solving activism facilitate a pressure cooker sociopolitical reality for their ‘If it Bleads, it Leads’ corporate propaganda profits, in knowledge application of: 1. ‘As long as there is some possibility of getting results by political means, the chances that any political group or individual will turn violent are truly radically small, or maybe vanishingly small’62; 2. ‘The exposure in the media is what gets people’s attention. People follow what is happening in the news, not what is happening in the courts’63; 3. ‘[Editors] abuse of media power, by means of strategies whereby they abuse public discourse/free speech resources; by providing certain parties with preferential and special access to such public discourse, and severely restricting or denying others any access to such public discourse64; 4. Mainstream media avoid addressing or enquiring into root causes of problems as reported in How and Why Journalists Avoid Population – Environment connection65; and censor non-violent root-cause problem solving activism66.

PDF: http://www.scribd.com/doc/16203475/090606-Population-Policy-Common-Sense-Exponential-Functions-The-Laws-of-Sustainability http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100718_rhwr-concourt-amicus?mode=a_p http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100518_cc2310_affid-bblanton?mode=a_p 60 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100522_cct2310_affid-dr-t-m-maher?mode=a_p 61 “The moderate blacks were not selling the papers. We were presenting a non-violent strategy, that did not say ‘Burn, baby Burn’. A strategy that said people must come together and sit down around a negotiating table. And this is not sensational stuff; it does not sell the papers.” – Rev. John Gogotya, ANC: VIP’s of Violence, documentary; “For revolutionary groups, the more murderous the deed, the more certain the media coverage.” -- Nicholas Partridge, Presenter, ANC: VIP’s of Violence. 62 Clark McCauley, Ph.D, Prof. of Psychology at Bryn Mawr College, in When Does Political Anger Turn to Violence?, by Benedict Carey, New York Times, March 26, 2010 63 Jean Pierre Mean, Group General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, SGS Group, In Confronting Corruption: The Business Case for an Effective Anti-Corruption Programme, by PricewaterhouseCoopers Intnl [PDF: www.pwc.com/anti-corruption] 64 (I) Power and the news media, Teun A. van Dijk, Univ. of Amsterdam, D. Paletz (Ed.), Political Communication & Action. (pp. 9-36). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1995; (II) Ubuntu Amicus (UA) : [C] Right to ‘Free Speech’ Propaganda Profits Deception [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/32739403] 65 CCT 23-10: Statement of Consent by Dr. T. Michael Maher [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31373074]; How and Why Journalists Avoid Population-Environment Connection, by T. Michael Maher, Ph.D. [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/33694415] 58 59

[33]

Founded on among others Population Policy and Just War theory principles it argued that TRC was a fraud, and that the TRC’s ‘crime of apartheid’ conclusion was a falsification of history, because: A.

The TRC Negligently or Intentionally Avoided Key Concept Definitions for which there are Multiple Different cultural and religious meanings

The Amnesty Meaning was changed without Due Process

Truth and Reconciliation was not only not done; but was not Seen to be Done

Liberation Struggle: No Just Cause or Right Intention: ‘Evil Apartheid’ raised Black living standards to Highest in Africa

Apartheid was not a Crime Against Humanity; but a Just War for Boer Demographic Survival

The Nature & Causes of Apartheid prove that Apartheid was A Just War for Demographic Survival of Boer Afrikaners

Farm Murders are not a Rainbow TRC Peace; but a Racial Hatred War Reality

The Amicus also provided evidence for 40 SA media editors endorsement of legal and political persecution of Radical Honesty as a white refugee; and that Radical Honesty culture was not recognized (effectively banned) in SA’s alleged Multi-Culture courts.

The Application requested the Concourt to rule whether Radical Honesty was a recognized culture or a refugee status.

[34]

All other parties, the applicants, respondents and other Amicus Curiae’s totally ignored the Radical Honesty Amicus Curiae, as if it simply did not exist.

[35]

The Concourt Justices also ignored the contents of the Radical Honesty Amicus; as if it had never even been filed, and its TRC FRAUD argument and international expert witnesses were absolutely irrelevant; and unworthy of any thoughtful response; let alone enquiry and discussion.

HC-WC 19963-09: 140 SA Elite Deliberate Indifference to Rule of Law

[36]

All SA media publications wrote numerous articles and some indepth reports on the main parties arguments (Citizen and Robert McBride), including the other Amicus Curiae arguments (SANEF, FXI, Mxenge, etc). Not one newsarticle was written including any information about the Radical Honesty Amicus arguments. The media acted as if it did not exist.

[37]

The media censorship response occurred irrespective of a complaint filed by Radical Honesty with the South African Police (CAS # 823-08-2010) against twenty-two Media Editors for their: Bribery Conspiracy to Censor Ecolaw TRC fraud evidence before Concourt from Public’s Right to Know, to (a) enable TRC elite to retain TRC-PR benefits & (b) obstruct administration of Ecolaw Concourt justice.(PDF67) 1. Conspiracy: SANEF editors have conspired to aid or procure the commission of, or to commit the following offences: fraud, bribery and corruption, which amount to conspiracy to the obstruction of justice. 2. Fraud: SANEF editors by word and conduct made the following unlawful and intentional misrepresentations or perversions of the truth: (a) In SANEF’s 08 June 2010 Amicus to Concourt they imply that they oppose the suppression of expression and the truth and object to the impediment of a search for the truth1; (b) in their 08 August 2010 Auckland Park declaration to people of SA, they allege that they oppose the suppression of expression and the curtailment of freedom of expression and the free flow of information and will join hands with all South Africans, from all cultures and religions who value their freedoms. Both these representations are perversions of the truth, since SANEF editors repeatedly endorse (i) censorship of Radical Honesty Amicus curiae from the people of SA; and (ii) the legal and political persecution of individuals from the Radical Honesty culture, and perhaps other cultures they despise. SANEF’s fraudulent representation can lead to actual or potential disadvantage or prejudice to Plaintiff, Radical Honesty culture members, and other individuals and cultures. 3. Bribery (as a briber): SANEF editors conspiracy to censor the details of the Radical Honesty SA Amicus before the Concourt from the people of South Africa, are an unlawful and intentional indirect offer to State Officials (the Concourt Justices, and other SA TRC elite politicians whose reputations would prefer the contents of the Radical Honesty SA Amicus to the Concourt to remain censored) to pressure and/or bribe the Justices with the opportunity to ignore the Radical Honesty SA Amicus in their deliberations, as if its arguments and allegations do not exist, because it’s contents have been censored from public discourse; in return for such officials consideration in return for action or inaction in their official capacities. 4. Corruption: SANEF editors are directly or indirectly giving or agreeing or offering to give to other SA elite the gratification of censorship of the Radical Honesty SA Amicus, for their TRC-PR benefit, in order to influence such persons so to act, in a manner that amounts to the illegal, dishonest, unauthorized, incomplete, or biased; exercise, carrying out or performance of their power and duties or functions arising out of constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligations. These actions amount to the abuse of their position of authority, a breach of trust, the violation of legal ecological management duties and sustainable management corporate decision-making, and are designed to achieve an unjustified result; by the unauthorized or improper inducement to TRC Justices’, Political et al elites, to

http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100823_greenscorpions-saps-823-8-2010?mode=a_p

endorse a conspiracy of silence censorship, and are hence guilty of the offence of corruption. (S.3 of Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004) 5. Obstruction of Justice: SANEF editors conspiracy of silence is unlawfully and intentionally defeating or obstructing the administration of justice

[38]

Documents filed: (I) Application to Proceed (PDF68); (II) Heads of Argument (PDF69); Expert witness statements of Dr. Brad Blanton (PDF70) and Dr. T. Michael Maher (PDF71); and (III) Submissions on Forced Apology (PDF72).

[D] RADICAL HONESTY APPLICATION FOR DIRECT ACCESS: CCT 06-11: RADICAL HONESTY V. SANEF & OTHERS [39]

On Friday 28 January 2011, Radical Honesty SA filed an Application for Direct Access for a Writ of Certiorari/Review and Habeus Mentem (Right to your Own Mind) with the Constitutional Court. The Respondents being 88 SA National Editors Forum media organisations and editors, including the SA Press Ombudsman, and Press Appeals Panel. [Notice of Motion (PDF73); Founding Affidavit (PDF74); Condonation: Representation (PDF75); Order: Dismissed (PDF76)].

[40]

Among others the Application for direct access requested the Constitutional Court to review the media’s censorship of the TRC FRAUD arguments argued in the Radical Honesty Amicus Curiae in Citizen v. McBride: [B] South African Press Council and SA Press Appeals Panel (SAPAP) [1] lack of transparent administrative decision-making, and secrecy of complaints statistics; [2] 24 June 2009 ruling by Ombudsman: Joe Thloloe, [3] 11 October, 3 and 4 November 2010 rulings by Deputy Ombudsman: Johan Retief, and [4] 17 and 24 November 2010 rulings by SA Press Appeals Panel Judge Ralph Zulman; and [C] SA Media and Journalists Respondents (“SA Media”) endorse: (a) Media Corruption and legal, political and cultural persecution of minorities, and (b) Reasonableness78” Intellectual Media “Rainbow-Rule-of-Law77

http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100326_rhapplic2concourt-amicus?mode=a_p http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100718_rhwr-concourt-amicus?mode=a_p http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100518_cc2310_affid-bblanton?mode=a_p 71 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100522_cct2310_affid-dr-t-m-maher?mode=a_p 72 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110316_cct2310_rh_forcedapology?mode=a_p 73 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_nom-hmentem?mode=a_p 74 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_f-affid_hmentem?mode=a_p 75 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110128_cct-0611_condonation?mode=a_p 76 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_06-11_cct-dismissed?mode=a_p 77 In Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee , Judge McNair’s judgement dealt with the application of the common law reasonableness test in regards to negligence, where the ‘reasonableness test’ circumstance involved a special skill or competence. 78 In Affidavit of Brad Blanton, Ph.D, evidencing the legal, psychological, and socio-political ‘citizens privilege’, Nuremberg Principles skills and competencies of Individual Responsibility, required for acts of civil disobedience to perceived illegitimate authority; and their application to the common law ‘reasonableness test’ filed as Expert Witness Affidavit in High Court, W.C. # 19963-09; Dr. Blanton explains what happens in cultures of ideological obedience; how and why studies show that 92% of citizens lack the psychological and emotional – sincere forgiveness -- skills for non-violent disobedience. In Practicing Radical Honesty, Dr. Blanton describes the importance of sincere forgiveness to changing the statistics of the Stanley Milgram studies of Obedience, which proved that 92% of humans are as culturally, racially, ideologically or religiously obedient, and unquestioning to their beliefs as Adolf Eichmann was to Nazism. In a clash between their ideology and scientific evidentiary truth, their obedience to their ideology, causes them to consign the truth to the collateral damage refuse bin. Individuals who practice sincere forgiveness, and who are not obedient to ideology, but to scientific truth, always side in favour of scientific truth. 69 70

Incompetence79; and preference for propaganda smear campaigns, and repudiation of scientific journalism i.e.: [5] ‘SA Media’s’ Deliberate Indifference to Radical Honesty/White Refugee legal and political persecution; [6] ‘SA Media’s’ endorsement of media corruption (negligent and/or deliberate intellectual incompetence), and [7] repudiation of scientific journalism80: censorship of root cause “the most potent weapons of war are the penis and the womb81 problem solving, as per their endorsement of censorship of issues raised in Dr. T. Michael Maher’s study: How and Why Journalists Avoid Population – Environment connection82; and Dr. Brad Blanton’s Radical Honesty About Anger and Forgiveness83 expert witness affidavit as to how sincere forgiveness vs fake forgiveness affects the common law ‘reasonable reader’; as per orders applied for as set out below. [41]

The writ of Habeus Mentem – the right of a wo/man to their own mind and culture - was invoked in accordance with the Constitutional rights to invoking84 cultural law85 in S. 15 (3), 30, 31, and 185, and psychological integrity in Section 12; the former which may require the application of choice of law rules.

[42]

The title of the writ -- Habeus Mentem - was borrowed from Aldous Huxley’s A Brave New World Revisited; where he describes the insidious conspiracy to manipulate the masses by propaganda and lies, so as to make them controllable under the “steadily increasing pressures of over-population and of the overorganization imposed by growing numbers and advancing technology” It is perfectly possible for a man to be out of prison, and yet not free -- to be under no physical constraint and yet to be a psychological captive, compelled to think, feel and act as the representatives of the national State, or of some private interest within the nation, want him to think, feel and act. There will never be such a thing as a writ of habeas mentem; for no sheriff or jailer can bring an illegally imprisoned mind into court, and no person whose mind had been made captive by the methods outlined in earlier articles would be in a position to complain of his captivity. The nature of psychological compulsion is such that those who act under constraint remain under the impression that

79 Put simply the Dunning & Kruger effect “is a cognitive bias in which an unskilled person makes poor decisions and reaches erroneous conclusions, but their incompetence denies them the metacognitive ability to realize their mistakes.” 80 “WikiLeaks coined a new type of journalism: scientific journalism. We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but also to prove it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, then to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?” -- Don't shoot messenger for revealing uncomfortable truths , by Julian Assange, The Australian, December 08, 2010 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-messenger-for-revealing-uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq1225967241332 81 “We must all understand that the most potent weapons of war are the penis and the womb. Therefore, if you cannot convince a group to control its population by discussion, debate, intelligent analysis etc., you must consider their action in using the penis and the womb to increase population an act of war.” –-- Jason G. Brent, Attorney and author of Humans: An Endangered Species, as quoted in Boer Volkstaat for African White Refugees Briefing Paper 10/31/16 (www.african-white-refugees.co.nr) 82 How and Why Journalists Avoid Population-Environment Connection, by T. Michael Maher, Ph.D. http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/mahertm_journo-env-pop-connection?mode=a_p 83 Being Specific About Anger and Forgiveness; excerpts from Practicing Radical Honesty, by Dr. Brad Blanton http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/090611_sqworms_prh-social-contract?mode=a_p 84 Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi 1948 (1) SA 388 (A) at 397: Appellate Division held that neither common nor customary law was prima facie applicable. Courts had to consider all the circumstances of a case, and, without any preconceived view about the applicability of one or other legal system, select the appropriate law on the basis of its inquiry. 85 SALC, Sept 1999: Report on Conflicts of law: P.22: ‘1.58. The Constitution now provides an entitlement for invoking customary law in legal suits. Because ss 30 and 31 specifically guarantee an individual and a group's right to pursue a culture of choice, it could be argued that application of customary law has become a constitutional right. Previously, the state had assumed complete discretion in deciding whether and to what extent customary law should be recognized, an attitude typical of colonial thinking, for Africans were subject to whatever policies the conquering state chose to impose on them. Now, however, the state has a duty to allow people to participate in the culture they choose, implicit in this duty is a responsibility to uphold the institutions on which that culture is based.’

they are acting on their own initiative. The victim of mind-manipulation does not know that he is a victim. To him, the walls of his prison are invisible, and he believes himself to be free. That he is not free is apparent only to other people. His servitude is strictly objective. [43]

The writ of Habeus Mentem requested the Concourt to confirm – for the record: [a] First and Second Respondent are members of the Radical Honesty culture86, who provided Respondents with the opportunity to resolve these matters, out of court, upon the Truth and Forgiveness Social Contract: Being Specific About Anger and Forgiveness87; as excerpted from: Practicing Radical Honesty88. [b] Radical Honesty SA is founded on Radical Honesty Social Contract and Ecolaw89 principles: (a) A psychological integrity environment of philosophical courageous truth searching honesty and sincere forgiveness is a sine qua non90 for healthy, transparent relationships that result in the co-creation of a code of conduct that enables non-violent honest sincere resolutions to disagreements; (b) A healthy ecological environment, with due regard for carrying capacity laws of sustainability is a sine qua non91 for all other constitutional rights92. [c] Radical Honesty SA’s working hypothesis: First to Eighty-Eighth Respondents are imprisoned in their minds distorted and only partly conscious maps, but who are too psychologically incompetently unconscious – Dunning and Kruger Effect93 - to be aware of their mind-slavery. They are mind enslaved/imprisoned by their fragile ego’s, which are under the false impression that they act on their own initiative, but who are emotional and psychological slaves to their suppressed anger, resentments and politically correct ideologies. Their minds maps of reality are distorted by their repressed anger and resentment, their fake forgiveness and fake relationships, marketing character94 shame95; the greater the amount of suppressed anger, resentments and sincerity, the greater their distorted view of reality. Radical Honesty SA invites all respondents to liberate themselves

86 Members of the Radical Honesty culture practice total transparency, a commitment to practicing radical honesty with friends, colleagues, leaders, followers, enemies and themselves; to remaining in any disagreement with each other, until such disagreement has been resolved by sincere forgiveness, no matter how long it takes. Radical Honesty practitioners believe that the key to individuality, integrity, individual freedom, and free societies, lies in providing people with the skills and capabilities to get over their anger, and experience sincere forgiveness. It is the way the statistics from Stanley Milgram’s experiments on blind obedience to authority get changed. 87 Being Specific About Anger and Forgiveness; excerpts from Practicing Radical Honesty, by Dr. Brad Blanton http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/090611_sqworms_prh-social-contract?mode=a_p 88 Practicing Radical Honesty, by Brad Blanton, Ph.D. http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/blantonb__prh?mode=a_p 89 Principle 1: ‘All human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health and well-being.; Principle 2 (adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights), provides that all persons ‘have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.’ See Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, adopted by the WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law, reproduced in WCED Our Common Future (1987) 348. See also Principle 1, Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment in UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Human Rights and the Environment, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4.Sub2/1994 19 90 Practicing Radical Honesty, by Brad Blanton http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/blantonb__prh?mode=a_p 91 Opinion of Weeramantry J in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (1998) 37 International Legal Materials 162 206. http://judgechristopherweeramantry.com/wp/?cat=4 92 See eg Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) ECHR Ser A 303-C. 93 The Dunning–Kruger effect is the name for the research by Justin Kruger and David Dunning, then from Cornell University. Kruger and Dunning noted earlier studies suggesting that ignorance of standards of performance is behind a great deal of incompetence. This pattern was seen in studies of skills as diverse as reading comprehension, operating a motor vehicle, and playing chess or tennis. They proposed that, for a given skill, incompetent people will: * tend to overestimate their own level of skill; * fail to recognize genuine skill in others; * fail to recognize the extremity of their inadequacy; * recognize and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they can be trained to substantially improve. Put simply the Dunning & Kruger effect “is a cognitive bias in which an unskilled person makes poor decisions and reaches erroneous conclusions, but their incompetence denies them the metacognitive ability to realize their mistakes.” 94 To Have or to Be, by Erich Fromm: Chapter VII: Religion, Character and Society: The “Marketing Character” and Cybernetic Religion” (pp 133-154) 95 Brene Brown on shame as a psychological fear for transparency, joy and intimacy: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4Qm9cGRub0

from their Flat Earth intellectual, psychological and legal ego prisons of political correctness and denial. [d] Radical Honesty SA definitions of the word ‘Kaffir’, relevant to this matter: [i] ‘Kaffir Behaviour’: Cultural Beliefs and Procreation Behaviour Definition: Individuals who either independently or as a result of their cultural value systems, are incapable of, or unwilling to, practice sexual restraint and procreation responsibility; who consequently breed cockroachprolifically without personal financial or psychological responsibility to, or emotional concern for, their offspring; and/or who abuse women and children as sexual or economic slaves procreated for such purpose; and/or whose cultural ideal of manhood endorses non-consensual sex (rape) as their sexual slavery entitlement, etc. [ii] ‘Kaffir Etymology’: Original Etymological Definition for ‘Kaffir’: The word kāfir is the active participle of the Semitic root K-F-R “to cover”. As a pre-Islamic term it described farmers burying seeds in the ground, covering them with soil while planting; as they till the earth and “cover up” the seeds; which is why earth tillers are referred to as “Kuffar.” Thus, the word kāfir implies the meaning “a person who hides or covers”; To conceal, deny, hide or cover the truth. [iii] ‘Kaffir Legislation’ = Inalienable Right to Breed’ Poverty, Misery and War legislation; pretending it advocates for ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’. Kaffir Law/Legislation provides citizens with the Inalienable ‘Right to Breed’, but demands that Citizens need a Licence to Own a Gun, a Licence to Drive a Car, a Licence to Practice Law, a television licence, a credit licence, a licence to earn a living, a university exemption licence, a licence to fish, a licence to hunt, a liquor licence, a business licence, a marriage licence, etc, etc. Kaffir Legislation covers up that an ‘Inalienable Right to Breed/laissezfaire birth control policy + No Social Welfare policies or practices provides for an equilibrium carrying capacity; whereas Inalienable Right to Breed/laissezfaire birth control within a welfare state, results in Runaway Growth, and ultimately greater misery, poverty and war96. [44]

On Monday 01 February 2011 the Justice’s returned from their Christmas vacation and within less than 5 hours of receipt of the application, the entire bench of the Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed the application as ‘not in the interests of justice’.

[45]

Among others, the Application detailed the misery, poverty and resource war ecological footprint consequences of corrupt corporate personhood by comparing it to results that can occur under a Media whose principles are founded on Ecological Footprint of Transparent Scientific Journalism. The former encourages social trap97

96 From Shortage to Longage: Forty Years in the Population Vineyards, by Garrett Hardin, Population and Environment, Vol. 12, No. 3. Spring 1991 http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_from_shortage_to_longage.html 97 Social trap is a term used by psychologists to describe a situation in which a group of people act to obtain short-term individual gains, which in the long run leads to a loss for the group as a whole. Examples of social traps include overfishing, the near-extinction of the American bison, energy "brownout" and "blackout" power outages during periods of extreme temperatures, the overgrazing of cattle on the Sahelian Desert, and the destruction of the rainforest by logging interests and agriculture. The term social trap was first introduced to the scientific community by John Platt's 1973 paper in American Psychologist (Platt, J. (1973) Social Traps, American Psychologist, 28, 641-65) building upon the concept of the "tragedy of the commons" in Garrett Hardin's pivotal article in Science (Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162,

behaviour, and denial of responsibility and consciousness of such behaviour that results in overpopulation colliding with scarce resources resource wars; the latter encourages responsibility, transparency and honesty to confront the root causes of poverty, misery and resource wars, so as to avoid them and live and breed ecologically sustainably. [63] The documentary, The Corporation 98, based on The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power shows the development of the contemporary business corporation, from a legal entity that originated as a government-chartered institution meant to effect specific public functions, to the rise of the modern commercial institution entitled to most of the legal rights of a person. One theme is its assessment as a "personality", as a result of an 1886 case in the United States Supreme Court in which a statement by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite99 led to corporations as "persons" having the same rights as human beings, based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The film's assessment is effected via the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV; Robert Hare, a University of British Columbia psychology professor and a consultant to the FBI, compares the profile of the contemporary profitable business corporation to that of a clinically-diagnosed psychopath. [64] A critic of corporate personhood, Thom Hartmann100 argues in Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of Human Rights101, subsequent editions: Unequal Protection: How Corporations Became "People" And How You Can Fight Back that there was an intentional misinterpretation of the Supreme Court case on behalf of Corporate Personhood inserted into the Court record by reporter J.C. Bancroft Davis. The Secret of Life: Corporate Personhood102 provides a brief description of Hartmannâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s argument: Bancroft Davis had previously served as president of Newburgh and New York Railway Co. According to Hartmann in the May 10, 1886: Santa Clara County vs. the Southern Pacific Railroad Company Supreme Court Case: The entire case was not even decided by the Supreme Court Justices, what happened was that the headnotes, which are not legally binding and which were written by a clerk of the court (not a Justice) said that the case had decided the issue of corporate personhood in the favor of the railroad company, even though it had not. This decision however, influenced future court cases for many years to come. Once it had been embedded in the US court system, there was no turning back. So what was the case about, that ended up being decided by headnotes from a clerk of the court? One, aspect of the concentration of wealth that worried Jefferson and most American legislatures in those decades was that with enough wealth, a corporation can keep trying in the courts for centuries (literally centuries, because they don't die), no matter how much it costs until they get what they want. And ultimately that's what happened... In the decade leading up to this May Day in 1886, the railroads had lost every Supreme Court case that they had brought seeking 14th amendment rights. To this day there has been no Supreme Court ruling that 1243-1248), Platt and others in the seminar applied behavioral psychology concepts to actions of people operating in social traps. By applying the findings of basic research on "schedules of operant reinforcement" (B.F. Skinner 1938, 1948, 1953, 1957; Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950), Platt recognized that individuals operating for short-term positive gain ("reinforcement") had a tendency to over-exploit a resource, which led to a long-term overall loss to society. 98

The Corporation (www.thecorporation.com) is a 2003 Canadian documentary by Joel Bakan, Mark Achbar & Jennifer Abbott. "The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does." However, the Supreme Court decision did not itself address the matter of whether corporations were 'persons' with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment; in Chief Justice Waite's words, "we avoided meeting the question". (118 U.S. 394 (1886) - According to the official court Syllabus in the United States Reports) 100 Thom Hartmann (born May 7, 1951) is an American radio host, author, former psychotherapist and entrepreneur, and a progressive political commentator. His nationally-syndicated radio show, The Thom Hartmann Program, airs in the United States and has 2.75 million unique listeners a week. In 2008, 2009, and 2010, Talkers Magazine named Hartmann the tenth most important talk show host in America, defining him as the most important liberal host (the nine above Hartmann are conservatives). 101 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unequal_Protection:_The_Rise_of_Corporate_Dominance_and_the_Theft_of_Human_Rights 102 http://secret-of-life.org/corporate-personhood 99

could explain why a corporation -- with its ability to continue operating forever -- a legal agreement that can't be put in jail and doesn't need fresh water to drink or clean air to breathe -- should be granted the same constitutional rights American founders explicitly fought for, died for, and granted to the very mortal human beings who are citizens of the United States [and the world] to protect them against the perils of imprisonment and suppression they had experienced under a desperate king. See also documentary: Thom Hartman vs. Corporate Personhood103. [65] In Green Candidates call for end of Corporate Personhood104, Greenchange report that over 110 Green Party Candidates have endorsed “stripping [corporations] of artificial ‘personhood’ and constitutional protections,” along with “revoking the charters of corporations that routinely violate safety, health, environmental protection or other laws.” Among others, Democratic Congressional Representative Dennis Kucinich105, former Candidate’s for U.S President Ralph Nader106 and Mike Gravel107, the non-partisan group Reclaim Democracy108 have all called for the abolishment of corporate personhood, due to corporate personhoods toxic effects on republican democracy. [66] In When Corporations Rule the World, David Korten109 critiques current methods of economic development led by the Bretton Woods institutions and asserts his desire to rebalance the power of multinational corporations with concern for environment sustainability. Korten criticises consumerism, market deregulation, free trade, privatization and what he sees as the global consolidation of corporate power. Above all he rejects any focus on money as the purpose of economic life. His prescriptions include excluding corporations from political participation, increased state and global control of international corporations and finance, rendering financial speculation unprofitable and creating local economies that rely on local resources, rather than international trade. [67] In his award winning 2002 documentary for the BBC, The Century of the Self110, Adam Curtis111 describes how Sigmund Freud's family, exerted a surprising amount of influence on the way corporations and governments throughout the 20th century have used Freuds theories to psychologically engineer and manipulate citizens into the false illusionary belief that the power is finally in their hands, that they live in a ‘democracy’; that they are in charge, while their sense of identity has been subconsciously manipulated from that of citizen to consumer, fueling the massive growth of the mass-consumer society, and the corporatist Orwellian dictatorship. [68] In Michael Tsarion’s112 documentaries, The Age of Manipulation113, and Architects of Control Program114: he deals extensively with the evidentiary information on the role of media, advertising and public relations as a psychic dictatorship to manipulate the masses by psychological warfare brainwashing techniques to destroy citizens identity’s as patriotic rational citizens, and mould their identities into psychologically insecure, dumbed-down, consumerist mindenslaved automatonic zombies. One of Tsarion’s conclusions being that the Soviet 103

Thom Hartman vs. Corporate Personhood: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hziy7WR9TQc Corporate Personhood and Money as Speech: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FtSfUSy28w http://www.greenchange.org/article.php?id=6133 105 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6FY3YlxND4 106 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQ-k3eCcU0w and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DM585_htT-8 107 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEwRR0eFuAQ 108 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FtSfUSy28w 109 David C. Korten (1937– ) is an American economist, author, and former Professor of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business, political activist and prominent critic of corporate globalization, "by training and inclination a student of psychology and behavioral systems". 110 2002: The Century of the Self (BBC Four) documented how Freud's discoveries concerning the unconscious led to Edward Bernays' development of public relations, the use of desire over need and self-actualisation as a means of achieving economic growth and the political control of population. It received the Broadcast Award for Best Documentary Series and the Longman/History Today Awards for Historical Film of the Year. It was released in the US through art house cinemas and was picked as the fourth best movie of 2005 by Entertainment Weekly. 111 Adam Curtis (born 1955) is a British television documentary maker who has during the course of his television career worked as a writer, producer, director and narrator. He currently works for BBC Current Affairs. His programmes express a clear (and sometimes controversial) opinion about their subject, and he narrates the programmes himself. 112 http://michaeltsarion.com/ 113 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7l-T61gJoHs 114 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7MUGZ6JuRI 104

Union was a massive experiment in social control; and how many of the methods for social control perfected under the Soviet Union are used by the West in more subtle ways. Psywar – The real battlefield is your mind115, also provides background information on this phenomena. [69] Yuri Alexandrovich Bezmenov (also known as Tomas David Schuman; 1939 – 1997) was a journalist for RIA Novosti and a former KGB informant from the Soviet Union who defected to Canada. After being assigned to a station in India, Bezmenov eventually grew to love the people and culture of India, while, at the same time, he began to resent the KGB-sanctioned oppression of intellectuals who dissented from Moscow's policies. He is best known for his interview with Edward G. Griffin: Deception was my Job: Soviet Subversion of the Free World Press116, wherein he explained the psychological warfare methods used by the KGB to secretly subvert the democratic system of the United States. [70] In The CIA and the Media117, Carl Bernstein, from the Washington Post, writes about how “Americas Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up”. [71] In The Persuaders118 Douglass Rushkoff of PBS explore’s what’s going on in today’s marketers and advertising businesses; how the Public Relations industry has been given the responsibility to maintain the entire system of meaning, through which consumers get their sense of consumer identity and understanding of their role as a consumer in the world of consumerism identity. What are the new and surprising methods the PR industry is using to decipher who citizens are and what they want and how to manipulate them. How the study of cults was adapted to marketing brands, to manipulate a brand’s consumers into blind consumer obedience, in the same way cults manipulate their cult followers, and what the future holds. [72] In Douglass Rushkoff’s119 book Life, Inc: How the World became a Corporation and How to Take It Back120 Rushkoff takes a look at physical currency and the history of corporatism. Beginning with an overview of how money has been gradually centralized throughout time, and pondering the reasons and consequences of such a fact, he goes on to demonstrate how our society has become defined by and controlled by corporate culture. Douglas Rushkoff’s philosophy views everything except for intention as media, he frequently explores the themes of how to make media interactive, how to help people (especially children) effectively analyze and question the media they consume, as well as how to cultivate intention and agency. [73] Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media121 (1988), by Edward S. Herman122 and Noam Chomsky123, is an analysis of the news media as business. The title derived from “the manufacture of consent” by essayist–editor Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) in his book Public Opinion (1922).

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7A2hVDdB10 http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2307456730142665916 http://why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/2010/12/cia-and-media-fighting-cold.html 118 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/ and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hqWw3W5_bI 119 Douglas Rushkoff (born 18 February 1961) is an American media theorist, writer, columnist, lecturer, graphic novelist and documentarian. Rushkoff is most frequently regarded as a media theorist, and known for coining terms and concepts including viral media (or media virus), digital native, and social currency 120 2009. Life, Inc.: How the World Became A Corporation and How To Take It Back, by Douglass Rushkoff 121 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda_model 122 Edward S. Herman (born 7 April 1925) is an economist and media analyst with a specialty in corporate and regulatory issues as well as political economy and the media. He is Professor Emeritus of Finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He also teaches at Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. He received his Bachelor of Arts from University of Pennsylvania in 1945 and PhD in 1953 from the University of California, Berkeley. 123 Avram Noam Chomsky (born December 7, 1928) is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, and political activist. He is an Institute Professor and professor emeritus of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Chomsky is well known in the academic and scientific community as one of the fathers of modern linguistics, and a major figure of analytic philosophy. Since the 1960s, he has become known more widely as a political dissident and an anarchist, referring to himself as a libertarian socialist. Chomsky is the author of more than 150 books and has received worldwide attention for his views, despite being typically absent from the mainstream media. 116 117

[75] In Flat Earth News: An Award-Winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media124, Nick Davies writes that “journalism without checking is like a body without an immune system”. He “uncovers an industry awash in corruption and bias”, where “commercial forces are the main obstacle to truth-telling journalism”. In Our media have become mass producers of distortion: An industry whose task should be to filter out falsehood has become a conduit for propaganda and second hand news,125 he writes: I commissioned research from specialists at Cardiff University, who surveyed more than 2,000 UK news stories from the four quality dailies (Times, Telegraph, Guardian, Independent) and the Daily Mail. They found two striking things. First, when they tried to trace the origins of their "facts", they discovered that only 12% of the stories were wholly composed of material researched by reporters. With 8% of the stories, they just couldn't be sure. The remaining 80%, they found, were wholly, mainly or partially constructed from second-hand material, provided by news agencies and by the public relations industry. Second, when they looked for evidence that these "facts" had been thoroughly checked, they found this was happening in only 12% of the stories. The implication of those two findings is truly alarming. Where once journalists were active gatherers of news, now they have generally become mere passive processors of unchecked, second-hand material, much of it contrived by PR to serve some political or commercial interest. Not journalists, but churnalists. An industry whose primary task is to filter out falsehood has become so vulnerable to manipulation that it is now involved in the mass production of falsehood, distortion and propaganda.

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Issue: Ecological Footprint of Transparent Scientific Journalism, argued: “Once a culture becomes advertising friendly, it ceases to be a culture at all”126 “Advertising and Propaganda are antithetical to real journalism. In a democracy people have to have access to unbiased factual information to make rational reasonable decisions”127 -- Mark Crispin Miller, Professor of Media Ecology128, Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development, New York Univ., author: Mad Scientists: The Secret History of Modern Propaganda129 [76] In Don't shoot messenger for revealing uncomfortable truths130, The Australian, December 08, 2010, Mr. Julian Assange writes: “WikiLeaks coined a new type of journalism: scientific journalism. We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but also to prove it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, then to click online to see the original document it is based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately?” In Andy Greenberg's Forbes Interview of Assange131, Greenberg asks Assange: What do you think WikiLeaks mean for business? How do businesses need to adjust to a world where WikiLeaks exists? Mr. Assange proceeds to describe how Wikileaks restricts corrupt corporations or governments from abusing a commons, what psychologists refer to as the social trap132, such as for example: overfishing. In this

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http://www.amazon.co.uk/Flat-Earth-News-Award-winning-Distortion/dp/0701181451 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/04/comment.pressandpublishing The Persuaders, PBS http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hqWw3W5_bI 127 Russia Today Interview http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFPmUVU6eYE 128 http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/faculty_bios/view/Mark_Crispin_Miller 129 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HImJbRrs9kY 130 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-messenger-for-revealing-uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq1225967241332 131 http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-with-wikileaks-julian-assange/5/ 132 Social trap is a term used by psychologists to describe a situation in which a group of people act to obtain short-term individual gains, which in the long run leads to a loss for the group as a whole. Examples of social traps include overfishing, the near-extinction of the American bison, energy "brownout" and "blackout" power outages during periods of extreme temperatures, the overgrazing of cattle on the Sahelian Desert, and the destruction of the rainforest by logging interests and agriculture. The term social trap was first introduced to the scientific community by 125 126

case the exploitation of the ‘corporate trust and responsibility citizenship commons’, the erosion of which leads to anarchy and a total breakdown of the rule of law: WikiLeaks means it’s easier to run a good business and harder to run a bad business, and all CEOs should be encouraged by this. I think about the case in China where milk powder companies started cutting the protein in milk powder with plastics. That happened at a number of separate manufacturers. Let’s say you want to run a good company. It’s nice to have an ethical workplace. Your employees are much less likely to screw you over if they’re not screwing other people over. Then one company starts cutting their milk powder with melamine, and becomes more profitable. You can follow suit, or slowly go bankrupt and the one that’s cutting its milk powder will take you over. That’s the worst of all possible outcomes. The other possibility is that the first one to cut its milk powder is exposed. Then you don’t have to cut your milk powder. There’s a threat of regulation that produces self-regulation. It just means that it’s easier for honest CEOs to run an honest business, if the dishonest businesses are more effected negatively by leaks than honest businesses. That’s the whole idea. In the struggle between open and honest companies and dishonest and closed companies, we’re creating a tremendous reputational tax on the unethical companies. No one wants to have their own things leaked. It pains us when we have internal leaks. But across any given industry, it is both good for the whole industry to have those leaks and it’s especially good for the good players.

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It alleged that the ecological and socio-political results of Corrupt Corporate Personhood were encouraging a worldview paradigm of Denial about, & Cover-up of, Ecological Overshoot, which was promoting Instability & Anarchy: [78] In Stalking the Wild Taboo, by Garrett Hardin133: Part 4: Competition: (20) Competition, a Tabooed Idea in Sociology; (21) The Cybernetics of Competition; (22) Population, Biology and the Law; (23) Population Skeletons in the Environmental Closet; (24) The Survival of Nations and Civilisations, he deals with the concept of Competition, a process that is inescapable in societies living in a finite resource world. He proves that the end result of perfect laissez-faire, competition’s end result reduces all competitors until there is only one left. The monopolist will try to manipulate the machinery of society in such a way as to extend his powers everywhere, without limit. The same applies to labour monopolies. Under these conditions it is important to seek the boundary conditions within which the rule of laissez-faire can produce stability. An Act that may be harmless when the system is healthy and strong may be quite destructive when the system is stressed near its limits. To promote the goal of stability, a law must take cognizance not only of the act but also of the state of the system at the time the act is performed. Ben

John Platt's 1973 paper in American Psychologist (Platt, J. (1973) Social Traps, American Psychologist, 28, 641-65) building upon the concept of the "tragedy of the commons" in Garrett Hardin's pivotal article in Science (Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162, 1243-1248), Platt and others in the seminar applied behavioral psychology concepts to actions of people operating in social traps. By applying the findings of basic research on "schedules of operant reinforcement" (B.F. Skinner 1938, 1948, 1953, 1957; Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950), Platt recognized that individuals operating for short-term positive gain ("reinforcement") had a tendency to over-exploit a resource, which led to a long-term overall loss to society. 133 Garrett James Hardin (21 April 1915 – 14 September 2003) was a leading ecologist from Dallas, Texas, who warned of the dangers of overpopulation and whose concept of the tragedy of the commons brought attention to "the damage that innocent actions by individuals can inflict on the environment". He was most well known for his elaboration of this theme in his 1968 paper, The Tragedy of the Commons. He is also known for Hardin's First Law of Ecology: "You cannot do only one thing".

Bagdikian134 described the systemic process of corporate media cannibalism in Media Monopoly135. In that legal context, corporations who do not promote the goal of ecological stability, but who abuse the planet, should be denied any legal standing, and the law should take cognisance of the actions of corporations who promote the destruction of ecologically stable systems, including the state of the ecological system at the time of such corporate actions. Denial about & Cover-up of Ecological Overshoot Encouraging Instability & Anarchy: To promote the goal of stability, a law must take cognizance not only of the act but also of the state of the system at the time the act is performed. [81] If the State of the System is ‘Brink of Ecological Overshoot into Anarchy and Collapse’; and the media’s ‘act’ is (a) censorship of root cause problem solving, while (b) encouraging the factors (population growth, resource consumption) towards Anarchy and Collapse; then the conclusion is that the Media’s Actions are deliberate and intentional on behalf of Anarchy and Instability. [82] Where is Society in the Act of Understanding Exponential Population Growth colliding with Exponentially Declining Resources? What is the role of the Media in Society’s Ignorance? What is the role of the media in deliberately keeping Society Ignorant, by means of Environment Population Connection censorship? Where is Ecological Societal System, in terms of Exponential Population Growth colliding with Exponentially Declining Resources? Is the Media Aggravating Instability by encouraging Population Growth and Increased Resource Consumption? Is the Media Encouraging Stability in favour of Population Stabilisation & Reduced Resource Exploitation? [84] What shall be the Consequences of Refusing to Confront and Plan for Mitigating Ecological Overshoot?: Anarchy and Resource Wars: [85] Military Predictors: According to Major Ralph Peters, The Culture of Future Conflict, US Army War College, Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27. ““Resource scarcity will be a direct cause of confrontation, conflict, and war. The struggle to maintain access to critical resources will spark local and regional conflicts that will evolve into the most frequent conventional wars of the next century. Today, the notion of resource wars leads the Westerner to think immediately of oil, but water will be the fundamental need of some states, anti-states, and peoples. We envision a need to preserve rainforests, but expanding populations will increasingly create regional shortages of food--especially when nature turns fickle. We are entering the century of "not enough," and we will bleed for things we previously could buy. [.. ] Gross overpopulation will destroy fragile possibilities for progress in much of the nonWestern world, and much of this problem is the West's fault. Our well intentioned introduction of relatively crude concepts of sanitation and disease control, combined with our determination to respond generously to local famines, has allowed populations to explode. [..] Basic resources will prove inadequate for populations exploding beyond natural limits, and we may discover truths about ourselves that we do not wish to know. In the end, the greatest challenge may be to our moral order.” [86] According to the Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon Officials in Nightline, 2000 documentary136 with Ted Koppel; politicians refusal to confront reality, and the lack of political will, to act on exponential population growth colliding with declining resources, are the root causes of current resource wars over oil; which shall soon be manifested as resource wars over water, soil, arable land, etc.

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In 1971, whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg gave Bagdikian — then an editor at the Washington Post — portions of the Pentagon Papers, a topsecret classified history of the Vietnam War. Bagdikian passed a copy of the documents to Senator Mike Gravel, who promptly read them into the Congressional Record. 135 The Media Monopoly, Boston: Beacon Press, 1983. 136 Nightline Documentary Embedded Video available at: Boer Volkstaat 10/31/16 Theses: Briefing Paper: Executive Summary: TRC Just War Fraud: Population Policy Common Sense: [1] Population Policy Common Sense: Eco-Numeracy, Exponential Functions & Carrying Capacity, Youth Bulges Population Pressure Conflicts and Competitive Exclusion Principle: http://www.jussanguinis.com/BP/exec-summ.htm

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It also asked the Constitutional Court to address the issue of “Deliberate Indifference” to Media Corruption; i.e. how the media Manipulate the Habits & Opinions of citizens in favour of Consumerist Ecologically Destructive Society, for Profit: [94] The issue of Deliberate Indifference by journalists and media editors to their own media corruption (intellectual dishonesty, hypocrisy and deception and fraud) is found by all Respondents to varying degrees in this chronology. While the Nazi Party, ‘evil Apartheid’ and corruption on steroids ANC have individuals who are willing to risk their careers to expose ANC corruption, the only professional journalist who publicly spoken out about media corruption in South Africa is David Bullard (The Hollow Men of Journalism137, and A mosquito buzzing in the dark *138). [95] Mr. Bullard describes how Mondli Makhanya (Second Respondent) submitted forged documents into the court record during court proceedings; and how all SA media editors informed hereof refused to publish this information. If those allegations were made against General Beki Cele or Helen Zille, the same media editors would be acting like starving vultures; but when it is one of their own, in fact the Chairman of SANEF, they cover it up; and remain silent. When it comes to media corruption, SA media’s editors, professors and Ombudsman don’t think the public have a right to know; that SA’s selfrighteous editors are as corrupt, if not more corrupt than the politicians and civil servants they publicly flagellate and condemn for their own financial profit. [96] Except for David Bullard, it appears that there are no journalists or editors with the Milgramesque139 skills and capabilities to either (a) resist the temptation from participating in the dominant media corruption paradigm, and (b) cross the yellow journalism line of silence to expose their fellow colleague’s corruption. The media editor and media elite respondents herein cited, are as ideologically obedient to their code of silence about fellow media editors corruption, as Adolf Eichmann was to Nazism; they lack the capabilities to cross the yellow line and expose their own. [97] According to John Pilger: “It is not enough for journalists to see themselves as mere messengers without understanding the hidden agendas of the message and myths that surround it.” [98] In a Guardian article: Why Are Wars not being Reported Honestly140; John Pilger describes journalists and editors confirming their role as censorship agents, along similar lines of reasoning as detailed in Dr. T. Michael Maher’s report: How and Why Journalists Avoid the Population – Environment Connection,141 Pilger writes: "I am perfectly open to the accusation that we were hoodwinked," said Jeremy Paxman, talking about Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction to a group of students last year. "Clearly we were." As a highly paid professional broadcaster, he omitted to say why he was hoodwinked. Dan Rather, who was the CBS news anchor for 24 years, was less reticent. "There was a fear in every newsroom in America," he told me, "a fear of losing your job... the fear of being stuck with some label, unpatriotic or otherwise." Rather says war has made "stenographers out of us" and that had journalists questioned the deceptions that led to the Iraq war, instead of amplifying them, the invasion would

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http://www.newstime.co.za/rs_articles_contributors.asp?conid=9&recid=2357 http://www.newstime.co.za/column/DavidBullard/A_mosquito_buzzing_in_the_dark*/9/2200/ Radical Honesty SA Amicus Curiae: [II] Truth and Forgiveness Social Contract Principles: (B). Stanley Milgram Studies on Obedience: Legal, Socio-Political Implications, para.29; (C). Common Law Reasonableness Test: Skills and Competencies, para.30; and (D). Rule of Law and Forgiveness: Individuality, Independent and Integrity, para.31-33 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100718_rhwr-concourt-amicus?mode=a_p 140 http://johnpilger.com/articles/why-are-wars-not-being-reported-honestly 141 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/mahertm_journo-env-pop-connection?mode=a_p 138 139

not have happened. This is a view now shared by a number of senior journalists I interviewed in the US. "Does that make journalists accomplices?" I asked him. "Yes... unwitting perhaps, but yes." What is the value of journalists speaking like this? The answer is provided by the great reporter James Cameron, whose brave and revealing filmed report, made with Malcolm Aird, of the bombing of civilians in North Vietnam was banned by the BBC. "If we who are meant to find out what the bastards are up to, if we don't report what we find, if we don't speak up," he told me, "who's going to stop the whole bloody business happening again?" [99] John Pilgers The War You Don’t See142 Pilger traces the motivations for such censorship back to the father of public relations: Edward Bernays, the nephew of Sigmund Freud. [100] In Bernays’s 1928 book Propaganda143, he described the conspiracy of manipulating the public with ‘public relations news’ to behave as psychologically insecure, dumbed-down, automatonic zombie consumers, instead of educating them to be rational self-sufficient ecologically responsible citizens. [101] In How and Why Journalists Avoid Population-Environment Connection144, Dr. T. Michael Maher writes: As we have seen, both land development economists and environmental experts acknowledge population growth as a key source of environmental change. But journalists frame environmental causality differently. Why? Communication theory offers several possibilities. First is the hegemonytheory interpretation: reports omit any implication that population growth might produce negative effects, in order to purvey the ideology of elites who make money from population growth. As Molotch and Lester (1974) put it, media content can be viewed as reflecting "the practices of those having the power to determine the experience of others" (p. 120). Since real estate, construction and banking interests directly support the media through advertising purchases, this interpretation seems plausible. A number of media critics (e.g., Gandy, 1982; Altschull, 1984; Bennett, 1988) have suggested that media messages reflect the values of powerful political and commercial interests. Burd (1972), Kaniss (1991) and others have pointed out that newspapers have traditionally promoted population growth in their cities through civic boosterism. Molotch (1976) even suggested that cities can best be understood as entities competing for population growth, with the city newspaper as chief cheerleader. Certainly most reporters would be incensed at the suggestion that they shade their reporting to placate commercial interests. But Breed’s classic study of social control in the newsroom (1955) showed that news managers’ values are transmissible to journalists through a variety of pressures: salaries, story assignments, layout treatment, editing, and a variety of other strategies that effectively shape news stories in ways acceptable to management. [103] The Radical Honesty SA Amicus before the Constitutional Court, in The Citizen v. McBride 145 – totally censored by all the SA media -- makes this point very clearly in paragraph 7: Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud: Mainstream Accessto-Discourse-Gatekeeper Editors censorship146 of nonviolent political grievances and 142

http://www.johnpilger.com/videos/the-war-you-dont-see-trailer http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egcTynu6sBk Propaganda, by Edward L Bernays (Horace Liveright, 1928) 144 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/mahertm_journo-env-pop-connection?mode=a_p 145 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100718_rhwr-concourt-amicus?mode=a_p 146 “The moderate blacks were not selling the papers. We were presenting a non-violent strategy, that did not say ‘Burn, baby Burn’. A strategy that said people must come together and sit down around a negotiating table. And this is not sensational stuff; it does not sell the 143

problem solving activism facilitate a pressure cooker socio-political reality for their ‘If it Bleads, it Leads’ corporate propaganda profits, in knowledge application of: ‘As long as there is some possibility of getting results by political means, the chances that any political group or individual will turn violent are truly radically small, or maybe vanishingly small’147; ‘The exposure in the media is what gets people’s attention. People follow what is happening in the news, not what is happening in the courts’148; ‘[Editors] abuse of media power, by means of strategies whereby they abuse public discourse/free speech resources; by providing certain parties with preferential and special access to such public discourse, and severely restricting or denying others any access to such public discourse149; Mainstream media avoid addressing or enquiring into root causes of problems as reported in How and Why Journalists Avoid Population – Environment connection150; and censor non-violent root-cause problem solving activism151.

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The Concourt application was reported on by SAPA; with not very subtle insunuations that Johnstone was insane152. No psychological evidence or expert whatsoever was provided for the journalist’s insinuation. Johnstone was not asked for comment. On 15 April 2011 Jeni O’Grady of SA Press Association (SAPA) wrote another report on the Constitutional Courts dismissal of the Radical Honesty application, again published by various publications153. Both articles totally excluded any mention about the allegations and evidence of media corruption, or any detail about the TRC fraud allegations and evidence. None of the applications who published their biased smear articles provided their readers with a copy of the original Radical Honesty Application filed to the Court for their readers to determine whether the news publication’s report was an accurate or biased depiction of the legal documents filed with the Constitutional Court.

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An excellent example of how far the corporatist fascist elite goal’s of using the media as a psychological warfare brainwashing tool to destroy citizens identity’s as patriotic rational citizens, and mould their identities into psychologically insecure, dumbed-down,

papers.” – Rev. John Gogotya, ANC: VIP’s of Violence, documentary; “For revolutionary groups, the more murderous the deed, the more certain the media coverage.” -- Nicholas Partridge, Presenter, ANC: VIP’s of Violence. See: Transcript of ANC: VIP’s of Violence at: http://why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/p/anc-vips-of-violence.html 147 Clark McCauley, Ph.D, Prof. of Psychology at Bryn Mawr College, in When Does Political Anger Turn to Violence?, by Benedict Carey, New York Times, March 26, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/28carey.html 148 Jean Pierre Mean, Group General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, SGS Group, In Confronting Corruption: The Business Case for an Effective Anti-Corruption Programme, by PricewaterhouseCoopers Intnl [PDF: www.pwc.com/anti-corruption] 149 (I) Power and the news media, Teun A. van Dijk, Univ. of Amsterdam, D. Paletz (Ed.), Political Communication & Action. (pp. 9-36). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1995: http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Power%20and%20the%20news%20media.pdf 150 CCT 23-10: Statement of Consent by Dr. T. Michael Maher: http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/100522_cct2310_affid-dr-t-m-maher?mode=a_p How and Why Journalists Avoid Population-Environment Connection: http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/mahertm_journo-env-pop-connection?mode=a_p 151 HC-WC 19963-09: 140 SA Elite Deliberate Indifference to Rule of Law: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/56239025/ 152 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Woman-wants-editors-in-ConCourt-over-censorship-20110201 http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-02-western-cape-woman-wants-editors-in-court http://www.thenewage.co.za/9315-1008-53-WCape_woman_wants_editors_in_Concourt 153 http://m.sowetanlive.co.za/?name=sowetan&i=7896&lite=&art_id=14614&section=breaking&showonly=1 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ConCourt-dismisses-Johnstone-application-20110215 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/complaint-against-sapa-dismissed-1.1026935 http://www.newstime.co.za/SouthAfrica/ConCourt_Dismisses_Application_By_Lara_Johnstone/20816/ http://www.citizen.co.za/citizen/content/en/citizen/local-news?oid=172451&sn=Detail&pid=40&ConCourt-dismisses-Johnstone-application http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-15-concourt-dismisses-application-against-editors

consumerist mind-enslaved automatonic zombies; was provided to me; when I nominated

the Constitutional Court ruling dismissal of the Radical Honesty case, against 88 media respondents, as a World Guinness Record “of Judicial Incompetence – i.e. refusal to apply their minds to the evidence before them, to make such an impartial enquiry into such evidence; in accordance with the Rule of Law.”154 Guinness World Records declined to accept the submission stating that gross corruption was not of great interest to the worlds citizens. [51]

Concourt 06-11: Radical Honesty SA v. SANEF & 87 others, filed 28 Jan 2011. 1.

Application for Direct Access: Notice of Motion (PDF155)

Application for Direct Access: Founding Affidavit (PDF156)

Application for Condonation – Representation: Notice & Affidavit (PDF157)

Chief Justice’s Order Dismissing Application issued 01 February 2011 (PDF158)

[E] RADICAL HONESTY AMICUS CURIAE: 07-2010 EQ JHB: AFRIFORUM V. MALEMA [52]

On 19 April 2011 Radical Honesty filed an application to proceed as an Amicus Curiae in the ‘Kill Boers’ Hate Speech Equality Court case of Afriforum v. Malema (PDF159). The Amicus application requests the court to “admit the attached Heads of Argument as the Radical Honesty Culture and Religion’s Official For the Court Record Objective Reasonable160 Perspective in this matter: Heads of Argument of Lara Johnstone, Radical Honesty Culture; ‘Boer/Settler’ descendant of Dutch, French Huguenot and British ‘Settlers’: Hermanus Bosman, Andreus Lutgerus Kolver; Jacques de Villiers and James Augustus Johnstone; In Support of ‘Political Necessity French Riddle of the Kaffir Lily Pond’ Application of the Radical Honesty Population Policy Common Sense Interpretation of ANC’s ‘TRC Social Contract Fraud’; Recommendation to Constitutional Court to Resolve ‘Kill Boer/Settler Hate Speech’ Descartian v. Ubuntu Conformist Cultural Friction by Implementing: (A) 23 April 1994 Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination to

154

http://why-we-are-white-refugees.blogspot.com/2011/02/sas-trc-fraud-ecolaw-concourt.html http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_nom-hmentem?mode=a_p http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_f-affid_hmentem?mode=a_p 157 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110128_cct-0611_condonation?mode=a_p 158 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110201_cct_06-11_cct-dismissed?mode=a_p 159 http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110419__eq-07-10?mode=a_p 160 Affidavit of Brad Blanton, Ph.D, evidencing the legal, psychological, and socio-political ‘citizens privilege’, Nuremberg Principles skills and competencies of Individual Responsibility, required for acts of civil disobedience to perceived illegitimate authority; and their application to the common law ‘reasonableness test’; in terms of Criminal Procedure Act 51, of 1977: § 213: Proof of Written Statement by Consent; & § 171 & 172: Evidence on Commission 155 156

provide Boers with a ‘Kaffir’ Free Speech Volkstaat; and/or (B) Jus Sanguinis Repatriation of ‘Settlers’ to European Progenitor Nations.” [53]

The Founding Affidavit clarifies that Johnstone has various SA Court convictions for calling three different persons ‘Kaffirs’ in accordance with her Radical Honesty culture definitions of the word ‘Kaffir’; and that the courts ruled her cultural definition, cultural intentions and cultural expert witnesses to be irrelevant in their determination of the meaning of the word “kaffir’: [12] ‘Kaffir’ Contempt in Facie Curiae: Prison Sentence: One Year: [13] On 31 January 2003 I was convicted of ‘contempt in facie curiae’ for calling a black prosecutor (Sipoyo), and a white magistrate (ADS Meyer) respectively black and white ‘kaffirs’. The Prosecutor wanted to have me certified as insane, but she knew absolutely nothing about psychology. She did not know who Sigmund Freud is, let alone Karl Jung or Thomas Szaszz. She also had not the foggiest clue what a Forensic Psychologist is, or does; but she wanted to use her official authority as a prosecutor to have me certified as insane. I filed complaints161 with the NPA asking for her to be removed from my case; but instead I was arrested without the required arrest warrant paperwork and transferred to Lentegeur [Mental Institution] in the middle of the night. I escaped and hitch-hiked to Pretoria, to go and see the American Embassy. A US Embassy USAID Official called the Forensic Psychologist to enquire her reasons for my admission to Lentegeur. When I returned to George court, the same Prosecutor was still on my case. I told the Magistrate during court proceedings, that I did not want the corrupt black kaffir (deceiver) prosecutor on my case. He ordered me to apologize to her. I refused. He demanded I apologize, or he would convict me of Contempt of Court. I responded with ‘Fuck You, white Kaffir (deceiver)’ and your Two-Faced Gatkruiping Rainbow Hypocrisy and showed him the middle finger. He convicted me of three counts of contempt (2 x 3 months, and 6 months, served consecutively). I was denied parole, and served every single day of that prison term. [14] The NPA and Chief Justice Hlope refused to place the Appeal (HC-WC: A 696-04, leave granted on 16 February 2004, by Regional Magistrate VA Botha162), on the roll for hearing in the High Court, Western Cape. 163 [..] [26] ‘Kaffir’ Crimen Injuria: Prison Sentence: Six Months, Suspended 3 years: I am currently serving a six month prison term, suspended for three years, on a conviction and sentence of ‘crimen injuria’ for calling a politician (Mrs. Patricia de Lille) a ‘kaffir’ in a private SMS. The Magistrate ruled that my Radical Honesty culture definitions of ‘kaffir’ were irrelevant; my sincere motivations for sharing my anger honestly face-to-face in order to focus on attaining sincere forgiveness were irrelevant. It was irrelevant if the Radical Honesty culture’s definitions and meanings for the word are different to the politicians, even if the politician knew the definitions of ‘kaffir’ were not the same. The only thing that was important and relevant was that the politician decided to interpret my use of the word ‘kaffir’ according to her definition of ‘kaffir’, not mine; and consequently to feel hurt and insulted. The Magistrate had no interest whatsoever in hearing the expert witness

161

Questionable Qualifications and Understanding of Fundamental Legal Concepts displayed by George Prosecutor Ms. Sipoyo, in Case # C572-2002: Lara Johnstone (Johnson), dated 22 July 2002; and RE: Complaint dated 22 July 2002, Re: George Prosecutor’s Office in Case # C 572-2002: Lara Johnstone (Johnson) 162 06-06-17 HC-CPD A 696-04: HoA: S.4.1 (A) Chronology of Facts 163 HC-WC: Appeal A 696-04: Heads of Argument:

testimony of the leader – Brad Blanton -- of my culture: Radical Honesty, about how it was impossible for me to create the intention to insult, when my intention of sharing my anger honestly is the official Radical Honesty practice to share transparently and reach sincere forgiveness. Although the Registrar approved my In Forma Pauperis application164 to appeal the conviction and sentence, the appointed In Forma Pauperis attorneys Braam Swart & Partners declined to represent me for alleged reasons of ‘complexity of legal argument’165. [..] [29] Truth and Reconciliation Fraud: [..] [33] There was a nagging problem I have always had, which nobody has ever been able to give me an answer to; regarding the ANC’s alleged ‘tragedy of being forced to turn to a violent liberation struggle’. [34] “We must all understand that the most potent weapons of war are the penis and the womb. Therefore, if you cannot convince a group to control its population by discussion, debate, intelligent analysis etc., you must consider their action in using the penis and the womb to increase population an Act of War,” was the ‘Just War defence’ response by Former Judge Jason G. Brent, to an individual who disputed my statement that the National Party could rationally conclude that white South Africans would face extinction as a result of the ‘swart gevaar’; in the absence of implementing apartheid (the competitive exclusion principle). [35] I have so far submitted official requests to the European166, Netherlands167, Swiss168, UK169 Anti-Apartheid Movements: Could the ANC have won their struggle against Apartheid non-violently, by demonstrating their honourable Just War Just Cause Population Policy Intentions to end their Breeding War? [i] Prior to the ANC’s M-Plan declaration of War against Apartheid: Did any EU Anti-Apartheid Organisation advise the ANC or any SA Anti-Apartheid Organisation to avoid/suspend the violent ‘liberation struggle ’campaign against the Apartheid Goverment, and to launch a non-violent cultural and political campaign to stop the African ‘swart gevaar’ breeding-war population explosion, to demonstrate the ANC’s honourable Just War Just Cause Intentions? [ii] If (a) it was abundantly clear that the major fundamental motive for establishing Apartheid was fear of the ‘swart gevaar’; (2) Apartheid Officials and citizens ‘swart gevaar’ population policy fears are not only legally and ecologically justifiable, but common sense; (3) the ANC and Anti-Apartheid movement were culturally honourably concerned with Just War practices; (4) why did the ANC not consider launching a non-violent cultural and political campaign to stop their African ‘swart gevaar’ breeding-war population explosion, to demonstrate their honourable Just War Just Cause Intentions to ‘swart gevaar’ Apartheid Officials and citizens? [36] I have asked the following South African Anti-Apartheid Movement Organisations the same question: Nelson Mandela Foundation170; Archbishop Desmond Tutu171; 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

09-10-13: HC-WC: In Forma Pauperis Proceedings Referral to Braam Swart Partners 10-02-10: Braam Swart & Partners: In FormaPauperis Proceedings: L Johnstone http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AAM_EU_Ashton.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AAM_NL_IISG.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AAM_CH_Badler.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AAM_EU_Ashton.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/NMF_Mandela-Nelson.htm

President Jacob Zuma and African National Congress172; Ms. Helen Zille and Democratic Alliance173; Mr. Bantu Holomisa & UDM174; Mr. Amichand Rajbansi and Minority Front 175; Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)176; Ms. Patricia de Lille and Independent Democrats (ID)177; Letlapa Mpha-hlele, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)178; Mr. Lekota, Congress of the People (COPE)179; Mr. Hlabirwa Mathume, African People's Convention (APC)180; Mr. Lucas Mangope, United Democratic Christian Party (UCDM)181; Mr. Jacob Dikobo, Azanian People’s Organisation182; Mr. Kenneth Meshoe, African Christian Democratic Party183; the religious signatories to the Kairos Black Liberation Theology document justifying the violent liberation struggle as a just war: General Secretariat, SA Council of Churches184; Methodist Church185; Catholic Bishops Conference186; Anglican Church of SA187, etc; Mr. Raj Daja, Law Society of SA188; Ms. Janet Love, Legal Resources Center189; Adv. Jacob van Garderen, Lawyers for Human Rights190; Hugo van der Merwe, Center for Study of Violence and Reconciliation191; Frans Cronje, SA Institute of Race Relations192; Zwelinzima Vavi, COSATU 193; all editor members of SANEF who for the past 16 years have told SA’s directly and indirectly that the ANC’s resort to a violent liberation struggle was a last resort. [37] Not one of these organisations has yet provided me with an answer for whether any member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement suggested that the ANC adopt a nonviolent cultural and religions campaign to demonstrate their honourable Just War Just Cause Population Policy Intentions to end their Breeding War! And if not; why not? And if Not; how on earth they can justify the ANC’s adoption of violence as a last resort, when it is clear the ANC could have adopted a non-violent strategy which would have addressed the concerns of Apartheid politicians and citizens, and demonstrated their Just War Just Cause sincerity intentions. [..] [58] Consequently the Applicants In Forma Pauperis Amicus Curiae submission shall argue among others that: [i] ANC’s ‘liberation struggle’ violated Just War (Military Honour) Theory Principles of International Law [ii] The TRC negligently or intentionally avoided enquiring into evidence showing the ANC’s liberation struggle to have violated Just War Principles [iii] The ANC’s TRC was a falsification of history, and is the source of SA’s political and ecological systemic collapse braintumour; of which ‘Kill the Boer Hate Speech’ is simply one of many symptoms.

171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193

http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AVP_Varkevisser-Danie.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/ANC_Zuma-Jacob.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/DA_Zille-Helen.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/UDM_Holomisa-Bantu.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/MF_Rajbansi-Amichand.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/IFP_Buthelezi-Mangosuthu.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/ID_De-Lille-Patricia.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/PAC_Mpha-hlele-Letlapa.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/COPE_Lekota-MP.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/APC_Mathume-Hlabirwa.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/UCDP_Mangope-Lucas.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/AZAPO_Dikobo-Jacob.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/ACDP_Meshoe-Kenneth.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/SACC_SA-Cnc-Churches.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/Methodist-Ch-in-SA.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/Catholics-Bishops-Conf.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/Anglican-Ch-in-SA.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/LSSA_Daya-Raj.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/LegalResCtre_Love-Janet.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/LHR_vanGarderen-Jacob.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/CSVR_Kirsten-A.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/sairr.htm http://www.jussanguinis.com/JS-RoR/za/COSATU_Vavi-Z.htm

[iv] The ANC’s actions of poverty pimping population production breeding-war acts of war; speak far louder than their verbal diarrhoea platitudes of ‘commitment to nonviolence and peace’. [v] Their psychological admiration for ‘liberation struggle violence’ is found in their masculine insecurity breeding war poverty pimping, and the psychological theories of Frantz Fanon (the native’s colonized mind can only be liberated through violence, he can only regain his self respect, on the rotting corpse of the settler) and Black Liberation Theology (Black Power advocacy of violent Marxist Elimination of Whiteness as the road to Salvation/Reconciliation) [vi] Because Fundamentalist Black Liberation Theology ‘Anti-Whiteness’ Marxist Revolutionaries shall not rest until they achieve their Violent Marxist Cleansing Liberation / Reconciliation / Salvation on the Rotting Corpses of Boer/Settlers; the only way to enable Boer/Settlers to protect themselves is to: [a] Implement 23 April 1994 Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination, by endorsing and supporting the work of the Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie to establish a Boer Volkstaat; and/or [b] Initiate a Program of Jus Sanguinis Voluntary Repatriation of ‘Settlers’ to European Progenitor Nations, for Persecuted Settlers/African White Refugees who prefer to return to their Settler motherlands.

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The Radical Honesty Heads of Argument Table of Contents (PDF194):

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ADDRESSED AND RELIED UPON: ………………………………………………………….. A. Multicultural Conflict-of-Laws Substantive Due Process: Clarity & Impartiality.…………….

09 09

B. Bolam Test: Common Law Reasonableness Test: Skill & Competencies ………………………….. 11 C. Political Necessity: Freedom of Speech & Civil Disobedience …………………………………………. 13 D. Judicial Activism: A More Searching Judicial Enquiry: Search for Truth …………………………. 15 E. Ecolaw 101: Laws of Sustainability: Ecological Social Contract ………………………………………. 16 F. Law of Ecological Stability: State of System at Time the Act is Performed …………………… II: RADICAL HONESTY TRUTH & FORGIVENESS SOCIAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES …………….

19 20

A. Radical Honesty Overview: Being Specific about Anger and Forgiveness ……………..………… 20 B. Stanley Milgram Studies on Obedience: Legal, Socio-political Implications ………………..…. 21 C. Common Law Reasonableness Test: Skills and Competencies …………………………………………. 22 D. Rule of Law & Forgiveness: Individuality, Independence & Integrity ……………………………… III: POPULATION POLICY COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLES …………………………………………………….

23 24

A. French Riddle of the Lily Pond: State of the Eco-Cultural System ………………………………….. 25

194

B. Thou Shalt Not Transgress Carrying Capacity Prophets ……………………………………….……….

C. Eco-Numeracy: Exponential Functions and Carrying Capacity …………………………………...

D. Tragedy of the Commons: Limited World, Limited Rights …………………………………………….

E. Overpopulation: Resources Scarcity and Resource War Violence …………………………………

F. Demographics and Violence: Youth Bulges ……………………………………………………………………

http://issuu.com/js-ror/docs/110419__eq-07-10?mode=a_p

G. Population Pressures, Resource Wars and National Security ……………………………………...

H. How and Why Journalists Avoid the Population-Environment Connection ………………...

IV: JUST WAR & TRAGEDY OF ANC’S BREEDING WAR COMMONS …………………………………….

A. Apartheid: Crime Against Humanity; or Just War for Demographic Survival? ………………..

B. ANC’s Liberation Struggle violated Just War (Honour) Theory Principles: …………..…………

C. No Just Cause: ANC Could Have Non-violently Ended their Breeding War ……………………….. 37 D: No Right Intention: Apartheid raised Black Living Standards to Highest in Africa …………

E: No Proper Authority: Did Black South Africans want Black Rule? ……………………………………

F: No Proportional Force: People’s War Terror for ‘Liberation Struggle’………………..………….

G No Proportional Force: ANC’s Mbokodo Quatro Torture Camps …………………………………….

H: War No Last Resort: Violence a Liberating Force’ on Rotting Corpse of Settler …………..

V: TRC FRAUD: ‘CRIME OF APARTHEID’ WAS FALSIFICATION OF SA HISTORY ……………….

A. TRC Social Contract Maintains Legal Oppression by Avoiding Key Definitions ……………….

B. Black Liberation Theology vs Calvinist Christian Concepts of Reconciliation ……………….

C. Was Truth & Reconciliation Seen to be Done by Black Liberation Theology TRC? ………..

D. Nature & Causes of Apartheid: A Just War for Demographic Survival? ………………………..

E. Farm Murders: A Rainbow TRC Peace, or Racial Hatred War Reality? …………………………...

F. ANC’s Masculine Insecurity Poverty Pimping Population Production Breeding War………..

VI. A DESCARTIAN DIALOGUE: INTENTIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF ‘KAFFIR’? ………………..

A. Existential Friction Theory Identities: Boer Descartian v. Ubuntu Conformist ……………….

B. Radical Honesty Habeus Mentem Eco-Psycho-Cultural Definitions of Kaffir ……………………

C. SA Courts: Radical Honesty Intention & Definitions of ‘Kaffir’ Irrelevant ………………………

D. CCT: Radical Honesty Intention & Definitions of ‘Kaffir’: Not In Interests of Justice …... 99 VI. STATE OF TRC FRAUD’S SYSTEM: SYSTEMIC ECO-CULTURAL COLLAPSE ………………….

100

A. 74% OF White South Africans: We Are African White Refugees ………………………………………. 100 B. Ethno-Nationalism is foundation for Democracy, not its threat …………………………………….. 101 C. Multi-culturalism is Impossible with Dysfunctional Cultures ………………………………………….. 102 D. Peak Oil, Economic Collapse & Friction Theory Cultural Conflict ………………………………….. 103 E. Parallel Goals: Economic Relocalisation & Political Secession ……………………………………….. 106 F. Boer Volkstaat in SA: Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie (VVK) ………………………………………….. 107

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Radical Honesty SA’s reasonable recommendation to the Parties and Court being: [21] In the absence of a Truly Impartial Truth and Reconciliation Commission run by International Independents such as Dr. Blanton and Pastor James Manning to lobotomize SA’s TRC Fraud Political Tumour; the Eco-Cultural State of the Body Political System shall collapse from the pressure cooker masculine insecurity rage of perceived insults if ‘Kill the Boer’ and ‘Kaffir’ are both designated as Freedom of Speech.

[212] Unless they find the honourable courage to prove me wrong: Fundamentalist Black Liberation Theology ‘Anti-Whiteness’ Marxist Revolutionaries shall not rest until they achieve their Violent Marxist Cleansing Liberation / Reconciliation / Salvation on the Rotting Corpses of Boer/Settlers. ‘Kill the Boer’ is their Mascot, towards that ultimate ‘Settler Free Utopia’. Consequently, to enable Boer/Settlers to protect themselves: [A]Implement 23 April 1994 Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination for a Boer ‘Kaffir’ Free Speech Volkstaat, by endorsing and supporting the work of the Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie, for a Boer Volkstaat; and/or [B] Initiate a Program of Jus Sanguinis Voluntary Repatriation of ‘Settlers’ to European Progenitor Nations, for Persecuted Settlers/African White Refugees who prefer to return to their Settler motherlands.

[56]

Radical Honesty Application to Proceed as Amicus Curiae in Afriforum v. Malema: 1.

Notice of Motion: Application of Lara Johnstone, Radical Honesty Culture & Religion, to Proceed as an Amicus Curiae; Founding Affidavit of Lara Johnstone; and Heads of Argument: Written Submissions of Radical Honesty – SA (PDF195)

[57]

Copies of the Radical Honesty Notice, Affidavit and Heads of Argument were provided to SA Media196, Political Parties and NGO’s; as well as European ‘Settler’ Progenitor/Stamvader Nations, via their Embassies and other European Nations: 1.

Prime Minister Mark Rutte, c/o: Hon. Amb. Z.E. dhr. Rob de Vos; Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Ambassade197

President Nicolas Sarkozy, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Jacques Lapouge, Republique Francaise Embassy198

Ch. Angela Merkel & Fed. Min. of State, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Dieter W. Haller, Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ambassador199

Prime Minister David Cameron, c/o: Hon HC HE Dr. Nicola Brewer, British High Commission200

Pres. H. Inderkum, Council of States, c/o: Hon. Amb. H E Mr R Bäerfuss, Embassy of the Swiss Confederation201

Mr. A. Fogh Rasmussen, Sec. Gen. NATO, c/o: Office of the Defense Attaché, Embassy of Belgium in Pretoria202

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President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, c/o: HE Mr Carlos Sersale Di Cerisano, Argentine Republic Embassy203

Prime Minister Heinz Fischer, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Dr Otto Ditz, Rep. of Austria Embassy204

Prime Minister Julia Gillard, c/o: HE HC Hon. Ms Ann Harrap, Australia High Commission205

10.

Prime Minister Yves Leterme, c/o: Hon. Amb HE Jan F. Mutton, Embassy of Belgium in Pretoria206

11.

Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, c/o: HE Amb. Mr Volodya Neykov, Republic of Bulgaria Embassy207

12.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper, c/o: HE HC Ms Adele Dion, Canada High Commission208

13.

President Vaclav Klaus, c/o: HE Amb. Mr Martin Pohl, Republic of Czech Embassy209

14.

Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen, c/o: HE Amb. Dan Frederiksen, Embassy of Kingdom of Denmark210

15.

Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, c/o: Hon. Consul: Ms Rena Knipe, Republic of Estonia Honorary Consulate211

16.

King Juan Carlos I, PM José LR Zapatero, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Benavides Orgaz, Kingdom of Spain Embassy212

17.

Prime Minister Mari Kiviniemi, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Tiina Myllyntausta, Republic of Finland Embassy213

18.

Prime

Minister

Giorgos

Papandreou

MP,

c/o:

Hon. 214

Theocharopoulas, Hellenic Republic of Greece Embassy 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213

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Amb.

HE Ms

19.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban; c/o & via: Hon. Amb. HE Emri Istvan, Embassy of Republic of Hungary215

20.

President Mary McAleese, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Mr Colin Wrafter, Embassy of Republic of Ireland216

21.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Mr D Segev-Steinberg, State of Israel Embassy217

22.

Pres. G Napolitano & PM Silvio Berlusconi, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Mr Elio Menzione, Italian Republic Embassy218

23.

Pres. D Grybauskaitė & PM A Kubilius, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Ms I Skardziuviene, Republic of Lithuania Honorary Consulate219

24.

Prince Albert II & Min. of State: M Roger, c/o: Mr Francis Kasasa, Honorary Consul, Principality of Monaco Hon. Consulate220

25.

King Harald V, PM Stoltenberg, P Andersen, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Tor Christian Hildan, Royal Norwegian Embassy221

26.

Prime Minister John Key, c/o: Hon. HC HE Mr Geoff J Randal, New Zealand High Commission222

27.

Pres. A. Cavaco Silva, PM José Sócrates, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Mr Joao Ramos Pinto, Republic of Portugal Embassy223

28.

Pres. Boris Tadić & PM Mirko Cvetković, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Dr G Vujicic, Republic of Serbia Embassy224

29.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, c/o: Hon. Amb. HE Anatoly A. MAKAROV, Embassy of the Russian Federation225

30.

King Carl XVI Gustaf & PM F. Reinfeldt, c/o: HE Mr Peter Tejler, Ambassador, Kingdom of Sweden Embassy226

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31.

President Barack Obama, c/o: HE Mr DH Gips, Ambassador, United States of America Embassy227

32.

Pope Benedict XVI & Pres. G. Lajolo, c/o: Holy See: Nuncio of the Vatican, HE Archbishop James Patrick Green228

[58]

On 05 May 2011, Johnstone requested the Press Ombudsman, Mr. Joe Thloloe to please provide the SANEF editors reasons for their censorship229: Please would you be so kind as to inform me exactly what the SANEF editors reasons are; why the TRC FRAUD arguments of the Radical Honesty NL-FR-DE-UK-CH 'Boer/Settler' Applic. filed in Afriforum v Malema (PDF enclosed as per email sent on Thu, 21 Apr 2011 11:30:07 +0200); are determined not of interest to SA citizens. The Registrar received the Radical Honesty SA application to proceed as an Amicus Curiae, served on 19 April 2011. The Registrar submitted the application to Judge Colin Lamont on 19 April 2011. Judge Colin Lamont noted as part of public court proceedings on 20 April 2011, that he had received the Radical Honesty SA Application to proceed as an Amicus Curiae. The application is still before Judge Lamont, who shall issue his ruling in due course. Neither Afriforum, TAU-SA, Mr. Malema, or the ANC have yet filed any objections to the Radical Honesty SA Amicus application. I am unclear as to what factors these SANEF editors use to determine what is and is not in the public interest; and how exactly these TRC fraud arguments and their Black Liberation Theology TRC â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;violence on the rotting corpses of settlersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and population policy clash of cultures friction theory consequences detailed in this trial; are determined not to be in the interests of SA citizens.

[59]

A subsequent request on 06 May 2011 to enquire whether Mr. Thloloe intended to provide a response, has simply been ignored.

[60]

Respondents Ms. Celia Dugger of the Africa New York Times bureau, Ms. Ainslinn Laing of the UK Telegraph, and Editor Mr. Casper Naber of the Algemene Dagblad have also been provided with various updates on the TRC FRAUD legal applications filed to the Constitutional Court, as well as the TRC FRAUD arguments filed in the Boer Volkstaat Theses Briefing Paper (PDF230) submitted to Boer/Settlers European Stamvader/Progenitor Nations, NATO and other EU nations231. None of the SA Media Editors; nor the New York Times, Telegraph or Algemene Dagblad have provided any argument or evidence to contradict any of the TRC FRAUD arguments and evidence submitted to them; yet they refuse to publish the information or to allow for the TRC FRAUD argument to be debated in SA or International public discourse. The

226 227 228 229 230 231

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consequences of their censorship being their endorsement of the real life genocide and crimes against humanity consequences of the TRC FRAUD; such as for example: Farmer: Andre van der Merwe murdered, dragged 1.2 km behind his truck232 (No English News Media reports found in online search; only Beeld & blog translations) Farmer van der Merwe was unmarried, was dragged about 1.2 km behind his own Toyota truck by his murderers, who shot him in the back of his head, chest and cheek, said the NorthWest police. “You did not want to see the corpse. The murderers tortured him terrible. He did not have a shirt on anymore and his shorts were torn apart. They dragged him behind the truck over loose wire and mud,” said a man who wished to remain anonymous, for fear of being persecuted. 04-09-09 to 10-06-01: Helen Lotter, 57 & Alice Lotter, 76, tortured to death; Kill the Boer in blood on Welkom farm house wall (Censored by English SA media; who were too busy reporting on the ‘racism’ of the Reitz Four satire video in Bloemfontein) (PDF attached) Boer woman’s womb was carved from her body with a broken beer-bottle… 2010-06-09 Welkom, Free State. The unmarried 57-year-old farm woman Miss Helen Lotter was stabbed repeatedly with a broken beer-bottle – so fiercely and deeply that her sexual organs internally and externally were extensively mutilated – and her cervix and uterus were completely missing: ’ testimony by coroner. “Most cruel, violent crimes I’d ever seen while on the Bench…’ said High Court judge S.P.B. Hancke The gardener of the two unarmed, frail Boer women who were tortured to death on March 6 2009 was found guilty of their extremely cruel murders. The trial left many questions unanswered: why the women were tortured to death over a three-hour period; why the slogan “Kill the Boer’ was daubed on the farm house wall; why so little of value was ‘robbed’. High Court judge S.P.B. Hancke ruled that it was proven beyond any reasonable doubt that gardener Joseph Hlongwane, 22, had tortured to death the elderly, unarmed Helen Lotter and her daughter Alice, 57, on March 6 2009. No explanation was given by the gardener as to why he had displayed such extreme cruelty, carrying out at least three hours of torture. He will be sentenced on Wednesday 9 June 2010. Helen Lotter, 57 died of repeated, sharp trauma injuries to her lower body The frail, unarmed mother, Mrs Alice Lotter (76) died from multiple, deep stabbing wounds to her neck and throat on the night of 6 March 2009; her daughter Helen, left, succumbed to 'severe, repeated, sharp trauma injuries to her lower body administered with knives and a broken beer bottle.' A post-mortem examination by Dr Horst Bumba described that all of Helen’s front teeth were bashed out and that her entire body and face were ‘covered in severe bruises, chafing and stabbing wounds.’ Helen Lotter was tortured so extensively that her womb 'was completely missing', and 'slabs of human fat the size a man's hand were sliced off her body', according to the post-mortum examiner’s testimony.

[61]

The 3000 farm murders have occurred in a country officially allegedly at peace, after having achieved alleged ‘reconciliation’, indicate that the “rainbow reconciled nation” is nothing but an illusion not reflected in evidentiary facts and reality on the ground. People who have forgiven each other, or are participating in

232

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such a conversation, collaborate to address and eliminate the root causes of their dispute, they don’t murder, rape and torture those they allegedly forgave, in order to rob them; unless their definition for ‘forgiveness’ is liberation and salvation ‘murder, rape and torture’ on the ‘rotting corpses of settlers’. [62]

The Complainants consequently Request the ICC: Prosecutor’s Office to: 1.

Initiate an investigation into the allegations that the respondents are to be held criminally culpable for their endorsement and concealment of TRC FRAUD, the consequences of which are genocide and crimes against humanity against white South Africans, and ethno-cultural legal and political persecution of Afrikaner/Boer and Radical Honesty cultures.

Dated at George, this 08th day of May, 2011. Signed and Sworn to at George on this the 08th day of May 2011, the Deponent acknowledging that she knows and understands the contents of this Affidavit, and that she has no objection to taking the prescribed oath and that the oath is binding on her conscience.

___________________________ LARA JOHNSTONE, Complainant P O Box 5042, George Est, 6539 Tel/Fax: (044) 870 7239 Email: jmcswan@mweb.co.za.

Wednesday, 9 June 2010 Tortured farm women’s gardener guilty

“M o s t c r u e l , v i o l e n t c r i m e s I ’d e v e r s e e n w h i l e o n t h e B e n c h …’ s a i d H i g h C o u r t judge S.P.B. Hancke 2010-06-09 Welkom, Free State. The gardener of the two unarmed, frail Boer women who were tortured to death on March 6 2009 was found guilty of their extremely cruel murders. The trial left many questions unanswered: why the women were tortured to death over a three-hour period; why the slogan “Kill the Boer’ was daubed on the farm house wall; why so little of value was ‘robbed’. High Court judge S.P.B. Hancke ruled that it was proven beyond any reasonable doubt that gardener Joseph Hlongwane, 22, had tortured to death the elderly, unarmed Helen Lotter and her daughter Alice , 57, on March 6 2009. No explanation was given by the gardener as to why he had displayed such extreme cruelty, carrying out at least three hours of torture. He will be sentenced on Wednesday 9 June 2010. Helen Lotter, 57,

died of the repeated, very severe sharp trauma injuries to her lower body

The frail, unarmed mother, Mrs Alice Lotter (76) died from multiple, deep stabbing wounds to her neck and throat on the night of 6 March 2009; her daughter Helen, left, succumbed to 'severe, repeated, sharp trauma injuries to her lower body administered with knives and a broken beer bottle.' A post-mortem examination by Dr Horst Bumba described that all of Helen’s front teeth were bashed out and that her entire body and face were ‘covered in severe bruises, chafing and stabbing wounds.’ B r o k e n b e e r b o t t l e : H l o n g w a n e ’s p r e f e r r e d m u r d e r w e a p o n ?

Hlongwane was also found guilty of murdering Allanridge resident Bongani Landu on 2 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 7 . Apparently broken beer-bottles were Hlongwane's choice of weapon: he'd stabbed Landu to death with a broken beer bottle - and tortured Helen Lotter to death by stabbing her repeatedly into the vagina and anus with a broken beer bottle. She was tortured so extensively that her womb 'was completely missing', and 'slabs of human fat the size of a man's hand were sliced off her body', according to the post-mortum examiner’s testimony.

The convicted murderer's legal counsel, advocate Jan Nkhahle, submitted extinuating circumstances: Hlongwane is a single man with a little daughter, and also was “very young” at the time of the murders. "He completed his matric in 2005 and started medical studies but had to break them off because of financial problems,' he said. ‘ T h e s o u n d s m y s i s t e r m a d e a t t h e h o s p i t a l w i l l h a u n t m e a l l m y l i f e …’

Volksblad journalist Corne van Zyl also quoted Mrs Antoinette Horn, t he daughter and sister of the murdered women and who had attended the trial throughout. She said that 'the sounds which my sister made while they offloaded her from the ambulance at the hospital, will haunt me all my life. It's however a chapter one must try and close so that one can get on with one's Created with www.PDFonFly.com

life. Nothing is going to bring back my mother and sister.' “ I t w o u l d h a v e b e e n e a s y t o j u s t t i e t h e s e u n a r m e d w o m e n u p t o r o b t h e m …’

Just like the state witnesses had said during the trial, both the State counsel advocate Sophie Giorgi and judge Hancke also expressed deep shock about the extreme cruelty displayed by Hlongwane – especially towards his victim Alice Lotter. ● ●

Barbaric, gruesome…

"In my 25 years on the Bench this is the first time I have ever heard reports about a person murdered from the sharp trauma and injuries administered to her lower body. I can't do anything else except to describe these murders as barbaric and gruesome,' said Giorgi. She also submitted that the murderer should be sentenced to a lifetime in prison without any extinuating factors. "The court should also take into consideration the fact that the Lotter women were both unarmed, frail women. "It would have been easy to just tie them up and rob them without having to use any violence,' said Giorgi.

Judge Hancke also said this was the first time in his long career that he had ever come across such violence. "It seems to me as if the murders are carried out in a more gruesome and violent manner than before,' he said. Hlongwane also was found guilty of murdering Allanridge resident Bongani Landu on 2 November 2007 – he had stabbed him to death with a broken beer-bottle… http://www.volksblad.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Tuinier-skuldig-aan-2-se-dood-20100609 B o e r w o m a n ’s w o m b w a s c a r v e d f r o m h e r b o d y w i t h a b r o k e n b e e r -b o t t l e …

The unmarried 57-year-old farm woman Miss Helen Lotter was stabbed repeatedly with a broken beer-bottle – so fiercely and deeply that her sexual organs internally and externally were extensively mutilated – and her cervix and uterus were completey missing: ’ testimony by coroner:

2010-06-03 Tom de Wet VIRGINIA. – The gruesome cruelties suffered by the murdered Miss Helen Lotter, 57, and her mother Alice became very clear when coroner Dr Horst Bumba’s report to the Welkom High Court showed that Helen Lotter’s cervix and uterus were ‘missing’ and that her death was caused by ‘sharp trauma and injuries to her lower body’ incurred during the attack against the two Afrikaner women in their Allenridge, Free State farm house on March 6 2010.

Dr Horst Bumba’s report also described that all her front teeth were bashed out and that her entire body was ‘covered in bruises, chafing and stabbing wounds. Her sexual parts were mutilated extensively also internally. Dr Bomba was unable to find the unmarried Afrikaans woman’s uterus or cervix (womb). He described these extreme injuries as 'having been caused by very clear penetration with a sharp object’. Due to the extreme injuries, Dr Bumba was unable to determine whether she had been raped. Another report by medical examiner Dr Wilhelm van Heusden of the mother Alice, 76, concluded that the old farm woman had died due to ‘asphyxiation after breathing in blood from penetrating stabbing wounds in her neck and throat’. G a r d e n e r ‘s c l a i m t h a t h e w a s f o r c e d t o s i g n a c o n f e s s i o n r e j e c t e d b y t h e Bench: A ‘trial-within-a-trial’ was also held by Judge S.P.B. Hancke, assisted by two assessors, to determine the admissability of a conflicting signed and sworn confession by the one of the two accused black men who are on trial for murdering the women; their gardener, Joseph Hlongwane (22) and Joseph Khumalo (21). Judge Hancke examined all the statements submitted to the court by Hlongwane, including his claims that he had been ‘threatened, forced and dictated’ by the police to submit this confession. However the Bench ruled that Hlongwane had submitted the signed confession ‘from his own free will’ and that he himself had moreover, provided detailed descriptions of the way in which thewith attack on the Created www.PDFonFly.com

Lotter women had been carried out, including what he’d taken away from their homestead.” The Bench ruled the gardener’s confession legally-admissable after examining all the statements by Wesselsbron magistrate J A Smith, SAPS captain Francois Laux; warrant-officer James Mahlatsi, the investigating officer, and Captain André Niemann. “ I ’ d s t a b b e d h e r t w i c e i n t h e n e c k b e c a u s e s h e o w e d m e m o n e y …’

Hlongwane claimed in his confession, ruled admissable by the Bench, that he had ‘stabbed Mrs Alice Lotter twice with a pair of scissors in the neck because she owed me money”, after she had refused to pay him. Before the murders he’d gotten himself drunk at a local shebeen with his comrade Joseph Khumalo, they had returned to the farm and he had gone inside the farm house to argue with Mrs Lotter. He had submitted this statement to magistrate Smith in Wesselsbron three days after the double-murder. However this contradicts the old mother’s dying statement to Captain Koos Venter, the police officer who had found the mortally-wounded mother and daughter. ●

Her “death-bed confession’ was that the gardener had broken into their homestead by crashing through a window and that he had ‘hurt “ both women after the mother had spotted ‘a group of men standing outside at their bakkie and had warned them to go away or she’d phone the police’. Mrs Lotter told Captain Venter and an attending paramedic that she had recognised their gardener when he was climbing through the window. (The forensic evidence before the court earlier was that the window had broken into from the outside). http://www.volksblad.com/SuidAfrika/Nuus/Wreedaardigheid-van-moorde-blyk-uit-verslae-20100603

Just before she died, the mortally-wounded Alice had told investigating SAPS captain Koos Venter that the women were tortured by their gardener, Joseph (Hlongwane, 22) – and had pointed the policeman to the worker’s personal details which she kept inside her passport, which made it very easy for them to arrest the man shortly thereafter. Hlongwane was also directly linked to the murders of the two frail women by fingerprints lifted from the crime-scene by forensic experts, the court heard.

The mother’s last words to the Afrikaner policeman were “Thank the Lord that you care for us and that we can hide with you…’’ Alice Lotter died shortly after her arrival at hospital, her daughter Helen died several days later. Hlongwane, 22 and his co-accused Joseph Khumalo, 21 had denied all the charges. The torture/murders caused deep anger throughout the Afrikaner/Boer community. Information submitted by police members to the news media shortly after the murder also was that the words ‘Kill the Boer’ had alsobeen daubed in the women’s blood on the farmhouse walls. However while crimescene photographs were submitted, this aspect – providing a very clear political motive – was not raised during the trial: Hlongwane was not put on the witness stand for cross-examination. Shortly before he was also murdered in April 2010 - hacked to death so brutally that he was unrecognisable and his limbs were nearly severed - Ventersdorp farmer Eugene Terre’Blanche, leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), also referred to the extreme cruelty of the Lotter women’s torture-murders in media interviews. Terre’Blanche had also led peaceful protest actions at the Odendaalsrust law courts when the suspects made their first remand appearances in April last year. The Boer protestors (pictured above) also demanded that the murderers be hanged – and had also carried out graphic re-enactments depicting the exact way in which the Lotter women had been put to death – scenes which shocked many onlookers and caused indignation in the news media. Shortly before he was murdered a year later - hacked to death so brutally that he was unrecognisable - ailing Ventersdorp farmer Eugene Terre’Blanche, leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), also often referred to the extreme cruelty of the Lotter women’s torture-murders in media interviews. Terre’Blanche had led the peaceful protest actions at the Odendaalsrust law courts when the suspects had made their first remand appearances and applied for bail in April 2009. The Boer protestors carried out a graphic re-enactment of the way in which the Lotter women had been put to death and also demanded the return of the death sentence for such cruel race-hate crimes.. Their reenactment was so graphic that it had shocked many onlookers and caused outrage in the Afrikaanslanguage news media. Created with www.PDFonFly.com

A N C -M A Y O R M R S M A T A B A L E E T O A L S O L E D A C O U N T E R -P R O T E S T

The local ANC-mayor also organised a counter-protest with local ANC-cadres at the same time: but the Boer and ANC protestors did not clash: they were kept seperated by a large police force which was being ordered around by the ANC-mayor, who told the Boers that their protest was ‘illegal’. The two groups then stood side-by-side on the curb opposite the law court, loudly trying to outdo each other in singing their respective national anthems in their own languages… as can be seen on the picture below: the ANC contingent can be seen in the background, the Boers in front. http://censorbugbear-reports.blogspot.com/2009/04/odendaalsrust-law-court-scene-of-angry.html “C a p t a i n w h e r e a r e y o u ? ’

Captain Koos Venter, head of the detective unit at Allanridge, testified that he had received a call from Mrs Alice Lotter on the evening of March 6 2009. She ‘d asked him: “Captain where are you?” in Afrikaans – and then the line went dead. He was unable to call her back, so he jumped into his car and chased from his home in Odendaalsrus to the Allanridge farm. At the backdoor of the homestead he found a ‘very badly injured Miss Helen Lotter.’ Her face was coated in blood, some of her teeth had been smashed out, she wore a bloodied t-shirt and her naked underbody was covered in blood. A bloodied knife and scissors were found at the scene as well as bloodied beer-glas shards lying near the daughter’s legs. He found the mother Ieaning against a dining-room chair, just about to fall over. He gently helped her lie down on the carpet of the living room. She asked him: “Who are you?” while he examined the ‘gaping wounds at her throat, arms and hands,’ he told the court. ●

He told the mortally-injured old woman that he was Captain Venter, and then she told the Afrikaner police man “Thank the Lord that you care for us and that we can hide with you…’

Venter briefly searched the house and came across the women’s two dogs, locked into a room. He then rushed back to the women and tried to make them more comfortable while waiting for the emergency service he’d alerted, to arrive. While doing this Mrs Alice Lotter told him that it was Joseph, the gardener, who had ‘hurt them’. She also told Captain Venter that Joseph’s personal details were kept inside her passport, which was on the dining table. She didn’t speak anything else after that and died shortly thereafter at the hospital. Venter testified that he had 31 years of police service behind him – and that this was the bloodiest and cruellest crime scene he had ever seen. Hlongwane was also linked to the murder by finger-prints found at the crime-scene by forensic experts, reported Volksblad. The public prosecutor in this case is Advocate Sophie Giorgi, the defence counsellors are Advocate Jan Nkhahle and Mr. Lawrence Chabalala (sp?). Judge Hancke is assisted on the Bench by two Assessors,: Mr P Haasbroek and Mrs B Smal. Sentencing of the convicted gardener is expected shortly at the Welkom High Court. http://www.volksblad.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Bejaarde-se-gebed-laaste-woordevoor-dood-20100601 Excerpts: http://censorbugbear-reports.blogspot.com/2010/06/tortured-farm-womens-gardenerguilty.html

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Tuinier skuldig aan 2 se dood 2010-06-09 01:41

Corné van Zyl VIRGINIA.– Die tuinier van die Lotter-vroue van Allanridge is gister hier deur regter S.P.B. Hancke in die hooggeregshof skuldig bevind op drie aanklagte van moord en huisbraak met die opset om te roof en roof met verswarende omstandighede. Mnr. Joseph Hlongwane (22) is die tuinier wat by die Lotter-vroue gewerk het. “Die geluide wat my suster destyds gemaak het toe hulle haar by die hospitaal uit die ambulans laai, spook steeds by my, maar dis ’n hoofstuk wat mens moet afsluit en aangaan met jou lewe. Niks gaan my ma en suster terugbring nie,” het mev. Antoinette Horn gister ná dié uitspraak gesê. Adv. Sophie Giorgi, vir die staat, asook regter Hancke het gister hulle skok oor die wreedaardigheid van dié moorde uitgespreek. “In my 25 jaar in die hof is dit die eerste keer wat ek sien dat iemand weens die skerp trauma en beserings aan haar onderlyf dood is. Ek kan nie anders as om die moorde as barbaars en grusaam te beskryf nie,” het Giorgi gesê. Sy het ook in haar betoog aangevoer dat die hof in ag moet neem dat dié twee vroue ongewapen ten tyde van die aanval was. “Dit sou maklik gewees het om dié twee vroue te oorrompel, vas te bind en te beroof sonder om geweld te gebruik,” het Giorgi gesê. Sy het ook gesê sy meen dat die gepaste vonnis lewenslange tronkstraf moet wees sonder versagtende omstandighede. Regter Hancke het ook genoem dat dit die eerste keer in sy loopbaan as regter is wat hy met dié soort geweld te doen het. “Dit is vir my asof moorde deesdae meer gewelddadig word as destyds,” het hy in die uitspraak gesê. Hlongwane se verteenwoordiger, adv. Jan Nkhahle, het die regter gevra om die ouderdom van die beskuldigde tydens die moorde in ag te neem asook die feit dat die beskuldigde enkellopend is en ’n dogtertjie het. “Hlongwane het sy matriek in 2005 gemaak, waarna hy medies wou studeer, maar weens finansiële probleme kon hy nie sy studies voortsit nie en moes hy vir R40 in die Lotters se tuin werk om eendag vir sy studies te kon betaal,” het Nkhahle in sy betoog gesê. Mev. Alice Lotter (76) is die nag van 6 Maart 2009 aan steekwonde in haar nek en keel dood en mej. Helen Lotter (56) later in die hospitaal aan veelvuldige steekwonde in haar onderlyf. Hlongwane is ook skuldig bevind aan die moord van mnr. Bongani Landu, wat die nag van 2 November 2007 op die dorp met ’n gebreekte bierbottel doodgesteek is. Hlongwane word vandag gevonnis. - Volksblad Generated by www.PDFonFly.com at 7/10/2010 12:30:17 PM URL: http://www.volksblad.com/printArticle.aspx?iframe&aid=d4a24e74-25e1-4aa6-836d-d01088f91c29&cid=2114

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Wreedaardigheid van moorde blyk uit verslae 2010-06-03 01:01

Tom de Wet VIRGINIA. – Die gruwelike wreedheid van die grusame en wreedaardige moorde op ’n bejaarde vrou van Allanridge en haar ongetroude dogter het hier in die hooggeregshof die eerste keer uit die lykskouingsverslae duidelik geword. Mej. Helen Lotter (57) se dood is veroorsaak deur skerp trauma en beserings aan haar onderlyf toe sy en haar ma op 6 Maart 2009 in hul huis aangeval is. Luidens die verslag van dr. Horst Bumba, wat as bewysstuk by die hof ingedien is, was mej. Lotter se voortande uit en haar hele liggaam was vol sny-, kneus en skaafwonde. Haar geslagsdele was vermink tot in haar ingewande, wat ook beskadig is. Met die lykskouing was daar geen uterus of serviks nie. Hy beskryf die oorsaak van die beserings as “duidelike penetrasie met ’n skerp voorwerp”. Daar kon weens die omvang van dié beserings nie vasgestel word of sy verkrag is nie. Luidens die verslag van dr. Wilhelm van Heusden is mev. Alice Lotter (76) dood weens verstikking en versmoring ná die inaseming van bloed weens penetrerende steekwonde in haar nek en keel. Regter S.P.B. Hancke het gister in die binneverhoor in die verhoor van die twee beskuldigdes, mnre. Joseph Hlongwane (22) en Joseph Khumalo (21), bevind Hlongwane se bewerings dat hy deur die polisie gedreig, gedwing en voorgesê is wat hy in sy vroeëre bekentenis moet sê, is onwaar. Regter Hancke het beslis dat Hlongwane die bekentenis, met detail-beskrywings oor hoe die aanval op die twee Lotter-vroue plaasgevind het en wat in hul huis gesteel is, vrywillig afgelê het en dit as getuienis toegelaat word. Dit kom ná getuieis in dié verband deur landdros J.A. Smith van Wesselsbron voor wie die bekentenis afgelê is, asook kapt. Francois Laux wat by die uitwysings betrokke was, ao. James Mahlatsi, die ondersoekbeampte, en kapt. André Niemann wat Mahlahtsi na Smith in Wesselsbron gebring het. - Volksblad

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Allanridge-vroue glo oor geld vermoor 2010-06-04 10:00

Tom de Wet Volksblad

Verwante skakels Slagting van vroue beskryf Bejaarde man sterf in gru-moord

Virginia – Een van Alice Lotter (76) van Allanridge Ouma slaan glo skoondogter se kêrel se vermeende moordenaars het gesê hy het haar twee keer met ’n skêr in die nek gesteek omdat sy hom geld geskuld het. Lotter en haar dogter is wreed in hul huis aangeval en later aan hul veelvuldige beserings dood. Mnr. Joseph Hlongwane (22), wat by mev. Lotter en haar dogter, Helen (57), as tuinier gewerk het, het drie dae ná die aanval, op 9 Maart 2009, ’n bekentenis voor landdros J. Smith afgelê. Hy het vandeesweek in die verhoor aangevoer dat hy deur die polisie gedreig, gedwing en voorgesê was wat om in sy bekentenis te sê, maar dit is deur regter S.P.B. Hancke verwerp en die bekentenis is as getuienis en bewysstuk by die hof ingedien. Luidens die bekentenis is Hlongwane die Vrydag (6 Maart) omstreeks 18:00 na mev. Lotter, wat hy net as Oumies geken het, se huis om geld wat sy hom glo vir sewe weke se tuinwerk geskuld het, te kry. Sy het hom glo weggejaag en hy is na ’n taverne waar hy saam met vriende gekuier het. Ná sowat ’n uur is hy terug na die huis, het oor die heining gespring en in die Lotters se bakkie geklim. Lotter, wat die bakkie se deur gehoor het, het uit die huis gekom en met ’n sambok na hom gestap. Hy het met sy een voet buite die bakkie die voertuig agteruit laat loop tot dit teen die hek gebots het. Hy het toe uitgespring en in die straat ingehardloop. Hy het sy vriend en medebeskuldigde, Joseph Khumalo (21), daar gekry. Hulle is na die agterkant van die huis waar hy ’n vensterruit met ’n skêr gebreek en ingeklim het. Hy het mev. Lotter gevra waar sy geld is en haar twee keer met die skêr in die nek gesteek. Sy het op die vloer geval. Hy is terug na die stukkende venster en het vir Khumalo geroep wat toe ook ingeklim het. Mej. Lotter was toe nog buite die huis en het die deurknip gedraai en geroep om in te kom. Hlongwane het vir Khumalo gestuur om die voordeur te gaan oopmaak. Hyself is terug na mev. Lotter en het haar gekry waar sy oor haar selfoon met die polisie gepraat het. Hy het die selfoon gegryp en dit afgesit. Hy het haar weer vir geld gevra, waarna sy gesê het dit is in haar kamer. Hy het haar daarheen geneem waar sy ’n beursie vir hom gewys het. Hy het daarin ’n R20-noot, ’n R5-stuk, ’n R2-stuk en ’n klomp 5c-stukke gekry. Generated by www.PDFonFly.com at 7/10/2010 12:39:48 PM URL: http://www.nuus24.com/printArticle.aspx?iframe&aid=080446ad-66b3-429f-ae8d-053fe7eb2d22&cid=1479

In ’n ander vertrek het hy ’n radio gevat en gehoor hoe Khumalo en Lotter elders in die huis “geraas maak”. Hy het vir Khumalo gesê mev. Lotter het die polisie gebel, hulle moet vlug. Hy is weer by die stukkende venster uit. Toe Khumalo later nie uitkom nie het hy die radio by bome gelos en met die beusie na sy ouerhuis gevlug. Khumalo het later met leë hande daar aangekom. Die polisie het opgedaag, maar hy het toe na ’n plaas buite Bothaville gevlug waar hy die volgende dag in hegtenis geneem is. Die verhoor word Maandag hervat. - Volksblad

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Bejaarde se gebed laaste woorde voor dood 2010-06-01 00:58

Tom de Wet WELKOM. – “Dankie, Here, dat U vir ons omgee en ons by U kan skuil,” was die gebed en van die laaste woorde van die sterwende mev. Alice Lotter nadat sy en haar dogter op 6 Maart 2009, in wat deur geharde polisiemanne as een van die wreedaardigste misdaadtonele van hul loopbane beskryf word, beseer is. Lotter (76) is kort ná haar aankoms in die hospitaal aan haar beserings dood, en haar dogter, mej. Helen Lotter (57), enkele dae later. Dié wrede moorde op die twee vroue (mej. Lotter is onder meer met ’n gebreekte bierglas gemolesteer en vermink) het wye reaksie ontlok en mnr. Eugene Terre‘Blanche het tot kort voor sy moord nog in onderhoude na dié grusame moorde verwys. Hy het ook optogte na die hofgebou op Odendaalsrus gelei waar die twee vermeende moordenaars eers verskyn het. Die twee beskuldigdes, mnre. Joseph Hlongwane (22), die Lotters se tuinier, en Joseph Khumalo (21), het gister hier in die hooggeregshof voor regter S.P.B. Hancke skuld op drie aanklagte van moord en een van huisbraak met die opset om te roof en roof met verswarende omstandighede ontken. Kapt. Koos Venter, hoof van die speurtak op Allanridge, het gister in die verhoor getuig hy het die nag van 6 Maart ’n oproep van mev. Lotter gekry. Sy het gevra “kaptein, waar is jy?” waarna die telefoon doodgegaan het. Hy kon nie weer na haar deurkom nie en het in sy motor gespring en van sy huis op Odendaalsrus na Allanridge gejaag. By die agterdeur het hy op die erg beseerde mej. Lotter op die kombuisvloer afgekom. Haar gesig was vol bloed, van haar tande was uit, sy het ’n bebloede T-hemp aangehad en haar naakte onderlyf was vol bloed. Daar was ’n bebloede mes en skêr op die toneel, sowel as die gebreekte onderdeel van ’n bierglas wat naby haar bene gelê het. In die eetkamer het ’n erg beseerde mev. Lotter teen ’n stoel aangeleun en was besig om te val. Venter het haar gehelp en op die sitkamermat neergelê. “Wie is jy?” het sy hom gevra terwyl hy gapende wonde aan haar keel, arms en hande gesien het. Hy het gesê wie hy is, waarop sy gesê het: “Dankie Here dat U vir ons omgee en ons by U kan skuil.” Venter het die huis deurgesoek en net op die vroue se twee honde in die een kamer afgekom. Hy het die vroue gemaklik gemaak en nooddienste ontbied. Mev. Lotter het sy aandag getrek en gesê dit is Joseph wat in die tuin werk wat hulle seergemaak het. Sy het vir hom gesê Joseph se besonderhede is in haar paspoort op die eetkamertafel. Sy het nie weer gepraat nie en is kort daarna dood. Venter, met 31 jaar diens as polisieman agter die rug, het getuig die misdaadtoneel was die wreedaardigste wat hy nóg gesien het. Hlongwane word onder meer met vingerafdrukke met die moorde verbind. (Lees berig op bl.?4.)

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Adv. Sophie Giorgi kla aan, adv. Jan Nkhahle en mnr. Law-rence Chabalala verskyn vir die beskuldigdes. Regter Hancke word bygestaan deur twee assessore, mnr. P. Haasbroek en me. B. Smal. Die verhoor duur voort. - Volksblad

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Slagting van vroue beskryf 2010-06-02 06:46

Corné van Zyl Welkom. – “Helen Lotter was so erg beseer dat ek twee stukke vet so groot soos my hand langs haar op die grond gekry het waar sy bebloed in die kombuis gelê het.”

Verwante skakels Bejaarde man sterf in gru-moord Rowers in uniform skiet man by rooi lig Vier vas vir moord, verkragting

Só het ao. Frederik Meintjies, ’n fotograaf vir die plaaslike misdaadrekordsentrum (PKRS), gister in die verhoor oor die wrede aanvalle op Alice Lotter (78) en haar dogter Helen Lotter (57) getuig. Die twee vroue is in Maart 2009 dood nadat hulle in hul huis op die dorp oorval en grusaam vermink is. Geharde polisiemanne en paramedici het die slagting beskryf as die ergste wat hulle nog gesien het. Meintjies het getuig dat ’n erg beseerde Lotter in baie pyn op die sitkamermat gelê het toe hy daar aankom. “Lotter was by haar volle positiewe toe sy aan my en kapt. Koos Venter gesê het dit is Joseph wat in die tuin werk wat hulle seergemaak het. Ons het haar op haar sy gedraai omdat sy gekla het dat sy versmoor wanneer sy op haar rug lê.” Volgens Meintjies het Lotter aan hom vertel wat gebeur het. “Ek het by haar op die mat gaan sit om haar te vertroos. Sy het vir ons vertel sy was in die bad toe haar dogter roep om te sê sy het geluide buite by die bakkie gehoor.” Lotter het aangetrek en saam met haar dogter na buite gegaan toe hulle ’n onbekende getal mense by die bakkie gesien het. Lotter het vir hulle geskreeu dat hulle die polisie gaan bel. “Sy en Lotter het in die huis teruggegaan en die deure gesluit toe hulle hoor hoe ’n venster breek. Dit was toe dat Lotter gesien het dit was Joseph die tuinier.” Volgens Meintjies het Lotter gapende wonde aan haar hande, arms en nek gehad. Lotter, wat in die kombuis gelê het, kon nie praat nie. “Sy het gereageer deur ons hande te druk wanneer ons haar iets gevra het.” Antoinette Horn, dogter en suster van die Lotter-vroue, het dié verhoor bygewoon. Die twee beskuldigdes in dié verhoor is Joseph Hlongwane, die Lotters se tuinier, en Joseph Khumalo. Hlongwane se vriendin, Rebecca Bochedi, het gister getuig dat Hlongwane op die aand van die moord net ná 23:00 vol bloed by die huis aangekom het. “Ek was te bang om hom te vra hoekom hy so vol bloed was,” het sy gesê sonder om een keer na die beskuldigdes te kyk. Sy het ook getuig dat sy hom gehelp het om die bloed van sy hande te was voordat sy sy bebloede broek in ’n plastieksak gesit het. VolgensGenerated Bochedibyhet Hlongwane www.PDFonFly.com at 7/10/2010 12:44:25 PM http://www.nuus24.com/printArticle.aspx?iframe&aid=0272d6ae-92d2-4358-9d81-217b626cb503&cid=1479 weggehardloop toe die polisieURL: omstreeks 24:00 by hul huis stop.

“Ek het nie vir die polisie gesê Hlongwane was kort voor hul aankoms nog by die huis nie. Ek het ook nie vir die polisie die sak gegee met die bebloede klere nie.” Sy het saam met die twee beskuldigdes in Hlongwane se huis in Allanridge gewoon. Sy het ook in die verhoor die klere in die polisie-foto’s as Hlongwane se klere uitgewys. Dié twee beskuldigdes word benewens die moord en roof op die Lotter-vroue aangekla van die moord op mnr. Bongani Landu tussen 2 en 3 November 2007. Albei word met DNS met sy moord verbind. Hy is in ’n stuk veld in die dorp met ’n gebreekte bierbottel doodgesteek. Dié verhoor duur voort. - Volksblad Volg Nuus24 op Twitter - Volksblad

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Submitted as List of Authorities Evidentiary Doc1. to:

Constitutional Court of South Africa Case No. CCT 23/10 In the Matter Between: THE CITIZEN 1978 (PTY) LIMITED

First Applicant

KEVIN KEOGH

Second Applicant

MARTIN WILLIAMS

Third Applicant

ANDREW KENNEY

Fourth Applicant

And ROBERT JOHN MCBRIDE

First Respondent

And LARA JOHNSTONE

First Amicus Curiae

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE (FXI)

Second Amicus Curiae

S.A. NATIONAL EDITORS FORUM (SANEF)

Third Amicus Curiae

JOYCE SIBANYONI MBIZANA

Fourth Amicus Curiae

MBASA MXENGE

Fifth Amicus Curiae

Filing Sheet: Amended2 Practice Note and Written Submissions (Heads of Argument3) for Lara Johnstone; in Support of Radical Honesty Population Policy Common Sense Interpretation of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34 of 1995

CCT 23-10: Evidentiary Docs PDF File: www.scribd.com/my_document_collections/2308879 See also: Concourt 23-10 Amicus Expert Witness Statement by Dr. T. Michael Maher (How and Why Journalists Avoid Population-Environment Connection): [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31373074]; and Dr. Brad Blanton (Radical Honesty) [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/31989814] 2 10-07-18: 1st Amicus: HoA Condonation: Radical Honesty Interpretation of TRC Act [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/34551198 ] 3 10-07-18: 1st Amicus: Heads of Argument: Radical Honesty Interpretation of TRC Act [PDF: www.scribd.com/doc/34551212]

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The Truth About The Truth Commission by Anthea Jeffery with a foreword by John Kane-Berman SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS JOHANNESBURG 1999 Published by the South African Institute of Race Relations Auden House, 68 De Korte Street Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2001 South Africa P.O. Box 31044, 2017 Braamfontein, South Africa Telephone: (011) 403-3600 Fax: (011) 403-3671 e-mail: sairr@sairr.org.za Internet address: http://www.sairr.org.za Copyright South African Institute of Race Relations, 1999 ISSN 1018-0842PD 15/1999 ISBN 0-86982-463-5 Spotlight Series: No 3/99 Members of the media are free to reprint or report information, either in whole or in part, contained in this publication on the strict understanding that the South African Institute of Race Relations is acknowledged. Otherwise no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electrical, mechanical, photocopy, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover photograph: Paul Velasco, PictureNET Africa Cover design: G'Echo Design

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

I. Foreword The 1990s should have been a period of unqualified celebration for all who loathed apartheid and sought a society based on human dignity and equality before the law. By his dramatic actions on 2nd February 1990, the then state president, Mr F W de Klerk, had opened the way to negotiation about a new constitution based on universal adult suffrage. Yet violence intensified very shortly afterwards. The Institute watched with horror. It was tragic and ironic that this happened at the same time as political reform gathered momentum. Moreover, the vast majority of victims were not policemen, soldiers, or insurgents. They were ordinary people, nearly all of them black. From February 1990 to April 1994, nearly 15 000 people died in political violence in South Africa. These deaths amounted to 72% of the 20 500 political fatalities that occurred from 1984 to 1994. They constitute 62% of the more than 24 000 such fatalities that have now taken place since September 1984. The average fatality rate in political violence from 1985 to 1989 was about 1080 a year, but in the early 1990s it more than tripled to some 3 400. Some of the victims of violence were shot dead by the police while demonstrating against injustice. Some were tortured to death. Some were kidnapped or ambushed or led into traps, and then killed. Some died when car bombs and limpet mines exploded. Some were killed because they went to work or to the shops in the face of a stayaway call. Some died on commuter trains and taxis. Some were slain as they lay sleeping in their beds, or waiting at bus stops, or driving in cars. Some died in massacres. Some were executed by the necklace method. Some died because they were white, others because they were black. Many of the dead were selected as targets, because they were 'terrorists', or 'collaborators', or political rivals. Some died because they happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. We owe it to the victims and their survivors to ascertain and tell the truth about their deaths-to identify who killed them, to know why they were stabbed or shot or blasted by explosives or set on fire. Knowing the truth would have value in itself. If we could reach a common understanding of the conflict of the past, it would also help lay the foundation for racial and political reconciliation. The goals the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was mandated to attain were important. Superficially, the TRC appears to have provided a balanced and comprehensive account, for it has issued condemnations all around: upon the former National Party (NP) government for instructing the 'elimination' of political opponents and then claiming surprise at their deaths; the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) for its massacres of supporters of the African National Congress (ANC); the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and its armed wing for targeting civilians; the white right wing for planning an insurrection intended to derail democracy; the former United Democratic Front (UDF) for attacks in the 1980s on councillors, policemen, and collaborators; and the ANC for bombing operations that sometimes 'went awry' and Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

killed civilians, for abuses in its camps in other countries, and for creating a climate in which some of its supporters thought certain violations to be legitimate. The TRC was right to examine all these issues. It was also right to condemn these violations and their perpetrators. The fact that it condemned political organisations across the spectrum suggests, too, that it was even-handed in the way it did its work. There is, however, a fundamental problem with its report. It was required to tell the truth in full. Instead it has told some of the truth, but far from all of the truth. Significant multiple killings have been omitted, without explanation. Overall, the commission has done as much to distort as to disclose the truth. Distortion arises from two main factors-the methods it used, and the aspects of violence it left out. The commission's methodology is flawed, fundamentally so. The TRC failed properly to check the allegations on which it relied. It based key findings on untested and (effectively) uncorroborated statements that were sometimes mainly hearsay. It failed to comply with basic principles of fairness. It acknowledged that it was supposed to apply 'established legal principles' but in practice it exempted itself from them. It often relied on secret testimony and the self-serving allegations of criminals seeking to escape imprisonment. The quality and veracity of much of its 'evidence' was dubious. Yet it used this evidence to hold individuals and organisations accountable for what it depicted as premeditated murder-and did so without giving proper reasons to support its findings. It also reached its major conclusions about violations when some 90% of amnesty statements (on its own reckoning, a vital source of evidence) had still to be considered. It never quantified how many political killings had occurred within its mandate period (extending from 1960 to 1994). It left 12 000 or more killings unexplained-notably those that occurred when violence was at its most intense. Its approach was selective rather than comprehensive. Some parts of its report are simply sloppy. The commission sometimes effectively repudiated earlier judicial rulings without explaining why they were incorrect, or its own findings right. Sometimes, it got even basic facts wrong-such as the death toll in a well-known incident. On occasion, it misrepresented what courts or commissions of inquiry had earlier said. At other times, it simply ignored judicial rulings altogether, putting forth its own version of the truth as if no contrary finding existed. Both the law and principles of transparency and fairness require judges to give reasons for their findings. Often the TRC did not bother. The commission also went so far as to redefine the meaning of 'truth' and indeed to denigrate the very notion of 'factual and objective truth'. It invented 'narrative', 'dialogue', and 'healing' truths, tacitly admitting that the truth it told was something other than factual. Distortion also arises from what the TRC left out of its account. The commission rightly probed counter-revolutionary strategies and activities, some of them

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

criminal. It failed adequately to probe the revolutionary activities the counterrevolution was supposedly designed to overcome. The conflict, contrary to earlier predictions about South Africa, was not a race war. One of the major, and, for some people, embarrassing, problems confronting anyone examining the fatalities that occurred from 1984 to 1994 is the fact that nearly all of the victims were blacks, who were killed by other blacks. The depiction of violence as 'black-on-black' is a crude simplification which explains nothing. The real question is why these deaths occurred. Can they be explained by rivalry between competing political organisations? There was, of course, rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. There was also rivalry involving other organisations, such as the PAC and the Azanian People's Organisation, though on a smaller scale. But why was some of the rivalry so violent, particularly as between the ANC and the IFP? Two broad theories have been proffered in explanation. The first is that the conflict was engendered and continually stoked by a government-backed 'third force' which sought thereby to destabilise the ANC. The second recognises the brutalities of apartheid and the methods used to maintain it, but posits that many, or perhaps even most, of the deaths arose in the context of the 'people's war'. The TRC in effect embraced the third-force theory. Though it found that 'little evidence existed of a centrally directed, coherent and formally constituted "third force"', it also held that elements in the security forces and the IFP had fomented and engaged in violence, with the active collusion of senior security force personnel and the effective condonation of the government. Its further findingsthat the government in collusion with the IFP was responsible for the 'predominant portion of gross violations'-also reflects the third force theory. So too does its finding that the government deliberately mobilised one group against another, and helped establish 'hit squads' (including the Caprivi trainees) for use against its political opponents. On one level, it is obvious that apartheid was a lethal system. Clearly, there is also no justification for the fact that, when agents of the state killed people, they were seldom taken to task. Moreover, the National Party government, by stigmatising its opponents as communists and the like, created a climate of extreme hostility towards them. This, plus the fact that it used inflammatory language and turned a blind eye to some killings, was predictably interpreted by policemen or soldiers as a licence to kill outside the framework of the law. Clearly too, security force and IFP members conspired to commit acts of violence. All this, and much more, has been recorded over many years by the Institute as well as others. However, the TRC went significantly further. It depicted the former government as a criminal state. It found apartheid a 'crime against humanity'. And though it based this last conclusion on the racist nature of apartheid rather than on any policy of genocide, this qualification may not be widely known or understood. Implicitly, the TRC equated the former state with the Nazis. Such generalised accusations require a far greater level of substantiation than the commission has even attempted. It also requires an explanation of why the

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government would embark on a process of fundamental political and constitutional reform and at the same time allow its agents to plunge the country into violence. What, then, of the theory about the people's war? Numerous submissions to the TRC had detailed the role in violence of the 'armed struggle', especially after it had evolved (in the 1980s) into what the ANC termed a 'people's war'. The people's war explicitly targeted not only policemen and soldiers, but also local councillors, 'collaborators', 'informers', and all 'puppets and agents of the regime'. The aim of the people's war was to render South Africa 'ungovernable' and ultimately overthrow all authority. But because it relied on the masses to mount an insurrection-rather than on trained guerrillas to fight the police and army-the violence it generated spiralled out of control. And because it targeted so many in the black community, it also provoked a violent backlash from some at least. Once the retaliation began, moreover, it developed its own momentum and, among other consequences, evolved into a civil war between the ANC and the IFP that spread in time from Natal and KwaZulu to the Reef. The allegations put to the TRC about the people's war may have been exaggerated or incorrect. They were also sufficiently serious to merit systematic investigation. There was as strong a prima facie case for probing the people's war theory as there was for examining the third force theory. The TRC's findings embracing the latter would carry greater weight had it shown why it dismissed the former. But, despite the voluminous evidence presented to it and without proper investigation or explanation, the commission has effectively consigned the people's war to an Orwellian 'memory hole'. This study, in subjecting the TRC's report to careful scrutiny, has chartered new ground. Thus far, the commission's report has mostly been uncritically acclaimed. It has been hailed as having set a precedent for other countries. A more sober evaluation is needed. The methods used by the TRC, for all the reasons described in this study, are deeply flawed. From flawed methods flow flawed conclusions. The work of the TRC has clearly had value in allowing victims to tell their stories, and in highlighting gross violations perpetrated by the security forces, the IFP, and the PAC. Many of the 'unexplained' disappearances of those who opposed the former government are unexplained no longer. But the commission's findings, whether against these organisations or against the UDF and ANC, are too superficial to add significantly to our understanding of the past. On the contrary, they seem calculated to preclude a proper comprehension by discounting rather than exploring the impact of the people's war. Some of the commissioners believe their methods of ascertaining 'truth' and guilt are superior to those used in criminal trials and should be incorporated into our legal system-for political offenders, at least. If they had their way, they would undermine the due process for which South Africa's bill of rights provides.

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At least one commissioner believes the report should become a 'publicly sanctioned history' which 'can be taught in schools', to the exclusion of 'contradictory versions'. This, too, is an Orwellian notion, paving the way for renewed political indoctrination. Although the TRC's founding legislation required it to generate a factual, comprehensive, and properly contextualised rendition of past conflict, the report it has produced is anything but. The commission claims that there can be no dispute about how 'strong on truth' it has been. Dr Jeffery's meticulous study refutes this claim. The commission also said that there could be no healing without truth, that halftruths and denial were no basis for building the new South Africa, that reconciliation based on falsehood would not last, and that selective recollection of past violence would easily provide the mobilisation for further conflict in the future. If these are its criteria for the role of truth in promoting reconciliation, it has failed to meet them. by John Kane-Berman Chief Executive South African Institute of Race Relations

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II. Overview 1. INTRODUCTION The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995. Its stated purpose was to foster reconciliation by revealing the truth about killings (and other gross violations of human rights) committed between March 1960 and May 1994. The commission's founding legislation requires that the TRC provide a factual, comprehensive, and even-handed account of the gross violations committed on all sides in the conflicts of the past. It mandates the commission to identify the perpetrators of violations and hold them accountable. It also requires the TRC to place all violations in context by explaining the motives and perspectives of perpetrators as well as any 'antecedent factors' (prior provocation, for example) that might have influenced their actions. The commission was initially expected to complete its work by June 1997. This deadline was extended to mid-1998, but the time was still not sufficient. The amnesty committee was given an indefinite period to complete its work. The remainder of the commission had until 30th October 1998 to complete a report, and was then suspended until the amnesty committee had finished its task. The commission is then to be reconvened so that it can consider the further amnesty evidence assembled and complete its final report. In October 1998 the TRC published a 3 500-page report in five volumes. It found the former National Party (NP) government and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) the principal perpetrators of gross violations. To a lesser extent, it held the African National Congress (ANC) and the former United Democratic Front (UDF) accountable for certain violations. It also found that the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) had primarily targeted civilians in the course of its 'protracted people's war', and was thus accountable not only for gross violations of human rights but also for violations of international humanitarian law. (See The TRC's main findings, in the Appendix.) 2. Evaluating the TRC's report The TRC acknowledged that its success in meeting its objectives would depend as much on the content of its findings as on the methods used in reaching them. The main purpose of this study is to assess those methods. In particular, the study seeks to analyse the evidence before the commission, and the way in which this evidence was assessed. The commission's founding legislation makes clear the criteria by which the work of the TRC is to be evaluated, notably: Ă&#x2DC;

how factual was the evidence?

Ă&#x2DC;

how comprehensive was it?

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The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

how objectively was it compiled and analysed?

how well was it contextualised?

The TRC, though not a court of law, was nevertheless a statutory commission of inquiry. This meant, as it acknowledged, that it had to make 'defensible findings according to established legal principles'. It also had to make its findings on a 'balance of probabilities'-the standard of proof applicable in civil litigation. This gives rise to two further questions: Ø

were established legal principles applied?

were the probabilities properly assessed?

3. The need for factual evidence In making its findings, the TRC relied on various sources of information. Particularly important were the statements it received from victims of gross violations, and from perpetrators seeking amnesty for their wrongdoing. How factual were the victim statements? The commission emphasised that it received some 21 300 victim statements, recording approximately 38 000 gross violations of human rights. It implied that it had a large, comprehensive, and reliable body of statements at its disposal on which to base its findings of accountability. This was not so. The great majority of victim statements (some 90%, or about 19200) were not given under oath. Few, if any, statements were tested under cross-examination, for the TRC was anxious to avoid subjecting victims to this ordeal. Though the commission claimed to have corroborated all victim statements from independent sources of information, in practice it found this impossible. It therefore confined itself to a 'low level' of corroboration. Such corroboration did not encompass the identity of perpetrators. But this did not prevent the commission from using victim statements to make findings of accountability against named individuals and/or organisations. In about 17 500 instances, deponents told the TRC of the violations experienced by others-not by themselves. Many of these statements must have been based on hearsay, rather than personal observation. On the commission's own description of its methodology, it would be surprising if even a hundred of its 21 300 victim statements passed muster as 'factual evidence'. How factual were the amnesty statements? The commission also stressed the many thousands of amnesty statements it had received. Amnesty statements were potentially a better source of evidence than victim statements because they expressly qualified for cross-examination during

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public hearings. In reality, the weight of amnesty evidence was diminished by various factors. Amnesty applications to the TRC totalled 7 127. However, at the time the commission compiled its report, only 102 amnesty statements had proceeded through a public hearing and had supposedly been confirmed as accurate by the granting of amnesty. Only these 102 statements (1.4% of the total received) could properly be taken into account in making findings of accountability. The TRC nevertheless initiated what it called Operation Capture, to 'access relevant material from all the amnesty statements it received'. These included 1 239 statements that were still to proceed through public hearings. None of these amnesty statements had yet been verified, so none could properly be taken into account in making findings of accountability. Moreover, insofar as amnesty statements implicated others (the individuals on whose alleged instruction violations were carried out), they amounted to accomplice evidence. They therefore warranted particular caution, for an accomplice knows enough to tell a story that sounds credible, even though it may falsely implicate the innocent. And an accomplice who gives evidence has an interest in saying whatever will free him from prison or other punishment. Independent verification of such evidence is commensurately vital. There is little to indicate that this was obtained by the commission. Many amnesty statements were also flawed in other ways. They were full of hearsay allegations. And, though the commission claimed that they were all corroborated, the sources of information used for this purpose were generally inadequate. One important amnesty statement-that of Captain Brian Mitchell (who was convicted in 1992 on 11 counts of murder arising from the Trust Feed massacre in December 1988)-abounded in contradictions and other oddities. Notwithstanding these, Capt Mitchell was granted amnesty in December 1996. He repeatedly told the amnesty panel he had not been present at the house where the massacre took place. This was accepted as true. However, the judge at his earlier trial had expressly found that Capt Mitchell had not only been present at the house but had fired the first shots into the dwelling, so initiating the massacre. No new evidence was presented to substantiate Capt Mitchell's denial of his presence at the house. One of the members of the amnesty panel was the trial judge who had found that he had been there and had accordingly given him eleven death sentences. Capt Mitchell's amnesty statement was so full of hearsay, contradictions, and inherent improbabilities that it is hard to understand how it could have been accepted as a 'full disclosure' of the truth. If this particular statement was so flawed, it raises questions as to how many more of the 102 statements in issue were similarly unreliable. The Trust Feed massacre also illustrates the fact that the findings of the commission were often unexplained. One of the police officers it found accountable for the killings was Sergeant Neville Rose. Yet Sgt Rose had been acquitted at the criminal trial in 1992. The commission's finding that he was an Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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accessory to murder is not substantiated by any evidence. Neither are any reasons given for the TRC's decision. Factual truth versus other kinds of 'truth' According to the TRC, there are four different kinds of 'truth'. The TRC says that it took all four into account in doing its work, but ensured that its findings of accountability were based on factual truth alone. The reality is different. The commission 'rejected the popular assumption that there are only two options to be considered when talking about truth-namely factual, objective information or subjective opinions'. Instead, it said, there is also 'personal or narrative truth', 'social or dialogue truth', and 'healing or restorative truth'. Though the commission professed that 'factual' truth had 'featured prominently' in the making of its findings, this was not so. It did not have sufficient 'factual' truth at its disposal at the time it wrote its report. And so it fudged the nature of truth and allowed itself to use these other kinds of 'truth' to buttress its conclusions regarding culpability. By implication, it admitted that its 'truth' was neither factual nor objective. 4. The need for comprehensive findings The commission's statutory obligation was to establish 'as complete a picture as possible' of the gross violations of the past and then to compile a report that was 'as comprehensive as possible'. The TRC report is far from comprehensive, however. As earlier noted, the commission came to its conclusions regarding culpability when it had canvassed only a fraction of the applicable amnesty evidence. At the time it compiled its report, the TRC had heard little about violations from the ANC side of the conflict. Moreover, the killings it canvassed amounted to fewer than than half the 20 500 political fatalities that occurred from 1984 to 1994. The killings excluded from consideration (amounting to some 60% of deaths in this period alone) have yet to be explained. Having taken into account only a tiny portion of the relevant testimony, the commission has issued a report which can only be of an interim and tentative nature-and which should clearly have been identified as such. Instead, the TRC has acquiesced in the widespread media depiction of its report as a 'final' one and indicated that it will need, at most, a 'codicil' to be appended to it in the futureonce the outstanding amnesty applications have been heard. 5. The need for objective operation The commission's focus of investigation and research appears to have been onesided. Its national chronology, its commissioned research, and its investigations concentrated on certain events and issues (such as the role in violence of the former State Security Council). Other events and issues meriting equal consideration were downplayed or ignored. These included a number of massacres. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Various submissions to the TRC had alleged the importance of the 'people's war' the ANC had initiated in the early 1980s to intensify its armed struggle against the then government. According to a police submission to the TRC, the people's war resulted (within an eight-year period) in some 80 500 violent incidents, in which approximately 9 200 individuals were killed and 18 000 injured. The commission made no systematic attempt to probe these allegations. In particular, it made little attempt to investigate the possible role in violence of the Politico-Military Council of the ANC. This body, allegedly responsible for implementing the people's war, was supposedly the equivalent in some respects of the former government's State Security Council-which was investigated at length for its role in violence against the ANC. Though the TRC did take note of the people's war in its report, it did so in cursory and superficial fashion. It allocated the bulk of the blame for the violence accompanying the strategy of 'ungovernability' to the UDF. In doing so, it ignored the ties between the UDF and the ANC in the 1980s. It also failed to account for the upsurge in fatalities that took place in the early 1990s and continued after the UDF had been disbanded in August 1991. Some 9 500 people died between then and April 1994, reflecting an average monthly fatality rate of about 300. From September 1984 to February 1990 (when the bans on the ANC and other organisations had been lifted) the monthly fatality rate had averaged some 90. 6. The need for violations to be contextualised The TRC was obliged by its founding statute to record the context in which gross violations had occurred. It was instructed to reflect the perspectives and motives of the perpetrators, as well as any antecedent factors contributing to violations. The commission provided this contextualisation only as regards the ANC alliance. It noted the difficulties the banned ANC had faced in controlling its cadres from afar. It elaborated on the circumstances in which its bombing operations had sometimes 'gone awry', resulting in the killing of civilians. It took note of antecedent factors, recording that such operations (a blast at an Amanzimtoti shopping centre, for example) had often been in retaliation for the former government's raids on neighbouring countries. Though it held the ANC accountable for a landmine campaign in rural areas that had caused civilian casualties, it prefaced this by pointing out that the former government had effectively encouraged such attacks by declaring border areas 'military zones'. In describing the wrongdoing of the former government and the IFP, the TRC provided no equivalent contextualisation. It simply depicted the former government as a criminal state. Contrary to its own mandate, it gave scant regard to the government's perspective that normal legal processes were ineffective against revolutionary violence, and that law and order had to be restored to protect vulnerable civilians and provide a framework within which constitutional negotations could commence. According to the commission, the IFP-acting as a surrogate of the former government-was responsible for repeated attacks on the ANC. This finding coincided with the ANC's perspectives. It would carry greater weight if it had been Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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reached after the TRC had examined other perspectives, weighed them up, and then given reasons for rejecting them. But the TRC omitted even to probe the IFP's viewpoint that the ANC had declared war on all its political rivals, and especially on Inkatha. Nor did it give reasons for ignoring this perspective, let alone demonstrate why it was rejected. 7. The need to accord with established legalprinciples The TRC acknowledged that it was obliged to make defensible findings on the basis of established legal principles. Such principles required, at minimum, that it verify its evidence, take account of all relevant information, uphold basic principles of justice (audi alteram partem included), be open and transparent in its functioning, and give reasons for its findings. These common denominators of fairness are generally acknowledged in legal systems around the world. The commission did not do enough to uphold basic principles of justice, however. It failed to verify the evidence before it or to ensure that it took all relevant information into account. It expressed reservations about applying audi alteram partem and giving alleged perpetrators sufficient notice. It also conducted many of its investigative hearings behind closed doors, and thus shielded important parts of the evidence on which it relied from public scrutiny. The TRC failed, moreover, to give reasons for its findings. Established legal principles require that a decision-making body such as the commission should (at minimum) canvass in full the evidence adduced, analyse its strengths and weaknesses, and explain the findings of fact thus reached. This obligation is all the stronger where findings must be based on a balance of probabilities, as described below. The TRC failed, however, to explain the basis for its conclusions. 8. Findings based on a balance of probabilities The commission, as it acknowledged, was also obliged to make its findings of accountability on a balance of probabilities-the standard of proof applicable in civil litigation. Its task, it said (when confronted with different versions of events), was to 'decide which version was the more probable, reasonable, or likely, after taking all the available evidence into account'. The TRC's failure to give reasons for its findings makes it difficult to assess how well it discharged this duty. In certain instances, however, the commission's findings were preceded by earlier judicial rulings. These rulings are based on evidence which was tested and substantiated, while the reasons that underpin them are fully explained. They provide a basis for comparative evaluation. TRC findings vis-Ă -vis earlier judicial rulings The commission effectively repudiated various judicial rulings without citing evidence or reasons to justify this. Sometimes the TRC was mistaken as to basic facts, such as the number of people killed in particular incidents. At one point in its report, it said police at Sebokeng Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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(south of Johannesburg) had shot dead 13 people in March 1990. In various other places, it put the death toll at 17, 'at least 13', and eight. Judge Richard Goldstone had earlier investigated the shootings, however, and had found that the police had killed five people. Referring to another incident in Sebokeng, the TRC said the army shot dead 15 people there in September 1990. An earlier judicial inquest had found that the army had killed four. (The TRC seems to have based its conclusion on a simple but misdirected subtraction. The IFP, according to the same judicial inquest, had killed 38 people earlier that day in an attack on a hostel in Sebokeng. The commission said the IFP had killed 23, and then apparently attributed the balance of IFP-initiated deaths (15) to the army.) The TRC said lone gunmen had killed 23 hostel residents of Tokoza township in September 1991. The Goldstone commission had earlier established that the death toll was 18. The TRC said 42 people died in revenge attacks in the next two days. Goldstone had found that effective security force action had prevented further killings in the aftermath of the initial massacre. In this instance, the TRC also misrepresented what Goldstone had said. According to the TRC, Goldstone had expressly found that this attack on hostel residents of Tokoza was initiated by a police informer, Mr Mncugi Ceba. Goldstone made no such finding. He noted that Mr Ceba was a police informer, but he never found Mr Ceba responsible for the attack. In fact, he made it clear that his commission could not and would not name any individual as culpable without sufficient supporting evidence. The TRC ignored other aspects of Goldstone's findings on this incident. Goldstone found that a four-pronged ambush of hostel residents had been carried out by a self-defence unit (SDU) in the Phola Park informal settlement. The TRC implied that the three gunmen responsible for most of the killings were the sole attackers. It ignored evidence assembled by Goldstone that at least three units (of three men each) had been involved. The TRC, moreover, implied that the police initiated the attack to derail the peace process. Goldstone, however, had made it clear that it was the SDU that had planned and executed the ambush. On occasion, the TRC paid no attention at all to a conflicting judicial ruling. It stated, for example, that the Shell House shootings in March 1994 of eight IFP supporters outside the ANC's headquarters had taken place in response to an IFP assault on the building. Yet an earlier judicial inquest had found that no such attack had taken place. It had also found that these allegations had been fabricated after the event to justify shootings that were entirely unwarranted. The TRC made no reference to the inquest at all. In one key instance, the TRC cited earlier commission and court rulings but then simply repudiated them. This was as regards the Boipatong massacre in June 1992. An international policing expert brought in by Goldstone had found no evidence of police involvement. A hearing convened by Goldstone had effectively found the same, after allegations of police involvement had proved untrue. Based on the

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testimony of three accomplices and some 120 residents of Boipatong, a criminal court had later ruled that police had not been involved. The TRC quoted these findings. It then proceeded to find that the police had not only planned the massacre but had taken part in it as well. It cited no fresh evidence to justify this contrary conclusion. The TRC relied, instead, on a report compiled by a monitoring organisation, which had drawn up its account within a few weeks of the massacre and on the basis of allegations which were untested (and which have since been shown to be unsubstantiated). The TRC also commonly ignored what earlier judicial rulings had said regarding prior provocation. The IFP attack on the Sebokeng hostel in September 1990 had been found, by the inquest judge, to have been mounted in retaliation for the earlier eviction of the IFP from the hostel by ANC supporters. This, in general, was ignored by the TRC. The judge in the Boipatong trial convicted 17 IFP supporters of murder for their part in the massacre. He also found that all the accused were refugees, who had fled to the KwaMadala Hostel to escape ANC attacks on their homes and families. This, too, was ignored in general by the TRC. Sometimes, the TRC ignored even its own prior description of an incident. In describing the 'Battle of the Forest' outside Richmond in March 1991, it noted that 23 IFP supporters had been killed. It added that the IFP had later killed 14 ANC supporters, in the same area, in June 1991. Its sole finding, in relation to both these incidents, was that the IFP killed 23 people in June 1991. Nor was the Battle of the Forest the only massacre thus ignored. The TRC noted, but did not examine, the massacre of 23 IFP supporters at the Crossroads settlement on the Reef in April 1992. The KwaShange massacre in 1987 was left out altogether. This massacre was similar to the Trust Feed killings, in which a policeman had collaborated with Inkatha to attack the UDF (though, in the end, it was Inkatha supporters who were killed). In the KwaShange killings, a policeman had collaborated with UDF supporters to attack Inkatha. In the massacre that ensued, 13 Inkatha members were killed. According to the trial court, they were 'methodically executed, without a shred of mercy'. These killings were not mentioned by the TRC at all. On occasion, the TRC misrepresented both the criminal law and what had happened in the course of criminal proceedings. It implied that the legislation adopted by the former government had authorised the security forces to open fire on protesters with impunity. In fact, the relevant statute had strictly circumscribed the use of lethal force (though this did not prevent serious abuses from occurring). What the TRC said about the trial of General Magnus Malan in 1996 was also wrong. Contrary to the commission's assertions, extensive evidence of alleged 'hit squad' training provided by the army to Inkatha in the Caprivi was put before the trial court. (It was also found inconclusive as to the alleged 'offensive' nature of the training.) Contrary, again, to the TRC's various statements in this regard, the trial judge did not rule that the prosecution should have called additional witnesses. (The judge said he could have drawn an inference against the prosecution for Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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failing to call witnesses who should have been able to buttress its case. But he found it unnecessary to make this inference because the state's case was, in any event, too weak to succeed.) The TRC sometimes based extensive conclusions on minimal foundations. It found elements in the IFP and the security forces accountable for train violence on the Reef in the early 1990s, in which hundreds of people had been killed in hundreds of separate attacks. It based this conclusion on hearsay allegations regarding ten incidents. The Goldstone commission, by contrast, had considered the evidence too inconclusive to make any definite findings. Goldstone had also said, however, that there was no evidence that any organisation deliberately propagated train violence, and that it seemed to be a spillover from general township violence for which the ANC and the IFP were both responsible. The TRC ignored these statements. The TRC's mandate, when presented with conflicting versions of events, was to weigh all the evidence available in order to decide which version was the most probable, reasonable, or likely. In these various instances-where its findings can be compared with earlier judicial rulings-the TRC ignored this obligation. It did not explain why these earlier rulings were wrong. It did not explain why its contrary findings were right. It simply ignored or tacitly repudiated certain rulings. By its own admission, moreover, only some of its decisions could be 'corroborated'. Others, it explained, were 'value-laden and could be defended only as value judgements by people of integrity'. Findings of accountability for killings require a less tenuous foundation. Despite its errors, self-contradictions, and omissions, the TRC clearly believed itself and its methods better at ascertaining the truth than ordinary judicial process. The chairman of the commission, the Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, a former archbishop of Cape Town, put it thus: 'The commission can claim, without fear of being contradicted, that it has contributed more to uncovering the truth about the past than all the court cases in the history of apartheid.' As described below, this viewpoint has potential ramifications for the rule of law. 9. Implications of the TRC for the rule of law In addition to believing itself better than the courts at discovering the truth, the TRC criticised criminal trials on various grounds. They involved too great an expenditure of time and money. They took many years to complete. They necessitated 'large teams of skilled and highly competent investigators'. Most serious of all, they required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They could therefore result in the acquittal of people, such as General Magnus Malan, who were widely believed to be guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be too difficult to marshall, the TRC continued. This was especially so as regards 'political crimes'. Crimes of this kind were committed by 'highly skilled' people, 'trained in the art of concealing their crimes'. Relevant records were often missing, while witnesses were 'unknown, dead, unavailable, or unwilling'. In circumstances such as these, 'all that Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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effectively remained was the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law'. The result, concluded the TRC, was that 'judicial inquires into politically sensitive matters rarely satisfied the need for truth and closure'. The rule of law would be undermined, however, by a judicial process that dispensed with the need for the corroboration and substantiation of evidence, and was content to rest upon such things as 'instinctive suspicions'. The 'rigours of the law' criticised by the TRC may be difficult to satisfy at times-but they are crucial to due process, basic principles of fairness, and the protection of the innocent. The commission emphasised the 'urgent need to re-evaluate the nature of the judiciary', so as to help transform South African society into a 'more caring, humane, and just one'. It also criticised judges for failing to appear before it to account for their conduct and their rulings under the former government. Such an appearance, said the commission, would have given the TRC 'the opportunity to engage in debate with judges on how the administration of justice could adapt to fulfil the tasks demanded of it in the new legal system'. Its intention, it continued, was not to 'dictate to the judges or bind them in the future' but to emphasise the need for change. Whether change is needed now is doubtful. The rule of law was severely undermined by the former government, which reversed the normal onus of proof for certain 'political' offences and empowered the state to ban and detain political opponents. The new constitution expressly restores due process. It incorporates guarantees of fairness and entrenches them against erosion by the legislature and executive. The commission seems to misunderstand the present legal order and the major gains that it reflects. What kind of change would the commission want? It does not say, but its own methodology would suggest a system-for politically motivated crimes, at least-in which: Ø witnesses are encouraged to tell their own stories (or those of others), while their testimony is accepted at face value without cross-examination, proper corroboration, or exclusion of hearsay allegations; Ø 'the truth of wounded memories' and 'instinctive suspicions' are regarded as sufficient proof of culpability and are no longer betrayed by the 'rigours of the law' and its technical rules of evidence; Ø the standard of proof is lowered so that individuals who are widely believed to be wrongdoers cannot escape conviction; Ø

hearings can be held in camera;

Ø rulings can be made without citing the evidence or the reasoning underlying them; and Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Ă&#x2DC; conclusions can be based on 'dialogue' or other novel forms of 'truth'-and, in the final analysis, on 'the value judgements of people of integrity'. Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza, the erstwhile head of the commission's Investigating Unit, has been appointed as an acting judge on the Cape bench. He believes 'there is much the judiciary can learn from the TRC process'. He hopes, moreover, that 'the legacy of the TRC will find its way into the criminal justice system'. Two further commissioners, Ms Sisi Khampepe and Mr Denzil Potgieter, have been appointed acting judges for the duration of the amnesty process and are then to assume senior positions within the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions. If former commissioners continue to be appointed as judges or to other senior positions in the criminal justice system, this could promote the adoption of a 'TRC-type' approach in which, inter alia, guilt would be determined more by public perceptions than by due process and in which the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt would be dispensed with. The commission also advocated changes to the prosecution of criminal trials. In particular, it urged that 'specialist prosecutorial task teams be established to address political violence'. This was necessary, it said, because 'the work of special investigative teams, for example, the investigative task unit in KwaZulu-Natal, was nullified if the results of investigations were not appropriately pursued in the prosecutorial phase'. This recommendation also seems to have stemmed from the acquittal of Gen Malan-an outcome which was widely blamed on the alleged failure of the prosecution to call sufficient witnesses. The state's case against Gen Malan was, however, deeply flawed and it is doubtful whether calling more witnesses would have cured its defects. It was not the prosecution, moreover, which came in for criticism from the trial judge. A special investigation task unit (ITU) had been responsible for assembling the evidence against the accused. It was this unit that was implicitly censured by the court. The judge noted that the computer 'cut and paste' method the ITU had used to transfer portions of one witness's statement to another could readily lead to contamination of evidence. There was 'a lingering suspicion' that a KwaMakhutha resident had been 'inveigled' into giving testimony that supported the state's case. Defence allegations that witnesses had been coached had, disturbingly, been well illustrated. In addition, evidence presented by the ITU on an important issue had been 'misleading and probably deliberately so'. Special investigative units which act in this way are to be eschewed, not advocated. This is arguably the most important lesson to be learned from the trial of Gen Malan-and yet it is ignored by the TRC. Instead the commission implicitly endorsed the work of the ITU in KwaZulu-Natal and indicated that the problem lay rather in inadequate prosecution. Hence its proposal that 'specialist prosecutorial task teams' be established. Should a TRC-type approach be adopted in due course, the implications for the rule of law would be grave. Any such development lies, however, in the future. For the present, the key question is whether the commission has fulfilled its objectives of telling the truth about past conflict, and thus promoting reconciliation. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

10. How much closer to the truth? The importance of truth in promoting reconciliation is frequently acknowledged by the TRC. 'There can be no healing without truth,' said Archbishop Tutu in his foreword. The TRC's role, added the rest of the commission, was to 'uncover the truth about past abuses' as part of 'the struggle of memory against forgetting'. This struggle, the TRC continued, had to be inclusive to have value. It had to 'recognise that narrow memories of past conflicts could too easily provide the mobilisation for further conflicts'. It had to 'overcome the temptation to remember in a partisan, selective way'. It had to acknowledge that 'an inclusive remembering of painful truths was crucial to the creation of national unity and to transcending the divisions of the past'. Truth, concluded the commission, provides the only solid basis for reconciliation. 'There can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth,' it stated. 'Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on which to build the new South Africa.' 'Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not facing up to reality, is not true reconciliation and will not last,' added Archbishop Tutu. The commission was thus keenly aware of the importance of truth as a vital (if insufficient) basis for reconciliation. It implied that its report had succeeded in excluding 'lies, half-truths, and denial'. It intimated that it had faced up to reality in full, and that its report reflected a comprehensive and impartial record of the conflicts of the past. The TRC asserted too that it had 'provided enough of the truth about our past for there to be a consensus about it'. Indeed, it continued, there could be little dispute about how 'strong on truth' it had been. These claims are questionable, at best. There is little reason to believe that the commission has discovered and reflected 'the truth' about the Seboking shootings of March and September 1990, the Richmond massacres in early 1991, the deaths in Tokoza in September 1991, the Boipatong massacre in 1992, the Shell House shootings in 1994, or the train violence on the Reef in the early 1990s. On the contrary, in each of these instances (and in others besides), the TRC has obscured rather than revealed the truth. In fact, what the commission has done is to focus on only half the story-and to tell that half in a selective and distorted way. Some important insights into security force violations have, of course, arisen from its work. It has cast significant light on various security force outrages and atrocities. It has confirmed suspicions that torture in detention was widespread, that it frequently resulted in the deaths of the government's political opponents, and that it was effectively condoned and even endorsed. It has revealed the fate of many activists who simply disappearedand who are now known to have died at the hands of the former police and army. The commission has rightly castigated the former government for the methods of 'counter-revolution' it employed. The TRC has failed, however, to describe the revolution against which these methods were invoked. Nor could the TRC claim it had no evidence about this people's war. Detailed allegations were put to it, often citing the published utterances of the ANC itself. These accusations merited an equal vigour in investigation as those against the former government. If, Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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thereafter, the TRC concluded that the allegations against the ANC were unfounded, it needed to explain why this was so. A similar phenomenon is evident as regards the IFP. Killings perpetrated by its supporters are rightly condemned by the commission. But, again, the other side of the equation remains to be addressed. A lengthy IFP submission to the TRC alleged that the ANC had encouraged attacks against Inkatha-and that thousands of IFP leaders and supporters had died in the violence that then ensued. These allegations merited a full investigation, and a full explanation of any reasons for rejecting them. Neither is evident from the TRC's report. The current report is not a final one, as the commission's founding legislation makes clear. A final report is yet awaited, and is to be issued after all the amnesty evidence has been heard. There is little reason to believe, however, that the final document will remedy the defects in the present one. They go too deep. And the commission has shown little sign of being willing to rectify its methodology-or to examine the issues it has thus far omitted or downplayed.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

III. Introduction The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in December 1995, under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Its purpose was to: Ø provide 'as complete a picture as possible' of the gross violations of human rights committed on all sides in the conflicts of the past, in the period from March 1960 to May 1994 (the mandate period); Ø identify the perpetrators of such violations and determine their accountability, political or otherwise; Ø restore the human and civil dignity of victims by giving them the opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations they had suffered; Ø grant amnesty from both civil and criminal liability for politically motivated acts committed in the mandate period and proportionate to the political objectives being pursued; Ø make recommendations regarding reparations for victims, as well as the measures needed to prevent a recurrence of human rights violations; and Ø

compile a comprehensive report of its activities and findings.

Gross violations of human rights were defined as 'the killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill-treatment' of any person, 'emanating from the conflicts of the past', and committed during the mandate period. Severe ill-treatment, the most amorphous category of violation, was interpreted by the commission as connoting acts 'similar in degree' to killing, torture or abduction, and involving 'the deliberate and direct infliction of severe mental or physical suffering'. In practice, this was taken to include burnings, beatings, shootings, stabbings, stonings, sexual abuse, and attempted executions by the 'necklace' method (in which a tyre was hung around the neck of the victim, doused with petrol, and then set alight). The 17 members of the commission were appointed by the president, Mr Nelson Mandela, at the end of November 1995. A former Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, was appointed chairman of the commission while Dr Alex Boraine was appointed his deputy. At its first meeting (held on 16th December 1995) the commission chose Cape Town as its headquarters. It also established its three main committees (the Committee on Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Amnesty, and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation), as well as an Investigating Unit. Subsequently it established, among other things, a Research Department and four regional offices (based in Cape Town, Durban, East London, and Johannesburg). The TRC was initially given an 18-month period, until June 1997, to complete its work. This period was first extended to mid December 1997 and thereafter to 30th June 1998, while 31st July 1998 was the deadline for completion of the report. In Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

early 1998, however, it became apparent that the TRC would not be able to resolve all outstanding amnesty applications within this period. Its founding legislation was accordingly amended to cater for this difficulty. In terms of these amendments: Ø consideration of amnesty applications was to continue for an indefinite period; Ø

the rest of the TRC's work was to be concluded by 31st July 1998;

an initial report was to be submitted to the president by 30th October 1998;

Ø the president was to reconvene the commission once all amnesty applications had been decided; and Ø

the TRC was then to 'complete its final report' for publication to the nation.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

IV. Publication Of The Current TRC Report On 29th October 1998 the TRC published a five-volume report running to some 3 500 pages. It found the former National Party (NP) government-as well as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)-predominantly accountable for the thousands of gross violations of human rights committed in the mandate period. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was held accountable for targeting civilians primarily and thereby infringing international humanitarian law. The African National Congress (ANC), and the former United Democratic Front (UDF) were also found accountable for violations-albeit in far fewer instances and in significantly lesser measure. (See The TRC's main findings in the Appendix.) These findings are not legal judgements and do not establish culpability under criminal law. They are damning, nevertheless, of the organisations and individuals held morally or politically accountable for crimes of abduction, torture, and politically motivated murder. They are also already playing a key part in shaping public perceptions of the conflict. In the future, they are likely to do so even more-especially as individual recollection fades and the TRC's report becomes the main source of information and interpretation in this regard. Extensive media coverage of the TRC's report has helped to spread its message far and wide. Most of this coverage has taken the commission's findings at face value. Little or no effort has been made to evaluate either the quality of the evidence on which the TRC relied, or the adequacy of its assessment of this testimony. Such evaluation is vitally important, however. If the TRC's report is to become seminal to the country's understanding of political conflict, it must be clear that the report merits this stature. The commission itself recognised the vital importance of its methodology. 'Its integrity,' it stated, 'was dependent as much on its process or methodology as on its actual findings.' An assessment of its process and methodology is accordingly the primary subject of this study. In the course of such assessment, various inquiries are germane. The commission's founding legislation required that it provide a factual, comprehensive, and evenhanded account of the gross violations committed on all sides in the course of the conflicts of the past. This account, moreover, was to place the violations that had occurred in their full and proper context, by explaining, among other things, their antecedent factors and the motives of their perpetrators. The statute itself makes clear, thus, the criteria by which the TRC's report should be evaluated. The questions that must be asked include the following: Ă&#x2DC;

how factual was the evidence?

Ă&#x2DC;

how comprehensive was it?

Ă&#x2DC;

how objectively was it compiled and analysed? Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Ă&#x2DC;

how well was it contextualised?

A further issue is how adequately the commission assessed the evidence before it. In this regard, it is important to remember that the TRC-though not a court of lawwas nevertheless a statutory commission of inquiry. This meant, as noted by the commission in its report, that it was 'a legal institution with the responsibility for making defensible findings according to established legal principles'. These findings, the TRC also acknowledged, had to be made on a balance of probabilities-the standard of proof applicable in civil litigation. This gives rise to two further questions: Ă&#x2DC;

were established legal principles applied?

Ă&#x2DC;

were the probabilities properly assessed?

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

V. The Need For Factual Evidence The commission's founding legislation obliged it to compile its report on the basis of 'factual and objective information and evidence' received by it or otherwise placed at its disposal. How well did the TRC discharge this mandate-especially in making findings regarding culpability? According to the TRC report, the commission 'based its conclusions on the evidence brought before it'. This evidence included: Ø the statements of victims regarding gross violations of human rights (described in this study as victim statements); Ø the statements made by applicants for amnesty (here identified as amnesty statements); Ø

the material gathered to corroborate both victim and amnesty statements;

the historical documentation compiled by the commission; and

the submissions made to the TRC by political parties and other organisations.

Of these various sources of information, victim and amnesty statements were accorded particular weight by the TRC. The evidentiary value of these statements thus merits an in-depth evaluation. 1. Victim statements In drafting its report, the TRC gave 'priority attention' to the primary data, including the victim statements, that it received. Victim statements were regarded as particularly important in informing the work of the Committee on Human Rights Violations-which, in turn, was primarily responsible for investigating and making findings on the gross violations committed in the past. The commission as a whole, moreover, clearly regarded victim statements as vital to its understanding of the past. It considered these statements invaluable in revealing 'the truth about human rights abuses'. It also described the taking of victim statements by the human rights violations' committee as the 'primary information gathering activity of the commission'. For present purposes, the key issue is the evidentiary value of these victim statements-which totalled some 21 300 in number and gave details of almost 38 000 alleged gross violations. Various factors are relevant in this regard. No oath required Victim statements were taken by a number of statement takers, who were employed either by the commission itself or by certain non-governmental Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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organisations (NGOs.) (See The gathering of victim statements, below.) At an early stage in the statement-taking process, 'it was decided to remove the demand for the statement to be made on oath'. This was because 'there was a potential for error in the process of its being written down by a statement taker'. Most victim statements were therefore not recorded under oath at the time that they were made. Moreover, the volume of victim statements made it impossible for at least 90% of victims to testify in person at public hearings. Only those who did appear at such hearings had an opportunity to repeat their testimony under oath. It is also uncertain if as many as 10% of victims-amounting to about 2 130 individuals-were indeed able to testify in this way. (Some 70 public hearings were held for victims (see The focus of public hearings for victims, below) and lasted, in total, for about 185 days. On this basis, between 11 and 12 victims would have had to testify on every day of every relevant public hearing. It may not always have been possible for the commission to keep up this pace.) Even if it is assumed that 10% of victims were able to give oral evidence and that all took the oath in doing so, it follows that the remaining 90% of victim statements were not made under oath. This means that at least 19 170 of the victim statements received by the commission had an evidentiary status lower than that of an affidavit. Little, if any, cross-examination allowed According to the TRC, it faced a fundamental dilemma in seeking to assemble evidence of gross violations. On the one hand, it was enjoined to offer victims of gross violations of human rights a cathartic opportunity to tell their stories of past suffering. On the other, it was obliged to base its report on 'factual' information and evidence. The commission decided to resolve this dilemma by giving priority to its therapeutic role. It did not want to subject individuals who had already suffered greatly-many of whom who were disclosing for the first time the trauma they had experienced-to the indignity, the scepticism, and the hostile probing implicit in cross-examination. Instead, the TRC took pains to ensure that 'the interaction of the vast majority of victims with the commission was a positive and affirming experience'. This meant that it made no attempt to cross-examine those victims who gave oral testimony before it, and generally accepted the veracity of their evidence unless 'there were glaring inconsistencies and falsehoods' in it. This approach generated further difficulties, however. In particular, it required that the TRC have prior knowlege of an incident before it could assess whether a victim statement contained such flaws. On occasion, such knowledge was readily at the commission's disposal. At many other times, however, it was not. Where an incident was well known, the commission's capacity to identify flaws in witness testimony was much enhanced. In April 1996, for instance, a witness told the TRC that she had counted no fewer than 175 graves after the police had opened fire on protesters in Langa township outside Cape Town in March 1960. Her Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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evidence could not be squared, however, with other information regarding this police shooting-for a judicial commission of inquiry, held in its wake, had found that the police had killed two people and had injured a further 26. In this instance, the discrepancy was easy to discern. The witness was not subjected to cross-examination, and her dignity remained intact. No harm was done, and the TRC found that three-rather than 175-people had been killed by the police in this incident. (This finding was also partially inconsistent with the earlier judicial inquiry which had found two people killed, and the TRC did not explain its reasoning in this regard. Elsewhere in its report, moreover, it recorded the number of deaths as two.) In another instance-where the incident in issue was also well known-it is less clear whether the TRC succeeded in detecting and rejecting inaccuracies in victim statements. In 1985, a commission of inquiry under Mr Justice Donald Kannemeyer had probed a further police shooting-this time at Langa township on the outskirts of Uitenhage, near Port Elizabeth.Following an extended inquiry, Judge Kannemeyer had found that the police had killed 20 people and injured 27 when they opened fire, with sharp ammunition, on a crowd marching to a funeral. He had also rejected evidence that even more people had been killed and their bodies then concealed. The TRC thus had an informed basis for assessing the testimony of witnesses who asserted that 34 people had been killed. The commission nevertheless appears confused as to the number of fatalities. At one point in its report, it describes the shootings as having resulted in 20 deathsthereby echoing Judge Kannemeyer's finding. At another point, however, it asserts that 43 people were killed in this same incident-a conclusion presumably reflecting what victims had recounted. In many instances, however, the commission was unlikely to have had any prior knowledge of an incident. In circumstances such as these, the TRC's capacity to discern inaccuracies in victim statements seems far from clear. An example may serve to illustrate the point. In October 1996, two witnesses-both family members of the deceased-told the TRC that a Northern Cape farmer, Mr Kobus Hanekom, had poisoned one of his workers, Mr Piet Scheffers. (Mr Scheffers had died in February 1993 after drinking a considerable amount on Mr Hanekom's farm.) An earlier inquest into Mr Scheffers' death was re-opened in apparent response to the TRC hearing, and the witnesses who had appeared before the commission were called to testify again. The presiding magistrate found they made a bad impression under cross-examination and contradicted themselves a number of times. He rejected their testimony as unreliable, and found the evidence too inconclusive to point towards the culpability of any person. It is unlikely that the commission would have had any independent knowledge of an incident such as the death of Mr Scheffers. Hence, the TRC would not have been in a position, from its own prior information, to determine whether there were inaccuracies in the accounts of these two witnesses. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Relevant too, in this regard, was the sheer volume of the statements made to the commission. The 21 300 victim statements obtained by the TRC, as earlier noted, covered some 38 000 incidents extending over a period exceeding 30 years. This must have made it all the more daunting and all the more difficult for the commission-without resort to cross-examination-to detect the flaws, if any, contained in these many thousands of separate accounts. Important too was the fact, as earlier noted, that only about 10% of victims were able to appear before the commission at public hearings. In 90% of instances, thus, the commission had no opportunity to observe the demeanour of these individuals as they gave their oral testimony. Nor could it probe, in even the gentlest way, for further details of their allegations. This, too, reduces the likelihood of the TRC having been able to detect inaccuracies in victim statements that proper crossexamination might have brought to light. How many victim statements, if any, were subjected to cross-examination remains uncertain, for the commission provides no clear data in this regard. The right of alleged perpetrators to cross-examine victims at public hearings was, however, canvassed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) at an early stage in the commission's operation. The case arose from the TRC's first victim hearing, held in East London on 15th April 1996. Two former police officers, who were to be implicated in the torture and assassination of an activist, Mr Siphiwe Mthimkulu, applied for an interdict preventing these allegations from being heard by the commission until it had given them full and proper notice of all evidence that might implicate them in gross violations of human rights. (See Audi alteram partem, below.) The Appellate Division ruled that they were entitled to such notice, and added that the commission might also be under a duty to 'permit immediate cross-examination' of the witness responsible for making the allegations. The TRC remained anxious to avoid placing victims under this kind of pressure, however, and it seems doubtful if cross-examination was allowed in more than a handful of instances, if any. In general, moreover, victims and perpetrators were not invited to give evidence at the same hearing, and perpetrators thus had little opportunity to cross-examine their accusers. (The hearings into the Bisho shootings in September 1992, and into the conflict surrounding the incorporation of Moutse into the KwaNdebele homeland, were exceptions in this regard, for at these both perpetrators and victims were present.) A 'low level' of corroboration The commission took pains to emphasise that victim statements-though generally untested under cross-examination-were nevertheless corroborated through the seeking out of information from other sources that would tend to confirm their truth. The human rights committee, for example, stated that it was 'the corroborated allegations of gross violations of human rights contained in 21 000 statements that formed the basis for its conclusions about the nature of past conflict'. The TRC as a whole, moreover, emphasised that 'all findings were made on duly corroborated Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

evidence'. The reality, however, seems to have been rather different from what the commission averred. Corroboration was primarily the responsibility of the Investigation Unit, and was secured in a variety of ways. Particularly important was 'a standard list of corroborative pointers'. Such pointers were defined as 'pieces of information or evidence concerning a particular act or event which might assist the Human Rights Violations Committee in establishing that the information provided by victims in their statements was true'. In practice, the pointers used included court records, inquest documents, death certificates, and newspaper clippings. Various questions arise as to the adequacy of these methods of corroboration. A death certificate, for example, might confirm a fatality and record the medical reason for the death. In general, however, it would give little insight into the circumstances in which the death had occurred, and would certainly not identify the perpetrator of a killing. Newspaper clippings might confirm that a killing had occurred, but be unable to cast adequate light on the identity of the wrongdoer(s). Inquest findings, in addition, might be inconclusive as to culpability. (For example, the inquest into the death of Mr Steve Biko, a leader of the Black Consciousness Movement who died in police custody in September 1997, found that 'there was no proof that his death had been brought about by an act or omission involving an offence by any person'.) Corroboration was also obtained in other ways, but these seem equally problematic. It was sought, where possible, from interviewing the individuals who had made the statements in issue (the deponents) as well as other witnesses. It was also obtained by reference to the records of the former government and other archival material, the databases kept by other organisations, the transcripts of investigative hearings conducted by the Investigation Unit (under section 29 of the commission's founding legislation), and the submissions made to the TRC by political parties and other organisations. On occasion, it was acquired through consultations with 'organisations of the state and civil society'. Interviewing deponents, however, might result in little more than a repetition of the information earlier provided in written statements. Corroboration normally requires confirmatory information from another source. The records of the former government might be incomplete in key regards, as might archival material. Consultations with governmental bodies and NGOs might yield no more than hearsay. So too might the section 29 hearings generally held behind closed doors. Databases compiled by other organisations might be partial in their coverage and misleading in equal measure. So great were the difficulties implicit in securing full corroboration that the commission, for the most part, did not even attempt this. Instead, it used two 'levels' of corroboration. A 'high' level would provide confirmation, by other witnesses present at the time, of 'the identity of the actual person committing the gross violation of human rights'. By contrast, 'a low level of corroboration would arise where the witness confirmed the event but not the identity of the perpetrator'.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In corroborating victim statements, the commission was generally content with securing a low level of corroboration. According to its Johannesburg regional office, 'the concept of low-level corroboration gained popularity [towards the end of 1996] as a way of fulfilling the commission's promise to do some investigation on every [victim] statement'. The Investigation Unit stated, too, that 'the commission required only a relatively low level of corroboration' as regards victim statements. The purpose of low-level corroboration, the unit continued, was to enable the commission 'to make a finding that a person was a victim of a gross human rights violation, as described in the act'. Such a finding was important for two reasons. First, it would help establish the 'extent' of the gross violations of human rights committed in past conflicts-a matter on which the commission was obliged to report. Secondly, it would show that the individual in question was indeed a victim of a gross violation, as defined by statute, and would qualify, accordingly, for reparations in due course. Low-level corroboration was relevant, in short, to demonstrating victim status-not to identitying perpetrators. Even a low level of corroboration, moreover, proved extremely difficult to obtain. This stemmed from various factors, including: Ă&#x2DC; the sheer volume of victim statements coupled with the limited time available for their corroboration; Ă&#x2DC; a delay (until March 1997) in appointing the staff needed to work on corroboration, with the result that a 'tremendous backlog' developed; and Ă&#x2DC; the fact that many victim statements simply 'told a story' of past suffering, and contained 'no supporting documentation or other evidence'. In addition, both the Investigation Unit and the Research Department, which played the primary role in corroboration, were burdened with many other responsibilities. Skilled investigators were also in short supply, and had to cover incidents spanning more than 30 years and committed both within the country and abroad. Moreover, though the commission recognised (by February 1997) that it needed to give far more time to corroborating the 19000 or so victim statements that would never be heard at public hearings, it also found it difficult to shift its focus from convening such hearings to working behind the scenes on corroboration. This was partly because arranging hearings had become a familiar activity with its own inertia against change. It was also because of the commission's 'considerable concern that it would [then] become driven by technical rather than moral considerations'. What complicated matters even more was that 'there were different understandings and conceptions as to what was meant by the term "low-level" corroboration. It was not clear exactly what level of information the commission needed in order to make a finding that a person was a victim of a gross human rights violation as described in the act'. This problem, according to the Investigation Unit, was overcome in time through the 'development of some corroboration "pointers"' and the provision of training.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Whether this difficulty was in fact resolved seems less clear than the Investigation Unit would allow. Confusion seems clearly to have continued-at least within the four regional offices of the commission-as to what low level corroboration entailed. The Cape Town office reported that 'despite the call for standardised national procedures, interaction between the regions was poor, and each region tended to develop its own system'. Moreover, 'because the national Human Rights Violations Committee did not set guidelines on levels of corroboration, the process of investigation devolved on the regional investigation units themselves'. This gave rise to 'regional variations in the investigative process'. The regional offices-applying as they did their varying approaches to corroboration-nevertheless played a crucial role in making the commission's findings of accountability. Regional offices were responsible for making 'prefindings' in this regard. These were based on victim statements, as well as the 'corroborative material gathered by the investigators and the background research material provided by the researchers'. 'After a pre-finding had been made at a regional level, it was ratified at national level.' In general, such ratification took place without additional checking or verification. Only 10% of regional pre-findings, chosen on a random basis, 'went through a national check, to ensure that regions were operating on the same criteria so that findings would be uniform, and also to double-check for possible mistakes'. In 90% of instances, regional pre-findings were accepted at face valueeven though the victim statements on which they were primarily based might have been corroborated in an inconsistent manner, and would generally have received a low level of corroboration only. These various difficulties led the TRC to emphasise the 'enormity of the [corroboration] task'.So great were the obstacles, in fact, that the commission was also compelled to acknowledge that it had encountered 'virtually insurmountable practical difficulties' in corroborating victim statements. These problems, it continued, had served to 'crystallise' what it regarded as a 'profound dilemma'. On the one hand, it was 'a legal institution with the responsiblity for making defensible findings according to established legal principles'. This was essential 'both to safeguard the credibility of its final report and to ensure that those who received reparations were genuinely victims as defined in the act'. On the other hand, it also 'embodied a moral and therapeutic process that aimed at acknowledging suffering and giving victims an opportunity to tell their stories'. 'This aspect of its work', it said, 'would have been greatly diminished had the findings process been approached in too technical a manner, focusing narrowly on rules of evidence and requirements of proof.' The commission fudges the issue of how it resolved this apparent dilemma. 'In general,' it stated, 'it sought to be both therapeutic in its process and rigorous in its findings, but sometimes the effort to satisfy one objective made it more difficult to attain the other.' The TRC implies thereby that, on the whole, it managed to do both. What is more likely, however, is that it sacrificed the rigour necessary for making findings in order to spare the victims of past abuses the indignity of cross-examination or of having in other ways to substantiate their Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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statements. The commission acknowledges, moreover, that it was willing, at times, to make a finding 'whenever the circumstances allowed this, and even where available information was extremely scanty'. The commission's approach, to some extent, is readily understandable. 'Nobody who listened to the victims' hearings could fail to be moved by the testimony of people who had been abused or tortured or of families who had lost a son, a daughter, a brother, a sister, a husband or a wife.' The tales told at these hearings were heartfelt and heart-rending. They may not, however, have been wholly accurate in identifying perpetrators nor in assessing their accountability for previous wrong-doing. Moreover, no matter how well-founded a deep-rooted sympathy for victims might have been, it could not obscure the fact that the dilemma described by the commission was one largely of its own making. The TRC's primary obligation under its founding statute was to base its findings on 'factual and objective' evidence. If it did not want to subject victims to crossexamination or other means of objectively verifying their statements, it should have left victim statements out of account in making its findings of accountability. The proper solution to its apparent dilemma (which it failed to follow) was not to discount the crucial process of verification but rather to omit from its assessment of culpability any evidence that was not demonstrably 'factual and objective'. The commission seems, thus, to have missed a crucial point. It may have had a sufficient basis-based on a low level of corroboration of victim statements and sometimes on 'extremely scanty' information-for a finding that a particular incident qualified as a gross violation of human rights under the relevant definition contained in the act. It may then also have had a sufficient basis for a related finding that the individuals who had suffered this violation were victims entitled to reparation. However, since low-level corroboration did not encompass the identity of perpetrators-let alone their culpability for alleged wrong-doing-it is doubtful in the extreme whether the commission could validly use victim statements as a foundation for findings of accountability for conduct as heinous as torture and premeditated murder. Cursorily corroborated victim statements might have sufficed for the first two purposes. They could not properly be used for the third as well. Hearsay not excluded A further key question is how many of the 21 300 victim statements received by the commission were based on hearsay testimony. Some witnesses made it clear that they would talk only of their personal experiences, and would tell the commission the truth 'as they had seen it'. Others-according to a minority report submitted by Mr Wynand Malan (a former NP politician who later became a coleader of the Democratic Party)-were 'often not present at the actual violations to which they testified and their stories were accounts of what they had been told'. These accounts might well have seemed quite accurate. They could equally well, however, have incorporated significant misunderstandings and mistakes. The dangers in hearsay are legion. For example, the original eyewitness-whose experience is now being relayed-might not have been able to see the alleged Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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perpetrators very clearly, especially at night or from a distance. He might have been mistaken as to a complex sequence of events, while the lapse of time might have blurred his memory yet further. The overall surrounding circumstancesrelevant to motive and intent-might not have been apparent to him at the time, especially if he were caught up in the immediate events. He might have made deductions as to culpability without access to the further information that would have shown these to be unfounded. Hearsay is subject to all these difficulties, and many more. Established legal principles thus incorporate strict rules against the admission of any evidence that is not based on personal experience and cannot be tested through crossexamination. Exceptions to the general rule that hearsay evidence must be excluded are relatively few. The TRC, however, does not acknowledge that it might often have relied on hearsay-and that this might have distorted its understanding of the past. It is only in the minority report of Mr Malan that the issue is raised. According to Mr Malan, hearsay evidence was admitted 'often'. The rest of the commission, in its rejoinder to Mr Malan, takes issue with certain of his criticisms but is silent on this point. The TRC itself elsewhere implicitly acknowledges that hearsay may well have been common in victim statements. According to the report, deponents testified not only about human rights violations suffered by themselves but also about those experienced by others. In about 18 500 cases, deponents told of their own experiences of violations. In some 17 500 instances, however, deponents reported to the TRC gross violations committed against people other than themselves. Since more women came forward to give statements than men-and since more men had suffered gross violations than women-it so happened that many of the deponents who gave evidence about the violations committed against others were women. The TRC puts it thus: 'Men were the most common victims of violations. Six times as many men died as women, and twice as many survivors of violations were men. Hence, although most people who told the commission about violations were women, most of the testimony was about men. Most men who came to the commission reported violations they [themselves] had experienced, whereas women tended to talk about violations experienced by others.' Many of the individuals who gave evidence about the gross violations experienced by others may simply have been recounting what they had heard about these events. This possibility is illustrated by the example of Mrs Sylvia Dlomo-Jele, whose youthful son, Sicelo Dlomo, was killed on the outskirts of Soweto in January 1988. A well-known UDF activist, he had earlier told his mother that he was likely to die soon, as the police were after him. When his body was discovered with a bullet hole in the head, she remembered his words and concluded that the police had killed him. She gave evidence to this effect to the commission in 1996. Her evidence was clearly based on hearsay, however, and not on what she herself had witnessed. In 1999 she was shown to have been mistaken. Four former ANC cadres, all comrades of her son and frequent guests in her home, applied for amnesty to the Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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commission. They explained at an amnesty hearing in February 1999 that it was they-and not the police-who had shot Sicelo dead as a suspected informer. Mrs Dlomo-Jele's hearsay testimony, proffered in all sincerity to the commission, had clearly been inaccurate. Many of those who testified about the 17 500 or so violations experienced by people other than themselves may have been recounting hearsay too. Many may also have been eyewitnesses to the events in question. But the character of the violations in issue must also have made eyewitness testimony comparatively rare. Torture, by its very nature, would have taken place beyond the sight of relatives, friends, or other witnesses. When killings occurred, eyewitnesses would not necessarily be present. Even when they were, it would still, in many instances, have been difficult to identify the perpetrators. Some examples of the many ways that people died may illustrate the point. People died, for example, in confrontations with the police in which perpetrator identity might be readily ascertainable. But people also died from petrol bombs lobbed through bedroom windows at night by assailants who were never seen. People died in 'drive-by' shootings where the assassins could scarcely be glimpsed before they disappeared. People were killed as 'collaborators' or 'informers' by crowds of people so large and so enraged that it was difficult to know who had done what, or with what level of personal accountability. People died in massacres, where attackers came suddenly out of the darkness and as quickly disappeared again. Individuals who told the TRC about the deaths of others, in situations such as these, could offer no accurate eyewitness evidence as to the perpetrators of these killings. Whatever they said in this regard was likely to be based on hearsay, rather than on personal knowledge. The commission should have recognised this likelihood. And when it came to assessing accountability for gross violations, it should have treated testimony about these 17 500 or so incidents with greater circumspection than it seems to have evinced. Hearsay was also clearly used by the TRC at times to substantiate its findings regarding culpablity. It was used, for example, to found its conclusion that the security forces had assassinated Mrs Victoria Mxenge in August 1985. The evidence it gathered (from witness statements, it would seem) was that: Ă&#x2DC; a former askari, Mr Jimmy Mbane, had said in a statement to the TRC that another askari, Mr Thabiso Sphamla, had confessed to him, while drunk, that he (Mr Sphamla) and three further askaris had killed Mrs Mxenge; Ă&#x2DC; Mr Pat Hlongwane, who had been imprisoned in the ANC's Quatro camp in exile, had stated that his cell mate, Mr Marvin Sefako (alias Mr Bongani Malinga), had told him that he had killed Mrs Mxenge 'on orders from Captain Dirk Coetzee of Vlakplaas'; Ă&#x2DC; the ANC, in its second submission, had asserted that Mr Sefako had been recruited by the security police in March 1985 or earlier, and was in training in the use of firearms and poisons from March 1985 to September 1985; and

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Ø Mr Sefako had confessed-while imprisoned in Quatro, it would seem-that he had shot Mrs Mxenge five times and thereafter 'followed her with an axe and chopped her next to her dining room door'. None of this evidence would stand up in a court, either civil or criminal. Mr Sefako himself, moreover, could not be questioned for he had been killed in 1991 following the lifting of the bans on the ANC and his return to South Africa. (His killing is attributed to the IFP at one point in the commission's report, and to the ANC at another.) The TRC's finding on Mrs Mxenge's death is as follows: The commission finds that Mrs Victoria Mxenge was killed by, or on the orders of, unknown members of the security forces, and that her death was a gross human rights violation which entailed deliberate planning on the part of the said security forces. Mrs Mxenge may in fact have been killed by the security forces. But the commission could not properly make a finding to this effect on the basis of this hearsay (and contradictory) evidence. The TRC, shows no hesitation, however, in basing its finding on so shaky a foundation. It even acknowledges that a key aspect of the hearsay evidence in issue (the alleged confession) may have been obtained under duress-but it accords this scant regard as well. The gathering of victim statements The commission averred, at various points in its report, that the statements it had received from victims were 'self-selected'. They were made, it declared, by those who had sought it out in order to recount the violations they had suffered. Such self-selection could clearly have coloured the commission's understanding of the past. The commission acknowledged this, conceding that a victim sample confined to individuals who had sought it out would have tended to exclude: Ø

those who lived very far away from any of the commission's offices;

people who were too old, sick, or depressed to make the effort to depose;

those who were already dead;

Ø individuals with no access to the media and hence no knowledge of the commission's work; and Ø

people 'from constituencies hostile to the commission'.

The commission recognised as well that the last of these factors had resulted, in KwaZulu-Natal, in its receiving many times more statements from ANC supporters than from members of the IFP. It said this had 'created the impression that the violations suffered by the UDF/ANC outnumbered those suffered by Inkatha by five to one'. It added that it was 'unable to establish the degree to which the disparity was a reflection of the IFP's rejection of the commission, or a reflection of the Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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actual experience of violations'. (It did not, however, allow its uncertainty in this regard to hinder it from subsequently finding the IFP the principal perpetrator of politically motivated killings in KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere.) The problem goes deeper, however, than a 'self-selection' of victim statements. The commission is also less than frank in this regard. For victim statements, it appears, were often less 'self-selected' than pre-selected by the TRC itself. Such statements were not solely spontaneously volunteered to the commission, as it takes pains to emphasise. Often they were sought out by statement takers who had been briefed by the Research Department as to what incidents to cover-and as to whom to track down and interview. This emerges clearly from the TRC's report on the activities of its Research Department. This department began its work by holding a series of workshops in early 1996, in the 'first months of the commission', in the geographical areas covered by the TRC's Cape Town, Durban, East London, and Johannesburg offices. These events 'brought together a range of community-based people, historians, journalists, human rights activists, and others'. The purpose of these workshops was to 'identify gross violations of human rights that had occurred in the areaincluding events both well-known and documented, as well as lesser known events in danger of being lost to public memory'. The identity of those who attended these workshops is not disclosed in the commission's report, but would clearly have had an important bearing on the understanding of past violations that emerged from these discussions-especially if the majority of those present shared the view that a police/IFP 'third force' was primarily to blame for the political killings committed in the past. The outcome of these workshops, said the Research Department, 'was the beginning of a national chronology and four regional chronologies'. These provided a 'preliminary overview of the 34 years under review by the commission'.'The chronologies ďż˝ provided a framework for the information gathering work of the commission.' They were 'substantially developed', thereafter, as a result of 'statement taking, human rights violations hearings, and amnesty applications' and were used in 'the corroboration and investigative phases of the commission's work as well as in the findings process'. Particularly important for present purposes is that these chronologies were also used to brief the statement takers appointed by the commission to record the statements of victims. In the Cape Town office, for example, the Research Department 'supplied statement takers with a chronology of political events and a brief account of documented cases of gross human rights violations-giving them a useful point of entry. In addition, workshops were held for statement takers and local NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and CBOs [community-based organisations] before statement takers worked in a sub-region. These workshops helped further familiarise statement takers with political events and with the people in the community who had been involved in these events'. Towards the end of 1996, moreover, statement takers adopted 'a more pro-active strategy', in which they sought out potential statement makers rather than waiting

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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to be approached. CBOs were thus, for example, 'asked for information in order to locate potential deponents', while 'the voters' roll was used to try and establish their current whereabouts'. In other regions, statement takers also shifted from the passive receipt of statements to the overt canvassing of these. The Eastern Cape office adopted a 'more proactive strategy' after it became clear that 'few people were coming forward to make statements'. In the Johannesburg region, various local organisations contributed statement takers who 'proved invaluable in identifying and reaching victims in both urban and rural areas'. In the region encompassing KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State, the same shift apparently took place-some individuals 'approaching the commission of their own accord', while others were sought out by the statement takers 'deployed across the province'. (The commission implies that statement takers in this region sought to approach both ANC and IFP supporters, but were inhibited in their endeavours to be even-handed by the political hostility they encountered in some areas of KwaZulu-Natal.) Overall, what proportion of victim statements was obtained through pre-selection is not explained by the commission. Statement takers, it thus appears, were not only told what events were particularly significant, but were also in time mandated to seek out deponents who would give evidence regarding such events. Moreover, as discussed below (see National and regional chronologies), the national chronology at least left out a number of significant events-including various massacres of which IFP supporters were the victims. The seeking out of certain deponents to testify about events reflected in this chronology would clearly have influenced the content of the statements received by the TRC, as well as the thrust of its subsequent findings, and would have done so far more than any 'self-selection' would have done. The commission is also less than frank in this regard. It adverts to (and glosses over, especially in KwaZulu-Natal) the problems implicit in self-selection. But the more disturbing difficulties arising out of pre-selection are not acknowledged at all. The fact that statements were frequently sought out can be gleaned, moreover, only from the odd snippets the commission lets fall from time to time, in different parts of its report. Only a most careful reading of its 3 500-page account-a process handicapped by the absence of any index-makes it possible to piece together the story of how statements were in fact sought out from chosen individuals. The focus of public hearings for victims The Committee on Human Rights Violations conducted a considerable number of public hearings for victims. Most of these hearings were intended to give individuals who had experienced gross violations of human rights the opportunity to 'relate their own accounts' of what they they had endured. They were commonly referred to by the TRC as 'victim' hearings. Other hearings involved the testimony of victims in their capacity as witnesses to particularly important events-and were described by the commission as 'event' hearings. They 'focused on specific events in which violations had occurred', and their purpose was to act as 'window cases' that provided 'detailed insights into particular incidents that were representative of Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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broader patterns of abuse'. 'Theme' hearings were also held, to canvass the sufferings of victims as representatives of wider groups-women, youth, and those subjected to compulsory military service. ('Institutional' hearings were conducted in public too. These focused primarily on 'organisations, rather than the individuals within those organisations'.) Leaving aside these institutional hearings, some 70 public hearings were held for victims (either as individuals recounting their own stories, or as people caught up in significant 'window cases', or as representatives of wider groups). The focus of these public hearings merits examination. This focus, as described below, suggests that the commission may have been selective in the incidents it canvasseddemonstrating a particular interest in bringing certain events to public attention, and less concern about probing other incidents that seemed equally significant. 'Victim' hearings 'Victim' hearings, as they became known in TRC parlance, were intended (as noted above) to allow individuals to tell their own stories of their sufferings. Though they were conducted all over the country, they were organised by each of the commission's four regional offices.In the Western Cape, victim hearings canvassed, among other things, 'the ambush and killing of the "Guguletu Seven" by the South African Police (SAP); the death of the first detainee to die in police custody; indiscriminate shooting by police of civilians in the towns surrounding Kimberley; human rights violations committed by kitskonstabels or police assistants; the torture of young teenage activists (who 'had their testicles, penises, or breasts slammed in drawers'); actions of the Amasolomzi vigilantes, supported by municipal police, in the Boland; the 'recurrent shooting and killing of youths by the police and torture in police cells' in various Boland towns; the killing of an Umkhonto cadre, Mr Ashley Kriel; a further instance of torture in which a young woman's breast was slammed in a drawer in the Beaufort West area; a further incident of torture in the Karoo; and the killing of activists by the security forces in a 1985 cross-border raid.Victim hearings in this region also canvassed the St James' Church massacre, perpetrated by cadres of the Azanian People's Liberation Movement (Apla), the armed wing of the PAC; the killing of a community councillor near George; the burning of residents in Beaufort West who 'did not support the comrades'; the killing of a policeman in Upington and the trial of the 'Upington 26'; attacks on informers, community councillors, and police officers in the Colesberg area of the Karoo; and 'clashes between the UDF and the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo)' in the Boland. Although other issues were canvassed as well, the preponderance of the commission's focus fell on the conduct of the former security forces, particularly the SAP. The Cape Town office acknowledged, moreover, that it had been criticised for 'showing a bias towards investigations and hearings on violations committed by the security forces, rather than those committed by the liberation movement'. It justified this on the basis that '90 per cent of statements had demonstrated the involvement of security forces in human rights violations'. This does not seem sufficient an explanation, however-especially since many of the victim statements in issue were, by the TRC's own admission, not spontaneously received but rather deliberately sought out by the statement takers it deployed. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

(See The gathering of victim statements, above.)The same pattern seems evident in other regions too. In the Eastern Cape, the main focus was on killing, torture, and shooting by the SAP and other homeland forces. In the Johannesburg region, the primary emphasis was on shootings and other killings by the SAP and homeland security forces; by vigilante groups such as the Mbokotho (which had been formed in 1986 in the former KwaNdebele homeland to 'deal with people who enforced boycotts and handle "troublemakers"'); and by politically motivated gangs such as the 'IFP-aligned' Toaster Gang in Tembisa (on the east Rand). Hearings in this region also canvassed the killing of activists through booby-trapped hand grenades; the role of the former security forces and the IFP in hostel and train violence; and conflict between the ANC and the IFP. In KwaZulu-Natal, hearings canvassed primarily the culpability of the IFP and/or the former security forces in violence, including the killing of 15 people at a memorial service for Mrs Victoria Mxenge; the murder of prominent trade unionists in Mpophomeni (near Howick); the massacre of 11 people by IFP supporters at the Hlobane mine; the assassination of Dr Rick Turner; the killing by the IFP of 'hundreds' of people near Pietermaritzburg in the 'Seven Days War'; and the deaths, at the hands of IFP supporters, of some 35 ANC township residents in two massacres in Bruntville (outside Mooi River in the Midlands region). Particular emphasis was placed on the 1986 training, allegedly as 'hit squads', of 200 IFP supporters in the Caprivi strip in Namibia by the former South African Defence Force (SADF), as further described in due course. (See Ignoring other rulings too, below.) Other issues were also canvassed in the course of these regional hearings. They focused, for example, on the role of an ANC leader, Mrs Winnie MadikizelaMandela, and her Mandela United Football Team in violence in Soweto in the late 1980s. Overall, however, the preponderance of attention was clearly placed on the former security forces and their alleged allies, the IFP. 'Event' hearings A similar pattern emerges as regards the 'event' hearings that were intended, as noted above, to provide a window on to 'particular incidents that were representative of broader patterns of abuse'. Again, event hearings were organised by each of the commission's four regional offices. In the Western Cape, these hearings focused on: Ă&#x2DC; the 'ambushing and killing of the Guguletu Seven cadres', with a special emphasis on 'the Vlakplaas connection'-the evidence that police officers from the Vlakplaas unit had been involved in the planning of the incident; Ă&#x2DC; the 'Trojan Horse' incident in which three youths had been killed by police concealed in the back of a van, and in which 'evidence was led to show that the police were not reacting, but deliberately set out to provoke unrest in order to kill'; and

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Ă&#x2DC; events in KTC, an informal settlement near Cape Town, where the emphasis was placed on 'witdoek and police complicity in an attack on the KTC community'. According to the commission's report, these event hearings were particularly significant because they 'confirmed long held beliefs about the role of the state in fomenting violence (as in KTC), the involvement of the police in provoking unrest in order to kill (as in the "Trojan Horse" incident), and the involvement of security forces based at Vlakplaas in the Western Cape (as in the "Guguletu Seven" incident)'. They thus 'provided a window into understanding human rights violations' in the 1980s. The commission implies that these incidents were indicative of all the human rights violations committed in the 1980s. These cases, however, all focus on security force involvement in violations. They could provide a 'window' on to wrongdoing of this kind only. They offered little insight into the possible role of the liberation movements in political violence. And, by being posited as representative of all abuses from this time, they helped to obscure and conceal this latter aspect of past conflict. Other event hearings conducted by the commission canvassed, among other things, the Soweto revolt in 1976; the 'six day' war in Alexandra (outside Johannesburg) in 1986; the conflict that attentended the incorporation of the Moutse district into the KwaNdebele homeland in the mid-1980s; the killing of farmers in the former Transvaal; the 1990 'Seven Days' War' in Pietermaritzburg; the training of IFP supporters by the SADF in the Caprivi in 1986; the Pondoland rebellion in 1960; and the Bisho massacre in 1992. Of these eight further event hearings, almost all pointed to the culpability of the former government, the former security forces, and/or the IFP. Only one, the hearing into the killing of farmers in the former Transvaal, seemed likely to throw light on the possible role in political violence of the liberation movements. 'Theme' hearings 'Theme' hearings canvassed the sufferings of victims, as representatives of particular groups. The hearings focused on women; children and youth; and compulsory military service. Hearings for women canvassed the extent to which they had suffered sexual and psychological abuse, as well as other forms of torture. They were also intended to 'end the silence around the gendered nature of apartheid atrocities', and to show, for example, that the widows of activists had been arrested and harassed as well. Hearings for children and youth probed their detention, torture, and killing at the hands of the former security forces. They also canvassed the psychological effects on them of exposure to apartheid and violence. In Durban, for example, children 'affected by violence were given the opportunity to express themselves through art and drama workshops'. The overall focus of these hearings

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In conducting its public hearings for victims falling into these three categories, the commission seems to have devoted considerable energy to examining and reexamining certain issues, such as the Trojan Horse incident and the violence in KTC, or the training of 200 Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi as 'hit squads' against the ANC alliance. Its public hearings appear to have omitted, however, an equivalent focus on other important developments-all of which would seem essential to understanding the conflicts of the past. These included, for example, attacks on black policemen, the targeting of black councillors, the coercion that accompanied mass action campaigns, the necklace executions of hundreds of individuals, and the deaths of hundreds more in bomb attacks of various kinds. Submissions made to the commission had drawn the TRC's attention to all these issues, yet public hearings canvassed them only in outline-conveying very little of the impact they had had on township life. (See also Events and issues not investigated, below.) 2. Amnesty statements The key question here is the extent to which amnesty statements were corroborated, cross-examined, screened for inadmissible hearsay testimony, and verified in general. Each of these issues merits separate consideration. Inadequate corroboration According to the TRC report, amnesty statements were corroborated. For this purpose, 'the Investigation Unit was asked to obtain police dockets and other relevant information from institutions like the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Police Service, and the Department of Justice. In certain instances, evidence leaders and analysts interviewed individuals, applicants, and/or victims to corroborate information contained in particular submissions'. In addition, 'use was made of information gathered by the Research Department and the Investigation Unit or contained in submissions made by political organisations and liberation movements. The section 29 in camera hearings were another source of information used to verify and corroborate information provided in applications'. The commission does not explain what level of corroboration-high or low-was either sought or obtained. Nor does it acknowledge that these methods of corroboration may not have been sufficient. The statements in police dockets, for example, may not even be sworn affidavits and are not necessarily true. They cannot be accepted at face value without further verification. Police records, moreover, might prove prior criminal conduct, but would not demonstrate culpability in a further specific incident. Interviewing deponents and other individuals would clearly be no substitute for proper crossexamination, while the submissions made by political organisations might reflect no more than hearsay or opinion. The secret testimony given at section 29 hearings might also be mistaken, while its accuracy would be immune from public scrutiny and public confirmation. A further problem, said Mr Malan in his minority report, was that many amnesty applicants implicated or put the blame for their wrongdoing on individuals who Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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were already deceased. This meant that the most important corroborative evidence of all-that of an alleged co-perpetrator-was frequently beyond all reach. The commission, in its rejoinder to Mr Malan, takes issue with his views on many other matters but is silent on this point. Insufficient opportunity for cross-examination Amnesty statements were different from victim statements in a crucial respect. In terms of the commission's founding legislation, those who sought amnesty for gross violations of human rights could be cross-examined on the content of their amnesty statements. This was to be achieved through public amnesty hearings, where victims and others with an interest in the matter could challenge what was said by such applicants, and adduce their own conflicting evidence as well. The veracity of these amnesty statements could therefore be tested in much the same way as in court. This should have made amnesty statements a particularly important source of tested evidence on which the commission could draw in making findings of accountability. Various factors, however, served to limit the extent to which amnesty statements were actually cross-examined. First, comparatively few of the amnesty statements received by the commission qualified at all for public hearing-and hence for the cross-examination that this would entail. In all, 7 127 amnesty applications were received by the commission. Most of these, however, were not eligible for the granting of amnesty at all, or did not involve gross violations of human rights, as defined in the TRC's founding legislation. Some 1 700 did deal with gross violations, but it was not clear at the time the commission compiled its report that all would qualify for public hearing. (Some 350 were still awaiting further particulars that might, once received, have excluded the applications from further consideration because, for example, no political motive for misconduct was disclosed.) Thus, at the relevant cut-off date, only 1 341 applications had been identified as qualifying for public hearing. Of these, only 102 had proceeded through a public hearing, while 1 239 remained still to be heard. In these 1 239 instances, the statements made by applicants had not yet been subjected to cross-examination and could not provide the tested evidence required. It was only the 102 amnesty statements that had proceeded through a public hearing-and had seemingly been confirmed as accurate through the granting of amnesty-that could be taken to contain the substantiated evidence required for conclusions regarding culpability. These 102 amnesty statements comprised no more than 1.4% of the total applications received, and less than 8% of those qualifying for public hearing. The dangers of relying on the untested and unsubstantiated evidence of an amnesty applicant are clear, of course. In the criminal courts, such evidence would constitute 'accomplice' evidence-and would be treated with particular caution. This is for three main reasons. First, an accomplice, by definition, 'knows what happened when the crime was committed and can give a credible sounding account of it. By the same token, however, it is easy for the accomplice to swop role players and to attribute to one individual deeds that were possibly committed by someone else or even by the accomplice himself'. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Secondly, the accomplice witness has an 'obvious temptation to tell the police what he perceives they want to know'. Thirdly, accomplices are 'self-confessed criminals who are attempting to gain some benefit by testifying'. Amnesty applicants before the commission, like accomplice witnesses in the criminal courts, could use their knowledge of past violations to implicate others, particularly those who had allegedly instructed the commission of such abuses. The applicants could do so with seeming credibility, though not necessarily with honesty or accuracy. They would also have an interest in telling the TRC's investigators what they thought those investigators might want to hear, for this would increase their chances of obtaining amnesty. Moreover, the primary interest of the applicants would clearly be to escape the punishment that otherwise would lie in store for them. Many applicants, too, sought amnesty for crimes as serious as murder. They had already, by their own admission, demonstrated scant respect for human life. They might thus find the telling of a plausible lie a relatively trivial matter-especially if in doing so they could save themselves from life or other long-term imprisonment. Some were also likely, as the TRC itself acknowledged (albeit in a different context), to be 'highly skilled operatives, trained in the art of concealing their crimes'. The commission also conceded that, when amnesty statements were put to the test in public hearings, discrepancies sometimes emerged between what the applicants had originally stated and the oral testimony they subsequently gave. It noted, thus, that 'perpetrators recounted versions of events that were sometimes different'. (How often this occurred is not explained.) It glossed over the significance of this, criticising these discrepancies mainly because they 'led to confusion and anger on the part of victims' families and the wider public'. The more disturbing implication is that these amnesty applicants were likely to have been lying on one or both occasions. The commission admitted, too, that some of the individuals who claimed to possess important information regarding past violations (and who, on this basis, then sought the benefits of its witness protection programme) were nothing but 'confidence tricksters'. 'Often motivated by financial enrichment,' said the TRC, 'these [potential witnesses] wanted to mislead the commission by falsely professing knowledge of cases under investigation. Such misrepresentation was easily achieved because of the media publicity accorded the cases over the years, the absence of independent eyewitnesses, and the destruction of official documentation.' The commission seems confident that all these people were identified and dealt with. It fails to acknowledge the risk that some amnesty applicants might also have been 'confidence tricksters'-who would have been assisted in putting forward false testimony by the very same factors. The 1 239 untested amnesty statements that remained unheard on 30th June 1998 constitute, accordingly, a most uncertain basis for any findings of accountability. The commission seems nevertheless to have taken pains to ensure that these untested allegations would be available to it when it came to compiling its report. Thus, when it realised that these amnesty applications could not be finalised Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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before the cut-off date, it instructed the Research Department to embark on 'Operation Capture'. 'This involved reading all amnesty applications with a view to categorising these into themes and identifying and accessing relevant material for the final report.' How many of the unheard amnesty statements encompassed within Operation Capture were used to make findings of accountability is difficult to gauge. It seems clear, however, that the TRC relied on at least some of this untested data to support its findings. This is evident, for example, as regards the amnesty statement submitted by Colonel Eugene de Kock, a former police officer and erstwhile commander of a 'counter-revolutionary' police unit stationed at Vlakplaas, outside Pretoria. Col de Kock had been convicted in 1996 on charges that included five counts of murder, one count of culpable homicide, and 61 of fraud. He had been sentenced to two life sentences and a further 212 years' imprisonment. At his trial, Col de Kock had given no evidence on oath. Instead, he had made a lengthy statement from the dock in mitigation of his sentence. In this, he had placed the blame for his nefarious activities on various former police generals as well as two former state presidents, Messrs P W Botha and F W de Klerk. Much of his court statement had consisted of hearsay. He had also told the trial judge that he was contemplating applying to the TRC for amnesty, and had stated: 'My only strategy is to keep alive. I find myself in a steel vault with no passages and no turns.' Col de Kock subsequently submitted to the TRC an amnesty application running to 4 000 pages and encompassing some 140 incidents. His application had not been heard at the time the commission compiled its report. The TRC nevertheless seems to have relied, in making certain of its findings regarding the accountability of the SAP for extra-judicial killings, not only on the untested content of his amnesty statement but also on the hearsay allegations contained in his autobiography, A Long Night's Damage. The commission cites, for example, a passage from this book in which Col de Kock 'stated that he was instructed to "make a plan" in respect of Mr Dirk Coetzee by Brigadier Nick Janse van Rensburg'. (This prompted Col de Kock to post Mr Coetzee a Walkman music casette player containing a concealed bomb. This, in February 1991, ultimately instead reached and killed a Johannesburg lawyer, Mr Bheki Mhlangeni.) Col de Kock's statement implicating Brig van Rensburg is hearsay. So too is his amnesty statement that it was 'the head of the Komatipoort security police' who requested him to help dispose of the body of another activist, Mr Johannes Sweet Sambo. So too was his further statement that he was 'asked "to make a plan"' about an askari, Mr Johannes Temba Mabotha, whose loyalty had become suspect (and whom he then killed). So too was his evidence that Colonel Andy Taylor had instructed him to kill another suspected double agent, an askari called Mr Goodwill Neville Sikhakane. So too was his allegation, again contained in his autobiography, that two senior police officers, General 'Bertus' Steyn and General 'Krappies' Engelbrecht, had also authorised the assassination of Mr Sikhakane.

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The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The commission's report provides no indication of how these hearsay allegations against various senior police officers were tested or verified. The TRC seems simply to have assumed their veracity-even though Col de Kock might have had reason to make false or exaggerated allegations against the officers concerned. For Col de Kock's application could not succeed unless he could show that he had been following the orders of his superiors (and had thus been acting within the course and scope of his authority as a police officer)-and unless he could also satisfy the commission that he had made a full disclosure as regards the relevant chain of command. The commission nevertheless used Col de Kock's amnesty statement, together with similar and equally untested allegations by other amnesty applicants, to conclude that 'the SAP, in the post-1990 period, continued to carry out extra-judicial killings and attempted killings', by way of parcel bombs and other means. The implication is that the SAP, as a whole, was responsible for such killings as part of official police policy. Clearly, such killings were carried out by policemen in this period, as Col de Kock's own conviction on various counts of murder and culpable homicide makes plain. Col de Kock and other policemen guilty of such crimes might have been abusing their powers for their own purposes. They could also have been acting on the instruction of senior police officers and in pursuance of official police policy. Which of these options applied was a key question for the TRC to address. It is also true, of course, that the SAP had long implicitly encouraged extra-judicial killings by failing to probe or put an end to the mysterious deaths of the government's political opponents. The TRC's finding goes further than this, and indicates that the SAP itself was directly responsible for such executions in the early 1990s. This might well have been the case. But the TRC's finding to this effect would carry greater weight if it were not based on hearsay and untested allegations. The commission needed verified and substantiated evidence on which to found a conclusion of this kind. The commission refers also to the untested amnesty statements of various other individuals-including Mr Willie Nortje, Mr 'Brood' van Heerden, Mr W Mentz, Mr Derek Rausch, Mr Johann Verster, and Mr Douw Willemse. It uses their statements, for example, to describe the alleged supply of weapons to the IFP by the South African Police (SAP) in the early 1990s: According to the amnesty application of Mr Derek Rausch, he assisted Vlakplaas members Lionel Snyman and Snor Vermeulen to make home-made explosive devices. Rausch, a precision engineer and an ex-Rhodesian police officer, had an engineering shop next to Mechem, a subsidiary of Armscor, and frequently worked for them. Rausch brought the material and Lionel Snyman and Snor Vermeulen provided the explosives to build the explosive devices from Vlakplaas stores ďż˝ Snyman and Vermeulen ďż˝ approached Rausch to assist them in making home-made shotguns. Joe Verster of Mechem assisted with this project and Snyman told him that Basie Smit [a general in the SAP] approved of the project. They made Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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approximately 200 shotguns. According to Verster, Snyman later told him that General Le Roux was present when the prototype was tested and was very happy with the results. Both Rausch and Venter were told that the guns were intended for Inkatha. In his amnesty application, Douw Willemse stated that he assisted Snor Vermeulen and Lionel Snyman to test home-made weapons, on the instruction of de Kock. These allegations are untested, it would seem. They also abound in hearsay. The extent to which they have been corroborated-except by similar testimony from other amnesty applicants who might also have had reason to falsify their evidenceremains unclear. The commission implicitly acknowledges the difficulties of relying on this testimony when it states: 'The amnesty applications relating to the supply of weapons by the SAP to the IFP have at this stage not been heard and the commission is thus unable to make a finding on this issue.' In its very next sentence, however, the TRC appears to abandon this caution. It continues: 'However, sufficient evidence is available for the commission to make a finding that former SAP operatives provided substantial amounts of unlicensed heavy weaponry, explosives, and ammunition to senior members of the IFP in the post1990 period.' This finding appears to be based on the amnesty statement of Col de Kock, who (at the time he supplied weapons to the IFP) was no longer a member of the police. The commission fails to explain why Col de Kock's untested evidencehearsay against all individuals other than himself-should have sufficed to prove a conspiracy among former policemen to provide the IFP with weapons. (Col de Kock had himself been found to have supplied weapons to the IFP, but this did not necessarily prove the wider culpability the TRC asserted.) To recap, thus, of the 7 127 amnesty applications received by the commission, only 102 had been heard and upheld (through the granting of amnesty) by the time the TRC compiled its report. These 102 statements were only a tiny fraction of the amnesty applications received. They, at least, should have constituted a safe source of tested, substantiated, and reliable evidence on which the commission could properly draw in making findings of accountability. Whether this was always so is difficult to gauge. A careful scrutiny of one key amnesty application suggests, however, that it might not have been. Unexplained oddities in a key amnesty statement An application for amnesty was put forward to the TRC by Captain Brian Mitchell, a former police officer. Capt Mitchell had been convicted in 1992 on 11 counts of murder arising out of a massacre at Trust Feed near New Hanover (in the KwaZuluNatal Midlands) in December 1988, and had been sentenced to death-a punishment commuted in April 1994 to 30 years' imprisonment. The TRC report describes the Trust Feed massacre as follows. In the early hours of 3rd December 1988, gunmen opened fire on a house in the Trust Feed community, killing 11 and wounding two. The attack was perpetrated by four special constables, acting on the orders of Capt Mitchell.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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According to the commission, the attack had earlier been planned at a meeting involving various Inkatha leaders, including Mr David Ntombela. The police had agreed that they would initiate a 'clean-up' operation in Trust Feed one morning, so as to disarm and round up UDF suspects. (According to the trial record, this operation was decided upon after 'a vehicle had been apprehended on 24th November 1988 in which there were eight UDF supporters who were apparently on a mission to attack Inkatha leaders and were armed with firearms and petrol bombs'. The planned operation in Trust Feed was described as a normal crime prevention operation, and was notified as such to the district commissioner of the SAP in Greytown.) According to the TRC, the underlying intention was that the police would then withdraw-leaving Inkatha members and the special constables to launch an attack on remaining UDF supporters that evening. On 2nd December, the plan was put into operation. About 30 to 40 policemen rounded up known UDF members and detained them under emergency regulations. The police were then withdrawn. At midnight, Capt Mitchell went to Trust Feed to see how the operation had gone. Disappointed that only a building had been burnt and no one killed, he instructed the special constables to burn a shop belonging to a UDF supporter and to attack a particular house. During the latter assault, 11 people were killed. A mistake was made in identifying the house to be attacked, however-and those killed were all Inkatha members, attending a vigil (or wake) for a relative who had died of natural causes. In the investigation that immediately ensued, police involvement in the massacre was covered up. Senior police officers also tried to thwart a subsequent investigation by Colonel Frank Dutton, who ultimately assembled the evidence that saw Capt Mitchell and the special constables convicted on 11 counts of murder in April 1992. Capt Mitchell subsequently applied for amnesty to the TRC. His amnesty application raises a number of important questions as to the extent to which amnesty evidence before the commission was, in fact, tested and verified. Capt Mitchell had twice applied for indemnity in the past. On the first occasion, this was refused because he was awaiting execution rather than serving a prison sentence. After his death sentence had been commuted to 30 years' imprisonment, he applied again-this time under the Further Indemnity Act of 1992, under which the four special constables had been released. (See Indemnity without disclosure, below.) His application was again refused. Capt Mitchell then decided, 'in the spirit of reconciliation and for the purpose of applying for amnesty' to the TRC, that he was 'prepared to make disclosures of the events leading up to the Trust Feed incident and further revelations'. For this purpose, he was due to 'speak about matters not relevant to his application with the broader commission and its investigators', and meetings were being convened towards this end. He had refused to disclose this information in the past, he said, because he had regarded himself as a soldier captured in warfare-and had also expected the police to come to his assistance.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The amnesty panel hearing his application comprised Advocate Chris de Jager, Mr Justice Hassen Mall as chairman, Ms Sisi Khampepe, Mr Justice Bernard Ngoepe, and Mr Justice Andrew Wilson. Judge Wilson had also been the presiding officer in the trial of Capt Mitchell. He offered to recuse himself from the amnesty panel, but this was ruled unnecessary.During the trial of Capt Mitchell, Judge Wilson had noted on more than one occasion the contradictory statements made by the accused-and had commented that these 'highlighted Capt Mitchell's complete disregard for the truth'. During his amnesty hearing, however, Capt Mitchell's credibility was more assumed than challenged. This was despite the fact that Capt Mitchell-having twice been denied indemnity in the past-was utilising his last opportunity to escape a prison term of 30 years, and may have had considerable incentive to say whatever he thought would best secure his release. Capt Mitchell's amnesty hearing was supposed to have commenced on 15th October. It was postponed till the following day to allow the victims of the massacre and their families to obtain legal representation. When the hearing resumed the next day, however, the amnesty panel was told that the victims no longer wished to give evidence in the matter. This was because all their civil claims against Captain Mitchell, save one, had been settled by the government that morning, through the intervention of the relevant state attorney. Ministerial permission was required for the one that remained outstanding, but it had been promised that this would be 'positively considered'. The victims thus had no objection to the granting of amnesty to Capt Mitchell, and were content to leave the matter to the discretion of the amnesty committee. On this basis, the hearing proceeded-and did so without legal representatives of the victims cross-examining Capt Mitchell. Counsel for the TRC did not oppose the application and hence did not cross-examine him either. In support of his application for amnesty, Capt Mitchell lodged with the amnesty panel of the TRC an affidavit accompanied by various documents. These included SAP briefing documents and training material that described the 'total strategy' the government had initiated against the 'total onslaught' being mounted by the ANC and its internal ally, the UDF; the role within this of the National Security Management System; and the part being played by the 'special constables', in particular. One SAP document, compiled by a Major General Steenkamp in February 1987, stated that the total strategy included the training of special constables, who were 'to be taken out of the community and placed back within the community', and who were to provide a 'physical force or wedge against the tyranny of the Comrades, the UDF/ANC'. The special constables were to be attached to the SAP's riot units, and to be used in black areas where the UDF/ANC had made substantial gains in recent years, so as to prevent the alliance making any further gains. (It is unclear how new this evidence was. It seems to echo what Capt Mitchell had stated in his trial, where he had also asserted that the special constables were to be 'taken from the community and trained and placed back in the community as a physical force or wedge against the tyrannies of the comrades'.) Capt Mitchell also attached to his amnesty affidavit a copy of a 1988 research paper, compiled by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, and entitled 'Everyone is afraid: the changing face of policing in South Africa'. According to this Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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document, 16 000 special constables or municipal policemen had been deployed as a third or auxiliary force to the SAP, which then numbered 48 000. They had thus increased the numerical strength of the SAP by a third. They had also made it possible to depict the violence as 'black-on-black', while also being used to 'push up the violence suddenly in given areas'. In the case of Trust Feed, continued Capt Mitchell, 'the effect was to weaken the opposition and the area was left in the hands of pro-Security Force people and proInkatha and pro-Government people. The houses of activists were set alight and attacked. Hence the special constables, as a third or auxiliary force, played an important role'. Capt Mitchell also referred to further SAP documentation in the form of notes and a manual. This included a section describing police strategy for combating unrest in small rural black townships. The document identified the difficulty, in such areas, of using members of the local police in 'clandestine operations'-for such individuals would be well known to the community. It advocated 'making use of members from elsewhere to operate secretly' in such localities. Capt Mitchell said that he had thus used an unmarked kombi to bring four special constables, all dressed in civilian clothes, to Trust Feed. He left them at the home of the local Inkatha leader, Mr Jerome Gabela. He was instructed to do so, he continued, by Major Deon Terreblanche, the commander of the riot unit stationed at Pietermaritzburg. The special constables' role, he stated, was to 'render assistance to Inkatha on the evening of the attack on UDF supporters in Trust Feed'. Capt Mitchell testified further that he had 'seen this as falling within the strategy contained in the [SAP] documents'. Maj Terreblanche had also told him to bring the local Inkatha Youth Brigade leader, as well as other Inkatha leaders, to Morava House in Pietermaritzburg, to be addressed by Mr Ntombela, 'the warlord for Inkatha'. Thereafter, 'the specials were to come to Trust Feed and the attack would be launched that night against the UDF activists within the area. The attack would be conducted by the Inkatha Youth Brigade and Inkatha members, with the assistance of the special constables'. The Pietermaritzburg riot unit was to go into Trust Feed that morning 'to clean up the area of weapons and to make the resistance less against the offensive that was going to take place that evening'. Capt Mitchell appeared confused as to who had given the order for this attack on UDF activists. At various times-in both his documents and his oral evidence to the amnesty committee-he stated that the attack had been ordered by Mr Ntombela. Questioned on this point, he stated that it was Mr Gabela who had needed to be schooled into using 'a strong hand in the area'. Mr Gabela, he continued, had told him on the way back to New Hanover after the meeting with Mr Ntombela, that he (Mr Gabela) 'had been told to launch an attack against the UDF after the police operation on 2nd December. Mr Gabela had been told this by David Ntombela, and he had also been told that offensive assistance would be provided in the form of armed special constables'. Capt Mitchell went on to deny, however, that it must then have been Mr Gabela who ordered the attack, and said: 'I think the presence

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of Maj Terreblanche and myself and David Ntombela � I think it wasn't something we could have told him, and said to him "You must go and attack". It had to come from within his own party.' At other points in his testimony, however, Capt Mitchell emphasised that the order to use the special constables against the UDF had come-not from anyone within Inkatha-but rather from his immediate superior, Maj Terreblanche. This order, he first denied and then confirmed, had been given to him in the course and scope of his duties. (Under the commission's founding legislation, one of the requirements for the granting of amnesty to a former security force member is that he should have been acting in 'the course and scope of his duties' and 'within the scope of his express or implied authority'.) Towards the end of Capt Mitchell's evidence it emerged that he had not himself attended the alleged planning meeting at Morava House in Pietermaritzburg. The meeting between Messrs Ntombela, Gabela, and other Inkatha leaders had been private, he said. 'Myself and Maj Terreblanche stood outside. We never attended the meeting personally.' This statement seemed to take the amnesty panel by surprise. Questioned Judge Wilson: 'But you've given evidence about what was said at that meeting?' Capt Mitchell responded: 'No sir, it was things said to me by Maj Terreblanche and it was things said to me by Mr Gabela when we left there on our way to New Hanover.' This part of Capt Mitchell's testimony was no more than hearsay, accordingly. So too were the documents from both the SAP and the Catholic Institute that he tendered as evidence of the 'offensive' purpose allegedly underlying the deployment of the special constables in the Pietermaritzburg area and elsewhere. Other weaknesses and oddities became evident in his testimony as well: Ø Capt Mitchell could not remember how the UDF targets to be attacked by the special constables were to be identified until Judge Wilson reminded him that he (Capt Mitchell) had prepared a list of names which had also been used by the police in their clean-up operation; Ø the special constables, all strangers to the area, were not given a map of the house in which the activists were likely to have gathered, but were dropped off in darkness at a nearby shop-and pointed by Capt Mitchell in the direction in which the house lay. They were supposed to find a house where 'comrades' had hidden, possibly in a concealed underground cellar; Ø Capt Mitchell said it was difficult to explain how the special constables were going to find the house. Judge Wilson reminded him that, during the trial, it had emerged that the police had expected the UDF activists to gather together to discuss the morning raid and to have a light burning while they did so. Hence, the fact that there was a light on in the house where the wake was being conducted had led to confusion. Capt Mitchell denied, however, that the special constables had been instructed to attack any house in which a light was showing. He said the location of the house in relation to the shop where the four had been dropped off had been explained to the special constables, but that they must have gone too far

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in the dark. He also conceded that 'it was very poorly planned and very stupidly done', while Judge Wilson explained to the rest of the amnesty panel that the area in issue was a rural one, where 'the houses were not close together but down this road or that road'. Judge Mall queried, among other things, the content of the police documents cited by Capt Mitchell as proof that the special constables were intended by the SAP to be used in attacks on UDF supporters. These documents, said Judge Mall, indicated rather that the special constables were 'to be used within the terms of the law and not to commit crimes'. Capt Mitchell conceded that this was so and said that it was 'eventually in practice that things went wrong'. Judge Mall also asked if the idea of using the special constables to kill UDF activists had originated with Maj Terreblanche, or with SAP officers of higher rank-and Capt Mitchell explained that Maj Terreblanche's death in the interim had made it difficult to answer this. Questioned further by Judge Ngoepe, Capt Mitchell's counsel confirmed that his client had first given evidence of Maj Terreblanche's pivotal role in the massacre only after Maj Terreblanche had been killed. Capt Mitchell further conceded that the police documents disclosed 'no official justification' for using the special constables to attack and kill UDF supporters. He explained that it was hard to recall how fraught the situation had been in 1988, and said 'it was the despair and the difficulties facing the security forces in trying to control the situation' that had led to 'stupid, stupid mistakes being made by us'. Capt Mitchell added that police lectures had spoken of hitting hard and 'fighting fire with fire' and it was this that had informed his understanding. Judge Mall responded that he had read the documentation too and 'understood it to say that the police must hit very hard but within the parameters of the law'. Capt Mitchell had no answer to this. He also conceded that he was not aware of any similar operations having been conducted by other police station commanders in the Pietermaritzburg district. Judge Ngoepe noted further that, whether or not the SAP had authorised the use of the special constables to attack the UDF, it would still have tried to cover up police involvement in the Trust Feed killings because this would have been so embarassing and damaging. Capt Mitchell also repeatedly told the amnesty panel that he had not been present when the special constables found the house and began shooting at its inmates. This seems to have been accepted by Judge Wilson and his colleagues on the amnesty panel. During the earlier criminal trial, however, Judge Wilson had expressly rejected Capt Michell's evidence to this effect. He had found that Capt Mitchell had 'not only pointed out the lighted house [to the special constables] but had also given the signal for the attack to start ďż˝ by firing two shots into the house'. This finding had also been particularly important, it appears, in justifying Capt Mitchell's conviction on charges of murder (rather than any lesser offence), as well as in giving him eleven death sentences. Notwithstanding the oddities and the deficiencies in Capt Mitchell's testimony, he was granted amnesty by the TRC in December 1996. This was ordered on the basis that he had 'made a full disclosure of all relevant facts'. Moreover, said the commission, his offences were clearly 'part of the counter-revolutionary onslaught

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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against the ANC and UDF activists' and 'he had acted within the course and scope of his duties as an officer in the SAP'. The amnesty panel did not explain why it was satisfied that he had made a full disclosure when his amnesty evidence (denying his presence at the house at the time of the attack) had expressly been rejected by the trial court as untrue. A further important question that arises is the reliablity of Capt Mitchell's evidence in identifying the other perpetrators of the massacre. The TRC seems to have relied on Capt Mitchell's evidence to find Mr Ntombela accountable for the killings. According to the commission: 'Mr Ntombela's actions constituted gross human rights violations, including conspiracy to kill, attempted killing, and killing.' The basis for this finding is not explained by the TRC. Yet the only evidence that Capt Mitchell could have provided against Mr Ntombela was his hearsay testimony of what had allegedly been said at a meeting in Pietermaritzburg which he (Capt Mitchell) had not attended. The commission made no finding against Maj Terreblanche himself, despite the key role he had allegedly played in the massacre. The TRC did, however, make findings against various other SAP officers. The commission found, for example, that 'the actions of Sergeant Neville Rose constituted a gross violation of human rights in that he was an accessory after the fact to the killing of the persons who died at Trust Feed, and defeated the ends of justice by failing to take any steps to ensure that the persons responsible were charged and prosecuted'. In the Trust Feed trial, however, Sgt Rose had been charged with murder but acquitted. The principal allegations against him-that he had helped to spirit the special constables out of Trust Feed after the killings and had also replenished the ammunition they had used in the attack-were canvassed at length by Judge Wilson and found to be unreliable. The commission cites no new evidence of Sgt Rose's wrongdoing and gives no reasons for disregarding his earlier acquittal. Its basis for finding Sgt Rose an accessory to murder is not explained in any way.The commission's findings against Mr Ntombela and Sgt Rose raise further questions. It is not clear whether these individuals were even present during Capt Mitchell's amnesty application-nor whether they were accorded the opportunity either to cross-examine him or to adduce their own conflicting evidence. Moreover, the fact that the TRC cites neither the evidence nor the reasoning supporting its findings against them makes it difficult to assess the accuracy of its conclusions. A particularly important issue is whether Capt Mitchell's flawed amnesty evidence is indicative in general of the reliability of the amnesty testimony put before the TRC. Were the defects in Capt Mitchell's testimony the norm or the exception? If they were exceptional, it raises questions as to why this former police officer should nevertheless have qualified for amnesty. If they were the norm, it would indicate that amnesty statements were not a reliable source of information-and were likely to abound in hearsay and unresolved conundrums. 3. Other evidence of perpetrator identity Was the other evidence relied on by the TRC to identify the perpetrators of gross human rights violations then of a higher calibre? This needs also to be assessed. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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According to the commission's report, the TRC relied on various kinds of evidence in identifying perpetrators. The first was 'identification through court records, confessions, statements implicating people in court dockets, police inquests, and/or previous applications for indemnity'. Each of these merits brief consideration. The only part of a court record that can be used to identify perpetrators is the ultimate ruling regarding culpability. Such rulings might well have been useful in this regard, but would not necessarily be so. Take again the example of Sgt Rose in the Trust Feed trial. The court record showed him to have been acquitted on all charges. The TRC nevertheless found him an accessory to the killing of 11 people. The court record, far from supporting the TRC's conclusion, contradicted it. Nor was this an isolated example, for the commission often repudiated earlier court findings (see TRC findings vis-Ă -vis earlier judicial rulings, below). Confessions are also not necessarily to be accepted as the truth. Where they reflect accomplice evidence, they are subject to the three key problems identified above and must be treated with particular caution. The statements in police dockets may, or may not, be true. 'Police inquests' (presumably the commission meant court inquests, conducted either by magistrates or judges) are intended to probe the cause of an individual's death, and may be inconclusive regarding the identity of any killer. In addition, 'previous applications for indemnity' may not have been helpful either. (Applications for indemnity had been made under earlier legislation, but either concerned minor offences or were made without a full disclosure.) (See Indemnity without disclosure, below.) The second kind of evidence used was that arising from the commission's own investigations-particularly its section 29 hearings and its other 'investigative and research work'. According to its report, the TRC used evidence of this kind to identify perpetrators wherever its investigations had generated a 'high level of corroboration', with 'a witness confirming the identity of the actual person committing the gross violation of human rights'. Most section 29 hearings, however, were held in camera-and this raises the key question of whether secret testimony can or should be accepted as sufficient proof of culpability for gross violations as serious as torture and murder. Say that a witness at an in camera section 29 inquiry had identified Sgt Rose (to use this example once again) as the police officer who had primarily covered up the police role in the Trust Feed killings. Should this evidence suffice to find Sgt Rose an accessory to murder? Reliance on secret testimony is reminiscent of a medieaval inquisition. The sufficiency of such evidence can only be assumed-not demonstrated or assessed. Even if a second witness had thereafter told a TRC researcher that Sgt Rose had played this role, this would not necessarily confirm the policeman's culpability-for both witnesses might have been mistaken, or might have been recounting no more than hearsay. (Secret testimony may indeed have been used to find Sgt Rose and others accountable for the Trust Feed killings. The commission indicates, at one point in its report, that a former SAP general and commissioner of the KwaZulu-Police, General Jac Buchner, had given testimony in camera on the Trust Feed killings Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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during a section 29 hearing convened by the Investigation Unit. It notes that Gen Buchner had 'claimed the involvement of not just one or two individuals, but many'. This 'evidence'-not explained in any way-may have been used by the TRC to underpin its findings against Sgt Rose and others.) The third way in which the commission identified perpetrators was through the repetition of their names. 'Where names consistently recurred in the statements of people making allegations concerning gross violations of human rights', this was considered a sufficient pointer to culpability, it appears. This basis for identifying perpetrators is extraordinary, for the repetition of what might initially have been false or mistaken does not turn it into truth. The commission adds that, even where the repetition of their names pointed to the guilt of particular perpetrators, it still did not identify them as such without first notifying them that they were to be implicated in gross violations. It was obliged to do this, of course, after the former Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) had ruled that the commission was under a duty to comply with the audi alteram partem principle of justice. There are questions, however, as to how adequately the TRC discharged its obligations in this regard. (See Audi alteram partem, below.) 4. 'Justification' as a key factor The commission appears to have overlooked a further vital issue. It acknowledged at one point in its report that a perpetrator-even if properly identified-could not be held accountable 'if the conduct in question was legally justified'. Justification would be present, it noted, if a person had killed in self-defence. Explaining this further, it said 'the use of force is justified in defence of persons, property, or other legal interest against an imminent, unlawful attack, provided that the defence is directed against the attacker and is not excessive'. By contrast, it added, defence against 'an anticipated future attack or a completed attack is not justified'. Having thus acknowledged the importance of self-defence as a possible justification, the commission gives little indication of having taken this factor into adequate account. All it says in this regard is that 'the legitimacy of self-defence is often difficult to establish' and that the commission experienced particular problems in this regard because it 'had to deal with large numbers of cases in a limited period and had limited information at its disposal on many specific instances'. It was also especially difficult, it stated-in the context of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP-to ascertain 'who was "innocent" (defending) and who was "guilty" (attacking)'. (The commission does not, however, seem to have allowed this difficulty to deter it from finding the IFP a primary perpetrator of gross violations in KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere, and from concluding that the IFP had killed people at 3.5 times the rate the ANC had done.) 5. Four different kinds of truth The commission's founding legislation, as earlier noted, obliged it to compile its report on the basis of 'factual and objective information and evidence' received by Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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it or otherwise placed at its disposal. It seems, however, that the TRC took account not only of 'factual' truth but also of three other kinds of 'truth'. In describing the 'concepts and principles' that had guided its work, the TRC said it had drawn a distinction between four different kinds of truth. It identified these as 'factual or forensic truth', 'personal and narrative truth', 'social or dialogue truth', and 'healing and restorative truth'. Factual truth, it said, connoted 'the familiar legal or scientific notion of bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence, and of obtaining accurate information through reliable (impartial, objective) procedures'. Seeking this kind of truth, it said, had 'featured prominently in the Commission's findings process', and had involved 'an extensive verification and corroboration policy to make sure that findings were based on accurate and factual information'. This assertion is hard to square, however, with the many weaknesses in the verification and corroboration processes earlier described. Factual truth, moreover, was not all that the commission sought. 'Personal or narrative truth, said the TRC, had been particularly important for the victims of gross violations of human rights. Each had been 'given a chance to say his or her truth as he or she sees it'. These 'personal truths', widely communicated to all South Africans through the media, had provided an important potential not only for healing the individuals concerned but also for 'the creation of a narrative truth' that 'captured the widest possible record of people's perceptions, stories, myths, and experiences' and thus facilitated the 'restoring of memory and humanity'. The commission also saw 'social or dialogue truth' as particularly important to its work. Its understanding of this kind of truth had been informed by Mr Justice Albie Sachs, a prominent participant in the debates preceding the establishment of the TRC and now a judge of the Constitutional Court. Judge Sachs had drawn a distinction between 'microscrope truth' and 'dialogue truth'. 'The first,' he said, 'is factual, verifiable, and can be documented and proved. "Dialogue truth", on the other hand, is social truth, the truth of experience that is established through interaction, discussion, and debate.' In recognising the importance of this kind of truth, said the commission, 'its goal was to try to transcend the divisions of the past by listening carefully to the complex motives and perspectives of all those involved'. It thus 'made a conscious effort to provide an environment in which all possible views could be considered and weighed, one against the other'. (How adequately the commission in fact considered all views-especially in contextualising the gross violations of the past-is canvassed elsewhere, see The Need for Evidence to be Contexualised, below.) The commission also 'rejected the popular assumption that there are only two options to be considered when talking about truth-namely factual, objective information or subjective opinions'. There is also, it continued, 'healing' truth-'the kind of truth that places facts and what they mean within the context of human relationships, both amongst citizens and between the state and its citizens'. This kind of truth, it said, was 'central' to its work. Particularly important in this context was the healing brought about by the acknowledgement of earlier Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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wrongdoing. 'It is not merely the actual knowledge about past human rights violations that counts; often the basic facts about what happened are already well known, at least by those who were affected. What is critical is that these facts be fully and publicly acknowledged.' It is this, it said, which restores the dignity of victims. The commission asserts that it used only 'factual or objective truth' in arriving at its findings. Its emphasis on other forms of truth, it indicates, was intended merely to help heal the victims of past violations by giving them an opportunity to tell their stories, gain a public acknowledgement of their suffering, and participate in a 'dialogue' that sought to build a common understanding of what had happened in the past. Being 'victim-centred' in its approach and providing a cathartic release from previous trauma were indeed vital parts of the commission's reconciliatory function. They did not, however, remove from it the responsibility to ensure that its findings- particularly its findings of accountability-were factual and objective (as indeed demanded by its founding legislation). Too great a focus on other forms of 'truth' may have detracted from the accuracy of its conclusions regarding culpability. The risk of this occurring was particularly acute in situations where the TRC believed that 'the basic facts about what had happened were already well known,' at least to the victims-and that the only need was to heal the victims through narrative, social, and restorative truth. In such instances, the commission may not have done enough to seek a 'factual' truth regarding accountability. It may too readily have accepted that the victims rightly knew who was to blame. The personal beliefs of individuals, however-no matter how strongly held-provide no proper basis for conclusions regarding culpability. For the purpose of making findings of accountability, there was only one form of truth on which the commission could rely-the factual or objective truth termed 'microscope' truth by Judge Sachs. In making such findings, the commission was called upon to divorce all other 'truths' from its purview, and to focus solely on evidence that had been tested, corroborated, and adequately verified. Mr Malan, in his minority report, expresses a concern that the commission did not sufficiently maintain this necessary discipline. 'The report,' he states, 'offers a good exposition of different concepts of truth, especially of factual truth and narrative truth and then of social or interactive truth.' The difficulty, he continues, is that 'the distinction is not sustained'. Instead, 'in arriving at findings, all is accepted as evidence, an ingredient of the factual truth'. The rest of the commission, in its rejoinder, rejects this view-stating that it reflects 'a complete lack of understanding of the findings process' on the part of Mr Malan. The commission provides no explanation, however, of how the necessary distinction between factual truth and what it claimed were other forms of 'truth' was in fact upheld.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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VI. The Need For Comprehensive Findings The TRC was also required by its founding legislation to render, among other things, a 'comprehensive' account of its findings regarding gross violations of human rights. Four factors, however, cast doubt on the comprehensiveness of its report. 1. No final report as yet As earlier noted (see Introduction, above), the TRC's founding legislation was amended in 1998 to allow the amnesty committee to continue dealing with outstanding applications, while the rest of the commission turned its attention to compiling a report on its findings and activities. The amendment also stipulated that the commission would reconvene, after all amnesty applications had been resolved, to 'complete its final report'. It is clear, thus, that the present report is not a final one. Mr Malan, in his minority view, urges that the current report 'be viewed as preliminary', and that it be 'revisited after completion of the amnesty process'. The rest of the commission, in its rejoinder to Mr Malan, seems adamant, however, that the present report 'gives a full and comprehensive account', up to the date of its publication, and that 'there is no basis whatsoever for regarding it as "preliminary" or subject to revisiting in any subsequent reports'. This view is difficult to reconcile with the relevant statutory provisions. It is also somewhat at odds with what Archbishop Tutu has said in his foreword to the report. Archbishop Tutu acknowledges that the current report 'cannot, strictly speaking, be considered to be final'. Once all amnesty applications have been resolved, he continues, the commission 'will be recalled to consider the implications of the [amnesty] hearings that have taken place and to add a codicil to the report'. Only then, he concludes, 'can the commission's report be regarded as final'. The commission, in its rejoinder to Mr Malan's minority view, seems mistaken thus as to the status of the current report. Most of the media have been mistaken, too, for they have generally described the TRC's report as a 'final' one-contributing to a widespread public misunderstanding which the commission has not attempted to correct. But the current report will have to be revisited in the light of the evidence arising from outstanding amnesty applications. More than a 'codicil' may have to be added, moreover, if full account is to be taken of the amnesty evidence that has yet to be considered-which amounts to no less than 92% of the relevant amnesty testimony. Until then, of course, the commission's findings of accountability cannot be regarded as settled or, indeed, as justified. 2. The amnesty evidence outstanding

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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As earlier noted, amnesty applications dealing with gross violations of human rights totalled some 1 700-and the great majority of these remained still to be heard when the TRC report was written. Of these 1 700 or so applications, about 750 were lodged by members or supporters of the ANC. Very few of these 750 ANC applications had been dealt with by the time the commission compiled its report. Most of the evidence contained in these 750 amnesty statements has not been properly canvassed in the TRC report. Indeed, it could not have been-for these statements could not qualify as tested and substantiated evidence until they had proceeded through public hearings. (Since the publication of the TRC's report in October 1998, public hearings have focused on some of these ANC applications. They have provided, for example, an insight into the activities of the ANC's self-defence units (SDUs). Some SDU members have sought amnesty for a variety of gross violations, including the killing of IFP supporters as well as suspected informers or collaborators. Details of these violations have not, of course, been included in the TRC's report.) In addition to these 750 ANC applications, applications for amnesty were made on a 'collective' basis by more than a hundred of the ANC's most senior leadersincluding Mr Thabo Mbeki. The applications, said a spokesman for the ANC, Mr Ronnie Mamoepa, were 'in keeping with the principle of collective responsibility for acts and conduct committed in the course of the just war against the system of apartheid within the framework of ANC policy'. Amnesty applications made on this basis by 37 of these ANC leaders (again, including Mr Mbeki) came to public attention when these individuals were granted amnesty in chambers in November 1997. This decision was subsequently set aside by the Cape of Good Hope High Court because, among other things, the full disclosure required of all amnesty applicants had not been made. A new amnesty panel, convened to consider the applications afresh, has since ruled that the applications of 27 of these leaders (including Mr Mbeki) do not qualify for the granting of amnesty. They fall outside the ambit of the commission's founding legislation, which does not cater for the assertion of a collective responsibility on the part of organisations. Since this ruling the amnesty applications of a further 79 ANC leaders (including seven ministers and three deputy ministers) have likewise been rejected by the TRC. The reason given has been the same-that the commission's founding legislation does not allow the granting of amnesty on a 'collective basis'. None of the amnesty applications lodged by these leaders casts light on the possible role of the ANC alliance in the political conflicts of the past. It is questionable, too, if any of these leaders will be prosecuted in open court and the ANC's possible involvement in violence thus brought to public attention. The minister of justice, Mr Dullah Omar, has stated that decisions on prosecution rest with Mr Bulelani Ngcuka, the national director of public prosecutions (who at the time of his appointment to his current post was an ANC leader and deputy chairman of the National Council of Provinces). But Mr Omar has also made it plain that no member of the ANC's national executive committee will face charges, as none has 'taken part in any crimes'. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Most of the amnesty evidence that had been heard by the time the TRC compiled its report came from the side of the security forces. Overall, members of the security forces lodged some 350 applications for amnesty-far fewer than supporters of the ANC. An impression to the contrary arose, however, because the amnesty hearings that were conducted before the TRC published its report featured primarily the applications lodged by former policemen and soldiers. The evidence emerging at these hearings filled the media's reports of the TRC's activities, while comparatively little attention was focused on the applications lodged by ANC supporters. 3. Indemnity without disclosure When the former government lifted the bans on the ANC and other organisations in February 1990, it was necessary to provide a temporary immunity from prosecution or civil suit to ANC leaders in exile to enable them to return to South Africa and engage in constitutional negotiations. The Indemnity Act of 1990 was passed for this purpose. This act also provided for the granting of permanent indemnity from prosecution or civil suit to individuals not yet convicted of any offence. In practice, its application was governed by the so-called Norgaard principles. These principles, developed in the context of the Namibian transition by Professor Carl Norgaard, then president of the European Commission for Human Rights, required a proportionality between the act in issue and the political objective sought. In Namibia, this proportionality test had excluded the granting of amnesty for the killing of a civilian, and had done so on the basis that a political motive could never justify the murder of a non-combatant. In South Africa, reference to the Norgaard principles initially excluded those guilty of killing civilians for political purposes both from indemnity under the 1990 act, and from early release from prison (under other legislation allowing prisoners a remission of sentence). In 1992, however, a Further Indemnity Act was passed. This provided for the release of 'all prisoners whose imprisonment was related to political conflict of the past and whose release could make a contribution to reconciliation'. Under this criterion, the Norgaard principles of proportionality fell away. Under the Further Indemnity Act, some 200 prisoners were released by agreement between the ANC and the NP. In addition, all those who had been refused indemnity in the past had their applications reconsidered in the light of the new criterion, and this resulted in many hundreds of additional releases of individuals who had not previously qualified. Further, after the general election in April 1994, approximately 250 individuals were indemnified in terms of recommendations made by a committee chaired by Mr Brian Currin. (This had been appointed by the minister of justice, Mr Dullah Omar, to deal with some 1 000 applications that remained outstanding.) Those released under the 1992 legislation included, for instance, Mr Robert McBride, an ANC leader who had been convicted of murder for planting, at a beachfront bar in Durban in June 1986, a bomb that killed three people and injured 69. They also included, by way of further example, two other ANC Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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supporters, Messrs Nthetheleli Mncube and Mzondeleli Nondula. Mr Mncube had been sentenced to death in 1988 for the killing of a commercial driver in a landmine explosion, and for the murder of two policemen in an attempted escape from custody. Mr Nondula had been sentenced to death in the same year for killing six members of the de Nysschen and van Eck families in a landmine explosion near Messina in 1985. Those released also encompassed, from the other side of the political spectrum, Mr Barend Strydom-a former policeman and member of an organisation called the Wit Wolwe, who had shot dead eight black people in a shooting spree in the centre of Pretoria in 1988. What matters for present purposes is that a number of individuals were indemnified or given early releases for serious offences that included the killing of civilians-and that would have constituted gross violations of human rights, as defined in the TRC's founding legislation. According to the Department of Justice, the ANC benefited most in this regard-for some 95% of all applications for indemnity or release came from ANC members or supporters (and only about 5% from other political groupings). In all, some 2 300 ANC members and supporters were released from prison or indemnified from culpability for serious offences equivalent to gross violations of human rights. All these individuals were indemnified or released without reference to the proportionality principle-and without having to make a public disclosure of their misdeeds. Once the TRC was instituted, moreover, they remained entitled to the benefits they had obtained under the earlier indemnity acts. The ANC supporters (and other individuals) indemnified or released in this way had little incentive to approach the TRC for amnesty. They also had little reason to place the evidence of their wrongdoing before the commission. The TRC was nevertheless obliged, in terms of its founding legislation, to ascertain this evidence and give it adequate consideration in making its findings. The Committee on Human Rights Violations was thus enjoined to 'take into account the gross violations of human rights for which indemnity had been granted or for which prisoners were released or had their sentences remitted for the sake of reconciliation and for the finding of peaceful solutions'. There is little indication in the commission's report, however, that this statutory instruction to the TRC has been adequately heeded in the compilation of its report. 4. Thousands of unexplained killings The commission was mandated to investigate all the politically motivated killings that had occurred within its mandate period (which extended from March 1960 to May 1994). (See Introduction, above.) In the last ten years of this period-from September 1984 to May 1994-at least 20 500 people were killed in political violence. (This figure has been compiled by the South African Institute of Race Relations on a careful basis that understates, if anything, the total number of political killings that took place in this decade.) This total excludes, moreover, the political fatalities that occurred between March 1960 and August 1984.The commission makes little attempt to quantify how many political fatalities occurred within its mandate period. It explains this omission on the basis that 'human rights data are almost never taken from probabilistic samples'. Instead, 'people decide for themselves if they will make statements'. Hence, the TRC 'did Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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not carry out a "survey" of violations in the sense of drawing a probabilistic sample of victims. Those who chose to come forward defined the universe of people from whom the commission received information'. Some of the ramifications of this methodology have earlier been noted (see The gathering of victim statements, above). What matters for present purposes is that the TRC did not even try to determine how many political fatalities had occurred within its mandate period. It did so, moreover, for a reason that is unconvincing. The choice of whether to make a statement about a human rights violationwhether to the TRC or any other organisation-is, of course, a personal one. This does not mean, however, that the number of political fatalities that occurred within the mandate period could not have been computed by the commission in other ways. The Institute, for one, has been compiling a database of political fatalities for many years, and especially since September 1984. Other monitoring organisations have more recently done so, too-particularly the Human Rights Committee (HRC), whose data are often cited by the TRC in its report. (The statistics compiled by the HRC have been shown to be unreliable in various respects, but this has not prevented the commission from quoting HRC data to buttress its findings.) The commission was clearly aware of the databases compiled by 'NGOs, research institutes, and monitoring bodies'. It noted, on one occasion, that these organisations had numbered politically motivated killings in KwaZulu and Natal as somewhere between 18 000 and 20 000. (The South African Institute of Race Relations, on the basis of its careful methods of computation, has put the total of political fatalities in this region during the mandate period at approximately 10 500.) In assessing accountability for gross violations, however, the TRC has ignored such data. Instead, the commission has seemingly confined its focus to the political killings described in the victim statements it received. These fatalities totalled 9 980-less than half the 20 500 politically motivated killings the Institute's statistics reveal for the period from 1984 to 1994 alone. Of these 9 980 fatalities, the TRC accounts for a maximum of 8 500-finding that some 4 500 were caused by the IFP, 2 700 by the SAP, and 1 300 by the ANC. Many of these deaths occurred in KwaZulu and Natal where, according to the commission, the IFP was responsible for some 3 800 killings, the ANC for 1 100, and the SAP for 700. Whether the commission is correct in attributing the bulk of these killings to the IFP and SAP is questionable, for all the reasons mentioned in this study. Even if the accuracy of its assessment is accepted for the sake of argument, however, a further difficulty immediately arises. On a national basis, the commission has succeeded in explaining a maximum of 8 500 deaths out of a minimum of 20 500 fatalities. Within KwaZulu and Natal, it has accounted for 5 600 killings out of a total varying from 10 500 to 20 000. Its report thus falls very far short of the comprehensive account it was supposed to provide-and casts no light at all on how or why these thousands of further killings occurred.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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The TRC's founding legislation required that 'the commission, its commissioners, and every member of its staff should function without political or other bias'. Allegations of bias have been made against the commission since its inception, however. Controversy surrounded the appointment of the commissioners in November 1995, on the basis that they were not sufficiently representative of all sides to the conflicts of the past. Commissioners were also alleged to have displayed a bias on occasion-one example having arisen during the 'Bisho' hearing. (This was convened to hear evidence about the Bisho massacre in September 1992, when 29 people were killed and another 300 or so injured when Ciskei soldiers opened fire on ANC supporters, apparently intent on marching on the Ciskei capital to overthrow the homeland's military ruler, Brigadier 'Oupa' Gqoza.) Some commissioners were alleged to have been so 'aggressive and sarcastic' towards Brig Gqoza that Archbishop Tutu was compelled to intervene, and remind them not to 'say things during public hearings that could undermine the TRC's effort to appear evenhanded'. The NP frequently alleged bias on the part of the commission. The party also brought suit against it in 1997, after it had allegedly treated an ANC delegation with 'friendliness and respect', while subjecting an NP delegation to 'persistent cross-questioning' designed to elicit an admission that the former government had deliberately murdered its political opponents. The case was settled in due course, the TRC undertaking to uphold its duty to be even-handed at all times, and the NP agreeing to resume co-operation with it. (Archbishop Tutu and the deputy chairman of the commission, Dr Alex Boraine, also tendered personal apologies to the NP.) The NP and other political parties also alleged in December 1997 that the decision by the TRC's amnesty committee to grant amnesty on a collective basis to 37 ANC leaders reflected a bias on the part of the commission towards the ANC. (See The amnesty evidence outstanding, above.) The NP referred the matter to the Cape Town High Court for review-and the court, as earlier noted, set aside the decision on the basis, among other things, that the full disclosure required by the commission's founding legislation had not been made. The IFP also frequently alleged bias on the part of the commission. It criticised the selection of commissioners and the appointment of senior TRC staff, saying that 'loyalty to the ANC appeared to be prerequisites for these posts'. It contended that the truth was 'unlikely to emerge from a process driven by the (untested) confessions of those wanting to escape jail sentences'. As the TRC's work proceeded, the party also accused the commission of having manifested 'an unjust bias' against it in various ways-and especially in its failure properly to investigate the deaths of hundreds of IFP leaders and thousands of IFP supporters. In October 1997 the IFP asked the public protector, Mr Selby Baqwa, to investigate the TRC's anti-IFP bias and its 'apparent intention to discredit political parties in opposition to the ANC'. (This investigation remained in progress at the time of writing.) Some oddities in the TRC report also raise questions as to its impartiality. At one point in the report, Archbishop Tutu stated that 'security force violations seemed Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

to dominate' the TRC's proceedings primarily because 'most of the violations of which the liberation movements were guilty were already in the public domain'. This, he said, was because most of their perpetrators had already been 'arrested, convicted, and even executed'. He cited as examples the Magoo's Bar and Amanzimtoti bomb attacks, as well as various necklace executions. The implication is that these relatively few incidents were the only gross violations for which the ANC could be held accountable-a matter that needed to be investigated rather than presumed. Another oddity is to be found in the TRC's account of the 'Battle of the Forest' (which took place outside Richmond in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands in March 1991) and its aftermath. According to the commission: Fighting between the ANC and the IFP in the Richmond area 'culminated in the socalled "Battle of the Forest" on 29 March 1991, in which 23 IFP supporters, including women and children, were killed and the ANC regained control of the major portion of the Ndaleni area. A number of prominent IFP leaders in the area were attacked and/or killed ďż˝ On 21-23 June 1991, groups of heavily armed IFP supporters attacked ANC supporters in Ndaleni. Fourteen people were killed and nine others injured. The commission's finding regarding these events is as follows: The commission finds that 23 people, including women and children, were killed between 21 and 23 June 1991 in the Richmond area by unknown supporters of the IFP, constituting gross violations of human rights. This finding flies in the face of the commission's own description of two separate incidents (which took place in March and June respectively). It is silent about the 23 IFP deaths in March. It exaggerates the deaths caused by the IFP in June, while giving no hint of the provocation that might have sparked these killings. Another oddity arises from the TRC's finding regarding various deaths that occurred when the IFP held a rally at the Jabulani Stadium in Soweto on 8th September 1991. In describing the 'battle that ensued', allegedly after an IFP attack, the TRC says that 'hand grenades were allegedly thrown into the crowd of Inkatha supporters, killing five'. 'Later', it states, 'a further eight people were killed, allegedly by Inkatha supporters in retaliation.' Its finding, however, is as follows: In the aftermath of the march, IFP supporters attacked innocent residents, killing 13 of them and injuring 18 othersďż˝ The commission finds the IFP responsible for the commission of gross human rights violations. Again, the TRC seems to ignore its own earlier description of the incident. Instead, the deaths of five IFP supporters in a hand grenade attack are blamed on the IFP itself, the provocation that seemingly evoked the killing of a further eight people is ignored, and the IFP is held accountable for all the 13 deaths that thus occurred.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Apart from these issues, questions arise about the focus of the commission's investigation and research-and its failure adequately to respond to detailed allegations of the role of the ANC alliance in initiating and propagating a 'people's war' that ostensibly led to many thousands of fatalities. 1. The focus of investigation and research The commission had wide-ranging powers of investigation and research, and the way in which it exercised these powers is important. An outline at the outset? According to the minority view of Mr Wynand Malan, one of the first tasks the commission addressed was to prepare an outline of the report it had been enjoined to write. Mr Malan states that he had 'serious misgivings on both the principle and effect of submitting an outline for the report before we had reached a shared understanding of what we wanted to achieve, and before there had been some discussion on the analysis of the data, which at that stage was in the early stages of being captured'. Whether Mr Malan is right about an outline having been drawn up at the outset is disputed. The rest of the commission, in its rejoinder to Mr Malan, has denied this. It adds that 'the process of writing the report commenced during 1997 after full discussion and agreement within the Commission on the approach to be followed'. The matter thus remains inconclusive. National and regional chronologies As earlier noted, however, one of the first tasks undertaken by the TRC's Research Department was to conduct a series of workshops, involving a number of unnamed participants, to identify gross violations of human rights that were 'well-known and documented' or 'in danger of being lost to public memory'. The department then used these deliberations to draw up national and regional chronologies of particularly important events. The regional chronologies thus prepared are not included in the commission's report, and their content cannot therefore be assessed. (They form part of the records lodged by the commission with the National Archives and have not been made available to the public. Nor will they be, it seems, until the work of the commission has been completed.) The national chronology, however, is included in the report. It is noteworthy as much for what it includes as for what it omits. The chronology distorts the past. It provides no inkling of the extent of revolutionary violence in the 1980s and early 1990s. It presents security force abuses in a vacuum, omitting the context in which their conduct occurred. It describes some of the massacres perpetrated by Inkatha, but leaves out the series of assassinations and smaller attacks that might have provoked these killings. It thus omits, among other things:

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Ø the killing in 1987 of workers who refused to take part in strikes organised by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), or its affiliates, including the 'necklacing' of five men during a rail strike; Ø the killing of about 100 people in different parts of the country in the enforcement of the 'anti-VAT' stayaway called by the ANC alliance in November 1991; Ø the KwaShange massacre in September 1987, in which 13 Inkatha Youth Brigade members were killed near Pietermaritzburg; (See Events and issues not investigated, below.) Ø the massacre of 13 Inkatha supporters in March 1990 in an attack on the homestead of an induna, or headman, near Hammarsdale in the Natal Midlands; Ø a massacre in Patheni (near Richmond) in August 1992, in which another induna (an IFP leader), his wife, and his children, were lined up against the wall of his homestead and then gunned down; Ø the killing of eight IFP supporters in 1993, also at Patheni, by a raiding party that 'emptied automatic weapons into the windows of a home where women and babies slept on the floor'; and Ø a hand grenade attack on the Umlazi (Durban) home of a senior Inkatha leader, Mr Winnington Sabelo, in August 1986 in which his wife was killed and three of his children injured. In 1992, moreover, the chronology records the Boipatong massacre of 45 ANC supporters in mid-June. It leaves out, however, the killing of 23 IFP supporters at the Crossroads and Zonkizizwe informal settlements on the east Rand earlier that year. The Crossroads and Zonkizizwe attacks are notable not only for the scale of the death and destruction that they involved, but also for the comment, as described below, that they evoked from the Goldstone commission. The Crossroads settlement was attacked one night in early April 1992 by about 300 men armed with firearms, axes, and pangas. The 19 people killed in the attack included two children and a woman, while 12 individuals were injured and 45 shacks damaged or destroyed. The Zonkizizwe incident came soon thereafter and involved a group of 50 to 100 attackers, who left four IFP supporters dead, 10 injured, and numerous houses, shacks, and cars destroyed. The Goldstone commission tried to investigate both incidents. It found itself hampered by a lack of clear evidence, and was unable to draw firm conclusions regarding culpability for the attacks. It noted, however, that 'a large number of people had been killed and injured and considerable property damaged' in the two incursions. It went on to state: 'Unlike the so-called Boipatong massacre, these incidents have all but disappeared from the agenda and very little progress has been made in their investigation. This must leave innocent victims wondering whether there are

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

different laws and different processes for groups affiliated to different political parties.' The Goldstone commission's comment might be seen as applying with equal force to the national chronology compiled by the TRC. The chronology also refers, on four occasions, to the role of the State Security Council (SSC) in counter-revolution. Pointers to the revolution apparently thus being countered are omitted, however. There is no reference to various further matters (see Events and issues not investigated, below), including: Ă&#x2DC; the adoption by the ANC alliance in 1983 of a strategy document called 'Planning for People's War'; Ă&#x2DC; numerous calls by the alliance for violence against political opponents as well as collaborators, informers, policemen, local councillors, and all apartheid institutions; and Ă&#x2DC; the adoption by the ANC and its allies in May 1992 of the 'Leipzig option', in terms of which they planned to destabilise and ultimately topple three 'bantustan puppets' (Brigadier Gqoza of Ciskei, Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana, and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu) and, finally, the 'Pretoria puppet master himself'. The chronologies played an important role in shaping the work of the commission.They were used to brief the statement takers responsible for recording victim statements (see The gathering of victim statements, above), and also to identify the individuals to be sought out and requested to make statements. They also helped determine the focus of victim hearings, the nature of the evidence brought to public attention, and the process whereby conclusions regarding culpability were reached. 'Strategic' themes to guide research The 'early chronologies' compiled by the Research Department were also used to make a 'preliminary identification of 14 strategic research themes'. Five of these focused on: 'normative and moral questions'; the commission 'in historical context'; 'gender concerns'; 'children and youth'; and 'the health sector'. Five seemed calculated to focus on the former government. These were 'the development of the security establishment'; 'the judiciary and the legal system', 'imprisonment and detentions'; the 'homelands'; and 'vigilantes'. The four remaining themes were 'white right wing extremism inside South Africa'; 'KwaZulu-Natal'; the 'liberation movements'; and 'opposition groupings inside South Africa'. Of these, only one-'liberation movements'-seemed clearly to offer a vehicle for investigating the role of these movements in political violence (though the 'KwaZulu-Natal' theme might also have provided a means for exploring the involvement of both the ANC and the IFP in conflict in the region).

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Whether any theme was given a particular prominence by the TRC is not explained in its report. In May 1998, however, one of the commissioners, Ms Yasmin Sooka, told the Sowetan newspaper that a 'key' theme was 'the role of the third force in fomenting violence'. The third force theme merited this emphasis, she stated, because 'third force strategy affected all regions and included so many things, like organisational violence and vigilantism'.The research themes were important in various ways. They provided the context within which individual violations were to be understood. They 'assisted the Human Rights Violations Committee in making findings on the statements it received'. In addition-though the commission does not acknowledge this-they promoted the accumulation of a growing body of information falling within their parameters, while diverting attention away from other issues. Research papers commissioned The Research Department commissioned research papers on a number of topics. According to its report, these included apartheid as a crime against humanity; apartheid legislation; the Caprivi trainees, who 'were deployed as a covert paramilitary force in KwaZulu-Natal in 1986'; commissions of inquiry in South Africa; detention in the KwaZulu-Natal region; the history of conflict in KwaZuluNatal; homelands policy and development; hostel violence; conflict in the Natal Midlands; political prisoners and detainees; public order policing; the SADF in Namibia and Angola; the 1990 Seven Days War; homelands security forces; legal and judicial systems; the Moutse/KwaNdebele incorporation conflict; torture in South Africa; torture in the Western Cape; and warlords in KwaZulu-Natal. Other issues were also canvassed-including the role of the PAC in historical context; the Black Consciousness Movement; gender relations; and 'the medical and social consequences of gross human rights violations'. The focus of investigative hearings The Investigation Unit used its powers, among other things, to conduct a number of investigative hearings that were primarily held in camera (under section 29 of the commission's founding legislation). Its section 29 hearings included inquiries into 'Vlakplaas; Witdoek violence in KTC; the Civil Co-operation Bureau; the security police in KwaZulu and Natal; the Mandela United Football Club; and chemical and biological warfare'. Hearings were also held, with the assistance of the unit, into the role of the former State Security Council (SSC); 'the armed forces'; the training by the SADF of 200 Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi; the Trojan Horse incident; and the shooting of the Guguletu Seven. One prominent ANC leader, the former wife of President Mandela, was thus the subject of a special hearing. (This preceded her later public hearing, see Denial of bias by the commission, below.) Alleged abuses in ANC camps in exile were also canvassed by the TRC-but this was done rather briefly during a public hearing focused mainly on conditions in South African prisons under the former government. 'Events associated with the ANC in exile' were also canvassed during the ANC's second hearing before the commission, at the 'armed forces hearing' on 10th October 1997, and during in camera section 29 hearings, held in March and

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

April 1998, for a former ANC commissar, Mr Andrew Masondo, and a former ANC Quatro commander, Mr Gabriel Methembu. The abuses in the ANC's camps had already entered public knowledge through, among other things, a report published in November 1992 by Amnesty International. The Amnesty report had documented a 'pattern of gross abuse which was allowed to go unchecked for many years, not only by the ANC's leadership in exile but also by the governments of the frontline states'. It had urged that the ANC officials responsible be brought to justice, and barred from holding any position of authority within the organisation. Similar findings had previously emerged from the report of the Skweyiya commission, published in August 1992, and were echoed by the report of the Motsuenyane commission, appointed in 1993. What had occurred in the camps could thus hardly have been ignored by the TRC. The commission nevertheless failed to convene a full investigative hearing into the matter. Instead, it dealt with the abuses in the ANC's camps either in passing-in the course of hearings focused primarily on other issues-or behind closed doors. 2. Events and issues not investigated The commission took pains to ensure that the culpability of the former government and the IFP in attacking, torturing, and killing supporters of the ANC and UDF, especially in the 1980s, was explored and recorded in a comprehensive way. This was a vital part of its function, and clearly needed to be done. Thus, much of the TRC's 3 500-page report provides a graphic account of how, in this period, the former security forces (among other things): Ø detained tens of thousands of UDF activists without trial, sometimes for long periods; Ø

subjected very many of these individuals to brutal torture;

Ø whipped up white anger and white fear by invoking 'swartgevaar', while calling on policemen and soldiers to 'eliminate', 'wipe out', or 'permanently remove from society' those supporters and leaders of the ANC alliance who challenged NP rule; Ø engaged in the extra-judicial execution of key ANC alliance leaders, such as Mr Griffiths Mxenge, Ms Ruth First, Mr Matthew Goniwe, Dr Fabian Ribeiro, Mr Stanza Bopape, and Ms Dulcie September; Ø entrapped and killed groups of activists (the Pebco Three, the Nietverdiend Ten, the youths in Duduza on the east Rand supplied with 'booby-trapped' hand grenades); Ø evoked further violence and confrontation by firing without provocation or adequate warning at peaceful protesters (often funeral goers attending wakes or marches for activists previously shot dead by police); and

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Ø hid the evidence of their wrongdoing, in many instances, by tossing bodies into crocodile-infested rivers, burying them in unmarked graves, or blowing them to pieces with explosives-thus denying the bereaved the small comfort of securing a proper burial for the deceased. The TRC report describes, as well, how IFP supporters, in the 1980s and especially the early 1990s, banded together in armed groups, at various times, to attack and kill (among others): Ø

38 residents of a Sebokeng hostel in September 1990;

28 people in the Swanieville informal settlement in April 1991;

Ø 34 residents of Bruntville, in separate attacks in November 1990 and December 1991; Ø

18 people in the Uganda squatter settlement in Umlazi in mid 1992; and

45 men, women, and children in the Boipatong massacre of June 1992.

Although the TRC's account of some these events is flawed, the commission-in seeking to investigate and to record them-was fulfilling a vital part of its mandate. The problem is that the commission failed adequately to investigate or record other alleged gross violations that merited an equal attention. Allegations regarding the origins, ambit and extent of these other abuses were contained in a number of submissions made to the TRC. These may be summarised as follows. Submissions by the National Party In its first submission to the commission in August 1996, the National Party alleged, among other things, that: Ø the ANC was closely allied to and possibly 'even dominated by the SACP'. SACP members held powerful positions within the ANC's national executive committee (among other bodies), while the SACP's 'agenda was to use its position in the ANCled alliance to promote a two-phase revolution' that would culminate in communist control over the country; Ø the ANC earlier adopted and, at its Kabwe conference in 1985, re-committed itself to a 'people's war'. Its aim was that its 'liberation army [would become] rooted amongst the people who would progressively participate in the armed struggle both politically and militarily'. Its ultimate objective was to create a 'revolutionary situation', which would facilitate 'the seizure of power through a general insurrection'; Ø within 18 months from the outbreak of violence in September 1984, 'the ANC's revolutionary strategy resulted in the destruction of some 3 000 houses and more than 1 200 schools, the widespread disruption of black education and local authorities, and the deaths of 573 people, of whom 295 were burned to death by the necklace method'; while Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Ă&#x2DC; even after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP, revolutionary violence continued to take its toll. It was reflected, for example, in 505 necklace executions between 1984 and 1993; in 554 landmine, limpet mine, and car bomb attacks from 1985 to 1991 in which 87 people were killed and 997 injured; in sustained attacks on the police in which 1 030 policemen were killed between 1973 and 1993; and in 'attacks on thousands of black South Africans-most of them equally opposed to apartheid-who were murdered, injured, or intimidated because they chose to work for change within existing government institutions'. In its second submission to the TRC in 1997, the NP contended that the commission was in danger of losing its credibility through a lack of even-handedness. The party again urged that it endeavour to 'establish the truth about all gross violations committed by all parties to the conflict'. The commission was concentrating its attention on the security forces, the NP alleged, but 'the probability [remained] that the great majority of people who had died were victims of the conflict between various revolutionary and non-revolutionary organisations which were all opposed to apartheid'. The NP urged the commission, in particular, to assess the total number of political fatalities that had occurred. It requested that the TRC then break this total down and show how many had died as a result of security force action-and how many through the actions of the liberation movements. It also asked it to quantify how many people had died in conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, and to identify the affiliations of the victims. The NP also elaborated on the role the ANC alliance had allegedly played in condoning or inciting 'necklace' killings. It quoted, for example, an interview in Sechaba in December 1986, in which the late Mr Chris Hani, general secretary of the SACP, had refused to condemn necklace executions. It cited a Radio Freedom broadcast in October 1985, in which a spokesman had commented that 'the policy of burning sell-outs of the system seems to have paid out in the ultimate end'. It cited another ANC spokesman who had said in October 1985 that the ANC 'wanted to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people would never think of it'. It cited a statement by Mrs Winnie Mandela in April 1986 seemingly endorsing necklace killings-and it quoted the words of two ANC supporters who had engaged in this method of execution and who had expressed their 'happiness' at 'watching [their victims] burn'. The NP further alleged that the ANC had 'controlled' or 'deeply influenced' the UDF, the Mass Democratic Movement (which arose when the UDF was restricted in 1988), and the civic organisations in the townships-and said the ANC could not now distance itself from the activities of these structures. It called on the ANC to explain the role these organisations had played in making the townships 'ungovernable'. It quoted a statement by Mr Hani, in Sechaba in December 1986, indicating that these organisations had used 'the skills imparted to them' by the ANC alliance in order to 'deal with the police, community councillors, and collaborationist elements'. It cited a statement by Mr Ronnie Kasrils, in the May 1986 issue of Sechaba, apparently commending 'the people' for 'attacking the community councillors and the informers' and noting that 'unless a people arisen can purge its community of the enemy within, it is not possible to advance'. The Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

NP called on the TRC to investigate 'who was responsible for a mass campaign of terror and intimidation against thousands of black South Africans whose only crime was their rejection of the ANC's armed struggle and their desire to serve their communities within existing structures'. The NP submission also called on the TRC to investigate conflict in KwaZulu and Natal, including the ongoing deaths of IFP leaders and supporters. It reminded the TRC that the Goldstone commission had found both the ANC and the IFP guilty of violence, and had considered their political rivalry and fight for territory 'a primary trigger' of conflict (irrespective of whatever role the security forces might have played). The NP drew the TRC's attention to the calls made in May 1992, for example, by an ANC leader in KwaZulu-Natal who had urged ANC supporters to 'kill the SA Police, kill the SADF, kill the KwaZulu Police, [and] kill all our enemies'. It added that the ANC and others were now 'attempting to dismiss all the violence that had occurred in the conflict between various black groupings, including its struggle against the IFP, as the result of "third force" activities'. This, it said, was 'patently absurd'. Submissions by former generals The origins, scale, and nature of the revolutionary war allegedly waged by the ANC alliance was also described by: Ø General Johan van der Merwe, a former commissioner of police, in a submission made to the TRC in October 1996; Ø General Magnus Malan, a former head of the SADF and minister of defence, in a submission dated May 1997; and Ø General Herman Stadler, a former spokesman for the police, in a book entitled The Other Side of the Story, written in conjunction with other senior police officers, and submitted to the TRC by an organisation called The Foundation for Equality Before the Law. These police and army generals described the ANC's 'people's war' and its implementation as follows. In 1978 an ANC/SACP delegation visited Vietnam to study at first hand the requirements for a successful people's war. The ANC thereafter decided to implement a people's war and initiated a three-year plan aimed at mobilising and politicising the black population for this purpose. The ANC described a people's war as one in which 'the entire nation is engaged, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the people's army, workers, the rural masses, women, intellectuals, [and] the religious community'. It envisaged that the masses, thus mobilised, would engage in 'all forms of revolutionary warfare, armed or noncombat' and that 'legal and illegal means [would be used] to attack and destroy all symbols and structures of apartheid power, including all those who manned them'.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In 1983 the Politico-Military Council (PMC) of the ANC issued a document called 'Planning for "People's War"'. This envisaged 'a protracted guerrilla war, mass uprisings, and the establishment of "alternative structures" and "revolutionary bases"'. It also called for increasing mass participation in demonstrations, which were to proceed from those that were peaceful and non-violent to those 'with an emphasis on violence and insurrection'. It further urged the arming of the masses, so that 'the stone would be replaced by the petrol bomb, acid bomb, and hand grenade'-while firearms such as the AK-47 assault rifle would 'become a substitute for the stick and panga'. In 1984, as part of its people's war strategy, the ANC called on its supporters to make South Africa 'ungovernable'. This was to be achieved, among other things, through the breaking down of existing authority and the destruction of black local councils. This call was followed by 'the brutal murders of a number of community councillors, administrative personnel, police officials, and other persons who in any way assisted the state'. Often, these killings were by means of the 'dreaded "necklace" method'. The ANC's objective, in destroying black local government, was to 'create the necessary prerequisites for "liberated zones"'. These, in turn, would provide a safe haven for trained Umkhonto cadres who would then return to the country and expand the revolutionary army. The 'politicised masses' were to be drawn into this army and were to be 'recruited, trained, and supplied with arms' by the 'advanced detachments' of Umkhonto members. Their training would take place internally, and they would thereafter be organised into 'combat units'. Umkhonto-trained 'self-defence units', or SDUs, then developed. These played a vital role in enforcing ANC campaigns of mass action by coercion, in assailing the police and army, in intimidating township residents into supporting the ANC, and in attacking Inkatha supporters. As the number of Umkhonto cadres and SDU members increased, the police came under sustained attack. The onslaught against them escalated even further after February 1990 (when the bans on the ANC and other organisations were lifted), and police fatalities showed a steady increase. Thus, while 76 policemen were killed in six years (from 1973 to 1979), and 270 were killed in ten years (from 1980 to 1990), no fewer than 385 were killed in a two-year period from the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1992. The ANC further envisaged that the liberated zones would be run by 'street, area and block committees'. These would be buttressed by 'people's courts' whose task would be to ensure 'healthy revolutionary and democratic inter-relations within society'. These courts, once established in various townships, became responsible for 'dealing with cases of anti-social behaviour, conflicts, and "political crimes against the people"'. They 'progressively implemented a reign of terror and intimidation in the black townships against the population who had very little or no defence or protection in this regard. It was very often quite sufficient to be merely suspected of being a "sell-out" or "collaborator" to pay the ultimate price in the most dreadful manner'.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Attacks on civilian targets steadily proliferated as part of the 'people's war'. In 1981, attacks against hard (military) targets had comprised 88% of the total. By 1986, such attacks had dropped to fewer than 20%. In this process, 'people were burned alive in the streets, bombs exploded in shopping centres and restaurants, innocent women and children died, and the sight of dead and mutilated people was not uncommon'. In 1985, moreover, the ANC had stated in a broadcast on Radio Freedom that 'anybody who mobilised the Zulu-speaking people was regarded as a rival to be wiped from the scene'. Thereafter, conflict in KwaZulu and Natal had witnessed the 'systematic murder' of more than 400 IFP office bearers, while 'many more thousands of IFP followers had been killed or attacked by the followers of the ANC and its allies'. Overall, alleged Gen Stadler, the 'people's war' initiated by the ANC alliance resulted, within the space of some eight years, in no fewer than 80 500 incidents of violence in which approximately 9250 people were killed and 18 000 injured. Gen Stadler's submission also described the alleged role of the PAC and its armed wing, Apla, in waging a 'protracted people's war' against the former government. PAC leaders, for example, had called on their supporters to arm themselves, seek 'combat training from Apla fighters', and 'help Apla forces to develop the war of national liberation' in every way possible. The PAC's campaigns were aimed expressly at white civilians as well, as was reflected in PAC and Apla slogans such as 'One Settler, One Bullet' and 'One Hand Grenade, Ten Settlers'. According to Gen Stadler, the PAC used the freedom afforded by its unbanning in 1990 to step up 'its terrorist campaign' within the country. Policemen, in January 1992, remained targets for attack and were described by the national organiser of the PAC as 'robots of the system who should be sought out and destroyed'. In April 1992, continued Gen Stadler, the PAC held its third national congress where it resolved not to suspend or abandon the armed struggle. All branches were instructed to provide logistical support to Apla. Apla cadres continued to be trained in Tanzania, as well as within the 'independent' homeland of the Transkei, and the rest of South Africa itself. In January 1993 'an accord of co-operation' was allegedly signed between Apla and the Transkei's military ruler, General Bantu Holomisa, in terms of which Apla 'undertook to procure arms for the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) and to absorb 500 of its soldiers into Apla structures'. The TDF in turn agreed to provide Apla with guns and grenades. Evidence emerged, moreover, that the TDF had been issuing arms and ammunition to Apla since 1990. According to Gen Stadler, some 40 violent incidents that took place after 1991 were directly attributable to Apla operations. These included various armed robberies (apparently aimed at raising funds for the armed struggle), as well as attacks on policemen, farms, and restaurants in rural towns. Also attacked were the King William's Town golf club (in November 1992), the St James Church in Cape Town (in July 1993), and the Heidelberg Tavern (also in Cape Town) in December 1993. All attacks on white civilians were allegedly carried out on the specific instructions of Apla's commanders, and were in keeping with the Apla/PAC Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

objective of a 'people's war'. An Apla publication called Azania Combat lauded the deaths resulting from Apla operations, and claimed that Apla was 'spearheading the guerrilla war in the country'. Overall, though Apla's activities were sometimes aimed at the security forces, they mostly targeted 'the civilian population in general'. This, averred Gen Stadler, was with the particular aim of 'gaining control over rural areas from where an intensified terror campaign could be launched'. Some key omissions in investigation and research Overall, the TRC made little systematic attempt to probe the alleged role of the liberation movements in initiating and implementing 'people's wars'. In particular, it made no sustained endeavour to commission research into these allegations-or ensure that its chronologies, strategic research themes, and public hearings focused adequately on these issues. The submissions cited seemed clearly to indicate that full investigative hearings-of the kind initiated to canvass the significance of the Caprivi training, or the ambit of the former government's chemical weapons programme-were also needed to probe these allegations. Instead, the Investigation Unit was selective in the way it exercised its powers. This is illustrated, for example, by its differential treatment of the former State Security Council (SSC) and the ANC alliance's Politico-Military Council, or PMC. The Investigating Unit embarked on an intensive investigation of the SSC and the role it had played in implementing the former government's 'total strategy' against the ANC alliance. To this end, it not only convened a number of hearings but also subpoenaed a former state president, Mr P W Botha, and various members of his cabinet to give evidence of the unlawful conduct allegedly sanctioned by the SSC in the course of counter-revolution. The unit, however, launched no equivalent probe into the PMC. No ANC leader who had served on this body was subpoenaed to give evidence about the part the 'people's war' may have played in fuelling political violence. A similar dichotomy seems evident as regards the unit's investigations of the illegal arms that proliferated in the country from 1984 to 1994. The unit made sustained endeavours to probe the alleged supply of arms by the security forces to the IFP. It made no equivalent attempt, it seems, to investigate the arms allegedly brought into the country by the ANC alliance, even after its unbanning in 1990. The ANC had undertaken, in the Pretoria Minute of August 1990, to 'suspend all armed actions with immediate effect'. It had further promised, in the D F Malan Accord of February 1991, to terminate any infiltration of men or material, while also taking steps to legalise the arms caches already within the country. Though the TRC does not quantify the arms supplied to Inkatha by sympathetic policemen, the indications from its report are that the largest consignment, among a number of deliveries, ran to some 60 tons. (See Insufficient opportunity for cross-examination, above.) By contrast, a dossier compiled by the SAP (and submitted to the Goldstone commission in February 1994) indicated that some 22 000 tons of Umkhonto weaponry had been left behind in Angola, and that some of Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

this had since been smuggled into South Africa. In addition, 'large quantities of arms and ammunition', brought into the country in terms of Operation Vula, had 'never been found or handed over' to the police, while arms smuggling routes from Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe had allegedly continued to be used. A similar differential treatment is evident in the Investigating Unit's focus on alleged 'hit squad' involvement in political violence in KwaZulu and Natal. The unit mounted an intensive probe into the role of 200 Inkatha supporters trained in the Caprivi in 1986 (see also The Caprivi training in 1986, below), and concluded that they had been trained to operate as 'hit squads' against ANC and UDF supporters in the province By contrast, the Investigating Unit made little apparent endeavour to uncover the role of the ANC alliance in training and deploying in KwaZulu-Natal trained units that might equally have merited the term 'hit squads'. Relevant in this regard is a submission made by the SAP to the Goldstone commission in 1992. According to this document, 'the ANC was training and arming a large army of men, many of whom were being trained in the Transkei, for attacks on the IFP'. Moreover, said the SAP, it was clear from a variety of factors-including the nature of the activities being undertaken by Umkhonto and by the ANC's SDUsthat 'the ANC was waging an aggressive war on its political opponents [in the IFP] by military means'. These allegations would seem to have merited as much investigation as the role of the Caprivi trainees. No such probe into Umkhonto and SDU activity in KwaZulu-Natal was initiated by the TRC, however. Instead, the commission appears to have accepted the ANC's perspective that it had formed the SDUs to 'protect communities from attack by security forces and vigilantes'. The TRC ignores ANC strategic planning documents calling for the establishment of 'combat units', extensive police evidence of the role of SDUs in violence, and a court ruling in the early 1990s indicating that the SDUs had been formed, among other things, to attack the police and army. The TRC's diverse approach to two massacres involving police complicity also seems to illustrate the differences in treatment. Both massacres took place in the Natal Midlands in the late 1980s. One has become notorious around the world and is canvassed by the TRC at length. The other, though similar in various respects, is not mentioned by the TRC at all. The first is Trust Feed, the second is KwaShange. In the Trust Feed massacre, a policeman collaborated with Inkatha to attack the UDF. The resulting killings (of Inkatha supporters, as it happened) are described at length in the TRC's report. In the KwaShange massacre, a policeman collaborated with UDF supporters to attack Inkatha. Thirteen Inkatha members died as a result. According to the trial court, at about 11pm on 25th September 1987, a group led by the policeman, a Mr Nkosinathi Hlengwa, attacked a house in the KwaShange area, near Pietermaritzburg, in which some 30 Inkatha members had gathered. 'The house was encircled by Hlengwa's men and stones were thrown, breaking windows. Shots were fired and a door smashed in. When the youths tried to barricade the door, a fire was started. More shots were fired into the house.' Those who sought to escape from the blazing house were struck down one by one. The screams of those that remained in the house ceased only when a gas bottle Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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exploded, 'producing the final holocaust'. 'Most of the 13 bodies,' said the court, 'were unrecognisably scorched, with shin bones and skulls showing through their skin.' Extenuating circumstances were also found in that the accused had feared an attack from the youths and had struck first-and Mr Hlengwa was thus sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment rather than to death. The killings nevertheless remained, said Mr Justice N S Page, acts of 'appalling and merciless cruelty'. The court warned that 'the deeds of Hlengwa [and the others] had sown a crop of hatred among parents, friends and relatives, the fruits of which were probably still to come'. (The following month, violence intensified in the Pietermaritzburg area, marked by an upsurge in fatalities.) Certain parallels between the Trust Feed and KwaShange massacres seem evident. Both involved police officers working with members of one political organisation in order to attack another. Both witnessed the massacre of substantial numbers of people-11 in the Trust Feed incident, 13 in the KwaShange one. Both led to court judgements, in which culpability was made clear-and reliance did not have to be placed on newspaper accounts alone. Yet the Trust Feed massacre was repeatedly canvassed in the TRC's report, while the KwaShange killings were left out. 3. Denial of bias by the commission The commission rejected the criticisms made against it that it was demonstrating partisanship in favour of the liberation movements. This allegation, said Archbishop Tutu in his foreword to the TRC report, was 'a clever ploy to seek preemptively to discredit the commission and hence its report'. The commission had put a prominent ANC leader, Mrs Madikizela-Mandela, through a 'nine-day gruelling' but had not meted out this treatment to any leader of the NP or the IFP. Moreover, though the TRC had not held a public hearing on abuses in the ANC's camps in exile, it had heard testimony on this issue from victims. It had also canvassed conditions in the camps during a special hearing on prisons. Further, the ANC itself had provided 'considerable information in the Stuart, Motseunyane and Skweyiya commissions, which the ANC had itself appointed to investigate allegations of abuses'. It was thus mischievous to suggest, concluded Archbishop Tutu, that the commission had 'not wanted to investigate incidents that might prove embarrassing to the ANC'. The content of the TRC report confirmed this too. The references in the report 'to those abuses of which the ANC might be guilty' showed clearly that the commission had been 'politically independent and not biased in favour of any particular political party or group'. The commission's denials of bias miss the most important point. The TRC did examine the alleged role in violence of Mrs Madikizela-Mandela. But she was only one of many leaders in the ANC alliance. Also, comparatively little of the violence allegedly occasioned by ANC's people's war took place in the camps. The bulk of it occurred within the country where, if Gen Stadler's figures are correct, some 80 500 incidents of violence occurred within an eight-year period-leaving 9 250 people dead and a further 18 000 injured.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The people's war is acknowledged by the TRC in its report, but not adequately addressed. The report takes note that an ANC delegation had visited Vietnam in 1978, and records that the ANC (in March 1979) issued a document containing 'lessons from Vietnam' which became known as The Green Book. The commission describes The Green Book as having laid the foundation for increased mobilisation of the people. It fails to explain for what purpose they were to be mobilised, or with what result. The TRC notes too that some ANC supporters 'believed they were acting in accordance with ANC strategic objectives' when they engaged in actions such as 'the killing of local councillors, police officers, alleged informers and others deemed to be "collaborators"'.It finds the ANC accountable for having 'created a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimate and carried out within the broad parameters of a "people's war", as enunciated and actively promoted by the ANC'. But this is all it says about the people's war (except for its subsequent strictures against the UDF, as described below). The commission also holds the ANC responsible, in the early 1990s, for 'killings, assaults, and attacks on political opponents, including members of the IFP, PAC, Azapo, and the SAP'. It notes that the ANC 'contributed to a spiral of violence in the country through the creation and arming of SDUs'. The TRC adds that 'it was not the policy of the ANC to attack and kill political opponents'. Abuses happened because of 'a context of state-sponsored or -directed violence' and 'a climate of political intolerance'. In addition, command structures proved inadequate and SDUs often 'took the law into their own hands'. Culpability for the violations fuelled by the 'people's war' is primarily assigned to the UDF instead. According to the TRC, it was the UDF that: Ø

engaged in necklace executions;

Ø attacked political opponents and state structures (such as black local authorities and policemen); Ø

used coercive means to enforce stayaways and boycott campaigns;

Ø fostered the political intolerance that resulted in 'inter-organisational conflict with Azapo and the IFP'; and Ø 'failed to exert political and moral authority' to stop these abuses from recurring. It was the UDF, moreover, that encouraged such conduct 'through its endorsement and promotion of slogans, songs, and the "toyi-toyi"'. And the UDF, continued the commission, had to be held accountable for its use of language in just the same way as the former government (which had called for activists to be eliminated or wiped out and had claimed to be shocked and surprised when policemen then engaged in extra-judicial executions).

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The commission also recorded at some length the UDF's perspective on why things had gone wrong. According to the UDF, many incidents of violence committed in the 1980s had been 'aberrations perpetrated by unaligned and uncontrollable youth' (by people other than its own supporters, by implication). Moreover, the detention of many UDF leaders had made it difficult to exercise sufficient control over youths who were 'left without leadership', who were angered at the arrests, and who then 'did things which were irrational'. The UDF's objective, so the organisation said, had been solely to 'politicise the masses' and promote mass action. Many mass campaigns had 'proceeded relatively smoothly', but others had engendered 'unintended consequences' and had resulted in 'assaults, loss of life' and the development of 'extreme fear among perceived and real opponents of the struggle for freedom and democracy'. The TRC seems to echo the UDF's perspective in describing the violence that evolved against local councillors as an unintended consequence. The TRC depicts the violations sometimes committed by street committees and people's courts in the same light too. The commission seems willing to endorse the UDF's views without investigating their validity. It also fails to probe the relationship between the ANC and the UDF. It ignores the judgement, in the 'Delmas treason trial' of some 20 UDF leaders in the late 1980s, that the UDF had 'acted as the internal wing of the ANC and that it had conspired with the ANC to render South Africa "ungovernable"'. The TRC acknowledges that 'the ANC played a direct role in the establishment of the "new generation" of mass organisations in the late 1970s'. It adds that 'many individual activists who filled key positions in the organisations making up the MDM held primary allegiance to the ANC'. It says there was 'an unspoken understanding' that the UDF would generally tailor its actions to fit ANC policy. But it emphasises too that 'lines of communication and decision-making' between those inside the country and the ANC in exile were 'often ineffective'. And, having made no further attempt to investigate the ties between the ANC and UDF, it simply reiterates the difficulty of ascertaining accountability for the various violations perpetrated 'in the name of the ANC' during the 1980s. There are innumerable aspects of the people's war the commission omits adequately to explore. Particularly important is its failure to examine the major upsurge in violence that took place in the early 1990s-and that continued unabated after the dissolution of the UDF in August 1991.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

VIII. The Need For Violations To Be Contextualised One of the obligations resting on the TRC under its founding legislation was to contextualise, in full, the gross violations committed in the past. It was obliged to ascertain and to report 'the antecedents, circumstances, factors, context, motives, and perspectives which had led to such violations'. In keeping with its mandate to be even-handed, it was enjoined, moreover, to provide such an analysis on an equal basis and in relation to all those involved in the conflicts of the past. Whether the commission endorsed or agreed with the perspectives of the protagonists was irrelevant. Its obligation was to look inside their minds, to ascertain their motives and their viewpoints-and to record these without fear or favour. The TRC seems to have taken full account of the viewpoint of the ANC, but to have ignored, in general, the perspectives of the former government and the IFP. An example may serve to illustrate the point. The final volume of the TRC's report summarises the main findings of the commission. The TRC's finding against the former government-described by the commission as its 'primary' finding-is briefly stated: The predominant portion of gross violations of human rights was committed by the former state through its security and law-enforcement agencies. Moreover, the South African state in the period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s became involved in activities of a criminal nature when, among other things, it knowingly planned, undertook, condoned, and covered up the commission of unlawful acts, including the extra-judicial killings of political opponents and others, inside and outside South Africa. Two of the commission's findings against the ANC are as follows: In the course of the armed struggle there were instances where members of MK conducted unplanned military operations using their own discretion and, without adequate control and supervision at an operational level, determined targets for attack outside of official policy guidelines. While recognising that such operations were frequently undertaken in retaliation for raids by the former South African government into neighbouring countries, such unplanned operations nonetheless often resulted in civilian injury and loss of life, amounting to gross violations of human rights. The 1985 Amanzimtoti shopping centre bombing is regarded by the commission in this light. In the course of the armed struggle the ANC, through MK, planned and undertook military operations which, though intended for military or security force targets, sometimes went awry for a variety of reasons, including poor intelligence and reconnaisance. The consequences in these cases, such as the Magoo's Bar and Durban Esplanade bombings, were gross violations of human rights in respect of the injuries to and loss of lives of civilians. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In the case of the ANC, a significant effort seems to have been made to place what 'went awry' in a broader context which serves largely to exonerate the ANC from full responsibility for wrongdoing. In the case of the former government, no reference is made to the context in which 'extra-judicial' killings had occurred. The former government, moreover, is assumed to have intended all the extra-judicial killings that took place at the hands of the security forces-for it is found to have 'knowingly' planned, undertaken, or condoned them. In the case of the ANC, by contrast, the civilian deaths that occurred through its activities are assumed to have been unplanned-and to have arisen primarily because things 'went wrong' from time to time. This may have been the case, but the commission could not have known it for certain without the detailed and systematic examination of the 'people's war' which it failed to undertake. Nor does the TRC consider that the position might even have been the reverse. Violence against civilians from the ANC side might have been deliberate, as part of the people's war. And violence against ANC/UDF leaders and supporters might also have arisen because security force endeavours to contain the mounting unrest 'went awry' on various occasions. In the government's perspective-which the commission failed adequately to notethe ANC alliance had initiated a people's war, the SACP was playing an important role in this, and the situation was exacerbated by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. These factors had necessitated the development of a National Management System, with both security and welfare elements. The primary aim of this system was to ensure that 'all branches of government responded in a co-ordinated manner to the revolutionary threat'. This threat could not be countered 'effectively by military or security action'. Indeed, the 'main accent had to fall on the provision of effective government and social services and on promoting inclusive constitutional solutions'. Emergency rule nevertheless had to be introduced in 1986 because 'orderly constitutional transformation could not take place in a climate of general violence and insurrection'. Such rule also succeeded, by 1988, in reestablishing 'some degree of normality in most black residential areas' and thus paved the way for 'genuine and workable negotiations'. But it also suspended many normal legal principles and 'created circumstances and an atmosphere' conducive to abuses. In the viewpoint put forward by the government, the revolutionary strategies adopted by its opponents blurred 'traditional distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, between legitimate and illegitimate targets, and between acceptable and unacceptable methods. The normal processes of law-and even the government's tough security measures-seemed incapable of dealing with the situation. Members of the security forces watched, with increasing frustration, while revolutionary movements organised, mobilised and intimidated or killed their opponents, seemingly at will. The security forces were expected to play by the rules while their opponents could, and did, use any methods they liked. There was a need for unconventional counter-strategies of the kind developed by the British and others in successful campaigns against insurgency and terrorism. Consequently, the government began to make use of such strategies which, of necessity, had to be planned and implemented on a "need to know" basis'. The 'unconventional actions' that were approved by the cabinet and the SSC included 'information gathering, disinformation, and assistance to outside Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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organisations opposed to revolutionary violence'. They excluded extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, and assault. Abuses nevertheless occurred, and did so in a variety of situations. Some security force members acted bona fides, but their understanding was 'clouded by bad judgement, over-zealousness, or negligence'. Others acted male fides-probably because they opposed the transition process-and thus became guilty of 'malpractices, and serious violations of human rights'. According to the NP submission, the former government made every effort to prevent abuses from occurring. It did so especially during Mr de Klerk's presidency, when allegations of a 'third-force' role in violence were persistently made. Mr de Klerk thus phased out a number of secret and covert operations of the security forces; gave express instructions to senior officers that the police and army were to act impartially at all times; terminated the National Security Management System; and instigated various inquiries into alleged 'third-force' activities, including the Harms and Goldstone commissions. The Goldstone commission was instrumental in uncovering a number of abuses, but also found no clear evidence of 'third-force' responsibility for political violence. In many instances, the government was not aware of the abuses that were taking place-for those security force members who engaged in such conduct (probably because of their opposition to transition) did not, for obvious reasons, inform their superiors of what they had been (or were still) doing. However, 'whenever credible allegations of human rights abuses' emerged, these were investigated in order to bring them to an end and, where possible, to found criminal prosecutions against their perpetrators. The TRC may not have agreed with the NP's perspective. It may also have believed this an insufficient explanation of extra-judicial killings perpetrated by the former security forces from the 1960s on. Its statutory obligation was nevertheless clear. It was mandated to take the NP's viewpoint into full account. Instead, the commission failed even to record it, let alone to discuss it and give reasons for rejecting it. Mr Malan, in his minority report, took issue with the way the commission had contextualised the NP's role in violence. The TRC, stated Mr Malan, seemed to assume that the context surrounding the extra-judicial killings laid at the NP's door was 'a grand conspiracy of all members of government and senior bureaucrats' to engage in criminal conduct. According to Mr Malan, such a conspiracy was not plausible in the 1980s-and became even less so after Mr de Klerk had assumed the presidency, lifted the bans on the ANC and other organisations, and embarked on negotiations for a constitution based on universal franchise. The true context was far more likely to have been that 'some measure of licence was given to or assumed by some within security and intelligence agencies' to embark on assassinations and other illegal activities. This was then covered up by some politicians and senior officials within the former government. The full extent of the cover up, added Mr Malan, was never adequately addressed by the commission. There were various reasons for this omission, in his view. One was that the TRC, subconsciously at least, may have prejudged the issue through its 'dominant perception' of the former government as a 'criminal state'. It therefore saw no need for further investigation or analysis.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In contextualising past violations, the commission further took the view that 'racism was a central ideological ingredient at the core of the political struggle'. In one sense, this is obviously correct. Racism, or perhaps more accurately, the determination of the NP to maintain white supremacist rule over the entire country except the homelands, lay at the heart of the whole apartheid system and also of opposition to that system. The Institute has documented this in great detail over seven decades. Its chief executive, Mr John Kane-Berman, also summarised the pervasive impact of race discrimination in 1974 when he wrote: Discrimination is at the very heart of our society. It governs every facet of our lives from the cradle to the grave-and even beyond, since even our cemeteries are racially segregated. It is enforced where we live, where we work, where we play, where we learn, where we go when sick, and on the transport we use. Not only does government condone it; it systematically pursues it, preaches it, practises it, and enforces it. It is enshrined in our constitution, written into our laws, and enforced by our courts. In time, however, race discrimination began to crumble. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 'silent revolution' was well under way. Millions of ordinary South Africans of every race, by harnessing their labour and consumer power as well as their entrepreneurial skills and endeavours, had caused apartheid laws to become increasingly unworkable. From 1985 to 1993, in particular, the NP government began steadily to repeal apartheid legislation to bring the statute book into line with these underlying socio-economic realities. In 1990, moreover, the bans on the ANC and other political organisations were also lifted. In 1992, the white electorate voted (by a 68% majority) to continue constitutional negotiations that would inevitably result in the loss of white political power. The first upsurge in political violence took place-not when apartheid was at its height (in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s)-but in the second half of the 1980s, when the impact of the silent revolution was already clear and it was evident that apartheid was disintegrating. The second, and even larger upturn in such violence, took place in the early 1990s-after Mr Mandela had been released from prison, and after the ANC and other organisations had been legalised. It was this final ten-year period, from 1984 to 1994, that witnessed at least 20 500 political killings-more than had been recorded in the whole history of NP rule over 36 years. Racism might well have been a defining feature of white conduct prior to the 1980s, but it was not the only factor after 1984, when fatalities began rapidly to escalate.Racism alone provides no adequate explanation, furthermore, for the 10 500 or more political fatalities that occurred, also after 1984, in the course of the low-key civil war between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu and Natal.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

IX. The Need To Accord With Established Legal Principles A further vital question is how adequately the TRC complied with its statutory duties when it came to assessing the evidence before it. This requires an evaluation of whether the TRC upheld its obligation to make its findings on a 'defensible basis' and 'in accordance with established legal principles'. At various points in its report, the TRC stressed that it was not a court of law. This meant, it said, that it was not bound by the same rules of evidence as the courts. It added that 'if the full array of legal technicalities and nuances had been introduced into its work and decision-making function', this would have had various negative consequences. It would have made its task far more complex and timeconsuming, rendering it even more difficult to complete its work as expeditiously as possible. It would have also opened the way for a repetition of past injustices, 'with victims of political conflict being excluded by legal technicalities' from claiming compensation for their losses. It would also have limited the number of cases with which the commission could deal, curtailing its capacity to report in full on the conflicts of the past. The TRC also acknowledged that, while it was not a court of law, it was still a commission of inquiry. Its status as a commission, it said, obliged it to make 'defensible findings according to established legal principles'. There is a contradiction in these statements. On the one hand, the TRC acknowledges that it is a statutory commission of inquiry, obliged to make its findings according to 'established legal principles'. On the other hand, it dismisses relevant legal rules as 'technicalities' that might inhibit the claiming of compensation and would, in any event, take too long to fulfil. The commission's sympathy for victims of past abuses as well as its need for expeditious operation were important elements in the way its approached its complex task. These factors could not, however, override the TRC's overarching obligation to apply established legal principle in coming to conclusions regarding accountability for past violations. Established legal principle would seem to have required, moreover-if not the satisfaction of all the complex rules of evidencethen at least the fulfilment of five key criteria. It demanded, in particular, that the commission: Ø

take adequate account of all relevant evidence;

verify the testimony presented to it;

uphold basic principles of justice;

function in an open and transparent manner; and

give reasons for its findings. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

These are widely acknowledged common denominators of fairness in all legal proceedings, civil as well as criminal. How adequately the commission satisfied these five requirements needs thus to be assessed. 1. Taking adequate account of all relevant evidence In order to accord with established legal principle, it was vital that the TRC take adequate account of all relevant information. Major shortcomings in this regard have previously been canvassed. (See The Need for Comprehensive Findings and Events and issues not investigated, above.) At minimum, the commission could scarcely claim to have canvassed all the evidence at a time when some 92% of relevant amnesty applications remained yet to be heard. 2. Verification of testimony It is evident, as earlier described, that victim statements were generally not tested through cross-examination, that they commonly included hearsay, and that the 'low-level' corroboration they were accorded did not extend to the identity of perpetrators. (See Victim statements, above.) This approach may have been in keeping with the commission's obligation to offer victims a supportive atmosphere in which to provide their stories. The TRC could not, however, allow its cathartic role to obscure its obligation to ensure that its findings of accountability were adequately verified. Since victim testimony was generally not verified in this way, established legal principle required that it be excluded from consideration in making such findings. Often, however, the evidence of victims seems to have provided the primary basis for conclusions regarding culpability. On occasion, moreover, such testimony appears to have been accepted as the truth even where it contradicted judicial findings to the contrary. (See Findings Based on a 'Balance of Probabilites', below.) Since amnesty statements were open to cross-examination in amnesty hearings, this testimony merited, in principle, a greater weight than victim statements in making findings of accountability. Yet various important problems arose in this regard as well, for only 102 amnesty statements relevant to gross violations had been heard and upheld as accurate by the time the TRC compiled its report. (See Insufficient opportunity for cross-examination, above.) It is questionable, toobased on the Trust Feed example-whether even these 102 statements had been adequately verified in fact. (See Unexplained oddities in a key amnesty statement, above.) 3. Upholding basic principles of justice Established legal principle required, too, that the commission comply with two basic rules: audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and nemo judex in sua causa

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

(no one may be a judge in his own cause). The extent to which the TRC did so merits examination too. Audi alteram partem The commission's compliance with the audi alteram partem principle was challenged at an early stage in its proceedings. The first hearing it conducted (a victim hearing in East London in April 1996, convened by the Committee on Human Rights Violations) was intended to canvass the alleged torture and poisoning in the early 1980s of a political activist, Mr Siphiwe Mthimkulu, as well as his later alleged abduction and killing by two senior police officers, Brigadier Jan du Preez and Colonel Nick van Rensburg. Allegations to this effect-first made in April 1990 by a former police officer, Captain Dirk Coetzee, who claimed to have inside knowledge of various extra-judicial killings by the former security forces-were to be reiterated by Mr Mthimkulu's mother at the TRC hearing. On 13th April 1996, the commission gave notice (through the commissioner of the South African Police Service) that Brig du Preez and Col van Rensburg were to be implicated in gross violations of human rights at its forthcoming hearing, to be held between 15th and 18th April 1996.The notice informed Brig du Preez and Col van Rensburg that 'an unnamed witness would testify that they were involved in, or had knowledge about, the poisoning and disappearance of a person, also unnamed'. According to the TRC, the notice was 'cautiously and vaguely worded' because the commission was concerned that the witness in question would be in danger if her identity became known. The two police officers objected to the notice given on the basis that it was 'vague in the extreme', that they were unable to investigate the allegations in issue, and that they certainly could not do so before 15th April 1996. They sought an interdict preventing the TRC from hearing the relevant evidence until they had been given 'proper, reasonable, and timeous notice' of the allegations against them. Mr Justice E L King upheld the application, ruling that the commission was obliged to furnish the two officers with 'sufficient facts and information as they would reasonably need to identify the events, incidents, and persons' in issue. The matter then went to a full bench of the Cape Provincial Division, which overturned the earlier judgement. The full bench found that it was only 'if and when the commission contemplated making a decision that might be detrimental to an implicated person' that that individual should be granted an opportunity to make representations or submit evidence. On further appeal to the Appellate Division (renamed the Supreme Court of Appeal when the 1996 constitution took effect on 4th February 1997), the Chief Justice, Mr Justice M M Corbett, overruled the Cape full bench decision. Having heard argument on behalf of the commission that the TRC was not a court of law but 'an investigative procedure' in which the normal 'adversarial procedures' did not apply, Judge Corbett ruled that 'the solution to the issues could be found in the common law'. This required 'persons and bodies (statutory and other) to observe the rules of natural justice by acting in a fair manner'.

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The principle of audi alteram partem came into play, continued Judge Corbett, 'irrespective of whether the body was quasi-judicial or administrative'. It did so, moreover, whenever 'a statute empowered a public official or body to give a decision that could prejudicially affect an individual'. It followed, in the case of the TRC, that 'procedural fairness demanded not only that a person implicated [in gross violations] be given reasonable and timeous notice of the hearing, but also that he be informed at the same time of the substance of the allegations against him, with sufficient detail to know what the case was all about'. The person implicated should also have the opportunity to 'hear the evidence, to see the demeanour of the witness(es), and ďż˝ to rebut the evidence'. Judge Corbett added that the commission might 'well be under a duty to hear the rebutting evidence [at the same time], or permit immediate cross-examination'. Following this ruling, the commission 'adopted the procedure of sending section 30 notices to alleged perpetrators 21 clear calendar days in advance of the hearings'. It also accompanied the notices, it said, with 'all the documentation necessary to provide the alleged perpetrator with sufficient detail of the substance of the allegations against him'. It used this procedure, it continued, not only in relation to victim hearings, but also as regards section 29 investigative hearings and amnesty hearings. The commission provides no examples of the extent of the information included in such notices. Its assurance that 'sufficient detail' was given must largely be taken at face value-though the allegations of Dr Neil Barnard (a former director general of the National Intelligence Service, or NIS) cast doubt on this assertion in his case at least (as outlined below). The TRC did, however, express considerable concern as to the impact of Judge Corbett's ruling. It feared that it would come to be seen as 'too perpetrator-friendly'. It worried that its hearings would become 'too legalistic and formal, hampering the already painful and emotional process of giving public testimony and risking secondary trauma'. It feared, too, that it might also have to 'contend with perpetrators demanding to be heard at the same hearings as victims and requesting that they be allowed to cross-examine witnesses'. This, it said, would have 'a traumatising effect on many victims who had finally found the courage to testify'. Whether cross-examination of victims was in fact allowed seems unlikely. Elsewhere in its report, the commission states categorically that victims were not subjected to cross-examination unless there were 'glaring falsehoods or inconsistencies' in their testimony. (See Little, if any, cross-examination allowed, above.) In any event, as already noted, only some 10% of the victims who provided statements were given the opportunity to give oral testimony at public hearings. As regards 90% of victim statements, the opportunity for alleged perpetrators to observe the demeanour of deponents and to test the evidence put forward was simply not available. The commission seems to have been particularly concerned about the trauma victims might experience at having to come face-to-face with those whom they had accused of gross violations. This is a legitimate concern. But there are other

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

significant concerns at stake, among them the rights of accused persons. Allegations of complicity in murder, torture, and similar violations are of the utmost seriousness. Basic principles of fairness require that such accusations should not be made-especially by a court or statutory commission-without according the alleged perpetrator a right of rebuttal and reply. The damage resulting from accusations which may be unsubstantiated or untrue can otherwise be lasting, for a damning perception that has become rooted in the public mind is not easily dislodged. The commission also expressed concern as to the implications of Judge Corbett's ruling on the process of making findings of accountability. The ruling implied that every alleged perpetrator had to be notified of the finding being contemplated, and given an opportunity to make written representations to the commission. Often it was difficult to trace such individuals. Hence, some of the findings the TRC had intended to make against particular perpetrators had to be left out of its report. Particularly disturbing, in the commission's view, was that it found itself 'obliged to give alleged perpetrators a prior view of its report-a highly unusual circumstance for a report of a commission of inquiry'. Established legal principle makes it clear, however, that the commission-far from regarding compliance with audi alteram partem as an unduly onerous obligationshould have sought to ensure that it adhered to it to the utmost possible extent. Although the commission states that it 'complied with the ruling of the Appellate Division to the best of its ability', it appears to have begrudged its obligations in this regard. Yet the Chief Justice had demanded nothing more (or less) than that the TRC should act fairly and justly. The audi alteram partem principle requires, moreover, that both sides of the story should not only be ascertained but that they should also be taken into proper account. It is unclear what the commission did to ensure compliance with this second aspect of the principle. Mr de Klerk-who objected to the TRC about being named as a perpetrator of gross violations of human rights-was clearly dissatisfied with its response. Shortly before the TRC's report was due to be published, he applied to court for an order compelling the commission to give more adequate consideration to his own perspectives on the past. His application was postponed for hearing in early 1999, while the finding against him was removed, in the interim, from the commission's report. The ANC was likewise dissatisfied with the way the TRC responded to its objections against being named as a perpetrator of certain gross violations. It demanded the right to make oral as well as written representations, and applied to court for an order compelling the commission to accord it this. (The application was dismissed, however, primarily because the ANC had failed to lodge its written representations within the stipulated period.) Dr Barnard-who has been named in the TRC report as a perpetrator of three gross violations-has since brought action against the TRC for defamation. His affidavit, which remains to be tested and verified by the High Court in Cape Town, alleges that the commission failed to comply with either aspect of the audi alteram partem principle. According to Dr Barnard, the commission omitted to notify him, Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

on any of the various occasions when he appeared before it to give evidence, that it was contemplating making findings against him. Moreover, though the TRC subsequently sent him a notice under section 30 stating its intention to make two of its three findings against him, it provided no notice of the third (see below). It also gave no details of the evidence allegedly supporting the first two findings. It thus infringed the ruling of Judge Corbett in the Du Preez case and made it extremely difficult for Dr Barnard to respond by denying him 'sufficient details to know what the case was all about'. Though certain documentation was thereafter supplied to Dr Barnard at his request, he was left with little time after its receipt to formulate and submit his reply. There were indications, too, that any representations he might make would have little impact on the TRC's report. This was primarily because the TRC's director of research, Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, had already told the press that a final text of the report was going to be presented by his department to the commissioners on the very day that Dr Barnard (and some 200 others) were supposed to put in their responses. Though the commission assured Dr Barnard that his representations would nonetheless be properly considered, it also transpired that only a limited number of commissioners would be involved in this process-and not the commission as a whole. Dr Barnard was told that his reply would be weighed by 'at least two of the commissioners' and that their views would thereafter be ratified (automatically, it seems) by the rest of the commission. The TRC refused to disclose which two commissioners would be responsible for considering Dr Barnard's reply. It allegedly also refused to deal with his concerns that one of the commissioners, Mr Richard Lyster, had already reflected a bias against Dr Barnard and should not be involved in considering his response. The commission also apparently ignored the fact that its founding legislation required the commission as a whole to decide on representations of this kind. Dr Barnard asked, moreover, to be informed if his representations were to be rejected. This was not done. His first notice of their rejection was when the report was published-with the three findings against him included within it. Dr Barnard remained convinced, moreover, that the TRC report had already been drawn up and printed when he (and some 200 others) received their section 30 notices-and that the commission had no real intention of responding to any of the representations it received. Audi alteram partem was entirely ignored, Dr Barnard further alleged, as regards the commission's third finding against him. According to Dr Barnard, he was 'at no stage provided with the documentary evidence utilised by the commission in reaching this finding and was also not informed of the intended finding'. Nemo judex in sua causa Whether the principle of nemo judex in sua causa was adequately upheld by the TRC is also questionable. The principle has two main facets. It requires, in the first instance, that those called on to adjudicate between contestants have no link with either side. It demands, secondly, that the adjudicators maintain their objectivity,

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

doing and saying nothing that would indicate a greater sympathy for one side than the other. On both counts, the TRC seems to have fallen short. The commission was widely accused, from the time of its establishment, of being one-sided in its composition in the sense that its members were more sympathetic to the broad ANC alliance than to the NP or the IFP. As earlier discussed, furthermore, the commission seems to have been less than fully even-handed in various respects. The conduct of its own commissioners sometimes seemed to evince a predetermination of important issues. Its research and investigations, more over, omitted significant events and perspectives. (See The Need for Objective Operation, above.) The commission also undermined its obligation to be even-handed at all times by making moral judgements as to which side had been most to blame. It frequently expressed the view that 'those who sought to uphold and sustain apartheid could not be morally equated with those who sought to remove and oppose it'. In a court of law-either criminal or civil-a judge who expressed such a preference for the viewpoint of one side would be compelled to recuse himself. Moreover, the commission's founding legislation did not mandate the TRC to make this kind of assessment. Instead, it made it clear that the commission's function was to document gross violations committed on all sides-and to do so in a strictly impartial manner. 4. Open and transparent functioning Established legal principle required, too, that the TRC should function in an open and transparent way. This meant, in particular, that all its hearings should have been held in public-with the identity of witnesses kept confidential where required. Public hearings serve a vital function, for they allow a public awareness of the evidence giving rise to culpability-and a public assessment of its sufficiency as well. Secret testimony in secret hearings undermines the rule of law, for it erodes a vital safeguard of procedural and substantive fairness and can lead to miscarriages of justice. How well did the TRC uphold this key requirement? 'Victim', 'event', 'theme' and 'institutional' hearings were conducted in public view, (See The overall focus of these hearings, above) and so too were amnesty applications. Investigative hearings, however, were a different matter. A number of such hearings were held behind closed doors. Witnesses were subpoenaed to give evidence before them but the content of their testimony remained, in general, undisclosed. Cross-examination may have been permitted in these instances-but the public scrutiny of evidence that is essential to the rule of law was not allowed. Key testimony was thus kept confidential. Possible weaknesses in it were not revealed to public view. Its probity and its sufficiency remained obscure. No basis was provided for a public evaluation of whether the evidence was verified-or whether it sufficiently supported the conclusions reached by the commission.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The (untested) affidavit of Dr Barnard in his defamation suit against the TRC may also be indicative of other failures by the commission to function in an open and transparent way. According to Dr Barnard, the TRC: Ø failed to take account of the Annual National Intelligence Assessments from 1980 to 1994, which would have cast significant light on the role and operations of the SSC and shown that its concerns extended far beyond the 'total strategy' to the best means of resolving, by negotiation, the 'broader problems confronting the country'; Ø confined its focus to the minutes of a limited number of SSC meetings, whereas the minutes of hundreds of meetings were available to it and should have been taken into proper account; Ø sought to entrap Dr Barnard by putting to him fabricated allegations that had not in fact been made (regarding a cross-border raid apparently authorised by him); Ø refused to provide an assurance that untested amnesty statements would not be used to make findings against Dr Barnard-and did so on the basis that 'the commission had by resolution adopted a modus operandi for making findings, which was not something that [Dr Barnard] was entitled to any knowledge of'; Ø frequently relied in making findings against Dr Barnard on 'incomplete' and often 'undated' documents, many of which 'had no official status at all and represented, at best, the views of their (sometimes unidentified) authors without there being any indication that the contents were ever translated into policy'; Ø failed to furnish Dr Barnard with all the documents on which it relied in making its findings against him; and Ø based its findings against Dr Barnard on conjecture, on what it itself described as 'reasonable speculation', and on a series of unproven assumptions. It did so, moreover, without disclosing what specific misdeeds he was alleged to have committed. These allegations remain to be verified in the court proceedings that have been initiated by Dr Barnard. They are also confined to his particular experiences of the commission's operation. The failures he alleges may thus have been exceptions to a general rule of open and transparent functioning. They may also, however, point to shortcomings that were common in the way the commission went about its work. 5. Giving reasons for findings Established legal principle requires, in addition, that adequate reasons be given for findings made. A court, whether civil or criminal, is obliged to canvass in full the evidence adduced, explain its strengths and its weaknesses, link the facts thus established to the relevant legal rules, and arrive at a conclusion which is properly substantiated in terms of both the evidence available and the governing law. A Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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statutory commission like the TRC, which must make its findings on a balance of probabilities, must show (at minimum) the basis on which it weighed the probabilities and came to its findings of fact. The TRC, however, omitted to do so. The commission, in citing the evidence on which it relies, in general does no more than briefly summarise the allegations put forward by unnamed individuals. It does not explain whether these witnesses were victims or applicants for amnesty. Many, however, appear to have been victims. This means that their evidence would not have been tested under cross-examination, nor corroborated to any significant extent. The commission then tends to repeat this 'evidence' as its rationale for a finding of accountability-and to provide no further indication of the reasoning supporting its conclusion. (Examples of this approach are provided in Findings Based on a 'Balance of Probabilities', below.) In most instances the commission does not analyse the strengths or the weaknesses of the testimony before it. It does not canvass contrary views of what occurred, or explain why these should be rejected as untrue. Where documentary evidence is relied upon, it does not cite the words in issue, explore their different potential meanings, or elucidate why one meaning should be accepted as true in preference to another. Nor does it adequately contextualise events, by explaining the 'antecedents' and other factors that may have given rise to them. In addition, it does not properly scrutinise two key elements in liability-the intentions governing the conduct of alleged perpetrators, and whether their actions might have been justified in law (for example, under the doctrine of self-defence). In general, the reasoning on which the TRC relied is omitted from its report. This is a serious omission, for established legal principle requires that findings be adequately reasoned. The absence of proper reasoning also makes it difficult to assess how well the TRC has fulfilled its further obligation-carefully to weigh competing evidence, and then to base its rulings on a balance of probabilities.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

X. Findings Based On A 'Balance Of Probabilities' The commission made it clear that it was not required to meet the standard of proof pertaining in criminal law-namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It emphasised that it operated in terms of a different standard that required merely a balancing of probabilities. When it was confronted with different versions of events, its task was thus to 'decide which version was the more probable, reasonable, or likely, after taking all the available evidence into account'. This, it pointed out, was 'the standard criterion used in civil litigation' and was the basis on which it came to its conclusions regarding accountability. While the relevant standard of proof was thus only 'a balance of probabilities', that balance had nevertheless to be established in the light of all the relevant evidence. How adequately did the TRC discharge this obligation? The lack of proper reasoning in the report makes it difficult to answer this question. So too does the length of the report and the number of the violations canvassed in it. There are various instances, however, in which the work of the TRC was preceded by judicial inquiries-through which a significant amount of relevant background information had earlier emerged. In these judicial inquiries, evidence would have been properly corroborated and tested under cross-examination. Hearsay would have been excluded. A comprehensive account of the surrounding facts, as thus found, would have been provided. Reasons for any conclusions regarding culpability would have been adduced and properly explained. These rulings provide, accordingly, a good means of assessing how adequately the TRC weighed the balance of probabilities in coming to its findings. 1. TRC findings vis-Ă -vis earlier judicial rulings Five such incidents-in each of which the conclusions of the TRC can be compared and contrasted with earlier judicial rulings-are described below. For ease of reference, they are dealt with in chronological order. THE SEBOKENG SHOOTINGS IN MARCH 1990 In 1990 a UDF committee operating in the Vaal region (south of Johannesburg) decided to hold a march through the central business district of Vereeniging on 26th March to protest, among other things, against the housing shortage and the education crisis. Permission for the march was sought on 22nd March, and was refused the following day. The organisers then developed alternative plans for a number of local marches to local police stations in the Lekoa townships. During such a march in Sebokeng, a number of protesters were killed and injured when police opened fire on the marchers. A commission of inquiry, chaired by Mr Justice Richard Goldstone, was appointed to investigate the shootings.

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According to Judge Goldstone's report, a crowd of about 50 000 gathered in Sebokeng on the morning of 26th March 1990 and began their march. Some of the organisers of the protest met the local police commander, a Colonel Mazibuko, at the local police station and asked him to receive a petition there. In the meantime, however, the marchers passed the police station and moved on towards Vereeniging. The commanding officer of the local reaction unit (responsible for public order policing) came across the protesters and believed they were intent on marching on the town. To stop them, he formed a police line near the gate of a local brewery. The marchers came to a halt some 70m away. Col Mazibuko and the organisers moved up to the police line and agreed that the petition would be handed over at this point, while the march would go no further. They communicated this to the commander of the reaction unit, a Captain du Plooy. The organisers then addressed the people, explaining that the petition had been handed over and that they should go home. Many in the crowd were still speaking of marching on Vereeniging, however. They were armed with sticks of various kinds and were singing freedom songs, such as 'Shaye M'Boere' ('hit the Boers'). They were apparently not aggressive. As the organisers were speaking, those at the back of the crowd surged forward to hear. Some also tried to outflank the police line. The crowd moved to within 40m of the police line, but there was very little stoning and no immediate threat to the police of being overrun. Firing began without an order to shoot. A white constable fired a teargas canister, and set off a chain reaction in the police line. Shooting lasted for between 10 and 20 seconds, during which period some 60 rounds of ammunition were fired. Judge Goldstone found that five people had been killed in the shootings and 161 wounded, 84 from behind. He also found the shootings unjustified, as 'the force used was quite immoderate and disproportionate'. He strongly criticised Capt du Plooy for failure to control the police line. He also criticised the undisciplined behaviour of the policemen, many of whom had loaded their firearms without orders-and some of whom had opened fire without orders too. Judge Goldstone further criticised the organisers of the march for having decided at the last moment to hold separate and unauthorised marches, with no attempt to communicate this to the police; for having failed to tell the protesters that the Sebokeng march was no longer planned for Vereeniging (this failure having been a key reason for the crowd continuing to press forward towards the police line); and for having provided too few marshalls and megaphones with which to control the 50 000-strong crowd. Judge Goldstone rejected any criminal conduct on the part of Capt du Plooy, but recommended that the actions of certain policemen in the police line be referred to the attorney general for investigation. Nine of these policemen were subsequently prosecuted, and six of them were charged with murder. The TRC's finding on the Sebokeng shootings is as follows: On 26 March 1990, police opened fire on a crowd of 50 000 people who were marching from Sebokeng to Vereeniging, killing 13 people and injuring over 400. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Many of the injured people were shot in the back, indicating that they were fleeing when police opened fire. The Goldstone commission found that the gathering was peaceful before the police intervened and that the police did not give an order to disperse before opening fire with live ammunition. In reviewing the information on gross human rights violations committed at Sebokeng on 26th March 1990, the commission finds that the SAP and commanding officer W du Plooy were directly responsible for the deaths and injuries that occurred. Elsewhere in its report, the TRC states that 17 people died in this incident, while a few pages thereafter it says that 'at least 13 people died'. In its national chronology of events, moreover, it gives the number of people killed as eight, and the number injured as 'over 300'. The commission adds that Judge Goldstone had recommended that 'police be prosecuted', but that 'no action was taken'. In making this last assertion, it ignores its own acknowledgement (contained in another volume of its report) that nine policemen had been put on trial in the Vereeniging Circuit Court, six on charges of murder, in August 1993. The TRC contradicts the findings of Judge Goldstone in various respects. While Judge Goldstone found that five people were killed and 161 injured, the TRC states that 13 (or 17, or eight) individuals were killed and over 400 (or 300) people injured. It gives no reasons for its varying conclusions regarding the number of fatalities and injuries. The TRC holds Capt du Plooy 'directly responsible' for the shootings, and makes no mention of the Goldstone finding rejecting any criminal conduct on his part. The TRC states that 'no action' was taken against the policemen who opened fire without orders, whereas prosecutions were in fact instituted against nine of these police officers (six of them being charged with murder). Judge Goldstone, moreover, had criticised the organisers of the march as well and had made it clear that they had contributed in various ways to the incident (for which the ultimate culpability lay nevertheless with the police). The TRC makes no reference to the conduct of the organisers. The TRC does not cite the evidence on which it relied. It does not demonstrate how it weighed the probabilities, or what testimony tipped the balance against the findings previously made by Judge Goldstone. The TRC's claim that 'no action' was taken against the policemen in question shows the criminal justice system in a very poor light, but is simply incorrect. SADF shootings in Sebokeng in September 1990 On 4th September 1990, some 40 people were killed when IFP supporters attacked a hostel in Sebokeng, south of Johannesburg. A judicial inquest into these and certain further deaths was conducted by Mr Justice E H Stafford, who handed down his findings in March 1991. According to Judge Stafford, the attack was mounted by IFP supporters who had earlier been evicted from the hostel by the ANC and were aggrieved by this. 'Inkatha supporters,' stated Judge Stafford, 'had been removed from, chased away from, frightened away from, had left their hostel dwellings, whatever you like, and were living in tents with charitable aid, and other residences, including one

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belonging to the KwaZulu government � This was where it all started: the Inkatha supporters, evicted from the hostels and aggrieved thereby, and the mainly ANC supporters who lived in Sebokeng and those that still remained in the hostels.' Judge Stafford further found that the number of people killed in the IFP attack was 38. What then occurred, continued Judge Stafford, was that '137 red head-banded Inkatha supporters became trapped inside a part of the hostel. The crowd [surrounding the hostel] grew to 5 000 people and was baying for their blood. They, the crowd, firmly believed that the 137 supporters of Inkatha, inter alia or solely, were responsible for the dead and fatally wounded scattered all round the hostel'. The SADF was called in after some hours to help the police 'remove and arrest and disarm the 137 members of Inkatha in order to avoid a bloodbath and to carry out their duties'. The information that had been given to the SADF commanding officer was that 'the police were cornered in the hostel with Inkatha members'. Shortly after the army contingent arrived at the hostel, a soldier fired a shot and killed one person within the crowd. A further 160 or so rounds were fired within the next 20 seconds. No order to fire was given. Judge Stafford found that the soldier in question, aged 22 and of limited education, may have panicked at the sight of the 'huge, noisy, and hostile crowd'. He also found his behaviour, and that of the other SADF members who had fired without orders, to be inexcusable. In conclusion, Judge Stafford found that a total of four people had been killed by the SADF. He expressed the hope that this finding would lay to rest rumours and press reports that 11 people had been shot dead by the army. The TRC describes these events thus: On 3 September 1990, Inkatha members carried out an attack in the early hours of the morning on the Sebokeng Hostel. Twenty-three people were killed in this initial attack. A further fifteen people died when the SADF opened fire on the crowd. The commission subsequently expands its description, stating (among other things) that: Ø the Inkatha attack began at 1am on 3rd September 1990, and was carried out by Inkatha supporters armed with guns, hand grenades, home-made bombs, spears, and axes; Ø the attack was 'an attempt by those who had been evicted from the hostel in July to regain their former residence'; Ø it took the police four hours to arrive at the scene, even though an SAP police station was situated less than 500 metres from the scene; and

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Ă&#x2DC; the SADF opened fire without provocation on the crowd of Sebokeng residents who had gathered outside the hostel, trapping the group of attackers inside. The TRC, again, effectively repudiates important aspects of an earlier judicial finding. While Judge Stafford had found that 38 people had been killed in the initial IFP attack, the TRC concludes that 23 people had died in this way. While Judge Stafford had ruled that four people had been shot dead by the SADF, the TRC finds that 15 people were killed by the army. The commission cites no evidence and provides no reasons for its conclusions regarding the number of people killed in either incident. Nor does it deal in any way with the hope expressed by Judge Stafford that his finding (that four people had been killed by the SADF) would put an end to rumours of a much higher death toll. The commission does, at various points in its report, acknowledge that '350 Zuluspeaking people' had been expelled from the Sebokeng hostel complex, and that the IFP attack was an attempt to 'regain their former residence'. The significance of this 'antecedent' factor is not explored, however. Elsewhere in its report, the TRC entirely discounts this factor, moreover-stating merely that 'Inkatha had allegedly tried to lay siege to and occupy the Sebokeng hostel'. Deaths in Tokoza (east Rand) in September 1991 Eighteen hostel residents on their way to a meeting at the Tokoza stadium on the east Rand were assassinated on 8th September 1991. The Goldstone commission was mandated to investigate both these (and other) killings in the area, and delivered its report in July 1992. The commission found that there was a high level of conflict in the Tokoza township between the residents of a squatter camp called Phola Park, and those who lived within the hostels. This enmity had earlier resulted in the demolition by the residents of Phola Park of a large hostel complex adjacent to their settlement. Tensions had been further fuelled by several attempts to remove or relocate the Phola Park residents, by the establishment by the Phola Park residents of a selfdefence unit (SDU), and by ongoing incidents of violence in adjoining shack settlements. At the beginning of September 1991 the Tokoza Hostel Dwellers' Association decided to hold a meeting of hostel residents on Sunday, 8th September, at the Tokoza stadium. On the Sunday morning in question, a small group of hostel residents from more distant hostels gathered at the southern entrance to the stadium, awaiting the arrival of a bigger crowd of hostel dwellers from three hostels in Tokoza itself. The residents of these three hostels began moving down a road called Khumalo Street towards the stadium. Their conduct was apparently not provocative and was reasonably orderly. When some of these hostel dwellers had already passed house 2044 on Khumalo Street, near the north east corner of the stadium, three men armed with AK-47 rifles opened fire on them at very close range from the front garden of the house. Sixteen hostel dwellers were killed and 13 injured. Immediately the firing of automatic weapons commenced at house 2044, the small group of hostel dwellers that had already gathered at the south entrance to the Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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stadium came under attack as well. This attack was initiated by a group of men located at the south west corner of the stadium. Handguns were fired, and the hostel residents were assaulted with spears, pangas, assegais, and axes. A further two hostel dwellers were killed, bringing the death toll to 18. Three men armed with AK-47 rifles were also seen at the north west corner of the stadium. They were not seen to have fired any shots, however. There was also some evidence, found inconclusive, that a fourth group had been stationed at the south east corner of the stadium. The Goldstone commission found that the Phola Park SDU had held a meeting some time before the march began. At that meeting, 'it was arranged to mount an ambush on the hostel dwellers by locating small units of probably not more than three men each at the four corners of the stadium'. Shortly before the march, the SDU had called a meeting of its section leaders at a water tank at Phola Park. At that meeting the section leaders were advised of the impending gathering of the hostel dwellers, and Phola Park went on to a defensive as well as a 'war footing'many of the residents 'cloaking themselves with blankets, which constituted an accepted "military uniform"'. The three assassins who opened fire from house 2044 constituted the unit delegated to the north east corner of the stadium. The attack on hostel dwellers at the southern entrance to the stadium was executed by the unit delegated to the south west corner of the stadium. (It was clear, moreover, that some blanketed Phola Park residents who were not members of the SDU had also been involved in this attack.) The three men with AK-47 rifles seen at the north west corner of the stadium constituted the unit delegated to that sector. The attack at house 2044 on Khumalo Street, said the Goldstone commission, was 'executed with a high degree of professionalism-in the sense that the AK-47 rifles were handled competently and having regard to the number killed or wounded, as was intended by the assassins'. The attack at the southern entrance of the stadium which followed immediately thereafter was not 'mere spontaneous violence', moreover-for both its timing and the evidence of an ambush plot militated against this. The police and defence force, added the commission, were 'effective in bringing the whole situation rapidly under control, and in restoring relative calm to the area. There were no retaliatory attacks or counter-attacks despite the very high level of tension in the area following the attack on the hostel dwellers'. In the course of the subsequent police investigation, the Goldstone commission continued, a suspect and three other people who happened to be residing at the same place were taken to a farm called Vlakplaas. This was not a police station, and normal police records were not kept there. Two minor brothers of the suspect were arrested the same morning. All but the suspect were released the same day. 'An allegation of assault on the suspect was not proved, but the lack of records detracted from the police case,' the commission stated.

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The Goldstone commission declined to name any individual as having been guilty of the shootings at house 2044 on Khumalo Street. The police investigating officer, despite extensive efforts, had been unable to find sufficient evidence to lay charges against any individual-and the commission considered itself incompetent to apportion blame to named people in such circumstances. During the commission's investigation, it emerged that one section leader in the Phola Park SDU, Mr Mncugi Ceba, was a police informer. It also emerged that Mr Ceba had 'actually led the coup' in terms of which 'the Phola Park SDU had ousted the Phola Park Committee'. (This event was not further explained.) It was further argued before the commission that, 'by virtue of having informers in key positions, the police probably knew of the planned attack on the hostel dwellers on 8th September'. It was not contended that the police had instigated the attack in any way. The commission found that 'no offence on the part of the police was proved'. It added that the use by the police of 'informers in positions such as that held by Ceba was certainly not conducive to improving the already tense relations ďż˝ between the security forces and the communities in question'. The TRC reports the incident as follows: On 8 September 1991, a three-month period of relative calm was shattered days before the signing of the National Peace Accord. Approximately 300 members of the Hostel Dwellers Association on their way to a peace meeting at the Thokoza stadium on the East Rand were sprayed with gunfire by three AK-47 wielding gunmen, killing at least 23 people. By the following night, 42 people were dead and at least 50 injured in retaliatory attacks that swept Katlehong, Tembisa, and Johannesburg. Both the ANC and Inkatha later stated that they believed the killing was provoked with the aim of derailing the peace process. Members of the Political Violent Crime Unit based on a farm in Katlehong called Vlakplaas arrested and allegedly tortured a number of SDU members in response to the attack. The Goldstone Commission found in 1992 that this attack had been planned and carried out by a police informer, Mr Mncugi Ceba, who posed as the head of an ANC SDU in Phola Park. One of the participants in this attack, ANC member Mr Michael Phama, who is currently serving a life sentence for his involvement in the incident, applied to the Commission for amnesty for the killings. He stated in his amnesty application that he was ordered by his SDU commander to shoot "because IFP members might attack our people as they always attack when they have a rally". The commission's finding on the incident is as follows: The Commission finds that, on 8th September 1991, 23 people were killed at the Thokoza stadium on the eve of the signing of the National Peace Accord on the east Rand. The Commission finds that 42 people died and at least 50 people were severely injured in violence that broke out between supporters of the ANC and the IFP in the two days that followed. The Commission finds that the initial attack was

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initiated by one Michael Phama, a member of an ANC SDU, acting on the instructions of his commander, Mr Mncuzi (sic) Ceba. The Commission finds that Ceba was a police informer in the pay of the SAP. The discrepancies between the Goldstone commission report and the TRC report are significant. Goldstone found 18 people killed, the TRC found 23. Goldstone made it clear that the attack had all the flavour of a professionally-executed ambush, which had involved the stationing of SDU units at three corners of the stadium at minimum. The TRC, by contrast, indicates that it was three lone gunmen (those positioned at house 2044, presumably) who hadopened fire on the hostel residents. Goldstone said one suspect might have been assaulted by the police at Vlakplaas, though this had not been proved. The TRC states that the police 'allegedly tortured a number of SDU members' after the attack. Goldstone says rapid police and army action prevented any retaliatory attacks after the killings. The TRC says 42 people were killed and 50 injured in such attacks within the next two days. The Goldstone commission, moreover, professed itself incompetent to name either Mr Ceba or any other individual as having been guilty of the shootings from house 2044. It made it clear that it could not do this in the absence of sufficient evidence. The TRC evinces no such constraint. What the TRC states about Mr Ceba is entirely inaccurate, moreover. The Goldstone commission discovered that Mr Ceba, who was a section leader in the Phola Park SDU, was also a police informer. The Goldstone commission further stated that Mr Ceba had led 'a coup' against the Phola Park Committee. Goldstone also made it clear that there were a number of section leaders within the Phola Park SDU, and that the attack had been planned by the SDU as a whole-not by a single section leader. The TRC ignores all this, and states that Goldstone 'found that the attack had been planned and carried out by a police informer, Mr Mncugi Ceba'. The TRC thus misrepresents Goldstone. It also provides no evidence and no reasoning to show why his findings should be repudiated. It further fails to demonstrate how it weighed the balance of probabilities, or how it found these to support its conclusions. The Boipatong massacre in June 1992 On 17th June 1992, 45 people were killed in Boipatong, a township in the Vaal triangle south of Johannesburg, and in a neighbouring informal settlement called Slovo Park. Many others were injured. The ANC, which had earlier called for a renewed campaign of mass action to force the government from power, accused NP leaders and the police of having been party to the killings. The Goldstone commission was asked to investigate, and called in a team of policing experts from the United Kingdom for this purpose. This team comprised Dr Peter Waddington (director of criminal justice studies at the University of Reading), as well as Commander Tom Laidlaw and Detective Superintendent David Gon (both of the

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London Metropolitan Police). Dr Waddington presented his report to the Goldstone commission on 20th July 1992. According to Dr Waddington, 'there was no evidence that the police had any forewarning of an impending attack in Boipatong'. There were suggestions that some serious event would take place somewhere in the Vaal Triangle. However, to the extent that any area was specifically mentioned, it was Sebokeng and not Boipatong. Dr Waddington summed up the police role in events at Boipatong as follows: At around 10.00pm on 17 June police began receiving calls reporting shootings, assault, and damage from the Boipatong township. Two Casspirs were deployed under the command of their respective sergeants. The sergeants discovered evidence of murder, arranged for ambulances, and asked for detectives to investigate. The 'scene-of-crime' detective made a necessarily superficial examination of the murder scenes during two visits lasting from midnight to 3.00am, and from 7.30am to mid-morning. The ISU (Internal Stability Unit) supported the detective, protecting him whilst he made his investigations, and remained on patrol throughout the day. However, they took no part in the investigation itself (for example, by interviewing witnesses) and saw their role as merely preventing further disorder and violence. Throughout the night the mood of the township residents was agitated but not hostile to police. Hostility towards the police began to grow after daybreak, possibly as a result of rumours of police involvement in the massacre. Violence escalated and police fought a running battle with rioters throughout much of the day. The subsequent police investigation, continued Dr Waddington, concentrated on the KwaMadala Hostel, which police visited on several occasions the day after the killings. As a result of repeated interviewing, a number of suspects were then arrested and detained. Inquiries in Boipatong itself, among potential witnesses to the massacre, were obstructed throughout by the hostility and non-co-operation of residents. This, stated Dr Waddington, was 'apparently at the behest of the ANC'. Dr Waddington criticised the response of the police to the massacre, as well as the methods used in investigating the killings. He found, among other things, that the police had not made the best use of their limited manpower, that their intelligence gathering had been inadequate, that their contingency planning was defective, that their investigation was insufficiently co-ordinated, and that they had not tried hard enough to win the trust of the Boipatong community in the immediate aftermath of the killings. Dr Waddington also made it clear, however, that 'no evidence had been found of direct police complicity in the massacre itself'. In August 1992 the Goldstone commission began its own hearings into the massacre. Little, if any, credible evidence of police culpability emerged. In particular, the testimony of a special constable who had claimed he had seen gunmen 'climbing into police armoured vehicles' was discredited, for an inspection in loco made it clear that he 'could not have seen what he claimed to have seen'.

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The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In November, Judge Goldstone accordingly announced that 'it was impossible to make a finding'. Some 30 residents of the KwaMadala Hostel were subsequently tried for murder for their alleged part in the killings. During their trial, the accused contended that they had not been involved in the attack at all-and alleged that the police had been responsible instead. The police role in the massacre thus became a critical issue for Mr Justice J M C Smit to decide. Three accomplice witnesses from KwaMadala Hostel who gave evidence for the state all denied that the police had been involved. Some 120 witnesses from the Boipatong and Slovo Park communities gave evidence as well, and denied that police vehicles had assisted the attackers. The principal witnesses who testified to police involvement in the massacre, Messrs Joseph Sello and Abednego Mabuza, were unable to explain a number of material inconsistencies and contradictions in their evidence. Mr Sello was found particularly 'dishonest and unreliable', while Mr Mabuza-though less obviously a liar-was far from credible either. In the light of all the testimony before him, Judge Smit concluded that the police had not in any way participated in the killings. The allegations by Messrs Sello and Mabuza demonstrated, he continued, how rumours of police culpablity had been spread-but there was no truth in those rumours whatsoever. Moreover, though the tapes of transactions in the control room of the ISU had been found to have been erased when the Goldstone commission began its investigations, there was nothing sinister in this. According to Judge Smit, 'the erasure of the tapes was the result of incompetence rather than a deliberate attempt to hide evidence of police complicity in the attack'. He came to a similar conclusion regarding other evidence, in the form of eight bullet shells, that had also been inadvertently destroyed by the police. (Further bullet shells had, it seems, been removed from Boipatong by 'comrades' and unnamed persons in the aftermath of the massacre-at a time when the ANC had apparently instructed residents not to co-operate with the police. This may have impeded proper investigation to an equal extent.) The TRC was aware of the court's decision, for it cited Judge Smit as having 'unequivocally stated that, in the light of the testimony he had heard, there was no evidence to support the allegation that the police in any way participated in or were involved in the Boipatong massacre'. It cited as well his further conclusion that 'the erasure of the tapes was the result of incompetence rather than a deliberate attempt to hide evidence of police complicity'. It noted his similar conclusion regarding the bullet shells that had been destroyed. It referred as well to Judge Goldstone's statement that 'he had not received any evidence that led him to conclude that the police were involved in the attack'. And it cited the Waddington inquiry too, and noted its conclusion that the police had been guilty of 'inefficiency and incompetence' but not more. The TRC's findings regarding the Boipatong massacre are, however, as follows: The commission finds that 45 people were killed and 22 severely injured in Boipatong on 17 June 1992 in an attack perpetrated by residents of the KwaMadala Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

hostel, who were primarily supporters of the IFP. The commission finds that KwaMadala residents, together with the police, planned and carried out an attack on the community of Boipatong and the surrounding informal squatter settlement, Slovo Park, on 17 June 1992. The commission finds that the police colluded with the attackers and dropped them off at Slovo Park. The commission finds that white men with blackened faces participated in the attack. The commission finds further that, despite the presence of armoured vehicles in the township, the police failed to intervene and stop the attackers, despite calls by the residents of Boipatong and Slovo Park to do so. The commission finds that the police were responsible for destroying crucial evidence in that they erased the tapes of transactions in the control room of the ISU ďż˝ The commission finds the KwaMadala residents together with the SAP responsible for the massacre, which resulted in the deaths of 45 people and the injury of 22 others. The commission finds the commissioner of police, the minister of law and order, and the IFP responsible for the commission of gross violations of human rights. The TRC also uses, among other things, the inadvertent erasure of the ISU tapes and destruction of eight bullet shells to buttress a further finding that: The police, in their approach to the prevention and investigation of political violence, were biased in favour of the IFP and their failure properly to investigate such violence led to large numbers of gross violations of human rights, and strengthened the prevailing culture of impunity. The SAP was thus accountable for the gross violations of human rights that resulted from their actions. The TRC fails to explain how it reconciles its view that police investigations were biased in favour of the IFP with the fact that 17 residents of a hostel that primarily housed supporters of the IFP were successfully prosecuted for murder. Nor does the TRC explain its rejection of the conclusions reached by both Dr Waddington and Judge Smit: viz, that the police had not been involved in the killings. It also fails to explain its reasons for discounting Judge Smit's finding that the erasure of the ISU tapes and destruction of the eight shells had been the result of incompetence rather than anything more sinister. In its strictures against the police for inadequate investigation of the Boipatong massacre, moreover, it makes no mention of the ANC's apparent instruction to residents not to co-operate with the police-and the likelihood that this would have increased the difficulty of mounting a proper investigation. The TRC cites as 'evidence' of police involvement in the massacre the testimony of various victims and other residents of the area, most of whom remain unnamed. It does not, however, describe their evidence in any depth. Nor does it explain how such evidence was tested or substantiated. It gives no reasons why the untested allegations put before it should have prevailed over the conclusions of the trial court. Those conclusions, furthermore, had been based on the fact that three accomplices and some 120 residents of Boipatong had all testified that the police had not played any part in the attack. Moreover, the witnesses who had alleged

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the opposite had been shown, under cross-examination, to be dishonest and unreliable. Whether the commission had any substantial new evidence before it to justify its findings is also unlikely. According to Mr Jan-Ake Kjellberg, a Swedish policeman serving with the TRC, the commission conducted no real investigation of the massacre. It found no new witnesses, and elicited no novel or compelling testimony to cast fresh light on the killings. If anything, the TRC seems to have lifted its evidence, virtually verbatim, from a report by the Human Rights Commission, or HRC (which in turn had relied on a monitoring organisation called Peace Action). This HRC report was compiled within a few weeks of the massacre at most and before the allegations against the police had been put to any test. This Peace Action/HRC 'evidence' has effectively been recycled as a finding of the TRC. The commission's obligation, when confronted with different versions of events, was a very different one. It was not to give an official sanction to monitors' reports but to decide which version of disputed facts was 'the more probable, reasonable, or likely, after taking all the available evidence into account'. This-'the standard criterion used in civil litigation'-was, it stated, the basis on which it came to its conclusions regarding culpability. In the context of Boipatong, however, there is no indication that the TRC made any attempt to weigh which version of events was 'the more probably, reasonable, or likely'. On the contrary, it seems simply to have spurned the ruling of Judge Smit, as well as the earlier finding by Dr Waddington. The commission was specifically enjoined, moreover, to probe the motives and perspectives of all perpetrators of gross violations. Yet it ignored a seeming pattern of earlier attacks on IFP supporters in the area as well as the fact that the KwaMadala Hostel had become a refuge for Inkatha supporters driven from their hostels or township homes by ANC-supporting 'comrades' and SDUs. It also ignored attacks on IFP supporters that, it seems, had immediately preceded the massacre. These attacks, as described by two journalists, Mr Rian Malan and Mr Denis Beckett, had begun some four days prior to the massacre: The first person to die was a woman named Nomvula, whose sin was a romantic involvement with a Zulu hostel dweller. A crowd cornered her on Nkgomo Street and necklaced her-burnt her alive. When police tried to intervene they were attacked with stones. Thirty minutes later, a mob torched the home of David Mbele, a former schoolteacher and Inkatha member. A fire engine arrived, only to be driven off by gunshots and stones. Mbele ran for his life, but the mob caught and killed him. The charred body of a third Inkatha member, Mr D L Khumalo, was found near Boipatong cemetery the following afternoon. The commission ignored not only this account-which would seem to have merited further investigation-but also what was said by Judge Smit on the question of prior provocation. Having rejected police culpability in the massacre and found 17 of the accused guilty on various counts of murder, Judge Smit was obliged to weigh Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances in order to determine an appropriate sentence. Having done so, he concluded that 'the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravation'. Describing these factors, Judge Smit stated that the houses of IFP supporters and their families had been burnt down, while they themselves had been 'murdered and mutilated and driven from their communities'. Since 1990, the KwaMadala Hostel had become the only place of refuge for the IFP members thus forced to flee their homes. (Judge Smit found the death penalty an inappropriate punishment and imposed long prison sentences on the accused instead.) The Shell House shootings in March 1994 On 28th March 1994 thousands of Zulu loyalists armed with traditional weapons marched through Johannesburg in solidarity with a call by the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, for a renewal of his sovereignty over KwaZulu and Natal. Shooting broke out when the marchers were assembled at the Library Gardens, and ten people were killed-eight of whom were Zulu demonstrators. In addition, eight Zulu marchers were shot dead by ANC security guards from the roof of the organisation's national headquarters, Shell House. Police obtained a warrant to enter Shell House, but were denied entry to the building following the intervention of Mr Nelson Mandela, then president of the ANC. Mr Mandela told a press conference some days later that 'he had refused the police permission to enter Shell House to gather evidence on the killing of the eight Zulus'. Only after the police had demonstrated their impartiality by raiding all the hostels in the Johannesburg area, he continued, could they also raid Shell House. The ANC promised, however, to co-operate in the police investigation and to hand over to the police all relevant firearms. It was only in June 1995, however, that Mr Mandela first disclosed that he, personally, had instructed the ANC's security guards to protect Shell House from any attack, and to use lethal force as well if this were necessary. It was only in July 1996, moreover-more than two years after the event-that the minister for safety and security, Mr Sydney Mufamadi, told Parliament that the last batch of weapons from Shell House had been handed to the police that month. (It nevertheless remained unclear whether relevant weapons were still outstandingfor in December 1996 Mr Mufumadi allegedly told the newspaper Rapport that 99 firearms had yet to be delivered to the police.) A judicial inquest into the shootings was initiated in 1997. Mr Justice Robert Nugent and two assessors, Professor R C Whiting and Mr J S Baloyi, handed down their findings in December that year. Judge Nugent said that his task had been complicated 'by the failure of the authorities to conduct a thorough and prompt investigation into the killings soon after their occurrence, when the trail of evidence was still intact'. He thus relied substantially on relevant video footage for his assessment of events. Judge Nugent dismissed the IFP's contentions that the march had been organised by Zulu loyalists and indunas without party political connections. He found it had been organised by the IFP itself and in the party's name. Moreover, when Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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permission for the protest had been sought from the relevant authorities, it was 'the IFP that provided an indemnity for any damage which was caused'. Judge Nugent then turned to the ANC's contentions that IFP leaders and rogue police officers had conspired to attack Shell House, that the marchers had been the first to open fire, and that the guards had 'fired back in defence of their lives, their headquarters, and the ANC leaders who were there on the day'. Judge Nugent rejected the evidence proffered by the ANC, finding (among other things) that 'it was fabricated after the event so as to bolster the explanations that had been put forward for the shooting which had occurred at Shell House'. Judge Nugent's concluding words regarding the Shell House shootings were as follows: Prima facie the evidence does not show that Shell House and its occupants were about to come under attack nor could it reasonably have been believed at the time that it was about to come under attack. Prima facie there was no justification for shooting at the crowd at all. Moreover, the barrage of fire was in any event grossly excessive. We do not accept that any warning was given ďż˝ It is clear, too, that when the shooting started the crowd immediately disintegrated and fled. To have continued firing at them went far beyond what would be permitted in legitimate defence. The TRC's description of the Shell House shootings is as follows: On 28 March 1994, approximately 50 people were killed and more than 300 injured during violence associated with a march through Johannesburg in support of the Zulu king. The violence occurred after Transvaal indunas (traditional leaders) called on Zulus in the PWV region to stay away from work and gather at the Library Gardens in central Johannesburg to demonstrate their support for the Zulu sovereign, King Goodwill Zwelithini. After the events of 28 March, the IFP leadership was at pains to emphasise that the march was an independent initiative of the 'Zulu people', rather than a political gathering organised by the IFP. However, senior IFP leadership was present at the gathering and involved in its organisation. From the start, information about the proposed gathering was confused. Many people believed that the marchers intended gathering at the offices of the Independent Electoral Commission in order to demonstrate their opposition to the elections. However, such a march did not take place. It subsequently emerged that senior IFP leadership had received permission from the Johannesburg magistrate to hold a gathering at the Library Gardens, but had not sought permission for a march of any kind. No organised march did in fact happen. Instead, armed groups of men launched a series of 'offensives' against ANC offices in the city centre. The first three such offensives focused on the ANC regional offices. When the marchers moved on the ANC headquarters at Shell House, ANC security guards responded with automatic gunfire, killing eight people. Several of the ANC security guards who opened fire at Shell House applied to the Commission for amnesty. These hearings were ongoing at the time of reporting.

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The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The TRC does not refer to the judicial inquest. It ignores the finding by Judge Nugent that claims of impending or actual attack on Shell House were untrue. It also omits to mention Judge Nugent's finding that there was no 'justification at all' for the shootings at Shell House. It leaves out the judge's conclusion that the 'barrage of fire was in any event grossly excessive'. It also makes no attempt to explain its view that the IFP marchers were engaged in an 'offensive' against Shell House-a contention that Judge Nugent had not only expressly rejected but had also found to have been 'fabricated after the event'. 2. A possible pattern in the TRC's approach The errors, omissions, and (on occasion) misrepresentations in the TRC's account of these five incidents are serious. Should they be dismissed, however, as random and relevatively insignificant inaccuracies? Or do they reflect a pattern in the TRC's approach? If a pattern can be discerned, moreover, what is its effect? In assessing these issues, each incident merits brief recall. In describing the Sebokeng shootings in March 1990, the TRC doubles (or even triples) the number of fatalities at the hands of the police. It virtually doubles the number of people injured; ignores the fact that the police officer in charge was found by Judge Goldstone not to have acted criminally; ignores the behaviour of the march organisers; and wrongly claims that none of the policemen in question was prosecuted. In describing further incidents in Sebokeng in September 1990, the TRC downplays (or omits) the context in which the IFP attack on the hostel occurred; states that the SADF killed nearly four times as many people as Judge Stafford had found; ignores the judge's explicit call for his finding to put an end to rumours of a higher death toll; and states that the IFP killed 23 people when the correct figure was 38. Since 38 minus 23 is 15, the implication is that the TRC failed to do its homework. Having ruled that the IFP had killed 23, it may have attributed 15 killings to the army on the basis of a simple, but incorrect, subtraction. In describing the attack on hostel residents in Tokoza, the TRC omits salient evidence of a well-planned and three (or four) pronged ambush. It misrepresents what Judge Goldstone had said about the police informer, Mr Ceba; ignores Judge Goldstone's further finding that the police had committed no offence; and effectively convicts the police of premeditated murder. At the same time, it exonerates the Phola Park SDU, and this despite the evidence of the seminal role that the SDU had played in the ambush and the killings. In the context of the Boipatong massacre, the TRC omits the attacks on IFP supporters immediately preceding the killings as well as the way in which IFP followers had earlier been assailed and driven from their homes-forcing them to find refuge in KwaMadala Hostel. It spurns the findings of a UK policing expert, Dr Waddington, and repudiates the ruling of Judge Smit in the trial of the Boipatong accused. It uses unexplained, untested, and unsubstantiated allegations to convict the police, in effect, of 45 killings.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In the context of Shell House, the TRC effectively puts the blame on the IFP for provoking the shootings through its 'offensives' on ANC offices in Johannesburg.It omits all reference to Judge Nugent's inquest; ignores his finding that the ANC had lied about an impending attack; and disregards his further conclusion that the shootings had been unjustified and 'grossly excessive'. The effect of the TRC's approach, in each of these five incidents, is to heap the blame for violence on the former police, the former army, and/or the IFP. At the same time, any possible culpability of the ANC is downplayed or ignored. 3. An unconvincing explanation The commission's own explanation of why its findings differed sometimes from those of earlier judicial rulings merits mention. The TRC confined its explication to judgements concerning police misconduct in 'riot' situations. Within this context, it stated, some of its findings had differed from earlier judicial rulings for two reasons. First, it was sometimes 'presented with new and compelling evidence (for example, corroborated statements by victims or witnesses)'. Secondly, it regarded 'the use of lethal force as justified only in extreme situations', whereas earlier judicial rulings had been based on an 'uncritical application' by the bench of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, which had given the police 'very wide powers to use lethal force'. Neither reason stands up to scrutiny. As regards the first, victim statements-even if 'new and compelling'-were neither tested under cross-examination nor sufficiently corroborated. They did not have the evidentiary stature to support the repudiation of earlier judicial rulings. The second reason is also flawed. The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 does not deal with the use of lethal force by the police in riot situations. The relevant statute, within the commission's mandate period, was rather the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1982 (which repealed and replaced the virtually identical provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956). The ISA states that the use of force by the police must always be 'moderated and proportionate to the circumstances'. It adds that lethal force may not be used unless there is an actual or imminent threat of death or injury to any person, or of destruction or serious damage to valuable property. Even then, the force used must be applied with 'all reasonable caution, without recklessness or negligence, and so as to produce no further injury to any person than is necessary' to protect life, limb, or valuable property. The TRC is thus misleading in implying that earlier legislation gave the police virtual carte blanche to use lethal force in wide-ranging circumstances. The effect of its misrepresentation is again to hold up the police, the former government, and the judiciary to unjustified opprobrium. Even if the TRC's two reasons were to be accepted at face value, they would still not sufficiently explain the discrepancies, in the five instances described above, between the commission's findings and earlier judicial rulings. For, in three of these incidents, the use by the police (or army) of lethal force in riot situations was not what was in issue at all. Moreover, there is little indication (for example,

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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as regards the Boipatong massacre) that the commission had any new evidence at its disposal. 4. Ignoring other rulings too The five incidents outlined above are not the only ones, moreover, in which the TRC has departed from earlier commission or judicial findings-and done so without explanation and in a manner likely to exacerbate the culpability of the IFP or the former security forces. Some of these further incidents may briefly be summarised as follows. The Ngoye incident in 1983 In October 1983 five people died on the campus of the University of Zululand at Ngoye (KwaZulu). A commission of inquiry, chaired by Professor A J Middleton, a law professor at the University of South Africa, found that a group of students had taunted and attacked Inkatha supporters visiting the campus for a commemoration ceremony. The visitors retaliated, a fierce battle ensued in the men's hostel, and three students were killed. Later that day students, in apparent revenge, killed an Inkatha supporter who had arrived late and had taken no part in the earlier conflict. The following day a fourth student died of renal failure, probably caused by a combination of exhaustion (from running) and obesity. (According to an ANC leader and lecturer at the university, the student had heard a rumour that Inkatha was about to attack the campus for a second time, and was trying to run away.) According to the TRC: Ø

four students were killed by a group of 500 Inkatha supporters;

Ø the four died when Inkatha 'attacked the students' residences, breaking down doors and pulling students out from where they were hiding', and then 'assaulting them and stabbing them with traditional weapons'; while Ø

an Inkatha supporter was also killed in this clash.

Elsewhere in its report, the TRC states that 'Inkatha aligned "warriors" � killed five � students' in this incident, and injured many more. The commission does not explain the reasons for its finding on the Ngoye incidentin which calculated killings are implicitly found proven and relevant contextualisation is disregarded. In its description of the incident, the TRC ignores the substantial body of tested evidence assembled by the Middleton commission, and lends credence to the version of events that has consistently been put forward by the ANC alliance. The ANC's response to the incident, in an article in Sechaba in February 1984, was to accuse Inkatha supporters of having acted like 'Nazi youth' in their allegedly vicious and premeditated assault on students. ANC leaders have continued to echo this theme, generally accusing Inkatha of having murdered five innocent students. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

In doing so, they have simply ignored the Middleton findings to the contrary. So too, now, has the TRC report. The KwaMakhutha massacre in 1987 On 21st January 1987 a house in KwaMakhutha, south of Durban, was attacked and 13 people were killed. According to press reports published at the time, a number of Inkatha leaders and supporters in the township had been attacked earlier in the month, and one had been killed. Those who died in the massacre on 21st January included the owner of the house, Mr Willie Ntuli-a member of Inkatha-and four of his children. In 1996 General Magnus Malan, a former minister of defence, was charged (together with 19 co-accused) on 13 counts of murder arising out of the KwaMakhutha massacre. The prosecution alleged that the intended target of the attack had been Mr Ntuli's son, Victor. It described Victor, a 21-year-old UDF activist, as the owner of the house and said he had been planning to hold a UDF meeting there on the night of the attack. (A contemporaneous report in The Weekly Mail said Victor had not been staying at home for 'several weeks-ever since the start of clashes between the UDF and Inkatha'.) The prosecution further alleged that the killings had been executed by five Inkatha supporters, who had been trained by the SADF in the Caprivi strip (in Namibia) in 1986. It argued that the five (all co-accused with Gen Malan) had been trained to act in 'hit squads' against the ANC and UDF, and had used their training in the KwaMakhutha operation-which had been planned and initiated by Military Intelligence (MI). The court acquitted all the accused. Mr Justice Jan Hugo found the three prosecution witnesses, all alleged accomplices in the massacre, unreliable. The state's main witness, the MI officer who had ostensibly planned the operation, was found to be a 'lying witness in certain respects and an unreliable one in others'. Overall, Judge Hugo found his testimony 'often contradictory, improbable, and absurd'. The court also indicated (without ruling to this effect) that the police Investigation Task Unit-responsible for marshalling the evidence against the accused-had coached witnesses, transferred portions of one witness statement to another by a computer 'cut and paste' method, and seemingly 'inveigled' a KwaMakhutha resident into giving evidence supporting the prosecution case. It had also, said Judge Hugo, sought to mislead the court on an important issue and 'probably deliberately' so. The court was never presented, it seems, with the possibility that the attack might in fact have been aimed at Inkatha (as earlier attacks in KwaMakhutha had apparently been). The trial judge said that, though the five trainees accused of the killings were entitled to acquittal, the attack must have been conducted by some of the other Caprivi trainees, acting under the command of MI. This was no more than an obiter dictum, a statement made in passing. It was not a judicial finding on the culpability of the Caprivi trainees or the SADF. At another point in his judgement, Judge Hugo made this quite explicit. He said he was merely assuming-in order to weigh the state's contention of a broader conspiracy (see below) on the strongest basis it could possibly have-that 'the KwaMakhutha murders were committed by elements of the Caprivi trainees under the command Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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or guidance of MI officers'. An assumption of culpability, made for the purpose of weighing potential guilt, is very different from a conclusion that guilt has been established. According to the TRC, the court in the Malan trial 'found' that Caprivi trainees had been responsible for the attack on 'the home of UDF leader Mr Bheki Ntuli'. The commission presents one statement made in passing (which is in fact contradicted by another) as if it were a considered judgement. Relevant information regarding both the contradiction and the obiter nature of these statements is not provided. No reference is made to the numerous weaknesses in the prosecution case to which the trial judge had drawn attention. The Caprivi training in 1986 Gen Malan and his co-accused were also charged with having conspired to murder supporters of the ANC and UDF in KwaZulu and Natal. The prosecution alleged that the Caprivi trainees had been given 'hit squad' instruction to equip them to attack the ANC alliance. As evidence of this the state cited, in particular, a number of secret military documents regarding the 'offensive' nature of the Caprivi training. The court found that the documents were capable of an innocent interpretation as well-and ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The TRC's finding regarding the Caprivi training is that 'the SADF conspired with Inkatha to provide it with a covert, offensive paramilitary unit (hit squad) to be deployed illegally' against the enemies of the former government and Inkatha. The commission gives few reasons for its finding, stating that full reasons are contained in a 'lengthy document' available from the state archives. (No such document has been lodged with the state archives, however, and comprehensive reasons for the commission's ruling are thus not publicly available.) In its report, the TRC explains its effective rejection of the trial court's conclusion on the basis that: Ø

the trial was 'based primarily on one incident' (the KwaMakhutha massacre);

Ø 'no evidence was led to support the general conspiracy charge' that was added at a late stage; Ø the prosecution called insufficient witnesses (the court finding, among other things, that three named individuals should have been called as well); Ø the 'cut off date of the conspiracy charge excluded some of the most incriminating documents'; and Ø

the accused were all 'poorly cross-examined'.

These reasons for rejecting the court's ruling merit assessment. During the trial, the conspiracy charges featured as much as the 13 counts of murder arising out of the KwaMakhutha massacre. Numerous documents allegedly revealing the offensive Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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purpose and nature of the training were put before Judge Hugo and were dealt with by him at length. Indeed, Judge Hugo's description of these documents, the points arising from cross-examination on their contents, and his reasons for concluding that they were ambiguous as to the 'offensive' nature of the Caprivi training, ran to some 55 pages of his judgement. In addition, the court made no finding that additional witnesses should have been called. According to the TRC, Judge Hugo was 'critical of the [prosecution's] failure to call a military expert and lead detailed evidence as to the nature of the training'. If the TRC is to be believed, Judge Hugo expressly 'found that Mr Luthuli, [another Caprivi trainee] Colonel van den Berg and Colonel Blaauw, [both SADF officers] should have been called'. Judge Hugo made no such assertions. Instead-in analysing the weaknesses in the prosecution's case-Judge Hugo pointed out that he could have drawn an inference against the state for its failure to call witnesses who were available to it and who should have been able to buttress its contentions. He did not do so, however. He found this unnecessary because the prosecution's case, for a variety of reasons, was in any event too flimsy to succeed. Moreover, the cut off date for the conspiracy charge in the trial was June 1989, while the TRC identified the 'time of the conspiracy' as April 1986. It is therefore difficult to understand how the cut off date usedin the trial could have excluded consideration of relevant testimony. That the accused in the trial were 'poorly cross-examined' seems unlikely, too. The judgement reveals that the accused were cross-examined at length. (In general, they proved more credible than the prosecution witnesses, it seems.) Once more, the TRC has effectively repudiated an earlier judicial finding. It has failed to make public its full reasons for doing so-while the reasons it has cited do not stand up to scrutiny. The assassination of Chief Maphumulo in 1992 Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo (a former president of the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa or Contralesa) was gunned down in the driveway of his home in February 1992. Thereafter, allegations that a 'hit squad' had assassinated him were widely publicised, and were buttressed by an apparent confession by one of his killers. A judicial inquest was conducted by Mr Justice N S Page. The 'hit squad' allegations were placed before Judge Page, and were found to be fabricated and untrue. Judge Page found that Chief Maphumulo had many enemies, any one of whom might have killed him. According to the TRC, Chief Maphumulo (together with other community and political leaders) was 'targeted for attack in a planned hit-squad operation'. The commission ignores Judge Page's earlier finding. It gives no evidence or reasoning for coming to a conclusion that, again, points to 'third-force' culpability. Train violence on the Reef in the early 1990s Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Murders on commuter trains on the Reef in the early 1990s stood out from many other political killings because of the terror they evoked. The attacks began in 1990 and persisted until 1993, striking panic into millions of commuters with no other choice of transport. So great was the fear engendered that people often jumped to their deaths from moving trains at the first sign of an impending attack. Providing full protection for the trains was beyond the resources of the police, while two lengthy inquiries by the Goldstone commission failed to identify the perpetrators of the attacks. In July 1992 the Goldstone commission published an interim report on train violence on the Reef. It reported that-in the course of about 100 attacks on trains and stations-138 people had been killed and 261 injured in a ten-month period from July 1991 to April 1992. Goldstone noted that most attacks took place during peak hours when trains were severely overcrowded and it was impossible to maintain proper access control or conduct searches for weapons. The police and other security services were too overstretched to exercise proper control over all trains at all times, and successful prosecutions had been extremely rare-in part because witnesses were reluctant to come forward. The commission found itself 'unable on the evidence before it to apportion blame' for the attacks. In May 1993 the Goldstone commission published a final report on train violence. Since its previous report, 107 more people had been killed and 126 injured in train violence in a two-week period from late August 1992 to mid September 1992, while further attacks had also been mounted in October and November 1992. Since December 1992, however, train violence had declined. The commission noted that increased security measures were being introduced on trains and at stations, with positive effects. It noted, too, that the police had deployed an additional 1 100 members, assisted by the SADF, to combat train violence-and that visible policing had been much improved as a result. However, 'it remained impossible for the police to be everywhere at the same time, especially during peak hours when attacks usually occurred'. The ANC alliance urged Goldstone to find the SAP at fault for its approach to train violence. The commission, however, found itself 'unable to support the contention that the police were not serious in their endeavour to put a stop to train violence'. The Goldstone commission also noted the testimony put to it in camera by a former hostel resident. This individual alleged that 'attacks on trains were planned in the Nancefield hostel', and provided details of two such attacks, allegedly mounted in revenge for earlier killings of IFP supporters. Goldstone found some of his evidence reliable, but also ruled that it was not 'acceptable in all respects'. Goldstone further noted, once again, the difficulties in countering, or marshalling evidence against, the perpetrators of train violence. The attacks were carried out at peak hours, when searching commuters was impossible. Attacks were swift and sudden and resulted in 'utter chaos', 'rendering the police, even if present on the scene, ineffective'. Witnesses were untraceable or unwilling to testify in court.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The community had little confidence in the police, while some organisations were alleged to have discouraged their followers from making statements to the police. Overall, the commission's findings on culpability for train violence were inconclusive. It reiterated that 'train violence could not be separated from the ongoing violence in the townships'. It noted that 'political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP for support at grass roots level had resulted in distrust, intolerance and enmity between their followers'. This, in turn, had 'led to violent confrontation' between hostel residents (regarded as IFP supporters) and township residents (seen as ANC supporters). There was, however, 'no evidence that either the ANC or the IFP propagated violence as a policy to achieve their ends'. Moreover, there was also 'no evidence that any organisation actively encouraged the perpetration of violence on trains'. Further, the commission was 'unable to establish whether train violence was aimed at achieving any political goal'. The Goldstone commission also recalled a statement it had made in its interim report that 'when a group of attackers was identified, they turned out to be hostel residents'. It emphasised that there was 'no foundation for any finding that hostel residents were mainly re-sponsible for the attacks on commuters'. On the contrary, it was 'clear that attacks emanated from hostels as well as from surrounding townships'. Goldstone also referred to allegations that a 'third force' was responsible for train violence. The commission had invited people with relevant information in this regard to come forward, but no one had done so. It therefore made no finding on the matter, one way or the other. According to the TRC, about 600 attacks on train commuters took place between 1990 and 1993, and resulted in 572 fatalities. The commission noted that 'supporters of all political parties' fell victim to train violence, and said this 'seemed to suggest that train volence might have been aimed predominantly at causing general terror, rather than at achieving a clear, direct, political objective'. The TRC went on, however, to assert that 'both local and regional IFP leadership were centrally involved in the authorisation and planning of train violence.' It based this conclusion on the in camera testimony earlier supplied to Goldstone, which had dealt in detail with two attacks alone. As further evidence it cited allegations by: Ø witnesses to an attack in which 62 people had been killed, who said the assailants had ran off 'towards' an IFP-supporting hostel and had spoken Zulu; Ø Mr Xolani Mnguni (who had been convicted of murdering a train commuter in 1991) and who said he had been acting on the orders of an IFP official; Ø an east Rand resident, Mr Paulos Nkondo, who said the assailants in a train attack he had survived had 'spoken Zulu'; and Ø a former askari who said 'hostel dwellers from the Nancefield Hostel were used at times in train attacks'. Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

The TRC also cited allegations that 'special forces' had orchestrated train violence; that policemen had thrown 'about five people' from trains in 1988; and that attacks had been planned and ordered from Vlakplaas, with train killers being paid 'R1 000 after successful operations'. None of these allegations would qualify as corroborated and admissible testimony in a civil (let alone a criminal) court. Of the 600 or more attacks cited in TRC statistics, they encompass ten specific incidents at most-five of which occurred in 1988, outside the relevant period. On this basis, the TRC finds as follows: The commission finds that train violence was initiated by groupings opposed to a democratic transition and the possibility of an ANC led government. The commission finds that, whilst train violence was not official IFP policy, a number of individuals and leaders within IFP structures were involved in train attacks. The commission finds that between 1990 and 1993, 572 people died in more than 600 incidents of train violence ďż˝ The commission finds that, in a number of incidents, IFP supporters collaborated with members of the SADF's special forces and members of Vlakplaas in planning train violence attacks ďż˝ The commission finds the IFP, SAP, and the SADF responsible for the killings that took place during train violence attacks and thereby the commission of gross human rights violations. In concluding that train violence was 'initiated by groupings opposed to a democratic transition', the commission ignores its own earlier acknowledgement that victims came from all political persuasions and that attacks seemed to have no 'clear' political objective. Despite the absence of any new and compelling evidence, the TRC repudiates Goldstone's conclusion that 'there was no evidence that any organisation was actively encouraging the perpetration of violence on trains'. It overlooks his specific recognition that train attackers came from surrounding townships as well as from the hostels. And it rejects his finding that train violence was a spillover from general township violence which stemmed, in turn, from a variety of factors-including the 'political rivalry' between the ANC and IFP and the 'distrust, intolerance, and enmity between their followers' that this had generated. These further examples could also, of course, be viewed as additional exceptions to the general accuracy of the TRC's report. The pattern that emerges from these incidents seems too clear, however, to be dismissed as insignificant, random, or coincidental. There are many other indications, too, as earlier described, of deep flaws that pervade the TRC's report. Far from being 'strong on truth', as the commission has claimed, it has produced a report which distorts as much as discloses the truth. The full story about gross human rights violations in South Africa, and the violence that intensified as political and constitutional reform gathered momentum, has yet to be written.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

Appendix 1. THE TRC'S MAIN FINDINGS The TRC's primary finding was that the former National Party (NP) government had committed the 'predominant portion of gross violations' in the mandate period and had done so in collusion with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The NP government, together with the IFP, had engaged in activities of a criminal nature, including the extra-judicial killing of its political opponents. The State Security Council established by the government had foreseen that calls to 'take out', 'wipe out', 'eradicate', or 'eliminate' activists would lead to their being killed, and was responsible for the violations that then resulted. Apartheid had been a crime against humanity, and the government-in the pursuit of power and privilege for a racial minority-had engaged in torture, the unjustified use of deadly force in controlling demonstrations, the deliberate mobilisation of one group against another, and the covert training, arming and funding of hit squads for deployment against its political opponents. These hit squads had included Inkatha supporters trained by the army in the Caprivi strip (in Namibia) in 1986. The IFP had attacked and killed supporters of the ANC alliance as well as others who threatened its interests. Further, it had established a hit squad in Esikhawini township (in northern KwaZulu) to eliminate ANC supporters in the area. Prior to the April 1994 general election, it had developed self-protection units numbering between 5 000 and 8 000 men to give itself the military capacity forcibly to prevent the holding of 'elections which did not accommodate the IFP's desires for self determination'. It had thereby conspired to bring about further deaths and other gross violations. The TRC found that 'little evidence existed of a centrally directed, coherent and formally constituted "third force"'. It held, however, that a 'network of security and ex-security force operatives, often acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, had fomented and engaged in violence, including both random and targeted killings'. These networks functioned 'with the active collusion of senior security force personnel', while the former government failed to take sufficient steps to put an end to their activities. The commission also held the African National Congress (ANC) and the former United Democratic Front (UDF) accountable for certain violations. In waging its armed struggle, the ANC's policy had been to avoid civilian deaths. However, some members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Umkhonto) had sometimes blurred the distinction between military and civilian targets-for example, in a bombing in 1983 in Church Street (Pretoria). There had also been instances, such as the Amanzimtoti bomb in 1985, when Umkhonto operatives, using their own discretion, had determined targets for attack 'outside official policy guidelines' and often 'in retaliation for raids by the former South African government into neighbouring countries'. Sometimes, Umkhonto operations (such as the Magoo's Bar bomb in Durban in 1986) had 'gone awry' for a variety of reasons, including poor intelligence and reconnaisance. The ANC's landmine campaign in rural areas had killed a number of

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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civilians, but the government had earlier blurred the distinction between hard and soft targets in the border areas by declaring them military zones. The ANC had also engaged in the extra-judicial killing of informers and askaris (Umkhonto cadres who had defected to the police). Further, it had created a climate in which people who were not 'direct members of the ANC or operating under its formal command' had believed that certain gross violations were legitimate because they fell 'within the broad parameters of a "people's war" as enunciated by the ANC'. The ANC was also accountable for the torture and, on occasion, the execution of suspected 'enemy agents and mutineers' in its camps in exile. It was not the ANC's policy to engage in torture, but the organisation had not done enough to put an end to such abuses. Though it was also not the ANC's policy to attack and kill political opponents, in the early 1990s killings and assaults on its political opponents had occurred. 'Within the context of widespread state-sponsored or directed violence and a climate of political intolerance', the self-defence units (SDUs) the ANC had established had also 'often taken the law into their own hands' and committed gross violations. The commission acknowledged that 'it was not the policy of the UDF to attack and kill political opponents'. Such killings had nevertheless occurred 'in the context of widespread state-sponsored or -directed violence and a climate of political intolerance'. The UDF had facilitated violations through its campaigns, public statements, and speeches, and had helped 'to create a climate' in which its supporters believed 'they were morally justified in taking unlawful actions against state structures and persons perceived as supporters of the state'. Just as the former state was accountable for its use of language, so too was the UDF responsible for 'its slogans and songs that encouraged or eulogised violent actions'. These factors had led to 'widespread excesses and gross violations', including necklace executions, attacks on black councillors and policemen, the burning and destruction of homes, and the violent enforcement of stayaways and boycotts. They had also promoted a 'climate of intolerance', resulting in conflict with Inkatha, the Azanian People's Organisation, and others. The UDF's leadership had failed to put a stop to these practices, even though they 'were frequently associated with official UDF campaigns'. In particular, it did not do enough to 'bring an end to the practice of necklacing'. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), while proclaiming that its objective was to conduct rural guerrilla warfare within the context of a protracted people's war, had primarily targeted civilians for killing. This targeting of civilians (including whites at random and white farmers in particular) was not only a gross violation of human rights but also a violation of international humanitarian law. The TRC rejected the PAC's explanation that these killings had been acts of war. It also held the PAC accountable for the extra-judicial killing of dissidents within its ranks and of supporters who were 'branded as informers or agents'. As regards the white right wing, the commission found that the Afrikaner Volksfront and structures operating under its broad umbrella had been responsible, Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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in 1993 and 1994, for gross violations against the ANC alliance, the NP, and the PAC. In seeking Afrikaner self-determination and the creation of a volkstaat, the Volksfront had incited violence and attempted to mobilise for an insurrection. Its members had committed random attacks on black people, colluded with elements in the security forces and/or the IFP in various ways, and established paramilitary groupings to threaten revolution and derail the democratic process.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Bibliography Barnard L D, Affidavit filed in the High Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division), in the matter Barnard and another v Tutu and another, December 1998 De Klerk F W, 'Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Mr F W de Klerk, leader of the National Party', August 1996 De Klerk F W, 'Second submission of the National Party to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission', May 1997 De Klerk F W, The Last Trek: A New Beginning, The Autobiography, MacMillan, London, 1998 Goldstone R J, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents at Sebokeng, Boipatong, Lekoa, Sharpeville and Evaton on 26 March 1990, June 1990 Goldstone R J, Third Interim Report, Pretoria, December 1992 Goldstone R J, Interim Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into Train Violence, Pretoria, July 1992 Goldstone R J, Report on the Inquiry Conducted by the Committee of Inquiry into the Violence at Tokoza, Pretoria, November 1992 Goldstone R J, Final Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into Train Violence, Pretoria, May 1993 Human Rights Commission, Area Repression Report, June 1992 Jeffery A J, Riot Policing in Perspective, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1991 Jeffery A J, 'Spotlight on Disinformation about Violence in South Africa', Spotlight No 8/92, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1992 Jeffery A, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1997 Kane-Berman J, 'Pik Botha's Debut', Financial Mail, 1 November 1974, pp445-446 Kane-Berman J, 'Alex is at it again', Frontiers of Freedom, South African Institute of Race Relations, No 12, Second Quarter 1997, p1 Kane-Berman J, South Africa's Silent Revolution, 2nd edition, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1991

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

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Kane-Berman J, Political Violence in South Africa, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1993 Laurence P, 'The full Nugent', Frontiers of Freedom, South African Institute of Race Relations, No 16, Second Quarter 1998, pp23ďż˝25 Laurence P, 'What the TRC won't tell you', Focus, July 1998, Helen Suzman Foundation, pp2-5 Laurence P, 'Anatomy of a risky gambit', Financial Mail, 6 November 1998, pp39-41 Malan, M A de M, 'Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by General M A de M Malan', May 1997 Malan R, 'A question of spin', Frontiers of Freedom, South African Institute of Race Relations, No 20, Second Quarter 1999, pp26-35 Mandela R N, 'Opening address by President Nelson Mandela in the Special Debate on the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Parliament', Cape Town, February 1999 Marnewick C G, 'Memorandum submitted on behalf of the South African Police before the Goldstone commission sitting at Durban during the week 30 November 1992 to 4 December 1992', December 1992 South African Institute of Race Relations, A PrĂŠcis of the Reports of the Commissions Appointed to Enquire into the Events Occurring on 21 March 1960 at Sharpeville and Langa, 1961 South African Police, 'Submission on behalf of the South African Police to the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation regarding the Inquiry into the Organisation and Training of Self Defence Units and the Lawfulness of Military Type Training Supplied by Political and Other Organisations', February 1994 Stadler H G, The Other Side of the Story: A true perspective, Sigma Press, Pretoria, 1997 State v Hlengwa and others, transcript of judgement by Mr Justice N S Page, Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg, April 1988 (the 'KwaShange massacre' judgement) State v Msane and 19 others, transcript of judgement by Mr Justice Jan Hugo, Durban and Coast Local Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban, October 1996 (the 'Malan' judgement) State v Van den Heever and others, transcript of judgement by Mr Justice Andrew Wilson, Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg, April 1992 (the 'Trust Feed massacre' judgement)

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Truth about the Truth Commission, by Anthea Jeffery

State v Zulu and others, transcript of judgement by Mr Justice J M C Smit, Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, Pretoria, March 1994 (the 'Boipatong massacre' judgement) Tingle R, 'What Role for the Churches?' in Johnson R W and Welsh D, Ironic Victory: Liberalism in Post-Liberation South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1998, pp199-223 Transcript of amnesty application by Mr Brian Victor Mitchell, Pietermaritzburg, 16 October 1996 Transcript of amnesty decision: Brian Victor Mitchell, Application No 2586/96, December 1996 Transcript of judgement by Mr Justice E H Stafford regarding the inquest into the deaths at Sebokeng on 3 September 1990, Vereeniging, 22 March 1991 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, October 1998 Van der Merwe J V, 'Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by General J V van der Merwe', October 1996 Waddington P A J, 'Report of the Inquiry into the Police Response to, and Investigation of, Events in Boipatong on 17 June 1992', 20 July 1992.

Source: Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue: www.nelsonmandela.org

The Gonzaga Bulletin > Opinion

Letter from the President McCulloh talks Tutu By Dr. Thayne M. McCulloh University President Published: Thursday, April 19, 2012 Updated: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 23:04 To Our Graduating Seniors, Gonzaga Students, and University Colleagues: A major social justice issue during the 1980’s and 1990’s involved the ending of racist policies instituted by the minority government of South Africa in the years following World War II. “Apartheid,” a legislated system of racial segregation, denied literally millions of black South Africans their civil rights, including the right to vote and receive equal access to social services. Millions of South Africans were stripped of their citizenship and forced by a series of resettlement acts to move into governmentidentified “homelands” — areas defined largely by race and/or ethnicity. Those resisting governmentimposed apartheid policies were subjected to police brutality, imprisoned, and many — including many college students — were killed. It was out of this violent social context that the voices of religious leaders, such as South African Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley cried out to the world: “Will you help us?” While many heard but remained silent, some did lift their voices in support of the marginalized and suffering peoples of South Africa. In the midst of this horrific era, the Norwegian Nobel Committee in 1984 elected to award the Peace Prize to (then-Bishop) Tutu “as a unifying leader figure in the campaign to resolve the problem of apartheid in South Africa.” During that period, and in the long and distinguished tradition of our University, Gonzaga faculty, staff and trustees, together with a generation of students, worked to bring awareness of apartheid — and a moral imperative to do something about it — to the forefront of this community. Some 25 years later, we are privileged to have the rare opportunity to recognize a unique convergence of past, present and future at our upcoming Commencement ceremonies. Not only is this an opportunity to honor the determination and persistence of Desmond Tutu — arguably one of the most recognizable representatives of non-violent human rights activism on the planet — but it too is a chance to honor all those who speak out for justice when others remain silent. Ultimately, and most importantly, it is an opportunity to honor our graduates, who we recognize at the moment they transition from students firmly committed to the service of faith and the promotion of justice, to alumni who will go forth to serve others and provide leadership to our world. It is in recognition of this University’s past involvement in the anti-apartheid movement, and the dedication of our current students to the welfare of others, that Archbishop Emeritus Tutu has accepted our invitation. Desmond Tutu was honored with the Nobel Peace Prize not just for the essential work he did in the service of peace and justice but specifically “as a gesture of support ... to all individuals and groups ... who, with their concern for human dignity, fraternity and democracy, incite the admiration of the

world.” On the occasion of the University’s 125th Anniversary, in which we have a unique opportunity to connect with the noblest moments of our past, we are privileged to honor a Christian leader and social rights activist whose faith-based lifelong dedication to the cause of justice so clearly resonates with our efforts as a university. Desmond Tutu’s life has been dedicated to advancing the cause of peace through reconciliation, and justice through Jesus’ own instruction: “ ... love one another. As I have loved you, so you also should love one another” (John 13:34). His determination and courage during a period of hate and injustice had a transformational impact on a nation, on humanity and on our university community — and it is this that we will together celebrate as we welcome Archbishop Emeritus Tutu to Gonzaga University on Commencement Weekend. Thayne M. McCulloh, D. Phil University President