EDF yearbook 2019

Estonian Defence Forces

Yearbook 2019

Estonian Defence Forces

CONTENTS 4. TO THE READER Major General Martin Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces 6. RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2019 Military Intelligence Centre 16. TWENTY YEARS OF ESTONIAN AIRSPACE CONTROL Lieutenant Alari Tihkan 20. THE ESTONIAN NAVY: SEEING BEYOND THE HORIZON Commodore Jüri Saska 24. SNAP EXERCISE OKAS 2019 Lieutenant Colonel Indrek Lilleorg 28. OKAS 2019: WHAT DID WE LEARN AND HOW TO PROCEED Lieutenant Colonel Mart Sirel 32. WE ARE ALLIES Colonel Paul Clayton 36. TRACTABLE 19 – WHAT DID IT MEAN TO US Colonel Toomas Susi 40. UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES ON OPERATION BARKHANE IN MALI Captain Taavi Karotamm 44. SPECIAL FORCES TRAINS RESERVISTS Lieutenant Colonel Margus Kuul 48. INTEGRATING FORCES Colonel Mart Vendla 52. ESTONIAN RESERVE OFFICERS’ INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Lieutenant Commander Ingrid Mühling

EDF Yearbook on web: https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi In english: https://issuu.com/kaitsevagi

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TO THE READER Major General Martin Herem Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces

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his volume, the 2019 Yearbook of the Estonian Defence Forces, gives a brief overview of the development of the Estonian Defence Forces over the past year, a starting point for further potential advances. You will not find big surprises or sensations here. This book speaks little about military hardware or awe-inspiring combat capabilities.

Rather, it provides an overview of the current Estonian military mindset and the military culture that has been taking shape for 28 years. After all, with the exception of expert officers and our enthusiasm on every level, we started building the Estonian Defence Forces almost from scratch in 1991.

Today, I can say that we have become an experienced national defence force. This is discussed in articles about conscription, reservist training, learning recognition, and military education, of course. However, we cannot be content with all that has been achieved.

There is much to do and improve.

We are currently in the process of preparing the National Defence Development Plan, which will, in very specific numbers, set out our development arc up to 2030. It is a long period of time, but we must be as efficient and open as possible within the financial framework that society has allocated to us. Any adversaries we may have must understand that we are indeed, as the name of one of our exercises states, a ‘hedgehog’ in terms of our defensive capacity.

Our long process of becoming a national defence force has given us the experience and skills to share with our allies. The members of the Estonian Defence Forces tend to be praised by their allies when it comes to the training of reservists or active members of the Estonian Defence Forces.

We can attribute our good reputation to our responsible approach to military defence, not to any unique wisdom or success on Estonia’s part. Of course, the Estonian Defence Forces in their current state are not a phenomenon that emerged recently. This was the objective all along, since the establishment of the Estonian Defence Forces.

Over time, experience and enlightenment have developed, which, thanks to the recognition and support of society, has reached the level where it is today. Our citizen-based defence forces can be deployed to defend the country in a very short time. This is encouraging.

Meanwhile, our moderate self-confidence is support-

ed by the development of our military science. We no longer only learn from mistakes, but we are increasingly able to consider the circumstances and make the relevant decisions.

The steps taken to develop the infrastructure are also proof of balanced development. If we sometimes have doubts as to whether we are pouring our resources into overly extravagant engineering and construction projects, we have to remember the situation a decade ago – in the absence of infrastructure, some weapons systems collapsed as quickly as the other end could be repaired, taking vitality and morale with it.

So while it is a pity to pour money into concrete, in light of past mistakes, it makes sense to provide people and weapons systems with good living conditions. It is part of the will to defend and defence capacity. I am always happy to step over the threshold of a sauna in a new barracks and recall the dreadful conditions soldiers lived in 20 years ago.

Estonian Defence Forces are part of society and people support us in doing our job well.

We have also taken a number of real steps from the enthusiastic dream of ‘NATO interoperability’ or ‘Baltic cooperation’. We have common military command systems and an understanding of how to defend the entire region. Now we must hope there will be enough resources, will and time.

I have always stressed that the Estonian Defence Forces are part of society and that people support us in doing our job well. This is a source of both moral and material support.

When over 80 per cent of the Estonian people trust the Estonian Defence Forces, and businesses send their products to deployed soldiers and pay reservists full wages while they attend reservist training, I can only thank them for their support. On the other hand, it provides the strength to work harder and to justify the trust.

The yearbook is part of the report on the activities of the Estonian Defence Forces to the people of Estonia.

Bonne lecture!

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RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2019 Military Intelligence Centre

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n international relations, the security policy of Russia continued its revisionist approach, emphasizing the concept of a multipolar world as formulated in 1996 by then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. In fact, this concept is an attempt to revise the available and functioning system accepted by the international community, with foreign policy efforts (and also military efforts, if necessary).

Through opposition to the West and the gradual dismantling of the international security architecture, Russia aims to increase its role as the ‘third Rome’ in world politics. The Kremlin views this approach as a redressing of ‘historical justice’ by eliminating the ‘unfair’ situation that followed the collapse of the USSR, where a weakened Russia perceived itself as having no say in shaping the new security environment.

Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) concluded in 1987.

On the other hand, Russia has succeeded in regaining membership of the Council of Europe, the negotiations in the so-called Normandy Format to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine have continued after several years of inactivity, and President Vladimir Putin met bilaterally with the leaders of several European countries, which refers both to progress in developing bilateral relations and, more indirectly, to the success of disruption of EU unity.

Russia is back in Africa. First and foremost, Russia is interested in African mineral resources it lacks itself or which it needs due to geopolitical considerations (oil and natural gas). Export of arms (Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, Mi-type helicopters, the missile defence systems Pantsir-C1, Kornet-E, Tor-M2E, main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and firearms) continues to play an important role.

Already at the beginning of 2019, Rosoboronexport announced that Russian companies involved in military and technical cooperation had several major ongoing projects. From an arms export point of view, 2019 was called “the year of Africa”. It is noteworthy that the Kremlin’s focus of attention is slowly shifting

THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA On one hand, confrontation with the West, especially the US, has continued. Compared to previous years, relations with the US can be characterized as the status quo as there have been no fundamental changes. As an accent, the US has however imposed sanctions against Russia, and withdrew from the Intermediate-Range 7

from North Africa to Sub-Saharan countries in order to restore the positions established during the Soviet era in this part of the continent as well.

On the propaganda front, the so-called ‘turn to the east’ was also characterized by the 5th Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok between 2 and 5 September. The EEF was presented to the world as a symbol of national policy aimed at integrating Russia with the fastest growing markets in a situation where the US and Chinese economic axis is no longer extant and a multipolar world is emerging on the international scene.

Despite bold slogans, the Kremlin’s main objective was to attract investments from the economic forum to the least developed region of Russia – the Russian Far East, where the economy has remained stagnant.

At the same time, attempts were made to demonstrate to the West that the sanctions imposed by it are not bearing the desired fruit and Russia is continuing the pursuit of an independent policy based solely on its own interests. The same tendency is illustrated by the increasing number of joint exercises with the armed forces of China.

The activities of Russia in the Arctic are clearly the most vigorous in comparison with the other countries in the region (the so-called “Arctic Five”). Russia has expressed its ambition to extend its exclusive economic zone beyond the 200 nautical miles provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To this end, Russia must provide the UN Special Commission with geological evidence that its continental shift extends beyond the scope of the Convention and then submit a relevant request.

The option to force its will lies in the fact that international law, with the exception of UNCLOS, does not have any treaty dealing with the legal framework for the Arctic. Therefore, Russia primarily needs political support in the UN.

ensures the security of assets peculated from Russia and, on the other hand, “lubricates” power mechanisms when needed.

Russia can be seen as an example of a declining country where different parameters of power decay at different rates. The demographic situation is the most difficult, the economy is stagnating and the opportunities to reinvigorate it by administrative methods are likely running out. The authorities are continuing their efforts to control the dissemination of information, including the internet. Civil liberties, including freedom to organise politically, freedom of speech, freedom to run for political office and freedom to elect continue to be restricted even further.

Although Putin’s regime is rational, informed and equipped with everything needed, the President’s popularity is in clear decline and his base is also shrinking.

Thus, Putin may take more serious risks in foreign policy to stay in power.

As of this writing, Russian society and the power circles around Putin in particular were gripped by the question of what will happen after 2024 when Putin was expected to resign his office as the President under the current constitution. The appointment of an equal successor to Putin was increasingly unlikely, and the current President will likely rather assume a new position (be it formally prime minister, chairman of the federation council or something else) to continue as the state’s actual leader in the form of a grey cardinal.

DEFENCE SPENDING, ARMS PROCUREMENT According to Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu, the share of modern armament in Russian armed forces was 68.2 per cent by the end of 2019, thus achieving the 70 per cent milestone set in 2012 with the previous armament programme.

Although the exact meaning of ”modern” is questionable (equivalent to the Western technology or new platforms delivered during the armament programme), it is clear that the previous armament programme (2011–2020) managed to reverse the crumbling and underfunding of the armed forces, which lasted for more than 20 years.

At the same time, systemic deficiencies in the defence industry, such as overstretched structures, shortcomings in manufacturing capabilities and knowhow, corruption, etc., have not been addressed, requiring the defence industry to finance its debt every year instead of producing new technology in the required quantities.

The priority of the armament programmes is the maintenance and modernization of nuclear capacity –

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS According to Anders Åslund, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Centre, Putin’s system is based on clan capitalism, the essence of which is authoritarianism and unprotected property rights. This system relies on the “four circles of power”: 1. The President’s childhood friends from the Leningrad era (Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Oleg Deripaska); 2. The President’s friends from the KGB era, the so-called siloviki (Igor Sechin, Viktor Ivanov); 3. The President’s colleagues from Saint Petersburg city government (Dmitry Medvedev); 4. A global offshore system that, on the one hand, 9

the nuclear triad aims to achieve a 100 per cent share of modern armament by 2024 (currently it is the highest of all branches – 82 per cent).

However, they are also already looking into the distant future, 2030 and beyond, to focus on the development of unmanned weapons systems, the development of laser and hyper-light weapons, and the integration of weapon carrier platforms. Many of these weapon systems are already in the experimental phase.

suppress the enemy’s VHF and UHF radio and mobile communications, and for radio-electronic intelligence.

The system also has a function for integrating various EW equipment into a single system.

The Airborne Forces received 289 units of equipment: over 9,000 D-10 and Arbalet parachute systems, 203 units of armoured equipment, over 200 cars and other vehicles (ATVs, snowmobiles). The 76th Guards Air Assault Division received the third battalion set of amphibious BMD-4M IFVs and BTR-MDM APCs. The 124th Tank Battalion, which was formed in 2018, participated in training throughout the calendar year.

In the course of the exercises, non-floating equipment was moved over water obstacles by using pontoon bridge pieces as barges.

DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT BRANCHES Armament of the Ground Forces with new equipment and technology continued. Modernized main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, communication and electronic warfare systems, as well as indirect fire equipment were introduced in the armament. Deployment of service members to Syria continued (for example, from the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade in Leningrad Oblast) and lessons learned from Syrian experience were integrated into training.

Last year, all 12 rocket brigades of the Ground Forces were completely equipped with new and more powerful Iskander-M systems, which replaced the Tochka-U systems. The last unit to be rearmed was the 448th Rocket Brigade, 20th Guards Combined Arms Army.

During the year, the Western Military District received nearly 90 units of armoured equipment, including more than 40 main battle tanks T-72B3M, about 35 infantry fighting vehicles BMP-2M, 10 IFVs BMP-3, and one BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier.

As a result, the proportion of modern armament in the WMD has reached 62.9 per cent.

The automated command and control system (ASU) Akatsiya-M was introduced in the 20th and the 6th Combined Arms Army of the WMD. It was already experimentally used in the 1st Guards Tank Army before that. The system allows simultaneous use of all means of communication, including space, satellite, radio relay and wire communication.

Intelligence tools, including satellites and unmanned aircraft systems, have been integrated into the system to provide real-time access and analysis of data on the current situation. ASU testing revealed that electronics may shorten the battle command cycle to less than half. In addition, the 6th Army has been supplied with 10 command posts APE, located on a Kamaz 63501 truck and equipped with the GLONASS navigation system, audio-video equipment, open and secure communications and video conferencing equipment.

For the first time during the 20th Army exercise, a Palantin operational-tactical EW complex was used to

Last year, all 12 rocket brigades of the Ground Forces were completely equipped with new and more powerful Iskander-M systems, which replaced the Tochka-U systems.

In the Aerospace Forces, the long-range aircraft continued to patrol the world’s seas and oceans to demonstrate its presence and deterrence. As in previous years, strategic bombers were a tool in Russia’s military diplomacy, such as the transfer of Tu-160M strategic bombers to Air Force Base Waterkloof in South Africa, as well as the relocation of the S-400 missile system to Serbia during a joint air defence exercise. The most noteworthy exercises of the year with the Aerospace Forces were Okeanski Shchit, Tsentr, Grom and Shchit Sojuza.

An integrated missile defence system (anti-ballistic missiles, early warning radars and satellites, command and control chain) was further developed. The third Tundra satellite of the early warning system of missile defence was launched to the orbit from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Also, the construction of early-warning Voronezh radars of the missile defence took place in Olenogorsk and Vorkuta, which are scheduled to begin operations in 2022 and 2021, respectively. In addition, new early warning radars will be built in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ragozinka, Saint Petersburg region.

Progress was made on upgrading the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers into the Tu-95MSM and Tu160M (M1). The aircraft with updated avionics can be equipped with the cruise missile H-101. According to Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, serial production of the strate11

gic bomber Tu-160M2 was launched. The aircraft has new avionics, new engines (NK-32 engines were produced again after a 25-year break), and new armament.

By 2035, it is planned to manufacture 50 aircraft and the existing Tu160 and Tu160M (M1) will also be upgraded to version M2. During 2019, five modernized Tu95MS and Tu160M bombers were handed over to the Aerospace Forces.

In September, a modernized version of the IL-78M aerial refuelling tanker IL-78-2 (IL-78M2) made its maiden flight at the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex. The modernization extends the avionics, communications equipment and protective equipment of the aircraft to upgrade the available IL-78M flight resources. Two upgraded Il-76MD-M strategic airlifters were handed over during the year. Modernization of IL-76MD 41 aircraft to version IL-76MD-M is planned.

Over the year, the Military Transport Aviation Command received three series-produced IL-76M90A aircraft manufactured at the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex. The previously presented production plan for 36 IL-76M-90A until 2022 is likely to be revised as aircraft production has proven to be more expensive than initially planned.

As part of the national armament programme, the renewal of the fleet continued with existing versions of older generation fighters in the fighter aviation regiments being replaced with the new and/or modernized versions. During 2019, the assembly of the Su-35S fighter squadron of the Hotilovo Fighter Aviation Regiment in the WMD, and of the Shagoli Mixed Fighter Aviation Regiment in the Central Military District with Su-24M to Su-34 was terminated.

The 1489th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Leningrad Oblast was equipped with the S-400 missile system, which was also added to the 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment’s armament. In Kaliningrad, the 1545th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment deployed the first of two S-400 divisions. For the first time, the Air Defence Forces of the Eastern Military District received a S-300V4 missile system.

The Ministry of Defence received its S-350 first missile system set, which will become a training tool at the Zhukov Air and Space Defence Academy in Tver.

The 22nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment of the 11th Army Corps of the Baltic Fleet was re-armed with the Tor-M2 air defence system.

The company Kronstadt launched its serial production of the medium-range attack UAS Orion. In August, the first flight of the long-range attack UAS Ohhotnik was completed, and the Ohhotnik units will be established in the west-south strategic direction in 2024. The

medium-range UAS Orlan-30 was tested in Syria and during the exercise Tsentr. In addition, a UAS platoon is intended to be formed in the WMD, Shatalovo, equipped with medium-range UAS Forpost-R and later on also with long-range attack UAS Altius.

TRAINING EXERCISES The most important training event was the command and staff exercise Tsentr, which was held in the Central Military District with a large number of foreign service members from China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. A total of 12,950 participants (10,700 from Russia; up to 2,250 from abroad), 250 MBTs, 450 IFVs and APCs, 200 artilleries and artillery rocket systems were involved in the European part of Russia.

The most important training event was the command and staff exercise Tsentr, which was held in the Central Military District with a large number of foreign service members from China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

A total of 128,000 participants, 20,000 units of armament and equipment, 600 aircraft, and 15 ships were involved in the exercise. The most significant activities were the airborne assault of the 98th Guards Airborne Division regiment and the helicopter airborne assault of the entire contingent of the 31th Single Independent Assault Brigade at the Donguz training ground in the course of demonstration exercises. Tsentr was followed by the Strategic Missile Forces command and staff exercise Grom, which involved about 12,000 troops.

In addition, the cooperation exercise Shchit Sojuza of the joint force regiment of Russia and Belarus took place at the Mulino training area. Other important exercises organized on the territory of the WMD included the regiment-level exercise of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division in Strugi Krasnye, which involved 1,500 service members and 100 units of equipment, and the regiment-level exercise of the combined arms army in Luga, which involved 1,500 service members and 600 units of equipment, commanded by the army-level command brigade and supported by the aircraft from the 6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army.

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ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES DEPOLOYMENT AREAS

AFGHANISTAN While in 2017 and 2018 the Taliban said their main opponents were international forces in Afghanistan, Al-Fath did not formulate a specific target in its strategic operation plan for the 2019 combat season.

Nevertheless, the Taliban’s strategic goal remained the same: to achieve sole power as an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. The Taliban have maintained a high level of combat by aggressively focusing on occupying new territories in rural areas. As of January 2020, the Taliban controls nearly 50 per cent of Afghanistan territory. The strongholds of the government forces (ANDSF) have predominantly maintained in larger urban areas (Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.).

The peace talks between the US and the Taliban that began in 2018 in Doha, Qatar, continued in 2019. The main demand of the Taliban is the final withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan. The US, for its part, wants assurances from the Taliban that international jihadist groups cannot operate in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has so far been left out of the peace talks. Talks on possible peace can only begin at the Taliban’s request once the schedule for coalition forces to leave the country has been agreed on.

The branch of the Islamic State, Daish-K (Arabic: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah – Wilayah Khorasan), which has been active in Afghanistan since 2015, has lost a large part of its territory (Nangarhar) over the course of 2019.

This is largely due to active anti-Daish-K operations by coalition forces, the ANDSF, and the Taliban.

Military Intelligence Centre

Iraq

Afghanistan

Mali

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IRAQ

MALI

The year began with tough political challenges for the new government: Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who had been a compromise candidate, had difficulty in setting up a cabinet, and the last of the ministerial positions were only approved

by Parliament in late June.

The dismissal of the Commander of the Iraqi elite unit Counter Terrorism Service at the end of September triggered widespread demonstrations in central and southern Iraq. Demonstrators are calling for a replacement of the political system in place since 2003, the fight against corruption, the improvement of the economic situation and reforms, and access to vital services. Abdul-Mahdi took responsibility for the bloody suppression of the demonstrations and resigned in late November, but is still leading the Iraqi interim government.

In the first half of 2019, good progress was made in the fight against Daish and the number of deaths from terrorist attacks was the lowest in recent years.

At the end of 2019, the security situation drastically worsened, as the supporters of Kata’ib Hezbollah attacked the US Embassy in Baghdad.

The crisis deepened in the first week of 2020 as the US assassinated the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Unit (Quds Force), Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF / Hashd al-Shaabi), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, with a Reaper drone near Baghdad airport. The killings of Soleimani and al-Muhandis were followed by an Iranian “face-saving” missile strike against US bases on Iraqi territory.

Due to the significant deterioration in the security situation and threat level, both the NMI (NATO Mission Iraq) and the OIR (Operation Inherent Resolve, US anti-Daish mission) temporarily suspended their work in Iraq and most of the coalition troops were deployed to Kuwait.

The conflict, which broke out as the revolt of the Tuareg people in northern Mali in 2012, has taken on a much larger dimension in 2020. On the one hand, violence has increasingly spread across national borders to Burkina Faso and Niger. On the other hand, it is no longer a purely politically motivated conflict: the Sahel crisis is closely intertwined with political issues, conflicts between various ethnic communities and the ambitions of Islamist terrorist groups.

The 2015 peace agreement concluded between the government and the rebels is stalling, and the situation has worsened despite the activities of international security forces, in particular the activities of the Barkhane operation and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Skilfully exploiting Sahel’s endemic problems, local Al-Qaeda and Daish-related terrorist groups have expanded their area of operation in 2019 and demonstrated their ability to carry out increasingly sophisticated attacks.

As the situation worsens, the dissatisfaction of the population with the central government, the operation Barkhane, and other international security forces has increased.

Taking advantage of and promoting the anti-Western sentiment, Russia has intensified its cooperation with Mali and also concluded a military cooperation agreement with Mali in June 2019.

Africa’s foreign policy relevance to Russia has risen; in broader terms, however, Russian involvement in Mali remains at a relatively low level and no credible alternative to Western cooperation can be provided by the country. France, other Western partners and the Sahel countries have pledged to further strengthen cooperation in 2020: both the West and the Sahel countries understand that without international forces, the situation would be even worse.

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TWENTY YEARS OF ESTONIAN AIRSPACE CONTROL Lieutenant Alari Tihkan Chief of Training and Exercise Control and Reporting Centre Tallinn

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he new building of the Control and Reporting Centre was officially opened in Tallinn on 10 January 2020. The combined centre of the three Baltic States in Karmėlava, Lithuania, which administered the operations in the region so far, ceased operation at the end of 2019 and its duties were transferred to separate control units of the three countries, located in Tallinn, Lielvārde and Karmėlava.

The opening of the Control and Reporting Centre Tallinn (CRC Tallinn) is a remarkable milestone in the development of the Estonian Air Force and offers a good moment for a look back on the conduct of air operations in Estonia, especially over the past six years, when the regional air policing and defence capabilities have significantly increased.

The Air Surveillance Wing was founded in 1998 and the Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC), the predecessor of the current CRC, was established in 2000. Initially, only air surveillance was carried out, in a limited extent and with small crews. The Recognized Air Picture (RAP) was created on the basis of data received from civilian radars and one P-37 Soviet-era primary radar.

In 2001, 24-hour shifts was introduced and since then, airspace surveillance in Estonia has remained uninterrupted. Since 2003, several state-of-the-art primary radars have been added to the Estonian air surveillance system, which provide an excellent overview of what is happening both within and outside our national airspace. In 2009, the fighter control capability was added.

With the development of a new comprehensive NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS), it was decided in 2012 that the future direction in the Baltic region would be the closure of the combined Karmėlava Control and Reporting Centre and the establishment of three separate national centres.

In March 2014, only days after the Russian Federation’s occupation of Crimea, six F-15 type fighter jets and a KC-135 Stratotanker from the United States arrived in the Baltic region in order to complement the US air policing mission already under way in Lithuania. As they left, as many as four different detachments – two

from Šiauliai, one from Ämari, and one from Malbork in Poland – started their Baltic Air Policing rotation on May 1. This was NATO’s tangible and prompt response to the new situation to strengthen the defence of our region’s airspace.

Due to the sharp increase of military air traffic, an additional control unit was needed, as the combined centre was no longer able to manage the entire airspace of the Baltic region.

Due to the sharp increase of military air traffic, an additional control unit was needed, as the combined centre was no longer able to manage the entire airspace of the Baltic region. As a result, the former Estonian Control and Reporting Post in Ämari (CRP Ämari) also began controlling the air policing missions on a regular basis. Since 2014, the role of today’s CRC as a control unit for fighter jets and other military aircraft in the Baltics has been increasing year by year, and it has become an important element in NATO’s Air Policing and the organization of regional air-to-air training missions.

A DIFFERENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT In summer 2016, the largest air-to-air exercise ever conducted in Estonia – Aircraft Training Deployment – was carried out to practice air combat training. Manoeuvres of sixteen US F-15 fighter jets were controlled from CRP Ämari. Every year, the Estonian operations personnel also participates in the Ramstein Alloy live exercise series, where NATO allies, together with partners from Finland and Sweden, practice air policing missions of different nature over the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea region.

In addition to exercises in a real-world environment, air operations control is also practised in a simulated environment, which makes it possible to play through scenarios that would be too dangerous or im17

possible to create during peacetime. Examples of such exercises include the Uedem Awakening exercise series led by the Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem (CAOC Uedem) and the combined exercise Baltic Warrior, played by the three Baltic States.

In the simulated environment, medium-range surface based air defence is also practised, which in the context of integrated air defence is an organic duty of a CRC. In the last years, the Estonian operators have also participated in the largest annual air defence exercise involving NATO member states – Tobruq Legacy. In the future, it is planned to take part in the integrated air and missile defence exercise Astral Knight, led by the US, which will focus on defending the region against ballistic missiles.

The above-mentioned developments and activities have significantly increased the operational capability of CRC Tallinn. This is evidenced by international courses organized by the CRC, with regular participation of Latvian and Lithuanian airmen. For more than a decade, the Estonian controllers and surveillance specialists have participated in the air policing mission in Iceland, supporting their US counterparts.

THE FUTURE OF BALTIC COOPERATION The preparations for CRC Tallinn lasted for years: new cooperation agreements were made, numerous new employees were recruited, and thousands of hours of training were provided. As a result, Estonia now has a state-of-the-art air operations centre, which is capable of planning and conducting air policing and air defence operations that can be integrated with allied land, naval, and air force elements through modern data links.

From the beginning of this year, the working routine in the BALTNET (Baltic Air Surveillance Network) framework changed. As of 2020, all three Baltic States create the RAP in their respective areas of responsibility, and the responsibility for controlling air policing missions rotates between the three centres according to a pre-agreed schedule. The existence of three equivalent centres instead of the former one provides greater flexibility and sustainability in the region’s air operations management capability. In the event of malfunctions in the systems of one centre, the other centres are able to continue the control of the airspace at very short notice.

Thanks to the new Control and Reporting Centre in Tallinn, Estonia can perform integrated layered air defence, which in addition to the air-to-air operations includes electronic warfare, medium-range air defence and air-to-land operations. The centre’s biggest goal in near future is to pass NATO’s tactical evaluation (TACEVAL) to determine its compliance with NATO standards.

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THE ESTONIAN NAVY: SEEING BEYOND THE HORIZON Commodore JĂźri Saska Commander of the Estonian Navy

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have told my fellow sailors that while unfortunately we are not the best navy in the world; we are certainly the best navy in Estonia. We feel the responsibility on our shoulders and do our utmost to maximize our resources. I can assure you that the future of the naval branch of the Estonian Defence Forces is brighter than ever.

Mobile naval surveillance radars, once incorporated into our existing surveillance network, will ensure maritime surveillance. We will introduce force protection

boats to our service, making our training more versatile and improving our responsiveness. We are also developing NATO-compliant over-the-horizon communication capabilities.

The mine countermeasures capability upgrade programme to the Sandown-class has almost ended, making the ship class more efficient and reliable. The Navy will resume its duties within Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 in the Baltic Sea, thus unanimously ensuring common security.

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The Estonian Navy is highly valued in NATO for its mine countermeasures competence, as demonstrated by trust in our sailors. Estonia assumed the command function of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 in the recent past and we are working hard to be able to continue to live up to our ambitions in the near future.

regional level by training senior and junior staff officers, mine clearance divers, and communications specialists jointly with the other Baltic navies. Positive experience has paved the way for a new level of naval cooperation.

MARITIME SURVEILLANCE IN ESTONIA AND THE OTHER BALTIC STATES

The Estonian Navy is highly valued in NATO for its mine countermeasures competence, as demonstrated by trust in our sailors.

In order to defend the country in all domains – land, air and sea – one of the primary tasks for the Navy is to provide situational awareness within Estonian maritime areas. When I took command of the Navy three years ago, I emphasized in my first speech to my colleagues that we need to focus on and further develop maritime surveillance capabilities with the ambition of compiling a Recognized Maritime Picture. In doing so, it was necessary to make wise decisions quickly.

As human resources are limited, electronics play a significant role in maritime surveillance, providing us the necessary early warning. However, it is even more important to be physically at sea and above it to assure the protection of the interests of the stateas the need arises.

We have established a meaningful and effective bilateral cooperation with the Police and Border Guard Board in terms of national maritime surveillance activities. In addition, the M-28 Skytruck aircraft that, among other tasks, will be utilized for maritime surveillance, have been introduced into service within the Estonian Air Force.

Estonia’s Area of Interest is not limited to the maritime areas of the Baltic States. As a NATO member, we can also count on the navies of Allied and Partner nations. Within the Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) project Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom all contribute to the relevant activities. As part of this successful enterprise, participating nations exchange maritime surveillance information to enhance maritime safety, environmental and economic cooperation, and maritime security.

We have held numerous cooperation meetings with the naval commanders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in order to bring together and explore ideas for promoting independent defence capacity of the Baltic region. It was unanimously agreed that for the implementation 10 years from now, we need to start shaping the plan today. By agreement, we call it the vision of the Baltic navies, or 3B Naval Vision 2030+, which is primarily a view towards the future.

We see that in the near future, it is expedient to combine the capability development efforts of the three Baltic States by creating a joint prudent plan in view of the naval defence needs.

We see that in the near future, it is expedient to combine the capability development efforts of the three Baltic States by creating a joint prudent plan in view of the naval defence needs. We have explored options to enhance surface warfare capabilities and build sensors and weapon systems, taking into account maintenance and future innovation cycles.

The benefits would accrue in all of the above aspects, even with joint procurement. By working together, we can use our limited resources more effectively and efficiently and make Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania better protected than ever before.

VISION OF BALTIC BROTHERS OR 3B NAVAL VISION Experience shows that coordinated training provides an advantage in joint exercises and operations in terms of operational readiness and task execution. We are already working and cooperating on a 23

SNAP EXERCISE OKAS 2019 Lieutenant Colonel Indrek Lilleorg Commander of the Combat Service Support Battalion, 1st Infantry Brigade

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he purpose of a snap exercise is to mimic the formation of units with short notice in order to achieve combat readiness in case of any rapid escalation of crisis events.

During the period preceding Okas 2019, the battalion’s headquarters and the leadership of companies were engaged in drafting plans, practising staging elements, and eliminating operational bottlenecks. However, as always, the plans were not ideal before the additional reservist training.

During regular service, the task of the Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) is to support the 1st Infantry Brigade’s eleven units. It is mainly

conducted by the Logistics and Medical Company consisting of civilian employees and active service members.

The wartime structure of the CSSB, consisting of reservists, differs significantly from that of peacetime. The most important task of the Training Company is drilling conscripts and thereby strengthening the reserve force with almost no involvement from the brigade in peacetime support functions.

The difference of wartime support functions lies in the infrastructure and the established processes.

However, the scheduled reservist training sessions do not indicate the achievement of the battalion’s

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readiness in every situation. The invitations are sent out at least 120 days in advance, with even more time for the participants to plan activities, prepare equipment, and get used to the situation.

When the staging order is given unexpectedly and there is no time for preparation, human-generated variables come into play that are almost impossible to mimic, meaning that every little detail (incoherence, misunderstanding, assumptions, hopes, fear of failure, activity, speed of action, prior agreements, etc.) may activate a reaction chain, which significantly changes the achievement of readiness.

The Okas SNAPEX tested the operation of the mobilization system, which is why the order to participate comes like ‘lightning from the sky’. For active service members, this ‘lightning’ provides an excellent opportunity to test the system and other various plans in reality. But how does the battalion function when the ‘actual’ moment is here?

People involved in the mobilization of the CSSB (as well as the commanders of many other units of the EDF) received an early warning one day before late night that staging was about to begin. An order with the names of possible units increased readiness and blood pressure.

The staging points were completed, those responsible for staging were called in, information was provided to the key staff, the reservist hotline was up and operational, and then the waiting began. It was believed that the CSS Battalion would ‘win’, meaning that the leadership of the EDF and the Estonian government would provide this battalion with an opportunity to test themselves and welcome back its reservists.

Sure enough, before noon the next day, the Okas SNAPEX was announced – the reservists of the 61st CSSB were immediately ordered to participate in the additional reservist training exercise.

The staging of hundreds of reservists and providing

them with additional training is a rather tough nut to crack, and it was also accompanied by the specifics of the CSSB – a huge amount of various equipment, a variety of specialities, tasking for five different companies, etc.

The staging of hundreds of reservists and providing them with additional training is a rather tough nut to crack.

According to the battalion’s commander and those who assessed the additional reservist training, the CSSB did quite well. It was not perfect, but the shortcomings and issues that needed to be fixed were identified.

It was impressive to see the reserve officers who dealt with their subordinates – thinking, planning, coaching and helping them to get in shape again in terms of skills they might have been a little rusty with. The other ranks did not fall behind either. It is true that the everyday life of a reservist is very much influenced by these kinds of rapid exercises. However, most of the reservists of the 61st CSSB were extremely pleased with their achievements.

Five days flew by like one moment. Every unit’s commander would like to experience this in peacetime. It gave the CSSB the opportunity to become stronger and faster. Map or simulation exercises are often insufficient to identify areas that need improvement. It is necessary to call in actual persons and practise realistic plans with all the failures and successes that will yield valuable experiences.

Thanks to the contributing reservists, the 61st CSSB is significantly more ready to respond in a crisis situation. I would like to thank all the participants for giving us the opportunity to become better.

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OKAS 2019: WHAT DID WE LEARN AND HOW TO PROCEED? Lieutenant Colonel Mart Sirel Commander of the 23rd Infantry Battalion

SNAPEX Okas 2019, which took place in October, was an extraordinary exercise in its purpose, scale and duration.

Even more significant are additional aspects: the response rate of the reservists, level of participation, and the positive attitude towards the exercise in society as a whole. All these factors clearly indicate that we are moving in the right direction and have achieved a major milestone on this journey.

Our reservists and society have a high willingness to defend the country. We have developed a system to manifest this willingness on the battlefield, and we are clearly and decisively prepared to defend our country. However, while the exercise as a whole can be considered a success, it would certainly be wrong to say that everything is fine and there is no need for improvements.

In the following, without focusing too much on the details that were revealed during the exercise and that we have already improved or are currently improving, I would like to take a look at the SNAPEX Okas 2019 to create a thoughtful and, in a way, an out-of-the-box discussion on future activities.

In the event of a military threat to the Estonia, one of the critical factors would be the speed of our combat readiness. Simply put, this is achieved by means of two components: the response of the reservists and the provision of equipment to the unit being formed. The first depends primarily on the reservists themselves, while the second is up to the Estonian Defence Forces. I believe that combining these efforts would produce a much better result.

For example, with some envy, we often highlight the Swiss system, where soldiers remain in reserve with their personal combat equipment. Today, we should not place an additional burden on society by keeping armament at home, however, we might look for new solutions for allowing personnel to use individual clothing and personalized equipment.

As active service members, we can immediately set out the risks of such a solution – resources it would take.

However, regardless of our decision, the ultimate key to the solution is the ability of the reservists to understand the responsibilities and activities involved, as well as to ensure successful functioning of this system. The fact that many reservists were interested in this confirms that such a solution is not utopian in Estonia.

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When returning to the first component, i.e. the speed and the response rate of the reservists, I can be extremely satisfied with the result of Okas 2019 for my battalion. In less than 24 hours more than 100% of the battalion was formed. The number is even higher if we include the reservists who could not attend the exercise with a legitimate reason.

There is no need to get ahead of the laws of physics, therefore, the key issue is not so much to increase speed but to ensure its continuity in the longer perspective. In other words, how to maintain and further improve the readiness of reservists to participate in national defence during peacetime and wartime. In this, we – officers and non-commissioned officers – have a very important role to play.

As the sergeant major of battalion and I were preparing a lecture on service in the reserve to the soldiers who had been assigned to the reserve forces last May, I noticed that standard lecture materials focus on legislation, duties and penalties.

There is no doubt that these matters should also be introduced, but according to management theory such an approach is considered compliance-oriented. Our goal should be commitment-orientation. At all of our reservist training exercises, I have passed on three key messages to my soldiers: the importance of initiative, the importance of a team, and the necessity and efficiency of the reserve army.

Several positive examples of initiative may be highlighted from the exercise. For example, one platoon commander came up to his company commander with proposals on what training topics his platoon could cover besides the post-staging training topic.

On the second occasion, another platoon commander came up with an idea on how to improve the de-staging process. The next day we had the opportunity to test this proposal successfully. To ensure that such examples would not remain singular, it is certainly not enough for a battalion or company commander to deliver a patriotic speech in front of the formation.

The taken initiative must be facilitated every day during conscript service by those who come into direct contact with the soldiers – by our junior officers and non-commissioned officers.

While speaking about the importance of a team, I encouraged my future reservists to keep in touch within their small units, squads and platoons. We have excellent examples in the Estonian Defence Forces on how the reservists are kept in the information field through battalions’ social media pages. This time it was primarily an attempt to enhance coherence inside the small units.

Several platoon commanders had groups of their platoons set up in various communication channels and, on their own initiative, commanders used their own initiative to inform soldiers. As a result, one pla-

toon already arrived in almost full capacity within a couple of hours. Team spirit does not have to end at the squad or platoon level. Many reservists said that they arrived thanks to their company commander, Captain Mait Rembel.

The sergeant major of battalion, who greeted the arrived reservists with the phrase “Welcome to the 23rd Infantry Battalion”, often heard in response the battalion’s slogan which had been chosen during the Spring Storm exercise: “Fighting spirit! Unified team!” These examples clearly demonstrate the importance of details – small at first glance. But it improves the readiness of the reservists to suspend all their activities in order to participate in national defence when called to do so by the Estonian Defence Forces.

In less than 24 hours more than 100% of the battalion was formed.

When it comes to the reservist army, it is essential to consolidate the knowledge of our conscripts, reservists, and society that our chosen defence model is effective and functional. Our conscripts are successful in the exercises organized by the Estonian Defence Forces and at the international level, as well as in combat firing.

There have been units formed of service members who just finished conscription. These units have performed their duties in international military operations with great success, proving that it is possible to achieve professionalism within compulsory military service.

In conclusion, as one reservist told me during Okas 2019: “I have not trained with this unit, and I have been in the reserves already for five years, but when I see the successful operation of the unit from day one, it feels great!”

Okas 2019 showed that we have achieved a certain milestone. At the same time, we should not be content with this or focus solely on remedying the shortcomings emerged during the exercise. We must continuously think of ways to make our existing system even more efficient. I use this medium as an opportunity to once again thank all the reservists, their families, employers, acquaintances, and friends for their support and readiness shown to us during Okas 2019.

Finally, I would like to relatejust a few examples of what soldiers replied when I shook hands with them after the exercise: “Thank you, it was very nice!”, “I will come back for the third time as well! The exercise was cool!”, “It was a pleasant surprise!”, “It was great, I will definitely be there! It was a truly fantastic experience!”

We certainly seem to have a solid foundation to move on from.

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WE ARE ALLIES Colonel Paul Clayton Commander of the eFP Command in Estonia

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hank you for making 2019 such a rewarding experience for all of the UK soldiers serving in Estonia. There have been challenging exercises, new training opportunities, new partners to work with, enduring friendships and learning from each other.

In 2019 we said goodbye to the Yorkshire Regiment and the King’s Royal Hussars who together with Belgian and French partners contributed substantially to the integration and security of Estonia shoulder to shoulder with the 1st Estonian Infantry Brigade and Estonian Defence League. Towards the end of the year we welcomed the Queen’s Royal Hussars during the exercise Tractable along with paratroopers from 16th Air Assault Brigade who took part in the largest airborne jump in Estonia.

The year began with a focus on developing our training and ability to operate in extreme cold weather conditions. Ice breaking drills were overseen by highly experienced Royal Marine Mountain Leaders alongside lessons delivered by the instructors of the Estonian Defence Forces. This preparation made certain we were prepared to maximize the benefit from the Winter Camp training exercise, which saw Estonian, Belgian and British units working alongside each other and demonstrating our ability to operate as a team.

This unity and readiness was built on during the Spring Storm exercise. Ten thousand NATO soldiers from 10 alliance members proved to be a powerful demonstration of cohesion and ability to train together.

Apache helicopters deployed to Estonia for the first time alongside a contingent of Wildcat helicopters returning for a second deployment after the success of their first deployment in 2018. This proved excellent training for the eFP, exercising in Sillamäe on the streets and providing reassurance to the population that NATO was committed to the security of Estonian freedom and independence.

The summer months proved no holiday with exercise Baltic Protector arriving in the Baltic Sea. British Royal Marines and members of the Estonian Defence League were in action side by side at Kolga Bay, reinforcing bonds of friendship, demonstrating the ability of Joint Expeditionary Force nations to deliver a flexible and effective capability at speed. It was also an opportunity to work with the Baltic Air Policing mission from 33

Boris Johnson serving Christmas dinner to British troops in Tapa during visit to Estonia in December 2019.

Ämari highlighting the totality of the capability delivered in support of the NATO mission.

Components from air, land and maritime training collectively were an extremely impressive sight to behold. The King’s Royal Hussars conducted a joint training exercise with EDL counterparts sharing knowledge and skills during Exercise Hunt and it is clear that there are many more opportunities to train together.

We were also very fortunate to take part in the 150th Anniversary of the Estonian Song and Dance festival. UK soldiers learned a song in Estonian and joined a community choir in Tapa to celebrate a very special moment in Estonian culture. Getting soldiers to sing is no small achievement, and so successful was the participation that it was reported in the UK national media. We were also able to support the setting of the impressive Song Festival grounds. All of the soldiers who took part said it was the highlight of their time in Estonia and helped them to understand the culture and history of Estonia.

The third quarter of 2019 focused on the rotation of equipment and the UK Battlegroup between the King’s Royal Hussars and the Queen’s Royal Hussars. It was the UK largest deployment of equipment across Europe in nearly 30 years and saw the return of Wildcat and Apache helicopters to Estonia. It was also a first for paratroopers from 16th Air Assault Brigade jumping into Estonia for the first time showing UK high readiness troops ability to reinforce NATO allies at very short notice. The logistical planning and coordination of train movements carrying over 200 armoured vehicles, planes transporting 800 soldiers and vehicles driving over

1,300 km through 12 countries was an impressive feat achieved by allies working together.

As the end of 2019 approached, we looked forward to the NATO leaders’ summit hosted in London and it was useful to reflect on the achievement of collective security over the past 70 years. 2019 showed good progress in what can be achieved when allies train and work together. Lessons and experienced are shared but we are also able to anticipate new threats. For the first time in 2019, eFPC trained in the cyber domain during training exercise Cyber Fog. We learned from the experiences of Estonian partners and the Cyber Centre of Excellence to develop our tactics and procedures in the event of a cyber attack and highlighted the need to constantly train and develop a collective response to threats of the future.

The year ended with the UK Prime Minister visiting troops in Tapa, highlighting the importance of the mission and reinforcing UK commitment to NATO. He took the opportunity to serve some of the troops Christmas dinner and engaged with Estonian media. It was a nice way to round off an exceptionally busy and rewarding year. I’ve no doubt that 2020 will be equally as rewarding. There is lots to look forward to and opportunities to further develop and train together as allies are many. Exciting times ahead.

I’m very grateful for the support, attitude, camaraderie and soldier spirit of our Estonian hosts shown at every level during 2019. I’ve every confidence that a new decade will bring new challenges but together we will face them with a determined resolve that WeAreNATO, WeAreAllies, WeAreReady.

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TRACTABLE 19 – WHAT DID IT MEAN TO US? Colonel Toomas Susi Commander of the Support Command of the Estonian Defence Forces

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he Tractable 19 exercise was undoubtedly one of the toughest challenges for the Estonian Defence Forces last year, entailing the need to join the forces and ideas of two countries, Estonia and the United Kingdom, both in planning and terrain activities.

The exercise, which has been organized for years, is a British military logistics exercise and it usually does not involve partners from other countries. The exercise organized in the late autumn of 2019 was, therefore, unique in many ways – in addition to involving Estonians, this was also the first time that the operation was held in Estonia.

This great opportunity was presented to us by the commander of the British led NATO battle group that had been deployed in Estonia. His aim was to replace unit’s equipment and personnel located in Estonia: Queen’s Royal Hussars replaced the King’s Royal Hussars here.

The new arrivals brought their upgraded equipment, they had a leading role throughout the exercise.

Those who left took their existing equipment, which needed maintenance – it had been tested thoroughly in various joint training activity.

In order to make the situation even more complicated and tense, the organizers of the exercise constantly provided participants with situations where they needed to quickly change their plans, adapt to a new situation, as well as find appropriate solutions and solve complex situations. In practice, movement in such a manner to the positions located in Estonia took place through much of Europe; the units began their journey from their bases in the United Kingdom, as well as in Germany.

The Tractable 19 exercise was undoubtedly one of the toughest challenges for the Estonian Defence Forces last year.

The aim of Tractable was clearly defence-oriented. In practice, the deployment of units to Estonia in case of possible aggression had to be tested in order to bolster the forces already here. The British practised their procedures and moved the units in every possible way. Estonians, in turn, got to practise bringing in and receiving allied troops on a larger scale than usual, in a relatively small window of time, as well as simultaneously through various transport channels.

In fact, the whole exercise involved even more people and areas than it might seem. The main unit that was trained and assessed on the Estonian side, was the Support Command of the Estonian Defence Forces, which operated largely through its headquarters and employing the Movement and Transport Service, which, in turn, involved the Military Police of the Estonian Defence Forces and the voluntary security units of the Defence League.

In practice, this was not all – the staff officers of the exercise, organizers, evaluators, representatives in the

TRAINING FOR COLLABORATION In accordance with a topical and rather realistic scenario, the exercise Tractable 19 was launched to reinforce the British allied forces located in Estonia. According to the scenario, within a short period of time, a considerable amount of equipment and British troops were brought here to confront the enemy.

In numbers, this meant about 200 vehicles and 800 service members. In order to practise various scenarios and put more pressure on the leadership of these units, the allies were deployed to Estonia from the United Kingdom by using all considerable means of transport – the units were moved from country to country by air, sea, rail, and road transport.

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TROOPS FROM UK ROTATED TO ESTONIA Norway

Finland Sweden

TAPA

Belarus Poland Germany

France

field, and others also received a significant workload, excellent experiences, and useful lessons. All the elements of the exercise and of the involved headquarters, from personnel to the CIMIC and public affairs, practised their procedures and even more effective cooperation between the Estonian and British units – they all had a role to play.

Secondly, it meant that our relationship with the British as allies was growing and developing, becoming ever more secure. Tractable led to close communications and the strengthening of relations with our British allies. Aside from military missions, such joint exercises are the best way to learn to act together and work towards one goal, to practise cooperation. At the end of the day, our allies are the ones we rely on for support and whom we are always ready to help in times of trouble. But in order to really be ready to work together in a serious situation, it is necessary to practice together.

Thirdly, the successful organization of this joint exercise cemented the firm belief that in the future we would be able to accept any major ally if it were needed at some point. This is good and encouraging to know.

Collaborative exercises, such as Tractable, bring allied militaries closer to one another. This does not only apply to the defence forces but also to nations.

The United Kingdom has been a longstanding ally to Estonia after the latter regained independence. However, we were also bound by alliance already during the Estonian War of Independence.

As the British repeatedly confirmed during this exercise, the operation Tractable 19 and our engagement with it represents a strong message that our alliance is getting stronger even though the United Kingdom is leaving the European Union. After all, these allied relationships, these ties between states, units, and people are at least as much a guarantee of our security as the finely honed skills of deploying additional units to a crisis hotspot in just a few days.

VALUABLE LESSON “What does that mean to us anyway?” – this was the most common question I heard from journalists and many others about last year’s Tractable. The value of this whole venture cannot be overstated or fully explained from a technical or political point of view on these pages, but in very brief and simplistic terms it meant three things to me.

Firstly, this venture meant a very valuable lesson and experience for us. The exercise created a high-intensity situation for us as recipients, in which much of the knowledge we have accumulated was put into practice. While the Movement and Transport Service of the Support Command of the Estonian Defence Forces is engaged in this work on a daily basis by welcoming allies, planning and organizing their movements in Estonia, and taking the units of the Estonian Defence Forces abroad and to missions, as a rule, not all possible approaches or such scales are combined under normal circumstances. And this nuance added both tension and weight to the whole venture. In addition, it helped to deepen cooperation and training with the Military Police of the Estonian Defence Forces and Defence League units that support operations.

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UGV Period in Mali: from May 2019 Maximum payload weigth: 1200 kg

Operating time without additional refuelling: up to 10 + 1.5 hours

Maximum speed: up to 25 km/h

Payload capacity: 1,000 litres

Weight: 1,630 kg

Number of cameras: 6

Dimensions: 2 x 2.4 m

Weapon integrations tested: 7.62 mm machine gun 12.7 mm heavy machine gun 40 mm automatic grenade launcher Javelin anti-tank missile

Range (maximum distance between the device and the remote): 1.5 km

UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES ON OPERATION BARKHANE IN MALI Captain Taavi Karotamm Staff Officer of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

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stonian infantry platoons serving in the French-led Operation Barkhane in Mali have tested the unmanned ground vehicle THeMIS and tried its various uses in military operations. THeMIS (Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System) was developed by Milrem Robotics, an Estonian defence industry company.

Lieutenant Taavi Eesalu, the commander of the infantry platoon Estpla-32, who used the UGV in Mali, estimates that an unmanned ground vehicle of this size and capability can support an armoured infantry platoon in several ways. In his own experience, using the device on operations provides additional capability, which in some situations may be critical to the platoon.

HARSH CONDITIONS The testing of THeMIS in Mali began in May 2019.

For the first months, the system was used at a military base near Gao city to carry out various logistical tasks.

Simultaneously, various tests were carried to to evaluate wear and durability of the machine in harsh conditions of Mali, while at the same time pursuing product development by adapting the machine’s design and components to hot and dusty conditions.

Mali’s environment differs from Estonia in particular due to its high temperature, high amount of dust, and sharp volcanic rocks. Initial testing of the machine showed that it successfully withstands the described conditions, as well possible attacks. The machine was at the heart of a terrorist attack on July 22, only a couple of metres away from the suicide vehicle, with the explosion having direct impact on the system.

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The explosion mainly affected the body of the machine, yet the critical components of it withstood nearly 200 kilos of explosive material, and the UGV remained operational.

that even greater emphasis needs to be put on security of the robot and surrounding people.

In an environment such as Mali, it is extremely important to ensure the safety of children rushing to see the machine, as a UGV weighing nearly one and a half tons can pose a serious threat to an inattentive road user. Personnel that are using the machine must also ensure that equipment loaded on the vehicle remains securely attached and under the control of the service members throughout the operation.

Further tests with THeMIS confirmed that this UGV could provide additional support to a unit that was on foot and unarmoured. In addition to carrying ammunition, water, food, and other equipment, THeMIS or its equivalent can support the unit with observation or casualty evacuation capabilities. This would mean removing just one soldier (operator) from the battlefield and reducing the amount of time and energy lost in transporting the casualty.

The UGV can also support the unit exclusively with firepower (for example, if a 12.7 mm heavy machi-

CREATIVITY IS THE LIMIT Estpla-32, which took over responsibility in August, continued to implement THeMIS by using the machine on patrols, thereby taking testing to a new level. While the previous months involved testing the machine’s performance in tough conditions, Estpla-32 began to identify the best ways to use the UGV during operations.

THeMIS was first used on a foot patrol in the city of Gao, September 23, during which the focus was on testing basic procedures for involving the UGV on a patrol as well identifying potential issues and bottle necks. The first patrol confirmed that involving a robot on a foot patrol does not require major tactical reorganization, as it is similar to patrols with armoured vehicles. However, the interest of the public may mean 42

ne gun or Javelin anti-tank missile is installed on the machine). THeMIS has an advantage over armoured personnel carriers in confined, narrow, and soft terrain areas that require the unit to move away from the APC, as a UGV could be taken along.

Estpla-32 has used THeMIS on patrols both coupled to the APC and operated remotely. The platoon also successfully tested fitting the UGV on an a Boeing CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter, as well as towing a 22-ton Sisu APC and 32-ton VBCI infantry fighting vehicle. Thanks to the small size of THeMIS, its signature in night-vision or athermal device is modest, and even at 100 metres it is difficult to distinguish the UGV in low vegetation.

phase. While the initial plan was to test THeMIS for up to four months, due to the succes­sful outcome the EDF and Milrem Robotics extended their cooperation period to 2020.

“The arrival of unmanned ground systems on the battlefield is not a question of if, but when,” says Lt. Col. Sten Allik, the senior staff officer of the Planning Division, Headquarters of the EDF. “I have seen both in Estonia and Mali how the unit’s way of thinking changes when innovative technology is actually tested and made meaningful. Without fake modesty or exaggeration, Milrem Robotics and the EDF have become a world-renowned reference in topics related to unmanned ground systems.”

The UGV platform developed in Estonia also serves as the basis for the unmanned ground vehicle projects of 14 European Union countries, approved by EU defence ministers in 2018 under the PESCO (EU Permanent Structured Cooperation) and funded by member states through the European Defence Fund.

COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE As of the end of 2019, the Milrem UGV has covered nearly 1,000 km in Mali. Over six months, a noticeable amount of ideas for product improvement was gathered, many of which have already reached the product development and more efficient implementation 43

SPECIAL FORCES TRAINS RESERVISTS

Lieutenant Colonel Margus Kuul Commander of the Estonian Special Operations Forces

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or the Estonian Special Operations Forces it has been a year of many new initiatives and because of that we have become somewhat more open to the general public.

The media coverage of international military operation in Mali and a feature story on Estonian Public Broadcasting programme about the ESTSOF are our most important appearances. The general public has also heard about the change of ESTSOF commander and the successful execution of three special forces selection events and one reservist training exercise.

However, the plan to start training conscripts in the ESTSOF from 2021 attracted the most public attention. This is also proven by the applications received from several young volunteers looking to serve in the special forces as conscripts.

Reservist special operators have found their place among the NATO allied militaries decades ago and, therefore, training conscripts was the logical next step for the ESTSOF. Preparations for this began almost five years ago.

The ESTSOF needs a reserve to carry out its wartime tasks sustainably. This applies to the organization of both independent national special operations 45

as well as joint operations in the context of NATO. Moreover, the reserve is intended to serve as a recruitment field for the ESTSOF already during peacetime – these reservists have been carefully selected and tested in the course of training exercises and conscript service.

They are also familiar with the ESTSOF procedures and the overall operating atmosphere – such familiarity and trust could be one of the reasons that a prospective service member chooses the ESTSOF. A 21st century special operator, whether a reservist or a service member, is and will be a highly trained specialist with a well-formulated task. The reservists who have served in the ESTSOF become experts in operating as small mobile teams behind enemy lines, using various methods to influence the enemy.

One of these methods is to use mine ambushes.

Even as the enemy’s ability changes, we must modernize our way of thinking and, therefore, be ready for new challenges. Furthermore, cooperation is also possible with other force multipliers, such as joint terminal attack controllers, through which very small unit can have access to the entire arsenal of NATO allies, even from thousands of kilometres away.

Given the Estonian circumstances, it is important to use the reserves as efficiently as possible so as not to ‘forget’ anyone – this is the reason why, since 2018, the ESTSOF began inviting former conscripts of Narva-Jõesuu Border Guard Training Centre, who had received unique guerrilla training, to reservist training exercises. These reservists will also be invited by the ESTSOF in the coming years to refresh their skills.

Therefore, together with former and future conscripts, the ESTSOF will also ensure an increase in its reserve in the long term. In the future, anyone who joined the reserve from the ESTSOF during the last more than 10 years, may find themselves in the list of participants of the reservist training.

Given the increasing need for more flexible use of reservists, it is not excluded that Estonia will see the development of a number of reservists, whose service is even more flexible than today, and in addition to regular training exercises, a special forces team of reservists may be invited to serve for a limited period of time to represent Estonia’s interests on an international military mission instead. Of course, it is important that the creation of flexibility also be supported by an up-to-date legal system.

The Estonian Special Operations Forces highly values its reservists and continues to contribute to developing the reserve.

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INTEGRATING FORCES Colonel Mart Vendla Commander of NATO Force Integration Unit

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he NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) was established as part of the NATO force structure in response to the events in 2014, when the armed forces of the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula and invaded parts of Eastern Ukraine.

The member states of NATO’s Eastern flank felt threatened and requested an increase in NATO’s visibility in the region which was discussed during the NATO Summit in Wales. The Summit led to a redefinition of NATO’s regional operational requirements and capabilities. As a result, the NATO Command and

Force Structure were reconfigured to provide more of a regional focus to their advanced planning activities, a capability which had been previously eroded.

The establishment of NFIUs was part of a broader package of measures that re-defined NATO’s readiness to better respond to the threats. The package contained a number of means and activities, including improved situational awareness (enhancing NATO’s intelligence posture), and pre-positioning of NATO troops in threatened territories on the ground (Enhanced Forward Presence or eFP – army battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), at sea (Standing 48

Naval Maritime Group / Maritime Mine Countermeasure Group, SNMG/MCMG – permanent naval rapid response and mine countermeasure groups on the Baltic and North Sea) and in the air (Enhanced Air Policing or eAP – strengthened air policing over in Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland).

Following the swift changes, long-term issues were also addressed, including the re-organization of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the refinement of regional plans, the further development of an infrastructure to support deployment, and the enhancement of regional structures. The role of Multinational Corps North-East was redefined and the headquarters of South, Northeast, and North Division were established in cooperation with the framework nations. Needless to say, there was also a need for a new perspective for regional exercises.

The network of NFIUs (in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) was tasked to become an outpost of the NATO command structure and facilitate information exchange between NATO’s command and force structures and the host nation. The main purpose is to support situational awareness, planning, deployment and operation of the NATO Response Force from peace and deterrence through crisis to conflict.

As NFIU is not part of the NATO Command Structure (which is funded from the NATO Common Budget) but a NATO Force Structure, the armed forces of the host country are responsible for the infrastructure and technical equipment and support.

NFIU Estonia has a combined staff of about 40 members supporting NATO’s structures in place, possessing the competence of the combined services in land, naval, air, and special forces.

NFIU Estonia has a combined staff of about 40 members supporting NATO’s structures in place, possessing the competence of the combined services in land, naval, air, and special forces. In order to complement and implement the comprehensive approach to security and defence, the staff comprises specialists coordinating the civilian-military cooperation, host nation support and strategic communications.

About half of the NFIU positions are manned by representatives from the host country, while the remainder of the staff are comprised of servicemen and wo49

men from 11 NATO member states. It comes without saying that the working language is English, placing high demands on language proficiency.

The focus of NFIU activities is on creating and maintaining situational awareness and understanding. NFIU provides an overview of the situation in the Estonian Defence Forces (and more widely in Estonia) and transfers critical information requirements between the Estonian Defence Forces and NATO’s operational structures.

NFIU is subordinated to the Multinational Corps North-East (MNC-NE) in Szczecin, Poland, with various issues discussed at the component command level, although the joint nature of the unit means a major role for Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) in the Netherlands, which oversees Northern, Central, and North-eastern Europe.

NFIU has access to NATO’s “weapon systems” – the functional area systems (FAS) that provide awareness and oversight from various areas (intelligence, missions, planning, logistics, etc.), ranging from tactical to strategic levels.

NFIU is linked with the battle rhythm of the Multinational Corps North-East and Joint Force Command Brunssum, attending the working group and key leader engagement events in person or via secure video teleconferences (VTC). Needless to say, access to the NATO and HN staff and the leadership is a prerequisite for success. Visibility and understanding of the intent and activities of both sides facilitate better coordination and supports NATO’s response to the emerging security situation.

As alluded to earlier, the success of the NFIU largely depends on the cooperative spirit of the host nation.

Estonia, with its open society and governance, provides a good foundation for interaction with government agencies. NFIU is located next to the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces, which helps to bolster the relationships and trust between the functional area specialists and the leadership, ensuring the mutual understanding and support for critical information requirements.

Interoperability is facilitated by the day-to-day interaction with the infrastructure of the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Enhanced Forward Presence United Kingdom’s Task Force (eFP UK TF), strengthening contacts and situational awareness between the parties.

2019 was successful and, in addition to the support of regular training and planning events, NFIU Estonia was certified during a detailed two-phase evaluation process. The unit demonstrated all of the critical capabilities necessary to maintain combat-ready status.

Also, 2020 will certainly be a busy year and, among other things, we will celebrate our fifth anniversary.

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ESTONIAN RESERVE OFFICERS’ INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Lieutenant Commander Ingrid Mühling Member of the Board, Estonian Reserve Officers’ Association

T

he international reserve officers’ movement is older and has longer traditions than many transnational military or economic unions. The Nordic Presidium, which unites the reserve officers of the Nordic countries, was founded in the late 1930s, and the international reserve officers’ organization CIOR (Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers) started its activities a year earlier than NATO, i.e. 1948.

Traditionally, reserve officers are an active part of the population, comprising people who are not indifferent to national defence issues and are unafraid to speak up in society. It is worth recalling that in the recent past, reserve officers in Estonia were advocates for a national defence model based on conscription, as well as for the broad-based defence approach.

The Estonian Reserve Officers’ Association has been an active member of CIOR since its early days.

Currently, the 34-member CIOR brings together the reserve officers from NATO, partner countries, as well as more distant countries, such as Republic of South Africa.

Last year was a significant one for Estonia as a member of CIOR – Estonia co-chaired CIOR with the United Kingdom and it also acted as the main organizer of its collaborative events. The highlight of the year – the summer congress with a military combined event, an academic symposium, a youth reserve officers’ seminar, a civilian military cooperation exercise, and a language academy – brought over 500 reserve leaders from around the world to Estonia.

It should be noted that, apart from the support of the enterprises, the Estonian Defence Forces, and the Estonian Parliament, much of the organization was carried out by reserve officers at the expense of their own time and resources. The experience of being a cochair will be beneficial in 2022, when EROA will beco-

me the full and independent chair of the international reserve officers.

The cooperation events that have taken place throughout the year have made it possible to introduce our conscript and reserve service and EDF training exercises to the international community of reserve officers. There are fewer countries like Estonia where reserve officers actively contribute to national defence as a side-line to their daily work; countries where the reserve officer’s official and voluntary contributions are closely related are more common.

The international community of reserve officers is significantly different from that of active service members – uniformed volunteers include business people, public officials, and parliamentarians.

The international community of reserve officers is significantly different from that of active service members – uniformed volunteers include business people, public officials, and parliamentarians. The result of international cooperation and exchange of experience among reserve officers may not be immediately usable by the EDF, but it does fall within the field of broad-based defence approach, which produces understanding and support among opinion leaders.

At the beginning of the joint Presidency of the United Kingdom and Estonia, we decided that the main theme of the Presidency would be young reserve officers.

Sustainability and growth of the reserve service are important from the perspective of a national defence model based on both conscription and professional army.

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The congress held in Tallinn last summer dedicated its academic symposium to the generation of millennials and the opportunities to involve them in the national defence activities.

The most important aspect for reserve officers’ organizations is the development and pooling of reserve leaders. Countries whose defence model relies on conscript service have an advantage here, as reserve service is considered a natural part of life. At the same time, a person who is interested in the national defence and security in Estonia, especially a young person, has the opportunity to serve as a member of the Defence League, an assistant police officer, a teacher of national defence, or a member of the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization. To be an active reserve officer means taking more responsibility than a regular reservist, readiness to lead and perform tasks that may not always provide adrenaline, but sometimes include rather static (staffing) challenges.

Until recently, modern technology and armament were one of the main attractions of the military field for young people, it is now being replaced with environmental awareness and orientation on people.

We need to take into account that each generation has its own values and motivators – while, until recently, modern technology and armament were one of the main attractions of the military field for young people, it is now being replaced with environmental awareness and orientation on people. However, the key to involving young reserve officers lies in meaningful national defence activities and discussion, as well as active involvement of reserve officers in the activities of the subunits of the EDF. EROA is preparing for the CIOR Presidency in 2022 after Germany. The series of international events organized in Estonia during the summer showed that with the moral and material contribution of the volunteering reserve officers, we are able to organize very dignified and high-profile endeavours.

By the time of the Estonian Presidency in 2022, we have the ambition to take steps that essentially value reserve service and make it viable in NATO committees.

In particular, the international Presidency allows the Estonian reserve service model and additional training exercises to be introduced to the community of reserve officers, and help to establish a network of friends and supporters important to Estonia.

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Estonian Defence Forces

Issued by Strategic Communications Department, Headquarters of Estonian Defence Forces

Editors: lt-cmdr Ingrid Mühling, Kristopher Rikken, cpl Raiko Jäärats, Heiki Suurkask Design and implementation: Ivo Sokka Strategic Communication Centre, Cyber Command

Photos: Estonian Defence Forces, Ardi Hallismaa, Sigrid Paula Pukk, Mattias Allik, Karl Alfred Baumeister, Maria Tõkke, Rauno Volmar, Seidi Lamus-Tšistotin, Sander Mändoja, Karl Jakob Toplaan, Karl Heinrich Arras, Taavi Karotamm, Siim Verner Teder, Ingrid Mühling, Martin Hiir, scanpix.ee

Translation: Tiido ja Partnerid Keeleagentuur 0U, www.neontranslations.com

ISSN 2613-4934

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