Policy

Middle East

edited by Meryem Kucuk

Photo: Erdogan marked four years in July since a 2016 failed coup attempt. Turkish President Press Office/EPA 2020.

Post-Covid-19 Turkish Foreign Policy: An Ode to Misunderstood Insecurity

written by Meryem Kucuk

The past few years have witnessed a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy and system of governance, which has both been felt throughout the region and noticed in the international arena. Turkey’s increased assertiveness has recently led to its involvement in Libya, support for Azerbaijan against Armenia and skirmishes with Greece. When paired with Turkey’s internal politics and shifts in Erdogan’s rhetoric, more cynical observers have concluded that these are clear markers of a rising trend of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ within Turkish governance. The Covid-19 crisis has been key in exasperating these fears, pushing the official rhetoric and the actions to become drastic. However, Turkey’s policies should be viewed less as imperialistic ambitions of regional hegemony and more as the defensive and ad hoc responses of a country who views its internal stability, territorial integrity and economic independence to be under threat.

Erdogan’s recent decision to annul the 1934 decree, that turned one of the most contested religious buildings in the world from a mosque into a museum, led to claims of his neo-Ottoman ambitions resurfacing. The neo-Ottomanist appearance of the surprise decision seems less certain when viewed alongside the continuing social impacts of Covid-19 and the mounting economic issues that are beginning to bite into the initially positive public response to the government’s handling of the pandemic. Despite his rhetoric harking back to the days of the magnificent sultans that conquered Istanbul in the 15th century and a time when the Ottoman Empire was strong and stable, this move was a symbolic and transparent attempt to drum up support of his pious political base and instil governmental strength among the Turkish population during a crisis.

The timing of this was not accidental. On top of long-running claims of

Erdogan’s authoritarianism and his administration’s able to lend in lira. When coupled with depreciatcorruption, the population’s relative dissatisfaction ing currency, this has led to a growing foreign debt with partial lockdowns and a declining economy, repayment issue. Through the tried-and-tested hints to the waning of his popularity. Although not method of selling foreign reserves to buy up your out of step with his usual reclamation of Ottoman own currency, the lira was kept steady for most of heritage, the reversion of the Hagia Sophia into a June and July and the Turkish economy seemed to mosque was a very quick turn-around on his pre- be handling the Covid-19 crisis relatively well. This vious negative responses to a decade-old call. He was, however, a temporary measure and its bailout was trying to not only keep his political base loyal package was, again, based largely on keeping inafter a weak win during the 2018 election but at- terests low, adding to Turkey’s hidden debt. tempting to distract and unify a population during a tumultuous period. The Hagia Sophia, therefore, Erdogan, with both reins in his hands, is in a diffisymbolises not a government guided by neo-Otto- cult position. If he lets the lira fall, companies with man principles, but a reactive and pragmatic one dollar debts struggle. If he increases interest rates, guided by a need to look strong, by combatting he may save the lira but push the economy into a perceived threats with ad hoc policies. This deci- recession made worse by the Covid-19 slump, and sion can be dismissed as political posturing found- this is making no mention of the substantial hit his ed in his insecurity which has been heightened by popularity would take. The post-Covid economy of Covid-19’s impacts and public Turkey is both caused by insecuriresponses. This insecurity can also be seen in the interrelated “increased ty and has proven to be an insecu rity in itself. economic and foreign policy decisions taken recently. possibility for multi national conflict” Turkey’s current foreign policy, which has been mislabelled Emerging economies were hit as neo-Ottomanist, stems from especially hard by the Covid-19 this insecurity. This is clearly decrisis. Despite Turkey’s economy faring relative- picted by the geopolitical maelly well compared to that of others, the lira had strom with Turkey in its centre that has picked up already lost 10% of its value between March and again in the Europe-Middle East region since the April alone but remained relatively stable through- outbreak of the pandemic. But, Turkey’s geopoout summer. Falls in the lira’s value has meant that litical muscle-flexing loses the expansionist hue there is a rise in the prices of imported goods and it has been painted in when one considers the falls in living standards. With further drops expect- Covid-heightened Turkish social and economic ined over the next few weeks, this is a serious con- security along with its regional isolation. Claiming cern for a president with an already low approval that it was being excluded from attempts to transrate and, overall, Turkey’s current economic posi- form the EU-MENA region into an offshore energy tion is a clear representative of the insecurity it is hub as well as being faced with increased hostility facing. from Egypt and the UAE, in 2019, meant Libya was The constitutional reforms that followed Erdogan’s ty challenges. Turkey thus signed the highly conre-election in 2018, concentrated a large amount tested Maritime Boundary Treaty with Libya’s inof executive power in his hands. With the appoint- ternationally recognized Government of National ment of his son-in-law as finance minister, his aims Accord (GNA). As well as giving Turkey significant of taking full control of economic policy became sway in transnational gas exploration and pipeline clear. Since then, Erdogan has put pressure on the construction, this treaty promised military assisCentral Bank to keep interest rates low, regardless tance in return for a not-so-subtle reconfiguration of inflation and currency depreciation. Although of the Mediterranean Exclusive Economic Zones keeping interests low has encouraged lending (EEZs). and bolstered the credit boom of the last decade, Turkey’s solution to its perceived territorial integriTurkish banks have had to borrow from American The agreement complicated an already difficult and European banks in dollars and euros to be situation. It lay claim over areas the EastMed pipeline will need to cross and claimed Greece, Cyprus,