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Table 3. Recommendations of the NAS Going the Distance Report and their Current Status Recommendation
Current Status (as of January 2012)
Undertake full examination of spent fuel transport security by independent, cleared technical experts.
Members of the BRC and staff with appropriate clearances have been briefed by NRC and DOE on transportation and storage security analyses undertaken since 2006. However, the BRC does not believe this constitutes the “full examination” recommended by the NAS study and we are not aware of any other efforts that would satisfy the NAS recommendation.
Be proactive in formally assessing and managing “social risks.” Expand Transportation External Coordination (TEC) Working Group to include this issue, establish external risk advisory group, potentially under NWTRB auspices.
Research on social risks and risk perception has been ongoing, but the Commission is unaware of any specific changes that have been implemented by DOE or other agencies as a result. The TEC Working Group (now defunct) did not expand its scope to address this issue. The NWTRB has periodically examined public perceptions of transportation risks but has not established an external risk advisory group.
The NRC should analyze very longduration fires, and implement regulatory controls to reduce the chances of a spent fuel shipment being involved in such a scenario.
The NRC has made a practice of studying real-world fires and analyzing how casks would perform under such conditions. The NRC has also worked with the Association of American Railroads to establish a “no pass” rule for tunnels that would be used to transport spent fuel, effectively precluding the possibility that other trains with flammable materials would be in a tunnel at the same time. This would prevent a long-duration fire of any significant size.
Full-scale package testing should continue to be used as part of package performance evaluation. Testing to destruction should not be required.
The NRC had planned to implement a Package Performance Study that would involve a full-scale cask and would not “test to failure.” The project was never begun due to lack of funding and the eventual cancellation of the Yucca Mountain project. The study would have involved use of a Transportation, Aging and Disposal (TAD) canister in an overpack; initial design work for this canister has been completed but none have been fabricated.
DOE should continue to ensure systematic involvement of states and tribal governments in decisions about routing and scheduling for current spent fuel shipments.
DOE has continued to involve states and tribes in transportation planning, and has established a National Transportation Stakeholders’ Forum for that purpose. After the Yucca Mountain project was cancelled, DOE’s EM program and NRC’s Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation office provided funding to state regional groups (albeit at reduced levels).
DOT should ensure states rigorously comply with requirements for sound risk assessments in designating routes.
DOT has developed regulations for determining “preferred routes” for highway shipments, and the NRC reviews routes for security. DOE follows the same requirements for its shipments. The Commission is unaware of any recent or proposed campaigns where a state has attempted to re-route spent fuel shipments using impermissible assessments or practices.
B l u e R i bb o n C o m m i s s i o n o n A m e r i ca’ s N u c l e ar F u t u r e
