84
Another transport-related issue that will need to be addressed concerns the fact that the NRC has not yet granted a license for the transport of higher burnup fuels, which are now commonly being discharged from reactors.219 It will be necessary to reexamine current regulations and to develop a technical basis for assigning burnup credit to ensure that these higher-burnup fuels can be transported when needed. In addition, spent fuel that has been stored for extended periods may be degraded and may require additional handling and preparation before it can be transported. Finally, numerous parties have suggested that expanded full-scale testing of transportation casks (in addition to computer modeling) could be useful in enhancing public confidence in transport safety. Full-scale testing is part of the testing methodology used by the NRC in its integrated evaluation program. The NAS Going the Distance study endorsed the NRC’s approach and recommended that fullscale cask testing, as well as other accepted methodologies, should continue to be used for technical reasons. In 2005, the NRC approved a staff proposal for the full-scale testing of a rail cask (like one shown in figure 19)—of the kind expected to be used in transporting spent fuel to a HLW repository—in a scenario involving a collision with a locomotive traveling at high speed followed by a hydrocarbon fire. DOE supported the proposed Package Performance Study and suggested combining it with an emergency response exercise to maximize the benefits of the study. Plans to provide NRC with needed funding in 2009 did not materialize because of budget constraints (the estimated
cost of the study was approximately $15 million) and uncertainties about the Yucca Mountain project. The Commission’s view is that funding for the proposed test, if it has independent value, should be provided from the Nuclear Waste Fund so that the NRC can update these plans and proceed with those tests the NRC determines to be most useful. With regard to transportation security, the NRC has existing security regulations and orders in place and is currently undertaking a separate rulemaking to codify further transportation security requirements.220 The proposed protective strategy for transportation includes several elements: • Advance planning and coordination with states • Increased notifications and communications before and during shipment • Continuous and active shipment monitoring • Use of armed escorts over the entire shipment duration (previously, armed guards had been required only in highly populated areas) • Background investigations of personnel with access to Safeguards Information. In its Going the Distance report, the NAS noted that “[m]alevolent acts against spent fuel and HLW are a major technical and societal concern.” However, the report authors were unable to perform an in‑depth analysis of transportation security due to informational constraints (primarily lack of access to classified materials).221 Accordingly, the committee recommended that experts with full access to all relevant information conduct an independent assessment of security
Figure 19. Casks Being Transported By RaiL
B l u e R i bb o n C o m m i s s i o n o n A m e r i ca’ s N u c l e ar F u t u r e
