Some facts and figures on British and French arms sales to Saudi Arabia

Some facts and figures on British and French arms sales to Saudi-Arabia

28.11.2017/tob Legal Obligations All exports of military technology (as defined by the EU Common Military List and its 22 Military List (ML) categories) by EU Member States have to be in line with EU Common Position 944/2008/CFSP. This legally binding Common Position lists eight criteria against which Member States are obliged to check arms exports. They are almost identical with the binding criteria of the (global) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which all EU Member States also signed and ratified. In the case of exports to Saudi Arabia Member States constantly violate the following criteria: Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law (...) Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of inter national humanitarian law, Member States shall: (c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of inter national humanitarian law.

Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability. Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia: a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to: (a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and inter national organised crime; (b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;

The low number of licence denials compared to the high number of authorizations to export to Saudi-Arabia has led us to the point of saying (since 2016) that Member States should not assess any more individual requests for licences on national case-by-case basis, but should instead agree on an arms embargo at Union level (you would of course need unanimity for such a Council decision).

The Reality

France According to ORIENTXXI 15-20% of French arms exports between 2010 and 2016 went to Saudi Arabia.

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2015: The total value of licences issued was EUR 16.887 billion according to the 18th EU Annual Report. This is a very, very high value. Experts stress that the value of real exports/deliveries will probably be lower. So, not all licences will be used.

Some details:    

According to Amnesty International deliveries in 2015 amount to EUR 900 million (ORIENTXXI) Delivery of 191 Aaravis armoured personnel carriers (SIPRI) Order of Helios-2 reconnaissance satellites (SIPRI) Delivery of 745 sniper rifles (ORIENTXXI)

2016: The value of licences was EUR 13.821 million according to a report by the French government to Parliament.

Some details:        

Order of 100 Sherpa Armoured Personnel Carriers (SIPRI) Order of 100 VAB-VCI Infantry Fighting Vehicle (SIPRI) Delivery of 2 Baynunah corvettes (SIPRI) Delivery of 6 Fighting vehicles (SIPRI) Delivery of 1 90mm and 1 105mm artillery cannon (SIPRI) Delivery of 500 sniper rifles (SIPRI) Order of Couchs 39 naval patrol craft (ORIENTXXI) Delivery of 500 sniper rifles (ORIENTXXI)

2017: No data available.

One detail: 

Delivery of 60 Damocles Aircraft EO System for Tornado and Typhoon combat aircraft (SIPRI)

Great Britain According to SIPRI, Saudi Arabia accounted for 48% of the UKs exports of major conventional weapons in 2012-16 and the UK accounted for 27% of Saudi Arabia’s imports.

According to Saferworld, the UK has authorised the transfer of arms, ammunition and equipment valued at £ 4.6 billion since the Saudi intervention in Yemen began.

2015: According to the 18th EU Annual Report the total value of licences is EUR 3.336 million EUR. Some details: 

Order of 22 Hawk-100 trainer/combat aircraft, delivery in 2016 (SIPRI)

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2016: According to the quarterly reports by the UK government arms licences worth £ 682 million have been issued.

Some details: 

Delivery of 100 Storm Shadow Air to Surface Cruise Missile (SIPRI)

2017: According to the UK government it has approved licences worth £ 1.1 billion during the first six months of 2017.

Some details:  

Licence issued on combat aircraft and components there for £ 263 million and components for bombs for £2,72 million (Saferworld) Licence issued for air-to-air missile and bombs for £ 829 million (Saferworld)

Further info: On UK:  

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UK licence data on Saudi-Arabia for the first half of 2017: https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/exportlicences/licence?region=Saudi+Arabia&date_from=2017-01&date_to=2017-06 UK licence data on UAE: https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/exportlicences/licence?n=0&date_to=2017-0630&region=United+Arab+Emirates&date_from=2017-01 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/26/eu-under-mounting-pressure-toban-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/uk-sales-of-arms-and-militaryequipment-to-saudi-arabia-2017

On France:   

http://aser-asso.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ventes-darmes-_-Hollande-a-optepour-des-vues-economiques-a-court-terme-Le-Point-06-avril-2017.pdf http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/armement-la-france-supermarchede-l-arabie-saoudite-20-03-2017-2113291_53.php http://aser-asso.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Rapport-au-Parlement-2017-sur-lesexportations-darmement-de-la-France-Ministere-de-la-defense-juin-2017.pdf

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Annex I

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Annex II European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2017 on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP G. whereas some arms transfers from EU Member States to unstable and crisis-prone regions and countries were used in armed conflicts or for internal repression; whereas some of these transfers were reportedly diverted into the hands of terrorist groups, for example in Syria and Iraq; whereas, in some cases, the arms exported to certain countries, for example Saudi Arabia, have been used in conflicts such as that in Yemen; whereas such exports clearly violate the Common Position and thus highlighting the necessity for better scrutiny and transparency; N. whereas the European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2016 on the humanitarian situation in Yemen called on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to launch an initiative to impose an EU arms embargo on Saudi Arabia; O. whereas the situation in Yemen has since further deteriorated also due to military action carried out by the Saudi-led coalition; whereas some Member States have stopped providing arms to Saudi Arabia because of its actions in Yemen while others have continued supplying military technology contrary to criteria 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8; 16. Notes that according to the Annual Reports, criterion 2 was invoked 72 times for denials in 2014 and 89 times in 2015; deplores the fact that the data reveal the lack of a common approach to the situation in Syria, Iraq and Yemen in particular; encourages the Member States and the EEAS to embark on a discussion on the extension of criterion 2 to include democratic governance indicators, as such assessment criteria could help establish further safeguards against the unintended negative consequences of exports; believes, furthermore, that a more principled approach to risk assessment would focus on overall respect of international humanitarian and human rights law by the recipient; 19. Notes that according to the Annual Reports, criterion 4 was invoked 57 times for denials in 2014 and 85 times in 2015; deplores the fact that military technology exported by the Member States is being used in the conflict in Yemen; urges the Member States to comply with the Common Position in a consistent manner on the basis of a thorough long-term risk assessment; 3. Notes that according to the Annual Reports, criterion 7 was invoked 117 times for denials in 2014 and 149 times in 2015; expresses its concern, inter alia, over the alleged diversions of exports of SALW from European countries to certain destinations from which these exports were diverted in order to supply non-state actors and other end-uses non-compliant with the Common Position in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and South Sudan; points to the urgent need to base assessments of the risk of diversion on more than just an acceptance of commitments made by a recipient state in an end-user certificate; highlights the need for effective mechanisms of postshipment controls to ensure that arms are not being re-exported to unauthorised end users; highlights the potential role that the EEAS could play in supporting Member States’ efforts in this area;

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