Pro-social behaviour under the neoclassical research program and the process of social change
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et al., 1999; Rand et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2016), and only functional social norms successfully pass the selection process, being shaped by the “collective intelligence”. Therefore, unlike the substantive rationality framework, the ecological rationality framework does not demonstrate any inconsistency between the micro- and macro-level analysis. Correspondingly, there is no need to draw a borderline between “two different conceptions of ecological rationality”.
1.5. The nature of social norms Before discussing the nature of social norms and institutions, one should start with terms and definitions (since there is much controversy in this field). North (1990; 1991) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991, p. 97). From North’s (1991) perspective, the principal function of institutions is reduction of uncertainty through establishing unified “rules of the game” for all the agents. Wealth-maximizing agents are likely to cooperate during the repeated games, under perfect information, and provided that the number of players is relatively small. However, in a complex and uncertain environment, the opportunities for cooperation diminish. Institutions serve as mechanisms “solving the problems of human cooperation” (p. 98). Under North’s (1991) framework, the term “institutions” is general enough to involve “both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (p. 97). Aoki (2007) defines institutions as a “self-sustaining, salient pattern of social interaction, as represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows, and incorporated as agents’ shared beliefs about the ways the game is to be played” (p. 6), emphasizing the endogenous nature of institutional changes. For the sake of clarity, hereafter, formal institutions stand for rules of conduct introduced, supervised, and reinforced by central authorities. In contrast, social norms are understood as uncodified rules, principles, and values governing the process of social exchange and social interaction, according to V. Smith (2010). The necessity to distinguish between the social norms and formal institutions instead of elaborating on North’s (1990; 1991) classification arises from the inconsistency between the North’s (1990; 1991) institutional exogeneity assumption (Aoki 2007) and the entire principle of evolutionary change discussed by Simon (1968) and V. Smith (2010). Besides, denoting social norms and formal institutions using the same term means ignoring the fact that solely formal institutions are subject to central authorities’ supervision and reinforcement.
