University of Leeds Human Rights Journal — Volume 8, Issue 1 by Leeds Human Rights Journal

LEEDS HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL

VOLUME VIII, SUMMER 2020 IN FOCUS: PROTEST

Cover Photo by George Goss

Human Rights Journal Team

University of Leeds Human Rights Journal

Volume VIII - Summer 2020

Kane Emerson, Editor-in-Chief

Sara Green, Managing Editor

Joshua House, Managing Editor

Azhar Vickland, Online Editor

Peer Reviewers Shourya Alva Olivia Arnold Aksa Arshad Farida Augustine Amy Bentham Eve Clark Jian Feng Sophia Hadjipateras Libby-Jade Harris Charlie Howard Eve Jones Isabel Mulligan Anna Olney-Smith Zuzanna Schoennet

Letter from the Editor Dear Readers, Welcome to Volume VIII of the Leeds Human Rights Journal. When the editorial team decided on the theme of protest in December 2019 noöne could have predicted that protest would be very much the defining feature of 2020. Last year had its own strikes of course with the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, the gilets jaune and the september 2019 climate strikes. However, the protests of Black Lives Matter in 2020 have been all encompassing because the coronavirus pandemic has pushed many protests from the streets to social media in a way that hasn’t been as apparent with other movements. Being involved with the Human Rights Journal for the past two years has been a rewarding experience. To be involved with other like-minded students to discuss, publicise and learn more about human rights has been tremendously interesting and enjoyable. The editorial team in particular has been a cornucopia of drive, creativity, and dedication to human rights. Working with Managing Editors Sara Green and Josh House, we have extended our reach through the schools and on social media. Sara and Josh have introduced training sessions for our peer reviewers to improve the quality of peer review process and to add to the experience that peer reviewers will take away for academia and work. Our Online Editor, Azhar Vickland, has been terrific in soliciting blog submissions from around the world and keeping our social media engaging. Our online writers have demonstrated our increased

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reach as a journal as they have included undergraduates, alumni and students of other universities. The blog has also been a great way to reach students throughout the year and this year we have strengthened this with a collaboration with Leeds Student Radio’s topical human rights podcast Put The World to Rights. The Journal this year has had numerous roadblocks with academic protests and a global pandemic yet with the hard work of our supporters we continue to publish. The peer reviewers are a critical component of the HRJ and their skills have been invaluable. We would particularly like to thank alumna and editor emeritus Rosa Morahan for her continued generosity to the Journal with the HRJ Prize for Best Academic Submission, and Tess HornbySmith for her continued advice and assistance. I would also like to thank Nina Whitley-Jones for her superb graphic design and work in putting the finished journal together. The depth and breadth of submissions this year has been a genuine joy to edit so we hope you enjoy this volume and thank you for your continued support in reading the UK’s first undergraduate human rights journal.

Kane M. Emerson 6

Contributors Academic Contributors: Emma Berger: Second Year, BA History Joseph Carter: Third Year, BA International Development Thomas Davies: Fourth Year, BA International History and Politics Philippa Dearlove: Second Year, BA Music and Music Psychology James Holmes: Fourth Year, BA Chinese (Modern) Olivia McGhie: Third Year, BA History Niamh Punton: Second Year, BA Geography Maria Stankiewicz: Fourth Year, BA Arabic and International Development Maja Stefanska: Fourth Year, BA Arabic and International Business Emily Williams: Fourth Year, BA Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Thought

Creative Contributors: Olivia Frankland: First year, BA English Literature Andrea Loftus: Fourth Year, BA Spanish and English Literature Mervielle Nsumbu: Third Year, BA Theatre and Performance Channah Smith: Second Year, BA Sociology Ananya Sriram: Fourth Year, BA French and International Relations Wong Him Lan Jennifer: Second Year, BA Graphics and Communication Design

Design by Nina Whitley - Jones

Contents Foreword

â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;In the name of religion, we were robbed by thievesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;: AntiSectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

Failure to Comply

China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees James Holmes

What If Andrea Loftus

Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System Olivia McGhie

I Cry Channah Smith

Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change Joseph Carter

A Toast Mervielle Nsumbu

Thomas Davies

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Olivia Frankland

Boycotts in Qatar: Why FIFA World Cup 2022 will take place despite widespread uproar? Maja Stefanska

Alchemy: an interview with Jean-Claude Amara, co-founder of Droits Devant !! Ananya Sriram

Drag as Protest: The Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Palestinian Drag Scene in Israel Philippa Dearlove

A Wasted Chance: Why Did the Oslo Peace Process Fail? Maria Stankiewicz

Human Rights Discourse is too Individualistic to be a Useful Framework for Global Ethical or Political Conversations. Discuss. Emily Williams

The Power of the Veil: Exploring the Hijab as a Means of Protest Niamh Punton

The Presentation of Abolitionism and Feminism in Antebellum Slave Narratives Emma Berger

Revolution of Our Time Wong Hin Lan Jennifer

Foreword It has been a seismic year for global protest movements. In a proliferation of social contexts throughout the globe, protest is a reflection of the responsiveness of civil society to institutional breaches of human rights, as well as a mechanism by which to amplify the voices of those erased and marginalised by these breaches. From the demonstrations against the discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act in India, to civil unrest in Hong Kong in response to the repressive Extradition Bill, public spaces are being transformed into sites of political and human rights discourses through signs, silences, vigils and slogans. Painful moments of localised injustice are increasingly understood as evidence of structural and historical failings to protect human rights; the prolific global response to the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in the United States encapsulates this, its simple affirmation that ‘Black Lives Matter’ signalling the failure of postcolonial societies to process histories of racial injustice. We hope this issue offers a nuanced and expansive view of the functions, historical and social intersections, and impacts of global protest. Our call for submissions focussed on the theme of Protest returned diverse and thoughtful essays and creative pieces of a truly excellent standard. We are really pleased that students feel empowered to share their research on such pertinent contemporary issues, and we are continually impressed by the disciplinary and theoretical scope that our contributors bring to the study of human rights. Protest can often be a space where prescribed boundaries are challenged and negotiated, and this concept is explored deeply by this year’s Human Rights Journal Prize winner Thomas Davies.

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His detailed analysis of popular protests in Iraq reveals the public’s consciousness of elite uses of

traditional modes of identity, namely sect and political Islam, and the subsequent formation of a ‘unity in citizenship’ identity. This thoughtful piece highlights an interesting model of protest that has implications for many postcolonial societies dominated by rigid binaries. Other contributors have taken a historical approach to subversive acts of political protest; Emma Berger’s close analysis of antebellum slave narratives highlight the subversive nature of slave accounts in a structure that actively erases their personhood, as well as the intersection of feminist and abolitionist sentiments. Along similar themes, Channah Smith invokes the historical abuse of black women in Western gynecology as an analogy for the dismissal of Black suffering in contemporary society. In light of discussions of unprocessed histories of racial injustice triggered by the Black Lives Matter movement, we feel this poem intelligently explores the deeply personal effects of structural biases, and is one of the pieces we are proudest to publish. Philippa Dearlove and Niamh Punton’s explorations of Palestinian Drag in Israel and the Hijab in Iran and France, respectively, highlight the subversive role of cultural protest. Whether

living under Israeli occupation or limited by Islamaphobic tropes, simply embodying oneself as a marginalised person amounts to a form of political resistance. Similarly, Mervielle Nsumbu imagines the cultural exchanges of an interracial relationship as a form of protest itself, both by ridiculing racial bigotry and owing its tenacity to it. The interdisciplinary nature of the Journal has attracted diverse and complementary perspectives on climate change; whilst Joseph Carter advocates the extension of human rights discourse to future generations in an effort towards climate justice, Andrea Loftus and Olivia Frankland explore the notion of climate grief in their poetry. Olivia McGhie and Ananya Sriram’s exploration of the Gilets Jaunes, coupled with Maja Stefanska’s analysis of Boycotts in Qatar, offer an insight into the strategic aims of protest movements when faced by governmental suppression and international apathy. We have also welcomed otherwise salient pieces that lay slightly outside the scope of our theme; from Maria Stankiewicz’s sharp analysis of the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, to James Holmes’ enlightening study of China’s complex treatment of North Korean refugees, the global scope of our contributions offers a comparative reading of a plethora of human rights issues. Emily Williams’ critical exploration of a universalist approach to human rights may help us make these connections without oversimplifying local and cultural specificity. The blog has been our supplementary platform to discuss human rights issues globally, throughout the academic year. This year we received a significant number of blog submissions embodying the theme of Protest. The blog covered multiple protests worldwide: Kwan Yee Wong’s piece on the protest against the extradition bill in Hong Kong; Olivia McGhie’s documentation of the student protests in Paris; Abbie Sharp’s article on the South Korean feminist movement through Instagram hashtags; Zahra Iqbal’s personal experience participating in the International Women’s Day march in Madrid. These articles highlight the reality and commonality of protests movements, that study abroad students were able to participate in or witness. The number of protests in the past year reveals the fault lines within societies globally and the collective exercise of our right to fight against injustices to secure our basic human rights. We hope that this issue offers an opportunity for you to engage in human rights discourses, no matter your expertise, in a considered and critical way. The events of this past year have revealed that a closer inspection of prescribed norms or accepted narratives can allow us to achieve a more cohesive application of human rights, and we hope our brilliant undergraduate contributors can offer such insights. We are very pleased to present another successful edition of Leeds Human Rights Journal, and we look forward to continuing the spirit of inquiry and academic rigour that each issue of the Journal has developed.

The Editorial Board, 2019-2020.

‘In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement Thomas Davies HRJ Prize for Best Original Academic Research Abstract Mass protests have been a regular feature of Iraqi politics throughout the last decade. This essay analyses the extent to which anti-sectarianism – opposition to the organisation of politics based on sectarian identity – has become the dominant narrative of the protests, particularly since 2015. It argues that public anger at the systemic problems of post-2003 Iraq, including corruption, economic inequalities and failing public services, has translated into a wide and deep antipathy towards identity politics, or sectarianism. This has manifested itself in various ways, including rising ‘unity in citizenship’, a rejection of political Islam and a turn away from traditional methods of democratic engagement. The essay also explores the movement’s survival through the war against ISIS and the (lack of) Sunni involvement. Finally, it examines Shi’a political fragmentation and how state-level Shi’a political and religious actors have interacted with the protest movement.

Introduction Popular protests in Iraq have been a ‘terminal crisis of the post-Saddam state’.1 Since 2015, the country has been mired in an almost permanent state of protest. Demonstrations continued in spite of the war against ISIS and have escalated again since the group’s defeat.

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The most recent flare-up, which began in October 2019, is the largest and deadliest since the US invasion. This essay aims to analyse the extent to which the post-2011 protest movement has revealed a shift ‘from identity politics to issue politics’ in Iraq.2 It will argue that the movement has been defined by anti-sectarianism: a pronounced opposition to the post2003 political order based on identity politics. The focus of protests has been on issues that are a direct product of the sectarian organisation of politics, such as corruption, government incompetence, economic stagnation and the deteriorating quality of services. The perpetual recurrence of these systemic problems has convinced the public that identity politics can no longer work. Across the Shi’a south, people have taken to the streets to voice anger at their own leaders and demand an overhaul of the current sectarian quota system. The movement is not revolutionary, but protestors want to completely reorient their democracy towards issue-based politics not dominated by sect affiliation.3 The essay will begin with an overview

1 Deepika Saraswat, ‘Popular Protests in Iraq: The Terminal Crisis of the post-Saddam state?’, LSE Middle East Centre (17 December 2019), https:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/12/17/popular-protests-in-iraq-the-terminal-crisis-of-the-post-saddam-state/ [accessed 20 February 2020]. 2 Faleh A. Jabar, ‘The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 25 (June 2018). 3 Munqith Dagher, ‘Iraq’s protests haven’t yet changed the system — but they’re transforming Iraqis’ belief in themselves’, The Washington Post, 10 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/10/iraqs-protests-havent-yet-changed-system-theyre-transforming-iraqis-belief-

themselves/ [accessed 20 February 2020].

of sectarianism in Iraq, explaining how it embedded institutional flaws into society which became the focus of public protest. It will then explore three trends which highlight the depth of Iraqi anti-sectarianism: the expression, through protest, of ‘unity in citizenship’, the rejection of political Islam and the rise of alternative methods of democratic engagement. re-mobilisation of sectarian identity, before arguing that a lack of Sunni involvement in the movement does not necessarily suggest a limited anti-sectarianism. The final section will provide a top-down analysis, arguing that the actions of political leader Muqtada al-Sadr and religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have been important in the demise of the sectarian consensus.

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Thomas Davies In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

Then, it will show how the protest movement survived the threat of ISIS by resisting against

The Post-2003 Political System and the Foundations of Anti-Sectarianism The 2015-16 protests in Iraq targeted the foundations of the post-2003 political order. Constructed by US occupation forces and former Iraqi exiles, this order is based on the mobilisation of sectarian identity. An understanding of sectarianisation in the Iraqi state building process, and the flaws that it fostered, is necessary in order to explain the increasing anti-sectarianism of the protest movement since 2011. Toby Dodge argues that, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall, the US perceived Iraq as ‘irrevocably divided along ethnic and religious lines’. This view, partly informed by Washington’s selective hearing problem – a reliance on certain exile voices for intelligence – generated a ‘primordial’ organisation of politics, dominated by religious identity.4 Chérine Chams El-Dine largely concurs with Dodge, critiquing the power structure as one which reproduced sectarian division and entrenched corruption and dysfunction.5 The political compromise that Shi’a and Kurdish leaders agreed (known as muhassasa) allocates state positions and resources along denominational lines.6 Based on a majoritarian conception of democracy, it has encouraged misuse. The political parties asserting sectarian identities, at the expense of national identity, are rewarded with control over the state’s resources and levers of governance.7 This affords them the opportunity to monopolise power within the ministries and grip on to power through ‘a network of complicity and collusion’.8 The result has been rife corruption, incompetence, unequal resource distribution and chronic service provision failures. These issues are fundamentally rooted in the muhassasa system. The Iraqi public’s growing awareness of this – a strengthening cognitive link between the pervasive difficulties in their everyday lives and the country’s democracy by denomination – has been at the heart of the turn against sectarianism revealed by the protest movement.

4 Toby Dodge, ‘Tracing the Rise of Sectarianism in Iraq after 2003’, LSE Middle East Centre (13 September 2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ mec/2018/09/13/tracing-the-rise-of-sectarianism-in-iraq-after-2003/ [accessed 20 February 2020]; Saraswat, ‘Popular Protests in Iraq’. 5 Chérine Chams El-Dine, ‘Out of the ashes: the rise of an anti-sectarian discourse in post-2011 Iraq’, in Islamists and the Politics of Arab Uprisings, ed. by Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Paola Rivetti (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), pp. 341-357 (p. 342). 6 Renad Mansour, ‘Iraq after the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State’, Chatham House (July 2017), p. 5. 7 Dodge, ‘Tracing the Rise of Sectarianism in Iraq after 2003’. 8 Jabar, p. 16.

The rejection of sectarianism in Iraq has been a gradual process, driven from the bottom-up by dismay at a lack of progress on corruption, the economy and living standards. In 2011, when many Iraqis were inspired to take to the streets by mass demonstrations elsewhere in the Arab world, protestors complained: ‘there is no drinkable water, no electricity’, demanding ‘improved government services, better pay and an end to corruption’.9 Slogans, including ‘down to a democracy that transforms bad to worse’ and ‘what happened to all the billions in oil revenue’, bemoaned the failure to redistribute wealth and invest in basic infrastructure. 10

95% of Iraqis stated corruption as a major hindrance to progress and a majority believed

a bribe was necessary for better education and health care.11 There were some calls for the abolition of muhassasa, but the fractured movement was largely characterised by disparate demands.12 It lacked a concerted, overt anti-sectarianism linking basic economic problems with identity politics. However, by questioning the legitimacy of Iraq’s political parties and spotlighting the failures of a young democracy, the protest helped to form ‘latent structures’ which became the foundations of the larger protest movement in 2015-16.13

The Post-2015 Protest Movement: Citizenship, Political Islam and Alternative Engagement By 2015, the failure of Nouri al-Maliki’s coalition to tackle institutional problems triggered ‘one of the largest social protest movements in modern Iraqi history’.14 This movement, which has evolved, grown and continues to disrupt Iraqi politics today, is more distinctly antisectarian then previous iterations. Demands have focussed on three main themes: political reform and abolition of the muhassasa system, more effective anti-corruption measures and a commitment to improving and equalising public services.15 Corruption has been the dominant focus of protestors. 1 in 3 Iraqis consider it the main challenge facing the

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country.16 This fixation on corruption is an explicit critique of sectarianism, given the problem is ‘inseparably linked to the quota system’.17 Furthermore, many of the prominent groups in the leaderless movement have strong secularist credentials. In 2015, for example, ‘al-Tayyar al-Madani’, a ‘self-conscious entity’ of ‘independent secular civil society activists’ including academics, journalists and cultural figures, were a key organisational force.18 The Iraqi

9 Khalid al-Ansary, ‘Thousands Rally in Iraq’s Day of Rage Protests’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests/ thousands-of-iraqis-protest-in-day-of-rage-idUSTRE71O1RN20110225 [accessed 28 February 2020]; Associated Press, ‘Baghdad protestors converge on Liberation Square, The Guardian, 4 March 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/04/baghdad-protesters-iraq-driving-ban [accessed 28 February 2020]. 10 Charles McDermid and Karim Lami, ‘The Missing Ingredient in Iraq’s Day of Rage’, Time, 25 February 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,2055525,00.html [accessed 26 February 2020]. 11 Atlantic Council, What does new opinion survey data from Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan tell us?, online video recording, Youtube, 26 June 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BthfZxkqN-Q&feature=youtu.be [accessed 18 February 2020] [henceforth: Atlantic Council, YouTube]; Arab Barometer, Arab Barometer V: Iraq Country Report (2019), p. 4 [henceforth AB, Iraq Country Report (2019)]. 12 El-Dine, p. 344. 13 Ibid., p. 345. 14 Jabar, p. 9. 15 Saad Aldouri, ‘What to Know about Iraq’s Protest Movement’, Chatham House, 6 June 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/whatknow-about-iraq-s-protest-movement [accessed 21 February 2020]. 16 AB, Iraq Country Report (2019), p. 4. 17 Jabar, p. 16. 18 Ribale Sleiman-Haidar, ‘The Sadrist-Communist Alliance: Implications for Iraq’s Secular Politics’, LSE Middle East Centre (6 June 2018), https://blogs.

lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/06/the-sadrist-communist-alliance-implications-for-iraqs-secular-politics/ [accessed 20 February 2020].

Communist Party and leftist, secular allies were also involved. Supporters of Muqtada alSadr, a Shi’a cleric and former militia leader who recast himself as a nationalist, anti-sectarian ‘godfather of reform’, also joined the protests in 2016, which will be discussed in more detail state, a sense of Iraqi national identity has prevailed over sub-national identities. Protestors chant ‘no to religion or sect’ and the flag of Iraq is a prominent symbol at marches. In the most recent demonstrations, 97% of those involved said protesting made them prouder to be an Iraqi.20 There is ‘unity in citizenship versus division in religion and sect’.21

protest movement has been a clear decline in support for Islamist politicians, the main proponents of sectarian democracy. Continuously let down by corrupt politicians promising to protect the Shi’a community, public anger is encapsulated in the popular chant, ‘in the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’!22 The percentage of Iraqis agreeing that the country is better off with religious leaders in public office declined 35% from 20102019.23 For comparison, the Middle East average dropped only 7%. Iraqis no longer believe their leaders can deliver progress to the country. When Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced a reform plan to placate protestors in 2015, over 75% of respondents did not take it seriously.

At rallies, chants targeting the political parties are prominent. Trust

in Islamist parties is now less than 15% and in a recent major survey, 78% of Iraqis said they do not trust political parties at all.25 The idea that religion can be a bulwark against corruption also appears obsolete; a majority of Iraqis consider religious leaders as corrupt as secularists. Iraqis are rejecting political Islam, no longer permitting political elites to ‘hide behind identity politics’.26 Anti-sectarianism has similarly influenced public opinion on foreign policy debates. Until the assassination of General Soleimani in January 2020, which provoked anti-American outrage in Baghdad, rising anti-Iranian sentiment was a feature of the protest movement. Traditionally, sectarian division meant that Iraqi Shi’a tended to support the theocratic Iranian government, run by Shi’a clerics. Iran styles itself as the leader of the Shi’a Middle East, standing up to powerful Sunni forces from Saudi Arabia to ISIS. However, the 45% drop in Iraqi Shi’a with a favourable view of the Iranian government since 2014 indicates that this image is no longer enough to mobilise sectarian support. Instead, the narrative has focussed on Iran propping up a corrupt and inept Iraqi government. It should be noted that the

19 El-Dine, p. 348. 20 Dagher, ‘Iraq’s protests haven’t yet changed the system’. 21 Jabar, p. 18. 22 Ibid., p. 19. 23 Atlantic Council, Youtube. 24 Jabar, p. 28. 25 Richard Spencer, ‘Arabs are losing their faith in religious parties and leaders’, The Economist, 5 December 2019, https://www.economist.com/

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Correspondent to the prominence of anti-sectarian groups, slogans and symbols in the

Thomas Davies In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

later.19 Slogans and protest art evoke an alternative to sectarianism. Amid calls for a civil

graphic-detail/2019/12/05/arabs-are-losing-faith-in-religious-parties-and-leaders [accessed 28 February 2020]. 26 Mansour, p. 12.

disillusionment with domestic and foreign religious political institutions cannot be explained away as part of a wider process of decreasing religiosity. In fact, the percentage of Iraqis identifying as religious or somewhat religious has marginally increased since 2013, from 88% to 93%.27 Yet, this increase does not correlate to support for religious actors in politics. The decline in trust and support for domestic and foreign actors associated with sect-based politics is further evidence of the public disavowing the post-2003 political system. The chronic stasis that sectarianism has fostered in Iraq since the fall of Saddam has left the public with a tainted view of their democratic institutions and pushed them away from traditional forms of engagement. Belief that democracy is bad for the economy, security and decisiveness has significantly increased. The only institution with rising levels of public trust is the army.28 Voter turnout, the normal method of democratic participation, was 44.5% in the 2018 national elections, the lowest since 2003.29 Examining youth engagement in politics is particularly instructive. Under 30s are the least likely to take an interest in politics or vote in parliamentary elections but are the most likely to take part in protests. Young, educated Iraqis are also using social media as their primary source of information, which they trust more than newspapers or television.30 These trends are important. The country has a very young population – 70% of Iraqis are under 30.31 By choosing to protest rather than vote and embracing new sources of information detached from conventional centres of power, the youth are rejecting the sectarian institutions of Iraqi democracy. Although increasing trust in security forces, declining trust in politicians and widespread protests are often worrying signs of an impending coup or revolution, it seems protestors are ‘not demanding a new state, just one that works better’.32 Support for political parties may be at an all-time low, but a majority still believe democracy is preferable to any other system. This suggests Iraqis

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see a future for democracy in their country, just not in its current, sectarian form, explaining their ‘radically reformist’ but not revolutionary demands.33

ISIS and Sunni Absence from the Protests An indication of the power and obduracy of anti-sectarianism in Iraq is the continuation of the protest movement throughout the war with ISIS. Traditional logic suggests that the threat of ISIS, a Sunni extremist force, would have forced brought together on the Shi’a community in the face of an external threat. Political leaders, particularly the supporters of Nouri al-Maliki, tried to stoke fear by arguing that the protest movement was distracting the government

27 Arab Barometer, ‘Level of Religiosity’, AB Wave V (2018), https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-analysis-tool/ [accessed 26 February 2020]. 28 AB, Iraq Country Report (2019), p. 9. 29 ‘Iraq Post-Daesh: Improved Social Cohesion, but Iraqis Remain Dissatisfied with Government’, National Democratic Institute (July 2019), p. 16. 30 Kathrin Thomas, ‘Civic Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa’, Arab Barometer (2019); Jason Wee and Sophie Li, ‘Politics and Social Media in the Middle East and North Africa, Arab Barometer (2019). 31 Atlantic Council, Youtube. 32 Christine van den Toorn and Raad Alkadiri, ‘Can Iraq’s Revolution Succeed? Reflections from a Protest Movement at a Crossroads’, LSE Middle East Centre (7 November 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/11/07/can-iraqs-revolution-succeed-reflections-from-a-protest-movement-at-a-crossroads/ [accessed 20 February 2020].

33 Jabar, p. 13.

from the war and aiding ISIS. The Shi’a community, however, rallied against this narrative. Slogans included ‘corruption equals ISIS’ and ‘a popular mobilisation against terrorism and another against corruption’.34 The effort to corner protestors into a choice between sect or threat of ISIS.35 Young Iraqis did not retreat behind the wall of sectarian identity and instead blamed sectarianism for the era of instability they witnessed growing up after 2003. For many, the rise of ISIS was simply the latest in a string of failures that could be attributed to the post-invasion political system. If anything, the threat of jihad only heightened the urgency of political reconciliation and reform to strengthen the state against impending collapse.

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Thomas Davies In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

nation failed. Iraqi national identity triumphed as a form of resistance against the existential

The lack of Sunni involvement in the protest movement could be cited as evidence that the current protests are ‘part of an intra-Shia struggle, rather than a national one’.36 Shi’a political unity may have collapsed, but if the large Sunni minority (approx. 33.5% of the population) are disinterested by reform then anti-sectarianism in Iraq must be considered distinctly limited. However, Sunni absence from the protest movement belies general agreement with the motives of the protest. Data suggests that Sunnis in Anbar or Mosul share the same grievances as Shi’a in Basra or Najaf. Compared to Shi’a, Sunnis have an equal, if not more negative perception of corruption and unemployment. 60% of people in the Sunni-dominated West feel other groups get more services than they should, compared to 53% in the South.37 There is consensus on needs and priorities.38 Sunni politics has also seen fragmentation as sectarian mobilisation loses effectiveness. In the 2010 elections, Ayad Allawi’s cross-sectarian centrist coalition became the focal point for the Sunni vote, winning the largest number of seats. In 2014, the Sunni vote split and by 2018 it was spread between cross-sectarian coalitions such as Allawi’s National Coalition, Sunni lists such as Osama al-Nujaifi’s Iraqi Decision Alliance and local parties such as Anbar is Our Identity.39 It must therefore be asked: if Sunnis share the grievances of the protest movement and can no longer mobilise voters along sectarian lines, then why are they not protesting? After the defeat of ISIS in 2017, Sunnis are afraid that any actions which foment instability could be a backward step on three key fronts. Firstly, there is a major fear of repression and scapegoating, given the government’s aggressive reaction to Sunni protests in 2012-13 and persecution by Shi’a militias in their campaigns against ISIS. Secondly, Sunnis are unwilling to jeopardise security gains made since the defeat of ISIS; renewed instability risks creating the conditions for an ISIS resurgence. Finally, marginal economic gains in the Sunni provinces could be wiped out

34 El-Dine, p. 351; Mansour, p. 11. 35 Jonathan Marcus, ‘Iraq and Syria opinion poll – the world’s most dangerous survey?’, BBC News, 9 September 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-34173549 [accessed 18 February 2020]. 36 Tamer Badawi, ‘Why Arab Sunnis are disengaged from Iraq’s protests’, Atlantic Council (7 February 2020) https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ menasource/why-arab-sunnis-are-disengaged-from-iraqs-protests/ [accessed 18 February 2020]. 37 ‘Iraq Post-Daesh’, p. 24. 38 ‘Why are Iraqis protesting?’, ORB International (October 2019) https://orb-international.com/2019/10/25/iraqprotests/ [accessed 18 February 2020]. 39 Renad Mansour and Christine van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections: A Population in Transition’, LSE Middle East Centre (2018), pp. 7-11.

by protests; there is a precedent for the government cutting wages as a punitive response.40 It can therefore be surmised that limited Sunni participation in protests does not necessarily mean that the movement is a narrow, intra-Shia power struggle. Opposition to sectarian politics and the problems it has created remain a major Sunni concern but involvement in the protests is currently too greater a risk due to ongoing precarity in Sunni areas.

Fragmentation of the Sectarian Consensus The rise of anti-sectarianism in Iraq has primarily occurred at the individual level through popular protest, as has been explored above. However, analysing the role of state-level actors is also necessary, because Shi’a political division has weakened the sectarian consensus and consequently strengthened the protest movement. Faleh A. Jabar argues that genuine sectarian unity was short-lived, situating it within a longer history of intra-sect tensions and ‘repeated failure’ to politicise Shi’a identity.41 Fragmentation in Shi’a politics has certainly been a gradual process since 2003. In the 2005 election, the Shi’a parties stood together as one bloc. In 2010 they had split into two, in 2014 there were four and by 2018 five main Shi’a blocs were vying for the same voters.42 The response to mass protests in 2015-16 was a crucial moment for political elites, revealing major intra-Shia splits. The various coalitions reacted in notably different ways. Authoritarian former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters advocated suppression of the protest, whilst then Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi looked for a mild compromise.43 The most important decision, though, came from Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who organised his supporters to join street protests. A former militia leader who fought the American occupation, al-Sadr has undergone a political transformation into an Iraqi nationalist and anti-corruption reformer. He wants to

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expel religious identity from politics and create a civil state, free from foreign influence and corruption (although many are sceptical of his sincerity). Election campaigns, he argues, should ‘depend on programmes and agendas’.44 This vision was behind his influential decision to support the protest movement in 2016. On his instruction, hundreds of thousands of supporters marched into Baghdad’s Green Zone, home to the government and foreign officials, and ransacked the parliament. They called on al-Abadi to end appointment quotas and create a government of technocrats. Sadrist co-option of the movement was not universally accepted. His religious Shi’a credentials and chequered past as a protagonist in sectarian warfare sparked debate about whether Islamists should be accepted into a secularist movement.45 However, reformist rhetoric and recent track record on corruption, including pressuring his own officials to resign over a scandal, convinced most of his commitment

40 Badawi, ‘Why Arab Sunnis are disengaged’. 41 Jabar, pp. 10-12. 42 Mansour and van den Toorn, p. 8. 43 Jabar, p. 22. 44 Richard Spencer, ‘West’s hopes for Iraq rest on Moqtada al-Sadr, the rabble-rousing cleric who fought occupation’, The Times, 7 May 2018, https:// www.thetimes.co.uk/article/west-s-hopes-for-iraq-rest-on-moqtada-al-sadr-who-fought-occupation-ct87t76fc [accessed 11 March 2020].

45 El-Dine, pp. 349-50.

to anti-sectarianism. Mass mobilisation of Sadrists widened the movement’s base and alSadr’s leadership heightened pressure for reform. The surprise victory of his cross-sectarian Saeroun alliance in the 2018 elections was further evidence of the depth of anti-elitist, antithe protest movement marked a distinct and important moment in the progress of antisectarianism. Previous electoral fragmentation, whilst an indicator of collapsing Shi’a unity, had rarely threatened the sectarian order. Sadrist action against the leadership, on the other hand, when combined with ongoing protests, presented a very real threat.

unprecedented interventions by Iraq’s religious leadership. Previously called ‘the quiet ruler’, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is the most important and authoritative cleric in the Shi’a community.46 Since 2003, he has mostly taken a backseat in Iraqi politics. When he did intervene, by endorsing the constitution and free elections in 2005, it was to promote Shi’a unity. In recent years, however, al-Sistani and the Najaf clergymen have used their position to challenge the government. In 2014, he issued a fatwa calling on politicians to select a new government, precipitating the end of Nouri al-Maliki’s eight-year reign.47 The following year, a fatwa was issued in favour of judicial reform, to relax the government’s control over the courts.48 His intervention in the recent protests was particularly damming of the political leadership. He warned: ‘if those in power think they can evade dealing with real reform by procrastination, they are mistaken. What comes after the protests is not the same as before, so be careful’.49 The Grand Ayatollah, the only state-level figure with more than 5% pubic trust, holds potentially transformative power in Iraq, as testified by his role in the fall of Maliki and, more recently, Adil Abdul-Mahdi.50 The Shi’a political bloc has been severely weakened by his willingness not only to intervene in politics, but to actively challenge decision-makers by supporting public demands for reform. Facing down the protestors without clerical backing has proved difficult for the government and strengthened the impetus for reform.

Conclusion The 2018 electoral victory of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saeroun bloc prompted some hope for change in Iraq. Many believed that his nationalist coalition of mostly secular groups, with a candidate list full of political outsiders, could put the protestors’ demands for radical reform into action. Even in America, al-Sadr’s former sworn enemy, some saw the potential for progress under his leadership.51 However, coalition negotiations stalled and the eventual

46 ‘Al-Sistani: the quiet ruler’, The Telegraph, 24 January 2005, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1481969/Al-Sistani-The-quiet-ruler.html [accessed 11 March 2020]. 47 Alexander Dziadosz and Raheem Salman, ‘After years off-stage, Iraq’s Sistani takes charge’, Reuters, 29 June 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-iraq-security-clerics-insight/after-years-off-stage-iraqs-sistani-takes-charge-idUSKBN0F30KX20140629 [accessed 11 March 2020]. 48 Mansour, p. 13.

‘

Growing political opposition to the Shi’a leadership has been accompanied by

Thomas Davies In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

sectarian opinion across the Iraqi public. The election result and al-Sadr’s involvement in

49 ‘Amid protests, Iraq’s top Shia leader calls for new election law’, Al Jazeera, 15 November 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protestsiraq-top-shia-leader-calls-election-law-191115100830021.html [accessed 11 March 2020]. 50 Dagher, ‘Iraq’s protests haven’t yet changed the system’.

appointment of Adil Abdul-Mahdi, provisionally an independent but with close ties to the Islamist parties and Iran, did little to placate the protestors. Shi’a politicians remain divided, but the depth and consistency of public anti-sectarianism in recent years seemingly cannot overcome the inertia built into Iraq’s political system. Protestors on the streets today chant virtually the same slogans they did in 2015-16. With the prospects for meaningful reform looking slim (at the time of writing, Iraq lacks a functioning Prime Minister after the PMdesignate Mohammed Allawi withdrew his nomination), Iraq could face a dangerous slide towards instability and violence.

Bibliography al-Ansary, Khalid, ‘Thousands Rally in Iraq’s Day of Rage Protests’, Al Jazeera, 25 February 2011, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-iraq-protests/thousands-of-iraqis-protest-in-day-of-rage-idUSTRE71O1RN20110225 [accessed 28 February 2020] Aldouri, Saad, ‘What to Know about Iraq’s Protest Movement’, Chatham House, 6 June 2017, https://www. chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-know-about-iraq-s-protest-movement [accessed 21 February 2020] ‘Al-Sistani: the quiet ruler’, The Telegraph, 24 January 2005, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1481969/Al-SistaniThe-quiet-ruler.html [accessed 11 March 2020] ‘Amid protests, Iraq’s top Shia leader calls for new election law’, Al Jazeera, 15 November 2019, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protests-iraq-top-shia-leader-calls-election-law-191115100830021.html [accessed 11 March 2020] Arab Barometer, ‘Level of Religiosity’, AB Wave V (2018), https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-analysistool/ [accessed 26 February 2020]

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Arab Barometer, Arab Barometer V: Iraq Country Report (2019) Associated Press, ‘Baghdad protestors converge on Liberation Square, The Guardian, 4 March 2011, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/04/baghdad-protesters-iraq-driving-ban [accessed 28 February 2020] Atlantic Council, What does new opinion survey data from Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan tell us?, online video recording, Youtube, 26 June 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BthfZxkqN-Q&feature=youtu.be [accessed 18 February 2020] Badawi, Tamer, ‘Why Arab Sunnis are disengaged from Iraq’s protests’, Atlantic Council (7 February 2020) https:// atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-arab-sunnis-are-disengaged-from-iraqs-protests/ [accessed 18 February 2020] Chams El-Dine, Chérine, ‘Out of the ashes: the rise of an anti-sectarian discourse in post-2011 Iraq’, in Islamists and the Politics of Arab Uprisings, ed. by Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Paola Rivetti (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), pp. 341-357 Dagher, Munqith, ‘Iraq’s protests haven’t yet changed the system — but they’re transforming Iraqis’ belief in themselves’, The Washington Post (10 December 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/10/ iraqs-protests-havent-yet-changed-system-theyre-transforming-iraqis-belief-themselves/ [accessed 20 February 2020] Dodge, Toby, ‘Tracing the Rise of Sectarianism in Iraq after 2003’, LSE Middle East Centre (13 September 2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/09/13/tracing-the-rise-of-sectarianism-in-iraq-after-2003/ [accessed 20 February 2020]

51 Michael D. Sullivan, ‘I fought against Muqtada al-Sadr. Now he’s Iraq’s best hope.’ Foreign Policy, 18 June 2018, https://foreignpolicy.

com/2018/06/18/i-fought-against-muqtada-al-sadr-now-hes-iraqs-best-hope/ [accessed 11 March 2020].

Dziadosz, Alexander and Raheem Salman, ‘After years off-stage, Iraq’s Sistani takes charge’, Reuters, 29 June 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-clerics-insight/after-years-off-stage-iraqs-sistani-takes-chargeidUSKBN0F30KX20140629 [accessed 11 March 2020] ‘Iraq Post-Daesh: Improved Social Cohesion, but Iraqis Remain Dissatisfied with Government’, National Democratic Institute (July 2019)

Mansour, Renad and Christine van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections: A Population in Transition’, LSE Middle East Centre (2018) Mansour, Renad, ‘Iraq after the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State’, Chatham House (July 2017)

McDermid, Charles and Karim Lami, ‘The Missing Ingredient in Iraq’s Day of Rage’, Time, 25 February 2011, http:// content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2055525,00.html [accessed 26 February 2020] Muir, Jim, ‘Iraq divisions undermine battle against IS’, BBC News, 5 February 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-35492067 [accessed 11 March 2020] Saraswat, Deepika, ‘Popular Protests in Iraq: The Terminal Crisis of the post-Saddam state?’, LSE Middle East Centre (17 December 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/12/17/popular-protests-in-iraq-the-terminal-crisis-of-thepost-saddam-state/ [accessed 20 February 2020] Sleiman-Haidar, Ribale, ‘The Sadrist-Communist Alliance: Implications for Iraq’s Secular Politics’, LSE Middle East Centre (6 June 2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/06/the-sadrist-communist-alliance-implications-for-iraqssecular-politics/ [accessed 20 February 2020] Spencer, Richard, ‘Arabs are losing their faith in religious parties and leaders’, The Economist, 5 December 2019, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/12/05/arabs-are-losing-faith-in-religious-parties-and-leaders [accessed 28 February 2020] Spencer, Richard, ‘West’s hopes for Iraq rest on Moqtada al-Sadr, the rabble-rousing cleric who fought occupation’, The Times, 7 May 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/west-s-hopes-for-iraq-rest-on-moqtada-al-sadr-whofought-occupation-ct87t76fc [accessed 11 March 2020] Sullivan, Michael D., ‘I fought against Muqtada al-Sadr. Now he’s Iraq’s best hope.’ Foreign Policy, 18 June 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/18/i-fought-against-muqtada-al-sadr-now-hes-iraqs-best-hope/ [accessed 11 March 2020] Thomas, Kathrin, ‘Civic Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa’, Arab Barometer (2019) van den Toorn, Christine and Raad Alkadiri, ‘Can Iraq’s Revolution Succeed? Reflections from a Protest Movement at a Crossroads’, LSE Middle East Centre (7 November 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/11/07/can-iraqsrevolution-succeed-reflections-from-a-protest-movement-at-a-crossroads/ [accessed 20 February 2020] Wee, Jason and Sophie Li, ‘Politics and Social Media in the Middle East and North Africa, Arab Barometer (2019) ‘Why are Iraqis protesting?’, ORB International (October 2019) https://orb-international.com/2019/10/25/ iraqprotests/ [accessed 18 February 2020]

‘

Marcus, Jonathan, ‘Iraq and Syria opinion poll – the world’s most dangerous survey?’, BBC News, 9 September 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34173549 [accessed 18 February 2020].

Thomas Davies In the name of religion, we were robbed by thieves’: Anti-Sectarianism and the Iraqi Protest Movement

Jabar, Faleh A., ‘The Iraqi Protest Movement: From Identity Politics to Issue Politics’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 25 (June 2018)

Failure to Comply Olivia Frankland This poem was composed to highlight the hypocrisy within climate change protests; denoting the insincerity that lies within protesters claims. It emphasizes that the fragility of the Earth is a result of human ignorance regarding the true extent of climate change. It addresses the issues of hypocrisy within the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leaders, top organisations and those who claim to be actively helping the Earth. It emphasizes that we as humans have caused the damage and are too proud and supercilious to admit that we are not doing enough to prevent any further damage. I composed the poem with juxtaposing concepts to highlight the stark future that we are heading into due to human arrogance. The title of the poem depicts how humans have shown a blatant disregard to the needs of the planet, and how they are failing, regardless of their demonstrations that claim to call for change. Whilst we are in protest for a solution for the climate catastrophe, it is not enough.

Failure to Comply

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They call for Greenpeace but the land is burnt black.

They praise ocean rescue but the seas are suffocating. They shout Extinction Rebellion but extinction is winning. They call it clean energy but build it with dirty money. They follow a green diet but cook with black coal. They claim we can change the world but we already did.

China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees James Holmes Abstract Since the North Korean famine of the 1990s, North Korean people have been crossing the border into China illegally; given the dire human rights record of the DPRK, many NGOs and scholars refer to these border-crossers as refugees, although the UNHCR classifies them merely as ‘persons of interest’, and China classifies them as ‘economic migrants’, which is likely true in most, but not all, cases. I will show how China has a long history of engagement with the international refugee protection regime, but it is failing severely to implement its minimum responsibilities with regards to the refugees that exist amongst those entering from North Korea. China attempts to justify its actions by declaring all North Korean border crossers to be economic migrants and citing its bilateral agreement with the DPRK to return all its citizens, however this blatantly ignores the certain number of border crossers who are political, religious or racial refugees, and the primacy of the nonrefoulement principle in the Refugee Convention. Reasons for this policy are manifold, including avoiding damage to relations with the DPRK, maintaining regional security by supporting the DPRK, and avoidance of the social and economic burden associated with processing refugees.

Since the North Korean famine in the mid-1990s, large numbers of North Korean nationals having been crossing illegally into China each year; although most of these border-crossers might technically be classed as economic migrants under international standards, a certain number amongst them would qualify for refugee status due to political and religious persecution, and some scholars believe all should be considered refugees sur place (due to the severe punishment they face upon repatriation).1 However, despite having ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (which prohibit states from returning refugees to their source country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom) China’s policy is to forcibly deport all North Koreans in its territory and refuse them access to the UNHCR, without exception.2 In this essay I will explore China’s history of engagement with the international refugee protection regime, China’s domestic legal provisions towards refugees, how China violates the Refugee Convention and other agreements with regard to North Koreans and its justifications for doing so, and the various reasons behind these policy decisions.

1 Roberta Cohen, ‘North Koreans in China in need of international protection’, Forced Migration Review, 41 (2012), 42-43 (p. 42). 2Russel Aldrich, ‘An Examination of China’s Treatment of North Korean Asylum Seekers’, North Korean Review, 7 (2011), 36-48 (p. 37).

China’s history with refugee engagement While it is widely known that China is a major source country for refugees,3 it is less widely known that China is also a host country to around 300,000 refugees4 and in recent years China has become a growing refugee destination and transit country, with 460 people of concern registered by the UNHCR in 2015, for instance.5 China has a long history of engagement with refugees that cross its borders from abroad and the wider international refugee protection regime, but this engagement has been complex and inconsistent. Under the nationalist government, China was active in UN work to create an international framework for refugee protection after the Second World War; for instance, China participated in the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons in 1946, and in 1951 China participated in the drafting of the Refugee Convention (even though it didn’t itself ratify the convention until 1982).6 In the following decades China hosted three cohorts of co-ethnics migrating under forced conditions: Malayan-Chinese fleeing the British-ruled Malayan Union due to persecution as a result of their communist affiliations in 1949-53; Indonesian Chinese escaping anti-Chinese persecution in newly independent Indonesia in 1959-69; and Vietnamese Chinese fleeing ethnic persecution in 1978-79. While many of these groups should have been classified as refugees under the 1951 Convention since they were fleeing political persecution, China instead classified them as ‘returnees’ (guiguo huaqiao)7 meaning not all scholars include them in overviews of China’s history of hosting refugees. The most significant of these waves was the third, from Vietnam, as in 1979 the financial pressures of hosting and integrating the Vietnamese prompted China to change its policy, announcing that the displaced persons from Vietnam should be considered refugees, and accepting a UNHCR assistance programme, one of the first UN aid programs to take place in China.8 Three years later in 1982, with certain reservations, China acceded to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, second only to Japan in the East/South-East Asian region, and

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still one of only six signatory countries in the region.9 Besides influxes of North Koreans from the mid-1990s onwards, which is the main focus of this essay, more recently China has hosted displaced Kokangs and Kachins fleeing Myanmar, collectively numbering over 100,000.10

Domestic legal provisions and unenforceable treaties China’s domestic legal provisions regarding its duty towards refugees are very weak and non-coercive – article thirty-two of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, issued 3 UNHCR, World at War: UNHCR Global Trends Report 2014 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2015) <https://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html> (p. 17) [accessed 20 February 2020]. 4 Ibid, pp. 44-48. 5 UNHCR 2015 End-year report; subregion: East Asia and the Pacific <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GR2015EastAsiaandthePacific-eng.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 6 Angus Frances, ‘China’s refugee policy: pathways to reform’, Australian Journal of Human Rights, 17.1 (2011), 29-53 (pp. 30-31) < https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1323238X.2011.11910894>. 7 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, ‘’Refugee’ or ‘returnee’: the ethnic geopolitics or diasporic resettlement in China and intergenerational change’, Transactions of 8 Lili Song, ‘China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present and Potentials’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 37 (2018), 139-161 (p. 144). 9 UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific: Fact Sheet, (p. 7) <http://www.unhcr.org/5000139a9.pdf> [accessed 11 February 2020]. 10 Lili Song, ‘Refugees or border residents from Myanmar? The status of ethnic Kachins and Kokangs in Yunnan province, China’, International Journal

of Refugee Law, 29 (2017), 466-487 (p. 466).

in 1982, states that “The People’s Republic of China may grant asylum to foreigners who request it for political reasons”11, while article fifteen of the PRC Entry and Exit of Aliens Control Act of 1985 (effective from 1986) stipulates that “Aliens who seek asylum for political reasons shall be permitted to reside in China upon approval by the competent authorities of the Chinese Government”.12 Both provisions are notably permissive rather than mandatory, giving China no legal requirements or duties to which it could be held accountable. Besides these vague, brief provisions, China has no national refugee legislation or procedures to guide or standardise its treatment of foreign nationals wishing to claim asylum, and lacks a legal or administrative set of criteria for refugee status – that is, an official definition of the term ‘refugee’ in legal sense.13 This results in a significant lack of clarity on a number of key practical areas such as who has the right to apply for refugee status, how applications should be submitted and who to, what rights asylum seekers are entitled to, and so on.14 This demonstrates a clear lack of will on the part of China to fulfil its obligations under the 1951 Convention and take a significant role in the international refugee protection regime. Although China’s ascension to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol may theoretically fill in this gap in legislation and stipulate China’s responsibilities, in practice the Convention and Protocol have not become fully enforceable in China. This is because and the Protocol and Convention have never been directly applied by Chinese courts.15 Although there have been a few examples relating to civil and commercial matters where treaties signed by China have been directly applied by domestic Chinese courts, in general treaties ratified by China do not automatically become part of domestic law as China’s Constitution is silent regarding the domestic legal status of international treaties. Consequently there is no official clarity regarding whether China adopts a monist, treaties being automatically effective in domestic law, or dualist, treaties needing to be written into legislation to be enforceable domestically, approach towards treaties.

However it can be

seen that in Chinese legal practice “treaties acquire prevailing force over domestic law only when the relevant domestic law includes an explicit stipulation to that effect”,17 meaning China’s signing of the Convention and Protocol is insufficient to legally compel it to fulfil its responsibilities as described in those agreements, particularly its duty of non-refoulement, and they are not fully enforceable domestically within China.

China’s treatment of North Koreans in China, justifications and treaty violations China does not allow North Koreans in its territory to apply for political asylum and blocks them from accessing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Beijing, despite having ratified the UN’s 1951 refugee convention and 1967 Protocol in 1982 following the 11 ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, Purdue University <https://www.purdue.edu/crcs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Constitution.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 12 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens, The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China <http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/21/content_25035.htm> [accessed 26 April 2020]. 13 Frances, ‘China’s refugee policy’, p. 34. 14 Lan Lihong and Shi Xiuxia, ‘Reflection on the latest progress in Chinese legislation on international migration’, Frontiers of Law in China, 8 (2013), 618-647 (p. 634). 15 Lili Song, ‘Who shall we help: the refugee definition in a Chinese context’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33 (2014), 44-58 (pp.46-47). 16 Guo Sanzhuan, ‘Implementation of human rights treaties by Chinese courts: problems and prospects’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 8

Thomas Davies China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees

China has not codified its obligations as defined in the two agreements into domestic law,

(2009), 161-179 (p. 163). 17 Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 8 (2009), 299-322 (p. 305).

Indochinese refugee influx in the 1970s.18 China’s official policy is to repatriate any North Korean nationals without a valid visa immediately, and on average China deports five to six thousand North Koreans every year (and this figure has previously been far higher).19 The Chinese government justifies this policy by insisting that all North Koreans in China are economic migrants20, thereby washing its hands of any responsibility to provide asylum or support towards the border-crossers or allow further involvement of UNHCR. However, the fact that China does not allow them to even apply for asylum indicates an anxiety that many would qualify as refugees if they were given the opportunity. Secondly, China justifies its policy by the means of a bilateral repatriation agreement known as the Mutual Cooperative Protocol Between China and North Korea for National Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, which it signed with North Korea in 1986, to return all North Koreans discovered in China, as well as article four of the 1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Mutual Assistance, which provides for the return of all DPRK nationals without a valid travel certificate.21 However, article thirty-three of the 1951 Convention states that “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”,22 while the 1967 Protocol contains non-derogation clauses emphasising the primacy of the non-refoulement principle over any other duties or agreements.23 In addition, China also ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 198824 in which article three stipulates that ‘No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’.25 The UN’s Committee Against Torture has reported that China not only has no law to prevent a person being deported to a country where they

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may face a substantial risk of torture, it also provides no screening of those it deports to North Korea to assess the risk of torture.26 This is despite the fact that once returned to North Korea, under article sixty-two of the DPRK constitution defectors may be charged with the serious crime of treason against the state27, and a plethora of NGO reports pointing to the existence of torture in North Korean detention centres.28 Furthermore, in 2008 the UN issued a Guidance Note on Extradition Treaties and International Refugee Protection, 18 Liu Guofu, Chinese Immigration Law, (Farnham England and Burlington USA: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), p. 89. 19 Jeanyoung Jeannie Cho, ‘Systemising the fate of the stateless North Korean migrant: a legal guide to preventing the automatic repatriation of North Korean migrants in China’, Fordham International Law Journal, 37 (2013), 175-234 (p. 205). 20 Aldrich, ‘An examination’, p. 37. 21 Elim Chan and Andreas Schloenhardt, ‘North Korean refugees and international refugee law’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 19 (2007), 215245 (p. 224). 22 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2010) <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10> (p. 30) [accessed 20 February 2020]. 23 Elisa Gahng, ‘North Korean Border-Crossers in Yanbian: The Protection Gap Between the Economic Migrant and Refugee Regimes’ Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 24 (2010), 361-378 (p. 371). 24 OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard’, OHCHR <https://indicators.ohchr.org/> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 25 OHCHR, Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, p. 2 <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 26 Frances, ‘China’s refugee policy’, p. 34. 27 Hui-Yi Katherine Tseng, ‘Protect the unprotected: the escaping North Korean issue and China’s dual dilemma of theoretical enlightenment and operational trial’, The Pacific Review, 32 (2019), 505-539 (pg 510).

28 Jiyoung Song, ‘Smuggled refugees”: The Social Construction of North Korean Migration’, International Migration, 51 (2013), 158-173 (p. 163).

which explicitly states in article 3.21 that the non-refoulement principle in international law overrides any bilateral agreements between states,29 delegitimising the 1986 Sino-DPRK repatriation agreement, and also clarifies that non-refoulement has reached the status of customary international law, meaning all states are bound to this obligation regardless of whether they have signed the Convention.30 It is therefore clear that from a legal perspective, China’s policy towards North Korean border-crossers is untenable.

Reasons behind China’s policy regarding North Korean border-crossers China’s designation of North Koreans on its soil as illegal economic migrants is a strategic policy reflecting various important geopolitical concerns. China and North Korea have a long-lasting amicable relationship, reflected in the PRC-DRPK military alliance of 1961 (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance), and nurtured by shared communist ideology, wartime cooperation, and many years of aid and assistance provided by China to the DPRK. Although relations have become more complex since China entered its reform period in the 1980s and started normalising relations with almost all countries in the world including South Korea, the two countries maintain a frustrated but largely positive relationship.31 Recognising North Korean seen as denouncing its ability to govern itself properly, an implicit denial of the legitimacy of its leadership.32 However, China’s primary concern is the continuity and stability of the DPRK, due to its own concerns, principally regarding security, rather than selfless friendship or ideological unity. Were China to grant refugee status to DPRK nationals, or even simply allow them access to the UNHCR, this would almost definitely result in a very substantial rise in the number of North Koreans attempting to cross into China, potentially in a mass exodus phenomenon, threatening the stability, indeed the very existence of the already-fragile North Korean regime.33 In September 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria to West German nationals, which set in motion the terminal crisis of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and played an important role in the collapse of the entire Eastern Bloc;34 Beijing is undoubtedly aware of this historical precedent, and does not want to recreate it by allowing free passage of North Koreans through its territory.35 Preventing collapse is China’s primary priority with regard to North Korea, as this would have devastating economic and human consequences for China, including huge numbers of refugees crossing the border, resulting in a potential serious security threat, while the loss of another Communist state would be a major political setback.36 In fact, unlike western forces, considering the dire state of the North Korean economy and the nation’s weakness in general, China considers the threat posed by North Korea’s collapse, and the likely ensuing humanitarian disaster, to be more serious than that of it becoming a nuclear rogue state or a deliberate threat to international security.37 29 UNHCR, Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008) p. 11 <https://www.refworld.org/ docid/481ec7d92.html> [accessed 20 February 2020]. 30 Gahng, ‘North Korean Border Crossers in Yanbian’, p. 371. 31 Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin, ‘China-North Korea relations’, North Korean Review, 7 (2011), 94-101 (p. 99). 32Tseng, ‘Protect the unprotected’, p. 527. 33 Yuan Ji, ‘Crafting and multilateral solution for North Korean refugee settlement: what American policymakers can learn from the Indochinese refugee crisis’, Journal of International Law & International Relations, 6 (2011), 53-82 (p. 68). 34 Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Chichester UK, and Princeton USA: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 128-29.

Thomas Davies China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees

border-crossers as refugees would damage China’s relationship with the DPRK, as it would be

35 Andrei Lankov, ‘North Korean Refugees in Northeast China’, Asian Survey, 44 (2004), 856-873 (p. 868). 36David L Shambaugh, ‘China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (2003), 43-56 (p. 45). 37 John S Park, ‘Inside multilateralism: The six party talks’, The Washington Quarterly, 28 (2005), 73-91 (p. 83).

North Korea as a buffer state The ongoing stability of the DPRK is also significant to China due to its function as a buffer state, although the importance of this function in the modern day is debated by scholars. The Korean peninsula was the route by which the Japanese invaded China at the beginning of the twentieth century. China’s sense of vulnerability towards the peninsula was worsened when American troops crossed the 38th Parallel and came close to the Chinese border in late 1950 during the Korean War – scholars such as Andrew Scobell argue that China has viewed North Korea as a crucial buffer state against South Korea, an American ally, and the USA in general ever since, as well being key to the wider regional balance of power against US alliances with Japan as well as the ROK.38 It has been argued that due to its history of weakness, including the ‘century of humiliation’ in the nineteenth century and severe deprivation in the 1940s and 50s, defence against external threats is deeply ingrained as China’s primary concern, and as a consequence China has always placed high importance on controlling buffer states, and indeed Korea has a long history of serving as a buffer state for China since ancient times.39 However, the PRC and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992 and now have good, well-developed political and economic cooperation that can be described as strategic partnership founded on strong political trust,40 and furthermore South Korea is now China’s fifth biggest export destination,41 while relations with the USA can be described as cordial, with military aggression seeming very unlikely in the near future. This calls into question the significance of the buffer state concept, and furthermore Eric McVadon argues that the idea of the DPRK as a buffer state is far more widely accepted by academics and strategists in the West than in China itself, where twenty years ago many were already calling the concept an anachronistic hangover of the Cold War.42 However, China and the USA continue to have serious disagreements on key security concerns such as North Korea and the South China Sea, and the scenario of the US launching a preventive war against China is seen as unlikely but possible, meaning the buffer the DPRK provides between China and the ROK is still of long-term strategic value for China.4344Scobell, writing in 2004, argues that

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although not as important as it once was, the buffer mentality has it lasting strength due its wartime origins and continues to linger, and Chinese leaders and analysts continue to refer to North Korea as ‘lips’ and China as ‘teeth’ – if the lips die, the teeth will suffer the cold.45 If so, this mentality will likely heighten China’s anxiety vis-à-vis a potential North Korean collapse, giving China more motivation to crackdown on illegal cross-border movement.

38 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 3. 39 Won Geun Choi, ‘China and its Janus-faced refugee policy’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 26 (2017), 224-240 (pp. 234-5). 40 Zhang Huizhi, Wang Xiaoke and Zhang Yimeng, ‘China-South Korea Relations’, xiandai guoji guanxi, 23 (2013), 101-116 (p. 101).

‘

41 China’, OEC <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn/> [accessed 18 February 2020]. 42 Eric A Mcvadon, ‘China’s goals and strategies for the Korean Peninsula’, in Planning for a peaceful Korea, ed. by Henry D Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001), p. 134. 43 Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, US-China relations and the liberal world order: ‘Contending elites, colliding visions?’, International Affairs, 94 (2018), 113-131 (p. 128). 44 Brandon Yoder, ‘Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” is Real, but Limited’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24 (2019), 87-104 (p. 101).

45 Scobell, China and North Korea, p. 18.

Other reasons - domestic and economic There are various other reasons for which China chooses not to allow North Korean bordercrossers access to the UNHCR, a key concern being the loss of sovereignty that this could result in. Identifying any North Koreans on its territory as refugees would oblige China to open its doors to both assistance and scrutiny from international agencies and NGOs, which could potentially result in the refugee issue being politicised and used against China in global power struggles, as well as facilitating more criticism of China’s human rights situations with regard to its own nationals, and unwelcome foreign influence in general.46 China would likely not be able to be selective regarding which agencies it allows in, resulting in a significant loss of control over the situation as a whole. Moreover, changing its position now would make China appear weak and set a precedent for further foreign intervention on what China considers its domestic policy concerns, at a time when China is increasingly assertive on the world stage.47 From a domestic perspective, there is a possibility that due to the highly political nature of North Korean refugees, a large influx could trigger a domestic dissident movement within China, and could provoke a separatist movement in China’s north-eastern provinces.4849It has also been argued that if China were to fully comply with all the treaties it has ratified, it would be obliged to treat North Korean refugees far better than from an economic perspective, were China to classify some or all North Korean defectors as refugees, the aid and services it would be obliged to provide would result in a substantial financial burden – forcibly deporting them is much simpler, easier, and cheaper.51There would also be wider economic implications, for example although some scholars argue the Chinese economy benefits from the cheap illegal labour North Koreans provide, others suggest China is concerned these low-income labourers will put strain on the over-saturated Chinese employment market.5253

Conclusion In conclusion, China’s policy towards North Korean border-crossers is in clear violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and its domestic provisions to support refugees of foreign origin are insufficient and unenforceable. This reflects China’s will to maintain regional stability and security, avoid damage to its reputation with the DPRK, and avoid the financial and political implications of hosting a large number of refugees. While China’s human rights abuses and treaty violations with regard to its own nationals are relatively widely reported and discussed in the West, especially in Xinjiang province in recent years, more attention must also be paid to China’s treatment of foreign refugees in its territory and its disregard for their human rights, especially as China continues to strive for greater legitimacy and a leading position on the world stage.

46 Tseng, ‘Protect the unprotected’, p. 526. 47 Yeo Hoon Julie Park, ‘China’s “way out” of the North Korean refugee crisis: developing a legal framework for the deportation of North Korean migrants’, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 25 (2011), 515-883 (pp. 520-21). 48 Kyung-Ae Park, ‘People’s Exit in North Korea: New Threat to Regime Stability?’, Pacific Focus, 25 (2010), 257-275 (p. 274). 49 Tseng, ‘Protect the unprotected’, p. 526. 50 Park, ‘Inside multilateralism’, p. 82.

Thomas Davies China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees

it treats its own rural citizens, which could potentially result in unrest and conflict.50 Finally,

51 Lankov, ‘North Korean Refugees’, p. 868. 52 Ibid. 53 Park, ‘China’s “way out” of the North Korean refugee crisis’, p. 520.

Bibliography Technical and legal documents OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard’, OHCHR <https://indicators.ohchr.org/> [accessed 20 February 2020] OHCHR, Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment <https:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020] UNHCR 2015 End-year report; subregion: East Asia and the Pacific <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ pdfsummaries/GR2015-EastAsiaandthePacific-eng.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020] UNHCR, ‘Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific: Fact Sheet’ (p. 7) <http://www.unhcr.org/5000139a9.pdf> [accessed 11 February 2020] UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, 2010) <https://www.unhcr. org/3b66c2aa10> (p. 30) [accessed 20 February 2020] UNHCR, Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008) <https:// www.refworld.org/docid/481ec7d92.html> [accessed 20 February 2020] UNHCR, World at War: UNHCR Global Trends Report 2014 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2015) <https://www.unhcr. org/556725e69.html> (p. 17) [accessed 20 February 2020] ‘China’, OEC <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn/> [accessed 18 February 2020] ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, Purdue University <https://www.purdue.edu/crcs/wp-content/ uploads/2014/04/Constitution.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020] Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens, The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China <http://english1.english.gov.cn/2005-08/21/content_25035.htm> [accessed 26 April 2020] Scholarship Aldrich, Russel, ‘An Examination of China’s Treatment of North Korean Asylum Seekers’, North Korean Review, 7 (2011), 36-48 Chan, Elim, and Schloenhardt, Andreas, ‘North Korean refugees and international refugee law’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 19 (2007), 215-245

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Cho, Jeanyoung Jeannie, ‘Systemising the fate of the stateless North Korean migrant: a legal guide to preventing the automatic repatriation of North Korean migrants in China’, Fordham International Law Journal, 37 (2013), 175234 Choi, Won Geun, ‘China and its Janus-faced refugee policy’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 26 (2017), 224240 Cohen, Roberta, ‘North Koreans in China in need of international protection’, Forced Migration Review, 41 (2012), 42-43 De Graaff, Nana, and Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, US-China relations and the liberal world order: ‘Contending elites, colliding visions?’, International Affairs, 94 (2018), 113-131 Frances, Angus, ‘China’s refugee policy: pathways to reform’, Australian Journal of Human Rights, 17.1 (2011), 2953 < https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1323238X.2011.11910894> Gahng, Elisa, ‘North Korean Border-Crossers in Yanbian: The Protection Gap Between the Economic Migrant and Refugee Regimes’ Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 24 (2010), 361-378 Guo, Sanzhuan, ‘Implementation of human rights treaties by Chinese courts: problems and prospects’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 8 (2009), 161-179 Ho, Elaine Lynn-Ee, ‘’Refugee’ or ‘returnee’: the ethnic geopolitics or diasporic resettlement in China and intergenerational change’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38.4 (2013), 599-611 < https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00548.x> Lan, Lihong and Shi, Xiuxia, ‘Reflection on the latest progress in Chinese legislation on international migration’, Frontiers of Law in China, 8 (2013), 618-647 Lankov, Andrei, ‘North Korean Refugees in Northeast China’, Asian Survey, 44 (2004), 856-873 Liu, Guofu, Chinese Immigration Law, (Farnham England and Burlington USA: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011) Maier, Charles, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Chichester UK, and Princeton USA: Princeton University Press, 1999)

Mcvadon, Eric, ‘China’s goals and strategies for the Korean Peninsula’, in Planning for a peaceful Korea, ed. by Henry D Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2001) Nanto, Dick, and Manyin, Mark, ‘China-North Korea relations’, North Korean Review, 7 (2011), 94-101 Park, John, ‘Inside multilateralism: The six party talks’, The Washington Quarterly, 28 (2005), 73-91 Park, Kyung-Ae, ‘People’s Exit in North Korea: New Threat to Regime Stability?’, Pacific Focus, 25 (2010), 257-275 Park, Yeo Hoon Julie, ‘China’s “way out” of the North Korean refugee crisis: developing a legal framework for the deportation of North Korean migrants’, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 25 (2011), 515-883 Scobell, Andrew, China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004) Shambaugh, David, ‘China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (2003), 43-56 Song, Jiyoung, ‘Smuggled refugees”: The Social Construction of North Korean Migration’, International Migration, 51 (2013), 158-173 Song, Lili, ‘China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present and Potentials’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 37 (2018), 139-161 Song, Lili, ‘Refugees or border residents from Myanmar? The status of ethnic Kachins and Kokangs in Yunnan province, China’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 29 (2017), 466-487 Song, Lili, ‘Who shall we help: the refugee definition in a Chinese context’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33 (2014), 44-58

Xue, Hanqin and Jin, Qian, ‘International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System’, Chinese Journal of International Law, 8 (2009), 299-322 Yoder, Brandon, ‘Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” is Real, but Limited’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24 (2019), 87-104 Yuan, Ji, ‘Crafting and multilateral solution for North Korean refugee settlement: what American policymakers can learn from the Indochinese refugee crisis’, Journal of International Law & International Relations, 6 (2011), 53-82 Zhang, Huizhi, Wang, Xiaoke and Zhang, Yimeng, ‘China-South Korea Relations’, xiandai guoji guanxi, 23 (2013), 101-116

Thomas Davies China, the Refugee Convention, and North Korean Refugees

Tseng, Hui-Yi Katherine, ‘Protect the unprotected: the escaping North Korean issue and China’s dual dilemma of theoretical enlightenment and operational trial’, The Pacific Review, 32 (2019), 505-539

What If Andrea Loftus Having attended several Climate Protests with both Amnesty International and alongside Extinction Rebellion, it was truly soulful to see the crowds of youth ignited by the spirit of civil unrest to catalyse systemic change. However, I couldn’t help but wonder of the irony that we both support and encourage their strength but also have contributed to the need for change in our own way, as have they. We are all well meaning hypocrites recovering from the unconscious environmental impact we have had throughout our lives, seemingly insignificant compared to profit-driven companies funding practices like fracking but nonetheless leaving our drop in sea of significance. It is a thought that is like an unravelling thread, the end hard to locate as it leads to wondering whether we are protesting to heal a planet we never should have had the chance to harm. It’s time to nurture the youth to be better than us, but nonetheless reserve their right to learn and live and lead a life as liberally as those whose choices may rob them from having one at all.

What If

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Were we not here, to protect the young stems, who birth from stained soils on land we’ve laced with poison.

Were we not here, to guide the subtle shoots of fervent free youth as their bodies form forests. Were we not here, then their flushed, folded futures could bathe in soulful sentience, in saline waters, not turning tides. Were we not here, would our mother live on? The body we’ve bled dry but a memory, at mercy in our minds.

Photos: Andrea Loftus

Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System Olivia McGhie Abstract The Gilets Jaunes, whose protests began in November 2018, reached their pinnacle this Christmas. After joining forces with the huge, country-wide strikes against Macron’s proposed pension reforms, France saw the largest and most comprehensive challenge to its state and government since May ’68. This essay will trace the evolution of the Gilets Jaunes movement, their demands, and reason for existence: namely, the failures of the French representative democratic system which is witnessing an acute crisis. This simultaneously shaped their calls for greater direct democracy within the country. It also shaped the response from Macron and his government who firstly attempted to not only downplay but demonise and dismiss them as nothing more than a right-wing and reactionary movement, but then unleashed the full force of the French police whose sustained attacks against the Gilets Jaunes has been unprecedented since the riots of ’68. This essay therefore attempts to analyse the kernel of the protest movement, which to many still remains an unknown entity, and to show how they merely represent the obvious manifestation of decades of neoliberal policy and neglect from the French political process. The Gilets Jaunes protest movement that erupted on 17th November 2018 around France seemed to take the French establishment and her allies around the globe by surprise. Leaderless, spontaneous, and organised not through political parties or unions but through

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Facebook groups and chats, the Gilets Jaunes and their instantly recognisable yellow high-

vis jackets have captured the French political imagination for nearly a year and a half. Starting as a core group of those committed to the Gilets Jaunes cause, it has slowly morphed into a broader movement encompassing both Extinction Rebellion and the more recent major strikes against President Macron’s deeply unpopular pension reforms. In keeping with France’s history of anti-fiscal protests, it is surprising that Macron and his government were so taken aback by this movement. Following Charles VII’s introduction of the permanent royal tax on the whole of his kingdom in the 15th century, the rejection of certain taxes has been a crucial mobilising factor for popular protest in France. The Gilets Jaunes mobilisation around Macron’s carbon tax, that was arguably not much more than window-dressing for a lacklustre environmental programme, therefore followed in this French tradition. However, the historic tradition of anti-fiscal mobilisation within the French working class must not be confused for a regressive reluctance to pay one’s taxes. Rather, whilst a vocal strand does exist within the Gilets Jaunes movement that takes its cue from the neo-classicists who resent paying taxes on the grounds that it infringes on their personal liberty, it is more accurate to say that they dislike these taxes because the working class and lower-middle

classes of France feel as if they pay these taxes only to enrich the ultra-rich.1 These people reject Macron’s carbon tax on the grounds that it does not address the realities of those who will bear the brunt of it. The protestors would rather a more redistributive governmental fiscal programme was put in place.2 The tax weighed heaviest on the working and middle classes despite the fact that the richest ten percent of the population emits around three times more CO2 than the poorest ten percent.3 So, it can be seen that the Gilets Jaunes movement arose out of the structural inequalities brought to the fore by the unpopular carbon tax. Yet, the rejection of the tax was inextricably bound up in a call for greater democracy as the tax represented the failures of the current representative system. The tax was thus symbolic of the disconnection between those who made the policies and those who received them. This essay will therefore trace firstly the two main criticisms from the Gilets Jaunes which subsequently shaped their demands — more direct democracy, and will look to analyse the repressive police response to the movement which is bound up in a neoliberal understanding of structural, institutionalised violence but nevertheless symbolises the growing anachronistic representative French democracy. The Gilets Jaunes represent the obvious response to the critical failures of France’s representative democracy. Although the movement was born out of a hostile reaction to the deeply unpopular “carbon tax”, it quickly became a symbolic manifestation of an urgent call for greater democracy in the country. In fact, it is possible to see the catalytic “carbon tax” as wholly representative of what the Gilets Jaunes movement stands for. The tax was intended to reduce fossil-fuel consumption and demonstrate President Macron’s willingness to respond to climate change.4 However, it has been estimated that the carbon tax would, if implemented, weigh five times more heavily on the bottom ten percent of the population than on the top and, crucially, the car industry itself was to be exempt from this levy.5 Furthermore, the transport links to outer city areas have been chronically underfunded in France and thus for most people who do not live within the elaborate lattice of the métro, bus, or tram networks of the big cities, a car is a necessity.6 The tax, therefore, came to be seen as symbolic of the attitude of the French state towards its people: a failure to understand the realities of swathes of working class and lower-middle class men and women who have been economically squeezed for decades. The continued assault on the economic dignity of those who support and partake in the Gilets Jaunes movement is key for understanding their demands. This existential feeling of a loss of self-respectability; that these people can no longer afford rent or loans, let alone having to pay more for petrol when no alternative eco-friendly alternatives have been put 1 Gérard Noiriel, “Les “Gilets Jaunes” remplacent la question sociale au centre du jeu politique”, Le Monde, 27th November 2018, Idées section <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/11/27/gerard-noiriel-les-gilets-jaunes-replacent-la-question-sociale-au-centre-du-jeupolitique_5389042_3232.html> [accessed : 20th February 2020]. 2 Gérard Noiriel, “Les “Gilets Jaunes” remplacent la question sociale au centre du jeu politique”, Le Monde, 27th November 2018, Idées section <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/11/27/gerard-noiriel-les-gilets-jaunes-replacent-la-question-sociale-au-centre-du-jeupolitique_5389042_3232.html> [accessed 23rd February 2020]. 3 Lucas Chancel, “Are younger generations higher carbon emitters than their elders?: Inequalities, generations and CO2 emissions in France and in the USA”, Ecological Economies, 100 (2014), pp. 195-207 (p.203). 4 Didier Fassin and Anne-Claire Defossez, “An Improbable Movement? Macron’s France and the Rise of the Gilets Jaunes, New Left Review, 115

Olivia McGhie: Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System

a rejection of Macronism and years of austerity. Thirdly, and no less important, this essay

(January/February 2019), pp.77-92 (p. 78). 5 Fassin and Defossez, An Improbable Movement, p. 80. 6 Fassin and Defossez, An Improbable Movement, pp. 80-1.

in place, pushed many onto the streets in November 2018.7 It is not that the Gilet Jaunes are specifically against measures that help climate change, rather it is that these initiatives have been put in place without prior consultation with those who will bear the brunt of the new tax and without understanding of the growing structural inequalities that have been ignored by successive governments who have ignored the increasing proletarianization of the middle class. It is within this context that the Gilets Jaunes base their demands for democratic reforms. Angry with a system that takes them and their work for granted, disenchanted with a democratic process that delivers next to nothing for the “people” it claims to serve, and chronically underrepresented within these democratic institutions, the French parliament lacks a single blue collar representative despite this group making up twenty percent of the population. The Gilets Jaunes rallying cry is for a more democratic France.8 When the Gilet Jaunes burst onto the scene in late November 2018 the standout demand was for a constitutionally guaranteed “popular referendum” (Référendum d’initiative citoyenne) [RIC].9 The RIC is seen by the Gilets Jaunes as a way in which there can be greater direct democracy in the country as the referendum initiative would trigger a binary vote on a local or national level if enough people sign a petition on a given subject.10 The RIC is seen as an important way in which power can be rebalanced within the country. Decisions that affect the whole country would be made by the whole country rather than a group of people who are less and less seen as effective representatives of France in an attempt to re-establish a “true” democracy.11 Essentially, the thousands of men and women who each Saturday block roads, occupy public spaces, or traverse the grands boulevards of the cities in France are looking, in one way or another, to give a power back to the “people”. It can, at times, be over-simplistic to write about the “people” as if they exist only in opposition to the “elites” they are attempting to challenge as, evidently, the “people” are full of varying races, ideologies, classes, and contradictions. Nevertheless, the vast majority of those

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participating in the Gilets Jaunes are united in their calls for a new type of citizenship; a more participatory and truly representative one.12 The Gilets Jaunes were born out of a crisis in the French democratic system and were therefore, from their first tentative steps in November 2018, defined as in opposition to the politicians and institutions they demanded democratic change from. Interestingly, as political historian Alexis Spire points out, the binary construction was less around Us (Gilets

7 Jean-Claude Monod, “La Crise de l’Etat Néolibéral” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) and Isabelle Coutant, “Les “petits-moyens” prennent la parole” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) file:///C:/Users/livmc/OneDrive/Documents/year%20three/Leeds%20Human%20Rights%20Journal/Le%20fond%20de%20 l%E2%80%99air%20est%20jaune%20Comprendre%20une%20r%C3%A9volte%20in%C3%A9dite%20by%20Joseph%20Confavreux%20(Org.)%20(z-lib. org).pdf [accessed : 19th February 2020]. 8 Statistics from: Fassin and Defossez, “An Improbable Movement”, p.85. 9 Samuel Hayat, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Democratic Question”, Viewpoint Magazine, February 13th 2019, https://www.viewpointmag. com/2019/02/13/the-gilets-jaunes-and-the-democratic-question/ [accessed: 19th February 2020]. 10 Samuel Hayat, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Democratic Question”, Viewpoint Magazine, February 13th 2019, https://www.viewpointmag. com/2019/02/13/the-gilets-jaunes-and-the-democratic-question/ [accessed: 19th February 2020]. 11 Gabriel Bristow, “Yellow Fever: Populist Pangs in France”, Soundings; London, 72 (2019), pp. 65-78 (p. 70).

12 Monod, La Crise de l’Etat Néolibéral [accessed 20th February 2020].

Jaunes) vs Them (politicians) but rather We (nous) as the dominant identity organising point.13 This construction seems to hold true: the Gilets Jaunes movement, when it began in late 2018, could command support from seventy-five percent of the population.14 Thus, despite many French media outlets arguing that this movement appeared from nowhere, the sheer volume of support that the population had for the Gilets Jaunes points to the complete opposite: that this grass-roots campaign tapped into something within the French psyche. Whilst President Emmanuel Macron has been the most unpopular President in the history of the French Republic, with only thirty percent of the general public holding a positive view of him as of January 2020, arguably he is merely the most obvious representation of the failure of the French democratic and political system.15 For it is within his dishonesty of promising during his whirlwind Presidential campaign to be neither “left” nor “right”, to find the “third way” (troisième voie), when he has actually continued to pursue a relentless programme of He represents perfectly, and is the prodigal son of the system which both created him and which he is attempting to sustain. From the moment that the Gilets Jaunes blocked their first roundabout over a year ago, Macron has attempted to shape the discourse on the movement. He has referred to them as “Poujadists”, making reference to the populist anti-tax campaigners of the 1950s whose discourse was riddled with xenophobia and antisemitism, and called them a “hateful mob” (une foule haineuse) who have attacked “elected officials, the forces of law and order, journalists, Jews, foreigners [and] homosexuals” (aux élus, aux forces de l’ordre, aux journalistes, aux juifs, aux étrangers, aux homosexuels).17 Historian Gérard Noiriel has argued that this discourse that Macron is trying to forge around the Gilets Jaunes, one centred around identity which looks to score easy and quick moral points, is exactly what the movement deplores and is actively fighting against.18 Noiriel’s argument has validity, as in attempting to shift the discourse surrounding the Gilets Jaunes away from the economic and towards the sphere of identity, he is symbolising the very contempt those involved in the movement feel towards him and what he represents. By dismissing them as reactionaries he is deliberately ignoring the very delicate chain of events that lead to their creation. His failure to address or acknowledge the economic structures that have entrenched the precarity and inequalities that lead to the birth of the movement is symbolic of a man and who rejects ideologies and structural understandings of the class system. His tone of contempt for a movement that, in part, his policies and politics created, goes a long way to symbolise the impasse that France’s representative democracy has encountered. Macron, who once defined his style of governing as “Jupiterian”, is seemingly taken aback when, in a sort of reverse Promethean turn of events, he has created a politicised class out of those who he 13 Alexis Spire, “Reformuler la Question Sociale” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) [accessed : 20th February 2020]. 14 Fassin and Defossez, An Improbable Movement, p. 77. 15Federico Vacas and Mathieu Gallard, “Baromètre Politique: La popularité de l’exécutif se stabilise, mais certains membres du Gouvernement reculent nettement” in IPSOS Public Affairs, updated 22nd January 2020 [cited : 20th February 2020]. Available from : <https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/ barometre-politique-la-popularite-de-lexecutif-se-stabilise-mais-certains-membres-du-gouvernement>. 16 Laurent Joffrin, “Qu’est ce-que le macronisme ? ”, Libération, 12th May 2017, Editorial <https://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2017/05/12/qu-est-ceque-le-macronisme_1569242> [accessed 20th February 2020]. 17Emmanuel Macron “Vœux 2019 aux Français” [online], Elysée, 31st December 2018 [cited : February 20th 2020]. Available from: < https://www. elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/31/voeux-aux-francais-2019>.

Olivia McGhie: Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System

neoliberal reforms that the starkest realities of the French democratic system can be found.16

18 Gérard Noriel, « Les Gilets Jaunes, l’antisémitisme et « la démocratie du public » » [online], Wordpress : le populaire dans tous ses états, 20th February 2019 [cited : February 20th 2020]. Available from : <https://noiriel.wordpress.com/2019/02/20/les-gilets-jaunes-lantisemitisme-et-lademocratie-du-public/>.

feels should remain somewhat apolitical.19 It is therefore somewhat ironic that the Gilets Jaunes, as Noriel points out, can be compared to the way in Macron himself was elected President: without a political party, by surprise, and without a specific ideology.20 Some have argued the type of citizenism defined by the Gilets Jaunes is the neoliberal counterpoint to Macronism21, and whilst this is a compelling and interesting argument, it is not the focus of this essay; rather, within France’s representative democracy can be found the seeds of its own destruction. The years of being told, as Noiriel sums up, “vote for us and we’ll take care of everything” (votez pour nous et on s’occupe de tout)22, in an effort to create a wellestablished and trusted class of technocrats has seemingly failed. If not anything else, the Gilets Jaunes therefore represent a real rebellion against this out of touch representation. The Gilets Jaunes took their protests against the carbon tax, and then later in a more general sense against Macronism and his continued neoliberal fiscal reforms, to towns and cities all around France. Wearing their signature fluorescent yellow vests that are a legal obligation to have in the car in France in case of breakdown and also a symbol of their supposed apolitical nature, as opposed to the historically left wing colour of red, the women and men of the Gilets Jaunes movement have been met with unprecedented police force.23 Only one month after the protests began in November 2018, criminologist Fabien Jobard noted that the number of injuries at the hands of the police was higher than anything that had been seen in France since the uprisings in Paris in May ’68.24 Furthermore, as the protests seeped over into the new year of 2019, the police violence continued: the website desarmons-les, which collects statistics on police brutality towards the public, reported on the 4th January that 157 people involved in the Gilets Jaunes protest had either been injured or killed at the hands of the police.25 Most of the injuries sustained were caused by Flash-Ball rubber pellet guns and Sting-Ball grenades-both riot control devices that are not commonly used in other European countries.26 Whilst the riot police do not tend to recognise age as a factor when controlling the protestors, it is nevertheless interesting to point out that an 81 year old Algerian woman

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died in Marseille after police threw a gas canister into her fourth floor apartment which hit her head.27 Yet perhaps the death of this woman, who was not even involved in the protest on the streets below rather trying to shut her shutters from the violent clashes beneath her, is completely representative of the French police response to the Gilets Jaunes.

19 Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “Emmanuel Macron takes lessons from the Sun King”, Financial Times, June 12th 2017 < https://www.ft.com/ content/17f75282-4f61-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb> [accessed: 20th February 2020]. 20 Gérard Noiriel, “Les “Gilets Jaunes” remplacent la question sociale au centre du jeu politique”, Le Monde, 27th November 2018, Idées section <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/11/27/gerard-noiriel-les-gilets-jaunes-replacent-la-question-sociale-au-centre-du-jeupolitique_5389042_3232.html> [accessed : 20th February 2020]. 21 See Hayat, The Gilets Jaunes and the Democratic Question and “Un Point de Vue Antifasciste sur les Gilets Jaunes”, La Horde, 19th December 2018 <https://lahorde.samizdat.net/2018/12/19/un-point-de-vue-antifasciste-sur-les-gilets-jaunes/> [accessed : 20th February 2020]. 22 Noiriel, Les Gilets Jaunes. 23 Bristow, Yellow Fever, P. 74

24 Fabien Jobard, “Face aux “gilets jaunes”, l’action répressive est d’une ampleur considérable”, Le Monde, 20th December 2018, Idées section < https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/12/20/face-aux-gilets-jaunes-l-action-repressive-est-d-une-ampleur-considerable_5400077_3232.html> [accessed : 21st February 2020]. 25 Recensement provisoire des blessé-es des manifestations de Gilets Jaunes [online]. Desarmons-les, 4th January 2019 [cited : 21st February 2020]. Available from : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/04/recensement-provisoire-des-blesses-graves-des-manifestations-du-mois-dedecembre-2018/.

26 Fassin and Defossez, An Improbable Movement, p.88

27 Rebecca Rosman, “Have French authorities mishandled probe into Algerian’s death?”, Al-Jazeera, 10th July 2019, Features section < https://www.

aljazeera.com/indepth/features/french-authorities-mishandled-probe-algerian-death-190710101236211.html> [accessed: 21st February 2020].

Firstly, many of the techniques used by the police have their origins in France’s brutal colonial era, using the most violent tactics against the most marginalised within France and abroad in her colonies. Flash-balls, for example, which in the Gilets Jaunes era has been responsible for eye, finger and hand loss, and severe head injuries, have their origins in the colonial wars in Palestine and Northern Ireland.28 Furthermore, whilst police violence in the United Kingdom or Germany is not up for discussion here, and whilst it was the British authorities that invented such riot control techniques in the 1970s, they are not used at present in these countries to control protestors.29 It is undoubtedly the use of weapons such as flash-balls that lead to the UN’s decision to add France to a list of countries including both Sudan and Zimbabwe that it is investigating for excessive police violence towards protestors.30 Whilst the French authorities have as of January 2020 banned the use of the highly controversial been reluctant to act.31 Minister of the Interior, Christophe Castaner, said after the first two months of protest that he was “not aware of any police or gendarme who had attacked yellow vests” and insisted that the police were using “the means of defence” necessary to defend the Republic.32 Also, the director general of the national police refused, in an interview with L’Opinion, to acknowledge that there was any institutionalised police violence in France, rather there only existed police who committed violent acts.33 This individualising of the clearly coordinated and disproportionate attacks that the French police have carried out on the Gilets Jaunes protestors is symptomatic of the neoliberal ideology which seeks to supplant the structural with the individual. It is also important to note that these repressive tactics of the police may seem out of place in a supposedly liberal country like France, but those communities living in the banlieues and the quartiers populaires have been subject to institutionalised police violence for decades. In fact, the Flash-Ball was first used in France as a riot-control tool to combat the mainly second and third generation migrant communities in the protests of 2005.34 Thus these are thoroughly neo-colonial practices which are moored in the brutal colonial era and the more modern era in which non-white communities are subject to relentless control and harassment on the side of the police. Thus, whilst the violence towards the Gilets Jaunes is startling, it must not be scrutinised away from the origins and every day of police violence in France within which these practices are the all too common norm for French people of colour.

28 Mathieu Dejean, “Violence policières: “Il y a derrière chaque blessure une industrie qui tire des profits””, LesInrockuptibles, 12th December 2018, Société section <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2018/12/12/actualite/societe/violences-policieres-il-y-derriere-chaque-blessure-une-industrie-qui-tire-desprofits/> [accessed : 21st February 2020]. 29 “Riot Control Guns: What’s All the Fuss About Flash Balls in France?”, The Local, 28th January 2019 <https://www.thelocal.fr/20190128/riot-controlguns-whats-all-the-fuss-about-flash-balls-in-france> [accessed: 21st February 2020]. 30 Rebecca Rosman, “Have French authorities mishandled probe into Algerian’s death?”, Al-Jazeera, 10th July 2019, Features section < https://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/features/french-authorities-mishandled-probe-algerian-death-190710101236211.html> [accessed: 21st February 2020]. 31 Henry Samuel, “France bans stun grenade blamed for maiming dozens of Yellow Vests”, Telegraph, 26th January 2020, News Section < https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/26/france-ban-controversial-stun-grenade-blamed-maiming-dozens/> [accessed: 21st February 2020]. 32 Anthony Berthelier, “Ces gilets jaunes furieux de la petite phrase de Castaner sur les violences policières”, Huffington Post, 15th January 2019, Politique section <https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2019/01/15/gilets-jaunes-castaner-violences-policieres_a_23643118/> [accessed : 21st February 2020]. 33

“Les violences policières sont le reflet d’un échec”, Le Monde, 12th January 2020, Éditorial section <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/

Olivia McGhie: Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System

stun grenades that release 26 grams of TNT into the faces of protestors, otherwise they have

article/2020/01/11/les-violences-policieres-sont-le-reflet-d-un-echec_6025530_3232.html> [accessed : 21st February 2020]. 34 “Riot Control Guns: What’s All the Fuss About Flash Balls in France?”, The Local, 28th January 2019 <https://www.thelocal.fr/20190128/riot-controlguns-whats-all-the-fuss-about-flash-balls-in-france> [accessed: 21st February 2020].

The Gilets Jaunes are a multifaceted, diverse, and complicated movement. Ignited by a carbon tax that completely ignored the everyday realities of the people who would have to pay it on the most regular basis, it was sustained by a visceral call for greater democracy and an overturning of the current system that created the tax. It was also continuingly brutalised, harassed, and demonised by a police force that is bound up in the politics of the French state that mobilised colonial and neo-colonial tactics usually reserved for the descendants of colonial migrants found in the poorest areas of the large cities. Whilst some on the far-right in France, including Marine Le Pen, have tried to coopt the movement to suit their xenophobic, Islamophobic, and racist rhetoric because of its broad anti-Macron stance, this has largely been side-lined and kept to a minimum. Thanks to the unison of the Gilets Jaunes and those on strike over the proposed pension reform who took to the streets in December 2019 rain or shine, as well as Extinction Rebellion, the movement was reinvigorated and kept its authentic egalitarian nature. It has morphed into an intergenerational struggle: many of the Gilets Jaunes, those in Extinction Rebellion, and those hundreds of thousands of people opposed to the pension reform take to the streets for their children or grandchildren. The students of France have also marched in the streets in solidarity with the movement demanding a better future for themselves, and a better less precarious present for their parents and grandparent’s generation with greater economic, social, gender, and racial equality.

Bibliography

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Berthelier, Anthony, “Ces gilets jaunes furieux de la petite phrase de Castaner sur les violences policières”, Huffington Post, 15th January 2019, Politique section <https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2019/01/15/gilets-jaunescastaner-violences-policieres_a_23643118/> [accessed : 21st February 2020]

Bristow, Gabriel, “Yellow Fever: Populist Pangs in France”, Soundings; London, 72 (2019), pp. 65-78 Chancel, Lucas, “Are younger generations higher carbon emitters than their elders?: Inequalities, generations and CO2 emissions in France and in the USA”, Ecological Economies, 100 (2014), pp. 195-207 Chassany, Anne-Sylvaine, “Emmanuel Macron takes lessons from the Sun King”, Financial Times, June 12th 2017 < https://www.ft.com/content/17f75282-4f61-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb> [accessed: 20th February 2020] Coutant, Isabelle, “Les “petits-moyens” prennent la parole” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) [accessed : 19th February 2020] Dejean, Mathieu, “Violence policières: “Il y a derrière chaque blessure une industrie qui tire des profits””, LesInrockuptibles, 12th December 2018, Société section <https://www.lesinrocks.com/2018/12/12/actualite/ societe/violences-policieres-il-y-derriere-chaque-blessure-une-industrie-qui-tire-des-profits/> [accessed : 21st February 2020] Fassin, Didier and Anne-Claire Defossez, “An Improbable Movement? Macron’s France and the Rise of the Gilets Jaunes, New Left Review, 115 (January/February 2019), pp.77-92 Hayat, Samuel, “The Gilets Jaunes and the Democratic Question”, Viewpoint Magazine, February 13th 2019, https:// www.viewpointmag.com/2019/02/13/the-gilets-jaunes-and-the-democratic-question/ [accessed: 19th February 2020] Jobard, Fabien, “Face aux “gilets jaunes”, l’action répressive est d’une ampleur considérable”, Le Monde, 20th December 2018, Idées section < https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/12/20/face-aux-gilets-jaunes-l-actionrepressive-est-d-une-ampleur-considerable_5400077_3232.html> [accessed : 21st February 2020] Joffrin, Laurent “Qu’est-ce que le macronisme ? ”, Libération, 12th May 2017, Editorial <https://www.liberation.fr/ politiques/2017/05/12/qu-est-ce-que-le-macronisme_1569242> [accessed 20th February 2020] “Les violences policières sont le reflet d’un échec”, Le Monde, 12th January 2020, Éditorial section <https:// www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/01/11/les-violences-policieres-sont-le-reflet-d-un-echec_6025530_3232.html> [accessed : 21st February 2020] Macron, Emmanuel, “Vœux 2019 aux Français” [online], Elysée, 31st December 2018 [cited : February 20th 2020].

Available from: < https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/12/31/voeux-aux-francais-2019> Monod, Jean-Claude “La Crise de l’Etat Néolibéral” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) [accessed : 20th February 2020] Noiriel, Gérard, “Les “Gilets Jaunes” remplacent la question sociale au centre du jeu politique”, Le Monde, 27th November 2018, Idées section <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/11/27/gerard-noiriel-les-gilets-jaunesreplacent-la-question-sociale-au-centre-du-jeu-politique_5389042_3232.html> [accessed : 20th February 2020] Recensement provisoire des blessé-es des manifestations de Gilets Jaunes [online]. Desarmons-les, 4th January 2019 [cited : 21st February 2020]. Available from : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/04/recensementprovisoire-des-blesses-graves-des-manifestations-du-mois-de-decembre-2018/ Riot Control Guns: What’s All the Fuss About Flash Balls in France?”, The Local, 28th January 2019 <https://www. thelocal.fr/20190128/riot-control-guns-whats-all-the-fuss-about-flash-balls-in-france> [accessed: 21st February 2020] Rosman, Rebecca, “Have French authorities mishandled probe into Algerian’s death?”, Al-Jazeera, 10th July 2019, Features section < https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/french-authorities-mishandled-probe-algeriandeath-190710101236211.html> [accessed: 21st February 2020]

Spire, Alexis, “Reformuler la Question Sociale” in Le Fond de l’Air est Jaune : Comprendre une Révolte Inédite (France : Editions du Seuil, 2019) [accessed : 20th February 2020] Vacas, Federico and Mathieu Gallard, “Baromètre Politique: La popularité de l’exécutif se stabilise, mais certains membres du Gouvernement reculent nettement” in IPSOS Public Affairs, updated 22nd January 2020 [cited : 20th February 2020]. Available from : <https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/barometre-politique-la-popularite-de-lexecutif-sestabilise-mais-certains-membres-du-gouvernement>

Olivia McGhie: Gilets Jaunes: A Reaction and Response to the French Representative System

Samuel, Henry, “France bans stun grenade blamed for maiming dozens of Yellow Vests”, Telegraph, 26th January 2020, News Section < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/26/france-ban-controversial-stun-grenadeblamed-maiming-dozens/> [accessed: 21st February 2020]

I Cry Channah Smith This poem explores the role of anti-black racism in perceptions of pain and suffering, as represented in the motif of the crying embryo/fetus. The myth of the incapability of black bodies to experience pain has deep historical roots; James Marion Sims is glorified as the father of modern gynaecology, although he perfected his surgical techniques by operating on enslaved black women without anesthesia. These dehumanising practices, a symptom of social, political and medical legitimization of slavery, still permeate deeply into medical practice today -- in the United Kingdom, black mothers are five times more at risk of death during pregnancy or childbirth than their white counterparts.1 The testimonials of high-profile black mothers such as Serena Williams and Beyonce of systematized medical neglect and skepticism indicate the deeply racial, rather than socio-economic, nature of this prejudice. This poem invites us to examine these structural and implicit biases that perpetuate pain and alienation on a deeply personal level, refocusing the persona’s pain in defiance of these racial myths.

I Cry

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The sound of my cries annoy you, like a newborn baby, maybe if I looked like you, I wouldn't be seen as a problem, nuisance, inhumane.

According to Marion Sims black people don't feel pain. Performed operations on black women without anesthesia. Demoralizing our body as your hobby. I'm Tired. We are not sane if we reject indoctrination. So YOU do the talking for us, and we are deemed deviant when refused to give up a seat on the bus. You expect us to be quiet within the quarrels of life, walk with our head down low, we are no longer a slave to Jim Crow. I cry like a newborn baby, maybe if I looked like you, I wouldn't be seen as a problem, nuisance, inhumane. You give me side eye and clutch tight onto your brief, because we are automatically a thief, although slavery and colonization is one of the most hideous crimes ever be conceived, when all we want to do is take the shackles off our feet, And when our eyes meet, the existence of my being is frozen, like the aftershock of raped women because you feel that you own them.

1 See: Emma Kasprzak, BBC News, ‘Why are black mothers at more risk of dying?’ 12 April 2019.

Shall I sew my lips to make you feel satisfied ? Worship you as if you are God, Odd ? That YOU think of yourself so highly, refer to you as Honour in Court, even though you’re on a mission to let injustice live on. I cry like a fetus, maybe if I looked like you, I wouldn't be seen as a problem, nuisance, inhumane. Sexualised. Used. Abused. No we don’t feel happy when you say we would ‘make’ cute babies with John. Hypnotised us into the idea of equality, your women objectify our men, and feel prized when their baby came out with just enough fair skin, just enough curly hair, just enough of a straight nose, throw me a rose, because the flower is pretty on top but stings below, but not as much as you throw stones. The hanging of the head, amputation of the legs. Are you not satisfied ? I cry like embryo, maybe if I looked like you, I wouldn't be seen as a problem, nuisance, inhumane. Animals whatever world we’re in, reckless due to the fights in which we involve, ‘The world is evolving’ But for who ? Definitely, not for me or my future seed. ‘This poem took ages and I can't relate to it ‘. You're not meant to. You're just meant to listen. That’s all. Oh another black person talking about race, yes its the proudest thing I am to be, but the thing that causes me many problems in life. The sounds of my cries do not annoy you because I don't exist. Voiceless in a matter of speech. I am blacker than the hate in your heart for my people. Do not discriminate on the basis of race, but to do that one must acquire much grace.

Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change Joseph Carter Abstract The growing alarm within the scientific community and international civil society over the effects of anthropogenic climate change has sparked world-wide protests and strikes. A central demand of the modern climate protest movement is that governments take decisive action to reduce their countries’ greenhouse gas emissions, thereby mitigating the effects of climate change on future generations. In the same spirit, this paper will argue that governments worldwide have a rights-based duty to lessen the effects of climate change. This argument is premised on the reasoning that the effects of climate change will violate the human rights of future generations to life, health and subsistence. For the current generation these rights are enshrined in international human rights conventions. Based upon the interest theory of human rights, this paper contends that future generations have rights because they will have fundamental interests in protecting their lives, health and subsistence. Though Parfit’s ‘Nonidentity Problem’ challenges the claim that current generations can harm future generations, this paper argues that the problem can be avoided by defining harm in terms of rights thresholds. The ecological consequences of anthropogenic climate change will place people in future generation below the thresholds required to fulfil their fundamental rights. The harm done to future generations thus necessitates duties on the current generation to take immediate action to mitigate the current climate crisis.

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Introduction This paper will argue along the lines of Caney and Bell that climate change (CC) violates the human rights (HR) of future generations to life, health and subsistence.1 The effects of anthropogenic CC will result in the people(s) of future generations falling below the minimum standards needed to fulfil these rights. Therefore, the harm done to future generations’ basic rights necessitates duties on the current generation to take immediate steps to mitigate CC.2 This paper’s argument is first situated within literature which argues that future generations have rights against the effects of CC. The second section considers the negative implications of Parfit’s Nonidentity Problem (NIP) on the argument that future generations have no rights at all.3 The latter half of this section aims to evade the NIP by re-interpreting the counterfactual notion of harm upon which it is based. A case for the threshold notion of harm, as a vehicle to protect the rights of future generations, will then be made. The final section considers and counters two objections to the use of the harm thresholds as an instrument to evade the NIP. In the first, authors posit that the character of the harm thresholds only protect the bare minimum standards for human survival. In the 1 S Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’, in: Human Rights and Climate Change, ed. by S Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69-90; D Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 14 (2011), pp.99-124 2 S Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’

3 D Parfit, Reasons and persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)

second, authors question how the thresholds distribute harm between generations. Though thresholds are not a perfect solution to the NIP, this paper will conclude that it is imperative to use them as a means to defend the rights of future generations against CC.

Climate change and the rights of future generations There is a scientific consensus that human activity is responsible for the rapid speed at which the climate is changing.4 More recently, the tangible effects of rising average global temperatures have been thrown into sharp focus, with storm surges, floods and wildfires becoming more destructive.5 It has also become clear that the effects of CC will become more intense for future generations.6 HR scholars have therefore sought to engage with debates surrounding the possibility of rights for the unborn, against anthropogenic CC’s harmful effects. By establishing that these rights could or should exist, scholars have debated the extent to which their protection imposes duties upon the current generation.7 Bell argues that actions such as emitting greenhouse gases act to ‘threaten [the] basic human interests’8 upon which HR are based. Caney further isolates the rights to life, health and subsistence as general rights, codified within HR conventions, entitled to people ‘in virtue of their humanity’.9 Both argue that CC threatens these rights and thus necessitate a duty on calling for the codification of a new distinctive environmental right for future generations will be drawn on later in this paper .11 But its primary concern is to defend rights that have already been established in HR conventions and thus have (some) international support.12 Nonetheless, future generations are not entitled to their rights before they come into existence. In concurrence with Macklin, it is argued that when ‘these possible persons become actual persons…[that they] will have all the rights ordinarily assigned to persons’.13 This can be summarised as a ‘right-bearer contemporary requirement’ which ‘entails that future rights will necessarily be conditional on the existence of their bearer’.14 It could be counter intuitive to ascribe rights protections to those that do not yet exist, since their rights

4 V Masson-Delmotte; P Zhai; H.O Pörtner; D Roberts; J Skea,; P.R Shukla; A Pirani; W Moufouma-Okia; C Péan; R Pidcock; S Connors; J.B.R Matthews ;Y Chen; X Zhou; Gomis; M.I Gomis; E Lonnoy; T Maycock; M Tignor; T Waterfield, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’ IPCC <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ > [Date accessed 02.01.2020]; J Cook; N Oreskes; P.T Doran; W.R.L Anderegg; B Verheggen; E.W Maibach; J.S Carlton; S Lewandowsky; A.G Skuce; S.A Green; D Nuccitelli; P Jacobs; M Richardson; B Winkler; R Painting; K Rice, ‘Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming.’ Environmental Research Letters,11(2016), pp.1-7; W.J Ripple; C Wolf; T.M Newsome; P Barnard; W.R Moomaw, ‘World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency’, Oxford Academic <https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/ advance-article/doi/10.1093/biosci/biz088/5610806> [Date accessed 03.01.2020]. 5 E Gray, ‘Satellite Data Record Shows Climate Change's Impact on Fires.’ Nasa: Global Climate Change: Vital signs of the Planet <https://climate. nasa.gov/news/2912/satellite-data-record-shows-climate-changes-impact-on-fires/> [Date Accessed 02.01.2020]; E Bevacqua; D Maraun; I Vousdoukas; E Voukouvalas; M Vrac ; L Mentaschi; M Widmann, ‘Higher probability of compound flooding from precipitation and storm surge in Europe under anthropogenic climate change.’ Science Advances, 5(2019 ) pp.1-7. 6 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’; B Lewis, ‘The Rights of Future Generations within the Post-Paris Climate Regime.’ Transnational Environmental Law, 7(2018), pp. 69–87. 7 R Elliot, ‘The rights of future people,’ Journal of applied philosophy, 6 (1989), pp.159–169; A De-Shalit, ‘Community and the rights of future generations: A reply to Elliot,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9(1992), pp.105–115; A Gosseries, ‘On future generations’ future rights,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (2008), pp.446–474; R Hiskes, The Human Right to a Green Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 8 Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ p.100 9 Caney, Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds, p.164 10 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’; Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ 11 See for example: K Woods, ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans,’ Journal of Human Rights, 15(2016), pp. 291-306. 12 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’; Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’

Joseph Carter: Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change

current generations to pay the costs of lessening its harmful effects.10 The arguments of those

13 R Macklin, ‘Can future generations correctly be said to have rights?’ in Responsibilities to future generations: environmental ethics, ed. by E Partridge (New York: Prometheus, 1981) pp. 151–156, (p.152). 14 Gosseries, ‘On future generations’ future rights’, p. 455-6.

to health, life and subsistence are themselves dependent on their existence.15 However, it is possible to accept the idea that future generations will not have rights until they come into existence, while also asserting that the current generation has ‘rights-based duties’ towards the future rights of future generations.16 This, therefore entails rejecting Gosseries’s ‘obligation-right contemporaneity requirement’ which states that ‘for an obligation to exist, its correlative right would already need to exist’.17 For example, the depletion of fish stocks, as a result of a possible 2°C rise in global average temperatures, will cause greater food insecurity and so will likely jeopardise future generations’ right to subsistence.18 Obligations must, therefore, be put onto the current generation to mitigate such increases.19 Thus, while this paper does not lay claim to future generations having rights against CC before they come into existence, it does argue that the current generation has obligations to ensure that CC effects do not undermine the future rights of future generations. This claim is well-grounded in the interest theory of HR. Interest theory entails the view that ‘the function of rights [is] one of protecting significant interests’, with significant interests being defined as those human affinities considered to be ‘weighty enough to impose obligations on others’.20 Though it is not necessarily clear what specific interests future generations will hold, it is clear that the current generation’s actions will go some way in affecting them.21 Given the predictions regarding the impact of CC on human systems, it is conceivable to conclude that continuing to pursue policies that produce high levels of greenhouse gas emissions will severely harm the interests of future generations.22 As argued by Elliot and Meyer, if the present generation can adversely affect the interests of future generations, then they can also, in a sense, ‘violate their rights’.23 For Woods, the fact that the impact of the harm to future generations, ‘is not contemporaneous’ with their implementation, it ‘does not alter the moral conclusion’, since the perpetrators of high emissions policies are still responsible for the harm caused.24 Hence, it has been established that the effects of CC, and the policies driving them, will

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harm the interests of future generations. If protecting fundamental human interests is taken to be the function of rights, then the harm done by CC will endanger future generations’ future rights to life, health and subsistence. So long as future generations can be said to have fundamental interests against the adverse effects of CC, they can thus be said to have rights against it.

The Nonidentity Problem The most fundamental challenge to the notion that future generations have rights is Parfit’s NIP. The NIP rejects the claim that actions taken by current (living) persons can harm future 15 J Feinberg, J. ‘The rights of animals and unborn generations’, in Responsibilities to future generations: environmental ethics ed. by E. Partridge, (New York: Prometheus, 1981), pp. 139–50. 16 Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ p.104.

17 Gosseries, ‘On future generations’ future rights’, p.456

18Masson-Delmotte, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’. 19 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’; Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ 20 Gosseries, On future generations’ future rights, p.449; J Raz, The morality of freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166. 21 Elliot, ‘The rights of future people’; Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, in Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. by S.L Paulson; L.H Meyer; T Pogge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.143-159. 22 Masson-Delmotte, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’; Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’ 23 Elliot, ‘The rights of future people’, p.162; Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’

24 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.297

(as yet unborn) people. This is because the supposedly harmful actions will in some way affect or change the identity of the future person.25 Parfit takes a person(s’) identity to be the defining characteristic of their personhood, expressed here by the letters ‘A’ , ‘B’ and ‘C’. In Parfit’s view, the actions of a person ‘A’ cannot harm future person ‘B’ because the specific identity of the future person ‘B’ is in part defined by the effects of these purportedly harmful actions.26 If a person ‘A’ chooses not to undertake the supposedly harmful actions, then the effects that said actions would have had on the identity of the future person ‘B’ would be different. By a person ‘A’ changing their behaviour, the effects of their actions will sufficiently change the identity of the future person, from being expressed as ‘B’ to ‘C’. In this scenario, the effects of a person ‘A’ changing their behaviour would mean that future person ‘B’ would have never come into existence.27 From this, Parfit draws the moral conclusion that even if the future person ‘B’ is severely handicapped by the actions of current person ‘A’, as long as person ‘B’ lives a life that is ‘worth living’, their condition is justified on the basis that it would be worse than if they had never come into existence.28 Future people cannot therefore, be said to be harmed by the actions of present people: their identities depend on these actions to come into existence. 29

high emissions policies will undoubtedly affect the identities of future peoples.30 These future identities would be different if the effects of CC did not constitute them. Thus, as argued by Bell ‘the victims of anthropogenic climate change…cannot have existed without being victims of anthropogenic climate change’.31 Hence, there is no premise for invoking a rejection of Gosseries’s ‘obligation-right contemporaneity requirement’, since no obligation needs to be placed on the current generation to protect the interests of future generations.32In this way, Parfit’s NIP makes it very difficult to claim that future generations have any correlative rights, let alone those who would protect them against the effects of CC.33

Moral thresholds One way to counter this NIP argument is to reinterpret the concept of harm upon which it is based. As is pointed out in the literature, the NIP depends on a counterfactual notion of harm, whereby an individual can only be said to be harmed when they are ‘left worseoff than what would have been the case if some alternative action was performed’.34To be considered ‘worse off’, the person being harmed by the action/inaction must already exist. This accordingly excludes the possibility of harming future people.35 The counterfactual notion of harm can be rejected and replaced with a notion of harm dependent on moral thresholds.36 The threshold notion of harm entails that an action causes harm to someone 25 Parfit, Reasons and persons. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.; J Brännmark. ‘Future generations as right-holders’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 19(2016) pp. 680-698. 28 D Parfit, Reasons and persons, p.372. 29 D Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ 30 K Woods, Human Rights (London: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2014); A Gosseries, On future generations’ future rights. 31 Bell, ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’ p.108. 32 Gosseries, ‘On future generations’ future rights’, pp.455-456. 33 Parfit, Reasons and persons. 34 Brännmark. ‘Future generations as right-holders’, p.681; Gosseries, On future generations’ future rights.

Joseph Carter: Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change

The logical conclusion of the NIP is that the choice of people in the current generation to pursue

35 Parfit, Reasons and persons 36 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’; D Smolkin, ‘Towards a rights-based solution to the non-identity problem’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 30 (1999) pp.194–208.

when it results in them falling below a ‘specific threshold’ or certain level that ‘is required in order [for them] to lead a decent life’.37 From this perspective, HR designate and protect ‘the most basic moral standards below which people should not fall’.38 For Bell, interpreting harm on the basis of thresholds evades the NIP by showing that current people can violate the rights of future generations, independent of ‘the identity of the rights-bearer’.39 Therefore, future generations can be said to have rights against CC as long as its effects will cause them to fall below the critical thresholds needed to fulfil their fundamental interests.

Objections to moral thresholds A number of authors have critiqued the utility of thresholds as a means to evade the NIP. Thresholds present their own set of problems when attempting to justify rights for future generations.40 While Brännmark makes a case for the protection of future generations rights, the author levels criticisms at the use of moral thresholds as a means to protect them.41 Brännmark warns that the setting of particular thresholds to determine what does and does not constitute harm may result in current people only doing the bare minimum that is needed to prevent future generations from dipping below such thresholds.42 This could result in future people having a more inferior quality of life than current ones. But, because the ‘basic moral standards’ of the thresholds would have been met, future generations cannot be said to have been harmed.43 Brännmark thus claims that thresholds have an ‘all or nothing character’, which narrows the scope of future generational harm by precluding a swathe of possible actions undertaken by the present generation that could or should be considered harmful to their fundamental interests.44 This leads to the idea that thresholds should only protect the bare minimum standards for human life. However, this solution is rejected by Woods as being inconsistent ‘with the spirit of human rights’.45 For Woods, HR and the thresholds that indicate their fulfilment should direct ‘us towards minimum conditions for a decent life, rather than minimum conditions for being alive’.46

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Conversely, the idea that the threshold notion of harm is somehow ‘under-inclusive’ for actions that should qualify as causing harm is firmly rejected by Meyer.47 In defence, Meyer outlines a similar scenario to that of Brännmark, whereby a hypothetical action diminishes the welfare of a person, although it does not result in them falling below the threshold.48 However, Meyer strongly objects to Brännmark’s interpretation of the case,49 arguing instead that the ‘obligation to minimize harm’ imposed by the ‘subjunctive threshold’ demands that, ‘we do not cause another person to fall to a lower level of well-being quite independently of the level of wellbeing the person already realizes.’50 37 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, p.147; Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’, p.684. 38 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’, p.164; J Nickel, Making sense of human rights, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 39 Bell, Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights? pp.109-10. 40 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’; Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’. 41 Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’. 42 Ibid. 43 Caney, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’, p.164; Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’. 44 Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’, p.684. 45 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.299. 46 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.299. 47 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, p.153. 48 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’; Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’. 49 Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’.

50 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, pp.153-154.

Thus, Meyer argues that the threshold conception of harm is inclusive of actions which are detrimental to the welfare of individuals, even if they do not cause them to fall below the moral thresholds protected by their rights.51However, it is unclear how Meyer intends for the ‘specified threshold’ to adequately measure what constitutes ‘a lower level of wellbeing’ as this is only described in brief terms.52 In this paper’s view, Meyer’s pathway to enhance the threshold notion of harm, fails to evade the NIP.53 Meyer’s ‘combined view’ relies on a counterfactual notion of harm in specifying cases where an action is detrimental to the affected person’s wellbeing but still leaves them above the threshold.54 As argued above, the counterfactual notion of harm can only apply to people who already exist and so cannot specify any harm to future people. Since the NIP asserts that the actions of current peoples constitute the identities of future peoples, and the effects of the action/inaction on the wellbeing of future persons cannot be defined as harm if it does not cause them to fall below the rights threshold. Nevertheless, though it lacks specificity, the sentiment of Meyer’s original defence of the harm thresholds is still instructive in arguing for the rights of future generations against CC.55 In contrast to Woods, this paper argues that the obligations imposed by thresholds do in fact embody the ‘spirit of human rights’.56 Not minimums’ needed to ensure future generations survival, they also imposes a duty to minimize the overall harm done by anthropogenic CC to future generations’ wellbeing.57 In this way, Meyer’s duty to minimize harm necessitates that current generations must act to mitigate the effects of CC in order protect future generations’ rights.58 A second objection to the utility of rights thresholds, as a means to avoid the NIP, is based on scepticism regarding how the obligations imposed by moral thresholds distribute the responsibility of harm between generations. For Brännmark, the decisions taken within generations e.g. by governments have a far greater bearing on the distribution of harm within that generation, than those undertaken by previous generations.59 Even if the actions of present peoples lead to ‘more [future] people falling below the threshold of subsistence’, Brännmark argues these actions ‘will not be the sole determinants of those harms’ as it is the ‘distributive political choices’ taken at the time which tend to set the harm suffered by specific people.60 In the context of CC, Woods draws on Brännmark’s arguments to state that while ‘present persons (collectively) have the power to seriously affect the human rights of future persons’, it is future peoples collective action which will be decisive in distributing the harm to individuals within that generation. 61 However, this paper posits that the above argument does not adequately account for those historical actions whose legacies of harm have shown to be intergenerational. For 51 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’. 52 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, p.154. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.299. 57 Ibid.; Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’. 58 Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’.

Joseph Carter: Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change

only do harm thresholds place obligations on the current generation to fulfil the ‘absolute

59 Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’. 60 Ibid. p.685. 61 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.299; Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’.

example, the impacts of European colonialism have traversed generations by significantly affecting the distribution of harm within post-colonial populations.62 As argued by Blanton, Mason and Athow, how European powers partitioned and ruled large areas of Africa is to an extent to blame for the ‘forms and frequency’ of ethnic conflicts in post-colonial African nations.63 The colonisers were blind to the ‘distribution of indigenous-ethnocultural groups’ on the continent, and their differing styles of colonial rule exacerbated ethnic cleavages and political divisions within societies. Though independence dismantled colonialism’s formal structures, the country borders and ethnic cleavages remained entrenched.64 As Blanton, Mason and Athow argue, the legacy of colonial rule and organisation in Africa has been a significant explainer for ‘the likelihood and form of post-colonial ethnic conflict’.65 Gross HR violations often accompany such violent ethnic conflicts.66 In this way, the legacies of European colonialism can be seen as an example of intergenerational harm, whose effects have continued to influence the distribution of harm long after its formal implementation. Though they are substantively different issues, both European colonialism and anthropogenic CC are cases of real and potential intergenerational harm causing future generations to fall below the thresholds protected by their rights. Moreover, those who propagated these issues through their action/inaction are to some extent responsible for the distribution of harm caused. While it is clear that the ‘distributive political choices’ of future generations will be significant in determining which specific people fall below the rights thresholds, Brännmark’s claim that the harm suffered is ‘rarely traceable in any interesting sense to… historical actions’ is clearly not supported by historical context.67 Whilst this paper does not claim that ethnicity or colonialism is the root cause of every inter-ethnic conflict in postcolonial states, it does posit that the perpetrators of colonialism clearly shoulder a portion of the blame for entrenching structures which made such societies more conducive to conflict.68 In a similar way, Woods concedes that there will be specific future populations, such as those native to the low lying Pacific Islands, whose fate will ‘most likely’ be impacted by the climate

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related political choices of the current generation.69 Furthermore, the latest climate forecast by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has revealed how inaction could affect the distribution of harm within future generations as well as outlining the actions which could mitigate CC most harmful effects.70 In contrast to Brännmark , this paper argues that the distribution of harm within a generation can to some extent be attributed to the decisions made by a former generation.71 Thus, this confirms the utility of the threshold notion of harm as a method to avoid the NIP and argue for the rights of future generations against CC.

62 F Masson; L.H Smith, L.H, ‘Colonisation as collective Trauma’, in The Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Social Work, eds. by T Kleibl; R Lutz; N Noyoo; B Bunk; A Dittmann; B Seepamore (New York: Routledge, 2019, p.1-20. 63 R Blanton; D Mason; B Athow, ‘Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research. 38(2001), pp. 473-491 (p.473) 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p.475. 66 K Sharma; G Sehgal; B Gupta; G Sharma;A Chatterjee; G Shroff. A complex network analysis of ethnic conflicts and human rights violations. Nature,7 (2017), pp.1-7. 67 Brännmark, ‘Future generations as right-holders’,p.685. 68 See for example, M Lange; A Dawson, ‘Dividing and Ruling the World? A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on Postcolonial Civil Violence’, Social Forces, 88(2009), pp. 785-817; E.E. Oshagae, ‘Human Rights and Ethnic Conflict Management: The Case of Nigeria’, Journal of Peace Research, 33 (1996), pp. 171-188; Blanton, Mason and Athow, ‘Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa’ 69 Woods ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’, p.305

70 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’ 71 Brännmark ‘Future generations as right-holders’.

Conclusion This paper argues that future generations have rights against CC, in so far as its effects can be determined to harm the basic interests needed to fulfil their future HR. The NIP poses significant challenges to the notion that future generations can have rights against CC. Nonetheless, the NIP can be evaded by reinterpreting the notion of harm upon which it is based. By classifying harm as being dependent on an action causing someone to fall below a certain threshold, needed to fulfil a decent life, its effects on the identity of the person become irrelevant. However, utilising a threshold notion of harm to evade the NIP presents its own problems of being too minimalistic when determining what constitutes harm and for how the thresholds distribute harm between generations. This paper has sought to counter these objections and assert that rights thresholds are still effective tools in arguing for the rights of future generations against CC. The harm done to future generations HR necessitates duties on the current generation’s governments, corporations and civil society groups to take immediate steps to mitigate the current climate crisis.

Bell, D. 2011. ‘Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 14(2011), pp.99-124. Bevacqua E; D Maraun; I Vousdoukas; E Vousdoukas; M Vrac; L Mentaschi; M Widmann , ‘Higher probability of compound flooding from precipitation and storm surge in Europe under anthropogenic climate change’, Science Advances, 5(2019), pp.1-7. Blanton, R; D Mason; B Athow, ‘Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research, 38(2001), pp. 473-491. Brännmark J, ‘Future generations as right-holders’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 19(2016), pp. 680-698. Caney S, ‘Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds’ in Human Rights and Climate Change ed. by S Humphreys, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69-90. Cook, J; N Oreskes; P.T Doran; W.R.L Anderegg; B Verheggen; E.W Maibach; J.S Carlton; S Lewandowsky; A.G Skuce; S.A Green; D Nuccitelli; P Jacobs; M Richardson; B Winkler; R Painting; K Rice, ‘Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming’, Environmental Research Letters,11(2016), pp.1-7. De-Shalit, A, ‘Community and the rights of future generations: A reply to Elliot’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9(1992.), pp.105–115. Elliot, R. 1989 ‘The rights of future people’, Journal of applied philosophy, 6 (1989), pp.159–169.

Feinberg, J, The rights of animals and unborn generations, in Responsibilities to future generations: environmental ethics, ed. by E. Partridge, (New York: Prometheus, 1981), pp. 139–50. Gosseries A, ‘On future generations’ future rights’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16(2008), pp.446–474. Gray, E.2019. ‘Satellite Data Record Shows Climate Change’s Impact on Fires’, Nasa: Global Climate Change: Vital signs of the Planet <https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2912/satellite-data-record-shows-climate-changes-impact-onfires/> [Date Accessed 02.01.2020].

Joseph Carter: Why Future Generations Have Rights Against Climate Change

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Hiskes R, The Human Right to a Green Future, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Lange M; A Dawson, ‘Dividing and Ruling the World? A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on Postcolonial Civil Violence’, Social Forces, 88(2009), pp. 785-817. Lewis, B, ‘The Rights of Future Generations within the Post-Paris Climate Regime’, Transnational Environmental Law, 7(2018), pp. 69–87. Macklin R, ‘Can future generations correctly be said to have rights?’ in Responsibilities to future generations: environmental ethics ed. by E Partridge, (New York: Prometheus, 1981) pp. 151–156. Masson,F; L.H Smith, ‘Colonisation as collective Trauma’ in The Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Social Work, eds. by T Kleibl; R Lutz; N Noyoo; B Bunk; A Dittmann; B Seepamore (New York: Routledge, 2019), pp.1-20. Masson-Delmotte V; P Zhai; H.O Pörtner; D Roberts; J Skea,; P.R Shukla; A Pirani; W Moufouma-Okia; C Péan; R Pidcock; S Connors; J.B.R Matthews ;Y Chen; X Zhou; Gomis; M.I Gomis; E Lonnoy; T Maycock; M Tignor; T Waterfield, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C: Summary for Policy Makers’ IPCC <https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ > [Date accessed 02.01.2020]. Meyer, L.H. 2003. ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’, in Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. by S.L Paulson; L.H. Meyer; T Pogge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) pp.143-159. Nickel J, Making sense of human rights, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007). Oshagae, E.E. Human Rights and Ethnic Conflict Management: The Case of Nigeria. Journal of Peace Research, 33 (1996), pp. 171-188 Parfit D, Reasons and persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Raz J, The morality of freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). W.J Ripple; C Wolf; T.M Newsome; P Barnard; W.R Moomaw, ‘World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency’, Oxford Academic <https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/advance-article/doi/10.1093/biosci/biz088/5610806> [Date accessed 03.01.2020]. Sharma, K; G Sehgal; B Gupta ; G Sharma; A Chatterjee; A Chakraborti ; G Shroff, ‘A complex network analysis of ethnic conflicts and human rights violations’, Nature 7(2017), pp.1-7. Smolkin, D, ‘Towards a rights-based solution to the non-identity problem’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 30 (1999) pp.194–208. Woods K, ‘The rights of (future) humans qua humans’ Journal of Human Rights, 15(2016), pp. 291-306.

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- Human Rights, (London: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2014).

A Toast

Mervielle Nsumbu “A Toast” is a poem about an interracial relationship and defiance. The persona acknowledges the adversities the couple face as they toast to their differences and endurance. In “A Toast”, food becomes a way that the persona conveys affection and relates to her addressee and the wider world. The poem culminates in the last stanza, showing how effective interpersonal actions can be in transcending limiting boundaries of culture and race. “A Toast” is the personal turned political, both by ridiculing racial bigotry and owing its tenacity to it.

A Toast Here’s to us To those who claim My hands are too dark, too land mine Too forbidden fruit and Marmite in yours Here’s to us To their trembling jeers Your lips are too Yorkshire, pudding Too colonial and colourless against mine Here’s to the San Miguel-laced kisses Not too foreign, just right Enveloped in toasty hugs Sandwiched between Hovis goodbyes And finally A toast to our endurance! We sing warsung warsongs We are Psalms who cry And as we raise our throats to sing It tastes like protest It feels like gunpowder

Boycotts in Qatar: Why FIFA World Cup 2022 will take place despite widespread uproar? Maja Stefanska Abstract Qatar has been under close observation of the public eye and NGOs since Amnesty International’s 2013 revelations about potential abuses in migrant workers’ rights in the construction industry in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 2022. After their successful 2010 bid to host the event in 2022, Qatar faced a considerable challenge: to build sufficient infrastructure that was required by FIFA. Under this immense time pressure, the contracting companies across numerous industries seem to have benefited from the relaxed regulatory environment and are able to introduce slavery-like practices. In light of FIFA World Cup 2022 approaching rapidly, some football fans and activists suggested protests, petitions and boycotting the event altogether, to push the governing bodies to stop the 2022 World Cup from happening. This work examines the effectiveness and effects of boycotts in big sporting events and seeks alternative ways to remove the unethical treatment of Qatari migrant workers by analysing the cases of USSR, Israel and South Africa, and contrasting them with the case of Qatar. Tweets, online petitions and internet analytics are used to create a case, ultimately arguing that boycotting the event is unlikely to have a significant impact on the status quo.

Introduction Qatar has been under scrutiny of media and NGOs since the 2013 revelations about

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potential abuses in migrant workers’ rights in the construction industry in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar.1 After their successful 2010 bid against the United States, Australia, South Korea and Japan to host one of the biggest sporting events in the world in 2022, Qatar faced a considerable challenge: to build infrastructure that was required by FIFA, such as stadiums, hotels, roads and public transport as well as water and electricity supplies for the newly built locations. Under this immense time pressure, the contracting companies across numerous industries seem to have benefited from the relaxed regulatory environment (most notably the kafala system) and are able to introduce slaverylike practices. These include withholding payments, passport confiscation, tying the workers down with debt bondage, as well as physical and psychological intimidation and violence. Numerous NGOs such as International Labour Organisation, International Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Institute for Human Rights and Business, Human Rights Watch and the International Trade Union Confederation have conducted extensive research in Qatar to inspect these allegations. Most of their work has proved the rumours to be true and have made them public through media channels causing unrest among activists and researchers alike. In light of FIFA World Cup 2022 approaching rapidly, some football fans and activists suggested protests, petitions and boycotting the event altogether to push the 1 Amnesty International, ‘Qatar: The dark side of migration: spotlight on Qatar’s construction sector ahead of the World Cup’, Amnesty.org, <https://

www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE22/010/2013/en/>, [accessed 24 February 2020].

governing bodies to stop the 2022 World Cup from happening. This work examines the effectiveness and effects of boycotts in big sporting events and seeks alternative ways to remove the unethical treatment of Qatari migrant workers by analysing the cases of USSR, Israel and South Africa, and contrasting them with the case of Qatar. Tweets, online petitions and internet analytics are used to create a comprehensive case, ultimately arguing that boycotting the event is unlikely to have a significant impact on the status quo, i.e. the ongoing maltreatment of Qatar’s migrant workers.

In November 2013, a report by Amnesty International revealed the poor state of working conditions of migrant labourers in Qatar in preparation to 2022 FIFA World Cup.2 The report, published both in Arabic and English indicated that withholding payments, debt bondage from recruitment fees and passport confiscation were common human resources practices in the country, facilitated by the regulatory environment, most notably the kafala system, which significantly limits the workers’ freedom to move within the country.3 Altogether, the system creates practices much like those associated with modern slavery.4 The Qatari government has responded with amending the law in favour of the migrant workers, although still leaving significant loopholes for the employers to benefit from.5 In light of these events, many human rights activists and football fans decided to pressure their colleagues as well as various institutions to boycott the event. Kozinets and Handelman as well as Klein, Smith and John, point out that boycotts are a common way of protesting with the least involvement.6 It follows the logic of not participating in the consumption of a product or service to “feel good about oneself”7 under an umbrella of “self-enhancement”8 and still feeling like enough has been done on account of one individual. The success of such types of protests relies on several factors, such as the perceived success of the boycott, the reciprocity of the boycotting group, and the vulnerability of the provider of the service or product. It is of utmost importance to first and foremost distinguish between consumer and political boycotts. The former is usually organised and adopted by consumers of a product or service to manifest their displeasure with the provider of such product or service, often to impose a change.9 The latter is a boycott imposed by a state on another state, or region to achieve some sort of political or economic goals. Both types can apply to mass sporting events, wherein the consumer boycott it is the stakeholders who are the protesting force, while in the case of political boycott, a country might choose not to send their sporting representation to compete or ban another one from competing if the event is taking place in the boycotting country. The case of Qatar is complicated in that there is currently a political boycott of the country taking place by a Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates led coalition. This work, 2 Amnesty International, ‘Qatar’. 3 Ibid. 4 International Labour Organisation, Walk Free Foundation and The UN Migration Agency, ‘Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Forced Labour and Forced Marriage.’ International Labour Organisation, <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/ wcms_575479.pdf>, [accessed 25 February 2020]. 5 Qatar, Law nr 13, 2018, <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/107340/132079/F620027197/QatarGB-Law%2013%20(2018)%20 Ar%20Eng.revATfinal30Oct18.pdf>. 6 Kozinets, Robert and Jay Handelman, ‘Ensouling Consumption: A Netnographic Exploration of the Meaning of Boycotting Behavior’. Advances in Consumer Research, 25(1998), 475-480. and Klein, Jill, N.Craig Smith and Andrew John, ‘Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott

Maja Stefansja: Boycotts in Qatar: Why FIFA World Cup 2022 will take place despite widespread uproar?

Consumer vs. political: the nature of boycotts

Participation’, Journal of Marketing. 68 (2004), 92-109. 7 Klein, ‘Why We Boycott”, p. 95. 8 Ibid., p.96. 9 Ibid., pp.92-109.

however, aims at examining the protests concerning the unethical treatment of migrant workers in Qatar, which is not the reason for the ongoing Saudi-UAE boycott.

Consumer boycotts Most consumer boycotts include consumers with instrumental as well as expressive sentiments and the proportion of those can decide on the success or failure of a boycott. Makarem indicates that boycotts that are more instrumental have ultimately higher chances of being effective.10 Here, the word “instrumental” is used to describe such boycotts that aim at providing a substantial change of some sort, rather than at simply expressing the sentiments of a given group. In the case of Qatar, the boycotting public has not been very well-informed due to extremely limited research possibilities in the field. As a result, the changes they were calling for, which mostly included cancelling the 2022 FIFA World Cup altogether, were simply too great to be feasible. Thus, it can be argued that the instrumental nature of these boycotts was superficial and that they were, in fact, expressive, which can justify their rather limited success. Furthermore, it is worth noting, that for contractor companies operating in Qatar, turning to slavery-like practices is not necessarily an expression of discrimination against a certain group, but rather an economic saving activity as described in Crane.11 Spar argues that companies for whom the cost of switching to more ethical practices under pressure from the public are lower than potential losses from the ongoing boycott will be more likely to do so.12 For Qatar, it is close to impossible to estimate the numbers that are saved on account of employing modern-day slavery, but it is expected that Qatar will have to spend around $220 billion on preparation for 2022 FIFA World Cup.13 It can be argued that at this point, almost three years before the event, the costs of moving away from this slavery simply would not be beneficial for the country that holds a lot of stake in the success of the event, from an expected surge in tourism to improved international reputation.

Online activism in consumer boycotts

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The greatest amount of activism linked to the boycott of the 2022 FIFA World Cup was observed online. Koku points out that consumer boycotts organised over the Internet tend to have little impact on the issue.14 This is perhaps less true almost a decade after Koku’s findings due to the rise in Internet use and its accessibility, but the case of Qatar supports this, nevertheless. The data for this research comes from various online petitions platforms, Twitter and Google Trends.

1. Online petitions: While a number of petitions addressed to various parties, such as Gianni Infantino, FIFA, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, called for stripping Qatar of its rights to host World Cup 2022, reconsidering the location of the event and for ending the slavery practices, only one petition found online called explicitly for the football fans to boycott the event altogether. The petition has been running 10 Makarem, Suzanne and Harean Jae, ‘Consumer Boycott Behavior: An Exploratory Analysis of Twitter’, The Journal of Consumer Affairs. 50 (2015), 193-223. 11 Crane, Andrew ‘Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for Human Exploitation’, The Academy of Management Review, 38 (2013), 49-69. 12 Spar, Debora and Lane La Mure, ‘The power of activism: Assessing the impact of NGOs on global business’, California Management Review, 45 (2003), 78–101. 13 International Trade Union Confederation, ‘Frontlines Report 2015 – Qatar: Profit and Loss’ International Trade Union Confederation, <https://www. ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/qatar_en_web.pdf> [accessed 24 February 2022]. 14 Koku, Sergius, ‘On the effectiveness of consumer boycotts organized through the internet: the market model.’, The Journal of Services Marketing.

26 (2012), 20-26.

since 2015 and has reached 536 signatures all over the world,15 thus showing rather limited engagement.

2. It seems like football fans are more concerned with access to alcohol in the first-ever Muslim country to host the FIFA World Cup, than its approach to human rights. Even after the widespread revelation of slavery practices of 2013, the phrase “Qatar world cup alcohol” has been searched 30% more than “Qatar world cup slavery” (See Appendix A).

boycotting efforts so far brought so little change. Furthermore, Barakat and Moussa16 as well as Yilmaz and Alhumoud,17 note that consumers will boycott less when they see little chance of success. Thus, even the informed consumers will not be encouraged to boycott the event seeing such little civic participation. Even more importantly, the issue seems to be insignificant also for the core of the football community, the players themselves. In an interview with CNN Espanol, a world-class football player and a star of Portuguese national team, Cristiano Ronaldo, admitted that neither he nor his colleagues discuss the issue of controversies concerning FIFA or Qatar.18 On the other hand, several Scandinavian football players expressed displeasure and condemned Qatar’s HR unethical.19 It is worth noting, however, that no actual potential action will be taken, if the situation fails to see improvements. With such little support from those that are likely to have major bargaining power, the boycott is unlikely to reach any significance.

Political boycotts Even if the consumer boycotts were to gain a sort of impactful momentum, sports boycotts are normally a part of a larger package of sanctions – aimed at crippling the economy of the targeted country, as well as exclude the nation from an international arena.20 Unassisted by other means, they do not make any real impact, as has been the case for USSR’s 1980 Olympic Games, and an ongoing boycott of Israel. Goldsmith21 notes that boycotting USSR’s 1980 Olympic Games to force it to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan bore no results.22 To the Soviet Union, establishing a strategic position against the United States in Afghanistan was of more value than holding a successful Olympic Games. Although 65 nations refused to send their athletes to the USSR, the boycott has ultimately proven to be a failure.23 Similarly, several predominantly Arab or Muslim countries have boycotted Israeli sports since the 1950s. 24 A long-lasting tension between Israel and the international community,

15 Committee to Boycott FIFA World Cup in Qatar 2022, ‘Boycott FIFA World Cup in Qatar 2022’, The Petition Site, <https://www.thepetitionsite.com/ en-gb/1/boycott-fifa-world-cup-in-qatar-2022/>, [accessed 23 February 2020]. 16 Barakat, Areeg, and Faten Moussa, ‘Using the Expectancy Theory Framework to Explain the Motivation to Participate in a Consumer Boycott’, Competition Forum, 14 (2016), 162-175. 17 Yilmaz, Hurrem and Abdullah Alhumoud, ‘Consumer boycotts: Corporate response and responsibility’, Review of Management and Marketing, 7 (2017), 373-380. 18 CNN Espanol, ‘Cristiano Ronaldo: Watch Real Madrid star walk out of interview’, CNN Espanol, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/03/football/ cristiano-ronaldo-fifa-qatar-football/index.html>, [accessed 23 February 2020]. 19 The Local Denmark, ‘Scandinavian players slam ‘modern day slavery’ in Qatar’, The Local DK. <https://www.thelocal.dk/20160517/scandinavianplayers-slam-modern-day-slavery-in-qatar>, [accessed 24 February 2020]. 20 Goldsmith, Marlene, ‘Sporting Boycotts as a Political Tool’, The Australian Quarterly, 67(1995), 11-20. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

Maja Stefansja: Boycotts in Qatar: Why FIFA World Cup 2022 will take place despite widespread uproar?

The lack of awareness about the subject might be just one of many reasons, why the

23 Ibid. 24Doyle, Paul, ‘The Joy of Six: international football play-offs.’, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/nov/13/the-joy-of-sixinternational-play-offs>, [accessed 23 February 2020].

most notably numerous Arab countries, can be traced back to an ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. While it can be argued that it is an example of an expressive or non-instrumental boycott, one that is not aimed at achieving any tangible effect, the argument is supported in that sports boycotts unpaired with other sanctions have little if not zero chance of yielding desired change. On the other hand, an example of a successful sporting boycott in politics is the 1985-1991 boycott of South Africa aimed at isolating the “apartheid sport”. However, it is important to point out that international pressure on the country to remove apartheid policy came in several forms apart from the sports boycott, such as economic embargos and diplomatic isolation.25 It was also parallel to continuous development in social awareness and the legislative process. Thus, it cannot be argued that the sporting boycott of South Africa was a reason for reforms per se. Sporting boycotts will only be successful when part of a wider policy to install changes in a target country.

A way forward This paper argued, that the consumer boycotts on the current scale are highly unlikely to yield any positive change to the situation of migrant workers in Qatar because of highly disproportionate bargaining power between the boycotted and the boycotters. One can be tempted to argue that there is nothing that the public can do to improve the situation. While it is true, that the problem is twofold, both in the administrative structures of FIFA as well as in Qatar’s labour law, and immense structural and institutional reform is needed in both those bodies, the public can still attempt to influence them with consistent bottomup nudges. This can be achieved via intense and persistent lobbying across the football community, on one hand, to work with FIFA, as well as conducting more research on the ethics of modern-day slavery to help build a business case for developing countries. Most notably, one could argue, that the current failures in consumer boycotts of the 2022

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FIFA World Cup can be traced to lack of popular knowledge about the topic. It would, therefore, be advisable for the consumers to educate each other to increase the awareness of the existence and scale of modern slavery even today. Lastly, the current popular anti-slavery activism in the region is likely to dissolve once the event has concluded. The research and interest should continue especially then, as Qatar is becoming more focused on developing tourism and leisure industries.

Conclusion and limitations There are numerous ways in which the bottom-up initiative can improve the situation of migrant workers who currently suffer from employees’ and human rights abuses across several industries in Qatar as the country races against the clock to finalise preparations for FIFA 2022 World Cup. These include funding the NGOs who research the region with regard to migrant workers’ rights; pressuring football associations with support from NGOs, unions, official institutions; and educating one’s environment about the phenomenon of modern-day slavery and its scale in developing countries. Boycotting the event altogether is unlikely to bring a significant contribution to the issue, as the knowledge of it is simply too uncommon. 25 David Black, ‘Not Cricket: The Effects and Effectiveness of the Sports Boycott’ in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, ed. by Neta Crawford and Klotz, Audie (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 213-31.

People are unlikely to join the existing bottom-top initiatives in time to make a substantial change before 2022, as they do not believe it will have an impact. It can be argued that had large bottom-up debates took place in 2013 when the industries were only developing and the public first learned about abuses in employee rights, it would have given more time to install actual change in the country’s human resource management system and labour law. However, Koku notes that the effectiveness of consumer boycotts organised via the Internet was low at the beginning of the 21st century, thus suggesting that even then the impact of such initiatives would have been insignificant.26

ever Arab and developing country to host the FIFA World Cup and it is proving difficult to provide supporting evidence from other cases. Hahn27 indicates that reciprocal consumers, boycott more and more effectively, while self-regarding consumers will do the opposite. It would be useful to see more data concerning the football community in this framework. Thus, more research needs to be conducted on the potential of the football community to influence and impose a real systematic change in countries that host big sporting events as well as its sentiments towards modern-day abuses in Qatar.

Appendix A Google Trends: average popularity of searches for 1. “Qatar World Cup Alcohol” (in blue) and 2. “Qatar slavery world cup” (in red). The weekly average for 1. Is 12 and 9 for 2.

Figure 1.1. Average weekly popularity of searches for “Qatar World Cup Alcohol” (in blue) and “Qatar slavery world cup” (in red), respectively. [Online]. Available from: https://trends. google.com/trends/explore?date=2013-01-10%202020-02-27&q=qatar%20world%20 cup%20alcohol,qatar%20world%20cup%20slavery

Year-month 2013-09 2013-10 2013-11 2013-12 2014-01

qatar alcohol world cup: 5 9 5 7 6

qatar slavery world cup: 5 12 9 5 0

Maja Stefansja: Boycotts in Qatar: Why FIFA World Cup 2022 will take place despite widespread uproar?

The obvious limitations of this research are those of lack of empirical data as Qatar is the first-

26 Koku, ‘On the effectiveness of consumer boycotts organized through the internet’. 27 Hahn, Tobias and Noel Albert, ‘Strong Reciprocity in Consumer Boycotts’, Journal of Business Ethics, 145(2017), 509–524.

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2014-02 2014-03 2014-04 2014-05 2014-06 2014-07 2014-08 2014-09 2014-10 2014-11 2014-12 2015-01 2015-02 2015-03 2015-04 2015-05 2015-06 2015-07 2015-08 2015-09 2015-10 2015-11 2015-12 2016-01 2016-02 2016-03 2016-04 2016-05 2016-06 2016-07 2016-08 2016-09 2016-10 2016-11 2016-12 2017-01 2017-02 2017-03 2017-04 2017-05 2017-06 2017-07 2017-08 2017-09 2017-10 2017-11 2017-12 2018-01 2018-02 2018-03

5 4 6 7 22 15 5 9 7 7 5 4 8 8 6 8 15 4 0 6 4 4 4 4 10 4 0 0 6 8 7 12 4 15 0 6 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 10 7 7 0 6 5

7 6 9 9 15 15 7 6 4 11 0 7 9 8 9 11 11 12 4 4 11 4 4 4 6 6 12 4 6 6 9 4 16 10 4 4 8 4 4 4 8 0 4 4 4 12 7 9 0 5

5 3 53 75 9 9 8 9 5 17 7 6 3 12 10 8 7 13 6 5 7 9 4 8.1

4 5 5 12 3 7 0 3 4 3 4 8 9 5 10 5 10 8 6 3 3 3 5 6.4

Figure 1.2. Monthly popularity of searches for “Qatar World Cup Alcohol” and “Qatar slavery world cup”, September 2013-February2020 (worldwide)

Bibliography Adams, Andrew and Mark Piekarz, ‘Sport events and human rights: positive promotion or negative erosion?’, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, 7 (2015), 220-236 Amnesty International. 2013. QATAR: THE DARK SIDE OF MIGRATION: SPOTLIGHT ON QATAR’S CONSTRUCTION SECTOR AHEAD OF THE WORLD CUP. [Online]. [Accessed 24 February 2020]. Available from: https://www.amnesty. org/en/documents/MDE22/010/2013/en/Amnesty International. 2016. QATAR WORLD CUP OF SHAME. [Online]. [Accessed 23 February 2020]. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/qatar-worldcup-of-shame/ Barakat, Areeg. and Faten Moussa, ‘Using the Expectancy Theory Framework to Explain the Motivation to Participate in a Consumer Boycott’, Competition Forum, 14 (2016), 162-175 Black, David, ‘Not Cricket: The Effects and Effectiveness of the Sports Boycott’ in How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, ed. by Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 213-31. CNN Espanol, ‘Cristiano Ronaldo: Watch Real Madrid star walk out of interview’, CNN Espanol, <https://edition. cnn.com/2015/08/03/football/cristiano-ronaldo-fifa-qatar-football/index.html>, [accessed 23 February 2020] Committee to Boycott FIFA World Cup in Qatar 2022, ‘Boycott FIFA World Cup in Qatar 2022’ The Petition Site, <https://www.thepetitionsite.com/en-gb/1/boycott-fifa-world-cup-in-qatar-2022/>, [accessed 23 February 2020]. Crane, Andrew, ‘Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for Human Exploitation’, The Academy of Management Review, 38 (2013), 49-69. Dorsey, James, ‘The 2022 World Cup: A Potential Monkey Wrench for Change’ The International Journal of the History of Sport, 31 (2014), 1739-1754. Doyle, Paul, ‘The Joy of Six: international football play-offs’, The Guardian.z<https://www.theguardian.com/ football/2015/nov/13/the-joy-of-six-international-play-offs>, [accessed 23 February 2020].

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2018-04 2018-05 2018-06 2018-07 2018-08 2018-09 2018-10 2018-11 2018-12 2019-01 2019-02 2019-03 2019-04 2019-05 2019-06 2019-07 2019-08 2019-09 2019-10 2019-11 2019-12 2020-01 2020-02 TOTAL AVERAGE

Dun, Susan, ‘No beer, no way! Football fan identity enactment won't mix with Muslim beliefs in the Qatar 2022 World Cup’, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, 6 (2014), 186-199. Fédération Internationale de Football Association, ‘Formats of the FIFA World Cup™ Final Competitions’ <https:// www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/mcwc/ip-201_04e_fwc_formats_slots_8821.pdf>, [accessed 23 February 2020]. Garrett, Dennis, ‘The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts: Environmental Opposition to Marketing’ Journal of Marketing, 51 (1987), 46-57. Goldsmith, Marlene, ‘Sporting Boycotts as a Political Tool’, The Australian Quarterly, 67 (1995), 11-20. Hahn, Tobias and Noel Albert, ‘Strong Reciprocity in Consumer Boycotts’ Journal of Business Ethics, 145 (2017), 509–524. International Labour Organisation, Walk Free Foundation and The UN Migration Agency, ‘Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Forced Labour and Forced Marriage’ <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@ dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf>, [accessed 25 February 2020]. International Trade Union Confederation, ‘Frontlines Report 2015 – Qatar: Profit and Loss’, <https://www.ituc-csi. org/IMG/pdf/qatar_en_web.pdf>, [accessed 24 February 2022] . Klein, Jill, N.Craig Smith and Andrew John, ‘Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation’, Journal of Marketing, 68 (2004), 92-109. Koku, P. Sergius. 2012. On the effectiveness of consumer boycotts organized through the internet: the market model. The Journal of Services Marketing. 26(1), pp. 20-26. Kozinets, Robert. and Jay Handelman, ‘Ensouling Consumption: A Netnographic Exploration of the Meaning of Boycotting Behavior’, Advances in Consumer Research, 25 (1998), 475-480. Law No. 13 of 2018 amending certain provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015 in relation to organizing the entry and exit of expatriates and their residence (c. 13). Qatar: Ministry of Justice. Little, Charles, ‘The sports boycott against Rhodesia reconsidered’ Sport in Society. Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics. 14 (2011), pp. 193-207. Makarem, Suzanne and Haeran Jae, ‘Consumer Boycott Behavior: An Exploratory Analysis of Twitter’, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 50 (2015), 193-223. North, Andrew, ‘Qatar migrant workers ‘treated like animals’ – Amnesty’, BBC, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-24980013>, [Accessed: 23 February 2020].

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Spar, Debora, and Lane La Mure, ‘The power of activism: Assessing the impact of NGOs on global business’, California Management Review, 45 (2003), 78–101.

The Local Denmark, ‘Scandinavian players slam ‘modern day slavery’ in Qatar’, The Local DK, <https://www.thelocal. dk/20160517/scandinavian-players-slam-modern-day-slavery-in-qatar>, [accessed 24 February 2020]. Traicos, John and Rajah, Goolam, ‘Are sports sanctions and boycotts a pointless exercise?’, The Guardian. <https:// www.theguardian.com/sport/2008/jul/02/cricket>, [accessed: 23 February 2020]. Anon, ‘Urge football associations to boycott the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar’ UK Government and Parliament Petitions, <https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/203652>, [accessed 23 February 2020]. Yilmaz, Hurrem and Abdullah Alhumoud, ‘Consumer boycotts: Corporate response and responsibility’, Review of Management and Marketing, 7 (2017), 373-380.

Alchemy: an interview with Jean-Claude Amara, cofounder of Droits Devant !! Ananya Sriram Who has the right to move across borders, and why? This is the question at the forefront of the Gilets Noirs movement, a protest group in France campaigning for the rights of undocumented migrants, most of whom come from the African continent. Often subjected to exploitation at work, poor living conditions, and police brutality, Black migrant workers in France are forced to the fringes of society, struggling to survive within a state that once ravaged their homelands. The Gilets Noirs movement aims to connect the struggles faced by undocumented migrants to France’s colonial history, highlighting hypocrisies in the French state’s attitudes towards migration. Why is it, for example, that French settlers were once able to plunder Africa to the point of poverty, yet Africans today face such difficulty moving to France to escape from said poverty? Although the Gilets Noirs only emerged in late 2018, the fight for migrant rights in France is hardly a new one. Jean-Claude Amara has been campaigning for the human rights of undocumented migrants in France for the last thirty years. A key figure in the sans-papiers (undocumented migrants) movement, his organisation, Droits Devant !! stands for the rights of all undocumented migrants to an existence beyond just survival. They campaign for migrants’ rights to citizenship, good housing, and good employment, all of which are defined as basic human rights by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Droits Devant !! was one of the first organisations to support the Gilets Noirs, a protest movement for undocumented migrants which emerged late last year, capitalising on the social unrest created by the Gilets Jaunes. I spoke to Jean-Claude last month about the roots of his organisation, its links to the Gilets Noirs, and the wider implications of the anticolonial struggle.

To start with, could you please tell me a bit about the organisation, how it started and its main goals? I'm one of the founders of the association. From 1990 onwards, after year after year of campaigning through occupations and squats, we decided to set up a big operation in 1994 where we occupied a huge building in the heart of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, Paris, on a street called Rue du Dragon. About 200 people settled in an old school that had been empty for several years – women, men and children, all of whom were demanding housing. In that school, Droits Devant !! was created, and it was founded on three pillars. The key here is the 's' in 'rights', rights in the plural – it’s in the name, Droits Devant !!. These rights are based on three pillars. Firstly, solidarity with the struggles of undocumented migrants, and secondly, the exchange of knowledge. Because it is always very, very important

to be able to relay, from intellectuals and academics, to those who are most impoverished, a kind of exchange, a sharing of knowledge. That's why at the birth of Droits Devant !!!!, we created Rue du Dragon, our first people's university. This people's university was really the crucible, the basis, even, of Droits Devant !!!!. The third principle is the cultural element, which includes setting up writing workshops, publishing several books, etc. It is in this space of this former school that we have set up 52 writing workshops that are part of this people’s university. The workshops are very diverse, with subjects including philosophy, sociology, media, art, video, and more. Rue du Dragon, which we occupied for fourteen months, was really a kind of melting pot, a hub of activity which gave us the space to establish solid links with many intellectuals like Pierre Bourdieu, Copeau, Castoriadis, Derrida, and so on. All of these people came regularly to organize forums within the framework of this popular university, with people who were beginning to mobilise to campaign for citizenship. So, Droits Devant !! was created in January 1994, and is based on these three pillars. This people’s university was particularly avant-garde at the beginning.

That's very interesting, especially those three principles you mentioned. It’s particularly interesting to see that although Droits Devant !! is an association for undocumented migrants, its founding principles are aimed at helping migrants to flourish, in fact, and to have access to a good education, and to knowledge and culture. Absolutely. Because Droits Devant !! isn't just about undocumented migrants. We are committed to the struggle of the Palestinian people, for example, as well as the larger international struggle against economic globalisation. We addressed a conference of the World Trade Organization, for example, so Droits Devant !! is very broad, with a lot of

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international networks. At the heart of this struggle, indeed, in France, are undocumented migrants. And this is why at Droits Devant !!, at the very heart of the association, it is imperative that the sans-papiers (undocumented migrants) are the decision-makers on the boards and the administration. For us, it is very important not to fight for someone, but to fight with them, together, and to make our struggles universal. We are not there yet.

How important is solidarity to you as far as the association is concerned? Solidarity is at the very heart of our association, of course. I've been at the heart of these struggles for thirty years, and thirty years is a long time, but at the same time it's short. The main driving force of our fight is not simply rehousing of thousands of poorly housed people, or obtaining the regularization of hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants – these are not our only struggles. Rather, it is above all to have created this alchemy, to have created an alchemy where from the moment that individuals suffering on their own can come together regularly – from the moment they join forces, from the moment they unite, they can give birth to a collective force. That, for us, is the very principle of collective solidarity. Indeed, this is part of what I have been calling now for the last thirty years, an inevitable opportunity. The fact that all these individuals that are completely lost in life when they are alone, the moment they realize that they can come together effectively gives them

a collective strength. At the heart of this collective strength is obviously the fundamental word, the word solidarity.

While we're talking about solidarity, can you tell me a little bit about the connection between Droits Devant !! and the Gilets Noirs? Yes, of course. In 2018, 300 to 350 undocumented women, men and children occupied the Saint-Charles church in the 11th arrondissement of Paris, and Droits Devant !! was the first association that day to take action in immediate support of this occupation. From ‘96 to today, this struggle, of course, has been going on again and again. We end up with victories, but obviously it's a bit of an endless task, for example, when some migrants are regularized, just as many more arrive. Since 1996, there have been collectives of undocumented migrants, About 3 years ago, the comrades of an association, the collective La Chapelle Debout, which took action with migrants, was seeking to unite migrants who came from Turkey, Ethiopia, etc. We extended solidarity to these migrants who, at the cost of their lives of course, had finally arrived in France and settled and continue to settle in the capital. Later, we met with the leaders of La Chapelle Debout and we decided to fight together because we had a lot in common, notably the principle of autonomy. We are totally autonomous – that is to say we don't depend on any political party. For us, autonomy of action and thought is fundamental and has been part of our journey for thirty years. This principle being shared by the young activists of La Chapelle Debout, we all worked together. Our fight started to spread to migrant hostels in Paris in particular, where there are thousands and thousands of undocumented migrants. So we went around the hostels and little by little, a collective force grew steadily, to the point where several hundred undocumented comrades in hostels mobilized. Our movement was growing in strength at the same time that the Gilets Jaunes [literally translates to ‘yellow vests’ – a wave of strikes against Macron’s hike in fuel prices in late 2018 which spiralled into a protest movement that brought the nation to a halt] movement started, now more than a year ago. Almost immediately, it seemed, the Gilets Jaunes were on one side and the Gilets Noirs on the other. So that's how the Gilets Noirs movement was created, and several occupations took place, the last one being the occupation of the Pantheon in Paris last year, where 700, 700 or 800 undocumented migrants from Droits Devant !! and the Gilets Noirs came together.

It seems to me that there are a lot of similarities, as you said, between Droits Devant !! and the Gilets Noirs. It is a fight that doesn't end with regularization or housing – in fact, it's a struggle for life. I wanted to ask you, what is the significance of this fight at the national level, that is, for France, and at the international level? Yes, of course. We are first and foremost anti-colonialist fighters. It is fundamental to say so. Because unfortunately, for 20-24 years now, in this struggle of undocumented migrants, this fundamental aspect of the anti-colonialist struggle is sorely lacking. For us, it is quite obvious that all these undocumented people who come from the Global South to the Global

Ananya Sriram: Alchemy: an interview with Jean-Claude Amara, co-founder of Droits Devant !!

which Droits Devant !! has worked to support by uniting the struggles of common factions.

North risk their lives, leaving behind their families, their fathers, their children, their culture.

It is quite obvious that this immigration â&#x20AC;&#x201C; what I call a forced immigration â&#x20AC;&#x201C; has a direct relationship with the colonial destruction of an enormous number of countries that were, and still are being plundered, and which, for the most part, also paid the price in human flesh, as we used to say in the 1980s. For us, it is clear that this anti-colonial struggle is important. This is of enormous importance in relation to all those who are forced to leave their countries by virtue of the fact that these countries have been drained, have been plundered and have been looted. Even now, we have to contend with this economic globalisation by multinationals from the Global North establishing themselves in the Global South, which over-exploit and over-exploit countries where we are also fighting for climate refugee status. Africans are increasingly being forced to leave their countries as a result of desertification, deforestation, land plundering, and land impoverishment. They have no more resources and will be forced to move from the Global South to the Global North. All the better! What weâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;re saying is that the arrival of undocumented migrants in France is the historical result of this colonial plundering that has never stopped in all these countries of the Maghreb [the Arabic name for Northwest Africa, including countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria], West Africa, and so on. That is why this aspect of the anti-colonialist struggle is also

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a class struggle.

Drag as Protest: The Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Palestinian Drag Scene in Israel Philippa Dearlove Abstract In this essay I will examine the social and political implications of the Palestinian drag scene in Israel. Drawing on how drag, as a mode of sexual and creative expression, is utilised as a tool to challenge the Israeli state’s militarised, and powerful, control of the Palestinian ‘other’. Through close examination of the aesthetic form and effect of Kaswar Zant’s performance, in Jaffa, Israel, I will expose its relationship to the current cultural, political, and social climate of oppression and censorship. Additionally, through comparison with other attempts to reconfigure this power imbalance, I hope to expose the homonationalist nature of Israel’s publication of LGBTQ acceptance, as well as the covert sexual nature of the mechanisms of control enforced upon the occupied territories. Drag provides a powerful platform for political resistance, through destabilising boundaries; boundaries that restrict and obscure elements of sexual, national, and cultural identity, forcing individuals to exist within the borders of ‘acceptable’ binaries, and spaces. Drag stages a re-evaluation of these boundaries, placing concealed, or controversial identities under a lens to reveal a more simplified division, between those who accept and those who don’t. Kawsar Zant’s performance took place in the old town of Tel Aviv, Jaffa, an area previously referred to as the ‘Bride of Palestine’, pre-1948, distinguishing the district as a predominantly Arab space.1 The article ‘a burgeoning drag scene challenges stereotypes’2 documents the performance, and was written by a journalist based in the West Bank, part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).3 Since the formation of the Israeli state, the Zionist perspective that the state’s Jewish identity must be retained, has caused the subordination of Palestinian citizens. The ‘Zionist colonial project’ has forced the Palestinian body into an enclosed and deprived space, wherein it is vulnerable to exploitation and control by the Israeli state. 4 In this essay I will examine the properties of Kaswar Zant’s performance, their political significance, particularly in the context of sexuality, sexual orientation, the gaze and control, intertwined with elements of the social and cultural context; the physical and mental borders between Palestinian and Israeli citizens. The performance is described as follows: Kawsar Zant, a 20-year-old Palestinian drag queen from Jerusalem, stepped on stage at the Duplex Club in Jaffa, donning a loose-fitting graduation dress with a large Palestinian flag stitched on the front. 1 Daniel Monterescu, Jaffa shared and shattered: Contrived coexistence in Israel/Palestine. (Indiana University Press, 2015), p. 58. 2 Jaclynn Ashly, ‘A burgeoning drag scene challenges stereotype’, The Electronic Intifada <https://electronicintifada.net/content/burgeoning-dragscene-challenges-stereotypes/28206> [accessed 14 November 2019]. 3 OPT, or occupied Palestinian territories, predominantly the Gaza Strip and West Bank, are demographically Arab districts that lost their autonomy following the 1967 war. 4 Zeev, Rosenhek. ‘The political dynamics of a segmented labour market: Palestinian citizens, Palestinians from the occupied territories and migrant workers in Israel.’ Acta Sociologica, 46.3 (2003), p. 234 < https://www.jstor.org/stable/4194985?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1>.

Najwa Karam’s “Lashhad Hobak” (“Begging for Your Love”) blared from the speakers, and Kawsar lip-synched and shook her hips. When the beat quickened, she suddenly tore off her graduation dress from Al-Quds University in the occupied West Bank, revealing a short

Zant’s performance confronts issues regarding appropriate exposure, and sexualisation of the body, in particular the female, or gender-neutral body. Tel Aviv is deemed to be a hub of liberalism in the East, and following this worldwide projection of acceptance, most conspicuous through the state’s funding of gay-pride month, one might assume that this performance bears little political significance in a state deemed to be progressive.6 However, as Shaka McGlotten remarks, LGBTQ politics in Israel entail a form of ‘conditional acceptance’, wherein limited aspects of the political are embraced, described as ‘homonormitivity and homonationalism’, discussions of sexuality are restricted to sexual orientation alone.7 Therefore, heteronormitive ideologies, such as gender binarism, remain associated with the LGBTQ community, and interlinks between nationality and hierarchical LGBTQ marginalisation are denied. Therefore, Israel’s non-inclusive policy provokes critique of the state’s capitalistic motivations, questioning if this liberalism is intended exclusively to promote the state’s global image.

In 2005, a marketing strategy called ‘Brand Israel’ was launched in an attempt to portray the country as modern and relevant.8 An intricate feature of this re-branding involved promoting the country as a gay tourism destination. The commodification of ‘camp’ is a global venture, producing revenue through the idealisation of a white, gender-conforming sector of the gay community, linking their sexuality to glamour, fashion and subsequently modernity - including the development of creative, gentrified areas.9 Therefore, Israel is

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promoting LGBTQ acceptance in an attempt to attract tourists to the state; appropriating gay-pride. Further, Israel’s portrayal of acceptance towards LGBTQ communities also has an alleged ulterior motive. The term ‘pinkwashing’, first used by Ali Abunimah,10 is often used to describe how the state is utilising the image of progressive, LGBTQ acceptance, to ‘deflect international attention’ from the breaches of human rights, and international law, taking place in the occupied area; obfuscating the reality of Palestine’s annexation.11

The oppression and control of Palestinians within the state, and occupied territory, suggests the ‘homonationalist’ nature of Israel’s LGBTQ politics, as: whilst one sector of the 5 Ashly, The Electronic Intifada, p. 1. 6 W. Alqaisiya, ‘Decolonial Queering: The Politics of Being Queer in Palestine. Journal of Palestine Studies, 47.3 (2018), p. 32 <10.1525/ jps.2018.47.3.29>. 7 Shaka McGlotten, ‘Political Aesthetics of Drag’, ICI Berlin <https://www.ici-berlin.org/events/shaka-mcglotten/> [accessed 2 May 2020]; J. Puar, ‘Rethinking homonationalism’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45. 2 (2013), p. 336 < https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074381300007X>. 8 S. Schulman, ‘Israel and ‘pinkwashing’’, New York Times, 22. (2011), p. 1. <https://queeramnesty.ch/docs/NYT_20111123_Israel_Pinkwashing.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020]. 9 E. Whitney, ‘Capitalizing on Camp: Greed and the queer marketplace’, Text and Performance Quarterly, 26. 1 (2006), pp. 36-46. <https://doi. org/10.1080/10462930500382401>. 10 G. Shafie, ‘Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda’, Kohl: A Journal for Body and Gender Research, 1. (2015) p. 84 <https:// cdn.atria.nl/ezines/IAV_608076/IAV_608076_2015_1/Pinkwashing.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020].

11 Shafie, Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda, p. 83.

Philippa Dearlove: Drag as Protest: The Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Palestinian Drag Scene in Israel

silver number underneath.5

demographic, the Jewish homosexual community, is accepted, the Palestinian, or non-Jewish ‘other’ is marginalised. Additionally, the ‘pinkwashing’ strategy involves the maintenance of ‘backward, racist depictions of Palestinians in order to better justify oppression and unequal treatment of them’.12 The depiction of Palestinians as ‘homophobic and oppressive’, suggests an element of islamophobia in the ‘pinkwashing’ strategy, as ‘epistemic violence’ is indicated through the framing of homophobia as a ‘specific property of Arab/ Muslim society’.13 As Islamophobia becomes increasingly entrenched worldwide, associations between homophobia and Arab/ Muslim societies are increasingly utilised as justification for opposing the ‘spectral threat of ‘radical Islam’ or ‘Islamo-fascism’’.14 This is particularly noticeable when relating Israel’s ‘pinkwashing’ strategy, to America’s imposition of ‘love of gayness and democracy on Iraq’s allegedly homophobic people’.15 Therefore ‘nation-states are now vested with the status of ‘gay-friendly’ versus ‘homophobic’’,16 a polarity prevalent in Israel, where Tel Aviv is a ‘haven’ for LGBTQ Palestinians to be ‘saved’ if they can suppress their Arab-Palestinian identities; as Ghadir Shafie experienced when told to rename herself, hiding her nationality to conform with homonationalist conceptions of gay identity.17

In Zant’s performance, she establishes the relationship between nationality and LGBTQ identity in Israel, through stepping onto the stage in a graduation dress with a Palestinian flag stitched onto it. The Palestinian flag may suggest national pride, however it may also be indicative of how spectators immediately categorise her based on nationality; a surface-level perception of her worth, in a country where she is racially oppressed. The robe also masks her short silver dress, possibly alluding to the ‘homonationist’ nature of LGBTQ politics in Israel, as the robe, comparable to her nationality, obscures her sexual identity and therefore hinders her acceptance within the LGBTQ community in Israel. Zant’s striking portrayal of her national identity arguably counters Vaginal Davis’s concept of ‘disidentification’; ‘a performative mode of tactical recognition’ where the ‘minoritarian’ performer disassociates from their identity, ‘in an effort to resist the oppressive and normalizing discourse of dominant ideology’.18 However, through abruptly tearing off the robe, and flag, Zant may be attempting to portray an element of ‘disidentification’, as only when devoid of national identity, is she able to explore her sexual identity.

The graduation dress also has the aesthetic effect of provoking consideration of Palestinian employment and education prospects. The flag stitched on her graduation robe may suggest how her degree is discredited by her nationality, or her university’s nationality. Additionally, through removing the robe, Zant may portray a rejection of the education system, possibly alluding to its corruption and inequality. Her intentional defacement of the robe suggests an active attempt to deconstruct the uniformity of the garment, placing traditions such as graduation ceremonies under scrutiny, and questioning society’s uniformed composure and 12 Shafie, Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda, pp. 85-86. 13 Alqaisiya, Decolonial Queering, p. 33. 14 Puar, Rethinking homonationalism p. 338. 15 Alqaisiya, Decolonial Queering, p. 33. 16 Puar, Rethinking homonationalism p. 338. 17 Shafie, Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda, p. 84. 18 J. E. Muñoz, ‘’The White to be Angry’: Vaginal Davis’s Terrorist Drag’, Social Text, 52. (1997), p. 83 <10.2307/466735>.

amnesia. Universities provide a platform for free speech, however owing to their being funded by the state they also form an essential part of the state machine. Throughout the occupation, a clear censorship of academic content is evident, conspicuous through no Israeli universities showing any solidarity with the Palestinian struggle at all. In fact, content published is deemed to demonstrate complicity with the illegal occupation, providing justification for the state’s actions.19 Therefore, the universities’ prestige is arguably diminished in the eyes of the oppressed and voiceless, as the state’s universities facilitate an influential and academic force of opposition.

Additionally, whilst Israel’s universities are censored, they still exhibit a form of free speech in their global presence and agency. Conversely, Palestinian universities, contained within a divided and restricted space, possess almost no global autonomy, and therefore can exert almost no influence. The Israeli state has also broken international law through purposefully disrupting the Palestinian education system. Palestinian universities have been closed down, academic books censored, educational materials have been taxed, and tactical measures have been enforced to disrupt the physical ability of the Palestinian body to travel to and from university.20 Therefore, through the systematic disruption of education within the OPT, citizens’ voices are diminished, and they are further alienated and dehumanised. This links directly to LGBTQ politics because, as a mechanism of the ‘pinkwashing’ strategy, Palestinian schools did not receive the same educational resources during the effort to educate on LGBTQ rights.21 The disruption of Palestinians’ education exemplifies the state’s attempts to divide and destroy Palestinian culture; marginalising minorities further, and distancing the ‘liberal’ Israeli nation from the homophobic, oppressed ‘other.’

The performance also incorporates elements of Vaginal Davis’s ‘terrorist drag,’ wherein

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societal anxieties are provoked, instilling ‘terror’ amongst spectators, and revealing entrenched inequalities in the public sphere.22 As utilised by Liad Hussein Kantorowicz, when performing a ‘hijab strip tease’,23 Zant’s long, graduation dress may conjure associations with the ‘threatening Muslim other’ amongst Islamophobic spectators.24 The removal of the robe, to reveal a short dress beneath also links to the sexualisation of the female body, exposing and antagonising the nation’s fantasies, and cultural anxieties; particularly with regards to the maintenance of femininity, virginity and subsequently purity. In Liad’s (2007) performance she strips in a district of Tel-Aviv previously deemed a hub for prostitution, pulling an Israeli flag from her vagina, exemplifying ties between ‘occupation, immigrants and sex workers’; breaking the social hypocrisy and ‘amnesia’ surrounding the treatment of the ‘other’ social body.25 Therefore, both performances implement an intersectional strategy, wherein ‘sexuality, race, class and other identity differentials’ are recognised as co-present components that exist simultaneously, which is particularly relevant in the context of Israel, 19 A. Abunimah, Against Apartheid: The Case for Boycotting Israeli Universities, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015), pp. 21-31. 20 L. S. Hennawi, Education as Resistance: Detention of Palestinian University Students under Israeli Occupation and Palestinian Political-Cultural Responses, (Boston: Boston College University Library, 2011), pp. 23-41. 21 Shafie, Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda, p. 85. 22 Muñoz, ’The White to be Angry’, p. 91. 23 Liad Hussein Kantorowicz, ‘War is Good,’ (2007) Vimeo <https://player.vimeo.com/video/38457339> [Accessed 18 January 2020]. 24 Shaka McGlotten, ‘The Political Aesthetics of Drag’, Metropolitics, (2015) p. 3. <https://www.metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/met-mcglotten.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020].

25 McGlotten, Political Aesthetics of Drag, ICI Berlin.

due to the implementation of the ‘pinkwashing’ strategy that accepts elements of sexual identity, however oppresses specific nationalities.26 Zant’s form of ‘terrorist drag’ is therefore a powerful utilisation of drag to subtly critique the political, and social injustices of religious,

Zant’s engagement in political critique, through gender impersonation, is also significant due to the ‘gendered nature of nationalism’.27 The occupation of Palestinian land is presented as a masculine struggle; images of the men protesting on the boundaries epitomise the media’s limited portrayal of the occupation, contrasting the women, whose narratives are subordinated. As part of the ‘pinkwashing’ strategy, Israel may be attempting to portray a patriarchal division of societal roles within the OPT, through presenting the struggle as masculine. Additionally, this portrayal may also suggest a subordination of female, LGBTQ Palestinians narratives in an attempt to retain the limited conceptions of Palestinian gayidentity and reduce the exposure of ‘other’ social bodies. The gendered nature of the struggle is also demonstrated through reference to the loss of land as ‘rape’, conveying misogynistic perceptions of the Palestinian’s masculinity being damaged by the female being taken, or corrupted.28 Through Zant’s liquidation of gender categories, she re-frames associations between loss, through occupation and feminization, creating an image that empowers femininity and sexuality, contradicting the beliefs that Palestinian humiliation is rooted in, or linked to, the loss of pure femininity; virginity.

Zant also arguably presents the diminished voice of women, or LGBTQ individuals, through the incorporation of lip-synching. Lip-synching is a mechanism that indicates the adoption of a new identity, as another’s words are seemingly projected, possibly linking to Vaginal Davis’s concept of ‘disidentification’.29 In this circumstance, the identity of Najwa Karam is adopted, a Lebanese star who produces politically fuelled music, that questions societal perceptions of female sexuality, and attempts to unite Lebanon. Zant’s mimesis has the effect of summoning associations to a comparable political climate, in which Israel is again a dominant force. Raafat Hattab also suggests that lip-synching provides a platform for spectatorship; through the loss of voice, the performer is a witness to their surrounding reality.30 Therefore, the incorporation of lip-synching may portray the actor’s expression is restricted, particularly their sexual expression. However, lip-synching may also be utilised to liberate the actor from the role of the performer, providing them an opportunity to adopt a new identity, or analyse their surrounding reality; placed in a position of liminality between speech and silence, Israel and Palestine.

26 Muñoz, ’The White to be Angry’, p. 91. ; K. Crenshaw, ‘Beyond racism and misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew’, Feminism social thought: a reader. (1992), pp. 247-263 <ARI_ALEAC03975236>. 27 Gil Hochberg, ‘‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point: Fashion for Israeli Checkpoints.’ A Journal for Lesbian and Gay Studies, 16. 4 (2010), p. 568 <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/398469>. 28 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 587.

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sexual and racial control.

29 Muñoz, ’The White to be Angry’, p. 83. 30 Tobaron Waxman, ‘Interview with Raafat Hattab’, No More Potlucks <http://nomorepotlucks.org/site/interview-with-raafat-hataab/> [accessed 18 January 2020].

The borders between Israel and Palestine are both mental and physical, and power dynamics appear, and are accentuated by, the various gazes. Zant’s active role as a performer links to the visibility of specific bodies within the state; the public consensually gazes upon her, which in turn validates her existence as a member of Israeli society. However, within the OPT a non-consensual gaze occurs, a gaze that facilitates the state’s control, and renders the Palestinian ‘other’ a ‘primitive endangerment’ of the ‘national modernity that Israelis embody and enjoy.’31 Various checkpoints have been set up throughout and surrounding the Palestinian territory which facilitate this non-consensual gaze. Manned by Israeli soldiers, these checkpoints have the objective of observing, and subsequently controlling, the civilians. The surveillance of the residents in the OPT not only forces them into a subordinate position where they are ‘calculable and governable bodies’, but also provides material for Israeli media outlets, enabling the portrayal of specific, observable traits of the Palestinian ‘other’.32 The checkpoints imply that the population must be observed and in doing so create an accusatory atmosphere, where the Arab, Palestinian ‘other’ is essentially a terrorist.

At the checkpoints, Palestinians are stripped of their ‘dignity, agency and freedom’ by the Israeli troops.33 Strip-searching is a mechanism of control utilised by the Israeli military at the checkpoints. The procedure not only renders the Palestinian body ‘a symbol of imminent danger (‘the terrorist’)’ but also an ‘object of complete subjugation lacking any political agency (‘the occupied’)’.34 Sharif Waked’s ‘Chic-Point,’ is a fashion collection designed specifically for checkpoint strip-searches, to enable ‘efficient body exposure’. The actors expose the perversity of the militaries strip-search procedure through efficiently removing their clothes, framing their response to the sexualised mechanism of control, as voluntary; embodying their role as objects of the military’s sexualised gaze. This, in effect, undermines the most ‘immediate and visible’ practice of ‘control over the Palestinian body’, as, through their complacency, they almost show enjoyment of their exposure.35 A similar effect is

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portrayed in Zant’s performance, wherein the act of stripping becomes an empowering act of sexual, and material liberation, rather than an indication of physical and mental occupation.

However, Sharif Waked’s ‘Chic-point’ has also been met with some criticism. Due to the malecentric casting some view the show as an exploration of the relationship between ‘masculinity and nationalism,’ particularly when framed in opposition to the militarised checkpoint zones.36 However, others perceive it as a possible inadvertent means of diminishing the significance of other group’s narratives. Additionally, through the incorporation of homoeroticism, evident through the stripping procedure, associations form between sexuality and terror, or control. ‘Chic-Points’ portrayal of homosexuality as an underlying factor that influences these acts of oppression arguably demonizes homosexuality; the ‘forbidden’ non-heterosexual 31 S. L. Morgensen, ‘Queer settler colonialism in Canada and Israel: Articulating two-spirit and Palestinian queer critiques. Settler colonial studies, 2. 2 (2012), p. 177 <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648848>. 32 Irus Braverman, ‘Checkpoint Gazes’, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper. (2009), p. 213 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1348043>. 33 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 587. 34 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 578 ; Kotef Hagar and Merav Amir, ‘(En) gendering checkpoints: Checkpoint watch and the repercussions of intervention’, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32. 1 (2007), pp. 973-996 <10.1086/512623>. 35 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 580.

36 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 579.

desires drive the oppressors to sexually dominate the Palestinian body. The demonization of homosexuality is particularly problematic when framed in relation to Israel’s ‘pinkwashing’ strategy, where Palestine is ‘reactionary and homophobic’, legitimizing ‘progressive’ Israel’s cosmopolitan’ aesthetic, may be perceived as embodying the deemed feminisation of their nation, finding empowerment in their sexual liberation, countering ‘pinkwashing’ strategies.38 Or, conversely, may be perceived as using homosexuality as a tool to undermine the masculinity, and therefore power, of the Israeli soldiers.

Critique of Sharif Waked’s attempts to re-configure the power imbalance between the Israeli state and ‘powerless’ civilians in the OPT must however consider the sheer complexity of countering these sexualised mechanisms of control. Machsom Watch (MW), an organisation comprised of mostly secular, elderly, Ashkenazi women,39 is contradicting expectations of the demographic present in these militarised zones; their ‘grandmotherly presence’ is deemed to soften the occupier through reminiscence of their ‘civic life inside Israel’.40 However, the MW women’s non-violent attempts to counter the Israeli gaze, and re-frame Palestine’s image in the global public eye, provide justification for Israeli presence in the OPT. The Israeli state claims the MW’s presence indicates the ‘humanistic nature of its occupation of Palestinian territories’, again portraying sexist associations between safety and female presence, and exemplifying the complexities of countering Israel’s all-encompassing control.41 Therefore, Sharif Waked’s use of ‘campy’ aesthetic can be recognised as an attempt to counter racist depictions of Palestinian sexual rigidity, instil influence on the nation’s skewed global public image, and bypass Israel’s calculated censorship and control.

In conclusion, Zant’s performance encapsulates the internal, mental occupation of the Palestinian non-binary body; a detached body floating between the boundaries of acceptance. The performance relates to the social, cultural and political context of Palestine’s oppression through the incorporation of themes relating to feminisation, sexuality and the gaze. Discrimination of the Palestinian body is evident through the Israeli LGBTQ community’s complacency towards ‘homonationalism’, and the socially amnesic atmosphere associated with the rights of the minoritarian ‘other.’ The performance links to the cultural political climate through relevance to the Zionist perspective, which rejects the Arab, nonJewish other within the ‘holy’ liberal land. Additionally, the political context of LGBTQ politics, ‘pinkwashing’ marketing strategies, as well as mechanisms of control, such as sexual domination, censorship and the gaze, relate to Zant’s performance through her re-framing of heteronormitive concepts such as gender binary; masculine power versus weak, occupied femininity; militarised, dominating Israel versus voiceless, subordinate Palestine.

37 Alqaisiya, Decolonial Queering, p. 31. 38 Hochberg, ‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point, p. 580. 39 European-originated Jews

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‘illegal and oppressive practices’.37 Therefore, the ‘Chic-Point’ actors, with their ‘campy

40 D. Naaman, ‘The silenced outcry: A feminist perspective from the Israeli checkpoints in Palestine’, NWSA Journal, 18. 3 (2006) p. 170 < https://www. jstor.org/stable/i40002990>. 41 Braverman, Checkpoint Gazes, p. 212.

Bibliography Braverman, Irus, ‘Checkpoint Gazes’, Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper, (2009), pp. 211-214 <https://ssrn.com/ abstract=1348043>.

Crenshaw, K., ‘Beyond racism and misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew’, Feminism social thought: a reader. (1992), 247-263 <ARI_ALEAC03975236>. Hagar, Kotef and Amir, Merav ‘(En) gendering checkpoints: Checkpoint watch and the repercussions of intervention’, Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32. 1 (2007), 973-996 <10.1086/512623>. Hennawi, L. S., Education as Resistance: Detention of Palestinian University Students under Israeli Occupation and Palestinian Political-Cultural Responses, (Boston: Boston College University Library, 2011) Hochberg, Gil, ‘‘Check Me Out’, Queer Encounters in Sharif Waked’s Chic Point: Fashion for Israeli Checkpoints.’ A Journal for Lesbian and Gay Studies, 16. 4 (2010), 577-598 <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/398469>. Kantorowicz, Liad Hussein, ‘War is Good,’ (2007), Vimeo <https://player.vimeo.com/video/38457339> [Accessed18 January 2019]. McGlotten, Shaka, ‘Political Aesthetics of Drag’, ICI Berlin <https://www.ici-berlin.org/events/shaka-mcglotten/> [accessed 2 May 2020] McGlotten, Shaka, ‘The Political Aesthetics of Drag’, Metropolitics, (2015), 1-5 <https://www.metropolitiques.eu/ IMG/pdf/met-mcglotten.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020]. Monterescu, Daniel, Jaffa shared and shattered: Contrived coexistence in Israel/Palestine. (Indiana University Press, 2015) Morgensen, S. L., ‘Queer settler colonialism in Canada and Israel: Articulating two-spirit and Palestinian queer critiques. Settler colonial studies, 2. 2 (2012), 167-190 <https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2012.10648848> Muñoz, J. E., ‘’The White to be Angry’: Vaginal Davis’s Terrorist Drag’, Social Text, 52. (1997), 81-103 <10.2307/466735> Naaman, D., ‘The silenced outcry: A feminist perspective from the Israeli checkpoints in Palestine’, NWSA Journal, 18. 3 (2006), 168-180 < https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40002990> Puar, J.,‘Rethinking homonationalism’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45. 2 (2013) < https://doi. org/10.1017/S002074381300007X>

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Rosenhek, Zeev, ‘The political dynamics of a segmented labour market: Palestinian citizens, Palestinians from the occupied territories and migrant workers in Israel.’ Acta Sociologica, 46.3 (2003).

Schulman, S., ‘Israel and ‘pinkwashing’’, New York Times, 22. (2011) <https://queeramnesty.ch/docs/NYT_20111123_ Israel_Pinkwashing.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020]. Shafie, G. ‘Pinkwashing: Israel’s international strategy and internal agenda’, Kohl: A Journal for Body and Gender Research, 1. (2015) 83-86 <https://cdn.atria.nl/ezines/IAV_608076/IAV_608076_2015_1/Pinkwashing.pdf> [accessed 2 May 2020]. Waxman, Tobaron, ‘Interview with Raafat Hattab’, No More Potlucks <http://nomorepotlucks.org/site/interviewwith-raafat-hataab/> [accessed 18 January 2020] Whitney, E., ‘Capitalizing on Camp: Greed and the queer marketplace’, Text and Performance Quarterly, 26. 1 (2006), 36-46 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10462930500382401>

Philippa Dearlove: Drag as Protest: The Social, Cultural and Political Implications of the Palestinian Drag Scene in Israel

Abunimah, A., Against Apartheid: The Case for Boycotting Israeli Universities, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015) Ashly, Jaclynn, ‘A burgeoning drag scene challenges stereotype’, The Electronic Intifada <https://electronicintifada. net/content/burgeoning-drag-scene-challenges-stereotypes/28206> [accessed 14 November 2019].

A Wasted Chance: Why Did the Oslo Peace Process Fail? Maria Stankiewicz Abstract Ever since the creation of Israel in Palestine in 1948 the region has been marked by continuous conflict and violations of both international law and human rights. While aspirations of the two parties to this day seem impossible to be reconciled, peacebuilding efforts have been undertaken on both grassroots and political level. In 1993 in Oslo a peace process was initiated. In following years Palestinian and Israeli governing bodies came together to negotiate and mediate, on an unheard of before scale, in order to formulate a peace treaty and find solutions satisfactory to both sides. This essay examines political, social, and economic factors that contributed to the deterioration of the peace process and analyses their impact on the negotiations. It pinpoints the murder of Yitzhak Rabin as a beginning of the end of the process and further explores the significance of Netanyahu’s premiership, maladministration of the Palestinian Authority, prevalence of violence towards civilians, and expansion of settlements. The essay concludes that reasons for failure of the Oslo peace process were as diverse as they were deeply intertwined.

The 1980s in the history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict were determined by political disappointments and violent clashes, however with the change of the decade a new hope for conflict resolution started to spring. With face to face meetings of representatives of both nations taking place in Madrid in 1991 and Ha’Avoda, Israeli Labour Party, being elected in Israel a year later, the desire to break the vicious cycle of denunciation and violence and the willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations of coexistence seemed as strong as never before.1 In such a climate the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (commonly known as the “Oslo Accord”) was signed in 1993 marking the beginning of what came to be known as the Oslo peace process. The initial optimism was however not long lasting. Multiple interwoven factors soon contributed to aggravated scepticism, which continued to undermine the peace process resulting in its suspension in 2000 and 2001.2 In order to reveal reasons for its failure, this essay analyses components of socio-political reality of that time to examine their contribution to the deterioration of the process. It starts with chronological analysis of changes occurring on the Israeli political scene, to then consider the role of violence, settlement expansion, deteriorating socioeconomic realities, as well as the role of media in providing a misleading picture of the peace process. Rogan and Dowty classify the 1995 murder of Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli prime minister in favour of the Oslo Accords and Peace Nobel Prize winner, as one of the turning points in the history of the Peace Talks and a beginning of its end.3 Having endured multiple acts of violence from 1Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) 2 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 3 Dowty Alan, Israel/Palestine. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History. (London: Penguin, 2010).

both sides of the conflict, following this assassination the process gradually slipped into a mayhem to never fully recover. The tragic death of Rabin would possibly not be so decisive for the failure of Oslo peace process, had upon his death Shimon Peres been chosen as a prime minister over Benjamin Netanyahu.4 Netanyahu expressively opposed the peace process, although having won the election by a bare 1% he was not authorised nor had the popular support to single-handedly put an end to the negotiations. His discontent with ongoing process became apparent in the deceitful approach to fulfilling formerly agreed obligations. Tessler invokes a situation when a release of a specific number of Palestinian citizens from Israeli prisons was agreed between governments- while the agreed number of detainees was indeed discharged, the group constituted almost exclusively of common criminals and not political prisoners.5 Simultaneously, the Israeli administration under Netanyahu had undertaken efforts to sabotage the process by implementing policies specifically tailored to undermine the Accords, expanding the Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, and accentuating exorbitant standards of reciprocity.6 It comes as no surprise that such a radical shift from dialogue towards hostility generated major mistrust in the Palestinian population. After three years the prime minister’s office in Israel returned to a Labour party representative Ehud Barak, but much harm has already been done. According to Pundak permanent status negotiations – and peace between Israel and Palestine- could still have been concluded successfully if not for mismanagement of Barak’s administration.7 The new prime minister attempted to embark on the final negotiations swiftly, as the agreed deadline had passed during his tenure. Possibly due to this rush he failed to realise how critical it was to complete remaining commitments from the Interim Agreement first in order to re-gain Palestinian trust. Barak was replaced by Ariel Sharon whose campaign was based around refraining from engaging in negotiations with Palestinians under violence. Lack of a stable, decisive leader, constant rotation on the Israeli political scene, often drastic changes in country’s stance on the Oslo Accords, and its selective obedience to agreed solutions did not help to sustain the

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weak trust of Palestinians towards Israel’s intentions and the peace process.8 With the Oslo I Accord signed and the peace process regularly negotiated and re-negotiated, it does not seem unreasonable for Israel to condemn Palestinian acts of violence and to expect a strong reaction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was recognised as a representative of the Palestinian people in the peace process, against terrorism. Revealing the peace talks gained support of wide public in both societies and in the time frame between Oslo I and the Interim Agreement the vast majority of both Israelis and Palestinians believed that the conflict can only end if violence and war were absent.9 A number of individuals in both countries questioned the agreement and found it controversial, but it was a minority of zealous rejectionists united under religious banners who had engaged in terrorist acts designed to derail the peace process.10 Each diplomatic breakthrough, seen as capitulation, provoked intensification of violence.11 Despite the terrorists’ aim being recognised, they did succeed in producing doubts between the parties. The Palestinian Authority (PA), interim 4 Pundak Ron, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? Survival. 43 (2001), pp. 31-45. 5 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 6 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 7 Pundak, ‘From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?’ 8 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 9 Bouillon, M.The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process. Mediterranean Politics. 9.1 (2004), pp. 1-28. 10 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

11 Dowty Israel/Palestine

self-government body established as a result of the Accords, was accused of not tackling the issue sufficiently, which in turn delayed withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from Gaza and Jericho, providing yet another reason for intensified aggression. It is also interesting that tackling Palestinian violence was seen by Israel as Palestinian responsibility despite most violence happening within Israeli borders, rather than on the occupied territories that PLO had authority over. At the same time, Israel’s abundance of resources contrasted with Palestine’s underprivileged position.12 Simultaneously, Israeli politicians ignored the violence of Israeli settlers and IDF solders towards Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories.13 Dowty argues that the Palestinian Authority neglected preparing the Palestinian people for peaceful coexistence and incited violent reactions.

While PA’s disregard towards the

arms limitations listed as an obligation in the Accords is a well-documented fact, sources differ in their depiction of PA’s commitment to fighting violent opposition of the peace process. The USA officials considered PA to have cooperated in keeping the number of attacks to minimum, despite the fact that they considered suppression of violence to be a legal obligation enforced on them by the Accords rather than a moral responsibility.15 Khalidi discloses that PA brutally repressed members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Palestinian report reveals that at least 17 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad died as a result of torture experienced in Palestinian prisons in which they were detained without charge.17 Violence has become a deeply ingrained aspect of Palestinian approach to tackling disputes and was visible not only in the Palestinian response to Israeli occupation but also in the violent attempt to suppress violence towards Israel. While many probably hoped that brutal response would bring faster results, this philosophy disregarded the long-term detrimental consequences that violence has on communities. So while the PA’s intention was legitimate- to reduce the number of violent attacks- their approach could ‘work’ (i.e. meet the immediate objective) but could not possibly work in terms of creating a cultural transformation towards a peaceful coexistence as the means adopted were not coherent with this goal.18 Without such a transformation in both nations, bilateral documents themselves did not have enough power to maintain the agreement. Violent approach to fighting terrorism not only did not stop those activities, but also allowed for continuation of violence and ultimately the unsuccessful end of the process. It is also important to note that neither of the countries had undertaken systematic efforts to prepare their citizens to the outcome of the process and while a significant amount of cooperation happened between Israelis and Palestinians, it was primarily restricted to the ruling and economic elites.19 Edward Said argued that while secular Palestinians may deplored the methods employed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and considered them to be obstacles to peace, those terrorist

12 Rubenberg, Ch. 2003. The Palestinians: in search of a just peace. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner. 13 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 14 Dowty Israel/Palestine 15 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 16 2007 in Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. p.778

Maria Stankiewicz: A Wasted Chance: Why Did the Oslo Peace Process Fail?

organisations that took credit for a number of deadly attacks. 16 Human Rights Watch 1997

17 in Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict p. 945 18 Nagler, M. 2004. The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World. Novato: New World Library. 19 Dowty Israel/Palestine; Markus Bouillon ‘The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process.

groups embodied common protest against humiliation and injustice.20 In his columns contemporary to the peace process, he questions the entire notion of “peace” that drives people to terrorism and suicide. He, and many others, saw Oslo Accords as a loss of a chance for real freedom particularly due to the power imbalance between the parties that was prevalent on all stages of the process. Israel entered it at the pinnacle of its military strength and in a strategic partnership with the USA, while PLO joined at one of their weakest points without as much as their own maps of the region or sufficient power to significantly influence the peace process framework. This initial asymmetry allowed Israel to singlehandedly determine the character of the negotiations and resulted in Palestinian uncertainty of their final outcome.21 It could be argued that had the PLO have not been disadvantaged when the Oslo Accord was being discussed, the proposed deal would grant them more just than regaining the control of only 22% of Palestine’s pre-1967 territory and the Palestinian opposition would not be so strong and therefore the whole process more successful.22 This argument fails however to acknowledge the discrepancy between official agreements and the reality on the ground that wouldn’t necessarily change had a more balanced agreement been signed, as Israeli government was already reluctant to carry out their part of the arrangement.23 This reluctance shows in constant expansion of Israeli settlements in West Bank and Gaza throughout the peace process. The discussion on the future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza was initially deferred until the final stage of the negotiations. It was however declared that new Israeli settlements will not be created for as long as the negotiations are taking place.24 Despite the Israeli government stopping the settlement tax incentives the number of settlers continued to grow and new houses were built with private capital even under Rabin’s government. The Jewish immigration into settlements built in Palestine remained stable over the years of the peace process. The expansion of settlements and confiscation of land to construct roads between them, as well as little progress on the final status negotiations lead to Palestinian

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and international actors questioning Israel’s honesty and seeing its participation in the peace talks only as a way to secure more time to solidify its position in Palestine.25 At this time the area under Palestinian governance in the West Bank constituted of a congeries of small, detached section surrounded by the territory under Israeli control, which made up to 60% of West Bank.26 Travel became more difficult for Palestinians than prior to the Oslo Accords due to numerous checkpoints and controls.27 Netanyahu’s restoration of the financial incentives for settlers and centrally planned expansion in West Bank additionally advanced the growth of settlements. The most prominent governmental project sought to enclose the Arab East Jerusalem with Har Homa settlement and to stretch the municipal borders of Jerusalem as much as possible into the West Bank territory in order to obstruct Palestinian 20 1995 in Edward Said ‘The Middle East „Peace Process”: Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities’. In: Said. E. (ed) Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995) Pp.147-164. 21 Rubenberg The Palestinians: in search of a just peace 22 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 23 Dowty Israel/Palestine 24 Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 25 PASSIA, 1995 in Tessler A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. p.775 26 Thrall, N. 2018. BDS: How a Controversial Non-Violent Movement Has Transformed The Israeli-Palestinian Debate. The Guardian. 14 Aug2018. [Online]. Accessed: 9 Feb 2019. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycott-divestment-sanctions-movementtransformed-israeli-palestinian-debate

27 Dowty Israel/Palestine

Interim Government from claiming that part of the city.28 Those developments intensified Palestinian violent unrest. Israeli settlers were however not without contribution, as they had been conducting attacks on Arabs and cutting off roads in Gaza and West Bank to forestall Palestinian commute since the early days of the process.29 Netanyahu’s disregard of the international law and continuous expansion of illegal settlements created an environment in which the peace process could not simply continue. Likud’s political victory that enabled Netanyahu’s destructive endeavours could have however less to do with contestation of the peace process and more with the frustration of workingclass Israelis. The same process of economic liberalisation of Israel that created the basis for the Oslo Accords made numerous blue-collar workers redundant as their jobs were being outsourced or they were replaced by Palestinian and Jordanian migrants.30 At the same time Bouillon31 looks across the barricade and explains that the main reason for Oslo’s failure was not the political disappointment but constant degradation of living conditions in West Bank and Gaza, for which many Palestinians blamed corrupted and inefficient Palestinian Authority. Israeli economy experienced growth during those years but, despite international one in four of its residents.32 Some scholars33 accuse the Palestinian leadership of corruption, maladministration, and redirecting the funds according to their own interests suggesting even that the PLO’s agenda in entering the peace talks could be to support their limited budget. Building trust and creating affluence and well-being are foundations of any peace process.34 Their absence in Palestine and among working-class Israelis led to the Oslo peace process heading towards collapse a long time before it was actually terminated.35 The last factor that led to the failure of the Oslo peace process, and that played possibly the most substantial role in avoidably elevating hopes for reconciliation, is the narration employed by the media. According to Shinar36 the coverage related to the peace process set an overly optimistic tone focusing on end-of-conflict narration, failing to accurately interpret the occurring violence or provide nuance of the conflict. Shinar37 argues that the failure of Oslo is linked to the media (and through it the public eye) approaching the peace process in terms of conflict resolution and not transformation or management, which could be a more appropriate approach for such a prolonged struggle that was moulded into both Palestinian and Israeli national identity. After the eruption of the second intifada the media lost the ground to support their theories of reconciliation and embraced a narration of a vanished dream, accentuating the feelings of disappointment, which had a higher news value but were not productive in terms of encouraging public debate and reasserting the significance of working towards peace.

28 Rogan The Arabs: A History 29 Dowty Israel/Palestine 30 Bouillon ‘The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process’ 31 Ibid. 32 World Bank in Rogan, E. 2010. The Arabs: A History. London: Penguin p.600 33 Bouillon ‘The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process’ 34 Rogan The Arabs: A History 35 Bouillon ‘The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process’.

Maria Stankiewicz: A Wasted Chance: Why Did the Oslo Peace Process Fail?

aid and development funds, situation in Palestine deteriorated reducing to poverty almost

36 Shinar, D. 2003. The Peace Process in Cultural Conflict: The Role of Media. Conflict and Communication Online. 2(1). [Online]. Accessed: 5th Feb 2019. Available from: http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2003_1/pdf_2003_1/shinar.pdf 37 Shinar ‘The Peace Process in Cultural Conflict: The Role of Media’.

After decades of conflict the 1993 announcement of the Oslo Accord brought hope to Palestinians and Israelis. The whole world watched the historical handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. Peace seemed to be closer than ever. Unfortunately due to a number of tightly intertwined factors the process failed. I consider the most significant of those factors to be frequent, and quite drastic, changes on the Israeli political scene, Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership, violence engrained in responses to conflict, its prevalence on both sides directed at civilians, and maladministration of the Palestinian Authority. Not less important were diminishing standard of living in Palestinian territories and liberalisation of economy in Israel, together with media not presenting a balanced, realistic, in-depth reports from the process. All of those factors led to frail trust between Israel and Palestine being broken, and once the trust was gone, the process had no chance of surviving.

Bibliography Bouillon Markus, ‘The Failure of Big Business: On the Socioeconomic Reality of the Middle East Peace Process’ Mediterranean Politics, 9. 1 (2004), 1-28 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2593741> [Accessed 9 February 2019]. Dowty, Alan, Israel/Palestine, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) Nagler, Michael, The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World, (Novato: New World Library, 2004) Pundak, Ron, ‘From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?’ Survival, 43. 3 (2001), pp.31-45 Rogan, Eugene, The Arabs: A History, (London: Penguin, 2010) Rubenberg, Cheryl, The Palestinians: in search of a just peace, (Boulder, Columbia: Lynne Peinner, 2003)

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Said, Edward, ‘The Middle East “Peace Process”: Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities’, in Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process, ed. by Edward Said (New York: Vintage Books), pp.147-164

Shinar, Dov, ‘The Peace Process in Cultural Conflict: The Role of Media’ Conflict and Communication Online, 2. 1 (2003),1-10 <http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2003_1/pdf_2003_1/shinar.pdf> [accessed 9 February 2019] Tessler, Mark, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) Thrall, Nathan ‘BDS: How a Controversial Non-Violent Movement Has Transformed the IsraeliPalestinian Debate’ The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/14/bds-boycottdivestment-sanctions-movement-transformed-israeli-palestinian-debate> [accessed 9 February 2019]

Human Rights Discourse is too Individualistic to be a Useful Framework for Global Ethical or Political Conversations. Discuss. Emily Williams Abstract I will discuss a major concern for implementing human rights globally: that human rights have come to be viewed in some post-colonial states as a continuation of imperialism. I will then discuss the possibility of adopting an alternative human rights approach that incorporates communitarian values. This approach might have symbolic appeal in post-colonial Africa. I will discuss concerns that this approach leads to conflict between the rights of the individual and the community, and that this has unacceptable consequences for minority groups. I will discuss this particularly in relation to sexual minorities in Africa. I argue that these issues cannot be adequately resolved by a communitarian approach, whereas they are avoided by the individualist approach. I conclude that the individualist approach is the best available framework for global human rights discourse.

One major problem in current human rights discourse is the view that they are Western in nature. Some think that Western countries were disproportionately represented during the development of human rights, and that this has resulted in human rights discourse being excessively individualist. The implementation of human rights in some post-colonial states is sometimes seen as a continuation of imperialism, imposing and assuming the superiority of Western ideology. The Banjul Charter, because it incorporates communitarian values, may be more culturally applicable to Africa than Western human rights. However, this approach seems to have worrying consequences for minority groups and non-conforming individuals. If the interests of the community and the individual are both deserving of protection, what happens when they conflict? In practice, this means the rights of non-conforming individuals can be denied when they conflict with community values. I will discuss various attempts to resolve the tension between individual and community rights. I conclude that the communitarian approach is far from being able to do this, and that we should continue to make use of current human rights framework. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims to apply to “all members of the human family”, therefore asserting universality. It is also accepted to some extent that discourse must be adapted to be compatible with the culture of the area concerned. There is therefore tension created when these two values come into conflict. It will be relevant to consider that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 claims that human rights are “fundamental” and “inherent”. It therefore pretends that its articles are true a priori. This some way to 1 "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights", 1948, (preamble).

explaining the perception that human rights are an ideology that seeks to replace others. Human rights discourse also tends to rely on language that is indeterminate such as freedom or dignity. It has been argued by scholars such as Williams2 that there has been a Western bias in the way terms in human rights discourse have been interpreted. The establishment of human rights can be thought of as a product of particular historical events that occurred in the West, such as the American and French revolutions, the Enlightenment, and the Second World War.3 Human rights can be viewed as an attempt to address the concerns brought about by these events. If this is the case, it may be that the Universal Declaration fails to take in to account the totality of concerns brought about by the experience of humans globally.4 Some concerns thought not to be addressed by human rights discourse are those that have arisen out of the experience of people living in post-colonial states. One major limitation to the application of human rights framework to global conversations is the perception of human rights as a symbol of imperialism, particularly in post-colonial states. Mutua5 criticises the lack of dialogue with non- Western countries in the development of the UDHR. He claims that human rights primarily promote Western values, namely capitalism, individualism and secularism. He argues that in the making of the Universal Declaration, non-western philosophies about human nature and dignity were either marginalised or underrepresented. The post-colonial critique of human rights posits that human rights discourse places Western values as a morally superior standard to be enforced on the rest of the world. Mutua6 argues that this is comparable to the thought that informed colonialism, which was considered to be a “civilising” project by colonial powers of the West, resulting in the subjugation of indigenous peoples7. The post-colonial critique claims that human rights serve to further entrench post-colonial racial hierarchy rather than address issues stemming from it. In a climate where African political leaders are seeking to repair cultural and economic damage suffered under colonialism, human rights that are Western in nature are not seen to be a

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desirable framework for political and ethical conversation. This can be a severe limitation to the usefulness of human rights discourse in addressing issues in African states. This is demonstrated by the resistance to rights for sexual minorities in African states. One view that is exploited to support this continued resistance is the view that homosexuality is “un-African”. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has presented homosexuality as a result of Western influence, claiming that it has led to economic and spiritual derailment.8 The experience of sexual minorities is portrayed by those advocating for their rights with the use of narratives that are rooted in Western culture, contributing to the perception of homosexuality as a foreign phenomenon9. The fact that human rights discourse is typically Western in nature means that demands for rights for sexual minorities are often dismissed as imperialist demands of the West and are not seen to have moral or cultural relevance. 2 Preston Williams, "Human Rights Thinking In Relationship To African Nation-States: Some Suggestions In Response To Simeon O. Ilesanmi", The Journal Of Religious Ethics, 23.2 (1995), 323-331. (p.325). 3 Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Christianity And Human Rights", Journal Of Law And Religion, 14.2 (1999), 579-600, (p.583). 4 David R Penna and Patricia J Campbell, "Human Rights And Culture: Beyond Universality And Relativism", Third World Quarterly, 19.1 (1998), 7-27, (p.11-12). 5 Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political And Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 6 Ibid., p.10-12. 7 Pierre de Vos, "The Limit(S) Of The Law: Human Rights And The Emancipation Of Sexual Minorities On The African Continent", in Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, Gender And Law In Africa (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2015), 1-18, (p.11). 8 ibid., p.8.

9 ibid., p.15-16.

on post-colonial states may lead one to doubt that the current human rights discourse has universal applicability. Human rights developed in the West might not be a legitimate framework for the discussion of issues in Africa. One alternative ideology often discussed in relation to African states is communitarianism. Communitarianism recognises the community as a source of human dignity. Communitarian views assert that living in society is a natural state for humans and therefore a conception of the human must consider their relation to other people in the community10. This contrasts with individualism which posits that the individual should be the prime object of moral consideration. In the Universal Declaration, one’s claim for rights is based on “recognition of the inherent dignity” of each human being11. It therefore uses an individualist framework which can be seen as evidence of the Western nature of human rights. The establishment of the Banjul Charter can be seen as a recognition of the need to amend any bias towards individualism in human rights discourse. Banjul Charter establishes “Human and People’s Rights”,12 thus acknowledging a collective conception of rights not included in the UDHR. Article 17 of the Banjul Charter acknowledges the need for protection of traditional cultures. Some think that this means that Banjul has an advantage over the Universal Declaration as it better addresses the concerns arising from African historical experience by acknowledging the need for the protection of communities and their cultures to support post-colonial reconstruction of African states. The use of the Banjul Charter as a framework for issues in Africa would also alleviate the concerns about imposing Western normativity on African states. It has also been noted that communitarianism has the symbolic value of relating to a perceived pre-colonial “golden age”.13 Therefore an approach that encompasses communitarian values may be more easily accepted than one that is perceived to be Western in nature. However, there are also concerns about the ability of communitarian ideology to support the individual rights, particularly those of minority groups. Article 27 (2),14 states that rights should be exercised “with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest”. In practice this can serve as justification to deny rights to individuals on vague grounds.15 There arises the question of extent to which community wellbeing should be favoured to the detriment of the individual. Oyowe16 discusses communitarian conceptions of human rights that answer this question two different ways, as well as the problems that arise from each.

10 Uwaezuoke Precious Obioha, "Radical Communitarian Idea Of The Human Person In African Philosophical Thought: A Critique", Western Journal Of Black Studies, 38.1 (2014), 13-23, (p.14). 11 "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights", 1948, (preamble). 12 Organization of African Unity (OAU), "African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter")", 1981. 13 David R Penna and Patricia J Campbell, "Human Rights And Culture: Beyond Universality And Relativism", Third World Quarterly, 19.1 (1998), 7-27, (p.12). 14 Organization of African Unity (OAU), "African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter")", 1981. 15 Rachel Murray and Frans Viljoen, "Towards Non-Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation: The Normative Basis And Procedural Possibilities Before The African Commission On Human And Peoples' Rights And The African Union", Human Rights Quarterly, 29.1 (2007), 86-111,

Emily Williams: Human rights discourse is too individualistic to be a useful framework for global ethical or political conversations.

Considering the possible ethical issues arising from the imposition of Western normativity

(p.92-93). 16 Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe, "An African Conception Of Human Rights? Comments On The Challenges Of Relativism", Human Rights Review, 15.3 (2014), 329-347, (p.336-339).

One conception of communitarianism put forward by Kwame Gyekye17 posits that individual and equal rights should be given equal consideration. Oyowe18 argues that this conception could not be useful in practice as it fails to acknowledge that the interests of the individual may be at odds with those of the community and thus gives no indication of how to deal with tension between the two objectives of community and individual interest. Another communitarian view is that community is the fundamental object of moral consideration. It is in virtue of belonging to the community that individual dignity is derived. This is demonstrated by the Ubuntu dictum:19 “I am because we are”. Oyowe20 argues that it is incoherent to regard the community as more fundamental than the individual, as the community is not fixed and cannot exist independently of its members. This view seems to have the consequence that individual rights must always concede to community rights. Oyowe takes this to be a concern that should lead us to reject this view altogether. He notes that this view implies that one’s status as a human being would be diminished when one is removed from the community. This raises concern about how such an approach may result in the exclusion of non-conforming individuals and minorities from consideration of rights. Political elites in Africa justify the discrimination against sexual minorities by claiming that sexual minority identities are incompatible with national identity21. On this basis, the protection of local values seems to require the suppression of same-sex practices. It seems that the rights of sexual minorities would not be well supported by this view, as their interests would be seen as a lower priority than the protection of a culture that denies the expression of their sexual identity. Possible ways to make use of the framework of people’s rights have been discussed, one being the possibility that sexual minorities could be thought to constitute a “people” and are therefore eligible for protection.22 The realisation of such an aim can be aided by referring to the ways in which Western discourse on human rights has been adapted over time to better support LBGT rights. For example, it has become recognised that homosexual

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orientation is shared by a group of people, which has encouraged the European Court of human rights to view LGBT people as a protectable minority group. However, it will be a significant endeavour to develop this framework as it will have obstacles to overcome. For example, it will face dilemmas when the cultures of two groups conflict but are both entitled to protection. In relation to sexual minority rights in Africa, the establishment of LGBT people as a group deserving of protection only does half the work. Groups that deny LGBT rights will also have a claim to protection. So, then a choice needs to be made about which group is more deserving of protection. Who should be allowed to decide? One can see that this can quickly become problematic. Alternatively, neither group is protected. This approach would clearly be self-defeating. The lack of satisfactory solutions to this dilemma is concerning for the communitarian approach. In light of this, I think it is perfectly legitimate 17 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition And Modernity: Philosophical Reflections On The African Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), (p.59). 18 Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe, "An African Conception Of Human Rights? Comments On The Challenges Of Relativism", Human Rights Review, 15.3 (2014), 329-347, (p.336-339). 19 John Mbiti, African Religions And Philosophy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969). 20 Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe, "An African Conception Of Human Rights? Comments On The Challenges Of Relativism", Human Rights Review, 15.3 (2014), 329-347, (p.332-335). 21 Pierre de Vos, "The Limit(S) Of The Law: Human Rights And The Emancipation Of Sexual Minorities On The African Continent", in Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, Gender And Law In Africa (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2015), 1-18, (p.13). 22 Paul Johnson, "Homosexuality And The African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights: What Can Be Learned From The History Of The European

Convention On Human Rights?", Journal Of Law And Society, 40.2 (2013), 249-279, (p. 276-278).

moral concern, it benefits from theoretical simplicity and avoids these kinds of dilemmas. In conclusion, whilst there are concerns about universalising human rights discourse that was developed in the West, this should not lead us to reject it immediately in favour of a communitarian approach. The communitarian human rights approach faces significant theoretical problems: conflict between the individual and the community and conflict between communities. In practice, this has unacceptable consequences for minority groups and non-conforming individuals. Although there may be promising adaptations of the communitarian approach as suggested by Johnson,23 it will require significant work to resolve the issues that arise. In the absence of a satisfactory alternative, it will be necessary to rely on the existing human rights framework. Due to this, I do not think that the use of individualist human rights implies any bias towards Western culture. We have legitimate reason to use an individualist conception of human rights due to theoretical and practical simplicity. I would suggest using alternative strategies for dealing with resistance to current human rights. In relation to sexual minorities in Africa, De Vos24 discusses the possibility of challenging the perception of homosexuality as un-African. This seems to offer a promising solution to support the rights of sexual minorities in Africa.

Bibliography de Vos, Pierre, "The Limit(S) Of The Law: Human Rights And The Emancipation Of Sexual Minorities On The African Continent", in Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, Gender And Law In Africa (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2015), pp. 1-18 Gyekye, Kwame, Tradition And Modernity: Philosophical Reflections On The African Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) Johnson, Paul, "Homosexuality And The African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights: What Can Be Learned From The History Of The European Convention On Human Rights?", Journal Of Law And Society, 40 (2013), 249-279 Mbiti, John, African Religions And Philosophy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969) Murray, Rachel, and Frans Viljoen, "Towards Non-Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation: The Normative Basis And Procedural Possibilities Before The African Commission On Human And Peoples' Rights And The African Union", Human Rights Quarterly, 29 (2007), 86-111 Mutua, Makau, Human Rights: A Political And Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) Nhlapo, Ronald Thandabantu, "International Protection Of Human Rights And The Family: African Variations On A Common Theme", International Journal Of Law, Policy And The Family, 3 (1989), 1-20 Obioha, Uwaezuoke Precious, "Radical Communitarian Idea Of The Human Person In African Philosophical Thought: A Critique", Western Journal Of Black Studies, 38 (2014), 13-23 (OAU), Organization of African Unity, "African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter")", 1981

Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony, "An African Conception Of Human Rights? Comments On The Challenges Of Relativism", Human Rights Review, 15 (2014), 329-347 23 Paul Johnson, "Homosexuality And The African Charter On Human And Peoples' Rights: What Can Be Learned From The History Of The European

Emily Williams: Human rights discourse is too individualistic to be a useful framework for global ethical or political conversations.

to favour the individualist approach. By proposing that the individual is the prime object of

Convention On Human Rights?", Journal Of Law And Society, 40.2 (2013), 249-279. 24 Pierre de Vos, "The Limit(S) Of The Law: Human Rights And The Emancipation Of Sexual Minorities On The African Continent", in Contested Intimacies: Sexuality, Gender And Law In Africa (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2015), 1-18.

Penna, David R, and Patricia J Campbell, "Human Rights And Culture: Beyond Universality And Relativism", Third World Quarterly, 19 (1998), 7-27 "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights", 1948 Villa-Vicencio, Charles, "Christianity And Human Rights", Journal Of Law And Religion, 14 (1999), 579 Williams, Preston, "Human Rights Thinking In Relationship To African Nation-States: Some Suggestions In Response

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To Simeon O. Ilesanmi", The Journal Of Religious Ethics, 23 (1995), 323-331

The Power of the Veil: Exploring the Hijab as a Means of Protest Niamh Punton Abstract The female body has been used as a site of protest throughout history. The meanings and values imposed upon women and their bodies by state actors has often resulted in women attempting to reclaim control over the female body. By using the body as a site of protest women are able to position themselves against government control, exploiting the public nature of the feminine form in order to amplify their political views. The hijab has often been a topic of contention within feminist literature; however, this essay seeks to highlight the ways in which both veiling and unveiling are used as a form of feminist protest. By choosing to cover or uncover oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s body, women make conscious decisions to protest against the different political and ideological meanings associated with the hijab. The hijab as both a cause and tool of protest is explored in the context of Iran and France. Examples of individual and collective action will be used to emphasise how the veiling and unveiling of women has become a form of protest. In considering the female body as a site of protest, this research seeks to widen what is considered protest and to highlight how the body can be used to challenge social and political norms.

Introduction In traditional forms of protest, public space is occupied; in taking up space a message of protest is conveyed.1 However, public space is not the only site of demonstration to exist- the individual body can also be manipulated to create a message of protest. Women, in particular, have used their bodies as sites of protest throughout history.2 Within this essay the specific act of veiling and unveiling as a means of protest will be explored. The hijab is often considered as divisive, with the varying meanings associated with the headscarf serving as motivations to protest. This essay will focus on the hijab as both a cause and tool of protest in the context of Iran and France. Whilst these countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; attitudes towards the hijab are somewhat diametrically opposed, in both Iran and France women are turning their bodies into sites of protest and actively positioning themselves against governmental controls. The essay will begin by discussing the meanings associated with the hijab, and the debates surrounding its use. The implementation of forced veiling in Iran will then be addressed, with consideration given to how the removal of the hijab acts as a means of protest against the government, and the challenges faced by those who choose to protest in this way. A comparison will then be made to French attitudes towards the hijab. The use of veiling, as opposed to unveiling, as a form of protest will be explored. The essay will conclude by considering how the body acts as a site of protest, and how in choosing whether or not to wear a hijab, women in both Iran and France are able to protest restrictions imposed on their bodies.

1 P Routledge, Space Invaders: Radical Geographies of Protest, (London: Pluto Press, 2017). 2 H Baer, Redoing feminism: digital activism, body politics, and neoliberalism, Feminist Media Studies, 16.1 (2016), 17-34, https://www.tandfonline. com/doi/full/10.1080/14680777.2015.1093070 [accessed 25 February 2020].

The Hijab and its Many Meanings The word hijab is an Arabic word which derives from the term hajaba meaning to hide, conceal or separate from.3 Whilst hijab can refer to the practice of modesty, it is also used to describe the headscarf worn to cover the hair and neck.4 Within this essay hijab will be used to refer to the covering of the hair and neck by a headscarf. The term veil will also be used however it should be acknowledged that this refers to the general covering of one’s body, and that there are several forms of Islamic veil – the hijab being just one example.5 Although modest dress is mentioned in the Qur’an, the practice of veiling originated from the Assyrian empire, where it was used by upper class women as a status symbol. Over time, this practice was adopted by early Muslims and the covering of the head eventually became tradition within Islam as a means of practising modesty.6 When referring to the hijab and the practice of veiling, it is important to acknowledge the loaded nature of these concepts and the contested meanings with which they are associated with. Throughout history the meaning of the veil has changed significantly – who wears the veil and what it symbolises has evolved. Currently there is much contestation over what the veil is now symbolic of. Many would argue that the hijab is no longer just a representation or expression of religion, but also of identity, politics and sexuality.7 For some, veiling represents sexism, the oppression of women and the expression of otherness.8 However, to others the veil is a symbol of religious identity and commitment to Islam.9 Whilst the contested nature of the hijab is evident, Moors (2010) argues that “what is perhaps most striking is the force with which politicians feel the need to fix meanings of items of dress Muslim women wear.” 10 In recent years the veil and its meaning has become appropriated by governments and politicians in order to advance their own political and ideological agendas.11 Forced veiling in Iran, and the banning of the hijab from schools in France are both examples of this, and

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within this essay the ways in which women are protesting these measures will be explored.

Iran Within Iran the removal of the hijab acts as an explicit form of protest against the government.12 Following the 1979 Revolution, it became compulsory for women to wear the hijab within public. Those who protest against enforced veiling often argue that the imposition of the

3 F Shirazi, ‘Islamic religion and women’s dress code: the Islamic Republic of Iran’, in Undressing Religion: Commitment and Conversion from a CrossCultural Perspective, ed. By L.B. Arthur (Oxford: Berg, 2000), pp.113-130 (p. 115). 4 Ibid. 5 S Sinclair, ‘Veiling’, Open University <https://www.open.edu/openlearn/ocw/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=14736&printable=1> [accessed 1 May 2020]. 6 A Zahedi, ‘Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 3.3 (2007), 75-98, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/219931/pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020]. 7 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1 (2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 8 S Sinclair, ‘National identity and the politics of the “headscarf debate” in Germany’, Culture and Religion, 13.1 (2012), 19-39, < https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14755610.2012.658424?needAccess=true> [accessed 1 May 2020]. 9 A Zahedi, ‘Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 3.3 (2007), 75-98, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/219931/pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020]. 10 A Moors, ‘Comment’, Material Religion, 6.1 (2010), p.112. 11 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1 (2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 12 S Maloney & E Katz, ‘Iran and the headscarf protests’, Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/> [accessed

27 February 2020].

veil violates women’s freedom and that the hijab has become a symbol of the subjugation women face under the Iranian regime.13 For protestors, the veil is a product of government oppression, and so in unveiling they are explicitly defying government control. The policy of obligatory veiling contrasts previous policies enforced within Iran. In 1936 Reza Shah abolished the veil, attempting to modernise Iran; the hijab came to represent traditional values, in opposition to the western ideals that the Shah wanted to implement. However, in 1980 veiling became obligatory. The force with which veiling became enforced after the 1979 Revolution is often attributed to the symbolism associated with unveiled women in Iran. For those in support of the revolution unveiled women were symbolic of a modern Iran which had succumbed to Western imperialism. As such the veil no longer was presented as backward, but a way to resist and defy the West. It is argued that by imposing veiling, the Iranian government ensures that women reflect the heavily Islamic nature of the state. The importance of this is evident in the extreme policing of the veil. Those who dress inappropriately in public are subject to verbal warnings, fines, and imprisonment.14 Agents patrol the public sphere, enforcing government, rather than the individual.15 The hijab in this sense becomes representative of state control over women. The power over the individual is not just a consequence of the hijab law, but of the policing and enforcement that is practiced. A variety of laws exist which seek to target not just women who do not observe the hijab rule but also those they associate with. This in turn has created a society in which women are always being watched and regulated. It is not just police agents who dissident women are forced to be fearful of, but also their fellow citizens.16 As a consequence of the extreme policing, for some, the hijab has become a manifestation of the sexist, oppressive nature of the Iranian regime.17 The resistance that exists is often not in opposition to the hijab itself, but to the forced nature of veiling and the lack of choice that women are afforded.18 This contentious nature of forced veiling is the cause of both protest and dissent within Iran; however acknowledgement of this upset has not always occurred. In the past protests have gone unreported, with the government silencing opposition. On the 8th March 1979 thousands of women marched in the streets protesting the proposed reveiling of Iranian women. Despite this, the protests were unreported, ignoring the divisive nature of the proposed law.19

13 K Ghobadi, ‘Opposing the Obligatory Hijab: How Iranian Women are Shaking the Islamic Republic’, LSE <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ religionglobalsociety/2019/11/opposing-the-obligatory-hijab-how-iranian-women-are-shaking-the-islamic-republic/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 14 A Zahedi, ‘Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 3.3 (2007), 75-98, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/219931/pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020]. 15 K Ghobadi, ‘Opposing the Obligatory Hijab: How Iranian Women are Shaking the Islamic Republic’, LSE <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ religionglobalsociety/2019/11/opposing-the-obligatory-hijab-how-iranian-women-are-shaking-the-islamic-republic/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 16 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1 (2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 17 K Ghobadi, ‘Opposing the Obligatory Hijab: How Iranian Women are Shaking the Islamic Republic’, LSE <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ religionglobalsociety/2019/11/opposing-the-obligatory-hijab-how-iranian-women-are-shaking-the-islamic-republic/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 18 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1

Niamh Punton: The Power of the Veil: Exploring the Hijab as a Means of Protest

strict modesty laws. Through this policing, women’s bodies become the property of the

(2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 19 A Zahedi, ‘Contested Meaning of the Veil and Political Ideologies of Iranian Regimes’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 3.3 (2007), 75-98, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/219931/pdf> [accessed 25 February 2020].

In the 21st century it has become increasingly difficult for protests to be censored by the authorities. The power of social media has seen a rise in digital activism, with the internet enabling people to connect. Now, protest can occur as a solitary act, which once shared on social media becomes part of a wider campaign.20 This tactic has been employed in Iran by the campaign ‘My Stealthy Freedom’, in which women post photos of themselves without a hijab online.21 Women who are unable to occupy the public sphere instead occupy the digital sphere, and create online communities of solidarity. Another protest movement against forced veiling is ‘the Girls of Revolution Street’. The movement began when Vida Movahed stood on top of a utility box in a busy street and removed her hijab, waving it like a flag. Since then, several other women have repeated Movahed’s actions as a sign of defiance against the government.22 However not all protest which occurs is as bold or blatant as this. Instead everyday activism occurs when women choose simply to wear their hijabs loosely, exposing their hair. In many ways this is a form of daily resistance, in which women try to reclaim their bodies and freedom within a hostile environment.23 When considering forms of protest, it is important to recognise that through the body, meaningful actions take place. Whilst many women within Iran have little voice politically, physical expressions can convey protest.24 From a female perspective, the body has often acted a site of feminist activism – providing a place of expression for those who are silenced. As argued by Judith Butler, “the body has its invariable public dimension; constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine.”25 Although the state seeks to control and regulate women’s bodies, in rejecting this and attempting to reclaim individual choice women use their bodies as a method of protest. Whilst within the public sphere societal meanings are inscribed upon the female body, by subverting this and exploiting the public nature of the body women have the capacity to amplify their protest against the state.26 Although body politics enables women to protest and reclaim their bodies as their own,

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there is currently little open resistance within Iran. Those who protest are threatened with severe consequences, and as such the decision to protest is a difficult one.27 Following the ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ campaign, the founder and women’s rights activist Masih Alinejad faced several repercussions. Despite already living in exile, state media broadcast smear campaigns, hackers attempted to close Alinejad’s social media accounts, and numerous death threats were issued. In pursuing such a public assault on Alinejad, the Iranian government sent a clear message to those opposed to veiling laws; those that denounce the regime will

20 S Maloney & E Katz, ‘Iran and the headscarf protests’, Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 21 K Ghobadi, ‘Opposing the Obligatory Hijab: How Iranian Women are Shaking the Islamic Republic’, LSE <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ religionglobalsociety/2019/11/opposing-the-obligatory-hijab-how-iranian-women-are-shaking-the-islamic-republic/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 22 S Maloney & E Katz, ‘Iran and the headscarf protests’, Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 23 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1 (2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 24 W Parkins, Protesting like a girl: Embodiment, dissent and feminist agency, Feminist Theory, 1.1 (2000), 59-78, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ pdf/10.1177/14647000022229065> [accessed 24 February 2020]. 25 J Butler, Undoing Gender, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.21. 26 H Baer, Redoing feminism: digital activism, body politics, and neoliberalism, Feminist Media Studies, 16.1 (2016), 17-34, https://www.tandfonline. com/doi/full/10.1080/14680777.2015.1093070 [accessed 25 February 2020].

27 G.Y Koo & H.E Han,‘To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition’, Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, 24.1 (2018), 47-70, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/12259276.2018.1427663?needAccess=true&> [accessed 26 February 2020].

be punished. Additionally, many of the women involved in ‘the Girls of Revolution Street’ protests were consequently imprisoned or have since gone missing.28 The invocation of fear is used by the government as a means of controlling women and suppressing dissent. Whilst the use these techniques have perhaps been effective, the existence of those unwilling to be silenced means that the government is unable to escape criticism.29 Although protest is predominantly occurring on a small, individual scale, the severity with which the government punishes protesters with is perhaps a signifier of the regime’s fear of the power that such protest can have.

France Whilst the absence of a headscarf acts as a means of protest within Iran, in France the choice to wear a hijab is seen by many as an act of political defiance against exclusionary laws introduced by the government.30 Within France there has been a shift since 9/11, with Muslims being constructed as ‘the other’ and perceived as a threat.31 This anxiety has led to increased regulation of the expression of religious identity, with religious symbols being banned from schools in 2004.32 Whilst the law banned any religious symbols from being discriminated against.33 The expression of religious identity has always been at odds with France’s secular foundations and the importance placed on laicité (religious neutrality). However following events such as 9/11 and the 2015 terror attacks, critics argue that laicité has been used as an excuse to discriminate against French Muslims.34 Visible practice of Islam is now enough to be considered a security threat, and therefore the state is attempting to regulate religious practices through laws such as the ban on religious symbols in schools.35 The banning of headscarves from French public schools suggests that to enjoy the privileges of a French citizen, there is a need to sacrifice individual religious and cultural identity.36 Through this law laicité has been used as an exclusionary tool; who can access education becomes determined by race and gender. In making it more difficult for an already marginalised group to access education, the hijab ban is arguably oppressive. Whilst some critics suggest that the hijab is a symbol of sexism and oppression, debatably the hijab ban is in itself discriminatory and oppressive; whilst forced veiling, such as in Iran, subjugates women, by depriving women of the choice to wear a hijab the French state is also complicit in female oppression.37 Through banning headscarves in schools the female body, in this case of young schoolgirls, becomes a battleground for political gain; the feminine form is 28 S Maloney & E Katz, ‘Iran and the headscarf protests’, Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 29 M Khalaji, ‘Iran’s Republic of Fear’, The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/21/iran-republic-fear-democraticmovement> [accessed 23 February 2020]. 30 J Dalley, ‘Why women’s bodies are a political battleground again’, Financial Times <https://www.ft.com/content/2aaba124-7b24-11e6-ae24f193b105145e> [accessed 27 February 2020]. 31 I Ajala, ‘Muslims in France and Great Britain: Issues of Securitization, Identities and Loyalties Post 9/11’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 34.2 (2014), 123-133 [Accessed 1 May 2020]. 32 A Chrisafis, ‘France's headscarf war: 'It's an attack on freedom'’, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/frances-headscarfwar-attack-on-freedom> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 33 A Barras, ‘France citizenship in the aftermath of 2015: officialising a two-tier system’, Citizenship Studies, 21.8 (2017), 918-936, <https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13621025.2017.1380647> [accessed 13 February 2020]. 34 Ibid.

Niamh Punton: The Power of the Veil: Exploring the Hijab as a Means of Protest

worn in public schools, some felt that it was mainly Muslim schoolgirls who were being

35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 C Teeple Hopkins, ‘Social reproduction in France: Religious dress laws and laicité’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 48.1 (2015), 154-164, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S027753951400154X> [accessed 12 February 2020].

appropriated by the government to enforce secular values within society. Supposedly ‘other’ practices, like wearing a hijab, become a marker of difference, and serve as a barrier to accessing the public sphere.38 In response to this exclusionary law, protests have taken place. Much protest has occurred at the individual level. Following the implementation of the law, Hanifa Chérifi (an inspector general for the Education Ministry) reported that 639 cases had been recorded. Of these, 626 were regarding the wearing of the Islamic veil. Many of these individuals – threatened by isolation and exclusion from school – chose to remove their veils and return to school.39 However, despite serious threats, some schoolgirls have refused to remove their hijab. By defying the ban these girls have attempted to reclaim their right to an education. However, many of those who have attempted to protest the law by continuing to wear a hijab have since been forced into distance learning or to attend private school.40 One schoolgirl, Cennet Doganay, was put into isolation after refusing to remove her hijab. When faced with conforming with state law or her religious beliefs Doganay decided to shave off all her hair. As such she was able to attend school not wearing a hijab, and also be respectful of her religious beliefs to not display her hair in public. In this sense, Doganay sought to display an act of resistance, even though technically conforming.41 Whilst individual claims over one’s body act as a form of resistance, action has also occurred at a collective level. Following a ban on hijab-wearing mothers from accompanying children on school trips, protest group ‘Mamans Toutes Egales’ took collective action through street demonstrations and blocking school coaches. In taking their protest to the streets and actively seeking to disrupt school trips, these women sought to reclaim the public space which they had been deemed unworthy to occupy.42 Following the initial 2004 hijab ban, thousands participated in protests in Paris and other French cities, as well as outside French embassies across the world. At many of these protests French flags were waved, the Marseillaise was played, and many women used the French Tricolour as a hijab. Through

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incorporating typically nationalistic practices into their protests, women sought to combat the notion that it is not possible to be both French and Muslim.43 French Muslim women demanded to be recognised, and to promote their right to occupy public space. Whilst it is suggested that their religious and cultural identity is in conflict with French values, through wearing their hijab with pride these women publicly claimed both their French and Muslim identity and sought to create a space for themselves.44

38 J Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity and the Politics of Citizenship, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014). 39 D McGoldrick, ‘Human Rights and Religion – the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe’, (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2006), p.100. 40 Reuters in Mulhouse, ‘School expels girls for wearing headscarves’, The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/20/schools. france> [accessed 1 March 2020]. 41 BBC, ‘Muslim girls shaves head over ban’, BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3708444.stm> [accessed 2 March 2020] 42 A Chrisafis, ‘France's headscarf war: 'It's an attack on freedom'’, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/frances-headscarfwar-attack-on-freedom> [accessed 26 February 2020]. 43 E Sciolino, ‘French Muslims protest rule against scarves’, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/world/french-muslims-protestrule-against-scarves.html [accessed 1 March 2020]. 44 A Barras, ‘France citizenship in the aftermath of 2015: officialising a two-tier system’, Citizenship Studies, 21.8 (2017), 918-936, <https://www.

tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13621025.2017.1380647> [accessed 13 February 2020].

Conclusion Although attitudes and laws regarding the hijab and veiling differ spatially and temporally, what is clear is that the hijab has often been used as a means of protest. The ways in which women use the hijab to protest, and the motivations behind such demonstrations vary; however, through using their individual body as a political tool, women are able to defy governmental control and oppression. Whilst the power that these women have as a marginalised group is limited, by reclaiming their own bodies in defiance of political and social meanings imposed upon them, women are able to regain control. Both the forced veiling and unveiling oppresses women and ultimately denies them of the freedom to choose; in using their own body as a site of protest, and choosing whether to veil or unveil in spite of state laws, women reclaim power over their bodies and are able to object to government control.

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The Presentation of Abolitionism and Feminism in Antebellum Slave Narratives Emma Berger Abstract This essay will explore the political messages present in antebellum slave narratives, with a particular focus on abolitionism and feminism. The narrative of Harriet Jacobs, entitled Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, was published in 1861 and displays complex political thought intertwined with the personal history of the subject. In describing her family, experience of sexual assault and the general cruelty faced by slaves at the hands of their masters, Jacobs produces a text which establishes equal rights for women as a desideratum, as well as the more obvious cause of abolitionism. Often dismissed by historians as unbiased accounts of American history, this essay will take the alternative view that slave narratives were a highly significant method of protest against the racist and misogynistic values of the pre-war American elite.

Introduction Antebellum slave narratives were characterised by accounts of brutality and cruelty to slaves to detail the heinous nature of slavery as an institution, in effect they were published to promote abolitionism and protest the American slave-owning elite. Such narratives have produced a plethora of historical literature regarding the purpose of publication; the shocking content; the involvement of prominent abolitionists such as Lydia Maria Child

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in publication; and the circulation of these texts closely aligning them with political texts intended to protest against the plight of American slaves. Furthermore, the narratives written and edited by women also dedicate attention to early feminist thinking, meaning that these accounts were a multifaceted form of political protest against unjust conditions. However, a more conservative view proposes that slave narratives were produced to give a nuanced account of recent history or were unable to be published as political manuscripts because the writers generally had minimal education. In light of these perspectives, this essay will argue that understating the political tone of slave narratives perpetuates outdated and segregationist ideas about African Americans because they fail to acknowledge the agency of African American writers. It is possible, therefore, to view antebellum slave narratives as a form of protest against a lack of fundamental rights because they skilfully promote the need for abolition and equality whilst effectively criticising the institution of slavery using the personal experiences of the author. This will be achieved by studying the politicisation of events described in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl by Harriet Jacobs and how Jacobsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; political beliefs are echoed in this account of her life. Beginning with an absolutist stance on the politicisation of narratives, the involvement of prominent activist Lydia Maria Child in the editing and publication of Jacobsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; narrative suggests the political references are intentional to persuade the reader into following her

cause. Child was primarily a women’s rights activists but felt that women could not achieve full emancipation until slave women were liberated, therefore it is unsurprising that this narrative invokes feminist sympathies as well as abolitionist feeling, making it a dual protest against patriarchy and slavery. As a result of this, Dickson D. Bruce stated that all slave narratives were inherently political documents because of their abolitionist authorship and explicit presentation of the brutalities of slavery which gained sympathy for the abolitionist cause, therefore it is plausible to view the narratives as a form of literary protest.1 This is evident in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl because Jacobs acknowledges the politicisation of events in her life to ‘convince the people of the Free States what Slavery really is’.2 By detailing the sexual assault she faced at the hands of her master, which she describes as ‘the degradation of the female slave’, she utilises her narrative to expose the devastating and brutal nature of slavery – especially as sexual assault was a taboo and delicate topic when it was published in 1861.3 As a result of this, Bruce’s argument appears valid, as Jacobs discusses socially unacceptable topics to shock her audience and to promote her political beliefs, including authority over her own body. Kerry Sinanan argues that narratives such as this promoted abolitionism by including sensationalist passages and topics, invaluable in this case because the assault Jacobs experienced was documented, again consolidating Bruce’s proposal that narratives are inherently political.4 Alternatively, Lawrence W. Levine argues that slave societies were ‘pre-political’ and could not formulate political forms of protest due to the inaccessibility of education within the slave community, raising questions about how useful it is to consider Jacobs’ memoir as protest if it was a product of apolitical communities.5 As Jacobs uses a large proportion of her narrative to discuss her relationship with her children and her life as a mother, Levine’s argument is somewhat valid as there seems to be little political propaganda in these passages. She describes separation from her son after his injury as ‘torture to a mother’s heart’. In prioritising descriptions such as this, Jacobs’ life and her familial relationships become paramount, not her abolitionist sympathies, acting as a reminder that this was intended to be a personal account of her life.6 However, in discussing her family and domestic life Jacobs uses her gendered experience of slavery to appeal to northern Americans, a method likely to gain sympathy from mothers in particular. When the aforementioned tactic of using sentimental issues to create an emotive account of her life is considered, Jacobs’ inclusion of her being unable to care for her child as a mother illustrates her use of an emotional experience to demonstrate the abnormality of a mother being separated from her son because of the institution of slavery.7 Furthermore, by directly addressing her audience when discussing her family, ‘if you had seen the tears’, the emotional nature of this situation is exaggerated to establish a heartfelt reaction to her situation which emphasises further the barbarity of slavery

1 Dickson D. Bruce, ‘Politics and Political Philosophy in the Slave Narrative’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 28 – 43 (p.28). 2 Harriet Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001), p.3. 3 Harriet Jacobs, p.27. 4 Kerry Sinanan, ‘The Slave Narrative and the Literature of Abolition’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 61 – 80 (p.73). 5 Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Conciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.54. 6 Harriet Jacobs, p.102. 7 Paul D. Johnson, ‘Goodby to Sambo’: The Contribution of Black Slave Narratives to the Abolition Movement’, Negro American Literature Forum, 6, (1972), 79 – 84 (p.79).

as an institution, making this narrative an effective political protest.8 When this is considered, Levine’s argument appears patronising and outdated because he fails to acknowledge the independent agency of freed slaves, shown here in Jacobs’ clever use of emotion to promote her cause, meaning this account is purely a product of the segregationist society in which it was published. Additionally, Levine disregards black political figures such as Frederick Douglass, a former slave who fought for abolition then the social and political rights of freed slaves. Douglass’s narrative, as well as Harriet Jacobs’s, was seen as representative of the political opinions of all slaves because his beliefs echoed those of slave communities elsewhere and were widespread.9 From this, it can be concluded that Jacobs’s work is not ‘pre-political’, but instead has a secure aim to gain sympathy for abolitionism by detailing her emotional experiences. This again shows that even the intimate aspects of narratives add to the protest because they were used to emphasise the need for abolitionism. Furthermore, Jacobs’ fixation on the domestic sphere is a deliberate feminist expression of her frustration; Stephanie A. Smith argues that Jacobs intended to intertwine her domestic life with elements of radical feminism to promote political ideas.10 Feminist thinking is evident throughout the narrative and most notably so when Jacobs discusses her anxiety felt about her daughter: ‘Slavery is terrible for men; but it is far more terrible for women’. From this anxiety it is clear that the treatment of women within slavery was a cause for anger for Jacobs particularly due to her personal experience of sexual violence and the risk of her daughter encountering similar treatment. Her narrative is fundamentally a protest against slave-owners because it displays new types of political thought – abolitionism and early feminism.11 Furthermore, Jacobs effectively shows the weaknesses in abolitionist reports by detailing her personal experiences, particularly motherhood and the sexual assault she experiences as these topics were seldom discussed by prominent abolitionists but were of great significance within slave communities.12 The application of gender history to Incidents in the Life of a Slave

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Girl has identified the importance of studying motherhood and sexuality within slave communities, showing how closely abolitionism and feminism are linked in passages about Jacobs’s personal life. The powerful and emotive topics discussed by Jacobs make her narrative a successful insight into the lives led by those without basic human rights. Antebellum slave narratives, like Jacobs’s, are significant because they apply complex political thought to their personal lives and experiences in order to protest against servitude. Although it is clear slave narratives were largely produced as political manuscripts, they also contribute to historical understanding of slavery from a more personal perspective. John W. Blassingame argued that slave narratives contained some element of political opinion but were primarily produced to study the history of slavery in America. He furthers this argument using the example of the Twelve Years a Slave editor David Wilson 8 Harriet Jacobs, p.110. 9 John Ernest, ‘Beyond Douglass and Jacobs’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.218 – 231 (p.219). 10 Stephanie A. Smith, ‘Harriet Jacobs: A Case of Authentication’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.189 – 200 (p.193). 11 Harriet Jacobs, p.66.

12 Karen Sanchez-Eppler, Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.92.

who recounted the personal history of Solomon Northup but was not involved with the abolitionist movement. As the editor had little interest in contemporary politics, he argues, the motive of this text was to inform the public about recent history.13 Wilson’s claim in the preface to the narrative clarifies that ‘the only object of the editor has been to give a faithful history of Solomon Northup’s life’. The intention here was evidently to provide a historical narrative of events, rather than a piece of abolitionist literature, making it disadvantageous to view this particular narrative as a source of protest.14 In contrast, the introduction to Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl makes it clear that the narrative is intended to spark debate, giving it a more political tone than Blassingame suggests: ‘I do it with the hope that every man… will swear solemnly before God that… no fugitive from Slavery shall ever be sent back to suffer’.15 movement, many, such as Jacobs’, were edited by prominent activists and would therefore be produced to support the abolitionist cause. The radical political views of the editor Lydia Maria Child are evident in this introduction, as she makes it clear that the book was intended to stimulate discussion about the moral implications of slavery. However, Blassingame does acknowledge that abolitionist editors were ‘honest but biased’, meaning that whilst he believes these narratives were intended to be historical accounts, there would be some political message within them in accordance with the views of the editor.16 From this, it can be contended that despite narratives also acting as significant historical documents, the political subtext must be considered to accurately portray how they were utilised as a statement against the slave-owning elite. In conclusion, it is useful to analyse antebellum slave narratives as a means of protest because they employed shocking experiences to dramatize their work and gain sympathy for anti-slavery causes. In utilising her experience of slavery as a mother and a victim of sexual assault, Harriet Jacobs was able to consolidate the importance of identifying the unique struggles posed by slavery for women and highlighting the need for reform. By endorsing abolitionism from a feminist perspective, Jacobs establishes a deeply political tone within her narrative and by approaching her life from this perspective she was able to contribute to discussions about conditions for women in the nineteenth century, thus creating a text which could be utilised to protest against a lack of women’s rights as well as the enslavement of African-Americans. Furthermore, because many of these narratives were edited or published by prominent abolitionists, the body of the narrative and the prefaces to the text contained subtle allusions to the political motivations of those writing them, so they should be studied as forms of feminist and civil rights protest.

13 John W. Blassingame, ‘Using the Testimony of Ex-Slaves: Approaches and Problems’, The Journal of Southern History, 41, (1975), 473 – 492 (p.475). 14 Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave: Narrative of Solomon Northup, A Citizen of New-York, Kidnapped in Washington City in 1841 and Rescued

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Whilst some narratives were edited by people who were passive regarding the abolitionist

in 1853 From a Cotton Plantation Near the Red River, in Louisiana (Auburn: Derby and Miller, 1853), p.15. 15 Harriet Jacobs, p.5. 16 John W. Blassingame, p.478.

Bibliography Primary Sources: Jacobs, Harriet, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001) Northup, Solomon Twelve Years a Slave: Narrative of Solomon Northup, A Citizen of New-York, Kidnapped in Washington City in 1841 and Rescued in 1853 From a Cotton Plantation Near the Red River, in Louisiana (Auburn: Derby and Miller, 1853) Secondary Sources: Blassingame, John W., ‘Using the Testimony of Ex-Slaves: Approaches and Problems’, The Journal of Southern History, 41, (1975), 473 – 492 Bruce, Dickson D., ‘Politics and Political Philosophy in the Slave Narrative’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 28 – 43 Ernest, John, ‘Beyond Douglass and Jacobs’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.218 – 231 Johnson, Paul D., ‘Goodby to Sambo’: The Contribution of Black Slave Narratives to the Abolition Movement’, Negro American Literature Forum, 6, (1972), 79 – 84 Levine, Lawrence W., Black Culture and Black Conciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) Sanchez-Eppler, Karen, Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) Sinanan, Kerry, ‘The Slave Narrative and the Literature of Abolition’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 61 – 80 Smith, Stephanie A., ‘Harriet Jacobs: A Case of Authentication’ in The Cambridge Companion to the African American Slave Narrative, ed. by Audrey A. Fisch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.189 – 200McDermid, Charles and Karim Lami, ‘The Missing Ingredient in Iraq’s Day of Rage’, Time, 25 February 2011, http://content.time. com/time/world/article/0,8599,2055525,00.html [accessed 26 February 2020] Muir, Jim, ‘Iraq divisions undermine battle against IS’, BBC News, 5 February 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-35492067 [accessed 11 March 2020]

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The Leeds Human Rights Journal is a student-led undergraduate journal, published annually in the summer term. The Journal has been the first of its kind in the United Kingdom and this is now the eighth year running. Each year, articles are submitted by undergraduate students across a broad range of disciplines and then undergo rigorous peer review to maintain an excellent standard of work. The Journal is a vital tool for encouraging research at undergraduate level, where there are fewer opportunities to display their work. This year, the â&#x20AC;&#x153;In Focusâ&#x20AC;? theme is Protest. The theme is to highlight the struggle of many across the world in protesting abuses, and advocating for improved human rights. From analysing Palestians using drag as a form of protest, to the political meaning in the personal diaries of enslaved people, Volume VIII of the Leeds Human Rights Journal aims to provide a global commentary on the protests of marginalised and exploited peoples. The Journal also includes the work of creatives to further comment on human rights and to illuminate advocacy.