University of Leeds Human Rights Journal - Volume 11, Issue 1

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LEEDS HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL

Thisyear,the‘InFocus’themeisvoice.

V o l u m e 1 1 o r X ,I I s s u e ,1 W i n t e r 2 0 2 3

Editor’s Notes

AliyaKanat|BachelorofLaws (LLB)

FromGazatoUkrainetoclimate changeadaption,existingasa youngpersonintheworldhas becomesynonymouswith attendinglectures,andsetting plans,andlearning,and changingyourmind,

andgrowingup-againstthebackdropof world-shatteringevents-oneafter anotherafteranother-fillingyoursocial mediafeed.Ponderingitallfortoolong leavesyouoverwhelmedanddoubtful,of theworldandwhereweareheaded, feelinglostevenmoreinrealisingyour privilegeinponderingthecrises,not livingthem.Then,inanefforttoreclaim yourownseeminglyinconsequential voice,andinaunquietingcompellingfor anycontribution,youfindyourself,time andagain,withhumanrights.Withallthe thingsweallthoughtweresacred,and recognisedassuch,protectedassuch. EachofuswithintheTeamcametothe Journalwithsuchanintention-tospeak andgetmorepeoplespeaking-to reinstallhumanrightswheretheybelong. Frontandcentre,attheheartofallthings, everywhere.Overayearlater,Iwantto extendmysincerestthankyoutomy felloweditor,whohasbeentirelessly devotedtotheJournal,evenand especiallyafterchangeswecouldnot haveanticipated.ItisforpeoplelikeLucy, andallourwriters,thatIholdfaithinthe sustainedandilluminatedshieldingof humanrights,inthesocietyweareall making.

Co-editor-in-chief LucyVo|BALanguages,Culturesand History(French)

Ourworldisconstantlychangingwiththe environmentexistinginboththephysical anddigitalworlds.Wearewitnessingthe developmentofhumanrights,andefforts toadvocateandsupportunfoldina multitudeofways.

AsoutlinedbyAliya,itcanoftenbe overwhelmingbeingayoungpersonto seekavenuestocontribute.Yettheyouth havefoundmethodstodisplayandgarner supportinboththephysicalanddigital worldthattheynavigatesowell.Animpact isanimpactwhetheritbebigorsmall.With socialpressures,weareconditionedto believethatwearenotdoingenoughin comparisontoeveryoneelse.Champion yourvoiceinwhatyoubelieveandinthe defenceofothers.Humanitariancrisesand humanrightsconcernsincluding displacement,foodinsecurity,andglobal inequalitiesarekeyissuesthatwemust educateourselvesonandacton.Our brilliantwritersandpeerreviewershave demonstratedtheuseoftheirvoicesto discussandhighlighthumanrightstopics oftheirinterests.Wetaketheexampleof theiruseofvoiceasanencouragementto useourvoices.

NotesfromtheSteeringCommittee

TessHornsbySmith

I'mreallyproudtosaythatI'vebeeninvolved intheLHRJsincethebeginning.Iremember in2012HannahTigerschioldgettingintouch, tellingmeallaboutajournalthatshe'dbeen involvedwithwhenshewasonheryear abroadintheUS,andthatitwouldbeamazing tobringsomethingsimilartoLeeds.Iloved theidea,andjusttoldhertogoahead,andshe did!

TheLHRJisabrilliantinitiative,andjustwouldn't exist without you, our amazing students: volunteering to edit, write, design and so much more, it's such an achievement, especially alongsideallofyourothercommitments.

I lurk behind the scenes, appearing if/when help is needed, and hope to help continuity between one cohort and the next. I hope that it runs for many more years to come, and know, with passionatestudentsasours,itwill.

Thank you to our...

Contributors

Academic

ElizabethMorison-LCS

HannahVaughan–SchoolofHistory

KwanTaiMichaelMo-POLIS

Creative

MollyCockerill–SchoolofHistory

AngelinaSmith-Schoolof Law

MinZou-LCS

ManuelaMarcondes-School ofPolitics/International Relations

FloraMiller-SchoolofHistory

OrianaCampbell-PalmerSchoolofSociologyand SocialPolicy

LaraAbbey-LCS

PeerReviewers

FOREWORDfrom TheEditorial Board

우리한국(Our Korea)-Should NorthKoreansbe considered refugees?. HannahVaughan

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Luna–Molly Cockerill

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Neglectedand Disarticulated Voicesof Hongkongersin theUK-KwanTai MichaelMo

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PAGES2-8
CONTENTS

PAGES18-24

Howdogender, race,andclass informsecurity?Elizabeth Morison

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SelectedBlog Postoftheyear: TheWayHome: CrimeanTatars andtheStruggle forSurvival- Eban Raymond

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FinalNotes

PAGE4 Studyshows importanceof biodiversityin maintaining healthy ecosystems

FOREWORDfrom ‘TheEditorial Board’

Dear Readers,

This year’s theme is ‘Voice’. We selected this pertinent theme as this year has been crucial to uplift human rights and marginalised voices. During our time with the journal, humans all over the world have been subjected to unprecedented challenges to their rights and livelihoods. We have witnessed an untold number of tragedies from the crisis in Yemen to the removal and destruction of homeless individual’s tents by Camden Council in London[1]. It is paramount that we bear witness to these events and inquire further about these issues.

In this journal, our fantastic contributors have used their voices to highlight topics ranging from the neglected voices of Hongkongers in the United Kingdom to inquiring about the status of North Koreans as refugees. Our contributors this year have truly been fantastic.

Our peer reviewers have also been pillars of support for the editorial team, assisting the journal with reviewing this year’s contributions. We are immensely grateful for the patience and work of both the contributors and peer reviewers this year.

The journal’s blog this year has equally received some excellent contributions, which we will be highlighting.

It is our duty and responsibility to uphold voices perhaps unheard and to provide a platform for these voices. We must listen and we must act. We ask our readers to find inspiration in this year’s journal to encourage you to use your voice, to listen to and to uplift the voices of others.

From the Editorial Board, 2022-2023

[1]https://www.bigissue.com/news/housing/londonhomeless-tents-destroyed-rough-sleepers-camdenstreets-kitchen/

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Abstract

국(Our Korea)-Should NorthKoreans beconsidered refugees?.

Hannah Vaughan

The topic centres on the political and social status on North Korean defectors in South Korea, and the rights and lack of rights this gives them. Previous research has minimal referencing to this subject, as it is very specific, but also a topic which has not been at the forefront of South Korea’s international relations. This meant that much of the research used in this article is a combination of South Korean laws, international responses to defectors and journalistic opinion.

PAGE2 우리한

Usingacomparisonbetweenallthreeoftheseresearchformats,thisessayaimsto shedlightontheinconsistencesthatoccurwhenNorthKoreansaredesignatedas permanentcitizensofSouthKorea.Oneofthemajorfindingsisthattheopinionsof SouthKoreansfluctuate,withlittleevidencetosuggestthatachangeofthepresident influencesthis.ThereisalsoacomparisonbetweenthetrueopinionsofSouth Koreansandthepublicisedgeneralopinionsofthecountry,wheretheyareshowed tobeonenation,butactuallyaresegregatedwithinitssociety.Althoughsocialstatus isimportant,thepoliticalrightsthatdefectorshave,aresimilartothatoftheirSouth Koreancounterparts.Itisthesocialstigmasurroundingtheiroriginswhichtrulyaffect theirsocietalrights.

Oneofthefirstquestionsthatneedstobeansweredis,areNorthKoreansconsidered foreigners?TheSouthKoreangovernment,underitslaw,considersallNorthKoreans asitsowncitizens,makingthegainingofcitizenshiprelativelyeasy(excludingthe dangerousjourneyundertakentogettoSouthKoreainthefirstplace).However,itis thedefactocitizenshipandacceptancebySouthKoreansthemselveswhichisa majorissue,withdiscriminationandexclusioncommonplaceforthesedefectors.A HanandSeolSurveyfoundthatonly27.8%ofSouthKoreansagreedthatSouth KoreaneededtomaintainahomogenoussocietywithNorthKorea.1 UnderSouthKoreanlaw,alldefectorsaregivenformaleducationintheHanawon(하 나원),aboardingschoolestablishedbythegovernmenttomaketransitiontotheir societyasmootherexperience.Withthecompletionofthisprogramme,defectorsare givenafamilyregisterand,therefore,becomecitizens.2

Thereisanimportancetothistopic,whichisbarelyrecognisedbythefewscholars thatdoresearchthistopic.IfthetwoKoreasdounite,thenhowwillthisstigmatisation oftheirfellowcountrymenbeeradicated?Educationisalong-termsolution,but, especiallywithSouthKorea’slowbirthratesandslow,impendingcollapseofNorth Korea,thechangewouldneedtostartnow.ThispapertriestoconveythattheSouth Koreangovernmentshouldstartplayinganactiverolewithinsocietytoeradicate socialprejudicestowardsNorthKoreansespecially,notjustleavingittothefew televisionshowswhichchoosetocoverthetopicofdefectors.

SouthKoreansandthefeelingofanimaginedcommunity

However,unlikewhatisdepictedbythemedia,forSouthKoreancitizens,thereare onlyloosetiesbetweenthemandNorthKoreanswiththeimaginedcommunityonce hailedasamotivationforreunification,havingbeenlostwiththeyoungergeneration. TheSouthKoreanmediatriestoportrayimmigrants,ingeneral,totheRepublicof Koreain‘broadlysympatheticterms’,withvarioustelevisionshowsandmediaoutlets dedicatedtoNorthKoreansandtheirstoriesaboutthecommuniststate.

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Althoughportrayedwithgoodintentions,thishasbackfiredwiththetelevisionshows reinforcingaviewformanySouthKoreansthatNorthKoreansaredifferenttothem, basedondifferinglevelsofeducationandlinguisticabilities.Asegregationbetween NorthandSouthKoreansfuelsdiscriminationbutalsothatNorthKoreansare considered‘ethnicallyhomogeneous’;separatefromSouthKoreansthemselves.3 ‘Defectorsarenotjustrefugees;theyareco-ethnics’butitissuggestedthatSouth Koreansdonotfeelthisconnectionbetweenthem.4

PoliticalStatus

Politicalstatusisanotherpointofdiscussion,withthegovernmentcallingNorth Koreanscitizens,buthumanrightsgroupsarguingthattheyarerefugeesofthe regime5.Specifically,underConventionandProtocolRelatingtotheStatusof Refugees,inarticleoneitstatesthat‘arefugee…issomeonewhoisunableor unwillingtoreturntotheircountry[for]…fearofbeingpersecutedforreasonsofrace, religion,nationality,membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinion’.6 SowhydefectorsdonotfallunderthiscategoryintheeyesoftheSouthKorean government.TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)argues that,althoughtheyleftNorthKoreainsearchoffood,becausetheyfacethethreatof persecutionuponreturningtoNorthKorea,theymeetthedefinitionofrefugee..7 ThereisonesuggestionwhytheSouthKoreangovernmentdoesnotfollow internationalrefugeeprotocol;that‘bothKoreasstillofficiallyupholdthemythof“one Korea”and“onepeople”’8,thatanimaginedcommunitystillexiststhrough ‘ethnocentricnationalisticunity’.9 TheSouthKoreangovernmentseesNorthKorean defectorsascitizens,notrefugees.10ThefeelingamongsttheSouthKorean populationdiffersfromthis.NorthKoreansareviewedasforeigners,withmanyciting thattheyhavebeendiscriminatedagainstbecauseoftheirNorthKoreanaccent.11 However,theSouthKoreangovernmentdidtrytochangethestatusofdefectorsin 1993,frompoliticaldefectorsto‘economicrefugees’,butwithanewgovernment comesanewviewondefectors,sothiswasquicklychangedbackwiththechange ofadministration.12Witheachchangeofadministrationcomeseitheranopenness orclosednesstowardsimmigration,with‘thebalanceofpoweramongvarious political,economicandsocietalinterests’changingconstantly.13NorthKorean defectors’citizenshipstatuschangesconstantly,butwiththeinfluxofmoredefectors, theirworthtotheSoutherngovernmentisseentobedecreasing.

Historicalbackground

Backinthelate20thcentury,justafterthesplitofKoreainthe1950s,thepolitical worthofdefectorswasveryhighforbothregimes,notjustfromtheSouth.

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Ideologicalpropagandawasveryprevalent,withtheSouthKoreangovernment (until1993)deemingdefectorsas‘freedomfighters’againstthecommunist regime.14Asthenumbersdefectingincreased,theirpoliticalvaluebegantolessen, thisissuebecame‘achoicebetween[a]humanitarianactand[an]economiccost’.15 Withtheincreaseofdefectors,cameachangeintheirdefinitionandachangeinthe RepublicofKorea(ROK/SouthKorea)’sdefinitionofethnicity.Inordertobeableto easilyacceptNorthKoreansascitizens,citizenshipwasnotdefinedbybirthplace anymore,butbybloodlines;NorthKoreansmusthavehadrelativeswhowereKorean inordertogaincitizenship.16Theywerecarefulenoughforthischangeindefinition tobeabletocorrelatewithConfucianistthought,butalsothe‘nationalmythologyof Koreabeing“[a]homogenousandUnitedcountry”’.17

Societalstatusandworth

Thisleadsontotheargumentaroundsocialstatus.Iftheworthofdefectors(forthe Southerngovernment)isdecreasing,thenhowaredefectorsseenwithregardsto theirsocialworthandstatus?ApelandEschbornexplainsthatmanySouthKoreabornresidentsarestillsuspiciousoftheirNorthKoreancounterpartsandhave createdadividebetweenthem.18Thiscontradictstheprevalentviewthat‘Koreans areknownfortheirstrongprideinanationalidentitybasedonethnichomogeneity’, withtheKoreancommunityencompassing,notjusttheSouth,buttheNorthalso.19 However,HundtcontradictsLee’sstatement,statingthatmanynowseeaNorth Koreanasa‘completestranger’.TherehavebeenstudiescarriedoutamongstSouth Koreans,tryingtogetamoredefinitiveanswertothequestionwhetherNorth Koreansareseenascitizensbytheirsoutherncounterparts.20Astudyconductedby Yusuggeststhat,withinaworkingenvironment,SouthKoreanshavecreateda hierarchybetweenthemselvesandmigrants.21Althoughpubliclyasenseofan imaginedcommunitybetweenNorthandSouthKoreahasbeencreated,thetrue opinionsofSouthKoreanstowardsNorthKoreandefectorsdiffertothis.

Internationalviews

Leadingonfromdomesticopinion,ifNorthKoreansarenotseenwiththesame statusasSouthKoreans,howdoestheinternationalcommunityviewNorthKorean defectors?Inhismeta-analysis,KangJinWoongfocusedonNorthKoreandiaspora andnotesthat‘untilnow,existingstudieshaveresearchedthemigrationandhuman rightsviolationsofNorthKoreansintermsofrefugeestatusunderinternational law’.22So,underthisassumption,whyisitthatmanycountries,includingtheUnited StatesandtheUnitedKingdomviewdefectorsasSouthKoreancitizens,not refugees,likeKangsuggests?ThesimpleanswerisbecauseSouthKorean policymakersviewdefectorsastheirowncitizens,meaningtheyarenotrefugees,but citizenswhentheyenterthecountry.23

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However,thiscanbeconsideredasadirectviolationofinternationalhumanrights law,whichstates,again,that‘arefugee…issomeonewhoisunableorunwillingto returntotheircountryoforiginowingtoawell-foundedfearofbeingpersecuted…’24, whichisamirroredexperienceofre-defectors,individualswhoreturnbacktoNorth Korea.25TheUNCHRhaveevendirectlyclaimedthat‘NorthKoreans…shouldbe consideredasrefugeesbecausetheyfacethethreatofpersecutionuponreturning toNorthKorea…’.26Tofurtherthis,areportconductedbytheEuropeanAlliancefor HumanRightsconcludedthatmanyWesterncountries,suchastheUK,Franceand Belgium,rejectmostasylumclaimsbyNorthKoreansbecausetheyviewthemas SouthKorean.27Inthesamearticle,JohnPowerquotesWolman,whoarguesthat “theyshouldarguablybeconsideredrefugeesanywayunderinternationallaw”.28 AlthoughtheopinionsoftheSouthKoreangovernmentsurroundingthistopicare notclearlystated,therearestillsuggestionsbyoutsidevoicesonwhatneedsto changeregardingthestatusandtreatmentofNorthKoreansinSouthKorea,bythe SouthKoreans.

Whatshouldchange?

YangJe-Eaarguesthatasocialchangeisthetoppriority,changingtheopinionsof SouthKoreansandtheireverydayreactionstotheirNorthernneighbours.29Then, aftertheminimisationofdiscrimination,moretailoredinterventionssuchas educationforbothpartiesandcounsellorsshouldbefundedinresettlement programmes.30Hundtarguesthatthereasonforalackofprogressionthroughout theyearsafterthesplit,isbecausetheissuehasbecomemoreofapoliticalissue, ratherthanasocialorhumanitarianissue.31KimHyun-Sunarguesthatthemain reasonforthede-factosegregationandalackofcaretowardsdefectorsisthefailure oftheSouthKoreangovernmenttotakeappropriateactionsregardingthe decreasedabilitiesofNorthKoreans.TheKoreangovernmenthas‘divideditsown population’throughtheprincipleofhavingasinglecitizenship32,meaningthatthey donothavetocarefortheNorthKoreansasmuchastheyneedtocareforother refugeessettlinginthecountry.Dahl’skeyprincipleisthatdemocracyisdefinedas treating‘allmembersofapoliticalcommunity’equally;aphilosophyregularly underminedbythechangingcitizenshipandstatusofNorthKoreans,despitethe SouthKoreangovernmentviewingthemasKoreanasanindividualborninthe South.33However,ifanindividualentersthecountryandisnotseenasanequal memberofsociety,doesthisstillmeanthatNorthKoreanscanbeacceptedaspartof theSouthKoreancommunity?Arguably,oneofthequickestwaysthatthischange wouldhappenisthroughgovernmenteducationpoliciesandanactivevoicewithin theROK’sgovernmentadvocatinganeradicationofprejudicetowardsNorth Koreans.

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Conclusion

ShouldNorthKoreandefectorsbeconsideredrefugees?WithinSouthKorea,thereis anembeddedprejudicetowardsNorthKoreans,whichhinderstheirlivelihoodsand abilitytosucceedwithinsociety.Beingarefugee,however,wouldnotchangethis butallowalegalseparationofSouthKoreansandNorthKoreans.Thisseparation wouldensurethattheROKgovernmentwereactivelyawareoftheseprejudices,but alsobringtheseissuesforwardtotheinternationalcommunity.NorthKoreanswould bebetterprotectedpoliticallyandlegallyiftheywereconsideredrefugeesbythe internationalcommunity.Historically,thesenseofbothKoreasbeingoneKoreahad beenmuchstronger,butwiththegrowinggenerationsbecominglessattachedto theironceunitedpast,thisimaginedcommunitydoesnothinderthegrowthof prejudicetowardsNorthKoreans.IftheSouthKoreangovernmentdoesnotincrease theamountofsupporttheygivetheirfellowcitizens,thenrefugeestatusmightbethe onlywayfortheinternationalcommunitytorecognisethetraumathatdefectorsgo throughtogettotheSouth.Iftheirstatuschanges,thenNorthKoreanswouldhaveto beconsideredasSouthKoreancitizensnotasforeigncitizens,butthiswouldalso givethemavoiceasarefugeeintheinternationalandnationalcommunity, somethingthathasbeendeniedsinceseparation.

Bibliography

Apel,Ines,andNorbertEschborn,‘NorthKoreanRefugeesinSouthKoreaArduous EscapeandDifficultIntegration’,ISPSWStrategySeries:FocusonDefenseand InternationalSecurity,2014,1–17(p.12), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184307/292 Eschborn Apel%20(2).pdf>.

Hundt,David,‘PublicOpinion,SocialCohesion,andthePoliticsofImmigrationin SouthKorea’,ContemporaryPolitics,22.4(2016),487–504(p.495), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1186346>.

Kang,JinWoong,‘HumanRightsandRefugeeStatusoftheNorthKorean Diaspora’,NorthKoreanReview,9.2(2013),4–17(p.6), <https://doi.org/10.3172/nkr.9.2.4>.

Koh,Byung-Joon,‘N.KoreanDefectorsDitchHometownAccentsforDreamsinS. Korea’,YonhapNewsAgency,2018 <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181218001000325>[accessed22June2023].

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Lee,Yoonkyung,‘Migration,Migrants,andContestedEthno-NationalisminKorea’,Critical AsianStudies,41.3(2009),363–80(p.372)<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672710903119727>.

McCurry,Justin,‘DefectorsTellCourtTheyWerePromised“ParadiseonEarth”inNorth Korea’,TheGuardian(TheGuardian,14October2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/14/defectors-tell-court-promised-paradise-onearth-north-korea>[accessed5November2022].

Poorman,Emma,‘NorthKoreanDefectorsinSouthKoreaandAsylumSeekersintheUnited States:AComparison’,NorthwesternJournalofHumanRights,17.1(2019),97 <https://scholarlycommonslawnorthwesternedu/njihr/vol17/iss1/4/>[accessed22June 2023].

Power,John,‘WhyAreNorthKoreanDefectorsBeingTurnedAwayin Europe?’,Thediplomat.com<https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/why-are-north-koreandefectors-being-turned-away-in-europe/>[accessed26February2023].

Son,SarahA,‘Identity,SecurityandtheNation:UnderstandingtheSouthKoreanResponseto NorthKoreanDefectors’,AsianEthnicity,17(2016),171–84(p 176), <https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2016.1151236>.

UnitedNationsHighComissionerforRefugees,ConventionandProtocolRelatingtotheStatus ofRefugees,2010,1-5(p.3),<https://www.unhcr.org/media/28185>.

Yu,Sojin,‘GenderedNationalisminPractice:AnIntersectionalAnalysisofMigrantIntegration PolicyinSouthKorea’,Gender&Society:OfficialPublicationofSociologistsforWomenin Society,34.6(2020),976–1004(p.978),<https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243220965916>.

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Luna–MollyCockerill

Content warning: gendered violence, abortion

Abstract: this piece was inspired by the recent changing of laws surrounding abortion in the United States of America, especially following the overturning of Roe v Wade in 2022, which ended nationwide right to abortion in the USA By revoking rights and access to abortions, the autonomy of women is removed - they have less say over what happens to their own body There are very divided views and opinions when it comes to discussing abortion, and all too often these are vocalised by men. This piece attempts to depict the sense of voicelessness, desperation, and above all, anger at a world that refuses to give women the autonomy and choices they deserve The inclusion of mythological references in the piece was chosen to suggest that there is a connection between all women, that something binds women together, so no one is fighting back alone.

The lunar cycle is twenty-eight days long, The waxing and waning of the moon in our sky, Hanging amongst the fires of constellations. Something about the silver moon feels inherently feminine: Artemis for the moon, Apollo for the sun.

P
E 9
A G

Artemis’womenfollowthemoon,thewaxingandwaning. Twenty-eightdaysebbingandflowing,orbiting. Ourbodiesintimewiththemonths.

Ancientlanguagesbreathedthesamewordformoonandmonth. Wemoveinthesamerhythmasthepullofthewaves Constrainedbyamasculinetwenty-fourhours.

Weturnfromgirlhoodtowomanhood, Bloodbetweenourlegs, Dancingtothelunarcycle. Amongstthisbleeding,istheknowledgeofalifewecouldcarry Onebornoftheother,safeinourwombs. Thisoption,thischoicefollowsus, Always.

Weknow,theriskswetake,theconsequenceswe’reinviting. Yetwechoose, Wewanttomakeourchoice, Toholdthereinsofourownbodies, Tobeinharmonywiththemoon.

Atsunami,ahurricanecrashdown

Punching

Drowning

Hitting

Stranglingus. Theystealourchoices Ourvoices.

Themasculineangerthatthreatensusalways Burnsgreaterthanever Withitsclawstearingoutourvoices Andourlives.

Weareleftvoiceless Inaworldwherewearedictated, Ourownbodiesandautonomyrippedfromourhands. Dystopianlawsareboltedintoplace, Cagesaroundus. Onceagain, Ourlunarmindsbattleagainsttherigid Tickingofamasculineclock.

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Womanarestrippednaked, Theirrightstornintheviolence. Themetallicstenchofdesperation Offear

Unfurlsacrosstheglobe. Thequotidianfemininefear,amplified Sothatitechoesandechoes Andechoes.

Everywomanintheworldshudders Asthehandsaroundourthroatsclose Andweareleftvoiceless.

Thelunarcycleistwenty-eightdayslong, Soarewomen.

Artemisstillwaxesandwaneswiththewaves Asshedidallthoseyearsago, Whilemortalwomenfade Prayerscaughtinourvoicelessthroats Attemptingtopraytoalong-forgottengoddess. Thecandlesofhopelongingfortherebirthofequality Arebrutallyextinguished Asideologies,barbaricandoppressive, Tearwomen’schoicesintoshreds. Theyliethere,brokenandbleeding, Silent.

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Neglectedand DisarticulatedVoicesof HongkongersintheUKKwanTaiMichaelMo

Abstract

The Conservative government uses Hongkongers in the UK to advance their argument for the need to legislate the Illegal Migration Bill. This paper argues that government officials intentionally twisted the visa programme for Hongkongers as a resettlement scheme on par with the ones for Afghans and Ukrainians, which is not the case. Moreover, the pride of being “model migrants” among Hongkongers resettling in the UK through the so-called safe and legal routes resonates with the Tories’ rhetoric to restrict immigration.

Their vocal online presence makes the Hong Kong diaspora leaders, who rely on their support for prodemocracy advocacy, reluctant to advocate for better support for Hongkongers struggling for their new lives in the UK.

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Divisions, differences in priorities and approaches among diaspora leaders exacerbate the problem, making struggling British National Overseas (BNO) Hongkongers and fellows who claimed asylum neglected by the leaders, British media, and political landscape. Without a change of focus and approach to work from the diaspora leaders, Hongkongers' voices will remain twisted, disarticulated, and neglected in British society.

Introduction

In March 2023, Home Secretary Suella Braverman presented the Illegal Migration Bill to Parliament, which has drawn a lot of controversies. Not only would the bill be described as a breach of Britain’s international obligation (United Nations 2023), but the language and tactics the Home Secretary chose to pitch for public support have also been delusionary. In particular, she brought up immigration schemes for Afghans, Ukrainians, and Hongkongers in parallel to demonstrate to the Britons that the “safe and legal route” for migration is possible1.

British media have far more positive reports on around 150,000 BNO Hongkongers settling in the UK than their struggles to integrate into the country. Politicians from Westminster and Holyrood were keen to meet and greet Hong Kong diaspora group leaders and took pictures of the event to praise such a model of migration over the boats crossing the English Channel.2 The self-reliant Hongkongers in the UK have become a handy example for the Prime Minister to advance the claim when promoting the positives of legal migration, then advance to the need for passing the Illegal Migration Bill3.

As a Hongkonger who fled the city from persecution, I, nevertheless, regard the tactics of the Conservative government to bring up the Hong Kong migration programme to favour their argument in the debate as a distraction from their failure in asylum policy. Moreover, the twisted facts of Hong Kong migrants, intertwined with the pride held by BNO Hongkongers, and the disarticulation of Hong Kong diaspora leaders have resulted in the voices of the struggling Hongkongers in the UK have been neglected in the public sphere.

Twisted facts by the government, twisted voices by the fellows

Before explaining the proposition of twisted facts on BNO, I will give some brief facts about Hong Kong and its relationship with the UK.

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The British Empire colonised two parts of Hong Kong in 1841 and 1860 and leased a substantial part of the land next to the colonised ones from the Qing Dynasty in 1898 for 99 years, ending in 1997. In the 1980s, London and Beijing started to negotiate Hong Kong's future without the involvement of Hongkongers. Around the same period, the Thatcher administration created BNO nationality to block the pathway for Hongkongers and their dependents to obtain British citizenship4. The denial of BNO Hongkongers having British citizenship is also reiterated in the Memoranda of the Sino-British Joint Declaration5, which declared that the sovereignty of all lands in Hong Kong would be transferred to the People’s Republic of China by 1997. Beijing promised the freedoms, and way of life of Hongkongers would remain unchanged for 50 years, which deteriorated after Beijing enacted the National Security Law (NSL) of Hong Kong in 2020. Soon after the enactment, law enforcement prosecuted and detained over a hundred prodemocracy lawmakers and campaigners who advocated for taking the majority of the city’s legislature. The UK government announced the BNO visa in response to the NSL, in which the British administration regarded the law as a breach of the Joint Declaration(Home Office and others 2021).

The BNO Visa allows Hongkongers born before 1997 who had ever had BNO passports to apply for leave to remain in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2021). Applicants must show they have enough funds to support themselves and their dependents to live in Britain for at least six months (ibid). Moreover, BNO Visa applicants are required to pay the Immigration Health Surcharge (IHS) as other Tier-2 and student visa applicants (ibid), unlike the applicants of Afghan and Ukrainian resettlement programmes which are not required to pay such fee6.BNO visa holders are also subjected to the condition of No Resources to Public Funds (NRPF) just as other skilled migrant visa holders, unlike Afghans and Ukrainians who are resettling in this country and can apply for benefits7. Higher education institutions are not obligated to provide Home Fee status to BNO Hongkongers, which the Home Office mandated to provide to their Afghan and Ukrainian counterparts8.

With the BNO visa having almost identical restrictions on accessing public funds as the working visa and having less favourable treatment than Afghans and Ukrainians, the Home Secretary kept branding the visa scheme as part of their generous regime9. This is neither true nor honest to the British people. The fact that Hong Kong families must pay thousands of pounds before being able to resettle in the land of their former coloniser should never be mounted as a benevolent policy.

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More importantly, framing the BNO visa scheme as a safe and legal route given by the Conservative-led government would only distract the muchneeded attention to Hongkongers who claimed asylum and are stuck in the broken system. According to the figures released by the Home Office in March 2023, 166 Hongkongers claimed asylum and are still awaiting the decision (Home Office, 2023b). Most are believed to be protesters, politicians and their staff who cannot benefit from the BNO visa scheme on eligibility or financial grounds. Among them, 137 have been waiting for an initial decision for over six months, the pledged timeframe printed on the asylum guideline booklet handed to asylum claimants (Home Office, 2022a). Regarding approval rates, only eight out of thirty Hong Kong asylum seekers were granted refugee in 2022, with 10 being refused and 12 having withdrawn their claims.

In an initiative I co-founded, the Hong Kong Scots CIC has been in touch with approximately 10% of Hong Kong asylum seekers residing in Britain in 202210. Although theyhave reached the UK legally, the Home Office cannot live up to its promises and process their claims on time. The initiative has also reviewed several Hong Kong protesters who have had their asylum claims rejected by the Home Office. For instance, activists have had their asylum claims rejected simply because they could fly out from the Hong Kong Airport safely, or because Chinese agents have not harassed their political activism in the UK (ibid).

There are no signs that Ms Braverman would bring the faces of struggling Hongkongers in the UK to the public. Her Home Office has only seen using the story of successful Hong Kong immigrants through the BNO visa scheme as the twisted voice, washing off their failure to provide accessible refuge forall British subjects and their descendants from Hong Kong11.

Leaders’ disarticulation because of divisions and mismatched strategy

In the last section, I highlighted that the current government’s treatment of Hongkongers relocating to the UK shouldhardlybe regarded as welcoming. From incoherent policies to the absence of resettlement schemes to outdated country briefs on Hong Kong for determining asylum claimants, the long list of problems should deserve better attention. Still, with dozens of Hong Kong diaspora groups were set up in the country, why do the diaspora communities unable to articulate the issue and advocate for the rights and better conditionsto Hongkongers in the UK?

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One of the contributing factors is the differences held among diaspora group leaders and their unwillingness to collaborate. Hong Kong diaspora groups in the UK can be roughly classified into three categories: advocacy, political action, and community services. As these groups are bounded by different mandates, membership composition and legal requirements, they prioritise their own domain or interest over the need to collaborate with other groups.Should these leaders respect the work of each other, it may not lead to a state of disarticulation. Nevertheless, it is not the case. These leaders are usually found engaging in heated debates on social media on the priorities and approaches in advancing the interest of Hongkongers in Britainand the strategies to bring democracy back to Hong Kong. In private, there is little room for consensus and mutual respect 12.Although these Hong Kong diaspora leaders claim their recognition of pro-democracy demands for their homeland in public, they, ranging from former politicians to propaganda social media group owners to community organisers, brought their divisions from home to Britain and continued the distrust among them13. Only on occasions significant to Hongkongers, such as the anniversary of the massive pro-democracy protest in June, would bring these leaders coordinate countrywide protests14.

The second contributing factor to the disarticulation is the mismatch between campaign strategieswith political realities in the UK. The way that Hong Kong activists learnt to campaign for a political cause in their homeland during contentious times has become ineffective and irrelevant in Britain. During the anti-extradition law amendment bill (anti-ELAB) protests in 2019,activistswho were new to the pro-democracy movement used to utilise social media and online forums to run campaignsand amplify their messages (Lee 2020 and Liang and Lee 2021). These activists expected the media to pick up their message spread online naturally, and politicians would subsequently react and follow through, hence spending little effort on pitching them.

While their familiar approach to propagating their causes might have worked back in 2019’s Hong Kong, these activists may have forgotten that their campaign landscape has completely changed – They are advocating for Hong Kong democracy by urging the Westminster, devolved administrations, and local authorities to exert pressure on Hong Kong and Beijing as an ethnic minority in the UK. Politicians in this country have a very different approach to work from the Hong Kong ones.

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Arguably, British politicians are less approachable and hold more diversified opinions than their pro-democracy counterparts from Hong Kong. Moreover, demanding the politicians exert pressure on their fourth-largest trade partners with little or no incentive in return makes little sense. These prodemocracy activists overlooked the quid-pro-quo reality of politics in the UK and failed to make the relevance of their demands to the British people, yielding low interest in British society to pay attention. In other words, the lack of realisation of the change in context and the need for a locally relevant campaign strategy made their articulation of Hong Kong-related topics in the UK political and civic landscape relatively unsuccessful.

The struggles of ordinary Hongkongers have been neglected as a result

The impact of the twisted impression of Hongkongers and the disarticulated Hong Kong groups made voices of Hongkongers who are struggling in the UK hard to be heard. In a survey by Citizens of Our Time Learning Hub (2023) on BNO Hongkongers, 31% of respondents said they have not adapted to the UK lifestyle, and 18.5% expressed their desperate need for cost-of-living support (ibid). The survey also shows that 47.6% of BNO Hongkongers were in desperate or in high need of job-seeking opportunities (ibid).

Despite such an apparent need, there is a tendency in which Hongkongers who emigrated to the UK via the BNO route do not dare to seek help and resort to individualising their struggles. The sentiment to become the socalled “model migrants”, which are self-reliant and proud of not taking any government benefits, dominated social media channels commonly subscribed to by Hongkongers in the UK and resonated with the rhetoric portrayed by the Conservative government.15 BNO Hongkongers who are struggling in the UK are also under pressure by the smears online launched by their fellows who remain in Hong Kong, accusing them of lacking preparation and hence suffering from their incompetence. Diaspora groups were also seen as not keen on helping them as well. For instance, the Hong Kong Scots CIC is the only Hong Kong diaspora group in the UK that submitted a shadow NGO report to the United Nations, expressing the concern of Hongkongers over Britain’s obligations to economic, social, and cultural rights (ESC Rights).16 In contrast, four UK-based Hong Kong diaspora NGOs submitted shadow reports on Hong Kong’s ESC rights17. There are also pressures diaspora groups face when trying to advocate for their struggling fellows.

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With such a complex, the British media and politicians pay little attention to the struggles faced by BNO Hongkongers as a result. For instance, when nearly a dozen Hong Kong and Chinese media outlets reported on a young BNO Hongkonger who had taken her own life in London, only one British media mentioned the tragic event19. Another event to illustrate such indifference is the issue of safety for dependents of BNO Hongkongers to get their passports renewed in the Chinese embassy and consulates. BNO visa dependents are not eligible to hold a BNO independently, and they must get their new Hong Kong passports from the Chinese embassy and consulates in the UK. A Taiwanese media reported worries held by these dependents on the potential risk inside the de facto Chinese soil20. Such worries have become apparent to these dependents after the Chinese consulate staff attacked Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters in Manchester21. These dependents demanded the Home Office to issue Certificates of Travel, which will allow them to travel abroad without risking themselves going to the Chinese embassy and consulates22. While the British media and politicians paid much attention to the behaviour of Chinese diplomats in the UK, no British media and politicians took the potential safety issue and the shortfall of the BNO visa scheme seriously23.

Conclusion

The twisted rhetoric of “model migrants” and disarticulation by Hong Kong diaspora leaders echo the “migrant phobic” sentiment portrayed by the Conservative-led government. Also, it cannot bring about positive change to the well-being of Hongkongers in the UK. Hongkongers struggling with their new lives in Britain will continue to be bound by the “model migrants” image and afraid of reaching out for help, while diaspora group leaders are reluctant to raise resources to help their struggling fellow. More importantly, the government's approach to twist BNO Hongkongers as defacto refugees would shift away the much-needed attention on asylum seekers from Hong Kong.

At the end of the day, Hong Kong diaspora leaders in the UK should set their differences aside, and put the well-being of fellows as the focus of their advocacy work. The campaign for policy change to improve the lives of struggling Hongkongers in this new home should have equal weighing with the advocacy work for bringing democracy back to Hong Kong. Without such change, the needs and voices of disarticulated Hongkongers in the UK would continue to be neglected by the government and the wider society.

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Abstract

Howdogender, race,andclass informsecurity? -Elizabeth

In this essay I will discuss how both the absence of,and the consideration of gender, race, and class inform security, looking at both mainstream and critical approaches to the study of security. The absence of gender, race, and class in security leads to an inequality in security knowledge whereby those in positions of privilege define security and set the security agenda, while other voices are marginalised.

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This marginalisation leads to a production of ‘legitimate’ but subjective security knowledge that masquerades as objective truth. In this vein, the inclusion of gender, race, and class in security questions this ‘objective’ knowledge. Working within and against mainstream Security Studies, an analysis of gender, race, and class underlines assumptions and blind-spots that underpin state-centrism, as well as highlighting how gender, race, and class are vital in understanding the construction, legitimation, and instigation of violent conflict. Beyond the state, gender, race, and class can show how ‘new’ security threats and the response to them, for example infectious diseases affect women and marginalised groups disproportionately, demonstrating the continued need for analysis of gender, race, and class in understanding these ‘new’ threats.

Part 1: Security Knowledge

Gender, race, and class inform what is considered to be true in security. Mainstream Security Studies is founded in Realism, which uses the state as the referent object and focuses on power relations and military conflict (Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 9). At its core, there is an assumption that a certain experience of security is an objective truth, when in fact it reflects a specific experience of Western, male, elite actors during the twentieth century. As Sjoberg writes, this conception is rooted ‘in assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality)’ that are necessary to ‘make particular actions meaningful in international security’ (2018, p. 46). This matters, because assumptions about security influence what type of security knowledge is ‘seen as possible and legitimate’ (Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 57). An absence of gender, race, and class in security is not only a ‘blind spot’ but a ‘constitutive practice’ that is ‘intrinsic to the deployment of global power’ (Biglin, 2010, p. 615). Any narrative about security is also a ‘narrative of political identity’ as those in positions of power have their voices heard, the division of power is along gender, race, and class lines, and those in power have the ability to set the security agenda (Wibben, 2011, p. 593). When gender, race, and class are considered, it becomes apparent that there is no such thing as objective knowledge about security – ‘objective knowledge is subjective knowledge of privileges voices’ (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 192) The assumption of Western, male, elite experiences as both universal and most important produces ‘legitimate’ security knowledge that prioritises certain voices and concepts in security. Therefore, our understanding of security and insecurity is limited by ‘the language of a privileged minority’ (Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 64). As Enloe argues, silence doesn’t mean absence and the lack of attention to gender, race, and class in security doesn’t mean that these factors are unimportant in security.

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In fact, when silence can mean ‘suppressed resistance, lack of consciousness, mere complicity’ or an ‘adaptive response to domination’, security cannot be addressed without an understanding of these silences (Enloe in Biglin, 2010, p. 618). Stern (2005)’s work on the insecurity of Mayan women in Guatemala demonstrates that these women experience security differently from the way it is addressed by mainstream security, due specifically to their position as low-class, indigenous, women.

Part 2: States and violent conflict

Postcolonial and feminist security scholarship takes issue with mainstream ideas about security for several reasons, emphasising global rather than national security as well as non-state-centric perspectives. (Wibben, 2011, p. 593). This is because, as Stern argues women and members of marginalised groups have been ‘denied adequate consideration in the formation of security politics’ when the state is the ‘predominant if not sole recipient and agent of security’ (2005, p. 6; p. 17). For example, Realism relies on the idea that states are functionally equivalent’ as actors (Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 102). Post-colonial studies highlight that states don’t share universal features and emphasise that state security for colonial states can only be understood with relation to insecurity in post-colonial states. For example, the idea of ‘state failure’ generally finds faults with states, leaders, or regimes, rather than the ‘global political-economic structure’ that ‘allows them to ‘fail’’ (Bilgin, 2010, p. 619). Realism’s reliance on the functional equivalence of states is founded in Eurocentrism.

Additionally, Realism relies on the construction of the state survival as being dependent on the pursuit of power, competitiveness, and self-interest, with war as a ‘necessary logical consequence’ of power balancing(Donnelly, 2013, p. 34). Feminist scholars argue that this construction is gendered, based on ‘a partial representation of human nature’ (Tickner, 1988, p. 432). When constructing security based on solely masculine conceptions of power and morality, ideas about ‘cooperation’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘deescalation’ are ignored (Tickner, 1988, p. 432). Grand and Newland argue that due to the exclusion of women’s lives and experiences, the study of international relations has been excessively focused on ‘conflict and anarchy’ and ‘competition and fear’ (1991, in True, 2013, p. 245).

Stern argues that mainstream ideas of security have been ‘inadequate in explaining or prescribing solutions’ for violent conflicts ‘within states, between states, and beyond states’ (2005, p. 6). State-centrism ignores the fact that states can ‘threaten their own populations’– often in the form of gendered and ethnic violence, structural violence, or war-fighting priorities (Wibben, 2017, p. 86).

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State-centrism marginalises women since threats to women’s security can and do come from ‘members of their own households’ or ‘representatives of their own states’ (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 48). For example, Guatemalan national security policy during the civil war was itself a ‘threat to Mayan women’s wellbeing’ as it ‘silenced [their] voices, sanctioned the acts which threatened them, and obscured relations of power which placed them in marginalised positions’ (Stern, 2005, p. 7). Furthermore, Biglin (2010, p. 618) argues that the state-centric approach to world politics, and national security as ‘the language of state action’ works deliberately to serve the interests of both Western and non-Western elites, leading to a decrease in the security of individuals and communities.

An analysis of gender, race, and class can be used to explain how wars and violent conflict are justified, as well as highlighting the unequal and unconsidered impacts of such conflicts. Feminist Security Studies looks at the impact of security politics on everyday lives, believing that ‘seeing women and gender in war and conflict is crucial to understanding those conflicts’ (Sjoberg 2018, p. 51). The irony, for example, in describing war as ‘the midwife of change’ reflects masculine ideas about destruction and death as synonymous with the life-giving abilities of a mother reflects a broader linguistic phenomenon where gendered discourse and constructions of masculinity are used to justify violent conflict (Carr in Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 127).Wilcox looks at how gender warps perceptions of offensive capabilities and the desirability of offensive strategies, arguing that aggressive military strategies cannot be understood without an analysis of gender (2009, p. 220). Sharp talks about ‘strategic essentialism’, where a clear image of identity is used to create an opposition, which would not be possible if every aspect of identity was incorporated (in Biglin, 2010, p. 615). Traditional Security Studies supports US imperialism, and the construction of Afghani women as‘passive victims’, in need of saving by Western men from Afghan men was used to justify US war in Afghanistan and the subsequent War on Terror (Wibben, 2017, p. 90, and Wilcox, 2009, p. 236). Mrsevic (2001), looking at the civil war in the former Yugoslavia asks if the war caused an increase in domestic violence, or if domestic violence itself caused the war. In a culture where ‘aggressive masculinity is not only tolerated, but encouraged’ it can be argued that the normalisation of domestic violence contributed ‘the ease with which’ young men became perpetrators of violence (Mrsevic, 2001, p.44). In Sjoberg’s words, ‘real world events are not adequately addressed’ (2018, p.45) without a focus on gender, and further –when we neglect to focus race and class.

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Part 3: Beyond the state

A deliberate focus of gender, race, and class changes how we think about security, moving beyond mainstream ideas of states and conflict. For example, security is often not considered with its counterpart –insecurity.The exclusion of the idea of insecurity is gendered, given that women are more likely to be in insecure positions (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 52). Tickner argues that a national security based on military strength and physical protection ignores the everyday lives of normal people, for whom security is ‘more to do with the satisfaction of basic material needs’ (1988, p. 435). Biglin describes Security Studies as ‘peripheral’ because it ‘neglects the importance of non-traditional security issues’ (2010, p. 619). Critical Security Studies, also called the Welsh School,builds on post-colonial thought and Peace Research argues that, instead of states, humans are the referent object of security (Jarvis and Holland, 2015, p. 106). Feminist Security Studies share the approach, prioritising the lived experiences of women, or the so-called ‘low politics’ of International Relations. (Sjoberg 2018, p. 53). Tickner (1992) argues that issues such as human rights, political economy issues and environmental issues ‘affect the viability and security of people’s lives as much as, if not more than traditional military security issues’ (Sjoberg 2018, p. 52). Feminist security concerns move beyond ‘guns, bombs and fists’, looking at ‘inadequate access to nutrition and healthcare’, ‘household security, economic stability, and freedom from sexual assault’ (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 52).

While gender, race, and class draw attention to the importance of opening up security beyond the state, they also help critique approaches within human security theory, shedding light on how so called ‘new’ security threats such as the environment and disease affect people disproportionately along gendered, raced, and classed lines. Feminist Security Studies goes so far as to interrogate the idea of human security itself, arguing ‘human’ is a gendered concept, arguing that while critical security scholars deepen analysis to include ‘humanity or the individual’ they do not ‘interrogate gender as part of a matrix of power where it intersects with other markers such as class, race, nation, religion…’ (Wibben, 2011, p. 592). ‘Human’ hasn’t always meant the same thing historically, sometimes only meaning men, or sometimes only white people. Human bodies have ‘gender-distributed needs and significations’, and a focus on human security often excludes gender-specific sources of insecurity, for example gendered violence, or even lack of access to birth control (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 52).

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Harman’s (2021) work demonstrates how an attention to human security itself often fails toaddress how threats differently impact women and marginalised communities, but also how inequalities along gendered, raced, and class lines are exacerbated in threat-response. Looking specifically at global health security and the response to public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC), disease outbreaks and pandemics, Harman analyses how gender is always ‘secondary or exempt’ from health emergency planning and response (2021, p. 608). Despite the lack of attention to it, these health emergencies are gendered in their prevalence and mortality; the ‘differential socio-economic burden’ that falls on women; the ‘exacerbation of female insecurity and threat of violence; and the ‘dominance of male representation in decision-making and response and planning’ (2021, p. 601). What’s more, the priority given to health issues is divided along gendered lines but also in the divide between the Global North and South, the issues that affect the lives of millions in low- and middle-income countries are not addressed or prioritised until they pose a threat to high income or Western countries. The COVID-19 pandemic raised the visibility of gender, but arguably because there are ‘higher rates of vulnerability and mortality among men’ (Harman, 2021, p. 619). Global health security ‘reproduces’ gender and other inequalities due to the prioritising of certain issues over others. A consideration of gender, race, and class shines a light on the invisible – unintended, or otherwise – consequences of security issues. During the second wave of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, reports noted that ‘the influx of responders and associated cash flow’ may have led to conditions that increased ‘economic of sexual exploitation and abuse’ (Harman, 2021, p. 615). Additionally, pandemic response calls into question the notion of ‘new’ or ‘human’ security as threats responses and policy-making still heavily revolved around the idea of ‘global health security as state security’ (Harman, 2021, p. 606), focusing on protecting the state from the impacts of the diseases rather than the individual

Conclusion

In this essay I have looked at how security knowledge is limited by the voices of those in power who have the privilege to prioritise certain narratives about security and action certain security responses. I have addressed that an analysis of gender, race, and class calls into question the objectivity of such knowledge and offers alternative narratives. Within mainstream security studies, gender, race, and class contest assumptions that underpin statecentrism such as functional equivalence and the role of state as protector.

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I have argued that gender, race, and class are crucial to understanding how violent conflict is justified and sustained as a viable policy option. Moving beyond mainstream security studies, I have discussed how gender, race, and class reinforce the need for a human object of security and the importance of everyday experiences. In analysis of new security threats such as pandemics and disease, gender, race, and class continue to be crucial in understanding the inequalities in threat construction and response.

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TheWayHome: CrimeanTatars andthe Strugglefor Survival-Eban

Raymond

On 24th February 2022, the world awoke to the largest military invasion in Europe since the end of Second World War some 70 years prior. The public were exposed to videos and images of tanks rolling across fields, bombedout nurseries,and cities aflame; overnight, sympathy and support for the Ukrainian people swept social media.

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Fast forward to the present day, and the war is treated as just another occurrence in international affairs, consigned to the back of people’s minds. Amidst the attention rightly given to the Ukrainian struggle, however, there exists a group that continue their own fight for survival. For the indigenous people of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, the invasion of Ukraine marks another bloody phaseon the road to freedom. From genocide anddenial ofidentity, to forced military enlistment, the wounds run deep.

To understand their story, we must traverse the last few centuries. In what is now Southern Ukraine, was a state known as the Crimean Khanate, with most of the population being Crimean Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group. This state was a nominal vassal state of the Ottoman Empire and was annexed by the Russian Empire in 17831. Thus begana lengthy period of Russian persecution of the populace, based on differences oflanguage and culture. Over the centuries, various conflicts including the Crimean War of 1853 and First World Wartriggered waves of further persecution, culminating in forced emigration that took thousands of lives.2

Through increasing recognition of the Ukrainian Terror-Famine of 1932-33 as an attempted genocide, so too are the forced mass deportations of Crimean Tatars to Central Asia by Stalin in 19433. Facing complete destruction, the Crimean Tatars were forced to abandon their homeland and between 2040% of the entire population are estimated to have died on the forced marches. Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were sent to repopulate their former home, permanently altering the ethnic make-up in the region to wipe away any trace of habitation.

The battle has since continued. Following the independence of Ukraine in 1991, the Ukrainian government authorised the repatriation of 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Crimea, beginning the first stage of re-confirming their cultural identity that had been denied for decades.

The most turbulent events have occurred in living memory After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Crimean Tatars were once again threatened. A fewhuman rights activists campaigning for recognition and autonomy were imprisoned by Russian state security and the representative body, Mejilis, was outlawed for alleged terrorism.

Return to the present day and the invasion of Ukraine marks yet another attempt at genocide, aimed at more than one group. Vladimir Putin’s ‘partial mobilisation’ in September 2022 has been internationally decried as forced service, but also a further attempt at ethnic cleansing across the nation.

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Minorities within Russia have been disproportionately pressed into service, forced to fight and die in droves; the Crimean Tatars are no exception. It is estimated that around 90% of Crimean Tatars within Crimea have received mobilisation notices, a move that has been condemned by Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky as a move to eliminate the Crimean Tatar nation completely.

Beyond simply accepting current circumstances, the Crimean Tatars have begun to mobilise themselves in defence of theircommunity. From military service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces to widespread support from the Tatar diaspora, efforts are being made to preserve their identity in a battle that has been raging for centuries.

Evidently, the struggle ahead will be difficult as the war will continue for the foreseeable future. Above all, the struggle of the Crimean Tatars to secure an independent future is one deeply intertwined with many others, from the Rohingya in Myanmar to Bashkirs in the Urals, and beyond. It also serves as a reminder that Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to continue his neoimperialist ambitions. It is awarning that passivity is complicity. Only once the war is over will the Crimean Tatars finally be able to secure the future they so deserve.

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Thank you to our readers.

Thank you to our wonderful contributors, peer reviewers and the team that have helped to create this year’s journal edition.

This year’s journal submission is exclusively online to move towards a more sustainable editorial practice.

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