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Volume One December 2023
Contributors
Dr Cauvery Ganapathy
Dr Namrata Goswami
Dr Ashok Sharma
Dr Parama Sinha Palit & Tejusvi Shukla
Dr Budi Hernawan
Wolfgang Johannes Widmoser
Tina Claffey
Roydon Cerejo
Zak Patten
Tang A Pau
Dr. Cauvery Ganapathy
Dr. Cauvery Ganapathy is a strategic affairs analyst and currently works as a Strategic Risk Management Consultant. She has been a Research Associate with the Office of Net Assessment under the US Department of Defense previously. As a Fellow of Global India Foundation, she has presented and published at various national and international forums. She has been a recipient of the Pavate Fellowship to the University of Cambridge as Visiting Research Faculty and a recipient of the Fulbright-Nehru Doctoral Fellowship to the University of California, Berkeley.
Dr Cauvery Ganapathy
India’s China conundrum: a different war in
the gray-zone
“This
is not an era of war”
Far removed from the carnage in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the tenuous status quo along the Taiwan Straits, there are multiple tensions simmering between nations that do not qualify as war, in the traditional sense. Neither can they be explained adequately under the nomenclature associated with non-traditional security threats anymore. They may, more appropriately, be understood as being part of Gray-zone activities and tactics that a country may systematically direct at another to destabilise it, without resorting to combat operations. These activities remain below the threshold of open warfare while States continue to operate surreptitiously against the interests of another. There is today an effective blurring of lines through an easy integration of actors, of technologies and of domains across demarcations that were earlier neatly segregated into civilian and military spheres. This enables Gray-zone activities more easily, and empowers States that use them. Such activities exact enormous costs upon the target countries. If intent and ability instead of any direct and immediate use of force or ammunitions were a more significant marker, multiple systematic attempts by countries to destabilize each other and inflict lasting damage, could be counted worldwide today. It may then be worthwhile to consider this era through the prism of the more nuanced calibration of approaches that countries take to one another while aiming to inflict damage. This commentary posits that the Chinese approach to India fits the bill of such Gray- zone activities, disturbingly well, and as a corollary, that we do live in an era of war albeit one largely bereft of actual combat.
This piece comes post the references to possible disengagement announced on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan in October, 2024. While appreciating the choice of diplomatic overtures over any active hostility on the borders, this commentary submits that there ought not to be any illusions about any real change in the status of bilateral ties between the two countries post the Kazan announcement. The issues that resulted in the Chinese misadventure in 2020 persist. The objectives of the Chinese, and the intent that established those objectives persist. It may then be worthwhile to consider why, or if at all, anything on the ground can change despite the separate pronouncements from both sides on the subject post the meeting between PM Modi and President Xi.
Perhaps the more reasonable takeaway from the developments in Kazan is that Beijing has recalibrated its approach due to considerations regarding the timing of the US elections and its anticipated fallouts, domestic economic compulsions, resource allocation and more pressing issues around the Taiwan Straits. An even less generous assessment would be that the Chinese misadventure has served its purpose for the time-being with adequate infrastructural development having been built on their side of the border (something that the Indians have also made impressive progress in), and that the Indians have been forced to allocate scarce resources to the Eastern flank (in addition to the Depsang and Demchok points) while grappling with multiple other stresses along their land and maritime borders presently. So, while the Chinese threat of easy escalation at the border persists, Beijing will find it even easier to prosecute the Gray-zone activities within the Indian borders, and register successes in destabilizing India from within.
The cost of war has a deterrent quality all its own. Which is why conducting Gray-zone warfare combined with a war of attrition along the eastern sector, may be an option the Chinese choose over a direct war with India. China’s choice then represents a low cost high cumulative yield option. The Chinese are choosing a two-pronged approach to their Indian concern- First, to stake claim over areas with no seeming immediate economic value, thereby keeping India engaged for a long-haul along the Eastern sector, and second, to use the uneasy peace meanwhile to gain entry into Indian civilian spaces and industries and hollow them out or leverage access and control over them when the time comes.
On the first issue, the approach is one of making incremental gains through relatively low-cost options. In addition to the presence of their troops (admittedly expected to be lesser in numbers post Kazan’s commitment) and infrastructure along the Eastern sector, the Chinese capture of land inside Bhutan and the takeover of Tibet, and encroaching of land along India’s eastern sector must be looked at through the lens of begetting such long-term payoffs for Beijing. This involves a process of consolidation wherein the captured land may not carry great value in and of itself, but which the aggrieved party cannot redress without triggering a kinetic conflict. It is necessary, in this context, also to consider where resources are being sacrificed for the necessary fortifications in the Eastern sector. India’s defense commitments, needs and focus in the Indo-Pacific may suffer for the investments to be robust enough on the eastern and western flanks of the country. With their continuing presence along the Himalayan sector despite talks of disengagement, the Chinese effectively establish a highly restrictive choice matrix for New Delhi wherein every resource allocated to the land boundary removes it from play in the larger strategic space of the Indian ocean.
Apart from this first approach, the fomenting of trouble in the Indian Ocean in general, and in India’s immediate South Asian neighbourhood in particular, are the most significant parts of Beijing’s toolkit of gray-zone activities. These are, however, excluded from the scope of this commentary, in order to flag 5 other sectors that appear most susceptible to Chinese gray-zone tactics- India’s electricity grids, Data security, Media, Manufacturing, and Defense procurement - that are critical in equal measure but do not invite as much easy outrage as Chinese activities in the neighbourhood do. The 5 that have been included here highlight a mix of India’s vulnerabilities and dilemmas viz a vis the Chinese that are more deeply entrenched in India’s internal security concerns and economic security compulsions.
India’s electricity grids - Chinese attacks on India’s power grids within this decade itself have not received nearly the kind of attention they deserve. 2022 alone saw more than 7 simultaneously. The idea that the electricity of the most populous country in the world with the 2nd largest army in the world and ambitions of becoming the 3rd largest economy in the world, could be so easily compromised by a phishing attack generated more than 2,500km away, without one bullet being fired, should generate far more anxiety than it presently does within India.
The ability of Beijing to impart a devastating blow to India through the power grids are worsened by the possibility of using polymorphic malware which are customizable to specific domains and purposes. The ability to engineer this would basically nullify the need for bad-faith actors such as China to use the older models of malware that leave traceable signatures within the system. This, in turn, would compound and frustrate any efforts of detection, apart from holding India hostage with complete blackouts.
Data is the new currency of power, and the India Stack has done a phenomenal job in leveraging it. India’s ability to use data in the provision of public goods and services in the last decade, has been one of the country’s most remarkable achievements. It is rooted, however, in the process of digitalization, which again carries within itself significant vulnerabilities and is highly susceptible to the kind of Gray-zone attacks that China can engineer in the sphere. The Cybersecurity and Information Technology Examination report, 2023 highlighted the kind of threats that financial institutions, among others, face from potential breaches in this sector. Digital breaches in organizations that serve as data repositories rarely excite the kind of national security concerns they should despite the public knowledge of a malign foreign actor with enormous resources working tirelessly to undermine India’s interests. China’s most recent attack in the sphere has been against India’s largest wearable tech company, thereby compromising the personal data of millions of Indians.
Media - closely tied to the possession of data is the reality of its distribution and dissemination. Media sits at the heart of this social experiment. Never before have the means to dissipate conflicts been so readily available in terms of open and easily accessible channels of communication between the two countries. Yet, never before has so much disinformation potentially plagued every channel of communication. Never before have the two countries, and the world in general, been as interconnected and interdependent as this; but again, never before have so many actors had easy access and owned the tools of disruption with absolutely no accountability. The degree of intractability involved in the sharing of disinformation and half-truths through instruments of the media are mammoth. The propagation of disinformation with no costs involved, has become a feature of the industry, and the Chinese efforts to hold fort in the domain of media sponsorships, data mining through social media platforms and old-school investments in media houses through opaque channels present a very disturbing trend.
Manufacturing and procurement - The Economic Survey of India 2023-24 recommends a recalibration in doing business with China so as to better navigate a challenging international financial and supply chain environment. The recommendation is undoubtedly based on hard facts that emerge from real-time numbers and capacity gaps. The supply chain issues and gaps that flared up during the pandemic have been compounded by the ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and FDIs have been lacklustre at best. India’s begrudging dependence on China to become the manufacturing hub it aims to be, is a tragic paradox. The country looks to China even for the electricity grid machinery that it needs to reach those massive growth targets we tout. The dependence on China for the components in the clean energy space, for instance, is highly significant and can be an effective Trojan Horse in the future. Removing this dependence entirely in the near to medium term is unrealistic and a naive expectation. The kind of network blackholes that have plagued the UK since the summary removal of all Huawei equipment from its 5G provision is a case in point to demonstrate what happens when countries act before preparing. So, as long as we continue to prepare, it is only wise to use the economic engagement with China the best we can. Simultaneously, however, it is important to factor in the assumption that Beijing is actively working to induce vulnerabilities into India’s manufacturing base that it can exploit at a later date.
Defense procurement - In the same vein, entirely insulating India’s defense procurement from even a modicum of Chinese participation is an unreasonable expectation just now. Defense manufacturing’s R&D is a highly capex intensive endeavour. It may be prudent then to approach this by buying what is off-the-shelf so that one may focus on modifying it to the Indian requirements within a more effective timeframe. Reliable and sustainable demand signaling that would propel domestic defense manufacturing industries forward is, therefore, a non-negotiable need in India today. Reducing the leeway the Chinese exporters and investors have in India’s defense procurement, even through ancillary inputs such as the parts that telecom and automobile sectors that supply to defense establishments have, requires systemic national commitments by both the public and private sectors. The balance sheet of defense spending must be read through the lens of the kind of technological advances it underwrites too. It may be the only way to effectively curtail the practical need for allowing dubious Chinese investment and inputs into the sector.
In the Indian context, it is necessary always to invoke the debate on ‘Guns or Butter’ when the issue of increasing spending on something like defense comes up. This becomes more pronounced when there is a dissonance in the degree of newfound engagement in a country’s foreign and national security policy, and the recognition that there is a cost to be paid as an invested citizenry. Yet, it is true that the larger, more incongruous and the most unjust impact of war is sadly felt by those that that would have had no agency in either its start nor in its conduct. The bulk of the share of sacrifices made, unfortunately, always fall on those that had no say in the resource allocations a country makes, to begin with. Despite this, it must be recognized that there can be no economic security much less growth if the physical security of the country is not fool-proofed, and increasing spending on defense manufacturing domestically can be the only answer to this dilemma, however uncomfortable.
There is a shock and awe factor which traditional kinetic warfare invokes quite naturally. The outrage of a people is immediately triggered by the more tangible forms of aggression- such as the capture of territory, the use of weapons against civilian populations, or even overt pronouncements extoling attacks on a population or sections of it. Gray-zone activities and non-kinetic actions, on the other hand, fly under the radar of collective outrage, usually. Such activities are typically conducted under the guise of economic activities which mask themselves effectively, and operate in a manner so as to not overtly violate the laws of the land, thereby avoiding drawing attention to themselves. The assiduous efforts to operate within the remit of the law of the land, allow countries like China to consolidate their penetration within India’s economy with minimal scrutiny. The easy integration of domains and the lowering of the barriers to entry, can have a most chilling impact on the future of a country, and yet not be discovered until it is too late.
In dealing with China, the feints are many. Despite pockets of cooperation and offers of latitude, trusting a revisionist power like China is an unwise enterprise at best. It is not a mistake India must allow itself. Wisdom lies more in working towards the prevention of war by single-mindedly preparing for it, as leaders past professed. It is incumbent to identify the fragility within our system, such as in the 5 sectors this commentary flags, which countries like China can use their gray-zone tactics against.
The Chinese may trace their strategic impulse for the conduct of Gray-zone activities to Sun Tzu’s summation that the supreme art of war is to subdue an enemy without fighting. When faced with a competitor who believes and acts on such a philosophy, India would do well to return to the beginnings of its own strategic thought where Kautilya advocates not taking recourse to armed conflict if the ends could be achieved by intrigue, duplicity and fraud, because it is indeed an era of war, even if the manner of its conduct may have changed.
Dr. Namrata Goswami
Dr. Namrata Goswami is an author and educator specializing in space policy, international relations, and ethnic identity. Currently, Dr. Goswami teaches at the Schriever and West Space Scholar Programs, the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University, and at the Joint Special Forces University. She is a guest lecturer at Emory University for seminars on Technology, Society & Governance, and India today. She worked as a Research Fellow at MP-Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi; a Visiting Fellow at Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia; University of Heidelberg, Germany; Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace; and was a Fulbright Senior Fellowship Awardee. She was awarded the Minerva grant by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to study great power competition in outer space. In April 2019, Dr. Goswami testified before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s space program. Her co-authored book, Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space was published in 2020 by Lexington Press; Rowman, and Littlefield. Her book on The Naga Ethnic Movement for a Separate Homeland was published in 2020 by Oxford University Press. She has published widely including in The Diplomat, the Economic Times, The Washington Post, Ad Astra, Asia Policy, Live Encounters Magazine, Cairo Review. She was invited in November 2019 to share about her life and her work at a Tedx event held at the Rosa Parks Museum, in Montgomery, Alabama. https://thunderbird.asu.edu/about/people/staff-faculty/namrata-goswami
Dr Namrata Goswami The Structure of the Global Space Race
A global space race is underway, focused on instituting a permanent human presence on the Moon, establishing mega-constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO),[1] and sending humans to Mars. While the normative and philosophical conversation around space is about common heritage,[2] common values, and common destiny,[3] the reality is much more complex and reflective of human nature: a focus on developing the means to build space for economic benefits, nationalism, and national interest, ensuring that space weaponization and militarization do not devastate our planet while at the same time recognizing the national security contribution of space assets, ensuring that humanity has the space enabled tools to guide itself in terms of weather forecasting, predicting crop yield patterns, understanding climate change, asteroid detection, and deflection, and accessing solar energy from space. In this world, it’s just not the United States’s NASA or the erstwhile Soviet Union Space Program that dominates the discussions around space, as it was during the Cold War.
Today, we have several new Major Powers like China, India,[4] and Russia; Middle Powers like Japan, South Korea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Brazil, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Emerging Powers,[5] like Indonesia, Ghana, Argentina, Ethiopia, Pakistan, that one day will elevate themselves to Middle and Major Powers if they continue to sustain their interest and funding for their space programs. The status of a nation as a Major, Middle, or Emerging Power is not fixed. It depends on what their policymakers prioritize, their political ideology, financial commitments, the environment for commercial space innovation, space education, and technology development. An example of change in status is the United Kingdom of England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, once a Major colonial Power, now relegated to the status of a Middle Power. Nations like India, devastated by nearly 200 years of colonial exploitation by the United Kingdom,[6] are now on their path to re-emergence and national renewal. China and India are the Major Powers of today but such statuses are not fixed. Change in human history is continuous and inevitable, as is the story of our planet Earth when we examine and understand the arc of its evolution.[7]
Sometimes, former Major Powers, that are now Middle Powers, like the UK, may take initiatives like introducing a UN Resolution on Responsible Behavior in Space (75/36),[17] but that may get pushback from Major Powers like China, and India. [18] Submitting a resolution may not be as consultative as it appears to be, and there could be major differences in words used to define an activity.[19] Major Powers are sensitive to moves by other Major Powers and Middle Powers to constrain their space development, specifically national security, and are highly resistant to pre-determined frameworks.
Major Powers
What makes a country a Major Power in space? First of all, its overall influence affects the invisible structure of how international relations are conducted. Second, its ability to develop its education (in this case, space education), which requires technical and non-technical skills [scientists, artists, policymakers, strategists, military space specialists, engineers, historians, and lawyers], towards crafting that nation’s future. Developing specialized institutions, civilian, military, and commercial, is a core part of that status.
To be called a Major Power in space requires the recognition of other Major Powers.[8] You simply cannot declare yourself to be a Major Power. Major Powers act at all levels, international, institutional, regional, and national, to ensure they have the status to make their own choices and preferences and influence those of others. To achieve this, they may build coalitions, develop offensive, defensive, and deterrence capabilities, enhance their civilian and military space capacities, and invest in their commercial space capacities. Major Powers take concerted actions to build their space launch capacities, fund their educational structures, invest in long-term space technologies, integrate space into their economic development, and assume leadership towards building legal frameworks, nationally and globally.
Today’s Major Powers include the United States (U.S.), China, India, and Russia. More importantly, they recognize each other as key players in the Space Race. This is evident, for instance, regarding the Moon and coalition building. The U.S. initiated the Artemis Accords and Program;[9] China initiated the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS),[10] and the membership that mattered the most to their Lunar initiatives was India (a Major Power) joining the Artemis Accords,[11] while Russia joining the ILRS.[12] Major Powers, however, behave differently in their foreign policy behavior from Middle and Emerging Powers. They treasure independence and autonomy. You can witness this in China, Russia, and India’s decisions to be part of BRICS and in their discussions around developing a BRICS Space Consortium.[13]
We can witness this in the U.S.’s negative response to China and Russia’s move to develop a treaty framework for the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. The U.S. position is that this move by China and Russia does not mitigate the gravest threats to satellites, which are ground-based anti-satellite weapons, that China and Russia are developing and testing.[20]
Middle Powers
Middle Powers are those countries that are below the Major Powers but are influential in informing how the space race emerges.[14] They may take sides and influence how the Major Powers play their game, joining one Major Power initiative over another after determining which side offers them the best advantages. Middle Powers push for their agendas in space, with a focus on equitable sharing, supporting responsible behavior in space, taking part in discussions around space resource utilization, space traffic management, and space debris removal at United Nations bodies like the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS),[15] and the United Nations Office on Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) who conducts an annual conference on space security.[16] However, UN membership by Middle Powers does not mean they have equal power to determine the paths Major Powers take in space. They may act as constraining or enabling entities.
Sometimes, former Major Powers, that are now Middle Powers, like the UK, may take initiatives like introducing a UN Resolution on Responsible Behavior in Space (75/36),[17] but that may get pushback from Major Powers like China, and India.[18] Submitting a resolution may not be as consultative as it appears to be, and there could be major differences in words used to define an activity.[19] Major Powers are sensitive to moves by other Major Powers and Middle Powers to constrain their space development, specifically national security, and are highly resistant to pre-determined frameworks. We can witness this in the U.S.’s negative response to China and Russia’s move to develop a treaty framework for the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. The U.S. position is that this move by China and Russia does not mitigate the gravest threats to satellites, which are groundbased anti-satellite weapons, that China and Russia are developing and testing.[20]
Emerging Powers
Emerging Powers are nations starting to recognize the importance of space but have not made the policy decisions, space education investments, and financial commitments toward building their space infrastructure. These nations, through their membership in the UN and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),[21] aspire to secure their access to orbital slots and radio frequency spectrum allocations.[22] They take their membership in regional bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), seriously.
Major, Middle, and Emerging Powers all have a role to play. Nations will negotiate and bargain on how they determine, constrain, or enable the space activities of themselves and others. This will occur at three levels: domestic, regional, and international. There will be moments of competition and collaboration based on the values, preferences, and choices of individual nations and their societies. Space is not just about astronauts and Earth science.
Emerging nations could become the Middle and Major Powers of tomorrow, depending on the kind of space policy vision, financial investments, space missions, and space education they commit to, today. An interesting example of a Middle Power that could be downgraded to an Emerging Power in Space is Australia, which has made decisions in recent years to scale back its investments in space.[23] Whereas, Emerging Space Powers like Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Kenya, Philippines, and Pakistan will play a major role and could become Middle Powers, in the future. The economic development of nations by 2050 will determine how they invest in space education and technologies that will have a deep impact on their lives. [24]
The Space Race today will determine the kind of future we live in. Space is a new activity in the six-million-year arc of human existence, [25] with our ability to access it starting in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik. The rules of the road, the UN treaties,[26] and the Guiding Principles for space will evolve as human activity has evolved and changed, including the role of state-based and registered private space sectors.
Major, Middle, and Emerging Powers all have a role to play. Nations will negotiate and bargain on how they determine, constrain, or enable the space activities of themselves and others. This will occur at three levels: domestic, regional, and international. There will be moments of competition and collaboration based on the values, preferences, and choices of individual nations and their societies. Space is not just about astronauts and Earth science.
In the 2050 future, the utilization of space for societal advantage and the economy will inform space policy-making. The development of institutional mechanisms to promote civil, commercial, and military space will accelerate. In this, space education will play a vital role, in developing specialists and generalists. The study of space power and its activities will be informed by the contending schools of international relations like Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and Critical Theory, but also Physics, Mathematics, Biology, Chemistry, and the Arts. There will also be growing challenges to West-originated International Relations Theorizing by the Major Powers of today, regarding their assumed universal explanatory value.
Space is a global game for influence, workforce development, technology, and strategic impacts. That nation, and/or a combination of nations, with the best integration of strategy, tactic, vision, and a space-educated workforce will have an advantage.
Major Powers like China and India would develop their non-Western analytical frameworks, specifically,[27] involving their policymakers making day-to-day real hard decisions for the societies they represent and live within. While issues like a clear night sky, Space Traffic Management, Space Debris mitigation, Rules of behavior, Space Resource Utilization, the regulation of private actors, Multi-Domain Operations, and Military Doctrinal shifts will form a powerful force, societies will also look back to their histories, cultures, religion, and the lure of the unknown to develop and fund their space programs. More awareness of the devastating asteroid hit 65 million years ago,[28] which resulted in the extinction of several species, would galvanize societies to invest seriously in planetary defense. Space is a global game for influence, workforce development, technology, and strategic impacts. That nation, and/or a combination of nations, with the best integration of strategy, tactic, vision, and a space-educated workforce will have an advantage.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of any affiliated organizations.
End Notes
1. “China in Perspective: China’s New Mega-Constellation Marks Milestone in Satellite Internet”, Xinhua, August 08, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240808/ef7d1b62fbfb4ea192f7433447a26499/c.html
2. Naman Khatwani, “Common Heritage of Mankind in Outer Space”, Astropolitics, 17/2, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2019.1638679
3. Zeeya Merali, “Our Manifest Destiny-In Space”, John Templeton Foundation, January 09, 2024, https://www.templeton.org/news/our-manifest-destiny-in-space
4. Namrata Goswami, “Assessing Great Power Competition and the Role of Middle Powers in Outer Space through the Lens of Geoeconomics”, in Vinod K. Aggarwal and Tai Ming, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Geoeconomics and Economic Statecraft, 2024, https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/56064/chapter-abstract/467421027?redirectedFrom= fulltext
5. Pablo Villar Bolanos, “Beyond the Final Frontier: Emerging Powers and Private Influence in Outer Space”, Security Distillery, April 26, 2024, https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/beyond-the-final-frontier-emerging-powersand-private-influence-in-outer-space
6. “Viewpoint: Britain Must Pay Reparations to India”, BBC, July 22, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-33618621
7. Claude J. Allegre & Stephen H. Schneider, “Evolutions of Earth,” Scientific American, July 1, 2005, https://www. scientificamerican.com/article/evolution-of-earth/
8. “China is Now a Major Space Power”, Wired, November 4, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/china-is-now-amajor-space-power-tiangong-space-station/
9. “The Artemis Accords Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future in Space”, NASA, https://www.nasa. gov/artemis-accords/
10. “International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) Guide for Partnership, China National Space Administration, June 16, 2021, https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html
11. U.S. Department of State, “The Republic of India Signs the Artemis Accords”, June 24, 2023, https://www.state.gov/ the-republic-of-india-signs-the-artemis-accords/#:~:text=In%20a%20ceremony%20held%20at,sustainable%20 and%20transparent%20space%20activity.
12. Fan Anqi, “Putin Signs into Law Joint Building of Lunar Base with China as Beijing Expands Circle of Friends in Moon Exploration”, Global Times, June 13, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1314079. shtml#:~:text=Russian%20President%20Vladimir%20Putin%20on,with%20the%20latest%20effort%20being
13. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “PM Narendra Modi Suggests BRICS Space Group as Chnadrayaan-3 Heads to Moon”, The Economic Times, August 24, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/pm-narendra-modi-suggestsbrics-space-group-as-chandrayaan-3-heads-to-moon/articleshow/102991720.cms?from=mdr
14. David Elliot, “Middle Powers: What are they and Why do They Matter”, World Economic Forum, January 26, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/middle-powers-multilateralism-international-relations/
15. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, https://www. unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html
16. “Outer Space Security Conference 2023”, UNIDIR, September 13-14, 2023, https://unidir.org/event/outer-space-
17 “Report of the Secretary-General on Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior (2021)”, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://disarmament.unoda.org/topics/outerspace-sg-report-outer-space-2021/#:~:text=By%20resolution%2075%2F36%2C%20the,could%20be%20considered%20responsible%2C%20irresponsible
18. 76th Session of the UNGA First Committee, New York Explanation of Vote of India on Draft Resolutions under “Outer Space” Cluster-Delivered by Ms. Subhashini Narayanan, Counsellor (Disarmament), https://pmindiaun.gov. in/public_files/assets/pdf/India_Explanation_NL3.pdf
19. Resolution 75/36: Reducing Space Threats through Space Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/India-Submission-on-Resolution-75-36-.pdf; Also see Permanent Mission of India to the UN, “75th Session of UNGA First Committee Explanation of Vote of India on Draft Resolution under “Outer Space” Cluster”, November 6, 2020, https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNGA?id=NDA5NQ
20. U.S. Mission to International Organization in Geneva, Statement by Ambassador Wood: The Threat Posed by Russia and China to Security of the Outer Space Environment, August 14, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/08/14/ statement-by-ambassador-wood-the-threats-posed-by-russia-and-china-to-security-of-the-outer-space-environment/
21. International Telecommunications Union, https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
22. ITU-R: Managing the Radio Frequency Spectrum for the World”, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/backgrounders/Pages/itu-r-managing-the-radio-frequency-spectrum-for-the-world.aspx;
23. Colin Clark, “Critics Slam Aussie ‘Brutal Blow’ to Whack $1.2B on Space Spending”, Breaking Defense, July 10, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/critics-slam-aussie-brutal-blow-to-whack-1-2b-on-space-spending/ 24. PWC, “The World in 2050”, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/research-insights/economy/the-world-in-2050.html
25. Brian Handwerk, “An Evolutionary Timeline of Homo Sapiens’, Smithsonian Magazine, February 02, 2021, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/essential-timeline-understanding-evolution-homo-sapiens-180976807/
26. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Space Law Treaties and Principles”, https://www.unoosa.org/ oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html#:~:text=The%20%22Outer%20Space%20Treaty%22,force%20on%20 10%20October%201967
27. Ren Xiao, “Why there is Non-Western International Relations Theory”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 17/3, 2024, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/17/3/262/7689578?redirectedFrom=fulltext
28 NASA, “Deep Impact and the Mass Extinction of Species 65 Million Years Ago”, https://science.nasa.gov/earth/ deep-impact-and-the-mass-extinction-of-species-65-million-years-ago/
Dr. Ashok Sharma
Dr. Ashok Sharma is a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is an Academic Fellow of the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne. His recent roles include Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University in the Department of Strategic & Defence Studies within the Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs, and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Canberra. There, he was the Head of the “South Asia Strategic, State Fragile and Security Program” and Conjoint Head of the “Indo-Pacific Strategic Issues and Major Powers Studies” at the National Asian Security Studies Centre. An alumnus of both Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University, Dr. Sharma’s academic journey includes Faculty, Fellow, and Honorary positions at the Australian National University, the University of Melbourne, the University of Auckland, and Victoria University of Wellington, as well as the University of Delhi. Notably, he served as the Deputy Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Auckland Branch, from February 2012 to June 2022. Dr. Sharma is a prominent authority in global affairs and security studies, specializing in the great power dynamics among the U.S., China, and India. He is recognized for his expertise in India’s global positioning, particularly its strengthening strategic ties with the U.S. and Australia, as well as its role in the Quad within the evolving strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. An accomplished author, Dr. Sharma has penned influential works, including India’s Pursuit of Energy Security: Domestic Measures, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics and Indian Lobbying and Its Influence in U.S. Decision Making: Post-Cold War.
Dr Ashok Sharma
PM Modi’s Laos Visit: Leveraging the Act East Policy to address Indo-Pacific Challenges and Opportunities
Abstract
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Laos for the ASEAN-India and East Asia Summits in October highlights India’s commitment to strengthening ties in Southeast Asia[1] and advancing its “Act East” policy. The visit underscores the need for collaboration amid challenges such as geopolitical rivalry, maritime security, and climate change. By enhancing economic cooperation and connectivity, India aims to position itself as a key player in the Indo-Pacific, fostering regional stability and mutual growth among nations.
Introduction
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Vientiane, Laos, in October for the 21st ASEAN-India Summit and the 19th East Asia Summit underscores India’s commitment to strengthening ties in Southeast Asia. This visit, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of India’s “Act East” policy, reflects Modi’s strategic vision for promoting regional stability, economic growth, and cultural exchange within the broader Indo-Pacific framework. The significance of this visit lies not only in reaffirming India’s role in the region but also in highlighting the necessity of collaboration to address multifaceted challenges facing the Indo-Pacific.
In an era characterized by shifting geopolitical dynamics, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a crucial area of global interest, drawing attention from major powers, including the United States, China, Japan, and Australia. India’s engagement within this context is vital for enhancing its influence and fostering collaboration with ASEAN nations and other key players. The subsequent sections explore the implications of Modi’s visit, focusing on India’s Indo-Pacific strategy and “Act East” policy.
The Indo-Pacific Landscape
The Indo-Pacific region encompasses a vast area stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the western shores of the Americas, holding significant strategic and economic importance.[2] The rise of China as a dominant force, coupled with ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, has heightened tensions among regional actors. In response to these dynamics, countries like the United States, Japan, Australia, and India have sought to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy, emphasizing the importance of international norms, maritime security, and economic cooperation. India’s “Act East” Policy
India’s “Act East” policy, initiated in 2014 under Modi’s government, aims to enhance engagement with Southeast Asia and beyond, focusing on trade, investment, security, and cultural ties. This policy marks a significant shift from the previous “Look East” policy, emphasizing not just economic ties but also political and security relationships with ASEAN nations. Modi’s recent visit to Laos serves as a reaffirmation of this policy and an opportunity to address both the challenges and opportunities that define the Indo-Pacific.
Key Highlights of Modi’s Visit to Laos
During his visit, Prime Minister Modi engaged in high-level discussions with Laotian leaders, including President Thongloun Sisoulith and Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone. The discussions centered on enhancing bilateral cooperation across various sectors, including trade, investment, infrastructure development, and capacity building. This engagement underscores Laos as a significant partner in India’s regional strategy and addresses the shared goals of both nations in promoting peace and development.
India-ASEAN Cooperation
Modi’s visit was part of the broader context of India-ASEAN relations. The ASEAN-India Summit provided a platform for discussing shared challenges, including climate change, terrorism, and regional security. India and ASEAN nations have increasingly recognized the importance of collaboration to address these issues, fostering a sense of collective security and resilience in the region. Modi’s emphasis on ASEAN unity and centrality reinforces India’s commitment to this multilateral framework, enhancing cooperative efforts in the face of regional challenges. [3]
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Act East Policy, Modi and other ASEAN leaders reviewed the progress of relations between India and ASEAN and charted a future direction for collaboration. This reflection underscores a shared commitment to strengthening partnerships and promoting regional stability.
India and the East Asia Summit
During the 19th East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Modi underscored the significance of the East Asia Summit as a cornerstone of India’s Act East Policy. He highlighted that this forum plays a crucial role in fostering dialogue and cooperation among member nations. Modi emphasized the importance of addressing shared challenges, including maritime security and counter-terrorism, to ensure regional stability. He reiterated India’s commitment to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, aligning with the summit’s goals.
Modi’s participation reflects India’s proactive engagement in enhancing partnerships in East Asia, reinforcing its strategic interests in the region’s peace and prosperity. The discussions during the summit highlighted the necessity of collaborative approaches to address common threats and promote mutual growth.
Emphasis on Connectivity
A significant aspect of Modi’s engagement was the emphasis on connectivity. The Prime Minister reiterated India’s commitment to enhancing both physical and digital connectivity in the region. This commitment includes initiatives aimed at improving infrastructure, such as the India-MyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which connects India’s northeastern states with Southeast Asia.[4] Enhanced connectivity not only facilitates trade but also promotes people-to-people ties, which are essential for building a cohesive regional community.
Infrastructure Development
The need for robust infrastructure is critical in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in developing nations. India has positioned itself as a key partner in infrastructure projects throughout the region, engaging in initiatives that promote connectivity and sustainable development. Projects like the India-MyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway not only enhance physical connectivity but also promote socio-economic integration, facilitating smoother trade routes and boosting tourism. Such initiatives are integral to the success of India’s Act East Policy and its broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
Indo-Pacific Challenges
The Indo-Pacific region faces numerous challenges that require concerted efforts from regional stakeholders:
1. Geopolitical Rivalry
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has intensified, leading to increased military presence and competition in the Indo-Pacific. This rivalry affects regional stability and raises concerns about the potential for conflict. India’s role as a stabilizing force is crucial in navigating these tensions, fostering dialogue, and promoting peaceful resolutions to disputes. By actively participating in regional dialogues and multilateral forums, India seeks to mitigate the adverse effects of this geopolitical rivalry.
2. Maritime Security
The South China Sea remains a flashpoint for tensions, with ongoing territorial disputes involving several ASEAN countries and China. Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight in these waters is essential for regional trade and security. India’s commitment to a rule-based maritime order reinforces the importance of international law in managing these disputes and ensuring peace in the region. While addressing the 19th East Asia Summit, PM Modi stressed the importance of conducting maritime activities under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to ensure freedom of navigation. He highlighted that peace and stability in the South China Sea are crucial for a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
3. Terrorism and Extremism
The threat of terrorism and extremism poses significant challenges to regional stability. Collaborative efforts among nations to combat these threats through intelligence sharing, capacity building, and joint exercises are critical. Modi’s emphasis on global cooperation to combat terrorism during his address at the East Asia Summit highlights India’s proactive approach to addressing this pressing issue.[5] By advocating for collective action, India aims to strengthen the region’s capacity to respond to terrorist threats effectively.
4. Climate Change
As a region vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, Southeast Asia faces challenges such as rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and food security. Collaborative efforts in sustainable development and disaster management are vital. India’s initiatives in renewable energy and disaster response can play a significant role in supporting ASEAN countries in addressing these environmental challenges. By sharing technological expertise and investing in sustainable practices, India positions itself as a leader in combating climate change within the Indo-Pacific.
Opportunities in the Indo-Pacific
Despite the challenges, the Indo-Pacific region offers numerous opportunities for cooperation and growth:
1. Economic Growth
The Indo-Pacific is home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies. Enhanced trade and investment ties can unlock significant economic potential for all nations involved. India’s expanding economy, with a market of over 1.4 billion consumers, presents an attractive opportunity for ASEAN nations and beyond. By fostering trade agreements and reducing barriers, countries can tap into new markets and enhance economic interdependence. India’s engagement with ASEAN is pivotal in creating a more integrated economic landscape.
2. Infrastructure Development
The need for robust infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in developing nations, presents an opportunity for India to enhance its role as a key partner. Engaging in initiatives that promote connectivity and sustainable development can bolster India’s influence in the region. Infrastructure projects not only facilitate trade but also create jobs and stimulate economic growth, contributing to regional stability.
3. Renewable Energy and Sustainability
As nations grapple with climate change, the shift toward renewable energy presents a significant opportunity for collaboration. India, with its ambitious renewable energy targets, seeks to be a global leader in solar energy and sustainable practices. Cooperation in renewable energy technology, investments in green infrastructure, and shared knowledge on sustainable practices can drive the transition to a more sustainable economy in the Indo-Pacific. [6]
4. Cultural and Educational Exchange
Strengthening cultural ties and educational exchanges can foster mutual understanding among nations. Programs promoting student exchange, vocational training, and research collaboration can enhance skills and knowledge sharing, benefiting both India and its partners in the region. Such initiatives contribute to building soft power and nurturing long-lasting friendships, essential for sustained cooperation.
5. Regional Security Cooperation
Amid the complex security landscape, there is an opportunity for India and its ASEAN partners to enhance cooperation in defense and security. Joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building programs can strengthen regional security frameworks. By collaborating on issues such as maritime security and counter-terrorism, countries can build resilience against common threats.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Laos and the discussions at the ASEAN-India and East Asia Summits reflect India’s strategic commitment to enhancing its role in the Indo-Pacific. By navigating the challenges of geopolitical rivalry, maritime security, terrorism, and climate change, India is positioning itself as a proactive player in the region.
The opportunities presented by economic growth, infrastructure development, renewable energy, cultural exchange, and regional security cooperation highlight the potential for a robust partnership among nations in the Indo-Pacific. As countries work together to address common challenges and seize emerging opportunities, the Indo-Pacific can become a hub of stability, prosperity, and mutual respect.
Through its “Act East” policy, India not only seeks to strengthen bilateral ties with individual countries but also aims to foster a collaborative regional framework that supports sustainable development and peace. The ongoing dialogue, enhanced connectivity, and shared visions for the future are essential for building a resilient Indo-Pacific that benefits all its nations.
As India continues to engage with its ASEAN partners and other stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific, the journey toward deeper cooperation and understanding is well underway. This promises a brighter and more interconnected future for the region, characterized by shared growth, stability, and a commitment to mutual respect among diverse cultures and nations. Modi’s visit will resonate as a crucial moment in shaping India’s engagement with Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, laying the groundwork for enduring partnerships in the years to come.
End Notes
1. “PM Modi arrives in Laos to attend India-ASEAN, East Asia summits”, The Hindu, 14 October 2014,https://www. thehindu.com/news/national/pm-modi-arrives-in-laos-to-attend-india-asean-east-asia-summits/article68740329. ece
2. Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2020)
3. “PM Modi Laos Visit Live Updates: PM Modi arrives in Delhi after concluding his two-day visit to Lao PDR”, The Times of India, 11 october 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-narendra-modi-laos-visit-live-updatesasean-india-summit-bilateral-meetings-east-asia-summits-lao-pm-sonexay-siphandone/liveblog/114102040.cms
4. “How India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Will Bolster Economic Growth And Regional Cooperation”, News 18, 11 October 2024, https://www.news18.com/explainers/how-india-myanmar-thailand-trilateral-highwaywill-bolster-economic-growth-and-regional-cooperation-9082672.html
5. “Solutions to problems can’t come from battlefield: PM in Laos”, The Tribune, 11 october 2024, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/solutions-to-problems-cant-come-from-battlefield-pm-modi-in-laos/
6. Ashok Sharma, India’s Pursuit of Energy Security: Domestic Measures, Foreign Policy and Geopolitics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2019)
Dr. Parama Sinha Palit
Dr Parama Sinha Palit is the author of the New Media and Public Diplomacy: Political Communication in India, the United States and China and Analyzing China’s Soft Power Strategy and Comparative Indian Initiatives. She is also the Co-Chair of Consortium for Research Security in Asia (CRSA).
Tejusvi Shukla is a PhD Scholar at OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat. Her research focuses on issues of National Security, particularly Cognitive Warfare.
Dr Parama Sinha Palit & Tejusvi Shukla Influence Operations in Academia: The
Indian Context
China’s ‘influence operations’ in academia have been rising, disconcerting academic communities and their respective governments worldwide. Defined by RAND as ‘the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination in propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent,’ the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been targeting the Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) and Research Performing Organizations (RPOs) abroad to manipulate and influence foreign students and their faculty.[1] The influence campaigns are aggressive and extensive in countries like the United States (US), where China competes for global leadership in technology and education, raising international apprehension. India, another robust democracy, has also been experiencing Chinese ‘influence’ in its academic institutions.
China’s global ambition to emerge as a superpower by 2049 has partly pushed the Chinese leadership to urge the CCP ‘to pick flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China,’ which fits well with the Party’s long-term agenda. Beijing has been employing Confucius Institutes (CI) as propaganda tools in American HEIs while deploying Talent Programs – targeting and recruiting US-based researchers and scientists with access to America’s cutting-edge research and technology. [2] On the contrary, Beijing’s influence operations, which are gradually picking up in India, are not only distinct but low-key compared to the US. China’s influence in the Indian academia is partly driven by the two countries’ awkward history and the long-standing border dispute.[3] This paper is an effort to analyze Beijing’s growing influence operations, particularly in the Indian academia, while seeking to highlight India’s responses.
Scholarships, Confucius Institutes, & Cultural Exchanges raise concerns.
The Indian academia has been increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence in recent times. These vulnerabilities have been multiple and range from impacting different sections within the academia, including students and the faculty. Actors outside the academic hold, directly influencing the academia – in think tanks, media, and cultural forums – have equally been vulnerable and targeted. The overarching concern is that despite the existing threats to the targeted actors, they mostly remain unaware of the gravity of the threats. Consequently, the preventive measures and preparedness strategies remain inadequate, particularly the standard best practices.
To view the existing threats, we seek to study them based on the sections within the Indian academic circles targeted through several seemingly benign initiatives and interactions. For assessment, these vulnerable sections may be identified as students and research scholars, academic institutions, and other influence groups. While all others are self-explanatory, the ‘other influence groups’ include the media, cultural associations/forums, and similar allied groups. This latter group – the ‘other influence groups’ – while not essentially a part of the Indian academia, hold close and regular interactions and exchanges with the academia, influencing their thinking and impacting academicians as well as policymakers.
Regarding influence on students and research scholars, vulnerabilities are varied and distinct.[4] For example, the interaction of Indian students with Chinese actors happens through multiple mediums. Not restricted to scholarships, exchange programs, language training courses, and cultural and youth forums, a few China Centers within Indian universities have been equally responsible for playing critical roles in influencing and manipulating the more prominent academia. While not all of these initiatives are involved in activities contradicting Indian interests, the potential threats that they pose in other countries must be cautiously noted.[5] Several scholarships – Ministry of Commerce scholarship, Belt and Road Initiative scholarship, International Students’ scholarship, Confucius Institutes scholarship, and the like – which China offers to Indian students are a cause for concern, given their potential to misguide and manipulate them in their campuses. While most of these scholarships are provided through an Education Exchange Programme (EEP) – signed between the two countries in 2006 to facilitate educational cooperation – the Chinese academic surveillance and interference in countries like the US cause suspicion in India. [6]
Tejusvi Shukla
Besides regular degree and exchange semester programs, the Chinese government also organizes fully funded summer school camps at Chinese universities to facilitate ‘cultural exchanges’ between their university students and foreign students. It is concerning that standard mecha-nisms for training visiting students at Chinese universities against propaganda and influence operations are not in place – thus making them easy targets in Chinese HEIs. Many Indian stu-dents are lured and encouraged to work for leading state-affiliated media agencies like CGTN and China Radio International (CRI).[7]
The CIs – known for being the propaganda arms of the CCP – in India, after being under the government scanner following the Galwan clashes of 2020, continue to remain operational though few. The CIs’ limited numbers in India, compared to their presence in other parts of the world, is because they have been looked at suspiciously from the beginning.
Currently, two Centres are operational in universities in India: the University of Mumbai (estalished in 2013 through an agreement with Hanban, China)[8] and Vellore Institue of Technology Vellor, Tamil Nadu (started as a Chinese language Centre in 2009[9], followed by a CI established in 2012). Five others have been approached for collaboration since 2017: Lovely Professional University, Jalandhar; OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat; School of Chinese Language, Kolkata; Bharathiar University, Coimbatore; and KR Mangalam University, Gurugram. Lovely Professional University has an operational Chinese Language Centre on campus.[11] Unfortunately, details of the establishment of the Centre and the curriculum are not available on its website,[12] raising doubts. Post-Galwan, they have been brought under the strict Foreign Contributions Regulations Act (FCRA) regulations.[13] Their funds and functioning are not only regularly scrutinized, but they are constantly monitored by the government as well.
Besides this, several Indian universities also offer Chinese language courses with Chinese, Taiwanese, and Indian-origin faculties visiting Indian campuses. However, standard mechanisms and best practices for ensuring Indian students are not exposed to any unwanted, orchestrated propaganda during such classes appear generally absent. Subtle sandwiching of propa-ganda during such language programs is not uncommon and holds potential risks of influencing and manipulating them. Through interviews held by the authors, it was found that themes of China’s ‘cultural superiority’ and ‘unnecessary/manufactured apprehensions about benign Chi-nese cultural initiatives’ by the Indian government are commonly mentioned and discussed dur-ing these classes.
In terms of influencing HEIs and RPOs, cultivating influential people with the offer of grants and funds is not only one of the most viable means to generate goodwill. [14] Still, it is also de-ployed to ‘influence’ and ‘initiate’ particular pro-China narratives. These are also undertaken through masked official channels like the Little Red Schools, CIs, Culture Centers, Chinese-funded programs, courses, etc. While these masked channel-driven influence operations are not country-specific[15], countries, including India, look at them suspiciously. Given their complicated relationship, actions like these raise questions regarding China’s intentions to fund research and scholars in India. Meanwhile, China’s expanding influence within South Asia has further upset India since such a Chinese presence is considered a ploy to destabilize the region. Whether Nepal or Bangladesh, China’s foothold in the area is increasing trepidation, competition, and confrontation between the two biggest Asian powers.
Regarding the ‘other influence groups,’ think tanks and journalists are the primary targets. This is in galore globally, with no exceptions in South Asia. The Nepal-China Forum is a classic example highlighting Chinese tendencies to engage local faculties for influence-building.[16] The forum’s founder is an alumnus of the premier Fudan University in Beijing and has been recognized by the Chinese government for his outstanding contribution to Nepal-China relations since 2020. He is also a visiting faculty member at Kathmandu University, facilitating interactions and exchanges between China and the local university students in Nepal. [17]
Beijing’s efforts to alter its negative global image exude influence-building tendencies.
Beijing’s growing negative global image has been pushing the government to take measures to improve its reputation, both globally and regionally. The CCP’s pursuits to influence news consumers worldwide have been one of their primary tools and have been elaborately studied by international organizations. Freedom House’s report titled “Global Media Influence” (2022) studies China’s media campaign to influence news consumers worldwide. It discusses how the CCP employs its media to circulate alternate narratives favoring the Party. [18]
Along with its massive media campaign, Beijing also runs academic programs for HEIs and RPOs, employing academic exchanges and collaborations to engage with international scholars and experts. For example, in November 2019, the Xinhua News Agency and Communication University of China (CUC) organized an ‘International Think Tank Experts’ short-term Visiting Program in Beijing and Zhejiang province, inviting experts from around 50 countries, including South Asia. [19]
The program aims to raise awareness and develop knowledge on the contentious BRI, which can be termed ‘benign,’ highlighting Beijing’s positive tendencies. However, given China’s recourse to coercion and negative actions to change target states’ behavior, the underlying hostile intent behind the program cannot be ruled out.[20]
It can be argued that these efforts targeting Indian academia and allied influence groups are majorly aimed at creating a favorable image for China amidst strained relations with the government. This includes New Delhi’s reactions post Galwan clashes as well as its refusal to join the BRI, among other areas of concern.[21] This has been a typical Chinese strategy that the CCP deploys to help the Beijing leadership manipulate the targeted audience. This Chinese tendency to shape and reframe narratives was overtly conspicuous during the pandemic. [22]
As for influencing journalists, starting in 2016, China’s foreign ministry has hosted 10-month-long fellowships for around 100 foreign journalists from leading Asian and African media organizations annually.[23] This has recorded participation from prominent Indian media houses, including the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), the Indian Express, and the Jansatta, a Hindi-language newspaper owned by the Indian Express Group. Participating journalists are provided handsome stipends and residential accommodation in Beijing, and they are offered language classes and a degree from a Chinese university. Taking cognizance of these developments, the Indian embassy in Beijing has identified and kept them away from its official events due to the underlying security concerns. At the same time, the journalists remain accredited under the fellowship.
Several shocking scandals involving the Indian media, including social media, have further made situations mirky in recent years.[24] There have been claims that China-linked sources had not only paid Indian journalists and online media outlets to turn in sensitive information but have pushed them to promote CCP narratives as well. In September 2020, the Delhi Police’s Special Cell arrested a freelance journalist, Rajeev Sharma, on similar charges – raising alarm bells across the country’s security circles.[25] Many of his published pieces (articles and journalistic write-ups), favouring the CCP’s narratives in the Global Times and in Indian media outlets, flagged the gravity of the situation.[26] Apart from claims that he was passing sensitive border information to China, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) —Tibet’s Dharamsala-based government in exile — also accused him of publishing a series of fake, misleading articles targeting the institution of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and CTA leadership ‘.
India keen to stop China’s growing clout in its academia & cultural forums
As HEIs, RPOs, and democratic governments grapple with Chinese influence operations in their spaces in their ways, countries like the US and India – the two leading democracies – have been seriously considering preventive measures to contain China’s growing influence in their respective academic and media spaces. The US has embarked upon building regional Consortiums to help prevent licit and illicit exploitation of research and technology by malicious actors on the one hand while ensuring an open and accessible research environment on the other.[27] With China’s growing intent and low-key strategy to influence Indian HEIs and RPOs, as noted earlier, a disconcerted India has also been restricting academic collaborations with Beijing. [28]
In 2018, the President of the University of Texas rejected funding for the Chinese Public Policy Centre, fearing that it might compromise the University’s academic integrity[29]; India has also been discouraging CIs in Indian academic spaces, particularly since 2020.[30] The 2020 India and China face-off in the Galwan River valley in Ladakh pushed New Delhi to monitor and curb Chinese intrusions and interference wherever it deemed fit, including its academia. India has scrutinized the Chinese-funded programs and organizations functioning and operating in India.
The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs have both cautioned Indian colleges and universities against any academic cooperation with Chinese counterparts without prior government permission.[31] While deciding to review its over 54 existing MOUs with China, restrictions have also been applied to existing agreements, which cannot become operational until both Ministries approve them. The restrictive regulations cover educational exchange programs, contracts, Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), and joint announcements of intent with Chinese institutions at private and publicly funded Indian universities. Post-Galwan standoff, India’s National Education Policy, administered by the Ministry of Education, also contemplated removing Mandarin from the suggested language list for students.[32]
Regarding the media, several regulations are underway, and measures include caps and conditions on foreign investment.[33] While the Press Council of India has also been mandated to build a Code of Conduct for news agencies, journalists, and newspapers, the law of India prohibits spreading or publishing fake news through social or mass media. It could lead to the imprisonment of journalists or newspaper bans.[34]
In terms of cultural forums, in August 2022, the India-China Friendship Association was forced to cancel a seminar titled ‘Interference of US Imperialist in the Internal Affairs of the People’s Republic of China’ after it sparked controversy and a prominent opposition leader in the state of Karnataka opposed it.
Concluding Thoughts
China’s influence operations within academia highlight its strategic use of education, media, and cultural exchanges to manipulate narratives and cultivate favorable opinions. Beijing strategically targets students, academic institutions, media personnel, and think tanks through scholarships, Confucius Institutes, research collaborations, and talent recruitment programs. While such initiatives may appear benign, they carry underlying risks of propaganda and surveillance, with growing concerns about China’s intentions to reshape global and regional discourses. In India, the presence of Confucius Institutes and educational exchanges has raised red flags, particularly post-Galwan clashes, leading to heightened scrutiny and restricted collaborations. Beyond academia, Chinese efforts to sway public narratives through media partnerships and journalist fellowships further reveal a deliberate strategy to promote favourable views of the CCP.
To establish its global influence, China displays its superpower tendencies. Initially masking these ambitions, Beijing now pursues them more openly, aligning them with long-term goals, including its Belt and Road Initiative. As it seeks an expanded regional role, China’s influence-building operations in academia—both global and regional—are becoming increasingly conspicuous. India’s cautious responses reflect an urgent need to safeguard academic integrity and national interests against such covert attempts at narrative manipulation.
End Notes
1. Information Operations. (n.d.). RAND. https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html
2. Joske, A. (2018). Picking flowers, making honey: The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities. In Australian Strategic Policy Institute. International Cyber Centre Policy. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https:// www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey#:~:text=The%20PLA%20Daily%20uses%20the,to%20develop%20better%20military%20technology.&text=This%20is%20one%20aspect%20of,fusion’%20(%E5%86%9B %E6%B0%91%E8%9E%8D%E5%90%88).
3. Palit, P. S. (2022). China’s ‘Influence Operations’ in Academia, Confucius Institutes and Soft Power: Strategic Responses of India, Bangladesh and Nepal (No. SAND2022-1249 O). Sandia National Laboratories. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/02/SAND2022-1249O.pdf
4. Ibid.
5. “Confucius Institute U.S. Center” designation as a Foreign Mission - United States Department of State. (2020, December 1). United States Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/
6. Embassy of India, Beijing. (n.d.). https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibejing_pages/Mjc,
7. Pandya, A. (2021, May 30). Has China’s propaganda machinery taken over global media? - The Sunday Guardian Live. The Sunday Guardian Live. https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/chinas-propaganda-machinery-taken-global-media#google_vignette
8. Confucius Institute (Chinese Mandarin). (2019, July 9). Mumbai University - English. https://old.mu.ac.in/faculties/arts/languages-linguistics-literaure/confucius-institute-chinese-mandarin/#:~:text=%E2%80%8BTHE%20 CONFUCIUS%20INSTITUTE%20WAS,AN%20AGREEMENT%20WITH%20HANBAN%2C%20CHINA.
9. From Our Online Archive, & From Our Online Archive. (2012, May 15). Chinese language centre at Vellore Institute of Technology. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2009/Apr/07/ chinese-language-centre-at-vellore-institute-of-technology-39057.html
10. Global Times. (2020, August 6). India’s Chinese culture enthusiasts to suffer ‘decoupling’ brunt amid Confucius institutes review: observer. The Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196953.shtml
11. Scroll Staff. (2020, August 4). China asks India to treat Confucius Institutes teaching Mandarin in ‘fair manner’ amid review. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/latest/969390/china-asks-india-to-treat-confucius-institutes-teachingmandarin-in-fair-manner-amid-review
12. LPU Chinese Language Centre Archives - Happenings@LPU. (2021, June 18). Happenings@LPU. https://happenings.lpu.in/tag/lpu-chinese-language-centre/
13. Express News Service. (2022, April 29). India makes FCRA clearance mandatory for tie-ups with China’s Confucius Institutes. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/education/india-makes-fcra-clearance-mandatory-for-tie-ups-with-chinas-confucius-institutes-7891399/
14. Palit, P. S. (2022). China’s ‘Influence Operations’ in Academia, Confucius Institutes and Soft Power: Strategic Responses of India, Bangladesh and Nepal (No. SAND2022-1249 O). Sandia National Laboratories. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/02/SAND2022-1249O.pdf
15. Shepherd, T. (2022, March 25). University students and staff face increasing threats, foreign interference inquiry finds. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/25/university-students-and-staffface-increasing-threats-foreign-interference-inquiry-finds
16. Gauttam, Priya & Singh, Bawa & Chattu, Vijay Kumar. (2021). Higher Education as a Bridge between China and Nepal: Mapping Education as Soft Power in Chinese Foreign Policy. Societies. 11. 10.3390/soc11030081.
17. Kalyan Raj Sharma: Contributor to China-Nepal Friendship. (2021, April 15). Fudan University. https://www. fudan.edu.cn/en/2021/0415/c344a108517/page.htm
18. Freedom House. (2022). Authoritarian expansion and the power of democratic resilience. In Freedom House. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience
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20. Zhang, K. V. (2019, January 22). Chinese non-military coercion—Tactics and rationale. Brookings. https://www. brookings.edu/articles/chinese-non-military-coercion-tactics-and-rationale/
21. India refuses to support China’s Belt and Road project at SCO meet. (2020, November 30). Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-doesn-t-join-sco-members-in-endorsing-china-s-belt-androad-project/story-CBH22ODWVImRFpwkkhehWI.html
22. Yang, W. (2020, March 16). Chinese propaganda reframes the coronavirus narrative. dw.com. https://www. dw.com/en/how-chinese-propaganda-is-reframing-the-coronavirus-narrative/a-52796337
23. Krishnan, A. (2018, November 24). China is buying good press across the world, one paid journalist at a time. The Print. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://theprint.in/opinion/china-is-paying-foreign-journalists-includingfrom-india-to-report-from-beijing/154013/
24. Mukhopadhyay, S. (2023, March 29). Is China running a secret propaganda operation with journalists in India? Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/is-china-running-a-secret-propaganda-operation-in-india-journalists-gettempting-offers-to-write-articles-11680051816402.html
25. Arrested Delhi journalist Rajeev Sharma was passing info to the Chinese. (2020, September 19). The Hindu. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/arrested-scribe-rajeev-sharma-waspassing-info-on-border-strategy-to-chinese-intelligence-police/article32648112.ece
26. Indian journalist who published disinformation targeting His Holiness the Dalai Lama and CTA arrested as Chinese spy. (2020, September 23). Central Tibetan Administration - Restoring Freedom for Tibetans. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://tibet.net/indian-journalist-who-published-disinformation-targeting-his-holiness-the-dalailama-and-cta-arrested-as-chinese-spy/
27. Regional consortium efforts. (n.d.). Academic Research Security Program. https://rsec.sandia.gov/regional-consortium-efforts/
28. Shrangi, V. (2023, February 9). Exclusive | Fearing Espionage, Govt to Restrict Educational Institutions from Academic Tie-Ups with Chinese. News18. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.news18.com/news/india/exclusivefearing-espionage-govt-to-restrict-educational-institutions-from-academic-tie-ups-with-chinese-firms-7036723.html
29. Rogin, J. (2018, January 14). University rejects Chinese Communist Party-linked influence efforts on campus. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/university-rejects-chinese-communist-party-linked-influence-efforts-on-campus/2018/01/14/c454b54e-f7de-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html
30. Sen, S. R. (2020, August 21). India slaps new curbs on visas, universities to stem China influence: Report. Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-slaps-new-curbs-on-visas-universities-to-stem-china-influence-report-11598013487928.html
31. India restricts university collaborations with China. (2019, October 10). University World News. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2019101013182324
32. Jebaraj, S. H. (2020, August 3). India to review Chinese language programmes across universities. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-to-review-chinese-language-programmes-across-universities/article32254737.ece
33. Viswanath, N., Kazia, N. A., Sanghavi, N., & Adhikari, R. (2022, June 24). In brief: media law and regulation in India. Lexology. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=225d5e03-f14c-492f-b2a4-c55f49a063d1
34. Home | Press Council of India. (n.d.). https://www.presscouncil.nic.in/Norms.aspx
35. Express News Service. (2022b, August 27). India-China Friendship Association calls off seminar after Siddaramaiah declines invitation. The New Indian Express. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2022/aug/28/india-china-friendship-association-calls-off-seminar-after-siddaramaiah-declines-invitation-2492194.html
Dr. Budi Hernawan
Budi Hernawan is Senior Lecturer at Driyarkara School of Philosophy in Jakarta. He obtained PhD from The Australian National University, Canberra. He is the author of Torture and Peacebuilding in Indonesia: The case of Papua. His scholarship focuses the phenomenon of violence, esp. torture, its impacts on civilian population in a fragile context in Asia-Pacific and explores the whole spectrum of regulatory framework to address the violence in the long run. His current research deals with “Religion and Protection of Civilians during armed conflict: a comparative study of Papua-Indonesia, Southern Thailand and Myanmar.” He has extensive experience of working with both international human rights and humanitarian organisations such as Franciscans International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Dr Budi Hernawan
“Let’s bulldoze and occupy them now!”:
dismantling the logic of outsourcing
in the National Strategic Project for Food Estate and Energy in West Papua
I was privileged to attend two important events in Jakarta on 16 and 18 October 2024 where representatives of the Malind and Ye tribes from the Southern Papua advocate for their rights to exist in their own land against the encroachment of the so-called Proyek Strategis Nasional Food Estate (the National Strategic Projects for Food Estate, hereafter PSN). The first event occurred in the Office of Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and the second in the office of the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference. I am not reporting the details of the events, but I will reflect on the testimonies presented by the indigenous Papuans during the meetings since their narratives encapsulate what the Cameroonian philosopher, Achille Mbembe, calls ‘indirect private governance’ of postcolony (Mbembe 2001: 80) or I would call it outsourcing of West Papua as postcolony.
Mbembe explains that indirect private governance entails “privatisation of state sovereignty performed by private operators for private ends” (Mbembe 2001: 78). The outsourcing of state sovereignty aims not only privatises the means of coercion but also resources and other utilities formerly concentrated in the state. In exercising the state’s coercion against the Papuans, the Indonesian state armed forces remain the main operator on the ground as we will learn from the testimonies below. However, the absence of a presidential decree that governs a military operation for both combat and non-combat functions as stipulated by Law 34/2004 regarding the Indonesian Military (TNI) demonstrates the ways in which the state has outsourced its power to various units within the Indonesian military without the required legal and legitimate power of the state. As a result, these military units no longer act to protect the nations, the people and the country but the private enterprise.
On the other hand, the privatisation of state power over resources has been translated into encroaching extractive industry that has deeply changed the landscape of Papua and the indigenous Papuans. The state has outsourced its authority to both national and international corporation to dominate the Papuan landscape, body and psyche.
The outsourcing framework is effective to analyse the production of Papua as a postcolony, which Mbembe defines societies that [1] emerged from colonial past and violence. It is [2] chaotic but coherent, governed by [3] political improvisation, and [4] distinctive regime of violence (Mbembe 2001: 102). The postcolony of Papua, however, not only involves a binary opposition of Papua and Indonesia. Rather, it implants ‘the logic of conviviality’ to all Papuans and Indonesians whereby the state, the Papuans and the Indonesians co-exist and share space.
The testimonies
During the two separate meetings, the representatives of the Malind and Yei tribes explained the penetration of PSN to their lives, their land, their forest, their animals in a bitter tone. They represent some 50,000 indigenous peoples affected by the project (Pusaka Bentala Rakyat 2024: 12). The number is only half size of the population of Setiabudi District, the smallest district in Jakarta[1] but their land that the project has been penetrating is about 10 times larger than Jakarta.
Mama Sinta, a woman elder from Ilwayap District, told the meetings, “We put sasi, coconut leaves, as a sign of blockade but Jhonlin Group [the corporation] doesn’t care. They keep bulldozing our land. We are helpless. We are scared. Jhonlin Group does not acknowledge us. We cannot do anything because the [Indonesian] military are there to protect them. They just shoot at deer randomly. We can only look at from a distance with tears. When we heard that the Regent of Merauke was going to visit us, we told him our rejection of the project. We told him the destruction and impact that we suffered from the project. We already complained to him but he did nothing. So, we are appalled whom he protects? We reject the corporation, but they already bulldoze our forest, dig up our water fountain, drive away fish, deer, kangaroo, pigs and other animals. So, we came here to Jakarta to raise our concerns to the government ministries here.”
Vincent, another landowner from Jagegob District, continues, “In my area, they plan to grow sugarcane. My clan has already rejected the project. We are a bit better off than Mama Sinta’s situation because we did not deal with the [military] troops. We only deal with Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa, low ranking army officers) who go around door to door to tell off people to give up their land. This [action] has caused tension and rift within families. For some families, where brother agrees to receive compensation, his sister opposes or vice versa so they have family fight.”
Simon, the Coordinator of Forum Solidaritas Merauke (Solidarity Forum of Merauke), narrated his story. “Around June-July 2024, we saw a luxury cruise with five decks and helipad belongs to Haji Ihsam harboured in Mariana strait. Towards the end of July 2024, some 100 excavators arrived, and they are now clearing the forest aiming to construct 135 km road with 1 km wide straight from District Ilwayap in the West to District Muting in the East [see the long orange line in the middle of Figure 1]. The excavators are so cruel. They just killed deer by crushing them with their claws just like that. Meanwhile, the army are flying around with choppers and shoot dead at any deer they see are running away from the excavators. Then they collect and bring them to the camp to eat. They never ask for our permission.”
“The road project is ridiculous. There are many parts on the way are very deep peatland. Boats can even sail through during the rainy season. How come they will build the road? Nonetheless, they already destroy our water. We drink from the swamp. There are lotus flowers and others who filter the water so we can drink it. Now, it’s gone. Other parts are our sacred ancestral ground where not everyone is allowed to enter. They have also been destroyed. So we oppose this project. We already raised this issue with Papua’s People Council (MRP) of South Papua Province but they told us that they know nothing. They confessed that they have never been consulted by the central government or the Regent of Merauke. So, we put sasi adat, symbolic blockade, in every village to tell the corporation that we oppose them.”
Affirming the previous testimonies, Franky Samperante, Director of Pusaka Bentala Rakyat Foundation, explains that the Food Estate project in Merauke is full of secrecy. “We already sent letters to the government of Merauke to request the site plan of the food estate project on the ground of freedom of information. But we only received a list of small companies operating in Merauke unrelated to the food estate projects. They do not comply with free prior informed consent as required. There is no AMDAL (Environmental Impact Analysis), KLHS (Strategic Environment Analysis) and permission of the feasibility of the environment documents”.
Figure 1. Map of Food Estate National Strategic Project in Merauke Regency. Courtesy
Pusaka Bentala Rakyat, 2024.
He also questions the road project that Haji Isam is currently doing [see the long orange line in the middle of Figure 1]. “The road project doesn’t make sense. Where do you find in Indonesia a road with one-kilometre wide? We suspect it’s not only for road but for something else. But we don’t know, and we don’t have information from the government or the contractor because they do not want to tell us. It’s also questionable the role of the military troops with big guns in the field protecting the project”
The testimonies went around for almost 2 hours. At the end, the speakers expressed their gratitude to the audience who paid attention to them because no one in Merauke listened to them. They smile but they are also well aware of that their struggle is far from over.
What is the National Strategic Projects for Food Estate and Energy?
PSN was born in 2016 by Nawacita, the nine vision of the outgoing President Joko Widodo, who was determined to expedite economic development and economic equality in 3T (tertinggal, terdepan, terluar or the most undeveloped, the frontier and the outer) areas through massive infrastructure development (Rasunah et al. 2024: 1). The vision was implemented by various Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Regulations resulted in 341 PSN across 34 provinces in Indonesia during the period of 2016-2024. The latest Ministerial Regulation No. 8 of 2023 regarding the Fourth Amendment of Ministerial Regulation No. 7 of 2021 regarding the Change of the List of PSN is the one that introduces 10 new mega projects in Papua. Five of them are infrastructure projects, such as Sorong Port, new airport of Nabire, new airport of Siboru and others. The food estate projects in the Regency of Merauke falls under the category of Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus (Special Economy Zone) aiming to produce sugar, bioethanol, and rice (Pusaka Bentala Rakyat 2024: 2).
The logic of the project is not novel. It is a continuation of 2.5 million-hectare MIFEE (Merauke Food and Energy Estate)[2] project introduced by Yudhoyono administration in 2010 but failed to meet its own ambition as initially had claimed. Officially, the government grabbed 1,282,833 hectares (see Figure 2) from the Malind tribe or 25 percent of the territory of Merauke Regency for the project but since it was outsourced to 38 corporations, the size of the occupied land became 1,588,651 hectares (almost ten times the size of London). Nevertheless, the destruction of the Malind’s life is more than real. Half size of MIFEE project was virgin rainforest, which belongs to the Malind tribe. It had been cleared but left abandoned.
The logic of the project is not novel. It is a continuation of 2.5 million-hectare MIFEE (Merauke Food and Energy Estate) project introduced by Yudhoyono administration in 2010 but failed to meet its own ambition as initially had claimed. Officially, the government grabbed 1,282,833 hectares (see Figure 2) from the Malind tribe or 25 percent of the territory of Merauke Regency for the project but since it was outsourced to 38 corporations, the size of the occupied land became 1,588,651 hectares (almost ten times the size of London). Nevertheless, the destruction of the Malind’s life is more than real. Half size of MIFEE project was virgin rainforest, which belongs to the Malind tribe. It had been cleared but left abandoned.
A joint investigative report of TEMPO magazine, Pusaka Bentala Rakyat and Trend Asia, “Competing Food Estates in Merauke”, 23 September 2024[3], reveals that Jokowi refused to reuse MIFEE area because he did not want the Democrat Party, Yudhoyono’s political party, would have taken credit, should the project had gone well. Instead, Jokowi expedited the food estate project in Central Kalimantan aiming for food storage and grow casava. Nonetheless, TEMPO noted that both projects withered away with no result and both Ombudsman and BPK’s audit found huge problems of the project starting from the planning until the implementation stage. The failure of Central Kalimantan projects, however, did not stop Jokowi’s administration. Instead, it prompted Jokowi to issue Presidential Decree No. 15/2024 set up a new task force to expedite self-sufficiency of sugar and bioethanol headed by Minister of Energy and Investment, Bahlil Lahadalia. It did not take too long for Bahlil Lahadalia to act. He held meeting with various ministries and local government of South Papua and Merauke that outsourced 10 corporations to do the job which resulted in the first planting of sugarcane by Jokowi in Tanah Miring District on 27 July 2024 (Pusaka Bentala Rakyat 2024: 6-7).
But at the same time, then President-elect Prabowo felt that food estate was his idea since 2009 since as the Minister of Defence, he was appointed by President Jokowi as the head of task force of food security. He instructed his Ministry of Defence to find a tycoon who was willing to prefinance the project. They found coal mining entrepreneur Andi Syamsuddin Arsyad also known as Haji Isam, the owner of Jhonlin Group and the cousin of the former Minister of Agriculture Amra Sulaiman. He is the one on the ground now. He is tasked to clear 50,000 -100,000 hectares which costs Rp1 trillion (USD66 millions). Prabowo also revived PT Agra Industry Nasional (Agrinas) which previously failed in the food estate project in Gunung Mas, Central Kalimantan (Pusaka Bentala Rakyat 2024: 10).
Figure 2. Map of Merauke Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE). Courtesy of Pusaka Bentala
Bentala Rakyat, 2024.
In a broader picture of PSN, the recent report of Nalar Institute from Yogyakarta, “Proyek Strategis Nasional: KepentinganSi(apa)? Catatan Kritis Implementasi PSN 2016-2024” (Rasunah et al. 2024) is revealing. Although the report is framed in economic terms, it provides us with in-depth analysis of the inherent contradiction between the Nawacita promise for economic development and equality and the reality on the ground. The Report argues that construction of infrastructure does not necessarily generate multiplier effects that lead to an increase of people’s welfare. On the contrary, the PSN policy has increased social conflict and environmental destruction. The report from Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA/ the Agrarian Reform Consortium) explains that during 2020-2023 there are 115 agrarian conflicts eruption due to PSN, which continues to increase exponentially every year; down streaming process in the mining industry has increased poverty; and food estate project seriously damage the environment (Rasunah et al. 2024: 4).
Further the report explains two major detrimental impacts of PSN: social and environmental. In the social sphere, PSN has caused the decline of people’s economy, the rise of agrarian conflict and dispute over land compensation, disruption of daily life activity, threat of the life of indigenous community, and threat to public health and safety. For instance, the nickel project in Sulawesi Tenggara has impoverished the people from 11,17% (2021) to 11.43% (2023) instead of increasing their welfare whereas the similar nickel project in Obi Island in North Maluku has significantly caused air pollution which led to the increase of perspiration infection disease between 2021-2022 (Rasunah et al. 2024: xx).
Similarly, PSN has caused detrimental impacts on the environment. The report found that the most frequently impact of the infrastructure development is the damage of the green ecosystem. This includes destruction of forest and peatland, and reduction of green space. For instance, the construction of Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Central Sulawesi has sacrificed 8,700 hectares of forest for mining operation and smelter. 90 hectares of forest was cleared to construct Tiu Suntuk dam in the Sumbawa Barat Regency and of course, 2,684,680.68 hectare of forest in the South Papua Province will be destroyed to develop food estate projects as explained above (Rasunah et al. 2024: 4).
If we scrutinise further, the PSN is flawed since its inception since it adopts the logic of outsourcing. The report clearly identifies the flaws in five stages of project design and implementation (Rasunah et al. 2024: 19-21). At the project design stage, PSN failed to meet its promise to redistribute resources.
The fact is distribution of resources, and the project puts a heavy emphasis on procedures than substance, which is about people’s consent and participation. The second stage is the agenda setting which lacks legitimate representation of all stakeholders and does not comply fully with AMDAL and KLHS. The third stage, planning and policy formulation of PSN, does not include public consultation, proper dissemination of information to the public, and transparency of information about the project. The fourth stage of implementation is full of intimidation, blockade from the affected community so the project is delayed which is supposed to be finalised in the beginning of the project. The fifth stage of monitoring indicates corruption of the project funds and there is no follow-up of people’s complaint by the government whereas corporation does not monitor and evaluate of the safety and welfare of employees and implementation of CSR and the environment. In sum, the report argues that the main problem of PSN is all about governance.
Why is it called outsourcing?
If we analyse PSN, the problem not only lies on the failed promise of development, but it is much more disturbing than that. The logic of outsourcing of PSN demonstrates that the Indonesian state treats West Papua as postcolony or no man’s land. The testimonies of the indigenous community shows that they do not exist in the eyes of the government, the corporations and TNI. The indigenous people have told us that they have to accept the dysfunctional state apparatus: Regent of Merauke, the newly established South Papua Province, Papua’s People’s Council (MRP) of the South Papua Province, and the Papua People’s Council (DPRP) of the South Papua Province. All these institutions have failed to protect them as the legitimate citizens of the South Papua Province. Instead, they have been treated as an alien who does not have any rights to exist. The state has even privatized its sovereignty to the selected corporations to occupy the Malind land and remove their people with the direct assistance of TNI.
The whole policy of PSN is chaotic since the planning stage as the first Mbembe’s criterion of the postcolony characterises. Competing interests to be portrayed as the saviour of food security have been manifested in Yudhoyono’s policy of MIFEE, Jokowi’s policy of PSN and now Prabowo’s PSN follow-up. PSN does not follow the logical and ethical planning, but it has a coherent internal logic, namely growthism and occupation.
The promises for economic development and equality of the local community do not match the reality on the ground since the indigenous community have been removed from their ancestral land so the project only benefits corporations as the outsource of the state sovereignty. MIFEE failed but the same logic was adopted in the PSN which only further harm the indigenous community. The policy does not learn from failure in Central Kalimantan or any other parts of Indonesia.
We also found the competing interests among different administrations which resulted in political improvisation to twist regulations as the second Mbembe’s criterion of the postcolony suggests. For instance, the legal requirements of AMDAL, KLHS, permission of feasibility of the environment, prohibition of the involvement of the Indonesian military in civilian affairs, and more importantly, free prior informed consent from the affected community--all have never been fully fulfilled. Yudhoyono, Jokowi, and now Prabowo is determined to be the only game in town so each of them does not tolerate any competition. Now Prabowo administration is the only one that has a chance to prove. That is why since day one of his administration, various ministeries have declared their determination to make PSN in Merauke a big success. Moreover, Haji Isam, the outsource, is fully mandated and protected to break the ground by constructing 135-kilometre road project to penetrate the Malind land regardless of the opposition of the landowner and serious and permanent destruction to the environment.
Finally, regime of violence, the last criterion of Mbembe’s postcolony, has been manifested in both the massive destruction of the environment and the role of military outside their jurisdiction. Despite all previous failures in other parts of Indonesia, PSN has no hesitation to bulldoze the ancestral land which equals the existence of the Malind while TNI are protecting the PSN, not the people. The involvement of TNI is not limited to bad apples but as an institution. While such involvement is not novel in the Indonesian history, especially during Suharto’s New Order, it remains disturbing and illegal since Article 17 of Law 34/2004 regarding the Indonesian National Military clearly stipulates that any deployment of the Indonesian Military for non-combat operations requires a presidential decree with the approval of the National Parliament. To date, the continuous TNI’s deployment to West Papua does not comply with the legal requirement and thus poses legality and legitimacy questions.
Wolfgang Johannes Widmoser was born in Munich on February 25th 1954. Frequent excursions in the Alps taught him the wondrous and sometimes perilous conditions of life. Fascinated by what he experienced he turned to Art as a form of exploration. Since early childhood Wolfgang engaged in many artistic endeavors, Painting Music Architecture and Philosophy to understand the meaning of the world. After finishing high-school he went to study with with Ernst Fuchs and Salvador Dali to become familiar with old-mastertechniques of painting and the intricacies of rendering dreams. The many discussions he had with both masters opened his eyes and confirmed Wolfgang’s capacity to render his vision with utmost clarity. With his Still lifes from the seventies a world of objects and their relationships formed to complex compositions. Studies about projective geometry led Wolfgang to introduce curved mirrors that reflect the objects in surprising ways and led to the proposal of an elegant Universe. Moving to Toscany in 1980 landscape and atmospheric effects crystallized to intense Portraits of Nature – a theme he is still persecuting today. Since 1984 Wolfgang kept visiting Bali where he is living today. In his search for the abstract he discovered photos of Papua New Guinea – Warriors with their fascinating body-paints. A series of large, formatted canvases of archetypal faces evolved. A Phanteon of personified elements to combine the archaic with the futuristic. In the 1990s the always latent passion for architecture broke to the surface. His father, a gifted architect and painter himself always supported his son in his aspirations. Inspired by tensile structures (Frei Otto) and lightweight engineering (Buckminster Fuller) Wolfgang set out to design a sculptural and organic set of shapes – a unification of landscape and city. Some of his ideas were realized in Indonesia and Europe. Wolfgang’s motto – aesthetic = ethic – points to a new version of the – Gesamtkunstwerk – places where humans experience the Good, the True and the Beautiful.
Eliade
Mona Lisa
Norbu
Sila
Tina Claffey
Tina Claffey is an award-winning Irish nature photographer and author of ‘Tapestry of Light-Ireland’s bogs & wetlands as never seen before’ in 2017, and ‘Portal-Otherworldly Wonders of Ireland’s Bogs, Wetlands and Eskers’ in 2022. Her observations and unique perspective through her macro lens of the flora and fauna of the raised bogs and wet woodlands of the Irish midlands are celebrated in her work. She has exhibited in group shows in the US, Botswana, Zambia and has had solo exhibitions throughout Ireland. Her work is part of many art collections, permanent exhibitions, including the permanent collection at Áras an Uachtaráin, home of the Irish President. She has presented her work on many worldwide online platforms including the Wildlife Habitat Council Online Conference in the US and the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 26) to promote the importance of the Irish bog wilderness.
Tina Claffey Winter Wonderland
Photo feature
I love to get ‘lost’ in the bogs, eskers and wetlands of Ireland with my macro lens throughout the seasons.
Winter is a most magical season.
The plunging temperatures, and sharp frost decorate the flora of the bog with icy jewels.
The bog landscape becomes a world of white, a magical wilderness. Sphagnum mosses, the bog builder, sparkle in the golden Winter light, icicles suspended from fallen reeds drape above the mosses, like priceless jewels. Spider webs appear like shattered windows encrusted with ice diamonds.
Bracken fern dies back in the chilly temperatures, and turns to a deep ruby red, in many ways at its most beautiful when lit by the evening winter sun, dying in a blaze of glory. Deep in the bog’s wet woodlands, wondrous False Turkey Tail emerges and reveals its layers of glorious colours from fallen waterlogged tree trunks.
It is easy to get lost within the lichens of the bog, especially when they have a layer of that magical frost. Devil’s Matchstick with their scarlet tips, Trumpet Cups full to the brim with icy dew, and ghostly frozen forests of Reindeer lichen. A magical Winter wonderland.
Bracken Fern Fire
False Turkey Tail
Frosted Jewels
Frosted Sphagnum Mosses
Frosted Devils Matchstick Lichen
Reindeer Lichen Wonderland
Frozen Bog Landscape
Roydon Cerejo
Roydon Cerejo is a digital media professional with over 10 years of experience covering consumer tech for some of the leading media houses in India. He is also an aspiring photographer and enjoys capturing candid moments, mostly of his family, with either his phone or digital camera. Wildlife photography is one of his budding interests, and his goal is to explore more of the rich and varied wildlife habitats of India.
Roydon Cerejo Winged beauties of Tadoba Maharashtra, India.
Photo Feature
The Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve nestled in the heart of Chandrapur district of Maharashtra, India, attracts thousands of visitors each year all in the hopes of catching even a glimpse of orange and black stripes. But should you strike out, you shouldn’t be disheartened. Apart from the majestic tiger, the reserve is also a haven for roughly 195 species of birds, including three endangered species. The Andhari river that flows through the range and the two lakes in the reserve provide water all-year round, allowing the diverse wildlife to thrive.
If you aren’t a bird enthusiast, a single visit to Tadoba is enough to turn you into one. Even during the summer months, it’s easy to spot a variety of wetland and grassland birds as you trundle along the forest path in your guided vehicle. Some of the interesting species of birds to look for would be the Indian pitta, Crested treeswift, Black ibis, and peacocks.
The Red-wattled lapwing is a common sighting near water bodies. Groups of Painted storks can be found in shallow water bodies, as they sift through the waters for fish. The White-throated fantail can be found all over Tadoba, while the Jungle babbler has a knack for interrupting your afternoon siestas. Make sure you carry along a pair of binoculars, and a good camera with a telephoto lens for capturing these magnificent creatures in their natural habitat.
Peacocks are plentiful in Tadoba and can be seen walking along the forest floor or perched on forest.
on the lower branches of trees. It’s hard to miss the shock of colour against the earthy tones of the
A trio of Painted storks wading through a shallow pond looking for lunch. They feed on small aquatic life.
small fish and walk slowly in the water with their bills submerged, feeling for fish and other small
The Grey-headed swamphen (left) is stunning to see in the flesh, with its vibrant shades of blue
blue feathers. Next to it is a Bronze-winged jacana, seen foraging on floating aquatic vegetation.
The Indian roller or Neelkanth as it’s known in Hindi, is an auspicious bird in Maharashtra. Its especially in the sun.
Its true beauty lies in flight, when the intense blue and purple shades of its wings are on full display,
A flock of Lesser Whistling Ducks shifting base to another location on the lake. They usually fly flying.
fly low to the ground, in loosely-packed formations, and produce a distinct whistling sound when
The White-throated fantail can be seen all around the Tadoba sanctuary. It can often be spotted tips of its tail feathers.
spotted out in the open too and is easily identifiable by the patch of white on the neck and the white
Zak Patten
Born in Dublin, Ireland, and raised in and around Burlington, Vermont, Zak developed a lifelong love of storytelling and language. After graduating, he embarked on a cultural adventure, teaching English in the vibrant city of Prague. Returning to the United States, he settled in Boston and pursued a career in travel media, honing his skills as an editor. With a growing passion for sustainability, Zak transitioned into the world of environmental consulting, where he now leverages his writing and communication expertise to promote sustainable solutions to some of the world’s most challenging problems.
Zak Patten Light Water
Photo Feature
Zak Patten’s love for photography began in a college history of photography class. Intrigued by the art form’s ability to capture and preserve moments in time, he started experimenting with a film camera. The tactile experience of developing and printing his own images solidified his passion.
As digital technology transformed photography, Zak embraced the newfound freedom. He explored a wider range of techniques and styles, experimenting with exposure, composition, and post-processing. This evolution allowed him to express his unique vision more creatively.
Zak is drawn to the natural world, often capturing impressionistic images that evoke emotion and contemplation. However, he also finds beauty in the built environment. Old signs and architecture offer him a chance to document the passage of time and capture pieces of history. Through his lens, Zak shares his perspective, inviting viewers to see the world in a new light.
Liquid Jade, 2020
Venusian Dream, 2020
Ripple, 2020
Whiskey Fire, 2021
Golden Tears, 2024
Shimmer, 2024
Sunset Deck, 2024
Glass Trees, 2024
Tang A Pau
Tang A Pau is a professional photographer living in Saigon. He has 15 years of experience. He is a volunteer photographer with ICF Asia (International Crane Foundation) and of some National Parks in Vietnam. Tang's stories are usually about the natural beauty of places, and species at risk, and encourage environmental awareness. He hopes through his experience and photographs he can highlight all the great benefits that Nature has to offer in Vietnam. Publications: 2021 - Co-author, Birds of Vietnam Co-author, Atlas of Cattien National Park
Special thanks to Nguyen Thuy Hoa.
Tang A Pau
Wild Vietnam - Cát Tiên National Park
Photo Feature
The following are stunning images of the Cát Tiên National Park, which is located in the south of Vietnam, in the provinces of Đồng Nai, Bình Phước and Lâm Đồng. It is approximately 150 km north of Ho Chi Minh City. It has an area of about 720 km² and protects one of the largest areas of lowland tropical forests left in Vietnam.
Nature in all its glory.
Come, experience wild Vietnam with Tang.
01. Tetrameles Nudiflura, foreground is a member of the S’Tieng indigenous ethnic minority.
