Guide to Gadamer on Hermeneutics
Andrew Abernethy Andrew.Abernethy@wheaton.edu
*these handouts were prepared to assist students in readings from Gadamer, Truth and Method
Part I
“A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text’s alterity But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriating of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.” (Gadamer, Truth and Method, 269)
Your task is to read Gadamer, Truth and Method, 265–71, 277–85. To assist you in this process, I have provided several summaries and diagrams below.
Summary of 1.A.i. Heidegger’s Disclosure of the Fore-Structure of Understanding
Heidegger is a philosopher most known for “phenomenology.” This is the recognition that human beings by their very nature automatically and instinctively engage with the “phenomena” around them to understand them. For example, if you came upon a waterfall, you are immediately seeking to understand it at some level. This takes place by automatically “foreprojecting” what you think about this waterfall. As you consider, learn about, and explore the waterfall, your “fore-projections” are gradually refined by engaging with the “object” (waterfall) to the point where your “fore-projections” of understanding are becoming less and less arbitrary. The purpose of Heidegger’s inquiry is to say something about the nature of humanity, to describe our ontology (the nature of being we are those constantly engaging in fore-projections with phenomena around us). (pgs 265–68)
Engage with phenomenon via initial fore-projection
Fore-projection
Heidegger’s Phenomenology
Phenomenon encountered
Encounters with phenomenon refine our fore-projections to align more readily with the thing itself
*the cycle above is a continual process resulting in less and less arbitrary ‘fore-projections’ of the phenomenon. The above shows a gradual process of understanding a waterfall.
Gadamer affirms much of Heidegger’s schema, but he calls into question several key areas.
Understanding does not happen automatically. We need to intentionally be open to acknowledging our own prejudices and ready to receive something new from the “other.”
Since we are historical beings who have experienced life in a particular environment, prejudices are inevitable. Prejudices are not always or necessarily bad things that need to be suppressed or replaced (as with Heidegger). These can be either positive or negative, and they are fundamental for being able to “understand.” (269–71)
Summary of 1.B.i. The Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition Authority, Reason, and Prejudice
Some will say that in order to “understand” we need to be set free from prejudice so that reason can be our sole guide in understanding. Authoritative tradition, some say, holds us captive in prejudice, preventing genuine understanding. For example, in the Reformation, Martin Luther set people free from the shackles of authoritative tradition (pope and Roman Catholic Church) to enable them to understand Scripture through reason. The flow chart summarizes this logic:
Getting rid of prejudice and authoritative tradition leads to autonomous reasoning which leads to understanding
Or to illustrate this in another way:
Understanding Prejudice
Barriers
Understanding
This sort of mentality resulted in the perception that misunderstanding is caused by our prejudices that derive from authoritative tradition which hinders us from the use of reason. (pgs 277–78)
Gadamer challenges the logic above to show that tradition and authority are not always bad (279–82). First, reason can’t explain everything. Morality, even for Descartes, cannot be established by reason. Morality rests upon tradition (279). Second, authority figures are not just heeded blindly. Instead, authority is acknowledged and granted; one observes something superior about the authority. If an authority who knows more about a subject gives me a prejudice, this may be justifiable (279–80). Third, in reality, tradition lays behind many of our attitudes and institutions (280–81). Fourth, tradition and reason really are not opposites. In tradition, history and freedom come together. An individual freely decides to preserve, affirm, and cultivate a human tradition. Even in the most radical revolution, the “new” often retains a high level of continuity with previous traditions and understands changes as responses to some of those previous traditions. For example, when the United States was formed, it is obvious that many of the attitudes and beliefs stem from traditions that align with England.
So, one must ask what traditions are and how they relate to the historical entity in question. As the diagram below attempts to illustrate, when a historical event occurs, such as a text being written, a stream of traditions begin to unfold. These traditions encounter the interpreter in light of his/her own questions and historical situation. The result is a repackaging of history upon gaining a unique glimpse at the historical event (283–85).
Text
Written (historical event)
Stream of traditions
Historically rooted interpreter
Unique concerns and vantage point from today brings one to a text, allowing past to “resound in a new voice”
Thus, reason does not function independently from tradition. Instead, reason operates in conjunction with tradition to express an understanding of history in a way that is meaningful in the present. Part II of this guide will look more closely at what happens when understanding occurs.
Part II
Your task is to read pages 291–307 of Gadamer, Truth and Method. The summaries below and diagrams aim to assist you in the reading process.
iii. The Hermeneutics Significance of Temporal Distance
Interpreters are “trapped” in the same realm of time and history as the text which they studying (diagram 1). As a result, we cannot pretend that we are “neutral” observers who objectively study an ancient text at a safe distance. We share the same space, for traditions from that text impact us today. Even our very interest in studying a text springs from having been influenced by traditions stemming from the text. Furthermore, when we approach the text, we do so through “fore-conceptions” shaped by these traditions (prejudices). For this reason, Schleiermacher’s circle is inadequate (part-whole) because it treats understanding as if it only involves an objective quest to ascertain what an author meant.
text
Understanding, then, is not an objective activity (diagram 2). As part of a shared continuum of time and history, an interpreter has been influenced by traditions stemming from the text. This means that the interpreter already has “fore-conceptions” about what a text is about. So when an interpreter approaches a text, they do so in light of already existing prejudices. There are two presuppositions that must be factored in which inform an interpreter’s approach to a text in light of these traditions. First, an interpreter assumes that the text is “complete” in the sense that it is intelligible and capable of conveying its message. Second, an interpreter is not simply interested in knowing what an “author” meant; instead, an interpreter is regularly asking if something is “true.” This rings true with the world around us. People don’t just want to understand a judge, but they evaluate if a ruling was “right.” When I read Tortilla Flat by Steinbeck, I wonder whether his depiction of human nature is true. As we try to grasp what a text is saying, we simultaneously discern whether we think a text is true, right, or good.
Understanding occurs amidst a spectrum between familiarity and strangeness (diagram 3). Since we always share some common ground in tradition with a text (otherwise we would have no interest in studying it), there is always some level of familiarity with it deriving from traditions which inform our fore-conceptions as we approach a text. On the other hand, because a text is always “other,” there will be a strangeness about it that our “fore-conceptions” cannot fully grasp.
What conditions enable an interpreter to “understand” amidst being in-between on this spectrum? When an interpreter encounters a text, it is the “strangeness” or “otherness” of it that provokes us, addresses us. At that moment, we realize that our “fore-conceptions” do not align fully with the text. This forces an interpreter to question, to be open to our own prejudices being wrong. This establishes the basis of hermeneutics; a recognition that we share in the traditions of a text, while remaining open to questioning the fore-conceptions we have about the text.
To illustrate, think of meeting the parents of your girlfriend/boyfriend for the first time. You already have fore-conceptions about them based upon what your girlfriend/boyfriend has said, and the parents already have some fore-conceptions about you. As you get to know them, there is familiarity and a lot of strangeness. A growth in understanding (knowing) them takes place when we are open to having our prejudices reworked/enhanced/built upon. As we study the text, something unfamiliar reminds us that the text doesn’t entirely fit our fore-conceptions. We then re-approach the text with a renewed openness to understand it from its own vantage point, while all the same time assessing whether we think what it is saying it right and true.
iv. The Principle of History of Effect (Wirkungsgeschichte)
Since we are unavoidably impacted by traditions stemming from a text or historical event, we should strive to be aware of this history of traditions as it bears on our own situation. While it is impossible to grasp entirely our situation, it is clear that we do exist within a particular historical vantage point. Gadamer defines this as a horizon. “The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (302). At the same time, as we look at a text, we need to attempt to place ourselves in the horizon of that text and its traditions. In a sense, our own horizon is part of the historical horizon of a text. Simultaneously, there also is a level of distinction between me as interpreter now and the horizon of a text in history. For this reason, understanding occurs when we fuse our own historical horizon with the horizon of the text.
When an interpreter considers a text in its historical horizon, while ever aware of and interested in one’s own horizon, understanding occurs.