Restructuring the upgrade process of Kibera Soweto East, Zone A, through a practice of Co-production by Maureen Muthoni

RESTRUCTURING the upgrading process of

KIBERA SOWETO EAST, ZONE A through a practice of

CO-PRODUCTION Maureen Kinyua

University of Sheffield School of Architecture ARC6982 Urban Design Project 3: Thesis Academic Year 2015/2016 Module leader: Beatrice De Carli

Restructuring the upgrading process of Kibera Soweto East, Zone A through practices of co-production.

Maureen Kinyua Registration no. 150201896

Supervisor: Beatrice De Carli

Thesis submitted to the University of Sheffield in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA in Urban Design

Sheffield, 2 September 2016

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to interrogate the notion and practice of co-production between top-down (state-led) and bottom-up (community-led) approaches in the context of informal settlement upgrading projects in Nairobi. To do so, the thesis examines and suggests alternative strategies for the ongoing Pilot Project of Kibera Soweto East Zone A. The research focuses on the current standstill project whose completion has stalled for about 6 years, and has been facing criticism for its unsuccessful top-down approach. Issues have been raised in regards to the projectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s failure being due to the lack of community involvement and participation, the lack of partnerships/ collaborations, and poor planning, amongst others. This thesis draws on the analysis of the project as well as on a review of local and international case studies to articulate principles for the integrated upgrading of Soweto East. This is based on examining local examples in other informal settlements in Nairobi (Huruma Housing Upgrade project and Mathare Mabatini Community led School project) that have successfully used bottom-up and top-down/bottomup approaches respectively. These cases are used as model examples to articulate principles and guidelines for an alternative solution for Kibera Soweto Zone A. Additionally, the thesis draws from international literature about, and instances of both bottom-up and integrated top-down/ bottom-up approaches to slum upgrading. Borrowing international processes of planning and realisation of redevelopment of informal settlements, the research aims to localise the international examples with the use local projects to suite Kibera Soweto Eastâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s uniqueness. As an outcome, the thesis defines principles and guidelines for the inclusive upgrading of informal settlements in Kibera Soweto, based on ideas of co-production and in the creation of better connections/networks between top-down and bottom-up developments.

Table of contents 02 03 04 05

Introduction 1 Summative overview 1.1 Case studies 1.2 Aim 1.3

6 Litreture Review 2 7 Background 2.1 7 Co-production 9 Yerwada Slum Upgrade, Pune 2.2 11 Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi 2.3 13 Conclusion 2.4 15

Methodologies 3

19 Theoretical Exploration 4 19 Nairobi Informal Settlements Case Studies 4.1 20 Project location I 22 Background State-led Initiatives II 23 Case study Outlines III 24 Soweto East Zone A Pilot Project, Kibera 4.2 24 Project location I 25 Case overview II 28a Participants Mapping III 29 Backgroung Community/NGO led initiatives IV 30 Kambimoto Housing Upgrade Pproject, Huruma 4.3 30 Project location I 31 Case overview II 36a Participants Mapping III 37 Mathare 4A Upgrading Project 4.4 37 Project location I 38 Case overview II 41a Participants Mapping III 43 Findings and Discussion 5 43 Planning 48 Maagement 52 Service 55 Economy 59 Participation 63

Conclusion 6

References

Terminology

GoK Government of Kenya IEK Institution of Engineers of Kenya KENSUP Kenya Slum Upgrading Project KISIP Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Programme MuST Muungano Support Trust MwW Muungano wa Wanavijiji SIDA Swedish International Development Coordination Agency UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Programme ha hectare (1 ha = 10,000 m2) km kilometre CBD Central Business District KSh Kenyan Shilling (KSh 1,000 â&#x2030;&#x2C6; US$ 11 per January 2014) MFS Minor Field Study NGO Non-Governmental Organisation MDG Millennium Development Goal

1. Introduction

Fig. 1: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

Summative review The vast rise of urban dwellers (due to rural-urban migration, population growth) has led to uncontrollable growth of slum areas in developing cities. Slums make up 30-70% of urban population (UN Population Fund, 2007) which equates to the majority of urban population in developing countries constituting of the urban poor. Most of the conditions in these slums are inhuman characterised by high density/congested, deprived housing conditions, poor sanitation, lack of basic facilities such as water and electricity, low income/unemployment, physical and legal insecurities and crime. Whilst urban poverty is on the increase, so does urban inequality with Kenyaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s current GINI coefficient at 44.5% (UN Population Fund, 2007). The marginalised groups are prevented from receiving equal social, economic and political benefits hindering the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic growth and sustainable development. Consequently, topics relating to slum/informal settlement upgrade processes have become important issues discussed in international and national development agendas of the Global South. This has also been influenced by The United Nations Millennium Development Declaration of 2000. Notably one of the goals, by 2020, is to greatly improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers globally (United Nations, 2015). This has led to variation of responses, by country governments, to overcome the challenges that come with slum upgrading. A slum upgrading development programme was first introduced in Kenya, in 2003. The programme known as KENSUP (Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme) begun as a partnership between UN HABITAT and the Government of Kenya, which attributes to Millennium Goals on slum improvements whilst influencing the national campaign in the elimination of informal settlements. However, a complexity of realities and dynamics have had to be navigated for an informal settlement upgrade programme to eventually result in the elimination of the occurrence of urban and rural slums. In many developing countries, there is significant uncertainty from the governments concerning the expansion of informal settlements. One of the fears speculated by policy makers, in the past, is that execution of policies that consider shack dwellers could enhance rural-urban migration (Rimui,2011). Additionally, another concern is that allowing slum areas inevitably leads to urban degradation, social conflict and illegality due to the problematic areas that would require upgrading and managing (Obudho,1997). The prior reflection disregards the fact that expanding slum areas express natural population growth in as much as rural-urban migration; whilst the later reflection pessimistic in ruling out the potentials of gradual improvements of slum areas (UN-Habitat, 2013). Therefore, policies to prevent growth of informal areas should not only originate from state efforts, which faces a lot of limitations, but also from its citizens. There is an 3

Fig. 2: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

ever growing need for affordable low-income livelihood and basic services in many developing cities, which has accelerated the search for convenient strategies to meet this demand. The purpose of this paper is to explore how a co-production/collaborative perspective can assist in comprehending the challenges faced in upgrade of informal settlements and seek to provide solutions to enhance living standards of these areas. It argues that a tri-coalition of partnerships involving the private sector, government sector, and voluntary bodies (NGOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s CBOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s) offers a favourable resolution to the challenge as it enables actors to lessen their shortcomings in the provision of low-income housing and service by adapting the strength of other partners. Hence increasing the delivery of housing and basic services to low income city inhabitants. Case studies Before discussing how collaboration, co-production and participation in the upgrade processes of slum dwellings can lead to additional service and housing benefits to low income tenants, the research delivers backgrounds of a number of approaches, some more successful than others used to meet the housing and service demands. The research focuses on top-down and bottom-up approaches carried out in informal settlements within Nairobi. Furthermore, it borrows international literature and principles from successful international case studies that have focused on themes of co-production, collaboration and participation to better inform their strategies. At the international scale the literature focuses on two successful ongoing projects; the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi, Pakistan and Yerwada Housing Upgrade project in Pune, India. The main local case study in discussion is Kibera Soweto East, Zone A, pilot project in Nairobi, Kenya. An evaluation to the individual strengths and weaknesses of the government, voluntary bodies and private sector the upgrading and development of informal settlements within Kibera is discussed, in order to reveal why none of the sectors is single-handedly adept in meeting the challenges faced. Next follows an analysis of the benefits and challenges of a collaborative tri-bodied partnership, before demonstrating their efficacy through two local ongoing case studies in Huruma and Mathare in Nairobi, Kenya. These case studies are employed as model examples to express principles and guidelines for an alternate resolution for Kibera Soweto East Zone A. The paper is based on research obtained in journals, articles and books that focus majorly on the voluntary and state role in the upgrading of informal settlement within local context of Nairobi as well as international context in India and Pakistan, and additionally

private sectors in the later. Aim It argues that a mediation of both bottom-up and top-down initiatives are essential to sustainable slum upgrading. It borrows from international processes of planning and realisation of redevelopment of informal settlements, and localises literature discussed with use of local projects within Nairobi to suite Kibera Soweto Easts uniqueness. As an outcome the thesis defines principles and guidelines for the inclusive upgrading of informal settlements that not only benefit Kibera but other informal settlement within Nairobi and Kenya as a whole. Based on themes of co-production, collaboration and participation, in the creation of better partnerships and multi-sectoral approaches in urban developments. The paper reasons that â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;co-productive governanceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; may be advantageous framework for structuring sustainable informal settlements. Creates a method that extends past civic and voluntary provision to support inclusivity in decision-making that promotes the stakeholders and local community as active partners, and not just as passive dependents in slum improvement processes. When it comes to constructing all rounded and sustainable societies, the private and civic sector also have significant roles to play. Due to its comparative capital and preferable capabilities to absorb population growth in decent conditions than many other cities within Kenya, Nairobi was selected as the city in discussion. The population area and growth rate of inhabitants in Kibera slum dwellings is highest within Nairobi, in comparison to other province in the country (Muraguri, 2012). Accordingly given adequate administrative will and collaborative capabilities Nairobi is likely to be a model of inclusive and progressive urban planning and development management, rather than managing slum growth in an uncertain and almost susceptible approach.

2. Background / Literature review Key words: Partnerships, Co-production, collaborative, communicative, participation, co-operation, inclusivity, state-society engagement, development, global South, top-down, bottom-up, community engagement, in-situ, resilience, urban informal settlements

Fig. 1 and 2: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

i. Background When it comes to planning literature, according to (Hillier & Healey,2008) an outstanding subject that has been a point of discussion for the past two decades, is how the society and state is involved in affairs associated with urban planning. Contradictory concepts and perspectives assessed through varied contexts and expressing a series of diverse intellectual traditions have emerged, majorly form developed countries. Whilst later critiques such as Jean Hiller (2008) presented concepts such as ‘agonism’, which draws on ‘Foucauldian’ philosophies of power discussed by Bent Flyvjerg, and criticises the pre-occupation with decision-making process at the expense of spatial processes and outcomes discussed by Margo Huxley and Oren Yiftachel. Earlier phrases discussed by Patsy Healey and Judith Innes (along with a number of other scholars related with these terms) in these debates referred to ‘communicative’ and ‘collaborative’ as an approach to planning (Healey, 1997). According to Watson (2002, 2009) state – society engagement in developing countries has indirectly been influenced by the definite social environments in developed countries, defined by Western liberal democracy and established progressive economies to varying degrees. When these critical and normative ideas of planning are assimilated into very different parts of the world (than their areas of origin) it begs the question whether these ideas no longer hold/ partially hold as suitable concepts for practitioners and planning theorist alike. Especially due to the special circumstance faced by the developing countries who experience pressures of rapid urbanization under environments of unemployment, unstable political environments, poverty, feeble public institutions and poor infrastructure; especially when one considers the global demographics tipping point of over 50% of the world’s population in cities an increasing proportion of which will be in cities in global South (UN Habitat, 2009). Despite the fact that there is a great need for urban planning in the global South, there is an acknowledgement that practices to planning commonly in use were established with a very dissimilar socio-spatial circumstances in mind and are frequently out-of-date. (Watson,2009) proposes that planning should instead take a ‘view form the south’ to inspire planning theory of developed countries, as implemented conventions take for granted and fail to recognise the difficulties faced in the global South. This should thus inspire planning theory discussions to which planning needs should respond to by drawing attention to new situations and environments. ii. Co-Production This research explores notion of co-production as a form of state-society engagement structure that can be implemented in the upgrading of informal settlements in Nairobi, Kenya. It borrows 7

philosophies on debate held about co-productive engagement of state-society as a structuring and urban planning development processes in the global South environments. The idea of coproduction has been a topic of interest in planning theory due to a number of advantages it poses. Primarily, co-production has been a medium through which the urban poor have been able to acquire noteworthy developments to their living surroundings especially in situations where the state has been incapable or reluctant to provide these developments. Current practises of co-production express an improved method of ‘participation’ to cases frequently described as communicative or collaborative planning. Therefore, the expansion of the scope on the study of planning can be achieved as cases of co-production serve as additional notions from which planning ideas can be drawn. Furthermore, (Seekings and Keil, 2009) arguments propose that practises of the global North may not be universally suitable and are far more probable to be deviant form a global perspective. Thus internalization planning theory can be fostered through consideration of forms of engagement on planning issues in very diverse surroundings, including models of co-production in developing countries. Moreover, practice can influence planning theory be it unevenly or indirectly; where models of co-production can demonstrate inventive and possibly progressive developments of government-citizen engagement especially in difficult surroundings. Thus the analysis of the downsides and achievements of these cases and implementing them into the sphere of planning practices becomes essential. Elinor Ostrom, a political economist, is among the first people whose work refers to the term co-production; whilst working on the ideas of co-production in relation to the field of Public Administration in the UK and USA, in the 1970’s. According to Ostrom (1996, p.1073), the definition of co-production is that ‘it is a process through which inputs from individuals who are not in the same organization are transformed into goods and services’. Her literature which centres on public service provision and discusses how engagement of the government and society can generate interactions through which participants contribute in divers but correlating ways. Whereas in one hand the government has capital and specialisation proficiency, on the other hand the societies have time, abilities, and a grounded know how of their surroundings. In addition, the government and the citizens have diverse production abilities: whilst the government can generate primary services, the society can provide secondary and tertiary services. This shows that government and society, who are service recipients, have diverse but correlating forms of knowledge which can improve final outcome when working together: creating a ‘clap effect’ on top-down and bottom-up development process (Keare.et.al,1982). If it case where the role of service delivery can be filled in by the society, the most economical at a given scale is chosen. Regardless of Ostrom constructive views on co-production as a form of promoting social capital through community’s association in service management and delivery; her work does not mention interceding roles of CBO’s or NGO’s, instead it just narrows down on the direct link between citizen and state. According to Beall and Fox (2009) these assumptions made by Ostrom (as well as public participation discussions at the time) was that citizens would gain equal access to these services, thus excluding realities of power such as ethnic, income and gender inequalities, corruption and politics; and thus conflicts would be containable. Another interpretation of the term co-production is made by Joshi and Moore (2004) who refer to ‘institutionalised co-production’ as a heterogeneous form of government-civic interaction in service delivery, which would occur in the case of a feeble state that is incapable of offering services, lacks information on how to do it, or wishes to cut down on costs on service distribution. Even though they suggest that it can be beneficial where the government needs to organise capitals to face logistical issues, it is uncertain that society empowerment is a principal

objective, that adjusting the nature of national governance might have a noteworthy result, or that co-production should develop beyond contributing services. Different view is stated in the public administrative journals by Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) expressing a difference among co-management, co-governance and co-production; which they point out as a charitable effort by individual residents placing it in the sphere of voluntary aid and ‘third sector’ contribution. In line with this thought, Bovaird’s (2007) notion is based on ‘third sector’ examples from USA and UK; where he views a concern of positive benefit of co-production being reliant on costeffectiveness and efficiency of government’s service provision rather than societies approval as an end in itself. Hence the outcomes of co-production can end up being communally undesirable which generates a need for ‘reserve powers of state regulations’ (p.857). However, another interpretation of co-production debated later on by Mitlin (2008, p. 347) who critiques that none of the above writers discuss co-production within a broader relation to choice, self-determination and intermediate-level political relations in which society and government seek an interaction with each other so as to secure redelivery, and are also inclined towards self-management and local control over local supplies in areas related to basic requirements. A common concept that is expressed in these cases and interpretations (above) the state is generally the instigator of the relationship and the balance of power remains firmly with the government. The research looks at two international examples that draw on co-production, collaborative and communicative processes of upgrading informal settlements. The research looks at two international examples where lessons are drawn from discussion on Yerwada Slum Upgrade in Pune, India and Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi, Pakistan; that influence co-production strategy for Kibera Soweto East Project, Nairobi, Kenya. iii. Yerwada Slum Upgrade, Pune, India The ongoing Yerwada Slum Upgrade pilot project shows how a co-production can play an important role in development of a society. The project which is considered as one of the best practises on in-situ slum upgradation due to its collaborative, co-productive, participative nature has become a model to other schemes. Exists as part of an initiative programme whose main goal is creating a slum free sustainable city, realised through engagement amongst professional, NGO’s and most importantly unions formed by informal settlers themselves.

Fig 3: Meeting being held between the community and other actors discussing design and layout of housing units

Fig. 3: Anon, Incremental Housing Strategy | My Work. Available at: http:// martinhopita.wordpress. com/architecture/ihs/ [Accessed April 26, 2016]

It started off in 2008 as a community driven in-situ pilot project aimed at upgrading housing standards of communities in Yerwada, driven by collaboration among Filipe Balestra (Urban Nouveau), Sheela Patel(SPARC) and Jockin Arputham(NSDF) (Shodhana, 2002). One of key aspects drawn for these project is its deep engagement with the Yerwada community from the projects inception to its current status, so as to sustain and support the neighbourhood in its future. The projects funding come mainly from the central government of India and was incorporated as a pilot project under JNNURM programme in 2009 (Patel, 2010). The aim for the programme was to provide approximately 1200 families, from seven hugely populated informal regions within Yerwada, with upgraded housing by 2012. In addition to housing other objectives of project included provision of clean water supply, education, health care, social empowerment. Due to its simplified nature in promoting civic involvement, the model would thus strive to create an upgradation model that is applicable to other cities, achieving sustainability through society involvement and empowerment (Cronin, 2012 ). The project partnersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; tasks were carefully designated, with the focal point being the inhabitants, so as to ensure an effective and participative process.

Fig 4: Community workshop with beneficiaries

Fig. 4: Anon, Incremental Housing Strategy | My Work. Available at: http:// martinhopita.wordpress. com/architecture/ihs/ [Accessed April 26, 2016]

The actors involved in the projects include Urban Nouveau (as concept designers and community planners), Prasanna Desai Architects (as project architects, building designers and construction chosen by SPARC) who had to work closely with residents as their clients and consider there housing needs, NGOs such as SPARC and NSDF, PMC the local authority and the housing subsidy beneficiaries and the community. Other partners involved were Mahila Milan (a CBO that is represented women who mostly live in the seven cluster of slums that make up Yerwada 10

informal settlement) who were strategically involved and become correspondents enabling effective communication with the shanty residents. Although the project starts as a bottomup approach, local authority services such as infrastructure, funding and security of tenure is delivered by the PMC (Pune Municipal Council). Another achievement to note about the project is community activity at varied levels and processes; meetings, workshops, involvement with CBO in regards to construction, data collection, financial management, collaboration with state authorities, choice of housing typology, and advancement of units’ design typology. The slum dwellers were active involvement in decision making process empowered them and enhanced their participation as their consent was the final decision when it come to the finalization of the plans.

Fig 5 and 6: On the left real scale model on site to allow community’s review of design, on the right render of desired design outlook

Fig. 5 and 6: Anon, Incremental Housing Strategy | My Work. Available at: http:// martinhopita.wordpress. com/architecture/ihs/ [Accessed April 26, 2016]

iv. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan The OPP looks at how social co-production of space is significant in the upgrading of informal settlements within Orangi, Karachi and Pakistan as a whole. The project’s, which was initiated in 1980 as ‘research and action’ study by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, in response to the prevalence of informal settlements in Karachi. OPP sought to detect and support existing self-help initiatives within the communities and enhance governmental partnerships for local development and use of local resources. Main aim was to improve the living standards of the informal settlement Orangi through a different means that involved interventions carried out through research, action and extension, where the local participants had a huge say in the transformation to happen around them (Khan, 1992). This has been a theme consistent within their work, which has been adapted as their programme has expanded and diversified. The firsts physical intervention was sanitation, which lead to other interventions such as housing, security of tenure, microcredit, and technical support. The successful collaboration and partnership involves an ever growing list of permanent and temporal actors such as Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), residents of Orangi, municipality, multiple Pakistani and global NGOs and CBOs, social and technical consultants. 11

and CBOs, social and technical consultants. OPP later upgrades into three autonomous branches (Oppinstitutions.org. 2016): 1.OPP-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) manages the a) low cost sanitation, b) housing/ secure housing support program, c) education program, d) flood rehabilitation program the related research and training programs and the now evolving water supply program. 2.OPP-Orangi Charitable Trust (OPP-OCT) manages the micro enterprise credit program. Provides credit to existing enterprises that lack the access. 3.OPP-Karachi Health and Social Development Association (OPP-KHASDA) manages the health program. Fig 7: Community workshop with beneficiaries representatives

Fig. 7: Oppinstitutions. org. (2016). WELCOME TO OPP. [online] Available at: http://www. oppinstitutions.org/ [Accessed 20 May 2016]

The later organisations formed show how OPP’s functions has extended over the years in many forms, whilst still encouraging partnerships and community involvement in collectively determining and developing the conditions of their surroundings (Khan, 1992 ). OPP possessed no authority, no sanctions. It may observe and investigate but it could only advise, not enforce” (Turner, 1988). This form of relationship between OPP and the dwellers of Orangi where OPP acts as a supporting and encouraging body has been a constant practice that has proved very beneficial and successful step in developing local initiatives and allowed scaling up. OPP enabled community –led design and planning through tapping into existing framework of the community and thus sustained and encourage initiatives instead of imposing new ones that were not an immediate need by the community. This endogenous research and observations lead to the success of the low-cost housing and sanitation programme where OPP’S objectives involved: identifying activists; providing training in community organization and technical details; providing further guidance and supervision; and helping to simplify designs so that they become affordable and could be technically implemented locally. Furthermore, OPP becomes successful in accomplishing another goal which involved enhancing connection/network 12

between government and Orangi settlement, seeking a top-down bottom-up cooperation. Furthermore, the successful installation brings a whole new network connection amongst diverse participants ranging from; government bodies, academic institutions, international donors, NGO’s, local funders, community based organizations and Orangi residents.

Fig 8 and 9: On the left showing poor drainage and sanitation before improvements, and right same path after improvments on sanitation infrastructure

Fig. 8 and 9: Oppinstitutions.org. (2016). WELCOME TO OPP. [online] Available at: http://www. oppinstitutions.org/ [Accessed 20 May 2016]

v. Conclusion Sustainable slum upgradation flourishes in the capacity of actors achieving collective responsibilities based on their specific capacities. These international examples highlight an important role of co-productive participation with the slum dwellers in decision making and implementation. The role of the CBO’s as led actors in the projects allow an efficient and effective integration of strategies. It also exemplifies the potential models for collaboration of civic society (NGO’s, CBO’s and citizens) and state institutions (Local and national authority. In a way emphasizing on the need for an optimal approach of coproduction and such projects need not be essentially approached in a top-down or bottom-up approaches but a mediation of both. The projects show that co-production become successful through tangible interventions in the improvement and provision of housing and service needs, to intangible aspects such as facilitating microcredit union and empowerment of not only women but society as a whole. In both projects the successful co-productive, collaborative, communicative and participative aspects from varied network of participants (from government, specialist, local community and CBOs, NGOs) enhance communities’ empowerment, maintenance, sustainability and scalability of the project where their impact has been applied and adapted in other projects globally.

3. Research process / Methodology

Fig. 1 and 2: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

Descriptive Case Study and Combined Strategy Research The descriptive case study and combined strategy research and approach is opted in this paper as it is most flexible of all research designs, allowing the recollection the general characteristics of real-life events while investigating experimental events. It enables an experiential inquiry to be carried out which: will investigate a modern and complex phenomenon (urban poverty) within its real-life context (urban informal settlements). The paper revolves around boundaries between phenomenon (slum redevelopment) and context (slum) are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2003). Data collection and sampling: Carried out using literature survey review references (books, articles, journals, internet blogs, and websites). Techniques that have been involved in the research and analysis include notes taking, notes recording, filling material illustrations, surveys, recording sources and reviewing notes (Borden and Rüedi, 2006). System inquiry inductive research: ‘what’ the problem of slum conditions is known and the results of solutions carried out can be observed, the research’s main concern lies in the working principles/ ‘how’ these solutions are governed and carried out (Wang and Groat, n.d.). A number of slum upgrading programmes are introduced and subsidised by the government, multi-lateral organisations, external bodies, bi-lateral institutions, non-government organisations and private sector. Most of their process approach being either top-down or bottom up. This method allows an in depth review into real life cases where analysis of a variety of approaches that seek to better living conditions in informal settlements are implemented. Strategy context analysis: The paper provides focused and concise exploratory research on strategies that hinder or enhance development and advancement of upgrading projects in Nairobi, comparing Soweto East project with Huruma and Mathare 4A upgrade projects. Research is done on the planning issue that arise with the Soweto East project where approaches are drafted and executed without clear revised implementation process that considers all stakeholders (their interests). Different initial notions on the failure causes are investigated such – unrealistic approaches and goals, unadapt resolutions that fail to realise uniqueness of different communities. Case studies and combined strategies analysis: In a bid to seek better solutions to upgrading informal dwellings in slum of Kibera, the paper shall investigate two types of approaches commonly used within Nairobi city, Kenya. The paper shall analyse the state led Soweto East upgrade project and compare it with two community/NGO led approaches implemented in Kambimoto neighbourhood in Huruma village and Mathare 4A village. This thesis draws on the analysis of the community/NGO led project as well as on a review of

local case studies to articulate principles for the integrated upgrading of Soweto East. These cases are used as model examples to articulate principles and guidelines for an alternative solution for Kibera Soweto Zone A. Additionally, the thesis draws from international literature on coproduction, and instances of both bottom-up and integrated top-down/bottom-up approaches to slum upgrading carried out in Orangi Pilot project and Yerwada Slum Upgrade project. Borrowing international processes of planning and realisation of redevelopment of informal settlements, the research aims to localise the international examples of co-production with the use local projects to suite Kibera Soweto Eastâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s uniqueness. As an outcome, the thesis defines principles and guidelines for the inclusive upgrading of informal settlements in Kibera Soweto, based on ideas of co-production and in the creation of better connections/networks between top-down and bottom-up developments. As site visit is not possible, research will be carried out through analysing materials such as journals, books, archive research, borrowed field research, websites; organisation websites the government, multi-lateral organisations, external bodies, bi-lateral institutions, nongovernment organisations and private sector. Methods of data collection involves gathering relevant information. Analysing findings researched until I reach a satisfactory conclusion. This would be followed by a structured visual mapping and surveying findings into useful creative inventions. Proposition strategies: that can be adopted into current Kibera projects through creation of conceptual synthesis that are adapted into existing projects. Encourage the idea that coproduction along with a mediation between bottom-up and top-down approach is most effective. Designed based-small scale to large scale proposal. Research based-knowledge and application process proposal to small scale and large scale developments. Use successful precedents locally and internationally to borrow ideas that can be re-structured to suit Kibera environment and implemented in current projects. The research carried out prior to proposal shall inform the experimental combined strategies that the paper shall seek to create having revised their application process.

Fig 3: Process methodology map

Fig. 3: Authors work

4. Theoretical Exploration

4.1. NAIROBI INFORMAL SETTLMENTS CASE Overview This chapter looks at case studies of slum upgradation that have been implemented in Nairobi (Kenya’s capital city) and focuses on different processes, strategies and varied outcomes of each approach. Primarily, it focuses on a top-down state initiative in Soweto-East Zone A in Kibera informal settlement where a critical analysis on the project’s co-productive, collaborative and participative aspects are analysed in respect to the projects limitations and success. Secondly, it looks at a two successful slum improvement initiatives within Mahare Valley: first a community/NGO initiative in-situ housing upgrade project located in Kambimoto, Huruma village and a tri-sector initiative in Mathare 4A village. The research paper analyses the positive attributes of the later projects and compares them to shortfalls of the prior project, so as to derive principles and guidelines that can be adapted in the Soweto East project.

‘Mathare and Kibera share four things in common. First both had quarry at stage in life. Second they neighbour some of the most rich neighbourhoods. Kibera has Karen while Mathare is to Muthaiga. Another interesting observation is that the too have golf courses nearby. Mathare is next to Muthaiga Golf Club and Kibera has Royal Golf Club. Major road road construction are going, across Kibera we have while Mathare has Thika Highway’. (Obudho, 1997)

Fig. 1: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

Project location

Nairobi Province showing informal settlements including Mathare Valley and Kibera, in 1990 (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006)

Fig. 2: Huchzermeyer, M. and Karam, A. (2006). Informal settlements. Cape Town: UCT Press.

Fig. 3: Authors work

example: image

II.

Background - State-led interventions

The rise of slum dwellings in Kenya begun during the colonial period due to lack of sufficient housing for dwellers within urban cities, the situation only worsened following countries independence in 1963 due to high rate of rural urban immigration, urban poverty, housing shortages, inequitable patterns of landownership and over-urbanisation leading to high costs of urban living (Obudho, 1997). State implemented projects and programmes aimed at subduing slum growth have risen throughout the years in a bid to better the urban housing shortage, especially in Nairobi where informal settlements have become prominent character. These projects and programmes include support based policies such as slum-upgrading and site/ service schemes, slum clearances, and subsidized housing among others (mainly implemented through a collaboration with bilateral and multilateral donor agencies) (Mitullah, 1992). Sadly, by 1980 the shift in global economic paradigms along with government’s incapability and inclination to continue the support given to slum eradication led to its increase of slums. A ‘laissez faire’ method was adopted where the state no longer made any efforts in improvement of slums, but also stopped demolition of slum structures (Syagga, Mitullah, & Karirah-Gitau, 2002). Instead the government diverted its incomes to other development sectors, leaving the housing provision in the hands of the private sector (Obudho, 1997). By 2000 though, initiatives targeting slum upgradation were reintroduced through policy adjustments, projects and programmes. Policies such as Housing and Lands policies formulated in 2005 and 2009 respectively (Government of Kenya [GOK], 2005) Kenya’s Vision 2030 launched in 2007 (Government of Kenya [GOK], 2007), the country’s new Constitution (Government of Kenya [GOK], 2010) and the Kenya Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy presently being formulated, have been created to support slum upgradation. The key agendas that these policies represent involve commitments to participatory decision making through collaborations with beneficiaries and other participants, changes that support-based mediation and implementations of in-situ upgrading. A number of programs have been developed inside this agenda, including the Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP) and Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Programme (KISIP). (Conference Proceedings: Planning Africa 2014). The below case study focuses on an undertaking by KENSUP.

Fig. 4: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

III.

Case studies outlines

Fig. 5: Authors work

4.2. CASE STUDIES: SOWETO EAST , ZONE A,

KIBERA

Project location

Fig 8 : Soweto East , Zone A location within Kibera informal settlement

Fig. 6: Authors work

Fig. 7: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

II.

Case study overview

Fig 8 : Soweto East Overview

Fig. 8: Authors work

Outline The KENSUP projects in Kibera begins as joint partnership between Kenyan Government and UN-Habitat, who become the main funders and directors of the programme. Other actors involved in the programme in varied capacities include professional, the private sector, civil society, NGOs, CBOs, and beneficiary and local communities. The programmes goals were to develop housing conditions/standards and improve the infrastructure of around 170,000 slum inhabitants (UN Population Fund, 2007), as well as enhance community involvement within the upgrade process. The project has been ongoing from its implementation in 2005 with an aimed completion date of 2025 (in line with 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda goals of poverty reduction, inequality elimination and sustainable development) and at an estimated project cost of 13 billion USD (UN, 2005). Government role was mainly tangible aspects of upgradation; physically realising the project, that is through supervising workforces, training, material, supplies and equipment provision, design and construction of the housing units. Whereas the agreed task for UN-Habitat was mostly the intangible upgradation aspects; assist with mobilisation of funds, provision of technical advice, provide needed resources, and provide basic infrastructure. The main implementation process involved a modified form of in-situ upgradation whereby the residents are temporarily relocated as improvements are done to their dwellings and return after completion of their refurbished dwellings. The reason behind this choice upgradation strategy was that Kibera was very densely populated and thus for more effective impact relocation was needed (UN, 2005). The restoration process would involve constructing new apartment blocks to replace the existent densely populated and congested shanty houses that are used (refer to figure 9).

Fig 9 :Image showing the poor structure of a single housing unit using corrugated iron sheets

Fig. 9: Khamis, N. (2009). Residents move into apartments at Kibera slum in Nirobi, Kenya, September 16, 2009. [image] Available at: http://www. reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Kibera in itself is divided into 13 villages, and thus villages would need to be tackled one at a time due to its high density. Soweto East village, located in the eastern part of the settlement with approximately 19,000 inhabitants (Calas & Fernandez 2011), was chosen as the first village for the upgradation process. The village was later clustered into 4 zones (A, B, C and D) with zone A starting as the first phase (refer to figure 6), so as to carry out the scheme in more manageable stages (Stenton, 2015). Initial phase begun with mapping out of Soweto East village. The first planned construction phase of temporal site consists of 21 six-storey blocks with a total of 912 apartments, located in Langata, a photo displaying two of the completed apartment blocks can be seen in (Figure 10 below. By 2009, the dwellers of Zone A were transferred to temporal location known as Langata, from when the residents would move back once their section of the slum had been refurbished which was to occur by 2012 as planned (Government of Kenya [GOK]. (2005).

Fig 10 :Iwo blocks of the 912 apartment blocks costurcted as temporal location for residents of Zone A

Fig.10: Khamis, N. (2009). Residents move into apartments at Kibera slum in Nirobi, Kenya, September 16, 2009. [image] Available at: http://www. reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Although community participation and engagement had been an important element in the planning of the upgradation process, the situation on ground would prove opposite as residents claimed they were not involved in the process as they would have expected. According to documentary by (Good Fortune, 2009) majority of the residents claimed to not have been consulted in any of the decision made, and the development process was imposed top-down initiative. In addition, the community claims that an earlier engagement by the UN-Habitat would have more beneficial rather than the later engagement they experienced, as a lot of concerns and issues that arise later on would have been avoided. Later on in the project some of the displeased temporal dwellers begun sub-letting their apartments and moved back to the slum, and when questioned expressed several reasons for doing so. Amongst this reasons were the destruction of the social structure that existed amongst them, lack of access to infrastructural services due to increased distance of travel, higher rent rates, and an inability to produce an income to maintain themselves in their new surroundings (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013).

From an earlier stage in the relocation process the residents had voiced their concerns that a number of issues had not been consider, in spite of forums being hosted and representatives sent to inform them, thus community blamed the government for still implementing the programme without consulting or heading to their comments as the beneficiaries (Stenton, 2015). A series of more blame games also ensued where the stakeholders blamed these neglect of feedback on the disorganisation of diverse actors involved in the project. Additionally, security of tenure had become a major concern, as most of the landlords do not inhabit the dwellings they construct a thus a fair population of Kibera residence is made of tenants. Furthermore, during the last general Kenyan election held on 2013, there was talk of how the project was politically influenced where cases of tribalism occurred as well. Owing to the overall conceptual variances that arose on the division of roles within the project, UN-Habitat and KENSUP opt to go their separate ways. KENSUP continue with housing upgradation scheme, which is currently experiencing shortcomings as the temporal residents of Zone A are yet to be relocated back to their permanent residents. UN-Habitat on the other hand commenced on a series of projects that address poor sanitation and water shortage issues within other parts of Kibera, which is ongoing.

Fig.11: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

IV.

Background - Community/NGO-led interventions

In addition to state-led slum upgrading mediations, private-sector interventions emerge in the late 1990’s, mainly supported by NGO’s, CBO’s, private agencies and religious organizations. These interventions work majorly with participation with communities, and government is sometimes involved. Noteworthy non-state bodies involved in informal settlement improvements in Kenya are Pamoja Trust (an NGO) and Muungano wa Wavijiji (a Kenya urban poor federation) .Muungano wa Wanavijiji was formed in 1996 as a network of informal settlements in Athi river and Nairobi: to combat prevalent demolitions, evictions and land grabbing that occurred in the late 1990s to early 2000s. Muungano’s current success can be seen its involvement in over 400 slum settlements across Kenya aiding more than 300,000 homes in regards to mobilisation in accessing basic needs such as housing, and income generating and saving schemes (Pamoja Trust, 2010). Pamoja trust on the other hand, has been active since 2000, whose aim is to promote urban poor communities access to shelter, land, basic services and needs (Weru, 2004:50; Pamoja Trust, 2012:2). It’s a member of an international network of community based organisations, known as Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), aimed at improving poor conditions of informal settlement in Nairobi. Both Pamoja trust and Muugano have collaborated over the years on a number of projects. The Kambimoto, Huruma project is an examples of such initiative undertaken by Pamoja Trust and Muungano wa Wanavijiji, whereas the Mathare 4A is an example of an initiative undertaken by religious organisation the Catholic 29

4.3. CASE STUDIES: KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA,

MAHARE VALLLEY I.

Project location

Fig 12 : Kambimoto location within Huruma vilage

Fig. 12: Authors work

Fig.13: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

II.

Case study overview

Fig 14 : Kambimoto project overview

Fig. 14: Authors work

Outline Kambi Moto is one of the sub-villages that exist within Huruma village, consist of approximately 270 homes (Chege, 2013). Its name meaning “place of fire’ originates in the late 1990’s where several sever fires occurred causing complete destruction, and community was forced to organise themselves in order to improve their living environment. The project’s brief overview is represented in (figure 14). The physical construction of the in-situ project begun in 2005 with a collaboration between a number of actors including local NGO’s, Nairobi universities, the Nairobi City Planning Department a team of specialists and the beneficiaries themselves. The approach used was quite similar to the Yerwada housing upgrade programme in Pune. The residents were given an opportunity to finance and construct their own units, with no compensation for landlords who initially owned multiple buildings within the slum. The community had joined forces in 2001 and attained a memorandum of understanding with Nairobi City Council in 2003, which through help of Pamoja trust they had received secure tenure to the land on which they lived. They later received sectional title on their respective land plots of 20.25m2 each, greatly improving their position in regards to housing needs and security of tenure. Although the main funders were Italian developers, Muungano wa Wanavijiji (MwW) also formed a local savings group in 2000 to aid and support the finance the construction materials and hire skilled labourers (World Habitat Awards 2009). Each household contributed 10 %, saving group contributed another 10%, while the remaining 80% come through a loan from Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT), a pro-poor finance facility in Kenya. Community-Led Infrastructure Finance Facility (CLIFF) propelled the project in 2008/2009 by supplying capital grant funding as loan for one of the Kambimoto phases (Homeless International, 2009). A very low interest rate reimbursement period of between 6 to 8 years was agreed with AMT (refer to figure 15).

Fig 15 : Community memebers updating their savings financing with CLIFF

Fig. 15: Pamoja Trust, 2010

Fig. 16: Pamoja Trust, 2010

Fig 16: Meeting held amongst community, NGO and specialist discuss implementation process of units Participation of the community was key from the beginning, the technical team presented various unit designs to choose from, and delivered specialist support during construction. The model developed through a collaboration between specialist (surveyors, planners, engineers, architects,) and the community who were aided by Pamoja Trust (Weru, 2004:59; Alam et al, 2005:19). After consultation with the community, a life-sized house model was erected in the settlement to examine the designâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s suitability (as shown in figure 16, 17 and 18). The favoured model was a 3 storied concept, which could be constructed in stages over a period of time. Firstly, each of the 34 family units received equal sized plots then house dimensions were provided after. There was flexibility as well with the pace of construction depending on each familyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s situation (Chege, 2013).

Fig 17: Community memebers discussing their housing design needs

Fig. 17: Pamoja Trust, 2010

Fig 18: Community memebers analysing the life sized housing unit models

Fig. 18: Pamoja Trust, 2010

First phase done for 34 units, consisted of construction of ground level, which is a bedroom with kitchenette, and a staircase leading to first level where a toilet would be constructed as well. The community was trained in the production and assembly of the pre-cast elements and other building modules such as metal window frames and doors (Ettyang, 2011:8; Pamoja Trust, 2008:25). Each family was expected to participate in constructing its own ground level unit, at least 80 hours of labour was required for first stage, with support from specialist and labourers. The excavation and foundation work for all houses took place concurrently. Additional floors and finishes were left to the families’ choice and affordability, with support. ‘Ladhi’ slabs, a form of affordable pre-cast technology used in Kenya (refer to figure 19 and 20), was used as structural support elements.

Fig 19: A beneficiary producing precast elements for constuction

Fig. 19: Pamoja Trust, 2010

Fig 20: Community labourers at work with construction of units Fig. 20: Pamoja Trust, 2010

The use of manual labour instead of machinery or formwork enabled the construction and material costs to become affordable as well as providing job opportunities for the community. Another benefit of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;ladhiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; structure is that it provided terraced roofs for additional space, plus they could be later transformed into floors. Materials used were prefabricated on site as well, reducing transportation costs and providing and enhancing skills within the community (refer to figure 19 and 20). One criticism the project faces is its lack of consideration to the initial shack owners who rented the structures as a form of income, as there is absence of renting in the scheme produced by Pamoja Trust (The incremental house, 2012). The community also favoured the same notion as agreement ensued from the beginning where unit holders were not allowed to own more than 1 unit and if the it did occur then their initial status as tenants would prevail (Kambimoto resident; personal communication, 15 September 2012).

Fig 21: Left Showing a single house unit and Right showing different levels of completion and materiality preference of different housing units

Fig. 20: Pamoja Trust, 2010

Fig 22 : Showing new improved constuction of Kambimoto neighbourhoood on the right in comparison to the original shanyt stuctures still waiting for upgrading on the left.

The first cluster of 34 units was completed by 2007. Since its initiation the second and third phase consisting of 28 and 24 units respectively were completed by 2009. The fourth and last face of the project consisting of 57 units was completed in 2014. The increase in materials used and labour cost in the completed units led to a doubling of the initial cost of Ksh 200,000 thus the loans repayment periods were extended to 8 years from initial 2 years to help community afford the costs. Additional units have greatly followed the original design, with varied aesthetics and quality of materials used dependent on a familyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s income. Although the neighbourhood safety and health conditions have improved than of its original form as a slum, it still needs more improvement in regards to sanitation (exposed sewerage pipes), improved materiality and construction technology (damp walls), and maintenance.

Fig. 22: Pamoja Trust, 2010

4.4. CASE STUDY: MATHARE 4A, MATHARE

VALLEY

Project location

Fig 23 : Map showing location of Mather 4A village within Mathare Valley

Fig 8 : Soweto East Overview

Fig. 23: Authors work, Diangâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;a (2012)

II.

Case study overview

Fig 25 : Mathare 4A village project overview

Fig.24: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Fig. 25: Authors work,

Outline The Mathare 4A upgrading project is an example of a tri-sector (private/state/voluntary) initiative that resulted from collaboration between the state, local religious societies, private sector, external funders (Germany), and community groups (Otiso, 2003; Kusienya, 2004). The projects aim was to upgrade living standards of Mathare 4A residents through the construction of business stalls, schools, a sewerage and water reticulation system, water drainage system, street lighting system, and shower, 8000 housing units and toilet facilities per every 10 houses. This project was aimed to cover roughly 18.5 hectares of Mathare slum area and end up benefiting roughly 20,000-25,000 slum dwellers when completed (Otiso, 2000).

Fig 25 : Showing unit structures before improvements( corrugated metal sheets) on the left, and after upgrading ( use of brick materials) on the right

Fig.26: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Different actors had different roles to play in the project based on their strengths and capabilities. The Kenyan and German state funded the project jointly donating US$6.4â&#x20AC;&#x201C;7.5 million, furthermore the GoK (Government of Kenya) provided land to community and allowed more adaptable affordable design and construction methods to be implemented in the projects realisation (Kigochie, 2001). The voluntary participants mainly included 2 actors Approtec (Appropriate Technology) and the Catholic Church of Kenya (CCK). The CCK was the initiator of the project and lead NGO acting as an intermediary between the community and other actors, advocate for the slum dwellers, project implementer and manager, and community mobilizer. The German government which was the lead funder asserted that an NGO had to be the implementing body, as GoK had poor track records in regards to utilization of donor funds in the past decades. Thus the churchâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commitment to social development and its familiarity with social slum conditions, especially in Mathare region, made it the best candidate responsible for the projects management and implementation (Mwananchi, No. 274, April, 1999). Amani Housing Trust, an associate of the CCK, influenced both the Kenyan and German government to fund the project, and also influenced GoK to provide the land (and currently hold the land title) and allow adaptability of building designs and regulations. The adapted designs and construction regulations allowed for construction of smaller rooms areas per housing unit, as well as construction using affordable non-conventional building materials which helped 39

maintain low cost of the upgrade project and avoiding displacement of residents. Additionally, as mediators CCK ensured smooth implementation of the project by managing other partners as well. The local community, have managed to not only benefit from the project but also be involved through contribution of labour and funds, logistical assistance, political support when project face external threats especially form displaced landlords, through the support of CCK as mobilizers (Kigochie, 2001,Etherton, 1971 and Otiso, 2000). Approtec’s responsibility involved providing technology for creation of low cost bricks ad tiles used for construction of housing units. Other actors from the private sector involved 4 main actors. The first being Wabere construction in charge of physically realising the project’s physical infrastructure such sewerage and roads, and housing units. The remaining 3 – Birdi Civil Engineers, Keyplan Consultants and Gitec Consultants – were in charge of the legality and safety of the built infrastructure and housing. Fig 27 : Meeting between Amani Housing Trust and community memebers

Fig.27: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Despite the projects initial successful ongoing implementation process, it is important to acknowledge that the project has currently come to a standstill under new management of KENSUP. According to research by Rebak (2007), tribalism, corruption, conceptual differences and lack of proper communication channels and led to the downfall of Mathare 4A slum upgrading project. The main cause of its downfall has been associated to incitement by local political leaders who previously owned structures within the upgraded houses. Political leaders and landlords interrupted the project by provoking rent strikes and influence criminals to burn houses within the slum. This later led to mistrust between the slum dwellers and the project implementers. Sadly, residents came to believe that the project provided no benefits to them. Since rent strikes meant that no resident was to pay rent, Amani Housing Trust saving scheme experienced financial disruptions and shortfalls. This handicapped the project since rent had been the internally generated revenue resource that paid for the maintenance and construction of roads with the slum (Rebak, 2007). 40

Fig.28: Kris, C. (2016). Mission of Hope Mathare Valley. [image] Available at: http:// kcinkenya.com/about/ [Accessed 15 Jul. 2016]. .reuters.com/article/ ozabs-kenya-propertyidAFJOE83A07720120411 [Accessed 2 Jun. 2016].

Fig 28 : Dilupitated current conditions of the Mathare 4A tir-sector upgrade initiative

In 2000 the project stopped after employees were badgered, intimidated and structures vandalised. There was a however a restart of the project in 2003 where the structures were purchased from existing structure owners and rents reduced. By 2007, 98 percent of the roads had been completed with only 50 percent of housing upgrading complete. However, the projects upgradation future became uncertain as the implementing office became financially unstable. Though the state through KENSUP took up from AHT, no significant change has been noted. Despite the challenges Mathare 4A project has experienced, itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s important to note that the primary intended results were admirable. It had managed to bypass the accomplishments of prior slum upgrading projects in Kenya, through demonstrating the potential efficiency of multi-sector collaborations in realising low-income urban needs.

5. Findings and Discussion

Case studies outcomes and comparative analysis In the earlier international case studies discussed in the literature review, as well as the later NGO and community led interventions in Nairobi, it appears that inhabitants’ opinions were assimilated into the project’s structure and the executing stakeholders operated around their ideas to integrate the communities’ views on the upgradation process. Although this is a common challenge in majority of the developments of informal settlements, in the case of Soweto-East Zone A, although the residents were given a chance to voice their opinions, their ideas are not accommodated in the stakeholders’ plans thus project ends up being imposed on the community. The shareholders’ failure to realise the importance in co-production, collaborative and communicative strategies results in a number of problems that become evident and affect the projects planned success. This research paper analyses the case studies of state-led Soweto East initiative in comparison with community/NGO led initiatives of Kambimoto and Mathare 4A, and principles and guidelines derived from the later projects so as to influence the Soweto East Zone A project. The issues derived from Soweto East project and themes emerged from Kambimoto and Mathare are listed below. Issues and themes are divided into the following analysis clusters: • planning • management • service • economy • participation

CASES

MAIN CASE: SOWETO EAST, ZONE A, KIBERA

PLANNING Relating to project goals agreed upon by the partners and the beneficiaries and the success or limitations of those goals Cons • Purpose of resolving housing fails to an extend as units are sub-let, some as rooms others the whole house, as forms of business for residents (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013 ) • Slum eradication instead seem to be creating new informal settlements within the temporal location and also being formed elsewhere in Kibera (Good Fortune, 2009 ) • Process or upgrade slow, some other areas (Railways) facing evictions population of nearby residents (Good Fortune, 2009) • Fear of projects failures due to wrong intentions of politics, power, corruption. Leaves them destitute

Fig.1: Greg Scruggs, (2015)

• Kenyan government is committed to issuing a communal title for each municipal building, not favoured process by the tenants of Kibera, who prefer individual titles, issuing of security of tenure of new housing in Kibera facing a lot of challenges (Stenton, 2015 ) • Some Soweto East residents decided to skip the decanting site and are instead waiting out the interim period as renters back home in the slum. Others have opted to illegally sublet their decanting site units and voluntarily move back into slum housing (Rimui, 2011 ) • Fear of corruption in housing allocation of housing, not being able to pay for the new house, feared the lengthy and obscure process. implementation of such a complex project seemed to be very long (causing lack of confidence and the feeling that it would become another incomplete project) • Unsure of the future, projects structure and process not clear not defined ( Muraguri, 2012 ) • The needs of the vulnerable (physically challenged) tenants not considered in design of the temporal location (refer to figure 2) Fig.2: Upgrade of housing units at different levels ( Greg Scruggs, 2015)

Sloped access with no room for ramps for the disabled. Vertical design also inhibits access

Fig.2: Greg Scruggs,. Soweto East Relocation Apartment Units, Langata. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2016.

Pros Conclusion •

KENSUP has succeeded in building some schools, roads, clinics and other facilities (Muraguri, 2012 )

•

KENSUP Kibera Soweto pilot project integrated lessons and recommendations from past experiences, even if these recommendations were made from commissioned government studies and initiatives (Muraguri, 2012 )

•

UN-Habitat’s approach is to help city governments — and often national governments — come up with a strategy and help them implement it (Stenton, 2015 )

•

UN-Habitat seeks to leverage its partnership with privatesector entities like Cisco, Orange Telecom, and BASF to build resource centres such as the one in Soweto East (Stenton, 2015 )

•

KENSUP new National Housing Policy in Kenya - Kenyan Government adopted a more pro-poor approach and stopped viewing slums as areas to be demolished but as areas to be rehabilitated ( UN-Habitat, 2009 )

•

Specific department, the Slum Upgrading Department (SUD), within the Ministry of Housing was created to specifically address the issue of slums, strengthened by the commitment of this ministry to finance KENSUP ( UNHabitat, 2009 )

•

Successful pilot project which has led to its upscale of more unit construction as well greatly improved the lives of the beneficiaries (Ettyang, 2011:8; Pamoja Trust,

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

2008:25 ) •

Enabled residents to acquire suitable accommodation and become owners of their units

•

Improved the living conditions and expectations of the informal settlement and its surroundings

•

Empowered the community to scale up the project (Pamoja Trust, 2008:25 ) 45

•

Successful planning and implementation, in-situ, upgradation works for the project (refer to image 3 )

Image 3: Upgrading of unit done on same site as initial shack dwelling ( Ettyang’,2011)

Construction of new units

MATHARE 4A

Demolition of shack unit

•

Successful tri-sector partnership

•

Avoided displacement of community members by managing to keep project cost friendly and affordable noteworthy success

•

Demolishing shacks only when the rebuilding process is ready to be constructed

•

Constructing new units before demolition of old shacks,

•

Accommodating inhabitants in temporal units whilst their upgraded units are constructed

•

Although initially planned as a tenant-purchase scheme, Amani NGO developed it into renter-occupied scheme to evade the likelihood of beneficiaries reversing the project into an income earner scheme thereby defeating the upgrades purpose ( Otiso, 2000 )

•

This move however restricting on 8% who were landlords, was necessary as previous mistakes had been done on other project which had undermined their success (Syagga and Kiamba, 1992)

•

Although the project has been a challenge the result has been noteworthy, considering the complexities of players involved

Fig.3:Kamukam Ettyang’. Empowering the Urban Poor to Realize the Right to Housing: CommunityLed Slum Upgrading in Huruma, Nairobi. Les cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, p.147-p.158.

CASES

PLANNING: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

•

In all three cases each family in slum settlements eventually has equal access to either own or rent their new housing unit

•

In both cases, each household in the informal settlement potentially has equal access to benefit (either own or rent) in the new housing environment

•

The Kambimoto and Mathare 4A schemes by their designs and response to density accommodates all the households in the same portion of land they formerly occupy, but the Soweto project has failed to achieve this

•

Soweto East case was that of middle-class homes designed for low-income earners while in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A, low-income homes were designed for the urban poor

CASES

MAIN CASE: SOWETO EAST, ZONE A, KIBERA

MANAGEMENT Relating to success and limitations of partnerships in regards to projects maintenance and co-ordination, between partners and community beneficiaries •

Overcrowding house sharing of new apartment of up to 4 families (4-7 members each) (refer to Image 4)

Image 4: the sharing of an apartment amongst different families ( Rosa Flores, 2011) Fig.4:Rosa Flores Fernandez, Bernard Calas. The Kibera Soweto East Project in Nairobi, Kenya. Les cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, pp.129-146. <halshs-00751873>

Family unit with 4 members sharing 1 bedroom

•

Another family unit in adjacent room

Sharing of kitchen, bathroom and toilet

Disagreements between government and residents about management of the blocks; self-inflicted problems, no management committee (Stenton, 2015 )

•

Political implications of KENSUP being greatly supported but also controlled by government (Stenton, 2015 )

•

Those who refused to be relocated moved to Zone B, C, D

•

Middle class and students taking advantage of the housing deal instead, due to its location and cost. According to SUD. Kibera tenants sub-letting, moving back to Kibera. However, SEC members refute this (Stenton, 2015 )

•

Social structure not considered, residents are reluctant to share their space in the apartments, due to having different neighbours to those in the slum (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013 )

•

Social fragmentation brought about by the relocation, and vertical stacking of apartments has led to breaking of neighbourhood ties, is accompanied by a high prevalence of psychological disorders (refer to image 5)

Image 5: high-rise apartment blocks, vertical stacking of unit households ( Rosa Flores, 2011)

Fig.5:Rosa Flores Fernandez, Bernard Calas. The Kibera Soweto East Project in Nairobi, Kenya. Les cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, pp.129-146. <halshs-00751873>

Vertical stacking of units resulting in destruction of neighborhood ties •

Infiltration of SEC by certain notables is a failure of the promotion of participation, the institutionalisation of the representation of the residential community is quite innovative in the context of Kenyan urban policy and credit is due to KENSUP (Muraguri, 2012 )

•

Even at the community level, the actions of some leaders or members of the Committee (SEC) have been challenged by residents who complain about their absence in meetings and lack of communication between the affected community and those responsible for the project implementation (Good Fortune, 2009 )

•

Although in voluntary capacity, SEC officials are the primary beneficiaries of the project 49

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Collaboration and effort amongst all actors of project led to creation of community groups, saving plans (Pamoja Trust, 2008:25 )

•

Up scalability of the project has made it a role model and inspired other informal settlement upgrading projects within the area and country as a whole

•

Pamoja trust has managed to achieve a successful collaboration between the specialists and the community (Ettyang, 2011 )

MATHARE 4A

•

Keeping a tight vetting system that ensure Mathare residents are the only beneficiaries and not members of higher income group ( Otiso, 2000 )

•

Legally binding agreement that is signed to ensure dwellers take part in developments of their neighbourhood

•

Amani has had to combat with opposing external forces such as landlords and initial shack owners, despite their structures being compensated for considering they had been built illegally

•

Some of these opposition had become tribal at times forced the NGO to appeal for support from the Catholic Archbishop, senior government officials, or the German government to keep the project going (Kigochie, 2001)

•

Noteworthy success in co-ordinating the actions of the trisector actors and beneficiaries whose interest have at times been conflicting, where the project was at times forced to slow down or paused (Syagga and Kiamba, 1992)

CASES

MANAGEMENT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

â&#x20AC;˘ This difference can be attributed to the low levels of meaningful participation and community involvement in Soweto-East and the deep engagement undertaken in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A â&#x20AC;˘ Both Kambimoto and Mathare 4A explored alternative building materials and technology, as well as an incremental construction in Kambimoto which resulted in cost reduction and enhanced affordability

CASES

MAIN CASE: SOWETO EAST, ZONE A, KIBERA

SERVICE Relating to amenities created by the project that influences the community either positively or negatively •

Water shortages and severe rationing makes new accommodation no better (Rimui, 2011 )

•

Garbage disposal poor and poor open sanitation system (refer to image 6)

Image 6: poor waste disposal surrounding the temporal location ( Greg Scrugg, 2015)

•

Not enough security within the relocation site (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013 )

•

Promised retail kiosks were not delivered. Additionally a ban on informal shops is only partly enforced, but in general the commercial needs of the temporary community are way underserved (Good Fortune, 2009 )

•

Jobs created for community youth through garbage collection ( refer to image 7 ) Image 7: waste collection within temporal location neighborhood by youth (Greg Scrugg, 2015)

Youth get jobs through garbage collection, paid by SUP

Fig.6 and 7: Greg Scruggs,. Soweto East Relocation Apartment Units, Langata. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2016.

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Enhancing and creating skills within the community, labourers, material providers

•

Reduced construction costs allowed affordable housing, and creation of skilled labour (Pamoja Trust, 2008 )

•

Co-production in the project led to improved communities living situation, provision of security of tenure, better housing standards, access to electricity and water supply, improved sanitation control

•

Collaboration of the community

•

Community was trained in construction and labouring skills creating jobs enhancing skills

•

Providing construction and labouring skills and services to the improvement of neighbouring slum dwellings(Toomey, 2010).

MATHARE 4A

•

Major enhancement in the access to basic services such as roads, sewerage and improved quality of housing (Kigochie, 2001 and Mwaanchi , 1999)

•

Rent cost have managed to remain low despite the upgrade process in the neighbourhood, thus avoiding relocation of dwellers

•

Hurdle faced in the project is residents’ discontentment with the upgraded unit’s sizes being too small, which Amani has justified is necessary if the whole population is to be housed as well as provide room for infrastructure (refer to image 8) (Mwananchi, 1999)

Image 8: single household unit occupy same area as original shack area ( Diang’a, 2012)

Fig.8: Diang’a, S. (2012). Regularizing Informal Settlements for Sustainable Housing Development: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya. Gesellschafter, Lambert Academic Publishing

No higher level incremental construction

CASES

SERVICE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

â&#x20AC;˘

Equality of access, the new houses resulting from the upgrading scheme are developed on the same portion of land occupied by the settlement, with a bit of a variation in Soweto East upgrade which uses temporal units and site

â&#x20AC;˘

In-situ interventions but social fabric in the informal settlement communities would not remain the same in the redeveloped and differently configured housing environment in the case of Soweto East as the neighbourhood fabric is disrupted

CASES

MAIN CASE: SOWETO EAST, ZONE A, KIBERA

ECONOMY Relating to how the project has had a monetary related impact on the community. •

Low housing interest rates

•

High rent of Ksh 3000, of which services included Ksh 300 electricity, ksh 200 water, 75% tenants of Soweto East don’t have formal jobs. Triple increase from Ksh 500 per room in Kibera (Good Fortune, 2009 )

•

Lack of planning of economic spaces for kiosk, most tenants business people. Kiosk taken up playing grounds and garden grounds (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013 )

•

Project also suffers from lack of analysis and consideration of the residents’ economic activities as well as informal economy was not considered in the project (refer to image 9 and 10) Image 9 and 10: informal activities carried out in recreational areas and ground level balconies ( Rosa Flores, 2011)

Informal shop owner selling her goods

Fig.9 and 10:Rosa Flores Fernandez, Bernard Calas. The Kibera Soweto East Project in Nairobi, Kenya. Les cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, pp.129-146. <halshs-00751873>

Some shop occupy a room in the unit

Those on higher levels use the grounds

Playground makeshift

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Negative Socio-economic impact arise when unfamiliar families are forced live together, security, mistrust, loss of neighbours and friends, loss of income sources (jobs, customers), increased work transport

•

Difficulty of registering members into co-operatives and micro-credit schemes as there is lack of trust in the project (Stenton, 2015 )

•

Use of design, construction materials and techniques that are not affordable to low income earners of Kibera residents (refer to image 11)

Image 11: construction of Soweto East temporal apartments in Langata ( Greg Scruggs, 2015)

Fig.11: Greg Scruggs,. Soweto East Relocation Apartment Units, Langata. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2016.

Kibera lower income units in the background

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

Construction techniques used for middle class housing

•

Creation of jobs maximise on skills of community

•

Provision of jobs to the community as labourers, material providers as the project sought to look from within to source the project

•

Increased costs of construction doubling form initial cost led to increase of labour costs and material cost enhancing the trade of constructions within the community (Pamoja Trust, 2008 )

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Skills being put into good use beyond the needs of the projects, income generating (refer to image 12)

Image 12: locally sourced labourers, construction materials making the project affordable ( Ettyang’,2011)

Fig.12:Kamukam Ettyang’. Empowering the Urban Poor to Realize the Right to Housing: CommunityLed Slum Upgrading in Huruma, Nairobi. Les cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, p.147-p.158.

Local labourers constructing new units MATHARE 4A

Locally sourced materials used in construction

•

Rent charges based on dwellers affordability

•

Use of a flexible rent collection system allows stretching the rental payment in bits throughout a month (Kigochie, 2001)

•

The adaptable design and techniques employed in the project enabled it to remain affordable by maintaining low building costs, pre-upgraded rent

•

Adapted building designs allowed households to continue their trade as a source of income (refer to image 13 ) Image 13: upgrade of housing units ( Diang’a, 2012)

Shop space available before improvements

Fig.13: Diang’a, S. (2012). Regularizing Informal Settlements for Sustainable Housing Development: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya. Gesellschafter, Lambert Academic Publishing

Shop space available after improvements

CASES

ECONOMY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

• Finance arrangements for residents to own or rent their unit in the schemes are also open to all projects • Although beneficiaries in each project have equal access to houses, we see that the ability to afford their future homes is notably different • Houses in the Kambimoto and Mathare 4A scheme are generally affordable to the residents. Soweto East development is still on course, but from all indications, outputs will not be affordable for the residents • Fears of Soweto-East project resembles and might turn out like the contentious Kibera High Rise project of the early 1990s and the Pumwani-Majengo Slum redevelopment Phase II, both by the National Housing Corporation (Huchzermeyer, 2008:21). Apart from the negative influence of corruption, houses in both later cases were taken up by the middle-class because they were unaffordable to the intended beneficiaries • Less amount of energy was used in production (for example construction, laying of infrastructure) and sustenance (transport costs, energy costs for housing operation) in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A projects due to their localised nature, when compared to Soweto East

CASES

MAIN CASE: SOWETO EAST, ZONE A, KIBERA

PARTICIPATION Relating to community engagement and positive and negative results of failing to adapt the community’s concerns •

Resident voiced that they weren’t consulted on upgrade rehabilitation project (Good Fortune, 2009)

•

17% interviewed expressed their desire to want to build their own homes rather than be relocated

•

Insufficient attention paid to resident’s requirements cannot afford new units thus forced to share with other unfamiliar families (Stenton, 2015)

•

51% of the residents not in agreement with the relocation project

•

Tribal issues raised by the temporal relocation area considered to be ‘Luo’ territory, from Soweto area ‘Kikuyu’, by the ‘Raila’ village that considers that area to be theirs (Anderson & Mwelu, 2013 )

•

UN-HABITAT critiqued role in late intervention (interviews days before relocation) at participatory processes in slum upgrading ( UN-Habitat, 2009 )

•

Kenyan government is committed to issuing a communal title for each municipal building, not favoured process by the tenants of Kibera. issue of security of tenure of new housing in Kibera (Good Fortune, 2009)

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Community participation in the designing of the model and in its construction processes as well was required

•

Community engagement in the creation of saving loans groups to aid in financing the building of their individual units

•

Skilled members in construction, labouring and material provision are using their skills and resources to upgrade neighbouring informal settlements (Toomey, 2010). 59

KAMBIMOTO, HURUMA

•

Community was hugely involved in the designs and construction process of the project (refer to image 14) Image 6: construction of life-sized model used to interact with dwellers and get feedback ( Pamoja Trust, 2010)

Slum dwellers voicing their opinions •

Slum dwellers required to upgrade there units from the second levels onwards at their own affordable pace (refer to image 15)

Image 15: upgrade of housing units at different levels (Pamoja Trust, 2010)

One unit under construction MATHARE 4A

•

Another unit completed

Enhancing local support and participation through reassurance of the upgrade process and its affordability (Mwananchi,1999)

•

Implementation has at times been slowed on occasion where dwellers have complained about political interference by local and national leaders, as well as Amani’s overbearingness (Kigochie, 2001) Fig.14 and 15: Pamoja Trust. (2010). Profile of Huruma Settlement

•

Negotiation of controls of each actor have been achieved where a consensus has been achieved to ensure continuation of the project Dialogues have been held where actors have successfully created joint managements (Mwananchi, 1991)

CASES

SUMMARY

PARTICIPATION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

• It is important to note that while in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A project process and implementation was agreed through a process of negotiation with area slum dwellers, in Soweto East, this decision was imposed on residents, leading to a dispute between landlords and the government that significantly delayed project implementation • This difference can be attributed to the low levels of meaningful participation and community involvement in Soweto-East and the deep engagement undertaken in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A

6. Conclusion Recommendations

Fig. 1 and 2: Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http:// greatphotojournalism. com/christianals_ series676.

Despite the fact that a number of upgrading projects on slum settlements have been implemented in Kenya the overall result has been diminutive. Slum settlements still remain a huge reality in the countries urban fabric. The case discussed in previous chapter on Soweto East looks at example of project whose efforts have been least effective in comparison with more successful Kambimoto and Mathare 4A projects. It compares the former state led initiative with the later 2 community-led and NGO led initiatives respectively; analysing the benefits, opportunities and shortcomings of the different initiative processes. It also expresses the benefits of when slum dwellers, CBOs and NGOs work together to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers as opposed to when the state solely initiates and implements the upgradation processes. While the improvements made in Kambimoto and Mathare 4A are better suited to the urban poor and enhance socio-economic empowerment of the community, whilst those in Soweto East fail to achieve this. Its design is unsuitable to the beneficiaries intended making it unaffordable, and its implementation does not support community participation, or socio-economic empowerment. When it comes to housing and service provision in the upgrade processes of informal settlements projects that have a co-productive, collaborative and participative approach tend to become more successful as is the case in the Mathare 4A and Kambimoto project. In Kambimoto we see how a collaboration between NGO’s, private sector, and community organisation propelled the accomplishment of the project, even allowing its up-scalability. In the case of Mathare 4A we see how a tri-sector co-production of the slum has allowed its upgradation process to continue running successfully, being a crucial element considering the scale of the project. It is evident that partnerships amongst the voluntary, private and state sector are essential in an upgradation project as each sector has a huge role in providing varied levels of support depending on its capacity and capabilities. In the case of Soweto East, a state led initiative, despite the large scale efforts of the project it is evident that the impact it has on upgradation of Kibera slum is limited when compared to the other 2 case studies. In the voluntary initiative expressed in Kambimoto it is evident that in small-scale project of Kambimoto, the voluntary sector is able to achieve bigger impact in the improvements of slum conditions within those areas. Whereas in the case of Mathare 4A, due to its tri-sector partnerships being well regulated, the private sector is able to provide a huge impact and on a larger scale. According to Otiso (2000) the varied capabilities of these sectors proves that collaborating together ‘fosters success by utilizing mutual strengths and skills, promoting community participation, local capacity-building, self-help and empowerment, efficient resource mobilization, and diffusion of best practices’. Despite the fact that each sector’s degree of involvement in upgrade partnerships varies, their aim in collaboration is similar, to overcome their limitations and enhance their impact by taking advantage of each other’s strengths. Therefore, each sector is drawn to partner up with each other so as to achieve certain objectives that would surpass the price of contribution. In regards to the state, its involvement in a slum upgradation process would enhance its political acceptability and backing by its citizens and enhance its possibilities of receiving external aid as well to support urban needs of the country (Tripp,1992 and Aina, 1997). The CBOs and NGOs would be involved in order to attain intangible and tangible resources required such as material contributions, funding, and technical support and most importantly government support which is crucial in regards to land provision, financial support and policy 63

support (Fowler, 1995). Private sectors collaboration allows to acquire a source of profitable opportunities through attaining contract for construction of units and infrastructure (Aina,1997). Apart from the collaboration of the tri-sectors, the urban communities end up being the biggest beneficiaries of partnerships as they gain improved housing and infrastructure services that would previously be unavailable. It is also important to note that regardless of the benefits of a multi-sectoral co-productive upgradation of informal settlements, there are also a few weaknesses experienced in such partnerships. Primarily, the maintenance of partnerships with diverse objectives is no easy feat. This is seen in the Soweto case where a series of conflicts arise between implementers and beneficiaries in regards to choice of housing units and the relocation process which has greatly delayed the initial plans of the project, or in the case of Mathare 4A project where external conflict and internal conflicts have at times led to slowing down or pausing of the projects implementation process. And secondly, the unequal roles in partnerships often led to suppression of the weaker partners, especially in regards to CBOs who tend to lack control due to limited power as in the case of Soweto East where their concerns were ignored by the state, or where bigger partners tend to be overbearing as is the case in Mathare 4A with the Amani NGO. Although the influence of partners varies in different cases, it is evident that order of power starts with the government, then the NGOs, then the CBOs, though at times well-funded NGOs can alter the order. It is however important for the stronger partners should acknowledge this power and opt to empower the beneficiaries by ensuring community participation and collaboration so as to guarantee effectiveness and efficiency of a project as is seen in the Kambimoto project. The paper seeks to express that co-production and collaboration of tri-sectors partnerships is beneficial especially when dealing large scale projects as in the case of Mathare 4A. Additionally, community led and NGO assisted initiatives as is in the case of Kambimoto, are a better implementation process that ensure community participation and involvement, enhance socio-economic empowerment and enable up-scalability of project. Thus the approaches implemented in Mathare 4A and Kambimoto ought to be adopted and adapted by KENSUP into the Soweto East project to ensure its success. State’s resources as expended in the Soweto east project can be channelled to subsidize construction cost in the implementation of the ‘Kambimoto model’ in that area of Kibera. with respect to completion time, community involvement and empowerment, cost reduction and affordability, socioeconomic sustainability and other measures of project performance, the community-led, NGO-assisted model presents more opportunity. Additionally, partners’ and roles within Soweto East project need to have more defined roles, to avoid cases of overbearingness, undermining and imposition of the upgradation process on the community as is evident in Soweto East. Effective partnerships and collaborations between implementers and beneficiaries generates a setting of mutual understanding that helps actors avoid situations such as government sector inability and inefficiency to co-operate with slum communities, or NGO inability to provide resources. The Soweto East case should seek to adopt actions implemented in Mathare where an NGO is instead given the power to implement and manage the project. Thus state should reduce its power over KENSUP and allow it work as a NGO instead of government organisation, as well as consider involving other supportive NGOs such as Pamoja Trust and Muungano wa Wanavijiji in the project who partner and excel in community engagement with the urban poor.

7. References / Bibliography

Alder, G. (1995). “Tackling Poverty in Nairobi’s Informal Settlements: Developing an Institutional Strategy.”Environment and Urbanization Vol. 7(No. 2): 85-107. Als, C. (n.d.). Kibera- The shadow city. [image] Available at: http://greatphotojournalism.com/ christianals_series676.html#PhotoSwipe1472814366881 [Accessed 10 Aug. 2016]. Amis, P. (1984). Squatters or Tenants: The Commercialization of Unauthorized Hosuing in Nairobi. World Development. 12: 0-105-114. Amnesty International. (2009a). Kenya: The unseen majority: Nairobi’s two million slumDwellers. London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International. (2009b). How the other half lives. London: Amnesty International. Amnesty International. (2009c). Slums: Human rights live here. London: Amnesty International A.M. Tripp, (1992) Local organizations, participation, and the state in urban Tanzania, G. Hyden, M. Bratton (Eds.), Governance and Politics in Africa, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO Anderson, M. & Mwelu K., 2013. Kenya Slum Upgrading Programs: KISIP and KENSUP. Centre for Global Health Cities, Berkely, CA Anon, Incremental Housing Strategy | My Work. Available at: http://martinhopita.wordpress. com/architecture/ihs/ [Accessed April 26, 2016] Barrett, A. & Beardmore, R., 2000. Poverty reduction in India: Towards building successful slumupgrading strategies. World Bank South Asian Urban and City …, I, pp.326–333. Available at: http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-18-02-02.pdf [Accessed June 8, 2016]. Branam, John. (1994). Life in Kibera: A multi-dimensional look at Nairobi’s most highly populated slum. Brandsen, T., & Pestoff, V. (2006). Co-production, the third sector and the delivery of public services. Public Management Review, 8, 493– 501. Beall, J., & Fox, S. (2009). Cities and development. London: Routledge Bovaird, T. (2007). Beyond engagement and participation: User and community co-production of public services. Public Administration Review, 67, 846– 860. Conference Proceedings: Planning Africa 2014 - Making Great Places, 19th -22nd October, 2014, International Convention Centre (ICC), Durban, South Africa ISBN: 978-0-86970-781-4 333 Cronin, V., 2012. Slum upgrading in India and Kenya: investigating the sustainability. University of Cambridge. Available at: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.550171 [Accessed June 12, 2016]. Efm.leeds.ac.uk. (2016). BSHF World Habitat Awards. [online] Available at: http://www.efm. leeds.ac.uk/CIVE/Sewerage/articles/orangi.html [Accessed 20 May 2016]. Ettyang, K. 2011. Empowering the Urban Poor to realise the Right to Housing. INTERNET: halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs. Site Assessed 30 January 2013 65

Friedmann, J. (2000). The Good City: In Defense of Utopian Thinking. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), pp.460-472. Fowler, (1995) NGOs and the globalization of social welfare: Perspectives from East Africa, J. Semboja, O. Therkildsen (Eds.), Service Provision under Stress in East Africa, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen Gaiser, A., Knighton, R. and Kinyua, M. (2016). Orangi Pilot Project. [poster] Sheffield Good Fortune, 2009. (Film) Directed by Landon Van Soest. USA: Transient Pictures Healey, P. (1997) Collaborative Planning. Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Houndmills & London:Macmillan Press). Hillier, J., & Healey, P. (2008). Contemporary movements in planning theory: Critical essays in planning theory vol. 3. Aldershot: Ashgate Huchzermeyer, Marie & Karam, Aly. (2006a). Informal Settlements: A perpetual challenge? South Africa: UCT Press. Huchzermeyer, Marie & Omenya, Alfred. (2006b). Slum upgrading in the complex context of policy change: The case of Nairobi, in Huchzermeyer, Marie & Karam, Aly. (2006a). Huchzermeyer, Marie & Omenya, Alfred. (2006c). Slum upgrading initiatives in Kenya within the basic services and wider housing market: A housing rights concern, in Discussion Paper Joshi, A., & Moore, M. (2004). Institutionalised co-production: Unorthodox public service delivery in challenging environments. Journal of Development Studies, 40, 31 – 49. Keare, Douglas H., and Scott Paris (1982) Evaluation of Shelter Programs for the Urban Poor: Principal Findings. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 547. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Khan, A. (1992). Orangi Pilot Project programs. Karachi: Orangi Pilot Project, Research & Training Institute. Mitlin, D. (2008). With and beyond the state – coproduction as a route to political influence, power and transformation for grassroots organizations. Environment and Urbanization, 20, 339– 360. Mitullah, W V (1992) Towards a policy of upgrading informal settlements and site and service schemes in the city of Nairobi, Kenya.African Urban Quarterly7(1&2, February and May), 186– 194. Muraguri, L., 2012. Kenyan Government Initiatives in Slum Upgrading. Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est, IFRA Nairobi, 2011, 44, pp.119-128 Mwananchi, 1999 Mwananchi (No. 294, April 1999) “Mathare 4A: The true story”. Catholic Church, Nairobi. Obudho, R A (1997) Nairobi: National capital and regional hub. In The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities, (ed.) C Rakodi. United Nations University, Tokyo. Oppinstitutions.org. (2016). WELCOME TO OPP. [online] Available at: http://www. oppinstitutions.org/ [Accessed 20 May 2016] Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development.World Development, 24, 1073– 1087. Otiso, K M (2000) The Voluntary Sector in Urban Service Provision and Planning in Nairobi City, Kenya. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA. Pamoja Trust, 2001. Huruma Informal Settlement – Planning Survey Report. Pamoja Trust. Nairobi. Pamoja Trust, 2008. Annual Report 2008. Pamoja Trust. Nairobi Pamoja Trust. (2010). Profile of Huruma Settlement. 66

Pamoja Trust. (2011). Enumerations and Mapping Manual. Patel, S., 2010. SCALING UP FOR CITYWIDE SLUM UPGRADING IN INDIA. Available at: http://indiausp.org/events/SPARC-Delhi-Case-study.pdf [Accessed April 28, 2016]. Reback, A., 2007. Slum Upgrading Case Study: Nairobi’s Mathare 4A’.Unpublished paper, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania School of Design. Republic of Kenya. (2005a). Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) Implementation Strategy 2005 - 2020. Republic of Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer. Republic of Kenya. (2005b). Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2004 on National Housing Policy for Kenya. Ministry of Lands and Housing. Nairobi: Government Printer. Republic of Kenya. (2007). Kenya Vision 2030, the Popular Version. Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2007. Nairobi: Government Printer. Republic of Kenya. (2009). Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy. Ministry of Lands. Nairobi: Government Printer. Republic of Kenya. (2010). Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Programme, Resettlement Policy Framework. Retrieved January 30, 2011, from Ministry of Housing, Kenya: http://www. housing.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49:-world-habitat-day-2010&catid=3:newsflash Rimui, M. B., 2011. To Investigate Factors Influencing Implementation of Upgrading Projects within Kibera Slums in Nairobi, Kenya. Kenyatta University Seekings, J., & Keil, R. (2009). The international journal of urban and regional research: An editorial statement. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(2), i– x. Shodhana, 2002. Phasing out Plan from Slums of Yerwada - Pune, Stenton, C., 2015. Struggling for the ‘Right to the City’: In Situ Informal Settlement Upgrading in Kibera, Nairobi. Ottawa, Ontario Swyngedouw, E. and Lefebvre, H. (1992). The Production of Space. Economic Geography, 68(3), p.317. Syagga, P and Kiamba, J M (1992) Housing the Urban Poor: A Case Study of Pumwani, Kibera and Dandora Estates in the City of Nairobi, Kenya.African Urban Quarterly7(1&2), 79–88 Syagga, P.M., Mitullah, W. & Kariara-Gitau, S. (2002). Nairobi situation analysis. Nairobi: Government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT T.A. Aina, (1997) The state and civil society: Politics, government, and social organizations in African cities,C. Rakodi (Ed.), The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York and Paris, pp. 411–446 Turner, J., 1988. The squatter settlement: An architecture that works. Architectural Design. Available at: http://ojs.ruc.dk/index.php/pdc/article/view/342 [Accessed June 20, 2016]. UN-Habitat, 2003. The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003. United Nations Human Settlement Programme. ISBN-13: 978-1844070374 UN-HABITAT. (2007). UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme. Nairobi UN-HABITAT. (2008a). Minutes of the Design and Redevelopment Committee Meeting, Thursday, 26 June 2008 UN-HABITAT. (2008b). Soweto East Redevelopment Proposal. UN-HABITAT. (2008c). UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy Document. Nairobi UN-HABITAT. (2009). Satisfaction relocation survey to Lang’ata decanting site. UN-HABITAT. (2010). State of the world’s cities 2010/2011: Bridging the Urban Divide. Overview and Key Findings. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. United Nations Population Division (2012), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision, 67

, 302 pages; also Parnell, Susan and Ruwani Walawege (2011), “SubSaharan African urbanization and global environmental change”, Global Environmental Change 21S, pages S12−S20. UN-Habitat, 2013. State of the World’s Cities 2012/2013. Prosperity of Cities. State of the World’s Cities. HS/080/12E UN-Habitat, 2014. Kibera Integrated Water Sanitation and Waste Management Project. Progress and Promise: Innovations in Slum Upgrading. Report Watson, V. (2002). The usefulness of normative planning theories in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Planning Theory, 1, 27 – 52. Watson, V. (2009). Seeing from the south: Refocusing urban planning on the globe’s central urban issues. Urban Studies, 46, 2259– 2275.