Volume VII- Winter 2018

BRANCHES THE MCGILL UNDERGRADUATE ENVIRONMENT JOURNAL VOLUME 07 . WINTER 2018

McGill University

Montreal, Canada

Bra nc hes acknowledges th a t McG ill is o n t radit io n al Haud enosaunee t err it o ry .

Acknowledgements Copyright © Branches: The McGill Undergraduate Environment Journal, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2018. Editorial selection, compilation and material © by the Editorial Board of Branches and its contributors. Branches is an academic journal of McGill University with submissions by students. Printed and bound in Canada by Solutions Rubiks Inc. All rights reserved. Except for brief passages quoted and cited from external authors, no part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any way of form without the permission in writing from the publisher. Special thanks to the Arts Undergraduate Society of McGill University, the McGill Environment Students’ Society and the Environmental Residence Council for enabling the publication of this journal. Cover photo by Matthew King. V is i t u s on F ace book a t McG i llBra nches .

BRANCHES THE MCGILL UNDERGRADUATE ENVIRONMENT JOURNAL

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Elena Friederike Kennedy Emma Sutherland UNDERGRADUATE EDITORS Maha Asad Clara Michels Christina Baik Ewa Nizalowska Jessica Di Bartolomeo Agnessa Karapetian Mackenzie J. Bleho Reine Donnestad Sevrenne Sheppard Kristen Lalla Rasha Lama Gabi Gionet Cody Kane

Maya Lew Caroline Lou Shivang Mahajan Carey Miao-Tang Giovanni Antonucci Blythe Middlebrook Tamara Mitchell Alexis Newman Dassyn Barris Grace Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Brien Antonina Scheer Scarlett Xiao

DESIGN EDITORS Thomas King Marie Labrosse Charlotte Zaininger

Table of Contents

Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

Las Cruciatas

Abigail Drach

Climate Change and Canadian International Development NGOs

The Maladaptation of Tourism Development Plans on the Galápagos Islands

Health and the Environment: China’s Cancer Village Phenomenon

Drowning Cities

Working Against Waves

Socio-Environmental Conflicts Caused by Hydroelectric Development on the Río Chiriquí Viejo

A Theoretical Assessment of Green Bonds as an Innovative Climate Change Mitigation Tool

The Great Bear Rainforest: From Conflict to Resolution

Ellen Gillies

Frances Miltimore

Quinn Barrie-Watts Fiona McRaith Matthew King

Constance Lambert-Tremblay and Antonina Scheer

Audrey Azerot Andrew Stein

Mammalian Carnivores and Maasai Pastoralists: Thoughts for Carnivore Conservation Going Forward

102

About the Contributors

114

About the Editors

116

Daniel Silver

Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

I am very excited to share with you the seventh issue of Branches. We are a journal that strives to showcase the work of undergraduate students in the environmental sciences and environmental studies. This issue has been two years in the making, and has benefitted from the contributions of numerous students from a variety of backgrounds. Talking, researching and writing about the environment requires interdisciplinarity, drawing on the teachings of the physical and social sciences and transcending the boundaries between departments and faculties. We hope this issue offers a glimpse of the richness and diversity of the environmental field at McGill University. We recognize that learning can take place inside a classroom or out in the field, and information can be transmitted through conventional academic writing as well as personal essays and creative work. To that end, we feature a broad range of pieces, including poetry, art, photography, essays and research papers. I am inspired every day by the intelligent, driven and passionate people that surround me in the School of Environment and in the broader McGill community. Students, researchers and staff make consistent efforts to advance their field, volunteer for important initiatives, show solidarity with marginalized communities and hold our institutions accountable. These individuals constantly work to leave the world better than it was before. It has been an absolute honour and privilege to uplift a few of these voices in this issue of Branches. This journal would not have been completed without the dedication of our team. Our authors put their beautiful writing in our hands to be dissected, and our editors reviewed and revised each piece extensively. Our design editors committed many hours to assembling the journal, and our artists and photographers provided beautiful artwork to enrich the publication. Thank you to Elena for dedicating herself to the journal and creating the foundation on which this issue was built. I would also like to offer special thanks to those who passed on their knowledge and offered their support from afar: Nessa, Dassyn, Marie and Sevrenne. On behalf of the Branches team, Bonne lecture!

Gartered Trogon

Trogon caligatus Jessee Tinslay

Las Cruciatas By Abigail Drach The following poem was inspired by a decade-long saga of court cases between the Canadian mining company Infinito Gold and the Costa Rican government. The saga began when under pressure from local and international activists, the Costa Rican government withdrew permission for an open-pit gold mine in a region known as Las Cruciatas. The company then turned to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Over the course of a series of more cases and appeals, Infinito Gold went bankrupt, further complicating the case. Gold These trees are the past Irrelevant to you and me. They shrivel in the shadow of modernity. The now is gold. Gold. Gold. Shining like sunshine with fortune to hold In two strong hands That know how to fuck the land just so She exhales an oh oh yes Gold. The trees are rather old, wouldn’t you say Their shade has obscured the opulence Of the glittering gold down below—Nonsense To allow them to continue such offense To the sensibility of modern man Damn mother greenery Holy father scenery Bleeding hearts call us obscene revile us all Alright, let them if they want to We swear to the depths of this open golden pit to haunt you ICSID be our judge! So civil society mobilizes for the sake of their precious land Concerned foreign Samaritans decide to lend a hand Still we sue and we sue

For we have a right to do We sue and we sue Millions unto billions unto Whatever it takes We’re not the ones making the mistakes History may be on their side But the present is ours. Stock gets traded now 24 hours. They don’t like it—see their pouts and the glowers Their terribly tender tears at the loss of their flowers. We’re not claiming we’re not in it for the power For the money For the gold. We’re told we are so very evil But is it our fault that we supply a demand? Cell phones, laptops, medicine all eat from the same hand This beautiful, virgin, oh so important land. We don’t understand why we are the villains We feel so victimized Criticized by those who cover our asses with silk Fill our garages with SUVs and if you please, Cover our fingers line our coffers with the very same Gold.

Climate Change and International Development NGOs by Ellen Gillies the apolitical nature of NGOs, the scale at which they operate, the groups of people Canadian international development NGOs they target, and the ideologies which guide have existed since the 1950s to improve their work. Based on these four problems, a living conditions in less-developed countries, third section discuss why the incorporation and have traditionally focused exclusively of environmental objectives into the work on the human dimensions of poverty. In of development NGOs is not simply a set of recent years, however, the increasing levels logical fallacies which can be overlooked in of global attention on environmental favour of their marginal impact, but rather degradation and climate change have led is impeding a transition to a sustainable many of them to incorporate the discourse society by allowing dominant power of sustainability and environmental justice structures to go unchallenged and using into their work. For example, some of resources where they might be better used these NGOs promote sustainable farming elsewhere. The final section comments techniques among farmers in less-developed on how international development NGOs countries, conduct environmental impact might restructure and reimagine their work assessments on their projects, or simply to more effectively address the current tack the word “sustainable” onto the front realities of climate change. of their “development” mandate. Yet, this trend contains many inherent contradictions Development NGOs in Canada and needs critical re-examination. This paper will demonstrate that international As Rist (2002) remarks, almost any modern development NGOs are poorly positioned human activity can be undertaken in the actors to take meaningful action on climate name of development. For the purposes change, and that this should serve as impetus of this paper, “international development to move towards Escobar’s (1995) vision of a NGOs” are defined as “professionalized, post-development society by adopting more non-profit organizations that depend on justice-driven, solidarity-based approaches to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for funding and whose social change. primary aim is to permanently remedy This paper’s first section will provide a brief poverty in the Third World” (Barry-Shaw & history of Canadian development NGOs Jay, 2012, p. 13). and the ways in which they have begun their efforts to incorporate environmental 1This definition encompasses organizations sustainability into their work. The second 1. CIDA was merged with the Department of Forsection will examine four problems eign Affairs and International Trade to become inherent to these efforts, which relate to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and DeIntroduction

velopment (DFATD) in 2013.

Photo by Lorena Vidal

which range in size, regional focuses, and areas of specialization, including education, micro-credit and children’s issues. These organizations are distinct from humanitarian organizations, which focus on providing immediate, short-term relief in emergency situations. Despite this diversity, many commonalities connect Canadian international development NGOs. Thus, it is possible to critique them, and to discuss them, as a convergent societal actor (Brodhead, 1988).

History Although Canadian religious volunteer organizations have been undertaking missionary work in less-developed countries since the country’s earliest days, development NGOs under the above definition began to emerge in the 1960s (Van Rooy, 2000). Global events, such as South African apartheid and the US occupation of Southeast Asia, raised awareness of global poverty and created a generation of socially concerned young students (Van Rooy, 2000). This led to the creation of Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO) in 1964, an organization which allowed young Canadians to volunteer in developing countries (Van Rooy, 2000). Many of these volunteers created their own NGOs upon their return from their placements (Van Rooy, 2000), which led to what Barry-Shaw termed an “NGO boom” beginning in the 1980s: the number of development NGOs in Canada rose from 107 in 1980 to 240 in 1990 to over 500 in 2005 (2012, p. 16). He attributes this ‘boom’ to the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, which resulted in a contraction of the social services provided by governments in low-income countries, creating a void for development NGOs to fill. This phenomenon coincided 12

with the emergence of the ‘alternative development paradigm’: a set of ideals which aimed to distinguish development NGOs from large-scale, top-down development programs administered by governments and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. This new paradigm valued small-scale, localized approaches and ‘participatory’ programs, or those which involved the direct contribution of beneficiaries into the design and implementation of programs (Tandon, 2001).

Enter “Sustainability” Over the course of the past 30 years, Canadian international development NGOs have become increasingly concerned with environmental sustainability and, more recently, with climate change. This concern was first prompted by the 1987 Bruntland report on Sustainable Development, which introduced the concept of sustainable development to respond to critiques that development institutions acted in favour of economic growth without concern for the environmental implications of such an agenda. Shortly after, CIDA released a report called “CIDA and Sustainable Development”, adopting this new concept of sustainable development as one of their official priorities (Swift, 1991). A new buzzword emerged since the Bruntland and CIDA reports: “since then, ‘sustainable’ has applied to everything done in development’s name” (Black, 2007, p. 94). This shift in dialogue occurred prior to the growth of global attention on climate change to the level it is at today. Climate change is a much more prominent concern within present-day public discourse than it was in 1987. Global temperatures have peaked to the highest levels ever recorded,

natural disasters are occurring with increasing strength and frequency, and the ever-broadening consensus among the scientific community is that we need to keep warming below 1.5°C to avoid catastrophic impacts (Paris Agreement, 2013). This reality is felt most prominently by communities in the developing world, who not only depend more immediately on the Earth’s natural systems for their livelihoods, but are also in areas where temperatures have been affected the most (Klein, 2014). The pressing palpability of climate change “has been a very challenging realization for many NGOs in the development community and has taken us into new realms, from which, until very recently, we had been sheltered” (Hobbs, 2013, p. 122). Sustainable development has gone from a trend in the development world to a broader and more pressing consideration.

community: many of them have begun altering their narratives and work in tentative, minimal ways to acknowledge the reality of climate change while they establish more long-term strategies and goals.

Others NGOs have responded in ways which impact the work that they carry out on the ground more directly. World Vision Canada, CARE Canada, and Free the Children are all NGOs which administered skill-building and training workshops to communities in developing countries as part of their development programming. These workshops focused on a range of issues, from proper health and sanitation practices to technical improvements of agricultural productivity. Now, these organizations have begun administering workshops on sustainable farming techniques to educate small-scale farmers on how to produce food in environmentally From trend to necessity responsible ways. The Free the Children Engineers Without Borders Canada is website notes that “participants work with one example of a Canadian international Free The Children staff on the ground to development NGO that has had to navigate learn environmentally sustainable ways of the challenging new realm that Hobbs producing food.” (Free the Children, n.d.). (2013) describes. In June 2014, it launched This involves incorporating sustainability a consultation process of its volunteers and into agricultural inputs use, irrigation staff to “decide on what the organization techniques, crop harvesting, and soil care should do to engage with climate change (Free The Children, n.d.). and environmental sustainability” (myEWB. Finally, the approaches adopted by some ca, 2014). In July 2015, it decided on several Canadian development NGOs depart courses of action: it would create an more radically from their traditional official organizational position statement approaches, undertaking new types to recognize the interconnectedness of activities altogether. World Vision of climate and development, provide Canada, another NGO which has begun educational opportunities to their staff to confront the realities of climate change, and volunteers on environmental issues, is traditionally known as an organization and conduct environmental impact which has focused on the provision of assessments of their work both at home material goods, such as school supplies and and in African countries (myEWB.ca, 2015). agriculture tools, to communities living in This is in line with what Hobbs (2013) has poverty. Recently, the organization started observed among the development NGO intervening directly in environmental 13

systems by planting trees, rebuilding soils, and restoring watersheds in the communities they work in (World Vision, 2013). Engaging on a more institutional level, Oxfam Canada has become involved in environmental advocacy and has been invited to take part in many global climate negotiations, a slightly unconventional role for a development NGO (Hobbs, 2013, p. 122). Altogether, this range of approaches reflects the fact that development NGOs are in a period of uncertainty on how to best confront this new, severe, and pressing global reality. Contradictions Though the variety of responses discussed above are as diverse as the organizations themselves, they share a number of commonalities. At first glance, it might appear promising that international development NGOs are beginning to incorporate environmental concerns into their work. However, a deeper analysis reveals four key factors which make their engagement in meaningful environmental action difficult and often contradictory. These factors are: (1) the apolitical nature of development NGOs; (2) the scale at which they operate; (3) the groups of people they target; and (4) the ideologies which guide their work. The development NGOs discussed above have yet to address any of these factors in a tangible way. Development NGOs must confront these contradictions, incorporate them critically into their environmental strategies, and use them to rethink their overall role in society. Each is expanded upon below. (1) NGOs are expected to be apolitical Most Canadian NGOs, including all of those discussed above, are incorporated as 14

registered charities under Revenue Canada. This status provides them with certain benefits, such as exemption from income tax and the ability to provide tax receipts to donations they receive (Barry-Shaw, 2012). However, this comes with a serious drawback: registered charities in Canada are by law severely limited in their ability to engage in political activities, which include involvement in partisan politics, promoting socio-economic ideologies, or carrying out their work in a manner which might be construed as political (Barry-Shaw, 2012). NGOs can legally engage in advocacy work, provided it remains “ancillary and incidental” to the organization’s more charitable endeavours (Brodhead 1988, p. 51). Additionally, Global Affairs Canada retains the power to cut NGO funding at any point at their discretion should they suspect that the organization has breached this requirement (Barry-Shaw, 2012). Indeed, the federal government exercised this power on numerous occasions. In 2009, the CIDA cut funding to prominent development NGOs KAIROS and Alternatives. The CIDA did not offer an explanation for this decision, but both NGOs had previously received attention for criticizing a stance of the government at the time. Most NGOs receive more than half of their funding from the federal government, but the department does not have any clear regulations surrounding what activities are acceptable or not for an NGO (Barry-Shaw, 2012). These realities have created a subtle yet significant form of control, a dynamic NGO scholar Allison Van Rooy labels a “notable timidity” among development organizations. Because of the serious potential implications of a funding cut and the lack of clear guidelines, NGOs focus their work on areas they know are in line with the government’s priorities, and

shy away from meaningful engagement with the policies and politics that shape the issues they work to address. Addressing global poverty is an inherently political issue because it requires new configurations in the use and distribution of land, money and energy resources (Black, 2007). Klein (2014) views climate change similarly; it requires heavy-duty interventions, substantial transfers of resources and technology, and a serious reconsideration of the way we organize our economy and society. Because Canadian development NGOs are required to remain relatively insulated from politics, they are severely restricted in terms of the approaches they can take to engage with issues such as climate change. The lack of engagement with real political issues has “relegated the NGOs, at best, to a benign but marginal role in the world” (Murphy, 1991, p. 193). Unless charities become able to engage in political activities, a similar fate awaits development NGOs on the issue of climate change. (2) Macro-scale problems cannot be solved by micro-scale solutions Another factor which makes development NGOs poorly suited to engage in the issue of environmental sustainability is that of scale. Since the alternative development paradigm emerged in the 1970s, development NGOs have operated on a small-scale, community basis in order to be able to adapt their interventions to very localized contexts (Tandon, 2001). Though generally coordinated by a higher body, this approach is generally viewed as superior to a top-down one, as it lends itself better to involving and collecting input from the project’s intended beneficiaries. The climate interventions development NGOs have adopted have naturally been executed at this small scale.

Although localized approaches enable development NGOs to customize their interventions to the needs of individual communities, climate change is an issue which requires a response at the global scale. Whether a small-scale, rural farmer is using natural instead of synthetic fertilizer on their 2-acre plot of land is almost an inconsequential question when developed countries, with only 26% of the world’s population, account for 70% of global chemical fertilizer use (Escobar, 1995). Similarly, NGO efforts to plant a few acres of trees near a community with which they work is similarly insignificant when carbon dioxide on the scale of 565 megatonnes was released by the burning of fossil fuels in Canada in 2014 (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2014). This misalignment of the scale of the problem and the solutions development NGOs have been using to address it reflects the fact that while NGOs might have good intentions, they cannot have meaningful impact without changes in their status quo. (3) These NGOs misplace the burden of addressing climate change onto poor communities It is becoming increasingly accepted that the more economically developed countries bear the weight of the responsibility for climate change, as global warming has increased steadily alongside global GDP growth since the Industrial Revolution (Ponting, 2007). Indeed, in 2011, six industrialized countries accounted for approximately 70% of global carbon emissions (IPCC, 2013). At a more individual level, one U.S. resident uses as much energy per year as 5 Mexicans, 55 Indians, 168 Tanzanians, and 900 Nepalis (Escobar, 1995, p. 212). These authors share the view that the nature of our current environmental problems cannot be understood outside 15

of the context of global industrialization which has occurred since the 1500s, and that this places the bulk of the responsibility to respond with industrialized countries such as Canada.

inherent complexity and sophistication of many developing societies. Development practice operates on the premise that the causes of poverty reside in “the deficiencies and delinquencies of poor people and the communities in which they live” (Smith, International development NGOs, however, 2001, p. 33). Whether or not development focus their interventions on changing NGOs actually believe that the causes of behaviour and lifestyles in less-developed socio-economic issues lie in the deficiencies countries with some of the lowest per-capita of poor people and communities, the carbon emissions in the world. Through current approaches they use to address interventions such as teaching farmers to climate change reflect this problematic practice agriculture more sustainably, they assumption. perpetuate a narrative which takes the focus and accountability away from the (4) “Sustainable development” as an oxymoron responsible actors and which misplaces burden onto communities that are not A growing body of critical scholarship responsible for the bulk of environmental has advanced the simple idea that the degradation. An excerpt from a 2013 World tenets of indefinite economic growth are Vision report illustrates this narrative: incompatible with the reality of living on a planet with finite resources. International “Small, poor, undeveloped communities have development work has always been some of the biggest opportunities to make premised on the idea that economic an impact in repairing the global life support system. Poor communities often live in more growth will lead to a reduction of poverty sustainable ways than rich communities. (Brodhead, 1988). This assumption is Because of this, they have more opportunity to reflected in the Sustainable Development embrace sustainable development since it does Goals, the most recent global development not require extensive conversion of existing agenda adopted by the United Nations systems and structures.” (World Vision, 2013) in September of 2015. This document calls for an annual growth rate of 7% in This excerpt reflects a narrative that global GDP and “sustained, sustainable encourages less-developed communities and inclusive economic growth” (United to adopt a sustainable lifestyle yet fails Nations Department for Economic and to challenge the systems and structures Social Affairs, 2015). of rich communities. Although this excerpt does not explicitly deny the Our economy exists within, and depends need to challenge overconsumption in on, a broader set of natural systems, which rich countries, it implies that addressing all have limits in the degree to which they lifestyles in poor communities is more can be disrupted or exploited before their convenient than addressing lifestyles in resilience is threatened. Steffen et al. (2015) wealthy ones. This view perpetuates the set out a framework which defines nine problematic assumption that the systems planetary boundaries. They found that two and structures of less-developed countries of these boundaries, related to biosphere are more easily altered than those of our integrity and biochemical flows, have own, which reflects a total disregard for the already begun to be surpassed. Surpassing 16

these boundaries creates a substantial risk of destabilizing natural systems and bringing about unpredictable impacts on the climate. Daly (1990a) defines environmental sustainability as the ability to continue the activities of renewable resource harvest, pollution creation, and nonrenewable resource depletion indefinitely over time. Critics of the “sustainable development” concept argue that resource and carbon dioxide limits render the prospect of sustainable economic growth impossible. They contend that a shift in the current growth paradigm is required to avoid crossing even more planetary boundaries (see Schneider, 2010; Kallis, 2010; Kosoy, 2012; Woodward, 2015). Geo-engineering and other ‘techno-fixes’ are insufficient to permit our current trajectory of growth to continue in a sustainable manner: recent research has demonstrated that even the most sophisticated technological innovations currently available are inadequate. For example, Mathesius et al. (2014) found that Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), one of the world’s most promising geo-engineering innovations, is unable to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration to back to pre-industrial levels.

These four contradictions show that Canadian international development NGOs are poorly positioned to address climate change in any meaningful way. One might argue that such actions, though marginally impactful and logically questionable, are better than doing nothing. This paper now turns to present two reasons why development NGOs adopting environmentally-conscious actions is not simply a positive, though minimally impactful trend, but rather impedes transition to a sustainable society. Firstly, by targeting poor communities as the site of the problem and engaging with the issue in an apolitical way, development NGOs are contributing to the understanding that climate change can be addressed without any reconsideration of the lifestyles and carbon-based economies of countries in the developed world. Engineers Without Borders has committed to conducting environmental assessments of their projects, Free the Children has begun teaching small-scale farmers in the developing world how to farm sustainably, and World Vision has taken to planting trees and restoring watersheds in the communities in which they work. These actions address symptoms of climate change without engaging with any of its root causes. As discussed above, these actions Canadian international development direct the discourse surrounding climate NGOs have always subscribed to a belief change away from powerful players such as in economic growth. This section has industrialized countries and transnational demonstrated that the current model of corporations, and onto communities economic growth is incompatible with that bear little to no responsibility for the environmental sustainability as Daly problem. Transitioning to a sustainable (1990) defines it. By undertaking work in society requires engagement with the environmental sustainability, development underlying structural issues with the way NGOs exhibit the same contradiction as the that our economy and society is currently Sustainable Development Goals, and are organized (Klein, 2014). Narratives which thus subject to the same critiques. fail to do so simply prolong this transition. The need for alternatives Development NGOs are not only directing attention away from a deeper engagement 17

with environmental issues, but also take resources where they might better be used elsewhere. By expanding their mandates to incorporate environmental concerns, development NGOs need additional time, money, and people. Arundhati Roy, in her 2004 article “Help that Hinders”, discusses the issue of the “NGO-ization of resistance” and comments that NGOs employ individuals who might otherwise take up more political causes, but instead satisfy their need to engage in social change work through such paid positions. She comments that this depoliticizes resistance and leads to a dilution of its power. By employing people to conduct environmental interventions, development NGOs take people-power away from movements which can engage with the issue on a deeper level. The same reasoning also applies to the time and money it takes to administer these programs. Toward post-development

We have since entered into a new period of history, one which is characterized by significant environmental challenges on unprecedented scales which a serious threat to our survival as a species (Ponting, 2007). Furthermore, the dualistic conceptualization of the world into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ which dominated in the latter half of the 20th century is now becoming obsolete, with new set of medium-income countries emerging, and growing income disparities within countries themselves (Rosling, 2013). The former UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon recently called climate change “a defining issue of our time” (UN News, 2015), and former US President Barack Obama has called it a challenge which will “define the contours of this century more than any other” (Al Jazeera, 2015). In short, development NGOs have lost their relevance in the climate change movement.

These NGOs have made efforts to change their narratives to accommodate this It has so far been demonstrated that new global reality. However, as has been development NGOs are poorly suited to demonstrated, climate change is an issue address the issue of climate change and which is outside of the scope and capability that their attempt to do so is not a neutral of such organizations to effectively or positive act, but rather an impediment to address. This challenge was exemplified an effective transition to a more sustainable by the confusion of organizations such as organization of society. This paper takes the Engineers Without Borders Canada in 2014, position that development NGOs should an NGO that had accepted the reality and not simply tweak their existing activities, severity of climate change but that was initiate some environmental programming, at a loss about how to engage with it as a and move on with their business as usual. development organization with little to no Instead, the current reality of climate experience in environmental issues. EWB change should inspire and propel these decided to educate its membership, adopt NGOs to critically re-examine their work a position statement, assess the impact of and their role in society. their work and commit to learning more – it was unable to engage in effective International development NGOs first action. Yet EWB did the best that it could, took hold in Canada in the 1960s, at a since development NGOs are limited in time when the world’s consciousness was their ability to take on an impactful role in focused on the plight of the world’s poor. addressing the severity and scale of climate 18

change. Critical development scholars have written of their visions of a post-development organization of society. Escobar (1995) calls for a shift to a post-development world, in which we reject the idea that developing societies need intervention and “saving” from developed countries. Instead, he argues that we should redirect our energies to supporting grassroots movements of “independent organizations of the poor - trade unions, coops, political parties, peasant federations, neighbourhood communities, and grassroots religious communities” (Escobar, 1995, p. 76). The 1980s marked the beginning of a “spectacular growth in grassroots movements devoted to environmental issues” (Black, 2007, p. 100), such as the Chipko movement in the Himalayas which mobilized to save trees and stop erosion; the rubber-tappers’ union of Brazil which mobilized under activist Chico Mendes; or the Green Belt Union of Kenya, a non-profit organization led by indigenous Kenyan women which aims at conserving their natural environments. Manji (1998) agrees, and adds that real solidarity means raising funds to help others fight their own battles, rather than raising funds to run one’s own projects to help others. Ferguson (1994) has also written of the imperative to provide support to existing movements rather than imposing external agendas, no matter how well-intentioned.

and too politicized for these NGOs to have relevance in solving it. Activists in the ‘developed world’ have been mobilizing to protect their own environment and rights for decades, and development NGOs continue to impose their own agendas – planting trees, teaching techniques, and conducting impact assessments – despite the demonstrated ways they are not suited to address this challenge. As the climate crisis intensifies, the traditional work of development NGOs is less and less relevant. The time has come for them to rethink their role in society. It would be unrealistic to suggest that development NGOs immediately stop what they are doing and take up arms with environmental activists in developing communities. However, just as they were able to shift towards more environmental mandates, they can also begin shifting their work towards more solidarity-based approaches. They could initiate this transformation by gradually redirecting resources to supporting these grassroots movements, using their platforms to attract attention to voices of populations who have been impacted by climate change, and realigning their strategic priorities with those expressed by the communities in which they work.

Additionally, development NGOs should incorporate climate issues more actively into their advocacy agendas in Canada. Industrialized countries carry a large portion Development NGOs should embrace this of the responsibility for climate change, post-development view, and shift to this and these impacts have a dispropormore solidarity-based approach advocated tionate impact on the populations which by Manji (1998), Ferguson (1994), Black development NGOs target. Development (2007) and Escobar (1995). The challenge NGOs should push for stricter climate of the day is no longer the challenge which regulations, such as tighter emissions they originally were created to address. targets and a higher price on carbon, The current challenge is too big in scope to slow the warming which has already 19

devastated some developing communities. These suggestions, of course, risk offending the requirement of political neutrality – this requirement should also be challenged and revisited.

significant environmental challenges on unprecedented scales which a serious threat to our survival as a species (Ponting, 2007). Furthermore, the dualistic conceptualization of the world into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ which dominated in the latter Yet, this burden cannot be placed half of the 20th century is now becoming exclusively on development NGOs. The obsolete, with new set of medium-income international development sector employs countries emerging, and growing income thousands of Canadians at home and disparities within countries themselves abroad, and has established a small but (Rosling, 2013). The former UN Secretary firm place as a part of Canadian society. For General Ban-Ki Moon recently called these reasons, this paper speaks not only climate change “a defining issue of our time” to development NGOs, but also to ordinary (UN News, 2015), and former US President citizens. Canadians have a role to play in this Barack Obama has called it a challenge transition by supporting the work of NGOs which will “define the contours of this who support grassroots movements led by century more than any other” (Al Jazeera, people living in poverty, and pressuring the 2015). In short, development NGOs have NGOs they have connections with to do the lost their relevance in the climate change same. movement. Conclusion

These NGOs have made efforts to change their narratives to accommodate this It has so far been demonstrated that new global reality. However, as has been development NGOs are poorly suited to demonstrated, climate change is an issue address the issue of climate change and which is outside of the scope and capability that their attempt to do so is not a neutral of such organizations to effectively or positive act, but rather an impediment to address. This challenge was exemplified an effective transition to a more sustainable by the confusion of organizations such as organization of society. This paper takes the Engineers Without Borders Canada in 2014, position that development NGOs should an NGO that had accepted the reality and not simply tweak their existing activities, severity of climate change but that was initiate some environmental programming, at a loss about how to engage with it as a and move on with their business as usual. development organization with little to no Instead, the current reality of climate experience in environmental issues. EWB change should inspire and propel these decided to educate its membership, adopt a NGOs to critically re-examine their work position statement, assess the impact of their and their role in society. work and commit to learning more – it was unable to engage in effective action. Yet EWB International development NGOs first did the best that it could, since development took hold in Canada in the 1960s, at a NGOs are limited in their ability to take on an time when the world’s consciousness was impactful role in addressing the severity and focused on the plight of the world’s poor. scale of climate change. We have since entered into a new period Critical development scholars have written of history, one which is characterized by of their visions of a post-development 20

organization of society. Escobar (1995) calls for a shift to a post-development world, in which we reject the idea that developing societies need intervention and “saving” from developed countries. Instead, he argues that we should redirect our energies to supporting grassroots movements of “independent organizations of the poor - trade unions, coops, political parties, peasant federations, neighbourhood communities, and grassroots religious communities” (Escobar, 1995, p. 76). The 1980s marked the beginning of a “spectacular growth in grassroots movements devoted to environmental issues” (Black, 2007, p. 100), such as the Chipko movement in the Himalayas which mobilized to save trees and stop erosion; the rubber-tappers’ union of Brazil which mobilized under activist Chico Mendes; or the Green Belt Union of Kenya, a non-profit organization led by indigenous Kenyan women which aims at conserving their natural environments. Manji (1998) agrees, and adds that real solidarity means raising funds to help others fight their own battles, rather than raising funds to run one’s own projects to help others. Ferguson (1994) has also written of the imperative to provide support to existing movements rather than imposing external agendas, no matter how well-intentioned.

rights for decades, and development NGOs continue to impose their own agendas – planting trees, teaching techniques, and conducting impact assessments – despite the demonstrated ways they are not suited to address this challenge. As the climate crisis intensifies, the traditional work of development NGOs is less and less relevant. The time has come for them to rethink their role in society. It would be unrealistic to suggest that development NGOs immediately stop what they are doing and take up arms with environmental activists in developing communities. However, just as they were able to shift towards more environmental mandates, they can also begin shifting their work towards more solidarity-based approaches. They could initiate this transformation by gradually redirecting resources to supporting these grassroots movements, using their platforms to attract attention to voices of populations who have been impacted by climate change, and realigning their strategic priorities with those expressed by the communities in which they work.

and revisited. Yet, this burden cannot be placed exclusively on development NGOs. The international development sector employs thousands of Canadians at home and abroad, and has established a small but firm place as a part of Canadian society. For these reasons, this paper speaks not only to development NGOs, but also to ordinary citizens. Canadians have a role to play in this transition by supporting the work of NGOs who support grassroots movements led by people living in poverty, and pressuring the NGOs they have connections with to do the same. References Free The Children. (n.d.). Agriculture and Food Security. Retrieved from http://www. freethechildren.com/what-we-do/adopt-a-village/ agriculture-and-food-security/ Al Jazeera (2015, September 01). Obama: Climate change defining threat of century. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2015/09/obama-climate-change-definingthreat-century-150901011859504.html.

economics, 2(1), 1-6. Daly, H. E. (1996). Beyond growth: the economics of sustainable development. Boston: Beacon Press. Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ferguson, J. (1990). The anti-politics machine: ‘development’, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harvey, D. (2010). A companion to Marx’s Capital (Vol. 1). New York: Verso. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2013). Climate Change 2013: The physical science basis: Working group I contribution to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press. Klein, N. (2014). This changes everything: capitalism vs. the climate. New York: Simon and Schuster. Manji, F. (1998). Rights, Poverty and Development: NGOs and the Depoliticisation of Poverty. In D. Eade (Ed.), Development and Rights (12-33). Oxford, UK: Oxfam GB. Mathesius, S., Hofmann, M., Caldeira, K., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2015). Long-term response of oceans to CO2 removal from the atmosphere. Nature Climate Change 5, 1007-1113.

Assembly, U. G. (2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. UN Doc. A/70/L, 1.

Muhammad, U. (2014). Confronting injustice: Social activism in the age of individualism. Charleston, SC: Createspace.

Barry-Shaw, N., & Oja Jay, D. (2012). Paved with good intentions: Canada’s development NGOs from idealism to imperialism. Halifax, NS: Fernwood.

Murphy, B. (1991). Canadian NGOs and the politics of participation. In B. Tomlinson (Ed.), Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World (161-211). Toronto: Between the Lines.

Brodhead, T., & Herbert-Copley, B. (1988). Bridges of hope? Canadian voluntary agencies and the third world. Ottawa, ON: The North-South Institute. Cook, J., Nuccitelli, D., Green, S. A., Richardson, M., Winkler, B., Painting, R., Way, R., Jacobs, P., & Skuce, A. (2013). Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature. Environmental Research Letters, 8(2), 024024. Daly, H. E. (1990). Toward some operational principles of sustainable development. Ecological

myEWB. (n.d.). Retrieved December 9, 2015, from http://my.ewb.ca/posts/13/102177/navigation-circle-draft-recommendations-open-for-commentdue-feb-28 Ponting, C. (2011). A new green history of the world: the environment and the collapse of great civilizations. New York: Random House. Roy, A. (November 2004). Help that hinders. Le monde diplomatique. Retrieved from http://

mondediplo.com/2004/11/16roy Rist, G. (2002). The history of development: from western origins to global faith. London: Zed books. Schneider, F., Kallis, G., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2010). Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue. Journal of cleaner production, 18(6), 511-518. Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockstrรถm, J., Cornell, S. E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E. M., Biggs, R., Carpenter, S. R., de Vries, W., de Wit, C. A., Folke, C., Gerten, D., Heinke, J., Mace, G. M., Persson, L. M., Ramanathan, V., Reyers, B., & Sรถrlin, S. (2015). Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet. Science, 347(6223), 1259855. Tandon, R. (2000). Riding high or nosediving: development NGOs in the new millennium. Development in Practice, 10(3-4), 319-329.

UN News. (2015, September 7). We have the unique opportunity to define our own destiny, Ban tells UN climate summit. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52745&Cr=COP21&Cr1=climate#. Vmepo2QrJsM. Van Rooy, A. (2000). Good News! You may be out of a job reflections on the past and future 50: years for Northern NGOs. Development in Practice, 10(3-4), 300-318. Woodward, D. (2015). Incrementum ad absurdum: global growth, inequality and poverty eradication in a carbon-constrained world. Does Saving Increase the Supply of Credit? A Critique of Loanable Funds Theory, 4, 43-62. World Vision Canada. (2013). The natural environment in development and well-being. Retrieved from http://www.wvi.org/sites/default/ files/The%20Natural%20Environment%20in%20 Development%20and%20Well-Being.pdf

Photo by Leila Farahdel:

Forget me not, as I am one in a million. Mont-Tremblant, Quebec.

Photo by Hana Shiraishi

The Maladaptation of Tourism Development Plans on the Galápagos Islands Case Study: Puerto Villamil by Frances Miltimore ABSTRACT: On the Galápagos Islands, mass tourism development plans are promoted as both positive for local development and as a way to simultaneously protect the environment. The archipelago contains fragile ecosystems and an emerging Isleño culture among locals, both of which suggest that mass tourism plans are maladapted to the specifics of the islands. An analysis of the political climate of the Galápagos reveals that current policy prohibits local access to traditional resources as land is set aside for tourism; environmental protection laws have been weakly implemented; and many of tourism profits seldom reach the local level. The hundreds of thousands of visitors each year have resulted in numerous invasive species, pollution, and substantial pressure on limited water resources and sewage infrastructure. The mass tourism model is also causing social issues as locals are marginalized due to the drowning out of island culture. A case study conducted by Walsh, McCleary, and Heumann (2010) explores the environmental and social impacts driven by tourism at Puerto Villamil on Isabela Island. The study highlights several of the aforementioned issues and is used as a case study showing that the current tourism model is maladapted to the environmental particularities and societal needs of the Islands. The main findings indicate that tourist-driven population pressure has largely outpaced the development of proper institutions and infrastructure for environmental management, waste disposal, and water provision. Solutions to these issues could be the shift of the mass tourism model to an ecotourism model, more stringent visitor and environmental laws, and the inclusion of locals in determining policies of protected areas.

Introduction Sustainable development requires developing livelihood plans and related policies to suit the specific characteristics of the social and physical environments in which they are being implemented (See Carney, 1999; Holmberg, 1992; and UK DID, 1999). A development agenda must operate within its related cultural context while enabling society to better adapt to the environment. A maladapted development plan can at best

lead to minor and impermanent issues which require plan revision. At worst, it can cause irreversible damage to the ecosystem and to society. The Galápagos Islands are an archipelago of thirteen major islands off the Ecuadorian coast that are currently facing the growth of a maladapted mass tourism industry. In 1939, roughly 900 residents of the Islands depended on fishing and whaling for their livelihoods (Alvear, 2011). In the 1960s, 25

six ships and a few hotels were established, marking the humble beginnings of the nature tourism industry (Epler, 2007). The archipelago boasts an attractive array of biodiversity with unique evolutionary traits that result from its volcanic origins and from a largely isolated existence (Galápagos Conservancy, 2016a). The Islands are now home to 30,000 people and attract approximately 170,000 visitors annually (UNESCO, 2016). The 2010 Ecuadorian National Census found that 81% of the residents identify as Mestizo (Spanish-European decent), and that 74% of permanent residents are migrants from outside the region. Half of the migrants cited economic opportunities as their reason for moving, which illustrates the Islands’ booming tourism sector. For many Galapagueños (Galápagos people), tourism-based jobs are replacing other livelihood strategies centered on fishing in small coastal communities and on agriculture in the rich volcanic soil of the humid highlands (Epler, 2007). Due to the constant inflow of migrants, “the lifestyle of today’s population is similar to that of the inhabitants of mainland Ecuador, as opposed to being adapted to the particularities of the archipelago” (Grenier, 2013, p. 25). Tourism for development is appropriate in many places around the world; however, extensive research indicates that the growing mass tourism model is not a well-suited strategy for the fragile Galápagos Islands.

tend to emphasize mass tourism for development and the use of large protected areas, covering 97% of the Islands, as a measure of conservation (Brewington, 2013). These strategies, however, cut locals off from traditional resources, ignore the interconnectedness of the social and environmental systems, and decrease the benefits reaching the Galapagueños by encouraging foreign investment. The following section explores the reasons for which the current plans are maladapted to the Islands’ sensitive ecosystems. The Galápagos’ unique biodiversity is sustained in large part due to the isolation and protection of the surrounding ocean (Taylor et al., 2009). Increasing outside contact and developing even small sectors of the Islands have reverberating effects throughout the environment, making it crucial for governments to improve resource management plans and island waste-disposal infrastructure (Gonzálaz, 2008). Pollution, invasive species, and resource scarcities, in particular water scarcity, are harming the social-ecosystems, and the situation is deteriorating with the effects of tourism (Epler, 2007). The sensitivity of the Islands’ ecosystems to direct and indirect human pressures indicates that the archipelago is not an ideal candidate for mass tourism.

The final section of Part II shows that the current tourism model is not complementary to the emerging cultural identity This paper begins in Part II with a discussion and values of the Galapagueños. Gonzálaz of the political background to development (2008) argues that the Islanders’ cultural strategies on the Galápagos and identifies identity is still forming due to the relatively the weaknesses of past and current models. recent colonization, and this emerging The Galápagos Special Law was revolu- identity could result in either an Insular or tionary for its focus on local ownership and Islēno lifestyle. The former would arise as environmental management plans, but migrants arrive in search of job opportuits weak implementation ultimately led to nities, bringing with them a foreign way its failure (UNESCO, 1998). Current plans of life and exogenous extractive patterns. 26

management of the Galápagos Marine Reserve (UNESCO, 1998; Gonzálaz, 2008). This law laid the foundation for ecotourism standards and management regimes that would be sustainable, well adapted to the Islands, and beneficial to locals. The governing bodies of the Galápagos, however, lacked the resources to enforce the promised regulations, and disagreements among the many stakeholders further hindered this process (Brewington, 2013). A report by Watkins and Martinez (2007b) found that as of 2007, fifty central government organizations and nine local organizations had decision-making Part III of this paper presents a case study responsibilities. This overlap made effective on Isabela Island that exemplifies a few and efficient coordination nearly imposof the issues identified in Part II: the rapid sible. The most enforced conservation expansion of the tourism industry and the initiatives targeted fishers and migrants; subsequent pressures on government however, policy makers, researchers, and planning, water resources, human health enforcers of the Special Law tended to and ecologically valuable areas. Part IV ignore the important link between tourism gives recommendations for improvement and resource pressure (Brewington, 2013). with a focus on ecotourism and the comanagement of resources, and, finally, In 2005, the fourth management plan of the Galápagos National Park was approved, Part V offers a conclusion. but all layers of attempted management II. The Social and Environmental regimes had adverse social-ecological Effects of the Post-1998 Policy effects (Gonzálaz, 2008). Social conflicts Approach to Development proliferated as locals were limited in the area, season, and quantity of the resources a. An Overview of Major Plans and their they were allowed to exploit, and several Weaknesses expressed “discontent with the unfair distribution of benefits derived from tourism” In the 1990s, in reaction to the adverse effects (Gonzálaz, 2008, p. 6). Global forces largely of the tourism industry, several stakeholders influence the tourism industry through and planners realized the importance of foreign investment or ownership, and as striking a balance between environmental Brewington (2013) observed, “economics, conservation and island development more than sustainability criteria, have (Gonzálaz, 2008). In 1998, the Galápagos dictated decision-making” (p. 108). Special Law was enacted alongside Galápagos does not limit the number of new marine management plans. These visiting tourists, and the government has measures implemented special protective recently been relaxing foreign ownership measures, quarantines for invasive species, restrictions to encourage foreign investment migrant restrictions, and participatory in 20 large-scale projects, including This migration is problematic because it can result in conflict and marginalization of the locals. In contrast, the Galapagueños and migrants could adopt an Isleño lifestyle where idiosyncrasies are deeply rooted in the local region, and related cultural practices and sustainable productive patterns emerge. Some evidence indicates that the Isleño culture is developing, but nature tourism plans hinder it. Indeed, these plans lack migrant control, emphasize poorly-adapted luxury tourism, and increase foreign control over the Islands’ future (Gonzálaz 2008).

a spa and a golf course (CGREC, 2013). As a result, the planned tourism expansion is unlikely to benefit locals, and all the incremental effects of tourism projects cumulatively jeopardize the biodiversity that gave rise to the industry in the first place. b. Why the Current Mass Tourism Development Plan is Maladapted to the Galápagos Environment

Studies of environmental sites show evidence of negative impacts in both protected and unprotected areas, notably in terms of water and soil quality (Martin et al., 2015), and that the rate of ecological degradation is accelerating (Gonzálaz, 2008).

Widespread habitat degradation and overall ecosystem stress occurs as The interconnectedness of the Islands’ garbage, biohazardous chemicals, ecosystems, combined with the pressures of untreated wastewater, and pollutants the tourism industry and the ineffectiveness are dumped directly into the ground and of the resource management sectors, has led oceans (WWF, 2010). The primary source to widespread habitat degradation, biodi- for marine pollution has been identified versity loss, and uncontrollable invasive as waste dumped from tourism ships species (Epler, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates how (WWF, 2010). The Islands lack the resourcpopulation, resource consumption, and intro- es and expertise for proper organization duced species have grown exponentially in and supervision to occur, because municconjunction with the number of tourists from ipal management has evolved at a slower 1962-2008. Tourism has brought a plethora rate than that of the complications of of new demands, including infrastructure population pressure (WWF, 2010). such as hotels, pools, ships, and restaurants, to the 3% of the Galápagos Islands that is not Regulation of invasive species has also been under government protection (Epler, 2007). an ongoing struggle. By favouring mass luxury tourism over small-scale ecotourism, Galápagos has experienced increased

Fig. 1: A depiction of the increase of population alongside tourism since 1962, including patterns of fuel consumption and the introduction of non-native species Source: Gonzálaz et al. (2008).

immigrant workers and imported goods. More than one third of the flora and fauna on the Galápagos are unique to the Islands, and their historical isolation from the mainland has kept the fragile ecosystem functioning (Taylor et al., 2009). As of 2007, 68 of the 551 insect, invertebrate, and vertebrate species introduced in the Galápagos were determined to have the potential to cause severe impacts on native biodiversity (Watkins and Cruz, 2007a). For example, the native Giant Tortoise’s population became devastated with the introduction of species that eat their eggs, such as the brown rat which arrived and spread rapidly in the early 1980s (Galápagos Conservancy, 2016b). Therefore, the current tourism model based on mass luxury tourism is a social feature that is maladapted to the sensitive Galápagos environment. The industry’s development has not been matched with effective resource management, and has thus resulted in widespread habitat degradation, biodiversity loss, and invasive species. Plans to expand the industry threaten the very ecosystems that prompted the emergence of the tourism sector. Yet, poorly adapted development plans cause damage beyond ecological degradation; they also harm local residents. c. Why the Current Mass Tourism Development Plan is Inappropriate with Regards to Galápagos Society The development plans on the Galápagos should reflect the cultural values and objectives of its society. Well-adapted plans encourage local participation and support, while minimizing violent conflict. According to a study on over 1000 Galápagos residents by Brewington (2013), 98% of residents agree with the need for conservation

on the islands and 92% agree with the need to preserve an Isleño lifestyle. Yet, as former Charles Darwin Foundation director noted, “If the local community doesn’t benefit directly from tourism, it’s not going to support conservation” (as cited in Brewington, 2013, 123). In other words, because conservation efforts benefit the nature tourism industry, if locals were to benefit as well, the locals would be motivated to actively promote conservation initiatives. However, rather than benefitting from the tourism industry, and therefore from conservation, many Galapagueños feel marginalized. This marginalization is a product of companies’ preferential employment of migrants who offer cheaper labour; mounting water scarcity; the growing rate of foreign ownership; and the lack of local engagement in decision-making (Watkins and Cruz, 2007a). Real per capita income declined between 1999 and 2005 due to the increases in immigrant workers and to rising costs of living which offset gains in GDP (Taylor et al., 2009). Furthermore, locals are suffering from environmental degradation, particularly from water scarcity. Hotels, pools, restaurants, and other facilities that serve tourists require a large amount of clean water. Bottled water is being imported from the mainland because the water demands exceeds the available potable water on certain islands (Réyes et al., 2015a). If Galapagueños cannot afford the clean bottled water, many resort to potentially hazardous sources of water. Due to poor waste treatment, disease-causing fecal coliforms have been found in local tap water (Martin, 2015). The improper management of water is only one example of many where tourist demands for luxuries override the voices and needs of locals. This public health issue illustrates locals’ suboptimal level of participation in policy 29

decision-making processes. Many residents consider that their concerns are not given sufficient attention in the governmental and private spheres, because of foreign owners and world economic trends drive the development of the Galápagos, and because the Galápagos governing bodies are disorganized (Taylor, 2009). The mass tourism model is thus not complementary to local cultural values. This model marginalizes locals’ concerns regarding policy and basic needs. This situation can engender hostilities between groups; for instance, between the government and the locals. An improved model would adequately reflect the concerns and values of local residents. Galapagueños overwhelmingly place high value on conservation; this fairly new development reflects the possible transition of Galapagueños towards an Isleño lifestyle. A new model should also recognize that culture is not static, and should be capable of responding to emerging values: “humans in Galápagos are in the process of adapting; it is expected that some cultural characteristics will be lost, habits changed, and new mindsets created” (Chalen, 2015, 54). The ecotourism model could be the starting point of a well-adapted development plan that is suitable to social and ecological dynamics. III. Case Study: Puerto Villamil, Isabela Island a. Objective and Background To illustrate a few of the issues highlighted in Section II of this paper, the results from a study conducted by Walsh, McCleary, and Heumann (2010) will be analyzed by asking: Given the data collected, do the impacts of the tourism industry on development 30

support that the mass tourism model is well-adapted or maladapted to the environmental particularities and societal needs of the Islands? The study was conducted on Isabela Island at the town of Puerto Villamil. Located on the Western portion of the Galápagos Islands, Isabela Island is home to 1,800 permanent residents (Galápagos Conservancy, 2016a). This island includes two spatially distinct human use zones – a rural community in the highlands along the flanks of Sierra Negra Volcano, and the town of Puerto Villamil, situated in the lower region (Walsh, 2010). Puerto Villamil is representative of several trends and conditions typical of Galápagos Island communities. The spatial set-up of the coastal town nearby the highland community, as well as the emerging urbanization in the lowland community, reflects the situation of other Islands’ establishments. Traditionally, most livelihoods were based on agriculture in the highlands and fishing along the coast, but livelihoods have recently diversified into the tourism and services industry in the coastal town of Puerto Villamil (Walsh, 2010). Tourism drives development on the Galápagos (Epler 2007, Taylor et al. 2008) and Puerto Villamil is no exception. Understanding how this development interacts with the social and environmental realms is crucial to identifying the root causes and impacts of current resource mismanagement, increasing urbanization, environmental degradation, and related health issues. b. Methodology The study by Walsh et al. (2010) assessed the impacts of development on human health, well-being, and environmental quality in Puerto Villamil with data from 1960-2009.

2003, a new airport northeast of the town center and an enhanced port facilitated the direct contact of the community with the outside world (Figure 3c). Building density slightly increased (Figure 2), mainly due to the developing commercial district near the beach. The median building density decreased substantially from 1992 to 2003 (Table 1), declining from 4 to 2 buildings per hector as development spread out along roads. Lastly during this period, several lagoons along the coast were engulfed by new buildings and disappeared as the waterways that connected them to the c. Results and Analysis ocean were cut off. After 2003, the community expanded into the lava fields in NorthUrban Development Patterns ern Puerto Villamil (Figures 3d & 3e). The From 1960 to 1992, Puerto Villamil trans- overall high building density is explained formed from a little fishing village into by the fact that the Galรกpagos National Park a small community that had tripled in and National Institute for the Galรกpagos size (Figure 3a, Figure 3b). Mean building Islands strictly regulate the areas allowed density increased by nearly 50%, from for development, so as to avoid building 3 to 5.4 buildings per hector (Figure 2, on ecologically valuable land. As of 2009, Table 1), and the road lengths quadrupled there were 837 buildings in Puerto Villamil to accommodateehicle traffic. By confined to only 115 hectares in total area (Walsh et al., 2010, 145). To characterize urban development, a time-series of photographs and images were constructed using aerial and satellite photography. GPS and digitalized maps allowed for the mapping of the current water and sewage infrastructure in the community, and household access to the systems was determined with GIS and visual interpretation. Additionally, interviews were conducted with health care professionals and residents to address issues surrounding water, health, and environment on Isabela Island.

Fig. 2: Graph generated by author using data from Walsh (2010

Table 1: Building and road density in Puerto Villamil 1960-2009. Source: Source: Walsh et al. (2010).

Fig. 3: Building density and road networks for Puerto Villamil, for 1960, 1992, 2003, 2007, and 2009. Source: Source: Walsh et al. (2010).

Water and Sewer Infrastructure The second set of data collected was the layout of the water and sewer infrastructure depicted in Figures 4 and 5. The Galápagos Islands do not have an abundant source of freshwater due the archipelago’s low elevation and cool waters, which cause low precipitation (d’Ozouville et al. 2008). The available freshwater that is available often forms lagoons that are susceptible to waste pollution and salt water intrusion from over-pumping (Walsh et al., 2010). Walsh et al. (2010) found that Puerto Villamil pumps its untreated tap water from such brackish reservoirs north of the town. Some interviewees for the study indicated that the tap water is poor quality, processed water is unaffordable, and that bottles are often contaminated. An analysis of water and sewer infrastructure revealed that approximately 82% of households of Puerto Villamil have access to the municipal water network (Figure 4). In contrast, the municipal sewer system only services about 40% of the households (Figure 5). Walsh et al. (2010) found that a common practice is to dump waste into the surrounding environment. The wastewater collected by the municipality is inconsistently treated prior to being dumped into fissures in the lava field, and, at the time of the study, no treatment equipment was working. Near-shore contamination from dumping, seepage through the fractured rocks, and the usage of water from nearby wells create risk to human and ecological health: “In nearly all situations in the Galápagos, including Isabela Island, population growth and development have outstripped the existing water, sewer, and sanitation infrastructure” (Walsh et al., 2010, 151).

Fig. 4: Municipal piped-water system in Puerto Villamil (~2009) Source: Walsh et al. (2010).

Fig. 5: Municipal piped-water system in Puerto Villamil (~2009) Source: Walsh et al. (2010).

Water in Connection with Human and Environmental Health Up to 70% of local illnesses in Puerto Villamil may be caused by the consumption of, or exposure to, contaminated water according to a 2009 interview by Walsh et al. with a community physician. Interviewed residents believe that the government has a responsibility to provide a reliable source of potable tap water. Data from a study in 2007 and 2008 support this finding; fecal coliform was detected in tap water samples taken from local homes and salinity levels were steadily increasing, likely due to over extraction (Medina et al., 2007, 2008). 33

From an environmental health perspective, the coastal lagoons of Isabela are important sites for migratory and local bird species as well as aquatic fauna. Notably, negative relationships have been reported between salinity levels and fish diversity in tropical coastal lagoons (Sosa-López et al. 2007). Sensitive coastal forest species, particularly mangroves and flamingos, inhabit and encompass the lagoons that are located in close proximity to Puerto Villamil (Walsh et al., 2010). These are the same sites that have been directly and indirectly harmed by the surrounding human activities. d. Discussion

Several of the problems identified can be reconciled by adjusting the current tourism model to one of ecotourism. This recommendation reflects the findings of multiple scholars (Hoyman and McCall, 2013; Gonzalaz et al., 2008; Brewington 2013; and Réyes et al., 2015b). Ecotourism should, according to Martha Honey (2008), be environmentally sound and small scale, benefiting to conservation while empowering and enriching the lives of local residents. Stricter enforcement of an updated version of the 1998 Special Law would encourage ecotourism through the tighter regulation of migrants, and therefore population growth; the enforcement of protected areas; and participatory management that would empower locals. In discerning managerial tactics, the archipelago needs to be treated as a socio-ecosystem in need of integrated management for the permanent interactions between the inhabited and protected areas. The enforcement of protected areas requires input from locals because in the past, Galapagueños, particularly fishers, have felt alienated when they were cut off from the reserves (Brewington, 2013). Instead of eliminating local access to the land completely, the governing bodies should work with communities to develop a program for sustainable resource use and monitoring: “An adaptive co-management model is, undoubtedly, a better choice for the archipelago than conventional conservation frameworks based on increasing controls and regulations” (Gonzalaz et al., 2008, 18).

As recognized by Walsh et al. (2010) at the beginning of the study, community growth and expansion of the urban footprint in Puerto Villamil are driven by tourism. Urban development patterns are tourist-oriented, as the port was expanded to accommodate boat tours, hotels were erected, and an airport was built. Ecologically valuable areas, such as the nearby lagoons, disappeared due to land use change. The higher population pressure also strained the water and sewage infrastructure, leading to the spread of contamination and disease. The causes of these phenomena are not only impacts from the tourism industry, but also a lack of planning that has further aggravated the situation. Ultimately, the findings of this study support the proposition that the current mass tourism model is maladapted to the environmental particularities of the Islands, and that smaller-scale ecotourism would better suit local, societal To enforce an updated version of the needs. Special Law, the governing bodies need the tools and resources to enforce it and IV. Recommendations for to manage the archipelago in its entirety, Improvement: Ecotourism, which requires a less fragmented system Community Involvement, and the of governance. By starting with the impleIsleño Lifestyle mentation of participatory management 34

from the early stage of management design, new discourse is needed to reconcile, understand, and accommodate to the different interests among actors at the community, regional, and global levels: “The development of solid institutional networks and the promotion of joint activities will contribute to build trust among stakeholders and significantly improve the decision-making process” (Gonzalaz et al., 2008, 19). Such an institutional network would contribute to the success of an effective and efficient ecotourism plan.

sustainable ecotourism policies” (Hoyman and McCall, 2013, 139). This model can be achieved through the education system and community information sessions on sustainability. Although a study (Brewington, 2013) found that conservation was a top priority for locals, community leaders recognize that there is still much work to be done for action and significant change to actually occur (Hoyman and McCall, 2013).

Part of the ideal ecotourism model would involve self-sufficiency and internal growth over external recruitment of business. For example, the tourism industry could use locally-sourced products rather than imports from the mainland to generate increased revenues in the community which could be used to improve community infrastructure. Decreasing imports and fixing the sewer and water pipes reduces exposure to invasive species, contamination, and local exposure to poor water quality water. This illustrates one pathway in which ecotourism is well adapted to the Galápagos social and environmental needs and characteristics.

The Galápagos tourism model is maladapted to the environment, and it is out of sync with the cultural values and needs of the Islanders. The Islands’ development plans show a disregard for the interconnectedness of the social and environmental systems by the continued expansion of the mass tourism sector. Local actors are being marginalized as protected areas occupy nearly the entire archipelago, and foreigners are increasingly reaping the benefits due to limited foreign investment restrictions. Local needs are not being met as resources become contaminated or access becomes limited, and the emerging Galapagueños culture is being drowned out by foreigner lifestyles. Moreover, the increased numbers of tourists, imports, and migrant workers haves brought invasive species and spurred other stresses to the relatively vulnerable ecosystem. A case study at Isabela Island illustrates such pressures; it found environmental contamination, resource pressure, and biodiversity loss.

In contrast to mass tourism, the endogenous development model of ecotourism is also more suitable to the emerging Islēno lifestyle on the Islands. Cultural values do not have to be ignored in place of economic objectives. Rather, the two can complement and facilitate one another. “An Islēno lifestyle […] emphasizes low imports, less motorized transport, [and] responsible development” (Brewington, 2013, 110). Unlike mass tourism, ecotourism is suitable to Galapagueños culture. Many local leaders envision an ecotourism model where a

V. Conclusion

Ecotourism is appropriate on the Islands because, unlike mass tourism, it coincides more closely with the concept of sustainable development. The emergent characteristics of a resilient social-ecological system 35

sense of place, and relationship to the environment (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes, 2003). Some evidence suggests that an Islēno lifestyle is emerging; that lifestyle should be allowed to mature through conservation actions, such as public education on the importance of Island sustainability. The Special Law of 1998 is imperfect; however, it presents a solid foundation on which new management and development plans can evolve. It already fits well with a model of ecotourism that is in line with local needs and values. Yet, it requires improvements to facilitate the participation of all local stakeholders at each stage of development plans. Although the future of the Galápagos is uncertain, it is increasingly clear that “the current tourism model reduces the system’s resilience through its effects on the economy, population growth, resource consumption, invasive species arrival, and lifestyle of the island residents” (Gonzalez, 2008, 1). With the identification of the problem, the next steps can be taken to design a plan that is adapted to the Islands and is accepted as a social feature in line with the Galapagueños’ needs and culture. References Alvear, C. (2011) “Are We Loving the Galápagos to Death?” The Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cecilia-alvear/ are-we-loving-thegalpago_b_518602.html Brewington, L. (2013). “The double bind of tourism in Galápagos society.” In S. J. Walsh & C. F. Mena (Eds), Science and Conservation in the Galápagos Islands: Frameworks and Perspectives (105-125). Heidelberg: Springer. Carney, D. (1999). Approaches to Sustainable Livelihoods for the Rural Poor (Overseas Development Institute Poverty Briefing No.2). London: Overseas Development Institute.

Consejo de Gobierno del Regimen Especial de Galápagos (CGREG). (2013). Table from CGREG identifying new hotels and resorts for approval and construction in Galápagos 2013. CGREC. http://www.scribd.com/doc/239302004/TableNew-Hotels-and-Resorts-Planned-for-Galápagos Davidson-Hunt, I. J., & Berkes, F. (2003). “Nature and society through the lens of resilience: toward a human-in-ecosystem perspective.” In F. Berkes, J. Colding & C. Folke (Eds.), Navigating social-ecological systems: building resilience for complexity and change (53-82). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. d’Ozouville, N., Auken, E. Sorensen K., Violette, S., de Marsily, G., Deffontaines, B., & Merlen, G. (2008). “Extensive Perched Aquifer and Structural Implications Revealed by 3D Resistivity Mapped in a Galápagos Volcano.” Earth and Planetary Science Letters, 269, 518-522. Ecuadorian Census 2010. (2010). INEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos. Retrieved from http://www.inec.gob.ec/estadisticas/ Epler, B. (2007). Tourism, the Economy, Population Growth, and Conservation in Galápagos. Ecuador, Galápagos Islands: Charles Darwin Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.Galápagos.org/ wp-content/uploads/2012/01/TourismReport1. pdf Galápagos Conservancy. (2016a). “Isabela.” About Galápagos. Galápagos Islands: Galápagos Conservancy. Retrieved from http://www.Galápagos. org/about_Galápagos/about-Galápagos/the-islands/isabela/ Galápagos Conservancy. (2016b). “Rat Eradication on Pinzón.” Ecosystem Restoration. Galápagos Islands: Galápagos Conservancy. Retrieved from http://www.Galápagos.org/conservation/conservation/project-areas/ecosystem-restoration/ rat-eradication/ González, J. A., Montes, C., Rodríguez, J., and Tapia, W. (2008). “Rethinking the Galápagos Islands as a complex social-ecological system: implications for conservation and management.” Ecology and Society, 13(2), 13. Grenier, C. (2013). “Island cultures.” In GNPS, GCREG, CDF and GC, Galápagos Report 2011-

2012 (31-36). Galápagos: Puerto Ayora. Retrieved from http://www.Galápagos.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/06/4.-HUMAN-SYS-island-cultures. grenier.pdf Holmberg, J. (1992). Making Development Sustainable: Redefining Institutions, Policy and Economics. International Institute for Environment and Development. D.C., Washington: Island Press. Honey, M. (2008). “Ecotourism and sustainable development: who owns paradise?” Washington: Island Press. Medina, J., Rueda Córdova, D. & Nagahama, Y. (2007). Informe Annual. Monitoreo de Calidad del Agua en la Isla Isabela. Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz: Parque Nacional Galápagos and Agencia de Cooperación Internacional del Japon. Medina, J., Rueda Córdova, D. & Nagahama, Y. (2008). Informe Annual. Monitoreo de Calidad del Agua en la Isla Isabela. Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz: Parque Nacional Galápagos and Agencia de Cooperación Internacional del Japon. Macdonald, T. (1997). Conflict in the Galápagos Islands: analysis and recommendations for management. MA, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Martin, M., Haerdter, U., Poehlmann, H., & Valdés, A. (2015). “Monitoring Environmental Indicators on Isabela Island to Prevent and Reduce Pollution.” In GNPD, GCREG, CDF and GC, Galápagos Report 2013-2014 (40-45). Puerto Ayora, Galápagos, Ecuador. Retrieved from http://www. darwinfoundation.org/media/filer_public/47/ cc/47ccd2cc-d295-4b44-b433-2a62440c8442/ Galápagosreport_2013-2014.pdf Réyes, M., Trifunovic, N., Sharma, S., & Kennedy, M. (2015a). Data assessment for water demand and supply balance on the island of Santa Cruz (Galápagos Islands). Desalination and Water Treatment. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19443994.2015.11197 56 R Réyes, M., Trifunovic, N., Sharma, S., & Kennedy, M. (2015b). “Water Supply Assessment on Santa Cruz Island: A Technical Overview of Provision and Estimation of Water Demand.” In GNPD, GCREG, CDF, GC, Galápagos Report 2013-2014 (46-53).

Puerto Ayora, Galpagos. Sosa-López, A., Mouillot, D., Ramos-Miranda, J., Flores-Hernández, D., and Chi, T. D. (2007). “Fish Species Richness Decreases with Salinity in Tropical Coastal Lagoons.” Journal of Biogeography, 34, 52-61. Taylor, J., Hardner, J. & Stewart, M. (2009). “Ecotourism and economic growth in the Galápagos: an island economy-wide analysis.” Environment and Development Economics, 14, 139-162. Cambridge: Cambridge Journals. U.K. Department for International Development (DID). (1999). Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheet: Introduction. London: DID. Retrieved from http://www.livelihoods.org/info/info_guidancesheets.html#1. UNESCO. (1998). Decision: CONF 203 VII.23: SOC: Galápagos Islands (Ecuador). Committee Decisions. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/ decisions/2483 UNESCO. (2016). Galápagos Islands. World Heritage List. UNESCO World Heritage Center Website. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1 Walsh, S., A. McCleary, & B. Heumann, B. (2010). “Community Expansion and Infrastructure Development: Implications for Human Health and Environmental Quality in the Galápagos Islands of Ecuador.” Journal of Latin America, 9(3), 137-159. Retrieved from http://livingGalápagos.org/static/ pdfs/walsh_etal_2010_water&access_Isabela.pdf Watkins, G., & Cruz, F. (2007a). “Galápagos at Risk: a Socioeconomic Analysis.” Ecuador, Galápagos Islands: Charles Darwin Foundation. Web Access: http://www.Galápagos.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Galápagos-at-Risk.pdf Watkins, G., & Martinez, A. (2007b). “The Changing Organizational Framework in the Galápagos.” In Galápagos Report 2007-2008 (59-68). Galápagos Islands: Charles Darwin Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.Galápagos.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/changing-org-framework-watkinsmartinez.pdf WWF. (2010). Waste Management Blueprint for the Galápagos Islands. Galápagos Islands: WWF

Publications. Retrieved from http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/waste-managementblueprint-for-the-Galápagos-islands

Appendices Figure 1 A depiction of the increase of population alongside tourism since 1962, including patterns of fuel consumption and the introduction of non-native species Source: González, J. A., C. Montes, J. Rodríguez, and W. Tapia. (2008). “Rethinking the Galápagos Islands as a complex social-ecological system: implications for conservation and management.” Ecology and Society 13(2): 13. Resilience Alliance. Figure 2 Graph generated by author using data from Walsh (2010) Table 1. Building density and Road Length in Puerto Villamil in 1960-2009. Table 1

Figure 3 Building density and road networks for Puerto Villamil, for 1960, 1992, 2003, 2007, and 2009. Source: Walsh, S., A. McCleary, and B. Heumann, B. (2010). “Community Expansion and Infrastructure Development: Implications for Human Health and Environmental Quality in the Galápagos Islands of Ecuador.” In Journal of Latin America. Vol 9. Num 3. Pp. 137-159. Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers. Figure 4 Municipal piped-water system in Puerto Villamil (~2009) Source: Walsh, S., A. McCleary, and B. Heumann, B. (2010). “Community Expansion and Infrastructure Development: Implications for Human Health and Environmental Quality in the Galápagos Islands of Ecuador.” In Journal of Latin America. Vol 9. Num 3. Pp. 137-159. Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers. Figure 5

Building and road density in Puerto Villamil 19602009.

Municipal sewer system in Puerto Villamil, (~2009)

Source: Walsh, S., A. McCleary, and B. Heumann, B. (2010). “Community Expansion and Infrastructure Development: Implications for Human Health and Environmental Quality in the Galápagos Islands of Ecuador.” In Journal of Latin America. Vol 9. Num 3. Pp. 137-159. Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers.

Photo by Hana Shiraishi

Health and the Environment: China’s Cancer Village Phenomenon By Quinn Barrie-Watts ABSTRACT: China faces a challenging phenomenon in the rise of “cancer villages”, villages which have an unusually high number of cancer patients due to water contamination and air pollution. Government policy response to pollution in China has been primarily focused on urban areas to the detriment of these rural villages. The proper management of cancer villages and their harmful effects will only be achieved through aggressive cleanups and the provision of accessible healthcare, coordinated by the national and provincial governments. However, both governments have been undemocratic in their responses by censoring the press and shifting blame. This paper explains the harrowing effects of cancer villages on their inhabitants, provides an overview of government responses, overviews challenges and offers potential policy solutions moving forward.

Introduction An urban-rural divide is evident in the Chinese government’s environmental and health policies. Government officials have been primarily focused on the well-being of the country’s urban people. An article published in The Economist highlights that “air pollution is choking [China’s] urban population.” Indeed, spending a day in Beijing is equivalent to smoking nearly 40 cigarettes (“The state of the climate in 2016,” 2016). As urgent as the current situation is in Beijing, the government has been hard at work in other cities, creating what Lee Liu, a Chinese professor of geography, deems ‘model cities’: industrialized cities that have undergone aggressive environmental cleanups due to heavy pollution (Liu, 2013, p. 127). However, the government should also be turning their attention to China’s “cancer villages”: “a post-reform phenomenon in mainland China, where the number of cancer patients 40

in some villages is extraordinarily high, and water contamination from industries is often the likely cause” (Liu, 2013, p. 9). Xi Jinping and his government must work with local authorities to create new environmental and health policies to improve the living conditions of the rural population suffering in these villages. The government should be made more responsive and democratic in order to take control of the “cancer village” phenomenon. The Effects of Cancer Villages The rate of cancer in these rural villages is unusually high. One typical cancer village, studied by researchers from Dezhou University in 2008, reported between 80 and 100 deaths from cancer over five years in a population of only 1200 (Wei, Li, & Rui, 2008). There are over 400 cancer villages primarily concentrated in the provinces of Henan and Jiangsu. China’s environmentally progressive cities have

been moving their polluting industry into rural areas. Chuyong Lu and Xiaohui Zhong at Central China Normal University argue that higher levels of industrial development are associated with higher numbers of cancer villages (Liu, 2013, p. 10). The government has been intensely focused on improving the quality of life for those living in the cities, while simultaneously worsening the already difficult living conditions of the rural population. Village dwellers endure the harmful health impacts of pollution. The pollutants found in the air and water of these villages include heavy metals such as mercury, lead and chromium, as well as numerous other carcinogens (Gao, 2013, p. 284).

produced over 2,000 tonnes of carcinogenic waste per year, resulting in the death of much livestock. While Julong was still in operation, villagers had to sleep with wet towels covering their mouths and noses, in fear of inhaling toxic fumes. The air surrounding their local elementary school was so polluted that parents had to move their children to neighboring villages with cleaner air (Kaiman, 2014). Today, the plant remains closed but will continue to impact the region for decades. The wind continues to carry remnants of toxic material, while riverbeds have run dry due to the water-intensive operations of these chemical companies (Kaiman, 2014).

The industrial activities responsible for the high cancer rate in these villages affect the social and personal well-being of the residents. One villager described their experience living in Yanglingang, a fishing village on the outskirts of Jiangsu province: “Yanglingang is home to only a few hundred people and at least 11 have died of cancer since 2003. [My] neighbour, Liu Shudong, is dying of oesophageal cancer. Another neighbour, Wang Jinlan, died of breast cancer in 2010. Last year, stomach cancer claimed [my] friend’s 30-year-old wife” (Kaiman, 2014). Another villager, Wei Dongying recounted the arrival of industry in her village outside Hangzhou City. In 1992, a chemical industry zone was built in her village. Soon after, the waterways were covered with black streaks and soapy froth (Kaiman, 2014). A chemical plant called Julong is located near a third village known as Dongxing, which is four hours north of Yanglingang. Over 100 residents of Dongxing were diagnosed with cancer between 2000 and 2005 (Kaiman, 2014). At its inception, the plant

There are numerous challenges villagers have had to face on their journey to inclusion within the government’s 2013 environmental plan. Due to a lack of scientific research, there is little evidence proving that industrial pollution is the main cause of the rise in cancer cases in these villages (Lora-Wainwright, 2010, p. 298). This in turn is due to the authoritarian restrictions on democracy and freedom in Communist China. In recent years, NGOs and local civil society have attempted to bring cancer villages to the attention of local authorities through organized protests. Many protests resulted in Chinese authorities jailing protest leaders and prohibiting journalists from publishing the personal stories of the villagers (Lora-Wainwright, 2010, p. 15). In other cases, research has been conducted but local authorities have refused to publish the information (Kaiman, 2014). Without sufficient evidence to prove the rise in cancer patients is due to pollution, cancer villages are ignored. The Chinese government should focus its 41

attention on cancer villages because of the economic, environmental, health and social impact this phenomenon has on local populations. In contrast with China’s urban areas, cancer villages do not have a social safety net (Yingying, 2011). These villages are in remote areas and do not have the same financial means and access to resources such as hospitals. Also, these villages are not consulted on the sites of future factories (Kaiman, 2014). The government uproots factories from the cities and transplants them wherever is convenient. The residents of cancer villages suffer at the hands of the government, whose responsibility should be to take care of their citizens. The Government’s Response Cancer villages are a longstanding issue that has worsened over the last few years due to China’s rapid economic growth. In February 2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection included cancer villages in its latest five-year plan. This mention is the only ministry-level acknowledgement of the issue since it was first reported by government officials in 1998 (Kaiman, 2014). Despite a long-awaited acknowledgment from the national government, local authorities continue to govern these villages undemocratically through intimidation, denial, silence, and inaction. Furthermore, the national government claims that mentioning cancer villages in the 2013 plan was a mistake (Kaiman, 2014).

to shifting responsibility, Chen has failed to recognize that cancer villages are associated with effects spanning across the concerns of various ministries. The pollution of these villages should not be dealt with solely by China’s health minister. To tackle the situation adequately, the Chinese government should adopt an integrative approach that strives to improve various aspects of the villagers’ lives. Economic, environmental, health, and social concerns are intertwined and would all greatly benefit from receiving the attention of more than one government ministry. With this growing recognition of cancer villages, some villagers hope to gain the opportunity to raise their concerns and legitimize their activities. However, the aforementioned 2013 statement by the Communist Party may be a tactic to further silence the villagers. By publicly announcing their awareness of cancer villages, the government may be trying to take control of the debate on cancer villages by suggesting action has been taken (Lora-Wainwright, 2016). By taking responsibility for the villages, the government continues undemocratic political maneuvering. In the report from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, though “cancer village” was accepted as an official term, the government did not provide an explicit definition. Even if officials understand the pollution problem is becoming serious, there is an “absence of consensus about the degree of openness to adopt for environmental issues” (Gao, 2013, p. 284). This openness is limited because of the government’s unwillingness to take responsibility.

According to Chen Wanqing, the deputy head of the National Central Cancer Registry of China, cancer villages are only to be dealt with by the ministry of health, not the Ministry of Environmental Challenges Ahead Protection (Kaiman, 2014). In addition 42

The acknowledgement of cancer villages is the right step forward for the Chinese government, but the country will face numerous difficulties while attempting to address the issue. Even with accessibility to these villages for research purposes, determining causation is extremely complex in itself because “exposure may take place over a long‐term period, risk may be posed by a multiplicity of factors rather than single substances, incidence of chemical exposure is difficult to pinpoint, and symptoms may not fit a typical pattern” (Lora-Wainwright, 2013, p. 397). Finding a particular contaminant and linking it to specific health effects is challenging and would require years of experimentation and field research. Thus, controlling this situation will take many years, to the detriment of the current population and its descendents. Another problem is the undemocratic practice of restricting the press, carried out by local and national governments. When villagers request intervention from the national government, they often lack sustained media attention. Thus, they usually resort to putting pressure on local authorities by protesting. As of 2013, “there is no known national ban on cancer village reporting, though new cancer village reports are rare after May 2009” (Liu, 2013, p. 10). In fact, there are reports recounting incidents where local governments and industry have threatened, harassed, and assaulted investigators and reporters (Liu, 2013, p. 10). These undemocratic practices are used by local authorities to the detriment of the media, and therefore hinder the spread of important information. Local authorities cite a lack of funding as a reason for the absence of proper media reporting. The authorities cannot afford

to implement environmental regulations, so in order to minimize social unrest, they prefer to cover up the cancer village phenomenon (Lora-Wainwright, 2013, p. 404). Under the Dome, a documentary created by Chai Jing, an investigative journalist, was released in 2015, and was viewed by over 100 million people within two days of its release. The film opens with Chai blaming pollution for her infant daughter’s benign tumor. Through the use of statistics, research conducted by scientists, as well as personal stories, Chai reveals China’s pollution problem to its citizens (Hatton, 2015). Shortly after the release of the film, the Communist government censored it across the country due to the threat it posed to the government agenda (Browne, 2015). It seems that the government feels it is most qualified to deal with the pollution problem, and thus does not accept input from its citizens, to the detriment of the cleanup process. By not giving citizens opportunities to discuss and share ideas, the Chinese government prevents its people from mobilizing, while simultaneously keeping them ignorant about the problem of pollution in their country. The reluctance of the government to respond to the cancer village situation is also demonstrated through delayed court cases on the matter. In 2011, Chinese environmental campaigners successfully brought a chemical factory to court. In the city of Qujing, Yunnan a factory’s illegal dumping of chromium waste caused more than a dozen villagers to develop cancer (Gao, 2013, p. 284). However, in late 2012, the trial had yet to go to court. Friends of Nature, an environmental group involved in the case, strongly believes the situation demonstrates the unwillingness of the 43

local government and the court to draw connections “between pollution and the deterioration of public health” (Gao, 2013, p. 284). To have the proper integration of environmental and health policy, the Chinese people need their government to be more responsive to the crisis at hand, in particular by participating in court cases meant to fix the situation. Furthermore, looking at the inner groups within the government reveals a conflict between politicians and civil servants in different ministries. This tension within different branches of government reflects bureaucratic politics, where officials argue for different goals depending on which ministry they work for. For example, certain “officials tend to argue that China is still in the middle stage of industrialization, and economic growth is the priority” (Liu, 2013, p. 18-19). The government is in a deadlock if its officials cannot agree on how to respond to the cancer village phenomenon. There is a balance the Chinese government must find: it must seek to stimulate economic growth while also increasing environmental regulation. The government must make economic compromises for environmental and healthcare policies to develop properly. Potential Policy Solutions One reason the government may claim not to pursue aggressive policy changes to improve the quality of life in cancer villages is a lack of financial resources. This money would come from a thriving economy, so China’s primary focus should be economic development. However, the government has demonstrated that it already has sufficient funds because it has spent money on environmental 44

regulations in urban areas. Currently, in the most extreme cases, more than two dozen villagers die each year from pollution-induced cancer. In addition, national cancer rates have increased significantly in the past two decades, accounting for one in every five deaths. Every year, one to four million lives are lost due to cancer (Gao, 2013, p. 284). These statistics demonstrate how dire the situation is. Legally, China has now made it possible for industrial polluters to be charged with the crime of poisoning. But instead of industrial companies paying for medical treatment and relocation costs, this responsibility falls on the government. For this law to function properly, companies should take full responsibility for covering the costs of their damaging industrial activity (Liu, 2013, p. 19). In recent years, the government has dispensed some money into mitigating the problems faced by cancer villages. However, further investments in these rural areas must be made. Between 2006 and 2010, over $100 billion was spent on water infrastructure alone to clean up polluted waterways (Gao, 2013, p. 284). Despite these investments, an inspection of 200 cities across China in 2011 revealed that 55% of underground water supplies are still rated “fairly poor to extremely poor” (Gao, 2013, p. 284). Money may not be the sole solution to China’s environmental problems. The government must better enforce its policies and the citizens have to become even more socially aware. While enforcement is controlled by the government, the spread of social awareness involves the full commitment of the entire population. Hopefully, if citizens believe their opinions are heard, they will mobilize. With a free press to share personal stories as well as substantive

scientific research and cooperation from local authorities, awareness can be strengthened both within cancer villages and beyond their boundaries. Awareness differs across urban-rural divides, and thus so does environmental policy implementation. China has tended to favour urban areas over rural areas, consequently making the disparity among the worst in the world (Liu, 2013, p. 124). Villagers generally have no access to healthcare and rarely receive physical exams. Consequently, cancer is often only diagnosed in its late stages. The poor are either unable to afford treatment, or are forced to take out loans that push their families further into debt. Since the rural poor inhabiting cancer villages are socially and politically marginalized, they are usually excluded from environment-related decisions, such as the displacement of a factory from the urban centre to the rural countryside. The government must become more politically inclusive of the poor and alert them of the potential risks of local industry. China needs to implement better social-environmental policies. These policies should combine social justice and environmental protection to ensure a comprehensive approach to sustainability. Environmental law should be standardized across the country. Implementing environmental policies must be done through an integrative approach that takes into account the social awareness and well-being of the population. The Chinese government now has to treat the negative effects of pollution, as a result of not taking a preventative approach in the past (Gao, 2013, p. 284).

Another issue contributing to the rise of cancer cases in cancer villages has been the decline of government funding in healthcare spending. Since the 1980s, public hospitals have run like businesses because of the decrease in funding their only incentive is to make money. Sabrina Luk, an assistant professor at Nanyang Technological University, states, “Doctors, who would receive performance bonuses, were incentivized to prescribe unnecessary drugs or provide unnecessary medical tests and treatment” (Luk, 2017, p. 4). Healthcare has become lucrative for public hospitals. Private practice has become widespread in the countryside where the rural poor cannot afford it. Over the past three decades, China has developed a targeted healthcare system that includes the following programs: the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) and the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS), for urban and rural dwellers respectively (Luk, 2017, p. 71). Reform of the medical system is still in progress, as President Xi Jinping is hoping to achieve universal healthcare by 2020. Implementing a universal healthcare system will have both costs and benefits for China’s cancer villages. There are deep-seated issues including inequalities in treatment between different population groups that make universal healthcare challenging. Presently, many people do not belong to one of the four programs China currently has, but changing the healthcare system will be difficult. Since 2013, a number of campaigns and movements have emerged. A few notable ones include the Harmonious Society Program, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme and the “Cover the Countryside” campaign. These 45

three groups will be major drivers in the push for universal healthcare (Manuel, 2010, p. 363). Implementing universal public healthcare will help give residents in cancer villages access to treatment and hopefully lead to earlier cancer detection. Overall, some work has been done by the government to deal with the cancer village phenomenon, but more action is required to address this pressing issue. Conclusion In conclusion, the Chinese government needs to turn its attention to the country’s cancer villages. How the government treats their rural population is a failure on the national scale. The government has spent resources addressing pollution in its cities. The rapid increase in cancer makes it the most prevalent disease in China today, and the 400 cancer villages spread across the country have disproportionately large numbers of people with the disease. The Chinese government has prioritized the economy above all else, and because of this, polluting industries have taken over most of rural China. Cancer villages present environmental and social issues. Thus, the government must implement integrative policies and reforms. They should not focus on just the environment or solely on health, because these issues are intertwined and must be treated as such. In the long term, if China wants to progress in their environmental and health initiatives, they will need a more responsive government. References Browne, A. (2015, March 17). Pollution film too popular for beijing’s comfort. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-world-pollution-film-under-the-dome-too-popular-for-beijings-comfort-1426567136 Duckett, J. (2011). The chinese state’s retreat from health. Routledge.

Gao, H. (2013, April). Chinese government admits existence of cancer villages. The Lancet, 14. Hatton, C. (2015, March 2). Under the dome: The smog film taking china by storm. BBC News. Retrieved from http:// www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-31689232 The state of the climate in 2016. (2016, November 17). The Economist. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/ blogs/graphicdetail/2016/11/global-warming Kaiman, J. (2013, June 4). Inside china’s ‘cancer villages. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/jun/04/china-villages-cancer-deaths Kaiman, J. (2014, December 10). Chinese government investigates ‘cancer village’ pollution case. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/10/chinese-government-investigates-cancer-village-pollution-case Li, L., Chen, Q., & Powers, D. (2012, November). Chinese healthcare reform: A shift toward social development. Modern China, 38(6), 630-645. Liu, L. (2010). Made in china: Cancer villages. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 52(2), 8-21. Liu, L. (2013). Environmental policy is social policy -- social policy is environmental policy : toward sustainability policy (I. Wallimann, Comp.). New York: Springer. Lora-Wainwright, A. (2010). An anthropology of ‘Cancer villages’: Villagers’ perspectives and the politics of responsibility. Journal of Contemporary China, 19(63), 79-99. Lora-Wainwright, A., & Chen, A. (2016). A companion to the anthropology of environmental health (M. Singer, Comp.). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. Luk, S. C. Y. (2017). Financing healthcare in china : towards universal health insurance. New York: Routledge. Manuel, R. (2010). China: The next twenty years of reform and development (R. Garnaut, J. Golley, & L. Song, Eds.). ANU Press. Shapiro, J. (2016). China’s environmental challenges. Cambridge: Polity Press. Slezak, M. (2013, February 26). China takes steps to clean up ‘cancer villages’. New Science. Retrieved from https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23212-china-

takes-steps-to-clean-up-cancer-villages/

Wei, Z., Li, H., & Rui, Y. (2008, November 28). Determination of major elements in soil from cancer village by x-ray fluorescence spectrometry. Retrieved from PubMed.gov database. Yingying, Y. (2011, February 10). The shadow over rural china [Blog post]. Retrieved from chinadialogue website: https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4098-The-shadow-over-rural-China

Photo by Lorena Vidal

Photo by Hana Shiraishi

Drowning Cities by Fiona McRaith ABSTRACT: Many coastal U.S. cities are at risk of flooding, and pre-disaster mitigation plans are urgently needed. Through a case study of the city of Hoboken, New Jersey, which was severely damaged by Hurricane Sandy, this essay explores how “hard” and “soft” infrastructure can make cities more resilient to flooding. Yet, social and political factors can delay the implementation of such plans. Pre-disaster mitigation plans must account for the particular social and environmental characteristics of the target area, and must engage stakeholders and actors at every level.

Introduction Climate change is frequently touted as being closely tied to the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, acidifying seas, holes in the ozone layer, and the destruction of natural habitats. Yet, many people fail to recognize the current effects that climate change is already having on our livelihoods. Perhaps civilians of the island nation of Kiribati are acutely aware of these effects, as this nation was the first source country of climate change refugees. While many Canadians and Americans are unaware of the impact of climate change on their lives, thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of North American dwellers are impacted by climate change every day due to the increased frequency of floods. In fact, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the U.S. government states the following: Between 1980 and 2013, the United States suffered more than $260 billion in flood-related damages. On average, more people die annually from flooding than any other natural hazard. Further, the costs borne by the Federal government are more than any other hazard. Flooding accounts for approximately 85% of all disaster declarations. With climate change, we anticipate that flooding risks will increase over time.

(An Introduction to the Federal Flood Risk Standard section, para. 3).

In places where flooding is a concern, urban planning must respond to increased risk due to climate change. Building standards for floodplains may need to be revised. A key tactic of urban planners must be to understand, analyze, and ultimately make informed decisions based on the history of the area being addressed. Impact of Hurricane Sandy on Hoboken The city of Hoboken, New Jersey, is situated on the Hudson River directly across from Manhattan, and it boasts a population of about 53,635 (U.S. Census). In 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck northern New Jersey October 29, 2012 (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2013). Weehawken Cove, on the north side of Hoboken, began to overflow by 6:30pm on October 29. At the same time, the Long Slip Canal on the south side was overflowing, causing the Marin Boulevard underpass on the south side of the town to be exposed to surging water. The nearby railroad tracks were soon flooded. By 9pm, the two surges of water had met in 49

the middle of the city at 7th Street (Fessenden & White, 2016). An estimated 20,000 Hoboken residents were surrounded by water and stranded within 24 hours. The storm also flooded 1,700 homes, impacted the power grid, and caused USD$100 million worth of local damage (Szokan, 2014).

Fig. 1: Post-Sandy flooded parking lot for taxis, Hoboken Source: CNN

The impact of Hurricane Sandy was felt before the storm touched down on the continental U.S.: New Jersey Governor Chris Christie declared a statewide state of emergency days before the flooding in Hoboken began. Governor Christie highlighted the role of the government in handling the impending devastation of Sandy: With this [coordination between federal, state and local governments], government at every level can respond more effectively to conditions on the ground, activate emergency operations plans, and ensure that resources are being marshalled to assist and protect the public through this storm. (Stirling, 2012).

Former U.S. President Barack Obama echoed Christie’s statement at his press conference, noting the “[t]here has been extraordinarily close coordination between state, federal, and local governments. And so we’re confident that the assets are pre-positioned for an effective response in the aftermath of the storm” (as cited in Johnson, 2012). As great as these intentions 50

may be, the actors involved in responding to the effects of natural disasters need to concern themselves with pre-disaster mitigation. An article by Eric Jaffe (2014) illustrates this need for resilience: Two years after the hurricane, Hoboken remains susceptible even to lesser storms; Zimmer [Hoboken mayor Dawn Zimmer] explained that half a dozen significant floods have hit the city since Sandy. I asked her when Hoboken would ideally have a storm system in place. “Tomorrow,” she said, moments after an aide joked, “Yesterday.” (Jaffe, 2014)

Awareness of the impact of natural disasters on communities – individuals’ safety and the safety of their possessions – is a key aspect of both governing and city building. Kristina Ford, the director of city planning for New Orleans from 1992-2000, admitted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that her and all those who had also held her role could have prepared more effectively. In Ford’s article “The Trouble with City Planning: What New Orleans Can Teach Us” (2010), she states that “city officials trusted with the care of New Orleans’ citizens should’ve prepared for their safety” (p. 3). This statement can be extended to city officials and planners in all at-risk areas. Superstorms such as Katrina and Sandy are no longer remote future possibilities; with climate change, natural disasters such as these storms may occur more frequently. By 2014, Hoboken had been hit by half a dozen floods since Hurricane Sandy in 2012 (Szokan, 2014). How can current urban planners tackle these issues – issues that they did not cause? A key tactic of urban planners should be to understand, analyze, and ultimately make informed decisions based on the history of the area being addressed. Ford (2010) argues that history cannot be discounted in the

analysis of the dominoes leading to the disastrous impact of Hurricane Katrina on the city of New Orleans in Louisiana. The same goes for the impact of Hurricane Sandy’s floods on the city of Hoboken; preparation must occur through the lens of the area’s history.

project proposed for Hoboken. The Hoboken project was described as one which “takes a multi-faceted approach intended to address flooding from both major storm surges and high tides as well as from heavy rainfall events” (NJDEP Bureau of Flood Resilience, 2016). However, the proposal

Fig. 2: Elevation levels of Hoboken Source: SWmaps.com

The Hoboken flood-proofing project In response to Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched a design competition aimed at building resilience and “protecting areas battered by Sandy from future extreme weather” (Jaffe, 2014). The Hoboken project proposal was submitted by the Office of Metropolitan Architecture, a Dutch Firm (McGeehan, 2016). In June of 2014, HUD awarded 1 billion dollars to the winning projects, $230 million of which went to the “Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge”

has faced a number of challenges – many arising from the residents of Hoboken. The project follows a “Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge” blueprint, which are four components described by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s Bureau of Flood Resilience as: 1. Resist: a combination of hard infrastructure (such as bulkheads, floodwalls, and seawalls) and soft landscaping features (such as berms and/or levees which could be used as parks) that act as barri51

ers along the coast during exceptionally “hard” and “soft” infrastructure, is dehigh tide and/or storm surge events; signed to respond to Hoboken’s unique characteristics. The professionals involved 2. Delay: policy recommendations, guidelines, and urban green infrastruc- in the project took into account Hoboken residents’ appreciation of, and reliance on, ture to slow storm water runoff; the Hudson Riverfront for aesthetics, tour3. Store: green and grey infrastructure ism, and historical value. Thus, according improvements, such as bio-retention ba- to the article, the project proposal offers to sins, swales, and green roofs, that slow accompany “hard” infrastruc ture, namely down and capture storm water, and flood walls between the town and the wawhich will complement the efforts of the terway, with “soft” infrastructure such as City of Hoboken’s existing Green Infra- increased parkland, greenery, and sloping structure Strategic Plan; and lawns. The project, created by Diana Bal4. Discharge: enhancements to Hobo- mori and her team, engages stakeholders at ken’s existing storm water management every level of government – from national system, including the identification and to local – as well as public agencies such as upgrading of existing storm water/sew- New Jersey Transit. er lines, outfalls and pumping stations. (New Jersey Department of Environ- In February 2016, approximately three mental Protection [NJDEP] Bureau of and a half years after Sandy, the New York Times published two articles on the same Flood Resilience, 2016) day. Both discuss the Hoboken project. A 2014 exposé by Eric Jaffe, published in One was titled “How Sea Walls Around The Atlantic, explained the hopes of the Hoboken Might Have Stopped Hurricane project through an interview with the ur- Sandy’s Floods” and the second, “Plan to ban planner behind it, Diana Balmori. Flood-Proof Hoboken Runs Into a Wall.” This piece highlights the ways in which the The fact that Hurricane Sandy continued to be discussed 40 months after it occurred ambitious project, in utilizing both

Fig. 3: The impact of walls around the city of Hoboken – the yellow indicates areas that were flooded by Sandy and that would have been protected with the proposed walls Source: New York Times

illustrates the persisting relevance of this disaster. First, preventative measures could have averted the millions of dollars of damages to Hoboken, the thousands of homes abandoned, and the tens of thousands of people stranded. Government officials should have recognized the threat of flooding in Hoboken, and pushed for a plan to mitigate the disaster before it occurred. Second, the issue of flooding remains pressing, especially with the increasing threat of floods due to rising sea levels. The public opposition to the project is highlighted in Patrick McGeehan’s article “Plan to Flood-Proof Hoboken Runs Into a Wall.” The author reveals that no concrete steps had been taken to implement the project proposal in the almost two years since the government of New Jersey was awarded the $230 million budget. This delayed implementation is in large part due to opposition by local residents, many of whom argue that the project would decrease the value of their riverfront and hinder the view it provides of New York City’s Manhattan skyline. Yet, many citizens, including Hoboken mayor Dawn Zimmer, remember the terror of Hurricane Sandy. One citizen recalls going without electricity, access to food, and basic belongings. Another recounts his experience of when his store doors burst open due to water pressure; his merchandise slammed into the walls, ruined (McGeehan, 2016).

had been implemented in October of 2012 when the historic storm struck. This piece included illustrations demonstrating the pattern and speed of the flooding during Sandy, and it concluded that the proposed barriers would have kept almost 100% of the water at bay (Fessenden & White, 2016). The most recent information released to the public comes directly from a release from New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection on September 9, 2016. Fittingly, the headline addresses the most controversial aspects of the plan – the lagging timeline and the Hudson waterfront. It reads, “Christie Administration Moves Forward with $230 Million Project to Protect Hoboken and Parts of Weehawken and Jersey City from Storm Surge” with a subheading stating in capital letters, “recommended plan calls for seamless integration of protective system into city streetscape, preserving waterfront access and views” (NJDEP, 2016). The plan is slightly altered from the original proposition, taking into account both the practicality of handling increased flooding as well as maintaining the city’s vital waterfront.

The “Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge” plan illustrates one way in which various actors are engaged in solving a city planning issue. The federal, state, and local governments were all involved, as were private planning firms, the public, and the media. Only time will tell if these actors have manThese memories may provide explanation aged to collaborate to create a successful for the Times’ coordination of this article solution to the flooding faced by Hoboken. with its second one, titled “How Sea Walls Around Hoboken Might Have Stopped Conclusion Hurricane Sandy’s Floods.” This article functioned as an opportunity to highlight Historically, city developers failed to fully the effect the “Resist, Delay, Store, Dis- account for environmental limitations. Citcharge” plan would have had on the floods ies have been built where the natural landinduced by Hurricane Sandy the project scape seemed to be screaming “not here!!” 53

This narrow view has had devastating effects in New Orleans, built on reclaimed swampland near the Gulf of Mexico (Ford, 2010), as well as Hoboken, which was originally an island surrounded by swampland. Many other areas on coastal U.S. are similarly at high risk, and this risk must be mitigated before a disaster hits. These areas urgently require resilient infrastructure, a priority which an aide of the Hoboken mayor alluded to in joking that a plan to combat flooding should ideally be implemented “yesterday.” Although city planners and government officials cannot alter decisions made in the past, they have a duty to focus on pre-disaster mitigation. It took Hurricane Sandy to bring this urgency to the attention of the New Jersey government, who is now moving forward with the $230million project to protect the city of Hoboken (NJDEP, 2016). Yet, local government is not solely responsible for the safety of civilians – the private sector, individuals, and all levels of governmental and non-government institutions must utilize their unique roles to help guide local government maximize cities’ resilience to natural disasters. References

Sea Walls Around Hoboken Might Have Stopped Hurricane Sandy’s Floods. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/08/nyregion/hoboken-flood-wallmaps.html Ford, K. (2010). The trouble with city planning: What New Orleans can teach us. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (2013). Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, A Resilient Region. Retrieved from https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/ huddoc?id=hsrebuildingstrategy.pdf Jaffe, E. (2014, December). The Water Next Time: How nature itself could become a city’s best defense against extreme weather. The Atlantic. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-water-next-time/382242/ Johnson, G. (2012, October 29). Hurricane Sandy a wash for candidates in state, national races. Boston Globe. Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe. com/news/politics/2012/10/29/its-outset-hurricane-sandy-political-wash-for-candidates-state-national-races/KUMA799v8ZpFkhnYLes9hI/story. html#comments McGeehan, P. (2016, February 07). Plan to FloodProof Hoboken Runs Into a Wall. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. com/2016/02/08/nyregion/plan-to-flood-proofhoboken-runs-into-a-wall.html

Dunbar, B., Voiland, A., & Carlowicz, M. (2013, March 07). Hurricane Sandy (Atlantic Ocean). Retrieved October 01, 2016, from https://www.nasa. gov/mission_pages/hurricanes/archives/2012/ h2012_Sandy.html#.V_PVQrwrIfE

NJDEP (2016, September 09). News Release 16/84 - Christie Administration Moves Forward with $230 Million Project to Protect Hoboken and Parts of Weehawken and Jersey City from Storm Surge. Retrieved October 02, 2016, from http://www. nj.gov/dep/newsrel/2016/16_0084.htm NJDEP Bureau of Flood Resilience (2016, October 03). Rebuild By Design – Hudson River. Retrieved October 04, 2016, from http://www.nj.gov/dep/floodresilience/rbd-hudsonriver.htm

Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS). (2016, August 23). Retrieved October 03, 2016 from https://www.fema.gov/federal-flood-risk-management-standard-ffrms

Hoboken Museum (2012). Short History of Hoboken. Retrieved October 01, 2016, from https://www.hobokenmuseum.org/history/ short-history-of-hoboken

Fessenden, F., & White, J. (2016, February 07). How

Stirling, S. (2012, October 27). Hurricane Sandy

American FactFinder - Results. (n.d.). Retrieved October 01, 2016, from http://factfinder.census. gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview. xhtml?src=bkmk

update: Gov. Christie declares state of emergency for all of N.J. NJ.com. Retrieved from http://www. nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/10/hurricane_sandy_update_gov_chr.html Szokan, N. (2014, December 15). After Hurricane Sandy, Hoboken works on plan to avoid future flood damage. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/health-science/after-hurricane-sandy-hoboken-works-on-plan-to-avoid-futureflood-damage/2014/12/12/4ec919b6-7a44-11e4b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html White House, Executive Office of the President. (2012, October 29). President Obama Makes a Statement on Hurricane Sandy [Press release]. The White House. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/ video/2012/10/29/president-obama-makes-statement-hurricane-sandy

Images Otto, J. (Photographer). (2012, October 30). Hoboken, NJ: CNN iReport. Retrieved from http://i. cdn.turner.com/ireport/sm/prod/2012/10/30/ WE00849003/2269464/DSC00361jpg-2269464_ p9.jpg Stevens Institute of Technology. (2016, February 07). New York Times. Retrieved from http://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/08/nyregion/ hoboken-flood-wall-maps.html Walkowiak, S. (2013, April 03). Normal Water Level (digital image). Retrieved October 03, 2016, from http://swmaps.com/new-hoboken-flood-mapwith-water-levels-post-hurricane-sandy/

Photo by Rasha Lama

Working Against Waves

Fishing along Ecuadorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s tectonic plates, a short photo-story by Matthew King

When the world shakes, people flock to the shore. Free of collapsing buildings and splintering boards, the beach is an odd haven, especially on April 16th, 2016. On that afternoon, sand shifted with unease as the world swayed to a seismic rhythm. Houses are heard collapsing in the distant twilight as jade froth laps at toes. At 6:58 in the afternoon, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake hit Ecuadorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s coastline with force unseen since 2010. Saddling the subduction zone between two tectonic plates, Ecuador is a hotspot for volcanic and seismic activity. This time, restaurants and hotels collapsed all along the coast. Once the earth stilled, the silence lasted. Even after hostels repaired beams and patched ceilings, their lobbies remained empty. For the buildings left standing, travelers rarely frequent national emergencies. But despite the economic depression, fishermen fish and birds steal.

Walk along Ecuadorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s coast at 9am and you will hear the blue canvas of temporary homes whipping in the wind. People and black vultures shuffle around while the tide creeps towards beached boats. Broad silhouettes circle in the sky. The day started far earlier for those braving waves for a living and the aptly-named Magnificent Frigatebird eagerly awaits their return. A boat arrives and roughly 15 men scramble to help unload thousands of fish. The goal: a pickup truck that has arrived on the shore. The method: scooping as many fish as possible into a bucket from the boat, then running towards the truck. Running, because while this is happening, the frigatebirds have a mission of their own. Their goal: steal as many fish as possible. Their method: wait until one human travels from boat to truck unguarded, then dive-bomb the open container.

Some men wave a hand over their bucket, more out of principle than practicality. Others give the birds their due without a fight. Frigatebirds, whose wingspan almost matches the fishermenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s height, dart around in a confusing haze, moving nimbly for such a large body size. At times, this feast seams anything but graceful; birds crash into each other trying to score an easy meal. Often the same fish is grabbed midair and scales burst from the carnage, raining on the beach below. The assembly line between terrains lasts for 30 minutes before the birds are full and the boat is empty. It seems like a large catch, but tension hangs in the air. For all the hard work, who is going to buy the fish? Some people still live in their tents because they fear a collapsing roof, some still live on the beach because they canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t afford to repair. Hotels are empty or broken, foreign wallets are nowhere to be seen. No one will starve, but rebuilding will be slow.

Socio-Environmental Conflicts Caused by Hydroelectric Development on the Río Chiriquí Viejo by Constance Lambert-Tremblay and Antonina Scheer ABSTRACT: In the 1970s, Panama began constructing hydroelectric dams to promote the country’s energy independence. Although this move to clean energy has benefited the country, the manner in which these dams are approved and built deserves critique. Panama’s Rio Chiriquí Viejo (RCV) watershed, located in Chiriquí province, contains 22 hydroelectric dams that are either in operation, in construction, or in the process of being approved. This high density of dams has provoked strong resistance among the area’s inhabitants. Our research aimed to explore the perceived impacts of hydroelectricity and the problems with the participation process institutionalized in the approval of hydro projects. Through interviews, we found that local political representatives perceive multiple negative impacts of dams, including a decrease in the river’s discharge and the water’s quality. These changes affect the human consumption of water, the agriculture and tourism sectors, as well as fishing activities along the river. Hydro companies have also damaged local roads and deforested large tracts of land. After studying the governmental approval process for dams, we identified important flaws and found the citizen participation process to be inadequate because participative tools are neither binding nor enforced. Socio-environmental conflicts have arisen in Panama’s Chiriquí province due to the direct and cumulative impacts of hydroelectric development and because the participation process in place does not ensure sufficient public input in decision-making.

Introduction Low and middle income countries have rushed towards hydropower for a variety of reasons, including the energy demand of growing populations and international pressure to replace carbon-intensive energy infrastructure with renewable energy. In the 1970s, the Panamanian government began constructing hydroelectric projects to minimize the country’s dependence on oil, and thus lower the volatility of domestic electricity prices. Two decades later, the government 62

embraced neoliberalism and allowed private involvement in the generation of electricity. The country’s private sector and their foreign investors became major players in the country’s economic development (Perdomo, 2008). Panama’s hydropower rush may also have been encouraged by the incentives created by the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism allows companies in industrialized countries, who find cutting emissions too expensive, to earn emissions reduction credits if they finance low-carbon

projects in developing countries (FinleyBrook & Thomas, 2011). In order to gain foreign investment through this mechanism, the Panamanian government vigorously supported hydro companies by facilitating permit acquisition. Hydropower is now Panama’s main source of electricity, accounting for 53% of installed electrical capacity, with nearly half of that share coming from large-scale dams (ASEP, 2016). Interwoven with the growth of hydropower in Panama is a history of violent conflict. In some cases involving hydro infrastructure on indigenous land, for example the Chan 75 and Bonyic dams, there were human rights violations as authorities used physical violence against communities opposed to the projects. The government’s tendency has been one of “green authoritarianism”, which uses the carbon offset argument to prioritize hydro development while acting in oppressive ways towards affected populations, who are often marginalized peoples (Finley-Brook & Thomas, 2011). Public opposition to hydroelectricity reached such an intensity that the government of Juan Carlos Varela cancelled the permits of sixteen hydro projects in the provinces of Chiriquí and Veraguas in October 2015 (Jaramillo, 2015).

population of nearly 60,000 inhabitants (Ministerio de Ambiente, 2016). The river itself is dammed by five hydroelectric projects, and five more projects have been granted construction permits. The tributaries of the RCV contain an additional twelve hydroelectric dams (ASEP, 2016).

This paper explores the socio-environmental conflicts surrounding hydroelectricity in Chiriquí. An environmental conflict results from the scarcity of natural resources (Libiszewski, 1992). Usually, conflicts arise when a resource is limited and the costs and benefits of its use are unequally distributed (Sanchez-Vasquez, 2016). A socio-environmental conflict is triggered by a power imbalance between agents with opposing worldviews (Ortiz et al., 2011). In this case, the conflict itself is not only about the distribution of resource property rights, but also includes the cultural perception of the resource and the value communities attribute to it. The conflicts observed surrounding the RCV are not only caused by the dams’ negative impacts, but arise in a particular institutional framework where opposing views are not accorded equal importance. As foreign researchers, our analysis may be influenced by our own Western perceptions of sustainability, ecology, resource use, and democracy, which may not match those of Chiriquí’s communities. In an effort to address this, In this context of international financial we worked closely with a local NGO, and drivers and local conflict, our research given our access to academic audiences, focused on Chiriquí province. It is a we hope to give a voice to the Chiricano mountainous region with elevated precip- communities opposed to hydroelectricity. itation levels, and thus has an especially high potential for hydropower. The Rio Methodology Chiriquí Viejo (RCV) is the province’s principal river; within its watershed are Our research objective was determined a multitude of smaller tributaries (Vega, through a partnership with a Chiricano 2012). The RCV is 162 km long, and flows NGO called FUNDICCEP (Fundación para through four districts with a combined el desarrollo integral, comunitaro, y conservación 63

de los ecosistemas en Panama – Foundation for integrated community development and the conservation of Panama’s ecosystems). The mandate we were given was to explore and map out the socio-environmental conflicts caused by the twenty-two hydroelectric projects in the Rio Chiriquí Viejo watershed. We studied these conflicts by collecting data on the dams’ impacts as perceived by local political authorities, civil society, and affected individuals. Our aim was to record the perceived impacts, since documenting the “real” impacts would have required intensive data collection impossible within the time frame of our study. We collected exploratory data with the aim of illustrating the geographical distribution of these perceived impacts.

viewed some of the local representatives of the sixteen “corregimientos” (municipalities) bordering the river. We acknowledge that these sources of information may not fully represent the population under study, since elected officials cannot be assumed to reflect the electorate’s experiences and opinions. Our interview questions centered on the impacts perceived by the interviewees, as well as the general perspective of their corregimientos in relation to hydroelectric companies. To communicate the geographical distribution of these perceived impacts, we created a map in ArcGIS. For our research on the Panamanian approval process for hydroelectric projects, we used government documents as our main sources of information, as well as news articles and interviews with representaAs no previous research has outlined tives of NGOs and government agencies. specific conflicts occurring on this river, As a second visual communication tool, we used an exploratory approach to gain we created a flow diagram to illustrate the familiarity with the local issues surround- numerous steps in this approval process. ing hydroelectricity. This phase was the foundation for our research. The informal, Results: Perceived Impacts of unstructured interviews we conduct- Hydroelectricity ed during this stage contained exclusively open ended questions, with the Mapping the Impacts interviewee leading the discussion. We also attended a community meeting in Our map of perceived impacts shows the Paraíso, a municipality of Chiriquí, where rivers of the Chiriquí Viejo watershed citizens shared their concerns and asked and the corregimientos of the four districts questions to a representative of the hydro bordering the river. The map locates the ten company building the Chuspa dam in hydro projects on the RCV and the twelve their area. For all interviews in our study, projects on its tributaries. All projects are we provided consent forms or asked composed of a dam and a power station, for verbal consent in our recordings. where the kinetic energy from the turbines is transformed into electricity. ConnectAfter this preliminary stage, we aimed to ing these two points is an underground uncover the precise impacts felt by affected tunnel equipped with turbines that transcommunities. We conducted semi-struc- ports a share of the river’s discharge. The tured interviews with the deputies or map pinpoints two separate geographimayors of each of the four districts that cal locations for the four projects, Pando, border the RCV: Renacimiento, Bugaba, Monte Lirio, Baitun, and Burica, whose Baru, and Alanje. In addition, we inter- dams are over 5 km from their respective 64

Proyectos Hidroeléctricos en la Cuenca del Río Chiriquí Viejo Este mapa muestra las ubicaciones de los 22 proyectos hidroeléctricos aprobados, en construcción y en operación en la Cuenca 102 del Río Chiriquí Viejo. Todos los proyectos se componen de una presa y una casa de máquinas. Sin embargo, sólo aquellos con una distancia significativa (más que 5 km) entre los dos se presentan como tres elementos: una presa, un túnel subterráneo y una casa de máquinas. Para la longitud del río donde está presente un túnel subterráneo, las empresas hidroeléctricas sólo están obligadas a dejar el 10% del caudal del río en su cauce natural. Según los representantes de los corregimientos que bordean el Río Chiriquí Viejo (RCV), estos proyectos tienen impactos en sus comunidades. Estos impactos se describen en el documento de acompañamiento. Mapa creado por Antonina Scheer y Constance Lambert-Tremblay Estudiantes de la Universidad McGill Contacto: antonina.scheer@gmail.com

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8°45'N

PARAÍSO

CAÑAS GORDAS

POTRERILLOS DOMINICAL

18 8a

Costa Rica 8°40'N

POTRERILLOS ABAJO 8°40'N

GUAYABAL

BUGABA

ROVIRA

SANTA CRUZ SAN ANDRÉS

8b SANTA ROSA

BREÑÓN

GUABAL

POTRERILLOS ABAJO TINAJAS

EL BONGO

SORTOVÁ

8°35'N

10a

8°35'N

GÓMEZ GUACÁ BOQUERÓN (CAB.)

SANTA MARTA

Mapa de Localización Regional

LA CONCEPCIÓN (CAB.)

10b

BÁGALA

ASERRÍO DE GARICHÉ

Viejo

8°30'N

SANTO DOMINGO

Río Chiriqui

8°30'N

SAN CARLOS

PEDREGAL

LA ESTRELLA

BUGABA TIJERAS

PROGRESO

SAN PABLO VIEJO

EL TEJAR NUEVO MÉXICO DIVALÁ

8°25'N

CANTA GALLO ALANJE RODOLFO AGUILAR DELGADO SANTO TOMÁS

BACO

BARÚ

ALANJE

QUERÉVALO

PALO GRANDE SANTO TOMÁS SANTO SANTO SANTO TOMÁS TOMÁS TOMÁS

8°20'N

PUERTO ARMUELLES

7.5

82°55'W

SAN PABLO 8°20'N NUEVO SAN PABLO NUEVO QUERÉVALO

GUARUMAL

Kilómetros 83°0'W

SAN PABLO NUEVO

82°50'W

82°45'W

82°40'W

82°35'W

GUARUMAL

82°30'W

power stations. For these four projects, the underground tunnels are represented by a dotted red line. In a table above the map, the following are given: the hydroelectric company associated with each project, the river in which it is located, the status, Environmental Impact Assessment category, and the size of the project in megawatts.

government was not determined through an evaluation of the volume of water required for specific ecosystem functioning or the other uses of rivers by communities (CIAM et al., 2014). The underground tunnels can range from less than 1 km to 25 km in length. Interviewees mentioned that hydro companies sometimes take a greater percentage of the flow than the 90% This research and the associated map they are allocated (D. Samudio, personare designed to support FUNDICCEP’s al communication, February 1, 2017). work on raising awareness about hydropower development in the RCV water- A decrease in river discharge can also be shed. Rather than place permanent observed downstream of multiple hydro symbols printed on the map, we created projects, even after all water is returned small removable stickers to symbolize the to the river from the hydro tunnels. This impacts perceived by each corregimiento. occurs due to increased water evaporaHopefully, this is an effective tool that can tion from the reservoirs created by the be adapted in case more research is done dams because of the greater surface to identify additional impacts in other area of the body of water. A cumulacorregimientos. The map is accompanied tive impact of multiple hydro dams on by an extensive explanatory document a single river is therefore a lower total written in Spanish to clarify its content. volume of river water downstream of the dams (Kohli & Frenken, 2015). A third Ecological Impacts explanation for lower flow in the river is that hydro companies can retain water Though there is no clear line between in their reservoirs in order to stock up ecological and social impacts, we have potential energy during periods of low separated the two into distinct sections electricity demand (F. Vargas, personal for clarity. The most common ecologi- communication, April 19, 2017). These cal impact expressed by our interview- last two cumulative mechanisms can ees is the lowered discharge of the Rio explain why the representatives of three Chiriquí Viejo. Indeed, it was mentioned downstream municipalities went so far as as being important in thirteen of the to say that the RCV’s flow has decreased sixteen corregimientos under study. The by more than 50% since the five existlower quantity of water in the river can ing dams were built (Q. Piti, personbe experienced through three different al communication, March 14, 2017). mechanisms. Where a hydro dam is operating, the majority of the river’s volume flows Interviewees also mentioned a decrease through underground tunnels, which are in the water quality, though specific legally allowed to remove up to 90% of explanations were not given. Throughthe river’s flow from its natural channel out our literature review of the poten(F. Vargas, personal communication, April tial impacts of hydroelectric projects, 19, 2017). The minimum ecological flow we found evidence that water contamof 10% mandated by the Panamanian ination can indeed occur. When a reser66

voir is constructed, the initial flooding of terrestrial forests results in methylmercury contamination which temporarily poisons the watershed, soil, and food web (Rosenberg et al., 1995). A second effect that reservoirs have on water quality is through eutrophication. When a contained volume of water becomes enriched with nutrients like phosphorus and nitrogen, algal blooms occur. After the death and decomposition of these algae, the water becomes depleted in oxygen. Though there were serious social and economic impacts mentioned in our interviews, nearly all interviewees felt the most drastic impacts were on the environment. The disrespect for nature demonstrated by hydro companies tended to be one of the most important reasons for communities’ opposition. The reduced quantity and quality of water as well as the physical presence of dams, which create ecosystem fragmentation, could have caused the decrease in fish populations observed by the representatives interviewed. Dams have negative effects on the reproductive strategies of migratory amphidromous fish, which require the saline conditions of the ocean for their eggs to develop to the juvenile state (Holmquist et al., 1998). In addition to observing a decrease in fish populations, the individuals we spoke to noted that the deforestation associated with the construction of hydro dams has negative effects on riparian flora and fauna. Interviewed representatives told us that wild animals are leaving the areas they used to inhabit near the river. In many areas, hydroelectric companies have not honoured their commitments to reforestation, a requirement of the projects’ Environmental Impacts Assessments (Q. Piti, personal communication, March 14, 2017).

Social Impacts The decreased volume of water – whether it is caused by underground tunnels, increased evaporation, or water storage in reservoirs – has important implications for the human consumption of water, local fishing activities, the tourism sector, and the agricultural industry. Indeed, the excess of hydroelectric projects in Chiriquí has elicited concern from Panama’s Ministry of Agriculture, which noted that dams are threatening farmers’ access to water (Arcia, 2015). According to our interviews, half of the corregimientos along the RCV have experienced negative consequences on their agricultural sector. One representative estimated that crop yields have decreased by about 40% (Q. Piti, personal communication, March 14, 2017). Because the population of Chiriquí is largely composed of rural agricultural workers, the lack of water faced by the regions’ farms will have significant effects on the province’s economy. Though not widespread, the lack of water for human consumption due to hydro dams is a serious issue. The RCV is used for drinking water in three municipalities along the river. In Dominical, inhabitants used to drink the water of the RCV, but according to the president of the Fundación Amigos de Renacimiento (Friends of Renacimiento Foundation), this is no longer possible because the water is contaminated by the chemicals present in the hydro projects’ underground tunnels. Though we could not confirm such a contaminant was present, health risks do arise when drinking water is extracted from eutrophic areas, which can be created by dams as explained above (European Commission, 2002). In Progreso, the water intake for human consumption is only a kilometer away from the Burica hydro project. In this context, 67

a lowered volume of water or a reduced water quality could have serious consequences on the municipality’s health. The community of Frontera, within Progreso, does not have a water treatment plant, which poses additional risks (O. Mendoza, personal communication, March 9, 2017). Though none of the corregimientos we studied were said to have a commercial fishing industry, 75% of our interviewees stated that people who used to fish in the RCV for personal consumption are affected by the hydro dams. Decreases in fish and shrimp populations can compromise livelihoods as well as have cascading effects on the food web – affecting both birds and micro-aquatic organisms (Kennedy, 2014). Fishing is also affected by reduced accessibility to the river. In some cases, the areas near dams and along the river where an underground tunnel is present have become private property that is suddenly inaccessible to locals (O. Mendoza, personal communication, March 9, 2017). In seven corregimientos, we were told that the banks of the RCV are now private property owned by hydro companies. This situation has reduced local communities’ access to the river, which is important not only for fishing but also for washing, bathing, recreational activities, and tourism. Both the reduced flow of the river and the reduced public access to it make touristic activities, like whitewater rafting, very difficult. About a third of the corregimiento representatives we interviewed stated that tourism has been negatively affected by hydroelectricity. Safety is another reason why why people living along the RCV have not been able to access the river. According to interviewees in seven corregimientos, there is a risk to people who go to the river. When there is too much water in a dam’s reservoir, 68

the hydro company will open the dam’s sluice gates to relieve the water pressure. This creates a sudden and drastic increase in the river’s discharge. Though there is an alarm system for when this occurs, it is not always possible for everyone along the river to hear it (Q. Piti, personal communication, March 14, 2017). When hydroelectric companies begin construction, heavy equipment is transported in large trucks on rural roads that sometimes cannot support the weight. In a quarter of the corregimientos we studied, roads were damaged or completely destroyed by the passage of construction vehicles. In the corregimiento of Santa Cruz, 26 km of the main road was unusable (J. Famania, personal communication, March 13, 2017). In Plaza Caisan, the companies responsible for damaged roads offered to repair them, but have yet to do so (F. Gonzalez, personal communication, March 14, 2017). The impact of hydroelectric infrastructure on roads in this area of the country has been documented by the Panamanian Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, 2013). During our interviews, we also asked about the perceived benefits of hydroelectricity. The hydroelectric company Hydro Caisan S.A. was said to provide annual financial assistance to communities, giving 150,000 USD every year to be divided among the corregimientos affected by El Alto, the company’s dam (F. Gonzalez, personal communication, March 14, 2017). Such payments are used for public projects in communities, such as school renovations, road construction, and soccer fields. The other benefit of hydropower mentioned by our interviewees is the employment opportunities it brings. However, according to the district deputy of Baru, the influx of higher paying, temporary jobs

Cerro Punta Volcan Santa Clara Plaza Caisan Monte Lirio Rio Sereno Canas Gordas Dominical Brenon Santa Cruz Asserio de Gariche Gomez Progreso Baco Nuevo Mexico Divala

Corregimiento

81.25%

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

Decreased river discharge

✔

25%

Decreased water quality

Fig. 2: Flow chart.

18.75%

✔

56%

✔

✔ ✔ ✔

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

75%

✔

25%

43.75%

✔ ✔

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

43.75%

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

✔

18.75%

✔

12.50%

✔

37.5%

✔

31.25%

✔

✔ ✔

PERCEIVED IMPACTS OF HYDROELECTRICITY Impact on Impact on Impact on Damaged Private Dangerous Land Lack of Impact on Impact on consumption agriculture fishing local roads river banks river banks dispossession reforestation environment tourism of water ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

Fig. 1: Perceived impacts of hydroelectricity.

Proportion with this impact:

Alanje

Baru

Renacimiento

Bugaba

District

provoked social problems related to drug of the hydro projects. Some even described use and prostitution (C. Motta, person- the consultations as rigged. Only one repreal communication, February 21, 2017). sentative did not clearly state his opinion of the participative process itself, and instead When asked if communities affected by blamed citizens for not engaging sufficiently. hydroelectric companies receive cheaper electricity, all interviewees responded that Conflicts arise from the lack of local they do not. We were told that the electrici- democratic input in the decision-makty produced by the hydro dams in the RCV ing process, leading to national-level is sold to neighbouring Costa Rica, and that decisions that do not consider the real locally affected communities are not sold social cost endured by affected commuelectricity at a discount. Monte Lirio even nities. All political representatives, includsuffers from regular blackouts despite having ing district deputies, were unanimous in multiple hydroelectric projects within its saying that they would not accept any territory (Q. Piti, personal communica- new hydroelectric projects on the Rio tion, March 14, 2017). Despite the devel- Chiriquí Viejo under any conditions. This opment of hydropower generation in the statement was often accompanied by a province, more than a tenth of the popula- reference to the high number of projects tion of Chiriquí lives without electricity currently in place. According to the direc(El Instituto de Estadística y Censo, 2010). tor of the environment unit of Panama’s Public Services Authority (ASEP), FernanResults: Public Participation in the do Vargas (2017) , the maximum number Dam Approval Process of projects in a river is calculated based on the river’s discharge. However, the fixed Context and Approaches to Public 10% of this discharge allocated for the Participation ecological flow has been declared inaccurate by the Supreme Court of Panama In the corregimiento of Paraíso, we attended and must be revised for each of the a meeting between community members country’s watersheds (Jaramillo, 2017). and a representative of the hydro company According to one approach, public particNavitas International. This meeting ipation can be seen, as a way of providing revealed profound conflicts between enough information for authorities to make communities and the different actors informed decisions, without giving an actual involved in the hydroelectric projects built role to the public in the decision-making in Chiriquí. Many citizens raised concerns process (Morrison-Saunders and Early, about the lack of proper public consulta- 2008). This approach does not guarantee tions before the approval of the Chuspa that the information collected will actualdam in their area. Specifically, construc- ly be taken into account, especially if the tion began without the required municipal population affected is marginalized or if permit. The local representatives we inter- there is no real political pressure to count viewed in other corregimientos almost unani- local resistance as a significant cost. The mously perceived the participatory process extreme opposite approach is to use the negatively and were dissatisfied with the public participation process to shift the participatory process integrated in the balance of power. Most researchers agree Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) that the purpose of public involvement is 70

to improve the decision-making process, not necessarily to let the public shape the final decision. However, despite the risk of policy paralysis caused by giving communities more power, if they are given none at all the public could withdraw from any participatory process (Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Faircheallaigh, 2010).

Description of the Dam Approval Process in Panama To understand the problematic institutional mechanisms that lead to socio-environmental conflicts, we can look at the various steps in the approval process of hydroelectric projects in Panama. Accompanying our description of this process is a flowchart, which uses numbers to represent the chronological order of the different stages of the approval process. First, the promotor sends a hydroelectric project application to the Public Services Authority (ASEP). The application of the chosen promoter is then transferred to the Ministry of Environment, which evaluates whether the project complies with environmental norms, and whether the resource is available for the type of project proposed. If the project location is approved, the application goes through a competitive bidding process. Then, ASEP determines if the promoter complies with the relevant norms and will establish a reference price. The resource concession is given to the promoter offering the highest bid (ASEP, 2012). The contract is then transferred back to the Environment Ministry. The promoter must hire an environmental consultant certified by the Ministry to produce an Environmental Impact Assessment (Mendez, 2002). The requirements that must be fulfilled by a promoter vary depending on the category of their project. The EIA of each hydro

project designates it as either Category II or III. Category I projects are judged to have no environmental impact, which is rarely the case for hydro dams. Category II projects are expected to produce partial effects on the environment and no serious indirect or cumulative effects, unlike Category III projects (Panama Tramita, 2016). In the case of multiple dams on one river, there is no cumulative EIA, there are only individual assessments. Citizen participation requirements vary according to the category of the project. Both Category II and III projects must provide surveys to the community, respond to information requests, and hold a formal consultation on the projectsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; impacts. Unlike Category II, Category III projects must also hold a public forum with a minimum 2% attendance from the affected population (Decreto ejecutivo 123 de 2009, 2009). The EIA produced by the private consultant is then sent back to the Ministry of Environment (step 2 in the flowchart) who will evaluate and approve the project with the insight of all involved institutions. The approved EIA and concession contract will then be transferred back to ASEP who will award it to the promoter (step 3 in the flowchart). The contract formulated by ASEP provides a deadline by which construction of the project must begin, and a deadline by which construction should be completed. In addition, the promoter must obtain a construction permit (step 4 in the flowchart) from the municipality (CAO, 2010).

Critique of the Dam Approval Process in Panama Several critiques of the approval process emerged throughout our interviews. First, there is potential for conflict of interest because the environmental consultant is 71

hired directly by the promoter. Multiple interviewees, including Felix Wing, the General Secretary of Panama’s Ministry of Environment, stated that some EIAs contain false information, and even plagiarize content from the EIAs of other hydroelectric projects. The assessments were also found to frequently contain errors and inconsistencies (Bigda-Peyton, 2012). Important information is claimed to sometimes go unreported in the EIA, which threatens the legitimacy of the assessment. This could, in part, be explained by the consultant’s subordination to the promoter: they may be incentivized to make the environmental costs of the project appear less severe. Two reforms are under discussion at the national level and would be possible solutions to this problem. Environmental consultants could be hired by the state, or the government could create a third-party institution where companies would deposit funds to pay environmental consultants indirectly.

tent, according to the academic definitions of Webler and Tuler (2000). Fairness refers to the level of involvement of the public and what they are “permitted to do in a deliberative policy-making process”. For a policy-making process to be fair, individuals of the public must have the opportunity to attend participative meetings, participate in the discussion, and have a certain weight in the decision-making (Webler and Tuler, 2000). The case of the Chan 75 hydroelectric dam in Bocas del Toro province is an example of an unfair process. The public forum for the project took place in a remote area, which was inaccessible to the affected Ngobe communities due to economic constraints (Barber, 2008). Another example of an inadequate participative process was given by Jacobo Famania, the corregimiento representative of Santa Cruz. He said that in 2005, during the formal consultations for the Baitun project, the hydro company put a sheet at the door saying that those who A second critique of the approval process signed it would get employment related is that there are some cases where Catego- to the project’s construction. According to ry III projects were reported as being Famania, the company used these signafragmented into different projects so that tures to prove community support for the they would only have to comply with the project. These examples reflect the lack of lower standards of a Category II EIA. To fairness in the participative process because ensure the adequate categorization of potentially affected populations are not hydroelectric projects, a company could be given adequate and informed access to it. restricted to creating only one document for all its components to prevent the possi- The competence of a participatory process bility of the project being subcategorized. refers to the pursuit of a full understandHowever, the rationale for allowing compa- ing between actors before an agreement nies to fragment their EIAs is relevant. It can is made (Webler & Tuler, 2000). Accordtake years to complete an EIA, and promoting to several interviewees, the participaers may not have sufficient funds to incor- tion mechanism associated with hydro porate all the components of their project development is not binding. Therefore, into the assessment at the same time. if a company promises something in a public forum, they are not legally obliged to respect the oral promise. The represenCritique of the Public Participation Process tative of Breñón told us that the promotThe citizen participation process in place in er of the Baitun and Bajo de Mina projects Panama cannot be defined as fair or compe- committed to providing compensation 72

to the community by improving local schools, churches, and roads (M. Martinez, personal communication, March 10, 2017). However, Breñón has not received any of the compensations promised during the public forum that took place over ten years ago. This demonstrates the process’ lack of competence: a complete understanding was not struck between the company and the communities before the projects were approved. Since oral promises are not binding, even if the participative process follows national norms, there is no way for affected communities to base their decision on the actual benefits that a hydroelectric project could bring. These deficiencies in the participative process and the lack of community autonomy in relation to resource management can explain the public distrust in participatory procedures that most local representatives we interviewed have expressed.

206, which could not be easily overturned by hydro companies. This project also aims to organize an audit of all existing concessions to ensure their compliance with the law. Conclusion Our research identified two main sources for socio-environmental conflicts in the Chiriquí Viejo watershed: multiple direct and cumulative impacts perceived by our interviewees, and a flawed public participation process. We found that local political representatives have perceived a decrease in river discharge and water quality. These changes affect the human consumption of water, the agricultural and tourism sectors, and fishing activities along the river. In addition, according to our interviews, people’s access to the river has decreased because of land privatization and safety concerns. Other important impacts include damage to local roads, deforestation, and impacts on the watershed’s fauna and flora. These results are significant because they explain the profound opposition to hydroelectricity in this region. Understanding the sources of this opposition is key to reconciling the government’s dual roles of promoting clean energy and protecting affected communities and the environment. Several critiques of Panama’s participative process in dam approvals were identified, including the potential conflict of interest between the consultant and the project promoter. Our research on this approval process highlights a deficiency in the extent to which affected communities are included in decision-making related to clean energy development.

As the institutionalized participative mechanism within EIAs does not satisfy local representatives, some have used the requirement of a municipal construction permit as a leverage point. In 2011, the district of Renacimiento passed a moratorium that prevents any construction permits from being provided to hydroelectric companies (Vásquez, 2011). Since then, no new hydroelectric projects have been constructed in the district. Hydroelectric companies could theoretically accuse this moratorium of being anti-constitutional, making it only a temporary solution to the excess of dams in the RCV watershed. As a second tool to oppose excess hydroelectric development, Jose Luis Castillo, the deputy of the district of Bugaba, is currently working to pass a moratorium on the approval of hydro projects at the national level. Unlike the municipal The creation of our map of perceived moratorium passed in Renacimiento, his impacts has the potential to help our host project is to pass a national law, the Ley No. institution in its work by spreading aware73

ness and building civil society involvement surrounding this issue. Our explanation of the complex approval process for dams can empower those who oppose hydro development in Chiriquí. Our critical assessment of this process can be used by FUNDICCEP and other civil society groups to develop policy suggestions and request specific governmental reforms. Socio-environmental conflicts have arisen in Chiriquí because of the direct and cumulative impacts of hydroelectric development and because the participation process in place is inadequate to ensure sufficient public input in decision-making. These two issues are deeply interrelated and should not be addressed in isolation. Indeed, the complete acknowledgement of all potential impacts to affected communities and the environment can only be achieved in the context of a fair and competent public participation plan. Acknowledgements We would like to send our deepest thanks to the incredible people at FUNDICCEP, particularly Damaris Sanchez, for inviting us to work on this project with them and for providing us with indispensable guidance. We would also like to thank all of the individuals who generously gave us their time for an interview. We are grateful to Ariel Espino for being our project supervisor, Milton Solano from the Tropical Research Institute for his expert assistance in ArcGIS, and Dr. Catherine Potvin for making all of this possible through the McGill Panama Field Studies Semester. References Arcia, José. (2015, July 30). Exceso de hidroeléctri-

cas pone en riesgo seguridad alimentaria. La Estrella de Panama. Retrieved from http://laestrella. com.pa/panama/nacional/excesohidroelectricas-pone-riesgo-seguridad-alimentaria/23882295 ASEP. (2016). Datos relevantes del mercado electrico Panameno, diciembre 2016. Retrieved from http:// www.asep.gob.pa/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=379 Barber, J. (2008). Paradigms and Perceptions: A Chronology and Analysis of the Events of the Chan-75 Hydroelectric Project and the Roles and Relationships of Participants, Bocas del Toro, Panama. CAO. (2010). Informe de evaluación del Ombudsman: Reclamaciones relacionadas con el proyecto hidroeléctrico Pando Montelirio de Electron Investment S.A. Retrieved from http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=156 CIAM, E., AIDA. (2014). NGOs fight to defend Panama’s rivers. Retrieved from http://www.aida-americas.org/sites/default/files/press_rel/PR%20Env%20 Flow%20 Panama%20ENG%2014-08-06_0.pdf Decreto ley 35, Comisión Legislativa Permanente, Mediante el cual se reglamenta el uso de las aguas, 22 de septiembre 1966. European Commission. (2002). Eutrophication and health. Retrieved from http://www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mb9Q7Nzw5iI%3D Finley-Brook, M., & Thomas, C. (2011). Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations: Illustrative Cases from Indigenous Territories in Panama. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101(4), 863-872. FUNDICCEP. (2017). Quienes somos. Retrieved from http://www.fundiccep.org/quienessomos.html Holmquist, J.G., Schmidt-Gengenbach, J.M., Yoshioka, B.B. (June 1998). High dams and marine freshwater linkages: effects on native and introduced fauna in the Caribbean. Conservation Biology. Vol 12(3) 621 -630.0 El Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo. (2010). Volumen I: Lugares Poblados de la Republica: 2010. Retrieved from https://www.contraloria.gob.pa/ INEC/Publicaciones/ Publicaciones.aspx?ID_SUBCATEGORIA=59&ID_PUBLICACION=355&ID_IDIOMA=1&ID_CATEGORIA=13 Jaramillo, O. A. (October 17, 2015). Anulan permisos a hidroelectricas. La Prensa. Retrieved from http://www.prensa.com/judiciales/Ambientalistas-piden-suspender-concesiones_0_4324817661. html Jaramillo, O. A. (January 30, 2017). Batalla legal por acceso a agua. La Prensa. Retrieved http://impresa.prensa.com/panorama/Batalla-le-

gal-acceso-agua_0_4678032294.html Kennedy, J. (January 16, 2014). Panama’s Indigenous Peoples: Paying the Price for Hydro. Intercontinental Cry Centre for World Indigenous Studies. Retrieved from https://intercontinentalcry.org/panamas-indigenous-communities-paying-price-hydro/. Kohli, A. and Frenken K. (2015). Evaporation from artificial lakes and reservoirs. AQUASTAT Programme, FAO. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/a-bc814e. pdf Mendez, J. (2002). El proceso de evaluación de impacto ambiental en la legislación Panameña. Tecnociencia, 4(1). Ministerio de Ambiente. (2015). Requisitos para registro de consultores ambientales. Retrieved from http://www.miambiente.gob.pa/index.php/es/requisitos-para-registro-de-consultores-ambientales

project in Ecuador. Ambient. Soc. Ambiente e Sociedade, 19 (2), 23-44. Vásquez, J. (2011). Renacimient o no autorizará más construcciones de hidroeléctricas. Panama America. Retrieved from http:// www.panamaamerica.com.pa/content/renacimiento-no-autorizar%C3%A1-m%C3%A1s-construcciones-de-hidroel%C3%A9ctricas Vega, M. J. (2012). Transformaciones y conflictos ambientales relacionados al uso del recurso hídrico en la Cuenca Hidrográfica del Río Chiriquí Viejo, Provincia de Chiriquí. HUMANITATES, 94. Webler, T. and Tuler, S. (2000). Fairness and competence in citizen participation: Theoretical reflections from a case study. Administration & Society, 32(5),

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Ministerio de Ambiente. (2017). Process para la modernización del sistema de evaluación de impacto ambiental. Retrieved from: http://miambiente. gob.pa/index.php/es/proceso-para-la-modernizacion-del-sistema-de-evaluacion-de-impacto-ambiental. Ministerio de Obras Públicas (2013). Autoridades del MOP inspecciona derrumbe de vía. Retrieved from: http://www.mop.gob.pa/?s=MOP+inspeccionan+derrumbe Morrison-Saunders, A., & Early, G. (2008). What is necessary to ensure natural justice in environmental impact assessment decision-making? Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 26(1), 29-42. O’Faircheallaigh, C. (2010). Public participation and environmental impact assessment: Purposes, implications, and lessons for public policy making. Environmental impact assessment review, 30(1), 19-27. Ortiz, P., Zárate Díaz, C., & Terán, J. F. (2011). Mirar los conflictos socioambientales: Una relectura de conceptos, métodos y contextos. Abya-Yala/UPS. Panama Tramita. (2016). Estudios de Impacto Ambiental Categoria II. Retrieved from https://www. panamatramita.gob.pa/tramite/estudios-de-impacto-ambiental-categor%C3%ADa-ii Perdomo, D. (2008). Contradicciones en el desarrollo de las hidroeléctricas en Panama. Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales. Rosenberg, D.M., Bodaly , R.A., Usher , P.J. (1995). Environmental and social impacts of large scale hydroelectric development: who is listening?. Hydropower Reform Coalition. Vol. 5(2) 127 – 148. Sanchez-Vazquez, L., Espinosa, M. G., & Eguiguren, M. B. (2016). Perception of socio-environmental conflicts in mining areas: The case of the mirador

A Theoretical Assessment of Green Bonds as an Innovative Climate Change Mitigation Tool By Audrey Azerot ABSTRACT: Green bonds are financial items exclusively sold to fund environmentally-friendly projects. Since the emission of the first green bonds by the World Bank in 2007, the market has grown exponentially. This paper assesses the extent to which green bonds could fund climate change adaptation policies and help the international community cap temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Green bonds exhibit promising qualities, notably, adaptability and access to private markets’ large funding capacity. Despite this, they are unlikely to be decisive environmental tools for two reasons. First, much work must be done to incentivize investors to buy green, rather than conventional, bonds. For example, the legal and institutional frameworks of the market must be clarified. Second, an increase in funds will not necessarily translate to a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, the effectiveness of green bonds is contingent on unpredictable hinges such as technological innovations. On the whole, the development of green bonds is part of a bigger trend in policy-making–that of marketization of governance.

Introduction

system. In such a scheme, global GHG emissions must be dramatically reduced In 2015, state representatives from 197 na- to achieve the objective affirmed in Paris. tions met in Paris to negotiate the future of the international climate regime. At this The ambition of the climate change re21st Conference of the Parties (COP21), gime is well-defined, but the way to fulfill the Paris Agreement was born. Building on it has caused disagreement among poliprevious COPs, it reaffirmed the absolute cy-makers and worry among climate scinecessity to restrict the global temperature entists. Because it currently does not afincrease to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. fect everyone equally, there has been an Global warming is caused principally by emergence of competing ideas, concerning human activities, which cause the emission both the sources of climate change and of greenhouse gases (GHG) like carbon di- the best methods for tackling it. Episodes oxide. Adaptation policies are one way to such as the “Climategate”1 (“Mail Strom”, cope with climate change, as they ensure that societies keep prospering in a warmer–and less welcoming–world. Another 1. Shortly before the Copenhagen Summit (COP15), emails exchanged by climate scientists response to global warming, on which this in the UK were hacked and released online. Their paper focuses, is abating GHG emissions content arguably indicated that the detrimental efto a level consistent with the Earth’s eco- fects of global warming had been purposefully ex76

aggerated by the scientific community.

Photo by Lorena Vidal

2009) fuel climate skepticism and averseness to tackling climate change. Fortunately, despite these disagreements, the current consensus is to take immediate action and to develop innovative and efficient policies to compensate for the lack of success of previous attempts to regulate emissions.

section, the characteristics that make green bonds promising policy tools are presented. As their assessment reveals the weaknesses of green bonds, the fourth section evaluates the role of policy-makers in redressing these drawbacks. Finally, green bonds are placed in an international context; the current global climate change regime has often The development of sustainable finance been described as unsuccessful, so one may has drawn attention to financial markets, wonder whether green bonds could posiin particular green bonds. Green bonds tively change this disheartening pattern. are similar to conventional bonds, but their proceeds must go towards environmental- Literature review: What do we know ly-friendly, low-carbon projects. The first about green bonds? green bonds were issued in 2007 by the World Bank, and the market has grown The first green bonds were issued only exponentially since then; as of December ten years ago. Therefore, although litera2017, it was estimated at more than $895 ture on them is still developing, it remains billion by the Climate Bonds Initiative scarce and many gaps must be filled. For (CBI). Such dynamics raise questions on instance, no empirical research on the imthe extent to which green bonds can fuel pact of green bonds has been conducted. a decrease in GHG emissions using funds Nevertheless, a consensus has been reached from the private sector. In other words, the on at least three matters. First, green bonds potential relevance of green bonds in envi- should be as close to plain vanilla bonds (i.e. ronmental policy-making must be assessed. conventional) as possible (Mathews & Kidney, 2012). Second, institutions at all levThis paper evaluates the theoretical ef- els have a key role to play in ensuring that ficiency of green bonds as a climate the green bond market is attractive, stable, change mitigation policy tool and iden- and environmentally-viable (Mathews & tifies the factors that could hinder the Kidney, 2012; Young, 2015; Clapp, 2014). success of this strategy. Although green Third, although the market is currently relbonds seem promising in theory, this pa- atively small, its potential for growth is masper finds that their effectiveness depends sive provided the development of a sound on factors that can hardly be predicted. legal and institutional framework (Young, The international harmonization of fi- 2015; Clapp, 2014; Van Renssen, 2014). nancial markets for green bonds is paramount to a successful green bond scheme. Some theoretical work has been conducted However, cooperation will ultimately de- on the dynamics of the green bond market. pend on the willingness of policy-makers. For example, why did green bonds, originally issued exclusively by international inThe next section reviews the existing lit- stitutions, move into private markets? Aperature on green bonds. It describes the parently, it is not because of an increasing main questions and issues related to them environmental awareness within financial and the hypothetical institutional frame- markets. Rather, Van Renssen argues that works developed by scholars. In the third two dynamics fostered divestment from 78

fossil fuels towards “Green finance” (2014). On the one hand, demand for fossil fuels is supposed to falter in the coming decades; on the other, the extraction of fossil fuels is increasingly expensive. Consequently, financial institutions expected a surge in green investments, and this was one of the motives behind the introduction of the first green bonds by the World Bank in 2007. Much work has been done on the efficiency of the green bond market. Bracking (2015) analyses the extent to which green bonds actually lead to asset creation or whether they develop merely as virtual financial items. In other words, are green bonds created to fund concrete projects (like new infrastructure) or only to be speculated on, with no interest in actual funding? Bracking refers to the Clean Development Mechanism implemented from 2007 to 2012 in South Africa as part of the Kyoto Agreement. This program had been manipulated by Annex-I countries2 who wanted to benefit from public subsidies, but did not care much about environmental protection. It resulted in a gap between the amount of green funds invested and their expected impact on the environment. Bracking argues that green bonds are essentially the same: “the overall Green economy is framed in spectacle” (Bracking, 2015: 2238). This implies that she would not expect green bonds to perform well with regards to reducing GHG emissions reduction.

market in comparison to the conventional bond market, distinguishing between labeled and unlabeled green bonds3. Some conclusions are key. First, labeled green bonds offer a higher return than both unlabeled and conventional bonds, given a similar risk level. Second, the degree of positive correlation between conventional and green bonds has been increasing over time. Pham interprets this as a proof of their growing substitutability. Third, there is a spillover effect between green and conventional bond markets, so that “a shock in the green bond market tends to spill over to the conventional bond market” (Pham, 2016: 265). These findings imply that investors’ interest in green bonds will probably keep rising, making green and conventional bond markets converge.

Many share this optimistic view on the future of green bonds (Mathews & Kidney, 2010; Mathews & Kidney, 2012; Wood & Grace, 2011; Clapp, 2014). Interviews revealed that investors favour green bonds mostly because they see strong growth prospects for the market (Wood & Grace, 2011). Other motives include the resemblance between green and conventional bonds, the transparency of green bonds that makes it easy to conduct “environmental due diligence” prior to investing if they are attached to specific projects (Wood & Grace, 2011; Clapp, 2014), and the typically renowned and trusted issuers. Indeed, the largest green bond emitOne of the only empirical studies on the ters are either multinational corporations efficiency of the green bond market is by (e.g. the French Electricité de France or Linh Pham. Using data from 2010 to 2015, EDF), large private banks (e.g. the Chi she analyses the volatility of the green bond 2. Under the Kyoto Protocol (1997), Annex-I countries are economically industrialized countries. They had to abide by the Protocol, while non-Annex-I countries were exempted from some clauses, given their need to industrialize.

3. “Labeled” green bonds have been designated as such by an independent organization after a review process. Examples of such organizations include the Climate Bond Initiative, CICERO or Standard & Poor’s. “Unlabeled” green bonds are bonds described as “green” unilaterally by the issuer.

nese SPD Bank), or international organizations (e.g. the World Bank), all of which are trusted by investors because they are considered “too big to fail”. In 2016, these emitters respectively issued 30%, 27.5% and 20% of the total green bonds emitted (Climate Bond Initiative, 2016: 17).

four “fundamentals” for green bonds. They must: (1) be a “bridge” between investors and environmentally-friendly projects; (2) be “asset-backed”, i.e. lead to a tangible result like new infrastructure; (3) have as long a maturity date as possible; and (4) be as similar to conventional bonds as possible.

Today, there is a general consensus that some form of institutional intervention is required for the market to reach its full potential, for example by backing up green bonds and facilitating the development of the market (Mathews & Kidney, 2010; Mathews & Kidney, 2012 ; Wood & Grace, 2011; Clapp, 2014; Pham, 2016; Young, 2015.). Additionally, a universal and clear definition of what green bonds are must be developed. Some initiatives have already been taken. For example, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) developed the Green Bond Principles (GBPs) in 2015. The four characteristics that make a bond “green” are: (1) proceeds must be used towards environmentally-friendly projects; (2) the “green project” that the bond finances must have clear environmental objectives; (3) proceeds must be managed in a transparent fashion; and (4) the use of proceeds must be reported annually (ICMA, 2015). The GBPs are a laudable attempt to develop green bond standards. However, they are only voluntary guidelines, while the literature pushes for a higher degree of harmonization involving supranational power. The main advocates of an overarching regulation are Mathews and Kidney (2012: 343)4, who establish

The last branch of literature I will explore takes a step back and reflects on how, why, and to what extent green bonds can be part of a climate change tackling policy. The main work on this topic has been conducted by Sachs (2014) and Flaherty et al. (2016). Sachs’ paper is indirectly related to green bonds. He argues in favour of a new type of environmental policy funded by intergenerational fiscal policy. The idea is to solve the intergenerational tradeoffs that are systematically related to environmental policies. In a nutshell, current generations pay for policies which will be enjoyed by future generations. As Sachs writes, “in this way, climate change policy is not really a tradeoff of current well-being and future well-being. It is instead a tradeoff of climate change versus taxation facing future generations” (2014: 249). In period t, the government issues long-term bonds, whose proceeds will be used to fund climate change mitigation policies. In period t+1, when the policies have been successfully implemented, the living generations will face higher taxes so as to balance the government’s budget. Of course, this theory is an oversimplification of the real world. Surely, climate change cannot be “solved” through funding alone: there is no clear negative correlation between global temperature increase and spending on environmental policy. But the value of Sachs’ paper is to neatly illustrate the opportunity provided by intergenerational public finance, and green bonds by extension. He concludes that such a fiscal arrangement would re-

4. In fact, Sean Kidney is the co-founder of the Climate Bonds Initiative, an organisation that advocates for the wide use of green bonds to fund climate change policies, and which is one of the two main green bond certifiers (along with CICERO, the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research based in Norway).

sult in a Pareto improvement for all generations, compared to a business-as-usual scenario. In other words, “the current generation [would remain] financially as well off as without mitigation, while improving the environmental well-being of future generations” (Flaherty et al., 2016: 21). Flaherty et al. argue that Sachs’ system can be implemented immediately through green bonds, and they have developed an econometric model to determine whether this would be financially viable. That is, they are testing whether enough funds would be raised and debts could be repaid. They reach the same conclusion as Sachs: this strategy is Pareto-improving. This review of the literature on green bonds outlined the main research areas and questioning on this topic. Drawing on previous research, I will now dive into the purpose of this paper: to what extent can green bonds help reduce GHG emissions? How auspicious are Green Bonds as Climate Change mitigation tools? For decades, various environmental actors have stressed the need for efficient climate change mitigation policies, yet efforts have often proven disappointing. Despite the numerous pledges made by countries in international agreements to reduce their GHG emissions, few tangible results have been observed. The need for innovative environmental policies was reasserted in the 2015 Paris Agreement, and nations party to the Agreement have committed to designing such policies. They must improve existing environmental policies, both in terms of scope–the amount of abated emissions–and efficiency–how easy they are to implement optimally.

A short review of two traditional policies Let us first reflect on traditional environmental policies and examine how green bonds can improve them. By “traditional environmental policies”, I am referring to the pricing of pollution, i.e. playing on the so-called rationality of economic agents5. They include cap-and-trade systems, through which a government allocates permits for polluting to economic actors, that can then be traded on a market (and therefore priced), and Pigouvian fees, or carbon taxes, through which firms are taxed an amount equivalent to the decrease in social welfare they are inflicting on society. The success of these policies is disputable. For example, the US Clean Air Act, amended in 1990, is considered a success.It is estimated to have reduced the amount of total suspended particles by 10% (Isen et al., 2017). However, the RECLAIM trading system in place in Los Angeles since 1994 is widely viewed as a failure. Many firms chose to purchase the emission permits, which were sold at a low price, rather than invest in pollution-reducing technologies (Kolstad, 2011). From an analytical perspective, traditional environmental policies suffer from a few weaknesses. First, they are seldom optimally implemented. The Pigovian tax must exactly offset the harm caused by pollution and maximize social utility. If the tax is too high, production will be too low and the fiscal policy will result in lower utility; if the tax is too low, production will remain too high and the economy will not be in equilibrium. The government must get it exactly right, but how? Asymmetries of information are likely to stand between firms and policy-makers. More5. For a thorough description of these environmental policies, see Kolstad, 2011, p. 223-231.

over, the fee must be adapted to each producer, as they all have different marginal costs and benefits. Even in the unlikely case in which the government enjoys perfect information and can tailor its policy, it is unclear how the cost of pollution on society should be priced. This last issue remains true in a cap-and-trade system: how can we determine what the social utility-maximizing amount of pollution is?

both a Pigovian tax and a cap-and-trade system may reduce the level of pollution to a socially optimal level, but this level may be inconsistent with a sound climate change mitigation policy. The rationale behind effective environmental policies should be rooted in a top-down framework, in which the outcome of the policy depends on environmental factors, rather than the current bottom-up structure.

Second, concerns have arisen over the role of the government because these policies rely too much on its intervention. Overarching coordination and supervision are essential for adequate policy enforcement and monitoring. However, the government is constrained in many ways, which may lead to suboptimal policy outcome. For example, its interests diverge from that of the private sector. While firms desire to produce as much as is profitable, regardless of the externality created, government policy aims at restricting their output. Another constraint is rooted in political economy: governments are ultimately driven by shortterm political interests. This contradicts the consistent and long-term policy required to tackle climate change. Policy-makers may decide to weakly enforce a Pigovian tax system to gain partisan support from a specific industry. Generally, giving too big a role to governments exposes them to policy inefficiency through government capture.

The Dynamics of the Green Bond Universe

Third, Pigovian taxes and cap-and-trade systems are ill-designed to tackle climate change because they focus on maximizing welfare rather than maximizing pollution abatement. Although the ultimate purpose of environmental policies includes the notion of welfare, it is of the intertemporal sort, leaving the well-being of future generations, rather than current generations at stake. In other words, 82

We can now return to our initial investigation and consider green bonds as relevant environmental tools, given that they surpass some of the deficiencies raised above. When assessing the likely effects of green bonds, one must keep in mind that they are, ultimately, bonds. In fact, this is their main strength. The more transparent green bonds are, the more likely investors are to want them. It is in the bond issuersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interest to prevent asymmetries of information on the nature and impact of the project financed by the proceeds of the bond. This is a shift from the policies described above, in which society bore the cost of firmsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; overproduction. Hence, if bonds are not sold, the emitter is harmed along with future generations. I have argued that the aforementioned traditional policies relied too much on government intervention. Green bonds alter this picture in two ways. First, as anyone may enter the green bond market, the dynamic between public and private actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests shifts from discordance to complementarity. For example, if a government launches a low-carbon project, it will want to sell as many green bonds as possible. On the one hand, it is of interest to develop a sound project likely to both reduce emissions and

be profitable in the long-run, as investors will only want to buy the issued green bonds if they expect a positive net rate of return. On the other hand, if investors believe that the project can yield a high net rate of return, it is in their interest to invest. Second, green bonds preserve the government’s commitment to environmental policies in the long-term. In 2016, 61% of issued green bonds (labeled and unlabeled) had a tenor greater than 10 years, with the average tenor being 11.7 years (CBI, 2017: 5). Therefore, when one government issues green bonds, the succeeding governments will be pressured by investors to keep the policy running until the bonds’ maturity. Finally, I have maintained that traditional environmental policies have focused on reducing pollution enough to maximize economic actors’ utility, while they should be aiming for a pollution level sufficiently low to bring the consequences of climate change to an acceptably low-risk level. In essence, they follow a “bottom-up” approach while the argument can be made that a “top-down” policy framework is necessary to tackle climate change policy (Nordhaus, 2015). Green bonds somewhat resolve the fundamental paradox of environmental policies: agents presumed to be rational utility-maximizers are to implement policies which would lower their current utility and are unlikely to enjoy the benefits of these sacrifices. The beauty of green bonds is in reconciling these conflicting factors, at least to a certain extent. Recall that both Sachs and Flaherty et al. found a policy scheme based on green bonds to create a Pareto improvement with regards to intergenerational utility, compared to a business-as-usual framework. Current generations invest now, but will benefit from dividends later, while future generations will theoreti-

cally bear a lower cost of climate change. Beyond this comparative analysis, the green bond market provides a good foundation for climate change mitigation policies. It represents a large sum of money, as the universe of bonds is estimated at more than $90 trillion (CBI, 2017: 19). Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that about $53 trillion must be invested in green projects by 2035 to potentially achieve the limited 2°C rise in global temperature. The required resources are available, but must be redistributed towards environmentally-friendly investments. An encouraging shift away from fossil fuels and towards green investments has been noted, which indicates that investors find the latter promising (Van Renssen, 2014). In addition, the rate of growth of the green bond market is phenomenal. From its inception in 2007 to 2016, where $81.4 billion worth of green bonds were issued, the market has been multiplied 80-fold (CBI, 2017: 16). It is expected to reach $130 billion by the end of 2017 and to exponentially expand over the following years (CBI, 2017). This clear tendency supports the view of green bonds as potential key players in environmental policy.

Summing up: are Green bonds promising? Given the above account of green bonds, they do appear sufficiently promising. However, the benefits stemming from green bonds as financial assets are only one side of the coin; the other side relates to the problems posed by financial markets. A simple yet terribly undermining question lies in the background: what is the value-added of green bonds? Why would people invest in them or issue them in the first place? These problems cannot be ignored and may reappraise the optimistic 83

claims made within this paper. Regula- & Packer, 2017)7. Additionally, investors’ tion may be one way to correct some of feedback revealed that a lack of regulation the deficiencies linked to green bonds. was the main factor hindering a stronger development of the green bond market Policing Green Bonds (Wood & Grace, 2011; Young, 2015). Consequently, a clear and sound regulatory Undoubtedly, green bonds are innovative framework is essential for policies based instruments for tackling climate change. In on the green bond market to be effective. theory, they could help prevent exponential growth in GHG emissions. However, some A market-based approach has many beneregulatory framework is required to en- fits, yet it makes the policy’s efficiency desure their success. What are the shortcom- pend on the efficiency of the market. As fiings of green bonds, and how can nation- nancial markets are periodically subject to al government intervention help unlock fluctuations8, there is a risk associated with the potential of the green bond market? free market conditions. In particular, speculation or the development of new – and hence unregulated – financial products What could go wrong? can lead to instability. What would have Partly because they are so recent, green happened to environmental policies if the bonds are still poorly regulated. In January “mortgage backed securities” sold prior to 2014, the International Capital Market As- 2008 had been made of green bonds? On sociation released the Green Bond Princi- a related note, there is the issue of what ples, but they are only “voluntary process Bracking refers to as the “performativity” guidelines” (ICMA, 2014: 2). Moreover, of the green bond market. In other words, a bond can be designated as “green” by do green bonds actually generate materiissuers themselves without the interven- al outcomes, or are they only virtual assets tion of a third party6. This gives issuers being speculated on? Generally, it does not the opportunity to “green-wash” their seem reasonable to let the funding of clibond. Some independent organizations, mate change mitigation policies depend such as the CBI, Standard and Poor’s, on as unstable a structure as financial marand Barclays, offer green bond certifica- kets. Without some kind of regulation, a tion. However, the methods and criteria speculative bubble may build up, causing used to classify bonds are at the discretion the market to collapse, and threatening of the certifier. Therefore, while labelling all the policies financed by green bonds. should ease the investment process, the lack of harmonization may in fact com- An additional issue related to green bonds plicate it. Empirical research has found is the potential mismatch between investthat investors’ willingness to pay for green ment needs and funds. Where the probonds increases if they are labelled as ceeds go and what they fund is a critical such, relative to unlabelled bonds (Ehlers issue directly linked to the efficiency of

6. For an introductory discussion of green bond certification and the issues linked to it, see Ehlers & Packer (2017).

7. Emitters’ characteristics are controlled for as part of the study. 8. As J. P Morgan famously answered when asked about the future of the stock market, “it will fluctuate”.

climate change mitigation policies. Specifically, mitigating climate change involves massive investments in developing countries because most developing economies rely on fossil-fuel intensive industries and are expected to continue on this trend for some time. A second reason is linked to Schelling’s conjecture, which states that developing countries are the most vulnerable to climate change because of their limited infrastructure and financial and technological resources. Ideally, then, the amounts raised through green bond issuance should be invested there. Yet, as bond markets in developing states are less developed than in more economically advanced countries, funding may be misallocated. Markets have generally been found to be inefficient at funding climate change mitigation policies (Newell, 2010). One explanation is that they respond to demand. If the demand for environmental innovation is too low, only small amounts of funds will be raised. Another explanation is that knowledge is a public good with positive externalities. Newell writes that “[the value of investing in innovation] tends to spill over to other technology producers and users, thereby diminishing individual private incentives for R&D” (2010: 254). The “induced-innovation hypothesis” recognises this fact; fortunately, it recognises that governments can resolve this deadlock by implementing adequate environmental policies.

Government intervention in the green bond market The problems enumerated above clearly call for government intervention. Some regulation must exist to unlock the potential of green bonds and induce investors to purchase green rather than conventional bonds. What kind of regulation is needed?

It is recommended that a government should set up a regulatory framework for green bonds (Mathews & Kidney, 2010; Mathews & Kidney, 2012; Wood & Grace, 2011; Clapp, 2014; Pham, 2016; Young, 2015). In particular, it must make clear who will certify green bonds and what renders a bond “green”. Some call for the creation of an institutional body at the international, regional, or national level dedicated solely to green bond matters (Mathews & Kidney, 2010). Harmonization between certifiers’ methods and definitions is also necessary to improve the transparency of the market (Ehlers & Packer, 2017). A second set of regulations could be directed towards the green bond market itself to minimize the risk of destabilizing behaviour. This could include market monitoring or regulations on speculation. For example, as part of the EU Emission Trading System, EU member states’ emissions are supervised to ensure that the expected decrease in emissions is reached. Third, some have argued in favour of a “commitment device” from governments to encourage investors to buy green bonds (Mathews & Kidney, 2010; Mathews & Kidney, 2012; Wood & Grace, 2011; Clapp, 2014; Pham, 2016; Young, 2015). The government would commit to step in financially if the bond’s issuer cannot pay dividends. Finally, governments could implement policies that tangentially support green bonds and encourage investments in areas where most funding is needed. Government policies could try to influence the destination of funding and solve the problem of misallocation. Newell (2010) also mentions innovation protection (e.g. through patents), pricing policies that increase the cost of using fossil fuel technologies, and increased funding for universities conducting research on climate change mitigation 85

as worthwhile government policies. However, government intervention raises many issues. Let us consider the certification of green bonds. First, it is unclear how to set criteria and how to harmonize them at the international level. This harmonization is necessary considering the openness of capital markets. Second, certification could affect the market in a negative way. Indeed, the more strictly defined green bonds become, the less bonds will actually match up to the standards. This goes against the intended goal of the policy, which is to help the green bond market grow. If the demand remains stable or increases–assuming a better regulation decreases the risk of investing in green bonds–while the supply decreases, the interest rate on green bonds could rise, thereby increasing the possibility of default and putting more pressure on governments as “commitment devices”. Additionally, the incentives for investors to buy green rather than conventional bonds are weak; they mostly depend on whether investors care about environmental matters, which recalls the issue of the value-added of green bonds. Therefore, investing in green bonds may become a convoluted process if the market is over-regulated, and lead to a divestment from green projects in favour of conventional bonds. In other words, there could be a trade-off between government intervention and policy efficiency.

technological innovations is undertaken (for example, because of an incentivizing policy implemented by the government), there is no guarantee that this will result in successful climate change mitigation. In other words, the green bond market could work perfectly, but not tackle climate change effectively, with or without government intervention. Finally, moral hazard, in conjunction with emissions leakage, could greatly undermine the efficiency of the policy. An international producer issuing green bonds could use the proceeds to increase the energy efficiency of a plant in country A, but produce more emissions in country B, with a plant that pollutes more. Government intervention may be counterproductive. However, it is clear that regulation must be harmonized at the domestic, regional and global levels in order to be effective. This is to be achieved through the international climate change regime. Green Bonds in the International Climate Change Regime The stakes of climate change policies involve the world as a whole and the issue can only be properly tackled through a global joint effort. Assessing the efficiency of green bonds as a climate change mitigation policy requires an appreciation of their value at the international level. The current international climate change regime was officially created in 1992 with the first United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)9. Since then, many treaties related to climate change have been signed, including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. Although they are all

Finally, some may argue that government intervention is doomed to fail because environmental policies in general, and green bonds in particular, suffer from drawbacks which regulation cannot address. There is no empirical proof of a causal link between investment in climate change-related R&D and a successful environmental outcome. Therefore, even if many green 9. See Paterson (2011) for a review of the causes behind the development of the current internabonds are sold, and research in low-carbon tional climate change regime. 86

ambitious in limiting GHG emissions and reducing the risk of environmental disaster, none have proven successful (Young, 2011). The United States, one of the biggest GHG emitters, never ratified the Kyoto agreement and will not ratify the 2015 Paris agreement either. The efficacy of this agreement would be greatly undermined by the American absence, as empirical research has found that states’ aggregated Intended National Declared Contributions (or INDCs) are currently too low to achieve the UNFCCC’s goal (Boyd et al., 2015). How can such a failure rate be explained? There is no international overarching entity to oversee sovereign states’ decisions; policies cannot be enforced at the international level. Thus, international environmental agreements fail because the cost of implementing environmental policies is not compensated by any benefit (Young, 2011). States do not have an incentive to develop domestic environmental policies, let alone those emanating from an international body without coercive enforcement mechanisms such as UNFCCC. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed unanimously in 1997 by the US Senate to protect American interests against Kyoto’s most restrictive clauses, neatly illustrates this dynamic. In addition, states have an incentive to freeride on international climate change agreements to benefit from reduced emissions at no cost (Nordhaus, 2015). This explains, for instance, the exploitation – and failure – of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) pushed for by the United States. These repeated failures raise questions about the architecture of the international climate change regime and how it can be improved. What role can green bonds play? Mostly, they can encourage CO2 emitters to engage dutifully in the in-

ternational climate change regime. The US is not only the world’s second largest GHG emitter, it also hosts the broadest and deepest financial markets. It is in the American government’s interest to foster the development of the green bond market and to keep it stable and steadily growing if this is what investors want. China, the biggest GHG emitter, would also benefit from an international move towards a global green bond market. It could help the Renminbi, China’s currency, gain wider international recognition, as is already wished by the current government (“China Modernizes its monetary policy”, 2017). There is potential here: a majority of green bonds (32%) were issued in Renminbi. An international climate regime encompassing green bonds could be in the interests of the two largest GHG emitters, and therefore of the world as a whole. Green bonds could easily be integrated into the international climate change regime, as they perfectly fit the current trend in international regulation towards neoliberalism and reliance on markets (Paterson, 2011; Newell, 2008). This is the so-called “marketization” of global governance. Markets are the most efficient way to administer global policies because the issues tackled by international regimes are less and less focused on states, and now include businesses and non-governmental organizations. Markets provide “concentrated and immediate benefits for powerful actors impacted by the issue at stake” (Paterson, 2011: 219). In the case of climate change, Paterson believes the private sector, and in particular big businesses, to be the most influential actors in terms of policy-shaping. While industries were mostly lobbying against environmental policies a few decades ago through associations like the Global Climate Coalition or the 87

Climate Council, the current corporate sector is more complex. Many industries find environmentally-friendly investments increasingly appealing. Moreover, as stated earlier, green bonds align the corporate sector’s interests with those of policy-makers. Therefore, the development of the green bond market could make use of businesses’ influence to create powerful momentum towards carbon neutrality. According to Young, climate change is a complex issue caused by factors that cannot be disentangled (2011). As such, it calls for an equally complex response involving a mix of mitigation, adaptation, and innovation-inducing policies. Designing a climate regime consistent with the features of climate change is challenging. Unsurprisingly, the existing regime suffers from a “problem of fit” (Young, 2011) because it has been tailored by states’ desires, rather than designed to address climate change per se. This argument echoes the issue of “bottom-up” versus “top-down” approaches mentioned above. The relevance of green bonds stem from the fact that they give access to funding. Their proceeds may finance mitigation, adaptation, or innovation policies. In this sense, they allow for flexibility, which is identified by Young as paramount to a well-functioning international regime; it makes it easier for participants to comply with the regime’s rules. Further, green bonds allow for “nimbleness” (Young, 2011: 628): financial markets are very responsive to signals and very prompt to adapt if needed (Paterson, 2011). Green bonds could prompt a restructuring of the international climate change regime, synchronize the interests of the main GHG emitters to those of the rest of the world, and allow for more flexibility and 88

adaptability to changing circumstances. However, the issues of financial market instability and inequity pointed out earlier remain. Indeed, fairness is another attribute of efficient international regimes identified by Young. More precisely, an international regime must appear “fair” to all its participants. If a group of States believes the regime to be somehow biased, cooperation may fail (Young, 2010). This problem of fairness in global environmental policies is acknowledged, as attested by the classification of states between Annex-I (developed) and non-Annex-I (developing) countries and the rights and duties associated with each category. Nonetheless, it is unresolved: there are still tensions linked to the benefits of belonging to one group rather than another. For example, Annex I countries may argue that non-Annex I states benefit from trade advantages because they can use more polluting (and cheaper) production means, and export at a lower price than developed countries, whose emissions are closely monitored. Green bonds may not increase the degree of fairness of the international climate change regime because of financial markets’ location, and because the investors’ objective is ultimately to make a profit rather than invest in the most needed projects. Thus, the mismatch between funding needs and funds remains a key obstacle to the success of a global climate change mitigation policy. Indeed, developing countries’ emissions are the biggest challenge to come in terms of reducing GHG emissions (Mathews & Kidney, 2010). Without a strong and fair institutional framework, green bonds could exacerbate the vulnerability of developing states to climate change, relative to developed states. However, it is unclear whether developed countries are willing to go against their imme-

diate interests and act upon preventing This leads to a rather pessimistic concluthe approaching environmental disaster. sion. Although green bonds seem to be a promising climate change mitigation Conclusion policy tool in theory, many issues would arise in practice. Nevertheless, the rise Climate change is arguably the most of green bonds reflects the developing pressing threat to be faced by the human trend of marketization in global goverworld; the urgency and potential disasters it nance; an alignment of ideas on global could engender call for a reasoned and ef- governance would make international fective response equal to the circumstances. cooperation easier. Defecting on climate However, the current policies put in place change mitigation policy is not an option. are not powerful enough so innovative ways to curb GHG emissions must be discovered. References This paper has investigated the extent to which green bonds could frame such an innovative climate change mitigation policy. They would: (1) allow for “nimbleness” (Young, 2011: 628), as the funds can be invested in anything; (2) give access to a large pool of funding (the bond universe amounts to $90 trillion); and (3) harmonize the interests of public and private actors. Looking more closely into green bonds though, they have drawbacks. In particular, investments in green projects could be concentrated in developed countries (where financial markets are most developed), i.e. where relatively fewer investments are required to reduce GHG emissions. Additionally, financial markets are unstable: strong fluctuations would have boundless consequences on humanity’s well-being. Government intervention is a necessity for such a policy scheme to work well, although it raises further issues. For example, how can governments regulate financial markets without undermining their efficiency? At the international level, it is unclear whether policy harmonization is possible among actors – private or public – who share neither preferences on which environmental policy to adopt nor ideas on climate change.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2014), ‘Fixing the Future: Green Bonds Primer’, Thematic Investing. Boyd, R., Turner, J. and Ward, B., (2015), ‘Intended nationally determined contributions: what are the implications for greenhouse gas emissions in 2030?’, ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Policy Paper. Bracking, S. (2015) ‘Performativity in the Green economy: how far does climate finance create a fictive economy?’, Third World Quarterly, 36 (12), pp. 2337-2357. Clapp, C. (2014), ‘Climate Finance: Capitalizing on Green Investment Trends’, The Way Forward in International Climate Policy, pp. 44-48. Climate Bond Initiative (September 2017), Bonds and Climate Change: The State of the Market 2017. Ehlers, T. & Packer, F. (2017), ‘Green bond finance and certification’, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2017, pp. 89-104. Flaherty, M., Gevorkyan, A., Radpour, S. and Semmler, W. (2016), ‘Financing Climate Policies through Climate bonds: A Three Stage Model and Empirics’, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series 2016-3. Galaz, V., Olsson, P., Hahn, T., Folke, C. and Svedin, U. (2008), ‘The Problem of fit among biophysical systems, environmental and resource regimes, and broader governance systems: Insights and

emerging challenges’, in O. R. Young et al. (eds.), Institutions and Environmental Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pp. 147-186. ICMA (2017), The Green Bond Principles 2017. Isen, Adam, Rossin-Slater, M. and Walker, W. R., ‘Every Breath you take–Every Dollar You’ll make: The Long-Term Consequences of the Clean Air Act of 1970.’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 125, no. 3, 2017, pp. 848-902. Kolstad, C. D. (2011), Environmental Economics (2nd ed.), Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Mathews, J. A. & Kidney, S. (2010), ‘Climate bonds : mobilizing private financing for carbon management’, Carbon Management, 1 (1), pp. 9-13. Mathews, J. A. & Kidney, S. (2012), ‘Financing climate-friendly energy development through bonds’, Development Southern Africa, 29 (2), pp. 337-349. Newell, P. (2008), ‘The Marketization of global environmental governance: Manifestations and implications’, in Park, J. et al. (eds.), The Crisis of Global Environmental Governance. London: Routledge. Pp. 77-95.

ford University Press. Schelling, T. C. (1992), ‘Some Economics of Global Warming’, American Economic Review, 82, pp. 1-14. The Economist, ‘China Modernizes its monetary policy’, August 17th 2017. The Economist, ‘Mail-Strom’, November 26th 2009. Van Renssen, S. (2014), ‘Market Watch: Investors take charge of climate policy’, in Nature Climate Change, Vol. 4, pp. 241-242. Wood, D. & Grace, K. (2011), ‘A Brief Note on the Global Green Bond Market’, IRI Working Paper. Available from: http://iri.hks.harvard.edu/files/ iri/files/iri_note_on_the_global_green_bonds_ market.pdf [Accessed on September 5th 2017]. Young, O. R. (2011), ‘Improving the Performance of the Climate Regime: Insights from Regime Analysis’, in Dryzek, J. S. et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 625-638. Young, T (2015), ‘Defining Green’, International Financial Law Review (34).

Newell, R. G. (2010), ‘The Role of markets and policies in delivering innovation for climate change mitigation’, Oxford Review of Economy Policy, 26 (2), pp. 253-269. Nordhaus, W. (2015), ‘Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy’, American Economic Review, 105 (4), pp. 1339-1370. Paterson, M. (2011), ‘Selling Carbon: From International Climate Regime to Global Carbon Market’, in Dryzek, J. S. et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 611-624. Pham, L. (2016), ‘Is it risky to go green? A volatility analysis of the green bond market’, Journal of Sustainable Finance and Investment, 6 (4), pp. 263-291. Sachs, J. (2014), ‘Climate Change and Intergenerational Well-Being’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Macroeconomics of Global Warming, Bernard, L. and Semmler, W. (ed.), pp. 248-259. Oxford: Ox-

Photo by Lorena Vidal

Photo by Lorena 92 Vidal

The Great Bear Rainforest: From Conflict to Resolution by Andrew Stein ABSTRACT: The Great Bear Rainforest is both an ecological and political hotspot. Three of the main political actors involved in the dispute over the Great Bear Rainforest are First Nations, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs), and the logging industry. Following a discussion of each these groups, this paper presents a brief history of the political history of the Great Bear Rainforest from the mid 1990’s through the current day.

Introduction

Sitka Spruce (Picea sitchensis) which grow to nearly 100 meters tall (Ricketts, 1999). These tree species are iconic of the Old Growth Forests for which the GBR is renowned. The Great Bear Rainforest is named after the Kermode bear (Ursus americanus kermode), also known as the ‘Spirit Bear’, which is a rare, white-coated sub-species of the Black bear. Due to a double-recessive gene, approximately one tenth of the population display a stunning white coat (Ritland, Newmand, & Marshall, 2001). The bears which display this trait are not albino, as they have a brown nose and eyes, nor are they related to Polar bears or any other species of Ursus. The Spirit Bear was named the official animal of the province of British Columbia in 2006; then Premier Gordon Campbell said “The Spirit Bear is a magnificent symbol for our province”. The GBR is also home to wolves, cougars, falcons, eagles, and six species of salmon.

The Central and North Coast Forest of British Columbia came to be known as the Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) during the 1990’s (Reed, 2003). Its 32,000 square kilometers (6.4 million hectares) comprise one quarter of the planet’s remaining temperate rainforest and is the largest continuous tract of this unique ecoregion (Canada: Ministry of Forests, 2016). The GBR extends from Knight Inlet on the mainland north shore of Vancouver Island to the Alaskan border. It includes all islands and waters along its 400 kilometer coastline except for the Haida Gwaii Archipelago and Vancouver Island. Situated between the Pacific Ocean to the West and the Coastal Mountains further inland, the GBR experiences high levels of precipitation and a climate moderated by the interplay of land and sea (DellaSala, 2011). Disturbance by fire is very infrequent in this area due in large part to the high levels of precipitation but also the geographic isolation of As well as being an ecological hotspot, the the area; as a result the stands grow to be GBR is also a political hotspot as conflicting human interests converge in this territory. very old (Daniels & Gray, 2006). As with all political struggles, the complex The GBR is home to thousand-year-old history and the ontologies of the parties Western Red Cedar (Thuja plicata), and involved play a significant role in framing 93

the problems. In this paper I discuss three of the political actors involved in the dispute over the Great Bear Rainforest which I group as follows: First Nations, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs), and the logging industry1. After discussing each these groups independently, I present a brief history of the political history of the Great Bear Rainforest from the mid 1990’s through the current day. First Nations The Great Bear Rainforest lies on the traditional territory of 28 First Nations (Appendix 1). Archaeological evidence dates activity of the Heiltsuk nation to at least 11,000 years ago in this region (Hester & Nelson, 1978). From a legal perspective, “in British Columbia most First Nations have never signed treaties with the government. This means that much of British Columbia is still under claim by First Nations” (Low & Shaw, 2011). How a people situate themselves in the universe, in relation to nature and to others, is a crucial starting point from which their political views stem. While it is important to respect the differences among the many First Nations in British Columbia, given the scope of this paper I will focus on the broader differences between a generalized Indigenous ontology and the ontology of the Western settler-colonial world. In the case of

1. While I recognize that the conflict with industry extends far beyond simply logging, for the scope of this paper I chose to limit the discussion of industry to the logging sector. For a comprehensive analysis of the issues affecting the GBR see: Braun, B. (2002). The intemperate rainforest: nature, culture, and power on Canada’s west coast. U of Minnesota Press.

the GBR2 and for the purposes of this paper, I take the following passage to be broadly representative of the position of many First Nations in the Great Bear Rainforest area. The following is the Declaration of the Coastal First Nations—an alliance of nine First Nations who reside in and around the Great Bear Rainforest. They state: We declare our life source is vital to the sustenance and livelihood of our culture and our very existence as a people. The First Nations of the North Pacific Coast inherit the responsibility to protect and restore our lands, water, and air for future generations. We commit ourselves: • To making decisions that ensure the well-being of our lands and waters. • To preserving and renewing our territories and cultures through our tradition, knowledge, and authority. • To be honest with each other and respectful of all life. We will support each other and work together as the original people of the North Pacific Coast, standing together to fulfill these commitments.

There are stark contrasts between the principles guiding Indigenous peoples’ life projects and those which guide the majority of the West. Notions of respect and stewardship as well as traditional knowledge are foundational to First Nations’ approach to political issues. The mention of financial gain is noticeably absent. Some challenges faced by First Nations are due to geographical and economic isolation, with regional unemployment rates as high as 85% (Davis, 2011). Further, they continue to face an ongoing legacy of settler2. For a broader overview of First Nations in British Columbia see: Muckle, R. J. (2014). The First Nations of British Columbia: An Anthropological Overview. UBC Press.

colonialism, as articulated by Rossiter: “the land policies enacted by colonial administrations in the late nineteenth century have carried through to the present and structure relationships between First Nations, governments and settler populations” (Rossiter, 2004). As such, Chief Marilyn Slett captures the position of the Heiltsuk people: We are not anti-development, because like other British Columbians and Canadians, we do need and want jobs, income security, training, education, improved health, better housing, and other benefits and opportunities for our communities and families. But at the same time, we won’t support development at all costs, including the negative impacts against our environment and wildlife that are so central to our cultural, social, and economic well-being. […] People need to understand the Heiltsuk approach to resource development is a practical one where we consider and balance all the risks and opportunities that each development brings with it. The development of natural resources doesn’t have to be harmful or unjust. The futures of natural resource development is a part of all our common future, and First Nations have a right not only to benefit from this, but also to help determine its path.

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) Greenpeace, the Sierra Club BC, Forest Ethics Solutions, among many others, allied forces against industrial logging in British Columbia in the 1990’s; in fact it was this group of conservationists who came up with the name ‘Great Bear Rainforest’(Young & McAlister, 1997). The vision guiding these ENGOs in their struggle is based in science and ideas of conservation; Sierra Club B.C.’s mission statement embodies this sentiment “Sierra Club B.C.’s mission is to protect, conserve, and educate the public about B.C.’s wilderness, species and ecosystems—within the urgent

context of climate change impacts.” The ENGOs’ focus on science-based ecological conservation is manifested in the issues they address. For example, their resolve to eliminate clear-cut logging practices is rooted in biodiversity conservation and ecosystem integrity (Price, Roburn, & MacKinnon, 2009). Conservationists are well-versed in the concept of keystone ecosystems - systems with a disproportionately large ecological impact relative to their size and abundance (Pojar, 2003). McCrory et al. found that if current logging practices in the GBR continue, 82% of the unprotected ecosystem will vanish in the next century (2003). Concerns over riparian zones stem from the integral role that salmon play in nutrient cycling, plant diversity, and the interrelationships between terrestrial and marine ecosystems (Hocking & Reynolds, 2011; Gende et al., 2002). Despite their honest intentions and sense of urgency in the face of climate change, conservationists and ENGOs have been criticized for their monocular approach to conservation and the resulting neglect of - and, in certain cases of dispossession, violence towards - indigenous peoples (Escobar, 1996; Katz, 1998). Further concern that ENGOs are facilitating philanthrocapitalism are expressed by Delacey Tedesco; “the political economy of financial resources and neoliberal rationalities, even when locally mutated, generates different possibilities for and limits to democracy” (2015). Jessica Dempsey critiques the conservationist movement in the GBR through the lens of Latour’s ‘Naturpolitik,’ (2009) raising the concern that “using Nature as a trump card (i.e. through climate models) is increasingly commonplace as the threats of climate change becomes ever so real, alongside staunch government inaction” 95

(Dempsey, 2011). Ultimately, however, she finds that “in the GBR, the success achieved depended, to no small extent, on bracketing out and excluding broader issues in the region and (more radical) voices and visions. It depended on environmentalists departing from ideal ethical/moral positions as a part of their political strategy” (2011). To their credit, ENGOs did learn much about relations with First Nations groups through the Clayoquot Sound struggle in the early 1990’s (Turner & Bitonti, 2011). Industry In 1909, the first pulp and paper mill opened along B.C.’s coast at Swanson Bay. Forestry had already long been a strong industry in the province (Forest History Association of British Columbia (FHABC), 2005), indeed, logging has been an integral part of British Columbia’s economic development for over a century. Industry experts argue that of the 55 million hectares of forest in B.C., 22 million hectares are available for harvesting yet only 200,000 hectares (0.3%) are harvested annually (Forestry Innovation Investment, 2016). The industry plants 200 million seedlings per year and since the 1930’s has planted over 7.5 billion. Further, the IPCC states “in the long term, a sustainable forest management strategy aimed at maintaining or increasing forest carbon stocks, while producing an annual sustained yield of timber, fibre or energy from the forest, will generate the largest sustained mitigation benefit” (Nabuurs et al., 2007). Proponents of the forestry industry in British Columbia regard the industry as providing a necessary commodity to markets and people, a net benefit to both the local economy by developing resources, and to the climate by planting new trees 96

which take up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they grow, all while working within the confines of the law. They are not climate-deniers, nor are they anti-nature; they simply see themselves as providing a social good from a renewable resource. They view the forest as property to be exploited in a sustainable fashion. Criticism of the forest industry falls under three main categories: logging practices, economic exploitation, and government influence (Marchak, 1995). With regards to logging practices it is worth noting that the industry defends clearcutting in certain circumstances: Clearcutting, which removes most of the trees from an area and leaves patches and buffers to protect other values, is often used because it mimics natural forest disturbances such as wildfires. It is also best suited to the ecology of sites with tree species that thrive in full sunlight such as Lodgepole pine and Douglas-fir. When used appropriately, clearcutting is less disruptive because the site is left to grow once it is regenerated. Stumps, branches and fallen trees are left behind to maintain biodiversity and provide habitat (FHABC, 2005).

Clapp highlights the economic criticism: “three point six million cubic meters of timber are cut annually within the region, generating approximately 4500 person-years of employment, but 96% goes to people living outside the region, and 95% of the timber from the Mid-Coast Timber Supply Area is exported unprocessed, or shipped to Vancouver Island or metropolitan Vancouver for milling” (Clapp, 2004). Political Climate While First Nations have been in conflict with colonialism since the arrival of Europeans, the conflict over land claims and logging of old-growth rainforest in the GBR picked up in the 1990’s with the ‘War

in the Woods’ – a direct action campaign launched against the logging industry. First Nations were engaged in territorial legal battles with the provincial and federal governments. Lowe & Shaw characterize some of the outcomes of these legal proceedings, which “[have] confirmed that neither the province nor the federal government can unilaterally extinguish constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights; infringements of such rights must meet strict criteria that included meaningful consultation with affected First Nations; and Aboriginal title exists as a distinct species of Aboriginal rights” (Low & Shaw, 2011). ENGOs and environmental activists were taking on the forestry industry on the ground, as well as in the market. They successfully campaigned over 80 companies who purchased forestry products from the GBR. Influential companies such as Ikea, Home Depot, and Staples all agreed to take a stance against old-growth logging practices. This attack through the marketplace resulted in the premier at the time, Glen Clark, calling activists “enemies of B.C.” (Hunter, 2016). In 2000, Rainforest Solutions Project (RSP) - a coalition of ENGOs - and Coast Forest Conservation Initiative (CFCI) - an alliance of forestry companies - agreed to negotiate, and together formed the Joint Solutions Project (JSP). The JSP led the forestry industry to cease logging in 100 intact valley bottoms, while ENGOs agreed to suspend their marketing campaigns. This ‘ceasefire’ was enacted to allow for an independent scientific inquiry. At the same time, First Nations were engaged in discussion with the provincial government, which ultimately led to a ‘government-to-government’ relationship and the implementation of Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM)

and revenue-generating endeavors so that First Nations could diversify their economic opportunities. Between 2001 and 2006, government-sponsored Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) processes brought all of the stakeholders to the table to negotiate the recommendations that would ultimately inform the government-to-government negotiations and the fate of the Great Bear Rainforest. The results of these negotiations came in February 2006 with consensus-agreements that consisted of four main points: protected areas that cover some two million hectares - one third of the region - of which more than half were to be designated “conservation areas;” implementation of EBM practices and lighter-touch forestry; the establishment of a $120 million dollar Coast Opportunities Fund - half of which was put up by the federal and provincial governments while the other half was raised by ENGOs - aimed at preserving the GBR’s ecological integrity and promoting economic opportunities for First Nations; and lastly the official involvement of First Nations in management and decision-making for the territory (McGee, Cullen, & Gunton, 2010). Implementation of these plans was to take place no later than March 31, 2009. A decade later, on February 1, 2016, an updated agreement was announced: the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement. 85% of the territory was now to be permanently protected with stringent logging standards being set for the remaining 15%. Total logging, by volume, would be reduced by 40% of 2006 levels (Canada, Great Bear Rainforest Act, 2016). “The outcome is we have a sustainable forest industry for B.C., and a platform for us to march down the road of reinvestment in the industry” said Rick Jef97

frey, chief negotiator for the forestry com- reach a consensus. As is often the case with panies operating in the territory (Hunter, political change, the process took a very 2016). long time, but it arrived at solid results. Moving Forward

I close this paper with a few personal remarks. I have never been to the GBR; it is not a place that I have any tangible attachment to. Perhaps one day I will visit – I would certainly like to, though I am not attached to such an outcome. Whether or not I ever step foot in the Great Bear Rainforest will not change the existence value (Attfield, 1998) that I hold for that space. Admittedly, part of the appeal to the Great Bear Rainforest is the notion of idealized wilderness – the romanticized view of nature, which I recognize as a social construct. Yet, I feel that there is something primordial and majestic about the life force in a millennium-old tree.

The Great Bear Rainforest Agreement announced in February is certainly a step in the right direction. Its components recognize and involve First Nations in decision-making processes; conservation practices that respect ecological boundaries while respecting the peoples of the land; and a concrete framework within which industry can plan and operate sustainably. However, there is always room for improvement. Notably missing from the new act is a ban on sport hunting (although the Spirit Bear remains under protection) and language around non-logging development projects such as mining and energy infrastructure is clouded and arbitrary (McGee, Appendix 1 - First Nations in the Great Cullen, & Gunton, 2010). Bear Rainforest There are many lessons to be learned from the Great Bear Rainforest. Possibly the most important part of all is the process of bringing together groups with vastly different interests, which are based on fundamentally different ontologies. The First Nations see themselves as political agents—despite centuries of exclusion and oppression—with a comprehensive responsibility toward the land, of which they are a vital part. The ENGOs frame themselves as scientific agents with a responsibility towards nature, and they are learning that nature is not necessarily devoid of human activity. Industry frames itself as an economic agent with fiscal responsibility to their shareholders, the province, and their employees. The Great Bear Rainforest is a case study in effective communication and knowledge-sharing between groups with opposing ontologies who were able to 98

Nisga’a Kitsumkalum Gitga’at Ulkatcho Gwawaenuk Tlowitsis Kwicksutaineuk-Ah-Kwa-mish Lax Kw’alaams Kitselas Kitasoo/Xaixais Wuikinuxv Dzawada’enuxw Kwiakah Mamalilikulla-Qwe’Qwa’Sot’Em Gitanyow Gitxaala Heiltsuk Haida Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala Xwémalhkwu (Homalco) We Wai Kai (Cape Mudge)

Metlakatla Haisla Nuxalk Gwa’sala-‘Nakwaxda’xw ‘Namgis K’ómoks Wei Wai Kum (Campbell River)

DellaSala, D. A. (2011). Temperate and boreal rainforests of the world: ecology and conservation. Island Press.

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Photo by Perri Wiatrak

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Mammalian Carnivores and Maasai Pastoralists: Thoughts for Carnivore Conservation Going Forward Photos and article by Daniel Silver ABSTRACT: In Maasailand of Southern Kenya, successful coexistence between large carnivores and humans has occurred for millennia, even though carnivores occasionally hunted and consumed livestock. Recently, some Maasai communities have expressed lowered tolerance to the damage carnivore depredation of livestock inflicts on pastoral livelihoods. This paper argues that reduced acceptance of carnivores by Maasai pastoralists may result from the ways conservation interests, including the Kenyan government, have interacted with Maasai communities. I contend that conservation groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; lack of respectful and honest communication about carnivore conservation policies has led to perceived mistreatment and neglect within communities. As a result, many Maasai pastoralists have become more inclined to resent wild carnivores, the object of restrictions on resource usage and a recipient of preferential treatment by the Kenyan government.

Introduction Across the globe, wild mammalian carnivore populations are threatened due to loss of habitat and human-wildlife conflict. Apex, keystone predators, in addition to holding important ecological niches at the top of food webs, capture human interest to a degree matched by few other animal groups. They are charismatic and conspicuous, loved and respected, feared and hated because of the potential danger they pose to humans. One of the countries best known for its large carnivores is Kenya, where robust numbers of lions, leopards, hyenas, and cheetahs still exist in the wild. These savanna carnivores are unique and captivating creatures, which intrinsic-value proponents believe is itself reason to protect them. Moreover, these iconic carnivores attract vast numbers of inter102

national visitors, which helps support an important tourism industry that makes up a significant portion of Kenyaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy. Efforts to conserve such wildlife have historically focused on removing anthropogenic influences by creating protected areas (PAs). Such top-down, people-absent PAs represent a model known as fortress conservation, which asserts that the presence of humans is inherently detrimental to wildlife (Brockington, 2002). Employing this fortress conservation framework, Kenyaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts to protect wild animals have led in many cases to the eviction of indigenous peoples from their traditional land (Brockington, 2002; Homewood & Rogers, 1984; Hughes, 2002; Jacobs, 1975; Robertshaw, 1991). PAs, in addition to alienating and displacing indigenous peoples, have been largely

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ineffective at preventing the worldwide decrease in carnivore numbers (Western & Gichohi, 1993). Thus, in order to continue conserving carnivores ethically and effectively going forward, it is imperative to establish models of conservation that include land between and beyond the insulated habitats formed by PAs, while also respecting the land rights and living needs of indigenous inhabitants. Such a model necessarily entails interactions between carnivores and humans, and hence success depends heavily on peaceful coexistence. In light of this, I explore conservation practices in the South Rift region of Southern Kenya, between Amboseli National Park and the Maasai Mara National Reserve, an area in which successful coexistence between carnivores, Maasai pastoralists, and livestock has been taking place for centuries. However, this scenario of coexistence is not perfect, and is worsening in some areas. Carnivores depredate, or prey upon, livestock and humans and are killed in retribution, which drives most conflicts in the area. Notably, many Maasai communities have expressed lowered tolerance for livestock depredation in recent years. In addition to factors such as overpopulation and climate change, I attribute this to the poor treatment of Maasai pastoralists by the conservation movement. I refer to the “conservation movement” as all the groups from the Kenyan Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Kenyan government, to international NGOs and eco-tourism lodges, whose main interest is conserving Kenya’s wildlife. I conclude that carnivores would be better preserved if conservation proponents dealt more respectfully with Maasai people and acknowledged the economic sacrifices pastoral people are making by allowing carnivores to reside on their land. 104

Many of my findings are based on the three months I spent living in the Olkiramatian Group Ranch in the summer of 2017. Olkiramatian is a Maasai pastoralist community where populations of lions, leopards, striped and spotted hyenas, and cheetah live, all of which I observed in the wild while there. During my stay, I had the opportunity to interview Maasai pastoralists in the neighboring Oldonyo-Nyokie Group Ranch as part of McGill’s Institutional Canopy of Conservation (ICAN) research project. Throughout this summer, I was also able to hear firsthand about people’s experiences living with large carnivores. Thus, while the majority of this paper’s information is cited from peer reviewed literature, I have also included material from my personal observations and conversations. I do not claim that the people with whom I interacted are representatives of these communities as a whole, and such information represents the situation in the South Rift as it was told to me by a limited number of people from two specific Group Ranches. However, my conversations were with the main stakeholders in the area— Maasai pastoralists—and their thoughts and opinions may in fact be more relevant than scientific articles for the issue at hand. How Conflict Occurs In general, the ecological characteristics of rangelands, driven by the lifestyle of the Maasai pastoralists inhabiting them, create a scenario in which people, carnivores, and carnivores’ natural prey are able to share space and resources. However, in a landscape where carnivores, people, and livestock live so closely together, some instances of conflict are inevitable. Livestock depredation, though usually not as significant a danger as drought and disease, is seriously damaging to the livelihoods of pastoralists

(Mishra, 1997; Marker et al., 2003). This makes it the predominant reason for conflict between carnivores and livestock herders (Nowell & Jackson, 1996; Woodroffe & Ginsberg, 1998). When depredation occurs, carnivores also fare poorly, as some are killed in retaliation (Blackburn et al., 2016).

area between 2001 and 2006 (Hazzah et al., 2009). This is a dramatic example of retributive killings, which is not reflective of the practice in most communities. While Maasai have historically killed animals that cause damage with spears, poisoning has now become an easier and more accessible practice due to the “widely available and inexpensive pesticide” known as Carbofuran/Furadan (Maclennan et al., 2009). While spearing carnivores to protect the homestead is considered a heroic act in Maasai culture (killing a lion is part of the traditional ‘Olamayio’ manhood rite of passage), poisoning is often done in secret (Hazzah, 2006). People will usually poison a carcass on which the target carnivore will scavenge (Hazaah, 2006). This has ramifications for the entire ecosystem, as many organisms in addition to the targeted carnivore will feed on the carcass.

Overall, livestock depredation inflicts serious economic damage on people who are in many cases already struggling to meet basic needs (Mishra, 1997; Marker et al., 2003; Ragan et al., 2017). Attacks on cattle are also emotionally damaging for Maasai people, who have a deep cultural connection to the animals (Hazzah et al., 2009). This is evidenced by the fact that lions, which partake in a fraction of the total livestock depredation of spotted hyenas (hyenas accounted for 98% of depredation in the Mara region), are perceived more negatively by many Maasai people, as they often kill the more culturally important cattle (Hazzah et al., 2009). Such conflict, however, is nothing new. Over the centuries, countless livestock Responses to depredation are understud- have been killed by carnivores, and ied (Hazzah et al., 2009). Overall, despite countless carnivores have been killed by the 1977 Kenyan Wildlife Act, which Maasai in retaliation. This has led to a banned any killing of wildlife, retribution mutual respect for the power and potenkillings of carnivores still occur in parts tial danger each poses to the other, and of Maasailand (Hazzah et al., 2009). It is consequently, behaviors have evolved to also likely that figures for such retaliato- avoid destructive encounters. These bery killings are underestimated, given the haviors mitigate conflict in areas where contentious nature of the practice and the carnivores and people cohabitate, which desire of communities and local author- has promoted coexistence in rangelands. ities to hide such behavior (Blackburn et al., 2016). Maasai communities surround- Why Conflict has Worsened ing Amboseli National Park eradicated the park’s lion populations between 1990 Centuries of coexistence in the South Rift and 1993 to protest restrictions on graz- allowed both Maasai pastoralists and large ing and access to swamp lands, as well as carnivores to survive into the 21st century. livestock depredation in general (Hazzah This is nothing short of remarkable given et al., 2009). Later, after lion populations that carnivores have become extirpated in had returned to Amboseli, more than 140 most other regions of Africa where they are lions were speared or poisoned in the same not protected in parks or preserves (West105

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ern & Gichohi, 1993). However, tolerance for carnivores within many Maasai communities has dwindled in the past few decades (Hazzah et al., 2009; Mishra, 1997; Marker et al., 2003). This is of serious concern, as experts believe that carnivore conservation will depend most heavily on mitigating human-wildlife conflict, even more so than managing human population density (Hazzah et al., 2009; Nowell & Jackson, 1996; Woodroffe & Ginsberg, 1998; Linnell et al., 1999; Blackburn et al., 2016). Indeed, local tolerance for carnivores is perhaps the greatest influencer of whether populations are sustained, and Robin Reid, an East African scholar, asserts that “where wildlife exists in pastoral rangelands it is because pastoral people have chosen not to extirpate them” (Reid, 2012, p. 49). Despite a fair amount of research on the topic, it is not well known which of these determining factors cause certain communities to extirpate carnivores and others to tolerate them (Hazzah et al., 2009). However, based on my experiences and discussions in Southern Kenya, I believe that there is one deep socio-political factor which may be a significant driver of Maasai people’s negative feelings towards carnivores: mistreatment by the conservation movement. Before the rise of the conservation movement and associated laws, Maasai people dealt with problem carnivores as they saw fit, but now, conservation laws fundamentally restrict communities’ ability to autonomously manage problem wildlife (Kissui, 2016). Many herders now perceive wildlife on their land as belonging to the government, which is legally the case (Reid, 2012, pg. 149). Due to perceived and actual vulnerability to imposed conservation laws, many feel more inclined to resent carnivores, the object of many restrictions on the way they 108

manage their land and resources (Lindsay, 1987; Adams & McShane, 1996). This perceived lack of control, rather than actual levels of depredation, has been suggested to be the driving force of an individual’s propensity to be intolerant of carnivores and partake in retaliatory killings (Mishra, 1997; Naughton-Treves & Treves, 2005). A long and troubling history of conservation in Kenya has certainly influenced Maasai people’s attitudes towards carnivores. Although indigenous people were often forced to sacrifice their land and way of life for the sake of wildlife protection, their lack of economic, social, and political power historically excluded them from the profits generated by wildlife tourism (Okello et al., 2009). Kenya’s tourism industry was at one point controlled almost entirely by Western investors and the extent of Kenyan ownership was restricted to a minority of elite individuals (Okello et al., 2009; Thompson & Homewood, 2002; Manyara & Jones, 2007). Given this situation, and the legal inability to deal with problem wildlife, communities often viewed their connection to wildlife simply as a cost, and thus had no incentive to take interest or initiative in conservation (Meguro, 2014). Research suggests that when communities do not see direct benefits from wildlife, they may be more inclined to participate in retaliatory killings of carnivores (Baur et al., 2015; Blackburn et al., 2016). Conservation laws were largely resented in the Oldonyo-Nyokie Group Ranch, an area where I helped conduct interviews. Here, herders reported being told that they would receive compensation for depredated livestock by government officials in the late 1990’s. Since the apparent delivery of that promise more than two decades ago, no one has actually received any compen-

sation, except in one or two cases when an individual had a personal connection to a KW.S official. Additionally, informants unanimously stated that KWS responded quickly and effectively when herders kill wildlife, yet was unresponsive when carnivores killed livestock. In addition to feeling neglected and mistreated, Oldonyo-Nyokie herders were discouraged by the fact that carnivores, which caused serious damage to their pastoralist livelihoods, seemed to be getting preferential treatment by the Kenyan government. Importantly, most pastoralists in Oldonyo-Nyokie stated that they were willing to live with wildlife. It seemed that not following through with compensation promises and half-hearted responses from KW.S, rather than carnivores themselves, were the driving forces of their bitterness about livestock depredation.

Unfortunately, there is no data on retaliatory killings in either of these communities, nor have any major studies been performed gauging the attitudes of these pastoralists towards carnivores. However, my personal (albeit perhaps biased) conversations suggested a tangible difference in these communitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; feelings towards carnivores. In general, it seems that the conservation movement has, throughout history, failed in many respects to productively and respectfully interact with Maasai communities. Notably, promising compensation for depredation and not following through undermined peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s trust, while disproportionate responses to conflict-cases by KWS marginalized pastoralists and augmented their bitterness towards depredation. Ironically, it seems that in an attempt to promote conservation, the Kenyan government disrupted a functioning system of In contrast, in the neighboring Olkirama- human-wildlife coexistence unique in Kentian Group Ranch, many seemed to have ya in its conservation of large carnivores. a less resentful attitude towards wildlife. This could be partly due to a program This case study comparing the Oldoncalled Rebuilding the Pride (RTP), which yo-Nyokie and Olkiramatian Group is run in partnership with the South Rift Ranches highlights an important factor in Association of Landowners (SORALO), promoting coexistence between humans a land trust established in 2004. RTP em- and carnivores: respect of Maasai people ploys many Maasai community members, by the conservation movement. Compenand through the use of quadrats and radio sation and financial benefits are an intecollaring, tracks the Group Ranchâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lions gral component of this respect. However, and informs herders in the vicinity when a meaningful and genuine recognition of the pride is close to livestock. Additional- the damage carnivores inflicted upon pasly, when livestock depredation or human toralists, as well as the sacrifice pastoralists injury occurs at the hands of carnivores, are making by allowing carnivores to share RTP visits the individual, records their their land, is an essential, but often lackstory, and does what they can to console ing, component of this dialogue. Shown them. This service sends a message that respect, communities may show a greatpeople concerned with protecting car- er willingness to work towards conservanivores also care about the damage that tion goals and to coexist with carnivores. those carnivores are inflicting on the community, and that they are committed to Conclusion looking for win-win situations where carnivores and pastoralists can both benefit. South Rift pastoral rangelands are unique 109

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in Kenya in their conservation of diverse and robust, large carnivore populations. While other land uses eradicated carnivores, the contiguous and sparsely populated rangeland savannas, ecologically supported by Maasai pastoralists, preserved a viable habitat for wildlife. In this landscape, millennia of cohabitation allowed carnivores and Maasai pastoralists to adapt to each other’s presence and coexist. Conflicts do occur between these two keystone members of the rangeland ecosystem, mostly due to depredation. But, for centuries, this conflict was tolerated, as evidenced by the fact that carnivores persisted in Maasailand into the 21st century. Today however, coexistence in parts of the South Rift is threatened. Key to this issue is communities’ perception of “conservation” in general. In many cases, the presence of carnivores is associated with restrictions on land and resource usage from a government that does much to enforce punishments for retaliatory killings, but little to find win-win solutions for carnivores and humans. This has led to a resentment of conservation by many local communities, and consequently a perilous scenario for wild carnivores. I believe that tolerance of carnivores may be largely influenced by the context and manner in which conservation is discussed with locals. My impression is that communities whose losses to carnivores are sincerely acknowledged in dialogue and addressed thoughtfully in policies are significantly more receptive to tolerating carnivores on their land.

preserved carnivore populations to a degree matched by few other people in the world, and there is much to be learned from the ancient relationship between carnivores and Maasai people, which has endured in South Rift rangelands for centuries. Given positive ecological and socio-economic outcomes of frameworks such as community-based conservation, I am optimistic that coexistence between people and carnivores can persist long into the future, in the South Rift and beyond. References Adams, J., McShane, T.O. (1996). The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation without Illusion University of California Press, Los Angeles. Bauer, H., Müller, L., Van Der Goes, D., & Sillero-Zubiri, C. (2017). Financial compensation for damage to livestock by lions (Panthera leo) on community rangelands in Kenya. Oryx 51(1), 106-114. Blackburn, S., Hopcraft, J. C., Ogutu, J. O., Matthiopoulos, J., & Frank, L. (2016). Human–wildlife conflict, benefit sharing and the survival of lions in pastoralist community-based conservancies. Journal of Applied Ecology 53(4), 1195-1205. Brockington, D. (2002). Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania. Oxford: International African Institute. Hazzah, L. (2006). Living among lions (Panthera leo): Coexistence or Killing? Community attitudes towards conservation initiatives and the motivations behind lion killing in Kenyan Maasailand. Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison. Hazzah, L., Mulder, M. B., and Frank, L. (2009). Lions and warriors: Social factors underlying d e clining African lion populations and the effect of incentive-based management in Kenya. Biological Conservation 142, 2428–2437.

Given a changing climate, rising populations, and new socio-economic realities, the historic system of coexistence beHomewood, K., and Rodgers W. A. (1984). Pastotween carnivores and Maasai pastoral- ralism and conservation. Human Ecology 12, ists may be more vulnerable than it once 431–442. was. That said, Maasai pastoralists have 111

Hughes, L. (2002). Moving the Maasai: A colonial misadventure. PhD diss., Oxford University. Jacobs, A. H. (1975). Maasai pastoralism in an historical perspective. In Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, ed. Monod, T. 406– 425. Oxford: International African Institute. Kissui, B. M. (2008). Livestock predation by lions, leopards, spotted hyenas, and their vulnerability to retaliatory killing in the Maasai steppe, Tanzania. Animal Conservation 11, 422–432. Lindsay, W. K. (1987). Integrating parks and pastoralists: Some lessons from Amboseli. In Conservation in Africa: People, Policies, and Practice, ed. Anderson, D. and Grove, R. 149–167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maclennan, S. D., Groom, R. J., Macdonald, D. W., and Frank, L. G. (2009). Evaluation of a compensation scheme to bring about pastoralist tolerance of lions. Biological Conservation 142, 2419–2427. Manyara, G., and Jones E. (2007). Community based tourism enterprises development in Kenya: An exploration of their potential as avenues of poverty reduction. Journal of Sustainable Tourism 15(6), 628-644. Mishra, C. (1997). Livestock depredation by large carnivores in the Indian trans-Himalaya: conflict perceptions and conservation prospects. Environmental Conservation 24, 338-343. Naughton-Treves, L., and Treves, A. (2005). Socio-ecological factors shaping local support for wildlife: Crop-raiding by elephants and other wildlife in Africa. In People and Wildlife: Conflict or Coexistence?, ed. Woodroffe, R., Thirgood, R., and Rabinowitz, A. 252–277. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nowell, K. and Jackson, P. (1996). Wild Cats: Status Survey and Conservation Action Plan. World Conservation Union, Gland, Switzerland. Okello, M. (2005). An assessment of the large mammal component of the proposed wildlife sanctuary site in Maasai Kuku Group Ranch near Amboseli, Kenya. South African Journal of Wildlife Research 35, 63–76.

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Okello, M., Ole Seno, S., Nthiga, R. (2009). Reconciling people’s livelihoods and environmental conservation in the rural landscapes in Kenya: Opportunities and challenges in the Amboseli landscapes. Natural Resources Forum 33(2), 123-133. Ragan, L., Silver, D., Godfrey, K., Pollini J., Kipanoi., A. (2017). Quick case study report #7: Oldonyo-Nyokie group ranch, Kajiado County, Kenya. Unpublished. Reid, R. S. (2012). Savannas of our Birth: People, Wildlife, and Change in East Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. Robertshaw, P. (1991). Early Pastoralists of South Western Kenya. Nairobi: British Institute of East Africa. Thirgood, S., Mlingwa, C., Gereta, E. (2008). Who pays for conservation? Current and future financing scenarios for the Serengeti ecosystem. In Serengeti III: Human Impacts on Ecosystem Dynamics, ed. Sinclair, A. R. E., Packer, C., Mduma, A. R. and Fryxell, J. M. 443–470. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Thompson, D. M., Serneels, S., Kaelo, D., and Trench, P. C. (2009) Maasai Mara—Land privatization and wildlife decline: Can conservation pay its way? In Staying Maasai: Livelihoods, Conservation, and Development in East African Rangelands, ed. Homewood, K., Kristjanson, P., and Trench, P. 77–114. London: Springer. Western, D., and Gichohi, H. (1993). Segregation effects and the impoverishment of savanna parks: the case for ecosystem viability analysis. African Journal of Ecology 31(4), 269–281. Woodroffe, R., and Ginsberg, J. R. (1998). Edge effects and the extinction of populations inside protected areas. Science 280, 2126–2128.

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About the Contributors Audrey Azerot is a final year student drawn to research in Environmental and Experimental Economics. She wants to help find ways to tackle climate change, which she sees as the most urgent challenge humanity has ever faced. When she is not in the library, you can find her singing (shouting) old French songs or thinking about how little she knows about Physics. Quinn Barrie-Watts is a U2 student in Political Science with a minor in East Asian Languages and Literature. She has a keen passion for environmental policy in Canada and abroad, especially in China where she was adopted from 20 years ago. She loves watching films, playing board games and going out for food with friends. Abigail Drach is a first year student interested in studying theatre, French literature, and anthropology. She is interested in using art to grapple with injustice and pressing global concerns. Leila Farahdel is a second year medical student and graduated from Materials Engineering at McGill University. She enjoys taking pictures of natural beauty within the concrete city. Her recent travel to Haiti to teach Anatomy to medical students inspired her to explore different ways of merging her passion of photography, medicine and engineering. Ellen Gillies finished her degree in Geography in 2016, and currently lives in Yellowknife, NWT. She hopes to contribute to building anti-oppressive and loving communities, maybe through public policy. Her most prized possession is her collapsible food container. Matthew King is currently working as a photographer for the Indigenous Health Adaptation to Climate Change research group. His most current project is titled Adapt to Eat, which focused IHACCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s different regions of study. His passion is in communicating science through art, especially photography. Constance Lambert-Tremblay recently graduated from McGillâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s B.Sc. in Food Security and participated in the Field Study semester in Panama. She has been pursuing a Masters degree in Agricultural Economics at McGill with a research focus on development. Fiona McRaith is a recent graduate of McGill who studied International Development Studies, Environmental Studies, and Urban Systems. Fiona became more interested in reliance and the variety of ways in which action is being taken through her internship with the Obama White House in the summer of 2016. She is again working in Washington, D.C., this time for a nonprofit environmental think tank. Frances Miltimore is completing a degree in Environment and Development with minors in Economics and World Religions. Her interests lie at the intersection of policy and the natural world. She is continually inspired by explorations of different cultures and environments. Hana Shiraishi is an Arts student studying Environment and World Cinemas at McGill. She was born and raised in Japan and has an avid passion for photography and the art of creation. Daniel Silver is a third year student majoring in Environment and minoring in Organismal Biology. His academic interests include the social dimensions of conservation and conservation policy, environmental impact assessment, ecology, and wildlife conservation. Daniel worked last summer in Southern Kenya doing ethnographic and conservation research, and will be spending summer 2018 in Ontario doing his honours project on dark sky preservation. Andrew Stein completed his undergraduate degree in Environmental Science and Philosophy, before opening an environmental consulting company, Manifest Solutions, which he operates part-time while pursuing graduate studies in Bioresource Engineering at McGill. Jessee Tinslay is a U3 student completing her major in Environmental Biology. She participated in the Panama Field Study Semester in 2017; in fact, it was on that trip that she saw the wonderful gartered trogon and decided to draw it! Lorena Vidal is an Environment student in the Biodiversity and Conservation domain. She is passionate about conservation and wildlife photography. She hopes to become a conservation biologist and raise awareness about environmental issues through photography. Perri Wiatrak is a second year Biology and Spanish student from Nashville. She is interested in documenting at-risk species to raise awareness against poaching and territory loss.

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Photo by Perri Wiatrak

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About the Editors Giovanni Antonucci is a first year Environment student concentrating in Economics and Environment, with a minor in political science. He is interested in environmental policy, international relations, and Spanish. Maha Asad is a first year Arts student with a concentration in Economics and International Development Studies. She is interested in the intersections of environmental and human rights issue, and relevant policy. Christina Baik is a first year student in the Faculty of Management with an interest in data analytics and sustainability. You will likely find her running to class, playing sports, attempting homemade DIY projects, or attending case competitions on weekends. She hopes to continue making a difference by building a sustainable world for future generations. Dassyn Barris graduated from the MSE in 2016, and is currently exploring the realm of sustainability communication and community building. She loves historical thriller novels and podcasts, because learning about our past to build a great future can be done in many different ways. She also really likes chocolate desserts. Jessica Di Bartolomeo is a second year Environment student studying Atmospheric Environment and Air Quality. She is interested in intersectional feminism and urban sustainability, and loves sloths. Mackenzie J. Bleho is a U2 student pursuing a Joint Honours degree in French Literature and Canadian Studies. Particularly interested in all that is existential, she dedicates most of her time to her three passions: reading (18th century onwards), writing (any and all genres), and, yes, editing (peersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; fascinating research)! Reine Donnestad is a third year Environmental Science student studying Renewable Resource Management at MacDonald Campus. She is also studying agricultural economics to better understand how communities can develop sustainably. When not stressing about the state of the planet, she can be found making music and reading books. Gabi Gionet is a Biology and English double major with a strong passion for environmental protection. She is particularly interested in issues of biodiversity, human health, and community resilience (in all forms). She is also a proud member of three dogspotting groups on Facebook. Cody Kane is an Environment student concentrating in Ecological Determinants of Health with minors in Hispanic Languages and International Development. He is interested in the interplay between science, environment and politics in public health policy. Agnessa Karapetian is a third year Psychology student with a background in Environmental Science. She is interested in reaching out to people and informing them about the different ways they can incorporate environmentally-friendly habits in their lives. She also enjoys spending time in nature, hanging out with her cat and watching comedy shows. Elena Kennedy is a McGill Law student. Her concern the translational challenges between science, environmental thought, and the law kept her on the journal after graduating from the MSE in 2014. She is primarily interested in environmental civil liability and class actions. Thomas King is a first year student in the School of Architecture, with plans to minor in Environment. He is deeply passionate about sustainability and its relation to architecture, and intends to immerse his life into the realm of revolutionizing design methodologies to better cohere with our natural surroundings. Marie Labrosse is a U3 Bachelor of Arts student, studying English Literature, German, and Classical Languages. In her free time she enjoys reading environmental dystopias and exploring Montrealâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s bountiful coffee shop offerings. Kristen Lalla is a U3 Environment student in Biodiversity and Conservation with a minor in Biology. Her Honours project brought her to Alaska last summer, where she fell in love with the black-legged kittiwake, a seabird. She is interested in the interactions between the living and non-living world, especially speciesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; responses and adaptations to climate change. She loves being outdoors and is an enthusiastic birder. Rasha Lama is a U1 Management student in Managing for Sustainability who is possibly minoring in Urban Systems. She is a poet/photographer infatuated with the juxtaposition of light/dark, angles/curves, masculinity/femininity, and nature/humanity. She also submitted photography for this issue.

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Maya Lew is a second year Environment student studying Earth Science and Economics. She loves brunch, lizards, and the TV show Kitchen Nightmares. Her plans for the future are to be successful enough in her work to retire early, and then spend her later years writing a sitcom. Caroline Lou is a second year Biology student at McGill. Her passions include environmental conservation and spoken word poetry. You can find her wandering through forests or curled up with a good book. Shivang Mahajan is a first year student in Economics and Finance. He is interested in reading, debate, writing, movie watching and camping. He hopes to win in life and make sure there is a life to win at by saving the precious environment. He is also a “Friends” fanatic. Carey Miao-Tang is a U2 Environmental Science student from New York specializing in Renewable Resource Management. He has lived in New York, Beijing, and Montreal, taking in many perspectives of environmental treatment. Carey is a violinist who has performed in Lincoln Center many times and despite playing Tchaikovsky’s and Beethoven’s symphonies, his favorite artist is Future. Carey’s favorite food is soup dumplings and favorite animal is the panda. Clara Michels is a third year student double majoring in Sociology and International Development. When she is not eating or sleeping, she likes to daydream about a greener and healthier future. Blythe Middlebrook is a second year student majoring in Economics and the Earth’s Environment, with a minor in history. She is interested in creating smart and sustainable cities and developing effective environmental policies. Tamara Mitchell is a fourth year International Development and Geography student minoring in Social Entrepreneurship. She is interested in food security and green commuting initiatives. In her spare time, she loves baking vegan treats and skiing in the winter, and in warmer months, biking to explore a different part of the city. Alexis Newman is a U2 student, completing a B.A. Honours degree in Environment and Development .She aims to spend her life working on the issues she frequently reflects upon, concerning food security, wildlife conservation efforts, sustainable urban development, and environmental policy. Ewa Nizalowska is a second year Political Science student with a minor in Environment. She is interested in the links between politics, law, and environmental thought. You can catch her biking to school in the most ridiculous of weather conditions or attempting to perfect the art of eating apples as quietly as possible in the silent section of the library. Grace O’Brien is a fourth year Environmental Science student specializing in Land Surface Processes and Environmental Change. She’s minoring in Politics, Law, and Society thus giving her an excuse to spend her time at the McGill Law Ping Pong table. Antonina Scheer is completing an honours B.Sc. in Environment with a concentration in Earth Sciences and Economics and a minor in English Literature. She is interested in research, legal work, and activism focused on transitioning away from the current carbon-intensive, extractive economy that so often violates the rights of Indigenous and other marginalized peoples. She also wrote the piece “Socio-Environmental Impacts of Conflicts Caused by Hydroelectric Development on the Río Chiriquí Viejo” for this issue. Sevrenne Sheppard is a fourth year student in Environment, Economics, and Urban Systems Geography. You can find her daydreaming about building happier communities, healthier environments, and more inclusive economies. Emma Sutherland is a third year Environment student in Biodiversity and Conservation with a minor in GIS and Remote Sensing. She enjoys learning about wildlife and dreaming of a world where effective policy and community-based conservation are widespread. You will likely find her creating yet another unnecessary knitted accessory, sharing an unsolicited animal fact or rambling nostalgically about her semester in Panama. Scarlett Xiao is a first year student majoring in Biology and Computer science. She is particularly interested in topics revolving around sustainability and the loss of biodiversity due to human activity. If she is not stressing over finals, you will most likely find her trying to finish a puzzle or watching a random documentary. Charlotte Zaininger is a fourth year Urban Systems major and Sociology minor. She has a passion for urban planning, design, and art. She is very concerned about climate change and hopes to use her education to mitigate its social effects. She is also obsessed with movies and enjoys taking photographs in her free time.

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