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CONTENTS
10
EDITORIAL SNAKE EYES ROLLING THE DICE WITH IRAN SINS OF GENERATIONS PAST WHY THE IRAN ACCORD MAKES SENSE THE IRONY OF REVOLUTION JCPOA AS YOUTH COERCION TOOL IN IRAN A LEGAL & CYBER MINEFIELD AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASPIAN REGION FOR MEMBERS ONLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CASPIAN SUMMIT’S FOREIGN MILITARY BAN A CASPIAN QUASI-KHANATE DAESH, WAHHABISM, AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISTRACTION AZERI JANUS BAKU BALANCING BOTH EAST AND WEST POPPIES AND POWER FIGHTING DRUG ADDICTION IN A POST-NUCLEAR IRAN KURIL ISLANDS RESOLVING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE FAR EAST
THE CASPIAN PROJECT A WEEKLY EDITION FROM THE MODERN DIPLOMACY
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PROJECT TEAM DiMiTRis GiAnnAkOPOulOs DR. MATThEw CROssTOn PETRA POsEGA TEJA PAlkO luisA MOnTEiRO ninA lAvREnTEvA GAbRiElA PAsChOlATi DO AMARAl bRiAn huGhEs TAylOR MORsE JEAnETTE JJ hARPER DiAnnE A. vAlDEz EvAn ThOMsEn zR JOshuA PATTERsOn PAulA MAlOTT sTACEy COTTOnE MEGAn MunOz ChRisTOPhER whiTE AMy hAnlOn
editorial
T
he Caspian Project has already hit its tenth issue. This milestone is marked by a deep and probing analysis of not just the Iran nuclear accord but the subsequent chaotic reactions to it and the possible geopolitical trajectories that may play out moving forward into the future. If anything, The Caspian Project shows how the world really is still trying to work what to ultimately think about the accord and how Iran proceeds from here with it. For every hopeful voice that wishes to see the accord lead to a reintegration of Iran into the global community (and thus setting the process for a changed and perhaps even democratically developing country) there are several more that are fearful and worried, intent on viewing Iran only through diplomatic glasses tinged by suspicion and mistrust.
What the contributors to the present issue show are that there are intriguing and compelling arguments fueling both perspectives. Indeed, this is the nature of global affairs and geopolitics: the angles and agendas are always multiple, sometimes counter-intuitive, and in unfortunate cases utterly contradictory. It seems the way the accord is so far being interpreted around the world gives credence to all three possibilities. Which of course means the immediate future in the great Persian kingdom is going to get just that much more interesting. For if The Caspian Project stands for anything at all, it is to open up to the world the understanding that international relations often likes to talk boldly in black and white terms, in assigning ‘good’ and ‘bad’ designations to this side or that, while the true reality of the global stage is much more complex, nuanced, and difficult to attain certainty. In such a cloudy and ambiguous environment the one true need is a reliable source for information. Not something trying to cajole or coerce, but simply expose and reveal. The contributors in this special issue, even when taking a side, have tried to remain faithful to this larger objective.
Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston ProjeCt DireCtor Bellevue university, oMaha, ne, usa
I sincerely hope this issue proves as thought-provoking and positively surprising to all of our devoted readers as previous editions have been, if not more so. This region of the world, given the players sitting around this Caspian table, is always going to remain critically important far beyond its geographical borders. It is why we all here at Modern Diplomacy find it so fascinating and why it was so important to create The Caspian Project to begin with. One thing is certain: when studying this region of the world you will never ever be bored.
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SNAkE EYES ROLLINg THE DICE WITH IRAN
In lIght of the Recent nucleaR accoRd with Iran it is worthwhile to consider how some have always argued there is no real inherent problem with Iran ultimately possessing a nuclear weapon. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze this position, proposing the notion that the world should take great concern over Iran’s ultimate possible entry into the “Nuclear Weapons Club.” This will be accomZR plished through a diverse review of topics, ZR is a full-time specifically the notion of Iranian proxies analyst who has and their affect in the world, that an Iranian worked with national bomb would not spark an arms race in the security issues for Middle East, and finally the belief that the almost 12 years. He is world could live with a nuclear-armed Iran currently completing as well as it has lived with a nuclear-armed his Bachelors of Science degree with Pakistan. (Conca 2014) the prestigious InterIran totes that its program is for peaceful national Security and energy and that no nuclear weapons proIntelligence Studies gram ever came out of a legitimate nuclear Program at Bellevue energy program. It is theoretically possible, University. Upon but not practical. Nations have tried, but graduation, he will even Argentina and Pakistan realized that if continue to provide professional support you want weapons, then you develop a to national security weapons program and pick one of the two issues and policies. traditional paths to the bomb.
And no one is fooled by an energy front anyway. However, the choice to develop a bomb will clearly require dedication and money, something to which Iran will soon have access because of the new accord. (Sagan 2010) So, to highlight this point, regardless of the deals struck between Iran and other countries regarding nuclear non-proliferation, Iran will be financially and scientifically able to create a weapon and use it to gain a clear upper-hand in any future negotiations. Then the world will have to also worry about other uses Iran might have for a nuclear weapon, specifically proxies. Mr. Pillalamarri notes that “while some Iranian proxies have committed terrorist attacks, those are few and far between, especially as the zealous phase of the Iranian revolution fades to more realistic concerns.
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THE CHOICE TO DEvELOP A bOMb WILL CLEARLY REqUIRE DEDICATION AND MONEY, SOMETHINg TO WHICH IRAN WILL SOON HAvE ACCESS bECAUSE Of THE NEW ACCORD Compared to its neighbor, Pakistan, which actually has nuclear weapons, Iran’s proxies have engaged in many more stabilizing activities rather than random terrorist attacks that accomplish nothing geopolitically.” (Pillalamarri 2015) I would argue that Iran’s proxies have been responsible for as much, if not more, negative impacts geopolitically than most nations that have sponsored terrorism. This global reach should cause deep concern over the possible development, down the road, of nuclear weapons. The U.S. State Department’s current concerns could not be made more obvious despite the current agreement: Iran has increased its presence in Africa and attempted to smuggle arms to Houthi separatists in Yemen and Shia oppositionists in Bahrain. Additionally, Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its regional proxy groups to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.
Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), although Hamas’ ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. Furthermore, the IRGC-QF, in concert with Hezbollah, provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device technology and other advanced weaponry On January 23, 2013, Yemeni authorities seized an Iranian dhow, the Jihan, off the coast of Yemen. The dhow was carrying sophisticated Chinese antiaircraft missiles, C-4 explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and a number of other weapons and explosives. The shipment of lethal aid was likely headed to Houthi separatists in Northern Yemen. Iran actively supports members of the Houthi movement, including activities intended to build military capabilities, which could pose a greater threat to security and stability in Yemen and the surrounding region. (U.S. State Department 2013) With such a sullied past and proven ties to terrorist activities on a global scale, the world should worry greatly over the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon and even worse, Iran’s geopolitical motivation in supplying proxies with such weapons.
Additionally, Mr. Pillalamarri notes that it is highly unlikely that the Middle East would go nuclear in response to an Iranian bomb. No Arab state has the industrial or technical capacity to build its own weapons. (Pillalamarri 2015) This idea can be easily argued against by looking at recent reporting out of Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have issued explicit warnings about Riyadh's intention to acquire nuclear weapons in the event Iran does. However, many analysts argue that such pronouncements are simply bluster aimed at drawing U.S. attention towards Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's nuclear program in the hopes of securing additional security assurances from the United States. (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2015)
So basically, if for no other reason, the U.S. should care about Iran getting a nuclear weapon because of the potential nuclear arms race it will spark, something the world should always fear. Lastly I would like to comment on Mr. Pillalamarri’s thoughts on how it “would not be a big deal if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. Like Pakistan, it would quickly come to terms with the limitations of such weapons. In fact, by bringing countries closer to the abyss, nuclear weapons make them more aware of the consequences of foolish actions. Pakistan, a more unstable and dangerous state than Iran, has nuclear weapons and the world does not do much about this.
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That suggests that we can also live with a nuclear Iran if that comes to pass in the future.” (Pillalamarri. 2015) Mr. Pillalamarri hung part of his argument on the fact that, “…Pakistan, a more unstable and dangerous state than Iran, has nuclear weapons and the world does not do much about this.” This feels similar to someone saying, well, “we let the other guy do it and it hasn’t turned out so bad so we really cannot protest someone else doing the same thing.” This is a rather reckless position on which to balance the lives of the millions of people residing across the Middle East that would likely be directly affected in very real ways by a nuclear Iran.
The development of a nuclear weapon by Iran would spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, specifically with Saudi Arabia, as well as put Israel on an extremely heightened and agitated state of military readiness. For those who still believe the nuclear accord does not go far enough to ensure Iran’s commitment to exclusively peaceful nuclear energy uses, this geopolitical concern does not seem like paranoia but more like logical realism given Iran’s track record on the diplomatic global stage. The accord is a risky roll of the dice by the West. Let us hope it doesn’t come up snake eyes.
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sIns of GeneratIons Past Why the Iran accord Makes sense
the Joint ComPrehensive Plan of aCtion (JCPOA) is a step in the right direction. The agreement takes place between Iran and six other nations, including the United States.
Joshua Patterson
It gives Iran approval to enrich uranium for civilian uses, while keeping in check its use for weapons development. The agreement also lifts several sanctions off of Iran that were arguably not having the desired effects, while leaving more vital ones in place. Given the shaky recent history of Iranian relations with the UN, the agreement is a calculated and smart plan of action towards overall peace. Through this plan, Iran is not economically crippled under sanctions and international tensions with Iran across the rest of the international community are eased as well. In recent years Iran has been under constant pressure from the international community over its enrichment of uranium and attempted development of nuclear capabilities. It’s possible that under such international pressure Iran could eventually have felt compelled to continue with its enrichment in secret.
Thus, while the JCPOA is arguably not a complete non-proliferation agreement, it doesn’t need to be in order to be effective and ultimately ease tensions on all sides long-term. Over the past thirty years, for example, the U.S. has been concerned mainly with stopping Iran’s support for terrorism and enthusiasm for nuclear power. Negotiations were always less than successful one-on-one, leading to the U.S. imposing crippling sanctions, with support from the international community coming later. But concern still remained on whether or not Iran was attempting to develop nuclear capabilities. Iran, for its part, was struggling under economic sanctions and nearly paranoid of possible U.S. attack or direct intervention. After all, one only needed to look on a map and see that the U.S. had attacked the country to the left of Iran (Iraq) and had attacked the country to the right of Iran (Afghanistan).
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any sort of MILItary InterventIon coULd have GIven Iran the LeGItIMacy It needed for deveLoPInG nUcLear WeaPons In secret Thinking Iran would be the final piece in a three-piece jigsaw puzzle of hard power geopolitics was not an entirely illogical concern for Iranian authorities. It was part of President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ lest we forget. Any sort of military intervention, however, could have given Iran the legitimacy it needed for developing nuclear weapons in secret. Israel’s attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor and supposed involvement in the Stuxnet attack in Iran is an example of this. The bombing led directly to Iraq developing weapons further and Iran becoming more convinced than ever it needed the strength of nuclear deterrence in its corner. The smart emphasis should have been on diplomatic engagement and negotiations, however, not on covert military actions alone. And sanctions, quite frankly, only postponed dealing with the real problems and poisoned the diplomatic space. Thus, the consequential silence between Iran and the U.S. was drawn out by decades and Iran’s nuclear situation remained at best murky and uneasy. With this agreement, both sides can work away from violence, mistrust, and suspicion and towards engaged diplomacy instead.
Although the sanctions imposed were an attempt by the U.S. to hamper Iran’s economy, and thereby hampering its nuclear and military capability, it only seemed to hamper the former while igniting the latter. Iran’s economy indeed suffered greatly, but its supply of arms to Syria and terror factions all across the Middle East were not stymied at all. Iran’s nuclear aspirations seemed not to have been greatly affected by sanctions either: On March 16, 2014, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation Vann Van Diepen said Iran was still ‘very actively’ creating front companies and engaging in other activity to conceal procurements and that Iran's activities had not changed since the old Joint Plan of Action (JPA) was agreed to. This implied that Iran had internal capabilities not dependent on trade that could continue nuclear research as well as develop conventional weapons and arm external groups, regardless of how severe sanctions became. In this way, the sanctions were not only NOT achieving their goal but perhaps even doing the reverse: hurting the people while giving them reason to support their own government instead of oppose it. Bijan Khajehpour, a political and economic analyst who was imprisoned in Iran, noted in 2009 how the nation was disappointed that in previous P5+1 negotiations the sanctions against it were not eased. However these sanctions were imposed partly because of Iran’s unwillingness to cooperate and openly limit its nuclear development. Now those two problems seem alleviated. Another positive upswing of the JCPOA is that the U.S. is not required to abandon its current sanctions against Iran in total. This includes sanctions for alleged human rights violations and terrorism support.
These sanctions will remain in place while various other sanctions regarding economy and trade will be lifted. Due to the oil embargo and banking sanctions, inflation in Iran rose nearly 50% in 2013. Unrest due to Iran’s rising food prices have also been on the rise. Across the board it has been the civilian sector which bore the brunt of the effects of such sanctions. And they are hard to justify with the lack of any evidence actually showing the intended goals of deterring nuclear and military capability, and ultimately deposing the theocratic regime, were even coming close to being accomplished. Thus, the JCPOA lifts the sanctions that were having ill effects that outweighed any alleged positive results, while implementing a program that will more effectively allow the international community to monitor Iran’s civilian nuclear development and keep it in check. Also built into the plan is a ‘snap back’ measure: if Iran is found in violation of the agreement, then the previous sanctions would fall back into effect.
This mechanism will last for ten years with the option to reinstate it for another five. If it is determined that Iran has violated its agreement, the five nations can take a vote to lift the resolution and Iran’s sanctions will ‘snap back’ within 30 days. It’s an effective deterrence measure, as it is in Iran’s best interest to not allow these sanctions to fall back into place. Its economy needs a chance to grow again. That is a far greater national security goal than trying to force its way clumsily into the global nuclear club. Thus, Iran’s cooperation is a chance for it to demonstrate compliance and a positive attitude towards the international community while being a fully responsible and engaged member of said community. This potentiality alone makes the JCPOA cause for buoyed optimism. It is a chance to create a new diplomatic space and conversation where the sins of generations past, on BOTH sides, don’t continue to constantly haunt the arena. And absolution of these sins was something long ago needed. WWW.ModerndIPLoMacy.eU the casPIan ProJect
the irOnY Of revOlutiOn JCPOA As YOuth COerCiOn tOOl in irAn
the reCently signeD Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China was barely completed and announced to the world when debates about its impact began.
Dr. Matthew Crosston
Paula Malott
As can be expected, much of the conversation since the announcement has been focused on Iran's nuclear program and whether this plan can prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the future. Formally speaking, the JCPOA leaves Iran enough capacity to still attain a nuclear weapon in the future should it decide to pull out of the agreement. But the question that must be asked, that we must keep in mind when discussing JCPOA, is this: What does Iran gain by signing the JCPOA? When one considers that Iran has expended a great deal of resources over previous decades on building up its nuclear program, there has to be a serious reason for it to give up its nuclear aspirations now. Iran has spent billions of dollars on building infrastructure: nuclear reactors, centrifuges, and facilities; attaining nuclear materials; and thousands of man-hours expended on uranium enrichment. So why after all that material, time, and man-power investment does Iran reverse course and agree to curb its nuclear aspirations?
The most obvious gain to the Iranian government and its partners in the JCPOA is the economic and geopolitical cascade eects of full Iranian reintegration into the global economy. Iran's economy has taken hits related to drops in the price of crude oil the last couple of years from over $100.00 a barrel to just above $50.00, as well as chronic strains on economic output because of sanctions imposed by the UN, the EU and the US. Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iran was OPEC's second largest oil producer with the fourth largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. Indeed, 80% of Iran's economy was based on its petroleum industry. Iran's economy was growing before the sanctions and it enjoyed a relatively low unemployment rate.
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Green MOveMent hAs AlWAYs been WOrkinG belOW the surfACe Of irAn's POlitiCAl sCene, PushinG fOr DeMOCrAtiC AnD sOCiAl refOrM As intended, these sanctions have had a devastating effect on the Iranian people over the last decade since their imposition. Iran's unemployment rates now hover in the low teens and 20% of its population lives below the poverty line. Iran would greatly benefit by a return to its pre-sanction economic output. For the European Union, Iran's return to the global market would offer it a welcome alternative to obtaining its natural gas supplies from someone other than Russia. Russia has used threats to shut off natural gas supplies to Europe to gain leverage in negotiations on the situation in the Ukraine. While much of Western Europe isn't 100% dependent on Russia for its natural gas supplies, it nevertheless must be very attractive to remove that threat leverage from future negotiations with Russia. So on this level the JCPOA has very little to do with joining or being prevented from joining the global nuclear club and much more about a return to what must be seen in Iran as its proper economic birthright on the global market and in the EU as a wonderful chip to work against the Russian Federation as concerns its own energy needs.
But as we continue to ponder the question of what Iran gains by signing the JCPOA, we must begin to look also at a less obvious and, at least in our opinion, more compelling reason for its sudden agreement to capitulate on a nuclear program now. It is Iran's demographics and the potential for political unrest related to its large youth population that can no longer be simply dismissed by the governing authority. Since the Ayatollah’s revolution Iran's population has doubled and nearly 50% of the population is now under 35 years old. Unlike previous generations, this youth population is well-educated, since earning a college degree was highly encouraged by the Iranian government since the revolution. Despite their education levels, the brute force and displacement of the economic fallout caused by sanctions has fallen squarely on this young and talented generation. Youth unemployment remains at nearly 25%, double the rate of other generations. The last time Iran had youth unemployment rates this high was in the decade prior to the revolution. The current regime is largely dominated by leaders who were youth members of that revolution. We find it hard to believe they themselves fail to recognize the strange similarities between the current situation and the 1970s, especially if they continue to ignore youth dissatisfaction. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was largely born within a restive youth population suffering from high unemployment rates that then partnered with other marginalized groups to overthrow the Shah and his US-backed government, which almost all sides had come to view as corrupt and ineffectual.
While the current youth dissatisfaction has no religious underpinning or charismatic single leader to powerfully unite them all, it is not illogical to think current progressive thinkers within Iranian authority see concern with all this displaced anger and wasted young talent. For recognizing that danger and trying to counteract it through the JCPOA, Iran has proven itself to be diplomatically cunning and adept. Keep in mind Iran had already experienced civil unrest from this demographic group. Following the 2009 presidential elections the Green Movement, which supported reform politicians in the elections, organized and led some of the largest protests seen in Iran since the revolution itself.
Hundreds of thousands of Iran's youth were in the streets protesting for political reform in the weeks following President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's reelection. While the government ultimately quelled the protestors, the sentiments expressed by the movement did not just melt away. On the contrary, the Green Movement has always been working below the surface of Iran's political scene, pushing for democratic and social reform. As the 2011 Arab Spring spread through neighboring nations, Iran's leaders had to notice the similarities to the Green Movement protests of 2009. They might have even worried that the base source for the Arab Spring may have been its own quashed Green Revolution.
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There had to be concern that the Arab Spring could create a ‘full circle’ effect, bringing revolution back to the place it all almost started three years before. In addition, the countries that had the largest protests and ultimately largest reforms were the countries that had similar demographics to Iran: high youth populations and high youth unemployment rates. During the Arab spring, leaders of the Green Movement organized street demonstrations that had nearly a million protesters on the streets of Tehran. The candidates selected by the Guardian Council in the 2013 election cycle also show that while the Green Movement is not as openly active they are still clearly on the minds of the ruling class: the eventual winner, while a conservative leader, has shown more willingness to enact reforms and engage the broader population across the country. The ultimate goal for Iran to join the JCPOA is rebuilding economic opportunities for its large youth population and hopefully redirecting it energies into building careers, raising families, and achieving stability and
prosperity. Prior to the JCPOA, with sanctions still firmly in place, those goals had to seem largely out of reach for many of the young members of Iran’s society. Again, the true diplomatic talent with the nuclear accord is in Iran recognizing what could be a boiling point for political dissent and with one deft stroke has attempted to turn that energy into an economic aspiration for the entire country. Once it gains economic prosperity for its youth population, while still trying to ensure political stability for its ruling class no doubt, it will be interesting to see if Iran will continue to follow the mandates set out for it under the agreement. Or will it choose to pull out of the agreement (as it has a right to do let’s not forget) and return to its quest for a nuclear weapon, only now with the stability and prosperity and LEVERAGE of being a fully integrated and quite possibly valuable piece of the global energy economic puzzle for the Western world. Who says global affairs isn’t full of irony in the modern day? The Iran accord proves this cynicism false.
Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University Paula Malott is a 2012 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue University's International Security and Intelligence Studies program. She is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor (Booz Allen) instructing Intelligence Analysts for the U.S. Air Force. She has also worked as an Arabic and Russian linguist and Intelligence Analyst for the USAF.
A LegAL & CYber MinefieLD An Overview Of the CAspiAn regiOn
control of the caSpian Sea has been highly sought after due to its abundance of natural resources. Nearly 3 billion gallons of crude oil are produced every day and 3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are produced every year.
Stacey cottone Stacey Cottone, a recent graduate of Bellevue University with a Master’s degree in Cybersecurity and Bachelor’s degree in International Security and Intelligence Studies, just completed an internship with the United States Department of State in Washington, DC.
It is estimated that there could be well over 48 billion barrels of crude oil and over 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that still remain to be discovered. Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan surround the Caspian Sea, each battling for the territorial rights to the land and seabed near each country’s borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Prior to 1991, only Iran and the Soviet Union controlled the Caspian Sea. The two countries had a series of bilateral treaties that equally divided the Caspian. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, created many challenges for both countries. For Russia the collapse of the Soviet Union meant losing valuable land and seabed rights of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Iran was faced with the challenges of competing with and negotiating with these new countries as well as losing its equally-shared rights of the Caspian with Russia.
The Caspian has been called a sea since its discovery in ancient times, but there has been much debate over the years whether the Caspian should be considered a lake rather than a sea. The rationale behind this debate is because a lake would be equally divided while a sea would not. Bilateral treaties between Iran and the Soviet Union dating back to 1921 called the Caspian a lake rather than a sea. Calling it a lake would specify that its waters and resources would only be divided by the surrounding countries. As a sea the United Nations Convention on the Seas would regulate the Caspian’s waters and resources, making them available to the surrounding countries as well as the international community. The equal division of the Caspian and renaming it a lake has been rejected by several of the littoral states and divisional agreements of the seabed still has not been reached. So the legal battle for the Caspian continues to quietly rage.
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it is nOt iMpLAUsibLe thAt A CYber-AttACk COULD DeterMine whiCh LittOrAL stAte COntrOLs the nAtUrAL resOUrCes AnD trAnsnAtiOnAL AgenDAs Of the CAspiAn Countries surrounding the Caspian Sea are not the only ones that have great interest in the sea’s natural resources. Individuals, international communities (U.S., China, Turkey, EU) and multinational corporations all have a financial interest or desire to invest, in addition to those that wish to utilize the Caspian’s natural resources, and are trying to wedge their own agendas into the process, adding fuel to the fire. It would seem that the territorial disputes could not be more complex, but now the nuclear deal with Iran could cause even more legal and geopolitical wrangling. The removal of international sanctions against Iran would once again allow it to export crude oil and natural gas. Iran could potentially join the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline that would connect with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, allowing Western Europe to receive natural gas from the Islamic republic and nearly bypass Russia completely. The removal of sanctions could thus be viewed as both beneficial and dangerous. These potential export developments with Iran could threaten the current revenue and natural resource funding for the other states surrounding the Caspian Sea.
Historically, during previous wars and battles near the Caspian, transportation problems with oil and natural gas cascaded into the world market. Problems included deliberate sabotage of pipelines, incidental destruction during the course of battle, and improper maintenance of pipelines due to fighting in the area. So it is clear that there is no Caspian conflict that can remain a purely parochial or local problem. It will always be innately transnational. Currently Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan produce the largest amounts of natural resources from the Caspian Sea. Russia has created a monopoly on the export of natural resources, as travelling through its country’s pipelines was the easiest and most cost effective way for the resources to reach their final destinations. Once Iran is allowed to export these natural resources again it is likely that they will receive substantial international investment to increase their production levels as well as create new pipelines. It is estimated that Iran possesses the second largest natural gas reserve in the world and could produce up 600,000 barrels of oil daily. All of this potentially makes Iran the largest producer of oil and gas from the Caspian, as well as providing new transportation routes that might massively disrupt the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. On the surface these changes for Iran may seem rather insignificant as the full breadth of potential power it will gain has yet to be seen. Iran could use this power to control others by withholding its natural resources or using them to influence other nations’ policies against it (in short, something like a mirror of the concerns presently being levied against Russia by the EU).
Skepticism surrounds its nuclear program as countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia view the program as a direct threat, no matter what accord has been signed. Countries who view the nuclear deal with Iran negatively may take actions into their own hands to prevent Iran from rising to its fullest potential prosperity and global integration. So the evolution of Caspian fallout from the Iran nuclear deal will likely soon show how much International Political Economy bleeds into global security concerns. Bilateral treaties guaranteeing physical security have been created between the littoral Caspian states. In 2007, the treaties specifically included declarations of non-aggression against one another. In 2014, at the Caspian Summit, the five Caspian presidents signed a declaration to guarantee security and stability in the region by only allowing the Caspian littoral states to have their armed forces present in the Caspian Sea and agreeing to not allow military forces of any other nation to enter the sea. No longer is physical security the only concern that must be taken into consideration, however.
The littoral states of the Caspian Sea, as well as the global oil and gas investors working with them, must take into account the potential for a cyber-attack. The emergence of a brave new dangerous cyber world with the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s facilities several years ago shows that Caspian security needs to move beyond expectations and definitions that are exclusively conventional. It is not implausible that a cyber-attack could determine which littoral state controls the natural resources and transnational agendas of the Caspian, especially if a serious attack like Stuxnet ever happens again. Such an attack could have devastating eects on the global community, not just the Caspian littoral states, as it is clear there is great hope from the United States all the way to China that the development of the Caspian region is something seen by all as a global economic and security priority. Thus is the nature of this fascinating region: a land full of promise and seen by many with great hope while also being laden with far too many potential minefields.
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for memBers only
The ConsequenCes of The Caspian summiT’s foreign miliTary Ban
Last septeMber brought with it major changes to the hotly contested Caspian Sea region. These changes were revealed at the IV Caspian Summit held on September 29th in Astrakhan, Russia.
Megan Munoz Megan Munoz is currently a graduate student at Bellevue University, Bellevue, Nebraska where she is earning a Master of Science degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program. She works as an intelligence analyst for the state of New Jersey, previously served as an intelligence analyst in the United States Air Force for 10 years, and remains a reservist.
Of the greatest significance was the unanimous vote by the “Caspian 5” (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) to no longer allow foreign military presence in the Caspian region and that all issues that were to arise would be solved between the littoral states only. The political declaration, according to an announcement by Vladimir Putin and signed by all five presidents “sets out a fundamental principle for guaranteeing stability and security, namely, that only the Caspian littoral states have the right to have their armed forces present on the Caspian.” Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani echoed this sentiment stating “there is consensus among all the Caspian Sea littoral states that they are capable of maintaining the security of the Caspian Sea and military forces of no foreign country must enter the sea.” The five further agreed to expand cooperation on the Caspian Sea in terms of meteorology, natural disasters, and environmental protection. The declaration also revealed clear formulations on the delimitation of the seabed with each country having exclusive sovereign rights to a 15 mile area.
This puts to rest an issue that had been contested since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new independent states. Apart from being a unique body of water in terms of its bio and ecological resources, the Caspian Sea comes with a massive amount of oil and gas reserves, an estimated 18 billion tons with proved reserves of four billion tons. These numbers put the Caspian Sea directly behind the Persian Gulf in terms of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves. This declaration also outlined many other projects in the works for this region – a major one being the joint construction of a railroad that would encircle the Caspian Sea, connecting key Caspian ports and cutting transportation time in half.
WWW.moDernDiplomaCy.eu The Caspian proJeCT
The signing of This agreemenT To Ban foreign miliTaries has Been The BiggesT game-Changer To Take plaCe in The Caspian over The lasT 20 years The five states also signed an emergency prevention and response agreement which called for joint efforts in responding to emergencies in the region. Additionally, plans were revealed for a joint emergency response exercise to take place in 2016 that will test the capabilities and partnerships between the nations and develop procedures of notifying and coordinating rescue units. Disguised underneath these projects, exercises, cooperation, and initiatives is a very real threat to the United States and NATO. Russia and Iran have long felt threatened by the possibility of a foreign military presence in the Caspian Sea and Moscow was determined to find a way to ensure it would not lose any more influence in the global energy sector (this in light of Europe slowly but surely diversifying away from Russian gas after the Ukrainian crisis began). The best way to do this was to bring these nations into the fold of Kremlin interests, while making them feel their own interests were also being served.
By strengthening relations in their own backyard Russia has been able to increase influence and gain back power in the region. Shutting NATO out of the region also significantly increases Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan’s dependence on Moscow in many different aspects. Another added bonus is that a clear alliance made up of Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, Ukraine (absent any ‘outsider presence’) would be comparatively easy to control. The effects of this agreement have already resulted in major changes to relations between Caspian nations and the United States. For years Azerbaijan has welcomed American-Azeri relations by stepping up logistical support for NATO operations in Afghanistan and even serving in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF, but relations have clearly cooled between the two nations. There were also serious talks between Kazakhstan and the United States for building a base on the border in Aktau that would cater to the needs of the United States and NATO troops, but since the signing of this declaration the project has been halted. Finally, the geopolitical shift in the region has resulted in the closing of the North route for NATO military equipment being sent to Afghanistan. Prior to this Caspian Summit agreement the United States had played an active role in helping Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan bolster their military defenses and develop their own navies. The maintaining of close relations in this region was of great political and strategic importance to the United States, not only due to its vast oil and gas riches (originally outside of Russia’s control) but its strategic location that connects it with many regions of Western interest.
Other ways that Russia has benefited from this deal include: the creation of a rapid response force unfurling along the Caspian Sea coast as a means to extend influence over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and its troops in the Armenian Gyumri base; jumpstarting cooperation with Giorgi Margvelashvili, the new Georgian Prime Minister; maintaining the ability to block Georgian and Azerbaijan pipelines; improving relations with Turkmenistan; beginning plans for building a pipeline with Turkey (named the Turkish Stream) out to Europe, which will compete with the Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline project (sponsored not coincidentally by the US, EU, and Azerbaijan). The United States has another reason to worry about being blocked from the region – Chechnya. In Azerbaijan, jihadists from the Jamaat (Community) Group are already operating and maintaining connections with Chechen Islamists, the Caucasus Emirate, and Syria’s Islamic State: the attack on Eurovision in 2012 and the murder of several Shiite clerics all carry their hallmarks. This insurgency is threatening to turn the region into one of the most ungovernable locations in the world where neither aggressive use of military/intelligence force (counterterrorism operations courtesy of Russia) nor engaged economic assistance has helped the situation. With the United States not being able to join together with forces in the region this threat will not just remain present but will likely only continue to grow. Arguably, the signing of this agreement to ban foreign militaries has been the biggest game-changer to take place in the Caspian over the last 20 years.
The West not being able to be involved in the region not only decreases energy development and security in the oil and gas-rich Caspian sea basin, but also wounds in several other respects: it reduces the ability to deter adversaries in the region against attacks; it weakens what were growing U.S. alliances; it allows Moscow to project its power over the other Caspian nations with little interference; it cuts o access to ports for deployments to the Middle East; it does not allow for responses to humanitarian crises in the region; and it does not allow for the U.S. to project its own power and reach as easily as it once did. All of these make the United States and NATO much weaker than before the Summit began. Round One in this heavyweight prize fight has clearly gone to the Russian bear. WWW.moDernDiplomaCy.eu The Caspian proJeCT
A cASpiAn QUASi-KHAnAtE DAESH, WAHHAbiSm, AnD tHE GEopoliticS of DiStrAction
in this artiCle i Will briefly outline how the history of this region, with its dominant religion of Islam, as well as its poverty and economic instability, develop and promote the possible spread of DAESH and the extension of the global jihad battlefield to the North Caucasus/Caspian area.
Christopher White Christopher White is an Undergraduate in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE. He currently resides in California and is a former Cadet of the California Maritime Academy
Throughout I will use disturbing supportive evidence that lends itself to the explicit understanding that Islamic extremism will continue to spread to this region, causing a new battleground to develop and likely bring Russia back more forcefully into the Caucasus with a renewed Slavic war against terror. The region of the North Caucasus and the area around the Caspian Sea has always been dominated by Islam. During the time of the Soviet Union, the extremist ideology of radical Islam was not popular within the region. During the reign of the Soviet Union, and towards the end of its collapse, religion renewed itself in force with the local population. With its downfall, the Soviet Union’s inevitable economic collapse resulted in local people looking for guidance and hope buoyed by religious faith, something often seen during times of massive political upheaval.
However, even after returning to the Islamic faith, the region was not able to lift itself out of the poverty brought about by the collapse of communism. Not only was there a wide ideological void left by the absence of communist thinking, poverty was not alleviated and in many parts of the region got severely worse. This structural desperation proved a fertile ground for the growth of extremist views, as separatist Islamic sects spread into the region. These extremists countered each negative attribute brought about by communism, such as corruption and indulgence, as a point of focus with which to channel population worry and concern into greater reliance on religious faith and the wisdom of subjugation to radical ideologies based on salvation and holy approval.
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tHE poSSibilitY tHAt tHE ExtrEmiSm of DAESH coUlD SprEAD tHroUGHoUt tHE cASpiAn SEA rEGion mAKES it So tHAt rUSSiA WoUlD loSE SomE of itS moSt importAnt trADE AnD EnErGY roUtES The resurgence of religious views in this region was matched by a global phenomenon: the Pew Research Center published a study putting into perspective how fast the spread of Islam was/is occurring worldwide and predicted that by 2050 Islam will have spread and overtaken the majority religion of Christianity by at least 1%. The projected outcome hypothesizes that Islam will double in population, even making up at least 10% of the population in Western Europe. Taking this information into consideration, the probability of the spread of more radical Islamic sects seems to be inevitable not just for the Caucasus region but worldwide as well, as fringe elements often piggyback onto the more moderate religious spread. (Islamic Daily Observing Media) Saudi Arabia stands out in this regard, having spent $89 billion in the past two decades alone toward propaganda with the intention of spreading Wahhabism to the region. This includes the distribution of Wahhabist textbooks to Islamic religious schools along with donations to prestigious universities in exchange for the placement of Wahhabist scholars into influential positions.
The money spent by the Saudis is put into stark perspective when you consider the Soviet Union only spent $7 billion TOTAL promoting communism across seven decades. (Winsor 2007) The majority of the Saudi propaganda money spent towards spreading Wahhabist ideals has not only been used in regions that are predominantly Muslim but have also been used in countries where poverty and political instability is prevalent. Converts, with few financial holdings, are being encouraged to send their children to Saudi Arabia to be educated free of charge. Seemingly, the North Caucasus region has had a political shift with the influx of such Wahhabist ideology as current militant groups seem bent on creating a second possible battlefield in the greater Caspian/Middle East region for global jihad. Ironically, the group benefiting the most from this emergence of Wahhabism in the Caucasus is DAESH. The possibility that the extremism of DAESH could spread throughout the Caspian Sea region makes it so that Russia would lose some of its most important trade and energy routes. However, Russia has so far been lax in taking preemptive steps to combat DAESH in the region or even in tracking Russian nationals who leave the area for the sole purpose of joining the DAESH cause in Syria and Iraq and ultimately the spread of global jihad beyond the Levant. Perhaps the crisis in Ukraine has blinded Russia to the possibility that a new DAESH war could be developing in the ashes just south of where the Chechen wars used to be. This geopolitical shortsightedness could cause grave problems for Russia’s Southern flank in the relatively near future.
Since the international community clearly does not support Russia's role and agenda in the Ukrainian crisis, it might be in the best interest of Russia to withdraw and refocus its attention to the Caucasus/Caspian region. The presence of DAESH and its slow growth in the region is a concern the international community would support Russia in fighting. It would be a unique potential opportunity for Russia to reorient its current bad standing with the West and find common ground with which all rational parties seem to agree: the spread of groups like DAESH has to be contained within the Levant currently and ultimately defeated. The international community is well aware of the actions and abilities of DAESH but has been reluctant so far to tie it explicitly to the Saudi form of Wahhabism. Regardless of the debate of whether DAESH Wahhabism is the same or a twisted subset of Saudi Wahhabism, the reality of its potential encroachment into the Caucasus/Caspian region should be a global security priority of the highest order.
The notion that the global jihad battlefield is just emerging might be playing down the true facts, which some can at least argue has already been established in the region. While it cannot be argued that it has taken root in the political power institutions of the region, the potential for just such a political development exists. Unfortunately, DAESH activity in the Levant has made the West largely miss this Caspian development, while continued crisis in Ukraine has made Russia also relatively oblivious to the threat. Hopefully in the near future, if the aforementioned crises cannot be resolved and contained, the West and Russia learn to start eectively multi-tasking their counterintelligence and anti-terror capabilities. Failure to do so could ultimately signal a failure to keep the Caspian region from becoming radicalized. A Caspian quasi-Khanate is a development that stands against all rational standards of civilization and modernity. WWW.moDErnDiplomAcY.EU tHE cASpiAn proJEct
azERi Janus
Baku Balancing Both East and WEst
Since itS trAnSition to independence, Azerbaijan has looked both east and west for its place on the world stage. Predominantly Muslim, Azerbaijan has no formal state faith and its constitution allows for freedom of religion.
Amy HAnlon Amy Hanlon is currently finishing her degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University and has been employed as a government contractor for the U.S. State Department since 2010. All views expressed within this piece are hers and hers alone and do not represent an official statement or policy from the United States government.
“Under the constitution, persons have the right to choose and change religious affiliation and beliefs (including atheism), to join or establish the religious group of their choice, and engage in religious practice.” (Religious Freedom Report, 2013) However, like other Middle Eastern countries, Azerbaijan’s laws targeting religion lead to fines, closures mandated by court decisions, police harassment, and the restriction of importing some religious literature (Ibid). Azerbaijan has used these laws to imprison and restrict the activities of religious groups that it considered ‘non-traditional’. Azerbaijan’s human rights record, at least as concerns real religious freedom, is thus tarnished. Several times this year the United States has called upon Azerbaijan’s government to respect the universal rights of all its citizens. (Daily Press Briefings, 2015) Yet Azerbaijan has continued to restrict religious freedom, freedom to assemble, and restrict and punish peaceful dissent. (Human Rights Report, 2015)
Previously, Western countries, while concerned about Azerbaijan’s human rights record, focused on the energy sector and Azerbaijan’s strategic location and willingness to provide NATO and U.S. forces a supply route to Afghanistan to fight the war on terror. Potentially a key transport hub from the region to Europe, Azerbaijan wants to peacefully promote oil imports away from Russian gas, hoping to double the flow to Europe and potentially transfer gas from Turkmenistan and/or Iran as well. (Farchy, 2015) However, with the potential for new gas now able to come from Iran directly (on account of the new accord) and with the American military drawdown in Afgha nistan, Azerbaijan’s strategic importance for the West has arguably waned. Investing in its Southern Gas Corridor project, Azerbaijan’s focus will shift in the immediate future to the slightly less grand need of transporting regional oil to the Mediterranean.
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With thE PotEntial foR nEW gas noW aBlE to coME fRoM iRan diREctlY and With thE aMERican MilitaRY dRaWdoWn in afghanistan, azERBaiJan’s stRatEgic iMPoRtancE foR thE WEst has aRguaBlY WanEd Yet with declining oil prices and the expensive funding of the pipeline, Azerbaijan will increasingly need to be looking for external investors. This has led to some increasing friction between Azerbaijan and Western nations on the promoting democracy and human rights fronts. (Kauzlarich, 2015) This is at least partially explained because of the following: Azerbaijan’s rightful belief in its own inviolable sovereignty; the conviction that it is following international law already; the suspicion that there is a double standard in how the West applies international law related to human rights and sovereignty (for example, the West’s support for Ukraine’s demand to return Crimea while refusing to support Azerbaijan’s plea to return NagornoKarabakh). In the midst of these changes, Azerbaijan participated in the IV Caspian Summit held in Astrakhan, Russia, on September 29, 2014. After this meeting both Russia and Iran spoke to the unanimous decision by the Caspian States on the inadmissibility of any foreign military presence. Both Russia and Iran have long sought to restrict Western influence in the region and highlighted in the agreement that regional militaries are fully capable of independently maintaining the security of the Caspian Sea.
According to a statement issued by Russian President Putin, “only the Caspian littoral states have the right to have their armed forces present on the Caspian”. His Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, added that “there is consensus among all the Caspian Sea littoral states that they are capable of maintaining the security of the Caspian Sea and military forces of no foreign country must enter the sea.” (Ibid) Yet, paradoxically and nearly immediately after the meeting, the United States and Azerbaijan reaffirmed their commitment to each other. First, on September 30, 2014, one day after the Caspian Summit, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said, "We maintain a strong security cooperation relationship with Azerbaijan, focusing on border security, counterterrorism, NATO interoperability, and its capacity to contribute peacekeepers to international missions. We do not anticipate the Caspian Five joint statement will change that.” (Daily Press Briefings, 2014) Additionally, in an interview to Bloomberg in December 2014, the Azerbaijani President`s Aide for Public and Political Affairs, Ali Hasanov, highlighted U.S.-Azeri bilateral relations: "The ties between Azerbaijan and the USA coincide both in terms of national interests and from the point of view of global international aspect, and are partner relations in nature. Today the relations between the two countries continue on main issues of mutual concern, including the global transnational aspect of cooperation and partnership. These are intensive mutual contacts. I believe that these factors will define the future trend of the ties between our countries.” (Alibayli, 2015)
However, Azerbaijan still strongly disagrees with the Western view that it has suppressed human rights and ignored international law. To Russia and Iran’s benefit, Azerbaijan therefore has a love-hate relationship with the West. While it plans to continue its focus on energy production and gas exports to Europe’s markets, Azerbaijan hates the aforementioned double standard. Yet that main energy focus on Europe also somewhat injures its positions with Russia, who is the main exporter of oil to Europe, and Iran, who will enter the market quickly with the approval of the nuclear deal and removal of some of the West’s sanctions. Currently, Azerbaijan is also dependent on Russia and Iran for grain. Vugar Bayramov, Chairman of the Center for Economic and Social Development, states, “given the fact that Azerbaijan’s population consumes more bread, products like grain and bread became strategic items for Azerbaijani government. Although Azerbaijan produced 2.4 million tons of grain in 2014, the quality of major part of the grain was not appropriate for baking industry.”
He noted only a few parts of the grain are appropriate for use in the baking industry, so Azerbaijan must purchase grain from neighboring countries, in particular Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran. “Although Azerbaijan has increased its grain production, the country practically depends on import in ensuring its domestic demand.” (Karimova, 2015) Thus Azerbaijan must look to the East and to the West, both as ally and adversary. Azerbaijan depends on Western energy markets and NATO training and coooperation. Yet, Azerbaijan similarly depends on regional cooperation to build it’s pipeline, transport gas, and provide security to the region. Thus, like the Roman diety Janus, Azerbaijan is a country of transitions – facing both east and west, to and from conflict, from its past with Russia and Armenia to its future with the West and Iran, its desire for a heightened place on the world stage remains constant. It is a delicate and ever-changing balance indeed that shows no sign in the near future of becoming less so. WWW.ModERndiPloMacY.Eu thE casPian PRoJEct
PoPPies AnD PoWer
Fighting Drug ADDiction in A Post-nucleAr irAn
WitH tHe sloW lifting of iranian sanctions, the government will have opportunity to utilize the benefits of a burgeoning economy. With its target of doubling oil exports in six months, it will expectedly expand energy infrastructure and further support international commerce.
However, with increased tax revenue from the sale of oil, Iran will finally be able to tackle one of the most prevalent problems in Iranian society today, largely hidden from the outside world: a deep and troubling addiction to illegal narcotics.
Brian HugHes
Brian Hughes is currently a student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.
Iran has slowly become one of the most addicted nations in the world. Although Iran’s official stance on usage rate is just over 2%, many studies have put that number closer to 6%, with nine out of ten being male. Ayatollah Revolutionaries once blamed the Pahlavi-era influences of Western culture for high usage rates, but with an ever-increasing rate of addiction in the new millenium, the addiction problem is now acknowledged as an issue of geography and geopolitics: close proximity to the poppy fields of Afghanistan and a painfully isolated economy. However, as sanctions gradually lift, the once small glimmer of hope for addiction prevention is now shining more brightly before the government.
President Rouhani will not only have to stand behind his formal anti-narcotic doctrine, but innovatively tackle a problem few countries in the region have successfully solved. The single most debilitating obstacle in Iran’s drug battle is the 936 km-long border shared with Afghanistan. On the other side of the border is a desolate and war-scarred landscape dotted with the pink and red sea of poppy flowers. Since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, poppy production has nearly tripled, leaving Iran to singlehandedly defend its borders from the staggering amount of illegal narcotics that spill across it. Each year hundreds of Iranian border guard conscripts die in confrontations with drug smuggling operatives. With Iranian prices for opium six times higher than in Afghanistan, those clashes will not quickly conclude and the seduction and temptation economically speaking to keep bringing narcotics into the country will remain high.
WWW.MoDernDiPloMAcY.eu the cAsPiAn ProJect
iF irAn Does not Act More holisticAllY to its ProbleM, then the DeMAnD For More Drugs coulD exPloDe into the countrY With this nucleAr AccorD The official Iranian stance toward drug smugglers detained at the border is one of severe punishment. Amnesty International has forecast that Iran will execute well over 1000 people in 2015, with over 80% of those for drug-trafficking convictions. Almost all are public hangings. While this method has not shown any effectiveness as a deterrent in drug use or trafficking, it has remained the only real policy for years. Iran accounts for 75% of the world’s opium seizures and 25% of heroin seizures. With a large conscription border guard force, Iran has been able to accomplish this while only spending 7% annually on drug prevention compared to what the United States spends. While poppy derivatives have skyrocketed since the beginning of the US invasion of Afghanistan, methamphetamine (known as ‘Shisheh’ in Farsi, or ‘glass’) has rapidly become a popular drug as well in the last several years. Thus, while Iran apprehends and seizes more drug traffickers and illegal narcotics than any other country, and rather brutally dispatches most of them, this has only led to an increase in amphetamine-type stimulants, which carry less risk than Afghan opium trafficking.
All of this is to the obvious suffering and detriment of Iranian youth and the unemployed. Over 20% of drug addicts in Iran have undergraduate college degrees, but many do not work. In the wake of repeatedly harsher sanctions the Iranians have repeatedly turned to illegal narcotics as a form of escapism in an economy that could no longer support them. While the government has tried desperately to end the drug flow into Iran, its attempts have ultimately failed and those that are addicted have little recourse. In this languished space of addiction, Iran has begun to establish hundreds of methadone maintenance treatment (MMT) programs in prisons and charities. However, these programs have also been irregularly funded as sanctions cut into essential budgets and those that were treated were released too quickly and therefore often relapse. Iranian MMT success rates have dipped to 25-30%, while developed programs around the world generally experience 60-90% success. While the population struggles with staggering addiction rates, the government has finally negotiated a lifeline for its economy. Not only will the lifting of sanctions eventually put youth and the unemployed back to work (albeit slowly and cautiously), the government will finally have the capital to improve its social works projects. This should begin with the immediate funding of additional MMTs and increased funding for those operating with extremely tight budgets. While additional border guards will certainly result with more seizures, the flow of drugs is ever-constant and nightmarishly difficult to contain. In addition, increased economic growth may come with increased disposable income. If Iran does not act more holistically to its problem, then the demand for more drugs could explode into the country with this nuclear accord.
Over half of the poppy produced in Afghanistan is grown in Helmand province, a region devastated by war and tribalism. In order for Iran to curb poppy growth, it must cultivate economic participation in this area when possible. While Iran may have little authority over Afghanistan at the present time, a power vacuum will be left in the wake of US forces’ continued long withdrawal. This could create a vacuum Iran might exert influence on to the benefit of its own national security. Iran should encourage the Afghanistan market for saffron, a product that can replace poppy fields and brings 3,000 to 6,000 USD per kilogram. If Iran can encourage, educate, and create a saffron export marketplace within Afghanistan, the potential is large for poppy replacement and reduced trafficking. Iran has been investing heavily in Afghanistan and, with newfound economic power because of reduced or removed sanctions, Iran can provide a market for legal Afghan products while continuing their draconian tactics toward drug trafficking. If Iran truly wants this development and influence, and it should, then it will need to attach stipulations to economic aid in the tragically corrupt Afghanistan. Thus, with the international spotlight now on Iran, it should use this as a fascinating side opportunity to show how it can engage and integrate into the global community on more than just an anti-nuclear platform.
If economic participation explodes and Iranians go back to work, the government will be wholly pressured to continue its move toward progression and Western cooperation. Similarly, if Iran breaks the nuclear accord and sanctions return, the population may finally experience its ‘Arab Spring’ moment and demand a regime change as it nearly did following the 2009 elections. In this tightrope act, Iran must strategically seize the present opportunity. While economic participation will put people back to work and Iranian oil will once again flow to levels that have not been seen since the Pahlavi-era, Iran must address this underground and pernicious societal problem. Iran carries the world’s attention at the moment. Unlike in years past, the attention is almost unanimously positive (aside from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and American Republicans, but that is another story for another day). Iran must not let this opportunity pass, for the cycle of drug use will only increase if it fails to be addressed. The nuclear deal, therefore, is about a lot more than just energy and power projection.
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KuRil islands
Resolving teRRitoRial disputes in the FaR east
a disPuTe over kuril islands is the reason why Russia and Japan still after more than 70 years have not signed a peace treaty to end the World War II. Could compromise about so long stagnating conflict which was so far discussed by Gorbachev, Yeltsin and also by Putin, be found this year during Russian planned visit in Japan?
The Kuril Islands lie north of Japan, and their status has been unresolved since 1945. Importance of Kuril Islands lies in strategic importance and access to Pacific for Russia. Importance of the Northern Territories lies also in its rich marine life, mineral deposits, gold, silver, titanium, iron and possibly offshore oil and gas reserves. National pride also plays an important role.
Teja Palko Defense Editor Teja Palko is a Slovenian writer. She finished studies on Master’s Degree programme in Defense Science at the Faculty of Social Science at University in Ljubljana.
Russia’s view is that Kuril Islands, called by Japan the Northern territories are legally part of Russia as a result of the World War II. The Yalta Agreement, signed by the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 1945 stated the Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union and since Russia is its legal successor islands are Russian. Russian official stance is that Japans territorial claim over Kuril Islands is not historical nor geographical supported. Russian officials have expressed their preparedness to negotiations and resolving the territorial dispute.
Kremlin considers the Northern territories to be the price Japan payed for Second World War. Russia also points to the Treaty of San Francisco as justification of ownership, which gave them right of occupation not annexation. Japan’s view on four disputed islands Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, Habomai islands which also have two names, one Russian and the other Japanese, differs from Russian. Disputed islands were annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of the WW II. Japan points out the Treaty of Shimoda – the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation from 1855, which defines the border between countries as a line running through the Vries Strait, between the islands of Iturup and Urup is a keystone in Japan’s claim of ownership.
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KReMlin ConsideRs the noRtheRn teRRitoRies to be the pRiCe Japan paYed FoR seCond WoRld WaR
In 2010 when Dimitri Medvedev, as a first Russian leader to visit the islands, visited disputed islands sharp criticism from Japan began and temporary called its ambassador back from Russia. Their official stance is that Russia should return all four islands to Japan. In 2009 Japanese parliament adopted a law stating the Southern Kuril Islands are Japanese territory unlawfully occupied by RusThe Treaty of Saint Petersburg signed in 1875 sians. All agree that territorial issues should gave Japan sovereignty over the entire Kuril be settled by a peace treaty. Islands in exchange of relinquishing its claim to Sakhalin Islands. Japan and United State With many international agreements and claimed that the Yalta agreement did not peace treaties between the Japan and Russia apply to the Northern territories because and before Soviet Union Robert A. Collins has they are not a part of the Kuril Islands. Pots- in his paper in 2013 examined The Russodam Declaration from the same year does Japanese Dispute over the Ownership of the not explicitly include the Northern territories, Southern Kuril Island and concluded that scibut in the phrase that Japanese sovereignty entific evidence and legal evidence justify shall be limited to the four major islands and Russia’s claim to all of the Kuril Island chain, “such minor islands as we determine” is including the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. today used to justify the Japan sovereignty He has summoned up that Japan in highly over the islands. In 1951 Japan signed The unlikely to sign a peace treaty with Russia. Is San Francisco Peace Treaty, which states that he right? Japan must give up all claims to the Kuril Islands, but these four islands were not men- Broader region is also changing as a result of tioned since by Japan opinion has never regional competition. Military Balance by Inbeen part of the Kurile chain. The peace ternational Institute for Strategic Studies retreaty, however, did not grant a non-signa- vealed that Russia ranked third on scale of tory country – Russia any rights. Since the top defence budgets (in billions of US dollars 1960s country claimed all four islands to be spend for defence) for the year 2013 and Japanese territory. Japanese authorities op- what is surprising is that Japan is very high pose to any trips by Russian officials to these on the scale on seventh place. Regional comislands. We have seen many protests and not petition and rival are seen among nations in Asia. only on the Northern Territories Day.
China has raised concerns about Japan defense budget and questioned if Japan was abandoning it’s exclusively defence policy based on peace constitution that was signed at the end of the World War II with which country, gave up the right to wage war and was forbidden of use of force to settle international disputes. Japan plans for defense spending for fiscal 2015 was set to 42.1 billion dollars or about 329 dollars per capita, which is the highest largest military budget since WWII and three times larger compered to China. Reason is also territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Based on the World Bank Russia military expenditure as a % of GDP are 4.5 and rising and Japan 1% stagnating. Recent events regarding the relationship between countries are Russia’s prime ministers Dmitry Medvedev intentions to visit archipelago that includes Japanese claimed islands. A senior official in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement “If Russia wants to improve relations with Japan, it should restrain its actions”. Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida has also sent a request to cancel the visit. The date of the visit is unknown, but the purpose, official Russian statement, is to bolster border security and installation of military and civil infrastructure on the islands. Russian government revealed a program to develop southern Kuril Islands or Northern Territories called by the Japanese.
Japan and Russia are trying to build and strengthen their relationship with economic cooperation. We have seen many statements and intentions made publicly which are not helping to reach the goal of cooperation and solution of so long lasting territorial dispute that is not going to solve itself over time. It looks like backward solutions are not working so new narrative should be found. The territorial dispute should not be resolved separately but within the broader concept. Maybe some guaranties should be made because Japan is afraid the scenario that happened in the Crimea could also happen in the Kuril Islands. We are still waiting for the right solution that could solve the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan and could lead to increased cooperation between the countries. Agreement and solution between Moscow and Tokyo has yet to be reached and question of the rightful owner has to be answered.
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