The Caspian Project 15 by Modern Diplomacy

A NEW GREAT GAME IN THE CASPIAN NATO AND RUSSIAN COUNTERMEASURES TROY BAXTER WHY RUSSIA WON’T GIVE UP THE BOMB SARAH NOLDER

CLEANING UP AN AMERICAN MESS DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON NOT JUST ABOUT ASSAD EXPLAINING THE RUSSIAN-IRANIAN AXIS IN SYRIA JEANETTE “JJ” HARPER A STRUGGLE IN SHADOWS THE FIGHT BETWEEN A NEW AND OLD IRAN STEPHEN SARTY

CONTENTS OUTFLANKING IRAN THE SALMAN CANAL PROPOSAL EVAN THOMSEN THE DAESH CIVIL GOVERNANCE BLACKHOLE IRAQ, IRAN, QUDS, AND KURDS BRIAN HUGHES

HOW INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS HELPED PUTIN AT HOME LAURA GARRIDO THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIAN SANCTIONS VLADISLAV LERMONTOV RUSSIA: TIME TO FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN AFRICA KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH

THE CASPIAN PROJECT BI-WEEKLY DIGITAL EDITION Dimitris Giannakopoulos Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief Dr. matthew Crosston The Caspian Project, Director

proJeCt team

www.moderndiplomacy.eu Caspian@moderndiplomacy.eu

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The Geostrategy Issue

T Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

he word ‘geostrategy’ can be quite the buzzword for political analysts. In fact, the word tends to be both overused and misunderstood. When a state has global power already or is striving to obtain such power, it crows about the need to be geostrategically prudent, to properly drive its geostrategic interests forward. What often gets lost in the noise of such grand statements is how geostrategy is ultimately a dangerous game usually set in zero-sum: the obtainment of one country’s objectives is often to the detriment of another’s. Ensuring the security of one state always seems to end up being perceived as the lessening of security to another state. What this issue of The Caspian Project shows in detail is how rich and healthy the famed ‘Security Dilemma’ of International Relations still is in the 21st century. Whether this fact is something to rejoice in or cower in fear from is left for the devoted readers of CP to decide individually. If anything, these articles enclosed show how diﬃcult that determination can be.

This issue will address a wide diversity of geostrategic considerations, covering important topics ranging from Syrian intervention to Russian sanctions to domestic reactions to such sanctions to NATO eastward expansion to old-school nuclear deterrence considerations. All of them, without exception, deal with geostrategy and its importance in the considerations of modern states on the global stage. Most intriguingly for those of us at Modern Diplomacy is how geostrategy is always a wildly ‘grey’ area of engagement: it is not always so easy, once you scratch away the surface, to readily determine which actors where the ‘good guy hats’ and ‘bad guy hats.’ Indeed, what should be fascinating to the readers of CP is exactly what diplomats and analysts find so maddeningly frustrating: the diﬃculty in determining issue parameters, and the battle to measure short-term interests against long-term ones, is often why conflicts remain so steadfastly enflamed. Indeed, in this issue readers will also get to see the insidious side of geostrategy: some of that frustration is done purposely, as there is much to be gained by many states when the rules of the game remain shrouded in confusion and conflict rages on with no real end in sight. As always with The Caspian Project, we honor the intellectual tradition of shedding light for the sake of shedding light: judgment is left to the reader and no agenda or personal axe to grind is found within its pages. While some may find that frustrating in its own way, we believe it is the best way to expose these complicated topics to our inquiring readers. Enjoy!

NATO ANd RussiAN COuNTeRmeAsuRes

A New GReAT GAme iN The CAspiAN

TROY BAXTER Troy Baxter is currently a Master’s Student in Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies Program in Omaha, Nebraska. He received his Honours Degree in Criminal Justice and Public Policy from the University of Guelph in Ontario, Canada in 2013.

ussia has worked diligently to keep NATO from entering its perceived geostrategic territory, even if that comes at great personal cost to the nation, which it has on a number of occasions. Russia’s latest move to block NATO’s entrance into the Caspian region came after it led other littoral states to sign a declaration guaranteeing stability and security in the region. The presidents of the five Caspian states signed the political declaration, which ensures that only the Caspian littoral states have the right to maintain an armed forces presence in Caspian territory. This effectively shuts NATO out of the area and prevents it from establishing any foreign base of operations in the foreseeable future. The issue to consider: how much does this matter and why? The most interesting aspect in this scenario is the change in political favor by some of the Caspian states.

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Azerbaijan in particular has been a strong strategic energy partner with the US and Europe since its separation and subsequent independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The country possesses a wealth of natural gas and oil riches that have continuously gone westward. This is partly a strategy of Western desire to purchase oil from Azerbaijan in place of Russia, as it eﬀectively keeps the money out of Russia’s oil economy. This is why it is of particular interest that Azerbaijan is now siding more closely with Russia on a declaration that would eﬀectively keep its Western economic allies out of the area. Aside from Azerbaijan’s strong economic ties to the West, it has also contributed some logistical support to the international security assistance force in Afghanistan. Thus, at one point in time both its security and economic interests aligned with that of the West.

The CAspiAN deAl demONsTRATes ThAT RussiA is pROACTively CReATiNG A buffeR zONe Of eCONOmiC ANd sTRATeGiC pARTNeRs ThAT will be miliTARily depeNdeNT upON iTs miGhT For Azerbaijan to side with Russia on the declaration would seem to fly in contradiction to what the nation has been doing for the past two decades: cultivating a Westernleaning relationship.Azerbaijan appears to have voluntarily put that relationship in jeopardy, or at the very least placed it in a more stressful situation than before. One could even argue that Azerbaijan missed a glorious opportunity to ally itself closely and personally with NATO by having a foreign operating base established within its borders.

This could have led to an expansion in economic trade first and foremost and could even have cultivated further security coordination and cooperation. It seems likely this is NATO’s long-term desire. However, this was precisely what Russia was aiming to prevent by leading the Caspian states to sign the declaration. Russia has no interest in having NATO encroach further onto its geostrategic territorial influence. Aside from the residual Cold War tensions that still exist between the US and Russia, there is also a tangible security concern for Russia: the West has already advanced further east than Russia would like or can tolerate. What first began as an exclusively Western European treaty has gradually spread further and further east to the point where nations such as Turkey are being actively courted to join the organization. In fact, Turkey was very close to joining NATO recently. However, there is some evidence to suggest that Russia intervened with those talks and ultimately succeeded in putting them down. Its actions in Azerbaijan can be seen as a preemptive strategy, utilizing what it learned observing NATO’s courting of Turkey. For Russia, the idea is to get out ahead of NATO and foster a relationship between it and the Caspian states, thus mitigating NATO’s objectives to advance further east. Thus, NATO penetration into the east has been put on hold for the time being. Russia’s obvious desire to keep the US in particular away from its eastern and southern borders weakens the likelihood of NATO penetration in the area. This could mean that in the future Caspian nations are tied to Russia more deeply, particularly as it concerns security and other military activities. The main takeaway from the Caspian summit is that Russia is now the main military force in the area.

It is without a doubt the most powerful of the five Caspian states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran). In fact, Russia’s military is more powerful than the rest of the Caspian states combined. Russia has eﬀectively assumed control over the Caspian region so far as international security and military deterrence is concerned. However, some concessions were made by Russia in order to achieve this end. The belief is that Russia would rather make minor economic concessions to the Caspian states rather than allow major security concerns to arise by not making such compromises. Though it would seem that NATO has hit some serious resistance in its drive to expand east, with failed initiatives in Turkey and now the Caspian region, NATO is undoubtedly still looking to push east for both economic and military reasons. NATO is not pushing simply to intrude on Russian borders, however. Though it would give the alliance a significant strategic advantage to be able to set up a base of operations that could also fall under a missile defense plan, allowing them to install missiles closer to Russia, there are still a number of economic reasons for NATO to continue its drive east. Ironically, though this deal may have squashed NATO’s strategic goals of intruding on the Caspian area in the short-term, it may have opened the door for further oil pipelines to be built in the long-term which could benefit NATO allies. One of Russia’s main concessions was to help build a north-south corridor linking Western and Northwestern Europe to the Caspian basin, making the shipping route considerably shorter in the process. This would be expected to lead to some economic stimulation primarily for Caspian nations but also some Western states by extension. Russia is keen to protect its geostrategic border areas, even if that comes at some economic cost to itself.

The Caspian deal demonstrates that Russia is proactively creating a buﬀer zone of economic and strategic partners that will be militarily dependent upon its might. So far the Caspian region is the only real success it has had toward that end, as Turkey has remained independent from complete Russian influence. While this should not have any major impact on NATO and its current operations in Western Europe, it will mean that NATO needs to find a new angle for entry if it wishes to keep pushing eastward. What this brief analysis hopefully shows is how that push will likely always be met by Russian resistance and not entirely without solid geostrategic logic that encompasses not just military objectives but long-term economic ones as well. A new game is afoot in the Caspian, still shrouded in the trappings of military garb but really more about the soft power of economic clout.

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Why Russia Wonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t Give up the BomB

SARAH NOLDER Sarah Nolder is a Master’s student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska. She works for the United States Air Force as an Intelligence Analyst and is stationed in Tuscon, Arizona.

hile the United States emphasizes reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation continues to stress the importance of its nuclear arsenal in its national defense strategy. In order to provide a better understanding of the establishment and development of Russian nuclear doctrine, it is important to understand the events which prompted and contributed to the conception of the doctrine as developed. The Soviet Union’s nuclear activities began basically as intelligence collection and research against the United States, spying on its nuclear activities. When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in WWII, nuclear research was all but suspended. “It was intelligence relating to the Maud Report in the United Kingdom, and concerns that Nazi Germany had an atomic project, that eventually led to the reestablishment of soviet nuclear research in 1943.”

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The dropping of atomic bombs on Japan by the United States prompted the Soviet Union to accelerate and emphasize its nuclear weapons program. After the end of Stalin’s regime the Soviet military took control of the weapons program.

Russia and the united states have tWo sepaRate nucleaR ideoloGies – While the u.s. pRoclaims to advocate foR less Reliance on nucleaR Weapons, the Russian fedeRation pRomotes theiR impoRtance in its militaRy stRateGy At this point, both the United States and Soviet Union realized the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons and neither wanted to use them in war as an active strategy of first resort. Despite this, the Soviets understood the advantages that the possession of nuclear weapons gave them and used them to try and achieve military and diplomatic objectives. Beginning in the mid1960s, the United States proposed a freeze on the number and type of US and Soviet strategic nuclear vehicles, the amount of which would be negotiated with the Soviet Union. This first attempt at the regulation of nuclear weapons failed. It was launched on a multilateral forum, at the Geneva-based EighteenNation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), and failed because the US stockpile far exceeded that of the Soviets, so the Soviets refused to be party to the talks. In 1966-67, the United States and Soviet Union began nuclear talks about the deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses, strategic oﬀensive and strategic defensive weapons.

The result of these talks was the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Both the United States and Russia today are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s objective is to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.” The NPT entered into force in March of 1970 and 190 countries are now signed on to it. In 1995, at the Review and Extension Conference, the treaty was extended indefinitely but is still reviewed every 5 years. Shortly after the NPT entered into force the Soviet Union and the United States began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), which ended in 1972 with the production of two treaties dealing with offensive and defensive arms: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty placed limits on national missile defense systems. The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was to limit the amount of Strategic Offensive weapons on both sides of the conflict. It was only designed to be in place for five years, as a complement to the ABM treaty. SALT II followed SALT I and reduced the amount of strategic delivery vehicles to 2,250 for both sides. Both sides honored the treaty until 1986, when President Reagan declared that the Soviets had violated the treaty.

One of the last treaties regarding nuclear weapons signed before the fall of the Soviet Union was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, which removed the entire category of weapons, nuclear and conventional, with ranges of 500km-5,000km for both the United States and the Soviet Union. START I was followed by START II, and though it was signed in 1993 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, START II never went into force, due to Russian concerns about the United States’ withdrawal of the ABM treaty. START II aimed to limit the amount of warheads to between 3,000-5,000 warheads for each country. Work on START I and II paved the way for the Strategic Oﬀensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in May 2002, which demanded that each side reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012.

The main strategic defense planning document for the Russian Federation on the heels of this nuclear history is the 2010 Military Doctrine. This doctrine states that “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat. ” The 2010 Military doctrine was amended in 2014 to include a section about conventional weapons threatening the existence of the state, but the Minister of Defense at the time, Igor Sergeyev, assured that the condition didn’t change the overall intent of the doctrine. According to Article 22, the 2010 Military Doctrine is only retaliatory, not preventive.

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The wording of this section of the military doctrine mirrors that of the U.S., British, and French nuclear strategies during the Cold War, which allowed for a first-strike nuclear attack. In actuality, Russian doctrine was changed to allow for a first-strike only in the early 1990s. Though some interpret this new clause to be aggressive, Dvorkin gave an alternate and astute interpretation in that ‘the unchanged conditions for nuclear weapons use and the description of their role in ensuring Russia’s and U.S./NATO security fifteen years after the end of the Cold War reflects the fact that the principles of mutual nuclear deterrence have not been altered, although these principles are useless in counteracting new challenges and threats.”

Russia and the United States have two separate nuclear ideologies – while the U.S. proclaims to advocate for less reliance on nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation promotes their importance in its military strategy. In addition to new rhetoric, Russia has increased eﬀorts to improve the capability of its nuclear arsenal, in an attempt to try and keep up with the capabilities of the United States.This disbalance has always been a major sticking point for the Russian Federation: it thinks it is easy (and insincere) for the United States to proclaim the ‘lack of reliance’ on nuclear weapons when the US easily outpaces all countries around the globe in terms of nuclear quantities.

It means, to the Russians, that the Americans are ‘diplomatically aggressive’ about nuclear restraint while knowing it has a secret hammer hidden behind its back if ever necessary. A hammer that is far bigger and heavier than everyone else’s hammer. The strategic nuclear policies of Russia and the United States are subject to change as time goes on and the security situation changes. Despite their long history of attempting to regulate nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia continue to alter their nuclear strategies to account for changes in the international security environment and changes with their political relationship with each other.

Russia will continue to emphasize the importance of its strategic nuclear weapons to provide for the defense of the Russian Federation, as it continues to be distressed at how much the United States outpaces all others in terms of nuclear holdings. Proclamations of peaceful intent are always moot to the Russians when they can physically quantify the destructive power of the adversary’s arsenal. Deterrence may indeed be a good thing. But absence of nuclear capability is far safer to Russia than absence of malicious intent. This is the area of engagement, an attitudinal one, which the United States needs to do a much better job of when it comes to working with the Russian Federation.

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Cleaning Up an ameriCan mess

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

he recent appearance of Russian President Vladimir Putin before the UN was a command performance for any Western analyst who wants a deeper and more brazen access to Russian global aďŹ&#x20AC;airs thinking. The traditional mistake made, by Americans most certainly, is to dismiss Russian argument as nothing but crying over spilt geostrategic milk: in short, since Russia lost the Cold War and lost its beloved communist system, it cannot stop diplomatically whining about the victor. While there is no doubt that there have been over the past two and a half decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union some examples of resentment by the Russian government over its fall from grace oďŹ&#x20AC; of the bipolar world stage, it would be reckless and unwise to permanently paint Russian diplomacy with the bitterness brush. American political recklessness can indeed be found just as much, if not more than, examples of Russian diplomatic petulance.

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Indeed, some of the more memorable quotes from Putin’s speech are in fact ideas he has spoken openly about for the past decade: "After the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world, and then those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think they were strong and exceptional, they knew better."

The problem is ThaT ameriCa never TrUly aCTively CommiTs, bUT raTher ‘half-CommiTs’ To iTs inTeresTs. This is whaT resUlTs in The Chaos "An aggressive foreign interference has resulted in a brazen destruction of national institutions . . . Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress, we got violence, poverty and social disaster. Nobody cares a bit about human rights, including the right to life." "We are all diﬀerent, and we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the right one." The problem in all of this, of course, is that the United States will adamantly defend its good intentions in each and every case of foreign intervention and/or pursuit of its national interests on the global stage. Ironically, Russia has been the only country to date that accepted the American right to behave in this manner but only if that right was granted as a universal reality of global affairs and power disbalance.

And that is where the United States and Russian Federation have always wildly disagreed. I have written many times before, much to the chagrin of my American colleagues, that on this one point at least logic and consistency side more heavily with Russia’s argument. Anyone who studies international relations knows well the internal philosophical dilemma between politics as they are versus politics as they ought to be. Think of it as Locke and Rousseau fighting against Hobbes and Machiavelli. Russia openly and unabashedly accepts global affairs as being the exclusive realist domain of Hobbes and Machiavelli: life is brutish, nasty, and short, and the preservation of power is not moral or immoral but rather an amoral pursuit that is simply about capability and eﬀective strategy. Before you think that means America sits squarely on the side of Locke and Rousseau, on the side of freedom and civil liberty, think again: America has always been equally ready to recognize the nastiness of foreign aﬀairs and the deviousness that is sometimes required to get a mission accomplished. But America is just about the only country on earth that can recognize that reality while simultaneously proclaiming itself and its own behaviors as somehow above such realist ends-justifying-the-means gamesmanship. Welcome to what drives the Russian diplomat absolutely insane with incredulous frustration. Russia (and to a lesser extent China) has always dismissed this inconsistency. In fact, some might argue Russia has been somewhat gleeful in pointing this hypocrisy out. This was exactly what was happening this past week at the UN with Putin’s speech. The Russian President basically stood back from the podium, symbolically spread his arms out wide, and with a Cheshire cat grin, declared to the world watching: So, America, are you happy now?

Are we ready to get serious about cleaning up these messes now? While most of America has been critiquing the Russian presence in Syria as just a cheaply-veiled attempt to keep Assad in power while supposedly trying to do damage to DAESH, Russia looks on bemusedly and says, ‘ah, yeah, exactly. What’s your point???’ After all, it was over three years ago that Russia publicly said the removal of Assad from Damascus might not be all that America was cracking it up to be: the ‘rebel alliance’ seemed to be a fractured and disorganized band of miscreants. While some were true rebels aiming to topple a decrepit regime with the democratic experiment that had been washing over the Middle East in general with the Arab Spring, there were plenty of others who were crossing secretly over the border from Turkey looking to help radical Islamists fill what could be an expected power vacuum.

Russia will always be worried about radical Islamists on its southern flank. The fact that this happened to be taking place in a country whose leader was politically-aligned with Moscow just made the decision-making calculus simpler. Thus, when America lobs an accusation that Russia isn’t fighting DAESH but supporting Assad, Russia with complete sincerity responds that it is openly and unashamedly doing BOTH. The only country in the world more afraid of or against the spread of radical Islam than the United States is Russia. It also does not have a problem with countries determining and preserving whatever system of power central authority can maintain (see quote above). No, Russia does not believe this principle results in the most free, most open, and most democratic societies emerging. But it does believe this principle keeps the global stage far more stable.

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American contradictory experiments in tampering (where it believes that it is exceptional to all other countries but that its exceptional system and beliefs should be exported everywhere else) is what rocks global equilibrium to Russia. China has always believed in this reality as well. But it is Russia that has taken on the unique responsibility to call the United States out for it. Again and again and again. What some might think is that this is a diatribe against American arrogance, or that American ‘moral imperialism’ has to be met with resistance from countries like Russia. I think this is an overstatement. I don’t believe Russia worries about such things. It may state things to that eﬀect for the mere drama and ‘media sexiness’ of calling America out.

But the real reason Russia stands against the posturing of American de facto exceptionalism is that it sincerely believes it leaves nothing but a mess behind. The worry is not that America is taking over the world (anyone who looks at Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria understands that American intervention doesn’t result in any immediate and positive American interests), even if Russia thinks America might want to take over the world, fantasy-style. No. The problem is that America never truly actively commits, but rather ‘half-commits’ to its interests. This is what results in the chaos. Russia entering Syria and actively conducting air raids on various DAESH and rebel positions is simply Putin saying ‘THIS is our priority and so we will act. Because we have the power to do so and therefore it is our right.” It believes this same right was acted upon by America with all of its adventures overseas. What’s good for the American goose will always be seen as also just fine for the Russian gander. At the very least, there is something refreshing about a country stating where it stands and then acting exactly in accordance with that position, rightly or wrongly. And anyone who knows Russia and Russian history, this aspect, of charging forward whether it is undeniably proper and correct or irrefutably brash and impatient, is wonderfully consistent of the Russian foreign policy character.

Not Just About AssAd JEANETTE “JJ” HARPER Jeanette “JJ” Harper is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

ussia and Iran – both members of the Caspian Five – believe they have acted as a main force for stability in the Caspian region and the Caucasus. Hidden under the waters of the Caspian Sea is a treasure trove of immense natural wealth, which both countries wish to protect at any cost for themselves. While these riches are a potential source of conflict, both countries recognize that their eﬀorts to cooperate must begin in the Caspian region because it gives them leverage economically and may even be the key to bolster their negotiating position in the international community writ large. For Russia, this could mean ensuring its geopolitical survival by maintaining its “sphere of special interests” across the former republics of the Soviet Union. For Iran, it could mean strengthening its respective international position and even help it progress towards being a regional kingpin, despite its unique non-Arab ‘outsider’ status.

Thus, both Iran and Russia have a keen interest in keeping the region – particularly Syria – stable and intact along a benign status quo axis. The situation in the Levant is so convoluted that it would take a long time to explain all of the diﬀerent components.

to uNdeRstANd why the destAbilizAtioN of syRiA would be devAstAtiNg to the RegioN, oNe oNly hAs to look At dAesh, which foRmed iN the poweR vAcuum left behiNd AfteR sAddAm’s bAAthist goveRNmeNt wAs dismANtled To stay focused on the Iranian-Russian alliance, however, it is important to understand why it is in the interest of the two countries to prop up the Assad regime. To understand why the destabilization of Syria would be devastating to the region, one only has to look at DAESH, which formed in the power vacuum left behind after Saddam’s Baathist government was dismantled. If Syria follows the same trajectory and the Bashar al-Assad regime is ousted, there will be nothing left to stop terrorist groups like al-Nusra, al-Qaeda and DAESH from consuming what is left of Syria and expanding beyond the region. If they spread their influence and ideology to other parts of the world, more countries may find themselves subjected to the same fate. While most of the West is at least peripherally concerned by this danger, countries like Iran and Russia see this in a much more direct and visceral way: to them Syria is not some far away province but a country right in their respective backyards and certainly a major component of their projected spheres of national security interests.

Within the Russian Federation, there are areas with a non-Russian and largely Muslim population in the North Caucasus – like Chechnya and Dagestan. The January 2011 suicide bombing in Moscow’s major commercial airport is evidence of the growing threat these terrorist organizations represent to Russia’s existence and have represented since the early 1990s. Iran also fears terrorist threats that lurk just outside its porous border. However, enigmatic Iran faces an additional two-pronged threat: they are a non-Arab Shiite Persian theocracy with what some consider the most Islamist, militant government in the Middle East. This not only puts them at odds with Sunni terrorist organizations, but with the governments of Iran’s Sunni neighbors that do not appreciate Tehran’s evangelistic eﬀorts to encourage their own Shiite populations to rise up with local insurrections. Additionally, Iran is not popular among the more moderate regimes in surrounding Arab countries. Clearly, under these circumstances, Russia and Iran believe they must strengthen their relations with each other and with other members of the anti-DAESH coalition, whoever they happen to be. These include Syria, Iraq and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. To further exacerbate the problem, the Iranian-Russian axis believes the United States has deliberately nurtured and encouraged the growth of DAESH in both Syria and Iraq, at least by its overemphasized focus on supporting groups trying to overthrow Assad. Rightly or wrongly, both Iran and Russia feel DAESH exists today as such a problem because America took its eye oﬀ the more important global security ball, instead wanting to play ‘democratizer’ in Damascus. Even China has expressed concern over this problem and many believe it could even become the next member of the coalition in Syria.

As Russia and Iran continue to intervene in Syria, many have questioned the true intentions of this alliance. In its airstrike campaigns, Russia has been accused of targeting moderate Syrian rebels – insurgents who have no aﬃliation with DAESH and in fact rebelled long before the Islamic State came into being. Among the areas that have been hit by Russian airstrikes are supposedly ones that accommodate groups supported by the United States and its allies. Furthermore, Russia skirted around Turkey – which is an ally of the United States and a firm opponent of Assad – to send its military equipment to Syria over the Caspian Sea (rather than the Caucasus isthmus), where the airspace rules are unclear. While there are many theories

surrounding this mystery, one thing is obvious. Relations within this triangle have been strained for a very long time. Until the 1980s, Syria was among Russia’s closest allies in the region and in fact the Baathist regime was more socialist in orientation than most Arab regimes. Syria also provided Russia its only naval base on the Mediterranean – one of its most geostrategic assets. Things got a bit more intense when Vladimir Putin came to power and insisted on maintaining good relations with Israel. But this is in keeping with Putin’s personal foreign policy of cultivating assets that can benefit Russia regardless of how those assets interact with each other. He wryly noted the United States was the other major power in the world that commonly does this.

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The alliance between Syria’s pan-Arab secular regime and Iran’s Islamic theocracy was suspicious from the start. It began when Bashar’s father, Hafiz al-Assad chose to support the Iranian revolution as a sign of protest against the US-imposed world order. While Syria and Iran did cooperate with one another on several issues, both countries knew there was a deep, conflicting divergence in their ideological characteristics and regional aspirations. They both knew there would come a time when their divergent political goals would clash with one another. For example, Syria was not impressed with Iran’s backdoor dealings with the Americans and Iran was oﬀended by Syria’s participation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its willingness to make concessions in regards to its territorial stability.

While Russia and Iran are clearly busy building the foundation of a new geostrategic bloc in the region, what is not evident is why Syria – despite the fact that its very survival depends on it – refuses to let go of its attitude of defiance towards the United States and its allies. It appears that Assad believes that this stance will guarantee the support of the Syrian people and ensure the survival of his regime. Unfortunately, the same tactics Assad used to build up his corrupted legitimacy within his own country is working against him now. Because Assad does not have much more than hereditary custom to oﬀer his people as to why he should remain in power, his country has devolved into chaos. One thing is certain: Assad should not assume the Russian-Iranian axis is about propping his regime up personally. In all likelihood, it is much more about maintaining a Syrian territorial space that is open to Russian and Iranian interests and policies. WHO happens to be leading the country doesn’t really matter to these two regional giants, as long as said leader is willing to be a strategic and close partner. For now, that is Assad and Assad only. But that doesn’t mean it can only be Assad moving forward into the future.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

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a STruggle in ShadOwS The FighT beTween a new and Old iran

STEPHEN SARTY Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

rior to the 1979 Revolution Iran had experienced an epic transformation during the Pahlavi monarchy. During this time Iran transformed from a mainly tribal state into a more modern one based largely on its oil and manufacturing sectors. But this tremendous growth did not come without its costs. The same reforms that had accounted for much of the growth had also alienated many influential Iranians. Land reforms had uprooted many rural Iranians who then ended up in the slums and shantytowns of the swelling cities. This upheaval of much of Iran’s traditional past and the suﬀerings as Iran strove forward in its march towards modernization led to a resentment of the West and fueled a growing militancy which eventually led to the Shah’s ouster.

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Since the revolution, Iran’s domestic politics have mainly revolved around two main ideologies: one being an intense nationalism based on historical achievements and rich culture and the other being centered on an influential role for promoting Shia Islam within the region. These two ideologies have created an enormous internal tension, as those who believe firmly in Persian exceptionalism that prefer a return to more historico-cultural roots based on Iranian identity have clashed with those from a combined religious-secular side that work to push Iran as the leader of the Muslim world and regional political hegemon.

iran’S dOmeSTic POliTicS have mainly revOlved arOund TwO main ideOlOgieS: One being an inTenSe naTiOnaliSm baSed On hiSTOrical achievemenTS and rich culTure and The OTher being cenTered On an inFluenTial rOle FOr PrOmOTing Shia iSlam wiThin The regiOn Atop the Islamic Republic’s power structure resides the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Through his role of being responsible for the general policies that guide the Republic, he sets the direction for all foreign and domestic initiatives for the state. He also directly commands both the military and intelligence sections of the country, as well as appointing members of the judiciary, the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a number of other representatives, clerical commissars, throughout the government.

Second only to the Ayatollah is President Rouhani. In his role as the chief executive, together with the Council of Ministers and Parliament, he is responsible for the day-to-day running of state aﬀairs. Unlike the common Western concept of “President,” he does not control the military nor define state policies. Under the presidential layer is an intricate web of interwoven power centers, both formal and informal, that constitute the heart of the Republic. These are somewhat mysteriously lorded over by members of the leadership elite. The connections, and competitions, between the various power centers create a complex web mainly designed to ensure that no single leader within the structure is capable of posing a threat to the control of the Supreme Leader. Prior to President Rouhani’s election Iran suffered from a fractured elite leadership and an international community resolved in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon through crippling sanctions. Iran’s technological achievements throughout history are a main source of pride and its ability to successfully develop a nuclear program is seen as a continuation of this exceptionalism. As such, the nuclear program has become somewhat woven into its national identity and is therefore of great importance not only as a security tool but also of national pride. Tired of a history filled with foreign oppression and occupying a unique geographical space between Asia and the Middle East, Persians tend to possess an intense sense of uniqueness and honor that often drive them to resist outside influences even when it creates hardship as in the case of sanctions. As such, Iran’s nuclear development program as a tool in domestic politics continues to play a major role.

Additionally, while recent presidencies have seen more pragmatic leaders that are somewhat removed from the religiosity of the revolution, the revolution itself still remains a powerful source of legitimacy. From the top the leadership of Iran appears to have moved into a stage where it is now more willing to engage foreign leaders and move the state towards globalization. In the years following the revolution much eﬀort was spent on securing power domestically and instituting a system whereby that power could be protected and maintained. Today, it seems Iranian leaders are keen to rejoin the international community. In the most recent presidential election the majority of the focus was on economic reform and the ability for the next leader to eﬀectively manage the country’s struggling economy.

In addition, the ability to lead the nation’s merger back into the global environment with religion taking almost no role was a prominent talking point. Consequently, Hassan Rouhani, a man who had campaigned on a platform based on restoring the economy, improving relations with western states, increased access for the general public to information, more personal freedom, and increased women’s rights, was elected as the nation’s seventh president. On the nuclear issue President Rouhani is seen as a nuclear centrist: a person who is willing to accept some temporary constraints on the uranium enrichment program in order to relieve international sanctions and allow Iran back into the international world order.

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The pressure at the moment is on from the reformist side with the nuclear agreement. Domestic issues have largely been ignored and Rouhani has seen a slip in his popularity as the economy continues to flag, several important pro-reform (Green Party) leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi remain under house arrest, and other campaign promises have failed to materialize. He will clearly be hoping that once sanctions are lifted there will be a boost to the economy, lifting him to re-election.

He firmly believes that Iran has the right to enrich its uranium but that it also needs to possess the ability to work with the international community and be flexible as it continues toward modernization. He walks a tightrope on the nuclear issue, however, as much of Khamenei’s power base, which has final say on the nuclear issue, is comprised of nuclear supporters that believe a nuclear Iran is a necessary geostrategic deterrent to ensure Iran’s security and status. Thus, Rouhani must show positive progress while not “weakening” Iran in order to retain the support of Khamenei, who remains relatively guarded on the issue outwardly. Politically speaking, President Rouhani does not belong to either of the two main camps, reformist or conservative, but is rather seen as a moderate. This is important as it means that he has to walk a tightrope to draw support from both sides, which becomes of great importance as he manages priorities between nuclear discussions and the domestic issues he campaigned on.

The relieving of sanctions, however, will also bring another key issue back into focus, one that is especially important to the conservatives who currently hold the majority of power: the issue of foreign investment and involvement inside Iran. Given Iran’s deep resentment and mistrust of outside entities this will be a major hurdle to overcome as the lifting of sanctions will bring a flood of outside companies and nations eager to do business. How Iran deals with the inevitable pressure for further reforms and the increased flow of foreign involvement in its domestic dealings may well hinge on whether those deals are viewed as legitimate business dealings or whether it is some sort of grand plan by western states to control Iran. Iran is at an important crossroads at this moment. It is still too early to tell whether the lifting of sanctions and inevitable foreign wave will be met with open arms or whether mistrust will take hold and prevent them from accepting change. With the more proreform populace pushing for inclusion back into the global economy and the conservative elite keen to continue its tight hold on power, it remains to be seen just how this quiet power struggle will be settled.

OuTflanking iran EVAN THOMSEN Evan Thomsen is a graduate of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is currently a Master’s student at the world-renown Elliott School of International Aﬀairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. He has just joined with the Eastern Congo Initiative as Strategic Partnerships Oﬃcer.

he Riyadh-based Arab Century Center for Studies published a report last month that calls for a 950km canal to be built through Saudi Arabia and Yemen, allowing the oil rich gulf to bypass the Straits of Hormuz. The project is estimated to cost $80bn and will take 5 years. What is perhaps most striking about the study and limited/regional media attention it has gotten, however, is the distinct lack of geo-strategic considerations and consequences. The focus of the study is on the social benefits to those living on or near the proposed canal, the time that transporters will save, and the potential for regional and international tourism that will be gained from this regional revival. This again is the accidental or intentional avoidance of the strategic reality this project will bring. Make no mistake, the proposed Salman Canal is a tinder box of ideas between Arabian and Persian energy competition. It should furthermore come as no surprise that this report has come only weeks after the signing of the JCPOA nuclear accord with Iran.

In short, according to the report, the Salman Canal is a win for everyone - Saudi and Yemeni citizens will have new and higher paying jobs, a poorer region will be revived and invigorated with energy and economic growth, and energy producers in the region and consumers around the world will enjoy better access and prices to one of the world’s most important energy-producing regions. To use the words of the Head of the Arab Century Center for Studies, Saad Bin Omar, “The canal will add 1,200km of clean and splendid coasts in the Empty Quarter and will have 20 tunnels for cars and pedestrians on the Saudi side, while it will add 700km of waterfront to Yemen and revive the desert areas in the east of the country.”

Whether this study is the product of academic imagination, or an example of backroom side-dealing, the Salman Canal proposal represents Saudi fears and quite possibly Saudi Arabia’s first attempt to outflank a rising Iran post-JCPOA. The report makes two primary claims as to the feasibility and benefit of this project: reduced costs for gulf exporters and the general social and quality of life benefits for the areas near the canal. First, exporters that commonly pass through the Straits of Hormuz will have their travel time cut in half. This will therefore reduce shipping costs which is therefore a net benefit to producers and consumers. Second, the Canal will “revive the empty quarter” in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This revival will see the construction of industrial and residential cities, new areas of tourism and commerce, and is estimated to potentially create millions of jobs.

This outlook requires one large assumption, or a certain degree of ignorance, regarding the parties that benefit from, or control, the Straits of Hormuz. In this case it is diﬃcult to see how the Salman Canal is not seen as an act of Saudi economic warfare from the perspective of Iran. The most obvious lens to view the potential change is in oil, and therefore, money. While the JCPOA has been argued both positively and negatively as a plan that brings billions to Iran through the removal of economic sanctions, the Salman Canal will somewhat negate this benefit. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter through the Straits of Hormuz. However, the Canal will oﬀer a benefit also to Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. Each ship and barrel provides a transaction cost to the host it ships through. In this case, the Salman Canal, if it is indeed a shorter and cheaper route, undercuts Iran’s economic advantage in the region dramatically. A second lens is each nation’s new geostrategic leverage. Iran has for many years used the global importance of Hormuz as a bargaining chip and at times a de-facto veto on the world stage.

It has been long argued that if Iran were to blockade the Straits in order to secure a political or negotiated advantage that the global price of oil could increase by 50% in a matter of days. These terms are understandably unacceptable to the global market. The Salman Canal would eﬀectively eliminate Iran’s most important geostrategic ploy. While the Salman Canal is only a document at this stage, what is important for energy and Gulf security experts is paying attention to key political moments in the coming months. In other words, if this report moves from paper to planning, where will the great and regional powers line up? Not just the United States and EU, but Russia, China, and India.

From the Russian perspective, any US support will look no diﬀerent than other moves to divert economic power and energy toward the strategic dominance of America. From the Caspian, to Ukraine, to the Gulf, Russia fears its influence is being challenged if not waning in respect to the US. The fear in all of these cases is when does brinksmanship cross the line and devolve into open and dangerous conflict? As it currently stands the Salman Canal is just a proposal, nothing more. If the geostrategic realities continue to be ignored it should probably stay that way. For economic advantage aside, ignoring those realities will surely bring not just a quicker oil route through the Gulf, it will bring a whole new level of tension and potential hostility to a region that, quite frankly, cannot endure it.

From the US perspective this question is quite challenging. On the one hand the US may feel compelled to make moves to assure and reaﬃrm its historic relationship with Saudi Arabia. This relationship has been tepid at best since the signing of the JCPOA. Supporting the Salman Canal could be seen as an act of balancing or a form of benign neutrality in Middle East policy. Just because US has begun to open diplomatic and economic ties with Iran, does not mean it needs to cut oﬀ or lessen its ties with Saudi Arabia. This, however, will be in direct contestation with Iran and Russia. For Iran, US support of Saudi Arabia in this venture could be seen as classic Western diplomacy - to extend one hand in favor while keeping the other clenched and concealed. Iran will likely turn to old and new forms of brinksmanship in negotiation - first by threatening to blockade the Straits of Hormuz and second by mimicking much of the current US Presidential primary debates with the Republican Party by threatening to ‘tear up the deal.’

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The daesh CIvIl GovernanCe BlaCKhole Iraq, Iran, quds, and Kurds

BRIAN HUGHES Brian Hughes is currently a student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

he push to take back Ramadi has recently highlighted a litany of convoluted policy and societal sectarian concerns that have created pathways for DAESH to increase their territory and hold new positions. Additionally, there’s little direction and confidence in US policy regarding Iraq as the Iraq Interior Ministry has heavily relied on Iranian Quds Forces. This alliance, and the Shia-dominated government, has alienated many Sunni Iraqis, who see offensives against DAESH as fulfilling Shiite sectarian governmental goals and affirming long-term control from Iran. Even with these difficult circumstances, DAESH is finally showing signs of exhaustion. Iraqi political integration has been painfully elusive and mostly illusory. The Shiite-dominated government has been accused of pursuing its own interests in the war against DAESH, such as not defending Sunni-majority cities and failing to mount attacks to retake fallen ones. Four months ago Ramadi fell to brutal and swift DAESH forces, creating a need for the Iraqi government to organize and show that it was not defenseless against DAESH advances.

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However, squabbling within the government and a complete lack of trust in those tasked with such missions left Ramadi in DAESH hands. Conspiracy theories abound as to whether this is some master Shiite strategy engineered from Tehran.

daesh has noT only Condensed TerrorIsm InTo one larGe TerrITory of ConTesTed domInIon, BuT has esCalaTed BruTalITy Beyond whaT The world had prevIously wITnessed In addition to a non-unified government, Iraq’s military operations are organized as a patchwork of Sunni and Shiite militias, national security forces, and Iranian-backed Shiite paramilitaries. The Iraqi Interior Ministry is said to be under the command of Qassem Suleimani, the regionally venerated Iranian Quds Force Commander. This has not only further isolated Sunni militias in Iraq, but has created divisions within the Iraqi command hierarchy, as the Prime Minister is seen as losing control of his own military to Iranian influence. Notably, the most eﬀective force acting against DAESH has been Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, which muddies the territorial integrity waters further as their successes push advocates who ultimately see an independent Kurdistan as a globally-recognized state. While Iraqi authority struggles with sectarian divides within their government and military, US policy has largely focused on containing DAESH.

Containment was thought to be a losing strategy at the beginning of the oﬀensive, but the extremists’ fight has largely stood still in the past year compared to its initial campaigns. Since the Clinton administration, counterterrorism units have largely believed that the global terror threat cannot be solved in any definite way, but only ‘managed.’ Terrorism is largely seen as permanent fixture in a modern world of advanced globalism and high technology. DAESH has not only condensed terrorism into one large territory of contested dominion, but has escalated brutality beyond what the world had previously witnessed. This has not only discredited all political and religious motivation behind its movement, but has allowed the worst of terrorism to permeate into the local culture and conscience. Unfortunately this has, for some, only aﬃrmed the idea that containment is the only real possibility, not obliteration. The internal disharmony within Iraq, fueled by the various sectarian groups and a reinvigorated strategic Iran, certainly does not create hope for an internal Iraqi solution to the DAESH problem. A microcosm of US and international policy against DAESH has been the long struggle for Kobane, Syria. Strategically important, the US used Kobane as the Ottomans used the Dardanelles against the British in the First World War, letting the enemy pierce themselves again and again in a strategic dead end. It is estimated that over 2,000 DAESH members, mostly foreigners, have died at Kobane. Coalition partners used air strikes again and again for a large part of a year to stop all DAESH advances in Kobane. This strategy, however, must contend with DAESH stories of indiscriminate killing, rape, huge desertion numbers, murders of doctors and scientists, and brutality toward homosexuals and non-DAESH religion.

As a result, 2015 has seen a large decrease in recruitment numbers into Syria and Iraq. Additionally, as Syrian Kurds secure Jarabulus, said to be the last undefended city for allowing DAESH recruits passage deeper into the area, those numbers are projected to fall even further. Thus, while DAESH was the largest modern terrorist movement to gain control of large swaths of state territory, it was always going to be faced with dead ends in transforming that small rule into an oﬀensive that could challenge the formal rule of large powers long-term. By allowing them to operate in a constrained territory, perhaps accidentally or unintentionally, US and international policy has eﬀectively allowed DAESH terrorism to somewhat exhaust itself into a strategic dead end.

Since DAESH will not be ‘defeated’ in the near future, it allows them some freedom to operate and create a black hole of terrorism inside of a de facto Iraqi civil governance war. As with most terrorist movements, DAESH was born in a power vacuum. Much like the Taliban, DAESH gained prominence at a time when the government was either discredited or transitional, leaving little home power to stop such movements. Without a strong legitimate home rule to use eﬀective power to control civil unrest, the ethnic diversity among Sunni, Shias, and Kurds has led to a mismanaged government and weak security state. Even if DAESH was to be defeated in the near term, these complications will not go away any time soon.

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With Syria becoming further destabilized, Iraq will continue to have a strong element of disruption along its Western border. With the new nuclear accord and lifting of sanctions, Iran will have sustained influence inside the Iraqi government, further alienating Sunni Iraqis and perhaps allowing a violent DAESH legacy to remain to facilitate its own objectives. While DAESH continues its brutality and human rights abuses, the inability of the Iraqi government to function adequately in the wake of its advances creates a dire security problem in the Middle East. These problems will certainly not disappear with the elimination of DAESH, as that might not be truly possible, but only highlight the debilitating sectarian divides within Iraq and Syria.

A unified government will need to include a strong Sunni presence and formal Kurd involvement for any future stability to be present within Iraq. However, with Sunnis generally frustrated with their minority involvement in the democratic process and Kurds pushing for autonomy, all apparently approved of and designed by strings being pulled from Iran, the instability may continue unabated with or without DAESH presence. As has occurred in Syria, a black hole of civil governance unrest in Iraq with multiple proxy players may spell doom for long-term peace and stability. While US policy has largely discredited DAESH, thereâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s little recognition of the underlying societal problems in the area. As long as the US and others do not address the eďŹ&#x20AC;ects of political disunity and sectarian divides, then DAESH in the long-term might be the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s smallest problem.

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How InternatIonal SanctIonS Helped putIn at Home

LAURA GARRIDO Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Her primary research interests cover the post-Soviet space and the fight against radical Islamism.

he United States imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in the war in Ukraine. The sanctions have hit Russia’s economy hard largely due to foreign investors pulling $96 billion out of Russia since 2014. The sanctions imposed by the United States have affected Russia as a whole, from the top to the bottom, from the government to the people. This is an important issue as the Russian government has no intention of backing down or moving away from its defiant stance. The purpose of economic sanctions is to impose economic harm so as to effect policy change in the target nation. President Obama signed Executive Order 13660 on March 6, 2014, which authorized sanctions for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and/or stealing assets belonging to the people of Ukraine. The sanctions would restrict certain individuals’ travel, which included Russian and Crimean officials, as well as businessmen who were part of Putin’s “inner circle”, and would demonstrate the United States’ willingness to “impose a cost on Russia and those responsible for the situation in Crimea.”

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Also, certain Russian government oﬃcials’ assets would be frozen, thereby preventing them from buying or selling in the European Union. Eleven days later, Executive Order 13661 was signed by President Obama which stated that Russia’s actions toward Ukraine undermined the democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine and thus expanded sanctions further against Russian entities such as parts of Russia’s financial, energy, and military industries.

The title of the graph roughly translates to "How do you view the US generally"; the blue line represents the percentage of Russians who say they view the US positively, while the red line is percentage of Russians who view the US negatively.

Three days after President Obama signed Executive Order 13661, he issued Executive Order 13662 Directive 4. President Obama enlarged the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660 and had then expanded in Executive Order 13661 to declare that Russia’s actions and policies toward Ukraine were a threat to American national security and foreign policy:

“The provision, exportation, or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, services, or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic oﬀshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in a maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any persons determined to be subject to this Directive, its property, or its interests in property is prohibited.” A second round was applied on July 16, 2014, called sectoral sanctions. The sanctions prevent Russia from borrowing money to mitigate the blow of falling oil prices. Russian international reserves declined by $135 billion in 2014 and there has also been a huge outflow of capital from the country. Basic food prices have subsequently sharply increased since the sanctions began, with the price of buckwheat increasing as much as 70 percent, for example. The exchange rate in Russia jumps up and down, often by five percent a day, at times even ten percent, which is causing consumer panic. Incomes in Russia have also decreased. In 2014, real incomes decreased by 1% and already by 3.1% in the first half of 2015. This is the first time that has happened since Putin took oﬃce in 1999. Inflation also soared to 11.4% in 2014 and the ruble continued to decline, losing 40% of its value to the dollar. Those in the Russian government and the Russian people overall blame the United States for their worsening economy. Thus the blame for food shortages, inflation, devaluation of the ruble, decreasing real income, etc. also falls on the United States in their eyes. The sanctions most likely will not do much to change the mind of the Putin administration but rather will continue to lower the quality of living for millions in Russia.

Russia is highly dependent on food exports, especially from the United States and Europe. In 2013, Russia received $1.3 billion in food and agriculture exports from the United States and $15.8 billion in exports from the European Union. While Russia may try to increase its domestic production of food, it will not be able to fill the void that will be caused by such a loss. “Russia's Central Bank pointed out that bans on imported food will push up Russia's already high inflation rate, eroding the purchasing power of Russian citizens.” The people of Russia have shown deep dissatisfaction with the United States and have increased their approval of Putin. According to the Levada Center polling organization, the Russian people have been decreasing their approval of the United States since the sanctions were imposed in 2014. From this data, it can be implied that the sanctions started the current downward trend of negative views on the US. Looking at the data from 1990, there are three spikes of antiAmericanism that occur prior to 2014. One in the late 1990s during the Kosovo War; one in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq; and one in 2008 when the United States was critical of Russia’s conflict with Georgia. The diﬀerence between these spikes of antiAmericanism and the current trend is that this spike seems more intense and personal. During the Kosovo war, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 53% over a two-year period. In 2003, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 66% over a five-month period. In 2008, Russian disapproval of America peaked at around 67% over a three-month period. Even though the disapproval lasted the longest in the late 1990s, only half of the population held these views. Since January 2015, Russian disapproval of America stands at 81% and has been increasing for almost a year.

With this data, there is evidence to suggest that the level of anti-Americanism within Russia is strongly related to domestic economic conditions in the country. This further supports the primary hypothesis that current economic sanctions, and specifically their impact on the Russian people, will lead to intensifying levels of anti-Americanism. Even though the sanctions have worsened the economic situation in Russia, they have also created a foreign policy backlash resulting in an increased approval rating for Putin:

As seen in the chart above, Putin’s approval rating was slowly declining from 2008 to the beginning of 2014. In July 2008, Putin’s approval rating was at around 88%. By January 2014, his rating had dropped almost 28 percentage points. After the US sanctions were enacted in 2014, within eight months Putin was almost back to his 2008 rating. What this clearly shows is that there is definitely a sense of ‘nationalist backlash’ connected to the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Whereas there has always been something of a low-grade anti-Americanism in Russia for American global actions, these actions have always largely impacted Russian peripheral interests. The sanctions today, however, are direct and personal: they are seen as an explicit attempt by the United States to hurt Russia, not Russian interests. For that reason it is perhaps more surprising the West could not anticipate this attitudinal backlash. This is, it seems, political naiveté at its finest.

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The UninTended ConseqUenCes of RUssiansanCTions

VLADISLAV LERMONTOV Vladislav Lermontov is a graduate student in the Master of Science program in International Security and Intelligence Studies at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska.

n the United States the Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (SPI) holds responsibility for the development and implementation of international sanctions. A key factor in the development of effective international sanction policy and support is the cooperation of various internal organizations. The SPI focuses on providing guidance to the Department of Treasury and Commerce and continuously works with Congress for the purpose of drafting legislation in order to achieve policy goals in foreign areas. Many of the developed sanction policies focus on placing the largest amount of harm on a targeted state, while simultaneously minimizing the amount of economic harm to the United States and/or neighboring states. Economic sanctions are also enforced in a manner where a threatened state will be rewarded for good behavior through the removal of certain aspects over time. Effective enforcement of international sanctions also relies on joint cooperation of the Office of Foreign Assets Control Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security Department of Commerce, and the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative. But as we shall see, these carefully laid rules have not worked well in the Russian case.

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Economic sanctions involve several financial initiatives, such as annual appropriation bills. Over the years, sanctions have become a very popular first-action initiative in foreign policy maneuvers. This so called post-Cold War movement has created an increasing number of sanction impositions on foreign nations. Between 1993 and 1997 alone there were 61 U.S. laws and executive orders enacted against 35 countries. According to the Institute for International Economic Sanctions, U.S. sanction enforcement cost the United States between 15 and 19 billion USD in 1995 alone. Just such sanctions have been imposed on Russia today due to the recent activities occurring in Ukraine. While initially eﬀective, the potential for major economic turmoil to neighboring countries is very real due to the important role that Russia plays in the regional economic system and beyond.

iT is iRoniC ThaT The UniTed sTaTes, The leadeR in pUshing RUssia inTo The global eConomy and wanTing ConsolidaTed demoCRaCy To Take RooT TheRe, has single-handedly also CReaTed a CoUnTeR-foRCe ThaT CoUld Risk Those pRioRiTies How much sanction imposition is too much? Imposing economic sanctions on nations that are heavily involved in trade, import, and export could have serious ramifications to surrounding areas, resulting in more harm to not only the neighboring countries but the global system as well. Aﬀected states or nations could in turn punish sanction-supporting entities by cutting oﬀ valuable supplies, resulting in a downward economic spiral.

Economic sanctions by the U.S. and the EU onto the Russian government have resulted in this kind of collateral damage and intentional retaliatory actions. For example, a smaller but no less relevant consequence has been Europe facing one of its largest dairy farmer economic crises in the last decade. In the case of the Swedish farmer who needs the cost of milk to remain at roughly 3.6 and 3.7 krona in order to survive, the current milk cost is at 2.65 krona, creating a true crisis for Sweden. This could lead to the bankruptcy of a large portion of the 4,200 private dairy farmers that currently exist there. Such negative effects, even though seemingly insignificant, can and will spill into various other industries and create a negative cascade effect on the everyday lives of ordinary citizens across many countries. The impact of economic sanctions on Russia has had a very far reach. Eastern and Central Europe is feeling the same struggle in dairy farming economics seen in Sweden. Massive quantities, 500 to 1,500 tons of dairy products that typically went to Russia, now need a new home due to the inability to export products there. Germany lost 12,600 tons of cheese, equivalent to 1.26 million dollars, due to sanctions against Russia. For those who hold a close economic relationship with Russian trade, such as the Baltic States, sanction enforcement can have long-term ramifications leading to great economic stress and internal turmoil. Current global policy does not offer side support to offset the harm being done to nations peripherally connected to target nations under sanction enforcement. The continuous enforcement of economic sanctions on Russia will lead to not only short-term ramifications, but long-term economic strains on the Russian economy for years to come.

Russia is suďŹ&#x20AC;ering from inflation, foreign capital is continuing to flow out of Russia, and its 2 trillion dollar economy is beginning to stall. The bans imposed by the U.S. and EU on transactions with Russian companies such as VTB Group, OAO Novatek, OAO Rosneft and OAO Gazprombank have created a great deal of financial stress on the people of Russia, not just Russian oligarchs. According to a report from Bloomberg Business, construction volume has fallen by 8.1 percent, while retail sales have dropped over 8.2 percent. As previously mentioned, there is a great risk that sanction enforcement could lead to harmful economic spill-over to neighboring nations. Therefore, the U.S. has tried to ensure that existing contracts between states would be honored in order to limit the potential for additional foreign economic strain in the short-term.

The most crucial long-term ramification from sanctions on Russia, however, is the negative impact it will have on disconnecting Russia from the global economy. Over the last several years the integration of the Russian economy brought 140 million new Russian players onto the global market, creating a financial boom that began to finally create a legitimate Russian middle class. Now that economic integration has been threatened, the potential of seeing that middle class disintegrate beyond recovery is very real. It is ironic that the United States, the leader in pushing Russia into the global economy and wanting consolidated democracy to take root there, has single-handedly also created a counter-force that could risk those priorities. It is a clear example of when short-term national security concerns trump and compromise long-term ones.

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Nevertheless, the U.S. is not short on allies when considering further sanction extensions. Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inability to create and hold a cease-fire in Eastern Ukraine is said to be undermining international diplomacy. It is clear both the U.S. and EU consider that failure to be purposeful. Allies and adversaries do not have to be government entities alone, however. The general public can play an equally important role. According to a poll done by American news corporation CNN, 59% of people approve of economic sanctions imposed on Russia. While public support is crucial for international policy enforcement at first, long-term economic spill-over due to strict sanctions can cause a shift in approval ratings over time. Import and export trade limitations with Russia will continue to have a negative impact on Europe and the United States. The longer this plays out, the more likely international support may wane.

While the overall impact of sanction enforcement on Russia could lead to more international instability and disruption, it seems to be having minimal impact on Vladimir Putin and his agenda at home. While economic sanctions have been a nuisance on the Russian government, it is the people of Russia that seem to be paying the largest price. Traditionally, this is exactly when those imposing the sanctions hope for internal pressures to enact change within the target nation. But in Russia the opposite has actually occurred: able to eďŹ&#x20AC;ectively and compellingly show the decline in everyday standards of living coinciding perfectly with the imposition of foreign sanctions, Putin has actually seen his home approval rating recover and increase to levels never before seen. In this case, it seems something as small as spilt milk has a diplomatic and geopolitical ripple eďŹ&#x20AC;ect far more significant than the U. S. and EU ever thought possible.

Russia Time TO Finance inFRasTRucTuRe and invesTmenT PROjecTs in aFRica KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African aﬀairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics.

ver the past few years, Russian companies have shown an increasing interest towards investment and preparedness to compete with other foreign players in Africa, but they have also complained bitterly of lack of state financial support and investment credit guarantees from policy banks and money-lending institutions. China, India and Japan, and more recently the United States have provided funds to support companies ready to carry out projects in various sectors in African countries. This situation has sparked discussions among policy experts. For instance, Dr Martyn Davies, Chief Executive Oﬃcer of the South African based Frontier Advisory (Pty) Ltd, does not think that the Chinese model of financing various infrastructure and construction projects in Africa is replicable considering the current structure/nature of the Chinese policy banking system, adding that Russia's banking sector operates quite diﬀerently.

There are now approximately 50 leading Chinese state-owned enterprises that are all Fortune 500 firms that are present in Africa, with the majority of these active in infrastructure and construction in Africa, he explained to Buziness Africa.

Russia has a nORTheRn hemisPheRe FOcus. and ThaT exPlains why Russia has shOwn lOw Financial cOmmiTmenT in iTs FORegn POlicy imPlemenTaTiOn in aFRica Explaining further, he said although the rapidity of and pervasiveness of their market entry into Africa has taken many by surprise, and the main factor that has assisted this speedy market engagement was that the projects were largely "de-risked" from a financial perspective. Arguably the single greatest risk of contracting (with governments) in Africa is ultimately getting paid. In the case of the Chinese contracted projects, the Chinese state's so-called policy banks have provided finance and have underwritten the infrastructure roll-out very often supported by sovereign guarantees from the recipient African state. No other (even development) banks have been willing to absorb such financial risks on infrastructure projects in Africa. This accounts for China's "success" in building infrastructure in Africa in recent years, according to the academic professor. "It is almost impossible for the model to be replicated in a true commercial sense. The only likelihood of similar financial structures arising is in the case of tied-aid for commercial purposes. I would argue that the strategy of China Inc. is resulting in a rethinking of how aid/developmental capital is being allocated or spent in Africa by other partners.

This is especially the case with Japanese aid to Africa, with the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) meeting and the commercial outcomes from it evidence of this," Davies concluded assertively. When the former Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), he indicated explicitly that "China will expand cooperation in investment and financing to support sustainable development in Africa. China provided $20 billion dollars of credit line to African countries to assist them in developing infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and small and medium-sized enterprises." Japan made a five-year commitment of $32 billion dollars in public and private funding to Africa, and the money to be used in areas prioritized as necessary for growth by the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Japan's new pledge is nearly four times larger than its last commitment to the group. The plan of action is ambitious. Japanese funds will help in a number of areas, including trade, infrastructure, private sector development, health and education, good governance and food production SuďŹ&#x192;ce to say that the United States, Britain, Brazil and India have followed concretely Chinese footsteps with financial commitment towards sustainable development projects in Africa. These steps have, indeed, made competition keen for bidding for available infrastructural projects on the continent.During the oďŹ&#x192;cial working meeting with Barack Obama, South African President Jacob Zuma told his colleague: "The United States' strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa that you launched is well-timed to take advantage of this growing market. We look forward to strengthening the US-Africa partnership and we are pleased with the growing bilateral trade and investment."

For example, there are 600 US companies operating in South Africa which have created in excess 150,000 jobs for local people. Many experts still believe that Russian authorities have to provide incentives. Charles Robertson, Global Chief Economist at Renaissance Capital, thinks that the major problem is incentives. China has two major incentives to invest in Africa. First, China needs to buy resources, while Russia does not. Second, Chinese exports are suitable for Africa - whether it is textiles or iPads, goods made in China can be sold in Africa. Russia exports little except oil and has (roughly 2/3 of exports), steel and metals (which is either not cost eﬀective to sell in Africa, or again is the same as Africa is selling) and military weapons. "Most importantly, Chinese firms see African growth as benefiting China, while Russia has less to gain from this. There is little incentive for Russian firms to operate in Africa...though Renaissance Capital sees opportunities, as does Rusal, and a few others. The problem is not investment credits or guarantees," Robertson pointed out. In his objective views, Russia has a northern hemisphere focus. And that explains why Russia has shown low financial commitment in its foregn policy implementation in Africa as compared to countries such as Japan, India and China.

Dr Scott Firsing, a visiting Bradlow fellow at the South African Institute for International Aﬀairs (SAIIA) and a senior lecturer in international studies at Monash University in Johannesburg, said "the absence of export credit guarantees can be a real obstacle to some in countries such as Russia because there are businesses and policy holders that look for these guarantees to help alleviate the fear of doing business in high risk markets like Africa." Export credit guarantees show the exporter protection against the main risks, which include political and commercial risks, in places such as Africa. This has been very successful for countries like South Africa, which even manage to stockpile cash over time due to the premiums being more than the payouts. Moreover, one can deduce that without such cover or this 'safety net', South African companies might have never taken such risks or would have been unable to bid or win contracts in developing economics, according to his explanation to Buziness Africa.

According to Jimmy Saruchera, a Director at Schmooze Frontier Markets, an investment fund that works to support small-andmedium sized businesses in new emerging markets, suggested that both Russia and Africa needed work on a good trade policy, stable and transparent institutions are the fundamental ingredients, then tools such as credits and export guarantees can be more eﬀective.

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"I would suggest such a move that Russia has to design a policy strategy. One of China's policy banks, the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) is the country's largest lender for funding acquisitions and investments overseas, totaling more than its four main commericial banks. This has helped expand the overseas presence of Chinese companies like ZTE Corp and Huawei that wouldn't have been previously unlikely without the assistance from such a policy bank," he added. According to Dr Firsing: a similar statement can be made of the importance of American institutions like their Export-Import Bank that supports American companies and their expansion into African markets. Obama's latest African Power Initiative sees the ExportImport Bank granting up to US$5 billion in support of U.S. exports for the development of power projects across sub-Saharan Africa. Russia can learn a lot from the approach of these countries.

Professor David H. Shinn, an Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs George, Washington University, suspects that Russia's problem goes well beyond investment credits and export credit guarantees. Just look at Russian trade with Africa. It is embarrassingly low. Turkey has twice as much trade with Africa as Russia. Most Russian investment in Africa goes into large energy and mineral projects. China is investing in just about everything. Professor Shinn, who was a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia (1996-99) and Burkina Faso (1987-90), wrote in an email interview to Buziness Africa, that lack of or weakness of Russian government incentives for investing outside Russia seems to be the significant part of its African policy problem, that compared, China does a lot of project financing in Africa. He argued that western countries are also at a disadvantage because there is much more separation between the government and the private sector and there is no equivalent government state-owned sector, at least, not in the United States. Most Chinese investment in Africa occurs with the large stateowned companies, which work closely with the government. President Barack Obama recently tried to energize the US private sector in Africa during his recent visit, especially with the Power Africa initiative. Interestingly, Russian policy experts have repeatedly called for state support for corporate investment initiatives as well as helping systematically private entrepreneurs to make strong strategic inroads into mutually viable investment sectors and to raise economic presence in Africa."Until recently, Africa was poorly represented in macro-economic forecasting and research, especially in terms of Russian-African relations," wrote Professor Aleksei Vasiliev and Evgeny Korendiasov both from the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of African Studies (IAS).

Vasiliev is the current Director of the IAS and former Special Presidential Envoy to African Countries while Korendiasov retired Russian Ambassador and now the Head of the Department for Russian-African Research at the IAS. They both authored an article published in June that Russia has oﬃcially declared promoting relations with Africa a priority goal. Assurances made by Russian oﬃcials in their statements that Africa is "in the mainstream of Russia's foreign policy" have not been substantiated by systematic practical activities, and the development of relations between Russia and Africa has so far nothing to boast about. According to the academic researchers, currently the scope for Russian-African partnership is significantly expanding and of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Western experts consider 24 to be democratic countries.They both argued that "through large-scale and purposeful participation in the international development assistance, Russia strives to advance its foreign policy priorities and strengthen the positions of Russian business in the African economic space." But, they pointed out unreservedly that the situation in Russian-African foreign trade will change for the better, if Russian industry undergoes technological modernization, the state provides Russian businessmen systematic and meaningful support, and small and medium businesses receive wider access to foreign economic cooperation with Africa.

Russian POlicy exPeRTs have RePeaTedly called FOR sTaTe suPPORT FOR cORPORaTe invesTmenT iniTiaTives as well as helPing sysTemaTically PRivaTe enTRePReneuRs TO make sTROng sTRaTegic inROads inTO muTually viable invesTmenT secTORs and TO Raise ecOnOmic PResence in aFRica

Among other policy recommendations, they stressed "defining clear guidelines and priorities of Russian policy towards Africa, creating conditions for the promotion of Russian goods and investments in African markets, setting up mechanisms of financial support by the state of export and investment projects which is a compulsory condition for successful Russian business activity on the African continent and introducing tariﬀ preferences for trade with African partners."

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“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides