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06. editorial 08. statisticallY aHead- contextuallY BeHind RuSSIA’S CASPIAN FLOTILLA OuTFLANkS THE uS MILITARY EVAN THOMSEN 11. strategic Patience Paid off RuSSIAN REgIONAL HEgEMONY IN THE CASPIAN LAuRA gARRIDO 16. WHat russia’s Presence in sYria trulY reveals AN ENTANgLEMENT OF ENEMIES DR. MATTHEw CROSSTON, NENAD DRCA 20. Putin’s PossiBle liBYan Pivot JOHN CODY MOSBEY 23. a tangled afgHani WeB IS RuSSIA COMINg BACk IN? STEPHEN SARTY 28. turkisH dileMMa PROBLEMS IN BEINg A gREATER CASPIAN FORCE? JEANETTE "JJ" HARPER 31. kazakHstan’s urBan develoPMent struggles WitH Mono-cities SAMANTHA BRLETICH
35. trust, but VerifY Countering the CritiCs of the JCPoA AAron gooD 39. A DisturbiNg DOubLe stANDArD A huMAn rights CritiCisM of the JCPoA AnDY DeAhn 44. the iVOrY tOwer AND the JCPOA exPerts sounD off with guArDeD oPtiMisM sArA DYson 47. NeO-reALisM AND irAN’s NuCLeAr issue AntonY CLeMent
the CAsPiAN PrOJeCt bi-weeKLY DigitAL eDitiON www.moderndiplomacy.eu Caspian@moderndiplomacy.eu Dimitris Giannakopoulos Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief Dr. matthew Crosston The Caspian Project, Director
authors petra poseGa teJa palko luisa monteiro nina laVrenteVa GaBriela pasCholati Do amaral BruCe aDrianCe troy BaXter GreGory Brew staCey Cottone antony Clement anDy Deahn nenaD DrCa sara Dyson JareD s. easton Jeffery fishel laura GarriDo orhan Gafarli aaron GooD amy hanlon Jeanette "JJ" harper
Jonathan hartner Brian huGhes VlaDislaV lermontoV paula malott meGan munoz elena m. norBerto morales rosa taylor morse John CoDy mosBey sarah nolDer Joshua patterson Dayna riCe JessiCa reeD GreGory rouDyBush stephen sarty Dmitrii seltser rakesh krishnan simha eVan thomsen Dianne a. ValDez Christopher white
“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools� Thucydides
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FEARs OF A NEw DAwN: ThE TRUsT IssUE Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project
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Trust is one of those concepts in international relations that can be both amorphous and essential. Every single conflict situation in the world today is unlikely to achieve progress without it and yet almost universally every party to a conflict defines the term in different ways. Analysts and observers bemoan the necessity of establishing trust in global affairs, yet themselves rarely come to agreement on which actions are best for establishing trust and which behaviors are the most anathema to its blossoming. This issue of the Caspian Project examines the trust dilemma in the region and finds it to be as frustratingly complex as anywhere else in the world. Indeed, the greater Caspian region should become an exemplar test case for the examination of trust. Whether they are dilemmas of religion, economics, energy, political systems, diplomatic affairs, ethnic dissension, or proxy wars, this region today is home to all of it in one degree or another.
The edition’s contributors expose for us most of these problems: from the complex interplay of multiple sides in Syria to Turkey’s political designs so as to compensate for internal problems to the various academic and Arab analysts interpreting the JCPOA to various political philosophies competing everywhere from Libya to Iran. All of these wildly diverse topics end up influencing or being influenced by Caspian littorals. What this edition successfully crafts for our devoted readers is a stronger sense of how far-reaching the relevance is for Caspian states: not just the littorals’ own reach beyond their immediate spheres of personal influence but how other major states and global powers all have issues and interests that touch upon the very livelihood and lifeblood of the region. In the end, we come to learn that the key is to not push a single definition of trust or one common parameter to describe it. Adaptability and flexibility seem to be keys so that all of the promises and potential innate to relationships built on trust become a long-term foundation for peace and prosperity across all sides. One thing is certain after reading the pieces herein: without trust there cannot be nor ever will be a dawning of a new day.
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THE CASPIAN PROJECT 17
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RuSSIA’S CASPIAN FLOTILLA OuTFLANkS THE uS MILITARY
STATISTICALLY AHEAD
CONTExTuALLY BEHIND
EVAN THOMSEN Evan Thomsen is a graduate of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is currently a Master’s student at the worldrenown Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC. He has just joined with the Eastern Congo Initiative as Strategic Partnerships Officer.
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he past month has seen increasing tensions between Washington and Moscow over the Syria-Assad-DAESH nexus of seemingly perpetual conflict. This tension has not been mitigated by the sometimes-substantive but always-political interventions in the region. While both the U.S. and Russia increase strategic bombing campaigns and deploy ‘special advisors,’ neither have revealed anything beyond their strategic commitments. Until October 7th, 2015, that is, when Russia launched 26 Kalibr SS-N-30A cruise missiles from its recently upgraded and largely secret Caspian fleet.
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This display of power and capacity is not a windfall moment that tilts the scales dramatically in Russia’s advantage. I say this only to offer caution as new or emerging military technology and capabilities often go hand in hand with exaggeration. It is, however, a significant moment for Great Power Politics in the region. The Caspian launch was no mere theatre act and will have implications far beyond military tactics.
We should be reminded that war has many inputs, some of which are unquantifiable. While this maneuver was cavalier and technically unnecessary, morale on Russia’s southern front is at an all-time high as this display revealed not only a sense of parity in military might on the world stage, but in some ways a competitive advantage.
The geographic and organizational challenges which Russia overcame are also significant. It is not just technology and military will that sends a missile 1,500km across three countries - but military coordination and regional strategic cooperation are also required. The 26 missiles were not launched in a The first point to deconstruct is the now obvious vacuum, but amidst ongoing conflict, aerial bomgap between Russia’s actual capabilities and the bardment, and Russian/Syrian ground combat opAmerican understanding or appreciation of those erations. The Caspian naval strike, therefore, is not capabilities. Most of Russia’s naval assets in the just a testament to Russia’s naval modernization Caspian are vessels under 1,000 tons. These have project, but to the nation’s ability to conduct combeen often described as ‘patrol craft’ or ‘local craft’ plicated combined-arms operations and to organin U.S. military circles. Without meaning any disre- ize these efforts in an international theatre. spect to the U.S. armed services - this is Navy-speak for this is only the Russian coast guard and therefore The past month, if taken as a snapshot in time, not a serious capability. This assertion has now been should not be held up singularly as evidence of a handily debunked, as Russia’s Caspian fleet has Russian military that matches U.S. capabilities - let quickly proven to be capable of advanced naval op- alone as an event signifying a return to Cold War erations that extend over 1,500km beyond the conditions. Nevertheless, the relative change in power dynamics and military capacity between Caspian Sea. Russia and the US, particularly in the conflict in Russia did not use its forward-deployed aircraft to Syria, is significant. It is this point, that of a relative conduct this round of bombing. The targets of the change in local power, where U.S. political rhetoric Caspian strike (which were reported to be in the can be more fully understood. While Washington inareas around Aleppo), could have been more cost- creases pressure on Moscow over whom the aerial effectively struck with Russian aerial assets already and naval strikes are targeting (e.g. the fact-fencing deployed and active in the conflict. Why then was over whether Russia is targeting DAESH or simply the more difficult road taken? In a word - style. This Assad’s direct enemies), I find it difficult to believe strike was meant to send a message - not to DEASH, that the U.S. is singularly concerned over the gennot to Syrian opposition forces, but to the United eral ethics of Russia’s engagement. It is here where States. Bryan Clark, who is a senior fellow with the I agree with Bryan Clark, that the US military is emCenter for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, com- barrassed that they allowed, and were unprepared, mented that “the Navy should feel embarrassed for Russia’s quick rise to local superiority in the Syrian arena. that they let this happen.”
THE CASPIAN PROJECT 17
In the past two weeks alone the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees have held several hearings related to the intent, readiness, and capacity of the U.S. military - all with a heavy focus on naval positioning and operations. The primary take-away from these hearings, given both Russian and Chinese modernization and regional operationalizing, is that America is statistically ahead but contextually behind. A related take-away is that the U.S. has a surplus of words and a deficit of actions. One highlight came from Defense Secretary Carter when he said, speaking on U.S. naval strategy, that we will go anywhere international law permits. While it may strike many observers as bemusedly ironic that the U.S. is both hinging and invoking international law as the basis of its strategic parameters, this statement points to an emerging theme when it comes to the geostrategic hot spots, the U.S. chooses words while rivals choose actions. Foreign policy is supposed to drive military innovation and evolution. However, sometimes that gets inverted and military innovation drives foreign policy (e.g. we do because we can).
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The past two decades, due to U.S. military hegemony, American foreign policy had no real competitor. Consequently, the U.S. shaped its military predicated upon pax Americana, which created a foreign policy that encompassed everything. To put another way, today America can’t geostrategically see the world’s trees for its own forest. Meanwhile, U.S. competitors have crafted a more limited and tailored foreign policy, one that both advances its military capabilities in a more focused fashion and one that is flexible enough to adapt to military innovation. Russia’s Caspian flotilla is an example of this - regionally designed and strategically relevant. I expect that this will not be the last innovation-led foreign policy design the U.S. bears witness to in the coming years. The U.S., both politically and militarily, will have to grapple with the fact that victory is neither granted nor guaranteed based on hegemony and that statistically ahead but contextually behind needs to be a moniker it quickly sheds, both in Washington and on the battlefield.
MODERN DIPLOMACY
LAURA GARRIDO Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Her primary research interests cover the post-Soviet space and the fight against radical Islamism.
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t has been almost one year since the IV Caspian Summit in Astrakhan, Russia, where the presidents of the five Caspian states signed a political declaration that denied any foreign military presence in the Caspian Sea. By removing any Western military influence in the region, Russia will be able to maintain the regional hegemony it considers its natural birthright. Examining how scholars have so far in general viewed the Russian orchestration of this decision is both important and enlightening and reveals a plan that has long been in the making.
THE CASPIAN PROJECT 17
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RuSSIAN REgIONAL HEgEMONY IN THE CASPIAN
STRATEgIC PATIENCE PAID Off Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley (1999) studied Russia’s influence in the Caspian region and noted that the littoral states were dependent on Russia for trade, energy supplies, military equipment and training, and internal and external security. Russia also exploited its leverage and the weakness of the littoral states to extract military and economic concessions, including basing rights, participation in energy projects, and favorable decisions on pipeline routes. Menon, Fyodorov, and Nodia (1999) echoed these findings by stating that Russia maintained strong political, economic, and military ties to several littoral states from a position of dominance.
Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley (1999) also predicted that Russia would alter its policy toward the littoral states to a more cooperative and less confrontational policy. They also added that because the littoral states saw Russia as a stabilizing force and feared that Russian disengagement could worsen stability challenges within the region, they tended to view Russia as the region’s peacekeeper.
As seen in the IV Caspian Summit, Russia was able to capitalize on that history and nudge the littoral states into agreeing to block foreign militaries from the Caspian region by acting as a supporter, protector, and friend. Russia convinced the states that their militaries were strong enough to defend themselves only if they would have protection from the Russian military as well. Griffith (1998) also made predictions on Russia’s future motives toward the Caspian littorals. He discussed Russia’s loss of power in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union as the chief factor behind its motives. The loss of power meant a loss of control over the republics that were once an important buffer zone between the USSR, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Also, Russia saw Western oil industries in the Caspian region as a potential source of competition and threat to Russian economic hegemony and influence. Because of these threats, Griffith predicted that Russia would attempt to coerce the Caspian states into an economic-military-political union, which finally came to full fruition during the IV Caspian Summit.
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In promoting relations with Iran, Russia seemed to be more successful, entering large-scale political and economic cooperation with the Islamic Republic. Even though part of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) between the United States and Iran is to forego nuclear weapons attainment, without any foreign militaries in the Caspian, Russia might be willing and able to illicitly provide Iran with the necessary materials and technology without American knowledge. German (2014) discussed Russia’s views of a foreign military presence in the Caspian region, especially the US and NATO, as a provocative step. Russia was always determined to contain the influence of external actors and maintain the status quo in the Caspian Sea to ensure that its influence was not eroded. Abilov (2012) also commented on Russia’s desire to contain American influence in the Caspian region. The primary ambition of Russia was to preserve its regional power status and impose its political and economic will. Russia also intended to create new regional and international forums in order to maintain its sphere of influence there. German suggested the United States should try to develop its relations with the littoral states while acknowledging the significance of Russia’s role in the region, as well as the vulnerability Russia felt on its southern periphery if it was not the sole hegemonic power in the Caspian. Thus, as we can see, Russia has been working to gain trust with and influence over the littoral states for years. According to Chufrin (2001), Russia had always strove to work with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran in order to stop or slow the inexorable draw toward the West.
What ties all of these moves together in a disconcerting manner for the Caspian littorals, going back more than fifteen years, is Russian hegemony and its global imposition of strategic interests. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 has many post-Soviet states concerned about Russia’s future desires to reclaim Soviet territory which it feels is its birthright. Kistler (2014) discussed each of the post-Soviet state’s concerns and pleas for help from NATO. The decision to block the US and NATO from the Caspian region makes foreign intervention against any future possible Russian annexations much more difficult. Russia’s desire for dominance in the region fuels its agenda to keep the littoral states politically dependent while building trust so as to instill a positive global image and influence within its ‘near abroad.’ This slow and steady strategy has culminated in the decision to lock the United States, NATO, and any other foreign military from the Caspian region, thereby allowing Russia to remain the dominant regional hegemon without firing a single shot or putting a single boot onto foreign territory. It was impressive geostrategy, if also unnerving to the West.
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MODERN DIPLOMACY
WhAt RussIA’s PREsENCE
thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 17
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IN sYRIA tRuLY REvEALs DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University
NENAD DRCA Nenad Drca is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.
MODERN DIPLOMACY
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ver the years America has made little progress in Iraq and Syria, something Russia is determined to change apparently. The Obama administration maintains that a lasting political solution requires Mr. Assad’s departure, but facing Russian military involvement, Iranian ground troops, Hezbollah military units, many armed jihadists groups, and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the United States is facing a very convoluted and unclear situation that it seems unable to overcome on its own. NATO is concerned with the recent Russian creation of an A2/AD zone (anti access/area denial system) in Syria. This anti access/area denial strategy could severely hinder the ability of the Western alliance to use its military assets in Syria. Moscow’s military moves in the Middle East and its geopolitical positioning around the globe strive to embarrass America’s image as a reliable and confident player when it comes geopolitics and fighting terror. For the most part, this is just Russia employing a ‘turnabout is fair play’ principle, after what it feels is American harassment of Russia on many fronts. What is clear, after a subtle analysis of the consequences of Russia’s entrance into Syria, is an entanglement of enemies that might signal much more chaos before any substantive coordination.
The new U.S. strategy against DAESH in Syria will be backed by special operations forces in Erbil, Northern Iraq, and meant to be strengthened by cooperation with the Iraqi military in retaking key cities, with expanded security assistance by Jordan and Lebanon. This was done to counter the sudden Russian military expansion into the region. Iraqi Shiite politicians were calling for Russians to conduct airstrikes against DAESH in Iraq as well. Following intensive talks between Iraqi and U.S. officials, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, said the Iraqi government had promised it would not request any Russian airstrikes or military support for operations against DAESH. The United States is trying to engage in very demanding diplomatic talks which include the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran, firm supporters of Assad, and nations such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which are opposed to the Syrian Assad regime. Of course, it would have been better if these diplomatic talks took place earlier with more intensity, because it is hard to overestimate just how difficult getting all of these disparate players to cooperate at the negotiating table is. The complexity of these current diplomatic talks is evident by the fact that are still no agreements to establish areas of collaboration in various air campaigns or even to share intelligence and target information in Syria. The lack of military and diplomatic cooperation between Russia and the United States is pushing both sides to resort to Cold War-style tactics of proxy war. In addition, Russian cooperation in the region with Iran could imply proxy conflict that could create tension with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait. The United States is walking a fine line by attempting to court multiple sides while ensuring certain relationships do not escalate into something much worse. Indeed, it is proving quite difficult to wage war when ‘allies’ do not agree on the ‘enemy.’
thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 17
Before Russia’s entrance, America’s Persian Gulf allies wanted to fight the Syrian government but refuse to attack radical Islamic groups. Turkey was against the Syrian regime and DAESH but in reality it wanted to fight and weaken the Kurds, which so far have been one of the few good American allies and effective fighters against DAESH. Another U.S. ally, Israel, is cautiously observing the landscape and seems to be ready to act if any threat materializes against its interests. But other than that, Israel seems intent on remaining outside the fight. In all this it is fair to describe the fight against DAESH not so much a coalition but as a competing potpourri: it is more chaos than coordination. Then Russia arrives with a lean but clear objective of assisting its old Arab ally, Assad, while restoring its national prestige in the Middle East. Russia has received full endorsement to stay in the region from both Syria and Iran. A third party, Iraq, is considering the same. By comparison, U.S. diplomats are facing the very difficult task of appeasing many different allies whose demands seem non-negotiable and not compatible with each other. Asking Russia to stop its air campaign would play into the propaganda that the U.S. is not interested in defeating DAESH if someone else does it. If Russia is allowed to weaken DAESH in Syria and Iraq then that would be a major blow for the U.S. If the United States chooses to follow Turkey’s example of arming certain militant groups, then the risk is that it could find itself with a group of jihadists who are impossible to control at the end of the conflict. Ironically, this is the original criticism Russia made against the U.S. back when the first opposition groups fought against Assad. Another choice is to join Russia in its fight but that will make the U.S. look like it is endorsing a leader it has accused of dictatorship and oppression. So far, America simply seems incapable of cooperating openly with Russia, even with the terror fight.
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Are there any real options for this conflict in terms of diplomatic negotiations and concessions? Realistic electoral transition in Syria cannot take place without advanced talks and a lasting ceasefire, in addition to international observers. Only the combined pressure from Russia and the United States can realistically force those conditions on Syria. Russia can use massive debt to pressure Syria to comply and to promise economic relief once Assad is replaced. The alternative for Moscow is to indefinitely support the Syrian regime and military. That could be something economically unpalatable to Putin.
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In a show of good will, Europe and the U.S. could suspend their sanctions against Russia and encourage Turkey to remind Russia of its plans to expand trade there from $32 billion to $100 billion dollars in the next five years. The EU can assure the Russians that they will support cutting the weapons flow to jihadist groups throughout the area that often include Chechens. Reassurance from the EU and Turkey about stopping the weapons flow would make Russia feel better about militant groups such as Jaish Al-Muhajireen and Jaish Al Fatah, in addition to DAESH, which all include Chechen fighters. Russia is worried that hardened Chechen jihadists will always return from Middle East battlefields to Southern Russia and launch terrorist attacks against Russian citizens, something that has already played out in the past with both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. These diplomatic discussions could potentially bring some militants and government representatives into direct negotiations, which Geneva talks have always failed to accomplish. To this end aid could be provided only to non-Salafist militants who promise a protection of religious minorities. The role of YPG (Kurdish People’s Protection Unit) will have to be carefully negotiated with Turkey. In short, there are far more questions than answers involving far more players than most Western media reports seem to realize. This entanglement of enemies is far more complex than a simple reduction to Cold War proxies. Indeed, the world should be afraid when we look longingly at the prospect of Cold War proxy conflicts as an improvement over the current state of aairs.
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Putin’s Possible libyan Pivot JOHN CODY MOSBEY John Cody Mosbey is consultant and instructor in Criminal Justice and Emergency Management. He is also researcher and writer in various aspects of conflict resolution, terrorism, homeland security, and related criminal justice and national security fields. Mr. Mosbey is completing his PhD research in Russian Political Theology at Trinity College Dublin.
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he bad cloud that portends a perfect storm continues to build. Perhaps the most serious development on the near horizon is a possible Putin pivot from Syria to Libya. It may be in the works - if it is, bad things are bound to happen. There is no real and historic Russian desire for a mere presence in Southwest Asia. Geopolitical scholars, diplomats, and military thinkers who have put forth such ideas have been rightly criticized but largely for the wrong reason.
MoDeRn DiPloMaCy The fact is that those who believe that Russia has a real and historic desire for a presence in Southwest Asia and those who criticize those that do think this are both wrong. Russia has no desire for a mere presence in Southwest Asia - Russia’s desire there is for regional hegemony. In what here must be a brief examination, it is important to recall two historical developments: the first is the realization that for many Russia embodies the “Third Rome.” This is the idea that Moscow (i.e. Russia) is the inheritor of the mantle of Rome transferred to it via Constantinople. As Rome was empire, as Byzantium was empire, so Russia is empire. Coupled with the concept of Third Rome is the acceptance of Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Church (and the Christian Church collectively) throughout the lands previously under control of the Ottoman Empire. It is noteworthy that the Russian Orthodox Church, through a spokesman, has stated that Russia’s presence in Syria is historically consistent with the role Russia “has always played in the Middle East.” Alexandr Dugin, an outspoken advocate of Russian expansion who has been rather sensationally dubbed “Putin’s Rasputin,” has said that Russia should recreate empire and looks to Southwest Asia for Russia’s southern expansion. Besides belief in Russia as the Third Rome, the second important historical position to recall is the assumption of Russia as “Protector of the Persian Crown.” Russian expansion southward is no new thing. After victories in the Russo-Persian Wars, Russia was ceded a great deal of territory formerly under Persian control. The Czar was bestowed with the title “Protector of the Persian Crown.” In deference to Russia’s Eurasian outlook it should be noted that historical titles, possessions, and interests are deeply embedded in the long reachback of Russian memory.
Russia views Southwest Asia geopolitically as a region next door. This is a markedly different understanding from European or American perceptions of Southwest Asia as a much more distant region. When Russian understanding of close geographical proximity and perceived historical duty to protect both Christianity and Persia combine the result can help explain current Russian interest and involvement in the region. Consider that Mr. Putin has reinvigorated Russia’s historically important relationship with Iran and moved boldly into Syria. Surely no one can be naive enough to believe he will stop with these two works in progress. Russia is energized for action and pushback to Russian initiatives has been minimal, ineffective, or both.The US, the EU, and other concerned nations and bodies must prepare for Russia’s next move - and it may well be another bold one. Knowledgeable persons inside European and US intelligence communities are seeing indications of Russian intentions toward Libya begin to solidify.
tHe CasPian PRoJeCt 17 Mr. Putin has forwarded the notion that Russia has a responsibility to bring stability to the de facto failed state of Syria by supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad as the legal and legitimate governmental power of Syria. Putin claims that longer term peace can best be achieved when the established government and its adversaries can be brought to the table, not when a state descends into total chaos and there is not even the remnant of recognizable government left to negotiate with. This is his position in Syria and it is a ready-made position for him to adopt in Libya. Further consider the current Libyan situation. General Khalifah Hafter, the commander of the Libyan armed forces (such as they are), stated that he would be loyal to Libya’s Tobruk-based House of Representatives if they did not acquiesce to the Political Accord put forward by Benardino Leon and backed by Western governments and the UN. The House of Representatives (Libya’s internationally recognized parliamentary body) rejected the Political Accord.
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We will now see just how General Hafter will carry out his pledge to root out armed opposition, especially in light of his claim that Russia has offered to support his efforts. The unraveling of the UN sponsored Political Accord was in part due to what the Libyan House of Representatives viewed as its unwarranted support for the Salifist elements in Tripoli. The alarm bells should be ringing. Russian and Libya came close to closing a deal for a Russian base in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi. Of course to Libya, this would mean a real Russian presence in the form of arms; only this time armament at a level similar to the Russian arming of Syria. More importantly, a substantial Russian presence in Libya and continued lack of effective US pushback to Putin’s initiatives combine to make the Mediterranean much more attractive and tractable to Moscow. A perfect storm is now in the making. Russia and Iran will continue to test US resolve to hold Iran in strict compliance with the Nuclear Deal through deployments such as the S300 missile system to Iran. No Syrian style red line will be strong enough to keep Iran from unleashing the whirlwind if it continues, with Russian help, to develop truly heavy-lift capability for its ballistic missile program. Russia is daily strengthening its foothold in Syria and a Putin pivot off of that into Libya may prove to be too much Russia and too little US in a region Russian has long felt is rightfully in their sphere of influence. If conditions continue toward a perfect storm in Southwest Asia, one must consider the prescience of Alexandr Dugin’s claim that “We will have a new Cold War, but maybe not so cold—maybe hot this time.”
MODERN DIPLOMACY
W Is RussIA COMINg BACk IN?
A TANgLED AfghANI WEB STEPHEN SARTY Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.
ith First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum’s visit to Moscow in search of military support, and Russian confirmation that it was seriously considering such a request, the stakes just got raised in the battle for Afghanistan. On the surface, both the request and willingness on Russia’s part to assist make perfect sense: Afghanistan is a nation void of any real industry and relies almost exclusively on international aid to continue the fight against the Taliban.
The impending withdrawal of US and NATO forces would almost certainly ensure wide-spread destabilization inside Afghanistan and the Taliban could, once again, regain control of the state. Russia, meanwhile, has no interest in seeing the Pakistanbacked Taliban reestablish control of Afghanistan and incentivize radical groups within
ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 17 Central Asia, which would then threaten Russia’s broader interests in the region. So a more stable Afghanistan is vital to Russian security. But could this deal be that simple or are there far more complex forces at work in the background? The current proposed agreement would have Russia sending small arms, artillery, and Mi-35 choppers to Kabul. What Russia does NOT propose to send at this time would be Russian soldiers. Loath to be pulled back into the quagmire that cost them over 15,000 troops during their decade of fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russian officials have so far ruled out that as an option. This then begs the question: how does Russia expect, if US and NATO troops do proceed with a pull-out, that an infusion of weapons and ammunition could provide the means by which the current Afghan leadership might secure the country?
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Considering that the United States alone has pumped billions of dollars into Afghanistan since the start of its own campaign, it seems highly unlikely that this influx of Russian arms could fill the void left by the withdrawal of Western troops. So what then are the real goals and objectives? One possible plan could be that Russia simply expects that the shipments of arms and munitions into the country effectively forces the US and NATO to remain in place. Given the highly-charged nature of American politics, especially during a presidential election cycle, any decision to remove US support could have devastating effects, especially if viewed by the American public as caving in the face of Russian advances. This scenario is currently being played out in Syria: already Republican leaders have characterized the Afghan leaders’ approach to Russia as a symbol of failed leadership by the White House.
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This likely represents the most desired solution for Russia: embarrassing the US while gaining greater influence. It is unlikely that Russia has any vital interest in the internal struggles of Afghanistan and would likely be willing to work with any regime as long as it doesn’t pose a threat to Russia in the region. It is not inconceivable that Russia, Iran and other old allies have also struck a deal to reconstitute their earlier partnership and form a new “Northern Alliance” so as to thwart the Pakistan-supported insurgency in the Northern regions of Afghanistan. First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was a General in the Soviet-backed Afghan army during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, was also a key member of the original Northern Alliance during the latter part of the 1990s. Dostum is no stranger to Moscow-provided military aid as his own militia battalions received extensive financial and arms support from the Russians in his battles against the Mujahedin guerrillas. In such a scenario one could see aid received from Russia used by President Ghani and Vice President Dostum to secure Kabul and the Northern Provinces of the country and then aim to see US/NATO forces remain in place to conduct operations against the rising tide of DAESH fighters along with the Taliban fight. For Iran, a stabilization of Afghanistan is vitally important given its close cultural and religious ties. Iran has been attempting to increase its trade and investment interests there for a long time and, like Russia, has an on-going national security interest in slowing the rampant drug-trafficking problem that only increased during the US-led occupation.
As in Syria, it is easy to see a scenario that includes Iran working in conjunction with Russia and other local Afghan leaders to stabilize the region: Iran is coming under increasing threat from DAESH forces. The door is also slightly open for Iran working with the United States in some aspect as well. Because the two nations share the same end-state goal of stability and economic development in Afghanistan, there is room for the two nations to cooperate, although the recent announcement by Iran that it will not partner up with the US in Syria to fight DAESH could throw a monkey wrench into this potentiality in Afghanistan. That Afghanistan would turn to Russia at this time is, however, indicative of a larger trend across the region: with Russia underwriting an expansion of Iranian influence, increasing its own presence in Syria, creating a new intelligence-sharing cell in Jordan, and receiving the recent request by the Iraqi PM for Russian assistance, it is only logical that Afghanistan would also reach out for increased support. For the Russians the decisions are almost nobrainers. Currently in Syria they are largely using the Iranian-backed Shiite and Hezbollah militias already in place. The same would be true, for the most part, inside Iraq. The upside for the Russians is huge: they are able to shine the spotlight on what has been an incredibly schizophrenic Middle East strategy by the United States and, at the same time, put themselves in place to become the dominant player in Middle Eastern geostrategic affairs. For President Putin this is an enticing double play. All of this is also not lost on the Iranians: the TehranMoscow alliance has effectively outflanked Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni-dominated countries of the GCC in terms of strategic outcome and influence.
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Regardless of the scenarios that ultimately play out in Afghanistan, the message from the Russians is clear: they are resolved to impress upon the world that the news of their global demise has been greatly exaggerated. For Russia these moves also allow it to influence oil and gas pipeline routes so as to minimize competition with its own energy supplies into Europe and bring additional revenue through the sale of arms. Furthermore, the moves allow Russia to have a more direct impact on one of the biggest threats to its own Muslim-speaking regions: the spread of jihadism into sovereign Russia.
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At a recent Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Kazakhstan last week, Vladimir Putin said the situation in Afghanistan was “close to critical� and that terrorist groups were gaining more influence and not hiding their plans for further expansion toward Russia and the other CIS states. These moves go a long way toward addressing those concerns. Indeed, the whirlwind of Russian strategic positioning in 2015 has been surprisingly powerful.
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tuRkIsh DILEMMA
PRObLEMs IN bEINg A gREAtER CAsPIAN FORCE?
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JEANETTE “JJ” HARPER Jeanette “JJ” Harper is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.
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n the wake of Turkey’s recent election – supposedly fraught with corruption and fraud – and amid some of the worst violent outbreaks it has seen in years, many find themselves anxious over the country’s future. The fighting between Turkey’s security forces and Kurdish rebels has killed thousands of people. Even though claimed by the Islamic State terrorist organization, two massive suicide bombings that occurred recently at a pro-Kurdish rally have increased tensions between Turks and Kurds. The instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq, combined with the refugee crisis spilling into Europe, is making things even worse. To add insult to injury, Turkey’s economy is slowing and its private sector is losing revenue from decreased tourism. All of this is what leads to a refocused emphasis on Turkish interests and the Greater Caspian region. While not one of the Caspian littorals, it seems likely that Turkey is going to remain a major player in the region because of its own internal stresses. Whether those stresses push its influence in a positive or negative direction remains to be seen.
Turkey is in all senses of the term a modern nation: it is an important member of NATO and would be a member of the European Union if opponents had not prevented it. Over time, it has cultivated important strategic alliances with neighbors in Asia and the Middle East. These partnerships and Turkey’s geographic position – a location that flanks many troublesome regions – makes it a very important ally. It also seems to be the primary conduit for almost all energy plans stemming from the Caspian region and heading to Europe. Its presence helps balance the more militant regimes found in the area and serves as an important site for NATO actions. The country has a strict secular policy that has helped fend off more aggressive Islamic regimes. However, there are still many Turks that would prefer a more Islamic identity for the country. They believe a revival of the golden days of the Ottoman dynasty is possible with Turkey as the seat of a new Islamic caliphate. Yet there are others that recognize that the fall of the empire was a direct result of stagnant ideas and corrupt actions.
MODERN DIPLOMACY
As a result of this conflicting debate, the nation finds itself swaying back and forth between Western and Islamic culture. This is reflected in Turkey’s dealings with both its regional and international partnerships. In the early years of the 20th century, as long as Turkey remained true to its plans of building a Westernized society in matters of foreign policy, the country was considered an ally of Western nations. It was a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East. Despite its mistreatment of the Kurds, the resounding calls of pro-Islamic militants who preached the need to turn away from the West, and the subsequent postponement of EU membership, Turkey’s membership in NATO and intentions to join the European Economic Community were evidence of its desires to become an important fixture for a modern global community. Even today, Turkey is considered an indispensable partner in dealing with the misconduct of the Islamic State, the Syrian civil war, Russian movement in the region, and the developing migrant crisis. Today, Turkey’s major interests have also shifted to include the changing geopolitics of Eurasia. The Caspian region, an essential link between Central Asia and Turkey, has grown in importance as a source of energy. Its relationships with Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the Caucasus are opening up new opportunities for Turkey both politically and economically.
And while Turkey does stand to gain much politically with these new relations, its policy has so far been almost solely motivated by economic development. Turkish leaders believe, however, that its gains in terms of energy will not only help its own internal development but will also serve to promote stability across the Greater Caspian, decreasing the incidents of rivalry and conflict in the region. In some ways Turkey justifiably sees the Caspian as the most obvious foothold for itself and increasing global stature, especially as the tension increases in the region between the United States and Russia. While multilateralism and cooperation with the West still largely dominate Turkish diplomacy in areas like the Caspian, there are concerns about Turkey’s relationship with Islamism and the Middle East and what that could do to the region if problems emerge internally. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of Turkey’s Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), is seen as the key to the country’s political and economic stability – not only for Turkey but also for the entire Middle East. Unfortunately, this latest election may have served to undermine the secular social order and that key may now be a negative one. Disconcertingly, Erdoğan’s very character has been brought into question after the elections. Since the revival of Islamism in the Middle East and the events that unfolded from the Arab Spring in 2011, Erdoğan has been caricatured as a tyrant with unrivaled executive powers that may be used to slowly abolish some of the important gains Turkey has made over the decades. Worries about regression abound. Erdoğan’s AK party, now the dominant Sunni identity in the country, has been cracking down on anyone that opposes it.
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With arrests, confiscations, and violence, Turkey’s system is starting to look like those found in Russia, Venezuela and other ‘democracies’ that have no tolerance for dissidence or civil disobedience. Erdogan’s administration – not so long ago praised as an example of a modern Islamic democracy - is quickly becoming one that appeals to Islamists who wish to wage war against what they see as a godless secular system imported by the West. While it would not be fair to lump Turkey’s Islamists in with fanatical groups like DAESH it is important to recognize their potential to implement practices and rules that are so restrictive that they threaten to completely overhaul Turkey’s legal and educational systems. Because of Turkey’s importance in the region, this could mean further upsetting the regional balance in the Middle East and possibly even the Caspian.
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Most assuredly, Russia would stand against a rising Turkey in the Caspian region if radical Islamic tendencies were seen emerging within its political system at home. While it may not yet be time to panic – due to a significant secular-nationalist Turkish population that remains resistant to the rise of Islamism – the outcome of the recent events surrounding Turkey’s recent elections could have a serious impact on Turkey’s current system that promises to protect everyday Turkish social rights and liberties. They may also facilitate negative global repercussions. Turkey’s rising importance in the greater Caspian region has been slowly building for the last decade. It would be a shame to see ancient internal dilemmas cause that progress to be postponed or destroyed.
MODERN DIPLOMACY
KAzAKhstAN’s URbAN DEvELOPMENt stRUggLEs wIth MONO-CItIEs
SAMANTHA BRLETICH Samantha Brletich is a current graduate student studying peace operations policy at George Mason University, Arlington, VA. Ms. Brletich focuses on Russia and Central Asia focusing on extremism and terrorism, regional relations, strategic relations, Kyrgyz and Western relations, and governance. Ms. Brletich is an employee of the US Department of Defense.
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s Kazakhstan strives to be one of the most 30 developed nations by 2050, Kazakhstan struggles with transforming its economic system, dealing with regional issues including economic integration and terrorism, and with transforming Kazakhstan’s Soviet-era villages into modern day cities which will assist in Kazakhstan’s long-term development.One of the main nine concepts of the Kazakhstan Strategy 2050 is industrialization which is required to exploit Kazakhstan’s natural gas and oil reserves. Industrialization and the implementation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) will attract foreign investors boosting its economy and maintaining Kazakhstan’s relationships with companies and foreign nations.
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Kazakhstan, within the history and context of the Soviet Union, was a dumping ground for the Soviet Union’s unwanted persons and used as a nuclear testing ground (specifically Semipalatinsk, now called Semey). Populations are scattered throughout Kazakhstan in large cities once populated by ethnic Russians who left once the Soviet Union disintegrated. In Kazakhstan, a mono-city is defined by more than 20% of the population working in one industry. Mono cities were part of the planned and centralized economy and when Kazakhstan transitioned to a market economy and “many small and medium sized cities gradually started to fall into decline, which was caused mainly by low competitiveness of local enterprises.” Mono-cities still remained. “Mono-cities” were the industrial and economic backbone for municipalities. The mono-city is an urbanization pattern still prevalent in Russia that is vulnerable to economic shocks. If the company or industry falters or demand sharply drops for the product, the city experiences a sharp economic downturn which results in the loss of wages, jobs, and decline in the condition of living increasing social tensions and possibly violence. This was feared in the mono-city of Temirtau in 2015. As the national population rose, the population(s) of mono-cities declined by 4% during the last ten years (2005-2015) and the elderly populations of mono-cities exceeded 18% which increases the need for pension funds, more healthcare and a declining population. In Kazakhstan, 9%-10% of the population lives in 27 mono-cities in ten different regions; ten mono-cities are in Karaganda Province alone
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Citing statistics from UNESCAP , the mono-cities make up 16.8% of the country’s urban population. Most of the mono-cities are have populations below 50,000 with the exception of eight mediumsized cities with populations between 50,000100,000, and four larger cities with populations over “100,000–Temirtau, Rudny, Zhanaozen, and Ekibastuzand one large city – Termirtau with population above 150,000.” Workers at Temirtau, the location of Kazakhstan’s largest steelworks plant, were experiencing imminent wage cuts by 25% in July by the company ArcelorMittal Temirtau . This non-consensual wage decrease violated the country’s Labor Code which recognized the order to be ineffective. ArcelorMittal Temirtau was in a similar situation in February 2015 when the company had to pay wages as part of an agreement with Trade Union of Workers of Mining and Metallurgical Industries. The wages in Temirtau are impacted by Kazakhstan’s non-competitiveness in the steel industries and Russia’s 80% de-evaluation of the ruble according to Kazakh news agency , Tengrinews. The mono-cities have been the subject of economic diversification by the Kazakh government within the framework of State Program of Regional Development 2020. The mono-cities make modicum contributions to economy as the Kazakh economy is focusing more on global services and natural gas. The State Program of Regional Development strives to “ remove social stress in the mono and small cities, to create the new centers of economic growth” Trade blocks are also causing Kazakhstan economic problems. The State Program on the Development of Mono-cities for 2012-2020 is the first urbanization program for mono-cities approved by the government in May 2012. By the end of the 2015, “141.3 billion KZT [(Kazakh tenge)] [will be spent] on this Program.”
The Development of Mono-cities Program has four goals as identified by the Eurasian Research Institute based in Almaty, Kazakhstan: make the size of the mono-city proportionate to the size of the population; diversify the economy with more SMEs; increase labor mobility in mono- cities; and attract infrastructural development. The program is expected to “increase industrial output by mono-cities by 20%” and reduce poverty and the unemployment rate. Increasing labor mobility would be difficult because of the very nature of mono-cities unless there is a transfer mechanism in place. According to the second phase of the project, focused on entrepreneurship and microloans , those who “willing and having the ability to start or expand their own business may participate in the second phase” and will be executed through employment centers in the mono-cities. The Fund for Financial Support of Agriculture will also assist in the development of the mono-cities. The State Program on the Development of Mono-cities plans to provide microloans worth 1.4 billion tenge. The four mono-cities of Zyryanovsk, Kurchatov (one of the nuclear test sites, Semipalatinsk-21), Ridder (a mining site) and Serebryansk already have comprehensive programs for future development. Infrastructure was supplied to the Central Asia state by the Soviet Union but they are in disrepair. The infrastructure of the mono-cities should be provided by the government. Foreign direct investment would also increase infrastructure projects. An example would be China and its rejuvenation of the “Silk Road.” Transfers from the national budget development of social and engineering infrastructure supplied mono-cities received 5.5 % of 43.0 billion tenge.With growth, the cities can begin to accommodate more than just one single dominant industry. Services such as technology and manufacturing are increasing and it would be beneficial to the mono-cities and the Kazakh government if these types of services were introduced into a mono-city.
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Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Economy stated that in 2013 the budget of the State Program to Develop Mono-cities allocated 38.3 billion tenge “devoted to operating costs, demolition of empty buildings, and also on reconstruction and building of infrastructure objects, [and to] support of small and medium business.” Renovation of the mono-cities would make the mono-cities more modern, but fails to address their non-competitiveness. The Government is already working with the United Nations Development Program and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to assess the status of mono-cities and assist in development. The city of Ust-Kamenogorsk (or Oskemen) in Kazakhstan signed up for the UNICEF Program on making cities child friendly by “ improvement of quality of life of children by a way of providing social and legal guarantees.” Their goal is stop and alleviate the urban poverty that mono-cities create. The government has also begun geographic exploration near the mono-cities directed by the Ministry for Investment and Development in the Zhezkazgan, Satpayev, and Ulytau regions. The people in mono-cities would benefit from labor mobility or job placement programs, or job transfer programs. People outside of the mono-cities would benefit from working in the mono-cities. Exporting experts from the economic hubs in the country would also be helpful. The government, as it increases its focus on the information technology sector, should create a technology park near or in the mono-cities which requires updated infrastructure. Education grants and the ability to participate in state economic programs would also assist families in breaking the cycle of poverty.
Privatization of the mono-cities would help solidify Kazakhstan’s transition to the market economy. Another option would be to eliminate the urbanization pattern of mono-cities which privatization would achieve. This urbanization pattern is incongruent with Kazakhstan’s market economy. Understanding that most of the industries are state-owned in the mono-cities some industries and new economic initiatives in the industrial towns be backed by foreign investors. As Kazakhstan struggles with de-evaluation of their currency, and amid reports of food prices rising , the economic situation in the mono cities could become amplified for the Kazakh government posing new challenges and raising new questions about the vitality of these cities.
MoDern DiPLoMACY
Countering the CritiCs of the JCPoA
trust, but VerifY
AARON GOOD Aaron Good is presently a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. He is currently employed by the US Department of Justice.
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The real question on everyone’s mind with regard to the JCPOA is whether or not Iran will honor its commitments. There are two differing philosophies to this question. The first is that of the agreement’s critics, who argue that Iran will act similarly to rogue nations in the past and violate the agreement in hopes of attaining a nuclear arsenal. After all, a very similar agreement was made with Iraq, and the U.S. ultimately invaded the country in 2003 because of what was viewed as violations to the agreement. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his
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Similar to Iran’s recent commitments under the JCPOA, North Korea agreed to full compliance, including taking all steps deemed necessary by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to determine the extent to which North Korea diverted material for weapons in the past and giving inspectors’ access to all nuclear facilities in the country. North Korea eventually violated this arrangement, withdrew from the NPT, and attained nuclear weapons capability. Critics of the JCPOA have pointed to these failed agreements to validate their arguments. They are difficult to argue with as Iran and North Korea share some attributes, including violating international norms on nonproliferation, terrorism, and human rights.
weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq. Critics have pointed to the failed compromise with Iraq as an indicator of the forthcoming conflict that will arise from the JCPOA. The breakdown of the Iraqi agreement is not the first time that the U.S. has been part of an arrangement that has gone south.On October 21, 1994 the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework after North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Conversely, proponents of the JCPOA have argued that Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear energy and the right to address legitimate security concerns. It is no secret that Iran is trying to secure its position as a leader in the Middle East and the world. Advocates of the JCPOA contend that, because of its desire to emerge as a world power, Iran will be more likely to abide by the rules of the agreement and enhance its security through diplomatic relations with other world leaders. Additionally, enthusiasts of the JCPOA reject the idea that the U.S. is being seduced by a deal that is similar to failed agreements of the past and argue that the JCPOA is not the North Korea deal. First and foremost, the final agreement with Iran is vastly more comprehensive in terms of verification provisions and contains much stronger elements to deter cheating, as well as more meaningful incentives to motivate compliance than the Agreed Framework. Second, advocates of the JCPOA point to the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program compared to Iran’s when an agreement was signed as another essential difference: by the time the Agreed Framework was completed in 1994, North Korea was already estimated to have produced more than enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon.
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George Perkovich explains, “by contrast, neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor any intelligence agency has offered evidence that Iran has acquired enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon [and] therefore, Iran cannot hide behind a putative agreement and weaponize material it already possesses.” These two fundamental distinctions, coupled with advances in technical capabilities and the United States’ ability to adapt from former failed negotiations, give proponents the confidence to believe in the agreement’s validity. Supposedly, the U.S. has three alternatives to the JCPOA in terms of resolving the threat posed by a secret nuclear program of Iran. The first and most popular alternative is for the U.S. to impose increased sanctions. For example, The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) explains that the U.S. must, “revive the policy that first brought about negotiations—a combination of tough diplomacy and crippling sanctions [and] this time around must not settle for merely delaying ‘breakout’ time, but forge a deal that truly stops all of Iran’s pathways to a bomb.” Despite the committee’s enthusiasm for developing an all-inclusive agreement that ensures that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon, there are a few flaws in the strategy to re-impose sanctions. The first and most obvious problem with this strategy is that the U.S. has already accepted the terms of the JCPOA and, arguably, is at the point of no return. Congressman Jerrold Nadler correctly assesses, “The Europeans, Russia, and China, being eager to resume business with Iran, having agreed to voluntary sanctions only in order to coerce Iran into negotiating an agreement, and having reached what they regard as a reasonable agreement only to have Congress pull the rug out from under them, would certainly not want to maintain their sanctions.”
Second, if Iran determined that the U.S. was not adhering to its obligations under the agreement, then Iran would have no incentive to allow IAEA inspectors into its facilities and it could begin enriching as much plutonium as it wished. The second alternative would involve the boycotting of Iranian banks. The basic idea behind this strategy is for the U.S. to impose, more-or-less, secondary sanctions in order to get Iran back to the negotiating table. Jerrold Nadler explains, “We would take on essentially the rest of the world, including all our closest economic and diplomatic allies, and, by threatening to cut off their access to the American economy through our banks.” In other words, the U.S. would not only try to influence Iran through an economic boycott but the entire world. If that sounds suspiciously like coercion, that’s because it is. Unsurprisingly, there are several downfalls to this approach. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew sums it up best: “The countries we would have to coerce are among the biggest economies in the world [and] if we were to cut them off from the American dollar and our financial system, we would set off extensive financial hemorrhaging, not just in our partner countries but in the United States as well.” Another significant flaw in this approach is the fact that the rest of the world has the ability to call the American bluff. Over forty percent of U.S. exports go to these countries and American trading partners know that it will not shut down its exports or cut off countries that hold nearly forty-seven percent of foreign-held U.S. treasuries. The third and final alternative to the JCPOA is direct U.S. military intervention. As Jeffrey Goldberg argued, “an Israeli strike could theoretically set back Iran’s nuclear program, but only the U.S. has the military capabilities to set back the program in anything approaching a semi-permanent way.
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Many voices heard throughout the debate of Iran’s potential nuclear program have claimed that military action may be the only path available to the U.S. that would secure world stability. Besides the obvious consequences of military action including the loss of human life, there are some other issues that should cause the U.S. to pause. In 2004, the Atlantic magazine conducted a war game which simulated preparations for a U.S. assault on Iran and in doing so they arrived at a few sobering conclusions. First, the U.S. government had no way of knowing exactly how many sites Iran had, how many it would be able to destroy, or how much time it would take to do so. Even worse, the U.S. had no way of predicting the long-term strategic impact of a strike. If these were the conclusions that this group came up with in 2004, when the U.S. had forces in neighboring Iraq, how much more
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ineffective would an assault be in present day? It is also important to note that even if the U.S. were successful in its endeavor to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran would be more hostile towards the U.S. if it ever did achieve the production of a nuclear weapon down the road. And that as a goal would be extremely likely if the U.S. violated Iranian sovereignty and invaded. Each of these strategies offers a different alternative to resolving the conflict of a secret Iranian nuclear program. Unfortunately, each approach is even more unrealistic than the last. Currently, the U.S. has very little option but to embrace the terms of the JCPOA and to enforce those terms as rigidly as possible. Skeptics may believe it is foolhardy to ‘trust’ Iran, but in this case the old Reagan adage during the Cold War seems most appropriate: Trust, but verify.
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C
A HuMAN RIgHts CRItICIsM Of tHE JCPOA
A DIstuRbINg DOubLE stANDARD ANDY DEAHN Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program. He is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor working as a member of an intelligence analysis team throughout various worldwide locations. He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.
ritics of capital punishment have long claimed that the utilization of such measures are inhumane and disregard certain human rights. One state at the center of this debate has been the United States. Since 1976, when the death penalty was re-enacted in the U.S., America has executed more than 1,400 individuals, all of whom were convicted of wide range of highly evil crimes. However, when compared to the Caspian Five, this number is extremely small. Across the Caspian one can observe a dire human rights record. According to the 2015 Human Rights Risk Atlas, the five littoral nations can be categorized as holding an “extreme risk” or “high risk” of committing human rights violations. These risk classifications are based upon a scale of 1 to 10, where extreme risk is determined to be 0-2.5 and high risk is 2.5-5.0. Moreover, these classifications are based upon certain criteria which include state repression of assembly, speech, and religion; continued conflict; judicial corruption; torture; executions; and failing to uphold civil rights for workers.
tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 17 Russia and Iran both are categorized as extreme, while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are categorized as high. Just to put it into perspective the United States currently is considered a ‘medium risk’ (5.0-7.5) country. This is due to human rights violations in the areas of criminal justice, immigration, and national security—the criminal justice criteria include harsh sentencing and capital punishment. In comparison, capital punishment has been outlawed in Russia. However, the nation’s human rights situation continues to deteriorate. This is because the state suppresses the media, internet, and civil society, while at the same time turns a blind eye to the harassment of activists and corrupt legal and economic practices. Now, while capital punishment may be outlawed, Russia’s seemingly systemic human rights violations on multiple levels earn it the title of ‘extreme risk.’ Iran, on the other hand, is a nation currently attempting to gain international legitimacy and have a say in global political dialogue.
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However, while Western powers, and more specifically the United States, are attempting to engage Iran, the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric compared to its actions on human rights garners well-earned criticism. Just one year ago Iran carried out the second highest number of executions in the world, trailing just behind China, who was the world’s leading executioner per capita. Despite the election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013—a moderate in the eyes of many—and the JCPOA nuclear deal being struck with the United States, Iran’s human rights record has not improved. In fact, its record is now considered to be the worst in the world. For example, between January 2015 and September 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran carried out public executions by method of hanging on more than 694 individuals, a statistic that a United Nations human rights monitor has called the highest rate of executions per capita within the country in the last 25 years. The majority of these executions were due to a surge in drug-related crime, an offense that is punishable by death within the Islamic Republic.
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In addition to drug crimes, which accounted for 69 percent of all executions in the first half of 2015, Iranian law employs the death penalty for a variety of offenses. These include threats toward the security of the state, any verbal or physical hostility towards God - also known as Moharebeh - and for any insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. Moharebeh specifically has been frequently utilized by prosecutors as a criminal charge against political dissenters, journalists, activists, and bloggers, of which the Islamic Republic remains the one of the world’s largest incarcerators. However, for a nation that is attempting to gain both political and economic clout on the international stage, it still acts as a repressive government and uses wide state powers as tools of control against its society. So one must ask, when comparing international standards for human rights, why is there not more international outrage about the rate and number of executions being conducted inside of Iran? Furthermore, how is it that despite U.S. leadership’s knowledge of such dire reality for many Iranian citizens and political prisoners, America continued to pursue diplomatic openings that would remove sanctions and allow Iran to engage the global community freely? Does this not signify that the United States is undermining its own professed prioritization of human rights? For example, the ink had not even dried on President Obama’s historical nuclear agreement when in October 2015 United States citizen and Washington Post correspondent Jason Rezaian was convicted of espionage in an Islamic court in Iran.
However, if the Iranian regime is content with ruling heavy-handedly over its own citizens and moving against their human rights to the point of becoming the world’s leading executioner, how can Western powers trust the regime to not produce nuclear weapons or not act under false pretenses? Clearly, there seems to be a double-standard based upon certain political or economic advantages as deemed by the United States. And while it is not inherently wrong to engage and participate in developmental discourse, it is wrong to overlook what history has taught: evil deeds should not be discounted in an attempt to establish new positions with so-called moderate officials. We do know that under the Rouhani presidency, Tehran has pledged to become more moderate. But when dissecting the nation’s human rights score sheet, violations have become increasingly systemic. Nevertheless, the passing of the nuclear agreement between the United States and Tehran was a legacybuilding move on behalf of President Obama and one that may hold the potential to improve global nuclear security and stability. But with the agreement acting as the sole motivator and center of diplomatic openings, it overlooks and arguably even dismisses human rights as an issue of importance. This fact cannot help but allow the expansion of systemic abuse against human rights within Iran. Whether the JCPOA can be a positive facilitator to improve that record remains to be seen, but this author is highly skeptical.
(*) The opinions expressed in this article are not offered as unemotional objective political commentary but as a liberal critique in the long and storied history of human rights scholarship. The views expressed are solely those of the author and not necessarily a reflection of The Caspian Project, its other contributors, or Modern Diplomacy in general.
“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides
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ThE IvORY TOwER AND ThE JCPOA SARA DYSON Sara Dyson is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.
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ust as the early scientists in the 1930s and 40s spoke about the threat that nuclear weapons posed, today’s scholars and experts have spoken out on the new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Opinions have been polled and theories have been produced from many experts and scholars in the US and around the world. Although there is some degree of variance the theme remains fairly constant – the JCPOA, although not perfect, is the best option the world currently has at obtaining some degree of regional stability in the Middle East. Arab Scholars and Experts Discuss the JCPOA The JCPOA is an historic agreement that provides a very new and unique opportunity to engage Iran and potentially eliminate regional tensions, improve international security, and address nuclear proliferation for the entire Middle East. Given the significance of the ramifications that the JCPOA could bring to the future of the region, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University engaged regional scholars and analysts on the ‘future of Iran’s role in the Middle East and Arab security.’ 15 leading regional experts across the Arab world (Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Kuwait and Q’atar) were asked to share their views on the implications of the JCPOA on Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East and throughout the Arab world and how the nuclear agreement will impact the structure of regional security.
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When asked to identify factors that explained why the JCPOA was reached, the most common theory amongst Arab scholars and experts was the impact of the sanctions on Iran and the Iranian people’s desire to have them lifted. Others also targeted Iran as the catalyst for change by ‘allowing for successful negotiations.’ They identified the shift in Iranian foreign policy with the election of President Hasan Rouhani, the generational gap between Iranian officials and the public, and the military stalemate Iran faced in regional conflicts as explanations for Iran’s newfound willingness to participate in nuclear negotiations. Whether stated or implied, many found the deal to be either a ‘clear win’ for Iran or otherwise beneficial to it. Many experts who discussed the implications of nuclear agreement on regional nuclear proliferation believed that the JCPOA would ‘diminish the risk of proliferation’ and ‘praised the settlement’ for that reason and they were optimistic that the nuclear deal might advance the idea for ‘a WMD-free zone’ in the Middle East and bring Israel’s nuclear program in line with Iran’s. Others, however, were not as optimistic and expressed concern that Iran would not stick to the terms of the agreement and would drive towards nuclear weaponization and regional proliferation. The overall sentiment amongst regional experts was that any Iranian nuclear program poses a ‘significant threat to the Arab world’ as it is simply an outlet for Iran’s projection of regional power.
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US Scientists and International Relations Experts Weigh In The JCPOA does not just have implications for Iran and the Middle East. The US was a key player in the negotiations of the nuclear agreement and will continue to play a leading role as the terms of the JCPOA are implemented. 29 Nobel laureates, nuclear arms makers and former White House science advisors (some of the nation’s top scientists) provided contributory statements to President Obama on the JCPOA. In a letter to the White House, these 29 US scientists praised the agreement and used such words as “innovative” and “stringent” to describe the contents of the JCPOA. They congratulated President Obama for negotiating an agreement that ‘will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation agreements.’
An opinion poll conducted by The College of William and Mary found that there was a significant gap between the opinions of US international relations (IR) experts and the American public. A large majority of IR scholars, 80 percent in fact, believed that the JCPOA will have a largely positive impact on regional stability and security in the Middle East, whereas only 43 percent of the US public believed the same to be true. Additionally, IR scholars at Indiana University argued that although a deal with Iran that lifts its economic sanctions in exchange for ‘checking’ its nuclear capabilities is far from perfect, it is by far the best option for the US. They viewed it as a step toward restoring a positive and cooperative relationship between the US, EU, and Iran by alleviating tensions between them.
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The biggest concern for those opposed to the deal is that Iran will violate the terms of the agreement and pursue a nuclear weapons program illicitly, but IR scholars in America feel that the control the IAEA will have on Iran’s nuclear development minimizes the likelihood of Iran ever actually producing a nuclear weapon. Nuclear danger has now existed for decades. Before the first nuclear weapon was ever developed or used, experts expressed their opinions about the graveness of the threat that nuclear proliferation posed on global security. Today the world watched as the nuclear threat unfolded in the Middle East with Iran as the focal point of regional and international concern. As the P5+1 negotiated the agreements of a nuclear deal with Iran, scholars and experts around the world provided their assessments and theories on the impact the JCPOA would have on regional and global security. Nuclear experts, engineers, and scholars from the Arab world to the US responded with resounding optimism that the JCPOA was the best option the US and EU had at achieving some level of stability in the Middle East. Nuclear proliferation is a very complex, global issue. It will continue to prove a diďŹƒcult task to reach a balance between allowing Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program and regional security in the Middle East, but it is clear that the Ivory Tower, both in the West and the Arab world, is convinced that the terms of the JCPOA is a step in the right direction.
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NEO-REALIsM AND IRAN’s NuCLEAR IssuE
ANTONY CLEMENT Antony Clement is currently a student of the International Relations program at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK
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ust before a professor delivered a lecture on the neo-realism theory of international relations, he screened a video showing the dropping of the nuclear bomb at Hiroshima. Observing the nuclear bomb flying towards the civilian area caused sudden panic among the students, before landing in the middle of innocent civilians. The students silently watched the consequences of the nuclear bomb and remained so after the video ended.
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The professor then began to explain the concept of neo-realism. The lecture was very engaging and afterwards the students were asked to prepare for a debate on a topical article written by neo-realist Kenneth Waltz (‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb’, Foreign Affairs, 2012) with the question being whether Iran should be allowed a nuclear weapon? Firstly, those in favour questioned why Iran should be excluded when Israel, Western countries and other Asian countries already possess nuclear weaponry? Another material question is why the West accepted India’s nuclear programme despite it being outside of the NPT? Therefore, Iran can legitimately acquire the same weaponry for its strategic, security and national interest, in deterring the nuclear threat of Israel in the West Asian region. Further, those in favour of Kenneth Walt’s article argued that “history shows that nuclear weapons would balance and give peace to any region”. Walt described the “nuclear deterrence between the US and the Soviet as being the reason for the long peace during the cold war”. Let us apply this logic to the present situation. If Iran emerged as a nuclear power, it would deter Israel in West Asia, resulting in a more peaceful region. However, Iran’s behaviour at present reflects its insecurity and by extension the prevalent vulnerability in the region. Since neorealism expresses that states are self-interest oriented actors, Iran would never act as self-destructive state but as a responsible one if it had nuclear weaponry, knowing the impact of the nuclear casualty.
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Moreover, it has the capability to maintain the nuclear weaponry compared to the nuclear vulnerability of Pakistan. Secondly, those against pointed out that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, the tension in West Asia would only increase. With many devastated states in the region, should Iran acquire nuclear weaponry, Saudi Arabia would be forced to do likewise, seeking weaponry from Pakistan or China within a week or month. This chain of events would mean there would be an increased threat to Israel’s survival and the security of the region. Moreover, this may trigger a move by a small, wealthy oil exporting country to acquire a nuclear weapon. If bipolar was the safe game for peace during the cold war, the post-cold war multi-polar would be the reason for the world present disorder. Nuclear weapons in more hands would be more threatening to the region. Iran has threatened Israel on several occasions that it will wipe it off the map. Another important factor to be aware of is the possibility of Iran allows the nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists or that it transfers nuclear secrets to rogue states or to non-state actors. If such events occurred the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be unstoppable. The consequences and damage would be immeasurable. This would not only be a concern for West Asia security, but for the security of the entire world. Hence, it can be argued that there is no compelling reason for allowing Iran to attain nuclear weaponry.
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There will be no redemption across the entire region for the next five decades. A nuclear disaster would destroy the entire Arab region. It would also affect millions of expatriates and the global economy would soon come to a stand-still without the oil flow from this region.
Thirdly, the self-discipline of India as a nuclear state, in its exclusion from the NPT, is an example to follow. It did not produce a nuclear weapon by signing the NPT like Iran. However, India’s request for a security assurance from the western powers in the 1960s against the nuclear threat of China was not answered positively. Hence, India chose to walk down an undesired path, contrary to the vision of India’s founding father Mahatma Gandhi and the first Prime Minister Nehru. While India’s security was put at risk by its nuclear neighbour China, India refused to sign the NPT. When India refused to sign the NPT, it was expected that India would begin striving for nuclear weaponry. India did thereafter emerge as a minimum nuclear deterrent. Moreover, standing outside of the NPT, India has an impeccable track record with a non-proliferation past. So, with such striking differences between the two states, the value of such a comparison was not so high during this debate. Fourthly, if the world requires more experience of the effects of nuclear warfare than it observed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki then it may have the opportunity if the international community’s stance on Iran’s claim for the nuclear bomb does not change. The oil fields will not recover if any nuclear bomb was dropped in West Asia.
The present agreement with Iran has been seen as an achievement of the P5+1 joint effort. Although this deal has several limitations, it is a better than launching a military strike on Iran’s nuclear base. Iran cannot easily distract the P5+1. This agreement with the P5+1gives a strong signal that any violation of the agreement by the actor would result in a collective reaction by the P5+1. This would serve as a serious warning to Iran and to other reactionary states which seek nuclear weaponry. This path could also serve as a direction to deal with the North Korea nuclear issue in the future. However, the chaotic stance of the US Republicans is entirely misguided and ill advised. They are politically correct, but diplomatically wrong. It may help them for the 2016 presidential election campaign but not for their national security. One thing is quite clear - if the US Congress continues to diverge on this issue – there will be negative implications for US non-proliferation initiatives globally. Finally, the arguments on both sides of the debate are defended strongly. However, it is unlikely that the ‘yes’ group is in a strong position at the present stage of Iran’s ambition to attain nuclear capacity. The ‘no’ group has the upper hand. The core reason behind this is that Iran’s claim is unjustifiable because Iran has not demonstrated its responsibility as a state in the region so far. Hence, Iran’s claim of entitlement to nuclear weaponry did not convince the majority of the students in the lecture hall.
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