The Greater Caspian Project 19

contents

06. editorial 07. the hidden afterMath ECONOMIC COsts AftER tERROR ANDY DEAHN 11. turkeY and the sMuggling of isis oil GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI 15. World War Z WHY RussIA fIGHts DAEsH ZEALOts DR. MAttHEW CROsstON 21. china’s ‘Pivot’ to the greater casPian A stRANGE NEW WORLD Of WAR NENAD DRCA 25. Putting teeth into Peace MAkING tHE JCPOA LEGItIMAtE AARON GOOD 29. unbalanced balancing DOMEstIC suPPORt IN IRAN fOR tHE JCPOA sARA DYsON 33. additional considerations on the iranian nuclear PoWer GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

37. SyrianS not Seeking, SyrianS not Welcome Refugees and the Caspian Region tRoy BaxteR 41. Future Foreign PolicieS possiBilities faCing iRan stephen saRty 45. churchill WaS right about ruSSia and Still iS John Cody MosBey 50. eeu and PakiStan-belaruS Free trade engagementS nasuRullah BRohi 56. aFrica could reverSe trade imbalance With ruSSia KesteR Kenn KloMegah

the greater caSPian ProJect bi-Weekly digital edition www.moderndiplomacy.eu Caspian@moderndiplomacy.eu Dimitris Giannakopoulos Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief Dr. matthew Crosston The Caspian Project, Director

authors petra poseGa teJa palko luisa monteiro nina laVrenteVa GaBriela pasCholati Do amaral BruCe aDrianCe anatolii Baronin troy BaXter GreGory Brew nasurullah Brohi staCey Cottone antony Clement anDy Deahn nenaD DrCa sara Dyson JareD s. easton GianCarlo elia Valori Jeffery fishel laura GarriDo orhan Gafarli aaron GooD amy hanlon Jeanette "JJ" harper

Jonathan hartner Brian huGhes anDrii kolpakoV VlaDislaV lermontoV paula malott meGan munoz elena m. norBerto morales rosa taylor morse John CoDy mosBey sarah nolDer Joshua patterson Dayna riCe JessiCa reeD GreGory rouDyBush stephen sarty Dmitrii seltser rakesh krishnan simha eVan thomsen Dianne a. ValDez Christopher white

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools�

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

SECREtS AND LIES Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

I

n the academic world one of the great laments of any professor is the lack of subtlety and nuance in the writing of our students. That analytical skill, of looking past the superficial level and getting deeper into the more substantive yet more opaque layers of a research topic, is a Holy Grail of sorts as we try to develop young minds and push them to a higher and brighter future. In some ways this applies even more vividly in the world of international affairs: there is a thin ‘public relations’ level of communication, a layer full of obfuscations and buzz words and efforts to manage and massage a particular narrative to a relatively unaware public. Discerning analysts quickly try to wade past this management of the mind and get to the hidden layers that often reveal the true motivations and interests of the parties involved. This issue of The Greater Caspian Project is dedicated to that process and all those who do not like their information specially served on a manipulated platter.

Our new thematic and expanded geographic focus continues to produce benefits for our readers, as this issue lets us tackle issues pertaining to African trade with Russia, Turkey’s nefarious relationship with DAESH oil smuggling, an analysis of the Eurasian Economic Union that

ends up exposing people to issues between Pakistan and Belarus, and China’s initiatives across this great region. Our hallmark, our tradition of analyzing the Caspian littorals, however, also continues. In this issue you will find several investigations into lessemphasized aspects of the JCPOA, as well as two fascinating articles on Russia that are essentially juxtaposed against each other. This is yet another aspect of the GCP that we take very seriously: the world of global affairs is not a single uninterrupted storyline that has no alternatives to consider or perspectives to take. We here at GCP do not try to push a particular agenda or force a single orthodoxy. Rather, we push our analysts and our readers to always seek the hidden levels, the subtle nuances, and the perspectives lessdiscussed and barely-exposed.

It is this effort more than any particular country or theme which we hope you value the most. It means what you read within these pages is not always comfortable or pleasing. But we will always be committed to the pursuit of knowledge, to exposing the layers beneath the ‘official narrative’ of states and organizations. We want to find the secrets and lies, in order to know what not to believe.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

thE hIDDEN AftERMAth ECONOMIC COsts AftER tERROR

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07 /08

ANDY DEAHN Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor working as a member of an intelligence analysis team throughout various worldwide locations.

He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

A

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index (GTI) of 2014, violent acts of terrorism have increased dramatically, with estimates indicating a five-fold upsurge since 2000. In total throughout the last 15 years there have been over 48,000 terrorist incidents which have claimed over 107,000 lives.

The majority of these incidents (over 60 percent) have occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria. However, since 2013 the rest of the world has also observed a 54 percent increase in terrorist incidents. This increase and the impact associated to the activities of international terror organizations have been felt significantly among some of the Greater Caspian States. For example, Russia, according to the GTI, is now the 11th most likely nation (out of 124 states) to observe the highest impact of terrorism.Out of the five littoral Caspian states this ranking places them as holding the highest risk.

The nation observing the next highest risk indicator is Turkey, ranked as the 17th state to observe the highest impact of terrorism. This is becoming increasingly more relevant with groups such as DAESH encroaching upon its border. Next, Iran ranks as the 28th nation to observe a high to medium risk of terrorism. This is because Iran’s threat from DAESH manifests itself as a clash between a regional Shia power and a Sunni-driven extremist group. The nations of Russia, Iran, and Turkey have not just felt this impact in its violent form but have also felt the economic misfortunes associated with the financial impact of terrorism.

This is a major underlying issue, yet one still far less emphasized in contemporary political discourse.

This is because not only do acts of terrorism have an impact on the global market, but they also generate instability among national financial markets and alter domestic economic policies and practices.

These consequences have significantly shaped the economic policies and behaviors of the Greater Caspian states.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

There are two categories associated with the economic costs of terrorism. First, primary or direct costs related to immediate destruction or property and life in the aftermath of a terrorist event. For Russia, the primary cost of the Sinai Airliner bombing was the resulting 127 civilian casualties, the loss of one airplane, and the resultant impact on the lucrative Russian tourism industry. Turkey’s primary costs have been observed through suicide bombings against Turkish activists in Kobani, Syria, as well as similar acts of terror in its capitol of Ankara and the historic city of Istanbul. Moreover, Iran observed a psychological blow after Brig. Gen. Hosseiin Hamedani, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and more than a dozen other soldiers working as advisors to assist with Russian airstrikes were killed in Syria. And while each of these acts generates sizeable economic and psychological effects, the secondary costs are more complex with long-term cascading consequences.

For example, the aftermath of terrorist activities required each of the above-mentioned nations to increase security, generate new military expenditures, and fulfill subsequent insurance payments. Moreover, a nation on the receiving end of any act of terror will observe increased uncertainty in markets, decreased foreign investments due to this uncertainty, as well as altered trade, consumption, and savings and/or investment behaviors. The common theme with these secondary indicators is that each causes a disruption to the local economy that is quite significant.

For instance, the price tag of Russian airstrikes in Syria are now costing Moscow up to $4 million USD per day; Iran’s commitment has topped $6 billion annually (out of its’ $15 billion USD military budget) to assist in propping up the Assad regime in its fight against DAESH; and Turkey has also increased its military spending 25 percent since 2014 (Up from $17 billion USD to 22.6 billion USD), while at the same time spending over $8 billion USD to host and assist in the Syrian refugee crisis. To aggravate matters even more, Turkey shot down a Russian jet after it violated its airspace, which in turn has strained international relations, increased regional tensions, and produced sanctions against them from Moscow in retaliation. These negative affects have now become collateral costs in the combined fight against Islamic extremist groups like DAESH, spilling over into the areas of tourism, trade, and energy, from which both Turkey and Russia are highly codependent upon each other.

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Tourism, whose relationship with terrorism is strongly interconnected, has been significantly impacted not only in Russia and Turkey, but in the other Greater Caspian states as well. For example, terror attacks influence the entire tourism industry.

An illustration of this phenomenon can be observed after the Russian airliner was proven to have been a target of DAESH militants and both Russia and Great Britain suspended flights to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. This decision has severely impacted Egypt’s tourist industry because Russia and Great Britain are Egypt’s biggest tourist markets and a critical source of industrial income. Estimates indicate that Egypt could lose 2.2 billion Egyptian pounds— about $280 million USD—per month due to these flight cancelations, while at the same time Russian tour operators have lost over 1.5 million Rubles— about $23 million USD—since flights were suspended.

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There is no doubt that the cost of terror is larger than the initial psychological and physical blows delivered. The financial impact of terrorism and the economic consequences cascading from international terrorist activities has undoubtedly affected the Greater Caspian States in many secondary capacities. And while the result is not zero-sum to these economic anxieties, one should hope that the economic policies of the Greater Caspian States is stronger and longer lasting than the ideology of the diehard Islamic jihadists with whom they are currently at war with.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

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TuRkEY AND ThE sMuggLINg Of IsIs OIL

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

ccording to what disclosed by Russian sources, the fact that Turkey smuggles - on a large scale - oil coming from the Caliphate is - if not certain - highly likely. Al-Baghdadi’s networks have always used the transport routes near the Turkish border where the hydrocarbons - often coming from the Kurdish areas of Kirkuk or Sulemaianiyah - are traded by a network of brokers and intermediaries of various ethnic origins.

Furthermore the main oil pipelines are out of order and are also well-known to the Russian, Syrian and Coalition’s air forces.

Some sources say that there are also Western oil companies eager for buying Caliphate’s oil, but it is more likely for the oil of those areas to be admixed or shifted so as to make it impossible to detect and recognize its origin.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 19 In fact, on December 2, 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry showed pictures, photos and documents largely proving - according to the Russian political line and storytelling – that there is a "widespread system of oil smuggling between Turkey and the Isis/Daesh’s territories in Syria and Iraq.

According to the Russian sources, the routes of the illegal oil smuggling are three: the first going from Syria to the Turkish terminals on the Mediterranean; the second stretching from the deposits in Syrian territory to the Turkish refineries in the city of Batman, a hundred kilometres away from the Syrian border; the third ranging from the Caliphate’s territories up to the Turkish terminal.

The oil is transported in trucks - tens and hundreds of means - up to the Turkish territory where it is sent to the various refineries.

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According to Russian sources, the amount is 200,000 oil barrels per day, slightly less than the total of oil extracted by the Syrian government alone until the outbreak of the Syrian-Iraqi jihad.

Again according to Russian official sources, the air raids weakened the production and transport of crude oil by 50%, with a net gain for the Caliphate which fell from 3 million US dollars per day to 1.5 million US dollars per day.

According to Russian official sources, Russia hit 32 extraction facilities, 11 refineries, 23 pumping stations and as well as 1,080 trucks for oil transport.

Hence Turkey is being targeted, regardless of Russian allegations being true or not.

The problem lies in the fact that Turkey is the second NATO armed force, after the United States, and certainly one of Russian goals is to annihilate the Atlantic Alliance’s presence in the Greater Middle East.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

However, there is a linkage between the Russian operations against Turkey following the shooting down of the Sukhoi-24 aircraft and the NATO enlargement recently proposed. Montenegro - and probably Croatia, at a later stage -are supposed to become members of the Atlantic Alliance. This would mean Balkans closed to the Russian influence and strengthening of the Atlantic lines so as to protect Ukraine to the bitter end. Nevertheless, this is a condition that Russia will never accept.

Hence, if Russia strengthens its already significant ties with the Kurds, this will bring grist to the Daesh/Isis’ mill, because it would create other masses of refugees who would increase the blackmail power already shown by Turkey towards the weak and inept European Union, while Great Britain has already carried out four bombing missions against the Caliphate’s positions with its Tornado aircrafts. The Caliphate does not seem to suffer much these air raids and attacks: Isis has learned Hamas’ lesson and lives underground for the time needed to prevent the collateral damage of fighters flying over its skies.

In addition, there is a well-grounded reason to believe that the Caliphate’s expansion may lead the Al Baghdadi’s group to have chemical weapons - already partially owned by Isis and coming from Syrian and Iraqi arsenals – but, in particular, to have the fighter aircrafts available to the old Gaddafi’s regime. Moreover, with a view to controlling the Syrian area, the Russian fleet in the Black Sea must necessarily cross the seas controlled by Turkey.

Hence Turkey is becoming essential for NATO survival in the Middle East and the price paid by the other allies will inevitably be very high.

Also the old alliance - now deprived of strategic content - between Turkey and Israel will collapse, because the Jewish State now coordinates all its air and military operations with the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, following the recent elections of November 1, 2015, the new government was formed: it is a single-party government dominated by President Erdogan’s party, namely the AKP. It includes Ahmed Davutoglu, the Prime Minister and architect of the recent Turkish foreign policy, with Mehmed Cavusoglu as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Volkan Bozkir in charge of relations with the European Union. Cavusolglu had already been the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs from August 2014 to August 2015, as well as vice-President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, and is known for having prevented - with his accomplices - the election of his competitor in Antalya, on March 30, 2014.

Volkan Bozkir is a career diplomat, and he is the Head of the Delegation for Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

Hence Turkey is seeking the EU support as a starting point for its autonomous and independent project of power projection into Central Asia. If the European Union accepts this course of action, it will lose Mesopotamia and the agreements with Russia, which also supplies over 50% of the oil and gas used

by Turkey. Conversely, if Turkey’s accession to the European Union does not materialize, Turkey will do its utmost to make life hard for the Eurasian peninsula.

Bekir Bozdag was reconfirmed as Justice Minister.

He is a lawyer by profession and he was former deputy-Prime Minister in 2013, pending the large corruption scandal in the Turkish government.

Efkan Ala was appointed Minister for Internal Affairs. He had already been Minister for Internal Affairs from 2013 to June 2015, after having previously been Governor of Batman and then of Dyarbakir from 2004 to 2007.

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He had been Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers from 2007 to 2013.

In all likelihood, he is the strong man of the AKP regime and the spearhead against the Kurdish insurgency.

Ibrahim Yldirim is the Transport Minister, who has the task of expanding the Turkish large infrastructure, and particularly the route from Beijing to London, which would give to Turkey an extraordinary power vis-Ă -vis the European Union and Mesopotamia itself. He is a man who had been involved in the great scandal of 2003, but his unshaken loyalty to President Erdogan is the reason for his comeback.

Mehmet Simsck, who was appointed Economy Minister, is a Kurdish-Turk and was former Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic and Finance Minister from 2009 to 2015.

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He, too, comes from Batman and he is an expert of the economy of emerging countries and Europe with the Middle East. He also worked for Merrill Lynch in London, as well as for the German Deutsche-Bender Securities from 1998 to 2000. He had also worked for UBS Securities in New York in 1997.

Hence he is a neoliberal technocrat.

Berat Albayrak, Erdogan's son-in-law, was appointed Energy Minister.

Albayrak was CEO of Calik Holding, which deals with textiles, energy, construction, finance, logistics and media. He is the cashier and treasurer of President Erdogan’s family.

He studied at the London School of Business and at Pace University in New York.

He represented Calik in the United States.

In short, a government of technocrats linked to an entourage of super loyal aides to the President.

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THE CASPIAN PROJECT 19

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WHY RuSSIA FIgHTS DAESH ZEALOTS

WORLD WAR Z

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

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merica has made little progress in Iraq and Syria, something Russia is determined to change apparently.

The Obama administration maintains that a lasting political solution requires Assad’s departure, but facing Russian military involvement, Iranian ground troops, Hezbollah military units, many armed jihadist groups, and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the United States confronts a convoluted situation that it seems unable to solve on its own. Because of these seemingly immutable facts, louder voices are demanding that the US basically leaves the ‘Syrian mess’ to the Russians and let it be a de facto ‘Afghanistan Redux.’ More careful consideration, however, reveals that analysis to be misplaced and faulty.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

This camp’s basic logic rests on how ‘full-spectrum’ talks would demand the bringing together of so many sworn enemy groups (internal and external) that herding cats would prove more feasible. But there is also sinister realpolitik going along with these arguments: namely, that America should not counter Russian involvement but rather sit back and enjoy watching Russia get sucked into a conflict that might be the only real chance to significantly weaken Putin.

While no one should be surprised to hear that major global powers consider their own interests when becoming involved in the conflicts of other states, there is something disturbingly naïve with the above-mentioned arguments: Western commentators have too often brazenly declared across the Middle East and Post-Soviet space Machiavellian strategies in public while still hoping the nobler yet quieter motivations of freedom-enhancement were believed. Alas, they are not. Consequently, it does America no good to ‘hang back’ from Syria while Russia does all the dirty work, hoping the Russian Federation receives a devastating blow to its global power as President Obama talks eloquently about Syrian democracy. The only thing this does in real terms is create an environment of diplomatic insincerity that does far more damage long-term to American legitimacy than the possible advantages of a ‘weakened’ Russian state. On the ground, Russia’s reputation would still be rewarded for making the effort while America and the EU would look rather craven and manipulative.

These are not, however, the most serious errors in strategy. The premise that Russia would get sucked into a Syrian quagmire just as America has in Iraq and Afghanistan misses one very elementary but profound point: Russia is not in Syria to establish ‘freedom and democracy’ for the Syrian people.

Rather, it just wants to return the region to a more recognizable status quo where the preferred regime is in place and the potential of radical Islamism seeping into Russia’s southern flanks is markedly reduced. This is what makes the often-heard Western criticism about Russian air strikes hitting not just DAESH strongholds but also well-known rebel areas somewhat odd: Russia has never wavered on its principal position that the key foreign policy element to be handled in Syria is ‘fighting terrorism’.

Russia was never interested in seeing the now stagnant ‘Arab Spring’ reach Damascus. And while it has also freely stated that there is no formal state love or personal preference for keeping Assad in power, Russia does demand that whatever regime is in place needs to be as committed to preventing radical Islamist groups from operating as Assad was.

This was always a sharp point of contention for Russia since the early days of the anti-Assad uprising.

Russia never felt comfortable with the boast that the United States knew who actually made up the various ‘rebel groups’ and was equally certain that America was recklessly funding and arming people that could either be replaced by radical Islamists or be co-opted by them.

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Given that the rise of DAESH in the region is at least partially seen in Russia as a consequence of American strategy gone awry in Iraq and Syria, its skepticism cannot be so easily dismissed. Under such political chaos, Russia was quite happy with throwing its support behind Assad, no matter how heinous his own authoritarian rule might be. While it may have been unfortunately true that everyday Syrians would be hurt by a continued Assad tyranny, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that would at least be an internal Syrian affair and not immediately destabilizing to the global community. The same could not be said for the resulting chaos if the Assad regime fell to a hodge-podge of amorphous rebel groups mixed with jihadists who dreamt of apocalyptic Caliphate fantasies.

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This is the strange reality often missed in the West: Russia’s passion about eliminating radical jihadists is as fervent as American claims for promoting democracy. Thus, there is not really a Russian ‘political’ goal in Syria that mirrors the American one. Russia does not need a strong Assad or a competent Assad regime: it simply wants a return to the previous status quo where it had close ties to the governing regional powers and carte blanche permission to eliminate Islamic jihadists seen as legitimate threats. Therefore the criticism that Russia’s ‘strategy’ is doomed to fail because there really are not any groups to bring to the table to forge a pluralistic Syria is hollow. The reality is that Russia is not in the region to be the personal guarantor of such a goal.

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What is Russia to assume about ‘gamesmanship’ and ‘strategy’ when it gets criticized for airstrike targeting but is rebuffed by the United States when asking for specific targets to hit or locations to avoid?

How should the general public react to criticism of Russian motives as new voices begin to recognize the comprehensiveness of Russian strikes and that its air campaign might be working?

This level of ‘optimal fantasy diplomacy’ is what Russia usually criticizes the United States for and believes brings more problems than solutions.

Ultimately, Russia only wants to make sure its larger regional interests remain intact and, concurrently, no jihadist groups have the ability to spread beyond the region and attack its people.

If America had its ‘Vietnam syndrome’ for at least a generation – where getting stuck in a complex and horrifically violent conflict dramatically influenced its foreign policy and military thinking – it is fair to say Russia has had its own ‘Chechen syndrome’, which for the same amount of time had influenced Russian strategic conflict thinking in much the same way. It has always drawn a direct line between the Chechen wars of the 1990s to 9/11 to the Taliban to the Madrid train attacks to the Boston Marathon Bombing to the Sharm el Sheik civilian airliner crash to the Beirut-Paris-Kenya attacks. For Russia this has always been a single elongated fight meant to unite the modern world in a death-match against zealots.

It has always openly declared that this needs to be tackled by all sides and all countries, whether formally allies or adversaries. Which is why it has been so utterly frustrated with the United States: the one obvious partner that should share its distaste for such violent religious zealotry has always steadfastly refused to engage in real counter-terrorist partnership with it.

So when people like Simpson criticizes the conflict in Syria as a dilemma with no military endpoint because it is and can only be a fight to the death, they are unknowingly acknowledging the Russian argument that has been in play all along. And this is exactly why Syria could end up a ‘swamp’ that Russians are willing to get dirty in. When framed in the language of millenarian religious struggle harkening back to the vile barbarism of the Chechen wars, Russians on the whole are willing to fight if it might mean there will be no Paris tragedies in Moscow or St. Petersburg. For Russia this is not a battle about political systems or economic markets or global positioning (which is what it always accuses American ‘adventurism’ of being about), but rather a war over the very lifeblood of modern society.

So caution should be urged when critics claim impending Russian doom in Syria and an inevitable political quagmire. Syria is no Afghanistan Redux: Russia is not trying to ideologically claim the territory for itself in a move of proxy-prestige. Its goals are actually far more attainable and far more easily aligned with popular attitudes at home.It is not necessarily striving for a ‘perfect political solution’ that the whole world can get behind in order to claim personal victory: these are the lofty and often unrealistic foreign policy goals with which America pushes itself into a corner.

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Russia, in the end, can claim ‘victory’ if there is a local regime in Damascus partial to its interests and it continues to have the opportunity to kill jihadists at will there. In the Russian diplomatic mindset this matters because it means relevance on the world stage while having to worry less about creeping Koranic quasi-insurgencies across its own major cities .

Two things are certain as the battle rages on in Syria: assumptions about American foreign policy superiority need to be taken with a grain of salt, as there is as much rational geostrategic self-interest in America’s positions as there is with Russia’s. And when it comes to the fight against groups like DAESH, Russia has been rather uniquely candid about its purposes and goals, all while hoping America and the West would be willing to join in.

Even if that never happens and the West continues to refuse such a partnership, it might not want to hold its diplomatic breath waiting for the ‘quagmire demise’ of Russia. Reports on the inevitability of Russia’s slow Syrian death may just prove to be greatly exaggerated.

In the end, the mistake the Western world has made for nearly two decades is that it has drawn up civilizational lines based on geography, political ideology, state/religious boundaries, and even economic strategies. These lines have allowed the world to divide itself into ever-smaller camps, making the civilian undersides of societies ever easier and more susceptible to extremist bloodshed and horror. In this battle Russia feels it should not be seen as the West against the Rest or white against color or the Global North against the Global South. It is about the Modern world fighting the Zealot world.

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Until leaders in the West embrace this reality and begin to smash their own self-imposed boundaries of nationalism, statehood, and geostrategy, they will constantly be putting themselves in a limited and exposed position against a radicalized enemy.

And scenes like the ones played out in France, Lebanon, and Kenya will only continue. Hope at the moment does not seem bright: already less than two weeks after the Paris attacks and increased pressure from world leaders to consider cooperating in the fight against terrorist zealots,Turkey downed a Russian jet fighter that it claimed did not respond to ‘warnings about crossing into Turkish airspace.’ Worse still, initial reports are that the two pilots successfully ejected from the fighter, only to be shot at while floating to the ground via parachute.

Incidents like this, in the face of a greater common enemy, means the Modern world is not taking the Zealot world as seriously as it needs to. It means that World War Z will continue to be lost.

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ChINA’s ‘PIvOt’ tO thE GREAtER CAsPIAN NENAD DRCA Nenad Drca is a former military trilingual linguist who worked across many nations over eight years. He lived and worked on three continents.

This experience gave him a deep appreciation for intelligence community.

After graduating with BA in Psychology he returned to work for the US Army as a DOD civilian.

He expects to graduate next March with Master of Science in International Security and Intelligence Studies degree.

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D

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ue to changes in recent geopolitical events, Russia and China cooperate and coordinate politically, militarily, and economically to an extraordinary degree.

This new teamwork almost always carries a tinge of anti-Western and anti-American implications.

This is concerning to America as it is anticipated that China will soon assume the role of the world’s biggest oil importer along with its recent achievement of making the Yuan a world reserve currency.

Both Russia and Iran are now using Yuan instead of the U.S. dollar for all oil sales with China.

Russia and China and an assembly of smaller states such as Iran are committed to remove America from its role as sole geopolitical leader in the world. Their collective objective is to capitalize on the lack of an American response to their combined regional and global relevance. The China-Russia Axis now cooperates against American interests in almost every imaginable area. The level of this global cooperation presents a very serious challenge to the global status quo.

This mutual economic geostrategy is what holds China and Russia together most of all. Their bilateral trade rose to $95 billion in 2014. While the trade numbers are impressive, the reality is that China cannot ignore the fact that U.S. is its top trading partner while the E.U. is for Russia. At this time China cannot afford to sacrifice or isolate the lucrative U.S. market entirely. And while the United States is aware of this “axis of convenience” between Russia and China, the primary task ahead for the U.S. is to determine how to reset its relationship with both China and Russia before it is too late. If the current economic geostrategy is not stopped by 2040, then China’s GDP could be 40% of world GDP.

The new coordination between China and Russia is not only visible in massive economic agreements that exclude the U.S. dollar but in other areas as well. China has been emulating the Russian strategy of micro-territorial expansion, by claiming various disputed islands in the East and South China Seas.

Both nations tend to use their energy resources and other raw materials as strategic leverage in the global economic market. Both Moscow and Beijing have been blamed for large-scale anti-American cyberwarfare, leading to massive intelligence theft and industrial espionage. It is also important to note that China is converting its oil imports into Yuan as opposed to the U.S. dollar and Russia is wholeheartedly behind this maneuver.

In addition to Russia, China and Iran have negotiated ways to cooperate on civilian nuclear power as well as increasing their mutual oil business interests.

It is clear that China is achieving its goal of having Middle East countries turn to Beijing for economic benefits, weapons trade, and technology. In its fight against the American “Pivot to Asia,” China has turned out to be a skilled and capable negotiator.

Maybe that aspect of Beijing’s skill set was underestimated by the policymakers in Washington.

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While the United States worked diligently to convince allies against supporting Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China has managed to successfully convince many American allies to support it. The Chinese were proud to announce that not only did American allies like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany sign up as founding members, but Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates did as well.

The final insult was the announcement of Iranian membership. That took place while the United States was trying to apply financial pressure on Iran during the final details of the JCPOA. While the Middle East’s pivot to Asia is being positively reciprocated by the Chinese, that itself does not mean that Beijing wants to take on the exact role of the United States in the Middle East. China is not seeking the active role of ‘world cop’ in Middle East conflicts.

China would prefer influence by proxy than openly and directly.

The risk is easier to estimate and domestic backlash would not be as severe. Beijing has generally avoided the application of hard power thus far in its current era of ascendancy. With the counterstrategy to America’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, it is becoming clear that Beijing understands the true potential of soft power. All of these maneuvers undermine America’s traditional role as global leverager. The conflict in Syria is a perfect illustration.

The United States is trying to engage in very demanding diplomatic talks which include the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran, firm supporters of Assad, and nations such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which are opposed to the Syrian regime. It is too early to predict the long-term success rate of these current diplomatic negotiations. The weakness of current diplomatic talks is that they did not produce any agreements to establish areas of collaboration in the air campaigns or to share intelligence or target information in Syria. This lack of military and diplomatic cooperation between Russia and the United States is pushing both sides to resort to the Cold War-style tactics of political agitation and proxy war.

Any potential alignment with Russia could also imply cooperation with Iraq via proxy and that could ostracize Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait. The United States is walking a fine line by attempting to court multiple sides while ensuring certain relationships do not escalate into something much worse than the current status quo. It is difficult to wage war when allies do not agree on the enemy. It is even more difficult when the allies are allies only on the particular conflict in question but are in fact adversaries in many other areas of geostrategy. This article illustrates the complexity and difficulty faced by the United States today, as opportunities to cooperate in one arena are off-set by bigger worries in others. Russia may seek American cooperation in Syria, but is actively working with China to weaken American financial dominance in the global market. America may need positive Chinese relations because of extensive trade and debt holdings, but it also has to make note China’s increasing maneuvers with clear adversaries Russia and Iran. Thus any analysis of the global economic market has to consider Syria, while Syrian analyses have to understand the ebb and flow of Asian capital markets. It is indeed a strange new world of war we live in.

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MAkINg thE JCPOA LEgItIMAtE

PuttINg tEEth INtO PEACE AARON GOOD Aaron Good is presently a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. He is currently employed by the US Department of Justice.

ince the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed on July 14, 2015, a fierce debate has ensued within the United States. While the agreement is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, it remains the best option currently available to the U.S. and other world powers to address Iran’s growing nuclear threat. Despite its shortcomings, the deal provides the opportunity for the U.S. to make an essential security impact on the Middle East while potentially improving worldwide relations with Iran.

First and foremost, for the JCPOA to be eective the U.S. must adopt a policy of strict enforcement to the conditions of the agreement and not scrap the deal altogether. Some U.S. law-makers still believe that there is a better option than the JCPOA, as proven by the letter that 47 Senators sent to the Ayatollah warning him that the deal could easily be undone by a future Republican President or Congress.

thE CASPIAN PROJECt 19 To back out of the JCPOA would be extremely risky at this point, however, as the U.N. Security Council voted for the deal unanimously and more than 100 countries around the world have already publicly endorsed it.

Instead of hoping to get Iran and the P5+1 back to the negotiating table, the U.S. should focus on enforcing the best deal that it is likely to get with Iran now. Senator Coons of Delaware explains, “The President should coordinate a whole government effort utilizing the Pentagon, Intelligence Community, State, Treasury, and Energy to fully enforce this deal.

The President must support action by Congress to increase funding and resources for the IAEA and the Office of Foreign Assets Control to allow strict enforcement of sanctions against Iran and the most effective snapback mechanism possible.” If the U.S. proves now that it is willing to strictly enforce the agreement, then it will give Iran less incentive to cheat on the deal in the future, thereby increasing global security.

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It is equally essential for the U.S. to enforce the Additional Protocol that supplements the JCPOA. According to the IAEA, “the Additional Protocol aims to fill the gaps in the information reported under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

By enabling the IAEA to obtain a much fuller picture of such states’ nuclear programs, plans, nuclear material holdings and trade, the Additional Protocol helps to provide much greater assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in those States.” By demanding that Iran strictly adheres to the Additional Protocol the U.S. can avoid an outcome similar to the First Gulf War, when it became clear that Iraq had exploited a loophole in the standard IAEA Safeguards Agreement and used undeclared facilities to build a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Olli Heinonen, a veteran International Atomic Energy Agency arms inspector, explains, "Without unfettered access to people and all sites in Iran, and if limitations and sanctuaries are carved out, it will be impossible to convincingly certify that Iran is fully complying with its undertakings."

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Further assurances of Iran’s commitment to its obligations under the JCPOA can be achieved by dedicating resources to fully implement the Additional Protocol and by expanding the dimensions of the protocol to include Iran’s military sites.

Despite the presence that the U.S. commands in the world, it will not be enough to deter Iran without assistance. The U.S. must enlist the support of its European allies to make sure that they will take effective action against marginal violations by Iran. This includes re-imposing sanctions against Iran in order to prevent ballistic missile proliferation and the support of terrorism if necessary. When the U.S. helped to establish the United Nations after WWII, it learned that attacking a problem as a united front has many benefits. Current U.S. policy should mirror the philosophy of international partnership rather than hoping to deter Iran solely through its own military might and financial institutions alone.

For the future success of the JCPOA and worldwide security, the U.S. should look to strengthen the parameters of international treaties now, rather than in 15 years, when the most restrictive aspects of the JCPOA will be basically unenforceable. The two treaties that have the potential to affect nuclear proliferation most are the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The CTBT is a legally binding ban on nuclear explosive testing and the FMCT would prohibit the production of the two main components of nuclear weapons - highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.

The first step in strengthening both of these treaties is to get them passed and ratified in the United Nations. Then, under the precedent of these treaties, the U.S. can begin to pursue an international ban on HEU and plutonium, beginning in the most unstable region of the world: the Middle East. The U.S. and other world leaders should consider adding amendments to these treaties as well. As Senator Coons correctly assesses, “We should require continuous access to all IAEA inspection sites under the Additional Protocol and develop new standards for when a country can build a nuclear facility based on a minimum standard of international economic competitiveness.” Additionally, new technology has been developed in online enrichment monitoring and the U.S. should advocate for this technology to be standard practice for all nuclear facilities. If the U.S. decides to implement these changes over the next decade, then Iran will find that it is faced with a new set of barriers on its nuclear program when the restraints of the JCPOA finally come to an end.

In the Middle East, arguably the greatest plausible conflict is still between Israel and Iran. To regulate this potential threat the U.S. must reaffirm its support for Israel so that Iran understands that if it threatens Israel, it threatens the U.S. by default. The current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provides Israel with $30 billion in U.S. assistance through 2018. While the U.S. has always considered Israel’s security a top priority, money assistance as a means to an end will not be enough to convince Israel that the U.S. still has its best interest at heart.

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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent President Obama a letter outlining its support for a strengthened MOU with Israel. Michael Bennet, the ranking member of the committee correctly determined, “These measures are necessary to deter conventional and asymmetric threats to Israel. We also support providing missile defense funding, as necessary and appropriate, to accelerate the co-development of missile defense systems, and increased bilateral cooperation on cyber, intelligence, and research and development for tunnel detection and mapping technologies.” The measures outlined in this letter to President Obama are precisely the kind of enhancements that should be added to the MOU. These revisions will give Israel the military assurance that it requires to embrace the JCPOA, while effectively deterring Iran from escalating the regional rivalry.

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The JCPOA has the potential to supply the world with a promising future, but only if the policies outlined above are adopted. All of these policies are moot, however, if the U.S. does not have the fortitude to take military action if Iran violates the terms of these agreements. Engaging threats through multilateral institutions remains the best option, but the U.S. cannot afford to hesitate to use force if diplomacy fails. For now, the JCPOA is proof that the U.S. has embraced diplomatic options with both its allies and enemies in order to enhance world unity and security. By strictly enforcing the JCPOA, strengthening nuclear treaties, and endorsing Israel’s security, the U.S. can help to assure that the JCPOA is as effective as the world hopes that it will be.

moDern DipLomacY

Domestic support in iran for the Jcpoa

unbaLanceD baLanci SARA DYSON Sara Dyson is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.

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Even before an official announcement was made that an agreement had been reached on the JCPOA, it was evident that any negotiation would inevitably bring mixed public opinion around the world. In his Arms Control Today article, Kimball identified that some would complain that ‘the nuclear deal does not address human rights concerns, eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile program, or put an end to Iranian support for terrorism.’ Others also complained that the deal falls short of their expectations for limiting Iran’s nuclear potential and that tougher sanctions could be used to coerce Iran into further limiting its nuclear program.

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So far that support is unbalanced at best, in both places.

ng Kimball discussed fallacies with these likely outcomes: the goal of these nuclear negotiations and any subsequent deal was not to address any concerns other than those specifically dealing with Iran’s nuclear development program. Furthermore, the terms of an agreement should be judged as a whole concept focused on reducing Iran’s nuclear capacity and improving the ability to evaluate the possibility of any future nuclear weapons programs.

It should not be evaluated solely on the basis of any one feature of the agreement. Kimball also identified that to sustain implementation of an agreement there must be a sufficient amount of domestic supportboth in Iran and in the United States.

The vision of the P5+1 and the EU in implementing the JCPOA was for renewed confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

The JCPOA allows Iran an opportunity to move forward with its nuclear program as long as it remains consistent with the considerations of the agreement – “gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace.”

Iran also views this as an opportunity for the international community to restore its confidence in the Islamic Republic by showing it is capable of cooperating with international partners to improve both global and regional security.

In exchange for its guarantee to pursue only the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the JCPOA implements a process to lift all UN Security Council, multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program development. The removal of these sanctions will eventually allow Iran to have full access in areas of trade, energy, finance and technology.

THE HOPE OF IMPROVED DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

Many Iranians were on the edge of their seats as they awaited the outcome of the nuclear negotiations. A combined public opinion poll conducted by the University of Maryland and the University of Tehran concluded that most ordinary Iranians approved of the JCPOA. Immediately after the announcement that Iran had negotiated and finalized a nuclear program agreement with world powers, Iranians took to the streets proudly waving victory signs.

Those supporting the agreement, according to the poll, include moderates inside the government, many opposition leaders, a majority of Iranian citizens, and many in the Iranian-American diaspora.

moDern DipLomacY

FEAR AND MISTRUST TAKES ROOT Iranians have much to gain from this new agreement. According to a poll conducted by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, sixty-one percent of respondents believed that reaching this nuclear deal “should facilitate progress toward greater rights and liberties” and that the attention of the nation “previously monopolized by the negotiations could now turn to critical domestic issues” to include the state of basic freedoms. Furthermore, as discovered by the University of Maryland/Tehran opinion poll, fifty-seven percent of Iran’s people fully support limiting its nation’s nuclear centrifuges and stockpile to a level commensurate to support nuclear energy, all while accepting more extensive inspections, in exchange for the lifting of the crushing economic sanctions and expanding nuclear cooperation.

Conversely, the Universities of Maryland and Tehran identified that those opposed to the new nuclear agreement were “the most militantly authoritarian, conservative, and anti-Western leaders and groups within Iran.” They believed that imposing limits on nuclear research activities and dismantling half of Iran’s centrifuges was “unacceptable.” Economic sanctions and international isolation have deeply affected Iran’s domestic infrastructure and economy and many Iranians have sought to blame the US and the West for Iran’s domestic turmoil. There is a significant level of mistrust. These conservative Iranians are doubtful that the sanctions will actually be lifted. Past and present US policies toward Iran and cultural/religious differences leave many Iranians with a very negative opinion of the US government

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They believe that the negotiations have little to do with nuclear proliferation and are more an attempt to “dominate Iran or block its development.” Others feel that the US is trying to change “Iran’s domestic political order.” Others fear that the agreement has a potential to fail and the result would be a drastic increase in social hopelessness across Iran: “People would once again lose their motivation for reforms… The atmosphere for cultural activities and journalism would become tremendously more difficult… A continuation of sanctions would place the country in a defensive mode…and the domestic security organs would increasingly pressure the media and journalists in order to silence any voices of dissent” – anonymous Iranian journalist Since its inception, the Iranian nuclear program has been the center of international attention. Iran’s nuclear research and development has severe implications for both global and regional geopolitics.

Many feared that no agreement would ever be reached and that Iran would leave the negotiations in a worse global position than when talks began.

When negotiations were finally reached and the P5+1 announced the birth of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iranian people took two opposing stances. Those that supported the agreement were optimistic of the changes it could bring to Iran – lifted sanctions, improved social conditions, and the ability to focus on Iran’s domestic issues.

For those that were reluctant to get on board or that expressed their anti-American sentiments, opinion polls found the majority of their opposition was rooted in fear and mistrust of America and the West.

Such powerful emotions that took decades to build cannot easily be changed, most certainly not overnight. But through successful implementation of the terms of the JCPOA and the exchanges promised to Iran, there is room to believe that those opposed may find hope as well. Only in undoing this unbalanced balancing can the maximum potential of the JCPOA be realized and the optimal benefits to the global community emerge.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman.

T

he document issued on December 2, 2015 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the Vienna organization which is composed of representatives from 167 countries - is very important with specific reference to the nature of the Iranian nuclear power.

Even after the JCPOA P5+1 agreement, the problem of the Iranian nuclear system lies in the link between past and present – besides the link between the visible and the invisible - as well as the link between the nuclear sites open to inspectors and the closed ones, due to their military nature, which also the P5+1 agreement recognizes.

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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE IRANIAN NuCLEAR POwER

The Vienna Agency’s report certifies that Iran has maintained a coordinated program of nuclear energy military applications at least from 2003 onwards, while at least since 2009 Iranian scientists had been engaged in computer design for the components of an implosion-type bomb.

Implosion-type weapons are characterized by a 1518 kilogram "explosive device" of fissionable material, usually weapon grade uranium, around which a natural uranium surface is placed to favour the explosion and, finally, an additional reinforced steel surface is placed to prevent the device from exploding immediately. The inner core is surrounded by a series of high-potential explosives which, when detonated simultaneously, make the fissile material implode at very high pressure. The core mass shrinks and thickens and, at this point, neutrons are injected, thus triggering the chain reaction off. At this juncture, the system becomes “supercritical” – just to use the nuclear physicists’ jargon.It is worth noting that in Parchin, in early 2015, IAEA had already noted activities which could be correlated to a military use of nuclear technologies.

In fact, the Vienna agency had urged and obtained a "separate agreement" for that Iranian site, which is the largest and oldest site of the Iranian nuclear system. Furthermore, Iran has continued to develop its own technology for the EBW nuclear detonators, which are means for the ignition of nuclear bombs in which the initial burst is generated by an electric current which passes into the inner wire of the detonator itself. Moreover, in 2014, the Iranian Shiite regime started experiments and tests on the multipoint initiation (MPI), a technology for starting the nuclear chain reaction in a hemispherical area. The MPI technology is useful both for missiles and for nuclear weapons.

At least since 2011, Iran has also made experiments and tests on the very-high density nuclear weapons, with the related hydrodynamic testing of the explosion symmetry. Again in 2011 Iran tested a "neutron initiator", namely a source of neurons which can be activated by remote control.Usually the neutron initiator is placed at the core of the plutonium mass, which is also placed at the core of the bomb, and is activated by the shock wave of the explosion which compresses the fissile core.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Nevertheless, if we accept the Iranian strategy in managing negotiations and its civilian and military nuclear system, many countries - especially in the "hot" spots of the world - will be tempted into using the same Iranian strategy: at first build nuclear sites, then long refuse and finally accept an international mediation which - as the P5+1 agreement - accepts the national sovereignty on the laboratories and nuclear bases of the country. Just think of what would happen if Saudi Arabia, which is now a global geostrategic competitor of the Shiite-dominated Iran, did the same and asked for a treatment similar to the one required and obtained by Iran.

A nuclear hedging very similar, in its structure, to the one typical of the hedge funds in the financial sector.

It is now certain that, thanks to statements made by the Shiite government, the merely “civilian” features of the Iranian nuclear network are a cover, namely a form of "latency" of the nuclear program.

In April 2015 the centrifuges operating in Iran were over 19,000, producing at least 42% more energy that the one needed by the country to be used only for civilian purposes.

Furthermore, the Shiite country has asked IAEA to be authorized to build 16 additional brand new nuclear power plants, by indicating its favourite sites.

Only for growing better tomatoes, as shown years ago by the Iranian TV in a reportage on Parchin?

Moreover, all new reactors will be built by Russia and fed by Russian material.

The interest of the post-Soviet system in the Iran nuclear power is strategically evident: through this network of weapons and reactors, Russia seals its strategic threat both against NATO and, above all, against the regional powers not allied with Russia in the Shatt-el-Arab region. Furthermore the nuclear network enables Russia to make the threat effective on all oil and gas transport lines going to Turkey and Southern Europe, while the Russian government completes southwards - with a "friendly" and controlled nuclear system – the missile network targeted to Europe, going from Kaliningrad to Armenia up to Azerbaijan.

With its Trident Juncture 2015 exercise, the largest one since 2002, which started in September until early November 2015, NATO partially responded to that strategic problem.

The Trident Juncture operations regarded Africa and the issue was a sea border dispute, as well as a series of counter-terrorist exercises. Nevertheless the core of the issue is that – considering the United States walking out of the Greater Middle East and the ridiculous European helplessness - the basic acceptance of Iran's nuclear power could be equivalent to the simultaneous acceptance of the leading role played by Russia on the Syrian-Iraqi chessboard.

If this happens, as I fear, a series of Mediterranean countries and not EU Member States shall reconsider their policy on nuclear weapons or manage as the Russian Federation did - the supply and design of dual use nuclear power plants in friendly and strategically well-positioned countries.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

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SYRIANS NOt SEEkINg,

TROY BAXTER Troy Baxter is currently a Master’s Student in Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies Program in Omaha, Nebraska. He received his Honours Degree in Criminal Justice and Public Policy from the University of Guelph in Ontario, Canada in 2013.

T

he primary point of interest here is why Syrians are fleeing their nation and where they are going. The primary reason they are fleeing is relatively obvious: Syria is currently being torn apart by war and its citizens want to be free of the violence, destruction and general unrest.

But with increased pressure being placed on western states to accept a larger number of refugees, a secondary reason now also exists.

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SYRIANS NOt WELCOME There is a segment of the population fleeing in the hopes of upgrading their quality of life, despite not having been affected, or having been very negligibly affected, by the violence in Syria. In some cases the ‘refugees’ have yet to be displaced at all. The more interesting point of interest here is where Syrian refugees are going. The Syrian refugees have largely settled in nations along immediate borders such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There has also been a coalition of support from European and Eastern nations that have accepted large numbers of refugees. One group of nations, however, is notably rejecting support and has remained almost entirely refugee free: the Caspian states. These states are all geographically located very close to Syria and to date have either failed to accept any refugees or have accepted a trivial amount. In contrast, a nation such as Canada, literally on the other side of the world, has done more in the past month to support refugees than the entire Caspian region has since the conflict began.

Geography is the most easily justifiable reason for refugees to choose a nation to emigrate to. It is easier, logistically speaking, to take in refugees from one country to another if the countries are bordering each other. In the case of the Syrian conflict this is best exemplified by Turkey. Since the conflict began, it has taken in over 2 million Syrian refugees, nearly twice as many as the next highest, Lebanon.

However, other nations that either directly or very closely border Syria have failed to take on any refugees.The most readily apparent Caspian state to fit the bill is Iran.

To date they have accepted zero confirmed refugees despite being the closest state in the Caspian to Syria. Russia and Azerbaijan would be the next closest Caspian states to border with Syria, though there is a small nation in between (Georgia and Armenia respectively). Similar to Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia have taken in zero refugees. What may be occurring in this case is ‘opportunity asylum.’

Meaning that by having to travel through one nation to reach another, which is necessary to reach any of the Caspian states, refugees may receive asylum from the first nation they cross before reaching the second. Most refugees will accept guaranteed asylum in a nation rather than take their chances at the next one. This theory receives some support from the number of refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, but doesn’t explain why western nations significantly further away are accepting larger numbers of refugees while the much closer Caspian states continue to accept none. Thus, there must be other factors at play outside of geography and opportunity asylum.

Politics always plays a significant role with refugees.

This does not appear to be the issue in the Caspian region, however, as all five nations of the Caspian have policies in place to deal with the intake of refugees, be it from Syria or anywhere else. The history of refugee intake in the Caspian is not one decorated with successes, however. Azerbaijan has the most visibly negative track record for refugees, as its own citizens have historically at times fled from the nation to become refugees elsewhere, primarily in Armenia.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Every other state in the Caspian, however, has accepted refugees at one time or another. Iran in particular boasts by far the most impressive track record for refugee intake in the region. They have hosted the largest population of refugees in the world since 1979 and an Iranian, Sadruddin Aga Khan, assumed the position of High Commissioner for Refugees on behalf of the UN from 1965 to 1977.

Thus, there is precedent within the Caspian region for accepting refugees. So there must be other factors at play outside of politics keeping Syrians from finding asylum in the Caspian.

Social concerns and persecution have played the largest role in keeping Syrians out of the Caspian region. Despite the fact that all Caspian nations have refugee policies in place there are some significant social concerns when accepting asylum in a foreign nation. Will that nation treat you well? Will they respect your customs, culture, or religion?

Will they temporarily house and feed you until a more permanent solution materializes? Does the possibility of permanent citizenship and naturalization exist? These are important questions for a refugee to consider when fleeing any nation, particularly Syria, as there are currently many other options available. The policies may be in place formally but Caspian states have been notoriously diďŹƒcult for refugees seeking asylum.

Numerous human rights groups have been particularly critical of Russia’s refugee policies. There have been multiple reports citing concerns with everything from detention centers to impossibly tight deadlines to submit refugee applications, which could then deny them refugee status if not completed on time. Perhaps of greatest concern is the fact that Russia does not prohibit the return of refugees to their home country, which therefore does not guarantee asylum and is inconsistent with international norms.

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.In Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan there have been numerous reports of refugees experiencing human rights violations and racism. Combine that with general poverty for refugees in these nations and none of the states are particularly appealing options for seeking asylum. This therefore begs perhaps a rhetorical question: why would a refugee flee from persecution and violence in Syria only to arrive in a Caspian state and be persecuted more?

The fact of the matter is that Syrian refugees are not being accepted into the Caspian region largely because they do not want to claim asylum in the Caspian states. There are other contributing factors in geography and policy but ultimately when other nations with a better track record in economy, human rights and historical refugee acceptance exist as asylum options, then there is no reason to choose a lesser Caspian state.Though to be fair to refugees, the Caspian nations certainly are not encouraging Syrians to come and claim asylum either.

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In fact, the very opposite is occurring, as states like Russia have explicitly stated they will not be accepting any.

Finally, there could be an element of public image at play as well. If Syrians claim asylum in the Caspian and are persecuted shortly thereafter, an immense amount of critical attention and involvement from the UN and global community could be drawn. It could very well cause a state to suer embarrassment or even sanction. Rather than potentially suffer this embarrassment on the international stage, the Caspian states have de facto closed their borders knowing it would be near impossible to guarantee that Syrian refugees would remain free of persecution in the host nations.

The chance of this changing before the Syrian conflict ends is virtually zero and thus the Caspian will remain free of Syrian refugees for the foreseeable future.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

FutuRE FOREIgN POLICIEs: POssIbILItIEs FACINg IRAN

STEPHEN SARTY Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

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Iran’s foreign policy continues to be driven by a series of complex and often times overlapping and contradictory factors, involving its own ideological pursuits, the perception of threats caused by the US and its allies, national identity, and a belief in its historical right to regional hegemony.

These policies are also molded by the various factions within the Iranian domestic ruling elite, comprised of the leadership of the Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, President Rouhani, and other key reformist figures.The foreign policies created are then applied in a number of manners throughout the region that are based on its own strategic interests.

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The methods employed range from direct funding of militant proxy groups such as Hezbollah, diplomatic means via its numerous embassies around the world, and other methods such as Islamic training and education centers. The methods of application and the strategic reasoning behind these policies have been a source of intense scrutiny and conflict for many states around the world. This has ultimately been the reason behind many of the punitive measures applied to Iran.

For countries within the region, Iran’s perceived quest for regional hegemony has led to the majority of tensions, Saudi Arabia being foremost among them. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of trying to spread its religious ideology around the region in order to become the de facto “head” of the Muslim world. Iran, conversely, claims that Saudi Arabia also is attempting to assert its own brand of Sunni Islam and to subjugate Shi’i populations in Sunniled states. This has led both states to take especially hardline stances against the other and has led to a number of proxy fights between the two.

Iran’s policy of supporting militant groups throughout the region also continues to be a major concern to states both within the region and beyond.

Groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen enjoy considerable support financially and militarily from Iran and have been major players in Iran’s proxy wars. Iran, interestingly enough, has not solely supported Shi’i groups but has also shown a willingness to support groups that support its core interests, such as with Hamas in its confrontations against Israel.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Currently these policies pay dividends for Iran as in most locations it has a strategic upper hand, as in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. It is unlikely that Iran would be keen to end such an advantage. But it must for a greater global future.

Where does Iran head next in its quest to regain its place at the world table and to once again be an accepted nation within the global community? The nuclear accord and the subsequent lifting, or easing, of international sanctions will go a long way in determining the courses of action that Iran might take. Regardless of whether the sanctions are fully lifted or simply eased, Iran’s economy stands to improve dramatically. If Iran follows through on the terms of the agreement, then its standing in the world order will also improve dramatically. This new standing, coupled with the increase of foreign interest in investing in Iran, will also bring challenges as Iran struggles to develop the trust it needs to

renew and/ or improve international relationships.

This is one area that Iran needs to focus on. If its leaders are able to find ways to improve relations with Western nations, then that will allow it to reduce its fears of armed conflict and will allow for new partnerships greatly benefiting the general population. Another area that Iran could find improvement would be in developing joint energy ventures within the Caspian region. With its strengthening relations with Russia it could potentially leverage that relationship to forge partnerships in the region much in the same way that China and Japan have done. Joint partnerships would reduce the perception within the region that Iran is attempting to assert its dominance independently.

Iran and Saudi Arabia need to continue to work diplomatically to reduce their mistrust and misconstrued perceptions of one another. One potential item for the agenda should be Yemen.

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Yemen does not appear to be a dispute that has any core value to Iran outside of it being a target of opportunity to create havoc in the region and threaten Sunni hegemony. Given that this does not seem to be of true strategic value to Iran, it is possible that it could work diplomatically with Saudi Arabia toward conflict resolution that might ease the fears of the GCC states in a post-JCPOA world. Additionally, Iran should seek to resolve its longstanding conflicts with its GCC neighbors over issues such as the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

The largest hurdle for Iran to overcome within the region is the fear of Sunni-states that it will continue to support proxy groups against them, trying to foment uprisings within said states. Many of these issues can only be lessened by the passage of time where there is an indication of new trust. It is also possible that Iran may not want to effect change in this area. Given the very structure of Iranian leadership, change is oftentimes slow if not glacial. The complex web of the domestic political machine in Tehran is not geared toward change but rather is built to ensure the dominance of status quo.

If Iran could implement these changes to the way it conducts its foreign policies around the globe it could well be on its way to building the trust needed for the global community to accept it back into the fold as a full and productive member.

The world must believe that Iran is a country willing to abide by its international agreements and does not pose a threat to other nations within the region and beyond. But this future is dependent on both Iran and its Gulf neighbors accepting that their own mutually interactive policies have been collectively responsible for the problems now facing the region.

They must all work to make the internal adjustments necessary to ensure that a lasting peace is possible. Otherwise, the entire world will have to remember that the ‘status quo’ ultimately just translates into more conflict, more mistrust, and more suffering

MODERN DIPLOMACY

ChuRChILL wAs RIght AbOut RussIA AND stILL Is

JOHN CODY MOSBEY John Cody Mosbey is consultant and instructor in Criminal Justice and Emergency Management.

He is also researcher and writer in various aspects of conflict resolution, terrorism, homeland security, and related criminal justice and national security fields. Mr. Mosbey is completing his PhD research in Russian Political Theology at Trinity College Dublin.

T

he world buzzes with headlines of Vladimir Putin and Russian action and reaction to world events. On the surface it seems virtually all Russian foreign policy responsibility is vested in Mr. Putin alone.

Certainly the Russian governmental decision¬ making process is not bestowed solely upon one man, but it seems that little happens in Russia’s name that Putin does not endorse. Russia’s, and by extension Putin’s, actions and reactions tend to confuse and mystify us despite the rhetoric of various politicians indicating that they clearly understand Russian intentions.

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Churchill’s observation of Russian predictability is quoted so often we sometimes fail to remember that he did not stop with merely his observation of Russian inscrutability, and we can be thankful for it.

He left Britain and the West with an insight into deciphering Russian will with his additional surmise that “perhaps there is a key” to Russian reaction to political stimuli. Wisely Churchill posited, “That key is Russian national interest.”

Churchill’s prescient observations were aired in an October 1939 broadcast and concerned his speculation on how Russia would act throughout the course of WWII. Offering insight into solving the Russian riddle Churchill shrewdly noted that Russia would not put aside anything that “would be contrary to the historic life¬-interests of Russia.” It is very important to note that Churchill was not simply referring to what the Soviet leadership of Russia would do in a specific instance; he was looking instead to how Russia had historically acted, and he was predicting that Russia’s future actions would be in keeping with the major Russian interests exhibited in the past.

Actually understanding how Russia will act or react is as difficult as it has always been. In the West we tend to default to Winston Churchill's famous epigram on forecasting Russian actions: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma...”

This frank admission by Mr. Churchill about forecasting Russian actions and reactions holds today. If a politician of Churchill’s grasp and intellect placed prognostication of Russian proclivity within virtually impenetrable concentric circles, why should we assume to be blessed with better equipped political actors on today’s stage? The answer is simple: we should not because we are not.

In 1939 Russia was faced with a Nazi threat to establish a physical presence on the shores of the Black Sea, occupy the Balkans, and subjugate the Slavonic population in Southeastern Europe. Churchill knew then what we should know now: Russia will act and react in traditional ways as it evaluates its national interests. Correctly interpreting Russia’s “historic life¬-interests” allowed Churchill to predict Russia’s future actions only a month into WWII. Nazi Germany and the USSR had signed a mutual non-aggression pact less than two months before Churchill stated his conviction that “Hitler, and all that Hitler stands for, have been and are being warned off the east and the southeast of Europe” by Russia.

Churchill knew that Russia would not allow its traditional geopolitical aspirations to be threatened without mounting a serious response.

MODERN DIPLOMACY A precursor to the coming Nazi Germany-¬Soviet Russia death struggle came with the 1940 invasion of Romania by the USSR. This invasion underscored the conflict between the Russian “historic life¬-interests” and the strategically critical Nazi requirement for oil and other war material. Hitler had to see from Stalin’s actions that the USSR would be a competitor for the Balkans, and this knowledge, correlated with his view of “Slavic races”as Untermenschen and his ambition, propelled Germany’s massive preemptive strike against the USSR in June of 1941.

Hitler sowed the wind with his invasion of Russia, and Germany reaped the whirlwind of defeat and occupation. German defeat in effect gave Russia the Black Sea, the Balkans, and rule over the Slavonic people of Eastern Europe. With Germany’s defeat Russia’s traditional geopolitical interests gained a large measure of satisfaction. Russia may be the most traditional actor of all the major and secondary powers of the earth. But the assertion that Russia acts according to traditionalist tendencies runs the risk of venturing into an academic definitional fog because of the strand of religious belief known as Traditionalism. The difference between “traditional” and “Traditional” is largely a spiritual demarcation.

Traditionalism, either lowercase or uppercase, implies a handing down or generational passing on of beliefs and/or practices and may be applied across a range of practices from cuisine to courting to fashion. Uppercase Traditionalists believe that spiritual and religious truths have existed from time ¬outof mind and that only certain groups of selected and initiated candidates have been chosen to gain and maintain the pure revelations of Truth that Traditionalism possesses. Traditionalists do not confine their belief system to any specific religious expression, rather they claim that kernels of original (therefore pure) Truth still exist and can be discovered within the major religions.

Hence, Traditionalists often embrace selected elements of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism within the exclusive claims of Traditionalism.

Although traditional religious belief and practice cannot be equated exclusively with Orthodox Christianity, Russia does have a strong and pervasive embrace of Orthodox Christianity, and Orthodox Christianity is certainly traditional.

Russian culture is a very traditional culture, and Russian geopolitical interests run along recurring traditional strands. It is understandable that Orthodox Christianity and other religious expressions are considered traditional, but it would be a mistake to confuse the correlation of religious tradition between Orthodox Christianity and other Russian traditions. Although Russian religious and geopolitical traditions may be related, correlation of religious traditional traits should not be considered the cause of the traditional geopolitical interests of Russia a priori.

In addition to the recognizing the definitional fog surrounding “traditional” and “Traditional” (as if the common spelling is not enough) affecting those attempting to predict Putin’s future actions, it is important to recognize that distinctly anti¬-Modern, therefore anti¬-Western, sentiments are distinguishing elements in some contemporary adaptations of Traditionalism. Some influential members of the Russian political right, especially those identified as the “Russian New Right,” assert a connection with the Traditional strand of religious belief and practice.

Alexander Dugin, for example, is a Russian political philosopher who has been very closely associated with the ideas and teachings of the controversial Italian self--proclaimed Traditionalist, Julius Evola.

Documentation of Evola’s association with Fascism is extremely alarming to some students of Traditionalism.

thE CAsPIAN PROJECt 19

Mark Sedgwick’s provocative history and commentary, Against the Modern World, devotes considerable attention to Evola, hence to the reasoning of Dugin and the anti¬-Modern bend of Evola’s disciples.

To an adherent, Traditionalism is right belief, and right belief guides right actions. If right belief and right actions include a distinctly anti¬-Western characteristic, then Russian actions under Putin should be of serious concern based upon Putin’s reception of Dugin and others of the Russian New Right. Leaders and diplomats of the West would be well advised to study the works of Dugin and other seriously right-¬leaning writers and thinkers and their influence on Putin and his political actions.

The West should not be so naive as to believe that the Traditionalist factions evident in Russia today are not significant forces.

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Evola and his interpretation of Traditionalism influences Dugin and the Russian New Right; thus Putin is influenced in turn. Important manifestations of the contemporary Russian New Right thought include beliefs that the West is dangerously materialist, morally corrupt, and godless.

The Western tendency toward more direct democracy is viewed as promoting these damnable traits.

Does this characterization of the West sound familiar? There is a certain resonance between these views and accusations in many Islamic criticisms of the West. It is hubris of the worst sort to treat these accusations of Russia or the Islamic world in any flippant way; perhaps a too light consideration even borders on the suicidal. Russian traditionalist perspectives (its “historic life-¬interests”) are certainly geopolitical.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

It is a cultural and historical fallacy to project Western inculcated responses onto Putin’s Russia. A Coca¬-Cola sign displayed at a market in Moscow does not necessarily mean Russia is eager to be “just like us;” perhaps it means nothing more than there one may purchase a Coke. Russia (under Putin) will act and react purposefully, not as a Western actor, but as the Eurasian imperial power it aspires to be.

Putin may, or may not, be genuinely influenced by Traditionalist beliefs of the Russian right, but he will act traditionally (that is, within Churchill’s “historic life¬-interest” understanding) as a Russian imperialist.

The Russian Empire long coveted the Balkans and the warm water ports of the Black Sea and other access points to the Mediterranean and other seas.

Imperial Russia aspired to become the single great Eurasian power -- an empire stretching from Western Europe to India and perhaps farther. Does contemporary Russia under Putin aspire to less? One needs only to look to the plans and purposes of the Eurasian Economic Union to realize that there is an elephant (more appropriately a bear) in the room and that the bear is attempting to rearm in the grand style of the USSR.

Some experts on Russian political behavior credit Putin’s actions to his being a practitioner of realpolitik, others to Putin’s having pronounced megalomaniac tendencies, still others to Putin’s being a product of KGB culture. While expert opinion should be considered, no opinion affords the traction provided by viewing Putin as a Russian leader steeped in Russian geopolitical tradition who is open to the aspirations of Dugin and the Russian New Right. Putin does not, as some pundits proclaim, desire a 21st Century return of the USSR; his imperial desire is a return of the Czarist Empire constructed to his specificiations -- a Czarist Empire wielding the might of the USSR in its glory days and fulfilling the “historic life¬-interests of Russia” in a very real and recognizable way.

Mr. Churchill was right. Where geopolitics are concerned, Russia will act in historically traditional ways. To predict how contemporary Russia will behave, forget reading of the Enlightenment and the ideals of the French Revolution; instead read Alexander Dugin.

tHE CasPian PrOJECt 19

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EEu and Pakistan-BElarus FrEE tradE EngagEmEnts NASURULLAH BROHI Nasurullah Brohi works as a Senior Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad and can be reached at nasurullahsvi(at)outlook.com

T

he newly created Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has shortly got the momentum as an economic hub for the countries of the region.

The EEU includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia as its members, whereas; the Organization is a continuation of contemplation for establishing the integration projects by the Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia since 2007.

mOdErn diPlOmaCY

The Organization fundamentally promotes the ideas of streamlining the flow and transportation of services and goods between the member states, therefore, it greatly attracts the interests of many stakeholders and according to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, many international organizations and the economic giants like China has shown great interest in the creation of free trade zones through the EEU. The present political and economic importance of the South and Central Asian region along with free trade and economic potential across the Eurasian region greatly appeals almost every regional and international country, whether may they be developed or developing nation seems eager to come in bilateral and multilateral engagements with these organizations and the states in the region. The cooperation that is vital to the many states’ national interests consists of the fields of security, economic, energy, bilateral, free trade, scientific education and cultural interactions. Most particularly, the Russian Federation and China have leading ambitious roles in region’s economic and infrastructural developments. In addition, the growing significance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the present scenario has further enabled China and Russia to become a dominant player on the global economic and political arena. This in turn has also provided small or developing nations to benefit from the mutual benefit efforts of the SCO, EEU and other forums for their industrialization and national economic development goals.

The security issues in Afghanistan are the main obstruction in EUU’s direct trade with South Asia. Alternatively, there are two other options which connect the free trade activities with the regional market either through the North¬-South corridor between Russia¬, Iran and India by way of the Caspian and then the Arabian Sea and or the China¬ Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan is also ardent to benefit from the free trade engagements of the EEU and willing to sign free trade agreement with the EUU. Given its geopolitical location, Pakistan could gain huge economic and trade benefits. Pakistan has also offered Belarus to sign a Potential Trade Agreement (PTA) to facilitate trade connections between the two countries.

Belarus is a landlocked and one of the most industrialized countries located in the heart of the Europe and because of its significant geographic position Pakistan could achieve better access to the Eurasian and Eastern European markets through its free trade engagements with Belarus and the EEU. In addition, both the countries can also generate huge revenues through the industrial cooperation, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and other trade cooperation, therefore, for the reason Pakistan has invited the Belarusian side for a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) and hopefully both the countries will soon reach the accord. Apart from that, the Belarus has also a Custom Union with the Russian Federation and the Kazakhstan which is a growing free trade entity and a major trading partner of the near future. Pakistan also zealously seeks Belarusian support for Pakistan’s entry in the EUU and later on conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

tHE CasPian PrOJECt 19

The bilateral trade between both countries also demands increase and Pakistan’s exports to Belarus in 2014 were only $15.23 million. Despite of the fact that there are immense bilateral economic opportunities for the two sides, but its need of hour to explore the variety of ways for further extending their bilateral trade relationship as Pakistan has exceptional potential to meet Belarusian demands of textile, food commodities, chemicals and many other domestic products. Whereas, Pakistan can also benefit from the Belarusian industrial expertise and it can import tractors, synthetic fiber, and oil and energy resources. Besides vast trade and development opportunities there is a dire need of cultural interactions and educational exchanges.

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Other than its extraordinary trade and economic potential, the EEU also faces the challenges to its further enhanced role and enlargement, though it has been unsuccessful in integrating the former Soviet satellite states but still it seems eager to attain this goal. The Organization however needs to strictly ensure its political sovereignty otherwise, the objectives of rapid expansion in current geopolitical scenario despite of lack of any reasonable framework and structure makes EEU prone to make it a partial success like its predecessors.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

AfRICA COuLD REvERsE

KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African aairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics.

A

frican leaders, export trade organizations and corporate businesses have an extraordinary opportunity to design a well-timed strategy to take advantage of the growing market and to boost trade as a way to reverse considerably trade imbalance that has existed from Soviet days between Russia and Africa, both foreign and local experts have suggested.

In an interview, Maxim Chereshnev, the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Council for the Development of Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations, explains that nowadays there are

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TRADE IMbALANCE WITh RussIA are favorable for African countries to promote export/import and to cooperate in investment spheres with Russian companies.

In light of Russia's anti-sanctions – the ban on imports of many types of European agricultural products – diversification of sources of such raw materials has become especially crucial, while import substitution in the country is only fledging.

This presents an opportunity for strengthening trade with Asia and Africa.

Chereshnev, at least, is not alone calling for exports from Africa. Quite recently, Olga Kulkova, a research fellow at the Center for Studies of Russian-African Relations, Institute for African Studies in Moscow, noted assertively in her opinion article that "Africa has already started filling the niche, Russian market shelves are enjoying a surge in African vegetables and fruits, most of which used to be re-exported through the EU."

equally good business perspectives for Africa and that his organization, for instance, is ready to help with trade facilitation and can offer support for African companies, either small or medium enterprises that are looking for new trade opportunities in the Russian Federation.

"It's pleasure to note that Russia and African states have a long story of relations. Import of coffee, cocoa, tea, citrus, sea products and many more from African countries are important for Russia," he stressed assertively,adding that import substitution policy of Russia and the economic diversification

In 2014, African farmers expressed readiness to boost direct exports to Russia, bypassing European mediators. African countries of the continent can make a fortune by selling agricultural products to Russia.Interestingly, there are only few Africans trading products in Russia's market due to multiple reasons including inadequate knowledge of trade procedures, rules and regulations as well as the changing market conditions. And there are many other obstacles hindering African trade to Russia that have been identified and discussed in many business conferences and seminars, but concrete measures to improve the situation have not been seriously implemented.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

As Ibrahim Usman Gafai, Charge d'Affairs at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Moscow explained in an interview with Buziness Africa, that the overall trade volume between Africa and Russia has been extremely low and highly skewed in favor of Russia.

In addition, he pointed out assertively that one key advantage is regional trade alliances have helped their member states over the years in providing adequate information about the market rules and custom regulations of exporting products of all kinds to Russia.

Gafai pointed out the key challenge from both sides, Africa and Russia, has been dearth of information on doing business and the market environment, and thus has over the years created a condition of uncertainty, misgivings and negative perceptions among prospective traders and investors.

“In order to boost Russia-African trade, there should be policy interventions, initiate trade platforms for both Russians and Africans to participate in practical discussions on how to make trade policies more effective and to offer import and export credit support for corporate traders to achieve appreciable results,” Essenowo told me further in his interview discussion.

He, however, called for the need to create a mechanism for the dissemination of vital business and trade information that will enhance business interaction among African exporters and Russian importers. In addition, African leaders have to cultivate business interest in organizing trade platforms and business mission to showcase their potentialities in the Russian Federation.

Comparatively, African exports to the United States, European Union and even to India and China has been growing due to trade preferences, lower custom tariffs and other trade incentives that were made available to African exporters by these bigtime players, for instance the U.S. offers incentives through the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).

According to Rex Essenowo, chairman of the Russian Chapter of Nigerian Diaspora Organization in Europe (NIDOE), "African exporters have keen interests in the Russian market but face many challenges in getting their goods delivered on time to consumers in Russia. They know that the market potential is vast in both ways and further understand that Asian countries have comparative advantage trading with Russia, in terms of distance, transportation of goods and other infrastructure including logistics and warehousing."

“If we look at the trade volume between China and Africa, both regions have done so much for more than the past 10 years despite all the skepticism and criticism, but can't African countries raise their trade volume dramatically in order to cut down the trade imbalance given the necessary trade incentives and lower custom duties by Russia?” the chairman of NIDOE asked rhetorically.

As for ways on how to reverse the huge trade imbalance that exists between Africa and Russia, Dr Shaabani Nzori, a Moscow based independent African expert on Russia-African issues, doesn't see much that could be done at the moment for the following simple reasons: First, there is no much that Africa can propose to Russia that Russia lacks in its own country, that is raw materials in the form of gas, oil, minerals, and other products such as agricultural produce that Russia can easily and cheaply get from other regions like Latin America and/or Asia. Secondly, the lack of developed infrastructure, manufacturing, strict quality control and packaging in Africa also add to the odds of Africa's failure to export its products to Russia.

ThE CAsPIAN PROJECT 19 As for quality control and packaging, this is a huge problem with Russians as they seem to be too strict and particular on this subject, thereby among others, their reluctance to offer trade preferences to African goods, as they consider African products as being of poor or questionable quality, Dr Nzori explains.

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated several times in his speech to African diplomats that Russia was prepared to consider new initiatives aimed at improving trade between the two regions.

In May 2014, Lavrov wrote in his own article:"we attach special significance to deepening trade and investment cooperation with the African States.

Russia provides African countries with extensive preferences in trade."

Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry has posted an official report on its website that "traditional products from least developed countries (including Africa) would be exempted from import tariffs. The legislation stipulates that the traditional goods are eligible for preferential customs and tariffs treatment."

As far back as 2008, the African Development Bank (AfDB) said in a report that the importance of Russia as a trading partner to African countries is quite minimal when compared to other developed countries and emerging markets such as the European Union, the United States, China, India, and Brazil. Bilateral trade between Russia and Africa reached its peak of US$ 7.3 billion in 2008.

That is understandable. However, Georgi Petrov, vice president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation said at the executive board meeting of the Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with African Countries (AfroCom) held in April 2015, that Russia's trade with Africa, south of the Sahara, was only US$3.2 billion. The fact still remains that African trade has been minimal in the Russian Federation. And unbelievably, African trade figures with Russia are very hard to find from both African and Russian sources.

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For trade relations between Russia and Africa to improve appreciably, Professor Dmitri Bondarenko, deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, also confirmed to Buziness Africa that "Russia gives some trade preferences to African countries – for example, tax exceptions or reduction among other measures. This can become an effective political step to strengthen trade relations with African countries." According to the views of Jimmy Saruchera, a director at Schmooze Frontier Markets, an investment fund that works to support smalland-medium sized businesses in new emerging markets, both Russia and Africa need work on a good trade policy, stable and transparent institutions that are fundamental ingredients, then tools such as credits and export guarantees can be more effective in boosting trade to both regions. Experts have repeatedly called for state support and for radical corporate trade initiatives that can systematically bolster private African entrepreneurs’ efforts not only to raise their economic presence but also to facilitate in making strong inroads into the Russian market.

Russia is a member of the newly created Eurasian Economic Union (which constitutes a huge market and allows free movement of goods among member countries) and the other members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Eurasian Economic Union is an economic union of states located primarily in northern Eurasia.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

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