Greater Caspian Project 22

CON TEN TS

22

EDITORIAL CYBER-PREPPING THE BATTLEFIELD DOES RUSSIA HAVE A NEW WAY TO WAGE WAR? LAURA GARRIDO

THE MATURATION OF THE SCO AN EMERGING IO OF SIGNIFICANCE DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S GEOPOLITICS GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

GREAT GAINS OR GREAT GAME? GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT ACROSS CENTRAL ASIA KEVIN AUGUSTINE

NEW GROUNDS FOR WAR HOW THE POWER OF SIBERIA PIPELINE IMPACTS THE ARCTIC ALEXANDER S. MARTIN

GROWING MILITARIZATION IN ARCTIC AMID INCREASING DISPUTES BAHAUDDIN FOIZEE

CALLING OUT ‘BLUFF DIPLOMACY’ RUSSO-PERSIAN MANEUVERS TO OUTWIT OBAMA ANDY DEAHN

COMPETING COLD WARS TRYING TO PREDICT IRANIAN STRATEGIES STEPHEN SARTY

AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S ELECTIONS GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI

MORE BEAR THAN EAGLE RUSSIA TAKING ADVANTAGE OF AN AMERICAN VACUUM NENAD DRCA

SYRIA AND THE RETURN OF ‘SOVIET’ RUSSIA DR. ABDUL RUFF

CHECHNYA AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS ANTONY CLEMENT

PUTIN, DUGIN AND THE COMING WILD RIDE ON LEVIATHAN JOHN CODY MOSBEY

THE grEaTEr CaSPIaN PrOJECT BI-WEEKLY DIgITaL EDITION www.moderndiplomacy.eu Caspian@moderndiplomacy.eu Dimitris Giannakopoulos Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief Dr. matthew Crosston The Caspian Project, Director

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“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools�

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 22

STUMBLING INTO A CONFLICTED FUTURE Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston MD Advisory Board Vice-Chairman, Director, The Caspian Project

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t is a strange thing to contemplate how the world seems to obsess on everything ‘new’ while supposedly always remaining true to ‘old’ strategies, ideals, and approaches. This is most certainly the case in the world of conflict and cooperation: for every new invention or arrival of a new epoch the 21st century is supposed to bring us, we never seem far removed from thinking that has always gotten us into trouble as a species.

This issue of the Greater Caspian Project looks at a broad array of cases that illustrate this phenomenon. We consider innovative ways to look at the aftermath of the JCPOA, at Arctic exploration, and new Russian foreign policy thinking. We dive into larger problems that extend deep into the Middle East and clearly impact the European Union and United States. In each instance we begin with an assumed supposition by the global community that these challenges are somehow new and novel and unique. And in each case our analyses break down how even novelty can still be subsumed by old biases and long-standing prejudices.

This can be very disheartening for an organization like Modern Diplomacy, the parent of the Greater Caspian Project, so interested in seeing new connections and pathways develop for the interests of greater, broader, and deeper peace and understanding. Unfortunately, as this issue will show our readers, old habits die hard: diplomacy is not always for cooperation; exploration is not always for more opportunity for all; engagement is not always altruistic. One thing all of us affiliated with the Project continue to hope for, even if it is a small hope indeed, is that even when things look bleak or our optimism in the human agents conducting global affairs dims considerably, the effort to continue to expose our readers to knowledge, to new perspectives and outlooks, will shine a brighter light and construct newer pathways that seemed impossible before. Otherwise, to analyze the ways of war and peace, of life and death, would be a hopelessly depressing venture. So here is to No. 22 and to all of our readers: shine the light of analysis and knowledge into the darkest and dimmest corners. The world needs it.

The world needs you.

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CYBER-PREPPING THE BATTLEFIELD

Does Russia have a New Way to Wage War?

THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 22

LAURA GARRIDO Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Her primary research interests cover the post-Soviet space and the fight against radical Islamism.

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ccording to the Bloomberg report, Russia may leverage vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, including large banks, stock exchanges, power grids, and airports, as pressure points against the West.

Ashmore (2009) says the future of Russian cyber warfare is offensively poised. Mshvidobadze (2014) also claimed that analysts examining espionage malware of apparent Russia origin indicate a preparation of the battlefield for cyber war.

Heickero (2010) also identifies the main organizations responsible for offensive and defensive cyber capabilities as the Federal Protective Service (FSO), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russia’s approach to information warfare and information operations differs from that of Western countries to some extent.

Russia sees information as a valuable asset that has strategic value and is a key factor for the stability of the state, for the regime, and for influential actors.

Russia is developing information warfare capabilities such as computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, deception campaigns, and mathematical programming impact. Ashmore (2009) agrees that Russia is developing new information war strategies with the use of hackers that support Russian government information specialists, providing Russia with assets to use during future cyber conflicts.

According to Dr. Matthew Crosston, one of the leading experts both in cyberwar and Russian foreign policy, part of the reason why Russia is such a major threat to the United States is not only its increasing capabilities but the reasoning and psychology behind its attacks and development of such capabilities. Russia’s purpose in developing cyber capabilities seems to be predatory in nature.

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analysts examining espionage malware of apparent Russia origin indicate a preparation of the battlefield for cyber war This predatory purpose is heavily influenced by “the fact that much of the power dominating cyber capability in the Russian Federation is organized and controlled by federal security agencies but also quasi-outsourced to criminal groups, sometimes independently and sometimes in strict conjunction with governmental oversight.” Crosston also notes the cynical cyber mindset of Russia is somewhat controlled by short-term thinking that has massive profit and political power-wielding motives.

While not all cyberattacks originating in Russia come from the state, Russia has been seen as a safe haven for cyber criminality directed against foreign interests and to some extent domestic cyber criminality. Many have pointed out that Russia has not acted resolutely enough to deal with these law breakers. Thus, what makes Russia especially dangerous, according to Mshvidobadze (2014), is the collusion between the Russian state and cyber criminals. Criminal operators confound attribution and hone their skills on criminal activity, which ends up being a cost-effective reserve cyber force available to the state when needed.

There has also been a conjoining of criminal and governmental malware which could result in even more potent cyber weapons. All together this makes Russian cyber espionage widespread, hard to detect, difficult to attribute, and costly to counter.

Heickerö (2010) pointed out Russian strategy emphasizing the importance of information warfare during the initial phase of a conflict to weaken the command and control ability of the opponent. This was evident in the 2007 attacks against Estonia and the 2008 attacks against Georgia. Some calculate this was also extensively used during the intervention in Syria in 2015. To add to this, Herzog (2011) claimed that the severity of the Estonian attacks was a wake-up call to the world. It showed that potentially autonomous transnational networks, such as state-sponsored, pro-Kremlin hacktivists, could avenge their grievances by digitally targeting the critical infrastructure of technically sophisticated states. Herzog suggested that enhancing cyber security and creating new multinational strategies and institutions to counter cyber threats was essential to the sovereignty and survival of states.

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The biggest challenge, however, is striking a balance between Internet freedom and maintaining adequate early-warning monitoring systems.

Cordesman and Cordesman (2002) criticized the disconnect between US cyber-defense and cyberoffense. This was later expansively enhanced by the work of Crosston (2011; 2013; 2014) This conceptual analytic disconnect permeates US governmental efforts and the response of state and local authorities, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. They believe in a need for a “comprehensive annual net assessment of cyber threats that combines analysis of the threat that states present in terms of cyberwarfare with the threats that foreign, domestic, and non-state actor groups can present in terms of cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism.”

Ashmore (2009) believes that the international community should work together to track and prosecute cyber criminals that operate outside the country being attacked. Also, Ashmore (2009) believes that nations should “work together to share technical data to maintain cyber defenses and keep up with the newest and ever-changing cyber-attacks” because individual hackers usually share information on new techniques that can penetrate IT defense structures. This prescription, however, requires enormous amounts of trust from both sides, which is hard to ask for even amongst allies. While the international community should come together to secure cyberspace, it is a completely different ballgame to ask states to share their defense techniques. Not only could this information be used to identify vulnerabilities in their defenses, if the information is stolen by hackers, it could be used against these states and in turn applied to the hackers’ networks to make countermeasures impotent.

Another prescription offered by Ashmore (2009) is the creation of laws that make cybercrimes illegal with the hope that the punishments would deter potential cyber criminals. The problem with this is that there is already plenty of laws criminalizing hacking and cyber espionage, none of which have slowed the frequency of cyberattacks. Will new laws prevent the average middle-class Joe from sending vicious malware to his ex-employer out of spite?

Maybe. Will new laws prevent criminal hacktivists from launching a politically motivated attack to their adversary’s networks? The answer is most likely no. Just as terrorists continue to murder, maim, and rape their victims regardless of the laws that forbid such actions, those who want to hack likely will. It does not matter what laws are in place.

It is this innate internal motivation of the hacker that states like the Russian Federation count on and strategically utilize. For the most part, Russia is the undisputed leader in this newly politicized world of the dark net.

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THE GREATER CASPIAN PROJECT 22

THE MATURATION OF THE SCO An Emerging IO of Significance

DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON Advisory Board Vice-Chairman, Caspian Project Director Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

ANONYMOUS is currently a graduate student in International Security and Intelligence Studies at Bellevue University and works within the US governmental system.

The opinions expressed are strictly personal and do not reflect a formal endorsement of or by the United States’ government and/or Intelligence Community.

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he United States has long been the dominant economic-security structure in the world. It steps in to negotiate international trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership. Its military is relied upon to train NATO troops and forces from Iraq to Colombia on how to manage uprisings, terrorism, and invasions.

Its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) trains other countries’ law enforcement units about counternarcotics trafficking and other anti-crime measures.

Its Secretary of State and President are often called upon to negotiate peace treaties and conflict settlements.

However, with new nations rising to become powerful economic and military blocs in their own right, the United States may have new allies it can rely on to manage regional matters or, conversely, have new contenders to push into the power market and threaten America’s standing as the only global super power. The direct threat to US influence in economic trade or military matters will not likely come from Russia or China independently. The concern, rather, is an ever-strengthening alliance where Russia and China come together to oppose Western influence with other like-minded nations. One such alliance to emerge in the next decade is likely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which combines China’s economic power with Russia’s military assertiveness.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created as a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization in 2001 between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It was originally focused just on the Central Asian region but it has rapidly expanded its purview. In 2016, the SCO decided to admit India and Pakistan as full members and they are expected to join within the next year. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia are considered observer states while Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey participate as dialogue partners.

The SCO established formal relations with the United Nations where it is an observer in the General Assembly, alongside the European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), The Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The SCO largely focuses on economic trade opportunity and security in the Central Asian region. Initially, the organization was mostly oriented towards China’s interest in better economic trade. It has since broadened that focus to also build economic opportunities beyond the region and into the Persian Gulf. Iranian writer, Hamid Golpira stated, “according to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s theory, control of the Eurasian landmass is the key to global domination and control of Central Asia is the key to control of the Eurasian landmass…thus, Russian and China have been paying attention to Brzezinski’s theory since they formed the SCO in 2001, ostensibly to curb extremism in the region and enhance border security, but most probably with the real long-term objective of counterbalancing the activities of the United States and NATO in Central Asia.”

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In 2004, the SCO established the Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS). RATS is funded by the SCO and has a permanent staff of 30 with an initial budget was $2.6 million. Since then its budget has increased considerably. RATS is primarily a hub of information exchange between the security services of SCO members and conducts extensive analytical work. The 30 RATS staff includes seven from Russia and China, six from Kazakhstan, five from Uzbekistan, three from Kyrgyzstan, and two from Tajikistan. RATS was established to fight the “three evils”- terrorism, separatism, and extremism. One way this is supposedly done is by disrupting crossborder drug crimes, taking away economic opportunity and illicit finances.

The SCO has also conducted joint military exercises that the organization claims are transparent and open to the media and public. As SCO’s counterterrorist arm, RATS advises members on operational training, drafts international legal documents to combat terrorism, and is compiling a database of suspected or known terrorists and extremists for SCO-member use. The RATS committee participated in drafting the action plan on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia and sought to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation with ASEAN. In addition, RATS reportedly assisted with security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 World Expo, and the 2011 Asian winter games. RATS also supports security efforts and military training exercises for SCO members. China and Russia send the majority of troops participating in such games. However, all of the members are welcome to participate in these training exercises with topics ranging from peacekeeping activities to anti-terror exercises.

The concern, is an everstrengthening alliance where Russia and China come together to oppose Western influence with other likeminded nations All are joint efforts and depict scenarios such as disrupting and defeating hostage-takers, storming buildings and villages, and forcing down hijacked airliners. The main benefit to the members is that their military and security services practice tactics and weapons-handling while also gaining useful experience working with other countries on coordinated planning, command and control, logistics, and maneuvers. In 2008, for example, an exercise depicted neutralizing terrorists who had seized an oil tanker and its crew while another focused on repelling a simulated attack on a nuclear reactor.

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Another extraordinary agreement between RATS member states is the ability to extradite criminals across borders. In other words, RATS members can carry out abductions across national boundaries and outside of standard judicial procedures. This has been compared to the CIA’s practice of extraordinary rendition and allows members to detain suspects across the six participating states.

Furthermore, the members’ agents are not subject to criminal liability for any actions committed in the course of their duties and are immune from arrest and detention within the six states.

Finally, the SCO RATS has held several conferences that allow for coordination between the UN, ASEAN, NATO, EU, G8, and Organization of the Islamic Conference on critical issues like the lack of security and drug-trafficking in Afghanistan.

The conference in 2009 developed a framework for the SCO-Afghanistan Action plan, which called for joint operations to combat terrorism, drug-trafficking, and organized crime. It involved relevant Afghan bodies to take part in joint law-enforcement exercises led by the SCO, as well as provided measures to improve drug agency training and border patrols. A successful raid in 2010 by Russian, US, and Afghan forces against drug labs in Afghanistan was actually an example of international cooperation launched in the region by the SCO. In 2010, RATS signed a Protocol of Cooperation with the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) to combat drug-trafficking, trans-border drug crime, and subsequent terrorist-related financing. The CARICC was originally established in 2006 between Central Asian nations, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, and Russia. In 2015, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi officially reaffirmed the SCO’s commitment to becoming a regional security leader by calling for the organization to take a larger role in regional security and stability during a meeting of foreign ministers held in Moscow.

Once a group globally dismissed as an international organization in name only, the SCO has slowly evolved and deepened its power relevance within the constituent member states. As it continues to grow its ranks and develop deeper ties of influence within each member, the SCO has the chance to become an IO that actually wields an impressive portfolio of legitimate security, economic, and trade responsibilities. While there are still obstacles and tensions between the member states that hinder this future potentiality, it is nonetheless important that the SCO can no longer be considered a joke on the global stage.

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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S GEOPOLITICS

GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.

Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

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n a now famous speech delivered at the Conference on Security, held in Munich in 2007, Vladimir Putin harshly clarified the structural determinants of his foreign policy. Let list them briefly: according to President Putin, Russia does not tolerate in any way the encirclement that the Atlantic Alliance carried out and still carries out at the edges of the old Warsaw Pact.

Putin is not even convinced – and his argument cannot be faulted - that the network of sensors, radars, ICBM missiles currently operating around the Federation is bound to manage "instability in the greater Middle East".

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Moreover, Putin believed, and still believes, that the international system should only be based on the lawfulness of the United Nations and the other global agencies rather than on NATO and EU only, as the Russian President said to the Italian Minister of Defence at that time. Or on the coalitions of the willing that had unleashed - with adverse and unexpected effects - the US (and Saudi) actions in the First and Second Gulf War, by wiping out a Russian traditional ally, namely Iraq, to create the void of bands, gangs and regional powers on a territory turned into "no man's land", for oil in particular.

Putin still remembers when the Head of the US provisional government in Baghdad created a system for road signalling which was very similar to Boston’s. For the Russian President, the American unipolarity is the warning sign of the strategic void at the edges of empires, with incalculable negative effects for the future strategy of global leaders, even the United States themselves. Furthermore, again in Munich, Putin stated he was extremely interested in an agreement with the United States for the reduction of the ICBM missile systems, to be later extended also to other regional players.It had to be a negotiation to be carried out in strictly bilateral terms and within the UN bodies, and not delegated to other regional alliances.

Hence a "conventionalization" of confrontation which, for the Russian President, avoids the constant nuclear threat and allows a significant reduction in military spending, which will no longer be targeted to an impossible bilateral and final postcold war confrontation, but to the control and reduction of the peripheral clashes of the States placed in the Rimland, in the peripheries of the old opposing blocs.

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Once again there is special attention paid by Russia to the destructive eects of a future unipolar world: no power alone can control the world but, if it does so, it generates polarizations paving the way for a terrible war. In those years the Iran case was evident. For Russia, the future world must be multipolar, especially at a time when the United States have lost their geo-economic primacy and hence, basically, globalization is over. Indeed, it must be put to an end.

And Europe? Will it wait for the crumbs of the TTIP, namely the still secret Treaty with the United States, to believe it can expand its economy or will it begin to really think big, which, indeed, should be its role at global geoeconomic level?

Finally, after some very harsh comments on the US behaviour, in Munich Putin said that the undue pressures to export "democracy" were, in fact,

bad forms of interference, together with international NGOs, which produced the opposite eect.

This means weak and viable States which are at the mercy of expensive international aid, as well as Trojan horse of multinational companies that subsequently generate further social tensions which, in some cases, lead to the rooting of Islamist terrorism.

An objective and well-grounded analysis which with Machiavellianism and the harshness of the Russian decision-makers, from Peter the Great to the current time - avoids the rhetoric of fierce "tyrants" by nature, or the curse of religious ideologies ad memoriam which only lead to jihadists’ hegemony.

In Munich as currently, courage was needed to create a linkage between the global economic disasters and jihadist terrorism, as well as between globalization, unipolar policies, and social and political destabilization in the world.

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For Vladimir Putin, in substance, the unipolar world ended with the crisis of what we might define "the first globalization", cornered by the expansion of China, the BRICS and the other new centres of independent economic and political development which, over time, saw the United States be bogged down in a financial crisis that was directly derived from the geopolitical and financial overstretch of the only winner of the Cold War. Today, we realize that some of the Russian President’s prophecies have come true: China is expanding geo-economically beyond its borders, both with the One Road, One Belt initiative, which will lead to the economic development and geostrategic unification of the whole Asian Heartland, and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is bound to turn from an "Asian EEC" into a real "Eastern NATO". The United States, with current President Obama and his successor after the elections, are leaving the Middle East to its fate. This, however, will also be the end of Europe.

The traditional American pendulum swinging between the "necessary power" to be spent everywhere and the "house on the hill", between T. Roosevelt and Monroe doctrine of the 'kitchen garden", to be fully exploited up to its limits. Even Israel, which with Prime Minister Netanyahu has refused a meeting with President Obama in Washington on March 18, has resumed its ties with Russia. The Knesset, namely the Jewish State’s Parliament, paid a visit to Crimea early February, while the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has expressed his dissatisfaction with the new bilateral agreement between Israel and Turkey.Israel follows its own Global Strategy, which is the repetition of the old divide and rule strategy in the Arab region, typical of the Cold War, and its natural ambition to become a regional power, now that the Islamic world discovers itself at war with all its many souls and powers.

today both China and Russia tend to expand onto their “near abroad”, with a view to opposing the US unilateral order Currently Israel closely monitors the defensive infrastructure along its Syrian border and, while at the beginning of hostilities, it thought that Bashar alAssad was the ''weak link" of the pro-Iranian axis, the subsequent evolution of the strategic framework in Syria has meant that Israel has no longer plans to support the so-called "moderate rebels" a stance at the time passively inherited from the United States.

Also the United States, with NATO, believed that the Russian support for the Arab Syrian Army would be technologically and strategically irrelevant but the reality, with the Baath covert networks already operating in Raqqa, the "Caliphate’s capital city", and Assad’s forces a few kilometres away from that city and now placed all around Aleppo, the key to the link between Isis and Turkey, shows us a very different course of events.

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With its actions in Syria, the Russian Federation has proved to be a credible opponent of the Atlantic Alliance, while NATO is now deprived of a strategy in the Middle East and the Maghreb region going beyond the old peacekeeping rhetoric.

Hence, a new Russian-Israeli axis is likely to materialize, also thanks to the Russian and Chinese investment in the Israeli hi-tech sector, which is the most advanced in the world. A bond which, as already happened, fills the gaps left by the old North American hegemony, which now persists in maintaining pressures around China, so as to limit its terrestrial and maritime power projection, and encircle the Russian Federation, as in a resurgence of useless Cold War. The Philippines have offered six new bases to the United States, while China has built its new base in Djibouti and America is establishing a network of Special Forces that, starting from Eurasia and China, is global for its outreach and use.

In this regard, it is worth recalling John Maynard Keynes’ witty remark according to which "the difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones". The issue arises from Eurasia’ encirclement – that the Americans are pursuing - or from the Russian use of the Eurasian Heartland as hub for the expansion and hegemony of the new Russia (and current China led by Xi Jinping).

Today Putin is the most careful follower of the American geopolitician Spykman, one of the masters of the USSR containment, which attached priority to the "edges" of the world's great continental land masses.Furthermore, today both China and Russia tend to expand onto their “near abroad”,

with a view to opposing the US unilateral order, both by means of the economy, considering China’s gradual relinquishment of its role as first buyer of US Treasury bonds, and with Russia’s “conquest” of the Middle East nerve centre.

Both new powers, which want to become the reference poles of a new multipolar world, are divesting dollars and buying gold, while now the current domestic imbalance in world markets enables China to sign contracts denominated in yuan-renminmbi with emerging countries and enables Russia to sell oil and gas to the small "third" powers and to China itself, thus offsetting the embargo imposed by the United States and Great Britain. Hence a new distribution of world strategic polarities can be imagined in the near future. It is an axis going from Russia, the Western strong point of the new Chinese Silk Road towards the Middle East, and the European Union, so as to oppose the pro-US Sunni axis in Syria, with a new independent role played by Israel.

Russia is still afraid of the US Global Strike, with or without NATO support. Moreover, as early as the Munich Conference of 2007, Russia has attached essential importance to the decoupling between the Atlantic Alliance’s power, which Putin sees as part of the US global strategy and projection of US independent power.Furthermore, the Russian Federation will at first be connected with India in a stable way, so as to expand its own international market, and later with the EU, which is currently undergoing a process of strategic separation from the United States, if and when Europe implements an effective foreign policy. Later it will head for the areas not yet penetrated by the Western bloc.

These areas are the Arctic, and the Russian share of the Antarctic, namely the primary aim of the Russian new maritime doctrine until 2020, and finally its “near abroad” that Russia sees destabilized by the doctrine of the US "colour revolutions".

Moreover, NATO expansion is regarded by Russia as the primary threat to Russian strategic interests, in the new military doctrines followed by the Russian Armed Forces. Hence destabilizing the Rimland of the great continental aggregates to directly hit Russia or China? Are Italy and the European Union really interested in doing so? I do not think so. For the Russian strategic doctrine, a particular factor is the cultural and symbolic aspect. Eurasianism is the mainstay of Russia's geocultural issue.

The Soviet world has always seen cultural continuity between Western Europe and the "Third Rome" which, in the last Tzars’ political theology, was heir to the genuine tradition of a betrayed and forgotten West, in its deep and spiritual roots.

Even the Bolshevik revolution, long after Peter I and Tsar Alexander II, preserved the myth of equalizing, also violently, old Russia and its natural link with the Western spirit, merged with the popular and "oriental" traditions of the Narod, the Russian “people", seen as the spiritual root of the Nation, of its specificity, but also of its heritage of merger between East and West.

Therefore, today, the philosophical Eurasia is a cultural and strategic model of autonomy of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, an attempt at cultural interconnection between the Eurasian peninsula and the Slavic Heartland.

All this, with a view to creating a geo-cultural and military "environment", referring to a Russia which is still a great power capable of performing its function as a bridge between nations and traditional geopolitical areas, through the Russian spirit and its cultural autonomy.

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KEVIN AUGUSTINE Kevin Augustine is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

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lexander Cooley in his book, Great Games Local Rules, describes a new great game where the post-soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan take orders from Moscow, Washington, and Beijing. He describes this geopolitical concept as a race in which the winner vies to take all in a battle to secure vital strategic interests.

This great game metaphor is appealing because it suggests that great powers still attempt to sway, coerce, persuade, and buy the loyalties of strategically vital governments.

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GREAT GAINS OR GREAT GAME? Global Engagement across Central Asia

However, the new great game remains deeply blinding. Cooley mentions that as times have changed, so have the rules. Instead of dealing with local rulers, warlords, and chieftains, outside powers must now deal with nation-states and Presidents.

These nation-states have inherited certain international privileges and opportunities that their earlier counterparts lacked. Cooley is correct to use the great games local rules metaphor in describing the current situation in Central Asia. However, a better metaphor, great GAINS local rules, given the current situation and differing perspectives in Central Asia, is even more accurate.

According to Cooley, the Central Asian states have learned to play the great powers off one another for their local benefit. However, their exact tactics and demands depend on the institutional structures, capacity, and natural resource endowments bequeathed to them as independent states. Halvor Haggenes, in his thesis on Central Asia’s missing war, states that natural resources can act as both a mechanism for peace and armed conflict and thus it is never certain whether these new states will erupt into violence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, even though many experts have predicted this for a generation.

The great powers involved in Central Asia have different security, economic, and political goals. The great game of long ago was for power and control.

Much of the contemporary battle viewed today is in securing the Central Asian region and adjacent regions to enable national economic interests and certain natural resources. These national economic interests often lead to conflict.

In fact, Central Asia has not seen any more violent conflict than other areas of the former soviet union (FSU) and some would argue that it has been remarkably stable, at least compared to the Caucasus and Southern Russia. However, unequal distribution of natural resources in the region is still a troubling source of potential conflict.

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Haggenes rightly pointed out that resource scarcity may just as well lead to conflict, especially if combined with other more justifiable security-oriented factors that can easily piggy-back on top of economic motivations and stimuli.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are both rich in oil and natural gas. Their engagement with outside powers has been mostly focused in developing their respective energy sectors. (Cooley) However, the countries are starkly dierent in how they pursue relationships and cooperation. Kazakhstan is more willing to build an international reputation and secure international approval for its policies.

Turkmenistan, on the other hand, decided during Niyazov’s rule to completely isolate itself from unwanted sovereign interference and meddling. (Cooley) Uzbekistan with some natural resources and having the largest population of the region competes with Kazakhstan for the mantle of most important Central Asian state.

Uzbekistan has a slight transportation/transnational engagement advantage to the above-mentioned countries in the fact that it borders Afghanistan and every other central Asian state combined. However, the country has also at times clashed with the West on certain economic, military and political issues.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are resource-poor and increasingly weaker than the other Central Asian states and have failed to attract the interest of major international investors to a large degree. However, the attempted engagement of these states with foreign powers has led to increasing military-tomilitary cooperation by providing access to local military bases. In this sense both the Kyrgyz and Tajik governments have commodified their very territory to extract economic and political benefits.

(Cooley) The fact that these countries are hosting military facilities for countries like Russia, France, India, and the US can arguably lead to tension if not outright conflict for the local and major players involved.

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Foreign powers are seeking to improve the region’s security and hope to stabilize adjacent regions. This is their most important strategy. Simultaneously, the big three are also looking to secure certain resources for themselves, in particular oil and gas. Out of the three, China may be the only foreign power to secure major access to oil and gas in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and has rapidly completed the construction of new regional pipelines to transport this energy supply eastward.

(Cooley) This success, however, could lead to conflict with neighboring countries that are resourcescarce and looking at ways to capitalize on what is becoming a truly global, transnational new Silk Road economic path to prosperity.

the big three are also looking to secure certain resources for themselves, in particular oil and gas

It seems like it should be possible for the great powers to coexist peacefully while conducting strategic The entry of the United States and China, both as interests in the Central Asian region. China has sestrategic partners and competitors simultaneously, curity ties with Central Asian states through the has complicated Moscow’s efforts as it is looking to Shanghai Cooperation Organization and conducts resume its “privileged role” in Central Asia. Since energy trade bilaterally. Turkey has an oil pipeline these states were a part of the FSU, there is at least that connects their country with Central Asia. Iran a tactical if not strategic reaction from Russia to is looking at ways to construct an oil pipeline from other foreign powers openly and freely engaging the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Finally, Pakistan and wielding influence in its so-called ‘Near Abroad.’ seeks natural gas from central Asia and supports the While many in the academic and diplomatic com- development of pipelines from its countries. All of munities have thought it safe to assume that con- these projects have the potential to be great proflict will stem from resource scarcity within Central ducers of peace and stability. Unfortunately, these Asia or from a larger geopolitical conflict involving same projects have equal potential to be intensithe greater powers jockeying in the region, for the fiers of already existing tension and hatred, and ulmost part the countries of Central Asia have coex- timately becoming enflamed into real world conflict isted without nearly the level of conflict that the and war. Let us all hope that it will be the former and ‘New Great Gamers’ expected. (Cooley) not the latter that rules the New Great Game.

NEW GROUNDS FOR WAR How the Power of Siberia Pipeline Impacts the Arctic

ALEXANDER S. MARTIN Alexander S. Martin is currently pursuing a Master’s Degree in International Intelligence and Security Studies from Bellevue University.

He earned a Bachelor’s Degree in International Intelligence and Security Studies also from Bellevue University in 2014.

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he Power of Siberia pipeline, a joint Russian and Chinese venture in which Russia has agreed to provide $400 billion of natural gas (LNG) to China over the course of 30 years, presents a complex vector of potential conflict. Arctic ice melt, energy resource shortage, and increasing geopolitical tensions are all implicated. The complex nature of these issues and the uncertainty regarding their eventual manifestation places the pipeline in the realm of emergent conflict.

The Arctic nations, in particular the five littoral Arctic Ocean states - America, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark - are most at risk. China is also a key player, due to both its role as recipient of Russian LNG and its Arctic ambitions. These states are all members of the Arctic Council, the principle body involved in international Arctic governance. While many observers consider Arctic diplomacy via the Arctic Council a success, and point to the generally cooperative nature of international Arctic interaction, this hides the geopolitical divide that exists at the core of the Arctic Council. Most of the five littoral Arctic states belong to Western international and supranational organizations like NATO or the European Union (EU). However, the growing interdependence of Russia and China, and both states’ geostrategic expansionist ambitions, will likely complicate future efforts to prevent Arctic tensions and conflict.

PRODUCTIVE POLICY Arctic diplomacy via the Arctic Council has a long history of cooperative conflict resolution. The most notable instance of successful Arctic diplomacy is the landmark 2010 resolution of a Russian and Norwegian Barents Sea border dispute after decades of negotiation. This is largely a result of the unique application of the rule of international law in the Arctic. The predominant legal framework governing Arctic activities is the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes freedom-ofnavigation rights, sets territorial boundaries, sets exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and rules for extending continental shelf rights, and has created several conflict-resolution mechanisms. This has provided the Arctic states with a solid and widely accepted legal framework within which to conduct Arctic activities and provided effective mechanisms to address disputes.

The five littoral states reaffirmed their commitment to peaceful and cooperative action within the framework of UNCLOS in the Arctic with the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. The Declaration commits its signatories to address sovereignty and jurisdiction issues through the “extensive legal framework” that governs Arctic activity. Signatories also promised to strengthen cooperation multilaterally, through existing organizations such as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council.

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This emphasis on cooperation is reflected in the five littoral states’ Arctic strategy documents, which share a number of basic goals and principles. These include: a peaceful, safe, and secure Arctic; sustainable economic and social development; environmental protection; addressing the rights and needs of indigenous Arctic peoples; and the maintenance of sovereignty. Another particularly promising development is the signing of the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. This treaty, signed in 2011 by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, encompasses previous agreements like the Tromsø Declaration and commits its signatories to expanded cooperation and information sharing in Arctic search and rescue missions. The Arctic Council has historically had a reputation for keeping its dealings separate from other international controversies, and has developed an air of isolation from political turbulence.

This analysis demonstrates that Arctic states have taken great pains to maintain the cooperative, peaceful nature of national and international activity in the Arctic. In particular, the dogged adherence to international law has provided a unique way to manage disputes. In addition, the Arctic Council has proven a valuable forum in which member states can address concerns, pursue cooperation, and effectively manage increased access to the Arctic. Its ability to compartmentalize Arctic policy from other international disputes has proven mostly resilient.

Which is what makes the impact of Russia’s strategies concurrent to the Power of Siberia pipeline most intriguing.

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLICIES The insulation from international tumult the Arctic cooperation has enjoyed thus far may be eroding.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, linked to the Power of Siberia pipeline by precipitating the international sanctions which served as a catalyst to signing the deal, has become an important enough threat to influence Arctic policy. In protest of Russia’s supposed revanchism, the Canadian Chair of the Arctic Council refused to attend an Arctic Council meeting in Moscow. The Canadian government saw this action as building on other penalties, like sanctions and travel bans, it had already imposed on Russia. While well-intentioned, Canada’s policy of including the Arctic in its attempts to isolate Russia may have unintended consequences, particularly in light of Russia’s ongoing military expansion there.

Russia has been increasing its military capacity in the Arctic for several years now. On December 1, 2015, Russia’s Arctic Command Headquarters became operational, one of the most visible signs of Russia’s “plan to form a combined arms group and construct a unified network of military facilities in the country’s Arctic territories, by hosting troops, advanced warships, and aircraft to strengthen the protection of its northern borders.” This can be seen as a fulfillment of Russia’s 2009 Russian Arctic Strategy until 2020.

This strategy emphasized the national security dimensions of Russia’s Arctic policies, with a discussion of the need to militarily protect Russian interests. In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin has explicitly stated that any Russian military buildup in the Arctic is a result of US submarines already present in the Arctic.

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This has begun to trouble Russia’s Arctic neighbors and is rightfully seen as “a direct challenge to the longstanding consensus that the Arctic should be kept free of military rivalry.”.

Such challenges amid Western fears of Russian expansionism and heightened tensions do not bode well for future efforts to mitigate or avoid crisis in the Arctic. Recent backtracking notwithstanding, Canada’s decision to link Arctic cooperation with its wider foreign policy has set a precedent in which other states may choose to prioritize contentious foreign policy over the previously pristine Arctic cooperation. Likewise, Russia’s military buildup violates one of the fundamental tenets of Arctic engagement, that of keeping it free from military competition. In light of these developments, the potential for conflict over the Power of Siberia pipeline, arising from the geopolitics of climate change, energy scarcity, and divergent strategic positions, should become much more likely.

The Power of Siberia pipeline poses the potential for conflict due to the unique forces shaping its place in world affairs. As such, careful and effective policy is necessary to avoid such an undesirable outcome. International cooperation in the Arctic provides the most appropriate policy issue to explore these potentialities. Arctic policy has a reputation for cooperation even in the face of political adversity. For the majority of its existence the Arctic Council, along with related Arctic bodies, have served as valuable arenas for engagement and conflict resolution. However, recent developments give cause for concern that the Arctic may prove as contentious and competitive as other human endeavors. In total, while Arctic policy offers much in the way of useful means to arbitrate disputes and manage conflicts, there is growing evidence that it will succumb to the tendency toward competition and conflict. Thus, the melting ice may one day reveal new grounds for war.

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GROWING MILITARIZATION IN ARCTIC AMID INCREASING DISPUTES

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BAHAUDDIN FOIZEE Primarily a legal practitioner, teaches law at Dhaka Centre for Law & Economics, a University of London law graduate, regularly writes columns on international affairs

DISPUTES

W

ith the rapid melting of ice in the Arctic region, the long-isolated region is becoming a more accessible zone for commercial fishing, fresh water, minerals, coal, iron, copper, oil, gas, and shipping. Thus, the region is increasingly catching the world powers’ attention.

Arctic states – Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, Norway and the U.S. – are in rush to exploit all these opportunities from the region, which is believed to hold huge oil and natural gas resources.

With such lust for resources, there is the likelihood that the slow militarization, which has already been initiated by the stake-holding states, will be intensified, jeopardizing the peace and stability of the region and the globe.

The Arctic region is located around the North Pole and surrounded by landmasses of the aforementioned five countries. Since the Arctic region was “inaccessible” until the end of 20th century because of the layers of thick ice, there were less territorial disputes until the beginning of this (21st) century.

However, ice are melting rapidly in the Arctic region because of the global warming, clearing this icecovered region from ice. The ice of the region is already reduced by as much as 50% from 1950s. The region is warming faster than other areas across the globe. Such rapid melting of ice is making the region a more “accessible” zone. The melting of the sea ice has been opening up trade routes (during the summers) between Asia and Europe through the Arctic Ocean; the same region where such trades routes were unimaginable even couple of decades ago. In 2007, the Northwest Passage between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans opened for the first time in memory.

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all the Arctic countries have been moving towards militarizing the region in order to acquire each of their respective objectives in the region The constant change in the climate and the increasing accessibility to the region would make the extraction of oil and gas from the region much easier.

Estimations from different corners reveal that the region is speculated to hold oil reserves of upto 13% of the global total of undiscovered oil, upto 30% of natural gas, and also other precious metals. Such ‘speculations’ and ‘accessibility' have given rise to plenty of disputes that have emerged among the aforementioned five countries surrounding the region.

However, among those disputes, the most intensified ones are: (i) regarding boundaries in the Beaufort Sea and the status of the Northwest Passage between the U.S. and Canada, (ii) regarding Hans Island between Canada and Denmark (via Greenland), (iii) regarding the Lomonosov Ridge – a mountain range across the region — among Canada, Denmark and Russia, (iv) and regarding the maritime border from the Bering Sea into the region between the U.S. and Russia. Therefore, all countries surrounding the region are involved in disputes regarding the ownership and control over different parts of the region.

Alongwith these five Arctic countries, China and the UK are also involved in the dispute through their claims over the Svalbard archipelago, which happens to be within the region.

Some of the Arctic countries that are claimant to the disputes have been attempting to come to a solution through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, a constructive solution, which would bind all the claimants to the Arctic disputes to abide by it, could not be reached through these CLCS and UNCLOS. This is because, both CLCS and UNCLOS lack the appropriate mandate from countries across the world, including the aforesaid five Arctic countries, to impose “legally binding” decisions or provisions for any maritime disputes.Therefore, the absence of a binding legal regime creates scopes for intense territorial and maritime disputes concerning the control, exploration and exploitation of the energy resources in such a region that is becoming increasingly accessible for such purpose (i.e. purpose of energy exploration and exploitation).

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MILITARIZATION In the prevailing scenario, all the Arctic countries, which are involved in the territorial and maritime disputes among themselves, have been moving towards militarizing the region in order to acquire each of their respective objectives in the region.

Norwegian foreign secretary Jonas Gahr Stoere already expressed that the presence of “military, navy and coastguard” in the region is necessary. Canada planned deep water “naval facility” at Nanisivik, which lies at the entrance to the disputed Northwest Passage. Canada promised (under former PM Stephen Harper’s administration) to build armed ice-breakers, several patrol ships and several vessels in order to proceed towards gripping the Arctic. In 2011, Canada conducted large-scale “military exercises” in the region.

In August 2015, the U.S. permitted Shell to drill for oil in the Chukchi Sea, which falls within the periphery of Alaskan Arctic. The U.S. “Coast Guard” has already deployed “sophisticated ships, aircrafts and other maritime assets” in the Alaskan Arctic for the duration of Shell’s drilling in the Arctic. Through such presence, the U.S. is not only trying to exploit energy resources of the Arctic region, but also trying to keep its “military presence” deep inside the region.

On the otherside, in 2007, Russian scientists dived to the seabed in the Arctic Ocean and planted a titanium Russian flag (Russia claimed that it was flag of Russia’s ruling party) in order to beef up their claims. Russia has already moved to restore a Soviet era “military base” and other “military outposts” in the Arctic. In early 2015, R ussia exercised Arctic “military patrols” from its Northern Fleet, involving “38,000 servicemen, more than 50 surface ships and submarines and 110 aircrafts”.

More interestingly, Russia is currently planning to jointly explore for oil in Russia’s Arctic fields with China, which is increasingly becoming a strong “military power” besides being an economic giant.

Through such move, Russia is trying to make sure that Russia has a “rising military power” like China involved into its stake in the Arctic region so that such cooperation favours Russia at the time of escalation of any “military conflict”.

WRAPPING UP As of yet, the Arctic region is largely untouched by mankind. However, with the ice caps melting, access to the Arctic oil and gas reserves, which is estimated to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars, will become easier – a prediction that has already sparked a military competition in the region. Such militarization of the region is likely to increase with almost all the countries urging for increasing their military deployments and exercises, and there appears little hope & opportunity for any diplomatic resolution (or political agreement) regarding the disputes. It can be well presumed that without any diplomatic resolution (or political agreement), the current non-hostile debate over the Arctic could turn into a violent confrontation.

It seems our globe does not lack reasons to engage in chaos. The two world wars began as European conflicts, only to turn gradually into world wars.

Likewise, if the disputes over the control of the Arctic resources are not resolved quickly, it could turn into a larger military conflict that would not just involve the Arctic countries, but would also drag a larger part of the world into this conflict. And for sure, the start of such war would mean the cold, yet beautiful, Arctic region would become the targets of war machines– destroying the environment and the stability of the region and the globe.

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ANDY DEAHN Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree from Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Department of Defense contractor working as a member of an intelligence analysis team throughout various worldwide locations.

He had previously worked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

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CALLING OUT ‘BLUFF DIPLOMACY’ Russo-Persian Maneuvers to Outwit Obama

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ccording to the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal struck with the Islamic Republic of Iran over its nuclear capabilities, is a landmark and triumphant diplomatic opening with the isolated Tehran regime.

However, there have been multiple underlying issues boiling over into what can only be viewed as an attempt to escalate tensions between the two nations. These allegations hold the potential to undercut the “historic” nuclear deal, either by a breach of contract on the one side or by force on the other.

One such recent challenge toward the U.S.-Iranian relationship transpired at the end of December 2015 when five Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessels approached the USS Harry Truman—an American aircraft carrier currently tasked with conducting

naval operations in the Gulf Region—before launching multiple unguided rockets in close proximity to the U.S. naval vessel. And while this was not the first provocation, it was the most significant due to its proximity to U.S. forces. For example, the Iranian regime conducted a ballistic missile launch inside its borders in October 2015. This launch drew condemnation from U.S. Congressional lawmakers as well as the United Nations, which claimed the October launch violated U.N. Security Council resolutions.

A lack of clarity, credibility, and follow-through on behalf of President Obama in regards to a deterrence strategy has left Iran apparently guessing at which acts will trigger retaliation by Washington and has left no incentive for the regime to strictly comply with the provisions outlined in the deal.

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The October launch not only stirred up tensions among Western powers: a lack of serious consequences also prompted a second launch in November 2015. It should be noted that the November missile launch was conducted utilizing a Ghadr-110 medium-range ballistic missile. This weapon system has a range of 1,200 miles and is capable of striking U.S. military assets in the region as well as the nation of Israel. With Iran in possession of such a weapon and with the launches showcasing its capability in using it, the Islamic Republic arguably has no intention of normalizing relations with the United States or backing down from its potentially damaging and destabilizing Middle East policy.

So far President Obama’s lack of resolve in challenging Iranian provocations has generated two probable courses of action: first, Iranian use of “salami tactics”—that is, small violations of the JCPOA deemed not significant or dangerous enough to trigger a major response—bring the regime closer to nuclear weapons capabilities without getting close to any red-line responses from the West;

second, the Iranian regime may continue to clandestinely pursue nuclear capabilities, which poses a challenge for detecting these secret violations, even under the JCPOA. This latter course of action is perceived as more likely due to Iran’s extensive history of secret nuclear development as well as weak provisions in the nuclear agreement inspection protocols, making the detection of bomb-related capabilities difficult. Furthermore, the former and more aggressive course of action poses a significant challenge in the near-term as Iran approaches two critical elections in February 2016; the first election for its general assembly and the second for the council which chooses the next Supreme Leader. These domestic power struggles mean that more ambiguous and antagonistic incidents might possibly occur as the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei strikes a balance between hard-line rhetoric and following the guidelines of the JCPOA. In addition, since the nuclear deal was struck and the civil war within Syria expanded into a global issue, Tehran has bolstered relations with Russia.

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This Russo-Persian relationship may also be a contributing factor for poor attitudes within Iran toward the JCPOA, taking cues from the Russian playbook of hard-nosed diplomacy and prideful political discourse. While relations between Moscow and Tehran historically have not always been smooth, this newly revitalized partnership may be opportunistically geopolitical.

For example, bilateral dialogue between Moscow and Tehran is most often economic and political.

This is based upon tension from Western sanctions, energy needs, the Iranian nuclear program, security across Central Asia, and the impact of Western/U.S. involvement in Syria, Iraq, and the greater Middle East. Both nations have denounced regional terrorism, identifying the threat that it poses for their own national security, while at the same time criticizing U.S. sanctions and condemning Western demands for a regime change in Syria. Moreover, both players observe President Bashar al Assad’s stay in power as more preferable to their regional interests and provides the opportunity to exert and expand their influence in this strategically critical country.

Their status as two of the world’s largest energy suppliers, combined with their proximity to the Caspian Sea, has led these economic deals to become energy-centric collaborations: new initiatives have been created with Russia providing to Iran a 5 billion USD line of credit, with renewed cooperation over joint transportation and energy projects. Russia also agreed to begin construction of two nuclear reactors within Iran down the road. All of these are preemptive to the planned US sanctions relief as part of the JCPOA. It is unclear at the moment whether the Russo-Persian relationship will develop into a more geopolitically sound partnership enhancing the JCPOA or dissolve into geostrategic maneuvering that ultimately undermines the new agreement. Regardless, the increased aggressiveness on behalf of Iran and the nation’s stagnating relationship with the United States—even with the JCPOA intact—will continue to create a complicated detente, as no one seems certain that what is presently perceived within Tehran as serialized bluffing on behalf of President Obama will continue indefinitely. The goal of U.S. policy at this point should be to remove all doubts from all actors involved: namely, that the United States will uphold its commitments outlined in the nuclear agreement, even if that means showing a use of force once thought impossible. The JCPOA will amount to nothing if the only ‘tool’ being used by the United States to support it is bluff diplomacy.

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COMPETING COLD WARS

Trying to Predict Iranian Strategies

STEPHEN SARTY Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

T

he end of the Cold War brought about drastic changes in global relations between states as well as a dramatic change in international politics. These changes have brought about the need for states to maintain flexibility in their foreign policies to react to an everchanging world as states search to answer “what is next?�

For Iran, which was ill-equipped to face such challenges, it created a foreign policy nightmare it is still dealing with. This has never been truer since the end of the Cold War, which brought about widespread international system change, not all of it good to the internal dynamics within Iran.

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For example, the warming of Iran’s relations with its Gulf neighbors took a hit during the Gulf Wars. With increased relations and strengthened military presence of the US in the region, and its continuing hardline stance on Iran, reignited tensions were inevitable. The removal of the Saddam regime in Iraq also reignited fears across the Gulf of a spreading Shia influence. Saudi fears of an emerging Shia Crescent intensified. The US presence helped Saudi Arabia hold onto its grip on regional power, however, as Iran had to recalculate its own security posture in the face of a potential American strike. Adding to the tension was always the looming nuclear issue.

This caused Iran to enter into somewhat of a “Cold War” period with its Arab neighbors and in particular Saudi Arabia, while also continuing to try to assert its regional dominance: in Lebanon through its use of its main proxy, Hezbollah; in Syria, through its support of Assad; and in Yemen, through the Houthi militants.

Internal changes within Iran, however, have started to bring about an external change. While Iran seeks to improve relations internationally it also in particular wants to gain a place of dominance in terms of security within the region. As the Iranian domestic landscape continues to change towards more pragmatism, it has had a marked effect on its foreign policy. Iran currently maintains good relations with Turkey, the Assad regime in Syria, and also with the Hezbollah and Shia powers in Iraq. It has also recently entered into agreements with Russia and has begun to participate in several joint operations together

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It has traditionally been at odds with its Arab counterparts, mainly the GCC nations, as well as the United States, Egypt and Israel. The recent nuclear agreement appears to be part of a general warming trend, however, as the region remains hopeful that a nuclear Iran is not on the immediate horizon. A warming of the international community towards Iran, however, would most likely force Saudi Arabia into new alliances with Pakistan and Turkey, let alone Israel, along with further changes to the alliances with other GCC states in an effort to counter increased Iranian status and power.

The uranium enrichment program and an Iranian nuclear capability is also a major shaper of how Iran views its own internal security posture, as well as shaping how states within the region and beyond address Iran. Domestically Iran is divided in regards to the nuclear issue into three main groups: Nuclear supporters. Those who unreservedly support Iran’s nuclear program and believe Iran has the right to develop nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent against perceived external threats.

Nuclear detractors. Those who advocate permanently rolling back Iran’s nuclear program in favor of other national interests and domestic development priorities.

Nuclear centrists. Those who are willing to accept temporary constraints on Iran’s uranium-enrichment-related and reprocessing activities—thereby lowering the degree of nuclear weapons latency— to end Iran’s international isolation.

A nuclear Iran drastically changes the balance of power in the region, especially when it comes to Saudi Arabia, and has been a major factor in not only Iran’s international dealings but also for Saudi Arabia as it seeks to minimize this threat. Thus watching how the internal dynamics of those three groups within Iran jockey for authority and supremacy will be important in understanding how Saudi Arabia views Iran’s inevitable reemergence onto the regional/world stage. With its recent moves to improve relations and relieve tensions with regards to its nuclear program it is not inconceivable that Iran, while working to thaw its own Cold War with Saudi Arabia, could also be working to reignite Cold War tension between the United States and Russia.

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With increased relations and strengthened military presence of the US in the region, and its continuing hardline stance on Iran, reignited tensions were inevitable A return of Russia into the regional mix on Iran’s side, acting mostly with Iran’s interests, along with the concerns that the JCPOA agreement has created between the US and Saudi Arabia, bodes well for Iran.

On the other hand, instead of just assuming eternal discord and rivalry, Iran and Saudi Arabia need to continue to work diplomatically to reduce their mistrust and, at times, their misconstrued perceptions of one another. One potential item for the agenda should be Yemen. Yemen does not appear to be a dispute that has any core value to Iran outside of it being a target of opportunity to simply create havoc in the region and to threaten Wahhabist hegemony.

Given that this does not seem to be of true strategic value to Iran, it is possible that it could work diplomatically with Saudi Arabia towards a solution that could go a long way towards easing fears within the GCC states of a post-JCPOA Iran. Because there is so much ample opportunity for a future post-JCPOA Iran to be either a new stable ally of the global community or conversely revitalized adversary, and not much consensus as to which direction it will ultimately choose, political and intelligence analysis on the Islamic Republic should prove fruitful and fascinating for years to come.

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AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S ELECTIONS GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman.

He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.

Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

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F

irst and foremost, it is worth clarifying that in Iran the division between "reformists" and "liberals" on one side and "conservatives" or even "fundamentalists" on the other makes no sense whatsoever. Both political camps are linked to the memory and teaching of Imam Khomeini, who was a political leader because he was an innovator in the field of Twelver Shia Islam. For the Imam of the 1979 revolution who, immediately after rising to power, dismissed Iran's nuclear power inherited from the Shah as "a sign of the devil" – albeit he later changed his mind - the aim of the Prophecy, which for him is equal to human reason, "is to guide mankind towards the establishment of a just society through the implementation of divine laws".

Hence, unlike what happened in the old Quietist tradition of both strands of Islam, namely Sunni and Shia, for the Imam of the Shia revolution "Islam is a political religion, and every aspect of this religion is political, even its worship". Therefore, during the current period of ''concealment of the Last Imam", the faqih, namely the "experts of Islamic Shia law", must set up an Islamic State. In short, the political power is the faqih’s religious duty: this is the basis of the famous velayat-e faqih, namely the "guardianship of the jurist". For Imam Khomeini, the whole community of faqih represents the concealed Imam on the earth until his appearance-revelation.Hence the “experts of Islamic Shia law” have, jointly and collectively, the same authority and responsibility as those that Prophet Muhammad and the first “well-directed” Caliphs had on the earth.

Again to quote Khomeini, "Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional.

It is constitutional in the current sense of the word, i.e. based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Most Noble Messenger (s). It is the laws and ordinances of Islam comprising this set of conditions that must be observed and practiced. Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men".

All the members of the Iranian Parliament and of the other elected or non-elected institutions act within this set of values, principles, as well as legal and Qur’an practices. Needless to think of a Westernization through liberalization, as some Western analysts imagine.

Or to think of a Shia regime rift between pro-Westerners and "reactionaries" because, for the Iranian ruling classes, the core of the issue is how to use the West and not be used by it.

Hence thinking of a specific theocracy "of waiting" - as the one of the Iranian Shia State, a unique case in political theology - as a system divided between "liberals" and "conservatives" (regardless of what both words may mean in the West) is a sign of utmost naivety for those who have to interpret the results of Iran’s 2016 elections.

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for the Imam of the Shia revolution "Islam is a political religion, and every aspect of this religion is political, even its worship" The Pervasive Coalition of Reformists: the Second Step, named the List of Hope, led by Mohammed Khatami, is the only coalition which openly supports the so-called "reformists". It is an assemblage of parties or lists such as the Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front, Mehdi Kharroubi’s National Trust Party, the Union of Islamic Iran People Party, which is the Hassan Rowhani’s newly-established political arm, and finally, the Followers of Velayat, led by Ali Larijani, former chief nuclear negotiators (considered a "conservative") and current Speaker of Parliament.

The political groups allied to the List of Hope, which has great significance in two-round elections such as Iran’s, are the Assembly of Qom Seminary Scholars and Researchers, the Combatant Clergy Society and the Association of Followers of the Imam's Line.

It is worth recalling that the List of Hope also includes 24 other smaller groups, such as the Islamic Association of Women and the Islamic Labour Party of Iran.

In the elections this party-coalition obtained 28.62% of votes and got 83 Parliamentary seats out of a total of 239. The Principlists Coalition that the West (gazing, as Narcissus, at its own reflection) passes off as "conservative" is made up of a fraction of the Combatant Clergy Society and the Islamic Coalition Party, as well as four other smaller groups.

It got 64 seats in the Majlis with 22.06% of votes.

Ali Motahari’s People’s Voice Coalition was created to criticize the "conservative" Ahmadinedjad.

A cousin of Ali Larijani, who is now leading his own party within the winning coalition, Motahari is the son of a faqih and is regarded as a liberal-conservative politician. Motahari’s List obtained 3.44% of votes and got ten seats, but it is difficult to place it in the traditional Downs’ left-right axis we use for the systems derived from the American and French revolutions. There are many true independent candidates - as many as 55 members of Parliament, who can safely support either camps, which appear to us progressive or conservative.

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The religious minorities accepted in the country, namely Jews, Zoroastrians, Christians, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians, obtained their five constitutional seats and garnered 1.75% of votes.

The results are even more complex to analyze in the case of the Assembly of Experts, the Council entrusted with the task of supervising the Parliament in accordance with the velayat-e-faqih. It is the 88member Council that will elect the next Rahbar, the Supreme Leader.

As many as 27 seats were obtained by the Principlists Coalition, while the Second Step reformists gained 20 seats. As many as 35 candidates, however, were supported by both coalitions which we like to ascribe to our camp.

The results reached by the various coalitions show that, in the Assembly of Experts, 19 mujtahid were elected directly by the Second Step coalition, while 27 were elected with the votes of other lists not allied to the "progressives", for a total of 46 "experts" who, I assume, will be answerable to both political traditions – if any. The Combatant Clergy Society has 5 Experts directly elected, but as many as 51 voted also by other groups, including many of the camp we define as progressive.The Combatant Clergy was created in 1977, before the Islamic revolution, to topple the Shah. Its first leaders were Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who is the current leader of other progressive lists, and Morteza Mohtahari, the father of the current leader of the People’s Voice Coalition.

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Nevertheless many Rowhani’s personal opponents and competitors were excluded from Parliament or from the Assembly of Experts. Hence, for the President in office, the issue lies in using this power surplus.

The focus of Rowhani’s policy is the economy and, above all, the geopolitical impact of the planned Iranian economic expansion after the agreement with the P5+1.

Iran needs it. It needs a booming economy to tackle the problems and uneasiness of young people (leading to their "Westernization") and update its obsolete production system, which has grown lazy and idle as a result of an almost completely nationalized economy.

The group now counts 56 members in the Assembly of Experts, accounting for 64%. This rebalances much of the progressive shift in the Majlis.

The Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom elected 3 Experts directly and 51 ones jointly with other lists that sponsored them.

It is the group at the origin of the 1979 revolution, founded by Ayatollah Khomeini’ students as early as 1961, when the Shah seemed unassailable and indeed, according to his Iranian name, "King of Kings".

As can be easily imagined, in the city and province of Tehran, the People’s Experts list received a landslide victory.

But, as in other countries, including Western ones, here the divide is between urban and rural areas the same rift which gave rise to capitalism in the West and destroyed centralist socialism in the USSR and, in other respects, in China.

The President will privatize, at first, the automotive industry, but he has also bought a fleet of 118 Airbus airplanes for a total sum of 25 billion US dollars.

Nevertheless the political debate in Iran does not concern reforms, but their pace and their shape.

And especially their political impact on the relations with the United States and some other Western countries. Nobody, within the Majlis or the Council of Experts, wants the United States to monitor Iran’s industrial transformation and its very recent opening onto the "market-world".

Currently Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) amounts to 4.88 billion US dollars, but Iran has designed a Development Plan for the period 2016-2021. An amount of 361 billion US dollars needs to be invested, 204 of which can be found in Iran, but the rest has to come from foreign countries or private investors.

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Hence, if Iran uses the JCPOA to become the largest population and economy to be globalized after the USSR collapse, the geopolitical eects are likely to be the following: it will increase its engagement in the Greater Middle East, but only in connection with the Russian Federation and China; it will counteract the low oil price policy led by Saudi Arabia to "punish" the United States and Russia; it will create its own Shia area of influence, which will not lead to a war against the Sunnis, but to an ongoing attrition with Saudi Arabia and its allies.

The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be particularly fierce in attracting the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is coming to Iran after the signing of the JCPOA and after Saudi Arabia opening for the first time to FDI in June 2015.

The above stated plan envisages a yearly GDP growth exceeding 8%, a Chinese-style growth rate,

but it is very likely that - once temporarily put an end to the nuclear power for military purposes (but is it really so?) - Iran will manage a military build- up, funded by economic growth, which will follow the traditional criteria: the primacy of guerrilla warfare and "hybrid strategies", managed by the Pasdaran, and the ICBM missile system.

The strategic goals will be to strengthen its own regional role and the political management of the many Shia minorities scattered throughout the Sunni universe.

Moreover, the link between economic growth and Iranian remilitarization will be used to revive the relations with Russia and to enable China’s peaceful expansion into the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, finally as guardians of the future new "Silk Road" planned by Xi Jinping as early as 2013.

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MORE BEAR THAN EAGLE Russia Taking Advantage of an American Vacuum

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NENAD DRCA Nenad Drca is a former military trilingual linguist who worked across many nations over eight years.

He lived and worked on three continents.

This experience gave him a deep appreciation for intelligence community. After graduating with BA in Psychology he returned to work for the US Army as a DOD civilian.

He expects to graduate next March with Master of Science in International Security and Intelligence Studies degree.

t is evident that the US cannot fight DAESH as if there is no complex war raging in Syria.

Considering the conditions on the ground, the US administration must address not only how to degrade and destroy DAESH, but how US policy can help restore stability across the Syrian state.

It must do both by being diplomatically active in engaging all major actors in play in the region. For America, Russia and Iran cannot be allowed to set diplomatic precedence in Syria and Iraq and be the leaders.

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The United States must formulate integrated strategy that would involve Washington in any major diplomatic discussions regarding potential political solutions. So far this is not the case. This new approach will require expanded engagement with the Syrian players, both domestic and foreign, in order to improve possibilities for change.

Without inclusion of the Russian side, it will be more likely to undermine Western plans and potentially drag America into protracted and chaotic proxy war.

Once it was clear that Syrian leader Assad would not step down easily, US policy did not adapt nor did policymakers create a viable alternative strategy to achieve its goals. It is apparent that Syria is becoming a geopolitical Chernobyl, spreading violence and fanaticism across the region. Once DAESH is eliminated any new strategy must aim to achieve an immediate drop in violence by coordinating a ceasefire across all sides. The diďŹƒculty is going to be determining the political price for the elimination of DAESH.

American political and military lethargy in Syria should be viewed as a result of having no compelling strategy that could push for deeper eective involvement. This must no longer be the case, as the US must work towards curbing further spillover of the Syrian crisis, which has brought refugee mayhem to Europe. Now US allies in Europe must contend with the massive potential threat emerging.

The United States and European Union should use a combination of assertive military initiatives and broad diplomatic approaches to establish communication with all major regional actors. The United States must pressure Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to halt financial and weapons assistance to their groups of choice within Iraq and Syria. Both the EU and US can use an integrated strategy that includes arms embargos, economic sanctions and rewards, and airstrikes.

Keeping Russian pride in mind, cooperation is possible by working parallel, coordinated air strikes and other operations for maximum eect against DAESH.

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The priority for all involved sides right now must be the absolute destruction of DAESH and its allies In April, Foreign Minister Lavrov called it “the main threat” to Russia today. Jihadists who live in Russia’s North Caucasus have switched their allegiance to DAESH and declared their regions as part of the DAESH provincial network. Russia is worried that the Syrian Assad regime could be replaced by a worse Islamic extremist force. The collapse of governments in Libya and Iraq is used by Russia to affirm such concerns. The United States should use this shared fear to motivate Russia and the EU to work together with it. This is an opportunity for America to develop a new diplomatic path and establish new beneficial connections to Russia and come out as a cohesive positive influence. But so far this has frustratingly not happened.

Former deputy director of the CIA Michael Morell said that any strategy should probably include working with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Russia. The reason for this approach is that proxy war with Russia will not help America and it will not decimate terrorist groups that are more important in the immediate-term. The priority for all involved sides right now must be the absolute destruction of DAESH and its allies. DAESH has clearly achieved capacity to strike the EU and it has the same plans for the United States. The question whether President Assad needs to go can be tackled in a post-DAESH world.

The fight against radical Islam is something that the EU, Russia, and even China support. There is a potential to use this international sentiment to start working on new diplomatic relationships. While some countries can help militarily, many more can help financially by providing supplies or impeding DAESH financial networks. After multiple brutal terror attacks in France and now Brussels, the EU is out of time and must act as soon as possible on new ideas. Meanwhile, the United States must stop appearing hamstrung by the continued lack of valid partners on the ground in Syria, whether diplomatically or militarily. Too much time and resources are wasted and it is only adding to the image of the US being indecisive and even impotent.

Continued diplomatic dialogue should present realistic and achievable goals that many countries find attractive. At the moment most countries want DAESH to be eliminated. But the United States should not allow Russia to continue to lead the way in military and diplomatic action.

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It should be a primary part of all regional high level negotiations, which at the moment it is not. The current rigid and recalcitrant American strategy should be abandoned. The Middle East must understand that America will be the part of any solution no matter what. That is something Iran should be reminded of due to its recent political and military assertions.

At the moment, the EU lacks cohesive leadership that can mandate decisions and act in a timely manner. Sometimes it can take the EU a very long time to agree on something urgent. Following the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels, it remains to be seen if NATO can react according to its accord of mutual protection. If it doesn’t, then some of America’s prime European partners might start looking more toward Russia as a strategic partner. For example, British Prime Minister David is open to offering compromises on the future of Syrian President Assad in return for Russian help targeting DAESH.

French President Hollande will travel to Washington and Moscow to discuss ways of increasing international cooperation in the fight against DAESH, not just Washington. The United States must act to avoid losing leadership position to Russia in this fight against terrorism. Putin is more than willing to exploit the void left by Washington in Syria and Iraq.

Both France and the UK cannot single-handedly defeat domestic or international terrorist threats. They are now painfully aware that they both need foreign assistance in this desperate struggle. So what remains to be seen is who is going to step up to that desperate need in REAL terms: America or Russia?

Disturbingly, so far in real terms the answer seems to be more bear than eagle.

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DR. ABDUL RUFF Prolific writer, Independent Analyst; Columnist contributing articles to many newspapers and journals on world politics; Expert on Mideast affairs, Chronicler of foreign occupations & freedom movements (Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Xinjiang, Chechnya, etc.) Chancellor-Founder of Center for International Affairs (CIA); Commentator on world affairs & sport fixings, Former university teacher; Author of eBooks/books

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n order to deny Russia its due place in world affairs and contain it from all possible sides, the USA and its imperialist allies keep raising the bogey of Russian “intention” to revive the Soviet empire, even as the USA, NATO and EU make strenuous efforts to keep the former Socialist bloc of nations under its political and military control.

As Russia ventured military action in Ukraine and Syria, the Western powers cry oud about the return of Soviet empire under a “dictator” Putin. Russia annexed Crimea because it had been a part of Russia even before Soviet Union came into existence by adding neighboring nations and it did so in order to teach a lesson to Ukraine trying to be a part of western military alliance to target Russia.

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SYRIA AND THE RETURN OF ‘SOVIET’ RUSSIA Russia’s intervention in European Ukraine, followed by its annexation of Crimea, now direct intervention in West Asian Syria, among other Russo-US conflictual seeds, have sent unmistaken signals to USA and EU that Russia is back to reassert its super power status. In its military intervention in Syria, which is not a part of its backyard zone of former Soviet space, Russia has clearly let the USA know that it can’t , in order for securing its energy requirements on permanent basis , go on invading energy rich Arab nations like wild beast in modern times.

The Kremlin has a point to make: it does not fear US military prowess as it is capable of directly challenging it easily but it perhaps expected if it stayed out of confrontation with the West international peace as consequence of ending Cold war could take shape. Now that USA and NATO team nations have clearly established full control over the world and its military plus energy resources in the absence of any other super power, Moscow has also decided to reactivate and step up its military presence by entering into the Syrian conflict.

Most Russians feel Russian non-interference policy pursued since the end of the so-called Cold War did embolden the USA and its NATO allies to step up its unilateral military actions leading to invasions in Mideast after success in Afghanistan following the Sept-11 hoax. Russia’s reassertion of its military prowess now under strongman President Putin is meant to reveal its resolve to come out its “neutral” position of avoiding direct confrontational approach towards USA and reinvigorate the cold war phase.

Ever since Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president first in 2000 he has pursued aggressive foreign as well as domestic policy. Putin's military intervention into Syria to support President Bashar al Assad's failing regime against a broad US supported opposition, including the ISIS and al-Qaeda, certainly surprised many on both sides of the Atlantic. While that deployment is militarily modest so far politically, psychologically and geostrategically it has had far greater impact.

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And its launch of several dozen Kaliber cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea to attack Syrian opposition targets nine hundred miles away surely made certain political statements.

Russian antagonism against US military arrogance is well known but its military adventures in West Asia, besides Ukraine and earlier Georgia before that, expressed through a series of military actions, does not in any way indicate its love for Islamic or Arab world or it wants to defend energy rich Arab world its enemies in favor of Islam or Islamic world facing civilizational threat.

While earlier it has provided economic assistance to the needy nations, Russia only sells today and seeks service charges for any service it renders to another nation. This also explains Russian move today to strike economic and military deals with Pakistan, a traditional American ally. Moscow-Islamabad ties make both USA and India nervous and would coerce India to strike more military deals with Russia without hesitation. Putin’s message is loud and clear: consider Russia as a credible equal partner face our military opposition where necessary.

Not long ago (Soviet) Russia was a super power very Not at all! Russian is not even protecting Syria or actively opposing capitalist-imperialist policies of Assad in the real sense. It just challenges US/NATO the other super power USA and its allies. In fact, USA militarism, though some experts feel USA and Rus- then saw Russia as being a serious problem for capsia coordinate their military operations in Syria and italism and obstruction for the imperialist bloc of around with help from Israel. Russia just wants to countries and sought to end socialist construction showcase its military muscle to its former chief Cold process globally. Western world succeeded in diswar foe by trying to restrict the US/NATO military mantling Soviet and socialist system as corrupt eleoperations. Russia wants the West to know that it ments in Soviet Union deliberately spoiled the can intervene if the USA continues with its system, aided the Western eorts to destabilize Sounchecked military interventions and invasions viet Union and East Europe.

Not only the Berlin Wall fell, but even the mighty Soglobally.

Russia does this mainly because USA, as per the se- viet Union broke into pieces- most of them now are cret agreement among veto members, would not with USA and NATO. When Vladimir Putin assumed power in the Kremlin attack Russia directly. in 2000 following the incapacitation conditions, the There is a fundamental dierence between Soviet first ever popularly elected president of new of and Russian policies: while fighting USA, Soviet Rus- Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, by cruelly dealing sia also defended other weak nations, helped free- stock and barrel with the Chechen Muslim youths dom movement in third world leading to seeking freedom from Russian yoke, he, a former independence of countries like Pakistan and India KGB man in civil dress, began reasserting Russian against the will of USA and UK; Russia today pursues prowess lost with the collapse of USSR and socialist its military operations only to announce its return system, though he never initiated steps to revisit to world stage as a virtual super power and to in- Socialist aspirations of many Russians. Putin does not want to annoy the West. crease its military trade volumes.

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Not impressed by Russian efforts for “democracy” USA has not accepted Moscow as a truly equal partner because , according Washington, Russians do not share core “values” of USA and it wants to use Russia when needed and for which some “concessions” are readily provided off and on to Moscow.

But USA refused to treat Russia either as an equal partner or a new super power. In fact, USA would never accept any power as its equal, not even the United Kingdom but Moscow refuses to accept that truth.

Today Russia and USA share terror values. Russian leaders have with enthusiasm made efforts to oblige and appease Washington. When a new Russia was born out of the collapse of the mighty Soviet Union, the new President Boris Yeltsin went all out to embrace western capitalism and even ready to share military based imperialist values. Later, following the Sept-11 hoax, Russia was quick to come forward to “stand” by the affected America and south US opposition to the Chechen problem and support for the action of the Putin government in Chechnya.

However, while supporting Russia on Chechnya issue, USA was certainly not impressed by Russian support for USA and NATO military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.

That the USA still refuses to treat Russia as a trusted strategic partner sharing “values” annoys Russia which has, since the end of Cold War, made strenuous efforts to come closer to Washington by making maximum use of all available opportunities after the collapse of USSR. Both found a common enemy in Islam and Moscow sought US support to crush the Chechens seeking freedom. Disappointed by US cold attitude, eventually Yeltsin talked about USRussia relations as being based on “Hot Peace” in place of cold war.

Russia wants the West to know that it can intervene if the USA continues with its unchecked military interventions and invasions globally.

It might look strange that Russia has not yet come out of shame feelings that it had lost the WW-II to USA and then lost the Cold War also to USA again.

Possibly, therefore, many Americans believe Russia has taught a valuable lesson to them by the Sept11 hoax and they think Russia had engineered as part of winning the ideological and military rivalry with USA. Accordingly, the attacks well inside the USA would have given Russia the much needed victory and overall moral advantages. Although there were reports of terror attacks inside Russia a few years after the Sept-11 hoax, those were considered less important as they could not make Sept-11small or meaningless. Even the blasts in India, an emerging strategic partner of USA, particularly in Mumbai could not outwit the Sept-11 hoax.

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There is a clear agreement among the veto powers not to wage war against one another and each should, in case of mutual tensions, use diplomatic channels and threats along with hot lines to resolve them. Both USA and Russia use proxy wars in a third country by getting their allies on board to fight one another. That is why USA has never attacked Russia – or vice versa - over the Sept-II attack or tensions they create elsewhere even if it was convinced of American or Moscow’s role in it. For instance, USA did not attack Russia over Cuban missile crisis during the cold war or when Russia annexed Crimea deliberately; Moscow knows well USA can never attack Russia for whatever reason as it would never directly breach the Russian boundaries. Seemingly, USA does not seek to annoy Russia and rekindle the cold war rivalry.

The NATO is planning to expand its strength in Europe by getting more East European nations. The final decision is expected to be a priority for its Warsaw Summit in July. Russia has repeatedly opposed the NATO move to expand itself eastward by taking into its fold more East European states, thereby bringing its military directly to Russian borders.

Russia is genuinely concerned that the NATO has not given up its containment policy towards Russia.

Even while expanding itself to reach the Russian borders, NATO tells Russia it does not have any hidden agenda against Russia.

One consequence of Putin's expansive strategy has been a direct challenge to the West and to NATO and not just in Europe. So far, NATO responses to Russia’s increasingly active involvement in Europe and West Asia have been just tactical, not strategic.

USA uses former allies of Russia in East Europe to challenge the Kremlin and threaten Russia’s empire ambitions, if any, by taking them into NATO.

In order to deter Russia, the Baltic States as well as Poland repeatedly asked for permanent NATO alliance's forces deployment on their soil. From the strategic point of view provoking Russia with such steps may have serious consequences for the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. However, NATO is opposed to additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces, maybe to assure the Kremlin of any European aggression.

Poland and the Baltic States drive themselves into a corner insisting on permanent NATO troops' deployment on their territories and create conditions under which NATO could even frustrate some of its short-sighted member-states preferring to calm Russia in order to prevent the new Cold War. Three small Baltic nations Lithuania that border Russian territory, Latvia and Estonia joined NATO in 2004 for gaining protection from any possible attacks from Russia. The Baltic States will willfully continue to urge the need for permanent of NATO forces regardless on possible political implications.

What does Russian president Putin's challenge mean for NATO today? Do Russian incursions in Middle East through intervention in Syria mean anything significant for NATO? Is NATO ready or pre pared to deal strategically with Russia in Europe and, as after the end of the Cold War, is the alliance prepared to look beyond Europe's borders to the south and east and take a larger role in promoting global stability?

At times it appears Russia is aiming at a closer alliance with NATO. But Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intrusion into Ukraine, and now Syria indicate their tensions. Russia is trying to assure the NATO that Crimea was just one time affair and it does not have other agenda in store.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

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ANTONY CLEMENT Antony Clement is currently a student of the International Relations program at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

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CHECHNYA

An Unresolved Conflict in the Caucasus

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Chechnya today is a federal subject of Russia but long been a boiling point. Al Jazeera report point out that, “it remains a historic challenge for Russia”. The first and second Chechnya war respectively in 1991 and 1999 aimed to contain and crushed the ground gained for independence from the Russian Federation. Since the first Chechnya war more than 1,00,000 people were killed in that many of them were civilians.Russia’s masterful man President Vladimir Putin has appointed its own man Ramzan Kadyrov in-charge of Chechnya in 2007. Since then Chechnya prevails with some sort of stability. However, the natural mindset of the Chechnya’s would be the real question.

Russian troops today in Chechnya as peacemakers.

However, the US embassy cables in 2006 said, Kremlin’s present tactics towards in maintaining stability in Chechnya has limited ability to respond. This projection has could be meant with based on two observations. Firstly, the present economic situation in Russia link with the Ukraine crisis. The sanctions on Russia by the EU and the US have made challenges and opportunities for Russia. Russia could not get market access from the near neighbor EU; however, on this shadow of the crisis it has earned more contracts from the Chinese to export for its liquid gas. Secondly, the capacity of Putin’s man Kadyrov dealing with grassroots challenges in making the region peace.

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Moscow should encourage its direct control in the region in support towards for more open dialogue

Further, the accusation on Kadyrov for corruption and many other eventualities which has been buckled with mysterious assassination of opposition political leaders, human rights activists and media personalities have giving more pressure to Putin.

Now Putin has no other choice but to lean on Kadyrov for the stability of the region gave more privileges to be enjoyed by Chechnya leader while compare with any other regional leaders in Russia.

However, Moscow reluctant to criticize its proxy leader in Chechnya would be perceived the all whether ties between Putin and Kadyrov. Hence, reports climb that Kadyron himself as an increasing challenge to Kremlin. In future if the Chechnya leader goes against the strategic interest of Russia the perception would be Putin resist Kadyrov - perceived to be a jeopardy for the stability of Chechnya.

However, the present report admonishes that – though the concern is at large about the handling of human rights atrocity in Chechnya under the command of Kadyrov the present period would be described as relatively stable. This can be acknowledged as an advantage for Putin. It is true that the international community raise their strong concern against the suppressing on media freedom and human rights issue in Chechnya and criticizing Moscow. Further, though Putin relay on Kadyrov for the harmony in Chechnya always the Russian president keeps his eye on the region preciously. For Putin the advantage would be the free flow of information he has received helps him to theorize the reality in Chechnya in taking advance measures for avoid any farther conflict. This is because of his former designation as the KGP of Russia.

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The NATO stops at Ukraine would be converted as a strong hold for Putin tactical game in controlling Chechnya further. This should be the double victory for Putin.

During the 2015 the upheaval in the Middle East by the ISIS also has been reach out to Chechnya. The BBC report claims that during the last year “Jihadists, including those aligned with Islamic State and alQaeda, remain active in the region”. The philosophical terrorism is more danger than the institutional based, since the rise of the ISIS would be a bad news for Moscow. Hence, the takeover of Moscow theatre by the Chechen rebels in 2002 would be a prolong reminder for Russia. Furthermore, the separatist rebels occupied a school had taken hostages of more than 1100 people in 2004 required a bloody fight for evacuation. In this background the future security threat for Chechnya should be handled.

Preventing this kind of atrocities from the rebels to sustain the peace should require a substantial strategy to give a hope for the civilians to keep their trust on Russia for their security.

However, to retain the present momentum in a sustainable format would require undisturbed focus on the region’s local issues, I hope Putin will demonstrate. What Russia should do to – keep its forces continue as the peacemakers in the Chechnya in the same number for the reasonable time - to support the ground level democratic process with in the frame work of Russia.

At the same time Moscow should encourage its direct control in the region in support towards for more open dialogue. Further, this open dialogue would have a chance to facilitate to wider the path for most of ordinary Chechnya’s to accept their identity with in Russia.

If this happens the more possibility of repels, separatists and terrorists wings would imperceptibly decline in getting their ground support. Hence, this would weak their decisions to fight the mighty Russian army in the future. Moreover, a separate special package of development fund would be a necessary step to reassure for the ongoing educational programmes without any hindrances. At the same time Moscow should keeps its eyes wider if any of the outsiders like the ISIS sympathies recruiting the unemployed youth for fighting outside or to fight inside. This continual momentum has required more funds from the Russian Federation budget, but it may have more chances of keeping the region more stable and under its rule as a unified Russia.

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PUTIN, DUGIN AND THE COMING WILD RIDE ON LEVIATHAN

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JOHN CODY MOSBEY John Cody Mosbey is consultant and instructor in Criminal Justice and Emergency Management. He is also researcher and writer in various aspects of conflict resolution, terrorism, homeland security, and related criminal justice and national security fields.

Mr. Mosbey is completing his PhD research in Russian Political Theology at Trinity College Dublin.

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It does not strain the imagination to snare drum tautness to imagine Vladimir Putin, bare chested in his best rodeo persona, broncobusting Leviathan. However, the imagination does balk at him placing Alexander Dugin in the saddle behind him. Unfortunately, this could be more than just a Boris Vallejo rendition of a Hunter S. Thompson inspired movie poster; it is a real Eurasia vs. the West possibility and perhaps even be the basis to the trailer for the coming release of a sequel entitled, Cold War II.

Thomas Hobbes used biblical imagery of Leviathan the Sea Monster in his description of a powerful state able to keep peace and provide its citizens with security across the spectrum from personal to national. Hobbes was fain to envision the population of Leviathan the State contracting away most or all power to a single authority be it a single person or a relatively small authoritative council able to enforce the law and relieve the security concerns of the masses.

Alexander Dugin, the contemporary Russian geopolitical philosopher, is a strong advocate of a multipolar world where a strong Eurasia is the major land power that checks the unipolar, globalist ambitions of the Atlanticist ocean-based power of the West. Dugin has endorsed a Eurasian power, centered in Moscow (the Third Rome in his eschatological theology) stretching from Dublin to Vladivostok.

Dugin was an early supporter of Putin’s Crimean adventure, nullification of Ukraine’s Westward leaning, and Russian reassertion in the Middle East.

Dugin is a Russian traditionalist, a man who seems to yearn for a Russian inspired Eurasia with very conservative even Czarist Orthodoxy, but with even greater than Czarist geographical proportions and possessing the military might of the Soviet Union at its height. He is also a Russian Traditionalist claiming close kinship with René Guénon the French Metaphysician - a religious philosopher believing in the esoteric and revealed perennial Truth handed down through gnostic initiation from the days of God’s initial revelation to man.

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Dugin has expressed that Russia’s messianic role - a role that may involve hastening the end of the age associated with the defeat of Antichrist - is also Russia’s eschatological purpose

It is no coincidence that the acclaimed film by Andrey Zvyagintsev is titled Leviathan. Zvyagintsev portrays a powerful but corrupt state and the abuse of its power at the personal and community level.

Although Zvyagintsev is attempting to show the dark flip-side of Leviathan’s security powers, the Hobbesian association is unmistakeable.

“Realism in international relations,” Dugin has written, is based on the premise that human nature is imperfect, that humans are prone to sin and weakness, and that there is permanent discord between people (Hobbes’ thesis Homo homini lupus est: “man is wolf to man”). The state and society exist precisely for the purpose of maintaining the individual in a neutral state, or at least try to prevent him from total disintegration, if not improve him.

While Dugin views Putin as a political realist, he views Russia as having a higher purpose, “a specific Russian purpose which sets it apart” from other governments.

Dugin’s higher purpose ascribes to Russia a messianic and apocalyptic future. Placing inheritance of the Roman mantel on Russia’s shoulders, Dugin tends to divide Russian history, hence a very significant chunk of world history, into three rather distinct periods: Pre-Constantinian, Constantinian (later Byzantine, and post-1660 Muscovite; the ages of the First Rome, The Second Rome (Byzantine Constantinople), and Third Rome (Moscow). Ominously, The Third Roman period contains the Age of Antichrist.

Dugin has expressed that Russia’s messianic role - a role that may involve hastening the end of the age associated with the defeat of Antichrist - is also Russia’s eschatological purpose. Dugin’s support for Russian expansion eastward, westward, and southward are very much in keeping with his vision of a Eurasia, guided by Russia, and involved in directly checking the might and expansion of the Atlanticists.

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The easy thing to do is to write off Dugin as Putin’s Rasputin reincarnation. Certainly in an oh-sosecular-and-proud-of-it West Dugin seems to be a fringe Evangelical touting a strange and nonconsequensial occultic ecumentical brew. But, caution should be taken here. Alexander Dugin is not mad.

Theology is not relegated to the lunatic fringe in Orthodox Russia, nor in the eastern areas of a possible future Eurasia where much value is placed on both Muslim tradition and and theology.

Expect Russian pivots off of the Syrian adventure against and into Turkey and southward into Libya.

Expect renewal and expansion of economic and military agreements eastward. Expect Russian and Shia Muslim cooperation overtures, and mutual diplomatic, perhaps even military, support for Shia controlled areas and states.

If Alexander Dugin’s influence gains additional traction in the halls of Russian power, the West can expect continued and persistent pressure for westward expansion; first of Russian influence and next of Russian de facto control.

Putin is already riding Hobbes’ Leviathan; if and when he pulls Dugin into the saddle behind him it may be too late to take notice. Dugin has already stated that a second Cold War could become very hot very quickly.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

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