North Korea in the Crosshairs: Strategic Considerations about the Conflict

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NORTH KOREA IN THE CROSSHAIRS Strategic Considerations about the Conflict

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GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

MHER D. SAHAKYAN Advisory Board member Mher D. Sahakyan- Ph.D. (International Relations), School of International Studies, Nanjing University. China, Director of the “‘China-Eurasia’ Council for Political and Strategic Research” Foundation, Armenia DR. ARSHAD M. KHAN MD Senior Editor Dr. Arshad M. Khan is a former Professor based in the US. Educated at King's College London, OSU and The University of Chicago, he has a multidisciplinary background that has frequently informed his research AMNAH AMJAD Amnah Amjad has done BSc (Honours) in Political Science from Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Pakistan. She has keen interest in international relations, counter-terrorism strategies and peace studies.

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NORTH KOREA IN THE CROSSHAIRS Strategic Considerations about the Conflict

This anthology put together by the Modern Diplomacy gives readers an up-to-the-minute rendering of the conflict raging on the Korean peninsula from diplomatic, military, intelligence, cultural, and political perspectives – from the local on-the-ground street level all the way up to the grandest international organization/global power level. As is always the case with Modern Diplomacy, we seek to dissect problem issues and conflict regions with no specific agenda being pushed, no diplomatic angle being highlighted, and no one country treated as This is particularly important for studies on North Korea. For while the global community itself seems unanimously against the strategic, diplomatic, and military initiatives of the North Korean leadership, it is important to place all of these events and actions in a larger regional and global context.

This does not mean we are seeking to earn North Korea empathy or endorse any of the country’s inconsistent or unpredictable behaviors.

Rather, Modern Diplomacy believes the only way of hoping to unpack and unravel such behavior is to attempt to understand how it sees the world, its neighbors, its allies, and rivals. It isn’t necessarily about putting North Korea in a global objective context, but seeking to understand how North Korea subjectively perceives itself and its own situation. Elucidating these perceptions – no matter how delirious, unstable, or uncertain they are – is the key to finding opportunities to defuse the conflict and propose workable resolutions. This is the true hope and purpose behind these short anthologies: a working resource for those decision-makers and activated global citizens who care about the world we live in and want to be better informed about all of its dangers.

So, we hope you enjoy this effort and truly find the information contained within a step in the right direction for making you more informed, more enlightened, and more willing to investigate the problem deeply, accurately, and powerfully. In a world full of misinformation and disinformation, may the readers of our anthologies be the light shining such shadows away into oblivion.

Dr. Matthew Crosston Vice Chairman, Modern Diplomacy

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M H E R D . S A H A K yA N

China’s PoliCy on the DPRK’s nuCleaR issue

Cooperation and Disagreements with the US and Russia

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The main aims of this article are to investigate and explain China’s policy, cooperation and disagreements with Washington and Moscow on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) nuclear issue. As a permanent member of the UNSC and an important player in international relations, China has the capability and authority to address and solve internationally important problems. In turn, international society is also interested in Beijing continuing its active involvement in the improvements in world security․ China plays a decisive and important role in the negotiations regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issue. The de facto withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the DPRK led to a new political situation in the international community.

NORTH KOREA IN THE CROSSHAIRS

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons may trigger a decision by other Far East countries to acquire nuclear arsenals. The balance between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has already been violated in favor of the former. Whether the ROK will continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella or develop its own nuclear weapons depends on the final results of negotiations. Japan has previously announced that the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is a threat to its national security, which means that Japan may consider a possible substitute for the American nuclear guarantee.

Tensions regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issues threaten the entire political and economic stability of the Far East. China is the secondlargest economy in the world, and Japan and the ROK are extremely well developed economies. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Indian economies continue to grow rapidly. Tension or military actions in the Korean Peninsula can harm economic development throughout the entire region. However, after missiles and nuclear tests, the DPRK seems to be playing its own game, as it has not accepted UNSC resolutions. Officially, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT and rejects international norms; this behavior discredits the effectiveness and authority of the UN, as well. In a broader sense, the DPRK continues to attempt to solve its national security problems by developing missile systems and nuclear weapons.

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However, these projects harm the DPRK’s political relations with the international community, including with allies such as China.

When the DPRK began nuclear tests, China was initially surprised and attempted to punish the DPRK for its actions by voting for sanctions against the nation.

The following question therefore arises: Which action is more useful for a state? Developing nuclear weapons would give the opportunity to deter any offensive activity, whereas having allies and expanding economic relations would deter any possible revolutions or economic collapse. Recent world history offers a cogent example. The Soviet Union was one of the most powerful states in the world, but history has nevertheless shown that it is difficult to maintain sovereignty without a modern economy, free trade and open economic relations with the international community.

Moreover, if a state’s economy collapses, no nuclear weapon can help. The next hypothesis is that the DPRK’s government understands that the ROK’s economy develops quickly and that they are far from the ROK’s level of economic development. However, they want to show their domestic audience that they are building a modern and strong state. Although the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty and New Start treaties between Russia and the US might encourage other countries to reduce their nuclear capabilities, the DPRK’s nuclear tests can lead to a new nuclear arms race.

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View from Beijing on the DPRK’s Nuclear Issue In response to the DPRK’s nuclear tests, the UNSC chose sanctions as the appropriate way of halting the proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction (WMDs) in the Far East.

UNSC sanctions on the DPRK primarily targeted the military, financial and nuclear sectors of this country. China condemned the DPRK’s nuclear test and voted affirmatively for Resolutions․ With these steps, China sent a message to its partners in Pyongyang, stating that Beijing is not interested in a nuclear arms race in the Far East. Chinese decision makers sent another message to Western colleagues stating that they are ready to cooperate within the framework of negotiations and would not accept any attempt to solve the DPRK’s nuclear issue militarily.

Contributions of the Chinese researchers show that the opinions of China's researchers are divided on this issue. One segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is not China’s friend and that its behavior and nuclear arsenal is a threat to Chinese security.The second segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is a buffer between China and Japan and between Chinese and US troops that are based in Japan and the ROK and that China must help the DPRK for this reason.

In turn, the second segment of Chinese researchers can be further divided into two groups.

The first group believes that China should help the people of the DPRK because of the longstanding Sino-Korean relationship, but representatives of this group like to add that the Chinese do not like the Kim dynasty. The second group of this segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is China’s strategic partner, as evidenced by the SinoNorth Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961, and that China must continue to help the DPRK maintain its political system.

If we consider, that the DPRK is still China’s ally due to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, Mutual Assistance, that was signed by China and DPRK in 1961, which obligated each party to come to the aid of the other if attacked, so the following question arises: Why did China accept sanctions against its so-called ally?

China is disappointed by the fact that nuclear weapons technology is being spread to neighboring states, which may be a reason for the possible nuclear arms race in the Far East.

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Thus, if the international community could not find the ways to urge the DPRK’s government to completely, verifiably, irreversibly dismantle its nuclear arsenal, it is possible that other countries in the region such as Japan and ROK, which have the capability to build nuclear weapons, would strive to repair the balance and would start their own nuclear programs. They can announce that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons threaten their security and that they need to build their own to deter the DPRK. It is worth mentioning, that before the first nuclear test of the DPRK, China was the only legal owner of nuclear weapons among its eastern neighbors. Nuclear weapons give China an advantage against its perpetual opponent, Japan. This fact provided an impetus to China to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in NEA. The Chinese nuclear arsenal deters Japan, but what will happen if Japan creates nuclear weapons as well?

China would lose its coercive deterrent against its historical opponent.

I believe that China will continue to press the DPRK and urge it to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, but Beijing will never entirely turn to the US and leave the DPRK in complete isolation. It appears that if China agrees with the US’s wishes to isolate the DPRK that such an event would mean the beginning of the collapse of the DPRK. I believe that after this step, the US would reach a separate agreement with Pyongyang. The history of international relations features several examples designed and implemented by the US as follows: the first event was when the US improved its ties with China without discussing this step with Japan, and the second event was when the US improved its relations with Vietnam – a country that the US had struggled with in the past. Currently, the US serves as a reliable patron for the guarantee of security in Vietnam.

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China-US Disagreements and Cooperation on the DPRK’s Nuclear Issue The US-Vietnam strategic partnership is surely in opposition to China’s interests.

From my point of view, China would continue to support the DPRK in building its economy, which would give Beijing a chance to maintain its influence over the DPRK. Further, Beijing will continue to improve its ties with the ROK, as the ROK is the third-leading economic partner of China.

China will attempt to find ways to demilitarize and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula with the ROK. From Beijing’s perspective, these steps will provide an opportunity to reduce the US’s influence in the Far East. We can conclude that from China’s perspective, “no problems in the region will eliminate US interference in regional affairs.” In sum, during the negotiations for preventing further nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, China is in the most difficult position because it attempts to push the DPRK to continue the negotiation process and to stop developing new nuclear weapons.

China also makes an effort to ease sanctions on the whole. Beijing cannot allow an unstable situation in the DPRK, which would cause thousands of refugees to flee from the DPRK to China; thus, China is interested in the DPRK’s stability. Additionally, the government of China believes that if a communist regime is maintained in Pyongyang, China would be able to use the DPRK’s massive army in a possible “West-East” confrontation.

China-US competition for political influence on the Korean Peninsula began following the Second World War and escalated during the Korean War, as China was struggling with the DPRK against the US and its allies. The DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and tense relations between the DPRK and the ROK remain threats to the security and stability of the entire Far East. The conflicting parties have powerful military allies. On July 11, 1961, China and the DPRK signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and in 1953, the ROK and US signed Mutual Defense Treaty. Due to this treaty, the US maintains troops in the Korean peninsula.

In fact, the US has a military presence near China’s eastern borders (in Japan and in the ROK), and the DPRK’s nuclear issue has given the US an excuse to relocate more troops to the region and to relocate its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) advance missile defense system to deter the DPRK. From Beijing’s perspective, a concentration of US troops or relocation of the US missile defense system near its borders are also a real threat to China. China helps maintain Pyongyang’s regime so that its army can keep away and deter US ground troops from Beijing and Eastern China, which are located south of the Korean Peninsula.From previous experience, the Chinese people also know that the No.1 US ally in the Far East, Japan, might attack China if it strengthened its position in the Korean Peninsula.

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China-Russia Cooperation Regarding the DPRK’s Nuclear Issue

In sum, China and the US have different visions for the future political development of the Korean Peninsula. China would like to maintain the DPRK’s stability, whereas the US attempts to weaken it by sanctions. If it finally crashes, the US wishes to change the regime and unite it with the ROK. By contrast, China attempts to limit its disagreements with the US and maintain peace in the Korean peninsula; however, China’s strategy is also to develop high-level political and economic relations with the ROK, connect the ROK’s economy with China’s economy and, as a result, weaken the US in the Korean Peninsula. This strategy may yield results, but the main obstacle is that the DPRK periodically takes provocative actions, including nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.

Thus, ROK leaders continue to see the US as the main guarantor of ROK security. As a result, the US maintains a military base in the Korean peninsula.

However, China and the US also have one common goal: to remove nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and prevent a possible nuclear arms race in the Far East.

The main reason for cooperation between the US and China is that the two superpowers oppose nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula.

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In a broader sense, in the UNSC, Russian diplomacy regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issue entails finding solutions with China and subsequently negotiating with other partners. Russia attempts to use its influence on the DPRK to support the negotiation process. The main positions of Russia and China on the Korean nuclear issue match as both sides want to see the Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons and the peaceful development of the DPRK. The following question arises: What is uniting Beijing’s and Moscow’s positions on the DPRK nuclear issue in the UNSC? 1. China and Russia are responsible powers that are interested in dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal. China is not interested in seeing its neighbors become new members of the “nuclear club”. Russia is also interested in maintaining the balance of power in the Korean Peninsula and Far East.

2. The second reason for the Russian-Chinese united resistance against the DPRK’s nuclear tests is that that after the DPRK’s nuclear tests and missile launches, the US increased its military involvement in the Far East, arguing that it must protect the ROK and Japan from the DPRK threat, but in fact it is against China and Russia as well. The ROK and Japan subsequently began increasing their military potential in the Far East.

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III. China and Russia are against the rhetoric of US politicians who emphasize the importance of changing the DPRK’s political regime. Any type of political instability in the Korean peninsula would deepen – not solve – the political crisis in the Far East. Russian and Chinese decision makers understand that if the US leads political changes in the DPRK, it would completely change the direction of Pyongyang’s foreign policy and that the country would move into the Western camp. These types of possible developments in the DPRK would limit Russia’s and China’s ability to maneuver in the Far East.

1. In the UNSC, China and Russia have attempted to maintain stability and the balance of power in the Korean Peninsula.

Concurrently, along with the other main players of the international community that were involved in the negotiations on the DPRK’s nuclear issue, they continue to press the DPRK to return to the negotiating table to discuss dismantling its nuclear arsenal. In the UNSC, Moscow and Beijing maintain pressure on the DPRK but only to the extent that its economic and political systems do not collapse.

2. China and Russia continue to develop their economic relations with the DPRK, given the limitations of the UNSC sanctions.

These economic relations provide an opportunity for the DPRK regime to maintain its political and economic systems. China’s investments and economic aid are the DPRK’s main guaranties of stability. As developments have shown, China and Russia can exert influence on the DPRK; however,

regarding its nuclear policy, the DPRK has independently chosen its steps and listened to neither Beijing nor Moscow.

3. China and Russia cooperate regarding the DPRK’s nuclear issue and do not let the US and its allies isolate and destroy the DPRK; on the other hand, when the Russian bear returned to Korean Peninsula, a hidden struggle would develop between Russia and China for influence in the DPRK. This would provide more room for the DPRK’s diplomats to maneuver between Russian and Chinese disagreements, as was the case during the Cold War, when the DPRK’s leaders were playing on disagreements between China and Russia.

VII. China and Russia are against US and ROK’s use of the DPRK actions as an excuse for deploying the THAAD missile defense system, as it could become a real security threat for both China and Russia.

Conclusion From my perspective, the DPRK’s nuclear issue can be solved if the US, China, Russia, the ROK, and Japan can come to a united conclusion.

What type of policies do these 5 countries have?

The US has long attempted to find ways to change the DPRK’s political system or to disrupt the DPRK’s weak economy and receive concessions from Pyongyang. Japan, with some exceptions, has attempted to follow US policies.

NORTH KOREA IN THE CROSSHAIRS

The ROK has tried to maintain economic relations with the DPRK, but at a low level. China, by contrast, continues its economic relations with the DPRK, given the limitations of the UNSC sanctions. Beijing has urged the DPRK leaders to implement Chinese-style economic reforms and continues to provide the DPRK with food aid. China therefore attempts to maintain influence in the DPRK to prevent unpredictable or dangerous steps by Pyongyang, but as past developments have shown, the DPRK tries to play its own chess game and make decisions by itself. Russia has attempted to reestablish its influence in the DPRK, which was lost when the USSR collapsed. For this reason, Moscow wrote off the DPRK’s debt. Therefore, we have 5 players+ the DPRK, and every player attempts to play its own game.

I believe that the DPRK also tries to gain from the disagreements of the above-mentioned global and regional powers (China, Russia, the US, the ROK and Japan). I believe these powers can agree from their side that nobody should separately or secretly sign an agreement with the DPRK. The powers can offer the DPRK support for developing its north regions, which border China, to prevent further immigration to China from the DPRK’s poorest regions.

The 5 powers must announce that they have no intentions of changing the DPRK’s political system so that the DPRK does not need nuclear bombs to prevent such developments. I believe it is important to maintain an arms embargo and control the import and export of nuclear dual-use materials to the DPRK, but it is nonetheless possible to suspend heavy economic sanctions. These steps will provide the opportunity to build confidence among the negotiating parties and improve the DPRK’s economic situation, which in turn will give added impetus to stop the immigration of the DPRK’s citizens into China, which Beijing would like to prevent. The 5 powers can offer the DPRK a new roadmap for a final solution to its nuclear issue. The main idea can apply to that if the 5 powers help the DPRK join the global economic order, as a result it will be much easier to urge the DPRK’s decision makers to dismantle their nuclear arsenal. In this hypothetical scenario, the DPRK would have something to lose.

Mher D. Sahakyan- Ph.D. 2016 (International Relations), School of International Studies, Nanjing University, China. Director of the “‘China-Eurasia’ Council for Political and Strategic Research” Foundation, Armenia and the author of the article CHINA’S POLICY ON THE DPRK’S NUCLEAR ISSUE: COOPERATION AND DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE US AND RUSSIA, (Moscow University Bulletin. Series 13. Oriental Studies, No. 1, 2017, pp. 39-55), from which this essay is adapted. Used by permission.

All rights reserved.

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

The geopoliTics of NorTh Korea’s Nuclear capaciTy

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According to many nuclear experts, the detonation of a hydrogen bomb in the Punggye-ri site, in Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea is not a realistic fact. In fact, the reported 5.1 magnitude quake connected to the detonation is, however, of low intensity for this kind of tests – hence it is not possible that it was caused by a H detonation.

Many experts believe that, for North Korea, the announcement of the hydrogen bomb detonation is a clear falsehood or it is an improvement - or possibly an enhancement - of the now classic North Korean nuclear weapons.It is worth noting that China protested formally, with specific reference to the nuclear fallout of the test, and that Pungyyeri is less than a hundred kilometres away from the Chinese border.

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China maintained it would support any UN action, along with South Korea, which has already requested it in the framework of the Security Council. It is also worth noting that Kim Jong-Un has never visited the People’s Republic of China, while in October 2015 Liu Yunshan, a CCP leader - the first in four years – went to Pyongyang on the occasion of the celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean Workers' Party. Furthermore, on that same occasion, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a telegram of congratulations for the 70th anniversary of the Party ruling in North Korea.

Liu is a member of the CCP Standing Committee of the Politburo, but the relations between the two countries have grown cold especially after Kim executing his uncle Jang Song-Taek, who was a well-known and stable point of reference for Communist China.

It is worth recalling that, for Kim Jong-Un, the nuclear issue is not just a “matter of image” – just to put it in Western terminology.The strategic connection can be identified in the system of the Six Party Talks on the Korean nuclear program, which had begun officially in 2003, and were later aimed at the almost complete scrapping of the North Korean nuclear potential. Those Talks included the United States, China, South Korea, obviously North Korea, Japan and the Russian Federation. In 2009 North Korea decided to put an end to those negotiations and the significant fact is that, in 2012, Kim Jong-Un announced that North Korea would cease nuclear tests and accept the IAEA inspections if the United States supplied food to the country.

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The subsequent year China tried to revive the Six Party Talks by sending a representative to North Korea, thus creating the opportunity for a new round of negotiations at informal level. On the contrary, the United States want North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program before resuming the Talks and then re-discuss all the bilateral and multilateral issues at stake.

Hence we are approaching the strategic core of the issue: Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea wants to reopen a new phase of its international relations, also with this H-type "test”, which will probably be the result of a miniaturization of "traditional" nuclear charges for North Korea. China is no longer a reliable partner for Kim Jong-Un. In 2015, for example, a Korean band had to leave the Chinese territory without being able to play – and these are very important signs in the Communist international ritual.

Nevertheless, again in 2013, China opened a new free economic zone, known as Gomenvan, near Dandong. This means that, for China, North Korea is still a strategic asset.

But not so much as to necessarily support it to the point of "losing face" at international level and favouring - in a period of reduced GDP growth - a "sister" country which, however, has always shown its willingness to play alone.

In short, North Korea’s strategic equation is now clear and we can see it from different viewpoints: a) North Korea wants to deal directly with the United States, as it has often shown it wished to do.

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Moreover, b) North Korea’s geopolitical axis is a direct mediation with the United States, thus estranging China, which otherwise would absorb North Korea in its networks of interests with the United States, by de facto colonizing it. Above all, however, for the North Korean regime the issue lies in removing Japan from negotiations and from any sphere of influence over North Korea.

Many years ago, Robert Gallucci – a dear friend that I still miss – succeeded in understanding the North Korean geopolitical axis and operated consequently within his US administration. We talked passionately about it in Paris until three o’clock in the morning.

If the United States could create a link with North Korea, without involving but only informing China; if the United States succeeded in excluding but not weakening Japan, without worsening the already complex situation in this country, and if these signs could be correctly understood in North Korea, this would really be the beginning of North Korea’s peaceful integration into the mainstream of Asian nations.

For China, North Korea is an unavoidable "buffer zone" – hence the coldness between China and North Korea will never be completely solved or overcome.

Therefore signs shall be given to North Korea that this process will lead to a dual result: 1) to accept a reduced nuclear arsenal which, however, has already been made useless due to the great potential of North Korean chemical weapons deployed on missile carriers and 2) to support a domestic economic evolution which does not affect the current power system.

It is an activity of great diplomatic and intelligence art, which is no longer used today.

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DR. ARSHAD M. KHAN

The NorTh KoreaN eNigma

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part I: War and Peace

The North Koreans sent the U.S. a gift on its July 4th Independence Day. In the morning, -- their time, it was still July 3rd evening in Washington -- they launched a missile. It reached a height of 1741 miles (2802 Km) which was 400 miles higher than the earlier May 14 launch.

Calling it the Hwasong-14, they have claimed it has a range of 10,000 km and can reach anywhere in the world.

One with a range greater than 5,500 km is considered an ICBM. This is now their 11th missile launch this year and their expertise cannot be denied. It is not unlikely that they already have a warhead to fit since rational thinking leads to concurrent development.

Now what? The U.S. can send additional men or warships to the area in a show of force. But what else? The President leans on China in a tweet response but China has previously demurred.

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The Chinese President Xi Jinping was on a visit to Moscow and at a joint news conference with President Putin, the latter proposed pushing forward their joint initiative on North Korea. It calls for freezes in ballistic missile tests and also dealing with U.S. deployment of weapons in South Korea. He is referring of course to the THAAD ABM system installed in South Korea.

The Russians are particularly worried about the girdling of their country with ABM systems. Mr. Putin has pointed out previously how these have destabilized the prior balance. Russia now is faced with a launch on warning choice -- a kind of use it or lose it, because a U.S. first strike coupled with the ABMs present the potential of neutralizing the Russian ICBMs. The Dr. Strangelove who thought up this first strike capability must have been just about as nuts as the movie character for by creating a hair trigger he has brought us to the doorstep of World War III. Will we see reason and dismantle these sites, or will Russia eventually be forced to eliminate them unitarily? And then what will be the consequences? Is a reality TV star and property/casino developer the best equipped to handle them? Unsettling questions all of them, but this is the world we live in.

Are the days of the THAAD system in South Korea numbered? One can add, it is not particularly liked by the new South Korean president for it makes his country a target, and he, in contrast with his predecessor, favors a political diplomatic strategy in dealing with the North.

And so it was, as the U.S. celebrated its 241st anniversary of independence -- another war that might have been avoided. Had the radical Whigs won the British election, the colonists would have gotten the vote and we would all be living in a giant Canada benefiting from their excellent healthcare system.

Not to be, the authoritarians of the right won. They believed the colonists should do as they were told because they enjoyed Britain's protection. Perhaps patience would have resolved the issue. But then who had time for patience with France waiting in the wings to settle old scores, particularly its reversals in India. The web of global politics (and its uncertainty) can catch even the most wary.

While our president speculates on China to 'put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all' in his tweet, he forgets it is probably more likely China is helping its ally along to secure a bigger and bigger bargaining chip.

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Part II: Economic Ties and the Banyan Tree

About a hundred miles north of Bangalore, India, in the village of Thimmamma Marrimanu grows an eponymous banyan tree. There are all kinds of records for trees: the tallest, the stoutest, the oldest, and so on, but the record for the largest canopy, at an astounding five acres, is held by this banyan. And it also holds the key to the Korean enigma.

Relations with North Korea could not be worse:

Every so often it fires o a test missile or more, the latest an ICBM, and while President Donald Trump is delivering vague threats at the moment, he could eventually erupt. The resulting Far East chaos could be catastrophic.

It also recently released University of Virginia student Otto Warmbier, who was comatose and substantially brain-dead, and who has now expired. He had the misfortune to become tangled up in an incident while visiting there.

Not too long ago, news agencies including the BBC reported North Korean claims of a plot orchestrated by the CIA to kill Kim Jong-un through bio-chemical attack – a plot foiled apparently by North Korean security. For sometime now the CIA has been severely circumscribed in any assassination endeavors involving foreign leaders, but then there might be ways to bypass the legal restrictions.

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Whatever the truth, the disturbing fact of unrestrained bellicosity from both sides coupled with the prospect of nuclear-tipped ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. have brought matters to a head.

The options remain the same: Continue the status quo relying on China to restrain its ally; go to war; start new talks directed at some sort of peaceful accommodation.

China is clearly either unable or unwilling to lean on its ally, and consequently the first option means continuing the unstable present. War means terrible casualties for obvious reasons including Seoul being within artillery range. Logic then dictates the the third choice despite Mr. Trump's usual braggadocio.

It so happens the new South Korean leader President Moon Jae-in also favors political diplomacy. Following in the footsteps of his mentor, the late President Roh Moo-hyun, he advocates the ‘sunshine policy’ of openness and closer ties with the North, initiated originally by Roh’s predecessor President Kim Dae-jung – who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for improving relations with the North.

Talk of reunification then is clearly premature given the present confrontational stance, and Mr. Moon in deference to the US president has cooled off a little. Yet even if he were to coax Kim Jong-un’s cooperation and reinstate the sunshine policy, further progress is hampered by the very different economies.

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More so, the North’s ruling elite is unlikely to voluntarily relinquish power. The North is a militarized economy, the South a successful commercial one. Beginning in 1980, South Korea has surged in research. No longer an imitator of mature products, it is now (latest data 2015) among the top three countries granted US patents, behind only the US and Japan, and far surpassing Italy (17,924 vs.

2,645) for example. Its GDP is almost on a par with Canada and ahead of Russia; in 2016 its relatively new Hyundai (4.38% share) and sister Kia (3.69%) branded cars held over four times the market share of long-established Volkswagen (1.84%); and its Samsung cell phones, along with Apple, dominate the market. In comparison, North Korea is a commercial pygmy.

So, is there an answer to the Korean enigma?

In India, the banyan tree is revered and, dating from 1433, Thimmamma Marrimanu especially so. Shielded from the hot sun under its forest-like canopy is a temple. Monkeys, also revered in Hindu mythology, roam freely enjoying the figs – the banyan is a fig tree.

The fig seeds settle in the branches of adjacent trees. A seed sprouts sending down a tendril to the earth below. When it reaches the soil it roots. Dozens of these roots and coiling leaves eventually strangle the host and the tree’s canopy enlarges. Economic tendrils into North Korea can take many forms and need not necessarily strangle the host to continue their presence.

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The South has already had the Kaesong Industrial Park six miles across the border in the North. Up to 124 South Korean companies ran factories and businesses there making shoes and clothes primarily. Although diminished by the time it was shut down in 2016, it still employed 55,000 North Koreans.

The China model is another example. Training North Korean workers and setting up assembly and eventual manufacture of higher end products will profit both North and South economically; the North in growing a commercial economy and the South in increased profits and more competitive products due to cheaper labor and other costs.

In due course the vast economic canopy will ensure mutual prosperity, and prosperity is addictive. Inevitably it opens the doors to reunification. The sad history of a divided Korea, prey to global forces and fractures beyond anyone’s control will have come to an end.

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

Tension beTween norTh Korea and The UniTed sTaTes

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The tension between the United States and North Korea is still mounting. In fact, in mid-May, some North Korean executives accused the US intelligence services of having made an attempt on Kim Jong-un's life.

Allegedly the operation started with CIA selecting a North Korean citizen, who had already had contacts with the South Korean intelligence services, and who had to use highly poisonous chemical substances against the North Korean leader.

In addition, the attacker was supposed to have had links with a Chinese company, namely Qingdao Nazca Trade Co. It is also likely that the attempted assassination of the North Korean leader may be the result of an internal struggle for power in the country, but obviously - at a time of very high international tension - the North Korean propaganda lays emphasis only on the United States.

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However, the new South Korean President Moon Jae-In - a human rights lawyer - has repeatedly stressed that he plans to work with President Donald Trump. Nevertheless he has also stressed that he is anyway open to negotiations with North Korea without any conditions, which is certainly not what the United States wants from him.

Nor does it seem to us that the United States is building an effective strategy for dealing with North Korea and solving the tension regarding the North Korean nuclear missile system.

The issue can be solved neither with the rhetoric of "human rights" and the improbable and universalistic spreading of bipartisan democracy, as is usually the case with the US Democrats’ Presidencies, nor with a substantial block of relations with the countries of the "axis of evil", possibly pending a very dangerous military operation which, however, will never come. This is the latest typical attitude of the Republican Presidencies.

As is well known, the operations for assassinating the political leaders disliked by the United States were blocked by Congress in the 1970s, but nothing prevents direct actions against enemy Heads of State from being still carried out, with the collaboration of the intelligence services.

This is the sign of a severe conceptual and political mistake: a political system never depends solely on its leader, but it is a complex structure that is rapidly recreated if the supreme leader falls.

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Saddam's Iraq was not "bad" because Saddam Hussein was an evil man. Iran is not a member of the "axis of evil" because it is led by some extremely cruel Shiite Imams - not to mention the fact that Iran is not the world sponsor of Islamic terrorism, which is indeed strongly supported by the traditional US Sunni friends. Psychologism and personalism are two very serious mistakes for those who want to deal seriously with global strategy and foreign policy. Moreover, Fidel Castro’s assassination designed by CIA would have not destroyed the Cuban Communist regime, but would have made it even more radical vis-à-vis the United States.

Currently, however, which are the real strate gic direction, consistency and aim of the North Korean nuclear system? This is the only question we really need to ask, both to start realistic negotiations and to understand the geopolitical goals of the North Korean military system.

As to biological weapons, the relevant North Korean structures are the three Biological Research Institutes, included in the network of the National Academy of Sciences, as well as an Institute for Medical Research within the National Defence Academy. Besides these three Institutes, there are as many as sixteen specialized bodies dealing with the various fields of research on and for bacteriological weapons. With specific reference to chemical weapons, they are currently estimated at 5,000 tonnes of material.

The bodies involved in this defence sector are supposed to be 25-50, employing at least 5,000 people.

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Finally, as to nuclear weapons - the best known part of the North Korean military apparatus - the institutions and political organizations controlling them are, manifold, complex and interdependent, as is often the case with North Korea.

According to a source of the South Korean intelligence services, North Korea’s nuclear sites are approximately one hundred, while other sources talk about 150 entities and sites linked to North Korea’s nuclear-military research with a total of 9,000-15,000 employees. The Research Institutes involved in North Korea's nuclear project are 13, while the uranium currently available is estimated at 26 tonnes extracted from at least 10 mines.

Other sources talk about 33 kilos of Pu-239 and 175 kilos of enriched uranium, which should be the equivalent of 6-9 Pu-239 weapons and 13-18 enriched-uranium warheads. Too few to be a global threat, as some US analysts believe, but enough to keep South Korea in check and, above all, Japan and the US bases in the South Pacific region.

Currently North Korea has thirteen different types of missiles, with the latest ones (Pukguksong 1 and 2, Hwasong-12, 13 and 14) that can reach targets up to 12,000 kilometres from the launch site. Hence another future goal of the North Korean missile system is to put the North American Western territory - hence the US Pacific coast - under strategic threat.Although there exist US and South Korean military forces specialized in disrupting the sites for weapons of mass destruction, technically the distribution

of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical resources in North Korea is such as not to facilitate the success of the debunking operations in the North Korean sites. Operations that would be very difficult also in the event of the North Korean regime collapsing.

Just think what could happen with infiltrations from South Korea to destabilize the North Korean sites.

Hence, should North Korea collapse, the only solution for stabilizing the peninsula lies in China’s Armed Forces and policy. In case of North Korea’s implosion, China wants only three things: regional stability, as well as the creation of a buffer State between its own territory and South Korea (which would probably also implode) and, ultimately, the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula, with the subsequent expulsion of US forces from South Korea.

This would result in the rapid acquisition of most North Korean nuclear and bacteriological-chemical structures by the Chinese military forces.The Sino-Korean border is long and China could set up refugee camps and, above all, military bases to go deep into North Korea.Certainly, the tension between North Korea and China is now palpable hence, in the future, China may not be the ideal broker between North Korea and the West.

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However, while the bilateral situation between China and North Korea is worsening, the one between Kim Jong-un’s regime and Russia still seems to be good, if not excellent.

The United States is wrong in not considering important the role played by Russia in the North Korean system, while it has long been asking for the Chinese support to settle the Korean issue with a good agreement.

All three powers, namely China, the United States and the Russian Federation, have a clear interest in denuclearizing the entire Korean peninsula. Furthermore these three countries regard the North Korean nuclear proliferation as dangerous because it creates instability and triggers off further proliferation in other South Asian regions.

However, it would be enough to start negotiations with North Korea based on the acceptance of the status quo, enabling IAEA inspectors to return to North Korea for their nuclear monitoring activity and finally organizing economic and humanitarian support for the North Korean population - not to mention the definition of a series of industrial and financial projects to redress the North Korean economy and put it back on track so that the country could be stabilized permanently.

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North Korea should accept the block of any further nuclear or biological-chemical weapons; a nuclear, biological and chemical cooperation treaty with China and Russia; a peace treaty with South Korea and the official recognition of the current borders between North and South Korea. Moreover, according to Russia, the North Korean issue must be solved immediately to avoid nuclear proliferation, as well as the US military presence in South Korea and in the other Pacific Asian regions, and finally making economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea more effective.

As we already know, both Russia and China want the denuclearization of the entire peninsula, but only in a peaceful manner and through political negotiations. Obviously, China intends to avoid any regional military clash on its borders, which would have catastrophic consequences for its economic and geopolitical projects - just think of the new Silk Road designed by Xi Jinping.

For Russia, military tension between the two Koreas or between North Korea and Japan would certainly be a severe danger, but not such as to directly threaten its territory.

In fact, if the shield represented by North Korea were to disappear, China would have the US Army on its borders, with all the obvious consequences this entails.Furthermore, if North Korea imploded, China would have to be directly involved in the creation of a buffer State to avoid both South Korea's contagion and the direct confrontation with the US forces.

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For Russia, military tension between the two Koreas would mean a further worsening of the confrontation with the United States in other Pacific regions. Russia mainly wants to resume the six party talks, while Putin is likely to send a special envoy to North Korea in the near future.

Hence, while President Trump does not explicitly rule out the military solution to the North Korean issue, neither Russia nor China will be of any use.

Indeed, Russia will see in the new South Korea only the expansion of the North American strategic network, which it considers the main danger to its strategic autonomy.

However, not even North Korea wants to prompt a US intervention and, in fact, in its leaders’ texts and speeches, it emphasizes the use of missiles to block the Japanese actions and, above all, those starting from the Guam US base.

Hence, reopening the six party talks, with a new format attaching priority to Russia’s and China’s participation; reaffirming the legal acceptance of North Korea and opening up the North Korean regime to the Chinese, European and Russian economies.

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

How to solve tHe NortH KoreaN military aNd strategic issue

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Why does North Korea want to currently reach such a nuclear threshold as to threaten Japan, South Korea, the Southern Asian seas and, obviously, the US bases in the Pacific, as well as the North American mainland?

Because it fears to be invaded from the South or from the sea, with an integrated action on its coast by South Korea and the United States, with the Japanese support off the coast. The North Korean Republic fears to be invaded because it is close to countries which are also obliged to support and influence it, not through the Marxist-Leninist ideology but with geography, namely China and Russia.Hence it fears that the price of support will become too high for the country to be able to pay it without a "socialist" regime change, such as that of Deng Xiaoping’s China, or with Russia’s statist nationalism.

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These countries are such as to influence North Korea by helping the Juche (self-reliance) regime at increasingly higher, and ultimately unsustainable, strategic costs for the country. Furthermore, one of the ideological foundations of the North Korean regime is its very clear autonomy from the rest of the world - hence, as much as possible, also from Russia and China.

Moreover, after Kim-Jong Un’s rise to power, North Korea has turned the primary national and international policy line from Songun ("military first"), which was his father’s and Kim-Il Sung’s policy, into a directive called Byungijin, namely the parallel development of economy and defense. Since the beginning of Kim-Jong Un’s reign significant reforms have been implemented: the downsizing of common farms, fewer checks on the distribution system and greater availability of money have enabled peasants to retain a larger share of crops so as to give rise to a small-scale free local economy. It is worth recalling that agriculture was the focus of Deng Xiaoping’s "First Modernization" in China.

At military level, however, the Byungjin policy line envisages that, in strategic planning, preference be given to nuclear weapons: the civilian or military nuclear technology is cheaper than the conventional one, which also depends on a separation between "gun workers" - as Mao Zedong called them - and "plow workers". Too much military labour force takes men and women away from the production system and this does not certainly go in the direction desired by KimJong Un.

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Furthermore always portraying the leader of an "enemy" country as a madman - as the West has being doing since Hitler’s times - is really an act of madness on our part. The effects of the timid economic reform are obviously very slow and cyclical and this is the reason why the friendly China did not allow North Korea to be admitted into the new Asian Infrastructure Development Bank in 2016. It is also worth recalling that Xi Jinping, whose PCC is monitoring the situation in North Korea closely, has not yet paid any official visit to North Korea's capital town.

While North Korea’s nuclear armed forces are worth only 2-3% of GDP per year, according to the most reliable Western indirect estimates, the development of missile and nuclear weapons is an almost compulsory economic-strategic option for Kim-Jong Un, who wants an internal economic reform following the pathway of China’s "Four Modernizations", but does not certainly want to lose power or change its nature.

Hence for North Korea it is the globalization of a regional threat: the North Korean regime wants to directly threaten the United States in the Pacific and on its national territory. It wants to force the traditional allies such as Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan to defend it also beyond their national and local interests and it finally wants to oblige Westerners to help its economy and allow its steady expansion, with the unconventional threat.Missile explosions and the new thermonuclear weapons, such as the one detonated on January 9, 2016 - which North Korea declared to be miniaturized, and hence potentially

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tthreatening even for long-range targets suggest that, once finished the phase of the 5+1 negotiations and international agreements, North Korea now wants to make its status as nuclear power be accepted as a simple fait accompli. And the new small wealth secured by savings on conventional forces will be used exactly for this purpose, considering that the new North Korean leadership is clearly no longer interested in negotiating a new strategic set-up with countries that are ever less interested in solving the problem.

Or with countries which are particularly interested in the "usual curse" of the State which does not comply with international rules, invented by others alone.

Or with countries which are only interested in "showing their flag", as is the case with the recent US naval mission in the Korean regional sea, which, however - as the New York Times has recently revealed - had no particular characteristics of deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. How could we rationally oppose the new strategic North Korean posture, which is developing its non-conventional technologies along three directions: the dual space technology, submarine nuclear missiles and the ground handling of mobile launching bases?Either the unstable South Korea is armed with nuclear technologies, which would make North Korea’s weapons increase significantly, or the South is protected with THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) - as has already happened - or, finally, a new agreement is negotiated with North Korea.

How can this be done? The possible courses of action I envisage would be the following: a) a guarantee for developing the Special Economic Zones, the seven areas which attract regional capital into North Korea with great difficulty; b) the political and strategic act of recognizing the North Korean government’s legitimacy, thus putting an end to the old and trite memory of that war in Asia, which - however - was triggered off by two parallel mistakes by General MacArthur and Communist guerrillas in the North; c) North Korea’s entry into a new Regional Security Union that would stabilize Japan's, the Russian Federation’s, China’s, South Korea’s and the United States’ interests; d) the establishment of an International Fund for the Development of the Korean Peninsula, to which all the local countries that wish so may adhere; and d) a multilateral treaty, with the usual guarantees, putting an end to North Korea's nuclear escalation and preserving its status reached at the time of signature, as well as envisaging credible sanctions in the event of North Korea infringing the Treaty.

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Hence, if we do not follow Bob Gallucci's line, who - as a typical Italo-American - says that the "North Korean issue is not like good wine" which improves by aging, we will not manage to get out of this situation, getting enmeshed by a theatrical strategy that only serves media and does not solve anything, or by the even worse choice of threatening North Korea militarily. This gets us away from Russia and China which already have their disputes with North Korea, but are essential to bring peace to the region. And this also makes North Korea's policy even more aggressive and its rearmament faster.

Hence, as Bob Gallucci teaches us, we must negotiate with North Korea multilaterally, because the plurality of actors sitting at the same negotiating table does not enable North Korea to threaten us or wring concessions from the United States alone. Furthermore North Korea will feel how important, decisive and definitive are the pressures of friends or opponents in the same round of negotiations. Paradoxically, in a recent essay, Bob Gallucci says that "the United States and North Korea want the same thing."

Which one? The regime change. The United States believes that there should be a political and strategic change in North Korea and the same is wished by North Korea for the United States vis-Ă -vis itself.

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Also South Korea, concerned about the possible nuclear war against North Korea, does not like solutions based on a show of strength that would destabilize South Korea as a NATO attack on the Warsaw Pact would have destabilized the Federal Republic of Germany, which was mainly thinking of reunification - exactly what many people still want in South Korea. Furthermore, in Bob Gallucci’s opinion, doing business with North Korea is better than threatening sanctions, which are often politically useless and easy to circumvent or, sometimes, even harmful.

Therefore, within a multilateral approach, it is currently still necessary to: (a) stop the substantially useless North Korean nuclear program, because the political goals of that operation are reached with negotiations; b) initiate political normalization, which is also a goal of the North Korean regime that has no interest in being regarded as the global rogue State; c) provide some economic assistance, and, in exchange for it, d) be provided strategic reassurances on the security of the region by North Korea.

Furthermore, if North Korea were to win its current "war of nerves" with the United States, the future scenario could be that of Japan's nuclear rearmament and widespread insecurity of South Korea, which could also turn to China for its strategic projection - hence the nuclear balance will disappear in the geopolitical heart of Asia.

It is not an acceptable perspective, at least for us.

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AmNAH AmjAd

US, China Rift, and the new thReat fRom noRth KoRea

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The launch of Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by North Korea on 4 July 2017 has sparked new tensions between United States, China and North Korea. The intercontinental ballistic missile has the capacity to reach 578 miles with the potential of reaching an altitude of 1700 miles. This would mean that the missile has the capability to get to Alaska, USA. As a response to the North Korea’s missile launch, United States and South Korea held a ballistic missile drill on 5 July 2017 in the Sea of Japan to counter any attempt. However, the news of the drill broke within hours of the joint press statement by China and Russia in which they condemned the launch of ICBM by North Korea and in exchange demanded United States not to conduct military exercises with South Korea.

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The press statement indicates that both China and Russia want to address the issue on the table instead of using force.

North Korea’s latest missile test has created the rift between China and United States and many call it as an end of the ‘honeymoon period’ between the two countries.

Trump, who called Chinese President, Xi Jinping, a ‘good person’ during Xi's visit to the United States in April 2017, had taken a harsh stance against him this week and called for him to ‘do more’ for denuclearization of North Korea or face repercussions.

China is the biggest trade partner of North Korea and United States blames it for not imposing United Nations sanctions on North Korea that included banning of coal imports from North Korea. The food and fuel supplies to North Korea and coal imports from the country by China are considered as lifeline of the former’s nuclear project.

The latest ICBM test by North Korea proves that the sanctions have remained unsuccessful in the denuclearization of North Korea, hence probing United States to put pressure on China. United States have threatened China with the proposal of new sanctions that would curtail the Chinese bank linked to North Korea. This has been criticized by China that does not want to be affected by the US sanctions. Moreover, United States has also authorized sales of arms to Taiwan in order to put pressure on Xi. Although China claims to aim for denuclearization of the region, it fears destabilized North Korea more than a nuclear North Korea.

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China has been supporting Kim Jong-un’s regime with food and fuel supplies to avoid instability in the country. Moreover, the trade between the two countries have risen this year, i.e. there is a 15 % increase in the trade between China and North Korea in the first five months of year 2017 as compared to those in 2016.

This indicates that China has taken limited measures to impose the UN Security Council sanctions aimed to deter North Korean nuclear program. To aim for denuclearization of the region, China had suggested to resort to the Six Party talks (between North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and United States) and had aimed for the resumption of talks since its discontinuation in 2009.

There are a couple of reasons that China cannot cut off North Korea completely. Firstly, China’s priority is to have a stable Korean neighborhood; collapse of North Korea would create room for a United Korea as South Korea will take over the complete Korean region with the help of its ally, United States. This would make the lasting presence of the United States in the vicinity of China that will challenge the regional power structure. Moreover, United States is planning to test Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in July 2017. China has criticized the act and asks for peaceful settlement, as the use of force will create problems for China. Secondly, collapse of the North Korean regime would force refugees into China that will create problems for the country.

China shares 1420 km long border with North Korea.

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The two provinces of China that share the border with North Korea, Jilin and Liaoning, have lower GDP compared to other coastal regions of China. The influx of refugees would create more problems for China that is already facing territorial issues with Tibet and Xinjiang.

The rift between China and United States appear to lie in the approach both countries take towards the denuclearization of North Korea. United States approach is aggressive; it wants to use force against North Korea and is even threatening China with sanctions and the sale of arms to Taiwan. Whereas, China regards the purpose of force unproductive and wants to solve the problem with negotiations. The use of force and sanctions against North Korea and China respectively, would aggravate the situation. Firstly, if United States attacks North Korea then North Korea will respond aggressively and the nuclear war will only create casualties and loss of lives. Secondly, if United States tries to put sanctions on China, then it may be backfired as China’s status of the second biggest economy in the world and emerging superpower has got it support from different countries of the world. Hence, imposition of sanctions by the super power on emerging super power will only create chaos in the world and may be repetition of another Cold War.

One then imagines that what could be the best possible approach in such situation?

United States, China and North Korea need to come on one page and should revive Six Party Talks. The talks were discontinued by North Korea in the wake of resolution passed

by UN Security Council condemning North Korea for the launch of satellite in April 2009.

The revival of talks will foster dialogue process and will help in communicating each side’s picture clearly. This will also clear the picture of China’s approach towards North Korea as it had been unpredictable in the past; China agreed to adopt sanctions against North Korea in 2016, but 2017 has shown an increase in trade relations between the two countries. Moreover, instead of threat and sanctions, United States and China could offer economic incentives to North Korea. North Korea’s geographical location amidst strong economies such as China, Russia, Japan and United States would help its economy revive if it starts trade with these countries.

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

The Two Koreas

Considerations on the relationship between North and South Korea

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If the two Koreas reunified, as planned in 2000 with the joint declaration of June 15, we would have an unreasonable merging of two radically different political principles. South Korea has chosen to be a periphery of the American empire, which uses the US economy on the basis of its internal cycles and mature technologies that it exports by taking advantage of the low cost of manpower and of some raw materials. North Korea played the Cold War card, supported only partially

by China and Russia, which used North Korea as a block for the West and paid for said North Korea's commitment with political stability and some economic aid.

The Cold War, however, is really over and this holds true both for North and for South Korea. We need to think of new worlds and new “superconcept rules”, just to quote Wittgenstein.

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Traditionally, unification is conceived as a Confederation, as supported by South Korea, or as a Federation with wide autonomy for both areas, as always supported by North Korea. The two inter-Korean meetings held in 2000 and in 2007 - with the first one that even made the South Korean President be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his Sunshine Policy - recorded excellent economic results (including the free trade area of Kaesong and the tourist area of Mount Gumgang), but no effective political results.

Indeed, in November 2010, the North Korean Minister for Reunification officially dismissed the Sunshine Policy as a failure. This always happens when politicians are only interested in conveying a good "image". However, let us better analyzing the reunification policies which are currently being proposed, also by authoritative US think tanks.

The excessive psychologism - the flaw Husserl saw in the European philosophy of his time - still characterizes the North American analysis of strategic phenomena in Asia and the Middle East Hence, both in North and in South Korea, the phenomenology of elites is often quite simplified and devoid of the necessary nuances.

The "states of mind" or the subjective tendencies of the real members of the two countries’ ruling classes are not so relevant as they may appear at first sight. “Les faits ont la tête dure” (Common sense is not so common) - just to quote Voltaire - and elites do not live on psychology, but enjoy verifiable and significant privileges that someone has to pay anyway.

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Meanwhile, the Constitution establishing the North Korean Workers' Party repeats still today that conquering South Korea militarily is the primary strategic (and economic) goal of the North Korean regime - not to mention the fact that North Korea’s ruling class is selected with military and national criteria, while South Korea’s ruling class is more technocratic and less prone to accept the line of military confrontation.

The difference is not marginal. Pending an inter-Korean conflict, South Korea’s elites would escape to the United States - thinking of being at home - while the North Korean ones would fight their war until final victory.

Furthermore, in this Asian context, our American friends quote the example of "deBaathification" in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall. Never was an example more dangerous for the theses it intends to uphold.

The abolition of Baath, namely the PartyState, and the selective and loyalist mechanism of the ruling class in Syria and Iraq was, on the contrary, a real strategic folly which voided Iraq and certainly made it viable - just to use the typical terminology of US strategic analysis - not to the bipartite “democracy” which is so fashionable in the Anglo-Saxon world, but rather to the Iranian regime and later to the Sunni sword jihad of Daesh.

This means also viable to the division of the areas of influence in a country like Iraq, having a Shiite majority and a Sunni area which, through the jihad, has now become mass of geopolitical manoeuvre for the Gulf powers.

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Every manipulation of the historical heritage of peoples and Nations is bound to lead to their fragmentation into new areas of influence, which have often not even been foreseen by the crazy "social engineers" who believe - as happened to the first US Governor of Baghdad - they can use the same laws in force in Boston to regulate road traffic in the Iraqi capital city.

Just think of Macedonia’s current situation and the not-so-secret plan to achieve a Great Islamized Albania, capable of standing up to the Slavic and, hence, pro-Russian Serbia.

Turkey, too, has got its hands on Iraq - obviously with a view to settling the Kurdish issue. Furthermore it seems to flout any "line" worked out within NATO, of which Turkey is a member.

How? The North Korean system based on songbun, namely the traditional caste system, is further divided into 51 subgroups.

From the Balkans’ wars - waged to avoid the globalization of Russian oil and gas towards Europe and the Mediterranean region - to the massive use of the Afghan jihad to destabilize and disrupt the post-Yugoslav political system, to the stable destabilization - if I may use this oxymoron - of the Maghreb region with the silly "Arab Springs" to be completed with the end of Syria and its ethnic and religious splitting up, it seems that the current US global strategy is designed to disrupting every geopolitical region. Nevertheless if all countries become "liquid" and viable, every political contagion will tend to spread and worsen.

Reverting to the US line in this Korean region, the idea is that of a reunification creating a favourable interest for the North Korean ruling classes.

Obviously, as everywhere, the main criterion is loyalty to the regime - hence I do not see how the North Korean elite can accept a soft reunification, in which North Korea will inevitably lose a share of power to preserve hegemony - although with fewer elitist “privileges” - in a possible peaceful reunification with South Korea.

According to the most reliable calculations, approximately 4.4 million North Koreans can be part of the local "ruling class", but - as those who are acquainted with Pareto’s and Veblen’s theories know all too well - all elite classes are intrinsically factionist and must have strong symbolic and material incentives to back the regime that supports them.

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Quite the reverse. It would be necessary to support a population - about 50% of North Korean inhabitants - who is well below the typical economic standards of South Korea's working class.

Psychology and the democratic myth are not enough. Suffice to recall the phenomenon of Ostalgie, namely the nostalgia felt by many German citizens and voters for aspects of life in East Germany after reunification - NostAlgie for permanent and regular jobs, for the lack of unemployment, for the authoritarian but effective Welfare of the old Sociality Unity Party of Germany (SED). Money, however, never pays for the symbol - hence intangible incentives must always be greater than the tangible ones.

There is also talk about a selective amnesty for North Korea’s defectors.

Why? How could South Korea support this new share of frustrated ruling classes coming from Pyongyang and finally what would be the strategic aim of this operation? We may assume that the aim would be voiding the North Korean regime from inside - but are we really sure that the South Korean ruling class can safely double its size, possibly incorporating the North Korean songbun classes that are already accustomed to unlawful transactions? Furthermore, reunification would bring no concrete benefit to South Koreans.

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According to our estimates, for the five years following reunification, this would create a public debt at least 24% higher than expected - which is already approximately 40% - in a situation of weak growth, due to the crisis and saturation of the US market and the contraction of the domestic market.

Being a client State never pays. In other words, this kind of reunification would certainly lead to the default of the South Korean government. Furthermore, currently South Korea is bearing the brunt of political uncertainty, after the impeachment of President Park Geun Hye - not to mention the already described decrease of domestic consumption, resulting from an excessive cyclical link to the US economy and the decline of exports to China.

With a 2.6% planned growth throughout 2017, South Korea certainly has not the potential to absorb or make credible its debt generated by the costs of reunification, regardless of its being an elitist or mass reunification. Even demography does not help, as the South Korean population is expected to start falling structurally next year.Certainly we must consider the North Korean manpower, but the labour force has a cost of training, obviously adding to the cost of the means of production which should guarantee jobs precisely to the North Korean workers.

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It is worth recalling that it took over twenty years to achieve homogeneous social and economic conditions between West Germany and the old German Democratic Republic (DDR) - a goal that has not been reached yet despite the Euro manipulation and the huge German investment. Moreover, at the time of Vereinigung, Germany was the third world economy and certainly not the respectable, but much smaller South Korea’s economy. And what about China? Obviously it is not interested in the Korean reunification.

In fact, if this were to happen, it would be the repetition - in the Third Millennium - of the unification of Northern and Southern Italy and, in this case, the economic and political "line" would be dictated by South Korean and not by North Korea. As can be easily imagined, China does not like this. China has every interest in freezing any geopolitical issue in Asia, by operating with peripheral States - as in the Roman legend of the Horatii and Curiatii - by dividing and later linking them with bilateral agreements. In Asia, China wants to avoid everything may lead to the creation of a new strategic bloc capable of dictating certain conditions to its geoeconomic and military system.Considering that South Korea is always a US client State, China would regard reunification as an undesirable increase of the North American potential in the safety buffer zone of its Eastern and Southern coasts.

In many ways, however, not even the United States would benefit from the Korean reunification.While there is no longer such a reason to keep large troops in South Korea, the correlation of US interests is inevitably expected to change, thus leaving the Korean Peninsula uncovered while the United States is supposed to redeploy its Armed Forces in the Pacific, around the South China Sea and in the Japanese safety buffer zone. Currently neither China nor Japan appreciate this new scenario of the American military power in Asia.

If the United States maintained a large amount of troops in the new reunified Korea, everybody would regard this as only having the aim of opposing China.Not even Japan would benefit from a German-style reunification between the two Koreas. Both South Korea and, potentially, even North Korea, are now global competitors of Japan - not to mention the strategic bloc represented for the country by an imperial "co-prosperity area" that a reunited Korea would undermine.

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There is no Japanese geopolitics not targeted to the whole Southeast Asia - it is not possible otherwise. And this holds true both for the Empire - the Dai Nihon about which Haushofer spoke in the 20th century - and for the Japan regionalized by the United States.

The Asian Bank for European Infrastructure and the European financial institutions should take immediate action - and Italy is present in the Bank of Asia. In a new type of nuclear negotiations, we should also rethink the civilian potential of North Korea’s nuclear system for it to sell energy to its neighbours.

Unlike Italy, Japan was defeated in World War II, but it is still able to think big and really understand geopolitical issues without demonizing its past and worshiping its old enemy.

Hence, what can be done? It is simple.

Obviously the resumption of the Six Party Talks should be based on a reconstruction of North Korean free trade areas and on an effective relationship with Russia and China, which should become the new guarantors of the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear and economic balance.

Reopen the Six Party Talks circle, as well as fund specific projects in North Korea and help its people with humanitarian aid, but above all, with a peaceful reindustrialization policy going towards Russia, China, the EU and, possibly, also the United States.

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DR. ARSHAD M. KHAN

Is It war?

The crazy quilt of U.S. and North Korea posturing

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In a continuation of the theater of the absurd, all 100 U.S. senators were driven to the White House to listen to a top-secret intelligence briefing on North Korea. North Korea now has missiles capable of reaching Hawaii and will soon be able to extend its reach to California. As they also have nuclear weapons, putting two and two together should not be diďŹƒcult, but we are told it will take time to reduce their size to fit missiles. Yet India and Pakistan did it years ago -- the latter also has the even smaller tactical battlefield warheads.

It is inconceivable the North Koreans did not work on such practicalities simultaneously. The crucial element has always been producing the fissionable material.

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Who stands to gain was never an issue; neither was waiting for any kind of investigation. No one questioned why ... why would he do this when he is not short of conventional bombs?

As always the illogical logic of propaganda aimed at the American people prevails: first the scare of a 'mad' Kim Jong-un coming at them with missiles and then the 'but' of a window of opportunity for military action before doom. It is all a reminder of 'the smoking gun being a mushroom cloud' before the catastrophe of the Iraq war.

So is it all bluff directed at North Koreans for the South Koreans will never accept the military option? They have also been embroiled in a leadership crisis following a political scandal, culminating in first the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and then her removal from office on March 10, 2017.

A fresh election is scheduled for May 9.

To the extent our mainstream press has become an unquestioning cheerleader for conflict, one cannot expect any restraining influence. Its shocking behavior in the recent Syrian sarin gas attack is illustrative. The narrative of Assad the enemy holds that any abominable incident is automatically ascribed to him -- no questions asked. Within hours of the attack everyone was blaming Assad. Cui bono?

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Critical thinking from the American public is almost impossible when half do not know where Syria is. Gary Johnson, the Libertarian Party candidate for President in the last election, had an embarrassing moment last September when asked about Aleppo. His response: "And what is Aleppo?" That was indeed revelatory for Gary Johnson is a noted politician, and was the governor of New Mexico from 1995-2003. Like the president he too is a businessman and author. It all shows that when you live in the most powerful country on earth little countries are off the radar, forgotten in the midst of domestic (often) pocketbook issues.

It is purportedly the job of the news media to educate the public, a job at which they have clearly failed.

Meanwhile, North Korea staged one of the largest live fire artillery drills to mark its military founding day, as a U.S. missile submarine docked in the South. The point clearly to drill home Seoul's vulnerability.Pressure is being put on China to bring the North to heel by, say, using an oil embargo as a tool.

Yet China, which is urging restraint by all sides, is unhappy with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system being installed in South Korea.

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It's Defense Ministry also announced live fire drills and new weapons tests in response, and complained the system 'damages the regional strategic balance and stability.' Angering China to secure help against North Korea defies logic.

Stirring the pot further is Moon Jae-in, the South Korean opposition leader now ahead in the polls for the May 9th election. He has vowed to review the U.S. agreement with South Korea allowing the THAAD installation. In the meantime, villagers around the site continue their protests.

So, is the U.S. about to go to full-scale war with North Korea? Not in a month of Sundays! But such is the crazy quilt of posturing.

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

The missile issue in norTh Korea

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On April 15 last, North Korea celebrated the 105th birth anniversary of Kim-Il-Sung, the "Eternal Leader" and founder of the new republic of North Korea."The Day of the Sun" was the opportunity to remember the Eternal Leader, who has always been compared to this bright star, but it was above all the optimum time for a missile test. The launch was carried out in the morning of April 16, just a day after the huge military parade in Pyongyang and, particularly, few hours before US Vice-President Mike Pence was due to arrive in Seoul, South Korea, at the start of a 10-day trip to Asia.

The medium-range KN-15 missile targeted to the Sea of Japan was launched at around 7:18 a.m.

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The missile blew up almost immediately, but the political fact - also represented by the massive show of strength, displaying a bevy of new missiles and launchers during the giant military parade the day before - is that, as stated by the North Korean Deputy-Foreign Minister, Han Song-Ryol, "there will be ever more missile tests on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis."

We do not know whether the fall of the missile carrier was caused by a fault of the North Korean planning or by a US cyber-warfare action, as many Western sources maintained.

The Deputy Minister also added that any further US pressure would be interpreted as an act of war and as an opportunity for final bilateral confrontation between North Korea and the United States.

Shortly before the statement made by the North Korean Deputy-Minister, while speaking from South Korea, Mike Pence had said that the "the era of strategic patience" of the United States vis-à-vis Kim Jong-Un’s regime was over. The matter here is not about anger or patience. The issue is eminently geopolitical and - never as in these cases - multilateral.In the days before the "Day of the Sun", the US President had sent a naval squadron to the Korean peninsula, made up of the 97,000 ton USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, accompanied by a missile cruiser, the Lake Champlain, and two destroyers, the Wayne Meyer and the Michael Murphy.The geopolitical and military significance is clear: the United States penetrates into an area in which North Korea can easily launch missiles or anyway carry out military actions.

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And, if it did so, the North American naval squadron would be able to launch a counterforce strike of considerable importance and accuracy. An aircraft carrier, however, has scarce offensive potential, because its aircraft are still vulnerable to the strikes of the North Korean military forces, while USSouth Korean joint operations have always favoured a scenario of ground attack from the coast.

The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier will perform exercises with the Australian forces and, in the near future, with the Japanese marines. The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, however, is a US strong sign of strength that must not be overlooked: it carries 60 aircraft and 5,000 marines but, while it is true that the naval group can hit several strategic centers in North Korea, it is equally true that the North Korean response must be taken into account and it will certainly not be negligible.

However, as already said, the US-North Korea confrontation can never be interpreted in bilateral terms. The issue at stake is control over the China Sea and Southeast Asia - regions that no major Asian nation wants to leave only in US hands and the United States would be very naive to interpret the tension with North Korea as a "gunfight at the O.K. Corral".China, the only power having a full vision of the balance of power in the region, has recently asked the United States to immediately open direct diplomatic negotiations with North Korea.Furthermore China has not changed its relationship with North Korea since the last contact between Trump and President Xi Jinping.

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However, as some US Defense officers maintain, the issue does not lie in forcing North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile program, considering that weapons "cannot be disinvented" In a new US strategic horizon, the issue would rather lie in dissuading North Korea by granting some kind of geoeconomic asset, thus also gaining support from the major countries of the region.

Nor the issue at stake is only the survival of the North Korean regime, which would probably remain stable, even after an enemy nuclear strike. Moreover, are we really interested in a regime change in North Korea? Is it not enough to have experienced the disasters of the "Arab springs" or Syria? Regimes have always changed on their own.

Indeed, the real issue is the strategic relationship between China, the Russian Federation, Iran and, of course, North Korea. Currently Russia is the most linked to North Korea, as often reported by the agencies of the North Korean regime. Even over the last few months the Kremlin has strongly reduced the North Korean economic crisis and it is expanding the Hasan-Rajin railway network between the two countries - a project from which South Korea withdrew in March 2016.At energy level, Russia supports North Korea also during the recurrent crises of commercial relations between China and North Korea, with oil and gas transfers from Siberia to Rajin, starting from Vladivostok.The Russian oil has often been processed in North Korean plants and it has brought hard currency to North Korea, as well as particularly enabling it to resell to China precisely the Russian oil by-products.

At least 10,000 North Korean workers have already been posted to Russia, with a view to developing the Siberian infrastructure. In this case, the Russian strategic idea is to become a strategic partner both for South Korea and North Korea, thus playing a unique role between the two countries that no naïve naval group can play in the long run. Moreover, Russia blocks any illegal migration between North Korea and its territory, thus ensuring to Kim Jong-un strong demographic stability, which is essential for the country.

Paradoxically, another crucial fact for relations between Russia and North Korea is the presence, in South Korea, of the US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense) antiballistic missile system, which is seen by Russia both as an incentive for North Korea to continue the missile program and as a real threat to the Russian-Korean relations in the North of the Peninsula.For China, the relationship with the North Korean regime is even more complex. China is linked to North Korea by the Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961 and China imports and exports approximately three-quarters of North Korea’s production.

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Hence China does not seek the collapse of Kim Jong-un’s regime because, obviously, it does not want a flood of migrants on its borders, nor a peninsular reunification led by South Korea, which would mean thousands of US soldiers close to its national territory.

Instead of sending military ships, President Donald J. Trump would do well to discuss with Russia and China the future of North Korea, by reconciling all interests: the interest of Japan and South Korea, which do not want a strategic threat on their borders, as well as the interest of Russia and China, which have a geoeconomic interest and want a friendly country directed towards the South China Sea. As Napoleon used to say, it is geography which guides and directs military strategy. Gunboat diplomacy is also a relic of the nineteenth century or of the time when the United States forcibly opened new markets for their goods, as when Commodore Perry opened Japan to international trade in 1853.

Nevertheless also China supports and votes the resolutions on North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities and expands its relations with South Korea, thus playing a broker role that could be essential in the future. As is the case with the Russian Federation.

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North Korea, however, has never made concessions to its big neighbouring country, namely China. In 2006, for example, it informed China of its nuclear test only twenty minutes in advance and so far there has been no official meeting between Kim Jongun and Xi Jinping. China, inter alia, does not want a North Korea increasingly dependent on foreign aid, while international sanctions block the North Korean-Chinese trade despite the increase of North Korea’s production.

Hence a North Korean economic growth to absorb Chinese exports would be ideal for the CPC leaders, who have always set their relations with Pyongyang in view of making the two economies homogeneous. This is only part of North Korean goals, since the country wants integration in the Asian coastal economic context without strategic "godfathers".

The relationship between North Korea and Iran is even more complex. Iran has always used the North Korean companies for acquiring the materials subject to sanctions, especially in the military sphere. For no reason Iran will leave North Korea to its fate, while the economic relations between Iran and South Korea strengthen significantly as time goes by.

Certainly, still today the flow of funds from the Shiite theocracy to the atheist kingdom of the Korean Peninsula is focused on missile and nuclear technologies, but Iran exports large oil quantities also to South Korea.

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Nevertheless, reverting to the military parade of April 15 last, it is worth recalling it had begun with an unusual climax of accusations between the United States and North Korea. And exactly on April 11, North Korean leaders had declared that their country was ready to respond with a nuclear strike to any US conventional or non-conventional threat. And, as it has been happening for years, China tries to pour water on the fire of tensions between North Korea and the United States.

North Korea, inter alia, has an army of approximately one million people and seven million reservists, with a thousand ballistic missiles including six hundred SCUD B, C or D missiles and four hundred Nodong missiles - an adapted version of Scud missiles - while it is supposed to have some dozens of Musudan Taepodong missiles, which are the most suitable for an extra-continental attack. North Korea has 2,100 military vehicles, 4,000 tanks, 600 warplanes, 72 submarines and three frigates. The ready-made nuclear warheads are supposed to be twenty, with 5,000 tons of nerve agent available.For cyberwarfare, in the now famous "Unit 121", North Korea has 1,800 hackers, probably trained by China, Russia and Iran.

Hence, instead of sending the current version of Commodore Perry, the United States could agree with China and Russia to define, in North Korea, an economic system open for special economic zones in Pyongyang. Some work well, some others worse, but this is the main card to play so as to pool eorts between the United States, China and Russia in relation to North Korea. Moreover, it would be reasonable to hold a new round of negotiations, quite dierent from the Six-Party Talks which have already taken place. As is well-known, they were discontinued in 2009 following the dispute on the check and verification criteria and some missile launches by North Korea.

Now, on the one hand, it would be necessary to create such a linkage between the military structure and economy, in North Korea, as to ensure the stability of its political system and, on the other, to support the economy in exchange for verifiable and rational reductions of its nuclear apparatus.

But can this be the line of an America like the current one?

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G I A N C A R l O E l I A VA l O R I

The NorTh KoreaN sTraTegic issue

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Currently North Korea has turned from a regional threat into an unpredictable global strategic player. This implies that, in the future, we will need to reasonably deal with a Korean power which, however, is anything but irrational in its global choices.

Portraying Kim Jong Un’s Korea as a Shangri-La led by an unreliable man is not the truth and does not facilitate the solution of the Korean problem, both in North and South Korea.The fissile material now held

by North Korea can be used to build six to thirty nuclear weapons, but what is the North Korean strategy in the use of this atomic arsenal, which is also growing steadily at a yearly pace of 18%, according to the latest data?

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According to experts, four reasons are used

by North Korea to maintain and manage an autonomous nuclear threat which, from a regional area, has a strike range capable of hitting the United States and hence Europe.

The first one is the use of nuclear weapons

by North Korea with a view to obtaining international concessions at diplomatic or more directly political levels. What concessions?

Certainly the first would be an internationally recognized geopolitical status, perhaps in a stable correlation with South Korea. A status which would enable North Korea to expand its political and economic area in the whole South-East Asia, possibly in connection with the old regional alliances: maybe even the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), dissolved in 1977, the old " zoo of paper tigers ", as a British diplomat defined it - a zoo which, however, might be rebuilt around the two Koreas.

Currently a network of credible and multilateral alliances must be recreated so as to shut in and stabilize the North Korean strategic system, thus protecting South Korea and ensuring to North Korea the stability of its regime. Or a good solution could also be the new alliance recently proposed by China for Central Asia, with Pakistan, China, Afghanistan and Tajikistan: a grouping created to counteract the loss of Russian rayonnement in the region, which could be extended to the coasts of North and South Korea so as to incorporate them within a context of reasonable and, above all, credible checks and balances.

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Through Xi Jinping, China has warned the Asian regional powers against building new military alliances, proposed over the last few years especially by the United States. Nevertheless China, with its recent Conference on Interaction and Conference Building Measures in Asia (CICA), has a primary interest in neutralizing and strategically surrounding the offers of military alliance that US President Obama has proposed to Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam.

The tensions that China is facing in Eastern Asian seas and in the regional ones of Vietnam and Myanmar are such as to force it to create external (and independent) alliances compared to the old Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which plays a specifically terrestrial role. North Korea could even adhere to the SCO and hence China would certainly control, along with the Russian Federation, the North Korean missile and nuclear potential; or it could adhere to a new tripartite alliance, with Russia and China, where the North Korean geopolitics should dissolve in a wider and well-controlled context.

With a view to preventing the North Korean escalation from going on, it is important to include North Korea in a strategic framework capable of using its power projection and, in particular, securing the borders and stability of the North Korean regime.Without these credible assurances, North Korea will have a vested interest in managing its role as international free rider, which maximizes the political effects of its nuclear tests and hence makes an agreement with it more difficult and expensive for the other international players.

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It is a way to "raise the price" of its collaboration and to focus worldwide interest on its country. Not to mention the border with South Korea. For the North Korean leadership, the Korean Demilitarized Zone around the 38th parallel is a constant threat and the last, hateful, relic of the Cold War. The armistice of July 27, 1953 froze a strategic factor which, today, has no longer international motivations. The issue does no longer lie for the United States in covering up their presence in Japan and the Pacific. There is no longer need to stop the Soviet expansion into the Pacific on the edge of China.

Today everything has changed, and we must invent new political mechanisms to put an end to the Cold War phase in the Korean peninsula, which is no longer the Russian strategic "tooth" in the South China Sea, as was the case when the link between the USSR and Maoism became problematic. Hence either an international committee is established for defining a definitive border between the two Koreas, or North Korea is continued to be granted the role of global strategic free rider - a role that North Korea can no longer play with increasing doses of military power and nuclear threat, otherwise it would no longer be credible.

This is certainly not the panacea for North Korea’s economy. Hence, thanks to a global and innovative strategic vision, we must break the North Korean military spiral which, paradoxically, is directly proportional to its domestic economic crisis. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), established on the basis of the 1953 armistice, has now a mere role of communication between the two Koreas, so as to establish reliable relations between them.

Nevertheless, it is not certainly a body which can define a credible geopolitical project - this is not its purpose. The second of the four aims of the North Korean nuclear build-up is to internationalize the crisis of the Korean peninsula (and of the region) so as to lead to the US or Chinese mediation. Financial integration between (South) Korea and China - the free trade agreement between the two countries signed last year - is regarded as a threat by North Korea.

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Actually North Korea is not entirely wrong: the above stated agreement envisages the creation in Shanghai of a stock market of securities directly traded in the two currencies, namely the won and the renminbi. It also envisages that the South Korean government may issue bonds and securities of its own sovereign debt directly in denominated in the Chinese currency - securities which can be later sold on the large Chinese financial market. Therefore we can imagine a way to internationalize the North Korean sovereign debt on the Chinese or Russian markets, so as to stabilize the North Korean economy, thus making the Chinese and Russian strategic assurances stop the North Korean nuclear race.

A new Treaty between North Korea, South Korea - which is experiencing a period of financial deleveraging of foreign investors, or a capital flight which is also a form of economic war - the United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and, inevitably, the now useless European Union. This group of countries should also be joined by Japan and the Indian Federation.

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This Committee should establish: a) the internationally recognized border between the two Koreas, thus explicitly putting an end to the alleged hegemony claimed by both countries over the entire Korean peninsula; b) a joint North and South Korean Committee for economic development; c) a military committee supervising the North Korean military nuclear development, with the possibility for Russia - as was the case with Iran - to manage part of the fissile material; d) an international agreement for managing the North Korean nuclear material, which would be reached in the region by Russia and China.

Obviously with the guarantee of the North Korean national sovereignty. For international analysts, a third reason for creating and expanding the North Korean nuclear arsenal would be the response to possible military attacks threatening the existence of the North Korean Party and State.

This is still a commitment of the Conference we propose, which should explicitly deny any political and military thereat against the North Korean regime, by gradually accepting it into the mainstream of international alliances and organizations.

A normalization which is good for everyone: for the United States, which will save on the deployment of their forces in the Asian region; for China, which will rebuild a preferential relationship with North Korea; for Russia, which could have an interest in developing economic and strategic relations with North Korea .

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For Russia, which sets great store by trade with South Korea, the security of the North-Asian system must be ensured by a wide network of multilateral partnerships in various sectors: energy security, nuclear energy, transport safety, food safety and, finally, a multilateral guarantee on information security.

This is the right basis to start.

Finally, the fourth reason analyzed by experts to justify the North Korean significant nuclear build up is to oset, with nuclear weapons, the inevitable structural and conventional weakness of North Korea in relation to the United States and South Korea, two powers which, at various levels, are far superior to North Korea in terms of updating and quantity of their conventional forces.

We could even imagine a series of confidence building measures, managed by the Conference we have proposed, designed to simultaneously reduce the North and South Korean military potential and, hence, reshape the US strategy throughout the Pacific region in relation to North Korea. This can be done if there is the political will and the eective presence of Russia and China. It is worth trying.

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